Collin Anderson

Latin American Politics

Final Paper
3/15/13

The twentieth century in Latin America was a time filled with political fomentation,
war, brutality, and strong social movements. One of the most shocking aspects of the region
in the twentieth century is the degree in which certain trends are seen at a pan-regional level.
While different politicians, economic models, specializations, and movements are seen in
every nation, the common patterns between these nations has been the focus of much study
into democracy, economic development, and human rights as a massive case study for the
processes involved in the models of politics and economics in the developing world.
The aspects that tie these countries together also, paradoxically, tend to reveal
variance through undeniably unique aspects in each nation. One of the most unique,
contentious, and often times contradictory paths was that of Chile. The relationship between
economic development and democracy in Chile has raised eyebrows internationally as the
nation has risen to become one of the strongest economies out of all the nations in the
hemisphere. While most see Chile as a neo-liberal success, others are skeptical as to how
much of its success is due to the stark rules of a severe neo-liberal economy. The very tension
there is polemic. Yet, no one can deny that in Chiles history, democratic values were often
discarded in pursuit of pure economic development.
Before 1973, Chile can be viewed as having been one of the most stable and longestrunning democratic states in all of Latin America. Through the period starting with its

independence, Chile only saw a reprieve from democratic processes for a brief time. In 1927,
the Chilean congress elected President Carlos Ibaez to lead the state. His presidency soon
was consolidated into a dictatorship, which was a shock to the Chilean people who were used
to elections and civilian rule (Skidmore 288). When the stock market crashed, Chile was hit
particularly hard. The classical liberal economic model that had prevailed up to this point
began unraveling. The ruling elite put much credence into the copper mining industry,
because Chiles mines produce a massive amount of the worlds copper for export (Dollars
and Sense). When the stock market crashed, so did the demand for copper that kept Chiles
economy, and politics, relatively stable. This economic turmoil led to the ousting of Ibaez in
1931, followed by two years of what can best be called political confusion; many different
governments, leaders, and ideologies toyed with the country (Skidmore). After those two
years, democracy returned.
With Chiles economy having been so vastly export based (which up to 80% was
copper), the logical step after the crash was to adjust to import based industrialization models
of development to make Chile less vulnerable to the caprices of the market (Dollars and
Sense). The government took a hands-on approach in economic issues, and focused its
attention on development. It was during this period that the government implemented
programs to foster, support, and propagate domestic industry. One of the most important
programs was called the Corporacin De Fomento, or CORFO (Skidmore 289). The program
was designed to pump money into promising private, and public sector industries that would
boost the market. Once these companies were profitable, they would be offered up for sale to
the private sector.

This time period is not only defined by domestic industrialization. One major legacy
was a shift in the political arena from classical liberal and rightist prevalence, to include the
rising left. With the bolstered Radical, Communist, and Socialist parties appearing in the
political lexicon, alliances were necessary to ensure popular support of a candidate that met
not only the standards of the Chilean people, but also one whom was sympathetic to the
multiple party alliances (Oppenheim 20). While there was a marked ideological disconnect
between the three parties, they formed a union that was supposed to foster the politics of the
left.
The union was successful at garnering support, and as a result, Radical leadership
(being Radical only in name) took hold of the presidency. As the terms of the Radical
presidents unfolded, the political unity began to fall apart as many saw the leaders focused too
much on economic development, and not enough on human rights (Skidmore). The Socialists
became disillusioned with the more center-right policies that emerged from the government.
Continued economic problems such as inflation stirred the voice of laborers. In order to
maintain a firm grip on the people, the Radical leaders took oppressive measures to prevent
labor uprisings. In the early 40s the government of President Ros upheld a doctrine ruling
that rural peasants could not unionize.
After Ros, President Videla took office, and continued repression. He went as far as
making the Communist party illegal-mostly in response to political pressure from the Red
Scare in the United States (Oppenheim 21). As a result, the public staged large scale protests
in 1946. Videla responded by declaring a state of siege, and also discontinuing certain civil
liberties. In spite of these measures, riots continued for around a year (Skidmore 290). Despite
continuity in democratic processes in the years following the Depression, the state still

struggled to find harmony between economic development, and political discourse without
resorting to silencing opposition.
Its within this context that Carlos Ibaez manages to use populist tactics to secure the
position of President in 1952, despite the troubled past tethered to his name. He ran on a
platform that claimed electing him meant relief from the political games, and ideological
struggles. While he failed to get much done during his presidency, the race in which he won
serves to set the tone for presidential elections in the nation (Skidmore 290). From the race of
1952 onward, Chiles executive elections are characterized by the victor not having won the
majority of voter support(Oppenheim 21). This is due to the vast difference, and rigidity of
the running parties, and is one of the omens to a future of authoritarianism
The split nature of the politics had immediate, and also resonating effects. Until 1970,
the presidency shifted between the left, right, and center. The differences in ideology proved
to be polemic. The left was split in terms of the vehicle they used to achieve their common
goal: having wealth shift to the poor, and structurally reforming Chilean economics towards
state driven growth (Oppenheim 22). Some advocated for a democratic approach, while others
felt that a transition to a socialist state would be more efficacious. On the opposite side of the
political spectrum, discourse was dominated by liberal free market values. The right saw the
free hand of the market, and Chiles export industry as the future to the countries
developmental successthe center believing if it meant state involvement, than so be it (as
seen in Freis presidency, with his partial nationalization of the copper mines) (Skidmore
293).
Up until 1970, the Marxist based parties (Socialist, and Communist) had not gained
executive office, though they did manage to garner municipal victories, and a growth in voter

