Phaelyn Kotuby, 9/24/14, ENGW3302, Musselman, U1D2, IEEE, 1225 words
Privacy is one of the most important concerns of the digital age. It's paramount in allowing governments and businesses to run smoothly and without interference from competitors; more importantly, I feel that it's a basic human right to expect privacy in personal communications, purchase history, and anything that generally doesn't affect the lives of others. However, nearly every week, it's reported that yet another website has had its account databases hacked or another celebrity has had personal files stolen. These facts are why I was initially drawn to the article The ultimate physical limits of privacy by Artur Ekert & Renato Renner. Information leaks are not a product of the past few decades, but computers have made them more common with the advent of the cloud and common practice of storing important documents, such as bank statements and medical records, digitally. As a result, it's important that computer scientists research new and more powerful cryptographic techniques ones that can't be cracked so that digital files can be kept private once and for all. The area of quantum computing is a growing knowledge front in computer science. The basis of quantum computing is that, with better understanding of physics, computer scientists would be able to build computers that take advantage of certain quantum properties to perform calculations many orders of magnitude faster than they're able to now. While quantum computing isn't well-understood or feasible yet, the theoretical applications of quantum computing have been discussed for decades. Topics brought up most often involve more stable computers for airplanes and cars, lightning-fast PCs, more accurate statistical models to be used in economics, politics, genetics, and more. The ultimate physical limits of privacy asserts that it will also completely change the face of cryptography [1]. Basic cryptography has been around for much longer than some would expect; in fact, one of the first techniques students learn is named the Caesar cipher because Julius Caesar developed it to transmit secret military orders. Building ever-more complex encryption techniques while utilizing the advantages given by quantum computing is an obvious part of the knowledge front, but a less evident area of inquiry arises from the same difficulty that Caesar's cipher faced: so far, nearly every form of encryption that's been developed can be cracked given a little knowhow and a lot of time. Further, it's often debated whether thus-far untouchable ones will meet the same fate. This issue, as well as the question of discovering a truly unbreakable encryption technique, is one on the very edge of the knowledge front that I'd like to research. Due to my declared concentration in cyber operations essentially network security I may have an earlier chance at attacking this front than some, but I likely won't have the opportunity to make any real headway until well after graduation, especially considering that I'm only two years into my training with little practical work experience.
Quantum Computing and the Future of Privacy
Phaelyn Kotuby, 9/24/14, ENGW3302, Musselman, U1D2, IEEE, 1225 words While it's unknown how long current encryption techniques will stay viable, Ekert & Renner claim that even the most secure ones of our time are certain to fall with the advancement of quantum computing [1]. So what are we to do, assuming such a day comes that a quantum computer is built? Solving this issue is what The ultimate physical limits of privacy centers around. The paper asserts that completely secure communication could be achieved by observation of quantum photons that quantum optical techniques can be employed to generate pairs of polarization-entangled photons [and] such photons respond to measurements, carried out on each of them separately, in a very coordinated manner [1]. Basically, using techniques only made possible by quantum physics, two photons could be linked together so they move and behave the exact same way at the exact same time regardless of distance between them. The existence of such a pair of photons would allow two people to take one each, separately observe them, note some correspondent physical property they're exhibiting, and use this to encode or decode a message in a previously agreed-upon way (for example, direction of the proton's movement). Further, Ekert & Renner claim that quantum theory dictates that an eavesdropper's probability of correctly using stolen information to decide the outcome of one photon's behavior becomes 1/2; that is, [the outcome] is uniformly random and independent of any information held by [the eavesdropper] [1]. Given that such man-in-the-middle attacks have been (and continue to be) a great threat to the integrity of an encryption, defeating them would mean taking a crucial tool out of a code cracker's kit. Being that the article is featured in the second half of Nature [1], it's written for a scholarly audience who may not necessarily already be familiar with quantum physics, but likely have the appropriate background to understand simplified versions of quantum equations and jargon. The authors support all of their statements with concrete evidence, leaning especially on mathematical examples the article is sprinkled with equations and tables which illustrate their points well to those whose fields involve some higher math. The only prior knowledge required is calculus-level familiarity with the cosine function and unit circle. Further arguments are made around pre-existing research and theorems about quantum mechanics presented in a simplified fashion. In fact, most of the quantum-theory arguments that make up the vast majority of the paper are built off of a 2-paragraph explanation of just about everything [the reader needs] to know about quantum physics for now [1]. While Ekert & Renner don't give terribly diverse evidence, I feel what they use is more than sufficient to support their claims while not alienating those not immediately familiar with their field of inquiry. However, those without a background in concrete mathematics might struggle to understand most of the evidence given.
Quantum Computing and the Future of Privacy
Phaelyn Kotuby, 9/24/14, ENGW3302, Musselman, U1D2, IEEE, 1225 words A compelling piece of evidence in the paper's favor is the journal it was published in. Nature is a weekly publication that prides itself on peer-reviewed, recent, cutting-edge articles [2]. Nature believed that the concepts in The ultimate physical limits of privacy were exciting they even made it a cover story [1], suggesting that the article was groundbreaking enough to capture the interest of people in many fields apart from computer science and cryptography. Further evidence to the authors' credit are their ties to the academic and business communities (or lack thereof, in the latter case). Their resumes include credits from the University of Oxford, the Centre for Quantum Technologies at the National University of Singapore, and the Institute for Theoretical Physics at ETH Zurich [1], showing that they're well-qualified to be making the claims their paper is based on. Finally, both authors declare no competing financial interests [1], so their research is far more likely to be motivated by truly wanting to be involved in preserving privacy than in protecting the interests of companies, even though their findings would surely benefit such establishments. The ultimate physical limits of privacy introduces concepts that are both incredibly exciting to me as a computer scientist and crucial for anyone who wishes to reclaim their right to digital privacy. Password leaks could become a thing of the past, allowing institutions to use the internet to expedite confidential communications, kicking the speed of the business world into high gear, and freeing individuals from the fear of losing our financial accounts, important emails, or precious Instagram uploads. The quantum cryptography mentioned in the article is only the tip of the iceberg, though. Tying computers into the quantum world could be one of the biggest steps we ever take, forcing us to rethink everything we've learned up until this point; I look forward to being able to reach this knowledge front and begin further researching the implications quantum computing would have on our world.
Quantum Computing and the Future of Privacy
Phaelyn Kotuby, 9/24/14, ENGW3302, Musselman, U1D2, IEEE, 1225 words Acknowledgements I'd like to thank Dr. Cecelia Musselman, Kyle Alpert, and Billy Blanco for their input on my first draft.
Quantum Computing and the Future of Privacy
Phaelyn Kotuby, 9/24/14, ENGW3302, Musselman, U1D2, IEEE, 1225 words Works Cited [1] A. Ekert and R. Renner, The ultimate physical limits of privacy, Nature, vol. 507, no. 7493, 2014, pp. 443-447. [2] Nature, About the journal: Nature, Sept. 2014; www.nature.com/nature/about/index.html.