Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
ACRONYMS vii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO HISTORIC ETHIOPIA 46
1.1 The Evolution of Historic Ethiopia 47
1.2 The Institutional and Symbolic Elements of the Nation 64
CHAPTER TWO: THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF
MODERN ETHIOPIANISM 83
2.1 The Italian Interlude (1936-1941) 89
2.2 The Foundations of Modern Ethiopianism 104
CHAPTER THREE: THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL AND
ETHNIC NATIONALISM 150
3.1 Ethno-National Challenges to the Ethiopian State 160
3.2 The Ethiopian Student Movement and the National Question 169
vi
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ERA OF SOCIALIST NATIONALISM 201
4.1 The Genesis of Socialist Ethiopianism 206
4.2 The Nationalities versus the State 244
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ERA OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM 266
5.1 Ethno-National Empowerment and Redefinition of the
Ethiopian Nation 270
5.2 The Resurgence of Ethiopianism 308
CONCLUSIONS 331
BIBLIOGRAPHY 350
APPENDIX 380
vii
ACRONYMS
AAPO All Amhara Peoples Organization
AEUP All Ethiopians Union Party
AZ Addis Zemen
CUD Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EDP Ethiopians Democratic Party
EPF Ethiopian Patriotic Front
EPLF Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party
ESM Ethiopian Student Movement
ESUE Ethiopian Students Union in Europe
ESUNA Ethiopian Students Union in North America
GPNRS Gambella Peoples National Regional State
IES Institute of Ethiopian Studies
JOS Journal of Oromo Studies
MEISON All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council
SLM Sidama Liberation Movement
viii
SPNNRS Southern Peoples, Nations and Nationalities Regional State
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front
UJD Union for Justice and Democracy
USUAA University Students Union of Addis Ababa
WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front
1
INTRODUCTION
Nationalism is as old as the modern world but it gained an unprecedented momentum
during the 20
th
century, when it spawned very potent political and social movements,
became a driving force in the fight against colonialism and imperialism, and powered
genuine struggles for freedom and social justice everywhere. The international
community is organized in terms of nation-states and the politics of national interest. The
idea of the nation has become so normative that a person without nationality is a moral
and legal oddity. Almost all wars of the past century have been fought under national and
sub-national banners so that the world has entered the era of identity wars.
1
Nationalism is today a maker or breaker of states, an agent of peace, stability and
progress as well as a cause of horrendous bloodshed, destabilization and destruction. The
most damning indictment of nationalism is its role in promoting intolerance, communal
egoism, arrogant patriotism, racist tyranny, and genocide.
2
In spite of its checkered
career and to the great dismay of political analysts, however, the 21
st
century has not yet
proved to be the threshold of the post-national era. On the contrary, [n]ational
movements are regaining popularity, and nations that had once assimilated and
vanished have now reappeared.
3
1
This is in contrast to the ideological wars of the Communist period. Susan L. Woodward, The Political
conom! of thno"#ationalism in $ugosla%ia,& in Leon Panitch and Colin Le!s 'eds(, Socialist Register.
Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism 'London) The *erlin Press, +,,-(, pp..-"/+.
+
$ael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism '#ew 0erse!) Princeton 1ni%ersit! Press,1//- (,p./2.
-
Ibid, p.-. 3ther anal!sts such as .4.Carr, Nationalism and After '1/52(, pp.-6"-., and ric 4o7s7awm,
Nations and Nationalism since 17!: "rogram, #$th, Realit$ 'Cam7ridge 1ni%ersit! Press) 1//,8+,,,(,
p.+29, ha%e made the %er! same predictions almost half a centur! apart. :nthon! Smith, %heories of
Nationalism ';reat <ritain) Camelot Press, 1/.1(.
+
The growth in the international study of nationalism has closely followed the increase in
its relevance in the past century. Though nationalism had begun to draw academic
interest in Europe in the second-half of the 19
th
century, there was no systematic effort to
understand it as an autonomous phenomenon until the aftermath of the First World War
(1914-1918).
4
During the interwar period, the unprecedented intensity, duration and
destructiveness of the Great War directed attention to the investigation of the causes of
war in general. The question why do nations go to war? led to an explicit analysis of
nationalism, which was considered as the major breeder of strife. The first coherent
scholarly works on the subject were written during this turbulent period.
Historians pioneered the field by recognizing nationalisms diversity and by charting its
emergence as an ideological force.
5
They constructed spatial, chronological and analytic
typologies and provided models and taxonomies. Philological and conceptual historians
attempted to distill the semantic confusion attending nationalistic rhetoric, conventional
usage and academic discourse. When scholars from other disciplines began to take
serious interest after the 1960s, they criticized the narrowly empiricist approach of
historians and introduced new analytical tools, theories and insights. They conceived
nationalism not only as a doctrine or ideology but also as a social movement with
5
Smith, %heories, p.+29. Scott <urchill and :ndrew Lin=later, %heories of International Relations 'St
*artins Press) 1//6(, pp.2, 6.
2
Credited as the twin founders of the academic stud! of nationalism, Carlton 4a!es and 4ans >ohn
defined the general methodolog! and focus of historians. >ohn argued that a fruitful understanding of
nationalism can 7e gained from a comparati%e anal!sis of its indi%idual and concrete manifestations
through time. Later historians ha%e 7een as faithful to this dictum as a famil! 7usiness. The %er! titles of
their erudite 7oo=s, A &istorical E'ol(tion of Nationalism '1/-1( and %he Idea of Nationalism '1/55(,
respecti%el! emphasi?e that the 7asic concern of the historian is understanding of the phenomena as an
Idea in transformation.
-
If England had been the birthplace of the nation-state, France was the home of its
nationalism. This is because the French Revolution (1789) heralded the era of the mass
nation by upholding popular sovereignty instead of dynastic claims as the basis of
national community. Underlying this fundamental change was 18
th
century
Enlightenment thinking centered on the concepts of liberty, humanity and universalism
applied within the framework of the nation-state.
16
The revolution defined the nation as
the people of a state and for the first time established a necessary connection between the
state as a political unit and the nation as a cultural one and the combination of these
two elements in a single political conception.
17
Hitherto the nation-state had been a historical fact, now it became a theory. It was
embodied in the theory of nationalism, which posited as an ideal the identification of
cultural and political communities in a universal system of nation states.
18
There is again
a one to one congruence between state and nation though the state, now owned by the
people, consciously and programmatically strived towards forging a national community.
This original ideology of the nation-state was later identified as civic nationalism
19
due to
16
>ohn, %he Idea,p.522
1.
:lfred Co77an, %he Nation State and National Self-)etermination 'London) Collins, 1/6/(, p.-2. Carr,
Nationalism, pp.+, 6. >ohn, %he Idea, pp.-, 6.
19
Ibid, p.-6
1/
4o7s7awm, Nations and Nationalism, p.9.. The t!pologies of nationalism %ar! depending on the
perspecti%es of scholars. For e@ample, 4echters t!pologies which coincide with the a7o%e two categories
are state"7uilding nationalism and peripheral nationalism respecti%el!, 7ut he also adds irredentist
nationalism and unification nationalismB *ichael 4echter, *ontaining Nationalism '3@ford K #ew $or=)
3@ford 1ni%ersit! Press, +,,,(. Smith, on the other hand, 7ased on the ethnic origin of nations has
territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism respecti%el!. :nthon! Smith, %he Ethnic /rigins of Nations
'3@ford) <lac=well, 1/96(. :ndersons t!pologies are official nationalism and %ernacular nationalism
respecti%el!. <enedict :nderson, Imagined *omm(nities) Reflections on the /rigin and S+read of
Nationalism 'London and #ew $or=) Lerso, 1/9-81//1(.
.
its emphasis on common citizenship rather than a unique culture or language as the
measure and substance of nationality.
20
The above historical development in Western Europe was reflected in the early semantics
of nationalism. Even though the term nation was a derivative of the Latin verb natio,
which in its pristine usage meant place of birth or origin and referred to a group of
people who believe they are ancestrally related,
21
it started to gain wider social and
political import with the genesis of the early nation-states in the 16
th
and 17
th
centuries.
During this period, notes Carr, the term nation throughout Western Europe was the
most natural word for the state.
22
This implied the homogeneous or national character of
the nation-state because, in contrast, the multiethnic empires of Central and Eastern
Europe were referred to by the legal term state. Though the designation nationality
was used for the various linguistic and cultural subjects of these empires, it had no
political significance until the currency of the principle of national self-determination in
the 19
th
century.
Next to evolve was an organic and ethnic conception of the nation based on the Romantic
Movement
23
(late 18
th
and early 19
th
century), which defined the nation in biological
+,
>edourie,Nationalism,p.21) : nation, to the French re%olutionaries, meant a num7er of indi%iduals
who ha%e signified their will as to the manner of their go%ernment.& Co77an, %he Nation State, p.12/)
The essence of political nationalit! is the recognition of a single political authorit!, and common
citi?enship...&
+1
>ohn, %he Idea, p.1+,. >edourie, Nationalism, p.2. Wal=er Connor, Ethnonationalism. %he 0(est for
1nderstanding '1>) Princeton 1ni%ersit! Press, 1//5(, p./5.
++
Carr, Nationalism, p.1. Connor , Ibid,p./5, also notes) Dt was perhaps from the 1.
th
centur! on that
nation came to refer to the entire +eo+les or citi2ens of a countr!. <! the end of the 1.
th
centur! it was
also emplo!ed as a s!non!m to the territorial state.&
+-
This was a %ast ideological orientation which also e@alted the role of intellectuals in societ!, and made it
imperati%e for national communities to redisco%er their pristine origins and golden ages.& 0ohn
4utchinson and :nthon! Smith 'eds(, Nationalism '3@ford 1ni%ersit! Press) 1//5(,p.2.
9
terms. As originally articulated by German intellectuals, the nation was a unique natural
community or a natural division of the human race, endowed by god with its own
character.
24
Gottfried Herder made the Volk (the people, the community) and its
language the basis of his doctrine and claimed that human civilization lives not in its
general and universal, but in its national and particular manifestation. A group
speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a
state.
25
Such ethno-linguistic entities were, therefore, regarded as the sole legitimate
foundations of any social and political association. Now it is not the state which defines
and forges the nation, but the ethnie that must form and constitute a state, an ethno-state,
Volkstaat. What is more, while the state is something artificial and accidental, the ethno-
nation is natural and essential.
This ideology wanted first to divorce the state from the nation and then overtake it, and in
its aspiration to do so made nation and state appear antagonistic. It shifted the concept of
national homogeneity from relatively wider historical and cultural similarities to sharply
specific boundaries of blood, speech and custom.
26
The sovereignty of the people was
sidelined by the uniqueness of the people, and the basis of nationality became such
primordial markers rather than territorial and political bonds of citizenship. This
derivative ideology was termed as ethnic or vernacular nationalism due to its emphasis on
+5
>ohn,%he Idea,p.5+/.
+2
>ohn, %he Idea, p.5+/.Connor,Ethnonationalism,p./.;oetfried4erder,#atureproducesfamiliesBthe
most natural state therefore is one people'Lol=( with a national character...& Cuoted in 0ohn <reuill!, The
Sources of #ationalist Ddeolog!,& in 0ohn 4utchinson and :nthon! Smith'eds(, Nationalism, p.1,..
>edourie, Nationalism, pp.1+"5-, 21,6+.
+6
Clifford ;eert?, Primordial and Ci%ic Ties,& in *ontserrat ;ui7ernau and 0ohn Ae@ 'eds(, %he Ethnicit$
Reader. Nationalism, #(ltic(lt(ralism and #igration ';reat <ritain) Polit! Press, 1//.81///(,pp.+/"-5.
/
attention to the conceptual yarn between state and nation, by restricting the one to the
legal-political and the other to the social-cultural realm.
54
Though the modern nation-state
claimed to combine these two attributes, its essential characteristics such as defined
territory, power monopoly and sovereignty were considered irrelevant to the concept of
the nation. But this conventional observation overlooks the very fact that nationalism has
always been aimed at making the political and cultural boundaries congruent, and,
historically as well as theoretically, it is no more feasible to keep state and nation apart.
Keeping a distinction between nation and nationality or ethnie, rather than between state
and nation, based on possession or lack of state power, is very important in untangling a
part of the confusion. If nationality is defined in terms of cultural or historical attributes,
then it only becomes nation when it establishes its own state (independent or
autonomous). The equality between nation and state automatically makes the former
political, whatever its cultural claims; it will accommodate both the civic and ethnic
conceptions of nationalism, and reunite nation and state in a single framework. This
means that, even if defined in political terms, states would have nationhood, and nations,
whether composed of one or many nationalities, would have statehood. Citizenship will
then denote political nationality in all kinds of states.
Methodologically, this approach would make all nations modern while giving
nationalities or ethnies more time depth. In addition, it delineates the relationship
ethnicit!are=indredconcepts,themaIorit!ofnationalismsareethnicincharacter.&<utthereisnodirect
leapfromethnicit!tonationalism7ecausetheformerhasalargel!culturalcontentwhilethelatteris
political.Forethno"s!m7olists,therelationship7etweenethnicit!andnationhoodiscentral.&
#ationalismandethnicismarerathertwopolesofacontinuum,continuit!7utnotidentit!.&p,119.
25
Seton"Watson, Cuoted in Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp.2/"6,, argued that a state is a legal and
political organi?ation with the power to reCuire o7edience and lo!alt! from its citi?ens,& while a nation is
a communit! of people, whose mem7ers are 7ound together 7! a sense of solidarit!, a common culture,
and a national consciousness.&
+1
between the legal-political state and other sub-national units, be they nationalities, ethnic
groups, regions, etc. Nationalism would also be sufficiently extended to include the
integrative ideologies of a state, reformist social groups within it, or the demands of
constituent nationalities couched in both cultural and political terms. This would
overcome a hiatus in the conventional typology of nationalism as official/civic and
ethnic/vernacular, which is impervious to a third alternative outside the two brands. Civic
nationalism must not be exclusively limited to the state as official nationalism; it should
also include the nationalism of non-ethnic or supra-ethnic reformist groups.
The modernist and ethno-symbolist perspectives on nationalism can be synthesized in
that the ideology and movement incorporate political, economic and socio-cultural
dimensions. In the final analysis, whether the state embodied the nation or the nation
possessed the state, nationalism has always been an ideology about empowerment -
political, economic and cultural. It is not the mere existence of heterogeneous groups and
languages which determines the unity or destruction of national development, but more
dynamic processes such as social mobilization, cultural assimilation and political
integration.
