ABESAMIS, DAN RUNILLE M.

Basco et. al. v. PAGCOR (G.R. no. 91649)

FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and
four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional
grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional
provision on local autonomy.
Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
HELD:
PAGCORs charter is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. Section 5, Article 10 of the
1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create
and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore,
has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.

ABESAMIS, DAN RUNILLE M.

Navarro et. al. v. Ermita (G.R. no. 180050 )
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte.
It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land
area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to
this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
HELD:
YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They
compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an
exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to
extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC
(provision relating to creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus
correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the
equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization
as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.

ABESAMIS, DAN RUNILLE M.

League of the Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (G.R. nos. 176951, 177499, 178056)
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed
on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March
to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.
ISSUE:
Does the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution?
HELD:
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of
a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

CABARON, CAREL MAE L.

Sema vs. COMELEC (G.R. no. 177597)
Facts:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, the COMELEC, in its Resolution No. 7845 dated
March 29, 2007, initially stated that the 1st district is composed only of Cotabato City because of
the enactment of MMA 201. But it later amended this, in its Resolution No. 7902 dated May 10,
2007, stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections,
the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City this is also
while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative
district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because
her rival Dilangalen was from there and Dilangalen was winning in fact he won). She contended
that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (Shariff Kabunsuan), that province
automatically gains legislative representation and since Shariff Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato
City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the House of Representatives.

Issues:
1) Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.
2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
Rulings:
1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is unconstitutional.
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with

the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. And third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can
create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power
to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the
Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another
matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative
district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. But this can never be legally
possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in the Congress.

2)

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

The Court holds that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

CABARON, CAREL MAE L.

Latasa vs. COMELEC (G.R. no. 154829)
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
in
the
elections
of
1992,
1995,
and
1998. During
petitioners
third
term,
the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A
plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known
as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of
petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX
of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new
City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed
that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and
is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in
the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged
therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run
as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution cancelling
respondents certificate of candidacy for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001, which remained
unacted upon until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent
Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City
Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming
Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections. Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa
was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected
mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of
the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
Ruling:
Petitioner Latasa is not eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newlycreated City of Digos.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii)
a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b)
The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not apply where
the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c)
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there
is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit
when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes
affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.

As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion
of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such
creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a)
Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for
all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b)
Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c)
Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of theMunicipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes
and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until
such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have
already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, the Court notes that the delineation of the
metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were
held for the new cityofficials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years.
The Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon this Court
involving the same Constitutional provision.

In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who became the
mayor by operation of law and who served the remainder of the mayors term should be
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under the
Constitution. Private respondent in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death
of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was,
thereafter, elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when private respondent
occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for the remainder of the
term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional provision. The term served must be one for which [the official concerned] was
elected.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the
position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local government unit. The nature of the
responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vicemayor does not hold office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present
case, petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, continued to
hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were changes in the
political and economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no substantial change
occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as
mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections,
won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and
filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure of
elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and
petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections, petitioner
therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on
the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that
petitioner therein cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and that said petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the
May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by
reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? The Court believes that he did
involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal
mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for
even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from
acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his
duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

CABARON, CAREL MAE L.

Samson vs. Aguirre (G.R. no. 133076)
Facts:
On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535,
creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson,
incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation
of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches,
and the Department of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said
plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, through a motion.
Issues:
1) Whether or not R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local
Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income,
population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon
City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to
furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and
2) Whether or not R.A. No. 8535 will in effect amend the Constitution.
Rulings:
1)
R.A. No. 8535 did not fail to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government
Code.
The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11:

ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by
DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO;
or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be
borne by the petitioners.
Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance with the foregoing
requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in particular public hearings held by
the Senate Committee on Local Government. However, the court notes that the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Its principal
sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of Quezon City.
Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were
submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this
regard. Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites
therefor.
Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local
Government were resource persons from the different government offices like National Statistics
Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department of
Budget and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself. The representative from the
Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average annual income of the 13
barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local
Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least
P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years. The representative from the NSO
estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches
to be around 347,310. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing
Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and
population or land area. Other than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the
requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to
income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
Also, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public
hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written certifications. Note that under
the Implementing Rules, written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the
creation of a city, to be submitted by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the
form of a resolution. Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if

only to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. The Court
is thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these requirements were met
appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative act.
Petitioner then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the
proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code:
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and
Facilities. (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units
shall specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate
service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical
centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities,
drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant
considerations shall be taken into account.
Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide for a seat of
government. However, this omission is not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner
makes it to be. The Court agrees with respondents that under Section 12 of the Local
Government Code, which applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of
R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its
creation. For said Code already provides as follows:
SECTION 12. Government Centers. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall
endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of
the National Government, local government units, or government-owned or
controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a
center, the local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing
facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the
government center as contemplated under this Section. The National Government,
local government unit or government-owned or controlled corporation concerned
shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the
government center.
While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very well also be
the seat of government, from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.
With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of the City of
Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete evidence on this point. Quezon City
Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local
Government, and made no mention of anything concerning such adverse effects. As chief
executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the first person to protest any development
that might prove detrimental to Quezon City.
2)
R.A. No. 8535 will not in effect amend the Constitution. The Court held that the proposed
creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the
Constitution, contrary to petitioners contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution
merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts
in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17
cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or
appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

DY, JAMES MYCHALL

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr. (G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996)
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to
Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio
Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical
dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
against the Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its
answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the
Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary
of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It
held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the parties was void since
the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power
being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134.
The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC
of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its
Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and
Management, and the Executive Secretary.
Issues:

1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim

2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and
statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution
No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as basis for
adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations
is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by
executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation where
its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within
5 years from the act complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16
years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it
was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to
an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez
itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban since it states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the creation of
municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution
it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein
mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios. The reason for this is that
the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is
controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining
the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the barangays in
question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect
of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial Board declaring certain barrios
part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of
the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez
as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of
the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the Decision
and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the
governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs.
118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).

Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the start of the
proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in
Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of
a court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide
the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.

DY, JAMES MYCHALL

Torralba et. al. vs Municipality of Sibagat (147 SCRA 390)

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of
Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973
Constitution:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of
any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date
BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any criteria when the
Municipality was created.
The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was
enacted, the code was not yet in existence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 56 is valid.

HELD:
Yes, The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3,
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial
and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no
requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a

municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude
the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that
once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units
should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such
Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was
conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the
new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The
officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing
their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid
exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
(Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat, G.R. No. 59180. Jan. 29, 1987 147 SCRA 390)

DY, JAMES MYCHALL

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR. (G.R. No. 103702
December 6, 1994)

FACTS:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and
2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala
along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the
Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth
class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2
The executive order added that (t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as
proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition
sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of
the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since
the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation
had been void ab initio.

ISSUE:
W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August
1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of
San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in
1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence
for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated.
The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental
acts all pointed to the States recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174
classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the
income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the
effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.

QUIMZON, LORJEZZA

PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569)

FACTS:

From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,
or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC
has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected
and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the
proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the
new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is
that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD:
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.

In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not
administrative.

QUIMZON, LORJEZZA
CAMID vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (GR No. 161414)
FACTS:
The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually
insisted by some as alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared
void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that
Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in
Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec.68
of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370,
and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of
the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner
represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has
metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to
handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no
person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of
Andong since 1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a
regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official
database as [an] existing regular municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified
by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique status of the
Municipality of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners
allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-blown municipality.
DECISION:
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by
the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by
instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative
gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at
least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Petitioners
seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.

The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided
before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong
warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme
Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase
ab initio means from the beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather
expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as
overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong
does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet
limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before
this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the
LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by
the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities
which had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the
legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm
legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand,
the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through specific
legislative enactments.

