Descartes has jst sid tat all nowledge of sensory alga could de ‘ive im. te pretends to puto hie the astonished objection ofthe Imaginary nonphilosopher who is fghened by such eudacty and Sys no, no all sensory knowledge, forte you woul be med aad it Weuld be uareasonable to follow the example of adie, te pu fe. wana madmansalserurse. Descartes coe hie abjection since am ec, writing, and yon understand me, tam no mad, nor ate you, and ne ae all sane ere. The example of mane therefore not inden tie te ragiiy or te sensory fen So bel Descaresaequlsce to ns natural point of view oe rather he pretends tobe sing bac in his yea ity ei i ia a Gitsi Gee tnt) us uaa by Gul Regn as Soe ghsua estes Mesto, aa Bytes This sec om one nye a ss is ea oe ihe ae ee ae ha it of iim Efi case feeb ot hl exe Tha he woble of knwsedee wi ean the se viene ML. Cureh ts Te hypothe af estan Mey flo This Hope, Ths Bice 595 Dereda's mgmnentation is remarkable for it depth and peshaps even tore 50 for i frankness. The stakes ofthe debate are clear tnd {ated Gould Here he anything anterior ot exterior to phitosophical Aiscase? Can is eonudion reside tn an exclusion, a Aehisa, a Fisk avoided, and, shy nt, x fear? Destda rejects this suspicion passtone stely. "Pucdenda orga." as Neizsehe sid, about the vellgiogs und tet resin, let us confront Dervda's anges andl Descartes’ ens ‘hing Manes act nly renin ares ef sensuy peveptons cod ow, Deseantes oes nal say that dreaming is “more common and nore universal tha madness.” fa des te say that madinen ate nly md feom tine tn Hime and on pasticwlar points. Lets listen insted ta his eviction of people who “ists constantly that they are Sings." Is the madness of those men who think they ave Rtas, ws hove: diy nade of glass, more intermittent than dreams? Yet iis a Fact that inthe progression af his doubt, Descartes priv tees dreaming over madness Lets leave undesided fi the moment the problem of whether madness t¢ exeted, mrely neatecter ‘2c ap in broader and more rl test Scare has Descaesetted tne example of madness only to asan- son than he evoes the cise of nears: “However fist hese take i aeconnt the ict thot Tam man, an consequently have the babe seeping, and tmaxining on my dreams the sane or sometinies ‘mere unlikely things thaw these deranged pepe do when awake.” 9 dreams have # double advantage, On the one hand, they are ‘opmble of siving rise to extravnganees ht equal oF semctines ox el hose of made. On the other ha, they have the peopesty of ‘pening habitnally. The first advantage fs ofa logical and eon, sralvcurders everything tat madness (Ube example ave jst fel ta se side) could mae nie doubt ea ase596 Aesthetics, Method, and Bplsonotogs reas n hel power to make uncertain, dreams ar ot outdone by Seams then Ine Yo convince ase ofall hat mos ca ato Sb The ther abyntae of drs ute fee der they are request, they Ip olen; ny memories a them ae re cent not iil have sccets ods vind stress the leven abot ht praca advantage men it ne kngera swe tensioner ng “ipa memory oe atten the very mevemen of mediation oe ‘extravagance of dreams guarantees their demonstrative char- acter at an exompe lise Requency ensures her cee a cere An in nde hs ality of acces which pomer bles Desates here, certainly mee so than the demonsrove ql ‘hich he menons once an for le If to make se thatthe hn he theme tat reas happen ery often returns several es -Trn at, nl consequent at Sate hai of seeping” bom inany ls a pes tat Ihave dreamed at i wht happens in sleep” "Tnkng sb arty T remember hang site icon miten lester Tam alt hat Deri hes contd hse oo espe of ream ings sit hehad covered tiem both with one word that jie bem hey could be described “une together by force: “universal sal dreams would happen to everyone and about everything. Dreams would indicate that everything could be doubted by ever fone. But this forces the words; t goes far beyond what Descariess et falls far short of the peculiarities of thal test wagonce of dreams and sys; or, rather, eines the clear dslinetion between the exh ‘heir Roqueneys it erases the specie role uf these two characteris (lemonstration and exercise) in Deseartes's discourse; omits the sreater importance acearded io habit thar 6 extravagance, ‘Sut why is iLimportant chat dreams should be familiar and acces sible? Derr: “The veorence dreams constites inthe methodical onder ‘hich ere is our, the hypertllalextsperaton ofthe hypothess ot My Body, This Paper; Mis Fire 307 Tefore re-reading the paragraph on dreams! letus keepin mind what as just been seid: “But just a moment-these are madmen, and t Sould be no less extravagant iT were to fallow their examples The discourse then rns a5 follows: a resolution on He part ofthe ‘meditating subject to take into consideration that he is a mn, that he {es sometimes steep and dreasn; the appearance of a tieraory, or rather of « mulutude of memories, of dreams that coincide exactly, Point by point, with today’s perception (sitting here, fully dressed De side the ire); and ye. feling that there is a diference between this Perception and that memory difference not only noted tut broughe ‘out bythe subject inthe very movement of his mediation (Took ot this paper; I shake my head, I reach out my hand to make the der ‘erce between waking and sleeping stand out sharply), but thon tase farer memories, ata sooond level (the sharpness af this impression has oRen forte part of my dreams); with these memories the vied fecing that 1am awake disappears its replaced by the cleat vision hat here is no certain index that ean separate sleep and waking. an observation that provokes inthe meditating subject an astonish ‘wel thatthe lack of iferetition between making and steeping pre ‘oles the near certainty ofbeing asleep, 1s clear that making slep and woking ino a theme for reflection 'saotthe only consequence ofthe resolution to think about dreaming te the very movement tht proposes ft and makes it vary, this theme les ect inthe meditating subject in the frm of memories, sharp Impressions, voluntary gestures, fet differences, oore memorice fear vislon, astonishment, and a lack of diferentation very close te te feling of being asleep. To think of dreams is notte think of some Sing external, whose causes and effects Feould know, not is to ‘woke no more than a strange phantasmagori, or the movements of te brsin which can provoke i thinking about dreams, when ove ‘epliesoneselt to it, i such that its eet is that of blurring the per ‘ved limits of sleeping and waking for the meditating subject at the ‘er heart of his meditation, The subject who thinks of dreaming ls Sere