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i wet bes WHY GORDON PERISHED; | oR, THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE SUDAN DISASTERS. BY A WAR CORRESPONDENT °,’ WHO ACCOMPANIED THE NILE EXPEDITION, » Author of “ Teo Late for Gorden at Khartum,” &c. WITH MAPS AND PLANS, fonvow: : i W. H. ALLEN & CO, LIMITED, 13, WaTERLOO Pracz, S.W. 1896. : RO CO, Kes LER JUL 7 1916 Crarary fink PRINTED BY WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED, GREAT QUEEN STREET, LONDON; w.C, HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AUG 21 1973 PREFACE, ——— TuE chief object of the Author in the publication of his history of the Nile Expedition in 1887, was to give a more complete account of it than either — himself or his Press colleagues, who accompanied it with him, were able to supply through the Press at the time. This inability was chiefly owing. to the demand for the rapid despatch of news from a seat of war by the Journalism of the present day, and to the precedence consequently given to telegrams over the letters of War Correspondents. Hence only a synopsis of the most important events at first reaches the public ; and this, to a large extent, reduces the interest of later and fuller communica- tions despatched by mail. Under the trying circumstances of such an Expedition as that up the Nile, and the rapidity with which its most important events followed each other, it was physically and mentally impossible, even in our fuller despatches, to deal satisfactorily with them, and especially with those which in plan and conduct contributed to its sad and disastrous failure, so far as the objects it was intended to accomplish were concerned. iv PREFACE. Some of these events were noticed by the Author in the work referred to, but, as one of its reviewers rightly remarked, the Author knew more than he cared to publish at the time. This was consequent upon the difficulty of supporting his statements by satisfactory and sufficient evidence. That evidence having since been available, the restraint under which he dealt in his former volume has beer removed, and hence the full statement of substan- tiated facts is laid before the British public in answer to the questions :—Why Gordon perished ? and what were the political and military blunders which contributed to this and our other disasters in the Sudan, after our occupation of Egypt proper, following on the victory at Tel-cl-Kebir. The reasons which have induced the publication of the present volume are given to the Author's readers in the introductory chapter, and to which he will only add here that he is inspired by the epitaph on the monument at the Pass of Thermo- . pylez, to the memory of Leonidas and his gallant three hundred, by their fellow-countrymen, which was this :— _ Stranger, tell.the men of Sparta, we who obcyed the laws lie here! i THE AUTHOR. Lonpon, December 5th, 1895. CONTENTS. oo CHAPTER I. : PAGE INTRODUCTORY ose see nee tee tee tee nee tee ee CHAPTER II. A “non-proven” verdict—After Tel-el-Kebir—Pressed for an explanation—Warned of threatened danger and complications .. rT ee ee] CHAPTER III. Premature announcement of the “Rescue and Retire Policy "—Effects on Gordon's mission... +... 6 39. ‘ CHAPTER IV. Mr. Gladstone and the demand for Zebehr Pasha—Have we come to this?—Sir E. Baring’s interference with Gordon’s plan of evacuation ... 1. oo se oe cee 56 CHAPTER V.. Gordon in danger of being cut off—Refusal to keep his communications open—The Berber and Suakim route 72 CHAPTER VI. Refusal to facilitate evacuation of Khartum by a diversion of British troops—Gordon’s virtual abandonment— ... 92 vi CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. PAGE Lord Wolseley reports on the three lines of advance foran Expedition to relieve Khartum—Proposals of General Stephenson and others relative thereto... 00.0.1. os. 112 CHAPTER VIII. Her Majesty's Government roused to action and adopt . Preparatory measures for Gordon's relief... «0. 40. 127 CHAPTER IX. Expedition delayed by the adoption of the small-boat plan of advance up the Nile... 0... 0 6. eee eae ove 137 CHAPTER X. : Key to the policy of Her Majesty's Government—Not ready yet to sanction advance of troops beyond Egyptian frontier... 0.0... soe cee see cee tee vee Td CHAPTER XI. The Suakim-Berber route seriously considered—Why rejected—Objections against it criticised 0... ... 159 CHAPTER XII. Lord Wolseley urges immediate measures for Gordon's relief while pressing the adoption of the Nile route ... 174 CHAPTER XIII. Gordon can only hold out after December 14th with difficulty—How Lord Wolseley responds to his implied demands for hasty relief... 0 6.. see see cee tee one 189) CONTENTS. vil CHAPTER XIV. : PAGE Lord Wolseley’s fixed plan of operations and General Von Moltke’s strategic maxim—His view of the position on December 31st... ss see tee see tee nee tee cee 199 “CHAPTER XV. In view of Gordon being known to be pressed for food. Lord Wolseley delays a dash across the desert to Khartum a. see tee nee eee tee tee nee tee nee 209) CHAPTER XVI. The Nile Column—Its object—How delayed by unknown obstacles—Its recall ... se ess ee see se eee ee 220. CHAPTER XVII Caravan roads from Hamdab to Berber and from Korti to Mutemma compared—Gordon’s view for an advance from Ambukol on Hamdab ou. sss sss sue ee one 225 CHAPTER XVIII The short camel supply question—The double march to Jakdul and its consequences 4. ss se see ose oes 235 CHAPTER XIX, How Lord Wolseley delayed responding to Gordon's call " from Khartum on December 14th to come quickly * ... 248 CHAPTER XX, The Desert Column not primarily despatched for relief of Khartum—Why Sir Charles Wilson was delayed at Guat ose oe tee tee ee tee ee tte tue ane ane 262 viii CONTENTS, CHAPTER XXI. PAGR Lord Wolseley congratulates himself on having secured the desert road to Mutemma and a post there... ... 276 CHAPTER XXII. How and why Khartum fell before the Expedition could ave ee ee ee es, 290 CHAPTER XXIII. The theory of the fall of Khartum by treachery disproved —Cconcluding observations and final appeal... ... ... 302 ILLUSTRATIONS. . PAGE

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