Student ID: 0742694

This paper concerns itself with Don Marquis future-like-ours account for the
wrongness of killing and how it demonstrates that abortion is seriously wrong. I reconstruct
Marquis reasons for favoring the future-like-ours approach to the wrongness of killing
and his account for why the future-like-ours approach provides the justification for his
conclusion that abortion is seriously wrong; demonstrating that the right to life is a negative
right. However, I ultimately conclude that while Marquis provides the atheoretical
justification for the negative right not to be killed to be granted to fetuses and persons alike,

Comment [P1]: Does he mention that the

right to life is a negative right? Or does his
argument just rely on establishing what
makes killing wrong?

the future-like-ours approach does not justify the use of a negative right to gain a positive
right.
Marquis begins his paper by explaining the faults he sees with the current structure
of the abortion debate. Both sides are preoccupied with arguing for a definition of
personhood that fits their needs, rather than the moral permissibility or impermissibility of

Comment [P2]: Pretty good introduction.

You do a nice job of setting up the problem
and telling me what you are going to do in
the paper. I would like to see a bit of a
stronger thesis statement, or at least hints
as to what you have in mind with regards to
the right talk.
10/10

abortion. The moral claims made by both sides of the debate argue through accidental moral
generalizations, while at the same time rejecting the moral generalizations of their opponent
as having inescapable difficulties (Marquis, pg. 187);, this has led to a symmetric debate
where both sides do not touch on the essence of the matter (Marquis, pg. 188). This is
significant as it explains why Marquis starts his argument for the seriously wrongness of
abortion from the atheoretical perspective of why killing is wrong. He argues that it is
impossible to prove that abortion is moral or immoral without first understanding why
killing an adult human being that is like us is wrong.
Marquis starts off his discussion of the wrongness of killing by dismissing some
proposed answers that can easily be eliminated as they do not fully encompass the
wrongness of killing us. One such example is that it is wrong to kill us, as others would

Comment [P3]: What exactly do you have

in mind by atheoretical? Do you mean that
Marquis looks at the question of abortion
without taking a stance on personhood? If
so, then you might want to make that
clearer. (And especially since its that stance
that serves as a nice contrast to those who
have different views.)

experience a great loss because of our absence. While at face value, this explanation is
understandable; it does not explain the wrongness of killing individuals who are independent
or hermits (both of whom are just like us).
Marquis argues that the better account for the wrongness of killing has to do with
the loss that the victim suffers, specifically the loss of ones future (Marquis, pg. 189). Our

Comment [P4]: New idea, new paragraph.

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5"

future is composed of all of the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that
would have continued to exist in our future (Marquis, pg. 189), and when one is killed, they

Comment [P5]: This isnt the best way to

phrase what you have in mind.

are deprived of having a future-like-ours (Marquis, pg. 190). These experiences, activities,
projects, and enjoyments are not only valuable to us in and of themselves, but they are also
valuable as means to some valuable end. When we are killed we are deprived of what we
currently value and what we would come to value in the future (Marquis, pg. 190). Therefore
inflicting the loss of a future-like-ours is what makes killing any human prima facie
seriously wrong.
The support for the future-like-ours approach comes from some of its
implications that Marquis highlights, as they demonstrate how the approach makes sense of
why killing is wrong while still being aligned with the perspective of the dying (Marquis, pg.

Comment [P6]: Good. This is a nice

statement and reconstruction of Marquiss
position. Perhaps a brief contrast with the
other view you mention above would be
good.

Comment [P7]: Im not sure what this

means.

190). The first and second implications are that the future-like-ours approach is
inconsistent with the view that it is only wrong to kill biological humans, since it is possible
to encounter another species with future-like-ours whom it would be wrong to kill, and it
is possible that non-human primates can have a future-like-ours making it wrong to kill
them as well. This means that this approach is opposed to the view that the only valuable
lives are biological humans, which is a claim that has great moral worth for the antiabortionist argument.

Comment [P8]: This could be 2 sentences.

Another implication is that since the loss of a future-like-ours is what makes killing
wrong, the future-like-ours approach does not rule out euthanasia as being wrong. The

Comment [P9]: New idea, new paragraph.