disturbed. Applying one's mind to dreams isnot an indilferent ‘sk: perhaps ii inderd in me first place a self suggested theme, but ‘euickiy tums out fo be a isk to which one is exposed. A isk forte sie, of being modited; rsh ofno longer being atl sure of beng avake; risk of stupor, as the Latin tex says And its here that the example of dreaming shows another of is598 sestheses, Method, and Epttenatogy prvitoges: dreams may well modify the moutating subject to this ox rent, but the donot prevent him, in the very heart of this stupor, rom ‘continuing to meditate, to meditate validly, to see clearly # certain number ofhings or principles, inspite ofthe lack of dstintion, how ‘evordeep, beeen waking nd sleeping Even thongh Tam no longer sire of being awake, Lemain sure of what my meditation allows me to see: this is just what is shown by the felloning passage, which Begins, precisely, with a sox of hyperbolic resolution, "et us suppose then, that we are asleep,” or as the Latin text says more forces, ‘age somniemnus” Thinking aout dreams had led me to uncertainty, uncertainty, through the astonishment It provoked, led’ me to the nneat-ertainy of being asleep this near-certainty is now made by ms resolutions into a systematic pretense. The meditating subjects put sloop by way af artes: “ge somniemus” and ov this basis the neditaion wil be able to develop anew We can now sc al the possibilities furnished by the dream's peop erty of being, not universal, certainly, but modestly habitus » Iisa possible, immediately accessible experience, the wmode! for whieh is pat fortard by countless memories le experience is net only a theme for meditation: tis y produced in meditation, according to the follwing series: inking ofthe dream, remembering the dream, trying to sep Yate the dream from waking, no longer knowing whether one is dreaming oF not, acing voluntarily as though ane were dreaming + By means of this meditative exercise, thinking about dzeaming takes effect ithe sibject nkmseé modifies the subject by striking him wih stupor 4+ But in modiiying hie, in making of him a subject nncortain of being awake, thinking about dreams dbes not disqualify hun as med lating subject: even though transformed Into a “subject suppose aslee.” the meditating subject can safely pursue the progression of his doubt But we must go back and compare thls experience of dreams with the exemplo of madness which immediately precedes it 5. THE ‘00D’ AND THE ‘BaD’ EXAMPLE. Derrida: Wat ust be groped here is hat fom this sleeper, the drome, madden than te madman, (My Body This Paper, This Fire 509 For Derrida, madness is not excluded by Descartes tis simply ne lected. Neglect in fivor ofa better and more radical example, The exemple of dreams extends, corupletes and generalizes what the ex- ample of madness indicated so inadequately. To pass from madness to fren i ta pas rom # “bad” to a “good” instrument af doubt. [Now I believe that the opposition between dreamas and madness i of a quite diferent typo. We must compare Descartes's two pars raphe step by step, and follow the system of their opposition In deta 1. The nazureot the meiative exersse. This appears clesey in the ocabulary used. In the madness paragraph, a vocabulary of compart fon. If wish to deny that “these hands and thie body are mine." 1 rst “compare myself to certain deranged people” (comparare) bs ‘would be extravagant indeed “if I followed their examples” (s! quod ab tis exemplum ad me trenserrem: if | applied to rayself some ex ‘ample coming ftom them). The madman: an exteral term to which 1 compare myset 1m the dream-paragraph, a vocabulary of memory. “Lom in the habit of imagining in my dreams"; “how many Himes has it happened that. %;"thinking eareflly aboot i, [remeraber” The drearner- ‘hal which T remember having been; from the depths of my memory nies the dreamer that | was nyse that il be og. 12. The thames of the meditative exerese. They appear in the ex amples tat the meditating abject proposed by hime xamples of madness: thinking one fs a king when one Is poor, Imagining ones body is made of glass or that one isa Jog. Madness the entirely ther; it deforms and transpors: it gives rise to another "Examples of dreams: being seated (as 1am at this moment feeling ‘ne heat of the re (a8 feel It today): reaching owt my hand (as T decide, at this moment, to do. The dream does not shift the ene; t Aoubles the demonstratives that point tothe scane where I am (this Nand? Perhaps a diferent hand, in image. This fre? Perhaps a difer- ‘nt fie, dream). Dream-Imagination pins itself onto present pereep tom atevery point ‘The central tst of the exercise. This consists in the search for Aiterence; ean [take these proposed themes into account in my mes lation? Can I seriously wonder whether my body is made of glass, ot whether Iam naked in my bed? I can, then Tam obliged to doubt400 feateties, Method, ane Epistenony fever my own bo On the ether an, my body 6 saved my med Tobin remains quite stint ore madness andl drew. rstnel um dreams? put ito the es: remember dreaming that J seas ling my head. 1 Will therefore nod my ead again, here and nun Intherea dilference? Yes—a certain larly, certain distinctness. Burt and this isthe second state of the test, ca this clarity and dis tinetness be found in the dream? Yes, Lhave clear memory that i wae so, Therefore what 1 supposed was the emtevion of dierence (clarity and distinctness) belongs tndiferently to both dreams and ‘waking perception; so iteannot make tne dlference betwern them "Distinct fromk madness? The est Is twwmediately carried out, Ox, aiher, liking more closely the test does net take place 38H does in the ease of deeants, There is, i fet, no qnestlon of ying to take nyse to fea madman who takes himself ea Rings nor is there any question of sondern Hm a lng (or 8 eat fron Toots) ‘eho takes himself 1 bea philosopher shut up in a room to mediate ‘What is dlferent with maduess dacs not have toe teste, i esta shes, Seareely re the thnmos of extravagance evoked than the ds finetian bursts ov ke a shout sed amet snd ii 1 Thedifel ofthe exercise This appears inte senteness, nr rather inthe decision -satences, ich end both passages. Maviness-paragraphs “But just a moment-these are madmen (hint person plural, they, the others, dy "F should be no less ex travagant if fllowed their example”: it would be madness (note the rmntional even to try the test, to wish to sist al these delights nt play the fol Wits fats a foots do, tmitatng maine wil persue me that [apy tad (as thinking of drcems sil in moment Convince me that Lam perhaps asleep i the