Language-In-education Planning in Algeria - Historical Development and Current Issues

Language Policy (2007) 6:225–252 !
Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10993-007-9046-7
MOHAMED BENRABAH
LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION PLANNING IN ALGERIA:

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ISSUES
(Received 1 March 2006; accepted in revised form 31 December 2006)
ABSTRACT. The paper presents the language policy (arabisation) pursued in

Algeria since independence in 1962. The first section of the paper focuses on the
recent changes in government language policy (return to Arabic–French bilingualism
in schools) and reactions to them following the recommendations made by the
National Commission for the Reform of the Educational System in March 2001. The
second part gives a historical background to post-independent language-in-education
planning. The third section looks at the unplanned developments resulting from the
hegemonic nature of linguistic arabisation. The fourth section explores secondary
school students’ attitudinal reactions towards Algeria’s linguistic pluralism. Finally,
the paper argues that the Algerian leadership’s refusal to recognise linguistic plu-
ralism considered beneficial by the majority of the population represents one of the
major obstacles to the nation-building process.
KEY WORDS: Algeria, arabisation, bilingualism, English, French, language

attitudes, language educational policy, language hegemony, language maintenance,
Tamazight
ABBREVIATIONS: CNRSE – National Commission for the Reform of the Edu-

cational System; FFS – Socialist Forces Front; MCB – Berber Cultural Movement;
HCA – High Commission for Berber Affairs
Introduction
Algeria’s development history since its independence consists of

three main phases each of which has had an impact on language
education policies. The first phase is characterised by the colonial
legacies amongst which was a network of schools and an educa-
tional system dominated by the French language with Arabic grow-
ing steadily in importance. The second phase lasted from the late
1960s to the late 1990s and corresponded to the socialist-era central
planning economy, called the nationalist transition. The Arabic lan-
guage was gradually imposed in the educational sector. An extreme
226 mohamed benrabah
version of exclusive nationalism inspired by the 19th century

European ideal of linguistic convergence marked this era. The third
phase began in the early 2000s corresponding to the transition to
the free economic market with less assertive arabisation policies.
During the third phase, the authorities have encountered hostility
to the reform of the schooling system. In fact, the Algerian govern-
ment has come to admit that education has ‘‘failed’’. Two examples
of student achievement will be used here as recent illustrations of
this failure. In June 2005, ten classes in the city of Mascara took
their final examination at the end of the primary cycle (Sixth Form
examination for 11–12 year olds) and not one single pupil suc-
ceeded. The second illustration concerns university standards. In
mid-November 2005, the Minister of Higher Education declared
that 80% of first-year students fail their final exams because of lin-
guistic incompetence. The majority of the student population who
enrol in higher education have been schooled through Literary/
Classical Arabic only and are hence weak in French, the language
of instruction in scientific disciplines (Allal, 2005: 13; Maı̈z &
Rouadjia, 2005: 13). What is more, the imposition of an exclusively
Arabic monolingual schooling system implemented during the
nationalist phase is considered to be a major source of its current
‘‘failure’’, of the rise of religious fanaticism, and the civil war that
has ravaged Algeria since the early 1990s (Benrabah, 1999a: 154–
160, 2004: 71–73; Byrd, 2003: 78; Coffman, 1992: 147 & 185, 1995).
The issue of language education policies in Algeria is a sensitive
issue embroiled in passionate politics and, as correctly assessed by
Berger (2002: 8), it is ‘‘the most severe problem of Algeria in its
present and troubled state’’. This situation sets Algeria apart from
the rest of the Arab world and Africa and makes it a particularly
instructive example for the fields of language policy and language-
in-education planning.
The present paper aims to examine Algeria’s language education
policies since its independence. It will be organised as follows. The
first part will present recent reforms and opposition to their imple-
mentation. In the second section, a description of post-independent
language-in-education planning will be given with a view to set the
background for a better understanding of the current situation. In
the third section, it will be argued that the hegemony of linguistic
arabisation has led to resistance and to the maintenance of
languages that were targeted by arabisation. The fourth part of
the paper will explore Algerian secondary-school students’ attitudes
language-in-education planning in algeria 227
towards Algeria’s multilingualism. In the final section, it will be

argued that the opposition of the Algerian leadership to linguistic
pluralism remains the major obstacle to the process of nation-
building.
Educational System in Crisis: Reforms and Reactions
Since the early 2000s, the issue of languages in the educational sys-
tem has been the subject of considerable debate in Algeria: should
schools continue to favour monolingualism in Arabic or should
they adopt Arabic–French bilingualism? Arabo-Islamists, who sup-
port the policy of arabisation (monolingualism), are opposed to
‘‘Modernists’’ (mainly secular and/or francophone members of the
population and the elite) who call for the implementation of Ara-
bic–French bilingualism. The debate reached its climax in 2002
when opponents to bilingual education issued a fatwa against sup-
porters of educational reforms (Abdelhai, 2001: 7) and considered
the defenders of bilingualism as the ‘‘enemies of Islam and the
Arabic language’’ and the ‘‘supporters of forced Westernisation of
Algerians’’*1 (Djamel, 2001: 3). Due to be implemented in Septem-
ber 2001, the reforms were suspended by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior on 3 September 2001.
This strong opposition came as a reaction to the recommenda-
tions made in mid-March 2001 by the National Commission for
the Reform of the Educational System (CNRSE in French) set up
in May 2000 by the newly elected Head of State, President Abdela-
ziz Bouteflika. In March 2001, the CNRSE recommended that
French be reintroduced as the first mandatory foreign language in
Grade Two (for 6–7 year olds) of the primary cycle instead of
starting it in Grade Four (for 8–9 year olds) as had been the case
since the late 1970s. The CNRSE also suggested that scientific dis-
ciplines be taught in French instead of Arabic in secondary schools
(Sebti, 2001). The obvious intended outcomes are bilingualism and
biliteracy as ways of improving student achievement. It requires a
clear shift from a ‘‘weak’’ bilingual education – French taught as a
subject – to a ‘‘strong’’ form of bilingual education which involves
students learning content (scientific disciplines) through Arabic and
French.
1
Quotes marked by an asterisk were translated from Arabic or French by the present
author.
The authorities and a large part of the population alike have felt
the need for educational reforms, which should include, among
other things, the reintroduction of French at an early stage. Before
he was assassinated in June 1992, President Mohamed Boudiaf
described the educational system as ‘‘doomed and unworthy of the
Algerian people’’* (Messaoudi & Schemla, 1995: 186). Similarly,
prior to his election as Head of State in April 1999, candidate
Abdelaziz Bouteflika often repeated in public the expression
‘‘doomed schooling system’’. In 1999, a survey conducted for the
central authorities revealed that 75% of Algerians supported the
idea of teaching scientific school subjects in French (Djamel, 2001:
3). Many parents believe that Algeria’s public schools ‘‘produce
generations of illiterate people who master neither Arabic nor
French’’* (Beaugé, 2004: 17).
Indeed, the educational system in Algeria has been detrimental
to quality and open-mindedness (Si Ameur & Sidhoum, 1992: 167).
In 1999, President Bouteflika’s first government committed itself to
ending its interference with pedagogical matters, to revising school
cycles, curricula and textbooks, and to promoting teacher training
as means of eradicating Islamist fanaticism fuelled by the Algerian
educational system. The State also set itself the task of legalising
private schools that existed in a legal vacuum and which provide
an Arabic–French bilingual education for pupils who refuse to at-
tend Arabic-only public schools (Martı́n, 2003: 41). And following
the dramatic events of 11 September 2001, the Algerian authorities,
like most other Arab-Muslim governments around the world, came
under strong pressure from the West to reform educational curric-
ula as part of the Global War on Terror (Karmani, 2005: 262). In
addition to post-9/11 developments, two other factors have worked
against the maintenance of a monolingual schooling system: first,
the demand for economic reforms comes from the pressure exerted
by internationalism and the transition to a market economy,
second, there are socio-political demands for democratisation and
minority linguistic rights (Benrabah, 2005). Hence, educational
reforms that aim at bilingual/multilingual education are not simply
an educational issue: these are expressions of political ideology,
tides of political change and political initiatives (Baker, 2003: 101).
An understanding of the undergoing changes and the opposition
they generate require a historical perspective on language-in-educa-
tion planning in Algeria.
Post-independent language-in-education policies
One month before independence, the leadership of the Algerian

