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1987
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12:42:53 PM
In MemoriamCorneliaJohanna
De Vogel
MartinM. Tweedale
ReplytoProf.de Rijk
L.M. De Rijk
Postscript
23
Paul VincentSpade
JohnP. Doyle
SuarezonBeingsofReasonand
Truth(1)
47
76
Reviews
81
Neil T. Lewis
Determinate
TruthinAbelard1
HesterGoodenough
Gelber
TheFallacyofAccidentand the
Dictumde omni:Late Medieval
overa ReciprocalPair .... 110
Controversy
C.H. Kneepkens
Ab omnihominehabeturaliquod
capud: A Noteon theConceptof
in 12th-Century
Word-Order
Grammatical
Thought1
146
To
BooksReferred
153
Reviews
154
BooksReceived
160
12:42:53 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
IN MEMORIAM
CORNELIA
JOHANNA DE VOGEL
C.J. de Vogel, Emeritus professorof Ancient and PatristicPhilosophy at the State Universityof Utrecht, died on 7 May, 1986 in the
82nd year of her life. For her to study and teach the historyof philosophy eo ipso meant to express her own philosophical ideas.
Afterhaving taken her doctoral degree at Utrecht with a dissertation on 'a turningpoint in Plato's thought', she mainly focussed on
problems of a theological nature, and this field of problems received
most of her attentionafter she retired. Even during the years inbetween, however, she was almost exclusivelyinterestedand engaged in
problemsof a theologicalor metaphysicalnature (she did not consider
the two disciplinesas essentiallydifferentfromeach other), problems
which received her fullestattention.
which
When it became obvious that the scholarlyjournal Phronesis
she had helped to set up was hardly suitable forstudies on Mediaeval
thought,her pupil L. M. de Rijk found her willingto supporthis iniwas
tiativeto set up the presentJournal. The orientationof Vivarium
not the same as her own: she always maintained thatGreek philosophy
and especiallyPlatonism had prepared the way to Christian mediaeval
thoughtand that is why she hardly noticed the unique development
within Mediaeval culture. People like Abelard and Ockham she
viewed with suspicion, and even a figuresuch as Duns Scotus did not
seem to fitin with her ideas.
In Utrechtshe taught her pupils to studytextsin a strictlyphilological manner. She displayed an exemplary work ethic; she devoted
herselfto her pupils even if theychose to go theirown way. Her conversionto Catholicism (in 1945) and her sex oftenmade it difficultfor
her to feelat home withher fellowworkers,especially because she was
oftenunfathomableand difficultto get along with. She would have
nothingto do with feminismand yet she would, often passionately,
defendequal rightsforwomen. The last years of her life she chose to
spend in isolation in the Zealand coastal village of Renesse, where the
1
12:44:34 PM
locals only knew her as the organist of the littlechurch on the beach.
The parish priestwas the only person who frequentlyspoke to her and
few people she had known at the universityever came to visit her.
C.J. de Vogel deserves to live on as an influentialscholar, famous
even far beyond her own country. It is a great honour forher pupils
to have had such an inspiring instructor.
L. M. DE Rijk
12:44:34 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Reply to Prof. de Rijk
MARTIN M. TWEEDALE
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
MontaneMinores(Logica Modernorum
, vol. II, pt. 2,
(4) Introductiones
5
book
23
p.
p. 164):
(17-20), (my
essepredicatum
etsubiectum
: nonquodineis
inhuiusmodi
Dicittarnen
propositionibus
subitelo
, sedquiasubiecto
apponitur,
facitenuntiationem.
predicatum
predicatur
ofthissorta subjectand a predicate;
Yethe saysthatthereis in propositions
is predicated
ofthesubjectbutrather
it is notthatin themthepredicate
that
a declarative
it is attached
to thesubject,thatproduces
sentence.
I embellished this passage a littletoo much to bring out the rather
paradoxical thesisit attributesto Alberic, namely that in logicallyparticular propositions the predicate is not predicated of anything
including the subject term. In fact in the sentence preceding the one
above Alberic is said to hold the view that there is no predication in
such cases. In a ' bowler' ' of his own Prof. de Rijk chastises me for
constructinga translationwhich attributesthis "unexpected" view to
Alberic. "How on earth can Alberic of Paris (who is quoted here)
claim that in a propositionthe predicate is not predicated of the subject?" he asks rhetorically.Evidently Prof. de Rijk did not study the
preceding sentence very carefully.It reads:
determino
rem
dereterminm
nihil
dealiquo,
Albericus.
..dicit
,
praedicari
Magister
nonestpraedicari.
praedicari
quiaparticulariter
In otherwords, what authoritiescall a predicate in a propositionof
particularquantity is not in factpredicated at all, on Alberic's view.
I do not know how Alberic defendedthe view thistextand my translation attributeto him, but that the text says he held it seems to me
indisputable.
(By the way, Prof, de Rijk on p. 89 incorrectlycites my previous
'
translationby substituting'that' for 'because with the result that it
appears ungrammatical.)
(5) LNPS p. 527 (23-28), (my book, p. 165):
habent
hocestsensibilta
sunt
nonomnia
insensibilibus
Genera
etspecies
posita,
quaedam,
etnoncumaliqua
extra
idestreshabent
nominare
sensibilia,
forma
, etponuntur
significare
nonideo
amitterent,
subiacent,
subiaceat,
quaesensui
quiasi resomnes
formas
quaesensui
nominari
minus
a genere
etspecie
possent.
i.e. they
Certaingeneraandspecies,butnotall,havebeengivenin sensibles,
butnot
i.e. theysignify
andaregivenoutsidesensibles,
namesensibles,
things
lostall theforms
via someformthatfallsunderthesenses,becauseifthings
whicharesubjecttothesenses,theycouldjustas wellbe namedbygeneraand
species.
5 L. M. de Rijk,Assen1967.
5
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
'
way, I did not omit to translate quoque as Prof. de Rijk asserts on p.
94) As my commentaryon p. 207 states, I was unsure what to make
of this sentence and simply tried lamely to make the ' non9 of the ms.
play a role.
I have long been dissatisfiedwith 'type' as a translationof 'status'>
so I am favourablydisposed to Prof, de Rijk' s commentson thispoint
(p. 93), while remaining uncertain how best to translate it. Perhaps
it should just be leftin the Latin.
The reason I used 'the typeof a man' ratherthan 'the type of man'
is that only the formercan be at all read as meaning the character of
being a man. The latterwould referto some character whose extension is included in the extension of being a man. Certainly I was well
' means
aware that ' statushominis
'being a man', as anyone who reads
on
this
and
other
my commentary
passages could not help but
observe.
Also I would like to add to the list of my mistakes one which Prof,
de Rijk did not mention but which was pointed out to me by Prof.
Norman Kretzmann some years ago.
6
(12) Dialcticap. 140 (23-29), (my book p. 302):
vel
verba
contrarii
videmur,
Quodautem
quodmulta
componimus
grammaticorum
regulis
ut
velabaliisquamabactionibus
velpassionibus
ut'essehominem
substantiva,
sumpta,
*essealbum
Illienim
sententiam
rectam
enuntiationum
, nonabhorreas.
aperiendam
propter
multa
tenerorum
aut
tenent,
provectis
inquirere
procapacitate
quiprimm
disciplinae
gradm
subtilitatem
laborare.
inquibus
dialecticae
reliquerunt
oportet
corrigenda
of
Do notrecoilin horrorwhenin orderto openup thecorrectmeanings
we puttogether
suchas 'to be a man',
sentences
manyverbsor substantives,
other
suchas 'tobewhite',
from
thanactions
orpassions,
orverbsderived
things
Forthosewhoarein the
andthusseemtogo againsttherulesofgrammarians.
forthecapacities
ofbeginners,
first
rankofthediscipline,
outofa consideration
in
ofmanymatters
haveleftto theadvancedtheinquiryintoand correction
ofdialectic
whichthesubtlety
mustbe employed.
In only fourof the above cases, (1), (5), (10) and (11), does it seem
to me my readers could have been significantlymisled by my original
translations,and in the case of (1 1) theywere warned in the commentarythatI was unsure of the meaning of the sentence in question. Any
errorsof the magnitude of these fourare serious, but I am relieved to
findthat in no case were theyor any of the other errorsin translation
the cause of any misinterpretationin my commentaryof Abailard's
philosophical positions.
6 ed. byL. M. de Rijk,Assen1956,secondedition1970.
9
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
et
huius
sedentis
sit
huius
essentia
eadem
cum
album
albi;
,
prorsus
licetoccupata
huiusetillius,quaediversis
sitessentia
ethicalbus
hicsedens
, cumeadem
essedicitur.
Socrates
numero
autmulta
nontarnen
autmultae
sitformis,
Alioquin
personae
numero
esset
universale
'Socrates'
hocnomen
, cumdedijferentibus
quamsingulare
potius
diceretur.
17
12:44:40 PM
The point I want to make here is thatin the clause ' cumeademprorsus
ethuiusalbi' we must take the genitivesas paressentiasit huiussedentis
titive and not explicative, and consequently also in the clause ' cum
eademsit essentiahuius et illius'. This passage can hardly make sense
unless we creditAbailard with distinghuishingitems that nevertheless
havethe same essence so that it would be translated as follows:
Andsincethissitting
itemis SocratesandSocrates
is white,itfollows
thatthis
itemis white,sincethissitting
itemandthiswhiteitemhaveexactly
the
sitting
sameessence.Neither
wouldthissitting
itemandthiswhiteitembe saidto be
sincethisand thathavethesameessence,and thoughthe
manyin number,
essenceis occupiedbydifferent
nevertheless
Socratesis notsaid to be
forms,
thisnoun'Socrates'wouldbe
manypersonsor manyin number.Otherwise,
universal
ratherthansingularsinceit wouldbe said of itemsthatdiffer
in
number.
To returnto the phrase ' haecessentiavocis*
, which Prof. de Rijk says
means just "this individual word", I rather suspect that we are
dealing with an ordinary partitivegenitive here too. What Abailard
refersto by this phrase is the concrete thing, a sound of some sort,
which possesses two properties:(1) that of being an articulateproduct
of the speech organs, and (2) that of having a meaning established by
' '
linguistic convention. The formeris indicated by the term vox and
4
'
'
the latter by a term like sermo or nomen'
, for it is one of Abailard's
basic points that the very same thingcan be subject to both of these.
Abailard is playing here with a notion very akin to that of a
substratum,although he never, so far as I know, is led to espouse a
mysterioussubstratumof itselfdivorced fromall formsand properties,
such as Aristotleproposes in Metaphysics
VII, 3.
As forthe phrase haecmateriaSocratis9
, Prof, de Rijk complains (p.
87) that my translation of this as 'this matter of Socrates' gives the
erroneous impressionthatAbailard is talkingabout Socrates' material
component, and should instead be translatedas a genitivus
explicativus
construction,viz. as 'This material thing,viz. Socrates'. But it seems
to me that in fact it is "Socrates' material component" that Abailard
is talkingabout here, and the genitiveis partitive,not explicative. The
passage in question fromLNPS , p. 524 should be compared with ones
in TC where Abailard talks about a wax image and the wax that is its
matter. (See TC III, par. 140, and IV, par. 86.) The point of these
passages is to note that although the wax and the waxen image are the
same essence, it is not true that all the predicatesapplicable to one are
applicable to the other. For example, the wax is not made fromwax
even though the waxen image is; and the waxen image is not the
18
12:44:40 PM
matterof the waxen image even though the wax is. Much the same
point is made with respect to Socrates and the material making him
up in a passage at TC IV, par. 40. I shall translatethis passage since
it amounts to a gloss by Abailard himselfon the passage in LNPS we
are discussing:11
as we notedearlier,thereare manyitemsthatare thesamein
Furthermore,
thisespecially
number
whosenamesarenevertheless
bypredication;
disjoined
occurswherethenounscontaina certain
relational
force,sinceeveryrelation
is thematter
exists
between
thesameinnumber
ofSocrates
Certainly
opposites.
ofSocrates
andtheperpetual
alsothepriorelement
andSocrates,
andSocrates,
ofSocratesandSocrates,
element
sincethisbodyor thisanimalarein factthe
of
sameas Socrates.Andyetit is notrightto saythatSocratesis thematter
he is thesameitemwhichis thematter
ofSocrates,
or
eventhough
Socrates,
he
thathe is priortoSocrates,
i.e. tohimself,
or thathe is perpetual,
although
is thatwhichis perpetual,
namelythisbody.
The point, then, that Abailard is tryingto make by contrasting
Haec materiaSocratisestSocrates
with
Socratesest materiaSocratis
is that a shiftof a phrase fromsubject position to predicate position
can shiftthe sense of the predication fromone which asserts an identityof essence to one which asserts that a relation belongs to something. (We should recall that earlier in the passage from LNPS
Abailard has made this distinctionbetween predicating a propertyof
somethingand predicatingthe thingthat has that property.See supra
9
pp. 13-14.) In view of this it is clear that materiaSocratis indeed
does referto Socrates' materialcomponent,contraryto Prof. de Rijk's
conjecture. Also I doubt that we should followProf. de Rijk by inser'
'
'
'
ting haec before materiain the second sentence, even though this is
'
'
requiredto make the second the formalconverse of the first.The haec
is there in the firstsentence to make sure we read the proposition as
assertingthat one thingis the same in essence as the other. Its insertion in the second would encourage a like reading of it and thus
produce a sentence which would notstrikethe reader as absurd, and
thus the contrastwould be lost.
11p. 282(580)- p. 283(590):Praetera,
numero
eadem
multa
utsuprameminimus,
,
sunt,
visquaedam
nomina
sunt
relationis
tamen
disiuncta
, quodmaxime
facit
quorum
perpraedicationem
consistt.
inter
Idem
omnis
relatio
cumvidelicet
continetur,
quippe
quaeinillisnominibus
opposita
etperpetuum
Socratis
et
estnumero
etSocrates,
etpriusSocratis
etSocrates,
materia
Socratis
cumvidelicet
sitquodSocrates
diciconvenit
sivehocanimal
idem
hoccorpus
Socrates,
; tamen
aututsitprior
utSocrates
sitmateria
sitidem
Socratis,
Socrate,
Socratis,
quodestmateria
quamvis
sithocquodestperpetuum,
licet
hoccorpus.
hocestseipso,aututsitperpetuus,
utpote
19
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
12:44:40 PM
22
12:44:40 PM
Postscript
L. M. DE RIJ
I might
havegiventhatI didnot
I wouldverymuchliketoeliminate
anyimpression
valueProfessor
hisresponse
as a conTweedale'swork.I greatly
highly
appreciate
tothediscussion
venture'
tribution
twelfth
century
concerning
logic,the'fascinating
in whichAbelardwasso deeplyinvolved.
Thereare a fewsourcesofmisunderstanding
whichI wouldliketo remove.
thatthe
a. ad L.I. 117,2-7. I admitthatI started
fromthe(wrong?)assumption
thattheuser(Abelard!)doesnotsharetheviewmenEnglish
phraseasthough
implies
to
tioned.I did notsay thatour rendering
of quasishouldimplyhis adherence
viewinthis
hisadherence
view.(Incidentally,
inmyopinion
toAristotle's
Aristotle's
I do notwishto treatrerum
in thephrase
connection
is a surething.)Moreover,
4as a different
as Tweedale
sortofpartitive
rerum
digniora
(r! De Rijk) genitive',
Socratis
assumes;it is a commonuse of thepossessive
genitive
just as in manus
a handis a man'spart
, tobe sure).EveryLatinist
maytellyouthata Latin
(although
orpoculum
is a different
vint).
thingaltogether
partitive
genitive
(e.g. in ubiterrarum
thestringency
ofwhatI have
b. Professor
Tweedaleis certainly
rightin rejecting
thegenitivus
calledthe'goldenrule'(concerning
Indeed,MedievalLatin
explicativus).
s own
Abelard'
rex'
. The evidence
he adducesfrom
ofphrases
suchas lnomen,
admits
fromother
withexamples
textsis quiteconvincing
and couldeasilybe augmented
between
authors.
However,
'type'and 'submythesisaboutTweedale'sdistinction
aboutthiscontroversy
type'isnotaffected
bythat.I wouldliketoleavethejudgement
c. ad LNPS, 532,30-42.Again,
toothers,
between
Tweedaleandmyself
(andothers)
construcareparticipai
as hocvoce
locatedattheheadofa sentence
suchphrases
prolata
It is strictly
tions(incasu,an ablativus
againstLatinidiomtotaketheparabsolutus).
in suchcases.
ticipleas usedadjectivally,
(and render:'by thisspokenexpression')
If 'thisexpression
is awkward
English(as, no doubt,its
havingbeenpronounced'
thephrasesomething
areas well)onemustrender
inDutchandGerman
counterparts
our Latin
WhenI was a schoolboy
like:'whenthiswordhas beenpronounced'.
thisidiomintous. As oftenas we triedtoexplain
wouldnottireofdinning
teacher
he
as youwillunderstand)
awayouroffences
againstthatidiom(quiteinventively,
on thedesksayingthefinalwords:'a language'sidiomis notto
wouldbanghisfists
readyour
be understood,
but onlyto be seen and be accepted.And therefore,
Caesar!'
a review
I havea confession
tomake.The onlyreasonformetoattempt
Finally,
ofTweedale'sfinebookwashisremark
, mindyou!)that"he [Abelard]
(inhisPreface
''
knew
tobemisleading
inwayshehimself
andtalks
contradicts
himself
so frequently
(my
a
shred
not
book
does
I
been
to
see
that
Tweedale's
have
give
always
happy
italics).
of evidenceforthisodd thesisof his. However,someof mystudents
appealto
contraditions
somesupposed
oftheir
viewsconcerning
indefence
Tweedale'sauthority
manoeuvres
on thepartofAbelard.So I decidedtocometo
andsupposed
misleading
loveamongtheMedievais!)againsthisattackers.
thedefence
ofAbelard(myfirst
Whatan improper
motivation
fora review,
say,Andhowrightyouare!
youmight
23
12:44:46 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Five Early Theoriesin theMediaeval 'nso'uhi''3.~ Literature
PAUL VINCENT SPADE
Mediaeval logicians, fromat least the second halfof the twelfthcentury,devoted much time and effortto semantic paradoxes of the Liar
9
type ("This sentence is false' or "This sentence is not true"). Such
'
paradoxes were called insolubilia"- "insolubles".1 Despite the term
most authors were convinced that it was in fact possible to "solve"
such paradoxes; the solution was just very difficultto find.2It is not
surprising,therefore,that we see a wide varietyof suggestedsolutions
in the mediaeval literatureon thisproblem.3It is purpose of thispaper
to examine and survey such solutions during the early historyof that
mediaeval literature.
I
The earliestknown mediaeval discussions ofparadoxes like the Liar
took place in the middle or late twelfthcentury.In his Arsdisserendi
, for
1 Thisclaimneedssome
In factfewauthors
togivea rigorous
qualification.
attempted
ofan insoluble,
definition
andthosewhodidtrygavedefinitions
thatwereeither
too
broador toonarrow
tofittheirintentions
oreventheirpractice.
Someauthors
considered
undertheheadingof1'insolubilia"
variousparadoxes
orpuzzlesthatbearlittle
relation
totheLiar.See,forexample,
Ca. 8, sophisms
1-6,
JohnBuridan's
Sophismata,
'
inJohn
Buridan
OnSelfa Translation
, with
,
Reference:
Sophismata'
Chapter
Eight
ofBuridan's
anIntroduction
, anda philosophical
, G. E. Hughes,ed. & tr.,(Cambridge:
Commentary
onpp. 141-161.
In
Press,1982),pp.38-61,witha commentary
University
Cambridge
thepaperback
whichincludes
thetranslation
andcommentary
butomitsthe
edition,
Latintext,thecorresponding
ofthe
pagesarepp.34-45andpp.80-100.Foranedition
entireSophismata
Buridanus
T. K. Scott,ed., (Grammatica
, seeJohannes
, Sophismata,
vol. 1, Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
Speculativa,
1977),translated
by. . ScottinJohn
Buridan
: Sophisms
onMeaning
andTruth
NewYork
, (Century
Sourcebooks,
Philosophy
theseotherkindsofparadoxes,
itwasvariations
on the
1966).Butnotwithstanding
Liarparadoxthatappeartohavebeenthecentral
concern
oftheinsolubilia-iiterature.
2 See thediscussion
ofthisattitude
in myintroduction
to WilliamHeytesbury,
On
11
: Chapter
Insoluble"
Sentences
OneofHisRules
, PaulVincent
forSolving
Sophisms
Spade,
vol.21,Toronto1979),pp. 7-11.Heytesbury
tr.,(MediaevalSourcesinTranslation,
is theonlymediaeval
himself
authorI knowwhodidnotsharethisoptimistic
view,
andevenhe wasnotaltogether
consistent
aboutthematter.
See ibid.
3 Fora survey
ofthismediaeval
seeFrancesco
Leantinomie
semantiche
literature,
Bottin,
nellalogicamedievale
Liar.A
, (Padua 1976);and Paul VincentSpade, TheMediaeval
vol.5, Toronto1975).
Literature,
oftheInsolubiliaCatalogue
(SubsidiaMediaevalia,
24
12:44:58 PM
4
instance, writtenin 1132, Adam of Balsham asks "Whether he lies
who says nothingbut that he lies,"5 and also "Whether he says the
'
truthwho says nothingbut thathe lies' .6 These are the earliestknown
mediaeval formulationsofthe Liar-sentence. But Adam presentsthem
as examples of an altogetherdifferent
point. He says nothingwhatever
to indicate that he was aware of the very specialiproblems theypose,
that theywere currenttopics of philosophical discussion in his day, or
how one mightgo about tryingto answer those questions.7
Nevertheless, there is other evidence to indicate that the special
problems associated with such sentences were realized and discussed
by the second half of the twelfth century if not before.8 The
, for instance, includes the following
anonymous DialcticaMonacensis
remark in its account of the Aristotelian fallacy secundumquid et
: "But how this fallacy arises in utteringthe insoluble 4 am
simplicter
saying a falsehood', that is a matterdiscussed in the treatise on insolubles."9 This passage, from some time in the second half of the
twelfthcentury,10contains the firstknown occurrence of the word 4n4 On thedate,seeAdamBalsamiensis
ArsDisserendi
,
Alexandi)
(.Dialctica
Parvipontani
LorenzoMinio-Paluello,
ed., (Twelfth
Century
Logic:Textsand Studies,vol. 1,
had
Roma1956),p. xxi.Thisdatemustbe usedwithsomecaution.TheArsdisserendi
in1132,is
Thefirst,
which
atleasttworecensions.
appearstogobacktoAdamhimself
is quitedifferent
and
foronlypartof thetext.The secondrecension
preserved
thissecond
later.The passagesfrom"Adam" quotedbelowcomefrom
presumably
thattheywerepresentin theoriginal.Thereis
thereis no guarantee
recension;
' who
"Alexander'
toa certain
thetextoftheArsdisserendi
evidence
,
linking
manuscript
a
Adam's
school
later
member
of
withAlexander
isperhaps
tobeidentified
Neckham,
inanycasehas
Neckham
seeibid.
atthePetitPont.On allthesematter,
, pp.xiii-xxii.
a rolein ourstory.
See below.
5 Ibid.,p. 86.21-22:"An mentiatur
dicit."(Alltranslations
qui nichilnisise mentiri
in thispaperaremyown.)
6 Ibid., p. 107.26-27:
dicit."See alsoibid.
"An veredicatqui nichil
nisise mentiri
, p.
dicit."
107.25-26:
"An vereenuntiet
qui se mentiri
7 See thediscussion
of thesepassagesin Paul VincentSpade, TheOrigins
ofthe
in: Franciscain
Mediaeval
Studies,33 (1973),pp. 292-309at pp.
Insolubilia-Li/^ra/wr^,
294-295.
8 I didnottakesufficient
accountofthisevidencin myTheOrigins
oftheMediaeval
ofindiscussions
thattheearliestexplicit
whereI maintained
Insolubilia
-Literature,
cenofthethirteenth
before
thebeginning
solubilia
couldnotbe datedwithcertainty
tury.
9 See L. M. De Rijk,Logica
totheHistory
A Contribution
Modernorum:
ofEarlyTerminist
andEarly
, (Assen1967),
, vol.II: TheOrigin
oftheTheory
ofSupposition
Logic
Development
indictione
illiusinsolubilis:
Part2, p. 594.30-31:
lego
"Qualiterautemfiathecfallacia
" The "treatise
oninsolubles"
is
dico
intractatu
de insolubilibus.
, hochabetur
falsum*
as wehaveittoday.See ibid.,n, 1.
notcontained
in theDialctica
Monacensis
10On thedate,seeibid.,Part1, pp. 410-414.
25
12:44:58 PM
' as a technicaltermforthiskind of
solubile
paradoxical sentence,11and
shows that already separate treatiseswere devoted to the topic. By
itself,however, the passage provides no evidence that the special, antinomial nature of such sentences was understood.
Such evidence is unequivocally to be found, however, in another
late twelfthcenturytext. Alexander Neckham, in his De naturisrerum
,
writes:12
else,he sayssomeproposition.
sayshelies,andsaysnothing
Again,ifSocrates
ifSocrates
a trueoneora falseone.Therefore,
either
Therefore,
saysonlythathe
lies,hesayswhatis trueorwhatisfalse.ButifSocrates
saysonlytheproposition
lies.Andif
thatSocrates
lies,andhesayswhatistrue,thenitistruethatSocrates
ifSocrates
itistruethatSocrates
lies,Socrates
says
sayswhatisfalse.Therefore,
thatSocrates
lies,andhesayswhatis true,hesayswhatis
onlytheproposition
thatSocrates
false.ButifSocrates
lies,andhesayswhat
saysonlytheproposition
is false,thenit is falsethatSocratessayswhatit false.Andifit is falsethat
doesnotsaywhatisfalse.ButifSocrates
Socrates
says
sayswhatis false,Socrates
ifSocrates
whatistrueorwhatis false.Therefore,
onlythathelies,hesayseither
ifSocrates
saysonlythathelies,and
sayshelies,hesayswhatistrue.Therefore,
he sayswhatis false,thenhe sayswhatis true.ButifSocrates
saysonlythathe
ifSocrates
lies,he sayswhatis trueorfalse.Therefore,
saysonlythathelies,he
sayswhatis trueandsayswhatis false.
This text shows a clear understandingof the problem sometime in
the late twelfthcentury.13On the other hand, Neckham gives these
11On theclaimthatsucha useofthetermmaybe found
as earlyas 1159inJohnof
Metalo
Mediaeval
Insolubilia
, seeSpade,TheOrigins
-Literature,
Salisbury's
gicon
ofthe
pp.
295-296.