This study regards nations and states as synonymous as argued above. The nation-state
unifies the political and cultural aspects as it is based on two kinds of community, a
community of citizenship concerning the relations between citizens and the state
(including political, social, and economic rights and obligations); and a community of
sentiment, meaning a common language and a common cultural and historical identity
++
Academic concern with Ethiopian nationalism was coterminous with the national revival
and reunification efforts of the 19
th
century. The initial phase was a continuation of the
fascination with which medieval travelers, philologists, Semiticist scholars saw the
biblical antiquity of Ethiopia.
60
Ethiopian scholars also continued the mythology and
history in the hagiographic and chronicle writing tradition of the historic nation. Amharic
came of age as a national official and literary language mainly through the history writing
of the clerical scholarship. Narrative, chronological and genealogical histories were the
literary genre at this stage. When the earliest popular histories by Ethiopian writers began
to appear at the turn of the 20
th
century, their themes were ideologically allied to the
nation-building efforts of the modernizing state.
61
Italian scholarship during the
occupation period (1936-1941) outlined the future battle lines by shifting the emphasis
from the state to the peoples, from the nation to the ethnic groups, from politics to
cultures, from unity to diversity.
62
Modernity and modern education in the post-Italian
period ushered in a more scholarly work on the history of the nation. With the expansion
of higher education and training of a new generation of Ethiopian scholars, boosted by
coronation of mperor Tewodros DD'1922(, has an underl!ing modernist assumption of state consolidation,
e@pansion and continuit!. %en ethno"nationalists li=e Tesema Taa'1/96(, *erara ;udina'+,,-(, and
#egaso ;idada, 9e3Negaso #enged':ddis :7a7a) +,,5 C(, trace the roots of ethnic oppression to this
=ing. Surprisingl!, *erara 7ases his claim on a letter of mperor Tewodros, which has a single ethno"
stereot!pic word and fails to distinguish 7etween ethnicism and nationalism. :regawi, : Political
4istor!,& p.1, pushes a little 7ac= the politici?ation of ethnicit! in modern thiopia at least from the so"
called ra of the Princes.
6,
*erid Wolde":rega!, Southern thiopia and the Christian >ingdom, 12,9"1.,9. With Special
Aeference to the ;alla *igrations and their ConseCuences,& 'Ph.E. Eissertation) S3:S, 1/.1(, p.1/)GFor
most contemporar! uropeans who wrote on thiopia it was still the countr! of the Prester 0ohn. :s the
legendar! =ing was 7elie%ed to ha%e under him man! =ings, princes and du=es, thiopia was shaped to fit
the legend 7! 7eing di%ided into se%eral =ingdoms, principalities and du=edoms.G
61
Ta!e 'Ale6a(, 9e3Et$o+ia &i2b %ari4 ':ddis :7a7a) St.;eorge Press, 1/15.C(. 4iru! Wolde"
Silassie':ilaten ;etta(, 9e3 Et$o+ia %ari4 <e3Negist Saba Is4e %ala6( 9e3Ad,a )il ':ddis :7a7a) Central
Printing Press,1///.C(. Te=le"TsadiC *e=uria series from 1/-- onwards.
6+
Conti"Aossini and nrico Cerulli nota7l!.
+2
The integrationist views can be profitably combined to balance the two poles of the
nationalist phenomena: official or state-based nationalism from above and its impacts
on social groups below. Official nationalism operates through the fear of ethnic
nationalisms as threats to state integrity.
65
Thus at the heart of the history and politics of
nationalism resides a tension between the states concern for political stability and the
centrifugal quest for group-differentiated rights. The pattern of contact between the
central government and the peripheral cultures determines group formation. Therefore,
the state and its nationalism as expressed in official ideologies, institutions, policies and
legal provisions will be one major concern of this study.
Nationalities or ethnic groups are not, however, passive receptacles of everything from
above. As ethnic and social nationalists emerge as critics of the status quo, the study of
nationalism will remain incomplete without the study of opposition movements and
groups. The reason why ethnic communities should be among the basic social units on
which any analysis of nationalism is anchored is due to the profound interrelation and
continuity, though not identity, between nationalism and ethnicism.
66
The ethnie is a
mediate social category between the individual and the state which has a direct relevance
to the issue of nationalism. In polyethnic societies such as Ethiopia, the manner people
perceive their communal identity and destiny has a bearing on the conception of the
larger national community.
In addition, ethnic groups have come to attain increasing significance as ultimate units of
differentiation and rivalry, whether expressed in political or cultural terms, particularly so
62
>ellas,"olitics of Nationalism,p.2-.
66
Smith,National Identit$,p.5,.Smith,The ;enealog! of #ations&,p.//. Liah ;reenfield, Nationalism:
Fi'e Roads to #odernit$ '1S:) 4ar%ard 1ni%ersit! Press, 1//+(.
+.
significant gaps in the study. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the attempt to
supplement the study with extensive primary sources, such as newspapers, of the period
could not entirely overcome the national orientation of the dissertation.
The civicterritorial state does not define its relations exclusively with ethnic groups,
unless/even if it is ethnically structured. This unavoidable statecitizen interaction brings
into picture another aspect of nationalism, generational or ideological, especially
conceived in terms of reforming the state rather than destroying or dismembering it. This
supra-ethnic social nationalism is missing form most accounts of Ethiopian nationalism,
which either ignore it altogether or subsume it under official nationalism of the state.
69
This study adopts the concept of social nationalism as distinct from the official/civic
nationalism of the state as well as the ethnic/vernacular nationalism of particular ethno-
linguistic groups. It is intended to emphasize the socially inclusive characteristics of
nationalist ideologies and movements in Ethiopia between the two extremes, the state and
the ethnie.
70
The ESM started as a reformist generational critique of the ancien regime but its
moderate position was lost in the overbearing radicalism of the late 1960s and early
1970s and its original social nationalism remained in low key. The cardinal question of
the movement was the national question framed as a Marxist problematic and captured
in the terse query who is an Ethiopian? This is essentially a sociological question,
which is intertwined with a more historical question of when was Ethiopia? The
6/
*erara;udina,*om+eting Ethnic Nationalisms in Ethio+ia and the 0(est for )emocrac$ '+,,-(,for
e@ampleisconfusedhowtoaccountforwhathecallstheSouthandthethiopianLeft&inhisfault!
schemeofcontendingethnicnationalisms&inthiopia.
.,
:doptedfrom0ames>ellase@cellent7oo=,%he "olitics of Nationalism and Ethnicit$'London)
*acmillan,1//1(.
+/
answers may be categorized into two broad antithetical camps: Ethiopia always was and
Ethiopia never was.
71
The ambiguity about the concept of the nation, or more precisely,
who belongs to it and when did it emerge means that it is always hostage to conflicting
interpretations as this dissertation attempts to show.
Even though the Marxist generation (The Generation) was consciously anti-historical,
thus ahistorical and un-Marxist, the attitude towards the nationalities question was
ultimately decided by the political fortunes of contending groups at every stage of the
struggle. It is only partly true that the defeat and disarray of the multiethnic cosmopolitan
left constituted the defeat of Ethiopiansim.
72
In the heat of the ideological and military
battles between the Derg regime and sundry ethnic liberation movements, even the very
idea of historic Ethiopia was readily rejected by the latter in preference to the more
bizarre and derogatory appellation Abyssinia. The seemingly innocuous nomenclature,
which now permeates the literature, has, however, its consequence particularly in
obfuscating the understanding of the phenomena of nationalism. That the very term
Abyssinia was at best the result of European misunderstanding or, at worst, a deliberate
ploy by the colonial mindset intended to underscore the ethnic cleavages hardly needs a
71
$onas :dmasu, Narrating Ethio+ia: A "anorama of the National Imaginar$ '1ni%ersit! of
California)1//2(, p.2, Cuoting ;w!n Williams on the illusi%eness of the concept of the nation wrote) To
the Cuestion when was Wales, it is possi7le to return se%eral answers. 3ne could sa!, with a measure of
truth within narrow limits, that Wales ne%er was. Dt is eCuall! possi7le to sa!, with eCual truth within
eCuall! narrow limits, that Wales alwa!s was.& The antiCuit! %ersus in%ention de7ate has similarl! gi%en
rise to widel! di%ergent chronolog! of thiopian nationhood, from those li=e Sisai D7ssa, Tesema Taa and
Eimma #agoo who demarcate thiopias origin to the post"WWDD international recognition of its name
instead of the pre%iousl! preferred :7!ssinia, through those li=e dmond >eller who ma=e it no more
than a centur! old nation, to the traditional -,,,, !ears, and e%en to the li=es of Lapiso Eele7o who push
it 7ac= to 1,,,,, !ears and in e@treme cases as far as LuciR >eller, thiopia)Ae%olution,& p.2+5. Eimma,
Contested Legitimac!,& p.1,,. Tim Carmichael, :pproaching thiopian 4istor!) :ddis :7a7a and Local
;o%ernance in 4arar,ca 1/,, to 1/2,,& 'Ph.E. Eissertation) *ichigan State 1ni%ersit!,+,,1(, p...
.+
The mushrooming of national li7eration mo%ements in thiopia is regarded 7! some as a direct
conseCuence of the defeat of the Ae%olution. :ssafa ndeshaw, E%&I/"IA: "ers+ecti'es for *hange and
Rene,al 'Singapore) Seng Lee Press,+,,+(, p.-/.
-,
reminder.
73
The Abyssinian thesis has been effectively used to deny the pre-modern
history and continuity of Ethiopia.
Ethiopian nationalists and scholars seem to have roles in the ethncization of the nation
by unquestioningly adopting the term. This is too surprising since no Ethiopian of
whatever station of life ever called his country Abyssinia or himself and his people
Abyssinian as far as historical records go, at least prior to the 20
th
century.
74
The
hegemonic ideological and military battles of the past half-century resulted in standing
fissures among Ethiopian scholars and politicians over the nature and manifestation of
nationalism and its place in the countrys history. Nevertheless, on the main point of
divergence, that is, on the national identity of the Ethiopian polity and the appropriate
scholarly approach towards it, two main trends which parallel the civicethnic typologies
of nationalism theories are observed.
.-
The denial of the %er! self"name of the countr! thiopia, or the stu77orn and often racist preference
for :7!ssinia, has 7een a carr!o%er from that tradition of 3rientalist"Semiticist scholarship. thiopians
ha%e 7een consistentl! against 4a7asha':ra7ic( or its corruption :7!ssinia as earl! as the medie%al
period. *ichael ;eddes, %he *h(rch &istor$ of Ethio+ia 'London) 16/6(, p.11-, relates an interesting
incident) Tsega Ha7 asserts that G...#either is heOthe >ingP e%er called , as *atthew falsl!OsicP reported,
mperor of the 4a7assins, 7ut of the thiopiansB for heO*attehwP 7eing an :rmenian did not thoroughl!
understand our affairs, and least of all those relating to our Faith...G The appellation &abesha was
populari?ed in thiopia onl! in the post"Dtalian period. :regawi, : Political 4istor!,& p.+52, howe%er,
curiousl! mentions that 7esides thiopians another common name that includes man! of the people in
the central north of thiopia is &abesha3, and elderl! ritreans, along with their =in to the south, are
often proud to 7e called &abesha.G Eimma, Contested Legitimac!&, p.1,,fn)Mthiopia has 7een =nown as
:7!ssinia '&abash in :ra7ic( until it adopted the name thiopia after the Second World War, though the
name thiopia e@isted in religious te@ts, as it is also mentioned in the <i7le. Popular :ra7ic references to
thiopia still use the name &abash.G This is a willful 7lunder since the name thiopia was used 7! its
people since at least the 11
th
centur!, and alternatel! with :7!ssinia 7! outsiders perhaps a little later
than this.
.5
S%en Au7enson 'ed.(, Acta Aethio+ica, %ols. D, *orres+ondences and %reaties: 1!!-1?>':ddis :7a7a)
::1 Press, 1/9.(B DD, %e,odros and &is *ontem+oraries: 1??-1@':ddis :7a7a) ::1 Press, 1//5(B DDD,
Internal Ri'alries and Foreign %hreats':ddis :7a7a) ::1 Press, +,,,(.
-1
What may be termed as the Greater Ethiopia paradigm is the earlier trend which might
be ideologically traced to the initiation of national revival and reunification efforts of the
19
th
century. It underscores the civicterritorial conception of the nation and its historic
continuity.
75
The point of departure for this approach is the recognition that within the
geopolitical unit termed Ethiopia different peoples have been coexisting in various
degrees of interaction and isolation.
76
For Levine, Ethiopia is not yet a full-fledged
nation. It is rather an evolving system, a multinational polity with some coherence or
unity. Hence full understanding can be gained by approaching the matter from the
perspective of individualities as well as interactions with other groups and peoples.
77
The
Greater Ethiopia view adopts a dynamic and multilinear conception of history with very
important implications for the treatment of the history of nationalism in Ethiopia. By
integrating history with social theory it broadens the scope of investigation, enables us to
see changes and continuities and the interplay among diverse factors over a long period.
.2
Dt must 7e underscored that, in spite of the often misconstrued adIecti%e ;reater, this %iew does not
ad%ocate thiopian greatness and all scholars who consider the countr! as some form of unified entit!,
at least conceptuall!, do not su7scri7e to identical propositions regarding the characteristics of the unit
and its political and historical import. Cf. *ohammed 4assen, %he /romo of Ethio+ia 'Trenton, #0) 1//5(.
0ohn *ar=a=is, National and *lass *onflict in the &orn of Africa 'Cam7ridge 1ni%ersit! Press) 1/9.(. :ddis
4iwet, Ethio+ia: From A(tocrac$ to Re'ol(tion 'London)1/.2(. *andi 3ttawa!, Ethio+ia: Em+ire in
Re'ol(tion'#ew $or=) :frican Pu7lishing, 1/.9(. ;etahun Eele7o, mperor *eneli=s thiopia 1962"
1/16) #ational 1nification or :mhara Communal Eomination,&'PhE Eissertation) 4oward 1ni%ersit!,
1/.5(.