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5"

future of the sick and dying is not a future-like-ours because it is intolerable (as it is filled
with suffering and pain, as we see in Marquis example of the person with AIDs or cancer),
so a premature death might be better for them. Marquis points out that sanctity-of-humanlife theories cannot account for this and would consider active euthanasia to be seriously
wrong in a specific case, even though there is good reason for it (Marquis, pg. 190-191).
Lastly, the future-like-ours approach does straightforwardly entail that it is prima

Comment [P10]: New idea, new

paragraph.

facie seriously wrong to kill children and infants (Marquis, pg. 191) since we assume that
they have valuable futures like us, which is something that personhood theories cannot
directly do. Personhood theories must add ad hoc accounts to explain the wrongness of
killing the young; Marquis argues that the plausibility of such accounts depicts how
desperately we want these personhood theories to work (Marquis, pg. 192). Feinbergs
psychological personhood is one such example. Feinberg claims that there are necessary
moral traits and duties that are preconditions to rights, such as rationality and consciousness.
However, young infants, the severely developmentally delayed, and permanently
unconscious individuals are seen in society as having certain rights (like the right to not be
killed), yet they lack the capabilities for the necessary traits and duties (Marquis, pg. 1861877). This example and the implications from above demonstrate how the future-likeours approach that Marquis proposes avoids the weaknesses of both the personality and the
sanctity-of-life accounts; as the future-like-ours approach not only makes sense of the
attitudes of the dying, but it on its own also accounts for the rights of those who are not
granted personhood (Marquis, pg. 190-192).

Comment [P11]: You do a nice job of

explaining the perks of Marquiss views, but
you probably try to do too much. Focusing
on fully getting out one competing account,
then showing how Marquis thinks his FLO
account is better would have been a better
strategy and led to a more focused
reconstruction.

Since we have an understanding of why it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill

human beings, we can now examine Marquis use of the future-like-ours approach to
prove the wrongness of abortion. The future of a standard fetus is the same as the future of
an adult human in that it is likewise indeterminately composed of experiences, activities,
projects, and enjoyments. Just like adults, we cannot know what the fetus will come to value
in its future or what possibilities the future holds for the fetus (as the future is not a physical
or biological property), but since we know that they have the future-like-ours it is seriously
wrong to deprive the fetus of their future. Since it is prima facie serious wrong to kill an
individual with a future-like-ours in the time after birth, it is therefore also prima facie
seriously wrong to kill a fetus, granting them the negative right to not be killed (Marquis, pg.
192). However, it must be noted that Marquiss argument allows for fetuses that would be
severely disabled or would lead a future of suffering to be aborted, since he allows euthanasia

Comment [P12]: Marquis doesnt really

make this claim, right? He doesnt say much
about rights. (Your reference there is just
showing how he thinks that we could
establish a right to life non-circularly.)

(Marquis, pg. 191-192).

Some individuals may incorrectly inference that Marquis anti-abortionist argument
concludes that it is seriously wrong to kill potential persons, as well as persons. However,
Marquis makes the claim that the fetus does not need to be considered a person in order to
be morally considerable (Marquis, pg. 192). This argument comes from the first and second
implications of the future-like-ours approach that alelude to an example of how this is
true. It is wrong to kill any individual (regardless of personhood) if they have the potential to

Comment [P13]: This is awkward.

have a future-like-ours or even a future similar to ours. Biological categories are not the
same as moral categories. Marquis compares the format of his anti-abortion argument to the
argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals to demonstrate
how non-human individuals can be morally considerable without being granted personhood
(Marquis, pg. 193). The wanton infliction of pain on an individual is ultimately wrong

Comment [P14]: I feel like your

reconstruction is losing focus. Whats the
thread of the argument? Pick one thing and
really flesh that out.

because it causes both humans and animals alike to suffer. Since causing suffering is wrong
and the wanton infliction of pain causes suffering, the wanton infliction of pain is prima
facie wrong. The structure of this argument is almost identical to that of Marquis abortion
argument. Since the loss of a future-like-ours causes great suffering, killing an individual
causes them to be deprived of a future-like-ours, and abortions kill fetuses who would
otherwise have a future-like ours, abortions are prima facie wrong (Marquis, pg. 192-193).
While Marquis is successful in proving that fetuses have the negative right to not be

Comment [P15]: The thread of the

reasoning could be clearer than it is here.

right to live. On the other hand, positive rights grant the individual the right to impose a

Your reconstruction starts out pretty strong.

You do a good job of highlighting and
explaining the main points of Marquiss
argument. And, at times, the contrast to
other positions is clear. However, as
mentioned above, it seems that sometimes,
you are trying to fit too much in. Having
more of a focus by getting the FLO account
out and directly comparing it with the
personhood account would make for a
stronger paper.

positive duty on someone for something;, for example our right to education allows us to

42.5/50

killed, I find that he is ultimately unsuccessful in proving how this negative right transitions
into a positive right that trumps a womens right to control her body. The right to not be
killed is a negative right as it imposes a negative duty on all others to not interfere with ones

make a demand on the government to provide basic education. Marquis is highly successful
in proving that we have a negative duty not to kill fetuses because fetuses have a futurelike-ours, which makes it morally wrong to kill them. However, the fetus is not an
autonomous being. In order for it to continue living, it must place a demand on a woman to
use her body. This entails that the fetus must have a positive right to make this claim, which
is not something Marquis accounts for.
Negative rights only extend so far as they are not infringing on another individuals