revolutionary movement committed the future State to the policy
of linguistic arabisation as follows: ‘‘[The role of the Revolution]
is above all [...] to restore to Arabic – the very expression of the
cultural values of our country – its dignity and its efficacy as a
language of civilisation’’ (Gordon, 1978: 149). In fact, the assimila-
tionist ideology of colonial France, which undervalued Literary/
Classical Arabic, turned this language into the language of libera-
tion (Djité, 1992: 16). This language’s symbolic value was further
increased by its link with Islamic culture and religion. ‘‘Islam and
the Arabic language were effective forces of resistance against the
attempt of the colonial regime to depersonalise Algeria’’ (Gordon,
1966: 137). However, Algeria’s separatist nationalism was religious
in form but not content: the motivation was not the establishment
of an Islamic theocracy but of democracy even though the motiva-
tion for the latter has been obliterated by the military establish-
ment which has repeatedly imposed dictatorial forms of
government since the war of liberation (Roberts, 2003: 30). When
Algeria gained its independence in July 1962, it was linguistically a
pluralistic country. This was the result of its heritage including
influences from Berber, Phoenician, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine,
Jewish, Moor, Arabic, Spanish, Ottoman and French. Its inhabit-
ants spoke Algerian Arabic and Berber or Tamazight (in several
local varieties) and French. The arabisation policy overlooked
the country’s linguistic diversity, denied any status to the languages
spoken in Algeria and promoted Literary/Classical Arabic
developed as the lingua franca of the Arab Middle East (Roberts,
2003: 11).
Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, initiated the policy of
linguistic arabisation in primary schools and as early as October
1962, he declared that Literary Arabic was to be introduced to the
educational system (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27). Arabic teaching
became obligatory in all programmes and at all levels during
the period 1963–1964 and the amount of time spent on French-
language teaching decreased gradually (Bennoune, 2000: 228).
Hence, French turned out to be ‘‘the first target of arabisation’’
(Lewis, 2004). The following year, Grade One (for 5–6 year olds)
of the primary cycle was fully arabised and the amount of time
devoted to Arabic-language teaching rose to 10 hours in all other
levels. Furthermore, religious instruction and civics were added on

top of this (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27). However, the government’s
ambitious programme faced real difficulties linked with the social
changes that accompanied the end of French colonialism. The
government was confronted with a massive increase (from 14% to
36.37%) in pupil enrolment in the first cycle and the problem of
teaching personnel and their competency. By July 1962, 25,000 edu-
cators had left Algeria as a result of the mass exodus of Europeans
(Assous, 1985: 105; Bennoune, 2000: 223). The illiteracy rate
stood at around 90% (Bennoune, 2000: 12; Heggoy, 1984: 111;
Lacheraf, 1978: 313) and the number of Algerians literate in Liter-
ary Arabic only was estimated at around 300,000 out of a popula-
tion of 10 million (Gallagher, 1968: 148; Gordon, 1978: 151). As to
the French language, 1 million were able to read it and 6 million
spoke it (Gallagher, 1968: 134). In 1962–1963, the authorities hired
10,988 monitors (Assous, 1985: 106) ‘‘whose intellectual hori-
zons [were] at times only slightly less limited than their pupils’’’
(Gallagher, 1968: 138). A year later, 1,000 Egyptians were recruited
as Arabic-language instructors. Most of these teachers turned out
to be unqualified for teaching and totally ignorant of the Algerian
social reality (Sarter & Sefta, 1992: 111–112). Their spoken
Egyptian Arabic was incomprehensible to Algerians in general and
Tamazight-speaking populations in particular and their traditional
pedagogy (learning by rote and class recitation, physical punish-
ment and so on) proved inadequate (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27–28;
Wardhaugh, 1987: 189). What is more, the majority of these teach-
ers were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and ‘‘interested
more in the ideological indoctrination of the students than in
teaching’’ (Saad, 1992: 60). The Egyptian educators proved to be
major channels for importing Islamist ideology into Algerian public
life (Abu-Haidar, 2000: 161; Mostari, 2004: 38; Roberts, 2003: 12;
Thomas, 1999: 27).
After the June 1965 military coup led by Colonel Boumediene,
arabisation gained momentum under the latter’s presidency (1965–
1978). President Boumediene’s arabisation drive is best illustrated
by the following declaration made by his first Minister of Educa-
tion, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, during a government session in the
1960s: ‘‘This [arabisation] will not work, but we have to do it...’’*
(Grandguillaume, 1995: 18). In September 1967, Taleb Ibrahimi
initiated total arabisation of Grade Two in primary schools. But
the arabisation of the first two primary grades coupled with the
lower educational quality led many parents to delay the registration