.6
This %iew was populari?ed 7! Eonald Le%ine '1/.5( who attempted to o%ercome the limitations of the
three maIor approaches in the stud! of thiopian histor!Q the Semitic past, the ethnographic present, and
the modernist future. <! com7ining the Parsonian theor! of total societies and the theor! of social
e%olution with a good deal of historical data he attempted to reconstruct the image of thiopia as a
comple@ sociocultural s!stem that has e%ol%ed through determinate stages&'p)+2(. Le%ines wor= still
remains unsurpassed 7oth in terms of theor! and insights.
..
*ohammed 4assen, %he /romo of Ethio+ia '1//5(,p.5, for instance, discredits the theor! of a pure
3romo tri7e deri%ed from a single founding fatherS& 4e maintains that the histor! of the 3romo people is
not a mechanical and unilinear compilation of the stor! of disparate tri7es which had 7een ta=ing place in
a7solute seclusion. What is more, the 3romo are not e@ogenous 7ut one of the indigenous peoples of
thiopia&'p)@iii(. Teshale Ti7e7u,%he #a4ing of #odern Ethio+ia:1=@-1=7> 'The Aed Sea Press)1//2(,p.@i.
-+
The second school is what may be termed as the Abyssinian Core paradigm, which
emerged as a critique to the state and the traditional conception of the nation. Writers
under this category are even less unified in their subscription to the Abyssinian Core
thesis.
78
Mainly represented by ethno-nationalists, this view approaches the history of
modern Ethiopia and its nationalism from an ethnically-specific vantage point.
Abyssinia, which is the main concept of analysis of nationalism, has been conceived in
its discontinuity, mutation, or separateness from modern Ethiopia.
79
This paradigm
generally calls attention towards certain ethno-cultural and historical factors in
characterizing the state and attempts to reflect peripheral perspectives in the study of
nationalism in Ethiopia.
80
By employing historical ethno-symbolism, this study
endeavors to show that the attempt to present Ethiopia as a self-serving ethnic project is
at variance with history, theory and empirical facts. It argues that though ethnicity and
ethnic groups are the normal makeup of the country, the Ethiopian nation or appropriately
rendered as Bihere Etyopia has from its inception been a supra-ethnic ideal.
.9
The %iew was first populari?ed 7! dward 1llendorf from what Teshale terms as the 3rientalist
Semiticist school 'p.@ii( or Le%ines Semiticist school '1/.5(.
./
For ;e7ru Tare=e '1//1(,p.+,6, modern thiopia is not the successor state of Christian :7!ssinia
7ecause the former is an :mhara dominated state. Furthermore, :mhara thiopia is an empire"state
while Christian :7!ssinia is a Christian nation. There is, therefore, a discontinuit! in the genealog! of
the state since *eneli= DDs assumption of power. For :dhana 4aile, *utation of Statehood and
Contemporar! Politics,& in :7e7e Hege!e and Siegfried Pausewang'eds(, Ethio+ia in *hange: "easantr$,
Nationalism and )emocrac$ 'London) <ritish :cademic press, 1//5(,p+2, the change is rather the
mutation of thiopian statehood due to the su7Iugation and denationali?ation of the historic state"
nation 7! *eneli= towards an empire"state, with northern Shawa alone occup!ing the status of state"
nationhood.&. Dn other words, all the predicaments of nationalism in contemporar! thiopia ha%e their
genesis since 199/.
9,
The most prolific ad%ocate of this %iew is what ma! 7e con%enientl! termed as the colonial school.
Eisproportionatel! represented 7! hardliner 3romo nationalists and a few e@patriate scholars, this %iew
argues that modern thiopia is an in%ention of the :7!ssinian core or specificall! the :mhara"Tigre
coalition, and that thiopians8 :7!ssinians and other Southern peoples ha%e alwa!s 7een separate
historicall!, politicall!, and culturall!. Dt follows that these two entities must 7e treated distinctl!.
--
sentiments. From this they draw the inevitable conclusion that national and ethnic
ideologies are antithetical.
83
However, pan-Ethiopian movements cannot be regarded in
toto as enemies of ethnic-nationalism. Ethiopianism in this study is intended to stand for
all ideologies and movements which aim to maintain the unity and integrity of the
Ethiopian state and nation. Ethiopianism in this sense, which loosely translates as
Etyopiawinet or Etyopiawi Bihertegnet, had been tentatively used during the student
movement.
84
Ethiopianism and ethnicism are not merely two countervailing arguments
but also the dual constitutive elements of the history of nationalism. The matter should
not be perceived in zero-sum terms. Affective ties to the state, though variable among
ethnic groups, can coexist with ethno-national consciousness.
85
It is in such continuous
dynamism that the history of nationalism in Ethiopia must be sought.
It is assumed in this study that all modern nations represent an uneasy confluence of a
more recent civic and more ancient genealogical mode of social and cultural
organization. The territorial as well as functional expansion of the Ethiopian state has
necessitated the absorption or integration of newer elements into the old national
framework. This, in itself difficult task for a transforming state, was compounded by
external influences, such as the Scramble for Africa and African decolonization, the
international waves of socialism and revolutions, the alignment in the Cold War, and the
83
>eller and $oung are perhaps the most notorious, who write in the %el!n Waugh st!le with little
sensiti%it!tothiopiasinternalsituation.>eller,thiopia)Ae%olution,&pp, 21/"25/. 0ohn $oung, "easant
Re'ol(tion in Ethio+ia: %he %igra$ "eo+le3s Liberation Front, 1=7?-1==1 'Cam7ridge 1ni%ersit! Press)
1//.(, p.9/, considers nationalism as an ata%istic mo%ement, ne%ertheless, rather than Mre%oltM or
Mre7ellionM, he uses the more purposeful and respecta7le term Mre%olutionM in characteri?ing TPLF struggle.
4e also seems credulous in using the MShoan :mharaM thesis as self"e%ident.
95
See, for e@ample, $ohannes Woldegiorgis in Str(ggle, DD, 1'Eecem7er 1/6.( and, more ela7oratel!,
:7dul *eIid 4ussein in Str(ggle, DDD,1'0anuar! 1/6/(.
92
Connor, Ethnonationalism, p.91
-2
peoples desire for security, economic prosperity, as well as meaning. Hence, any
analysis must integrate the political, economic and cultural reasons for nationalism.
This study interrogates some of the core theses of nationalist politicians and
Ethiopianists, namely that ethno-nationalism in Ethiopia was engendered by national
oppression; that there is a homogeneous, an unchanged and unchanging national core;
that all ethnic groups outside the so-called Abyssinian core per se are antagonistic to the
Ethiopian idea.
90
Merara claims that the southern vision of unity in diversity in a
democratized Ethiopia is something of an anomaly in Ethiopian national politics. The
southern region, where national oppression was believed to have been severe and even
compounded by class differences, had remained less confrontational to the state until the
collapse of the military regime. This study attempts to show that where such resistances
occurred in Ogaden and Bale they were mainly driven by external factors. If the center-
south was a special object of Shoan Amhara inequities, then why was the feeling of
alienation and resistance apparently more intense in the north? And more important, why
did not the south uniformly advance the colonial thesis? Conversely, the ethnocentric
rigidity has prevented some students from explaining the very different views among
pan-Ethiopianists, and even in accounting for the intensity of ethno-nationalism within
the alleged core.
91
/,
This cannot 7e so 7ecause groups often decide their political lo!alties pragmaticall! as seen in <elete
<i?uneh, :n agrarian Polit! and its Pastoral Peripher!) State and Pastoralism in the <orana <orderlands
'Southern thiopia(,19/."1//1,& ' Ph.E. Eissertation) <oston 1ni%ersit!,+,,9(, p.12-, showing the
<oranas constant support for the thiopian state while the Somali and the *uslims of :rsi in the post"
Dtalian period were mo7ili?ing anti":mhara sentiment.
/1
>eller, thiopia) Ae%olution,& p.2+5'fn() GAmhari2ation is a term which is well =nown and much used
among thiopianists. Dt merel! refers to the acceptance of :mhara culture and custom 7! non":mharas.
This process is facilitated through education, language, the Coptic religion and the ta=ing of :mhara
-.
Another serious pitfall in accounting for the genesis and manifestation of nationalism,
either from a historical or other perspective, from one or another paradigm, is the
arbitrary use of terms, concepts and typology.
92
Many students of Ethiopian history have
characterized Ethiopian nationalism as war nationalism.
93
This, while understandable, is
extreme reductionism which deems the phenomenon to be even narrower than patriotism.
Another loophole in nationalist literature is lack of sense of historical time, a telescoping
timelessness and anachronism.
94
Despite claims to impeccable scholarship, ethno-
nationalist historians and ideologues seldom worried about critical methodological
approaches to source material or the substantive truth of historical legends.
95
Present
categories are projected backwards and past political orders are arbitrarily regarded as
precursors of nations to come. There is also an undue concern on the politics and
Christian names.G thno"nationalists ha%e two conspicuous silences) 3ne is regarding the pre%alent
presenceof3romoelitesintheconstructionofmodernthiopia.*eneli=snominationasheirapparent
of D!assu, with a *uslim and 3romo 7ac=ground, is something unimagina7le and inimita7le e%en in a
seculari?ed and democratic thiopia. The other similar silence is regarding the predominant and
pioneering role of M:mharaM elite in the opposition of the imperial as well as the militar! regime.
/+
D.*.Lewis, Pre" and Post"colonial Forms of Polit! in :frica,& in D.*.Lewis'ed(, Nationalism and Self-
determination in the &orn of Africa 'London) Dthaca Press, 1/9-(,p..2, considers this in part a conseCuence
of the almost o%ernight& transmutation of tri7es into nations, encouraging a wanton a7use of nation
as a status e@pression rather than a social categor!.
/-
Teshale, %he #a4ing of '1//2(. Clapham, thiopia and the Challenge,&'+,,5(.
/5
*erara, *om+eting Ethnic '+,,-( argues that *eneli=s conception of the Shoan 3romo elite was made
on uneCual 7asis&. What =ind of eCualit!, one might as=N *erara answers proportional to their
num7ersR This is a glaring anachronism since democrac! is the onl! political s!stem 7ased on num7ers.
4is assertion regarding the %ulnera7ilit! of the $eIIu 3romo elite& in the power struggles of the Aemene
#esafint li=ewise considers the ri%alr! as among the masses of the people rather than the politicall!
rele%ant classes. For all practical purposes thiopian political tradition has pro%ed capa7le of
accommodating all =inds of contingencies Q of 7lood, creed and region.
/2
Carmichael, :pproaching thiopian 4istor!,& pp.9,/, deplores the Gmethodological nai%etT& of the
counter"discourse, prominentl! of the Sisai"4olcom7 and :ssefa 0alata t!pes, most of which are 7ased on
secondar! or tertiar! literatures. *ost others also fall in the same pits of thiopian historiograph!) a
progressi%e 7ut hapless D!assuB poor Tewodros who left to his name nothing e@cept a worthless cannonB
*eneli= the %illain par e@cellenceB 4ailesilassie the epitome of e%il and conspirac!, etc.
-9
ideology of nationalism rather than on underlying cultural and historical processes; a bias
for normative rather than analytical aspects.
By employing a balanced interdisciplinary approach, combining historical and
sociological methodologies and concepts, this research intends to overcome the
limitations of ideological and disciplinarian straitjackets, unsubstantiated theorization and
dogmatic empiricism. Generally, it is assumed in this study that nationalism is a
reflection of historical dynamics and hence is not allied permanently to any social class or
single ideology. It may be constructive of new states or destructive of existing ones; it
may protect or destroy freedom, or it may be pacific or belligerent, exclusive or inclusive,
constitutional or unconstitutional, etc. The only dependable way to ascertain the nature
and characteristics of nationalism(s) in a given country is through a dialectic treatment
showing how it arises and evolves under particular contexts.
96
Most scholars concede that national awakening originally emanates from a minority
social group, usually a disaffected or ambitious intelligentsia. However, it can take hold
among the broad masses through the vehicle of communication and social change.
Hroch(also Deutsch though not so articulately) has identified three stages in national
awakening among Western societies. The initial one is the time of inward looking or
reflection in which philological and historical investigations are aimed at digging into the
roots of the cultural community. The next stage is usually a longer period of fermentation
in which politicization of language, history and culture take root. The final stage
culminates in the awakening of the broad masses into the reality of the nation.
97
This
/6
>ellas,"olitics of Nationalism,p.--.:lter,Nationalism,pp.5.,59.
/.
4o7s7awm,Nations and Nationalism, p.1.2. :lter, Nationalism, p.26.
-/
study attempts to identify the various social groups involved in the civic, social and
ethnic nationalist struggles and reconstruct the processes in the history of nationalism in
Ethiopia.
In engineering the awakening process, nationalists employ various instruments. They
make plenty of promises. Nationalism abounds with promises couched in such slogans as
Through Unity to Freedom! This may be freedom from real or perceived crisis or ills;
emancipation from etatism, or more positive promises for personal development and an
active role in national community. They employ symbols appropriated from the cultural
and social resources of the group, artifacts such as flag, anthem, map, the tomb or
monument of the Unknown Soldier, etc, to personify various aspects of the nation.
Nationalists also establish cultural and political bodies of various sizes and degrees of
cohesion. While culture represents the totality of mans life, only some features of it are
singled out and defined as crucial in boundary processes. Much of the rest, including
national history, is deemed as invention and annexation.
98
In arguing the fluidity of cultures and boundaries, the imaginedness of nations, and the
inventedness of traditions, however, we have to heed Smiths warning about the danger
of overstatement. Nationalists do not simply fabricate their ideology, though a lot of
imaginativeness and creativity is involved. They rather build it on some pre-existing
cultural and historical material. In other words, nations cannot be created or invented ex
/9
4o7s7awminric 4o7s7awm and Terence Aanger, %he In'ention of %raditio,p.1, defines in%ented
tradition as a set of practices, normall! go%erned 7! o%ertl! or tacitl! accepted rules and of ritual or
s!m7olic nature, which see= to inculcate certain %alues and norms of 7eha%ior 7! repetition, which
automaticall! implies continuit! with the past.& 3ne of the outstanding instances of recent recreation of
heroes is that of :latta 4ailemariam Aedda, a man who was e%en recruited 7! the )erg to suppress what
later 7ecame =nown as the second We!anne&, ironicall! he is 7eing promoted as the founder of the first
We!anne&. ;e7ru Tare=e, Peasant Aesistance in thiopia) the Case of the We!anne,& %he 8o(rnal of
African &istor$, +2'1(, 'Cam7ridge 1ni%ersit! Press)1/95(,p.9,.