very projeet of mist Ing them that is extravauan, ‘The extravagance apilles 49 the very ie of putting to the test, ard that i why the test fils to take place au is replaced hy a mere registering of aitference ‘Dreant-paragaph the sentence “itese are masimen” corresporuls to Tam quite astouistied™ (obstupescere: the ssapor of indstinetness respands tothe shot of aiference): and the sentence “I sould bene less extravagant if. isanwtered by “my astonishment (stupor is stich that altnosteapable of convincing ae that | amy asleep.” The Test shat has been effectively tried has “ken” so well that here am [note the present indicative) in wncertainty a to whether Lam awske An tim My Body, This Paper This Fire sor i would be mad to want to ae the madman (and 1 abandon the idea); but to think about dreaming is already to have the impression oC being asleep (and thats what I shall meditate on), Tis extraordinarily difielt to remain deaf tothe way these tro paragraphs echo one another. Difflt not to be stick bY the con plex system of oppositions which ungetlesthemn. Dlficalt not to ree Dgnize in thera two parallel but diferent exercises: that ofthe demons, tnd thet ofthe dormant. Dien natto hear the words and sentences tontront each other on ith sides of the “however” the importance of ‘which Derrida so dexply underlined, though I think ie was wrong not ‘wavalyze ts auction in the play ofthe ascourse, Difieult inde, to say simply that amyang the reasons for doubt, masiness isan insu ‘lent and pedagogially clumsy example, because the dreatner isin any ease muuch roadder than the madman, The whole discursive analysis shows that the establishment of oamadness (and the rejection of the test) isnot continous with the testofsleep (and the abservation that one Is perhaps asleep) But why this rejection ofthe est ofthe demens? From the fact that it ‘es not take place, ean one draw the conelnsion that itis excluded? Aer all, Descartes speaks s0 lite, and so beefy, about madness 4. THE DISQUALIFICATION oF THE sunsEOT Derrida: "What is spice tt Descartes at bottom, never speaks of madness ths text. fen aquesion of madness a th text Da several occasions Derrida wisely points out that in order to under stan Descartes’ text properly 1 1s necessary to refer to the original in version. He recals~and he is quite right-the words used by Descartes in the famous sentence: “But just a moment these are mad ‘men (sed amentes sunt st), and E shold be no less exiravegant (de ‘mong Lever to follow their examples. Unfortunately, he takes the ‘alysis no futher than this simple reminder ofthe words. Let us return to the passage lselh “How could I deny that these ands and this body are mine, except by comparing myself to certain seranged people .. 7 (The term used here is snsae), Now what ane these fnsan who take themselves to be kings OF jugs? They are ‘mente. and I should bo no less demons i were to apply their ex imple to myselE Why these nee terms, ot rather why use Rirstly theoa Jeatheties, Method, and Epistemology lev nsamn, het he opie amensadamons? When i Is matter of cchavneterizing them by the tntplausbilty of their imagination, the tnadmen are called ‘sant a word that belongs 8s mich to eurrent ‘catia’ as to medical terminology. As far as the signs of it are Conwaraed, ta be insu 6 to take nese to be what one 1 mo, Yo Ivlieve in fncies, 0 be the vitim of illusions, As fi is causes i ‘eames from having the brain gorged with vapor. But when Descartes ‘eats no lange to characterize madness buto afr that! oueht not to fillow the eanple of madinen, he uses the term demens and ‘amens:torms that are i the Gra pce jridica,beore being mete shih designate a orhnte entry of people incapale of ceetain rel ious, civil, ad judicial acts, The dementes do not ave tral posses ‘son oF thelr rigs sen i comes to speaking, promising, pledging unin staring a legal ction, ete Znsanus is a characterizing term frmensiedenaens ave dsblyng ones, the re, im os tsa signs; in the nthe, of ea The two sentences; I order to doubt wy fy, Hast“ nyse to certain deranged poople,” asd “but just ramen dese are madden.” are nok the proof ofa fnpalient and aneoved anta 3: Iti no ay # mailer of saying, “one must be mad or Ret ke tmaen.” a, these ane madnen an Fara not mad.” I would be 2 singular lattning of the text to som it wp as Deri oes: here. Tam not mas, nor are sou, we are all sane here." The de ‘elopment af the text quite different: to danbt ene's body is be Hike Those with deeanged minds, the sie, the insani Gan T otiow their ‘scape avi a east fein madness Far amy own pie, and make me lunceitain fa may own mind arhether Fam mad oF nol? Teannot and riast nol For these ivan are amet; and Leal be Just as demens i they, an juridical disqualified If ottaved Derrida has abscirely sensed this juridical conno wud He rtuens tit several times, insistently an estan. Des ares, ie say, "cats madness as wn index ofa question of principe hin epistenologieal vale.” Or again: “Deseartes is concerned here fin with determining the concept of madness but with utilizing the opar rotten a estravaggace fr juridical and miehodotogteal ends I onder to ask questions af prinesple regaraing cy the truth a eas” Yes, Deve is right to cmphasize thot is @ question af right {this point, Yes he right ino say Ua Descartes did not ano deerme the concept of madness (and Who ever My Body. This Paper This Fire 405 Ald). But he is wrong not to have seen that Descartes’s text plays on lhe gap hetween two types of determinations of madness (medical on tne ee hand and Juridical on the othe) Above all, he Is Wrong to say hastily that the question of right posed here concerns “the truth of leas” when infact, a i leary sated itconcerns the quaiiention ofthe subject ‘The problem can, them, Be posed vhus, Can T doubt my own bod can I doubt my actuality? The example of madmen, of te insant in ‘ites me todo so Bt comparing myself ta them and acting like them implies that oo, will become denvented, incapable and disqualified in my enterprise of meditation: I should be no lese demene i Ef lowed their examples. But fon the over han, Itake the example of roaming, #1 pretend to dream, then darmniens though Iam, wil be rile to continte meat, te#soning, seeing clears: Demens | shalt hie nnable o continu at the hypothesis alone [am ebiged to stop, imvisage something else, see if another example allows me to doubt my body: Dormaiens, [eam continue with my meditation; ¥ remain ‘waited to think, and I therefore make my resolution: “ge 20mm ‘enus," whic leads to @ nev stage of meditation Tr would have to be a very distant reading