12Alexander
De naturis
libriduo, withthePoemoftheSameAuthor
rerum
Neckham,
, De
laudibus
MediiAevi
divinae
, ThomasWright,
ed., (RerumBritannicarum
sapientiae
andMemorials
orChronicles
ofGreatBritain
andIrelandduring
theMidScriptores,
KrausReprint,
dleAges(RollsSeries),no.34; London1863;reprinted
1967),p. 289:
et nihilaliuddicit,dicitaliquodenuntiabile,
"Item,si Sortesdicitse mentiri,
ergo
dicitverum
verum
velfalsum;
se mentiri,
velfalsum,
sedsi
ergosi Sortesdicittantum
etdicitverum,
menSortesdicittantum
idquodestSortem
verum
estSortem
mentiri,
Sortesdicitfalsum;
id
mentiri,
tiri,et siverumestSortem
ergosi Sortesdicittantum
et dicitverum,dicitfalsum;
sed si Sortesdicittantum
id
quod estSortemmentiri,
etdicitfalsum,
falsum
estSortem
dicerefalsum,
etsifalsum
mentiri,
quodestSortem
sementiri,
estSortem
dicerefalsum,
Sortesnondicitfalsum;
sedsiSortes
dicittantum
dicitverum;ergosi Sortesdicit
dicitverumvelfalsum;
ergosi Sortesdicitse mentiri,
se mentiri,
se mentiri,
etdicitfalsum,
dicitverum;sedsi Sortesdicittantum
tantum
se mentiri,
dicitverumet dicit
dietverumvel falsum;ergosi Sortesdicittantum
oftheparadox,ibid.,pp. 289-290,
falsum."Alexander
goeson togiveotherversions
inDe Rijk,op.
arereproduced
formypresent
butthissuffices
point.Allthesepassages
cit., Part1, pp. 290-291.
13ThedateoftheDe naturis
inuncertain,
itwasapparenty
wellknown
rerum
although
toNeckham,
See Wright's
introduction
at theendofthecentury.
op.cit, pp. xiii-xiv.
ofAdamof
Neckham
wasbornin 1157.(Ibid., p. ix.) In viewoftheabovediscussion
hadstudied
at thePetitPont,at the
thatNeckham
Balsham,itis perhaps
significant
26
12:44:58 PM
versions of the paradox only as examples of the kinds of ' 'vanities' '
one deals with in dialectic. He offersno indication of how one
'
"
might- or did- tryto solve' them.
It is not until the turnof the centurythatwe findstillextantdiscussions that not only show an explicit awareness of the antinomial
featuresof insolubilia
, but also offeror referto more or less identifiable
to
resolve
them.14From that time on, we can distinguish
attempts
threemain stages in the mediaeval development of this literature:15
about1200toroughly
1320.
(1) An earlyorseminalstage,from
andsophisticated
centered
atMerton
stageofintense
(2) A short
activity,
mainly
from
about1320untilabout1350.
College,Oxford,
around1350totheendoftheMiddleAges,16
a periodthat,
(3) A latestage,from
schoolfounded
thatbothAdam
byAdam.{Ibid.,p. x.) It is perhapsalsosignificant
andNeckham
wereEnglishmen.
De Rijk(op.cit., Part1, p. 290)remarks
that"all the
thesesdiscussed
in thetextcontaining
thepassagecitedabove"are
byAlexander"
foundin theArsMeliduna,"whichhe datesbetween1154and 1180(ibid.,pp.
andattributes
toa Frenchman
, pp.279-280).ButI havebeenunableto
280-281)
(ibid.
locateanyunequivocal
references
toinsolubilia
inthedescription
andquotations
from
thisworkpublished
byDe Riik,ibid..Chs. 6-10,dd. 264-390.
14Theearliest
extant
treatise
ofthiskindis discussed
andeditedin L. M. De Rijk,
Some
Notes
onthe
Mediaeval
Tract
De insolubilibus,
with
Edition
the
the
ofa Tract
Dating
from
EndoftheTwelfth
4 (1966),pp. 83-115.
, in: Vivarium
Century
15See alsothediscussion
ofthesethreestagesin PaulVincent
, in:
Spade,Insolubilia
TheCambridge
et.al., eds.,
, NormanKretzmann,
History
ofLaterMedieval
Philosophy
accountofsomeofthedif(Cambridge
1982),Ch. 12, pp. 246-253.For another
' Metalferences
between
thefirst
twostages,see Francesco
Bottin,TheMertonians
Sciences
andtheInsolubilia,
in:P. OsmundLewry,
:
inguistic
ed., TheRiseofBritish
Logic
ActsoftheSixth
onMedieval
BalliolCollege,
European
Symposium
LogicandSemantics,
Oxford,
19-24
Vol. 7. Toronto
June1983,(PapersinMediaevalStudies,
19851),
pp. 235-248.
16Forthepost-mediaeval
ofinsolubilia,
seeE. J. Ashworth,
andLogic
history
Language
inthePost-Medieval
Historical
vol. 12,Dordrecht
Period,
(Synthese
Library,
1974),pp.
andE. J. Ashworth,
TheTreatment
Paradoxes
1400to1700,in:
101-117;
ofSemantic
from
NotreDameJournal
ofFormalLogic,13(1972),pp. 34-52.
17Thereweresome
forinstance,
theviewsofJohnWyclif
and
noteworthy
exceptions:
PeterofAilly.On Wyclif
s viewas contained
inhisLogicae
seeSpade,The
continuado,
Mediaeval
also wrotean independent
Summa
inLiar,itemxliii,pp. 74-76.Wyclif
in somemanuscripts
attributed
toJohnTarteys.
to
solubilium,
(TheworkI attributed
ibid.
s Summa
SeeJohnWyclif,
, itemxl,p. 70,is in factWyclif
Tarteys
insolubilium.)
Summa
PaulVincent
insolubilium,
SpadeandGordonA. Wilson,eds.,(Binghamton,
NY: Medieval& Renaissance
Texts& Studies,forthcoming).
The treatise
described
as itemxliv,andtentatively
attributed
toWyclif,
in TheMediaeval
Liar,pp. 76-77,isin
factnotbyWyclif
at all (although
it is influenced
by him),butrather
by Robert
See L. M. De Rijk,Logica
AnAttempt
Oxoniensis:
toReconstruct
a Fifteenth
CenAlyngton.
ManualofLogic
, in; Medioevo,3 (1977),pp. 121-164at pp. 139-140.On
tury
Oxford
PeterofAilly
's view,seePaulVincent
andInsolubles
, An
Spade,Peter
ofAilly:Concepts
Annotated
Historical
vol. 19,Dordrecht
Translation,
(Synthese
Library,
1980).Peter's
viewsappeartobe derived
inpartfrom
thoseofGregory
ofRiminiandMarsilius
of
morefully.See ibid.
Inghenin waysthatneedto be investigated
, introduction,
pp.
6-7.
27
12:44:58 PM
areconcerned,
wasdevoted
tothecareful
elaboration
as faras insolubilia
mainly
ofviewsoriginally
thesecondstage.17
andrefinement
developed
during
The turningpoint between the firstand the second of these stages
was the Insolubiliaof Thomas Bradwardine, writtenprobably between
1320 and 1324. 18The topic of this paper, therefore,is the insolubilialiteraturefromthe turn of the twelfth/thirteenth
centuryto the time of
Bradwardine.
In my earlier paper "The Origins of the Mediaeval InsolubiliaLiterature,"19I investigatedpossible sources forthe mediaeval discussion of these paradoxes. The resultsof thatpaper need not be rehearsed here, except to note that the mediaeval literatureseems to have
taken its inspirationfroma passage in Aristotle'sSophisticielenchithat
perhaps suggestsbut by no means explicitlyformulatesthe antinomy.
In that passage, part of the treatmentof the fallacy secundum
quid et
a
that
he
will
case
of
man
who
swears
mentions
the
Aristode
,
simpliciter
commit perjuryand then does so. Is that man a perjureror not? AbAristotlesays, he is; it is only in a certain respect
solutely(simpliciter),
( secundumquid), namely with respect to the particular oath that he
would commitperjury,thathe keeps his oath.20Aristotlethen goes on
18On thedate,seeJamesA. Weisheipl,
andSome
in: Mediaeval
Ockham
Mertonians,
in MarieLouise
Studies,30 (1968),pp. 163-213,at p. 190.The textis published
duXIVe
de
etaudbut
insolubles
auXIIIesicle
despropositions
, suivie
Roure,La problmatique
et Th. Bradwardine
de W. Shyreswood
l'dition
destraits
, in: Archives
, W. Burleigh
du moyen
etlittraire
d'histoire
doctrinale
ge,37(1970),pp.205-326atpp.285-326.
seePaulVincent
Thiseditionmustbe usedwithcaution.On Bradwardine's
theory,
in:Medioevo,7 (1981),pp.
andBradwardine's
ofSignification,
Theory
Spade,Insolubilia
were
115-134.The othermajortheories
duringthissecondstageoftheliterature
On Swyneshed's
andWilliamHeytesbury's.
view,seePaulVinRogerSwyneshed's
d'histoire
andComments
Edition
Insolubilia:
centSpade,Roger
, in:Archives
Swyneshed's
andPaulVicentSpade,
etlittraire
du moyen
doctrinale
ge,46(1979),pp. 177-220;
Semantic
Notions
A Study
,
ofSome
ofHisPreliminary
Theory
ofInsolubilia:
Roger
Swyneshed's
of
in: AchimEschbachandJrgen
, (Foundations
Trabant,eds.,History
ofSemiotics
see
vol. 7, Amsterdam
theory,
Semiotics,
1983),pp. 105-113.On Heytesbury's
Heytesbury,
op.cit.
19See n. 7 above.
20Aristotle,
xa
x8efxfjSe,
, 24, 180a38-bl:out'eteopxe
vyxrj
Refutations
Sophistic
if
8ou.("Neither,
toutofivov,
8' fiaa
eopxel
euopxeT
Triopxcv
mopxriaetv
euopxttv,
that
orkeepshisoathinthis
hekeepsthisoath[tocommit
way,isitnecessary
perjury],
hewhoswearshewillcommit
Rather
healsokeephisoath[without
perqualification].
toa secondoath]only;he
thisperjury
[withrespect
jurykeepshisoathincommitting
The textis veryobscure;in pardoesnotkeephis oath[without
qualification].")
two
doesnotunambiguously
Aristotle
ticular,
saythatthecasehehasinmindinvolves
I
thefirst.
oathfulfilling
anda second(perjured)
oaths,theoneoathtocommit
perjury
andthirteenth
havereconstructed
thecaseas itwas generally
bytwelfth
interpreted
InsolubilaSee Spade, TheOrigins
Latincommentators.
oftheMediaeval
century
Literature
, pp. 302-306.
28
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
whotakesucha namebecause
Theeighth
is thatofthe"distinguishes",
opinion
ofthefactthat,whenSocratessaysthatSocratesis sayinga falsehood,
they
anexercised
theequivocation
in'say'.Foritcansignify
ora consaying
distinguish
ceived
Thesaying
thatisintheprocess
ofbeingsaidandis notcompletely
saying.
orin
saidtheycalltheexercised
saying.Butwhena manearliersayssomething,
someway,andata laterinstant
saysthathesaysthat,orinthatway,theycallit
theconceived
saying.
Note that Bradwardine contraststhe exercised act with the conceived
'
4
act; he does not use the term actussignificatusas Scotus did.67 Note
also that Bradwardine interpretsthe theoryhe describes in such a way
that it is committedto a formof transcasus.Scotus' theoryis perhaps
not committedto this. He does say:68
Nowthatinthiscasethere
thisis clearfrom
thefactthat
is falsehood
absolutely,
an expression
is saidtobe absolutely
falsebecauseitis a signofthefalse.Forone
whobeginsto speaklikethis[namely,
T am sayinga falsehood']
saysnothing
thatmight
be false.Ifheweretosaythata manisan ass,orsomething
likethat,
wouldbe true.
[then]this['I am sayinga falsehood']
But, although it is a plausible interpretation,there is nothing explicitlyin this passage (or anywhereelse in Scotus' discussion) to indicate that the ' 'other" falsehood that would make I am saying a
falsehood' true would have to be a priorfalsehood; it mightverywell,
forinstance, be a falsehood the speaker is just about to say.69
Later in the fourteenthcentury,the distinctionbetween exercised
and signifiedacts is mentioned by Marsilius of Inghen- and through
him by Peter of Ailly- in the contextof the paradoxes, although it is
not clear that theyhad Scotus' doctrineparticularlyin mind.70Indeed
Scotus himselfmakes it clear thathe is not the firstto apply the distinction between exercised and signifiedacts to the paradoxes:71
67Giventhe close linkagebetweenthenotionsof
in
and thought
signification
mediaeval
thisterminological
notespecialy
is perhaps
semantics,
disparity
significant.
See Paul VincentSpade, TheSemantics
, in: TheCambridge
ofTerms
History
ofLater
Medieval
, Ch. 9, pp. 188-196.
Philosophy
68Scotus,op.cit.,q. 53,p. 269:"Quod autemcircaipsumsitfalsitas
hoc
simplicter,
falsa,quia estsignum
falsi,quoniamsic
patetperhoc,quodoratiodicitur
simpliciter
esseasinum,
vel
Si enimdiceret
hominem
incipiens
loqui,nihildicit,quodsitfalsum.
haecessetvera."
aliquidhuiusmodi,
69In hisonlyargument
adoppositum
inq. 53,Scotussays"...sed haecoratioestfalsa
sicloqui,cumnihilpriusdixit,etcetera."(...
'Egodicofalsum'
quamdicitincipiens
buttheexpression
'I am sayinga falsehood',
whichhe sayswhobeginsto talkthis
hesaidnothing
earlier
, andso on.") Scotusagreeswiththissideofthe
way,is falsesince
buthedoesnotexplicitly
onewayortheother
aboutthisarguquestion,
sayanything
mentforit.
70See Spade,Peter
, p. 69, par.262,andp. 143nn. 692-693.
ofAilly
71Ibid. : "Quod autem
sic incipiens
loqui sit verussecundumquid diversimode
a diversis.
ponitur
Quidamenimponunt
quodestverussecundum
quidquiacircaali37
12:44:58 PM
ina certain
is maintainButthathewhobeginstospeaklikethisis true72
respect
thatheis truein a
ed in different
waysbydifferent
people.Forsomemaintain
aboutsomefalseexis exercised
becausean actofspeaking
certain
truly
respect
In another
respect
way,itissaidthathewhosaysthisistrueina certain
pression.
tobe
theproposition
actthecaseis understood
becauseintheexercised
through
actthatanexpression
theexercised
thecase.Butbecauseitisnotfrom
as isreally
suchanexpression
issaidtobetrue
is saidtobeabsolutely
trueorfalse,therefore
an act
actitis understood
thatheexercises
Forintheexercised
ina certain
respect.
andthatis truein reality.
of"saying"abouta falsehood,
Scotus' theoryis an amalgam of several lines of thought.There is,
firstof all, the distinctionbetween exercised and signifiedacts, which
is what I am emphasizing here. In addition, theremay or may not also
But in any case, insofaras the theoryis combe a version of transcasus.
mittedto saying that the exercised act and the signifiedact are two,
not one, Scotus is also committedto some kind of restrictionon the
possibilityof self-reference.This brings us to the next main theoryI
want to discuss.
VI
There remain two other importantviews during thisearly period of
The firstis called " restriction
the insolubilia-litcrditurc.
("restriction"),
. This view rejectsthe possibilityof selfthe view of the "restringentes"
referencein some or all cases. The kind of "reference" at stake here is
"supposition" a property of categorematic terms that occur in a
sentence.73Thus the characteristicquestion with which this view was
concerned, and which it answered in the negative, was whether "a
part can supposit forthe whole of which it is a part".
Some authors also considered more complicated kinds of
pathological reference,and denied not only thata termin a sentenceP
can supposit forP itself,but also that it can supposit forthe contradictoryof P , or foranother sentence Q,thatis logically equivalent to P, or
aliterquodsicdicensest
exercetur
vereactusdicendi.Dicitur
falsam
quamorationem
sicutestinre.
verussecundum
intelligitur
perpropositionem
quid,quia actuexercito
veravelfalsa,ideotalisoratio
nondicitur
oratiosimpliciter
Sedquia ab actuexercito
actum
secundum
dicitur
quodipseexercet
intelligitur,
quidvera.Actuenimexercito
et illudin reestverum."
dicendicircafalsum,
72Scotusspeaks,bothhereandthroughout
ofthespeaker
thequestion,
, andnotjust
as beingtrueor false.Indeedthetitleofhis q. 53 is:
thespeaker'sproposition,
verusin dicendo?"
sic loqui 'Ego dico falsum'sit simpliciter
"Utrumincipiens
true
isabsolutely
a falsehood'
hewhobeginstospeaklikethis'I amsaying
("Whether
Dicens
: "Ad oppositum.
forthisusageis givenibid.
Thejustification
in[so]saying?")
a qualitatesui dieti...." ("On the oppositeside: A speakeris
denominatur
valueofwhatis said- ")
denominated
bythetruth
73On supposition,
see Spade,TheSemantics
ofTerms.
38
12:44:58 PM
that in turn contains a term that supposits for P , and so on.74 They
were worried not just about the case in which Socrates says only
'Socrates is saying a falsehood', but also about cases where, for instance:
(a) Socrates says only 'What Plato is saying is true', and Plato says
only 'What Plato is saying is false'. Here Plato's sentence is an immediate and directinsoluble. But no matterhow one chooses to handle
Plato's sentence, there is still a problem with Socrates' sentence.
Socrates' sentence is simply the contradictorynegation of Plato's
sentence,so thatthe two must presumbalyhave opposite truthvalues.
Hence, by saying that its contradictoryis true, Socrates' sentence
seems in effectto be saying that it itselfis false, and so in this indirect
way to be an insoluble too.
(b) Socrates says only 'What Plato is saying is false' and Plato also
says 'What Plato is saying is false'. Again, Plato's sentence is a direct
insoluble. But Socrates' sentence is not; it does not referto itself
' it
refersto Plato's sentence, a different"token" of the same "type".75
But however one handles Plato's sentence, the two sentences are
duplicates of one another, both syntacticallyand semantically(they
referto exactlythe same thingand make exactlythe same claim about
it, thatit is false), so thattheyare presumablylogicallyequivalent and
have the same truthvalue. Hence, by apparentlysaying thatitslogical
equivalent is false, Socrates' sentence seems in effectto be saying that
it itselfis false too.
(c) Socrates says 'What Plato is saying is false' and Plato says 'What
Socrates is sayingis true'. Here, apparently,what Socrates says is true
if and only if what Plato says is false- that is, if and only if what
Socrates says is nottrue. Hence, what Socrates says is true if and only
if it is not true, which is paradoxical.
In such cases the restringentes
said that this kind of referenceor supcannot
occur.
When Plato, for instance, says only
position simply
'What Plato says is false', the term'false' therecannot referto or sup74See Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, itemxxx,pp. 55-56(HenryofEngland),anditem
101-102(RogerRoseth).Virtually
is knownaboutthemysterious
lxii,
pp.
nothing
'
'Henryof England";eventhenameis uncertain.
RogerRosethwroteprobably
after
Bradwardine.
I havebeenunabletofindanyauthorwhowrote
slightly
definitely
beforeBradwardine
and whorejected
of referential
thesemorecomplicated
forms
Theremusthavebeensome,however,
sinceBradwardine
takesgreatpains
pathology.
toarerue
againstsucha view.See Roure,oto.cit.,pp. 287-293,para.2.00-4.11.
75Manymediaeval
authors
heldthatitis thesentence-token,
notthetypeand not
some"proposition"
thatis thebeareroftruth
value.
expressed
bythesentence,
39
12:44:58 PM
12:44:58 PM
in two
It is perhaps because of this that we find the theoryof restrictio
a strong form and a weak form.
forms in the insolubilia-literature,
rules out all self-referencewhatever,79and leaves itself
Strongrestrictio
rules out selfopen to the criticismjust mentioned. Weak restrictio
referenceonly in the case of insolubilia.It is sometimesdifficultor even
in its
impossible to tell whether an author is maintaining restrictio
strongor its weak form.Nevertheless,at least this much can be said.
was maintained by
Before Bradwardine, the strong form of restrictio
item 4 in the above list, the anonymous mid-thirteenthcenturytext
that adopts the theoryof transcasus
; by item 5, the anonymous text
sometimes ascribed to William of Sherwood; by item 9, Simon of
Faversham, with a qualification;80and by Scotus, item 10, with the
same qualification.81Curiously, although the author of item 5 accepts
'
the restringentes
rejectionof self-reference,he does not thinkthis alone
will adequately solve the paradoxes.82His own theoryin effectaccepts
and supposition
theirview, but is cast in termsof suppositionsimpliciter
item
13 on the above
is
also
restrictio
secundum
accepted by
quid. Strong
is said by Socrates',becauseSocratessaysnothingelse.
expression
'Something
forthiswhole
is saidbySocrates'can supposit
thesubjectof'Something
Therefore,
[sentence].")
79Andperhaps
in (a)-(c) above.
discussed
alsotheotherkindsofreference
80SimonofFaversham,
Simon,doesnotruleoutsuchsupposiop.cit.,p. 167.88-95.
in a
butsaysthatit is "improper".A termcontained
tionor reference
altogether,
forthatwholesentence.
asa part
cannot
sentence
Yet,asa universal
, supposit
properly,
- itmayindeed
- thatis,as a general
toa wholerangeofthings
termreferring
whole
in
the
included
sentence
is
if
that
that
whole
sentence
for
range.Thisis a
supposit
itcomes
reference.
Nevertheless
restriction
onselfmodest
since,whatever
remarkably
and notjustto insolubilia
to applytoall sentences
, I haveincluded
to,itis intended
restrictio.
ofstrong
Simonamongthosewhoholda version
81Scotus,op.cit.,q. 52,p. 269.Forthequalification,
note.
seethepreceding
82See Roure,op.cit., p. 253,para.4.10: "Licetautemrestringentes
benedicantquo
prototo,maletamensol(quo]quoqueed.)ad hocquodparsnonpotestsupponere
concetotum
vunt,quia,cumconcedunt
processum
argumentum,
usquead ultimum
sic
medicerefalsum,
etcumproceditur
concedunt
duntopposita,
quia respondendo
estmedicerefalsum,
ergonondicofalsum',malenegantilludidem.
'ergofalsum
concedendum
estquod
Item,hecsolutiononestsecundum
Aristotelem;
propterea
etnonverasolutio."("Butalthough
restrictio
sitviainsolutionem
veram,utpatebit,
for
tothefactthata partcannotsupposit
arewell-spoken
withrespect
therestringentes
thewhole,nevertheless
theygivea bad solution.For,whentheygrantthewhole
Forin theirreply
process
up tothelastargument,
theygrantopposites.
[reasoning-]
Andwhen
a falsehood'].
thatI saya falsehood
they
grant
[whenI sayonly'I amsaying
it is falsethatI say a falsehood;
goeson as follows:'therefore
[their]argument
thesamething.
I donotsaya falsehood',
therefore,
Again,thissolutheywrongly
deny
thatrestrictio
isthe
itistobegranted
tionisnotinaccordance
withAristotle.
Therefore,
as willbe clear,andnotthetruesolution
[itself].")
waytothetruesolution,
41
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42
12:44:58 PM
VII
The fifthand last of the major early theories of insolubiliais the
'
"
theoryof "cassatio", the view of the "cassantes", those who nullify'
or "cancel" . On this theory,when one uttersan insoluble sentence,
he is not reallysayinganything.'Nil dicis' ("You are sayingnothing")
is the phrase characteristicof this view. This seems perhaps to mean
that what is said "lacks sense" or "fails to make a statement".
This view is a popular modern theoryalthough once again, in the
absence of any exact and independent characterization of the
paradoxes, the theorytends to be trivial:sentencesmake statementsor
have sense except when they cannot.
Cassatio was maintained by two of our early texts: item 1, the
anonymous textfromthe late twelfthor early thirteenthcentury;and
item 3, the anonymous text fromc. 1225.87 It is significant,I think,
that two of the earliest known treatmentsof insolubiliatake this quite
non-Aristotelianapproach to the paradoxes. Item 3, around 1225,
says that this view- which the author does not call cassatiobut rather
"
actus" ("abolishing the act") is "according to the common
interemptio
judgment" {secundumcommune
judicium).88 Formerly I took this as
evidence forthe widespread acceptance of this view in the early thirteenthcentury.But now I thinkthe authormeant only thatthe view of
the cassantesagrees with what the "common man" would say. The
author makes a rathercurious appeal to the "man-on-the-street": If
"
"
you were to approach a rusticus and say 'What I am saying is false',
he would reply that you are not saying anything: "M/ dicis. "89
Item 1 on our list, the earliest extant complete treatmentof insolubilia,already recognizesthatsome distinctionsand refinementsare
necessaryin order to make the view plausible. The author says that in
the case of an insoluble we have to deny that there is an act of saying
anything,since in general, with respect to any judgment or proposition ( enuntiabile
), we have to deny everythingthat would make it insoluble.90He then raises an objection:91
87In Spade,TheMediaeval
Liar, p. 43, I wrongly
saidthatthistextrejects
cassatio
.
88See ibid.
89Ibid.,p. 44.
90See De Rijk,Some
Notes
ontheMediaeval
Tract
De insolubilibus,
pp. 105.32-106.2.
91Ibid.,p. 106.3-16:"Sed contra.Dicere
nilaliudestquampriusasserere
et postea
Sedassertio
nonestcassanda,cumexipsanonsequatur
inconveniens.
Dato
proferre.
enimquod asseratur
et non proferatur,
inpunepotestsustineri
quod sit falsum.
Similiter
nonestcassandanecsoletcassari.Etitacumassertio
nonsitcassanprolatio
43
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12:44:58 PM
46
12:44:58 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Suarezon BeingsofReasonand Truth(1)
JOHN P. DOYLE
SectionI -
The tradition
: Plato,Aristotle
and thescholastics
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Theproblemregarding
beingsof reason
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then, beings of reason are contrastedwith both independent real beings and withthebeing ofbeing known in the second way inasmuch as
beings of reason have in themselvesonly the being of being known in
the firstway.47
Beings of reason in this proper sense exist only when they are actually being known.48Were it otherwise, they would in fact be real
beings, independentof the mind.49This will serve in a firstinstance to
differentiate
beings properlyof reason fromnegations and privations,
which, as we shall see, Suarez thinkscan "be" even withoutbeing
known. Also, as a result of this, beings of reason cannot truly and
properlybe said to endure (of themselves, that is, with intrinsicendurance), and yet we could imagine an endurance forthem (e.g. that
a centaur lived for 50 years).50
At thispoint, therefore,let us say thatbeing can be spoken ofin two
basic ways. In one way, it is real and independent of the mind. In
'
another, it has no realityapart frombeing thought.51When 'being"
ad talemrem,ethocipsumestremillamesseamatam."ibid.Notethat
terminatur
an opposite
situation
isapparently
i.e. thatessecognitum
as suchcanbe theobpossible,
jectofan actofloveordesireon thepartofthewill;cf.DM 23, 8, n. 9 (XXV, p.
ofthetextinDM 23 Suarezmakesitclear
880).Butalsonotethatinthecontinuation
thatinthiscasecognition
oressecognitum
as itisa
is anobjectofthewill,notinasmuch
offinalcausality,
condition
butinasmuch
as an actionofthe
as ithasessereale
itself
intellect.
47"... vocantur
entiarationis,
in intellectu."
DM
quia solumhabentesseobjective
2, s. 1, n. 1 (XXV, p. 65).