5,
nihilo. However, national identity may be submerged by the vagaries of history and may
have to be recreated by an active intelligentsia in the modern period.
99
Historical ethno-
symbolism becomes useful in analyzing such cultural and historical resources and
symbols over time.
Nationalist movements can be identified according to their basic strategies. Some pursue
their aims overtly, advertizing themselves and sensitizing target groups. Others are more
covert and conduct underground and conspiratorial activities. Nationalist movements may
also be constitutional or reformist, struggling within the available legal framework and
advocating moderate reforms. Others may be revolutionary or radical in their demands,
often calling for independent statehood. In most cases, nationalists do not stop at
regenerating and elevating their nationality, but they take a negative and combative
stance against an imagined or real Other, often conceived in ethnocentric or racist
terms.
100
As Greenfield noted, ethnic nationalism is often inspired by a sense of collective
inferiority and resentment against societies (or social groups) perceived to be morally and
//
Ea! and Thompson, %heori2ing Nationalism, p.6-.
1,,
:regawi, : Political 4istor!,& p.+,1, relates a7out the s!stematic encouragement of anti":mhara
sentiment within the TPLF and e%en in the post"Eerg period. 4e accuses TPLF"affiliated writers such as
0ohn $oung '1///( of complicit! and deli7erate credulit!, p.+,,'fn(. Tim Carmichael, <ureaucratic
Literac!, 3ral Testimonies, and the Stud! of Twentieth"centur! thiopian 4istor!,& 8o(rnal of African
*(lt(ral St(dies , 19'1(,'+,,6(, pp.+-"5+, relates of the intensit! of the anti":mhara propaganda circulated
7! go%ernment owned media in the earl! and mid"1//,s and compares this with the anti"0ewish
propaganda in the *iddle ast.
51
culturally superior...
101
This becomes potentially dangerous because it feeds upon the
atavistic sentiments of the people. Merara considers the modern elite as the catalyst for
the rise of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia.
102
This is a valid point. The study attempts to
assess how reflective of Ethiopian realities was the nationalist struggle, or how far it was
a turf war between disaffected intelligentsia of the various ethnic groups. It also takes
into account the stereotyping and counter-stereotyping involved in the rival ideologies,
the perception of the Ethiopian state, and the definition of nationalist groups in
contradistinction to the Ethiopian-Abyssinian-Amharan obfuscation and conflation.
103
Therefore, the main areas of focus of this dissertation will be the economic, political,
ideological and cultural aspects of nationalism, horizontally and vertically, at national
and sub-national levels, of the center and periphery, and at the level of various social
groups and classes. Structural, institutional, legal, and policy dimensions specifically
pertaining to nationalist aims will be addressed. This study also draws a distinction
between nationalist politics or nationalism and the whole gamut of national politics.
1,1
Liah ;reenfield, Eemocrac!, ethnic di%ersit! and nationalism,& in >Iell ;oldman, 1lf 4anner? and
Charles Westin'eds(, Nationalism and Internationalism in the "ost-*old .ar Era '#ew $or=) Aoutledge,
+,,,(,pp.-5.
102
Lo%ise :alen, Dnstitutionali?ing the Politics of thnicit!. :ctors, Power and *o7ili?ation in Southern
thiopia 1nder thnic Federalism,& 'Ph.E. Eissertation) 1ni%ersit! of 3slo, +,,.(, p.5.) G<! ta=ing o%er the
ethnic agenda, the PAEF has 7een a7le to =eep other =e! issues out of the political limelight.G
1,-
#oted leaders of the ethno"nationalist struggle seem to 7e confused and reassessing their %iews on
the matter. :regawi, : Poltical 4istor!,& for e@ample writes that the struggle of Tigra! people had
genuine grie%ances, 7oth historical and e@isting'pp.2,"21(B he also seems to regard this more as ethno"
s!m7olic ri%alr! 7etween the Tigre and Shoa ruling houses'pp.26"2.(B and again as a deli7erate maneu%er
of the modern elite. 4e also deplores, p.+2,, GTrue, as Tesfatsion *edhanie '+,,.) 1-+"1--( wrote
4istor! has 7een 7adl! a7used in the course of the li7eration struggle. Dt has not merel! 7een
misconstrued, 7ut has also 7ecome the su7Iect of fraudulent discourse.G Eima, Contested Legitimac!,&
p.++1, also notes) The ethnici?ation of politics and the politici?ation of ethnicit!, 7esides igniting or
reigniting inter"communal conflicts in man! parts of the countr!, satisfied neither national groups
demanding greater rights and a fair sa! in the affairs of the state, nor those who 7elie%e in the unitar!
conception of thiopian identit! and the state.G
5+
Carmichael observes: "What is needed now is less re-interpretation at the national level
and more work in the provinces, work that will generate data and ideas that can be used
to reinvigorate or recast the nationalist debates."
104
This dissertation is an attempt to rise
to that challenge and to show that an extensive quarrying of data and reinterpretation are
integral to each other.
The remaining body of this dissertation is structured into five chapters dealing with the
pre-national background to Ethiopian nationalism, the genesis of modern Ethiopianism,
the genesis of ethno-nationalisms in the country, the era of socialist nationalism and the
era of ethnic nationalism. The first chapter gives a historical background covering the
period prior to 1941, which is regarded in this study as a proto-nationalist or formative
phase of Ethiopian nationalism. Though the 19
th
century is still regarded as the time of
the birth of the modern nation-state, the historical, cultural and ideological roots of the
nation are traceable back to the mists of antiquity. In this chapter, changes and
continuities of the mythology, symbolism and memory of the Ethiopian nation are traced.
Simultaneous semantic evolution in the conception of the nation, its dialectics with the
state, the people and the social and territorial boundaries of the nation, and the concept of
citizenship will be analyzed. Hence the analysis of ethno-symbolic elements over this
long expanse of time will be invaluable in reconstructing the proto-nationalist ideology
and the layers of the historic nation.
The second chapter begins by a reconstruction of the interethnic situation up to and
including the Italian period. The post-1941 period is assumed in this study to be the era of
1,5
Carmichael, :pproaching thiopian 4istor!,& p./.
5-
modern nationalism in the country. Thus, chapter two deals with the process of rebirth of
the Ethiopian nation-state, especially attempts of the restored monarchy to fashion a
rejuvenating ideology from the values of the historic nation as well as the challenges and
opportunities of the new post-war contexts. It outlines the civicethnic duality of
renascent Ethiopianism; the states efforts in practicing an evolving nationalism,
disseminating the core ideals, memories, values and culture of the historic nation; and the
legal and institutional frameworks in this endeavor. Here attempts will also be made to
relate the economic, political and cultural contexts with the emergence of new social
relations and classes and their role in expanding and modernizing the national idea and
community.
The third chapter deals with the emergence of a generational and ethnic critique of the
traditional nation and the evolution of social and ethno-nationalisms. The ESM was the
ideological womb of both the social and ethnic varieties of nationalism. Here attempts
will be made to reconstruct student ideology during the imperial period, the internal and
external resources and contexts for its fatal bifurcation. Moreover, analysis will be made
at societal level how popular local resistance and articulation of ethnicity, cultural and
religious expressions of opposition found early institutional expressions through self-help
associations and other informal bodies. The chapter will also assess the imperial states
attitude toward this burgeoning ethno-nationalism; and the place of the nationalities issue
in the Ethiopian Revolution.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the period of the military regime or the Derg (1974-
1991) and its attempts at redefining the nation-state and socializing it among the broad
masses. This involved emphasizing the civic nation, the inviolability of its national
55
territory, the regimes attempts at handling the vexed issue of nationalities and
citizenship, and refashioning national values and symbols along socialist lines. Analysis
will also be made of the ideological and structural underpinnings of socialist
Ethiopianism: political socialization, initiating the masses into membership of the nation;
the role of public education; the mass media, legal and institutional frameworks to
accommodate the nationalities demands.
Chapter four also analyzes the nationalities struggle and its articulation: contesting the
Ethiopian idea, delineating the question, transformations from reformist to combative
nationalisms, and ideologies of justifying the war of liberation. There will also be
concern on strategies of ethno-nationalist groups at mobilizing the ethnic community: the
cultural and ethno-symbolic ways of articulating opposition; the uses and abuses of the
past; forms of organization and struggle, and the dissemination of ethno-national
ideologies among the respective masses. Assessment will also be made of the varying
ethno-regional outcomes and the role of external factors in the ultimate outcome of the
nationalities wars.
The fifth chapter deals with the EPRDF period (1991-2012), the heyday of ethno-
nationalism, and documents the place of social nationalism in the new equilibrium. It
considers how the new regime attempted to resolve the nationalities question: redefining
the nation-state into a multi-national state, nationalism without national identity; the
translation of military victory into legal and political structures, and the ideological and
political rationale. It also assesses the transformation of ethnic nationalism into an
ideological tunnel of linguistic nationalism and linguism, or billboard nationalism; and
the accompanying proliferation of ethnic entrepreneurs; the legal and institutional
52
A#$a"a Haile, ,-tatio" o. &tate$oo# a"# /o"te0porary Politics, i" A1e1e 2egeye a"# &ieg.rie#
Pa-sewa"g*e#s+, Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*3o"#o"4 Britis$ Aca#e0ic
Press, 14+, p.27.
10
A#$a"a, ,-tatio" o., p.2!. Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, .or si0ilar 5iews.
270
translated their military victory into ideological, legal and institutional hegemony. The
new regime enshrined ethnicity as the governing principle of national life, redefined and
restructured the territory, memory and ideology of the Ethiopian nation. This radical
approach to the national question, its intolerance to moderate views and underestimation
of residual social nationalism characterized the post-1991 period.
5.1 Ethnic Empowerment and Redefinition of the Ethiopian Nation
The Transitional Charter, which not only served as the law of the land between 22 July
1991 and 21 August 1995 but also became a blueprint for the entire EPRDF regime, was
drafted by ethno-nationalists and reflected their radical attitudes towards the fate of the
Ethiopian state and people.
11
The preamble to the Charter stated that the military regime
was a continuation of the past while its demise provided an opportunity to refashion the
state anew. The enshrinement of ethnicity as the major principle of political association
became a typical expression of disengagement from the past. As noted in the previous
chapters, both the imperial and the military regimes had seen political ethnicity as a
danger for national harmony. On the contrary, the new regime regarded the
acknowledgement and institutionalization of ethnicity as the ultimate guarantee for
national unity.
The Charter made nations, nationalities and peoples the foundation of the Ethiopian state
and provided for their political and cultural autonomy (Article 2 a & b). This was again in
11
A"#argac$ew, The Ethiopian, pp.32!, 335. Hagos %e1reyes-s *15+, p.7. 3ee"co 3ata *1!+, p.56.
271
stark contrast to Dergs regional autonomy which bestowed the right on administrative
entities rather than social groups.
12
The EPRDF-led regime immediately proceeded to
dismantle the old apparatus and replace it with new institutions. The Boundary
Commission that was set up in August 1991 to determine the structure and composition
of national and sub-national units for the transition period faced many legal and practical
challenges. Though Article 13 of the Charter provided for the establishment of regional
and local administration on the basis of nationality, it did not define what nations,
nationalities and peoples were and how, if and when they desire, they would exercise the
right of independence (enumerated under Article 2c).
This problem was addressed by another bill to establish national regional administration
approved by the Council of Representatives on 14 November 1991. Issued on 12
December 1991 as the National Regional Self-Government Proclamation No.7/1991, this
law rendered nations or nationalities as:
! " #" $! % &' "%(( This was a far cry from the Stalinist
dogma of the pre-1991 ethno-nationalisms. Based on the definition, Article 3 of the
proclamation identified 63 nations, nationalities and peoples and established them into 14
Kilils (literally closer in meaning to Reserves). Nevertheless, language became the
ultimate criterion the 10-member Boundary Commission used to carve administrative
regions. This is inevitable as nothing was done to assess popular will and expressions of
common psychological make-up among communities.
Actually, the resolution of the nationalities question in terms of language proved
intractable since very few areas in Ethiopia were linguistically homogenous. The ultimate
12
Transitional overnment of Ethiopia Charter, Negarit a!etta, 15 Hamle 1!3.
272
result was composite regions, except Afar and Somali (Kilil 2 & 5 respectively),
containing more than one ethno-linguistic group. Some 48 of the 63 nations, nationalities
and peoples were established as self-governing units at woreda and above levels. The
remaining 17, which were found to have less population than the minimum set for
woreda administration, were represented in their constituencies as minority
nationalities. Proclamation No.7/1991 further provided that any adjacent self-
government units within the 14 Kilils could voluntarily form larger regional units. This
was a significant improvement on the Charter forced by the limits of ethnicity as a
universal principle, as well as an anticipation of developments in the southern region.
Though neither the Charter nor the proclamation did explicitly determine the structure of
the state as unitary, federal or confederal, what emerged in practice was an ethnic federal
structure.
13
As noted above, the Transitional Charter and the subsidiary laws for its implementation
were results of a back door deal orchestrated by TPLF and OLF. The Boundary
Commission was constituted by handpicked individuals representing the interests of a
few ethno-nationalist organizations. Therefore, the outcome of this caucus was bound to
be very much like a postwar settlement. There was little public deliberation on the matter
in spite of the invariable assurance by proponents about the new systems reflectiveness
of majority interest and its merits in creating strong popular unity. The principle of
ethnic self-determination upheld by the law was considered as the ultimate resolution of
two antithetical views on Ethiopian unity, i.e, territorial unity of the chauvinists versus
13
6asil 7a$o0, Constit"tion for a Nation of Nations *8$e 9e# &ea Press4 17+, pp.44:45.
273
popular unity of the democrats.
14
The state propaganda campaign attending the entire
process of transition rather labeled any kind of skepticism regarding the law and its
import as chauvinism.
15
In its initial couple of years, the Derg had been preoccupied
with explaining the merits of Etyopia Tikdem and Hibretesebawinet; now EPRDF was
likewise busy selling the idea of National Regional Self-Government throughout 1991
and 1992.
