1.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. Hon.

GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO [G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. He was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States (2)
tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions.
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The same was assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court however
dismissed the Petition. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ filed the appropriate Petition for Extradition and
prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of
PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which
prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing and
manifested to allow him to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After
hearing, the Court ordered to issues a warrant of arrest and fixed bail for his temporary
liberty. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether Jimenez entitled to bail.
Ruling: No. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It

does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is
merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions
that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. ]The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with
the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may
be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in
the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
2.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
CORONA, J.:
Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser
crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal on the grounds of his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied his
application for bail and found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment
of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger and the physical condition of petitioner does not prevent
him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred
to be attended by his personal physician. The Court of Appeals also considered the fact
of petitioners conviction and that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn
the evidence of petitioners guilt. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for
bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory
is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: Whether in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by

the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On
the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none
of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present,
the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail
pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating ]circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts
denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not
the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are
prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that
none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.

3.
PANFILO D. BONGCAC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE
PHILIPPINES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FORTUNATO LIM, and
TORIBIO BON, G.R. Nos. 156687-88, May 21, 2009

OF

THE

CARPIO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Panfilo Bongcac (Bongcac) was designated by the Mayor of Tagbilaran
City Consultant and Coordinator on market matters. Respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim
(Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in
Tagbilaran City and were referred to by Bongcac. Bongcac informed Lim and Bon the
government cannot afford to construct a new market and if the two were interested, they
should give Bongcac money for the construction. Lim and Bon thereafter gave Bongcac
a check amounting to 62, 000 and 40, 000 respectively. Thereafter, Lim and Bon
learned from a newspaper that Bongcac was sacked as market body consultant and
was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he
either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas
already constructed. Bongcac failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with Estafa by
respondents before Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found Bongcac as guilty of Estafa.
Bongcac filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by Sandiganbayan. He then
filed a certiorari before SC seeking reversal but was likewise denied through resolution.
No motion for reconsideration was filed and the resolution became final and executory.
Sandiganbayan issued notice to Bongcac directing him to be present for the execution
of judgement. An extraordinary relief was sought by him in SC. Meanwhile, he filed a
motion to suspend the execution in the Sandiganbayan but was denied and the cash
bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Hence, this
case. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order praying that
the Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the warrant of arrest
and the order cancelling the bail bond pending resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Respondent on the other hand in their comment
asserts Petitioners bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon execution of
the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Bongcacs cash bail bond.

Ruling: No. the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final
judgment of conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of
the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail.
From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon
execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling
petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became final and executory
and its execution became ministerial.
4.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No.
134504, March 17, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his
wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for
reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest.
Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and
trial. Thereafter, he filed an Urgent Ex-Parte to allow him to Post Bail. The Public
Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It
was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the
hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her
Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case.
Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and
after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.
Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.
Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no
hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion
by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the
application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what
he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before
whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character
of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of
the trial judge in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for
doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him
5.
JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA vs.. JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES A.M. MTJ No. 041526. February 02, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts: An administrative case was filed by wife of Gil Grageda against Judge Nieto
Tresvalles for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority relative to the criminal
case of murder where her husband was the victim. A complaint was filed for preliminary
investigation with Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. in the sala of Judge Nieto. On the same day he
issued an order stating that accused was probably guilty of the charged and grants the
warrant of arrest, and stated the amount of bail bond. Six days after the order, Accused
surrendered and filed a motion to strike out the testimony of Jocelyn and to grant him of
bail. The following day, Judge Nieto granted the release of Accused after he posted bail
bond of P30, 000. The record was thereafter transferred to Provincial Prosecutor which
contained the denial of motion to strike out of testimony of Jocelyn. However, upon
preliminary investigation conducted by the Prosecutor, he found that accused was guilty
of murder, with aggravating circumstance and no bail was recommended. Thereafter,
an administrative case was filed by Jocelyn Grageda against Judge Nieto Tresvalles.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused without
the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder
who made a positive identification of the accused. In his Comment, the respondent
admitted that no bail hearing was conducted, but reasoned that the evidence of the guilt
of the accused was not strong. According to the respondent, the matter of granting bail
is an exercise of judgment, and that the accused should not be denied his constitutional
right to bail.
Issue: Whether bail hearing is required to be conducted by the judge and which he shall
be held guilty.
Ruling: Yes. We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable for granting
bail to an accused charged with murder without conducting the requisite bail hearing.
The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be
emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows: Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail
application. - At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody

for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusionperpetua, or life

imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise,
unable to testify.
The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends
the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis--vis the duty of the State to protect the
people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important
norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not
eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judges decision, the Rules require the judge to
hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.
The respondents argument that a hearing is only necessary if there is an application
for admission to bail is erroneous. As found by the Executive Judge: [T]he fact that
the accused has not even filed yet any application for bail at the time bail was fixed
on December 5, 2000 aggravates matters. To state the obvious, there was no occasion
for the respondent Judge to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at that point in
time as the accused was not asking to be released on temporary liberty. The
respondent Judge should have followed the straight and trodden path, well-traveled by
members of the bench, that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also
be worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail may be waived considering its
personal nature. It arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact
that the respondent Judge already granted bail when the accused has not been
arrested yet compounds the aggravation.
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided
by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must
be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. In this case, the respondent
judge motu proprio granted bail to the accused. The prosecution was not even afforded
an opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with the Rules.
6.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs.
OLALIA, GR No 153675, April 1, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts: Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of
the offense of accepting an advantage as agent in violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged with
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law

of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received a request
from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The NBI
later on arrested him on the basis of a warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order
was declared void by the CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the meantime,
Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
He applied for bail which was initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting
the petition for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but it was denied, hence, a
special civil action for certiorari was filed alleging that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that
a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, Muoz maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Issue: Whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extend to a
prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.
Ruling: Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The following trends in
international law cannot be ignored, such as: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20 thcentury, has gradually
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance
the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

7.