48"... hujusmodi
entiapropriesolumdicuntur
esse objectivein intellectu;
unde
solumsunt,quandocognoscuntur
autfinguntur
ab intellectu,
..." DM 3, s. 1, n. 10
(p. 106);cf.also:DM 6, s. 7, n. 2 (p. 229);DM 8, s. 2, n. 20 (p. 283);DM 25, 1, n. 5
IV, . 3, . 26 (III, p. 730).
(XXV, p. 900); andDe Anima
49
etiamquandonon cognoscuntur,
"Certe,si ejusmodientiarationisexisterent
realiaplaneessent:nonenimmedium
daturinteressefurtum
etreale:..." DeAnima
IV, c. 3, n. 26 (III, p. 730);cf.alsoDM 10,1, n. 4 (XXV, p. 329).
50Cf. "... resautemfictae,
autentiarationis,
vere proprie
nondicuntur
durare,
sed eo modoquo finguntur,
vel apprehenduntur
ac si vereexquia nonexistunt;
etiamac si durarent,
et hocipsumconvenit
velattribuitur
eis
isterent,
concipiuntur
" DM
duratetexistit
actusmentis,
velcuiobjiciuntur.
50,s.
quatenus
quo finguntur,
1, n. 1 (XXVI, p. 913). Amongthe17thcentury
Suarez,Thomas
Jesuits
following
universa.
, d. XVII, s. 1, nn. 1-2,Antwerpiae
ComptonCarleton
Logica
(Philosophia
tobe inplaceand
1649,p. 79)makesthepointthata beingofreasoncanbe imagined
therefore
tohavelocalmotion
timecouldbe founded).
(on whosesuccession
51"... de entedupliciter
tantum
vera
possenosloqui:unomodo,utcomprehendit
entiarealia,etillaomniatranscendit
etsubse continet.
Aliomodo,utextenditur
ad
entianonsunt,solumque
multa,quae vereetintrinsece
perquamdamattributionem
extrinsecam
entia dicuntur,
ut sunt privationes,
vel omninoper accidensaut
rationis."
Index
herethepossible
inIV, c. 2, q. 2 (XXV, xv). Letus remark
locup.
ference
to a "supertranscendental"
more
conceptof being.For suchan inference
55
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negative
negations
privations
simple
negations
impossible
things63
57Forthedistinction
and itslineage,cf.DM 54, s. 3, n. 1 (XXVI, p. 1026);for
Suarez'sownacceptance
ofit,cf.theentire
3.
section
58Forsomething
cf.alsoSt. Thomas,De Ventate
similar,
, q. 21, art.1.
59Cf.DM54, 4, n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1030).
60Cf.DM 54, s. 3, n. 8 (p. 1028).
61Cf. e.g.: A. Ruvio,S.J.,Logicamexicana.
Tractatus
denatura
entis
rationis
, dub. 3,
. , d. 19,s. 4, . 70
Lugduni1620,pp. 71-72;P. Hurtadode Mendoza,Disp.Metaph
ands. 5, . 87, Lugduni1624,pp. 953,955.JohnofSt. Thomas,O.P. Cursus
Phil.
a similar
Log.II, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Reiser,Taurini1930,p. 287)attributes
opinionto
Serna[Commentaria
in Logicam
Aristotelis
Sum, Hispali1624]and to Cabero[Brevis
mularum
ofthisunderstanding
fVallesoleti
recapitulado
1623].ForSuarez'sawareness
ofthedivision
ofbeingsofreason,cf.DM 54,4, nn. 2-9(XXVI, pp. 1029-1031).
62Cf. "Addereveropossumus
modumalium,quo iliadivisioadaequatasitde toto
enterationis,
subnegatione
entiafictaetimpossibilia,
..." DM 54,
comprehendendo
inreofallbeingsofreason,cf.textsin
4, n. 10(XXVI, p. 1031).Forthefoundation
notes79 and97 below.
63Forthiscoordination,
cf.esp.DM 54, 3, n. 8 (XXVI, p. 1028).Fora different
57
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tionspermodumaffirmationis
, we do not predicate the precise mode in
which we conceive them. Instead, we leave this mode aside and
predicate only what is conceived or ultimatelysignified,i.e. the lack
of some reality.71Accordingly, when a negation or a privation is
predicated in this second way, a way which is somewhat "odd or improper",72 it is signifiednot as positing some being or reality in its
subject, but ratheras removing such.73In this manner, inasmuch as
both remove rather than posit, the second way of composition
becomes equivalent to the firstway of division- and by the copula
which it contains there is not affirmedany positive realitybut "only
the truthof cognition".74
To be sure, explicitbeings of reason may be formedalong with, or
in the wake of, predicationsof negations and privationspermodumaf. 75 Thus negations and privations can become beings of
firmationis
reason precisely when we conceive them as positive independent
realities.76They are in this given, as it were, a certain ontological
densitywhich theywould not otherwisehave. Accordingly,he can at
timessay thatprivationas such is a being of reason.77But again, with
total consistency,he can say that privations as such are not fictions;
et privationis,
considerado
sunt,..." ibid.5, n. 6
negationis
quatenusentiarationis
(p. 1032);cf.ibid.3, n. 4, textin note69 justabove.
71Cf. "... in hisaffirmationibus
nonattribuitur
subjectomodusquo praedicatum
ut iliomodosubjectoattribuatur,
sed solumtribuiid quod concipitur,
concipitur,
seu privationem
nempenegationem
ipsam;..." DM 54, 5, n. 6 (XXVI, pp.
1032-1033).
72Cf. "... extraneus
seu improprius
modusconcipiendi
et praedicandi,
..." ibid.3,
n. 4 (p. 1027);alsosee ibid.5, n. 6, textin note68, above.
73Cf. "... nonsignificai
DM 11,3, . 8
ponerealiquid... sed potiusremovere."
(XXV, p. 366);alsosee:DM 54, 3, n. 3 (XXVI, p. 1027);ibid.1, n. 4 (p. 1016).
74"... in reiliaaffirmatio
ad remotionem
aequivalet
quantum
negationi
praedicati,
velsolumperillamcopulamaffirmatur
..." DM 54, 5, n. 6 (p.
Veritas
cognitionis,
1033).
75
Cf.DM 54,5, n. 6, textinnote68above;ibid.3, n. 4, textinnote76,immediately
following.
76Cf. "... ut haec nonsolumconcipiantur
a nobispurenegative,
sed etiamper
modumentispositivae;
habentrationem
sub qua consideratione
entis,nonrei,sed
4 Metaph.,cap. 2, ubiAristoteles
idemsentit."
utrecteD. Thomasnotavit
rationis,
Whenwe
ibid.3, . 4 (p. 1027).Muchthesamecanbe saidofmerely
things.
possible
an
themas somehow
realin themselves,
we createa fiction,
conceive
independently
"actualpossible",as itwere;cf."Quocirca,si essentia
creaturae
praeciseac secundumse sumpta,
utactuens,... ac inse habensesse,sic
etnondum
facta,consideretur
verum
nonesseensreale,sedrationis,
earnconsiderationem,
est,secundum
quianon
estin se,sedobjective
tantum
in intellectu."
DM 31, 2, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 232).
77"... privatio
secundum
se sumptaensrationis
est,nihilquerealein rebusponit;
..." DM 47, 10,n. 5 (XXVI, p. 822).
59
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12:45:07 PM
For the moment, let us postpone treatmentof that species of negation which is impossiblebeings and instead say something about
positive beings of reason.
(b) On thepositivesideofthegeneraldivisionof beings of reason, a relationof reasonis described as one which the intellectfashions afterthe
manner of a real relation.96Like otherbeings of reason, a relation of
reason must have, at least remotely, a basis in mind-independent
reality.97There is, however, a differencebetween a relation of reason
and both a negation and a privation inasmuch as the basis of such a
relation is something positive.98At the same time, as relations of
reason mimic real categorical (rather than transcendental) relations,
they are "adventitious", that is, not necessarilyrooted in the nature
of what they relate.99Again, while relations of reason may have a
as theyare relapositive foundationin realityoutside the mind, precisely
tions mimicking categorical relations some have no foundation
while others have only a partial foundation,inasmuch as they have
none or only some of the conditions (i.e. a real subject, a real term,
and a real foundation)required fora categorical relation.100This is to
use the term "foundation" in at least two, or better,threeways. All
beings of reason, includingrelationsof reason, are founded in re. But,
as it were additionally, relations of reason inasmuch as they mimic
real relations, which need real subjects, bases, and terms, can be
totallyor partiallywithoutfoundation.
suntnecessariae
haeverocontingentes:
..." ibid.. 27 (p. 1039).Note
propositiones,
thattheformer
are immediately
baseduponthenatureof theangel,
judgments
whereas
thelatter
whichis extrinsic
tothenatureofa man.
requiresomecondition
96Cf."... relatio
rationis
incommuni
definiri
esserelationem,
positive
potest,
quam
intellectus
formae
ordinatae
ad aliud,seureferentis
unumad aliud,
permodum
fingit
autrelatum
nonest." ibid.6, . 1 (p. 1039).
quodin reipsaordinatum
97"Dico autemnecessarium
essealiquidin rebus,quodsaltemremotefundet,
vel
occasionem
huicrelationi,
praebeat
quia,ut saepedixi,agimusde entibusrationis,
ad cognitionem
entium
habentin
realium,
quae aliquomodoconferunt
quae semper
realiquodfundamentum."
ibid.n. 2.
98Cf. "Quod verorelatio
sitinilioordineetlatitudine
diversum
ensrationis
ab aliis
namfundamentum,
duobus,constat
fundamenti;
primoex diversitate
quod habet
intellectus
ad concipiendam
relationem
nonestnegatioaliquavel remotio
rationis,
sedpotiusestaliquapositiva
entitatis,
entitas,
quae a nobisnonperfecte
concipitur
nisipermodumrespectus."
DM 54, 3, n. 5, (XXVI, p. 1027).
99"... finguntur
ad instarrelationum
et non transcendenpraedicamentalium,
adventitiiperextrinsecam
et
talium,
quiasuntillirespectus
intellectus,
conceptionem
nonconcipiuntur
ut intrinsece
ad constitutionem
pertinentes
alicujusentis,quodest
de ratione
transcendentalis."
DM 54, 4, n. 6 (XXVI, p. 1030).
100Cf.note106,below.
63
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12:45:07 PM
12:45:07 PM
(peculiariter
) called "second intentions".119This is (in part, at least)
because they are objects of a second formal intending.120Of course,
the mind can furtherreflecton these second intentions- to formsucBut any foundation
ceeding (3rd, etc.) intentions121;to infinity.122
theyhave in existingthingsmust be understoodof the firstrelationsof
such a succession.123
3. Explicitly"Impossible"Beings
As we have seen, for Suarez all beings of reason somehow involve
conceivingsomethingto be which in factis not. But beyond this,there
are certain beings of reason which so involve internal contradiction
that they cannot exist and these he has explicitlylabeled "impossible".124 Keeping to the common classificationof beings of reason,
he has located them under negations, for the reason that they are
nothing in themselves.125In contrast to otherJesuit philosophers of
119"... soienthae ultimaerelationes
rationis
peculiariter
appellarisecundaeintentiones,..." DM 54,6, n. 10 (XXVI, p. 1041).
120"... quia secundaenotioni
seu intentioni
ibid.
formali
objiciuntur."
121"... possitintellectus
secundasintentiones
etconiterum
reflecti,
supraipsasmet
veldifferentiae
interipsasconsiderare,
et eas definire,
velex eis discurvenientias,
..." DM 54, 6, n. 11 (XXVI, p.
rere,atqueita in eis similesrelationes
fundare;
1041);ibid.2, n. 17(p. 1023).
122"... in infinitum
feremultiplican
velreflexiones
intellectus,
possunt
perfictiones
..." DM 54,6, n. 11(XXVI, p. 1041);cf.DM 6, 9, n. 20 (XXV, p. 242).Alsocf.
DM 15, 11,n. 19(XXV, p. 563); andDM 3, 2, n. 13 (XXV, p. Ill) wherehe excertain
andcallsthem" inplicitly
speaksofmultiplying
beingsofreasonto infinity
utiles
ofa process
"; as wellas DM 2, 6, n. 5 (p. 100)wherehenotesthemind'shorror
to infinity.
In thisconnection,
consider
A. Ruvioon theunscientific
character
of
thosebeingsofreasonwhichhe regards
as altogether
without
"... etde
foundation:
hocsecundocertum
... Primo,quia ea de
est,ad nullamscientiam
perse pertinere.
essedebent:sed Entiarationis,
quibusscientiaperse agit,determinata
quae non
habentfundamentum,
ab intellectu;
possuntin infinitum
multiplicari
ergonulla
scientia
Mexicana
entis
rationis
, De natura
, dub.6, p.
potest
perse agerede illis."Logica
79. For Suarez'recognition
ofsuchan objection,
cf.DM 54, 4, n. 2 (XXVI, p.
1029).
123"... cumdicuntur
haerelationes
fundari
est
aliquomodoinrebus,intelligendum
de primis
relationibus
hujusordinis."ibid.
124Cf.e.g.: "Itemmultacogitantur
etmodopossibilium
enquae suntimpossibilia,
tiumfinguntur,
utchymaera,
DM 54, 1,
quae nonhabentaliudessequamcogitari."
n. 7 (XXVI, p. 1017); ibid.n. 8; "... potestfingererem impossibilem,
ut
ibid.2, n. 18(p. 1023);ibid.4, n. 10(p. 1031);"... aequereperitur
in
chymaerum."
rebusimpossibilibus
ac in possibilibus:
..." DM 31, 12,n. 45 (XXVI, p. 297); "...
resimpossibilis,
utchimaera,
..." DeAnima
III, . 2, . 27(III, p. 622);ibid.. 28(p.
623).
125Cf. "... cumenimhujusmodi
entiafictasimpliciter
sintnonentia,merito
sub
..." DM 54,4, n. 10(XXVI, p. 1031),cf.alsonote65
negatione
comprehenduntur;
69
12:45:07 PM
his own time and after,126Suarez will allow their formationby the
imagination inasmuch as this faculty in human beings shares
somehow in reason.127 But their chief cause, he says, is the very
fecundityof the intellect itself,which in formingthem, from parts
which separately mightbe real, does not err, since it does not affirm
them actually to exist.128For this reason, the compositioninvolved in
fabricatingthem seems to be "non-ultimate".129 Even though it is
minimallysemantic,130this composition is not a finaljudgment of asweconsider
above;alsoDM 3, s. 2, n. 13,textinnote155below.Noteagainthatwhen
a merely
wemakeita beingofreason:cf.
beingas actualbythatverystroke
possible
note76, above.
126Cf. e.g.: P. Hurtadode Mendoza,Disput,
d. 19,s. 5, . 84; A. Ruvio,
metaphys.
, II, d. 2, q. 1,s.
, pp. 74-75;andG. De Rhodes,Philosophia
peripatetica
Logicamexicana
2, n. 2 Lugduni1671,p. 19.
127"... dicendum
... etiamposse
est,ea entiarationis,
quae suntmereimpossibilia,
humanain hocparticipai
tarnen,
quia imaginado
aliquo
fingiperimaginationem;
alsocf.DM 47,8, .
... ZW 54,2, . 18(XXVI, pp. 1023-1024);
modovimrationis,
6 (p. 816),andDe Trinitate
, IX, . 2, . 11(I, 725).
128Cf. "Est tarnen
tertiacausaproveniens
ex quadamfoecunditate
intellectus,
qui
partesquae in recomponinon
conjungendo
potestex verisentibusfictaconficere,
autquidsimile,
etitaformat
illaentiarationis,
chymaerum,
possunt,
quomodofingit
In hisautem
et ab aliquibusdicuntur
entiaprohibita.
impossibilia,
quae vocantur
itaessein re,sicutea connonfallitur
intellectus,
quia nonaffirmai
conceptionibus,
DM 54, 1,n. 8 (XXVI, p. 1017).To
inquo nonestfalsitas."
simplici,
cipitconceptu
Deus
thislast,he makesa similar
pointas regards
imaginary
space:"... nondicitur
ac
rebuspossibilibus,
sicutspatiisimaginariis,
essepraesens
quae itaapprehendimus
ea existere,sed per
non per deceptionem,
si existerent,
quia non affirmamus
..." DM 30, 7, n. 17 (XXVI, p. 100).
simplicem
apprehensionem,
129Cf. DM 8, 4, n. 8, textin note138below.
130Cf. De Trinitate
for
there,
IX, . 2, . 12,textin note22 above;as weremarked
theultimate
to someextent
Suarezthenon-ultimate
signifies
concept
conventionally
tradition
beforeSuarez,
conceptand thethingbeyond.Notethat,in theScholastic
ofsuch
thenon-ultimate
character
D. Soto,Summulae
, I, . 3, . 6 (6r.),compares
itself
leadstotheknowledge
tothatofan instrumental
sign,whichas known
concepts
of something
this,Fonsecaregardsthefirst
beyond.Not necessarily
contradicting
hoc
of the non-ultimate
conceptas natural:"Interquos conceptus
signification
naturaliter
discrimen
significai
ipsam
perspice,
quod Medius[i.e. nonultimtus]
ex im... Ultimusveroab ipsa eademvoce,aut scriptura
vocem,aut scripturam,
"
dialect
. , I, . 11 (ed. Ferreira
positionesignificatur.P. Fonseca,S.J., Institut,
thenis both
concept
saythatthenon-ultimate
Gomes),I, p. 40. The Conimbricenses
c. 1,q. 2, a. 3 (p. 20)andq. 2, a. 3,
andan instrumental
a formal
sign;cf.Indelnterp.
fromtheres. 2 (p. 27), in whichlastplace,theydispensea non-ultimate
concept
beforeit lead to the
thatan instrumental
signbe itselffirstperceived
quirement
conButtheyalsosaythatwe canhavenon-ultimate
ofwhatitsignifies.
knowledge
any semanticcarryoverto thingsbeyond,e.g., whenwe recite
ceptswithout
wordssuchas "Blictri")ofa
words(as opposedto non-significative
significative
their
without
meaning:
"Atqueadeosaepenosvoces
understanding
language
foreign
reisignificatae,
utetiameduntqui latina
edereabsqueullacognitione
significativas
nonadvertunt.
In quo
aut quamvisintelligunt,
intelligunt,
vocabularecitant,
70
12:45:07 PM
12:45:07 PM
12:45:07 PM
12:45:07 PM
12:45:07 PM
of reason is something which involves intrinsicrepugnance or imPrecisely as such, it does not just lack aptitude forexpossibility.155
istence. Instead, it excludessuch aptitude, and in so doing it is (in contrastto an extrinsicdenomination)156outside the range of being ( extra
In thisthe centralplace of impossible beings within
latitudinem
entis).157
the ambit of beings of reason stands revealed.
At this point, let me say that the problem of truthrelates to all beings of reason, but in a special way it regards so-called impossible beings. Simply stated: if truthis in a conformitybetween the mind and
reality,how can there be any truthwhere there is no independent
reality? But most of all, how can there be any truth where such a
realitywould be impossible of realization?
St. Louis, Missouri
St. Louis University
(to becontinued)
155Cf."... illudenimestproprie
utin
ensfictum,
apprehendi
potest,
quoditamente
se involvat
et impossibilitatem,
repugnantiam,
quae estnegatioquaedam,..." DM
3, s. 2, n. 13(XXV, p. 111).
156Foran insightful
ofSuarezon thereality
ofextrinsic
denominaunderstanding
d. 19,s. 1, esp.nn.
tion,cf.P. Hurtadode Mendoza,S.J.,Disputationes
metaphysicae
too
9, 15-18,Lugduni1624,pp. 943-945.Butalso,letusnotethat:(1) wecanconfer
a beingofreason;
muchreality
and thusfabricate
denomination
uponan extrinsic
froman actofsightas some
e.g. we mightregard"thebeingseen" whichresults
ofa wallwhichis seen(cf.DM 54,2, n. 16 [XXVI, p. 1022]);and
"quasi-property"
denomination
notresulting
froma realform,
which
(2) we couldhavean extrinsic
denomination
woulditself
be a beingofreason(cf.note103above).
157Cf. "... quodinvolvit
estextralatitudinem
entis."DM 30, s.
contradictionem,
17,n. 10(p. 209);alsosee: DM 6, 4, n. 7 (XXV, p. 219).
75
12:45:07 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 1 (1987)
Reviews
TheMetaphyDesmondPaul Henry,Thatmost
subtle
question
(Quaestiosubtilissima).
andContemporary
sicalBearing
, Manchester
Linguistic
Disciplines
(ManofMedieval
chester
University
Press)1984,pp. XVIII + 337.30- ISBN 0 719009472.
Mr. Henry'sreputation
of medieval
One solidpillarsupporting
amonghistorians
of
refined
ofAnselm
is hisincreasingly
studyindepthofthelogicalworks
philosophy
In threepenetrating
booksin succession
(1964,1967,1974)he hasconCanterbury.
ofparonymy,
histheory
s Degrammatico
, whichcontains
arguedthatAnselm'
vincingly
is not,as Prantland otherscholars
rashlyheld,a well-nigh
unintelligible
pieceof
andinstructive
a veryinteresting
ofa shrewd
butrather
technique
example
rigmarole,
in themaximthat
s aim is concisely
of philosophical
analysis.Anselm'
expressed
to
of1972,inwhichheundertook
tohisMedieval
LogicandMetaphysics
Henryprefixed
broaderperspective:
"We oughtnotto
ofhislabourin a somewhat
placethefruits
butshouldrather
attend
to
adheretotheimproprieties
ofwordswhichhidethetruth,
'.
ofourwaysoftalking'
thatlieshiddenunderthemultiplicity
oftruth
theproperty
artificialized
wasoneofthefirst
tousea highly
brandofLatininordertosubAnselm
toan acutelogical
surface
shapesofordinary
misleading
jectthefrequently
language
the
fundamental
difference
between
and so to bringoutthephilosophically
critique
ofan utterance.
andthelogicalform
grammatical
inovertoassisthisauthor
In suchcasesitisverytempting
fora modern
interpreter
a natural
difficulties
connected
withtransforming
theconsiderable
inevitably
coming
toelucidate
toolbyanendeavour
thosenecessariintoa logically
satisfactory
language
terms
ofoneofthe
in themuchmoreefficient
at formalization
lydefective
attempts
in ourtime.As a matter
offactHenryhas
specialcalculithathavebeendeveloped
theservices
writers
hestudies
ofoneparticular
offered
themedieval
logical
consistently
Leniewski
by thePolishlogicianStanislaw
language:a system
designed
originally
Czeslaw
andelaborated,
byHenry'sManchester
colleague
amongothers,
(1886-1939)
Thissystem,
ofa
to whomthebookunderreviewis dedicated.
consisting
Lejewski,
an ontology
(logicofnames)and a mereology
protothetic
(logicof propositions),
whichmakeit
to Henry,severalfeatures
ofpartandwhole),has,according
(theory
itis
instrument.
Asthenameontology
as an hermeneutic
suitable
indicates,
eminently
ofeverything
ofthemostgeneralcharacteristics
as an interpreted
theory
presented
terms
andcombetween
distinction
thereis. It doesnotmakeanycategorial
singular
inclusion
andexclufora variety
offunctors
ofexistence,
monnames,andprovides
and n (name)as
sion,and identity.
Beinga categorial
language,withs (sentence)
to his
it enablestheuserto extendthesemantical
according
categories
primitives,
needs.BothinthisbookandinMedieval
Henryequipsthereader
LogicandMetaphysics
ofthislanguage.
ofthetechnicalities
withampleexplanations
andmorefully
bookis bestregarded
as a moreambitious
The present
developed
bookof1972.Notably,
itisbasedon
inthemuchshorter
defence
oftheses
putforward
in particular
a richerselection
of texts,containing
manypassagesfromtheModi
76
12:45:15 PM
authorofa philosophical
ofDacia,a thirteenth-century
gramsignificandi
byBoethius
to
mar.It is typically
readerwhois prepared
a bookthatmustbejudgedbya patient
theLatintexts,
ofcarefully
takethetrouble
andcritically
Henry'stranslascrutinizing
in termsof Lesniewski's
tionof them,and theelucidations
categorial
language.
theauthor
Laudably,
alwaysputsallhiscardsonthetableandthusenablesus toexsetofsuchthorny
aminehisviewsinduedetail.Theseviewsrangeoveran impressive
thestatusofuniversais,
as non-referential
aboutessences,
names,discourse
problems
the distinction
betweenessenceand existence,
and, in general,the relationship
hasfurnished
thosewhodelight
In sum,theauthor
in
between
logicandmetaphysics.
- whicharenevertheless
naturethattheystill
subtlequestions
ofsucha fundamental
- witha fascinating
of
vexcontemporary
students
ofthephilosophy
oflogic
collection
exercises
in conceptual
flexibility.
As itis tobe hopedthata secondedition
willprovetobe necessary
(nottomention
I
thedesirability
ofa paperback
a
few
remarks
on
minor
add
points.The
edition),
references
onp. 13,1.9-10,andon p. 153,1.20,arenotquiteright.
Amongtherare
intheLatintexts
causesomepuzzlement:
thereis onethatmight
onp. 144,
misprints
1.6from
As regards
thetranslations,
onp. 21, 1.7from
below,nonshouldbe deleted.
thatthereare
maintained
below,suchshouldbe replaced
byother
(thegrammarians
onp. 22; 1.3,tobe taken
brakes
for
eightpartsofspeech);andhasthetranslation
frena
intheobsolete
senseofbridles!
itwouldbe wrong.Further,
onp. 30, 1.20,
; otherwise,
Etintelligendum
extremi
estdeistadistantia,
rem
suamutnoncedentem
inunitatem
quodsignificai
cumeo,dequoenuntiatur
shouldrather
be rendered
as follows:
Andas regardsthat
itshouldbeunderstood
whatever
itsignifies
thattheverbsignifies
as not
separateness,
withthatofwhichit is predicated
oneextreme
forming
(comparep. 31, 1.6 from
is perhaps
annexedtotheprinciple
tooreadily
of
below).On p. 50 theworddignitas
itseemstomethatitsimply
means.Thepassage
meansthatthewordaxiom
aloofness;
WalterBurleigh
on p. 153is notas clearas one might
wish;evenafter
concerning
I couldnotdecide
itwithsimilar
passagesinMedieval
comparing
LogicandMetaphysics
whether
ornotitis correct.
Such trifles,
do notin theleastdetractfrommyadmiration
forthe
however,
ofa moreprofound
author's
to thesteadygrowth
and
manysagaciouscontributions
exactinsight
intotheintricacies
texts
inthefieldoflogicandlinguistics.
ofmedieval
If
hereandtherea critical
itwillmostly
readerwillreacha different
concern
a
opinion,
forwhichHenryhasopenedhiseyes.
problem
Leiden
GabrielNuchelmans
. Nachdruck
Rudolfvon Biberach,De septem
itineribus
aeternitatis
der Ausgabevon
Peltier
1866miteinerEinleitung
indielateinische
undCorrigenUberlieferung
da zumTextvonMargotSchmidt,
inGeschichte
undGegenwart,
Tex(Mystik
I: Christliche
te undUntersuchungen,
von
Abteilung
Mystik,
herausgegeben
Band 1), Frommann-Holzboog,
MargotSchmidtund HelmutRiedlinger,
1985.