of their children until the third year where French remained domi-
nant (Saad, 1992: 61). A survey carried out by the University of
Berkeley under the auspices of the Department of Planning showed
that 80% of the youth were against the arabisation of university
learning (Calvet, 1996: 118). Meanwhile, Taleb Ibrahimi informally
allowed Mouloud Mammeri, a Kabylian writer/academic and
Berberist militant, to restore the chair of Berber studies at Algiers
University banned by Ben Bella’s government in October 1962
(Chaker, 1998: 42; Guenoun, 1999: 30). After a cabinet shake-up in
July 1970, Taleb Ibrahimi became Minister of Culture and Infor-
mation and launched the Cultural Revolution in order to accom-
pany the government’s radical economic and foreign policies
(Roberts, 2003: 11). In September 1976, educational reforms were
introduced to favour, among other things, linguistic arabisation as
a means of increasing the population’s competence in Literary
Arabic (Benachenhou, 1992: 210; Bennoune, 2000: 301). Until the
1970s, the educational structure inherited from the colonial period
consisted of three levels: primary school (lasting 5 years), middle
school (4 years) and secondary school (3 years). Starting from
1976, an experimental schooling system called the Fundamental
School was implemented. It consisted of a fusion of primary and
middle school grades (nine consecutive years) with all the teaching
done in Arabic (except foreign languages) (Assous, 1985: 132–133;
Saad, 1992: 65–66).
In April 1977, the appointment of Mostefa Lacheraf as Minister
of Primary and Secondary Education signalled a pause in the
ill-prepared and excessively speedy arabising process. This well-
known writer and thinker favoured gradual arabisation and bilin-
gual education because he believed that French could serve as a
‘‘reference point, a stimulant’’ that would force the Arabic lan-
guage ‘‘to be on the alert’’* (Berri, 1973: 16). At the end of 1963,
he advocated the necessary maintenance of French in the schooling
system for as long as it would take to reform Arabic and ‘‘desacra-
lise’’ traditional culture (Gordon, 1966: 192–193). Soon after being
appointed Minister, Lacheraf suspended the Fundamental School,
dismissed the arabophone personnel in his Ministry, re-instated tea-
cher training in French as well as ‘‘strong’’ forms of bilingualism in
primary schools with scientific subjects (math, calculus, biology)
taught in French. Lacheraf resigned when President Boumediene
died in December 1978. The pro-bilingual elements within the State
were sidelined by the pro-arabisation lobby (Islamists, conservatives

and nationalists). The successor of President Boumediene favoured
the latter group during his presidency (1979–1992).
Hegemony and Resistance
Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi replaced Mostepha Lacheraf as Minis-

ter of Primary and Secondary Education in March 1979. The new
Minister, a monolingual arabophone and pan-Arabist Kabylian
trained in Syria, was ‘‘detested [by his fellow Kabylians] for his
refusal to speak his mother tongue’’ (Roberts, 1980: 121). His first
decisions were to resume the policy of total arabisation, implement
the Fundamental School systematically and impose compulsory
teaching of religious instruction at all levels (Tefiani, 1984:
121–122). The Ministry personnel and course designers were given
a free hand in designing Islamist syllabuses and teaching. It did not
take them long to turn arabisation into an islamisation process
(Benrabah, 1999a: 154–157). French was postponed until Grade
Four as the first mandatory foreign language and English as the
second mandatory foreign language in Grade Eight. In 1986, for-
eign languages like German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, known
as ‘‘minority languages’’, were simply dropped in Middle Schools
(for students aged 12–15). Hence, between 1984 and 1994, univer-
sity departments offered ‘‘Bachelor’s degrees’’ for beginners in these
‘‘minority languages’’ (Abi Ayad, 1998: 99; Miliani 2000: 18).
In the meantime, Algeria’s elites preferred to enrol their children
in institutions controlled by the French government. They, thus,
indulged in the practice of elite closure (Myers-Scotton, 1993: 149)
and promoted arabisation as a strategy to disqualify those less for-
tunate and minimise competition for their own children, for whom
they could ensure the appropriate education needed (in French) for
good careers in modern business and technology (Thomas, 1999:
26). This practice was most visible in Algiers where a small number
of primary and secondary schools were unofficially bilingual. For
example, the former French Lyceé Descartes was ‘‘nationalised’’ to
provide a French education to the children of several members of
the political, military and educational elites (Messaoudi & Schemla,
1995: 59). As to the majority of young Algerians, often educated in
Arabic only and who had an inadequate command of French
(which is needed for career advancement), they enrolled in arabised
university departments (Islamic Law and Arabic Literature in

particular) and became susceptible to Islamist teaching and indoc-
trination (Coffman, 1992: 147 & 185, 1995; Roberts, 2003: 12;
Stone 1993: 52).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the pro-arabisation lobby put
pressure on the Minister of Education to delay yet again French
language teaching in the Fundamental School. The Minister did
not satisfy the lobbyists but he put English on the same par as
French (Laib, 1993: 7). Starting from September 1993, school-chil-
dren who accessed Grade Four had to choose between French and
English as the first mandatory foreign language (Bennoune, 2000:
303). In other words, not only was French no longer the first com-
pulsory foreign language, but it could also be chosen as the second
foreign language in Grade Eight. However, this new language com-
petition ended up favouring French because the number of pupils
who chose English was negligible (Queffélec et al., 2002: 38). In
universities, 95% of post-graduate courses in sciences and 95% of
undergraduate courses in medicine and technical disciplines are
taught in French. And the majority of undergraduates in scientific
streams prefer to follow lectures given in French (Miliani, 2000:
20). In the 1990s, many independent establishments were illegally
created by the associations of parents to offer Arabic–French bilin-
gual education from nursery to secondary levels. In 2003–2004,
there were between 380 and 600 such private schools in major
towns and cities (Gillet, 2004: 1342; Martı́n, 2003: 41). The total
student population in the private sector was estimated at 80,000 in
2004 (Kourta, 2004: 6).
The maintenance of French in Algeria could be interpreted as
resistance to the hegemony of arabisation. It has been argued that
‘‘strategies of resistance [are] a typical reaction to overt political
and linguistic oppression’’ (Mesthrie et al., 2000: 333). The targets
of arabisation were French and the first languages of Algerians
(Algerian Arabic and Berber). The survival and spread of both first
languages could be described as an illustration of covert and/or
overt resistance to the arabisation policy. Opposition to Algeria’s
language policy first came from the Berber-speaking minority, the
Kabylians. They began with an armed struggle against the central
authorities in 1963–1964 under the banner of the newly formed
party the Socialist Forces Front (FFS in French). The ideological
trends united by the FFS were all opposed to arabisation (Mahé,
2001: 442). The 1963–1964 dramatic turning point announced
future and repetitive unrest in the Kabylian region. The hasty