QUIMZON, LORJEZZA
MENENDILLA vs ONANDIA (5 SCRA 569)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mendenilla was appointed Chief of Police of the then Mun. of Legaspi by the Municipal
Mayor. The appointment was extended to him, pursuant to the law then existing and applicable
under the Municipal Law embodied in the Revised Administrative Code which is vested in the
Municipal Mayor. However, Republic Act No. 2234, otherwise known as the charter of the City of
Legaspi, took effect, which law, converted the former Municipality into the City of Legaspi. One of
the provisions of said law is that the Chief of Police shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. On March 15, 1960,
respondent Jose Manuel Onandia was nominated Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi, by the
President, Congress then being in session. On March 18, 1960, the designation of the petitioner
as Acting Chief of Police was terminated by the President, forthwith, the Executive Secretary sent
the petitioner a notice of termination, by means of a telegram and letter (Exhibits "2" and "3",
respectively). On the same date March 18, 1960, the respondent was designated by the
President as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi, vice the petitioner (Exhibit "1"). He took
his oath of office, and assumed the duties of the position on the same date.
On March 24, 1960, the petitioner filed the present petition for quo warranto, when he was still
supposed to be on official leave of absence. Upon representation of the petitioner, it is stated in
the stipulation of facts that he received the letter and telegram, requesting him to turn over the
office to the respondent, on March 25, 1960. This could not be true, for the reason that he could
not have filed his petition for quo warranto on March 24, 1960, one day before his alleged
receipt. As a matter of fact, the memorandum for the petitioner corrects this, and admits that the
petitioner received such advice on March 24, 1960.
ISSUE:
What legal effect had the conversion of Legaspi into a city on the municipal offices then existing?
DECISION:
With the creation of the City of Legaspi on said date, the legal personality of the Municipality of
Legaspi was extinguished, and the city, which superseded the municipality came into being as a
new legal entity or municipal corporation. The consequent effect of said dissolution, was the
abolition of all municipal offices then existing under the superseded municipality, including that
held by petitioner, save those excepted in the charter itself. Petitioner's appointment of June 21,
1954 by the then municipal mayor of the municipality of Legaspi, therefore, ceased to have legal
force and effect.
In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the superseding of the old charter by the new, has
the effect of abolishing the offices under the old charter. The general rule is, that the repeal of a
charter destroys all offices under it, and puts an end to the functions of the incumbents.
The only offices expressly excepted from said abolitions were those mentioned in Section 96,
Article XVII of the charter, which reads:

SEC. 96. Change of Government. The incumbent Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the
Municipal Board shall continue in office as the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the
Municipal Board of the City, respectively, until the expiration of their present terms of
office.
Applying the principle of "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in statutory construction, all
municipal offices including that held by petitioner, in the then municipality of Legaspi not
included in the above-excepted offices were deemed abolished.

RIPARIP, DELMER
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. No. 135927 June 26,
2000)
Facts:
A petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by herein private respondents. Among the precincts
sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan.
The incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner,
together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23)
barangays and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed
an "Answer in Opposition".
The COMELEC issued an Order to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost
barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur. The ocular inspection conducted on the
alleged ghost precincts and it appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is
a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This
obviously mean that no single human being could possibly reside in these two structures.
The COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct."
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of COMELEC in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct
was valid.
Ruling:
The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the
voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter.The Court finds that the
COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or
private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there
were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters.