One immediate consequence of the new paradigm shift was the proliferation of
organizations vying to represent ethno-linguistic groups. A plethora of fronts, movements
and parties formed and reformed often reflecting little more than the political whims of
individual actors. A total of 24 ethnic organizations had taken part in the July
Conference, whereas only 6 pan-Ethiopian and 2 professional associations were
represented. This was determined by the new regimes discriminatory measures as well
as its capacity to seek out and coordinate pliable ethnic allies in the hubbub of the run
about to the Conference. Within a few months, however, at least two organizations
emerged for every ethnie and began to vie for recognition and power in the idioms of
identity, legitimacy and history. The very ones to be targeted were the original ethnic
organizations which had acquired seats in the Council of Representatives.
For example, in early 1992, a newly-formed Wolayta Peoples Democratic Organization
(WPDO) mobilized residents of Areka town and the surrounding peasantry to denounce
the Wolayta Peoples Democratic Front (WPDF) as an agent of the past regimes.
16
14
A2, 3 Tir 1!4.
15
A2, 1 Tir 1!4.
16
A2, 23 Tir 1!4.
274
Similarly, the Sidama Liberation Democratic Organization (SLDO) leveled
incriminations at existing political organizations on behalf of the group including the
Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM).
17
The Somali and Oromo regions were the most
contested, where multiple contenders came out to haggle for political space. In extreme
cases, no less than nine political groupings were established in the name of various
Somali clans. Those vying to represent the Oromo were equally fragmented on the bases
of region, religion as well as ideology. The Oromo Unity Liberation Front (OULF), under
the erstwhile leader of the Bale rebellion Waqo Gutu, claimed that it was the oldest
organization fighting for Oromo freedom. Now in the intra-ethnic race to win the hearts
and minds of the Oromo people, the record of the former Western Somalia Liberation
Front (WSLF) and whose interest it had been advancing was being questioned. The
OULF argued in self-defense that despite the malicious rumors it had always been an
autonomous Oromo organization and nobodys agent.
18
Characteristically, the nationalities issue was not limited to a political controversy over
the spoils of government but even led to inter- and intra-ethnic debates over territory,
history, identity and legitimacy across the north-south divide. Some of these were low-
toned dialogues such as the overlapping identity of Irob Saho. On the one hand, there
was the view of those who considered Irob as the groups name and reserved Saho for a
language family spoken by the Irob and other neighboring groups. Others contended that
17
A2, 27 Tir 1!4.
1!
A2, 1 inbot 1!4.
275
the name of the ethnic group was Saho while Irob referred to the land in which the Saho
lived.
19
There were also more radical claims to recreate separate identities from an overarching
one. The Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF), for instance, was accused of
merging two peoples (Somali and Oromo) with distinct settlement patterns, cultures and
life-styles. According to the splinter Gurgura Liberation Front (GLF), the decision to
detach Gurgura from the common front with Issa was passed in a December 1991
meeting held at Dire Dawa town by members of the group and their traditional leader. A
forerunner of Silti ethnicism also began to mobilize pressure in 1992 against the Gurage
Peoples Democratic Front (GPDF) and other organizations formed in the name of the
Gurage. As we shall see below in more detail, this was originally a political bid claimed
on the basis of separate linguistic-cultural identity for a people called the Gogot.
A slightly different case from the above, but still based on ethnic and historical claims,
was that of the three woredas of Wolqayt, Tsegede and Humera. These had been historic
parts of north and northwestern Gonder, now merged with Region One (Tigray) on
linguistic grounds. Public representatives of the three areas opposed the demarcation as
inconsiderate to the culture, sentiment, economic and social ties of the people. Their
appeals to regional and federal authorities, including the Council of Representatives, the
Presidents and PMs offices, were rejected for allegedly being inspired by EDU
propaganda. Similarly, the merging of Metema, another historical part of Gonder, to
1
A2, 20 #ia!ia 1!6. A2, 4 inbot 1!6.
276
Region Six (Benishangul-Gumuz) was contested by residents. In both cases, TPLFs
decisions were influenced by concerts of strategic, economic and historic calculations.
20
The 1994/95 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was
an elaborate affirmation of the basic ideas of the Transitional Charter. Federalism based
on ethno-linguistic units became a permanent contrast of EPRDF to those of previous
Ethiopian regimes. The Constitution accorded ultimate political sovereignty to the
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. This was not a united popular sovereignty
but a composite sovereignty of the national groups. Ethiopia became a nation of nations
and was structured accordingly: States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement
patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned.
21
The outcome of this
provision was in the main a solidification of the transitional structure by transforming
numbered Kilils to explicitly titular ethnic Kilil Mengistat (Regional States) named after
their dominant groups. These entities were then recognized as mini-states with elaborate
trappings of government, including separate constitutions, working languages and flags.
Members of the Federation may by law determine their respective working
languages.
22
The right to secession (Article 39.1) was the most radical outcome of ethno-politics and
the one which made nationality rights a highly controversial part of EPRDF measures.
The regime defended this anachronistically Leninist position as the only way to establish
trust among the peoples of Ethiopia. However, in spite of its ideological justifications,
there was no way the regime could have excluded this right after endorsing the
20
Tobia, 21 $ene 1!6.
21
The %D&E Constit"tion, /$apter );, Article 41, 7o.2.
22
Ibid', /$apter ), Article 5, 7o.3.
277
independence of Eritrea (23-25 April 1993 referendum). What the FDRE Constitution did
to offset the disintegrative potential of the secession clause was build into the system as
much procedural encumbrances as possible. As the linchpin of EPRDFs ideology of
governance and legitimacy, however, the right to self-determination constituted
interrelated aspects of territory, history, culture, language and government. In other
words, it was about a broad spectrum of cultural and political empowerment.
One of the very first decisions of the Transitional Government regarding nationalities
rights was on the use of their language for educational instruction. The Council of
Representatives decided on how to provide primary education in the mother tongue on 10
October 1991. A body called the Coordinating Committee to Oversee Translation, Study
and Evaluation Project, ) '* +!! ,-. / 012 was established to
facilitate the implementation. In its meeting held on 26 January 1992, the Committee set
a guideline that regarding social studies, the curriculum must be consistent with the
spirit of the charter denouncing the previous system, while consolidating the equality and
spirit of coexistence of peoples, nations and nationalities.
23
The Coordinating Committee selected five nationalities languages to commence primary
education in the mother tongue for the 1992/93 academic year. The government did not
trust the job of preparation of educational materials for political parties but invited
professionals throughout the country. However, this matter sparked controversy even
before the preparation was off the ground. Especially in the south, the nomination of
Walaytigna elicited stiff reaction. Politicians of other ethnic groups such as the Gamo
23
A2, 17 Tir 1!4.
27!
complained that the peoples of the region had not been consulted about the conduct of the
process and the fact that imposing Walaytigna on others would be endorsing Walaytas
oppression on them, allegedly like in the Derg period.
24
Now this was not merely about linguistic issues, as groups under the Omotic family were
mutually intelligible and considered as dialects. Neither was it about workability, since
Walaytigna had precedent as a language of literacy during the Derg period. This was
rather about ethnic boundary and prestige, a symbolic expression of defiance aggravated
by the existing political atmosphere. Some among the opposition conceded that the
project could work, but if so the name of the common language should be changed to
Gamugofigna or Omigna.
25
This original conception would lead later to a grand attempt
at creating a unified language called the Wogagoda from an acronym for Wolayta,
Gamo, Gofa and Dawro(the major ethnic groups in the region). In 2000, the fiasco from
this experiment led to a serious ethnic conflict which resulted in the creation of three
separate zones in the region Wolayta Zone, Dawro Zone and Gamo-Gofa Zone. The
new education policy approved by the Council of Representatives in 1994 limited mother
tongue education to primary level mainly due to the high resources and preparation it
demanded.
26
Another important aspect of the language policy was the determination of script for the
various groups, which beyond intrinsic pedagogical and linguistic merits evoked
widespread political and symbolic elements. The OLF was the first to implement such
24
A2, 10 $ene 1!4.
25
Ibid.
26
A2, #ia!ia 1!6.
27
right by convening a public meeting on 3 November 1991 at the Parliament Building in
Addis Ababa. In addition to previous experience during the insurgency, the front had
already introduced literacy in afaan Oromo by using Latin script in the areas it controlled
following the demise of the military regime. Therefore, the meeting was only to
emphasize the historic significance of the issue. Following this formal endorsement,
Qubbe became the alphabet of work and education throughout Oromia. During Ibssa
Gutamas tenure as Minister of Education (September 1991 to June 1992) textbooks were
prepared and teachers crash-trained in Qubbe phonetics. Mother tongue instruction at the
primary level fully commenced from the new academic year in September 1993.
Interestingly, the issue of adopting a script was not a simple ethnocentric choice but took
roughly the Semitic-Cushitic divide. In a public discussion regarding the preparation of
script for the Hadiya language, held at Menelik II School in January 1992, the advocate
of Qubbe, Dr Tilahun Gamta from the Ethiopian Languages Studies, was guest speaker
on the merits of Latin in contrast to the Sabean (Geez) alphabet. The participants of this
meeting recommended for further studies to be conducted on the suitability of Latin for
Hadiya language.
27
Nevertheless, many languages of the Cushitic family, such as Hadiya,
Kambatta, Sidama, Gedeo, Afar, Nuer, Somali and others, adopted the Latin alphabet
with little popular consultation or consent. This issue proved to be persistent. In May
2003, the Benishangul Gumuz regional bureau announced its decision to use Latin for
writing the Berta language. Even as late as 2011, Tigray region itself faced mounting
Kunama pressure to adopt the Latin script.
27
A2, 16 Tir 1!4.
2!0
Whatever differences there were on the pedagogical and philological aspects, ethnic
entrepreneurs were unanimous on the political merits of linguistic autonomy. The
struggle the Oromo have made for self-determination has started to payoff. They have
adapted the Latin alphabet to their language without fear of incrimination.
28
This was a
laudatory measure not only for its intrinsic value but also: The development of the
Oromo language would, in the 1990s, mark the beginning of the end of Amharic
expansion at least in Oromia.
29
As Seyoum Hameso argued in a wider context, besides
being united by the quest for freedom, justice and democracy the ...Cushitic nations are
bound by ethnicity and cultural affinity. There is no readily available reason why all the
Cushitic-speaking nations should remain subservient to alien rule.
30
The process of
Latinizing is perhaps the single most important testimony to the role of a numerically
small intelligentsia in shaping the identity and destiny of the ethnic group.
A direct outcome of the ethnic arrangement was an obdurate choice between assimilation
and eviction for non-indigenous groups which were included or found in other regions or
zones. Their ethnic rights were circumscribed by retroactively depriving them of the right
to work, be judged and learn in their own mother tongue. They became an internal
diaspora' who suddenly found themselves excluded from the politics of their areas. Even
in regions which have made Amharic working language, such as Southern Nations
Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), Gambella Peoples National
Regional State (GPNRS), or even Waag-Himra Special Zone, the move was considered
2!
8ila$-" %a0ta, <-11e A.aa" =ro0o4 9easo"s .or /$oosi"g t$e 3ati" &cript .or >e5elopi"g a" =ro0o
Alp$a1et, ()$, ), 1*13+, pp.36, 3!.
2
,ek-ria, 8$e 3a"g-age Policies, p.111.
30
&eyo-0, 8$e /oalitio" o., p.125.
2!1
as a temporary strategy pending the development of local capabilities. This was
witnessed in the abortive Wogagoda experiment in the southern region in 2000
mentioned above. In the Amhara Regional State, the Waag administration had adopted
Amharic as a 'temporary strategy' in line with the policy objective of government. "By
1999 educational materials in Himtanga had been developed for school grades 1 to 4, and
the following year it was introduced in grade 5."
31
Meanwhile, zonal authorities made the
teaching of Himtanga for government workers and other residents compulsory.
Language was only one aspect of the symbolic assertiveness, or even sometimes an
expression of symbolic revenge, against a real or perceived oppressor. The wider
reclamation of ethnic history and culture led to a return to the values and ways of the
ancient pristine community in every aspect of life. The initial period witnessed en masse
name change of ethnic politicians, to some extent the common people, from Amharic or
Amharic-sounding to local languages. The Oromos were quick to search for authentic
ethnic names while the Tigreans and Eritreans initially retouched some names such as
Sisay to Shishay, Kassaye to Kahssay, etc. This was also considered as a symbolic
freedom from the lifelong weight of Amhara names. Place names as well were rectified
and reclaimed, for instance Alemaya to Haromaya, Nazareth to Adama, Debre-Zeit to
Bishoftu, Illubabor to Illu abbabora, Awash to Hawas and Awassa to Hawassa, even
Addis Ababa to Finifine, etc.
In some cases, attempts to estrange ethnic groups from Ethiopia were multifaceted, for
instance like adopting the Gregorian calendar and referring the Ethiopian one as ALH or
31
;a-g$a", ?t$"icity a"# Power, p.244.
2!2
Akka Lekofss Habasha (according to the Habasha Calendar). It was during this period
that public celebrations of Gadda ceremony as well as the annual Laga Horra or Irrecha
feast at Bishoftu were reinitiated as moments of ethnic communion. The resumption of
the celebration of the Gadaa tradition fosters public appreciation for Oromo cultural,
political, and social heritage.
32
Another case in point was the Sidama, who revitalized a
native ideology based on Sidama sky god; Sidama truth or Halale; and age-old national
sentiment or Aydu Ayana. The major Sidama holiday and its New Year festivities or
Fiche Chambalala was considered as a day of no work in the zone, even though there has
been no claim to make it a national holiday.
33
The Management of Ethnic and National Demands
The cardinal justification for the right of nations to self-determination was the belief that
it would bring sustainable popular unity based on equality and trust. The regime defended
its record by pointing out that there has never been a single demand for secession so far.
Many argued, however, that ethnic federalism and ethnic politics has proliferated
communal dissension and violence at lower rungs of the state structure to an
unprecedented level. Hence, rather than consolidating national unity it has been further
weakening social and historical bonds at the grassroots. If there was a superficial show of
unity, it had been forced by strict political, structural, and fiscal control by the federal
government. It is important to see some instances highlighting the management of ethnic
and national issues at various levels: ethnic or local, regional and national.
32
A#0ass- &$-"k-ri, 8$e )".l-e"ce o. A1yssi"ia" *?t$iopia"+ Political /-lt-re o" =ro0o 7atio"alis0 a"#
9e1ellio", ()$, )), 1@2*15+, p.66.