policy of arabisation and its acceleration with Mostefa Lacheraf’s
replacement by a ‘‘token’’ Kabylian kindled rioting in Kabylia
(Tabory & Tabory, 1987: 76). After the authorities cancelled
Mouloud Mammeri’s lecture on ancient Tamazight poetry which
was to be held at the University of Tizi Ouzou in March 1980, a
series of riots were sparked and various demonstrations were
organised in the spring of 1980. These had been preceded by a
number of repressive measures against the Berber language and
culture. The Circle of Berber Studies at Algiers University was
abolished and its Berberist leaders arrested in January 1971; the
chair of Berber studies at Algiers University was abolished in 1973;
possession of the Berber alphabet and dictionaries was made a
criminal offence (Guenoun, 1999: 32–33; Sadi, 1991: 29–30). The
frustration of the local population reached its climax with the
censorship of Mammeri’s lecture.
The 1980 convulsions, known as the Berber Spring, turned out to
be the first major destabilisation of the regime and announced the
1988 October uprisings which led to the end of the single-party
‘‘socialist’’ system and to political liberalisation. Prior to the Berber
Spring, Berberophones had adopted a form of passive resistance
expressed in language use. Tamazight-speaking parents banned the
use of Arabic by their children at home (Kahlouche, 2004: 106) and
resistance spilled over into the streets of Algiers where
Berberophones deliberately spoke French or Tamazight in cafes,
restaurants, hotels and certain administrative sectors (Harbi, 1980:
32). After 1980, under the ideological guidance of the Berber
Cultural Movement (MCB in French), Berberophones demanded
political liberalisation as a way to guarantee their linguistic and
cultural rights within a democratic Algeria (Maddy-Weitzman,
2001: 38). They also called for the official recognition of Algerian
Arabic and Tamazight and refused the arabisation of the educa-
tional system because of its ‘‘de-Frenchifying’’ objectives and its
inability to transmit democratic and secular ideals (Mahé, 2001:
471). Following the political liberalisation of post-October 1988,
two Departments of Berber Language and Culture were created,
one at the University of Tizi Ouzou in January 1990 and the
other at the University of Bejaia in October 1991 (Chaker, 1998:
150; Kahlouche 2000: 158; Tigziri 2002: 61). Between September
1994 and April 1995, the MCB organised general strikes and
paralysed the entire educational sector in Kabylia. Consequently,
the government decreed the creation of an administrative structure,

the High Commission for Berber Affairs (HCA in French) to be
attached to the president’s office (Cherrad-Benchefra & Derradji,
2004: 166). The objectives of the HCA were to rehabilitate the
Berber culture and introduce the Tamazight language in education
and the media (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001: 39). There was also a prom-
ise for a future recognition of Berber. Seven years later (April 2002)
following uprisings in spring 2001, President Bouteflika’s govern-
ment institutionalised it as a national (though not official) language.
The teaching of Tamazight organised by the HCA was marked
by a great deal of haste and improvisation because the Berber lan-
guage lacked an official status and proper planning institutions
(Kahlouche, 2000: 161–162, Tigziri, 2002: 64). The situation chan-
ged after it became a national language. Since September 2003 and
the beginning of the implementation of parts of the recommenda-
tions made by the CNRSE, Tamazight has been taught as a subject
in Middle Schools nationally (Benrabah, 2005). A year later,
French was finally introduced as the first mandatory foreign
language in Grade Two of the primary cycle with 3 hours a week
and English as the second mandatory foreign language in Grade
Six. The authorities also recruited 1,500 French teachers to meet
the demand for French language teaching (Cherfaoui, 2004: 2). But
the reintroduction of French as a medium of instruction for
scientific disciplines in secondary education is not on the agenda
yet because of the pressure exerted from the pro-arabisation
quarters. However, the government has made a major move against
this lobby. Since September 2005, the Ministry of Education has
discontinued the Islamic/religious courses in the secondary cycle
and their respective exams in the Baccalaureate (Aı̈t Ouarabi, 2005:
1 & 3). In August 2003, Article 6 of Ruling No. 03-09 legalised
private schools which provided ‘‘strong’’ forms of bilingual educa-
tion and which had so far existed in a legal vacuum (Nassima,
2003). It is within this context of change that the present author
decided to measure language attitudes among secondary school
students in Algeria.
Language Attitudes: ‘‘French for Action, Arabic for Prayer

and Poetry’’
Arabisation in Algeria had to be implemented with great care

because of the many obstacles that lay ahead of it. In the 1960s,
two prominent Algerian intellectuals expressed their anxiety

concerning possible negative outcomes. As early as November/
December 1963, Mostefa Lacheraf disparaged the first implementa-
tion of arabisation that had then been embarked upon. He warned
against Arabic school manuals which were so full of abstract words
that they might awaken a dislike for Arabic among Algerian stu-
dents and encourage them to prefer French (Gordon, 1966: 192–
193). A few years later, another Algerian scholar, Abdallah Mazo-
uni, published an extensive piece of work on the language issue in
Algeria in which he posited that rapid arabisation might prove,
among other things, harmful to the Arabic language itself, might
be regressive and could alienate students because the language was
difficult and the teaching tools were inadequate. In particular, he
warned against the persistence of the myth that maintained Arabic
as the language for prayers and poetry and French for action,
development and modernity (Mazouni, 1969: 38 & 185).
Young Algerians’ attitudinal reactions towards bilingualism
and multilingualism were intended to assess, among other things,
Lacheraf’s and Mazouni’s predictions. In April–May 2004, a
written direct questionnaire was filled in by Algerian secondary
school students. It is important to emphasise here the difficulties
associated with the use of direct questionnaires for the study of
language attitudes (attention focused on the issue to be probed),
and a fortiori of a self-administered written test battery. The aim
of the study was not about language but about attitudes towards
various languages that are in competition in Algeria. What is
more, a questionnaire remains a practical and economic way for
collecting attitudinal reactions. The questionnaire was designed to
solicit information from students in three cities located in the
west of Algeria. The test-battery consisted of 5 parts. In the first
2, respondents had to select one among 10 alternatives, each
containing 1 or a combination of 2, 3 or 4 languages. The third
section presented a series of 30 statements each expressing a
particular opinion about the 4 languages of Algeria: Algerian
Arabic, Literary/Classical Arabic, French and Tamazight (or
Berber). The subjects were asked to select the language they felt
corresponded to each statement. In the fourth part (Likert
attitude scale), respondents indicated strength of agreement or
disagreement with a series of 25 statements on a 5-point range.
The final section of the questionnaire sought to solicit demo-
graphic data.
Respondents were selected on the grounds of age, gender,