RUIZ vs. BELDIA A. M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: Shirley Ruiz is the private complainant in a case for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law pending before the DOJ. Santos, who was arrested during entrapment operations
relative to the carnapping of Ruizs vehicle, was one of the respondents therein.
After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
pending the filing of formal charges in court. Santos obtained an Order of Release
signed by respondent Judge Beldia who apparently granted bail to Santos and
approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.
Ruiz filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia
had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to
conclude the preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long as the information
has not yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person
since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
In his Comment dated August 14, 2000, respondent Judge Beldia maintained that
Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if not
formally charged in court, to apply for bail.
OCA recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00. It opined that although a person in
custody and who is not formally charged in court could apply for bail pursuant to Section
17 (c), Rule 114, the grant thereof by Judge Beldia was nonetheless irregular. It noted
that no formal petition or application for bail was filed by Santos, and even if one was
filed, the Marikina courts could not have properly taken cognizance of the same since
Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. There was also no showing that
the regular judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City, was unavailable to act on the
application for bail.
Issue: Whether the grant of bail by the respondent judge is valid.
Ruling: No. Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with which
she was charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or
death. Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to
Santos in accordance with established rules and procedure. Respondent Judge Beldia
failed in this respect and must thus be held administratively liable.
Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed.

(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (Emphasis supplied)
The Certificate of Detention issued by the PNP-TMG-SOD shows that Santos was
detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the OCA,
the application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and
not in Marikina City.
8.
ATTY. FRANKLIN GACAL vs. JUDGE JAIME INFANTE, A. M. No. RTJ-04-1845,
October 5, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts: Atty. Franklin Gacal, is the private prosecutor in a criminal case for murder.
Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose branch the
criminal case was raffled for arraignment and trial. Respondent judge was charged with
gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for his failure to
set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after
allowing bail.
Issue: Whether the grant of bail by the respondent judge is valid.
Ruling: No. Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was
a merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is
to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial;
and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an accused
who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to release, a hearing
upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or
of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section
7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal
action.
9.

OKABE vs. DE LEON GUTIERRES, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the money agreed upon
with Cecilia Maruyama through door- to- door delivery. The 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause
for estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest and
recommenced a bond of Php 40, 000. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the
said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Judge of RTC of
Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond
of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City. Upon her request, the

petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the
criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan without the trial courts permission, and returned to the
Philippines. She left the Philippines anew and returned. The trial court issued an order
setting the date for arraignment. The private prosecutor files an urgent ex parte motion
for the issuance of the hold departure order which was granted by the court. The
petitioner found that there are documents lacking as to determine probable cause. The
petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order to allow her to
regularly travel to Japan because she has minor children. She refused to enter her plea
with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA, her petition was partially granted.
The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the
petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of the existence of
probable cause.
Issue: Whether bail is a waiver of contending the decision of the trial judge.
Ruling: No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred
in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court
shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail
or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The
new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative
statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a
general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to
cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined
at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond,
it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause
and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There
must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to

relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a
warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the
petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance
of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her
provisional liberty. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to
assail her arrest.

10.
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN JR. ET. AL, vs. MAGDALENO PENA, GR.no.
143591, May 5, 2010
PEREZ, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case
for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees
against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Occidental, Bago City. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the
Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former
undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from
unlawfully
occupying
Urban
Banks
property
located
along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never
appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. They presented documents to disprove
the same. Atty. Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were
neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced
said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified. The City
Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of
the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued
the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners insisted that they were denied
due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary
investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were
not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. The court, likewise, upheld the
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the
warrant since they already posted bail.
Issue: Whether the question raised by petitioners were already moot.
Ruling: No. The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that
they had posted bail and were already arraigned.

It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers
of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners
refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true
only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or
For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise
expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the
validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their
plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the
Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no
valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to
avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their
arrest. Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right
granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.

11.

QUI vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012

VELASCO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), rll Article
VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act when he committedacts of cruelty and child
abuse upon the person of one Christian John Ignacio, a minor 8 years of age by then
and there angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at said minor and
threatening to knock down his head which acts are prejudicial to the childs
psychological and emotional development. Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With
the perfection of her appeal and the consequent elevation of the case records to the
CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application
for Bail Pending Appeal which respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail
application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is a
flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the
issuance of three warrants for her arrest. The CA issued the first assailed Resolution
denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule
114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in not granting the bail for petitioner.
Ruling: No. Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides: Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as
here. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of
bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not
with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. ll
The CA denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is
a flight risk, a bail-negating factor under Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114 quoted above. The CA
properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. The CAs determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without
factual mooring.