Cannstatt,
Stuttgart-Bad
ofthisnewseriesdealwithRudolfofBiberach's
The first
threevolumes
De
treatise,
itineribus
aeternitatis.
The first
volumepresents
theLatintext,thesecondconseptem
tainsa synoptical
editionoftheHighAlemannic
anda modern
translation
German
offers
thethird
a studyofthedegrees
ofspiritual
basedonthe
translation,
experience
fromwhichRudolfofBiberachhas drawnthequotations
authors
usedin the VII
Itinera.
Mostofthefirst
volumeis notnew.The Latintextitself
oftheVIIItinera
(pp. [1]oftheeditionofPeltier(1866),and thegreater
reprint
[92])is a photographic
part
oftheintroduction
ofa totalofforty-six
(pp. XII-XXXIX- i.e., twenty-eight
pages)
is a partialreprint
of Schmidt'sintroduction
to her former
editionof theHigh
77
12:45:15 PM
: Diesiben
strassen
zugot(1969).Thelatter
translation
secAlemannic
oftheVIIItinera
with
LatinMSS containing
theVIIItinera,
tiondealswiththelistofthe(ninety-one!)
thesametreatise,
andwiththeinfluence
themedieval
mentioning
library
catalogues
writers.
Neware thelistofcorrigenda
on othermystical
ofthetreatise
(pp. XLVintoPeltier's
andthe
anda fewpagesat thebeginning
edition,
XLVI) tobe inserted
endoftheintroduction
(pp. IX-XI andXL-XLIV).
forthe
one is mostgrateful
SincetheeditionofPeltieris almostunobtainable,
has notbeentaken
oftheLatintext.One onlyregrets
thattheopportunity
reprint
to thetextmucheasier.A
toadd line-numbers,
whichwouldhavemadereferences
someveryvaluablecorrections
is added.Theyprovide
listofalmostsixty
corrigenda
consist
fifteen
oftheinsertext.Amongthesecorrigenda
ofthePeltier
approximately
totheBible.I do notseeanycompeltionofsourcereferences,
references
especially
as havingexistedin theoriginal
thesereferences
criterion
to consider
linginternal
criteria
todo so. It is notclearwhythecontext,buttheauthormayhaveexternal
MS
cordance
ofthetwoBaselMSS (inmostcasesconfirmed
bytheHighAlemannic
external
ofEinsiedeln)
shouldbe a sufficient
argument.
totheedition
ofSchmidt's
introduction
As tothepageswhicharea partialreprint
a listofcorrigenda
wonder
whether
and
oftheHighAlemannic
onemight
translation,
heretoo.FromthelistofMSS containing
theVII
notbe appropriate
addendamight
to the
is saidto havebelonged
Itinera
K.B., 11489-91)
, numberthirteen
(Brussels,
ParlezLouvain" (p. XIII). There is indeedan abbey of
"Prmonstratenser
nearLouvain,at a placecalledPark."Parlez-Louvain"is apPremonstratensians
- i.e., Parknear
a rathercomicalslipofthepenfor"Parc-lez-Louvain"
parently
siben
to
Die
strassen
zu got
added
as
has
been
written
on
the
Louvain,
map
correctly
(betweenpp. 24*-25*).The mistakecouldhavebeenavoidedby usingFlemish
forFlemishplaces.
toponyms
Hendrik( + 1472)is called"Der flmische
Mystiker"
(p. XXXI). Though
hewas
Netherlands
hespenta considerable
(Mechlin),
partofhislifeinthesouthern
oftheBrethren
wherehewasrector
livedintheNorth,
bornandoriginally
probably
oftheCommonLifein DelftandGouda.Amongthesourcesofhistreatise,
Spieghel
arementioned,
butnotoneof
andseveralothers
dervolcomenheit
, RudolfofBiberach
inHerp's
ofRuusbroec
Thepresence
itsmostimportant
sources,
JanvanRuusbroec.
o.s.b.
Dom
much
so
that
so
most
the
is
J.
Huijben
prominent,
Spieghelquantitatively
has honouredHerp withthe title'De Hrautvan Ruusbroec'(the Heraldof
ofCanfield
to themanysourcesofBenedict
Furthermore,
(p. XXXV)
Ruusbroec).
Peer
shouldbe addedDie evangelische
le,as is madeclearbyP. Mommaers
(cf.Benot
48 (1972),pp.
de la Spiritualit,
etsessources
deCanfeld
, in: Revued'Histoire
flamandes
intheinremark
thesepagesofpartialreprint
concerning
423-434).A moregeneral
occurwhichcanonlybe identified
abbreviations
troduction:
by
manybibliographical
.
zugot
strassen
in Diesiben
thelistofabbreviations
consulting
theauthordeclaresthatthe
In theearlier(original)pagesof theintroduction
a familiarity
with
ofthemystical
andtheevaluation
implies
phenomenon
knowledge
tothe
thecourseofhistory.
ofmysticism
thevarioustestimonies
According
through
as a mostsuitable
lendsitself
itineribus
aeternitatis
RudolfofBiberach'
s Deseptem
editor,
morethan
successful
since
this
to
this
compilation
systematizes
entry-point history,
fromthesecondup to thethirteenth
writers
century.
forty
Schmidt
In theconcluding
givessomegeneralremarks
pagesoftheintroduction
istobe found
Thisimportance
oftheVIIItinera.
andthesignificance
onthestructure
of
and theparadoxaldescription
ofactioand contemplalo
in theorganicconception
ofunityin diversity.
unionas an experience
mystical
itineribus
aeternitatis
inLatin
ofDe septem
oftheeditions
A veryconcisebibliography
on Rudolfof
literature
andin MiddleHighGerman,andofsomesecondary
mainly
thebook.
Biberachconcludes
78
12:45:44 PM
ofthecover:
forthefinemake-up
witha wordofadmiration
Letmeendthisreview
on
in goldenletters
andthetitleofhisworkhavebeenprinted
RudolfofBiberach
linenofthe
whichin itsturnis surrounded
a blackbackground,
by theredbrown
Thishonouris wellpaidto Rudolfandhis VII Itinera.
binding.
G. de Baere
Nijmegen
I VonderPassio
Mittelalter.
imlateinischen
undEpochenstil
WalterBerschin,
Biographie
zur
zu denDialogiGregors
desGrossen
(Quellenund Untersuchungen
Perpetuae
Hiersemann
Anton
Bd.
des
lateinischen
Verlag,
Mittelalters,
8),
Philologie
1986,358 S.
Stuttgart
imlateiniderBiographie
DieserersteBandeinerzusammenfassenden
Darstellung
Da diemittelalterzu dereigentlichen
bildetdenAuftakt
schenMittelalter
Aufgabe.
unmittelbar
christliche
diesptantike,
licheBiographie
fortsetzt,
Lebensbeschreibung
Es
imvorliegenden
werden
zu
den
es
auf
der
Hand,
Anfangen
zurckzugehen.
lag
aus demIII. bis VI.
rund180lateinische
BandvonWalterBerschin
Biographien
Damit ist ein Werk
n. Chr. literaturwissenschafdich
dargestellt.
Jahrhundert
Fordas einerseits
allesntigeMaterialzu einereingehenderen
worden,
geschaffen
- wieetwaHinweiseaufTextausgaben
undaufdiewichtigsten
Stuenthlt
schung
FormeinesLesebuchs,
hates dieansprechende
dien- , andererseits
zumal,da den
ist.
lateinischen
Texteneinedeutsche
Ubersetzung
beigegeben
undPassionen,
denensichdieApowerden
Abschnitt
dieMrtyrerakten
Imersten
Ubermitdenlateinischen
dieMnchsvitae
undimzweiten
stelromane
anschliessen,
Die beidenletzten
der Vita Antoniials Ausgangspunkt,
besprochen.
setzungen
den Vitae
des MrderSptantike
sinddemBischofsleben
Abschnitte
(namentlich
bzw.den Schriften
des Venantius
und Fulgentius),
tius,Ambrosius,
Augustinus
des Grossen- gewidmet.
undjenenGregors
vonToursundGregors
Fortunatus,
nichtunbercksichtigt
derBiographie
hatauchdieRandzonen
Berschin
gelassen.
derbtissin
erdieberhmte
So bespricht
Egeria(S. 159-161;dasItineraPilgerreise
des Hieronymus
rium
(S. 146-149;De virisilluEgeriae
), den Schriftstellerkatalog
von
stribus
pontificalis
(S. 270 ff.;mitkurzenNotizenberdie Bischfe
), denLiber
unddie biographiundSententiae
(S. 128ff.;Mnchssprche)
Rom),Apophthegmata
vonTours(S. 289-291).
Francorum
desGregorius
aus derHistoria
schenGeschichten
Durch
Werkisbersichtlich
Stilgeschriebene
Das ineinemlebendigen
angeordnet.
derLesermitdenbesprochenen
kommt
Textstellen
treffsicher
zahlreiche,
gewhlte
sinddie vielevorzglihervorzuheben
Kontakt.
Besonders
Textenin unmittelbaren
MnchHilachenCharakterisierungen
(wieS. 143:dervordemRuhmflchtende
S. 313: GregorderGrosseredetin
rinwird'ein Held derAnti-Fama'
genannt;
dieGriechen
sind'Luft':'siesindda, aber
seinenDialogennichtvondenGriechen;
mansiehtsie nicht.').
klarzusammen
dieErgebnisse
derbisherigen
fasst
Berschin
Gewhnlich
Forschung
Analysevon GregorsDialogen)und spricht
(zB. S. 308: De Vog'sstrukturelle
des Stoffes
Urteilaus. SeineBeherrschung
dabeiauchnichtselteneinpersnliches
derbehandelten
dasbeiallerKrzeebendiewichtigsten
Aspekte
gehtdaraushervor,
ber
aufdieBemerkungen
insLichtgerckt
wofr
hierbeispielshalber
Vitae
werden,
sei.
laudatio-Charakter
derVitaetpassioCypriani
denrhetorischen
(S. 63-65)verwiesen
zu finden
StudieallesWichtige
EbenweilinBerschins
ist,kannmansichwundern,
Mann' (theholy
Aufstze
vonPeterBrownberden 'heiligen
dassdieanregenden
London1982).Ebensowenig
andtheholyinlateAntiquity,
man)fehlen
(siehe:Society
derdiesyrische
Ubersetwirddieaufsehenerregende
ThesevonR. Dragueterwhnt,
ensyriaque.
deS. Antoine,
conserve
Antonii
hat{La Vieprimitive
verffentlicht
zungderVita
79
12:45:44 PM
ettraduction,
eshabe
Discussion
CSCO 418,Lwen1980)unddieMeinungvertritt,
textus
vordemgriechischen
einenanderen,
Text
receptus
griechischen
koptisierenden,
der VitaAntonii
des Athanasius
in Frage
gegeben,wobeiauchdie Verfasserschaft
wird.
gestellt
MitRechthebtBerschin
eineParallelezwischen
einerStelleaus demPrologder
Antoniusvita
undXenophon,
Memorabilia
4,1,1 hervor
(bzw.:Tr michistschondie
blosseErinnerung
an Antonius
ein grosser
undntzlicher
Gewinn'- 'Schondie
an ihn(sc. Sokrates),
wenner nichtanwesend
keinen
war,bedeutete
Erinnerung
Hierzuistzu
Gewinndenen,die gewhnt
waren,mitihmzu verkehren').
geringen
dassneulicheinigeweitere
in Piatons
Parallelen
mitSokrates'
Auftreten
bemerken,
EchosausPiatons
Schriften
entdeckt
Phaedon
inder
wurden;sieheG. J. M. Bartelink,
? Mnemosyne
aus Piatons
VitaAntonii
37, 1984,S. 145-147;id., EineReminiszenz
inderVitaAntonii
Timaeus
40, 1987,S. 150.
, Mnemosyne
Interessant
von
ist,dassbei einerStellein der VitaFulgentii
(c. 9) des Ferrandus
si sicfulget
Romaterrecaelestis,
Karthago
(QuamspeciosapotestesseHierusalem
Paralleleaus dergriechischen
VitaPorphyrii
stris)sicheinegedankliche
(c. 47) des
MarcusDiaconusaufdrngt
derTauffeier
desspteren
KaisersTheo(Beschreibung
dosiusII inKonstantinopel,
demzweiten
dasnachkurzer
Rom):'WenndasIrdische,
Zeitverschwindet,
schonsolcheineHerrlichkeit
wievielmehrdas Himmlibesitzt,
bereitet
ist'.
sche,das denWrdigen
Berschin
umklarzumachen,
dassinTeilendesLiber
gibtS. 274-5Beispiele
pontificalisein biblischer
Stil vorherrscht
Autor
('Das Latein,das unserunbekannter
verrt
nureineSchule,diederlateinischen
schreibt,
Bibel').NebendenvomVerfasser
erwhnten
Parallelen
ausderevangelischen
Pilatusszene
findet
sichimzitierten
Textnochein weiterer
biblischer
Adhucea loquente(cf.Luc.22,47
fragment
Anklang:
Adhuceo loquente;Luc.22,60adhucilioloquente:auchhieram Satzanfang).
Die Ubersetzungen
derzitierten
sindlobenswert
Textstellen
klarundkorrekt.
Vielleichtknnte
manan zweiStelleneinekleinenderung
Ex aliainaliam
vorschlagen.
sensusoperitet velutilaetumgramensata
linguamad verbumexpressatranslatio
derVitaAntonii)
wirdvonBerstrangulat
(S. 121;Prologzu Evagrius'Ubersetzung
'Die wrtliche
schinbersetzt:
voneinerSprachein die anderedeckt
Ubersetzung
denSinnzu understickt
die Saatenwiedas ppigspriessende
Gras'. Besserwre:
ihnsowiedas ppigspriessende
'....decktdenSinnzu understickt
GrasdieSaaten'.
WeitersiehedenAnfang
derPassioAgnetis
sanctissimae
(S. 85): Diemfestm
virginis
Hincpsalmiresonent,
celebremus.
indeconcrepent
lectiones.
Hincpopulorum
turbae
indesubleventur
in domino
laetentur,
pauperesChristi.Omnesergogratulemur
feiern.
Von hiermgen
(Berschin:'Lasstunsden Festtagderheiligsten
Jungfrau
tnenPsalmen,
vondortLesungen.Hierfreuen
sichdieVolksmassen,
dortwerden
dieArmenChristi
Lasstunseinander
ist
Vielleicht
aufgerichtet.
beglckwnschen').
zu bevorzugen:
docheinemehrwrtliche
Wiedergabe
'...Mgendie Volksmassen
hierber
frohsein,mgendarin(nl. in denLesungen)
(nl. berdenPsalmgesang)
dieArmen
Christi
Trostfinden.
FreuenwirunsalsoindemHerrn'.FrdieUbersetmit'sichfreuen'
manThesaurus
Linzungdesabsolutverwendeten
gratulari
vergleiche
VI 22,55('ita utinsimplicem
notionem
abeatvocabulum'),
wo
guaelatinae
gaudendi
manauchmehrere
als Wiedergabe
vonx<*ipfciv
Beispielevongratulari
findet.1)
MitBerschins
istdieLiteratur
Arbeit
berdieBiographie
umeinewertvolle
Arbeit
Wirwnschen
bereichert
worden.
demVerfasser
zu,dasses ihmgelingen
wird,bald
auchdie brigen
Teilezu vollenden.
G. Bartelink
Nijmegen
S. 61 cumparent(VitaetpassioCypr.11):lies:cumparentibus;
S. 232Augustine
um 397 geschrieben
sindnicht387,sondern
worden.
Con/essiones
80
12:45:51 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
DeterminateTruthin Abelardn
NEIL T. LEWIS
I
In his excellent overview of medieval discussions of future
contingents2,Calvin Normore suggests that Abelard' s view on the
determinancyof the truthof sentencesin the commentaryon De inter'
Z
pretation(DI) in the Logica Ingredientibus(LI) differsfromthat in his
4
Dialctica (D):
' Abelardclaimsthatfuture
In theLogica'Ingredientibus
sentences
contingent
true
arenotdeterminate;
orfalse,theyareindeterminately
though
theyaretrue
orfalse.Buthepointsoutthatsince(1) ' "Socrateswilleat" is true'entails(2)
and so admit
"Socrateswilleat", we musteither
denythat(1) is determinate
aredeterminate,
orassertthat
'about'thepastorpresent
thatnotall sentences
His reasonforadopting
the
doesnotpreserve
validinference
determinateness.
truths
whichwe
first
alternative
seemstobe thattherearesomepresent-tensed
In theDialcnotdeterminate
as defined.
cannotknowandwhicharetherefore
tica,
he optsforthesecondalternative.
, however,
Normore's commentsreferin particularto a briefpassage5 at the end
of a longer discussion. I wish to show in this paper that when read in
thisbroader contextwe can see (i) thatAbelard does notadopt different
views in LI and D, in that the same solution is offeredin each to this
line of argument; (ii) that Abelard in these passages does not rely on
1 I shouldliketothankProfessor
PeterKingforhishelpful
comments
on earlier
versionsofthispaperand formaking
availableto mehismicrofilm
copyofthemanuAmbrosiana
to Prof.L. M. de Rijkand
indebted
script
M63sup.I am alsogreatly
B in the
MissB. J. M. Jolywhoprovided
ofthemanuscript
mewiththereadings
oftheoriginal
in this
version
appendixand a reworked
appendix.All translations
noted.
paperare myownunlessotherwise
2 CalvinNormore,
Medieval
PhilosoFuture
, in: TheCambridge
History
ofLater
Contingents
1982,pp. 358-381.Forthepassagequotedsee
, ed. A. Kennyetal., Cambridge
phy
pp. 362-363.
'
3 PeterAbelard,
', ed. B. Geyer,Mnster1927.
LogicaIngredientibus
4 PeterAbelard,
Dialctica
, ed. L. M. de Rijk,Assen1956,2nded. 1970.
5 LI, p. 424.36-40.The longerdiscussion
of concernto us occupiespp. 421.16a numberofincorrect
422.40.The textofthispassagein Geyer'seditioncontains
and theapparatus
and omissions.
contains
The reedited
someerrors
text
readings
maybe foundin theappendixto thispaper.
81
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
They are not necessary since being pale is not included in the specific
nature of Socrates, i.e. in what it is to be a man.)
Let us note, however, a point where confusionmay arise in reading
Abelard on this matter. For one thing,Abelard also indicates- as the
above passage attests- that when he wrote some people did thinkof
determinancyas a kind of necessity,hence the need forhim to stress
that in DI (and his own discussions) 4we take ' 'necessary'' for
inevitable ... not for determinateas some think'10.
The bearersof determinancy
i. Res, dictaand sentences in Abelard and Boethius
What sort of things are or are not determinate? Boethius views
Aristotlein his arguments in DI. 9 as employing two levels, the level
.
of what Boethius calls res and the level of sentences (propositiones)
Abelard shares this view, but instead of talkingof reshe usually talks
rerum
of dicta(literally'thingssaid') or, as in theDialctica, theexistentiae
of
'existences
things')11.
(literally
What are Boethius' resand Abelard' s dictaand what relations do
sentences bear to them? The answer to this is fairly clear and
uncontentious in the case of Abelard, but less so in the case of
Boethius.
. Dicta for
The key notion in both accounts is that of signification
Abelard are what are signifiedby sentences. Now foran expression to
signifyis for it to act as the sign of something: according to St.
Augustine's classic account 'a sign is both what shows itselfto the
sense and somethingbeyond itselfto the mind' ,2. To understand the
10LI, p. 437.37-39.In hisearlyglosson De interp.
Scritti
Abelardo,
(in:Pietro
filosofica,
Aristotelem
De Interpretatione
, ed. M. Dal Pra, Roma 1954)Abelardidentifies
Super
whathe callsthedeterminatum
necesse
witha kindof necessity,
, and
determinancy
ofnecessity:
Etcum
withthisconcept
concerned
ischiefly
arguesthatinDI. 9 Aristotle
hicaccipitur
necesse
tantum
totmodis
determinatum
, p. 99.43-44.In LI and D he
dicatur,
is whatis at issuein DI. 9.
seemsto holdthatabsolutenecessity
11Cf. LI, p. 443.31f.,andD, p. 221.4-9,whereAbelardclearly
Aristotle
interprets
shift
intheDialctica
hasbeen
The terminological
ofdictaandsentences.
tobe talking
butwhether
itmarks
notedbyrecent
commentators,
anyfundamental
changeofdocseeL. M. de Rijk,La
ofthedictum
trinehasnotbeenstudied.Fordiscussion
theory
le
Pierre
AblardchezAblard
dela proposition
, in: Pierre
(<dictum
propositionis)
signification
: Ancient
Theories
vnrable
, pubi.CNRS, Paris1982;G. Nuchelmans,
oftheProposition
andfalsity,
Amsterdam
andMedieval
1973;and M.
oftruth
ofthebearers
conceptions
1976.
onUniversais
, Amsterdam
Tweedale,Abailard
12Augustine,
Dordrecht
tr.B. DarreilJackson,
De dialctica
1975,
, ed. J. Pinborg,
p. 86.
84
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12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
nature.Foralthough
wemaynotknowwhether
thestarsareevenorodd <in
number
it is evident
in thenatureofthe
thatone is definitely
>, nonetheless
tous,butaltogether
knowntonature.Butit
stars,andthisindeedis unknown
is notthecaseas regards
mybeinggoingto see a friend
todayor notgoingto
seehim,thatwhatshouldhappenis unknown
tous, butknownto nature,for
butbychance.[InPer.//,p. 192.2-12.]
thiscomesaboutnotnaturally,
If we attemptedto gloss this notion of what is known to nature, we
mightsay that it is what can in principlebe known by purely natural
means, in particular by perception, traces and predictions based on
the naturesof things.Drawing out the implicationsof this is not a task
we can go into here, but it is clear that the deeper story,as Boethius
himselfindicates at the end of thispassage will concern distinguishing
statesof affairsthatobtain naturally
fromthose thatdo not. This is why
I say that Boethius gives a gwajz-epistemicaccount.
Abelard's approach is quite similar, though he replaces 'known to
nature' with 'knowable of itself [exse]. In LI he holds that an eventus
is determinateif 'of itselfit is knowable by us'. [LI, p. 422.26]. And
in D he writes that 'we call determinate whichever of those eventus
rerum
either can be known on the basis of their own existence or are
certain ex naturarei' . It seems that here he should be understood not
so much as giving a differentaccount than in LI, but as fleshingout
the way somethingmay be knowable of itself,since this will differin
the case of past and presentthingson the one hand, and determinate
futureones on the other:
andpastthings
onthebasisoftheir
couldbe known
own
Indeed,bothpresent
existence.
Forpastthings,
becausetheywereat sometimepresent,
wereable
tobe known
onthebasisoftheirpresence.
Butnecessary
orevennatural
future
aredeterminate
on thebasisofa characteristic
of < their
> nature.[D,
things
p. 211.7-11.]
These remarks, generally, are in line with those of Boethius; the
emphasis here, as in Boethius, is placed on the manner in which determinate states of affairscan be known, and it is clear- and Abelard
makes thisexplicitlater- thatnotjust any kind of knowabilitywill do.
Two kinds of knowabilityare here identifiedas sufficientand disjunctivelynecessary for a state of affairsto be determinate: either it is
knowable on the basis of the past or presentpresence
, or else,
ofsomething
in the case of futuredeterminatethings,on the basis of the nature of
something.
Let us startwith the latter case. Abelard (as well as Boethius) will
admit that some sentences about the futureare determinatelytrue.
The examples Abelard gives in the Dialcticaare the sentences 4God
89
12:41:26 PM
will be immortal' and 4Man will die'. The formeris a case of what he
calls the necessary future,the latter of the natural. Such sentences,
while determinatelytrue, are not so on the basis of what was or is happening; theyare determinateon the basis of the nature of the subject
in question. What Abelard means by this is, roughly,that it follows
from,forexample, man's nature, thathe will die and fromGod's that
he will not die and hence not just that he is but also that he will be
immortal26. The reason for adopting this approach to the determinancy of future-tensed sentences seems to be that, even ifone were
to say thatin some sense futureevents are, still,theycannot be known
on the basis of their(future)presence. And thiswould seem to reston
the view that the future is epistemicallyinaccessible to us. But one
mightobject, as Abelard takes pains to stress,thatit is not knowability
by us that is involved in the definition of determinancy, but the
, and given this it is unclear why
knowabilityof something of itself
futureevents should not be knowable exse on theirbasis of theirfuture
presence. The reply, I think, must involve construing Abelard as
offeringsomethinglike the view I ascribed to Boethius, according to
which the determinateis what can be known by us by certain'natural'
methods. Now we can know past and present events on the basis of
theirpresence withoutsupernaturalmeans. Present events, forexample, are known by perception, and past events may be known by
memory of direct experience of their occurrence or presence. But
futureevents differ.Even if we grant the reality of the future,no
naturalmeans gives us access to it on the basis of the futureevents
themselves.
Rather, the only natural means for knowing the futureis,
Abelard would seem to think,considerationof the specificnatures of
the entities involved in the futureevents. And accordinglyAbelard
defines determinancyin the case of future-tensedsentences in terms
of natures.
Abelard' s account of the determinancyof the truthof other types
of sentences also raises its own problems. Exactly what are the past
and futurethings[futura]at issue here?
present [praesentia]
[firaeterita],
Given the contextof his discussion we should expect them to be the
was once present,etc.
eventus
, and we must then hold thata past eventus
as what are said by indicativesentences,Abelard
But ifwe treateventus
offersa view incompatible with this. In the Dialcticahe writes:
26Somestatesofaffairs
in bothsenses,e.g. thaiGodis alive.
aredeterminate
90
12:41:26 PM
Butmaybethesentence
whichsaysthatwhichis notin factthecase is said
enunciate
whatis notyetthecase;
aboutthefuture
nottobe true;butsentences
I saythatwhilethething
whence
do notseemtobe true.Buttothesepoints
they
whatthe
dealsis stillfuture
nonetheless
itself
[resipsa] aboutwhichthesentence
a sentence
madeabouta future
canalsobe thecase;forexample,
sentence
says
4
thus:A battlewilltakeplace'.Forso longas itis notyettaking
battle,
place,
itis so as thesentence
says,namelythatitwilltakeplace;butso longas it is
place,itwillnotat thattimebe said <that> itwilltakeplace,butthat
taking
itis taking
place.[D, p. 213.21-28,myemphasis.]
The most natural reading of this passage is one holding that what the
- must itselfbe tensed: the sentences 'A batsentencesays- its dictum
tle will take place' and 'A battle is taking place' signifydifferently
tenseddicta21
. Moreover, ifwe thinkofdictaas statesof affairsasserted
we must say not that the formersentences states that a
sentences
by
certainstateof affairswill obtain, but ratherthat it states that a future
tensed-stateof affairs,thata battlewill takeplace, is obtaining, and ifthe
sentence is true this state of affairsobtains now. If then by praesentia
etc. Abelard has in mind past and present-tenseddicta, he would
simply be confused to say that praeterita
(for example) were at some
(past) timepresentbut now are not, forthe past-tensedstate of affairs
thatCaesarcrossedtheRubiconobtains now and did not obtain when he
was crossing it.
