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Further on in this military romancing spirit--for common sense will not permit any other description of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it--he further congratulates himself by these successes of being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers, manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was concerned, these steamers would enable him to communicate direct with him, and ascertain the real condition of Khartum!
Titolo originale
Why Gordon Perished or, The Political and Military Causes
Further on in this military romancing spirit--for common sense will not permit any other description of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it--he further congratulates himself by these successes of being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers, manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was concerned, these steamers would enable him to communicate direct with him, and ascertain the real condition of Khartum!
Further on in this military romancing spirit--for common sense will not permit any other description of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it--he further congratulates himself by these successes of being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers, manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was concerned, these steamers would enable him to communicate direct with him, and ascertain the real condition of Khartum!
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WHY GORDON PERISHED; |
oR,
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAUSES
WHICH LED TO
THE SUDAN DISASTERS.
BY
A WAR CORRESPONDENT °,’
WHO ACCOMPANIED THE NILE EXPEDITION, »
Author of “ Teo Late for Gorden at Khartum,” &c.
WITH MAPS AND PLANS,
fonvow: : i
W. H. ALLEN & CO, LIMITED,
13, WaTERLOO Pracz, S.W.
1896. :RO CO,
Kes LER
JUL 7 1916
Crarary
fink
PRINTED BY
WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED,
GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LONDON; w.C,
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
AUG 21 1973PREFACE,
———
TuE chief object of the Author in the publication
of his history of the Nile Expedition in 1887, was
to give a more complete account of it than either —
himself or his Press colleagues, who accompanied
it with him, were able to supply through the Press
at the time. This inability was chiefly owing. to the
demand for the rapid despatch of news from a seat
of war by the Journalism of the present day, and
to the precedence consequently given to telegrams
over the letters of War Correspondents. Hence
only a synopsis of the most important events at
first reaches the public ; and this, to a large extent,
reduces the interest of later and fuller communica-
tions despatched by mail.
Under the trying circumstances of such an
Expedition as that up the Nile, and the rapidity
with which its most important events followed each
other, it was physically and mentally impossible,
even in our fuller despatches, to deal satisfactorily
with them, and especially with those which in plan
and conduct contributed to its sad and disastrous
failure, so far as the objects it was intended to
accomplish were concerned.iv PREFACE.
Some of these events were noticed by the Author
in the work referred to, but, as one of its reviewers
rightly remarked, the Author knew more than he
cared to publish at the time. This was consequent
upon the difficulty of supporting his statements by
satisfactory and sufficient evidence. That evidence
having since been available, the restraint under
which he dealt in his former volume has beer
removed, and hence the full statement of substan-
tiated facts is laid before the British public in
answer to the questions :—Why Gordon perished ?
and what were the political and military blunders
which contributed to this and our other disasters
in the Sudan, after our occupation of Egypt proper,
following on the victory at Tel-cl-Kebir.
The reasons which have induced the publication
of the present volume are given to the Author's
readers in the introductory chapter, and to which
he will only add here that he is inspired by the
epitaph on the monument at the Pass of Thermo- .
pylez, to the memory of Leonidas and his gallant
three hundred, by their fellow-countrymen, which
was this :—
_ Stranger, tell.the men of Sparta, we who obcyed
the laws lie here!
i THE AUTHOR.
Lonpon, December 5th, 1895.CONTENTS.
oo
CHAPTER I.
: PAGE
INTRODUCTORY ose see nee tee tee tee nee tee ee
CHAPTER II.
A “non-proven” verdict—After Tel-el-Kebir—Pressed
for an explanation—Warned of threatened danger and
complications .. rT ee ee]
CHAPTER III.
Premature announcement of the “Rescue and Retire
Policy "—Effects on Gordon's mission... +... 6 39.
‘ CHAPTER IV.
Mr. Gladstone and the demand for Zebehr Pasha—Have
we come to this?—Sir E. Baring’s interference with
Gordon’s plan of evacuation ... 1. oo se oe cee 56
CHAPTER V..
Gordon in danger of being cut off—Refusal to keep his
communications open—The Berber and Suakim route 72
CHAPTER VI.
Refusal to facilitate evacuation of Khartum by a diversion
of British troops—Gordon’s virtual abandonment— ... 92vi CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VII.
PAGE
Lord Wolseley reports on the three lines of advance foran
Expedition to relieve Khartum—Proposals of General
Stephenson and others relative thereto... 00.0.1. os. 112
CHAPTER VIII.
Her Majesty's Government roused to action and adopt .
Preparatory measures for Gordon's relief... «0. 40. 127
CHAPTER IX.
Expedition delayed by the adoption of the small-boat
plan of advance up the Nile... 0... 0 6. eee eae ove 137
CHAPTER X.
: Key to the policy of Her Majesty's Government—Not
ready yet to sanction advance of troops beyond
Egyptian frontier... 0.0... soe cee see cee tee vee Td
CHAPTER XI.
The Suakim-Berber route seriously considered—Why
rejected—Objections against it criticised 0... ... 159
CHAPTER XII.
Lord Wolseley urges immediate measures for Gordon's
relief while pressing the adoption of the Nile route ... 174
CHAPTER XIII.
Gordon can only hold out after December 14th with
difficulty—How Lord Wolseley responds to his implied
demands for hasty relief... 0 6.. see see cee tee one 189)CONTENTS. vil
CHAPTER XIV. :
PAGE
Lord Wolseley’s fixed plan of operations and General Von
Moltke’s strategic maxim—His view of the position on
December 31st... ss see tee see tee nee tee cee 199
“CHAPTER XV.
In view of Gordon being known to be pressed for food.
Lord Wolseley delays a dash across the desert to
Khartum a. see tee nee eee tee tee nee tee nee 209)
CHAPTER XVI.
The Nile Column—Its object—How delayed by unknown
obstacles—Its recall ... se ess ee see se eee ee 220.
CHAPTER XVII
Caravan roads from Hamdab to Berber and from Korti to
Mutemma compared—Gordon’s view for an advance
from Ambukol on Hamdab ou. sss sss sue ee one 225
CHAPTER XVIII
The short camel supply question—The double march to
Jakdul and its consequences 4. ss se see ose oes 235
CHAPTER XIX,
How Lord Wolseley delayed responding to Gordon's call "
from Khartum on December 14th to come quickly * ... 248
CHAPTER XX,
The Desert Column not primarily despatched for relief of
Khartum—Why Sir Charles Wilson was delayed at
Guat ose oe tee tee ee tee ee tte tue ane ane 262viii CONTENTS,
CHAPTER XXI.
PAGR
Lord Wolseley congratulates himself on having secured
the desert road to Mutemma and a post there... ... 276
CHAPTER XXII.
How and why Khartum fell before the Expedition could
ave ee ee ee es, 290
CHAPTER XXIII.
The theory of the fall of Khartum by treachery disproved
—Cconcluding observations and final appeal... ... ... 302
ILLUSTRATIONS.
. PAGE