12.
FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 710 SCRA 358
REYES, J.B.L., J.
Facts: Petitioner posted surety bond in favor of the Commissioner of Immigration for the
temporary stay in the Philippines of Co Too, a Chinese alien. The pertinent conditions of
the bond are as follows:
a)
That the undersigned undertakes that Co Too shall not leave Manila or change
his address;
b)
That the undersigned undertakes to make Co Too all times available to and to
present him within 24 hours after receipt of notice to produce before the Immigration
Authorities for investigation of his right to further stay in the Philippines;
c)
That in case Co Too after such inquiry is found to have violated any limitation or
condition under which he was admitted as non-immigrant ,and is subject to deportation,
the undersigned undertakes to produce him for deportation within 24 hours after receipt
of demand to do so;
d)
That the undersigned agrees to answer for all expenses for the arrest and
apprehension of Co Too should the latter fail to appear before the Immigration
Authorities at the time, date and place set for the investigation or on such other time,
date and place set for the continuation of the investigation of his or should the
undersigned after the lapse of time granted him to do so, fail to produce said Co Too for
deportation:
x
x
x
i.)
That the undersigned agrees that this bond with all its terms and conditions shall
cover and apply to any and all extension of the temporary stay of said Co Too;
j.)
That breach of any of the conditions above-mentioned shall entitle the
Commissioner of Immigration to declare this bond or part thereof forfeited . ."
The Commissioner wrote a letter to the petitioner requiring Co Too to appear for an
investigation of his right to further stay in the Philippines in excess of one year. The
Commissioner sent another letter to petitioner requesting said surety company to pay
the sum of P3,000 within five days from receipt of said letter. Two extensions of time
were granted to the petitioner to produce Co Too: the first extension of fifteen (15) days
was given on March 8, 1950 and the second on March 15, 1950, which expired on April
14, 1950. After the last mention date, petitioner failed to comply with the demand to
present Co Too for investigation. The Commissioner of Immigration then wrote a letter
to the Solicitor General requesting the latter to file a complaint for the recovery of
P3,000 from the petitioner.

In the meantime, Co Too was apprehended by the immigration authorities without the
help of the petitioner. A deportation proceeding was conducted against him, after which
he was ordered deported. However, due to lack of transportation facilities and of a
definite place to deport him, he continued his stay here by giving a cash bond of P3,000
and a surety bond in the amount of P7,000, this time posted by the Paramount Surety
Company, while Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Companys bond No. 8569 was
declared forfeited. After the forfeiture, the Commissioner of Immigration sent a letter to
the petitioner with a list of its cancelled bonds, including therein the name of Co Too.
Later on, respondent Commissioner of Immigration sent another letter to the petitioner,
explaining that the inclusion of Co Toos name in the list of cancelled bonds was due to
mistake or inadvertence.
Issue: Whether the forfeiture of the bond is lawful.
Ruling: Yes. "By the failure of the alien to appear before the Commissioner of
Immigration and to report to him once a week as stipulated in the surety bond, the terms
thereof were breached not only by the principal but also by the surety, which justified
the forfeiture of the bond."
As regards the inadvertent cancellation of the bond in question, we believe it was really
cancelled through mistake.
Such failure on the part of the petitioner to produce Co Too constitutes a breach of one
of the principal conditions, especially paragraph (b) of the bond, entitling the
Government to forfeit the same to the full amount, without proving actual damage
suffered by it.
13.

CONQUILLA vs. BERNARDO, 642 SCRA 288

CARPIO, J.:
Facts: Complainant alleged that a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against
her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief
Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police Station. Respondent judge conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for
the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest with the
bail fixed at P12,000. Upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order
reducing the bail for complainants provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date,
complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that first level court judges
no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant
avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the
law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the
warrant of arrest. Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the

prosecutor when he reduced the bail considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the
court may increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.
Issue: Whether the issuance of bail by the judge is valid.
Ruling: No. MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. It
was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of
conducting the preliminary investigation himself.
On respondent judges issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of
bail, we find such acts void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it
assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge
conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of
arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also
void because in the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.
14.

PANTILO III vs. CANOY, 642 SCRA 301

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim, recounts in his
letter-complaint. Later, at around in the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that
Melgazo had been released from detention. Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo
was temporarily released upon the order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the
amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794
dated September 3, 2008. Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to
request a copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the
Surigao City Prosecutors Office. Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutors Office
the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned that no Information had yet
been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise,
he also learned from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been
issued but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his
detention cell. One of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a
written Order of Release would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008
after the Information is filed in Court.
Issue: Whether the release of the accused thru bail is a valid one.
Ruling: It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail,
more so in this case, when the charge against Melgazo. Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the letter-complaint focuses
on the manner of Melgazos release from detention. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged
in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he

is held. In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant
of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written
application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation
from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
15.

GACAL vs. INFANTE, A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845, October 5, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts: On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta
in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta,
who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona,
Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be
charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on April 21, 2003
(Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of
P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.
On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and
another releasing Ancheta from custody.
On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante,
filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond
With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The
Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent
And Patent Error (very urgent motion).
On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the ground
that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor,
and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as
such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. Judge Infante directed that
the consideration of the bail issue be held in abeyance until after the public prosecutor
had submitted a comment, because he wanted to know the position of the public
prosecutor on Atty. Gacals very urgent motion having been filed without the approval of
the public prosecutor.
Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently required a resolution that involved a
judicial determination and was, for that reason, a judicial function; that Judge Infante
failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with dispatch,
because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained
while Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such
event also put the integrity of Judge Infantes court in peril; and that although his motion
for reconsideration included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio
correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross
ignorance of law.

Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both guilty
of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue advantage to
Ancheta by allowing him bail without his filing a petition for bail and without a hearing
being first conducted. Judge Infante denied the allegations of Atty Gacal, hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether the judge in granting bail to the accused dispense with the hearing of
Application for Bail?
Ruling: No. The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is
considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be
exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing.
Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong (People vs.
Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to
conduct hearing the moment an application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If
doubt can be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be
recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be
granted.
Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the application for bail
filed by the accused (Annex "C") based merely on the order issued by the Fiscal (Annex
"A") recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without
even bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent
judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to determine whether the evidence against
the accused who is charged with capital offense is strong or not.
In case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable.
Judge Infantes contention is unwarranted.
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a
hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a
violation of due process occurs.
Public prosecutors failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence
did not dispense with hearing