which could assert that ‘its nat a question of madness fv this text Aight, You 5a. Lot us adit, in spite of Derrida, that it is neces sary to pay sich great attenon tothe text, and to sl ise der fences. Fo all that, have you demonstrated that madness ig well and In exehue from tke progress of ou? Does not Descartes rele > itagaix with reference to the imagination? Will tot be a question of matnese when he discovers the extravagance of painters, al all the fantasti ilusions they invent? Derrida; “What Descartes semis previously to etch». «at ex travapince he here ava ay possoty in ream «+ Now within ‘hove erpreventationy hese ning, these Nas inthe Gaesien sone ples whe imasnalons as Descartes expressly ys "ae extravs tent enough een betoce” Invent something s0 new ha te Uke tas never been Tew ndeed be a queston of madness several mone tines i the rest fDescartess work. And its disqualifying role for the meditating sub44 desthtics, Method, and Epistemology Jeet wil in no way prevent mediation from hearing on fr sot Tor the content ofthese extravagance that nuadnes spt ot of pay, ‘hat only happens forthe subject whe wants “in play the fo!” and rite a the same time, when n oct isa matter of knowing ithe subject ean take madness #y hasd, imitate i feiga i and risk 0 Tonger boing sure whether or not he is rational, {think 1 have med this point madaess is exchided bythe snbject who doubts as a means of alifying himself as doubting subject. But I not exclude as an object of eotection and knowledge. Is it not characteristic that the ‘madness tlked of by Descartes in the paragraph studied aboee is defined in medical terms the reso ofa “brain deranged or gorge swith the black vapors of bile"? Hut Dern enld insist a sess te fat that madness is Found sgan in the: mavenent of db, mses! np wit Uae magnon of Phinters Ris maui 8 present a siete Wy the word extra rznt™ used to deseribo the imagination of painters if is possible that thei imagination is extravagant ensygh to invent something 0 hvew that we have vever seen angthing like certainly at the ory leas! the pints [eondenrs its whieh they sompose st must be real." Derrida has realized perfectly what is od ast the expression hee nragnaton is extravagant enough.” So vel has he realized dat he underlines iim hi quotation asthe peg on which to hang his whole demonstration. And I subscribe wholly to the necessity of 60 Jatng these word's and keeping them well 10 one side Bur fora hiferent reason simply because they di ave appear iy Descartes’ test They are an addition by the translator. The Latin ex says only: “w forteatiquid excogitent a eo anwurt tnd perhaps thes invent something so new." lis curious thal i support et his thesis Derrida should have spontaneously chosen, retained and underlined what precisely is onfy found in the French transition ef the Meditations; curious, too, that he should insa,sndassce hat te ‘wurd “extravagant” has been “express” used by Descartes. Woes ot appear, then, shat the example of dreatning fs for Nes cartesonly a generalization or radicalization ofthe case of madness Is not as a feeble, inferior, “wnrevealing.* *nelfecnal” example tet madness is distinguishes! fo deaminase it 6 not for 1S lessor value thet, once evoked, it as Heft to ane side. "The example ef ‘madness stands against thal of dreaming: they are confeanted the one My Body, This Pape This Fie 405, ‘sith the other and opposed acconding to a whole system of der thoes which are clearly articulated in escartes's discourse ‘nd [amy afraid that Deevidas analysis nepects many’of these dt erences. Litera dilferences between worl (compararereminscere: erplun transferreio persuade; eonditionalindicative). Thematle tferences between Images (being heside the fre, holding out one’s ha and opening one’s exes/taking onesell to be a king, being coy cred in gc having a body made of elas); textual diflerences inthe disposition and opposion of paragraphs (the Brat plays on the ds- Tieton between éasanusand demens, and om the frdical implication afdemens by énsanns the secon plays on the distinction “rernember- ing being esleoprbeing persuaded that one is asleep,” and on the real pase fron the one othe eter in a mind thet applies itself to such a fremory. st abowe at, differences atthe evel of what happens in the mediation, at the level ofthe ents that flew one another; acts ferred oul by the meditating subject [eomparison/reminiscence); ¢ fects produced in lie mediating subject (ailden and inamediate per ‘eotion ofa dilference/astonshment-atuper~exporience of a lack of tstinebon) the qualleation of tke meditating subject (invalidated 1 Ire were demens validate even she were dormiens Ie ie clear that this last sete ilferences contro i the others i refers Jos to the sinilyiag organization ofthe wat than to the sesies events (acs fect, qualifcalions) which the discursive practice of tneditation caries wih i 18a question of the modiieations of de Subject bythe very exercise nfdiscourse, And Ihave the feling that arreader as remarkably assidaons a Derrida has missed so many ieray, thematic or textialdiflerences, then this is through having nisinderstond those diferences which are the principe of these ot ‘ej namely, he “sscursivediferences” ‘Ne must keep in mod the very ttle of “metations” Any diseourse,, nhatover tbe, is canstitted by a set of utterances which are pro Ahn each ints place and lime, #8 so mans discursive events IFUis ‘question of pune demonstration, Uiese utterances can be read as @ “vis of events linked ane to another aceording t a certain murmber sHformal rales; as forthe subject ofthe diseaarse he isnot mpteated in the demonivston-he remains, in relation % 1 fixed, invariable suds i neutralized On the eter han, a “meditation” produces, as Sinany discursive evens, new aiteranoes that earry with therm &406 “peshetes, Method, and Bpisemotogy series of modifications ofthe enuncfating sublet: torough what i Sait in mediation, the subect passes from darkness to hight fom Impurity to purity, from the constraint of passions to detachment thom usoertainy and disordered mewements to Use serenity of wr ‘dom, and so on In meditation the subjects ceaselessly altered by his ‘omn movement; his discourse provokes effects within which Be is aught it exposes him to risks, makes him pass through tials or temptations, produces slates tn him, and confers on him a stats or ‘qvaifiction he did not hold atthe inital moment tn short, mete tion implies a mobile subject modiNable throng lhe effect of te dis ‘cursive events that take place. Prom this one, one can see whel a Gemenstrative mediation would besa set