33
A2, 1 #egabit 1!6.
2!3
Generally, political mobilization in terms of ethnicity and the added promise of the
Charter as well as the Constitution to redress regional prejudices were recipes for
communal conflict. Appeals to ethnic sentiment in political elections based on ethno-
regional constituencies were a facile avenue to state power. Under these conditions the
growth of ethnicity was assured.
34
The ruling coalition, EPRDF, also had its share in
escalating the strife by creating the so-called PDOs (Peoples Democratic Organization,
the common name for its satellite organizations) to undermine independent ethnic parties.
This was a calculated risk designed to maintain the regime in power, though EPRDF had
little safeguards against the wastefulness of political fragmentation and duplication or for
controlling primordial dissensions going astray.
An unprecedented policy of beating up ethnic tension from above and simultaneous rising
expectation from below characterized the incumbent regime. In his speech on the
occasion of Eritrean independence celebrations in 1993, then President Meles said in
Tigrigna Do not scratch your wounds, we will not scratch ours!
35
He did reverse this
reminder in Ethiopia. In his televised meeting with Somali elders, clan representatives
and members at Harar in February 1994, Meles assured the audience that the Somali had
been forced to become Ethiopians a century ago and now there is no way that should be
repeated. There were also high profile agitations and inflammatory speeches by state
officials, such as Tamrat Layne in the Somali region, Tefera Walwa and Addisu Legesse
in the Southern region, publicly giving state endorsement to ethnocentrism and anti-
34
=k-#i1a 7"oli, *nderstanding Ethnic Conflicts in Africa *1!+, p.21.
35
9-t$ )yo1, 8$e ?t$iopia" A ?ritrea" /o".lict4 >iasporic 5s Hege0o"ic &tates i" t$e Hor" o. A.rica, 11:
2000, (#A$*2000+, p.67, B-oti"g Hadas Eritrea*13+.
2!4
Ethiopianism throughout the transition period. EPRDFs favorite metaphor to Ethiopian
unity was a marriage contract to be dissolved anytime by any of the signatories.
The early period was particularly propitious for the expression of spontaneous and
organized ethnocentrism. Various ethnic organizations attempted to exploit the
transitional instability to incite respective groups by reopening historical wounds. In
Gambella, the entire Nuer ethnic group fled to the Sudan during the power vacuum in
1991-1992. The Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement (GPLM) initiated a terror
campaign by killing, looting and intimidating Nuer communities to flee across the
border.
36
The longtime resident Gurage people in Dilla town were attacked and their
properties looted during this chaotic period. The Gedeo Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Movement (GPRDM) was later founded in a conference held at Dilla town
(3-5 January 1992) promising peace and security for other ethnic groups living in the
area. In 1994 again the mobile drama team was mobbed at Dilla town by
Gedeo youth who were allegedly infuriated by the theatres chauvinist message.
The most flagrant and systematic dissension campaign was carried out by ultra-ethnic
Oromo activists, at the forefront of which were the OLF. In January 1992, the OLF
organized a commemorative ceremony for the martyrs of Anole, the massacre
committed by Emperor Menelik 106 years ago.
37
OLF ethnic propaganda was so much
engrossed in giving precedence to blood, even to language, as the quintessential
criterion of Oromoness so that it sometimes tended to have a racist tone. It went as far as
36
8ewo#ros Haile0aria0, %a01ella4 a History o. )"tegratio" o. t$e Perip$ery,*AAC4 ,.A. t$esis i"
History, 17+. >ereDe 6eyissa, 8$e ?Eperie"ce o. t$e %a01ella 9egio"al &tate, *=saka C"i5ersity4 "o
#ate+, pp.10:11.
37
A2, 1 Tir 1!4.
2!5
making distinction between full-blooded and half-blooded Oromos. This ideology of
blood was sometimes employed in intra-Oromo infighting, for instance, labeling OPDO
as Oromo-speaking naftegna, or Shoan Oromos as walmaka, etc.
38
The primordial
politics of the day also had far more dangerous implications for all Amharas and other
northern groups resident in Oromia, who were now labeled as descendants of the original
naftegna conquerors and hence accountable for their fathers sins.
For instance, an Oromiffa weekly named Mede Welabu aired such extremist ideas as
opposing the assignment of Amhara and other non-Oromos in the regional civil service.
The Orthodox Church and its followers were not spared from the identity politics of the
period, especially so in the southern regions. Organizations such as the OLF explicitly
denounced Orthodox religion as only appropriate for the neftegna.
39
Even an intra-Oromo
conflict between Protestant and Orthodox followers was considered as a neftegna plot to
set brothers against each other.
40
In many places in the southern and peripheral regions
kekililachin yiwtulin (out from our region) became a convenient slogan. In fact, this
extremism seemed to threaten the very fabric of society and the viability of the system if
pushed too far. The Oromia regional authorities countered that eviction and
discrimination were a violation of constitutional right and they would continue to appoint
all Ethiopian citizens except in the judiciary. Some even argued that ultra-exclusiveness
was an individual agenda which conflicted with the traditional hospitality of Oromo
people.
41
3!
A2, 2! inbot 1!4. ;a-g$a", ?t$"icity a"# Power, p.221.
3
=)4 &$i.eraw ,-leta, perso"al co00-"icatio".
40
A2, ! #ia!ia 1!6.
41
A2, 15 #ia!ia 1!6.
2!6
The transition period was a time of soul-searching for the Amharic-speaking people
which, above the frameworks of the local and regional identification (as Yewenze lij) and
below an overarching Ethiopian sentiment, seemed to lack experience in a middle level
pan-ethnic identification. One of the most publicized dialogues of the early EPRDF
period was on the existence of the Amhara nation! In a 1992 televised debate between
then president Meles Zenawi and Professors Mesfin Woldemariam and Andreas Eshete,
Mesfin brought up an argument that there is no single homogenous nation called
Amhara.
42
This was in a sense a continuation of Mengistus historical analysis in the last
hours of the Derg, stating his finding about the meaning of Amhara as a people living in
mountainous region. The standing argument against the coalescence of the Amhara
under an ethnic party was that Amhara is an all-Ethiopian nation. It is a nation which
should not be dispossessed of its Ethiopian sentiment. To do this will only pave the way
for the disintegration of the country. Therefore, the Amhara should not be restricted to a
primordial party and separated from other nations and nationalities.
43
Nevertheless, the theoretical subtleties regarding the identity of the Amhara could not
stem the external ascription and violence engendered by ethno-nationalism in the period.
Now all native Amharic speaking people could not escape their Amharaness, and, if they
attempted to resist by asserting Ethiopian identity, they were subjected to harassment.
Again this took spontaneous as well as institutionalized forms. While all other ethno-
nationalist forces within EPRDF gave lip service to Marxist class solidarity and worked
to consolidate vertical ethnic bonds, the regime systematically divided up the Amhara
42
)" .act, ,es.i" see0s to retract $is origi"al arg-0e"t i" $is 14 1ook Etyopia +eyet ,edet.
43
A2, 10 Tir 1!4. %etac$ew Haile, -e.Amara/ Hi!b Tari01Amara #an.ne/23, 'as$i"gto" >/, 30 ,ay
13.
2!7
into chauvinist and oppressed, and a new addition was hodam, classes to weaken the
groups solidarity.
44
The Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM), or
sometimes criticized as the Amharic department of TPLF, was the institutional face of
this policy.
The sidelining and exclusion of the Amhara was a major hiatus in the transition process,
though EPRDF argued that the allotment of 10 seats in the Council of Representatives for
EPDM (in par with TPLF and OPDO) was to safeguard Amhara interest. Neither its
name nor its deed confirmed that claim until EPDM began to champion the oppressed
Amhara cause in late 1991. 3&45 6% &' 78 6"9 78 &' 8: ;<"9
86= /(( >& ? ;<@ 6 ABC 6 6D E:6?D * 0FG
/(( EPDM maintains that the Amhara people should be organized as a nation on the
basis of being Amhara and as a people on the basis of being oppressed. For this reason, it
deserves a national democratic organization which distinguishes the oppressed Amhara
from the oppressor Amhara.
45
Accordingly, EPDM introduced its agenda by hosting in
December 1991 what it called Oppressed Amhara Nations Peace Conference in Bahir
Dar city. This body later changed its name to the Amhara National Democratic
Movement (ANDM), though it was from the very outset considered as a stooge of TPLF,
just like the other ethnic PDOs.
46
The irresponsible and vindictive politics of the transition period, not an anomaly but a
continuation of insurgency propaganda, led to the death and destabilization of many
44
A2, 1! $ene 1!4. A2, 1! #ia!ia 1!6.
45
A2, 1 Tir 1!4.
46
A2, 27 $ene 1!4.
2!!
hundreds of Amhara in Asebe Teferi, Bedeno, Weter and many other places in the
country. The most glaring was the Araba Gugu massacre orchestrated by top government
officials, Hassen Ali (then Oromia chief), Hussien Adem, Dima Gurmessa(whose real
name is Captain Welde Senbet Gurmessa) and Kuma Demeksa.
47
Such tragedies
precipitated the establishment of the All Amhara Peoples Organization (AAPO) on 23
January 1992. According to its president, the late Professor Asrat Woldeyes, the overt
and covert attacks which then gained a TPLF blessing had their origins during the Italian
invasion in 1935-1941.
48
AAPO has remained an object of EPRDF subterfuge and
harassment throughout the period.
Oromo nationalism has been another major contentious issue throughout the EPRDF
regime. Although a number of organizations had claimed to represent the interest of the
Oromo people, OLF was generally believed to be the only one enjoying wider popular
support in the region. It had decades long history of struggle and a better military and
organizational capability than its rivals. The disagreement between TPLF and OLF
started on the eve of the demise of the Derg when the former created in 1990 a rival
Oromo organization in OPDO. The OLF believed that this action would undermine the
Oromo question and opposed it seriously. In addition, due to the inferiority of its military
might in contrast to EPLF and TPLF, the OLF was not seen as an equal player in the
transitional power arrangement.
49
Ironically, the political tension between the two fronts
47
,s0ak-, ,o#er"iFatio" a"# /$a"ge, pp.26:270. ,es.i" 'ol#e ,aria0, Etyopia +yet ,edet21A##is
A1a1a4 %-r0ayle P-1lis$ers, 1!6 ?/+, p.25.
4!
A2, 10 Tir 1!4.
4
Assa.a Galata, 8$e =ro0o4 /$a"ge a"# /o"ti"-ity i" ?t$iopia" /olo"ial Politics, ()$, ), 1*13+, pp. 17,
1!, 1. ,o$a00e#, A &$ort History )), pp.153:54.
2!
further escalated by the so-called colonial thesis to which Oromo nationalists adamantly
stuck even after victory over the Derg.
In an agreement signed between the two organizations on 26 September 1990, both OLF
and TPLF had identified their priorities. The OLF decided to agitate for national identity
and independence of the Oromo while letting the issue of unity with other peoples
emerge from future cooperation and trust building. The TPLF countered that in the event
the oppressive state is dismantled and peoples interests were safeguarded, it would be
mutually beneficial for all sides to work for democratic unity. On the issue of the right of
self-determination, both agreed that . . . the exercise of the right shall be through a
democratically held referendum and the choice of the concerned people either to form
their own state or join with others in a union shall be respected."
50
One of the cardinal
concerns of the July 1991 Conference was outlining the principles for resolving issues of
right of self-determination to dependent peoples.
Thus, the real test of EPRDFs commitment to national self-determination emerged in the
very first year of transition. Though OLF considered the Charter a partial victory, it was
not at all satisfied with its secondary position in the government as well as the increasing
erosion of its regional power through OPDO. The June 1992 elections were the climax of
the rupture between EPRDF and OLF. In his public radio and TV address on 19 June
1992, then president Meles accused OLF of disrespecting the agreement to keep its
army in barracks by deploying them in fighting positions. In response, OLF boycotted the
emergency meeting of the Council of Representatives held on 20 June 1992. What is
50
A1iy- %eleta, =36 a"# 8P364 ,aDor )ss-es a"# =-tco0es o. a >eca#e o. 7egotiatio"s si"ce 11, ()$,
H, 1@2*2003+, p.6.
20
more, members of the front who held ministerial posts in the Transitional Government
submitted letters of resignation to the Prime Minister on 22 June 1992. On the next day,
OLF wrote a formal letter to the Council of Representatives announcing its withdrawal
from the Council and the Government. It claimed that the withdrawal will disqualify the
integrity of the Transitional Government; hence OLF will no more consider itself bound
by decisions emanating from this body.
51
After the withdrawal of OLF from the Transitional Government, talks were held in
Asmara in September 1992 at which TPLF made OLFs commitment to unity a priority
agenda. Third party mediators also pressed OLF to accept unity of the Ethiopian
peoples.
52
All attempts in the period between 1993 and 1998 failed to bring peace
because of the uncompromising stand of the two parties. However, in 1998 some OLF
members showed tendency to accept the above preconditions in order to break the
deadlock. Towards the end of the 1990s, a new leadership of the OLF moderated its
demand for political separation and advocated a compromise regional autonomy solution.
This meant EPRDF was to admit that Oromia had been colonized whereas OLF was to
abandon its unconditional independence agenda. Mohammed Hassens statement is
representative of this view: I believe, what is needed is the decolonization of Oromia
through the devolution of real power to the Oromo.
53
In fact, government repression in the Oromia region had been severer than other regions,
as also testified by Human Rights Watch and other international and local organizations.
51
A2, 1 $ene 1!4.
52
A1iy-, =36 a"# 8P36, p.!1.
53
,o$a00e#, A &$ort History )), p.1!0.
21
However scanty the military presence and capability of OLF were, as it had been unable
to recuperate since the 1992 debacle, it seems to enjoy some sentimental hold among the
youth and educated section of the ethnic group. The EPRDF had been bent on uprooting
OLF from the region so that it incriminated the organization for sabotages and explosions
on public utilities. It also waged intensive propaganda campaign against the front as a
terrorist organization. In the late 1990s, the regime cracked down on members of the
reestablished Metchana Tulama Association and the Oromo Human Rights League.
54
Both organizations were closed in 2003. In spite of occasional rapprochement between
OLF and EPRDF-TPLF, therefore, the prospect of unity in equality seems still bleak.