Comment [P16]: Good. This is the type of

clear focus that I was hoping for in your
analysis.

right. This means that even though I have the right to live (the right to not be killed), I am
not entitled to something I need to survive if it infringes on someone elses right. Even if I
am terminally ill, and the only thing that can cure me is if some celebrity comes to visit me, I
am not entitled to this visit. My right to live does not extend far enough for me to make a
demand on an individual to do something for me or give me something, as I would be

Comment [P17]: You should make clear

that you are drawing from Thomson here. It
would be very obvious to anyone that is
familiar to the debate. I see you mention her
below, but you need to get the reference out
first.

infringing on their negative right to liberty. Even though the fetus has the right to life, this
does not translate into the right to demand to use a womans body (violating her right to
control her body) to maintain the fetuss life.
Even though Marquis dismisses theoretical approaches to the abortion debate

Comment [P18]: Again, Im not sure what

the contrast is supposed to be here.

(Marquis, pg. 189), such as argument outlined by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her paper A
Defense of Abortion (1971), thought experiments are highly useful in limit testing Marquis
approach. Thomsons violinist thought experiment is especially contingent to the
evaluation approach as she starts from the perspective that the fetus (in this case represented
by the violinist) has a right to life and it successfully encompasses the emotional situation
that a woman finds herself in when she is pregnant. The thought experiment is as follows;
imagine that one morning you wake up and you discover that you are connected back to
back with a famous unconscious violinist. You are told that this violinist has a severe kidney
problem where he is unable to filter toxins out of his blood, and he has a rare blood type
that only you and the violinist share. The Society of Music Lovers found you and kidnapped
you last night, and took you to a hospital to have attached the violinists circulatory system to
yours, so your kidneys can filter out the toxins in his blood, as well as yours. The director of
the hospital tells you that this is will not risk your health and only temporary, as the violinist
only needs to use your kidneys for nine months. If you have his circulatory system
unplugged from yours, the famous violinist dies. Can you, as a moral individual, unplug
yourself from the violinist (Thomson, 1971 pg. 49-50)?
In order to reach a conclusion to this thought experiment, we must evaluate the
rights and the types of rights that are at play in the thought experiment, which mirror the
rights that are in play between a fetus and a pregnant woman. Starting with the
violinist/fetus, he has one right which is the negative right to life. You/the pregnant

Comment [P19]: Do you mean,

pertinent?

woman, likewise also have the negative right to life, but you also have the negative right to
control your body. The violinist (and likewise with the fetus) needs to control your body, so
he can survive. This infringes on your right to control your body and even though he only
needs your kidneys for nine months to survive, he is not entitled to controlling your body
and nor is he entitled to infringing on your rights. If abortion/unplugging the violinist were
to be prima facie wrong, the violinist and the fetus would need to have the right to make a
claim on a womans body, he (and the fetus) would need to have a positive right to life,
where they can make demands on others to provide them with what they are entitled to for
life (Thomson, pg. 50-56). However, a positive right is not granted to fetuses or adult
humans alike by the future-like-ours account, as Marquis account only justifies the right to
not be killed.
In conclusion, after having presented Marquis future-like-ours account for the
wrongness of killing and the wrongness of abortion, I have demonstrated that while the

Comment [P20]: This is what Marquis

denies. The wrongness of abortion doesnt
have anything to do with rights. Its all about
depriving someone of a future like ours.
Having a future like ours might not grant
someone some right to life, though it might
very well make it seriously wrong to kill
them.
In any case, I think youre on to something
in your analysis. You do a good job of
drawing upon Thomson to make your claim.
Your analysis also exhibits a focus that I was
hoping for in your reconstruction.
28.5/30

future-like-ours account grants fetuses the negative right to not be killed, it does not
successfully prove that abortion is prima facie wrong. This is because the future-like-ours
account provides no justification for why the right to not be killed/the right to life should be
considered a positive right, when it infringes on a womans right to control her body. The
problem of the conflicting negative rights (right to life and right to control ones body) and
the lack of the fetus having a positive right is explored through Thomsons violinist thought
experiment, which allows the limits of the future-like-ours approach to be tested.
Introduction (see comment 2): 10/10
Reconstruction (see comment 15): 42.5/50
Analysis (see comment 20): 28.5/30
Writing (see comment 21): 9/10

Comment [P21]: Your writing is clear and

pretty easy to follow. I think you could
shorten some sentences and the paper of
your paper could be clearer with a few
paragraph breaks here and there.
9/10

Total: 90/100

Works Cited
Don Marquis. Why Abortion is Immoral. The Journal of Philosophy. Volume 06, No. 4
(1989). Web.
Judith Jarvis Thomson. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy &Public Affairs. Volume 1. No.1
(1971): pg. 49-56.