of discursive events which ‘conatiute af onee groups of utterances linked one to another by for tal rues of deduction, and series of modientions of the enunciating ubject which follow continuously one from another. More precise in a demonstrative meditation the uiterances, which are formal tn (roa HS Tinjesh mtoify the subject as they develop, Meret tanvielinns or on Uve contrary inducing systematic doubts, provokIng Shuminations or eesplutions, freeing hin from his atachments ork mediate certainties, including new slates. Bul, inversely, the dec Hons luctuaions, displacements, primary or acquired qualifications Grthe subject moke sets of new ullerances possible, which are in their {urn deduced regularly one from another The Meditations require this double reading: a set of propositions forming a ster whieh each reader must follow through iThe wishes to feel thelr tra, and a set of modifications forming an ezerese ‘which each reader must effet, by which each reader nvust be af ected, i he in tn wants tebe the subject enunciatng tis th on his own bea. Andi there are indeed certain passages ofthe Mesa tions which ean be deciphered exhaustively aa systemati stringing together of propositions-moments of pure deduction there exist ot the olhes hand sorts of echiasmias," where the two forms of discourse Jnterset, and whete the exercise modiying the subject orders tbe ‘iceesson of propositions, or controls the junction of distinct demo ‘trative groups. It seems thatthe passage on madness and dreaming | indeed ofthis order. \ ‘usu eke itup again now a9 9 whole and as an intersection ofthe demonstrative and esctic schemas. My Body, This Paper This Fire 407 1. The immediately preceding passage present tel as @ practical ssllogism. ‘ought o be wary of something that has deceived me once My senses, through which 1 have received the truest end surest things possess, have deveived me, and more than once ‘ought therefore no longer to trast there Cleary, it is here a question of @ deducive fragment whose import is completely general al that I have taken to be the most frve falls ner the sway of dub, along with the senses which furnishes it. A fonor, there can therefore remain nothing thet does not become at lease as doubtful. Need I generalize any further? Derrida’s hypothesis, ‘hat the (ineffectual) example of madness, and the (effectuaD example of dreaming are summoned to operate this generalization, and to ‘ary the syliogisn of doubt farther forward, eat thus not be retained Bit then by what are they summoned? 2. They ane summoned less by an objection or restriction than by @ resistance: there are percepible Uhings Gat “one eanmot rationally Shoub” Its the word “plane” that the translator renders by “ratio nally” What then s this “impossibility” ven that we have just estab ‘shed a completely binding syllogism? What, then, is this obstacle that opposes our doubting “entcely” "wholly “eompletls” (ratio rally) iven that we've just performed a rationally unassailable piece sf reasoning It 1s the impossibility of Unis subject’ really effecting such a generalized doubt in the exercise which modifies him; iis the impossibility of conetitating oneself as universally doubting subject ‘Whatis sil problem, afer a sylogise of sich general import isthe ‘ching-up of the advice of prudence ito effective doub, the transfor ination of the subject anoting he rnust doubt everyting” nto ub- ie applying hls resoluion-to-doubt to everything.” We see why the translator has rendered “plane” as “rationally”: by wanting to carry ‘hrowgh this qualification “rational” that T brought into play atthe ‘erp beginning of the meditations (and in a least three forms: having | suciently mature mind, being ree of cares and passions, being ‘sured ofa peaceful trea), iam to resolve myself ta doubt every ‘bing thovougiy, mst es squalty mse 98 rational? IFT want to ‘ints may quaifcation ax rational, must give up carrying out this eu, atleast carrying it out in general terms? The importance ofthe words “being able to doubt completely” con sit nthe fact that they mark the point of intersection of the two408 Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology discursive fooms—that of the system and that of the exercise: atthe level of ascetic discursvity, one cannot yet doubt rationally. Ii thas this level that wil contol the following development, and what Is involved ini isnot the extent of dou things but the statis ofthe doubling subject, the quaifctive elaboration that allows him tobe st nce *all-dbubitog” yet rational But what, then, isthe obstacle, of doubt? 5 My body, and the immediate pereeption Ihave of 2 More ex acily an atea defined as “the vivid and the neat” (in opposition to all those “distant” and “weak” things which I ean place doubt without difculty: Lam here, wearing a dressing gown, siting beside the Tiro-tn short the whole system of aewality which characterizes this moment of my meditation. Is of he first importance that Descartes here invoives not the cerainty that one may have in general of one's ‘own body bul rather, everything thal, at thi presse instant of med tation, resists infact the exerying-o af doubt by the subject whois ‘curently mediating, Cloaly, itis not certain things that in themselves (by their akin, their universality, eit ites) resist dob! but, eather, that which characterizes the actuality of the meditating sject (the place of his meditation, tke gesture eis in the process of making, the sensations that strike him). Ihe rely doubied all tis system of actuality, would he sil be rational? World he not precise be renouneing al these guarantees of rational mediation whieh he fave himself in choosing, a8 has just been sald, the moment ofthe lundertaking (quite late i life, but not too Tat: the moment that must not be allowed 10 slip past has come), its conditions (peace and pie. ith no cares to form distractions its place (a peaceful reireat) If ‘nist ein doubling the place where Lam, the attention tam paying to this plece of paper, andl this leat from the fire which marks my present moment, how could I remain convinced of the rational char scter of my undertaking? In placing this actuality tn doubt, arm Fnotat the sane time going to render impossible all rational meditatlon and remeve all value from my resolution to discover the truth at last? Wis in order to reply to this question that two examples are called on, side by side, both of which foree one to call into doubt the subjet _ystem of actually 4 First example: madness, Madmen indeed are completely de luded as to what consttates thelr actually: they believe they ace