While the Amhara and Oromo issues concerned the two major ethnic groups and their
places in the overall national apparatus, most others were of localized and regional in
character. One episode of ethnic struggle which demonstrates the protean nature of
ethnicity and nationalism was the protracted Gurage-Silti question. The Gurage region is
roughly categorized into three main language zones - namely northeast, middle and
southwest. If these three zones were to be strictly viewed by linguistic criteria, they
would be further divided into 17 parts. The Gurage Peoples Democratic Front (GPDF)
was formed in 1991 to represent a united Gurage and claimed to struggle any divisive
54
&tate0e"t s-10itte# 1y 8$e A#5ocates .or H-0a" 9ig$ts*AH9+, to t$e 4!
t$
sessio" o. t$e C"ite#
7atio"s /o00ittee o" ?co"o0ic, &ocial a"# /-lt-ral 9ig$ts, 30 April A 1! ,ay 2012, pp.2,7 "otes4 8$e
%o5er"0e"t o. ?t$iopia acti5ely i0pe#es t$e rig$ts o. #isa#5a"tage# et$"ic gro-ps to sel.:
#eter0i"atio"*Article 1+. 6or eEa0ple, i"#i5i#-al =ro0os a"# =ro0o "o":go5er"0e"tal orga"iFatio"s are
o.te" ass-0e# to s-pport t$e =ro0o 3i1eratio" 6ro"t A a" orga"iFatio" t$e %o5er"0e"t c$aracteriFes as
a terrorist gro-p A -"less t$ey acti5ely eEpress s-pport .or t$e r-li"g party. 8$ese allege# =36 ties are
-se# to D-sti.y arrest, .iri"g, eEp-lsio" .ro0 sc$ool, a"# co".iscatio" o. property. Bir$a"- 7ega,
-e.Netsanet oh $i4ed *Ia0pala4 ,.,. P-1lis$ers, 1! ?/+, p.22, eyewit"ess acco-"t a1o-t t$e 0aDority
o. t$e i"0ates o. <aliti &tate Pe"ite"tiary 1ei"g =ro0os s-specte# o. a..iliatio" wit$ =36. ,o$a00e#,
A &$ort History )), p.165. Ber$a"- %-te0a Balc$a, 9estr-ct-ri"g &tate a"# &ociety4 ?t$"ic 6e#eralis0 i"
?t$iopia, *P$> >issertatio" i" >)94 Al1org C"i5ersity, 2006+, pp.227:22.
22
tendencies and forces.
55
The Silte, originally Gogot, question was born in the attempt to
form a pan-Gurage organization but started to occupy public attention in 1994.
Coordinated by a diverse group which named itself the Silti, Azernet Berberi, Alicho
Werero, Mesqan, Melga and Welene Gedebano Democratic Organization (SAMWGDO),
it demanded that the chair held by GPDF in the Council of Representatives in the name of
the Gogot should be returned to the Gogot nation! The Silti politicians took issue with
GPDFs conception of identity hierarchies, that Silti=gosa, Gurage=biher, then
Etyopiawinet. They argued: Menelik called us Kembatta, Haile Selassie Gurage, the
Derg continued same, the Hadiya Gende, whereas the Gurage Adiya. However, our
people called themselves as Islam or Silti. They claimed that the two peoples are
different in history, language and culture as the Silti traced their origin from the eastern
part of the country, specifically the Harari, while the Gurage are of northern origin. They
also labeled GPDFs attempt to maintain Gurage unity as zemenawi timkhitegnet.
56
The issue which originated as a demand for zonal representation escalated into public
pan-ethnic conflict in 1994. The political organizations in the name of the Silti people
had their first chance of testing public support in the elections for House of Peoples
Representatives and regional councils held on 7 May 1995. Six years later, in a
referendum held in April 2001, the Silti were able to achieve a separate zonal
administration from the Gurage and a direct access to the national resources. This was
perhaps a classic example about the active creation of ethnic groups and ethno-
55
Tobia, 10 -e0atit 1!6.
56
A2, 21 #egabit 1!6. A2., 25 #egabit 1!6. A2, 5 #ia!ia 1!6. A2, 25 inbot 1!6. A2, 13 #ia!ia 1!7.
A2, 20 #ia!ia 1!7. A2, 4 inbot 1!7.
23
nationalism by a determined elite acting primarily in self-interest.
57
The selective
appropriation of history; drawing support from linguistic and other anthropological
studies eclectically; the emphasis on cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries; the self-
perception of a separate identity and self-name; the articulation of real or perceived
political oppression and economic injustice either by the Gurage or the central
government or in concert; and capitalizing on current political atmosphere all these
were involved in the Silti question.
The Gambella Peoples National Regional State (GPNRS) was another example which
shows how regional, national and even international issues impact the evolution of
ethnicity and nationalism. In general, Gambella regional politics evolved through three
overlapping phases. The transitional phase, 1991 1995, in which Gambella Peoples
Liberation Movement (GPLM) single-handedly ran the region, was marked by poor
governance, misappropriation of public resources and escalation of ethnic conflicts
especially between the two dominant groups, Anywaa and Nuer. GPLM was established
by Anywaa dissidents back in 1983 to fight against the Derg.
58
On the fall of the military
regime in 1991, the movement assumed uncontested control of Gambella and radically
transformed the political balance between the various groups.
Like any other neighboring people with different socio-cultural practices and lifestyles,
Anywaa and Nuer communities had a long history of ethnic integration, cooperation and
conflict. Together constituting about 80 percent of the total indigenous population in the
region, the relationship between the Anywaa and Nuer has always been vital to regional
57
;a-g$a", ?t$"icity a"# Power, p.265.
5!
=kello =0a", A2, 1 #es0erem 1!5.
24
peace and stability. During the second-half of the 20
th
century, the traditional systems of
maintaining ethnic balance were challenged by events such as natural disasters, regime
changes, the Sudanese civil wars and the unprecedented refugee influx into the region.
The Anywaa harbored increasing resentment against the Nuer who enjoyed a favored
position as woreda and awraja administrators during the Derg period. In addition to this,
the Anywaa had serious grievances against the depredations of Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army (SPLA) which had many Nuer members in its ranks. Therefore, at the fall of the
Derg entire Nuer communities in Gambella were forced to flee to the Sudan in fear of
reprisal by the Anywaa.
59
When the Nuer began to repatriate seeing a modicum of peace and stability in the region,
they found themselves totally excluded from the political apparatus. Therefore, they
formed in 1992 the Gambella Peoples Democratic Union Party (GPDUP) to regain
political space in the region. Now the traditional rivalry between the two groups assumed
modern institutional forms sanctioned by the new regime. On 18 March 1994, the GPLM
was transformed into Gambella Peoples Liberation Party (GPLP) partly pressurized by
the federal government to accommodate regional demands. The party also elected 23
permanent and 4 alternate members to its central committee, the latter to represent the
minority communities(Opuo and Komo) in the region. The conflict between the Anywaa
and Nuer, further escalated in the 1995 regional elections. Though the two parties had
agreed to work jointly through the regional council, the ruling GPLP created obstacles to
5
=ral )".or0a"t4 &a0so" Go$", .or0er speaker o. t$e %P79& /o-"cil.
25
GPDUP while the latter retaliated by preventing GPLP members from running in Jikawo
and Akobo woredas.
60
Mark Chuol Jewik, a Gambella Nuer, reminisced that he was elected as Deputy to the
Ethiopian Parliament four times up to 1969 by both the Nuer and Anywaa peoples.
During the Derg period he had served in various posts, as woreda and vice awraja
administrator, as advisor for Gambella affairs in Illubabor region and also as advisor in
Illubabor affairs in the Ministry of Interior. In the heat of the Anywaa Nuer ethnic
rivalry in 1994/95, he was accused of and convicted for conspiring to detach Gambella
and join it with the Sudan. He observed that what currently emerged in Gambella was an
ethnic-based tussle between GPLP and GPDUP, which will eventually go down to the
people unless solutions were sought immediately.
61
The Anywaa were afraid that Nuer
bid will erode their hegemony. They even sacked their leader Okello Oman in 1995 for
being submissive to external pressure and for accommodating other groups interests.
However, Okello was reelected president for second term due to the support from
highlanders and the Nuer.
The EPRDF intervened to bring about some accord between the five ethnic groups in the
region: the Anywaa, Nuer, Majangir, Opuo and Komo. In its first convention on 10 July
1995, the Gambella Regional Council decided on the regions flag, language, and
capital.
62
It also allotted one seat for each of the minority Opuo and Komo groups and
agreed to give them direct representation in the councils executive committee as they
would not be able to win elections due to the size of their populations. The conference
60
Tobia, 24 inbot 1!7. A2, 12 Tir 1!6. A2, 7 @ 10 #egabit 1!6.
61
Tobia, 24 inbot 1!7. A2, 2 @ $ene 1!7.
62
8$e legal 1asis .or t$is was t$e 15 /o"stit-tio", /$apter ), Article 3, 7o.3 a"# Article 5, 7o.3.
26
also approved a power-sharing formula for top executives by electing an Anywaa
president, a Nuer vice-president and a Majangir chief secretary/ later speaker/.
63
In 1996,
the Gambella regional state acquired its own constitution, similar to other regions issued
from the center, which provided a legal basis for the establishment of self-government
and proportional representation for indigenous groups in the regional and federal
structure (Chapter II, Article 30, No.3). It also stipulated that regional political
arrangement should take into consideration the democratic relationship between the
nations, nationalities, peoples and political forces in the region (Chapter V, Article 51).
64
The second phase in the dynamics of Gambella ethno-politics commenced with the
FDRE election in 1996 and continued until the TPLF infighting in 2002. This was a
period of unprecedented escalation of controversies over the manner of Nuer
participation, mapping ethnic zones and power sharing. The Nuer intensified their
demand for a fair political, social and economic representation in the region. Highlanders
in the region, though hardly represented in the political structures, initially had direct
influence through their votes and indirect pressures. This period witnessed a growing
disaffection between the regional and federal government, mainly due to the latters
unconstitutional highhandedness on the pretext of streamlining regional parties along
EPRDF lines. Okello Oman once again found himself in the political crossfire; thus in
1997 he landed in prison on charges of corruption.
The rivalry between the Anywaa and the Nuer, however, continued through the regional
political apparatus as well as the civil service. This was a too common problem the
63
A2, 5, 11 @ 15 Hamle 1!7.
64
8$e 16 %P79& /o"stit-tio". 9egio"al co"stit-tio"s were a#opte# i" G-"e 15 a"# re5ise# i" 2001.
27
EPRDF regime faced among what it called allied organizations. In August 1997,
therefore, the federal government conducted a series of conferences in Benishangul,
Somali, Dire Dawa, Afar and Gambella regions aimed at evaluating performance and
resolving outstanding issues of corruption, inefficiency and proliferation of ethnic
conflict. In the same month regional representatives were invited to attend the occasion of
unity between four political organizations in Benishangul Gumuz. Similar efforts in
Gambella had been going on for a year to create a united front between the GPLP and
GPDUP.
65
In particular, the Gambella Peace, Development and Democracy Conference,
held between 10 and 22 August 1997, criticized the two parties for distancing themselves
from the people and negatively contributing to ethnic conflicts of the region. At the end
of the Conference, a united organization named Gambella Peoples Democratic Front was
established.
66
This period also witnessed the transformation of elite politics into grassroots ethnic
violence. The federal government attempted to stem this tide by bringing the contending
parties under GPDF. The Federal Affairs Minister also appointed its own advisors to the
region who became de facto bosses until the split within TPLF. The period saw
unprecedented escalation of ethnic conflicts as the Nuer vied for a dominant position in
the regional leadership arguing that they had larger population than the Anywaa. They
also demanded for a fair resource allocation to Nuer woredas as well as the reconstitution
of the administrative structure which allotted more kebeles to Anywaa woredas than Nuer
ones, even though the latter had larger population size. The emergence of other rival
ethnic parties in the fray, Gambella Peoples Democratic Congress(GPDC January 1999,
65
A2, 4 #es0erem 10. A2, 16 #egabit 10. A2, 13, 2 @ 30 Nehassie 10.
66
&eporter, ))), 34J13, 26 #ia!ia 10. A2, 17 #es0erem 10.
2!
Anywaa) and Gambella Peoples Democratic Union(2000, Nuer), further escalated inter-
ethnic tensions and became a hurdle for the creation of a common political space; the
division even started to go down to the common people.
67
The third phase, from 2003 on, was a period of restructuring and overhaul of the parties
starting in November 2002. GPLP was reconstituted as Anywaa Peoples Democratic
Organization (APDO) consisting of Anywaa and Komo. GPDUP was reformed as Nuer
Peoples Democratic Organization (NPDO) consisting of Nuer and Opuo groups. The
Majangir Peoples Democratic Organization (MPDO), a new party for the third largest
group, was established from Majangir who were formerly members in Anywaa and
Nuer parties. Then the three PDOs were joined in a common front named as Gambella
Peoples Democratic Movement (GPDM). This was a very intricate process which has
done little to alleviate the inter-ethnic strife in Gambella regional state. After 2002, the
conflict between the two major rivals, Anywaa and Nuer, spread among the rural
communities. The traditional conflicts were localized and ignited by cattle raids and
trespassing of grazing areas. Now these transformed into pan-ethnic violence and came to
include urban areas. If a Nuer is a boss in a government post, the Anywaa did not take
orders and vice versa.
68
As the above four cases illustrate, ethno-national demands for empowerment during the
EPRDF period took various forms. These represent three categories in scale and
67
A2, 26 Tir 11.
6!
=)4 /$a" %atl-ak, 7-er, 5ice:c$air0a" o. Gikawo /oreda at t$e ti0e o. i"ter5iew o" 14 #ia!ia
15*22J4J2003+ at Gikawo. %ro-p #isc-ssa"ts4 Go$" 9iek 7i$al, ,oses %atk-ot$, 'atga %at#et$,
i"ter5iewe# at 8eil-t o" 15 #ia!ia 15*23J4J2003+. 6or striki"gly si0ilar #e5elop0e"ts o" t$e Bora"a o.
t$e 1or#erla"#s see Belete, Agraria" Polity, pp.3!4, 445, 450, 451. His co"cl-sio" also works too well
.or %a01ella regio", p.444 ,y 0aDor arg-0e"t $ere is t$at rat$er t$a" lea# to political sta1ility, et$"ic
.e#eralis0 as practice# i" Bora"a $a# .-rt$er i"crease# political i"sta1ility a"# eco"o0ic -"certai"ty. 8$e
policy $a# i"te"si.ie# local co"test o5er la"# a"# political power.