RIPARIP, DELMER
SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO (G.R. No. L-22766 August 30,
1968)
Facts:
Congress amended the Public Service Act, one of the changes introduced doing away with the
requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service
Commission for "public services owned or operated by government entities or governmentowned or controlled corporations," but at the same time affirming its power of regulation which
while exempting public services owned or operated by any instrumentality of the government or
any government-owned or controlled corporations from its supervision, jurisdiction and control
stops short of including "the fixing of rates."
Petitioner Surigao Electric Co., Inc., a legislative franchise holder to whom the rights and
privileges of the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred, challenge the validity
of the order of respondent Public Service Commission wherein it held that it had "no other
alternative but to approve as the tentative schedule of rates submitted by the applicant," the
other respondent herein, the Municipality of Surigao.
Issue:
Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electric
plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public
convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission."
Ruling:
A municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 2677, may promote community
welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services, without the need of a certificate of public
convenience.
"A municipal government or a municipal corporation such as the Municipality of Surigao is a
government entity recognized, supported and utilized by the National Government as a part of
its government machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as an
extension of the national government and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter; and by
express provisions of Section 14(e) of Act 2677, an instrumentality of the national government is

exempted from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission except with respect to the fixing
of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a) of Act 2677."

RIPARIP, DELMER
CITY OF MANILA and EVANGELINE SUVA vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989)
Facts:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo was buried in the
North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June
6, 1971 until the expiry date of June 6, 2021. However, the burial record does not reflect the term
of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.
Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5 of the City Mayor of
Manila, subject lot was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only and was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation. The authorities of the North Cemetery authorized the
exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo,
Sr. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the
plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that
the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they
lovingly placed on the tomb.
Petitioners alleged that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose and
they conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental
function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and
subordinate employees.
Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of
lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto.
Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
Issue:
Whether the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.
Ruling:

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. Its powers are two fold in character-public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
The following, the Court stressed, are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and
fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also
recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
Under the foregoing considerations, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila. There is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents.
Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no
penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

ROJALES, SHEILA MAY CARTONEROS

Torio vs. Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993 1978)
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution 159 to manage the town
fiesta celebration and, thereafter, passed Resolution 182 creating the "Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee, through which a stage was constructed for the zarzuela. When the
program started that evening with some speeches, many persons went up the stage, including
onlookers. The zarzuela then began, but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla, one of the troupe members, who was at the rear of the
stage, was pinned underneath. He was taken to the hospital but died the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint for damages against the Municipality of
Malasiqui. For its part, the municipality invoked the principal defense that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation, it performs sovereign functions, and the holding of a town fiesta
was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the
negligence of any of its agents.
ISSUE:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipalitys
governmental/public function, or is it an exercise of its private/proprietary function?
HELD:
The celebration of the town fiesta by the municipality of Malasiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of
its private/proprietary function.
Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare, and they include the legislative, judicial, public, and
political. Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private, and corporate. This
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons. If the injury is

caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function, no recovery, as a rule, can
be had from the municipality, unless there is an existing statute on the matter.
Section 2282 of the Charter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives
authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta, but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta, even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical
even of the town, is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the
general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that
the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment
to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income but is nonetheless a private undertaking as distinguished from the
maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. The basic element,
however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence;
otherwise, the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no governmental or
public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

ROJALES, SHEILA MAY CARTONEROS

Osmena vs. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 110045 1994)
FACTS:
The controversy started in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo dela Cerna, who
was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center but unfortunately died in the evening of the same
day due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it
not for the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity, and incompetence of the
medical staff of the Medical Center. The dela Cerna spouses instituted a civil action for recovery
of damages impleading the City of Cebu, which operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu City
Medical Center, on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was
vicariously responsible for the latters negligence since it failed to exercise due care and
vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, to prevent them
from causing the death of Reynaldo.
The parties eventually reached a compromise agreement with a provision for the payment of
P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by the defendant City of Cebu, which agreement was authorized by
the Sanggunian and submitted to the Regional Trial Court, which rendered a judgment finding
the same to be in conformity with the law, morals, and public policy and enjoining the parties to
comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
About 11 months later, however, the Commission on Audit disallowed the financial assistance
granted to the spouses dela Cerna claiming that it is not within the powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause or even on humanitarian
grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private interests
of certain individuals only. Cebu City Mayor Tomas Osmena ascribed grave abuse of discretion to
the COA and its members in so disallowing the citys appropriation of P30,000.00 made
conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the city, pointing out that
the city would have incurred a greater financial liability if it had not worked out such an amicable
settlement.