education (school grade), field of study (sciences or humanities)
and residence (size of urban centre). A total of 1,051 informants
filled out the questionnaire but not all respondents answered all
questions: for example, one statement received the lowest number
of responses (1,006) while another got the highest number of
responses (1,043). As far as gender is concerned, 42.5% were male
and 57.5% female. They were all aged between 14 and 20 and the
majority (55.6%) were 17–18 years old. All attended secondary
schools: 50.6% were senior pupils in the final year, at the end of
which they sit for the Baccalaureate exam, and 49.3% in the
second form 2 years before the Baccalaureate. There were 51.2% in
scientific disciplines and 48.8% in the humanities. Three major
towns were chosen on the basis of population size and accessibility,
Oran (1 million inhabitants), Saı̈da (200,000) and Ghazaouet
(40,000). The distribution of informants was as follows: 34.3%
Oran, 20.8% Saı̈da and 44.8% Ghazaouet. The rationale behind
choosing secondary school pupils was threefold. First, they were
preferred to university students in university language Departments
who had already made their choice. Second, the age-group of our
sample is representative of the Algerian population in general:
within present-day Algeria’s age structure, those under 30 represent
62.7% (Riols, 2004: 50–51), and 40% of the population is of
school-age (Martı́n, 2003: 53). Hence, this age-group determines the
future. Finally, the choice of secondary-school students was also
motivated by the following quote:
secondary schools in post-colonial societies are generally a significant site for
exploring how language use and attitudes about language are nuanced by broader
issues of identity as teenagers, in the throes of negotiating their identities, must do
so in an environment where language policies in the schools supplant their natal
language (White, 2002: 17)
Table 1 presents the pupils’ language preferences (1 – ‘‘Language

that I like most’’, 2 – ‘‘I like to learn/study in’’). The results show
that Lacheraf’s fears were not groundless. For both statements, the
French language disqualifies Literary Arabic: out of 1,035
responses, 44.4% preferred French, 36.0% Literary Arabic, 17.3%
Algerian Arabic and 2.2% Tamazight. Most of the results shown in
Table 2 tend to support the claims made by Mazouni. Traits related
to ‘‘sacredness’’, ‘‘beauty’’ and so on, are usually associated with
Literary Arabic. 82% chose Literary Arabic for Statement 1 (‘‘I feel
close to God in’’) and this is confirmed by an equivalent high
TABLE 1
Language preferences.
Algerian Literary French Tamazight Total

Arabic Arabic
Statement Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

(1) Language that 179 17.3 373 36.0 460 44.4 23 2.2 1,035
I like most
(2) I like to learn/study in 60 5.8 391 37.6 575 55.3 14 1.3 1,040
percentage (80%) for Statement 2 (‘‘The language of religious and

moral values’’). Moreover, of a total of 1,035 respondents, 75%
chose Literary Arabic as ‘‘the richest language’’ (Statement 3). As to
the fourth statement which concerns ‘‘authenticity’’ (‘‘The language
that allows me to understand the past’’), Literary Arabic has the
highest score (51.6%). However, the distinction was not as clear-cut
as for the preceding statements: out of 1,027 respondents, 33.8%
preferred Algerian Arabic as the language that allows them to under-
stand the past. For the trait ‘‘language of culture’’ (Statement 5),
TABLE 2
Religious values, aesthetics and grammatical difficulty.

Arabic Arabic
Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

(1) I feel close to 159 15.3 850 82.0 20 1.9 8 0.8 1,037
God in
(2) The language of 126 12.4 844 80.0 33 3.2 14 1.4 1,017
religious and moral
values
(3) The richest 66 6.4 776 75.0 185 17.9 8 0.8 1,035
language
(4) The language that 347 33.8 530 51.6 124 12.1 26 2.5 1,027
allows me
understand the past
(5) The language 70 6.8 550 53.7 388 37.9 17 1.7 1,025
of culture
(6) Most beautiful 125 12.0 471 45.2 432 41.4 15 1.4 1,043
language
(7) Language with the 42 4.1 620 60.4 252 24.5 113 11.0 1,027
most difficult grammar
Literary Arabic obtains almost the same score (53.7%) as for

Statement 4 (51.6%). French comes second with 37.9%. With
Statement 6 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’), the percentages for
Literary Arabic and French are more or less equal: 45.2% and
41.4% respectively. The ‘‘most beautiful’’ languages and ‘‘languages
of culture’’ are the two languages of literacy valued by the educa-
tional system. This is probably the reason why Literary Arabic and
French scored the highest for Statement 7 (‘‘The language with the
most difficult grammar’’). With 1,027 respondents, 60.4% chose
Literary Arabic, 24.5% French, 11% Tamazight and 4.1% Algerian
Arabic. These results confirm Mazouni’s claim about the difficulty
of learning Literary Arabic. In fact, in April 2000, participants to
the National Conference on the Teaching of Arabic declared: ‘‘after
9 years in basic education, pupils still do not master Arabic
properly’’* (Liberté, 2000: 24). This was recently confirmed
(January 2006) by the Minister of Education who regretted the fact
that pupils did not master the Arabic language (Amir, 2006: 4).
Traits pertaining to the language of action, development, utility,
liberation, modernity and so on (Table 3) are associated with
French. For Statement 1 (‘‘Language which allows openness to the
world’’), French stands out with 91.5% and Literary Arabic comes
in second position with only 6.6%. As to ‘‘the language of science
TABLE 3
Language as capital and vehicle of modernity.

Arabic Arabic
Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

(1) Language which 15 1.5 68 6.6 944 91.5 5 0.5 1,032
allows openness to
the world
(2) Language of science 19 1.8 121 11.7 887 85.7 8 0.8 1,035
and technology
(3) My parents would 34 3.3 214 20.8 763 74.1 18 1.7 1,029
be ready to invest
money so that I can
learn or ameliorate my
(4) Most useful language 33 3.2 392 38.1 597 58.1 6 0.6 1,028
for studies
(5) Most modern language 35 3.4 94 9.1 849 82.1 56 5.4 1,034
(6) I say ‘‘I love you’’ to 250 24.5 153 15 599 58.6 20 2 1,022
my lover in
and technology’’ (Statement 2), 85.7% of respondents preferred