ne resistance point ofthe exercise My Body, This Papen, Tis Fire 409 dressed when they ar naked, kings when they ore poor. Bat ca 1 ‘ae upthis example on my own account Toi throught tt tal beable to wars nto an effect resolution the propostion tat emus out evrything which comes ous fom reams? np sb: "ia sunt ements hat, they ae realy daqualied ‘aon sujet, and quality syslf among the, flowing thers Crasher exampie tome" would equally ne in my ttn {auld notbe able to bea atonal suber mean (1 shou so less extravagant”) ifone wees te example of ates ‘ove fem sytem to aes nthe proposition ote relation ‘ute possible to constitute ose as subject having eal every ting inte dou, ut impossible wo remeln quelifed a eee conducting raoaly his mediation rough doubt to aa evens th. The ressanee of acai tothe exes a doubt is reduced hy ‘oo strong an example: it carries away with it the possibility of medi- sting vali: theo qualicatons doubting subject” and meta ig subj” are nom case simancosty poms That madness epost ax dnqualicatory tay search for th tutti ot ravoal to ell Lup to ery at neresnary dole a re cannot eign eve or amen sat is inpossiiy tome Ahly obvious nthe asslgnaon ofthe term demons hs need Seaesine pn wien ompary mith of truth. : ae : 5: Sond est dreaming Madness hs therefore been exhided, sitasan nslfcenexaiple bas an excessive and posse tet Dreamingis now voted: bese renter the eal of the au ict no less dou than doe madness (ne aks one iting ile and one naked ts one's ed) and beau fers 2 cere ier of dierenes with respect o madness forms per ofthe “ihaties of the sabe (Cam a an), ef his request noliaed ‘ines (on sleep and dream) af Bis memries (fear re tember hating dreamt, and i nemories whieh ca eine Demos vivid of impressions (othe pont where {an compare my presen impression vabuly wih my merry of my ree). Fron Be ropes ning ser he mbes nck teeaerete of alg ino doubt a is own actual st sage (veh defines the tent remember baving dreamed whet tne prciveas my actly. Second sige (which or momen appearno Aesthetic, Method, an Hpistamatog to invalidate the te) the gesnare I make in the very instant of my ‘meditation to fd ont FY anv asleep ined appar to have the cles ‘an! dstinction of woking perception Thed stage (which validates the test): Fremember not only the imoges of my dream, but also their clarity, os great es that of my eurrent impressions. Fourth stage (onlieh cdnelides the test): atone ani the same time Fs mani That there Is ne certain mack for distinguishing dreare from reais ‘and lon 30 surprised that am) no longer sure whether at this preci roment Iam asleep or no These two sides of the suecessfl tes (oncertain stupor and manifest vision) indeed constitute the subjes, ts eifectively doubting his own actuality, and a8 validly continuing a edie that pts to one side everything that Is not manifest rah “The two qualifictions (doubting everything that arvives theough the senses and meditating validly) are really effected, The slog had require that they be simultaneously in play; the subject's conscious ‘ness of his actanlty fad formes an obstaele tothe accomplishment of ths requirement, The attempt to use the example of madoen as 8 tbose had confirmed this incompatibility the effort made to actuaize the vides af dreams showed, om the one hand, that this eo Loiity is not insurmountable. And the meditating subject becomes doubling subloet at the end of opposing tests: one that has constituted ‘he subject a8 rational (as opposed tothe disqualified modman). 208 ‘one that also constituted the subjeet as doubting (inthe lack of ds tinetion between dreaming and waking). ‘Once this qualifeation of the subject hes finally been achieved (Clee eomaierms’,systematie diseursivity will once again be able ty iiersect mith the discourse of Use exercise take the upper hand, plae inteligible truths under examination, til a nev ascotie stage consi tute the meditating subjects hreatened with universal error bythe reat trickster.” But even at hat stage ofthe metation, the quali tion ns “nonmad” (ike the qualification as “potential dreamer”) ye, remain vale Te soems to me that Derrida has vividly and doepty sensed that this psenge on midness has # singular place in the development oft Meditations. And he teanseribes his feeling ino is text, atthe very moment at which he attemps to master 1. livorderto explain that he question of madness should appearat this precise pont of the Meditations, Derrida invents an alteration ct My Body, This Paper, This Fire 4n tolces that would displce, reject, and drive out of the tet ise the ‘aieut exclamation: “but just a moment-these sre madmen.” Derrida did indeed find hiraselt faced with a knotty problem. If as he suppose, iis nse that this whole movement ofthe frst meditation sperates a generelization of doubt, why does it pause, only for & noment, over madness oF even aver dreaming? Why take pains demonsrate that vivid and recent ensations are ne les doubtful than the pleat and most distant ones, ance it has been established, x gen ‘rel terme, that what comes via the senses must not be trusted? Way riake this swerve toward the particular point of my body, this paper, his fire? Why make a detour toward the singular trekeries of mad- sss aid dreaming? Deed gives to this deviation the status ofa break, He fmagines a foreign intervention, the serupte or reticence of stragaler worried by the movement overtaking him and fighting « leet-minute rearguard retion, Deseares has searcely sa that we mast not trust the senses ‘when # voice would be raised, the voice of « pessant foreign to all pilosephial urbanity; he woud, n his imple way ty 19 broach, or least to lit the thinkers resolution: "Tim quite happy for you to “ionbt certain of your perceptions, but -- thal you are sitting hes by te fre, saying these things, holding that paper in your hands and ‘her things of the same natore’? You'd have to be mad to doubt them, or rather, only madmen ean make mistakes about such certain ‘hings. And Tin certainly ot mack. es at this point that Descartes ‘would take over again and say to this obstinate yokel: I'm quite pre- pared to ait that you're not mad, since you're unveiling to Be 05, bat remember that you dream every night, and that your nightly roams are no less mad than this madness you refuse. And the naive relcence ofthe ebjector who cannot doubt is body because fe does ‘ot ant tobe mad would be conquered by the example of dreaming, ‘Se much “more natural,” “more ennmon,” “more universal” Dernda’s hypothesis sa seductive one. Ie xeselves with the utmost ricety his problem, which is to shovr