base (Oppenheim 24). In the elections of 1970, this changed. President Salvador Allende, after
two previous popular, yet unsuccessful attempts at the presidency, won the office with 36.3%.
This made him an executive leader that nearly two thirds of the nations voters didnt support
in the ballot box (Skidmore 294). Allende strongly opposed capitalism, labeling the entire
capitalist model as being the reason the third world remained under-developed. When elected,
he began to transition the nation towards socialism. This meant turning away from policies
that were permissive of an inherently exploitative economic model (Oppenheim 27).
The beginning of La Via Chilena or, the Chilean Way to Socialism, was in the
mining sector. Allende nationalized the U.S. owned copper mines. The bill passed through
Congress unanimously, which indeed represented the popular sentiment that copper in Chile,
belonged to Chile. The largest three mines accounted for 50% of all foreign exchange in the
nation. Allende declared that Chile owed no money for the mines, which angered both the
government and companies from the United States (Oppenheim 48). Under Freis government
prior to Allendes, a law was passed that enabled agrarian land reform. Frei was successful in
redistributing land to 20,000 peasants (which was only a fifth of his proposed target of
100,000 peasants) (Oppenheim 49). By 1972, Allende had managed to redistribute virtually
all of the land that the 1967 law allowed for.
Allende knew that if he could maintain popular appeal, than he would get his agenda
completed. So long as the populace was behind him, he had very little threats to his
presidency. The 1925 constitution stated that the military had no right to intervene in
government proceedingswith the one clause being that the military could exercise a coup if
the government clearly had stopped being able to support the economy. Allendes economic
policy is one of the most relevant aspects of his presidency, not only for its radical nature, but

also because it led to his demiseand ultimately the demise of democratic process. His plan
in the first year of his presidency was to stimulate economic growth through state intervention
and wealth distribution to support the lower classes. The details included raising the wages of
workers, and eliminating excess spending through streamlining industry. Basic food prices
were also to be monitored and kept low by the state, so that working peoples would have
access to nutrition. The plan wasnt just economically inspired, but strategic in that Allende
thought if he could ensure economic success for the masses, he could hold on to popular
supportwhich he, along with the Popular Unity party would need to make a full transition to
socialism.
With newly nationalized enterprises, and wealth redistribution funneling money and
resources to the lower class, Allende felt he had an economic plan that would not only yield
growth, but would also feed money back to the government for more expansive social
programs. In fact, the plan was incredibly dependent upon the profitability of the public
enterprises (Skidmore). By 1972, it was becoming unclear whether the risk was going to pay
off, and by 73, the public enterprises were not meeting the expectations of Allende, or the
populace that supported him. The failing economic model as not meeting the interests of those
who politically backed Allende, and therefore, public dissent began to spread (Doll. Its from
this sound and fury that a new political and economic regime emerged.
In the Southern Cone countries of South America, a pattern of bureaucratic
authoritarian governments is traced through this period. These governments were military
lead coups, which promised a restoration of free market ideals through a temporary lapse in
civilian ruleand came through on the promises by brutal repression and risky economic
maneuvers. In the early months of 1973, the discontent in Chilean society was growing.

Allende saw a threat to his sovereignty and began asking congress for more executive power
to protect the state. This provoked the military to respond by leading a brigade of tanks into
Santiago. There was even a small attempted coup on June 29th of that year. A brigade of
soldiers charged at La Moneda, hoping others would join, only to met at the front steps by
General of the Army Prats demanding them to stand down (Oppenheim 73).
Prats then faced a lot of internal pressure from the armed forces to step down among
accusations that he was too far left leaningand therefore a threat to the military. He
succumbed to the pressure, and left his position open for the now infamous General Augusto
Pinochet to fill (Skidmore). It became undeniable that Allende was facing a direct threat when
the military began enforcing a civil arms ban that was put in place years prior in case it was
necessary to quell a leftist uprising. The military acted swiftly, and very overtly.
They surrounded factories and businesses, and forced searches for hidden stocks of
weapons. While it was supposed to be a ban for all, the military was specifically targeting the
left, and their supporters. These early indicators of the extents to which the military would go
to secure its powerin one famous case, the military turned to a cemetery, and began
exhuming corpses to check for weapons (Oppenheim). Allende continued trying to scramble
for legal support from congress that would enable him larger executive powersbut the plan
of attack was already in the works. On September 11th, 1973, Allendes Presidency, Chiles
democracy, and Allende himself were brought to an end.