In fact we should not be surprised to find ourselves

thus before the law: for the concept of law is already

analytically entailed by the fact of repetition, and so we
have been talking of nothing else since the beginning.
There is no law in general except of a repetition, and
there is no repetition that is not subjected to a law (D,
123) . 239
For in order to begin to reply to the suspicion of
passive acquiescence to the law, whatever it be, we shall
say that this co-implication of the law, of repetition and
of affirmatiqn, contaminates the law with a constitutive
illegality which will alone allow us to understand how
a given positive law could be unjust. Every law tries to
ground its justice in justesse, transforming the violence
of its performative force into a calm constatation of the
state of affairs it produces, according to the play we
have just seen for the contract. 240