That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it
recommended bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence were
irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge in
Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a bail
hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and clarificatory questions
from which to infer the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. He should not
have readily and easily gone along with the public prosecutors opinion that the
evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not strong enough to deny bail; else, he
might be regarded as having abdicated from a responsibility that was his alone as the
trial judge.
Judge Infantes granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in
capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules
as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion and that
the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held,
but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of
guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the
absence of a petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any order he issued in
the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion but
of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
16.
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. MARILOU RUNESTAMANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC PATEROS, METRO MANILA AND PRESIDING
JUDGE, MeTC SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, A.M. MTJ-04-155, April 7, 2010
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1594-MTJ)
Facts: An anonymous "Concerned Filipino Citizen" sent to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. a letter dated October 22, 2003 requesting the investigation of Judge
Marilou D. Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila. The lettersender complained that Judge Tamang, through the connivance of the arresting officer
and court employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving fake
bonds for a fee of P1,000.00 "per count ng kaso." The letter prompted the Court to treat
it as an administrative complaint. On November 4, 2003, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.
referred the letter to then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (DCA Lock)
for appropriate action.
In the initial investigation of the OCAd, they found out that the RTC, Branch 153, in
Pasig City furnished to the OCA a copy of its order dated October 22, 2003 revoking the
"unethical Orders of Release" issued by Judge Tamang in various criminal cases
assigned to that branch. The order stated that Judge Tamang had approved the bail
bonds issued by a blacklisted company without any showing of the unavailability of all
the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering that the accused persons posting the bail bonds

were charged in criminal cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and were detained in
the Pasig City Jail. Acting on OCAds recommendation, the Court En Banc made a
resolution requiring Judge Tumang to file an Answer/Comment.
In her Answer, Judge Tamang maintained her innocence and Sometime in August of
2003, an RTC Judge of Pasig City called her attention to an irregular order of release
she had signed as the Acting Judge of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila, involving a
criminal case pending in Pasig City. Allegedly, the order of release was signed without
the necessary supporting documents. The discovery of the irregular order of release
prompted Judge Tamang to conduct an investigation in the MeTC of San Juan. After
her initial investigation, she issued Office Memorandum No. 001-03 dated September
17, 2003, addressed to Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San Juan,
directing her to shed light on the anomaly. Office Memorandum No. 001-03 included a
directive that no bails bonds would be approved until after the controversy was
resolved.
In her response to Office Memorandum No. 001-03, Sorio explained that as standard
office procedure, she checked all orders and documents, including bail bonds, before
Judge Tamang signed them. Sorio added that to her recollection, all the bail bonds
passing through her for presentation to Judge Tamang had been in order, although on
many occasions, Ronnie Medrano, the MeTCs Process Server, retained possession of
some of the documents accompanying the orders of release. Sorios explanation
prompted Judge Tamang to issue Office Memorandum No. 002-03 dated September
21, 2003, requiring Medrano to submit his comment vis--vis Sorio's allegations.
Through his Tugon/Salaysay dated September 26, 2003, Medrano "admitted" his guilt,
and begged Judge Tamang for forgiveness. Executive Judge Amelia C. Manalastas of
the RTC in Pasig City directed Sorio and Medrano to file their respective comments,
and set the hearing of the administrative case. Judge Manalastas conducted hearings
on October 8 and 16, 2007. In her compliance dated November 29, 2007, Judge
Manalastas stated that she had found no evidence to support a finding against Judge
Tamang of bad faith, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice; but recommended
that Judge Tamang be found guilty of gross negligence for violating Canon 6 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and that her co-respondents be found guilty of grave
misconduct.
Issue: Whether Judge Tamang and her co-accused committed grave misconduct on
issuing illegal bail bonds.
Ruling: Yes, but Judge Tamang and Sorio must have lesser punishment compared to
Medrano who admitted his misconduct.
Liability of Judge Tamang
Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant although they manifestly
lacked the required clearance from the Supreme Court indicating that Covenant was
qualified to transact business with the courts. As earlier stated, Covenant was a

blacklisted company at the time of issuance of the bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of
a neglect of duty, for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated
Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65, the judge is still
bound to review the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if it is
the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and
that all requisites for approval have been complied with.
Judge Tamangs excuse of simply relying on the representation of the court personnel
who unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a deficiency in
that requisite degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe.
She cannot now thereby exculpate herself, or take refuge behind that excuse, for, in
fact, such reliance was actually her admission of being neglectful and of lacking the
diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her for signature. A
carelessness of that kind and degree ran contrary to the competence expected of her as
a dispenser of justice and as a visible representation of the law.
Liability of Ellen Sorio
Sorios insistence notwithstanding, there were still spurious bail bonds that had reached
the hands of Judge Tamang, and that the latter ultimately signed. Thus, although Sorio
denied any knowledge of or participation in such anomalous bail bonds, we find her
liable. Sorio should have rejected the bail bonds of Covenant due to the latters
blacklisting and its lack of clearance from the Supreme Court to issue such bail bonds.
She cannot now simply feign ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible pretext
that some bail bonds did not pass through her. Likewise, Sorio did not explain the nontransmittal of some approved bail bonds and their supporting documents to the courts,
before which the criminal cases of the accused concerned had been filed and pending.
Liability of Ronnie Medrano
We cannot be as compassionate towards Medrano, who categorically admitted his
offense, giving the simple explanation of having thereby accommodated ill-intentioned
people. His anomalies for a consideration appeared to be not isolated, but repeated
many times. He thereby converted his employment in the court into an incomegenerating activity. We find him guilty of grave misconduct, because he fell short of his
accountability to the people as a public employee.
17.

LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA, G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser
crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during
the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: No. Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural
and substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is
of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none
of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present,
the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not
the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail. A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result
in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs where,
between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is
more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the
end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and
relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending
appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending
cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth
in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August
16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
18.