French and 11.7% Literary Arabic. Out of 1,029 informants,
almost three quarters (74.1%) admitted that ‘‘[their] parents would
be ready to invest money so that [they] can learn or ameliorate’’
their French (Statement 3). 20.8% chose Literary Arabic. The
results obtained for Statements 2 and 3 confirm the Algerian
government’s poll carried out in 1999 and mentioned above. The
two most ‘‘useful’’ languages for studies (Statement 4: ‘‘Most useful
language for studies’’) are French with 58.1% and Literary Arabic
with 38.1%. Note again that the languages valued in education
tend to score the highest. These results also highlight an Algerian
paradox: French comes well ahead despite language policies target-
ing it. It stands out as the ‘‘most modern language’’ (Statement 5)
with 82.1% of the responses. As to the results obtained for State-
ment 6 (‘‘I say ‘I love you’ to my lover in’’), it seems that courting
for young Algerians involves the greatest use of French (58.6%)
with Algerian Arabic coming second (24.5%), Literary Arabic third
(15%) and Tamazight fourth (2%). The results for Statement 6
confirm Benmesbah’s claim that French is the language for court-
ing in Algeria (2003: 13). In fact, the use of French in contexts of
courting is considered more ‘‘liberating’’: taboos which cannot be
communicated in the majority’s first language are transgressed by
French which marks impersonality and socio-psychological distance
(Bentahila, 1983: 65; Caubet, 2004: 16). However, it should also
be pointed out that around one quarter of the sample preferred
Algerian Arabic for transgressing taboos. Hence, it seems that
Algerian Arabic meets more and more Arabophones’ demands for
both ‘‘authenticity’’ and ‘‘modernity’’ (Benrabah, 2005).
When the results shown in Tables 1–3 are correlated with gen-
der, differences are statistically significant for both items in Table 1
and four items in Tables 2 and 3 (see Table 4). For Statement 1
(‘‘Language that I like most’’), gender differences are significant for
3 languages (p < 0.000). For Statement 2 (‘‘I like to learn/study
in’’), differences are significant for Literary Arabic and French
(p < 0.050). In their responses to Statement 3 (‘‘My parents would
be ready to invest money so that I can learn or ameliorate my’’)
and 4 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’), male informants favour Liter-
ary Arabic over French, while females prefer French. The results
for the present study suggest a high degree of ‘‘overt prestige’’ in
French as a marker of status. ‘‘Covert prestige’’ in Arabic (both
Literary and Algerian) corresponds to markers of national and/or
TABLE 4
Language attitudes and gender difference.
Statements Algerian Literary French Tamazight p

Arabic Arabic
M%F%M%F%M%F%M%F%
(1) Language that 16.6 8.6 47.3 43.4 34.8 46.5 1.4 1.5 <0.000
I like most
(2) I like to 6.4 5.1 41.2 34.9 50.6 59.0 1.8 1.0 <0.050
learn/study in
(3) My parents would 4.2 2.2 24.5 18.1 69.2 78.2 2.1 1.5 <0.011
be ready to invest
money so that I can
learn or ameliorate my
(4) Most beautiful 16.6 8.6 47.3 43.4 34.8 46.5 1.4 1.5 <0.000
language
(5) Most modern 5.7 1.7 10.3 8.2 79.8 83.7 4.1 6.5 <0.001
language
(6) The language that 32.5 34.7 49.3 53.4 14.3 10.3 3.9 1.5 <0.019
allows me understand
the past
local within-group solidarity. In fact, the significant difference

shown between male and female informants’ choices for Statement
4 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’) can also be linked to perceptions of
‘‘masculinity’’: 16.6% of the male respondents chose Algerian
Arabic as the most beautiful language while only 8.6% of females
did so. With Statement 5 (‘‘Most modern language’’), the infor-
mants’ attitude is unambiguous: most of them (79.8% of males and
83.7% of females) are certain that the ‘‘most modern language’’ is
French, with female informants scoring significantly higher than
male informants. As far as Statement 6 is concerned (‘‘The
language that allows me understand the past’’), it is females who
favour Algerian Arabic or Literary Arabic more than males. This
seems to reflect a belief in women’s role as ‘‘guardians of tradition’’
in pre-industrial societies (Benrabah, 1999b).
The first and fourth parts of the questionnaire were designed to
measure, among other things, Algerian students’ attitudes towards
bilingualism/multilingualism. The Likert scale attitudinal measure-
ments show that most of the respondents value both speaking
several languages and Algeria’s multilingualism quite highly (see
Table 5). Moreover, these results support the issue discussed
TABLE 5
242
Attitudes towards bilingualism/multilingualism.
Statement 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Neither agree 4 Disagree 5 Disagree

completely nor disagree completely
(1) Today, it is an advantage 55.8% (586) 31.8% (334) 4.8% (50) 4.1% (43) 1.7% (18)
to speak several languages.
(2) The existence of several languages 48.3% (508) 34.3% (361) 7.7% (81) 5% (53) 3.9% (41)
is a wealth for Algeria.
(3) Arabic–French bilingualism 40.2% (423) 41.6% (437) 9.8% (103) 4.7% (49) 3% (32)
is an advantage when living in Algeria.
(4) I am for bilingualism in Algeria. 28.6% (301) 41.3% (434) 10% (105) 8.3% (87) 9.2% (97)
(5) Being bilingual in Arabic and French 40.5 (423) 41.9 (437) 9.9 (103) 4.7 (49) 3.1 (32)
is an advantage and allows one
to live and prosper in Algeria.
(6) Literary Arabic is necessary 8.5 (89) 19.3 (201) 17.5 (182) 32.8 (342) 21.9 (228)
for finding a job in Algeria.
(7) I think Tamazight should be recognised 6.2% (65) 7.3% (76) 10.6% (111) 18.7% (195) 57.2% (597)
mohamed benrabah
as national and official language

earlier: monolingualism in Literary Arabic alone does not ensure

social mobility, which is considered possible mainly through the
mastery of Arabic–French bilingualism.
However, the data collected with the first part of the test battery
show that the situation is far more complex and a number of inter-
esting observations can be drawn from Table 6. Informants remain
resolutely opposed to monolingualism in any one of the competing
languages in Algeria even though they do not necessarily support
all types of bilingual choices. For example, there are low percent-
ages for choices, which involve Tamazight. Three main reasons
could explain the rejection of the Berber language: (1) respondents
come from an exclusively Arabic-speaking region with very limited
contact with Tamazight (the cities of Oran, Saı̈da and Ghazaouet
are located in the western part of Algeria), (2) the common trend
in diglossic communities in general and in the Arab world in
particular that views ‘‘Low’’ varieties negatively, (3) the hostility
generated by the authorities’ propaganda that describes the rebel-
lious Kabylian community as ‘‘anti-Algerian’’ and ‘‘separatist’’.
The results in most tasks of the questionnaire tend to give credence
to the third hypothesis. Indeed, responses presented in Table 7
suggest that the young secondary school students held strongly neg-
ative attitudes towards the Berber language and had little respect
for it even though all of them lived in non Tamazight-speaking
areas with no linguistic competence in this language. Almost three
TABLE 6
Best choice of language(s) for social advancement.
Question: Out of the following 10 possibilities, what is the best choice of

language(s) that could allow you to live and prosper in Algeria and elsewhere?
Choices % (out of 1,036)
(1) English only 2.9

(2) Arabic only 4.4
(3) French only 2.8
(4) Tamazight only 0.2
(5) Arabic and Tamazight 0.5
(6) Arabic and French 15.5
(7) French and Tamazight 0.1
(8) Arabic and English 3.9
(9) Arabic, English and French 58.6
(10) Arabic, English, French and Tamazight 11.1
TABLE 7
Attitudes towards Tamazight.
Statements Algerian Literary French Tama- Total