On the other hand, Abelard in this passage distinguishes the res
themselveshere that the sentences deal with [de quibus aguntpropositions] fromthe dictasignifiedby the sentences, and allows that in the
case of the sentence 'A battle will take place' the resitselfwill be present, but is not present now. Identifyingthe eventuswith the res ipsa
would renderthe otherpassages cited fromD consistentwiththis. But
what thenare these res?And, more importantly,what relationdo they
bear to the dictasignifiedby sentences? No straightforwardanswers
are forthcomingfrom the text. But the move between treating of
eventus
as such and as the significatesof sentencesstronglysuggeststhe
two alternativesdiscussed in LI and thatAbelard has not got clear on
what to identifythe eventuswith.
Thus the account of determinancyhere in the Dialcticacannot be
, but this elusive resipsa. By the resipsa
directlyin termsof the dictum
here I thinkwe should take Abelard to mean the actual past and present events themselves,as distinctfromthe states of affairsor dictain
question. Thus to the state of affairsthatCaesarcrossedtheRubiconcor27Theremaybe a similar
viewin Boethius,
andp.
cf.In Per.//,p. 188.30-189.35,
199.12-19.
91
12:41:26 PM
responds the past event Caesar's crossingof the Rubicon. The (pasttensed) state of affairsobtains now, just in case this event did exist.
Thus in Abelard' s writingson determinancyit seems we must recognize a tripartitestructureof sentences, dictaor states of affairs,and
concrete events.
'
'
The extension
of determinate
Which true sentences count as determinatelytrue? To understand
Abelard' s discussion of determinancyin LI it is importantto see that
he classifiessentencesaccording to the tense of theirmain verb, as we
should say, classifyingthem by the phrases depraesenti
tempore
('about
de
temand
de
past
futuro
praeterito
tempore
('about
time')
presenttime'),
will
often
abbreviate
these
Abelard
future
time')28.
pore ('about
In his
expressions, writing,forexample, defuturofordefuturotempore.
but
in
case the formerexpression simply has the sense of the latter,
otherwritersthese expressions are oftenused not to referto the tense
of the verb but ratherto the temporal status of what the sentence is
about29.
I suggested in the last section that the significatesof sentences are
to be taken as sharing in the tense of the sentences that state them:
thus an account parallel to that of sentences can be given in the
classification of dicta into determinate and indeterminate. In LI
Abelard discusses the extension of 'determinate' in terms of this
classificationon the basis of tense.
If we take Boethius as using termslike defuturoetc. in thisway (and
there seems to be no reason not to) we shall have to say that for
Boethius the truthof any sentence about the past or presentis determinate, whereas the truthof only some sentences about the futureis
so, namely those the obtaining of whose significatesis known to
nature, or, as we might say, unpreventable30.Other future-tensed
28Abelardis onlyconcerned
is
no indication
herewithsimplecategorical
sentences;
sentences.
givenas to how,ifindeedtheycan,thesetermsapplyto morecomplex
made
ofthesephrasessee LI, p. 420.34f.: 'Nowthosesentences
Forhisdiscussion
is not,whether
is or something
timearewhatever
aboutpresent
saythatsomething
is
or neverbe at all,forexample:"Tomorrow
be present,
thethings
pastorfuture,
> aboutpastor
> is not". < Sentences
is" or " <A chimera
a day",or 'A chimera
as something
future
timecan alsobe madeaboutthesamethings,
namelyas often
is or is not,we saythatitwas or willbe or denythis'.
29Forexample
tomorrow
wouldbea sea-battle
a sentence
like'It wastruethatthere
,
stateofaffairs.
in thepasttense,mightbe takenas reallyabouta future
though
30See forexampleIn Per.//,p. 192.2-5.
92
12:41:26 PM
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12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
v
Discussionof The Argument
There seems no doubt that The Argument as formulatedabove is
valid; our attention must thereforebe focused on the premises.
Obviously the firstthreepremises are crucial here, and each presents
difficulties.Premise (5) relies on one side of the Tarski biconditional,
and I take it that it is uncontroversialformedieval as well as modern
philosophers. (6) makes the equally uncontroversial claim that the
sentence 4 "Socrates will eat" is true' is in the present tense. These
assumptions are not stated by Abelard, but are clearly needed if the
argument is to work.
Premise (1) states a claim that Abelard will deny in LI, though he
appears to accept it in D . I will discuss this mattermore fullyin the
next section; here it may sufficeto note that for the purposes of the
44
argument the weaker claim All true present-tensedsentences of the
4
form "<p" is true' are determinately true" would suffice for
Abelard' s argument, and I will show in section VI that he never
rejects this claim, neitherin LI nor in D.
Premise (2) is the focus of Abelard' s replyto the argument; insofar
as he denies that if a consequence of the form'If "9" is true, then 9'
has a determinateantecedent it has a determinateconsequent, this is
due to a parallel claim about the certaintyor knowledge of the antecedent and consequent and the assumption made here in (2) that certaintyor knowledge is equivalent to determinancy.He never gives up
the formerclaim, but he does give up the latter.
But why should anyone even thinkof accepting (2)? The obvious
problem here is that it would make what is determinatesimplya matter of what we know, but it is quite clear from the discussions in
Boethius, forexample, thatthe determinateis not so tightlybound up
with our actual knowledge; thus both Boethius and Abelard hold that
it is either determinatethat the number of the stars is odd or else it
is determinatethat it is even, but theydid not thinkanyone (save God
and some angels) knew the answer36.
36At one pointAbelardconsiders
are knownbyGod,
thatall truths
theobjection
He seemsto admitthat'all
aboutthefuture.
truths
evenso-called'indeterminate'
withrespect
tousthere
withrespect
toHim,whereas
canbecalleddeterminate
things
whichwe stillcannotat all comprehend.
aremanypresent,
hiddennatures
If,howis in
discussion
sincehereAristotle's
ever,we haveregardto humanknowledge,
seemdefinite'.
aboutthepresent
withhumanopinion,notall sentences
accordance
Whatever
otherproblems
[LI, p. 422.12-17.FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.]
96
12:41:26 PM
No doubt what must have given (2) an air of plausibiltyto some are
the idioms both Boethius and Abelard occasionally use to describe
'
determinancy.Boethius talks of what is knownto nature', Abelard of
what is 4certain
in itself, and of course by this theydo not mean what
is known by us or certain to us, and in fact they do not even mean
simply what is knowable or certifiableby us. But in less careful
momentstheydo talkloosely ofwhat is simplyknown or certain,omittingthe importantqualifications,and thismightlead a careless reader
to identifydeterminancywith what is known or certain to us. Insofar
thenas Abelard' s replyto the argumentfocuseson (2) we can see him
as in part concerned to dispel incorrectinterpretationsof his quasiepistemic account of determinancy.
Before going on to consider (3) we mightnote that (2) could, more
able by
plausibly, be rephrased in terms of what is knowable or certifi
us. So far as I can see the argument could be reformulatedin these
terms,and indeed strengthened.Yet not even thisversionof (2) would
satisfyAbelard, for, as I have said, his view is that the way it is
knowable is crucial to its being determinateor not.
Premise (3) 37is intended to license the move Abelard makes from
the determinatetruthof ' 4' Socrates will eat" is true' to the determinancyof the dictumthatSocrateswill eat. This move restson adopting
an emendationof the textat p. 421 .34-35 38.If we accept thisemenda4
tion, the move fromthe determinatetruthof "Socrates will eat" is
true' to that of thatSocrateswill eat, rests on the tacit equation (made
explicitin (2)) of determinancywithsubjective certaintyand the claim
that "it is impossible that a sentence be known to be true in such a
manner that it not be known that it is so as it says... since it is certain
that it is true forno other reason than that it so says by way of enunciating as in fact is the case". Now Abelard in this supportingargument appears to employ the followingprinciple:
[S] If it is known that '<p' is true, that<pis also known.
Here 'that<p' picks out the dictumsignifiedby '9'. Now, leaving to one
side for the moment the reasons for admitting [S], we must ask
thismight
inAbelard'
s discussion
toknowledge
raise,itmakesitclearthatreferences
are tobe takenas references
to ourknowledge.
37Premise
I propose
itsomewhat
ten(3) raisesconsiderable
interpretative
problems.
as mybestattempt
toreconstruct
lineofthought.
Itisthisprinciple
Abelard's
tatively
thatplaystherolein myinterpretation
oftheargument
thatNormore's
entailment
principle
playsin his.
38See below,p. 105andnote23 in theapparatus
in theappendix.
97
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
4
minancy of "Socrates will eat" is true' to that of thatSocrateswill eat
or 'Socrates will eat' on the basis of an equation of determinancywith
certaintyand some principle allowing us to move fromthe certainty
of the formerto that of the latter. If he is appealing to an entailment
principle then it must be one that holds for certainty.But it is quite
clear that the entailmentprinciple is false for certaintyor knowledge
and would not have been accepted by Abelard. For the claim thatvalid
inferencepreservesknowledge says that ifsome person a knows 9 and
9 entails c>then he knows c>:
If Ka<p & (<p=*c|>),
then Kac>.
Given no independent informationfor c|>,this principle could fail
either(i) because one did not know that 9 entailed c|>,or (ii) because
even though one knew this, he did not draw the conclusion c>.
This latterpoint also throwsdoubt on any suggestion to the effect
that Abelard is appealing to a related principle; the view that
42
knowledge distributesover entailment:
If Ka9 & Ka(9 =>c|>),then Kac>.
But thereis some textual support forAbelard' s acceptance of this. In
LI Abelard does admit thatifthe consequence: 'If "Socrates will eat"
is true,Socrates will ea be admitted[recipiatur],
then ifthe antecedent
is certain so is the consequent. And if one were to interpretrecipiatur
as being used in this contextsynonymouslywith 'certain', this would
fit the above distribution pattern. But this is rather inconclusive
evidence: recipiatur
here could simply mean that if we, the readers,
grantthe entailment,we must realize that if the antecedent is certain
to someone (not necessarilyourselves), so must be the consequent, this
being forthe reasons I have outlined in the discussion of [S], reasons
focussingessentiallyon the factthat the antecedentpredicates truthof
the sentence in the consequent. Furthermore,in parallel passages in
D the proposal does not fit the distributionscheme; here Abelard
simplysays: 'whoever is certain of the truthof the sentence, also cannot doubt about the eventus
, for if the antecedent is certain so is the
there
is no talk here of the consequence itself
consequent' [D, p. 212]
being certain.
42Cf. M. Slote,Selective
andFreeWill
79
, in: TheJournalofPhilosophy,
Necessity
agreedthat'A knowsthatp' and 'A knowsthat
(1982),pp. 5-24:"It is generally
substituends.
(p D q)' do notentail'A knowsthatq' forappropriate
Peoplemayfail
tomakeinferences
to make".,p. 11. Slote'spaperis an important
theyareentitled
recentattackon deterministic
for
arguments
usingthisand relatedprinciples
necessity.
101
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
thandoes'certain',
for
'Determinate'
alsoseemstomeansomething
different
an eventus
is calleddeterminate
whichofitself
beingknowable
byus, as is the
ofthe> stars,cangiveknowledge
ofitself
cvenessoroddnessofthe< number
thatithas.On theotherhand,thosethings
areceron thebasisofthepresence
ifI wereto
areactually
known.Forexample,
tainwhich,inwhatever
manner,
onthetestimony
ofan angel,itwould
arriveatknowledge
ofa future
contingent
to me,notofitself,
buton theauthority
oftheangel;butit
indeedbe certain
ofitself.
Andso
becauseitwouldnotbe knowable
wouldnotbe determinate,
is notcertain,
or conversely,
becausewe take'certain'in
whatis determinate
is clearto someone,
whereas
an actualsense,namelyas whatalreadyactually
ina possible
as whatis fitted
ofitself
tobe
wetake'determinate'
sense,namely
known.[LI, p. 422.26-36.FortheLatintextsee theAppendix.]
If we turn out attentionback to our formulationof The Argumentin
section IV, it failsat premise (2), in which a concept of subjective certainty is equated with determinancy.
VII
The Dialctica
Abelard considers the same set of problems in the Dialctica.After
having said that sentences about future contingents are indeterminately true or indeterminatelyfalse on the basis of the indeterminate eventuswhich they propose or signify[D, p. 211.30-32], he
raises the question whether in a certain sense they might not seem
determinatelytrue or determinatelyfalse 'according to the present
104
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
VIII
Conclusion
Abelars views on determinatetruthare more complex than has
hithertobeen thought. We have seen that one line of argument to
show certain present-tensed truths to be indeterminatelytrue is
rejected for the same reason by Abelard in both LI and D, since it
wronglyequates subjective certaintywithdeterminancy.Moreover, it
is wrong to see any logical principleabout determinancybeing carried
by valid inference or distributingacross such at play in Abelard' s
discussion. Rather, Abelard appeals to a principle relating our
knowledge of the truthof sentences to that of the dictathey signify;
thus underlyinghis discussion lurks the frameworkof sentences and
dictaoutlined earlier in this paper. Yet LI and D do seem to differon
whether all present-tensed truths are determinatelytrue. Abelard
rejectsthisin LI, thoughhis rejectionis not proposed as a replyto The
Argument, but he seems to accept it in D.
Lancaster, Pa.
Franklinand Marshall College
APPENDIX
Rdition of L.I. (ed. Geyer, pp. 421, 16-422, 40) 1
[p. 421,16-26] Propositiones vero de praesenti vel praeterito,
quaecumque verae sunt vel falsae, vera vel falsa2 determinateindicant, quia etsi nobis3 actualiter cognita non sit4 Veritas earum vel
falsitas,in natura tarnendefinitaest, quia iam in rerumpraesentia vel
est vel fuit5. Unde notitiam de se conferrepossunt et6, quantum in
ipsis est, cognosci. Nam cum7 astra paria sintvel imparia alterumque
1 A = codexAmbrosianus
M 63 Sup., 60 va-vb);B = codex
(Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,
Preussische
derStiftung
Preussischer
Berolinus
Kulturbesitz,
(formerly
(Staatsbibl.
Lat. fol.624,121va-vb);g = Geyerineditione
sua;] = scripsi
(scripStaatsbibliothek)
coni.= coniecit;
coli.= collecto
add= addidit(addiderunt);
sit,scripserunt);
(collectis);
= sup= superscripsit;
= correxit;del.= delevit; om.= omisit; superscr.
corr.
suppl.
plevi(t).
2 veravelfalsa] g verasvelfalsasA verasvelfai.B 3 nobis] A B g deteriate
add.etdel.A 4 sit] B g sintA 5 estvelfuit]A g fuitvelestB 6 et] A g
B
om.B 7 cum] A g superscr.
106
12:41:26 PM
12:41:26 PM
esse valet nisi per examen extremi iudicii37,et quod mulier concipit,
ex aliquo futuroeventu38notitiam expectat certam39.Si quis autem
dicat quod mulierem concipere si non sit nobis cognitum, salternDeo
patet [A 60 vb], idem etiam de quolibet futuro40dici potest41,quia
omnia determinatadici possunt42quantum ad Ipsum; quantum43 ad
nos vero multae sunt occultae naturae praesentesquae a nobis nullatenus comprehendi adhuc44 valent. Si autem ad humanam scientiam
respiciamus, cum hic Aristoteles45 iuxta46 humanam opinionem
disputt47,non omnes propositionesde praesenti48definitaevidentur.
[p. 422,18-40] Sunt autem qui dicunt quod 'Socrates comede
51 vera50
est
indeterminate
>
<
fortassis49
praesentialiter
quae
determinate vera est quantum ad veritatem ipsam scilicet
52
quam praesentialiterhabet; quippe determinatus
proprie< tatem>
est eventus proprietatis53praesentialiterei inhaerentiset ipsam iam
determinateveritatemhabet. Sed, licet determinatevera dicatur propositio quantum ad praesentemet determinataminhaerentiamveritatis, quantum54tarnen55ad eventum quem loquitur indeterminatum56,
indeterminate57vera est; et hoc loco Aristoteles determinate vel
indeterminate58veras vel falsas propositionesdicit quantum ad eventus scilicet determinatos vel indeterminatosquos proponunt. Aliud
etiam59sonare videtur 'determinatum'60quam 'certum', quia determinatus dicitureventus qui ex se cognoscibilisest61nobis, ut paritas
et imparitas astrorumex ipsa praesentia quam habet62de se cognitionem dare potest; certa vero sunt quae quoquomodo63 actualitercognita sunt, ut si quid64 de futuro contingenti65testimonio angeli ad
discretionem<meam venerit> 66, certumquidem67 illud68esset mihi
non ex se sed ex auctoritateangeli; sed determinatumnon esset, quia
37extremiiudicii] B g extermini
B
indicit(!) A 38eventu] A g affectu
39certam]g m (!) A nostram
B
B 40quolibetfuturo]A g futuro
quolibet
41potest] A g con. ex possumusB 42quia...possunt] A g superscr.
B
43quantum]A g om.B 44adhuc] A B g tenent
add.etdel.A 45aristoteles]
B 48praesenti]
A g autemB 46iuxta] B om.Ag 47disputt]A g superscr.
49fortassis]A B fortassese
futuro(!) add. B
A B G vel preterito
51 < indeterminate
50vera...praesentialiter]B om. A g
>
om. B
g
52proprietatem]
A B [viz.via itstruth:an legendum
B 53proprietatis]
proprie
55
A
veritatis?] 54quantum] A g om. B 57 tamen] B g superscr.
56indeterminatum]
A g quo deterA
B g indeterminatam
indeterminate]
add.
B om.A g 59etiam] A B g sonatur
minate(!) B 58velindeterminate]
Ag
sonarevidetur
B determinatum
etdel.A 60sonarevidctur
determinatum]
61est] B om.A g 62habet] A B habentg 63quoquomodo]B g quomodo
B 66 Cmeam
A g contingit
A 64quid] B g quide(!) A 65contingenti]
67quidem] Bg quodA 68illud] B
venerit>] suppl. <venerit> suppl.g
aliudA om.g
108
12:41:26 PM
ex se ipso cognoscibile non esset. Non est itaque determinatumertm,vel econverso,quia 'certum' actualiteraccipimus69quod iam scilicet actualiter alicui constat; 4determinatum' autem possibiliter
sumimus70quod videlicet aptum est ex71 se ipso sciri. Unde etsi talis
4 4'
consequentia recipiatur: Si Socrates comede' est vera, Socrates
comede et certumsit antecedens, certumest72et73consequens. Sed
non, fortasse:si determinatum[5 121 vb] sit antecedens74,et consequens, quia praesens eventus ex se cognoscibilisest, sed non ita futurus contingens75.
69accipimus]Ag accepimusi? 70sumimus]B sumamusi4^ 71ex] Bg
72certum
73et]Ag om.B
A certum
eritB
con.experA
est] g superset.
74antecedens]B g accidens
A 75contingens]A g contingit
B
109
12:41:26 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
The Fallacy of Accidentand theDictum de omni: Late Medieval
overa ReciprocalPair
Controversy
HESTER GOODENOUGH GELBER
In the SophisticalRefutations
, Aristotle distinguished two sorts of
fallacies, fallacies that depend upon language and fallacies that do
not.1 But just what the distinction distinguishes is not completely
clear. His examples of fallacies independent of language, particularly
And
the first,the fallacyof accident, pose problemsof interpretation.2
yet matters of considerable moment appear to be at stake in the
distinction.What exactly did Aristotleinclude and exclude with the
and ea>xfjXeeo
or in the Latin tradition: in
words rcocp
tt)vXetv
refer
to everyaspect of speech,
Did
"diction"
and extradictionei
dictione
including syntax,or did it referonly to the nature of terms?What lay
outside speech? Did Aristotlehave in mind thingsor did he have in
mind some ideal logical structureindependentof and priorto speech?
What did his distinctionimply for the relation between logical form
and content? Medieval authors trying to comprehend and give
coherence to Aristotlehad to make decisions about the meaning of his
text, and the questions hanging over Aristotle'swords resultedin full
fledged controversyduring the fourteenthcentury.
I. Settingup theproblem
Discussions about the nature and application of the fallacyof accident served as one occasion for interpretingAristotle's distinction
between fallacies that depend on speech and fallacies that do not.
Aristotledescribed the fallacy of accident as occurrring: "whenever
any attributeis claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to
its accident. For since the same thinghas many accidents there is no
necessitythat all the same attributesshould belong to all of a thing's
1 Aristotles,
4.166b20-27.
De sophisticis
elenchis,
2 Aristotle
See C. L.
in laterdiscussions
offallacy.
himself
droppedthedistinction
, London1970,pp. 26-28,67-73,84-87.
Hamblin,Fallacies
110
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
subjecto
(or essential) predication.8Fallacies of accident came to be seen
as the result of infringingthis restriction.
The De Jallaciis attributed to Thomas Aquinas provides a good
example of the developed medieval view. Discussion of the fallacyof
accident begins in thatworkwitha distinctionamong threetraditional
kinds of predication: per se primomododicendi
, in which the predicate
definesthe subject or encompases the subject; peraccidens,in which the
'
'
predicate is extraneous to the 'ratio' or meaning of the subject term;
and perse secundomododicendi
, in which the definitionof the predicate
is subordinated to the definitionof the subject, but the predicateis not
convertible with the subject. When predication is per se primomodo,
whateveris true about the predicate is also true about the subject. But
when predication is per se secundomodoor per accidens
, that is not the
a
because
that
conclude
cannot
and
one
case,
propertyis true of the
also
be
to
the
it
should
subject. A fallacyof acciassigned
predicate,
dent would result.9
8 Boethius,
nunc
Aristotelis
In Categorias
, 1: "Patefacto
igitur
quidsitesseinsubjecto,
Duobusenimmodispraedicationes
uno
declarat.
de subjecto
fiunt,
quidsitpraedicari
de hominenamquepraedicatur
aliode subjecto:
secundum
album,dicitur
accidens,
enimhomo
de eodemhominepraedicatur
enimhomoalbus,rursus
animal,dicitur
accidens
animal.Sed illapriorpraedicatio,
est,
quaeest,Homoalbusest,secundum
sed nonin eo
namqueaccidens,quodestalbum,de subjectohominepraedicatur,
accidens
de substantia
homosubstantia,
quodquidsit,namcumalbumsitaccidens,
accidens
secundum
nonpotest,
in eo quod quidsitpraedicari
ergoistapraedicatio
veropraedicare
De subjecto
dicitur.
est,quotiesalteraresde alterainipsasubstantia
utanimalde homine;namquoniamanimalet substantia
est,et genus
praedicatur,
idcircoin eo quodquidsitde hominepraedicatur.
hominis,
Quareiliasolade subet in diffinitione
reisubstantia
dicuntur
quaecunquein cujuslibet
jectopraedicari
de alterout
utalterum
fuerit
praedicatio,
hujusmodi
ergoquotiescunque
ponuntur;
ut animaide homine,
id estut de eiussubstantia
de subjectopraedicetur,
dicatur,
necesseest,utsi de eo quodpraedicatur,
evenire
hancproprietatem
quidpiamutde
de praedicatio
idem
hoc
necessario
est
id
substantia,
quod
praedicetur
ejus
subjecto,
uthomopraedicatur
dicatur
etiamde praedicati
dicitur,
quidemde Socrate
subjecto,
in eo quodquidsit." In PL 64, 175D-176B.Alsosee ErnestA. Moody,TheLogic
ofOckham
ofWilliam
, NewYork1935,pp. 129-130.
9 ThomasAquinas,DeJallaciis
nobiles
artistas
ad quosdam
, 12: "Dicendumestergo
primode fallaciaaccidentis.
contraperse. Per se
hicaccipitur
Ubi sciendum
proutdistinguitur
quodaccidens
definirationem
inessealiquidalicui,quodinestei secundum
autemdicitur
propriae
inesseperaccidens;undede
hocautemquicquidinestalicui,dicitur
tionis;praeter
hocquodestinesseperse aut peraccidens,tripliciter
aliquidpotestse habere.
ut
substantiae
enimsuntquae omnimodosunteademsecundum
rationem,
Quaedam
et in hisestsolumperse, et nullomodoperaccidens.
vestiset indumentum;
utalbum
a ratione
alterius,
sunt,quorumunumestomninoextraneum
Quaedam
et homo;et in istisestsolummodo
peraccidens,et nullomodoperse.
licet
rationem
verosunt,quorumunumad alterius
aliquomodopertinet,
Quaedam
et inferius:
sicutse habetsuperius
nonsintomninoeademsecundum
definitionem,
112
12:41:36 PM
In sum, the view which predominated at the beginningof the fourteenth century interpretedAristotle's distinction between fallacies
withinand outside speech as a distinctionbetween fallacies that arise
fromthe nature of terms and fallacies that arise from the nature of
things. The fallacyof accident, the firstof the fallacies dependent on
the nature of things,was allied with a furtherdistinctionbetween two
kinds of predication:essential predicationand accidental predication.
Fallacies of accident arose when syllogismscontained premisses with
predicatesaccidentallypredicated about theirsubjects. Since Boethius
had restrictedthe dictumde omnito cases of essential predication, the
fallacyof accident came to define the extension of the dictumde omni.
However, this complex of ideas about predication and fallacious
inference,had an important result. It subordinated the power of
logical formto the nature of the cases to which it was applied. The
matteror contentof argument had an ultimate precedence over the
form of argument in determiningthe validity of inferencebecause
contentdeterminedthe nature of the predication involved, whetherit
was essential or accidental.
The idea that the converse was true, that logical formhad priority
over the matterof argumentation,was inherentin Aristotle'sdevelopment of syllogistic,however. Aristotle'streatmentof logic in the Prior
analyticsconstitutedthe foundation for the medieval discipline,10and
in that work, syllogismswere treated, not as a collection of sentences
which contain words with constant meaning, but rather as formulae
which contain variables, so that in the discursus:
"All A areB,
AllB areC,
all A areC,"
Therefore,
theoretically,any term can be substitutedfor any variable, and the
namsuperius
indefinitione
tamennonestomnino
eademdefinitio
inferioris,
ponitur
inferioris
et superioris,
ut animaliset hominis,
cumdefinitio
inferioris
addatsuper
definitionem
... Et in hisestquodammodo
superioris.
perse et quodammodo
per
secundum
definitionem
etpartim
differunt.
accidens,
conveniunt,
inquantum
partim
In hisergoquaeprimo
modo
se habent,
necesseestquodquicquidverumde unosit,
sitetiamverum
de alio,eo quodtaliasuntpenitus
eademsecundum
remetdifferunt
secundum
nomensolum;undein hisnoncontingit
essefallaciam
accidentis.
Sed in
omnibus
aliisnonestnecessarium
quodquicquidestverumde uno,sitetiamverum
de altero.Et ideosi ex hocquodaliquidestde unoverum,concludatur
esseverum
de altero,
estfallacia
accidentis."
In Opuscula
M. Spiazzi,
, ed. Raymundo
Philosophica
Rome1954,pp. 233-234,nos.677-678.
10I. M. Bocheski,
A History
, trans.Ivo Thomas,2d ed., NewYork
ofFormal
Logic
1970,p. 23.