thatthe philosopher goes di- rely the calling into question of the “totality of Beingness” (Za inal de Vetantit, tat this is precisely the form and philosophical ark of his procedure; fhe happens to stop for monvent ala “being os as siagularas madness, this can only be ifsome Innocent ms et his sleeves and questions him; by himself he would nover have lin evel among these stories of jugs and naked kings, In Unis way the4 Aesthetics, Method, and Epistersatonse rejection of madness, the abrupt exclamation “but just a moment these are madmen” i its? rejected by Derrida and theee thes en «closed outside philosophica! discourse: Hrs, since itis another subject peaking (nat the philosapher af he Medaons bu the abjetor ras ing hie scarcely Fellned voice); second, because he spenks from « place witch i that of nompitosophical nalvete; and, finaly, because the philosopher takes over again and by quoting the “stronger,” more “telling” example of drearaing disarms the objection and makes the very man who refuses madness accept something far worse Bur it is nov clear what price Derrida has to pay for his shila hypothesis, The omission of @ certain number of ltral elements (oshich nppear as soon as one takes the trouble tn compare the Latin {ext withthe Freneh translation}; the elision of textual diferences (the whole play of semantic and grammatical opposition between the dream paragraph and thot on madness): finally, and above al, the crasure of the essential discursive determination (Ihe double web of ‘exereise and demonstration). Curlously, by imagining that ote na ive objecting voice behind Descartes's writing, Derr has fudged al the taxts ditferences; or, rather, in erasing all these diferences, In bringing the test of madness and tha of dreaming as close together as possible, in making the one the Fist faint fied draft of the other, n lAbcombing the insufficiency ofthe one inthe universality ofthe ote Derrida is continuing the Cartesion exclusion. For Descartes, the meditating subject had to exclude madness by qualifying himself a not mad, And this exclusion is, in its turn, no doubt too dangerous for Derrida: no longer for the disqualification with which it threatens the philosophizing subject but forthe qualification with wie &t would ‘ark philosophical discourse would indeed determine itas “othe” thaw the discohrse of madness; it would establish between Uhem « relationship of exteririty; ft would send philosophical discourse ‘across othe Sather sie," into the pare presumption of not being mat ‘Separation, extetiniy, a determination teora which the philosophers Ainconrse mast indeed he saved iit fs to be a “project for exceeding ‘every finite and determinate totality" This Cartesian exclusion mus, then be excluded beestse iis determining. And Derida is obliged proceed to three operations todo this as we ea se: fst, he afin, against al the visible economy of the text, that te power of doub specific to madness isa Tortior included i dreaming; second be {magines (to account forthe fact tha there i any question of madness My Body, This Papen, This Five 45 In spite of everything) that iis someone else who excludes madness, tm his own account and folowing the oblique Tine of an objection Finally, he removes alt philosophical status from this exclusion by ‘denouncing its naive rusticiy. Reverse the Cartesian exclusion and make itan inclusion; exclude the exeluder by giving his discoures the status of an objection; exclude the exclusion by rejecting it into ‘prephilosophical naivet: Dereida has needed to dono less than this to get through Descartes’ text and rece the question of madness 0 nothing, We ean see the result: the elision of the text’ diferences and ‘he compensatory invention ofa difference of voices lead Descarts's exclusion to a second level; philosophical discourse Is finally ex- cluded from excluding madness. 2, Bu madness does not allow itself o be reduce inthis way. Even supposing that Descartes was “not speaking” of madness athe point in his text where itis a question of ican and demente, supposing that he gave woy for a moment to a yokel in order to reise such a ‘ride question, could it not be std that he proceeds, albest in an Insidious ana silent manne, to exclude madness? {Could it not be said that Descartes has de facto and consta voided the question of madness? Derrida replies fo this objection in advances Yes indeed, Descartes fully Taces upto the risk of madness: nt as you pretend in prefato- rial and almost marginal way with reference to rome business about jugs and naked kings, bt atthe very heart of his philosophical enter- prise, atthe precise moment where his discourse, separating itself ‘rom all natural considerations on the errors of the senses or the en orgements ofthe brain, takes on its radical dimension in hyperbolic: oubt and the hypothesis ofthe evil genius. Thatis where madness is, falled into question aad faced up to; withthe evil genius T indeed soppose that Lam even more radically mistaken than those who think they hase a body made of glass~even go so far as persuading myselt that two and three do not perhaps add up to fve; then with the eogizal reach that extreme point, that excess with respect to any determine tom whic allows me to sa, whether mistaken oF not, whether mad 1 aot, Tam. The evil genius would indeed be the point at which Plilosophy itso in the excess proper toi, risks madness; and the fogito wonld be he moment at which madness is erased (not because ‘fan exclusion but because ils determination when faced with reason, ‘would slop being pertinent). According to Derrida, then, we sho iy4 festhetic, Method, al Epistonotagy nol attach to ch ianportance to ths ith fa Interrspteat the healing ofthe txt with hi sitloge fits im spite al their matey, they do ek mae to pose the question of mraness ‘On the other hank all the threats of Unreason wou feat play be neath the far more disturbing and gloomy figure of the evil genius Sinllaey, the thing up by drvams of the wors! extravauanees af mad ‘men atthe beginning a the lex sould he an easy vctorsson the other Ihand, after the great panie ofthe evil eens, we sold reed no hse than the pe of beingness") to mate the determinations of madness and dreams spar te be nonradical, The great solemn theater of the universe! teiekster and ofthe “think woud repeat she sill natura table oF the ‘madman and the sleeper, but this tine in philosophical radical. Ti hold sneh wi Inorpretation, Merridn hat to deny dha 8 was a the pasa ho ofthe engi fax its excess with respect to the “tag ‘question of madness atthe polnt where madness was tared (an i