ISSUE:
Does the City of Cebu have the authority to enter into amicable settlement of a pending litigation
filed against it?
HELD:
Yes. As a municipal corporation, the participation by the city in negotiations for an amicable
settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto are
indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil
suit in which it is involved as a party is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized by
even encouraged by law.
As a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued; it has the authority to
settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it. By
making reciprocal concessions, the parties in said civil case put an end to the action in a manner
acceptable to all of them. The city thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume
heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and
management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary
(as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held
liable ex contractu or ex delito for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary, or
business functions. It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by and
embodied in the judgment of the Court, which pronounced it to be in conformity with the law,
morals, and public policy, and enjoined the parties to comply strictly with the terms and
conditions thereof. This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties,
including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as above stressed. There was no
reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should
have been approved as a matter of course.

ROJALES, SHEILA MAY CARTONEROS

Democrito D. Plaza II vs. Cassion, et al (G.R. No. 136809 2004)
FACTS:
Before the passage of RA 7160, the task of delivering basic social services was dispensed by the
national government through the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Upon
the promulgation of the Local Government Code, some of the functions of the DSWD were
transferred to the local government units. The City of Butuan, through its Sangguniang
Panlungsod, passed Resolution 427-92 entitled Resolution Authorizing the City Mayor Democrito
D. Plaza II to Sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of
Butuan, by virtue of which Mayor Plaza issued EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social
Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 DSWD employees headed
by Virginia Tuazon (Social Welfare Officer V) and designating her as Officer-in-Charge of the
reconstituted CSSDO. Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD
building.
Aggrieved by such development, the original composition of CSSDO headed by Carolina Cassion
(Social Welfare Office IV) refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head and refused to report at
the DSWD building, which resulted to an administrative charge against them for grave
misconduct and insubordination and to their 60-day preventive suspension. Upon expiration of
their preventive suspension, respondents informed Mayor Plaza that they are willing to return to
work but to their old office, not to the DSWD building, thereby remaining obstinate despite
repeated notice from the City Mayor. Thereafter, pursuant to Civil Service Commission

Memorandum Circular No. 38, Mayor Plaza issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls,
which order was affirmed by the CSC, holding that officers and employees who are absent for at
least 30 days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL)
and may be dropped from the service without prior notice.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of EO No. 06-92, devolving or adding to the reconstituted CSSDO 19 DSWD
employees headed by Tuazon, is valid.
HELD:
The issuance of EO No. 06-92 is valid.
Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of
personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national
government agency to local government units. Under this code, the term devolution
refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
Section 2 provides: The local chief executive shall be responsible for all
devolved functions. He may delegate such powers and functions to his duly
authorized representative whose position shall preferably not be lower than the rank
of a local government department head. In all cases of delegated authority, the local
chief executive shall, at all times, observe the principle of command responsibility.
Section 22 specifies that the positions absorbed by the LGUs from the
national government agencies shall be automatically created upon transfer of their
corresponding budgetary allocation. Devolved permanent personnel shall be
automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon
their transfer. However, pending the completion of the new organization structure and
staffing pattern, the local government executives may assign devolved personnel to
divisions/sections/units where their qualifications are best suited or appropriate.
As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved
personnel and designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a
regular head, as was done by the mayor here.