113
12:41:36 PM
relationship among the terms will hold if the meaning of the terms
remains constant. The formal relations should obtain even in a case
like the following:
"All menare musicians,
All musicians
are green,
all menare green."
Therefore,
and what the terms of the propositions stand for should be quite
incidental.
During the teens and early twenties of the fourteenthcentury,
Richard Campsall and William of Ockham each perceived these conflictingcurrents in the Aristotelian tradition and developed a new
position on the relationshipbetween the form and content of logic.
Both Campsall and Ockham rejected the prevailing Boethian tradition, turningit on its head to emphasize the priorityof logicatiform
over content.The resultwas a realignmentof the relationshipbetween
logic and metaphysicswith importantimplicationsforphilosophyand
theology.11
Richard Campsall formedhis views while studyingarts at Balliol,
in the years priorto going to Merton College as regentmasterin 13061307. Apparently while still dominusand not yet magister
, he wrote
which contained the ingredients
twentyquestions on the Prioranalytics
of
the
to
achieve
logic.12Thus, of the two men,
realignment
necessary
was
the
seminal figure,completing
and
Ockham, Campsall
Campsall
before the summer of
even his lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences
13
1317, prior to the academic year 1317-1318, when Ockham began
his own lectures on the Sentences.However, while the fundamental
11 The controversy
to thesame
a discussion
subordinate
overuniversais
constituted
de
inlibrum
tohisExpositio
As Ockhamwrotein theintroduction
concerns.
Porphyrii
et consimiles
: "Quamvispraedictae
Praedicabilibus
quaestiones
[de naturauniversintpertinentes,
quia tarnenex
salium]non ad logicmsed ad metaphysicum
in multplices
etiaminlogicasuntprolapsi,
errores
earummultimoderni
ignorantia
. . . ." Ed. ErnestA. Moody,in Opera
ideode ipsisbreviter
3.10,lines
philosophical
17-21.
12EdwardA. Synan,ed. TheWorks
, Toronto1968,1.19.
ofCampsall
ofRichard
13EdwardA. Synan,Richard
,
, an English
Century
oftheFourteenth
Theologian
Campsall
in: MediaevalStudies14(1952),5. Katherine
Tachau,TheInfluence
CampofRichard
ed. AnnHudsonandM.
toWyclif
Ockham
sailon14th-Century
, in:From
Oxford
Thought
to Campsallas
a July,1317,reference
Wilks,Oxford1987,p. 150, interprets
ofPopeJohnXXII, as baccalarius
communes
intheology
intheLitterae
bachelor
formtus
notedthereference.
. Synan,ed. Campsall
rather
thansententiarius
Tachau,
, 1.15,first
in otherareasofthought,
art.cit.makesa case forCampsalPsseminalimportance
forleadingmetothink
I havehertothank
againaboutthe
epistemology.
particularly
placeofCampsallin theschemeofthings.
114
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
have held the fieldprior to Ockham.18 Giles had said that in order to
understand the nature of the fallacyof accident, one should note that
it includes three characteristicswhich follow one another in order.
First, the fallacy of accident occurs when the syllogismis diversified
and varied through the middle term. Second, since the middle is
varied, it has the power of several terms. And third, because the
middle is multiple, the major extremecannot be concluded about the
minor extreme throughthe middle term. Therefore, he said, we are
deceived througha fallacyof accident because we do not know when
the middle term remains the same and when it is diversified.We do
not know when the middle stands forone thingand when it stands for
several. Thus, the minor extrememay be extraneous to the middle as
the middle is related to the major extreme.19
As Giles sets it out, the fallacyof accident arises because of a process
analogous to that in Aquinas' De fallaciis. Alluding to the concept of
essential predication, Giles argued:
18The earliestglosseson Aristotle's
De sophisiicis
elenchis
, datingfromaboutthe
defined
thefallacy
ofaccident,
as wouldGiles,interms
middleofthetwelfth
century,
Modernorum:
A Contribution
inthemiddleterm.See L. M. deRijk,Logica
ofa variation
which
totheHistory
, I, Assen1962,82-97,146.Otherexamples
Logic
ofEarlyTerminist
ofthemiddletermpriorto Gilesof
ofaccident
to a variation
thefallacy
attributed
elenchos
inIncertorum,
Romecanbefound
, q. 84,lines36-45,pp. 194Super
sophisticos
, p. 234,no. 679.
195,and Aquinas,Defallaciis
and WalterChattonboth
FrancisofMayronnes
Of Ockham'scontemporaries,
ofaccident
occurred
onlywhentherewasa variation
espousedtheviewthata fallacy
: "Illudtamennonvalet,quiacum
ofMayronnes,
inthemiddleterm.Francis
Quaestio
. . . ."In Bartolomus
mediumvarietur
in omnifallaciaaccidentis
Roth,Franzvon
inGott
Lehre
vonFormalunterschied
seineWerke
OFM. SeinLeben,
, Werl
, seine
Mayronis
libros
Sententiarum:
Lectura
Inquatuor
, 1.2.6:Si enim
1936,p. 340;andWalterChatton,
diceremquod essetaliqua fallacia
diceremquod in talibussit fallaciaaccidentis,
. . . ." (Florence,
etaliquavariatio
mediitermini
accidentis
BNC,C. 5. 357),f.80rb
Elenchorum
and(Paris,BN. lat.15.886),f.127ra.Ockham,
, 2.9.2,OP 3:231,line24,
one.
refers
to a viewlikethatofGilesofRomeas thecommon
19GilesofRome,Expositio
autemquodin
Elenchorum
, 1.5: "Notandum
supralibros
diverhaectriase habentperordinem:
fallaciaaccidentis
primoenimpermedium
teret variatur;secundomediovariato,qualiterhabetvim multorum
sificatur
nonposmediimaiores
extremitates
estmulta,virtute
tertio
minorum;
quiamedium
suntconcludi
de minoribus.
accidentis,
quia nescimus
Decipimur
ergoperfallaciam
et quia manens
quandomediummanetidemet quandodiversificatur,
cognoscere
non
verohabetvim multorum,
mediumidemhabetvim unius,diversificatum
non
autemquando mediummanetidemet quando diversificatur
cognoscendo
ut
ut unumet quandout multa,et quia si accipitur
cognoscimus
quandoaccipitur
a medioetaccidit
extraneatur
multaminor
extremitas
ei,noncognoscendo
quaedicta
rei
minores
extremitates
accidunt
suntnoncognoscimus
qualibuspraedicationibus
subiectae
sivemedio."(Venice1496),f. 27v,citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
, 1.14.6,
OP 3:88, note1.
116
12:41:36 PM
ifitisverified
abouta middle
isthennecessarily
verified
"a majorextreme,
term,
areindifabouttheminor
extreme,
onlyinthosecasesinwhichthemiddleterms
ferent
becausethemiddletermmustnotbe variedor
to substance,
according
iftheconclusion
is to follow
ofnecessity."20
diversified
Giles believed that a failure to observe this rule would produce a
fallacy of accident.21If the predicate is not predicated of its subject
throughsome sort of perse identityrelation, then the predicate may
be ' 'diverse' ' or in some way "extraneous" to the subject. Any
syllogismconstructedofpropositionswithpredicatesof thisdiversified
sort, can give rise to a fallacyof accident, because the various terms
ofthe syllogismmay be relatedto one anotheraccording to theirdiversity rather than according to their unity.
What Giles had in mind is clarifiedin his treatmentof Aristotle's
sample of a fallacy of accident:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis theone approaching,
is knownto you."
theone approaching
Therefore,
Giles said that in this argumentit is as if there are fourterms,rather
than the requisite three, because the middle term ' 'Coriscus' ' is
diverse. "Coriscus" is varied because it stands forsomethingdifferent
when it means the-Coriscus-who-is-known-to-you,
than when it
means the-Coriscus-who-is-approaching.22
Ockham was not the firstto take exception to Giles' position.
Walter Burley raised objections in his Tractatus
superlibrumElenchorum,
to Giles' contentionthat the fallacyof accident arises fromvariation
in the middle term. AftermentioningGiles by name,23he contended:
20Ockham,Elenchorum
"Nam quodmaiorextremitas,
, 2.9.2,citesGilesas follows:
si verificetur
de medio,oporteat
earnverificari
de minoriextremitate,
solumhabet
veritatem
iniismediisquaesunt
secundum
substantiam
medium
, quia oportet
indifferentia
si debeatsequide necessitate
conclusio."In OP 3:230nonvariarinecdiversifican
on Ockham,Elenchorum
231,lines14-24.See theeditorscomment
, 2.9.2, in OP
3:230,note2, thatOckhamherequotesGiles,Elenchorum
, 2.7 (Venice1496),f.55vb,
verbatim.
21Ockham,Elenchorum
lines14-26,attributes
theposition
, 2.9.2,in OP 3.230-231,
toGiles,whomhe is citing.
22Gilesof Rome,Elenchorum
, 2.7: "Dicendumquod non est intentio
Philosophi
etcognitum;
sedutostendat
quodhaec
negarequodnullomodositidemignoratum
fallacia
inquattuor
terminis
etsemper
diversificat
ideoaitquod
medium;
quasiarguit
nonidemcognoscitur
etignoratur,
'Coriscus'et quasihabetvim
quia diversificatur
duorum
utstatsubcognitione
etutestveniens.
Etquiasicdiversificatur
terminorum,
dicitur
etignoratur."
'Coriscus',utestnotusetignotus,
quodnonidemcognoscitur
, 2.9.2, OP 3:231,note3.
(Venice1496),f. 56ra,citedin Ockham,Elenchorum
23GilesofRome,Elenchorum
, 1.3 and2.7 (Venice1496),ff.16vband 55v,citedin
Ockham,Elenchorum
, 2.9.2,OP 3:231,note3.
117
12:41:36 PM
Whatis necessary
ifthereis tobe a fallacy
is thatsometerm[in
[ofaccident],
theargument]
is compared
totheothertwoterms
inan extraneous
way.Hence
. . . thefallacy
ofaccident
occursfrom
variation
ofthemiddleterm
sometimes
fromvariation
ofthemajoror minorextreme."24
and sometimes
Burleyprovided an example in a versionof the Coriscus argument.
When the argument is presented in the form:
"Coriscusis knownto you,
Coriscusis theoneapproaching,
inasmuch
as he is theone approaching,
theone approaching,
Therefore,
is knownto you,"
a fallacyof accident occurs because the term"approaching" has a differentmeaning in the minor premiss and in the conclusion, but the
term "approaching" is not the middle term. Therefore, a fallacyof
accident could arise through variation in some term other than the
middle.25
In takingthisposition, Burley was heir to an earlier thirteenthcentury debate. In an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's Elenchi,
which its editors believe was writtena short time before Giles wrote
his commentaryin the early 1270' s,26the question was raised whether
in the fallacyof accident there is always diversityin the middle term
or in the major extreme or in the minor extreme. And an argument
was put forwardthat the fallacy always involved a variation in the
middle term. But the argumentin favorofdiversityin the middle term
was then countered:
24WalterBurley,Tractatus
"In
Elenchorum
librum
, cap. 'De fallaciaaccidentis':
super
accidenset res subiecta.Et
ista fallaciasoientassignaritria,scilicetattributum,
etmdiusterminus
res
estattributum
maiorextremitas
secundum
semper
Aegidium
accidens.De hoctamennonestmagnacura,sufficit
subiectaet minorextremitas
modocomparatur
extraneo
enimad hocquodhaecfallaciasit,quodaliquisterminus
in discursu.
Unde . . . fallaciaaccidentis
aliisduobusterminis
aliquandoacciditex
"
extremitatis.
velminoris
maioris
etaliquandoexvariatione
variatione
mediitermini
note
Elenchorum
OP
, 2.9.2, 3:231,
(London,Lambeth
70),f.141vb,citedinOckham,
andsome
Mertonians
3. JamesA. Weisheipl,
, in: MediaevalStudies,30
OP, Ockham
demodo
toan
s Tractatus
arguendi)
(whichhe callstheTractatus
(1968),assignsBurley'
earlydatein Burley'scareer.
25Burley,
accidentis
accidentis': . .est fallacia
Tractatus
, cap. 'De fallacia
respectu
'veniensin quantum
vel respectuilliusconclusionis
conclusionis
reduplicativae,
mediiterex variatione
a te', et tuncnonestfallaciaaccidentis
veniens
cognoscitur
'veniens'variomodo
minoris
extremitatis,
mini,sedexvariatione
quia isteterminus
in minoriet in conclusione."
(London,Lambeth70), f. 142ra,citedin
accipitur
, 2.9.2,OP 3:232,note4. See pages125and 126-9belowfora
Ockham,Elenchorum
of "in quantum"to theargument.
's addition
discussion
ofBurley
26Incertorum
, pp. xl-xlii.
auctorum,
Quaestiones
118
12:41:36 PM
ofaccident
notonlyarisesfroma variation
ofthemiddlein 'com"thefallacy
occurs
becausethefallacy
ofaccident
extremes,
parison'tothemajorandminor
to an
whenthereis a comparison
of one termto diversethingsaccording
extraneous
can be comparedto an
nature,and sincethemiddlesometimes
extreme
todiverse
andthemajorextreme
is sometimes
comnatures,
according
paredto the middleand to the minorextremeaccordingto diverseand
iscompared
extraneous
andsometimes
theminor
extreme
tothemiddle
natures,
I saythattherecanbe a fallacy
ofaccident
andtothemajorextreme,
therefore,
fromthediversity
ofanyone ofthosethree."27
So there is an example from about the time of Giles of Rome of
someone taking a position like the one Burley later espoused, that
variationcould arise notjust througha variation in the meaning of the
middle term,but also throughvariation in eitherone of the extremes.
John Duns Scotus expressed a similar view in his Ordinario:
"If oneortheothercondition
is lacking:
either
theunityofthemiddletermin
itself
or unityoftheextremes
to themiddle,therewillnotbe a syllogism
but
a paralogism
ofaccident."28
Therefore, Burley's critique of Giles does not represent a radical
departure fromprevious tradition. He viewed the fallacyof accident
as occurring because of something "extraneous" that gives rise to
variation in one of the three terms of the syllogism.While the argument on its face seems to have only three terms, it actually functions
as though there were four. Burley just did not want to restrictthe
fallacyof accident, as Giles had, to cases in which the middle termwas
the one that was diversified.
III. Williamof Ockhamand theprimacyof logicalform
Ockham, however, broke with the commonly held position. He
believed that the traditionof Boethius, Aquinas, Giles and Burley,
whichlocated the source of the fallacyof accident in an extraneouselement in the predicate, was deeply confused. On the one hand, those
27Incertorum
accidentis
non
auctorum,
Quaestiones,
q. 83: "Dicendumquodfallacia
tantumfit ex variationemedii in 'comparatonead' maioremet minorem
accidatex comparatione
uniussecundum
extremitatem,
quiacumfallaciaaccidentis
naturasextraneas
ad diversa,cum mediumaliquandopossetsecundumnaturas
diversascomparanextremis,
et maiorextremitas
aliquandosecundumdiversas
naturas
etextraneas
medioetminori
etminor
aliextremitas
extremitati,
comparatur
ex diversitate
quandomedioetmaiori,ideodicoquodpotestfierifallaciaaccidentis
illorum
trium."Citedfromp. 192,lines20-28.
cuiuscumque
28JohnDunsScotusOrdinatio
vel
, 1.2.2,qq. 1-4:"Omissaenimalteraconditione,
unitatismedii in se vel extremorum
ad medium,non est syllogismus,
sed
accidentis."In Operaomnia
, ed. CharlesBalie,VaticanCity1963,
paralogismus
2:362,no. 411.
119
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
when the same termfirststands fora man and thenstands foran ass.34
But since mental termsare natural signs of the thingsforwhich they
stand, they never representmore than one kind of entity.35Mental
termsin his systemare not subject to the sortof variation assigned in
the fallacyof equivocation. Fallacious deception about the efficacyof
an argumentcontainingtermswith more than one meaning was only
possible if the argument were situated in external speech. Deception
resultedfromthe relationbetween the spoken termsand theirmental
equivalents.
In Ockham's view, the fallacy of accident must originate in some
way other than a variation in the terms. Instead, he believed it
representeda breakdown in the formalstructureof the argument as
formed firstand foremostin the mind in mental language. While a
fallacyof speech mightand oftendid accompany a fallacyof accident,
no variation of terms, whether in the mind or in the spoken and
writtenlanguage used to representmental content,accounted forthe
fallacy of accident.36
For an example, Ockham said that a fallacyof accident occurs in
the followingcase:
44
Everywhitethingis colored,
Socratesbeginsto be white,
Socratesbeginsto be colored,"
Therefore,
There is always, he says, a fallacyof accident when a syllogismof the
firstfigure has an affirmativemajor premiss and a negative minor
premiss, because such a syllogism does not conformto the rules of
4
argument. In the syllogismin question, the term 'begins" on its face
seems affirmative,but it is an exponible term, and, therefore,one of
the thingsthe proposition: "Socrates begins to be white," means, is
that Socrates was not white immediatelybeforehe startedto become
white. The negative exponent invalidates the syllogism.37A semantic
34Ibid.,1.6.3:". . . quandoestfallaciaaccidentis
etnonestaliafallacia,
numquam
estvariatiomedii;quia mediumnonpotestvariarinisivel quantumad substan- sicutsi primoponeretur
'homo'etpostea'asinus'- , ettunenonessetfallacia
tiam,
. ..." In OP 3:50.
accidentis
35See Philotheus
Articles
in: Collected
OFM, Ockham's
Boehner,
Theory
ofSignification,
N. Y. 1958,pp. 214-217,and
St. Bonaventura,
onOckham
, ed. EligiusM. Buytaert,
, forthcoming.
Gelber,Mental
Language
36Ockham,
lines1-45;ibid.,2.9.4,inOP 3:237Elenchorum
, 2.9.3,inOP 3:236-237,
Summa
lines100-260;
,
Ockham,
logicae
238,lines1-16;ibid.,2.9.4,inOP 3:240-245,
lines38-64.
3.4.11,in OP 1:819-820,
37Ockham,Summa
ad
, 2.19: Ex praedictis
colligipotestquod ab inferiori
logicae
sicutnon
superiuscumhoc verbo'incipit'vel 'desininon valetconsequentia,
122
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
for the primacy of logical formover content. He argued, if the Corsicus argument contained a fallacy of accident:
ofaccident
"Then therewouldbe a fallacy
in thefollowing
instance:
'Socratesis a musician,
Socratesis white,
somewhiteis a musician,'
Therefore,
inas muchas heis a musician.
becausethewhiteofSocrates
is extraneous
And
createdfromitsopposite
thesyllogism
wouldnotbe valid:
consequently
'No whiteis a musician,
Socratesis white,
Socratesis nota musician/
Therefore,
teachesthat
when,indeed,it is governed
byall or none,and thePhilosopher
hold notonlyin thecase of essentialtermsbut also in
validconjunctions
accidental
terms,indeedevenin impossible
propositions."44
In the name of Aristotle,Ockham specificallyrepudiated the Boethian
traditionlimitingthe dictumde omnito cases of essential predication.
The editorsof Ockham' s textsuggestOckham had in mind Aristotle's
45
PriorAnalytics
, c. 5, (27b 31-39), where Aristotleproposed "white,"
"snow," "raven," "swan," and "man," among others, as terms
appropriate for syllogismsgoverned by all or none. In regard to the
two currentsin the Aristoteliantradition,one givingprecedence to the
matterof logic over its form and the other giving precedence to the
formof logic over its matter,Ockham emphaticallychose formalism.
Since he believed Aristotletaughtthatall conjunctionsgovernedby all
or none were valid, whether or not they involved essential or
accidental terms, he rejected Aristotle's example about Coriscus as
badly formed.
testfor a fallacyof accident
IV. The reduplication
Those who accepted the essentialist view that the dictumde omni
applied only in cases of essential predication, had developed a test to
44Ockham,
accidentis
'Sortesest
tuncessethicfallacia
Elenchorum
, 2.9.2: "Similiter,
Sorti
Sortesestalbus;igitur
musicus;
quiaextraneatur
aliquodalbumestmusicum,'
ex opposito
non
istesyllogismus
albumin quantumestmusicus;et perconsequens
Sortesestalbus;igitur
Sortesnonestmusicus,'
valeret'nullumalbumestmusicum;
doceatquod coniugationes
cumtamenreguletur
perdicide nullo,et Philosophus
immo
essentialibus
sed etiamaccidentalibus,
utilesnontantumtenentin terminis
Peridempatetquod tertius
etiamin propositionibus
paralogismus
impossibilibus.
In OP 3:232,
estbonusdiscursus."
namillediscursus
maleformatur,
qui formatur
lines48-57.
45Ockham,Elenchorum
, 2.9.2, OP 3:232,note5.
126
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
posits.56
The reduplication test depended on the reduplicative meaning of
"
terms like " inquantum being limited to the reduplicationof cause.
In the traditionalinterpretationof the fallacyof accident, conclusions
of syllogisms containing the fallacy exemplified variations of the
56Ockham,Summalogicae2.16: "Circa propositiones
est primo
reduplicativas
vocaturreduplicativa
in qua ponitur
haecdictio'in
sciendum
quod ilia propositio
et tenetur
aliquospotest
reduplicative;
quia secundum
quantum,'vel aequivalens,
ettuncfacitpropositionem
vam,etpotest
reduplicati
aliquandotenerireduplicative,
...
et tuncnonfacitpropositionem
reduplicativam.
aliquandotenerispecificative,
eo quodpotest
estquodtalispropositio
Circaprimum
sciendum
potestdistingui,
vel gratiacausae.Si fiatreduplicatio
essereduplicatio
gratia
gratiaconcomitantiae
tamtuncad veritatem
concomitantiae,
quatuorpropositiones
ipsiusrequiruntur
de
verepraedicetur
earn:una, in qua praedicatum
principale
quam exponentes
de
alia in qua illudsuperquod caditreduplicatio
subiectoprincipali;
praedicetur
de iliosuper
subiectoprincipali;
tertia,in qua praedicatum
praedicetur
principale
universaliter;
vera,ab iliosuper
quartaeritunacondicionalis
quodcaditreduplicatio
ab inferiori
ad
ilio
ad
modo
cadit
principale,
quo
praedicatum
reduplicatio
quod
et quo mododicitur
essebonaconsequentia
dicitur
quod ex uno conversuperius
...
tibilium
reliquum.
sequitur
talisreduplicativae,
fiatgratiacausae,tuncad veritatem
Si autemreduplicatio
quod illud superquod cadit
requiritur
praeterquatuorpraedictasexponentes,
velquodsitilludcuiprimo
causamimportati
perpraedicatum,
exprimt
reduplicatio
velquod illipriusinsitpraedicatum
inestpraedicatum
quam
principale
principale,
In OP 1:289illudproquo subiectum
demonstranti
supponit."
principale
pronomini
291,lines3-8,21-31,38-43.
130
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
V. RichardCampsall
Richard Campsall provided a supporting context within which
Ockham developed his critique of the established tradition.Just prior
to Ockham' s lectures on Peter Lombard's Sentences
, in the years
around 1306-1317, Campsall advocated many of the ideas which
Ockham came to espouse in realigningthe relationshipbetween logic
and metaphysics. In his Quaestionessuperlibrumpriormanaleticorum
,
omni
as
the
de
fundamental
to
asserted
of
the
dictum
primacy
Campsall
4
logic: 'Conversion is the principleof perfectingimperfectsyllogisms,
just as the 'dici de omni et de nullo' perfectsperfectsyllogisms."62
While he did not take up the Boethian restrictionof the dictumde omni
to instances of essential predication, he did propose a rule that
indicates opposition to the Boethian tradition. He asserted: 4'from a
universal [premiss] and any of its singular premisses, there follows
some singular conclusion, because of the relation to the universal."63
A syllogismof the sort which Ockham proposed as counter to his
opponents:
"No whiteis a musician,
Socrates
is white,
Socratesis nota musician,"64
Therefore,
which includes accidental terms and is governed by a universal first
premiss, follows from Campsall's rule, because the rule places no
restrictionson the subject matterof universal syllogisms.
Campsall also developed a position on mental language that
foreshadowedOckham's. The key passage reads:
orsyllogism
doesnothavetobe resolved
"One shouldsaythata proposition
. . . because,ifit
norconcepts,
norintovoicesfrom
intothings,
spokenterms,
wouldbe good:
thissyllogism
fromthings
or fromconcepts,
werecomposed
'Everymanruns,
Socratesis a rational
animal,
Socratesruns,'
Therefore,
becausethesamethingis signified
by 'man' and by'rationalanimal.'
62RichardofCampsall,Quaestiones
librum
analeticorum
, 5, ad I: "conpriorm
super
sicuddicide omnietdenullo
versioestprincipium
sillogismos
inperfectos,
perficiendi
In Synan,ed. Campsall
, 1:112,no. 5.41.
perficiunt
perfectos."
sillogismos
63Campsall,
necessarius
11,ad III: "et istemodusarguendi
Librum
est,quia
priorm,
etqualibetsingulari,
ex universali,
aliquaconsequitur
arguitur
perhancregulam:
. . . ."in Synan,ed. Campsall
clusiosingularis,
hocad universalem
,
quodpropter
1:196,no. 11.69.
64See note44 above.
133
12:41:36 PM
sincetwodifferent
namescansignify
thesameconcept
Andsimilarly,
orone
wouldbea goodsyllogism
wherever
there
onenamewassubstituted
singlething,
foranother,
whichisagainstAristotle
inthefirst
ofElenchi
, becausetheonewho
aboutgarments
did notsyllogize
aboutclothing.65
syllogized
Andtherefore,
oneshouldsaythat[propositions
and syllogisms]
haveto be
voices
as follows:
a thing
resolved
intoimagined
first
, whichshouldbe understood
and ifit oughtto be enunciated
to someoneelse,theoneenunis conceived,
whichhe oughtto
a voicesimilarto theone through
imagines
ciatingit first
enunciate
thethingtosomeone
else,andthatvoicedoesnothavebeingoutside
thatan object
thesoul,likethething
ofthepredicate,
becauseitisnotnecessary
intheimagination
thatithavesomesortofbeing
havetruebeing.Butitsuffices
ofthesortthat'nowhere'
and'vacuum'have,andfrom
whichis onlyobjective,
and syllogism
are composed,
and notfromvocal
suchvoicestheproposition
ifsomeone
as follows:
a letter,
that
sounds.Thiscanbeclarified
oughttoproffer
as in thecaseof
is nota truevocalsound,butonlyitssignis profferred,
letter
toproffer
a consonant
andsays'b,' andspeaksa vocal
someone
whois supposed
is not
ofthesound'e' andanother
soundcomposed
sound,andthatcomposite
whichis inthe
theletter.
Therefore,
[thespokensound]is thesignoftheletter
voice.Andinthesamewaythespoken
voiceisnota proposisoul,theimagined
and syllogisms].66
tionor a syllogism,
butonlya signof[propositions
'
4
Campsall's distinctionof a mental 'imagined' language from the
spoken language that is its sign, is roughlycomparable to Ockham's
early "fictum" theory,in which the termsof mental propositionshad
only objective being.67
65Aristotles,
6.168a28-33.