Arabic Arabic zight Fre.
Fre. % Fre. % Fre. % Fre. %
(1) The language that 58 5.7 95 9.4 105 10.4 753 74.5 1,011
I like the least
(2) Language that is 153 15.2 84 8.3 38 3.8 731 72.7 1,006
incapable of progress
and evolution
(3) Most difficult language 46 4.5 198 19.2 86 8.4 699 67.9 1,029
(4) The least ‘‘pure’’ 378 36.7 49 4.8 25 2.4 577 56.1 1,029
language and the
most ‘‘mixed’’
quarters admitted that Tamazight was ‘‘The language [they] like the
least’’ (Statement 1) and considered it ‘‘incapable of progress and
evolution’’ (Statement 2). Tamazight was also perceived as ‘‘the
most difficult language’’ (67.9% for Statement 3). Lack of respect
for it is reflected in the responses given to Statement 4 which
concerned purism: 56.1% considered the Berber language to be
‘‘The ‘least pure’ language and most ‘mixed’’’ – note also that
36.7% described Algerian Arabic as the most ‘‘impure’’ language.
Moreover, the informants’ strong opposition to Berber is clearly
expressed in tasks, which required them to agree or disagree with
the recognition of Tamazight as an official language (see Statement
7 in Table 5). Out of a total of 1,032 responses, 18.7% (195
answers) disagreed and 57.2% (597) disagreed completely with the
statement. In other words, 792 informants out of 1,032 rejected the
official recognition of Tamazight. No wonder Algeria’s Berberist
leadership rejects the government’s choice of a referendum on the
question.
The other results in Table 6 show that the combination of
Arabic and French with one or two other languages emerged as the
most interesting pattern (15.5% and 11.1% for choices 6 and 10
respectively). The majority preferred the choice, which involved
Arabic, English and French (58.6%). It was shown above that the
introduction of English as a competitor to French in the primary
cycle failed in the 1990s. This failure is also illustrated here in the
results obtained for choice 8 in Table 6: only 3.9% preferred the
choice ‘‘Arabic and English’’. In fact, respondents seem to reject

policies that seek to displace French in favour of English. The
young people surveyed value ‘‘additive’’ rather than ‘‘subtractive’’
language policies and favour multilingualism.
One step forward two steps back
Algerians’ experience with language policy in education grossly cor-

responds to two major periods. The first one was characterised by
widespread bilingualism in French and Literary/Classical Arabic
and produced a socio-linguistic competence frequently expressed by
Maghrebins/Algerians who attended these schools back in the
1960s and 1970s. Openness towards linguistic plurality is illustrated
in lecturers’ and/or students’ use of code-switching as a strategy to
get their points across. According to Sultana (1999: 32):
Anybody who has interacted with Maghrebin scholars knows the extent to which
this code-switching is not only frequent, but almost instinctive, producing an
effortless and seamless flow of language that is comprehensible and acceptable
within the academic community.
The second period produced monolingualism in Literary Arabic

for the majority of the population, and French–Arabic bilingualism
for the children of those in power. It has led to a worrying situa-
tion: every year, cohorts of semi-literate graduates (known as
‘‘bilingual illiterates’’) with low language proficiency and educa-
tional achievement (Azzouz, 1998: 52; Benaı̈ssa, 1998: 91; Coffman,
1992: 146–147; Miliani, 2000: 20) are denied participation in the
society. Their training has been prejudiced by the obligation of
learning scientific subjects in Literary Arabic. It has produced gen-
erations of outcasts unequipped to face the modern economy
(Beaugé, 2004: 17). In mid-November 2005, the Minister of Higher
Education publicly admitted that Algerian university graduates
could not be integrated into Algeria’s economic market (Allal,
2005: 13; Maı̈z & Rouadjia, 2005: 13). These dissatisfied graduates
constitute an important and potentially turbulent element of the
society. Moreover, they could become ‘‘a demographic bomb’’
(Riols, 2004: 50) if they were to migrate massively to neighbouring
Europe and reinforce international Islamist terrorism (Byrd, 2003:
78). The recent government’s educational reforms, with the reintro-
duction of Arabic–French bilingualism (at least on paper), reflect
the authorities’ (and the international community’s) awareness of
this serious situation. But attempts to reform the system are being
thwarted by strong internal opposition.
In Algeria, elites view linguistic pluralism with suspicion, if not
outright hostility. Their hesitation to abandon the policy of arabi-
sation is in stark contrast to neighbouring countries’ practices. In
2000, Moroccans produced the Charter for Educational Reform
which, among other things, aimed at encouraging more openness to
the languages that had been targeted by arabisation (French and
Tamazight). What is more, the term arabisation itself was not men-
tioned in the Charter because it has become negatively connoted
(Marley, 2004: 31). In Algeria, recent developments show that the
government has started back-pedalling on its engagements towards
educational reforms and bilingual education. In the fall of 2005,
the Minister of Higher Education admitted that the European
Union had suspended its aid to Algerian universities because the
government was dragging its heels over reforming the educational
system (Allal, 2005: 13). Furthermore, in November 2005, legisla-
tion was passed by Parliament forbidding the use of languages
other than Arabic as the medium of instruction in private schools,
which had provided scientific disciplines in French for 10 years
(Moali, 2005). School heads who do not abide by the rule will have
to face imprisonment (Maı̈z & Rouadjia, 2005: 13). And in May
2006, the Ministry of Education took the decision to move the
teaching of French from Grade Two to Grade Three, starting from
September 2006 (Benrabah, 2006: 70).
There is even greater indecision over how to tackle the Berbero-
phones’ linguistic demands. The authorities have made some con-
cessions but the major obstacle to granting broad linguistic rights
to Kabylians remains the government’s refusal to accept Berber as
an official language. The most recent developments show how the
situation is fraught with tension and difficulty. In September 1999,
President Bouteflika declared that ‘‘Tamazight would never be con-
secrated in law as an Algerian official language and if it were to be
a national language, it is up to the entire Algerian people to decide
by referendum’’*. In 2002, he made Berber a national language
without resorting to a plebiscite. Yet, in March 2004, he described
Tamazight as ‘‘a factor of division in national unity’’ (Lewis, 2004).
More recently, the talks between the Aruch (Kabylia’s representa-
tives) and President Bouteflika’s government have seemed more
promising. In August 2005, after several rounds of talks, the Prime
Minister and the Aruch agreed on making the Berber language
official without a referendum (Djilali, 2005: 2). But in September

