5 “JUST BE YOUR SELF” Logocentrism and difference in performance theory Philip Austander Among the terms Jacques Derrida employs in his devonstructve critique of West- em philosophy, of what he calls the “metaphysics of presence,” are logocentrism and differance (1978: 279-80). Logocentrism is “the orientation of philosophy toward an order of meaning ~ thought, truth, reason, loge, the Word — conceived as existing in itself, as foundation” (Curler 1982: 92)" Derrida, who denies the existence of such a foundation, points out that every mental or phenomenal event is 4 product of difference, is defined by its relation to what its not rather than by its, essence. If nothing can legitimately claim to possess a stable, autonomous identity, then there is nothing which can be invested with the authority of Jogos. In his discussions of language and linguistics, Derrida refers frequently to Suussure’s double hypothesis that because the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary, the production of meaning derives from the interaction of linguistic Units, not from additive arrangements of nuggets of meaning contained in words? “The difference which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself inaudible” (1982: 5); meaning is produced by the action of something which is not present, which exists only as difference. Derrida demonstrates that ‘meaning is generated by a productive non-presence he calls differance, defined as “the playing movement that ‘produces, but does not precede, differences” (1982: 11). The purpose of signification produees its own significance; there is no tran- scendent logos, no order of meaning which grounds the activity of signification, no presence behind the sign lending it authority Derrida’s critique has broad applications to performance theory. In diseussion, ‘we often treat acting as philosophers treat language — as a transparent medium Which provides access to truth, Jogos or a grounding concept which functions as logos within a particular production.® Such grounding concepts are: the play- \wright’s vision, the director’s concept or, more interesting, the actor's self. We often praise acting by calling it “honest” or “self-revelatory.” “truthful”; when we feel we have slimpsed some aspect of the actor's psyche through her performance, we applaud the actor for “taking risks,” “exposing herself.” One example must stand for many: Joseph Papp was recently quoted as saying: “With Brando in ‘Streetcar 3or Olivier in “The Entertainer, the actor exposed himself in such a way that it was a kind of revelation of sout” (quoted in Kakutani 1984: 1), With what authority can such a statement be made? As semiotists who have studied acting have discovered, the performing actor is an opaque medium, an intertext, not a simple text to be read for “content.” We arrive at our perception of 4 performance by implicitly comparing it with other interpretations of the same role (or with the way we feel the role should be played), or with our recollection of the same actor in other roles, or with our knowledge of the stylistic school to which the actor belongs, the actor's private life, etc.‘ If our perception of the actor’s work derives from this play of differences, how can we claim to be able to read the presence of the actor’s self back through that performance? ‘The problematic of self is, of course, central to performance theory. Theorists as diverse as Stanislavsky, Brecht and Grotowski all implicitly designate the actor’s self as the logos of performance; all assume that the actor's self precedes and ‘grounds her performance and that itis the presence of this self in performance that provides the audience with access to human truths. Their theories are aptly sum- marized by a sentence of Joseph Chaikin: “Acting is a demonstration of self with ‘or without a disguise” (1980: 2), For Stanislavsky, the disguise must be based on the actor's own emotional experience; Brecht wants the disguise to be separable from the actor's own persona. Grotowski believes that the actor must use the disguise by her role to cut away the disguise imposed on her by socialization and expose the most basic levels of self. An examination of acting theory through the lens of deconstruction reveals that the self is not an autonomous foundation for acting, but is produced by the performance it supposedly grounds. Stanislavsky’s discourse on acting is inscribed firmly within logocentrism: he insists on the need for logie, coherence and unity ~ the “unbroken line” — and invokes the authority of such theological concepts as soul and spi \ritings (1936: 237). There is no question but that the presence of the aetor’s self as the basis of performance is for him the source of truth in acting: he defines good acting as acting based on the performer's own experience and emotions. He privil- ceges the actor's self over his or her role by stating on the one hand that actor and character should fuse completely in performance (196) and, on the other, that an actor can never play anyone but herself, since she “can’t expel [her] sou! from {her} body and hire another to replace it” (188). The merging of actor and character thus results exclusively ina fresh presentation (or representation) of self. This privileging of self is also manifest in another aspect of Stanislavsky's theory. He treats actor and character as autonomous entities, each with its own soul. Because itis impossible for the actor either to divest herself of her own soul or to penetrate fully into another's, she can only hope to find emotions of her own that, are analogous (Stanislavsky's word) to the character's (166). The most important terms of that analogy, the choices that make one actor’s interpretation of a role