De sophisticis
elenchis,
66Campsall,Librum
estquodproposicio
velsillogismus
2, ad I: "dicendum
priorm,
. . . quia
necin vocesex terminis
in res,necconceptus,
nonhabetresolvi
prolatas,
istesillogismus
essetbonus:'omnis
si componeretur
ex rebus,vel ex conceptibus,
socrates
estanimalracinale;igitur,
homocurrit;socrates
currit,'
quia eademres
et per'animalracinale.'
significatur
per'hominem'
vel unam
eundemconceptum,
et similiter,
cumduo nominapossuntsignificare
unumnomenproaltero,quodest
bonusubicunque
rem,essetsillogismus
poneretur
de 'tunica'nonsillogizavit
de 'veste,'primo
contraaristotelem
quia,qui sillogizavit
elencorum.
est
invocesymaginatas,
etideo,dicendum
quodintelligendum
quodhabentresolvi
enuncians
sic:primoresconcipitur
et,si debeatalterienunciari,
primoymaginatur
illiperquamdebetremalterienunciari,
etiliavoxnonhabetesse
vocemconsimilem
<in > ymaginasieudrespraedicati,
extraanimam,
quodobiectum
quianonoportet
cuius
essealiquale,quodestobiectum
cionehabeatesseverum,sedsufficit
tantum,
et
esse habentinsitumet vacuum,et ex talibusvocibuscomponitur
proposicio
etnonex vocibusprolatis.
pareresic:quia,si aliquisdebeat
quodpotest
sillogismus,
illa literanonestveravoxprolata,sed solumsuumsignumproliterm,
proferre
etdicit'b,' dicitunamvocemcomconsonans
sicudsi aliquisdebeatproferre
fertur,
nonestlitera;igitur
estsignum
ex hacvoce'e' etalio,et illudcompositum
positam
nonestproposicio
eteodemmodovoxprolata
litee
que estinanima,voxymaginata.
In Synan,ed. Campsall
istorum."
velsillogismus,
sedsolumestsignum
, 1:62-63,nos
2.81-2.83.
67Philotheus
ontheSentences
Dateoj Ockham's
,
OFM, TheRelative
Boehner,
Commentary
N.Y.
onOckham
in: Collected
Articles
OFM, St.Bonaventure,
, ed. EligiusM. Buytaert,
1958,pp. 99-107.
134
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
". . . oneshouldobserve
thattoprovethata conjunction
ormodelacksutility,
tofindan exception
inthesubstantial
itis notnecessary
as someerringly
terms,
tofindan exception
inanykindofterm,
whether
substansay,butitissufficient
. . . Andtherefore,
thefourmodesofthefirst
orwhatever.
tial,accidental
figure
whatkindsoftermsareusedin them. . . ,"75
holdgoodno matter
The some who "erringly" believed that only substantialterms could
give rise to valid conjunctions in a syllogismincluded Giles of Rome,
whom Ockham had quoted verbatimto thateffectin his Expositiosuper
librosElenchorum.76
Giles, as we have seen, believed that a failure to
observe this rule would produce a fallacy of accident.77
Ockham, however, believed that a universal syllogismgoverned by
all or none was valid, no matterwhat kinds of termswere employed
in settingup the syllogism.He argued thatthe fourmodes of the first
figuregive rise to a good syllogism:
is affirmed
"whenthefirst
or deniedof
denotesthatthepredicate
proposition
andthesecondproposition
to whichthesubjectrefers,
denotes
all thosethings
is affirmed
aboutthesubthatthesubjectofthefirst
unequivocally
proposition
ofthefirst
andthenthepredicate
jectofthesecondproposition
(theassumptum),
is affirmed
ordeniedofall thattowhichthesubjectofthesecond
proposition
referred."78
proposition
Such a rule gives rise to a syllogismof the form:
"All A are B,
C is A,
C is B."
Therefore,
and any syllogism following this pattern would produce a valid
inferenceas long as the terms remained constant in meaning.
For examples of what he was rejecting, Ockham turned to the
Master of Abstractions, or Richard Sophista, the author of a work
75Ockham.Summa
con, 3.1.4: "Et esthicadvertendum
quodad probandum
logicae
interminis
invenire
instantiam
nonoportet
inutilem
velmoduminutilem
iugationem
in
invenireinstantiam
sicutaliqui errantesdicunt,sed sufficit
substantialibus,
sive
substantialibus
sive
accidentalibus
sive
terminis,
quibuscumque.
quibuscumque
terminis
. . . ."In OP
tenent
inomnibus
... Et ideoquatuormodiprimaefigurae
1:366,lines20-26.
76See note20 above.
77See note21 above.
78Ockham,Summalogicae
dummodoper primampropositionem
, 3.1.4: "...
subiectum
ab omniiliode quo dicitur
veredicivelremoveri
denotetur
praedicatum
non
illudquod priusfuitsubiectum
denotetur
et per secundampropositionem
illudquod
concludatur
etposteainconclusione
dicideassumpto,
aequivoceacceptum
in
de iliopraecisequod fuitsubiectum
in primadicivelremoveri
fuitpraedicatum
" In OP 1:366-367,
lines29-34.
secundapropositione.
138
12:41:36 PM
79
entitledtheAbstractions,
probably writtenprior to 1240. The textof
a collectionof sophismata
the Abstractions,
, has been discovered and is
available for study.80 Ockham cites the Master of Abstractions'
sophismsas evidence of the common confusionover the nature of the
fallacyof accident and over the nature of the syllogismin general.
For example, Ockham says that the Master of Abstractions had
argued that syllogismsof the sort:
"Everycoloredthingis,
Everywhitethingis a coloredthing,
Therefore,
everywhitethingis."
And:
"Everyanimalis a man,
Everyass is an animal,
Therefore,
everyass is a man,"
were not good syllogismsbecause theyinvolved a fallacyof accident.81
Each of these syllogisms is governed by the dictumde omni, so on
Ockham's view, while there might be other fallacies present, there
would be no fallacyof accident.
Unfortunately,comparing what Ockham says with the texts from
Richard Sophista' s Abstractions,produces some mysteries. The
Master of Abstractionsdoes not say what Ockham attributesto him
(at least not in the two manuscriptsI have been able to check). In the
firstexample, where Ockham believed the Master thoughtthere was
a fallacy of accident, the Master in fact says there are fallacies of
79L. M. De Rijk,LogicaModernorum
Richard
, II. 1 Assen1967,62-72,established
as theauthor
oftheAbstractions
andsuggested
hemight
be RichardFishacre.
Sophista
in: CIMAGL
Abstractionum,
, 18 (1976),1-4,believedthework
Magister
JanPinborg,
shouldprobably
bedatedpriorto 1240?andfoundtheattribution
toFishacre
unconHe suggested
RichardRufusofCornwall
instead.
towhich
Ofthesophisms
vincing.
Ockhamrefers,
Pinborgedited"Omnishomoestsingulare,""Omne coloratum
est,"and"Omnisfenix
est,"from
Oxford,
Bodl.,Digby24. William
J. Courtenay,
An Introduction
AdamWodeham:
to His Lifeand Writings
, Leiden1978,pp. 54-56,
thatGedeonGi,O. F.M. hassuggested
indicates
RichardRufusorRichardofConas possible
candidates
forRichardSophista.
ington
80I owe manythanksto Katherine
Tachau,Paul Streveler,
MarySirridgeand
CalvinNormore
whoarecurrently
onan edition
oftheAbstractiones
and
collaborating
allowedmeto use theirfilmsand preliminary
kindly
transcriptions.
81Ockham,
Summa
suntboni
, 3.1.4: "Ex istosequitur
logicae
quodtalessyllogismi
'omnecoloratum
est; omnealbumest coloratum;
ergoomnealbumest'; 'omne
animalesthomo;omnisasinusestanimal;ergoomnisasinusesthomo.'Etideoerrat
in praedictis
fallaciam
accidentis,
MagisterAbstractionum
assignando
syllogismis
cumistisyllogismi
In OP 1:367,
regulentur
perdicide omnietsintde se evidentes."
lines35-40.
139
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
presence of a fallacyof consequent would, therefore,imply the concomitant presence of a fallacy of accident. Perhaps he read his own
s text. In any event, he would not
view of the matterinto the Magister1
have agreed with the Magisteri analysis, since he rejected the rule of
three.86
The Magisteralso asserted that the same sophism contained a fallacy
of equivocation. He argued thatthe "is" in the syllogism:"Every colored thingis, everywhitethingis colored, therefore,everywhitething
is," is an equivocal term, because "is" can have two meanings. In
one case, "is" can stand for an operation of being, asserting the
existence of something,and that is the meaning of the term "is" in
the firstproposition: "Every colored thing is." But "is" could also
stand for the being of consequence or habitude, and in the second
proposition, "is" stands for this second kind of being, so that the
statement: "Every white thing is colored," must be understood to
mean: "If thereis a white thing,it is colored." Because of the change
in meaning of the term "is," Richard Sophista believed therewas an
equivocation in the syllogismthat preventedone frominferringfrom
the statement: "Every colored thing is," that: "Every white thing
is."87
In anothercontext,Ockham had assailed theMagister's treatmentof
the copula, citingthe same sophism and the Master's solution, as an
example of faultyreasoning. Ockham believed that to grant varying
meanings to the term"is" in a syllogismwould completelydestroythe
effectivenessof syllogisticreasoning. It would then be possible to say
that the term "is" has either of these meanings at will, and an
equivocation could be introduced into any syllogism whenever it
seemed convenient.88Thus, Ockham seems to have known that the
86Ockham,Summa
a
2.4: Ex hocpatetfalsitas
quae ponuntur
quorundam
logicae,
Unumesthocsignum'omnis'exigittriaappellata.Namponatur
quod
quibusdam.
et nullushomo,tunchaecestvera'omneintelligens
unussolusangelusintelligat
estangelus,'. . . ." In OP 1.260,lines61-64.
creatum
87RichardSophista,
Abstractions
, 11: . . dicendum
quodhaecestverasimpliciter:
'omnecoloratum
est,omnealbumestcoloratum,
est,'etnonvalet:'omnecoloratum
'esse.' 'Esse'eniminprimapropositione
ergoomnealbumest,'eo quodequivocatur
'omne
estessequodestoperatio
entis,ethocesseestesseeiusquodest.Etcumdicitur
estesse
cuiusmodi
siveessehabitudinis,
estesseconsequentiae
albumestcoloratum,'
cumdicitur'si estalbumestcoloratum."'(Oxford,
Bodl,Digby24), f.62ra,and
, p. 2.
Magister
Stadsbibliotheek,
497),f. 14va.CheckedagainstPinborg,
(Brugge,
88Ockham,Summa
, 2.4: Ex istisetiamsequitur
quod ialsumestquod isti
logicae
unum
et tantum
unumnigrum
unumalbumet tantum
dicunt,quod si sittantum
est falsa'omnealbumest,' 'omnenigrum
est,'
mediumquod quaelibetistarum
142
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
12:41:36 PM
145
12:41:36 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
Ab omni hominehabeturaliquod capud: A Note on theConceptof WordOrderin 12th-CenturyGrammaticalThought1
C. H. KNEEPKENS
12:41:41 PM
eleventh-century
fragmenton syntax,whichhas been preservedon the
thirdfolioof the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 7505,4 and to the remarks
on word-ordermade by Alexander de Villa Dei at the beginningof the
5 For the
of his Doctrinale.
chapter on constructio
concept of word-order
I
in twelfth-century
to
the observationmade
refer
exegetical grammar
in
the introductorysection of his Gloseon the
by William of Conches
minor.In thiswork the famous grammarianpoints out that the task of
the text-interpreter
consists in analyzing the authors' words fromthe
artificialorder into the natural order so thatthe proper meaning of the
sentence may be discovered.6
Considering this class-room interestit is remarkable that twelfthcentury grammarians did not develop an autonomous doctrine of
word-order with definitions, distinctions, divisions and the usual
explanations: in brief, that they did not build up a system of
theoreticalknowledge on this linguistic aspect like they did of such
other linguistic concepts as e.g. constructio
, transitivityand intranand
sitivity,
figurativespeech.
It is surprisingto notice that the master of the Glosuleon the minor
,
whom I am used to calling Master Guido,7 furtherWilliam of Con-
4 Ch. Thurot,Extraits
dedivers
manuscrits
latins
l'histoire
desdoctrines
pourservir
gramA Census
maticales
aumoyen
Latin
ge, Paris1869,87-9(cf.G. L. Bursill-Hall,
ofMedieval
Grammatical
Cannstatt
, Stuttgart-Bad
1981,no 208.42.1);cf.Scaglione
Manuscripts
1972,107sqq.
5 D. Reichling,
desAlexander
de Villa-Dei
Das Doctrinale
: Kritisch,
Exegetische
Ausgabe
Berlin1893(repr.NewYork,N.Y. 1974),vrs1390sqq:
"Contruesie:casum,si sit,praeponevocantem".
6 MS Paris,Bibliothque
fondslatin15130,f. 86ra:"Con (!) naturalis
Nationale,
ordoexigitnominatiuum
preponiin oratione,uerbumsequi, deindeobliquum
etsimilia,
et pedes
aduerbio
casum,aduerbium
aderere,
tempora
aliquandopropter
illeordomutatur
... necesseautemestin expositione
sua ad suumnaturalem
metri
ordinem
facilenonfieripotest";
dictiones
reducere,
quodsinescienciaconstruendi
cf.C. H. Kneepkens,
inde2de
HetJudicium
Constructionis.
HetLeerstuk
vandeConstructio
vande12deEeeuw
1987(Diss.
enInleidende
Studie
, Nijmegen
, Dl. I: EenVerkennende
Helft
Riiksuniversiteit
Leiden1987),579.
7 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens,
Master
16
GuidoandhisViewonGovernment
, in: Vivarium,
(1978),108-141.
147
12:41:41 PM
"
ches, the Anonymus of the Glose "LicetMulti In Arte preservedin the
MS Oxford, Bodl. Canon, misc. 281,8 and Peter Helias not only paid
no attentionto the notion of word-orderin their comments on Priscian's text ad litteram
, but also avoided discussing this subject in their
on
sections
construction
although, in my opinion, there was ample
opportunityand reason to do so in this connection.
Notwithstandingthe well-knownfact that the grammarians of the
second half of the centurybecame increasinglyinterestedin syntax
this situation did not change essentially,although it must be granted
that word-orderbecame an operative notion in grammatical discussions of a more speculative character. For example, in the Porretanic
the 44ideal' ' place of a term in a sentence was in fact of
Sprachlogik
essential importance for its semantic status and consequently forthe
meaning of the whole sentence. A referenceto the discussions in the
Porretanic Schools on such sentences as:9
(x) virgo concipiet10
and
(x) Deus Deum genuit,
might be sufficient.
This lack of a theoreticalfoundationof the concept of word-order
is sorelyfeltwhen we tryto get to gripswiththe developmentof grammatical thinkingconcerning this syntacticaspect in the twelfthcentury. It is beyond any doubt that compared with the previous period
remarkableprogresswas made in thisfieldat least as early as the first
part of the thirteenthcentury. In her study on transitivityand word8 Cf. C. H. Kneepkens
19871,pp. 47-9.
9 See theDialogus
ontheDocRatiietEverardi
, editedbyN. H. Hring:A LatinDialogue
trine
, in: MediaevalStudies,15 (1953),243-289,esp. 253-4.
ofPoitiers
ofGilbert
10Isai.7,14. The pointhereisthataccording
this
toPorretanic
doctrine
grammatical
onthe' 'ideal" placeofthe
in twoways,eachdepending
canbe interpreted
sentence
andconstructed
is usedinsubjectposition
NP "virgo".IftheNP "virgo"
personaliter
is:
ofthesentence
theverb,andtheinterpretation
withtheverb,itideallyprecedes
a true,butnot
willbecomepregnant",
whois nowa virgin,
i.e. a female
"a virgin,
If,on theotherhand,the"ideal" placeoftheNP "virgo"
proposition.
astonishing
substantive
withtheverb,i.e. without
theverbanditisconstructed
isafter
anyreferenis: 14
She willbecomepregnant
theinterpretation
tialor evendenotational
function,
thepoint
from
whichcanonlybe accepted
as (or:being)a virgin",a trueproposition
ofviewoffaith.
148
12:41:41 PM
order, I. Rosier11 pointed out that in 13th-centurytexts a fourprongeddistinctionoccurred withinthe notion of correctword-order,
which may be summarized as follows:
(1) the natural order: this is Priscian's ordinatiorecta= naturalis]
(2) the obligatoryorder: this order covers the obligatorydeviations
fromthe natural orderwhich occur e.g. in questions or in relative
clauses, where the relative always has to occupy the firstplace;
(3) the artificialorder
(4) the logical order: this order, which was not often referredto in
grammaticaltexts, merely requires that the word expressingthe
logical subject has to precede the predicate. However, one has to
bear in mind that the termexpressingthe logical subject does not
necessarilycoincide with the grammatical subject.
However, we are able to trace these fourkinds of word-orderback to
the grammaticaltextsof the twelfth-century,
although at the moment
I am not sure whetherthe syntacticiansof the last decennia of the centuryconsideredthe distinctionbetween the ordorectus
(1) and what has
been called the obligatoryorder (2) as essential. Neverthelessit is evident fromthe texts that they were well aware of the constructional
deviances within sentences in which this obligatory order occurs:
sit',ed. Kneepkens(1987II), p. 296, 5-15)
(Robertof Paris,Summa'Breue
"Secundumprimamopinionem
dicatur'ellum
queriturutrumconuenienter
uideo'et quareilleaccusatiuus
illuduerbum,quia transitiuum
estet
prcdt
transitiue
Et ideopociusdeberet
positum.
subsequiquamprecedere.
Etdicimus
illeaccusatiuus,
pecedit
quodmerito
quia inse habetimplicitum
aduerbium
demonstratiuum.
Et aduerbiademonstratiua
uerbumprecedunt
et
'Socrates
nonsequuntur,
' lileaccusatiuus
, quemuideo
quemadmodum
legit
quem
uerbumdeberetsubsequiet tamenpreponitur,
ne ad uerbumfierirelatio
uideatur.Similiter
et dictiones
negationes
que habentnegationes
implcitas,
uerbaprecedunt."
Rosier's fourthordo, sc. the logical order, deserves our special attention. It shows the differentapproaches to the concept of word-order
of the dialectician and the grammarian respectively.Rosier refersto
a text of Roger Bacon's Summagramatica
, who, incidentally,violates
the rules, since he treatsthe word-orderdifficultiesin the sentences:
11I. Rosier,Transitivit
desmots
etordre
chezlesgrammairiens
mdivaux
, in:Matriaux
pour
desthories
unehistoire
A. Joly,A. Nicolas,
, d. S. Auroux,M. Glatigny,
linguistiques
I. Rosier,Lille1984,181-190.
149
12:41:41 PM
12:41:41 PM
For in this sentence it is not the nominative phrase (capud' but the
ablative phrase 'omnihomine*
, which refersto the subject of discourse:
semperdesignairemsupp. 58-9)"Non cnimnominatiuus
(Ed. Kneepkens,
homine
habetur
immoquandoqueobliquus,ut 'ab omni
locutioni,
aliquod
positam
nontarnen
sedomnishomo,
sitnominatiuus,
id supponitur,
capu.Licetcaput
dicereindiuersis
tamenuidetur
significationibus
qui estobliquus...Expeditius
consideratione
utin eademgramatici
eandemesseconstructionem,
duplexfiat
'
ab utroque
dialetici
consideratio.
Sicutenimeademestconstructio
aliquiduidetur
istorum'
secundumgramticos,
sed diuersepropositiones
sunt secundum
dialeticos,
itaquein predicto..."
Earlier in the SummaPetrus Hispanus had also paid attention to a
similar difficultyin the discussion on the constructionof the clause:
(x) Tirynthiusvenies:14
enimaliterse habetratioconstruendi
quam
p. 40): "In multis
(Ed. Kneepkens,
ut 'abomni
homine
habetur
ordins,
capud'.Si constructionem
aliquod
significatio,
'
hominequoderitfalsum."
ab omni
ita fetaliquod
capudhabetur
Hispanus does not say that in this sentence we are confrontedwith a
problem of word-orderthat fallswithinthe grammarians' domain. In
thissentence,he stresses,thereis only one constructio
, that is, one syntactic structure:The nominative phrase is always constructedin the
preceding position with the finiteverb, i.e. "ex parteante". To the
of this sentence does not change,
grammarian the ordoconstructionis
regardlessof the orderin which itswords are uttered.This impliesthat
whetherone says "ab omnihominehabeturaliquod capud" or "aliquod
ab omnihomine in each case the nominative phrase "alicapudhabetur
44
is
quodcapud>} constructedexparteanteor as preceding" withthe verb
"habetur".The logician, on the otherhand, distinguishesbetween two
differentpropositions: (1) a true proposition, in which the ablative
"
phrase "omnihomine is the bearer of the utterance,which is indicated
by its preceding position, and (2) a false proposition, in which the
locutioni
nominative phrase "aliquod capud" representsthe suppositum
".
and obtains the firstposition: "aliquod capud habeturab omnihomine
The differencebetween both propositionsmust be looked for in the
distributiveforceof the universal sign omnis.If it occurs in preceding
position,not only the noun it qualifies, but also the nominativephrase
"
"aliquodcapud fallswithinits scope and is distributed,too, since the
meaning of the utterance is:
14luv. Sat.XI, 61.
151
12:41:41 PM
15A similar
onthe
discussions
in theMediaevalgrammarians'
viewcanbe observed
a sentence.
and itsplacewithin
scopeofthenegation
16Forsimilardiscussions
see L. M. de Rijk,Each
in 13th-century
logictextbooks,
Itemin 13th-Century
Semantics
Ass. On an Important
Man'sAssis notEverybody's
, in:
7 (1980),221-30.
Historiographia
Linguistica,
17See on thistopicalso: A. de Libera,Introduction
mdivales.
, in: Smantiques
Cinq
aumoyen
etlagrammaire
surla logique
tudes
Langage,3/1
Epistmologie,
ge( = Histoire,
(1981)),7-17,esp. p. 14.
152
12:41:41 PM
BOOKS
REFERRED
TO
A Census
LatinGrammatical
G. L. Bursill-Hall,
, Stuttgart-Bad
ofMedieval
Manuscripts
Cannstatt
1981
N. H. Hring,A LatinDialogue
on theDoctrine
, in: Mediaeval
ofGilbert
ofPoitiers
Studies,15 (1953),243-89
R. W. Hunt,ABSOLUTA.TheSummaofPetrus
onPriscianus
minor,in:
Hispanus
2 (1975),1-22
Historiographia
Linguistica,
C. H. Kneepkens,
Master
andhisViewonGovernment
Guido
16(1978),
, in: Vivarium,
108-41
inde2de
C. H. Kneepkens,
HetJudicium
HetLeer
stukvandeConstructio
Constructionis.
vande12deEeuw
1987
, 4 vols.,Nijmegen
Helft
A. de Libera,Introduction
mdivales.
surla logique
etla gram, in:Smantiques
Cinqtudes
maire
au moyen
ge( = Histoire,
Epistmologic,
Langage,3/1(1981)),7-17
D. Reichling,
DasDoctrinale
Berlin
desAlexander
deVillaDei:KritischExegetische
Ausgabe,
1893
L. M. de Rijk,EachMan'sAssisnotEverybody's
Item
Ass.OnanImportant
in13th-Century
Semantics
7 (1980),221-30
, in: Historiographia
Linguistica,
I. Rosier,Transitivit
etordre
desmots
e.a.
chezlesgrammairiens
mdivaux
, in: S. Auroux,
desthories
, Lille 1984,181-90
(eds.),Matriaux
pourunehistoire
linguistiques
A. Scaglione,
TheClassical
tothePresent.
From
ItsOrigins
A Historical
Theory
ofComposition
, ChapelHill 1972
Survey
Ch. Thurot,Extraits
dedivers
manuscrits
latins
l'histoire
desdoctrines
pourservir
grammaticales
au moyen
ge, Paris1869.
153
12:41:41 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
Reviews
onSupposition
's Logic
: TheTreatise
onConsequences.
Translated
Buridan
; TheTreatise
John
witha Philosophical
Introduction
byPeterKing,Dordrecht
(Reidel)1985,pp.
xii + 380, ISBN 90 277 19187.
a remarkable
wasclearly
whohadan immense
influence
on
logician,
JohnBuridan
thestudyoflogicthroughout
at Paris,in thetwocenturies
Europe,butparticularly
hisdeatharound1358.His majorwork,theSummulae
from
, is puttogether
following
on thetheory
ofsupposition,
ninetreatises
on logic,ofwhichthefourth,
makesup
halfofthepresent
ofanindependent
thefirst
volume.Thesecondhalfconsists
treatise
The twoworkssittogether
ablein hisendon consequences.
well,Kingbeingoften
ofthereaderoftheConsequentiae
notesto directtheattention
(TC) backto remarks
arepreceded
inDe Suppositionibus
(TS) toexpanda particular
point.The editions
by
an introduction
ofsome80 pages.
workin whichBuridandistinguishes
from
TS is an elementary
supposition
verification
(whatmakesa sentence
signification
(meaning),
true)and appellation
connotation
ofa term).After
thevariousmodes
anyadditional
explaining
(roughly,
- waysin whicha termcan standforobjects
- he proceeds
to discuss
ofsupposition
thatis,terms
backtoan antecedent;
thesupposition
ofrelative
and
terms,
referring
forwhicha term
andrestriction,
thatis,waysinwhichtherangeofthings
ampliation
or
or reducedbytheparticular
ofthesentence,
standsmaybe extended
predicate
in whichthetermoccurs.Forexample,'dead' ampliates
a
context
otherlinguistic
notonlyofthepresent
butalsoofthepast;'can' to things
termto standforthings
forwhichthetermnotonlydoesnowbutcouldstand;and so on.
Itstopicis farwiderthatitstitlewouldsugTC is a muchmoreadvancedtreatise.
thatthirdpartofa logic,dealingwithall sortsofargument.
gest,beingessentially
on propositions,
onlogicoften
consisted
ofthreeparts,on terms,
(Medievaltreatises
is any
Whatis noticeably
and on argument.
missingin thepresentcompilation
that
treatment
oftheproposition.)
Buridandealswithassertorie
extended
inference,
withmodalpropositional
is, the logic of unanalysedpropositions,
logic,with
Buridanis an unashamedand defiant
and withmodalsyllogisms.
syllogisms,
is validifeverymodeloftheantecedent
an argument
adherent
ofstrict
implication:
areparticularly
isa modeloftheconsequent.
BooksIII andIV, onthesyllogism,
rich,
fromanypairof
a verygeneralpictureofwhatcan be validlyinferred
presenting
syllogistic
premises.
(modalor non-modal)
in bothincunabula
andmanuscripts;
TC survives
TS, in itsoriginal
form,
really
on
oftheSummulae
containDorp'scommentary
onlyin manuscript
(theincunabula
theamendedtextalone,ofPeterofSpain'streatise
theamendedtext,orsometimes
Thereareat least16 manuwhichBuridanusedas thebasisforhiscommentary).
one
an edition
oftheLatintextofTS from
Reinaproduced
oftheSummulae.
scripts
diStoria
in 1957;Hubieneditedthe
critica
dellaFilosofia
ms.(CVP 5365)intheRivista
textsofTC in 1976.
andthreeprinted
Latintextfrom
thethreeknownmanuscripts
154
12:41:53 PM
withoneortworeferences
is basedonthesetwomodern
editions,
King'stranslation
to themanuscripts.