TANCINCO, PRECIOUS
Malonzo vs. Zamora
FACTS:
During the incumbency of Mayor Macario Asisto Jr., the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City
passed Ordinance No. 0168 which authorized the city mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings
for the lot of Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation. For
this purpose, said ordinance appropriated the amount of 35, 997, 975, representing1 5% of the
fair market value. However, it turned out that Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and
Municipality of Malabon prompting CLT to file a special civil action for Interpleader with Prayer for
issuance if TRO.
On December 11, 1997, the Caloocan City Sangguniang Panglungsod under the stewardship of
incumbent Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo enacted Ordinance No. 0246 which amends amending the
aforementioned ordinance. An amount of P39, 352,047.75 was appropriated for this purpose. In
the meantime, the voluntary sale of the CLT property failed to push through so the city
government field a suit for eminent domain against CLT on March 23, 1998.The expropriation of

the CLT property was then declared discontinued, thus the appropriation of P50M for the
budgetary item Expropriation of properties could now be reverted for use in supplement
budget. The amount of P39,343,028.00 was then used for the immediate repair of offices and
hiring of additional personnel. Because of this, the office of the President (OP), acting on an
administrative complaint filed against Malonzo et.al., were adjudged guilty of misconduct and
meted the penalty of suspension. Malonzos refuted the decision, claiming that 1) the
interpleader filed by CLT was an unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project; thus
the amount of P39, 352,047.00 could be reverted into savings and 2) said amount was could be
denominated as Expropriation of Properties and classified under Current Operating
Expenditures. The OP countered that the amount of P39, 352,047.75was a capital outlay that
must be spent for the project it is intended for, thus under Sec. 322 of the LGC it could not be
reverted into savings for another use 2) the filling of the interpleader could not be considered as
an unavoidable discontinuance since months after the interpleader, the Caloocan City
government even filed an expropriation case for the CLT property 3) The Sangguniang
Panlungsod, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 0254 did not adopt new or updated rules of
procedure for the current year; this was shown by the hurried passage in one day of the said
ordinance and 4) the appropriation of P50M for Expropriation of Properties actually did not exist
this was merely a subterfuge by Malonzo to dip his hands into the P39, 352. 017.75 intended for
the CLT property expropriation project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President gravely abused its discretion when it found petitioners
guilty of misconduct for the reason that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, was allegedly
tainted with irregularity.
HELD:
The OPs premise, in our opinion, rests upon an erroneous appreciation of the facts on record.
The OP seems to have been confused as to the figures and amounts actually involved. A
meticulous analysis of the records would show that there is really no basis to support the OPs
contention that the amount of P39,352,047.75 was appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, S.
1998, since in truth and in fact, what was appropriated in said ordinance was the amount of
P39,343,028.00. The allocation of P39,352,047.75 is to be found in the earlier Ordinance No.
0246, S. 1997 which is a separate and distinct ordinance. This point of clarification is indeed
very critical and must be emphasized at this juncture because any further discussion would have
to depend upon the accuracy of the figures and amounts being discussed. As will be explained
below, this faulty appreciation of the facts by the OP caused it to arrive at the wrong conclusion
even if it would have correctly interpreted and applied the pertinent statutory provisions.
Section 322 of the Code upon which the OP anchored its opinion that petitioners breached a
statutory mandate provides:
SEC. 322. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.
Unexepended balances of appropriations authorized in the annual appropriations ordinance shall
revert to the unappropriated surplus of the general funds at the end of the fiscal year and shall
not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent enactment.
However,
appropriations for capital outlays shall continue and remain valid until fully spent, reverted or the
project is completed. Reversions of continuing appropriations shall not be allowed unless
obligations therefor have been fully paid or otherwise settled.
Based on the above provision, the OP reached the determination that Ordinance No. 0254, S.
1998 could not have lawfully realigned the amount of P39,352,047.75 which was previously
appropriated for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such appropriation was in
the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent, reverted; or the project for which it is earmarked is
completed.
The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of P39,352,047.75 could fall under the
definitions of continuing appropriation[26] and capital outlays,[27] considering that such amount
was not the subject of the realignment made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Rather, the
issue is whether petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which actually