PEOPLE VS CAWALING, G.R. No. 157147, April 17, 2009

NACHURA J:
Facts: The legal poser arose because, after the prosecution presented an eyewitness to
the crime pointing to Cawaling as the perpetrator thereof, the defense offered the
testimony of a person, initially charged with Cawaling in the same Information and who
previously pled not guilty to the crime, confessing that it was he, and not Cawaling, who
murdered the victim.
Even the two courts below us parleyed and rendered conflicting decisions. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) partially upheld the defenses version of the events, rejected
the prosecutions eyewitness account of the murder and convicted Cawaling only as an
accomplice to the offense of homicide. In stark contrast, the CA found the eyewitness
testimony credible and convicted Cawaling of murder. He flee right away but

bondsperson Margerita Cruz posted bail to secure the formers person. Cruz filed a
manifestation to withdraw the bond.
Issue: Whether can withdraw the bail posted in favor of the accused appellant Cawaling.
Ruling: No. SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.
With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Courts consequent failure to
execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawalings flight, the motion must be
denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and
replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the
Court, or adequate proof of his death is presented.
SC are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate
Cawaling, a relative, obtain provisional liberty. However, under Section 1 of Rule 114,
Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as
required under specified conditions.
It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed
temporary liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment.
As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the
property bond cannot be released.
19.

BELLEZA VS MACASA, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009

Facts: Complainant thru referral wanted to avail of respondents legal services in

connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru
their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additionalP10,000.
She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made
thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose
of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day,
she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several

occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case
of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Issue: Whether compalinant was denied of right to counsel due to the negligence of
Atty. Macasa.
Ruling: The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.
However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal
assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes
an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being wellversed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without
counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is
the right to effective assistance of counsel.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving
his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the
cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant
was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not
only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to
counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters
constitutional right to bail.
20.

CERVANTES VS PANGILINAN, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709

CARPIO MORALES J:

Facts: Respondent Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for
Slander against the therein accused-herein complainant who subsequently posted bail
fixed at P2,000. On arraignment complainant pleaded not guilty. She later filed a
Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit with her Ganting Salaysay. Respondent Clerk of
Court Carmenchita refused to accept the Motion, however, in the absence of Judge
Pangilinan, being apprehensive that he might scold her.
Complainant returned during which Carmenchita told her not to see the judge that
day as he was still tired from his trip. The following day, Judge Pangilinan advised
complainant that he could not accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had
already been arraigned, Hence, spawned the filing of the present complaint.
Respondent Carmenchita explained that she refused to receive the Motion because
there was no proper proof of service, but she advised complainant to serve a copy
thereof on the Chief of Police of Cuyo, the designated prosecutor, at the police station
across the street. Judge Pangilinan justified the non-receipt of complainants motion for
lack of proper proof of service, and complainant, instead of heeding the advice to
comply therewith, went to Puerto Princesa City to air her grievance over a local radio
station.
Issue: Whether Judge Pangilinan and Baloco committed gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent judge manifested a lack of mastery of the provision of the
1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. On 05 December 2001, Judge Pangilinan issued a
Warrant of Arrest against Lanie Cervantes, fixing the bond of the accused in the amount
of Php2,000.00. The requirement for the accused to post bail is part of the regular
procedure, not the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
The proceedings in a criminal case for Slander are governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Instead of first ruling whether the case fell under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and
fixed complainants bail at P2,000. There being no showing that complainant failed to
appear in court when required by Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he issued had
no legal basis.
In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles the Court noted that the requirement to post bail is no
longer necessary under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Further, inMartinez,
Sr. v. Judge Paguio, the Court observed that under Republic Act No. 6036, bail is not
generally required for violation of municipal or city ordinances, and for criminal offenses
when the prescribed penalty is not higher than arresto mayor or fine of P2,000 or both,
as in the case for Slander against complainant which is covered by Art. 358 of the
Revised Penal Code.
21.
GO, SR. VS. RAMOS, G.R. NO. 167569; 167570; 171946
2009

SEPTEMBER 4,

QUISUMBING,J.:
Facts: A complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipinocitizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth
certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which
indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from
Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit.
Board of Commissioners found Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by
reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and
filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. The corresponding Charge
Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9) in relation to
Section 45(c) of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of
1940. The Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of
Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually
dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. On account of his detention,
Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC assailing his
apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on
recognizance.
Issue: Whether the there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the regular
courts in not entertaining the motions of the accused at bar.
Ruling: No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would
be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas

corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail
cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on
bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
22.

PEOPLE VS. PLAZA, G.R. NO. 176 933, OCTOBER 2, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: Luis Bucalon Plaza was charged of the crime of murder under the case filed in
Branch 30 RTC Surigao, presided by Judge Buyser. After the prosecution rested its
case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was
denied by Judge Buyser.
The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a
Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that
the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on
bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00
which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide.
The prosecution contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is nonbailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public
prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should
be charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not
just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his
right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceeding; and and that under the Rules, the
prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has
rested its case. Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers
impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to
Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond. Still, after examination, he agreed to the decision of Judge
Buyser. Therefore same was alleged acting in grave abuse discretion by Plazas.
Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner,
assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been
filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether
or not the prosecutions evidence is strong.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
adopted Robertos argument that the grant of bail to respondent without any separate
hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not Judges are guilty of serious and grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all
persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was
sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to
determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the
evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.
23.