Recallthemixedfeelings
themedieval
scribes:
labour
onehastowards
their
clearly,
intransmitting
medieval
logicaltextstous is beyondprice;on theotherhand,their
and omissionsare infuriating.
the same feelingis
Unfortunately,
misreadings
on reading
are mistranslated,
Occasionalsentences
experienced
King'stranslation.
in logicalnonsense;
fromtimeto timewholeclauses,or in one case, a
resulting
are omitted;
and on nearlyeverypage thereare minortypographical
paragraph,
as towhatis reallymeant.Constant
notinfrequently
errors,
puzzlement
provoking
toresolve
suchpuzzles.In a word,theaccusareference
totheLatintextis necessary
tionofcarelessness
cannotbe avoided.Someerrors
haveclearly
ariseninthephysical
ofthebook.Butnotall. Thisis a greatshame:fordetailapart,thework
production
wellthought
iswellpresented,
out,andshouldhavebeena mostuseful
introduction,
forreaderswithout
Latin,to a greatlogician.
Thereader's
confidence
isshaken
nearthestart
oftheintroduction
when,ina brief
allusionto Russell'stheory
ofdescriptions,
thefinalclause'&Bx' is ommitted;
and
an extract
openswhen,inthesecondfootnote,
againas thetranslation
Kingprovides
fromBuridan'squestions
on De Interpretation
to explainthephrase'ad placitum':
"Butifyouwereto askaboututterances
witharenounsandverbsadplacitum
, ..."
wouldbe: "But if
PerhapsKingmeant'which'for'with'here;a clearertranslation
adplacitum,
whicharenounsandverbssignify
youweretoaskinwhatwayutterances
..." (KingtakesthetextfromPinborg's1976excerpts;
thewholeworkwasedited
to somewhich
byRia vanderLecq in 1983.)Buttheseslipsare minorcompared
follow.
BookI ofTC. Here,as toooften
8 from
Forexample,
consider
Theorem
elsewhere,
evenlogically
mistranslation
makesBuridan
incompeappearattheveryleastsloppy,
reads:
tent.Butthefaultis notBuridan's.King'stranslation
follow
withthesamenumber
ofcausesoftheirtruth
fromthe
(a) Allsentences
> follow
from
same< sentences
>; (b) all havingmore< causesoftheirtruth
> by some
anyhavingfeweror thesame < numberofcausesoftheirtruth
> ofthose< having
> more,but(c) notconversely,
< sentences
(p. 204)
The
in
is
marks
brackets
words
added
(As customary,
King
byangle
translation.)
P norQ' havethesamenumber
astutereaderwillbe puzzled.'P andQ' and'Neither
ofcausesoftheir
butthecausesaredifferent,
andso theyclearly
arenotimplied
truth,
thesamesentences.
Reference
toBuridan'stextrevealsthathe wasquite
byexactly
awareofthis.Whathe wrotewas:
withan equalnumber
andthesamecausesoftheirtruth
mutually
(a) Allsentences
oneanother
> follow
> havingmore< causesoftruth
; (b) all < sentences
imply
from
< ofcauses> , but
fewer
andthesame
assome
number
anyhaving
ofthat
greater
(c) notconversely.
(My italics.)
Another
inthetranslation
occursonp. 267.
oflogicalnonsense
introduced
example
King'stextreads:
ofonepremiss
is acceptable
follows
inwhichthecontradictory
(b) anysyllogism
thecontradictory
from
oftheconoftheotherpremiss
alongwiththecontradictory
clusion.
text.Again,
Theitalicised
words
donotappearinBuridan's
(Myitalics.)
quiterightly
in hisintroduction,
(p. 48):
KingmakesBuridanlooka foolwhenhe writes
A common
ifitis notsufficient
termhasconfused
forthe
ina sentence
supposition
155
12:41:53 PM
ofthatsentence
thatitbe truefora singular
term
underthecommon
truth
falling
term(TS 3.5.1).
Thiscannotbe right.For'animal'in 'Everymanis an animal'
(Italicsinoriginal.)
is entailedby'Everymanis Socrates'.
has confused
butthesentence
supposition,
Buridan'stextreads(King'stranslation,
p. 129):
inwhichit
thesupposition
ofsometermis called'confused'
whenthesentence
can be truewithout
is found,or an equiform
sentence,
beingtrueforsome
<one> determinate
undertheterm.
thingfalling
a necessary
anda sufficient
Buridanknewthedifference
between
Thatis quiteright.
to Buridantheclaimthat
Andon p. 197Kingattributes
condition.
iftheconisanacceptable
as a consequence
formed
consequence
(b) anysentence
follows
from
thecontradicoftheantecedent
oftheindicated
consequence
trary
oftheindicated
toryoftheantecedent
consequence.
words'contradichasthesensible
wordsBuridan
(Myitalics.)In placeoftheitalicised
tory'and 'consequent'
respectively.
Therearetoomanysuchcases.Thereis notspaceheretodealwiththemall. But
on p. 107King'stextreads,
therearealso simplecasesofomission.Forexample,
clausein italics:
addingtheomitted
universal
is neither
theass is running"
I saythatthesentence
"Of-every-man
norusedindefinitely
is neither
distributed
because
thewhole
norindefinite,
, but
subject
fortheoblique,...
anduniversal
it is indefinite
forthenominative
wordsin italics):
and on p. 108(again,addingthemissing
"
is seeing
soSocrates
isa horse}
isseeing
horse
ThesyllogismSocrates
} Brunellus
every
Brunellus"
is acceptable.
On p. 265we find:
twotermsof whichone is trulycalledthesameas some
(a) For whichever
callednotthesame,theoneis nottruly
discrete
term,ofwhichtheotheris truly
of[actually:
thesameas theother
called
, andso theonecan be inferred
negatively
from]theother.
ofBookIV is omitted
Finally,on p. 298,thethirdtheorem
entirely:
The thirdtheorem
is:
' andsimilar
IV-3] Composite
usesof'know 'believe'doubt
modes
donot
yield
[Theorem
validsyllogisms.
Hencethisis notacceptable:
andthateveryC is B is known
(426)ThateveryB is A is knownbySocrates,
thateveryC is A is knownbySocrates.
therefore,
bySocrates,
formthetitleof a
(Buridanis hardlylikelyto have givenan invalidsyllogistic
arepurecarelessness,
andwhenmultiplied
Suchomissions
theunreliability
theorem.)
of
reference
totheoriginal
reduces
theusefulness
without
constant
ofthetranslation
King'svolume.
devirtute
sermonis
withthephrases
anddevisermonis,
leaving
Kingalsohastrouble
thatitis "verydifficult
on p. 121,witha footnote
comment
theformer
untranslated
like'bythepoweroftheword'."Actually,
totranslate;
itmeanssomething
literally,
on p.
hasgoneverywrong
itmeans'literally',
or 'properly
speaking'.So something
> explicitly
comesoutas "if <the sentence
184,wheresi visexpresse
loquidevisermonis
is in thecontext
absurd.
dealswiththemeaning
(vis)ofitswords",whichmoreover,
156
12:41:53 PM
StephenRead
157
12:41:53 PM
Tractatus
deuniversalibus
, editedbyIvanJ. Mueller,Oxford(Clarendon
JohnWyclif,
Press)1985,pp. CXIII + 403,35,ISBN 0-19-824680-3.
deuniversalibus
On Universais
byAnthony
Kenny,
( Tractatus
), translated
JohnWyclif,
withan introduction
byPaul VincentSpade,Oxford(Clarendon
Press)1985,
pp. L + 184,25,ISBN 0-19-824681-1.
s philosophical
inmodern
areaccessible
ediThatrelatively
manyofWyclif
writings
as a polemical
andthemorningtionsisnodoubtchiefly
duetohisrenown
theologian
founded
starofthereformation.
scholar
bytheVictorian
Amongthevarioussocieties
underwhoseauspicesthirty-nine
wastheWyclif
adventurer
Society,
F.J. Furnivall
in theyearsbetween1882and 1924.
volumes
ofmiscellaneous
textswerepublished
thedissolution
ofthesociety,
someworkswereaddedto thiscorpusafter
Although
AnAnnotated
a glanceat TheLatinWritings
, by WilliellR.
ofJohnWyclif.
Catalog
Thomson(SubsidiaMediaevalia,14, Leiden,Brill,1983)willshowthattheenteris stillfarfrom
production
priseofmakingavailablethewholeofhisphilosophical
Summa
deente
collection
ofphilosoEvenoftheso-called
, an important
completed.
thisdoes
pieces,severalpartsremainunedited.
Fortunately,
phicaland theological
themostfitting
notapplyanylongerto thetractthatis probably
keyto a proper
s ripest
ideas:thesixth(orfifth)
treatise
ofWyclif
ofthe
philosophical
understanding
deente
De universalibus.
first
ofthetwobooksoftheSumma
, entitled
hiscritical
The CzechscholarIvanJ. Muellerprecedes
editionoftheLatintext,
about1374inOxford,
wascomposed
whichinall probability
and
bya verythorough
and ofthetwenty-three
accountof itscharacter,
instructive
originand influence,
fallintotwo
on whichtheeditionhas beenbased.Thesemanuscripts
manuscripts
towhichtheeditorgenerally
tradition,
givespreference,
groups:thoseoftheEnglish
Thatthere
areso manyCzechmanuscripts
isexplaiandthoseoftheCzechtradition.
nablein thelightoftheclosetiesbetween
Englandand Bohemia,strengthened
by
themarriage,
in 1382,ofAnna,sisterofthekingofBohemia,toRichardII ofEngof
had a notableimpacton somecurrents
land. In particular,
Wyclifsteachings
in 1348.Suchthinkers
ofPrague,founded
thatdeveloped
at theuniversity
thought
influenced
as thefamous
Stanislaus
ofZnaimwerestrongly
JohnHus andhisteacher
an intellectual
climate
inwhichthelatter's
doctrines
andcreated
writings
byWyclifs
thesameallegiance
alsoledto theburning,
in 1410,
weremuchin demand;though
in thecourtyard
oftheArchvolumesofWyclifiana
twohundred
ofapproximately
bishop'spalace.
- a true
oftheLatintext
andverywelcome
edition
tothispainstaking
In addition
who
are
historians
interested
labouroflove,skillandperseverance
joinedtogether
nowalsohaveat theirdisposalan English
in Wyclifsphilosophy
translation,
bythe
himself
about1360,is at present
Kenny,who,likeWyclif
capablehandofAnthony
on
contributed
a smallmonograph
MasterofBalliolCollege,andhas,quitesuitably,
to theOxford'Past Masters'series(OxfordUniversity
Press,1985).HelpWyclif
a glossary
in whichsometechnical
scholastic
termsare
fully,Kennyhas provided
of
PaulVincent
an introduction
Moreover,
Spadehaswritten
summarily
explained.
as viewed
thegeneral
ofuniversais
aboutforty
problem
pages,inwhichheexpounds
on someaspectsofWyclifstheory
anddwellsspecifically
bymedieval
philosophers
notionofpredication.
and hisrather
and distinction
ofidentity
strange
ithastobe admitted,
evenby
allthesehighly
meritorious
efforts,
Notwithstanding
senseof
to makesatisfactory
thatthereaderwho is determined
Spade himself,
that
One of theidiosyncrasies
difficulties.
Wyclifstext,is facedwithformidable
so hardis, itseemsto me,Wyclifspractice
focused
render
a sharply
interpretation
andthought
to
tolanguage
a vocabulary
thatis primarily
oftransferring
appropriate
havea reasouniversal
itself.
Suchwordsas say,proposition
true,
, subject,
predicate,
reality
ofspokenand
as longas theyare appliedto theprovince
nablyclear-cut
meaning
158
12:42:02 PM
written
from
When,as wasusualintheMiddleAges,theyweretransferred
language.
so thatthinking
thatproper
domaintothefieldofthought,
cametobe characterized
wasnotwithout
buthadatleasttheadvanas mental
thisextension
speech,
problems,
rather
itsuserstoshedsomelighton an otherwise
intractable
tageofenabling
sphere
ofhumanactivity.
Mostphilosophers
withthissinglestep,
contended
themselves
ofsaying
thevocabulary
etc.totherealmofconventional
andnatural
restricting
signs
ina fairly
sense.Butthere
weresomeothers,
WalterBurleigh
straightforward
notably
whoboldlywentconsiderably
farther
and
and,moreor lessin hiswake,Wyclif,
thestatesofaffairs
and things
viewedevenreality
and
itself,
signified
by thought
withtheuniversais,
which,as extreme
realists,
speech,in lingualterms.Together
in theworldofthingsthatweresupposedto
theybelievedto existindependently
instantiate
overtotheoutside
worldthoseexpressions
thatare
them,
theyalsocarried
inthesphere
associated
withuniversais
as theyarepresent
ofthought
and
commonly
Forinstance,
sucha substance
as thatmanorthatstoneas
language.
Wyclif
regards
a proposition
in reality,
on thegroundthatithasan innerstructure
thatconsists
of
twoelements,
matter
and form,
and a tieor copulaconnecting
them.It is because
ofthistrinitarian
andpropositional
structure
ofthings
thattheymayoccasion
humans
to forma trueor falsementalor conventional
aboutthem.He further
proposition
holdsthatthethings
themselves
ofa proposition
in
maybe thesubjector predicate
The subject-thing
itself
as wellas thepredicate
thatis the
reality.
saysor manifests
universal
forminstantiated
in it.One consequence
ofthiswayof
byitandinhering
theworldis thatpropositions
inreality
aretruths
ina metaphysical
senseand
viewing
as suchthegenuineobjectsofscientific
and faith.ForWyclif,
themeaknowledge
as itis usedin thephrasea true
stone
andas itis appliedtopropositions
ningsoftrue
inbothcasesthewordindicates
coincide:
theconformity
ofthings
andstatesofaffairs
setbythedivineintellect.
tothestandards
truths
aretheextrinsic
Justas metaphysical
ofthederivative
oftheconventional
forms
truth
andmental
exemplary
propositions
thathappento be formed
aboutthem,God, as thesupreme
is theultimate
truth,
sourceofall metaphysical
thatis, ofeverything
thatreallyexists.God, too,
truths,
thedivineessenceis a wordor an eternalinwardsaying.Atthesame
sayshimself;
itis emphasized
thathissaying,
tohumansaying,
is never
time,though,
bycontrast
andpropositional;
whathethinks
isthetotality
ofabsolutely
universal
complex
simple
forms.
Thishugemetaphor,
tohumansayings
is darbywhichthevocabulary
applicable
totheworldas itexistsindependently
extended
ofspeechandthought,
andalso,
ingly
toGod,is typical
ofa tendency
thatis diametrically
partly,
opposedtotheapproach
favoured
Whiletheconceptualists
s contemporaries.
aimedat elibymanyofWyclif
as manyfeatures
as possiblefromtheoutsideworldbyexplaining
themas
minating
theoutcome
ofhumanthinking
andspeaking,
andhisfollowers
movedinthe
Wyclif
reverse
direction
andtriedtoelucidate
thestructure
oftheoutsideworldbytreating
itas a kindoflanguage:totus
rationaliter
dicipropositio
mundus
delogica
,
potest
( Tractatus
thisfascinating
demands
II, London,1896,p. 20). Naturally,
changeofperspective
from
a reader
whoisstriving
after
an unusualdegreeofflexibility.
fullunderstanding
he maysetto workin thespirit
Equippednowwithat leastpartoftherequisites
sSocraticwords(Ch. III, lines268-72):'ButtheruleI havelaid
expressed
byWyclif
downformyself
is thatwhenever
I seean overwhelming
reason,I giveup myformer
without
forreputation,
oraffection
forthemenI wasfollowing,
recalopinion,
regard
theinfirmity
ofnatureI havea greater
shareofignorance
thanof
lingthatthrough
certainty.'
Leiden
GabrielNuchelmans
159
12:42:02 PM
Vivarium
XXV, 2 (1987)
BooksReceived
- Musse
- Meditation.
zurVitaactivaundVitacontemplativa,
Arbeit
Betrachtungen
hrgg.
Zrich1985,xvi+ 311p.- Contents
vonBr. Vickers,
: G.
VerlagderFachvereine,
undbiospraktikos
beiAristoteles
undPlaton
; J.-M.Andr,La
Huber,Biostheoretikos
etsonrapport
la rflexion
duloisir
moderne
and
; P. Kuntz,Practice
antique
sociologie
Virtues
inPlotinus
andAugustine',
Br.Stock,Activity,
CivicandSpiritual
ConTheory:
between
theEleventh
andtheThirteenth
andLeisure
Centuries
, Work
; A. M.
templation
undactiva
derVitacontemplativa
inderDominikanermystik
des14.
Haas,DieBeurteilung
andtheContemplative
TheActive
; P. O. Kristeller,
LifeinRenaissance
Jahrhunderts
ontheActive
andContemplative
Lives
Humanism
Salutati
; V. Kahn,Coluccio
; L. A.
andContemplative
in Lorenzo
: TheFusionofOpposites
Valla
Panizza,Active
; Fr.
imRomanischen
Public
andPrivate
; Br. Vickers,
Schalk,Otium
LifeinSeventeenthB. Beugnot,
ouMarie,
TheMackenzieMarthe
Debate;
Century
England:
Evelyn
Diogene
au XV11e sicle
ouCicern:
lesmodles
existentiels
; Index
di Genova.Istituto
Arsrhetorica:
e nuova
di FilologiaClassicae
Antica
, Universit
Medievale,Genova1983( = Pubblicazioni,
83), 161 p. IT ISSN 0025-852
La naissance
: Ch. Perelman,
dela nouvelle
Contents
; G. Calboni,Oratore
rhtorique
Declamation
andLatin
senzamicrofono
; F. Quadlbauer,
; M. Winterbottom,
, Greek
undWandlung
desciceronischen
Rednerideals
ZurNachwirkung
; A. Michel,De Gerhard
: rhtorique
etcartsianisme
au P. Bernard
au XVIIe sicle'C. Vasoli,
Vossius
Lamy
nellacultura
metodo
e didattica
umanistica
Retorica,
europea
A Critical
Insolubilium.
Edition
Thomas
Tractatus
, byE. J. Ashworth,
Bricot,
Ingenium
Publishers,
Nijmegen1986,xxiv+ 155p. ISBN 90 7041912 2
toMedieval
Alexander
Press,Oxford1987,150
Broadie,Introduction
, Clarendon
Logic
p. ISBN 0 198249411
Vol. 49
de Copenhague),
del'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
N. Haastrup,
mss.
Esrom
Three
revisited
intheVatican
from
(1985),224p.- Contents'.
Instants
Richard
Lavenham
onTemporal
P. Ohrstram,
; St. Ebbesen& L. B.
Library,
with
's Summa
and Quaestiones
A PartialEdition
Mortensen,
Langton
ofStephen
Sunesen's
Hexaemeron
Parallels
Andrew
from
Vol. 50
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du MoyenCahiers
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
ber
undEinheit
contra
Ockham
Chr.Knudscn,
Chatton
Gegenstand
(1985)- Contents:
Sunesen's
TheSources
vonWissenschaft
undTheologie
; L. B. Mortensen,
ofAndrew
Hexaemeron
etlatin(Universit
Vol. 51 & 52
de Copenhague),
del'Institut
duMoyenCahiers
Agegrec
Azarchelis
de tabulis
de Siciliasupercnones
Johannis
Scriptum
(1986)- Contents:
ed. Fr. S. Pedersen,128+ 268 p.
Toletanis,
Vol. 53
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
de
: B. P. McGuire,A Letter
byGuibert
ofPassionate
Friendship
(1986)- Contents
St. Ebbesen,TerinMedieval
Chant'
Raasted,Chromaticism
Byzantine
Gembloux',].
theLate13thCentury
Texts
miniaccidentales
concreti.
from
Vol. 54
de Copenhague),
de l'Institut
du Moyen-Age
Cahiers
grecetlatin(Universit
ona
Raasted'
J. Raasted,Thoughts
Bibliography
Jorgen
(1986),218 p.- Contents:
160
12:42:07 PM
Revision
RulesoftheMonumenta
Musicae
S. Engberg,
oftheTranscription
Byzantinae'
TheGreek
OldTestament
asa Liturgical
Textbook
TheCon; N. Ulff-Moller,
Lectionary
Between
nection
Melodic
Formulas
andStereotype
inOldRussian
P.
Text
Phrases
Stichera'
SomeObservations
ontheInterpretation
andAccidentals
inEast
Weincke,
ofSignatures
andWest
andContinuity
inPostChurch
Pain; A.-M. Gravgaard,
Change
Byzantine
K. Fledelius,
Mentalities:
TheLegislator
M. Byskov,
LeoVIat Work',
ting',
Competing
Das Evangelium
Gottes
undKanon
in
Parchment
; Chr. GormTortzen,Medieval
- A CaseStudy
Elsinore
Notes
ontheErasmus-Autograph
Ms. Gl. Kgl.
; E. Pedersen,
a Survey
Saml.95,2with
Azarchelis:
SomeVersions
id., Cnones
, anda
oftheLetters',
Text
I. Universit
Columbeis
di Genova.Istituto
di Filologia
Classicae Medievale,
Genova
1986( = Pubblicazioni,
G. PettiBalbi,
94),224p. IT ISSN 0025-0852-Contents:
Nelmondo
deicartografi:
Beccari
a Genova
Battista
maestro
nel1427'R. Rocca,Colombo
e la "isladeCrcegaF. dellaCorte,Il Colombo
diGirolamo
Fracastoro
; F. Bianchi,
Chiabrera
e Colombo:
"trovar
Nuovo
Mondo
V. Amoroso,
Il " Christophe
affogare"',
" di Michel
Colomb
de Ghelderode'
S. Fasce,Colombo
terrestre
e Mircea
, il Paradiso
Eliade
allascoperta
; M. Salotti,Admiral
oftheOceanSea. La radiodi OrsonWelles
dell'America
Commedie
LatinedelXII e XIII Secolo
di Genova.Istituto
di Filologia
, Universit
Classicae Medievale,
Genova1986( = Pubblicazioni,
95),236p. IT ISSN 0025F. Bertini.
0852- Contents:
da
, a curadi P. Gatti;Ricardo
Introduzione;
Rapularius
De Paulino
etPolla,a curadi St. Pittaluga;
Venosa,
Bibliografia
DasEndederRenaissance:
Kultur
um1600, hrgg.vonA. BuckundT. KlanicEuropische
Wiesbaden
1987( = Wolfenbtteler
zur
zay,OttoHarrassowitz,
Abhandlungen
: A. Buck,MonRenaissanceforschung,
6), 239p. ISBN 3 447026871- Contents
unddieKrisedesHumanismus
des
; T. Klaniczay,Die politische
taigne
Philosophie
Manerismus:
ParutaundLipsius'A. Buck, TraianoBoccalini
(1556-1613)als
B. Keser,Heterodoxie
undSpthumanismus
imstlichen
Zeitkritiker,
; N.
Mitteleuropa
vomErasmianismus.
Humanisten
undderniederlndische
K.
Mout,Abschied
Aufstand;
- mentalittsgeschichtliche
N. Hammereiner
Erdei,DieMeditation
Deutungen
Gattung',
imheiligen
Rmischen
Reich
Deutscher
Nation
amEndeder
stein,Universittsgeschichte
Renaissance
Patriotismus.
Die Verbreitung
derIdeen
der
; K. Pter,Derrosenkreuzerische
Rosenkreuzer
imMittelundOsteuropa
irische
Barbaren:
Zur
; K. Uhiig, Spensers
vonA View of thePresentStateof Ireland;A. Tarnai,
Argumentationsstruktur
alsZentrum
Deutschland
derinternationalen
lateinischen
imSpthumanismus
; F.
Dichtung
VonderIdylle
zurEnttuschung:
zur
.dieKrisederPastorale.
Zemplnyi,
Anmerkungen
Fbula de Polifemoy Galatea von Gongora
; S. K. Nmeth,Ungarische
deutscher
seit1968
; A. Thill,BaldeTodesbetrachtungen
Herkunft
Forschung
Favolisti
LatiniMedievali,
di Genova. Istitutodi FilologiaClassicae
Universit
Genova1984(= Pubblicazioni,
Medievale,
84), 105p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
S. Curletto,
Contents:
Il lupoe lagrudaEsopoa La Fontaine
; F. DellaCorte,Quattro
inedite
delTardoG. Garbugino,
La favoladelleone
e
ammalato
Rinascimento',
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: De Tempore,De SpirituFantastico,
Robert
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deutschen
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Texte
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15),308 p. ISBN 3 92183415 5
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'Breve
sit dl. III: Eenkritische
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uitgave
uitgave
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Summa
Blund,
grammatica,
Hispanus
Summa'Absoluta
cuiuslibe,
IngeniumPublishers,
Nijmegen1987
(non-papa),
=
Diss.
RU Leiden),xxiv+ 712 p., x + 382 p., x + 249 p., x+109 p. ISBN
(
90 70419149/157/165/173
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BruniTraduttore
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La ProCtesiphonte,
MariaAccameLanzillotta,
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Universit
96), 196p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
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AnIntroduction
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LaterMedieval
, Routledge
Philosophy
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JohnMarenbon,
KeganPaul, Londonand NewYork1987,xii+ 230 p. ISBN 0 71020286 5
andthe
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AmsterdamAldoScaglione,TheLiberal
, Benjamins,
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1986,248 p. ISBN 90 27221030 (Eur.) / 0 91502777 1 (US)
Philadelphia
Paperback
L. Holtz,A. Kibre,
Donati
Liberinpartibus
, curaet studioB. Lfstedt,
Smaragdus,
Cont.Mediaev.LXVIII),
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Brepols,
9
3/03000
xcvi+ 313 p. ISBN 2 503036813/03682
nelmondo
epatristico
di Genova.Istituto
La donna
biblico
, Universit
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Sponsa,
Virgo.
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Classicae Medievale,
di Filologia
92), 155p. IT
- Contents
: S. Sierra,La donna
nelmondo
biblico
ebraico
ISSN 0025-0852
; E. CornelNuovo
La conoscenza
dellnativit
Testamento
dalla
; A. Quacquarelli,
sini,La donna
secoli
attraverso
di Cornelio
deiprimi
; T. Maniero,Ungiudizio
gliapocrifi
iconografia
libera
nelle
culture
e romana
edalcunirilievi
sulladonna
e greca
; A. Pastorino,
Nepote
nelmedioevo
latino
neipadridellachiesa
La donna
La condizione
; F. Bertini,
;
femminile
P. Meloni,Mariadi Nazaret
: Thought
FrankTobin,Meister
Eckhart
andLanguage
ofPennsylvania
, University
Press,
1986,xiv+ 234 p. ISBN 0 81228009 1
Philadelphia
au XlIIe sicle
Roma
desuniversits
, Edizionidell'Ateneo,
Olga Weijers,Terminologie
1987,xlii+ 437 p. ( = Lessicointellettuale
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