realigned a position of the P50 million which was simply denominated in a general manner as
Expropriation of Properties and classified under Current Operating Expenditures in the 1998
Annual Budget of Caloocan City. Clearly, these are two distinct amounts separate from each
other. That this is the case has likewise been clarified in the pleadings and during the oral
argument where petitioners adequately explained that the P50 million was NOT appropriated for
the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but rather for expenses incidental to
expropriation such as relocation of squatters, appraissal fee, expenses for publication,
mobilization fees, and expenses for preliminary studies.[28] This position appears to us more
convincing than that of the interpretation of respondents. The appropriation of P39,352,047.75
under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997 is, we believe, still a subsisting appropriation that has never
been lumped together with other funds to arrive at the sum of P50 million allocated in the 1998
budget. To be sure, denomination of the P50 million amount as Expropriation of Properties left
much to be desired and would have been confused with the appropriation for expropriation under
Ordinance No. 0246, S, 1997, but had respondents probed deeper into the actual intention for
which said amount was allocated, then they would have reached an accurate characterization of
the P50 million.
Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that it is the P50 million which is now being realigned, the
next logical question to ask is whether such amount is capable of being lawfully realigned. To
this, we answer in the affirmative.

TANCINCO, PRECIOUS
Joson vs. Torres
FACTS:
Private respondents file with the Office of the Presdent a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that in the

morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a
scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the
Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at
them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the
area. They claimed that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative
measure supported by petitioner Joson that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150
million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them
into approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held
that day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not considered; that
private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated
obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the
province could not afford to contract another obligation; that petitioner's act of barging in and
intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and independence of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed grave danger to
private respondents' lives and safety.
The letter-complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline
Jane Perez, two employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who witnessed the incident.
President Ramos noted that the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
approve the proposed loan did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed
followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG)
Robert Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but to "break not the
peace." Immediately thereafter, Sec. Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned
petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered
into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province
while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their
peaceful co-existence. However, the peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the
private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his
answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner was granted 3
extensions in filing his answer but still failed to do so. The DILG also informed him that his
"failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff shall be allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and asks again for 30 days
extension. Three months later, petitioner was declared in default and to have waived his right to
present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. Two days
later, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the
DILG an "Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer AdCautelam." Petitioner
received a copy of the order of default on May 2, 1997. Through counsel, he moved for
reconsideration. On May 19, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in
the interest of justice. He noted the appearance of petitioner's counsel and gave petitioner "for
the last time" fifteen (15) days from receipt to file his answer. Since petitioner still failed to file
his answer, he was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf.
Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to
present their evidence ex-parte on July 15, 1997. The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner,
through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not
verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint. On July 11,
1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60)
days pending investigation of the charges against him. Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine
National Police to assist in the implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In
petitioner's stead, Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor
until such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to exist.
ISSUE:
WON the DILG Secretary has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O.
No. 23, to wit: "Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against
elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President.
The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as
the Disciplining Authority." Sec.3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an
Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for the
purpose. The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a
Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government."
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines,
whether acting by himself r through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating
Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special
Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is
derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the
1987 Constitution provides:"Sec.4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure
that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions."
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their
duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring
that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the
act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority,
the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against
local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG
or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is
not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alterego principle r the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus, under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive."
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. The power of control is provided in
the Constitution, Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members
except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the
President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.
When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an
order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15 )days from notice.
Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating
Authority for investigation.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President
when he was required to answer the complaint, Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with
the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O.
No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the
complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further
proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is
necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case.] The
President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion

TANCINCO, PRECIOUS
Mondano vs. Silvosa
FACTS:
Jose Mondano, petitioner herein, is the duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao.
Consolacin Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. The
Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. The provincial governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst. Exec Sec,
is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may
appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor can exercise the power of control.
HELD:
The executive departments of the Government created and organized before the approval of the
Constitution continued to exist as authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise.
The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision
the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the
power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as
provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated,
the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of
section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local
governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79
(c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of
control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make

them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of
the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the
provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend
the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department
Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and such
additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by sec 79 (c) of
the RAC, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by sec.10(1),
Article 7, of the Constitution.