spect, carefully diferentiated terms}; now he has ty demonstrate {hat There fsa question of madness athe point her i snot AnH, Dein gis his demonstration ite oper suersion of poe gt “extra aqaon “pan th cant ae Copia: “ma auc.” “rd pofet “projee which veces “uheoet-of anid singular excess” “ences eidng toward Zery rdness 8 fren so es ype ess in aera sean” All hese desivations aroun! Descartes’ test are necessary forthe ex fenins and the evgitao become, ag Uertida wishes, the te scene of ‘confrontation with madness. But more fs needed: he has erase fr Deseartess texts themselves everything shoving tht the episae of the evil genius isa voluntary, controled exereise, mstore ant cr riod out from stat to finish by a meditating himself be somprised. APs true that the hypathesis wf Uae malign enies carries the sispieon of error far beyond those sions oF the senses exermplifid hy cerlain madamen, then he wo Forts this sion {and by the Very fat that he forms Ht velemaniy and 9s a exercise) escapes the risk f receiving them inte his beef as isthe ease and My Body, This Paper This Be 45 nisfortune of masimen. He ts tfeke, but not convinced. Perhaps ‘iything i illusion, but no credulity atacies toi. No doubt the evil sls rics far more than does an engorged brain he can give tise ‘ball dhe usory decors of mans, hut Be is sometbing quite eiffen fit rom madness, It could even bye said that he is the contrary « ralness: since i) madness Detewe that an iusory purple eovers my "udity ond my poverty, white the hypothesis ofthe evil genius permits ‘ne not i believe that my body and hands exist. As tothe extent of the ‘rp, itis true thatthe evil genius Is not outdone By madness; but, in ‘he position ofthe subject with respect tothe trap, there is rigorous ‘egpestion between evil genius and madness Ithe evil genie takes fn the powers of madres, this s only after the exercise of meditation as exchided the risk of beg mad {et ws reread Descartes text." shall think that the sk, thea, the forth, colors figures, sounds, and all ther exterual things are noth ing but ilusions anv daydreams” (ehereas the madman thinks that his iustons ond daydreams are really the sky, the ai and all external things). “T hall eosider myselfas having no hands, no eyes «but believing falsely that | have all these things” (whereas the madman Ietioves falsely tht his bods is made of glass But does not consider himseif as believing it falsely). I shal take great care not to receive ‘ny fasty into my elie? (mereas the madman receives all fas. ts clear fed with the eunning ticker, the meditating subject behaves not like a amadmaan ina panic at universal ervor bl as & no is cunning adversary, always aler, constantly ational, and remain ingin the position of master with espect ta his ton | shall prepare ny mind so well forall dhe ruses ofthis great trickster that however pomerful and cunning he may be, he willbe unable to catch me out lw far we are from Derrida’s pretty variations on themes; “total nadness total panic which fam unable to master since iis infited by hypothesis and Zam no longer sponsibe for "ovr is i possible 1 imagine thatthe meditating subject shows Longer be respon ‘ile for what he himself eaits“this painful and laborious design’? Techaps we shoud ask how its that an author as meticulous as Dex "ila and as attentive to texts, eal have been guilty of so many emis sons bat could also operate sn many displecements, trenspesitons, ri susitutions? Bu perhaps we should ask this othe extent that i ‘ ’ / i406 Aesthetics, Method, and Rpistemology dis reading Derrida is doing no more than revive an old tradition. He fs, moreover, aware of thi nd this conformity seems, justly, © comfort him, He shies in any ease from thinking thet the classical fnterpretors have missed through lack of attention the singularity of the passoge on madness and dreaming. (Om one fact at least | am in agreement itis not as an effect oftheir Jack of attention that, before Derrida and in like manner, tbe classical interpreters erased this passage from Descartes. It is by system. A system of which Derrida isthe most decisive modern representative, ints final glory: the reduction of asenrsive practices to wextual traces the elisin of the events produced therein and the retention only of marks for a reading: the invention of volees behind texts to avoid having to aualyze the modes of implication of the subject in dis ‘courses: the assigning ofthe originary as said and unsaid in the ext to avoid placing discursive practices in the feld pf wanstormations ‘shere they are carsied out Till not any that tis a motaphysies, melaphysie Helo ts eo sire wich ie hiding inthis “textallzaion” of discursive practices. fo anuch fester than that: shall say that what can be seen here so ‘isibly is «historically well determined litle pedegogs. A pedagogs {hal teaches the pupil there is nothing outside the text, but that a i in As gaps is lanks and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the ‘origin; that its therefore unnocessary to searel elsewhere, but that there notin the! words, certainly, bat in the words under erasure, in their grid, the *eense of being” Is said. A pedagogy that gives com: versely to the master’s voice the limitless sovereignty thot allows ite restate the text indefinitely Father Bourdin supposed that, according to Descertes, #1 asim possible to doubt things that were certain, even ifone were asleep oF nad, With respec to well-founded certainty, the fct of dreaming or ‘ofraving would not be pertinent, Descartes replies very explicitly 2 {his interpretation: “I do not remember having said anything ofthe sort, nor even having dreamed it while wsleep” Indeed nothing an be clearly oF distinely conceived of which is not true (and at this level the problem of knowing whether or not the conceiver is deear: Ingor raving does not need to be asked). But, Descartes adds imme ately, who then ean distinguish “what is clearly conceived and what ‘only seems and appears to be so”? Who, then, as thinking sd med tating subject can Know whether he knows clearly or not? Who, then My Bod, This Papen This Fire a7 ‘s capable of nut deluding himself as to his own certainty and of not being caught out by it? Except preciseiy those who are not mad? ‘Those who are “wise” And Descartes retorts, with Father Bourdin i his sights: “But es only the wise can distinguish what fs clearly eon rived from what only seems and appears tobe so, Lam not surprised ‘hat his fellow ean ell the diference between then.” Eoyontactatierriapemtanat aerate tne ‘ie Bag “eran” Ihe presen oe hs one ou ine ers recat bite We