BARBERO VS. DUMLAO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, June 19, 2008

Facts: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero
(Barbero) against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.Barbero filed a criminal case for estafa
against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The case was raffled to Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February
2003,Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest commanding the proper officer toarrest
Medina.
Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However, Judge Dumlao
approved Medinas bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an order commanding the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology and the Philippine
National Police to release Medina. Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlaos approval of
Medinas bail and his order to release Medina were unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge is guilty of serious and grave abuse of dicretion.
Ruling: Yes. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under
detention by legal process shall be released except when he is admitted to bail. Section
19 provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge
with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17. Section 17 provides that the bail
may be filed with the court where the case is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court
is absent or unavailable, or (2) the accused is arrested in a province, city, or

municipality other than where the case is pending. If the judge is absent or unavailable,
the bail should be filed with another branch of the same court. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the
bail should be filed with any RTC of the place.
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman Medina
were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In
fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the
said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should
have been issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by
another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is no proof that
Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In
fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao] ordered the release of
Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at
their respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an
accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section
17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court
recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release.
He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he
can approve Medinas bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is
rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. The acts of approving bail and ordering
the release of accused whose cases are pending before other courts constitute gross
ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious offense punishable by (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or
(3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
24.

TRILLANES IV vs. PIMENTEL SR., G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Facts: Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for
staging an alleged coup detat. Before the commencement of his term, his fellow
opposition Senators filed a motion to allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform
his duties as senator. It was argued that there is a world of difference between his case
and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the
motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.
Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his

mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He
argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office,
depriving the people of proper representation, denying the peoples will, repudiating the
peoples choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. Moreover, he pleads for the
same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend social functions. Are the contentions
of Trillanes tenable?
Issues: (1) Whether Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case; (2)
Whether Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator; (3) Whether there are enough precedents that
allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail.
Ruling. The SC ruled that the distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. That the cited provisions apply equally to
rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond
cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved
in the crime charged. The high court also denied Trillanes assertion that he was not a
flight risk since he voluntary surrendered to authorities. The incident at the Manila
Peninsula Hotel in Makati showed him to be a flight risk. xxx The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free
a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious. xxx Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial
of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor

engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in

detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his
mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by
the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by
the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free
a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in
the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of
candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senatorelect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist
the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner
largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and
blanket authorizations.
all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.

25.
WINSTON MENDOZA and FE MICLAT vs. FERNANDO ALARMA and FAUSTA
ALARMA, G.R. No. 151970, May 7, 2008
CARPIO, J.:
Facts: Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents) are the owners of an 11.7
hectare parcel of land (land) located in Iba, Zambales. The land was posted as a
property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal
possession of firearms.
When the accused failed to appear in court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court
ordered his arrest and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. It
also directed the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days the person of the
accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail bond.
However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court
issued a writ of execution against the land in april 14 1986. The land was eventually
sold at public auction and was awarded to petitioners and they immediately took
possession of the same.
Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against
petitioners. grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property
bond. The court decision dismissed the complaint and declared that the Order dated 14
April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the
proceedings on the execution, sale, and issuance of the writ of possession. The
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari in which the SC also affirmed the CA.
Meanwhile, petitioners applied for the registration of the land and the RTC zambales
granted it. Rspondents filed for annulment in rtc another branch which was denied
because of co-equality.
They went to the CA which granted their appeal and annulled the registration.
Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and in
ordering the annulment.
Ruling: Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall
be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce
their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before
the court and that the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the
bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day period to produce the accused or a
reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from
the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered
against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was
issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest
bidders.
These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The
execution was issued, not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and
solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being
something more to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This
process is also called confiscation of bond. an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and
merely requires appellant "to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against
it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different from a judgment on the bond
which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The judgment
on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it
becomes final, execution may issue at once. In this case, no such judgment was ever
issued and neither has an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held
liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated respondents right to
procedural due process.
26.

SAN MIGUEL v. MACEDA, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4, 2007

Facts: Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery
of .50 grams ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional. He
jumped bail. On May 10, 2001, then Judge Alumbres issued a bench warrant and
canceled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the
amount of P120,000.00. Complainant was arrested on September 8, 2001. On
September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail
on the ground of reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability that
accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution. The Motion was set for hearing
on September 19, 2001. On September 17, 2001, complainant filed an Opposition to the
Motion. Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due

process was gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001 Order
without giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. The issuance of the
September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's gross ignorance of the law as the
offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable by reclusion perpetua. His
right to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be
defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was to
deny him of his constitutional right to bail.
OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation and stated that the complainant is
correct in saying that the order dated September 17, 2001 of respondent denied him his
right to bail. It is thus clear that what the prosecution prayed for was the cancellation of
the bail of P120,000.00 set by Judge Alumbres in his Warrant of Arrest dated May 10,
2001. This necessarily meant that the prosecution wanted complainant to remain in jail
without bail. Hence, when respondent granted the motion in his order dated September
17, 2001, he in effect denied complainant his right to bail. It can not be denied that since
complainant was charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment and since he has not yet been convicted, bail in his case is still a
matter of right. (Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court) This is true notwithstanding the
fact that he previously jumped bail. In such a case, respondent should have increased
the amount of bail or set certain conditions to ensure complainant's presence during the
trial, but he cannot deny altogether complainant's right to bail. The Court agrees with the
findings and recommendations of the OCA.1awphi1.nHowever, respondent Judge
Maceda continued with the hearing on September 19, 2001. He considered the
Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order granting
the withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended bail.
Issue: whether or not the increased bail of P120,000.00 fixed by Hon. Alumbres, in the
Warrant of Arrest he issued on May 10, 2001 was also withdrawn by the Order dated
September 17, 2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its recommended bail.
Ruling:No. On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio xxx manifested that x x x the bail fixed
by Judge Alumbres was not affected by the withdrawal of the prosecution's
recommended bail. That is correct. Any of the accused, therefore, could have applied
for bail thereunder. They could have even moved for the lifting of the warrant dated May
10. But, they did not.
It is clear from the September 17 Order that only the bail recommended by the
prosecutor was "considered withdrawn". Such Order does not speak of cancellation of
the P120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding Judge x x x. And even granting for
the sake of argument that complainant was also charged with the crime of murder on
September 14, 2001, or three days before the Order of cancellation was issued,
respondent failed to consider that what was being prayed for by the prosecutor was the
cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the
crime of murder.

Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing was
justified considering that complainant was already detained for the non-bailable offense
of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered, is misplaced.1a\^/phi1.net
As the Court opined in Andres v. Beltran, it is a misconception that when an accused is
charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of
murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense that
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x x x is discretionary on the part of the
trial court. In other words, accused is still entitled to bail but no longer "as a matter of
right." Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence
of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail. The prosecution is accorded ample
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. And in Sy Guan v. Amparo, where bail is a
matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail
must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion
than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the
presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to
the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required.
Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing, we find that the prosecutor
failed to adduce evidence that there exists a high probability of accused's jumping bail
that would warrant the cancellation of the recommended bail bond. Following then the
above ratiocination, respondent's only recourse is to fix a higher amount of bail and not
cancel the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres.
27.

CHUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 140842, April 12, 2007

Facts: Rufina Chua, petitioner, met Wilfred Chiok, respondent, who represented himself
as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He encouraged petitioner
to invest her money in stocks, requesting her to designate him as her stockbroker. On
respondents prodding, she agreed. In 1995, respondent encouraged petitioner to
purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her earnings. Hence, in June 1995, she
entrusted to him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of
stocks in bulk. Petitioner deposited P7,100,000.00 in respondents account and
personally gave him the remainingP2,463,900.00. Thereupon, he told petitioner to wait
for one week. A week elapsed and respondent advised her to wait for another week.
Then, there was no more news from respondent. Finally, when petitioner was able to
contact him, respondent admitted that he spent the money. At any rate, he issued two
checks as payment but when petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks
were dishonored for insufficient funds. Petitioner then came to know that respondent
was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc.
Immediately, she caused the filing of an information for estafa against him.
After the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the trial
court set the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. However, respondent and

his counsel failed to appear on said date despite notice. The trial court reset the
promulgation of judgment on February 1, 1999, with notice to respondent. Again,
respondent failed to appear. The trial court then promulgated its Decision convicting
respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The prosecution
filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that respondent might flee or commit
another crime. The trial court issued an Omnibus Order cancelling his bail. However, On
September 20, 1999, after hearing respondents application for injunction, the appellate
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding
that the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as
the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the probability
that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the the filing of the motions for Injunctions assailing the Omnibus
Order cancelling the bail is proper.
Ruling: No. Firstly, the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction is not the proper recourse in assailing the trial courts May 28,
1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure3 provides:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or ON MOTION OF ANY PARTY, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the above provision that private respondents
appropriate remedy against the trial courts May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his
bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same
regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 he himself initiated. Such motion
is an incident in his appeal.
Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting
respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
of the trial courts Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual or legal
basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a
clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are in violation of such right.
The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his
appeal from the trial courts judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to
the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover,
he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26,
1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he
"shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also
showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on
bail.
28.

SAVELLA VS. INES, AM. NO. MTJ- 07-1673

TINGA,J.:
Facts: Virginia Savella filed a criminal complaint for the falsification of Public Document
against Isabel Ibanez in MTCC Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. Upon serving the
warrant of arrest, the accused was nowhere to be found. Instead, her saughter
produces copy of the order issued by Judge Iluminada Ines directing the provisional
release of the accused upon paying the posted bond of P12,000. Complainant claims
that the Clerk of Court of MTC-Sinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the court
where the case was pending. This failure, according to complainant, is tantamount to
serious misconduct. He further alleges that the order of respondent judge was highly
irregular for it gave undue favor and illegal accommodation to the accused who is
known to be a close friend of respondent judge.
Issue: Whether the judge was guilty of serious misconduct.

Ruling: Yes. Respondent judge failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond
application. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that (b)ail in
the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge of the province or city or
municipality. The instant falsification case against accused was filed before the MTCCVigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge
Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent judge clearly erred in entertaining
the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the falsification case before
the MTCC of Vigan.
Assuming arguendo that respondent judge rightfully granted bail to accused, her failure
to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case
is pending constitutes another violation of the rules, particularly Section 19 of Rule 114.
Respondent judge should have forwarded the records pertaining to the bail bond
immediately after she received the same.
29.

ESPANOL VS. FORMOSO, G.R. NO. 150949, JUNE 21, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
Facts: Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales
a piece of land. Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when
the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by
the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that
spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and
found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as
early as July 13, 1979.
Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite a
complaint for quieting of title. In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others,
that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
Judge Dolores L. Espaol, declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and
ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.
They were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day,
respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were
denied outright by petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition.
Issue: Whether Sharcons are guilty of direct contempt.

Ruling: No. Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of
Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot.
We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by
the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is
not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of
his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
30.

PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Facts: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder and among the respondents was herein
petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The amended
information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the
former President and several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No.
7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659.
Jinggoy filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only
allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or
criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. He prayed that he be allowed to post bail. On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a "Motion
to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."
Sadiganbayan set his alternative prayer to post bail for hearing after arraignment of all
accused.
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy
interposed a petition for certiorari before this Court claiming, among others, that
\Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not fixing bail for him. Pending
resolution of this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The
Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001, the
Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Jinggoy filed with the Court
an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with
the Sandiganbayan. On the same day, the Court referred the motion to the
Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court to make a report. According to the
graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy "failed
to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the
accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed
to post bail." On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus
Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail

hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the
omnibus application for bail.
Issue: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting Jinggoy Estradas Motion for Bail?
Ruling: No. To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is
great.14 Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than
four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a
flight risk. The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil,
given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
considering also that he has a reputation to uphold and a respectable name to protect
and preserve.
Moreover, Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner
urges, which necessarily implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be
tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayans ongoing determination of the facts and
merits of the main case.Here, the Sandiganbayan is not is not making any judgment as
to the final outcome of this case either with respect to movant Jinggoy or with respect to
accused Estrada, but is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence
of movant's guilt is strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is
predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail
hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted.
Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft
Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As
jurisprudence teaches:
xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the
trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is
not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due
course.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and
evaluating the weight of the prosecutions evidence, it determined that the evidence

against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of that determination,
resolved to grant him bail.
31.

VALERIO vs. COURT APPEALS, G.R. Nos. 164311-12, October 10, 2007

Facts: On March 18, 2000, Jun Valerio, Chief of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel, was shot and killed in front of his house at No. 82 Mapang-akit St., Diliman,
Quezon City. Thus, an Information for murder was filed against Antonio E. Cabador,
Martin M. Jimenez, Samuel C. Baran, and Geronimo S. Quintana; while an Information
for parricide was filed against the victims wife, Milagros E. Valerio.
Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was
not strong. The RTC granted Milagros application for bail, but denied the motion to
convert Samuel as state witness. On March 5, 2002, Milagros posted a bailbond
furnished by Central Surety and Insurance Company, and was ordered released. Herein
petitioners, Laarni N. Valerio, sister of the victim, and the People of the Philippines,
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
RTC judge for granting Milagros bail. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court found
no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC. Hence, this petition where the
petitioner and the people alleged, among others, that public respondent court of appeals
erred in holding that it found nothing arbitrary or capricious in the lower courts
evaluation of the evidence for purposes solely of private respondent milagros "myla"
valerios application for bail. Petitioners contend that Milagros is not entitled to bail as
the evidence of guilt against her is strong. They bank on the testimony of Modesto
Cabador that he heard Milagros impatiently ask Antonio about their plot to kill Jun
Valerio
Issue: Whether or not Milagros is entitled to Bail.
Ruling: No. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, "No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal action."
In this case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has
confessed to the crime and has implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken in
conjunction with the other evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that
Milagros may have participated as principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio.
It was thus a grave error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court to
grant her application for bail. The appellate court clearly committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial courts decision granting bail to Milagros Valerio

32.
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, DOLORES, EASTERN SAMAR, A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC,
October 17, 2007
Facts: This administrative case arose from a memorandum an audit team of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted. The audit team reported on the judicial
audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar.
Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez (Judge Alvarez), who was due for compulsory retirement on
9 September 2005, used to preside over the trial court. In view of his compulsory
retirement, the audit team conducted a judicial audit of cases.
The audit team also found that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case
Nos. 393 and 358, both of which were pending before Judge Alvarez. In Criminal Case
No. 393, the supposed surety filed with Judge Alvarez an affidavit of disclaimer stating
that (1) she did not know the accused; (2) the use of her property as bail bond was
unauthorized; (3) the signature on the property bond was forged; (4) she did not sign as
a surety; (5) her real signature was different from the signature on the property bond. In
Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond and, then officer-incharge Quitorio, now legal researcher, signed the order of release. Judge Bugtas and
Quitorio did not forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge
Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002
Judge bugtas explained that: (1) he accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393
and 358 because Judge Alvarez was unavailable; (2) ordered the release of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 393 because the property bond and other bail documents
were regular on their face and the suretys signature was genuine. Thus, In its
memorandum, the OCA found that acted without authority when he accepted the bail
bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358; violated the Rules of Court when he failed to
forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No.
358; and went beyond the call of his duties when he approved the spurious property
bond in Criminal Case No. 393.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Bugtas erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release
Ruling: Yes. SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said
place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza, the Court held that: there are prerequisites to be complied
with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is pending.
In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed

with another branch of the same court within the province or city. Second, if the accused
is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.
In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not present any proof to show that (1) Judge
Alvarez was unavailable, or (2) the accused were arrested in Borongan. Since (1)
Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, (2) there was no
showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not arrested in
Borongan, Judge Bugtas had no authority to accept the bail bonds in these cases.
In Espanol v. Mupas, the Court held that judges who approve applications for bail of
accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with
before he can approve [the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law
involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error.
In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail but also
failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez
as required in the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail
by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting
papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a
different one to be filed.
In Naui v. Mauricio, Sr., the Court held that judges should forward the records pertaining
to the bail bond immediately after receiving them. In the instant case, Judge Bugtas
accepted the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 358 on 9 December 1999. He forwarded
the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers only after a subpoena duces
tecum was issued on 29 January 2002. If the subpoena duces tecum were not issued,
Judge Bugtas would have continued to ignore the provisions of Section 19 indefinitely.
Judge Bugtas explained that he did not forward the records pertaining to the bail
because the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys
certificate of title. This is unacceptable. Section 19 is very clear: "When bail is filed with
a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall
forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court
where the case is pending."
Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that failure of the accused to cause
the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title within 10 days after the
approval of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the bond
and re-arrest and detention of the accused. Judge Alvarez could have cancelled the
property bond and issued the warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas followed
Section 19. Moreover, since Judge Bugtas opted to accept and retain possession of the

bail bond, albeit erroneously, the least he could have done was to cancel the property
bond and issue a warrant of arrest when the accused failed to cause the annotation of
the lien within 10 days, yet he did not do so.