2005, President Bouteflika took everyone by surprise when he pub-
licly disagreed with his Prime Minister. He said:
Arabic will remain the only official language of Algeria. No country in the world
has two official languages and it will never be the case in Algeria where the only
official language, recognised by the Constitution, is Arabic. I cannot accept things
that work against Algeria’s interests* (Benchabane, 2005).
In response to the president’s U-turn, the Aruch made public the

following statement
[We] consider that the arguments used by the Head of State to deny Tamazight
the right to be an official language are complete nonsense and full of untruths.
There are many states with several official languages: South Africa, with its eleven
languages, is the most enlightening example* (Benchabane, 2005).
The foregoing arguments and counter-arguments readily show

the difficulty for Algerians to move decisively from the ‘‘one lan-
guage–one nation’’ ideology of language policy and national iden-
tity (arabisation) to a multilingual language policy which promotes
ethnic and linguistic pluralism (algerianisation) as resources for na-
tion-building. Algeria’s promoters of linguistic convergence have
failed in their endeavours for at least four reasons. First, planners
overlooked both the full complexity of the country’s socio-linguistic
profile as well as the population’s feelings about the different lan-
guages in competition within the country. Second, arising out of
this is the presence of a sort of minority nationalism among the
Berber-speaking population, which prevents nation-building as a
viable strategy. The language issue has been divisive ever since
Algeria obtained its independence. Third, planners systematically
opposed Literary Arabic to French (or French to English) thus
creating a context of rivalry between them even though the two
languages are complementary. In fact, four decades of arabisation
have led to a situation where each language in Algeria occupies a
set of functions, which are more or less complementary. For the
majority of Algerians (1) their first languages, Algerian Arabic and/
or Tamazight, allow them to draw their sense of national belonging
(identity), (2) Literary/Classical Arabic is associated with Arabo-
Islamic values (religion), and (3) French, and English in some
specific domains, represent economic power (Benrabah, 2005).
Fourth, arabisation as an exclusionary (monolingual) educational
policy does not promote social justice because the majority of
Algeria’s youth are excluded from the socio-economic activities of
the country. The denial of French-medium instruction contributes

to perpetuating the linguistic gulf that separates the bilingual elite
from the vast majority who are literate or semi-literate in Literary
Arabic only.
Hence, the policy of arabisation was implemented by an
authoritarian regime that was and still is allergic to pluralism (be it
political, cultural or linguistic). When the Algerian government
yields to the pro-arabisation lobby and favours restrictive language
policies to forge national consensus and reconciliation, it seeks to
impose the preferences of one subgroup onto everybody. Their
claims are neither morally legitimate nor rationally convincing.
They are simply expressions of a non-democratic system: ‘‘Arabisa-
tion has become one more prop of an authoritarian regime that re-
fuses to engage in much-needed economic and political reforms.’’
(Lewis, 2004) The liberal-democratic tradition favours the set of
values, which enhance individual freedom, promote civic equality
and social justice, and/or strengthen democracy (Kymlicka & Pat-
ten, 2003: 7). To implement these values in Algeria, the authorities
need to move in the direction of reforms, which support linguistic
pluralism and abandon the policy of arabisation.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mohamed Benrabah is Professor of English Linguistics and Socio-

linguistics at the ‘UFR Etudes Anglophones’, Stendhal-Grenoble
III University (France). His research focuses on applied phonetics/
phonology, sociolinguistics, and language policy, language planning
and language-in-education planning with a particular interest in the
Maghreb and the francophone world. His publications include a
contribution to Les Violences en Alge´rie (Paris: Editions Odile Ja-
cob, 1998), and a book Langue et Pouvoir en Alge´rie. Histoire d’un
Traumatisme Linguistique (Paris: Editions Séguier, 1999). He is the
author of the recent monograph The Language Planning Situation
in Algeria (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2005). Address for cor-
respondence: UFR d’Etudes Anglophones, Université Stendhal
Grenoble III, Domaine Universitaire 1180 avenue Centrale, B.P.
25, 38040, Grenoble cedex 9, France. E-mail: Mohamed.Benra-
bah@u-grenoble3.fr

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Language Policy (2007) 6:225–252 !

LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION PLANNING IN ALGERIA:

(Received 1 March 2006; accepted in revised form 31 December 2006)

ABSTRACT. The paper presents the language policy (arabisation) pursued in

KEY WORDS: Algeria, arabisation, bilingualism, English, French, language

ABBREVIATIONS: CNRSE – National Commission for the Reform of the Edu-

Algeria’s development history since its independence consists of

version of exclusive nationalism inspired by the 19th century

towards Algeria’s multilingualism. In the final section, it will be

Educational System in Crisis: Reforms and Reactions

Post-independent language-in-education policies

One month before independence, the leadership of the Algerian

levels. Furthermore, religious instruction and civics were added on

lower educational quality led many parents to delay the registration

were sidelined by the pro-arabisation lobby (Islamists, conservatives

Hegemony and Resistance

Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi replaced Mostepha Lacheraf as Minis-

university departments (Islamic Law and Arabic Literature in

future and repetitive unrest in the Kabylian region. The hasty

the government decreed the creation of an administrative structure,

Language Attitudes: ‘‘French for Action, Arabic for Prayer

Arabisation in Algeria had to be implemented with great care

two prominent Algerian intellectuals expressed their anxiety

Respondents were selected on the grounds of age, gender,

Table 1 presents the pupils’ language preferences (1 – ‘‘Language

Algerian Literary French Tamazight Total

Statement Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

percentage (80%) for Statement 2 (‘‘The language of religious and

Algerian Literary French Tamazight Total

Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

Literary Arabic obtains almost the same score (53.7%) as for

Algerian Literary French Tamazight Total

Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.

and technology’’ (Statement 2), 85.7% of respondents preferred

Statements Algerian Literary French Tamazight p

local within-group solidarity. In fact, the significant difference

Statement 1 Agree 2 Agree 3 Neither agree 4 Disagree 5 Disagree

as national and official language

earlier: monolingualism in Literary Arabic alone does not ensure

Question: Out of the following 10 possibilities, what is the best choice of

Choices % (out of 1,036)

(1) English only 2.9

Statements Algerian Literary French Tama- Total

Fre. % Fre. % Fre. % Fre. %

choice ‘‘Arabic and English’’. In fact, respondents seem to reject

One step forward two steps back

Algerians’ experience with language policy in education grossly cor-

The second period produced monolingualism in Literary Arabic

official without a referendum (Djilali, 2005: 2). But in September

In response to the president’s U-turn, the Aruch made public the

The foregoing arguments and counter-arguments readily show

the country. The denial of French-medium instruction contributes

Abdelhai, B. (2001). L’école algérienne version Ennahda. El Watan, 8 April, 7.

Benachenhou, A. (1992). L’accès au savoir scientifique et technique. In M. Lakehal

Gallagher, C. F. (1968). North African problems and prospects: Language and

Messaoudi, K. & Schemla, E. (1995). Une Alge´rienne debout. Paris: Flammarion.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mohamed Benrabah is Professor of English Linguistics and Socio-

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