2
objective, national like that of Amhara and Oromo, local or regional like that the Silti and
Gurage or the Anywaa and Nuer respectively. The accommodation also varied according
to the magnitude of the problem and the threat it posed to the regimes political integrity.
EPRDF might have taken genuine steps to the resolution of the national question.
However, its insecurity emanating from the narrowness of its TPLF base often overrode
the proper accommodation of ethno-national demands. What the regime granted
constitutionally, it took away by the imposition of rigid central control through elaborate
party and parastatal apparatus.
Perhaps an outstanding fact in the intricate political brinkmanship of EPRDF was the
representation of the nationalities rights to self-determination as antithetical to Ethiopian
unity and identity. Timkhit and tebabinet were now contextually defined, if and when
they did not specifically refer to the Amhara or Oromo, to mean feelings of superiority or
sectarianism respectively. For instance, the Harari considered the Oromo claim to their
region as timkhit whereas the intra-Harari division along clan lines is dubbed as
tebabinet. The Silti labeled pan-Gurage sentiments as zemenawi timkhit, whereas intra-
Silti localism was tebabinet. Similarly, the conflict between various ethnic groups in
Gambella or Benishangul and between different clans in Somali or Afar regions was
referred as tebabinet.
Like its predecessors, or perhaps in a more profound manner, EPRDF attempted to
control and define national political space and dialogue. It directly or indirectly
controlled the mass media, attempted to regiment the entire civil service and manipulated
educational curriculum in its own ideological image. Higher Education Proclamation
No.351/2003 provides a special protection to academic freedom. In practice, however,
300
"all levels of education are politically influenced. This practice violates the right of all
ethnic groups and people of all political views to receive education."
69
EPRDF has
launched vast indoctrination and conscription activities in colleges, universities and high
schools.
In the entire political drama federal government attempted to operate from backstage and
maintain a semblance of ethnic or national autonomy. If zemecha (campaign) had been
the key term expressing the Derg, an even more apt term for EPRDF would be
koreta(diversion). The period also saw the expression of rival conceptions of popular
history, as well as a reinterpretation of Ethiopian history along ethnic lines. Even among
professional historians, an Oromo view or Gojjame view was taken for granted. In the
heyday of nationalism, the battle between opposite ideological fronts was fought on the
fields of history.
70
It was a classic example of the relationship between the power regime
and the knowledge regime.
History, Memory and Power
In war or peace nationalists fought for the hearts and minds of the people and in this
endeavour history became the handmaiden of embattled nationalism. During the
insurgency, TPLF and other ethno-nationalists embraced a compartmental view of history
6
8$e A#5ocate# .or H-0a" 9ig$ts, ?t$iopia4 ;iolatio"s o. t$e rig$ts o. t$e #isa#5a"tage# et$"ic gro-ps
protecte# 1y t$e )"ter"atio"al /o5e"a"t o" ?co"o0ic, &ocial a"# /-lt-ral 9ig$ts, a state0e"t s-10itte#
to t$e 4!
t$
&essio" o. t$e C"ite# 7atio"s /o00ittee o" ?co"o0ic, &ocial a"# /-lt-ral 9ig$ts, 30 April to
1! ,ay 2012, p.24.
70
Tobia ,agaFi"e, Kear ), 7o.1, 1!4. &ee ,o$a0e# Hasse", The )romos of Ethiopia *14+, a"# 8es$ale
8i1e1-, The #a0ing of #odern Ethiopia: 5678957:;*8$e 9e# &ea Press4 15+ .or t$e respecti5e =ro0o
a"# %oDDa0e 5iews o. ?t$iopia" $istory. A#$a"a i" ,-tatio", p.15, also s"i#es 8a#esse 8a0ratLs
i"terpretatio" as M&$oa"L4 ...a" e0i"e"t ?t$iopia" $istoria" .ro0 B-lga*i" "ort$er" &$awa+.
301
based on radical ethnicism. Over and above the skepticism towards Ethiopian history in
general, this ideology conceded little beyond ethno-history. In 1992, then President and
Chairman of EPRDF and TPLF, Meles Zenawi, famously proclaimed that Aksum is
nothing for the Walayita and Lalibela is nothing for the Anuak (sic). This seemed a
logical assertion to ethno-nationalists given their fresh military victory over state
nationalism. Again it was a grave miscalculation regarding the depth and magnitude of
Ethiopianism which haunted the regime throughout the period.
The assumption of a role as defender of the sovereignty and integrity of Ethiopia
demanded an ideological framework accommodating the apparently incompatible roles.
The necessity of an Ethiopian face to the regime demanded a rival historical narrative,
one which cut to the ruling group a distinctive niche in the national past. After a brief
spell of ultra-ethnicism, therefore, the TPLF-led government started to search for an
appropriate historical legacy and legitimacy. It shifted from total rejection of the past to
selective use of the past. It attempted to span the ethnic as well as the national aspects of
history, still with an inherent proclivity to the former. The new official ideology called
revolutionary democracy attempted to marry residual Marxism with traditional
ethnicism.
Interestingly, TPLFs alternative narrative and justification seemed to replicate the age-
old aristocratic rivalry of feudal Ethiopia. By reinvigorating an anti-Shoa/Amhara
propaganda, which incriminated the group as cause of the destruction of Ethiopia, TPLF
ideologues arrogated to themselves a new mission as saviors of the nation. The regime
hailed what it called the new politics of to be (revolutionary democracy) as an
302
antithesis to the former politics of not to be, i.e., to chauvinistic nationalism and a
nationalism of withdrawal plus everything in between. The latter are the offshoots of
the politics of the Shawan aristocracy (old and new). Both share the same thought
patterns and frames of mind: hate and exclusiveness. ...Both work to complete the task
the Shawan aristocracy left unfinished: the disintegration of Ethiopian statehood.
71
The EPRDF cast its roles and achievements in favorable light while it subtly
undercommunicated or debunked what it regarded as a history of Amhara regimes.
Aksum featured as an exclusive symbol of Tigrays historical legacy and a goading star
for Ethiopias future. In a February 1992 interview to Addis Zemen, Fitawrari Amede
Lema, a veteran member of the imperial parliament who was at the head of a 1967
motion for the repatriation of Aksum obelisk, reminisced Haile Selassies tacit opposition
to the move. Amede noted that the Emperor overrode the decision by a joint committee of
both houses (Hig Memria and Hig Mewesegna) demanding him to suspend his visit to
Italy until the obelisk was returned.
72
When EPRDF later revived diplomacy for the
repatriation of this historical relic, the state media played down similar efforts during the
Imperial and Derg periods. The Derg attempted to restore history to the masses whereas
EPRDF wanted to give it to the ethnic groups.
The occasion of Adwa Centenary in 1996 provided another instance of seeking historical
legitimacy. Originally the regimes tentative decision to host the national
commemoration in Adwa town was retracted due to strong public reaction. As a
compromise measure, therefore, twin celebrations were held in Addis Ababa and Adwa.
71
A#$a"a, ,-tatio" o., p.2!.
72
A2, 2 Tir 1!4.
303
The ethnicization of history and memory became more explicit with the retrenchment of
the regime after the 2004 elections. The ruling power portrayed itself as the Renaissance
Generation and traced its roots to the ancient civilization of Aksum. Radio and TV
documentaries propagated that Aksumite equality and freedom in Ethiopia had been
interrupted by the intrusion of Amhara feudalism between the 13
th
and the 19
th
centuries.
In fact, the ruling style of Emperor Yohannes IV was uniquely regarded as federalism,
endorsing the Tigrean leaderships legacy of democratic values. The repatriation and
erection of the Aksum obelisk in 2010 was also presented as the quintessence of revival
of Tigrayan power and glory.
Besides its eclecticism, EPRDFs general lack of concern for the national past and the
worth of history as an academic discipline seem unprecedented. In the early period, all
expressions of national history and culture were unceremoniously dismissed from public
forums as well as school curriculums. The regime substituted Yekatit66 Political School
by the Civil Service College in 1995 to produce a new breed of cadres and middle level
functionaries. It replaced Political Education by Civic and Ethical Education to infuse its
ideology through the national educational system. At the tertiary level, common courses
on Ethiopian history and geography were replaced by composite courses such as Civics
and Social Studies (containing history, geography and civics). Ethiopian history was
redesigned in line with the new emphasis on nations, nationalities and peoples.
73
At all
educational levels, the very title of the subject/course was changed to a wider Ethiopia
and the Horn and the specific reference Ethiopia was substituted in textbooks by a
more general and vaguer Ethiopian region. Though the course title Ethiopia and the
73
,es.i", Ethiopia +e.yet ,edet, p.14, recalls $ow two 8P36 ca#res ca0e to t$e -"i5ersity at t$e o-tset
o. t$e regi0e to i"str-ct t$e sta.. wit$ t$e "ew 5ersio" o. ?t$iopia" $istory.
304
Horn was originally introduced by the AAU Department of History, its adoption to
lower educational levels was in line with the governing ideology of the regime.
For much of the EPRDF period, regional education bureaus produced their own texts and
teaching materials often reflecting an ethnic version of history. Similarly, other relevant
bodies such as Culture and Tourism or Youth, Culture and Sports bureaus were
responsible for the promotion and preservation of regional culture, history and heritage.
This decentralization has undeniable merits in the opportunities it created for self-
government and empowerment, for drawing concern as well as material, financial and
human resources to sub-national and local values, institutions and traditions. Although
susceptible to propagandist and unscholarly abuses, one positive outcome of the post-
1991 period was the forum it opened for public and dialogue and research endeavors on
ethnicity, nationalism and their political and cultural implications. This was a period
when ethnic studies became a vibrant industry.
In tandem with global and national paradigm shifts, Ethiopianist scholarship entertained
vigorous calls by social scientists that preferred the emic approach in ethno-history to
the etic methods of historians. As argued by Ivo Strecker: Ethiopia offers great
opportunities for ethno-historical studies today, or perhaps I should say it demands them,
for there are still many people who want to tell their history to the world and by doing so
assert their identity and their position within the wider Ethiopian orbit.
74
The 13
th
International Conference on Ethiopian Studies(ICES), held in Kyoto in December 1997,
was themed Ethiopia In Broader Perspective to reflect the shift from center to
periphery, from national to ethnic concerns. Generally, in the main professional Ethiopian
74
)5o &trecker,?t$"o:History a"# )ts 9ele5a"ce .or ?t$iopia" &t-#ies, (E$, HH;))), 2*15+, p.4!.
305
outlets such as JES and ICES, there was similar gravitation towards ethnic and peripheral
issues. In some emerging universities, autonomous regionalist institutes were opened,
such as the Southern Studies Institute in Dilla University (2007), later renamed as the
Institute of Indigenous Studies, to rival the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES).
An outstanding testimony to flourishing ethnic scholarship was the emergence of Oromo
studies and the publication of its bi-annual journal, Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS),
since 1993. It is an index to the stage of Oromo nationalism that it has been engrossed
with the rediscovery, reconstruction and propagation of the history, culture and tradition
of the national community. At the forefront of this endeavor are historians, sociologists,
anthropologists, linguists/philologists, etc., though historians are highly represented.
According to a prominent Oromo historian, Oromo intelligentsia must play roles at all
phases of the collective attempt to carve a niche in the past, to justify the nationalist
struggle and give credibility to the ethnic view and ideology. Educated Oromo have a
national duty to argue for the self-determination of Oromia. They have also the moral
responsibility to articulate the Oromo yearning to live in unity, harmony and peace with
the people of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.
75
An instance of such radical vein is the
attempt by scholars, notably Assafa, Sisay, Mohammed and Ezekiel, to historicize the
colonial thesis in their recent works.
76
75
,o$a00e# Hasse", o" a re5iew o. Assa.a GalataLs 1ook, )romia in Ethiopia, ()$, ), 2*14+, p.11.
76
,o$a00e# Hasse", A &$ort History o. =ro0o /olo"ial ?Eperie"ce, 1!70s:10s4 Part ="e4 1!70s to
135, ()$, ;), 1@2*1+, pp.10:15!. Also4 A &$ort History o. =ro0o /olo"ial ?Eperie"ce4 Part 8wo,
/olo"ial /o"soli#atio" a"# 9esista"ce4135:2000, ()$, ;)), 1@2*2000+, pp.10:1!. ?Fekiel %e1issa, 8$e
3esser o. 8wo ?5ils Para#ig0 o. /olo"ial 9-le4 A /o0parati5e &t-#y o. /olo"ialis0 i" t$e &-#a" a"#
?t$iopia, ()$, ;))), 1@2*2001+, pp.1:33.
306
The major problem in the above development has been the lack of a healthy balance
between ethnic and national perspectives. The political context tended to underscore
every gain for the former as a loss for the latter. However, ethnic closure and disregard to
commonalities and overarching bonds would be inimical to the national interest of the
Ethiopian peoples. Perhaps a widespread and damaging outcome of this particularistic
attitude has been the ongoing destruction of collective memory and heritage in the
country. In times of crisis and upheaval, the main targets of organized and mob
vandalism and larceny have been such institutional and material repositories as cultural
and historical artifacts, relics, buildings, works of art and archives. In the history of the
nation, this had happened countless times whenever certain groups, localities and
regions rose up against central or local administration. In the more recent periods, the
internecine war between insurgents and the state had destroyed official archives in
conflict zones.
Transitional lapses such as the 1974 revolutionary upheaval and the demise of the Derg
in 1991 were particularly notable for nation-wide vandalization of official documents. In
addition to spontaneous occurrences, the lack of proper legal and institutional care goes
very far to threaten the nations historical memories. As argued above, the process of
obliterating history seems to be ideologically justified in the current political system,
which has condemned everything that reminds of the past. Neither the federal
government nor the regions have provided clear policy and appropriate institutional
dispensary for official archives. This is notwithstanding to the fact that the regime had
promulgated Proclamation No.209/2000 on Research and Conservation of Cultural
307
Heritage in place of a similar provision of the Derg Proclamation No.36/1989 for the
Study and Protection of Cultural Heritage.
The EPRDF issued Proclamation No.209/2000 after a decade of foot-dragging partly in
response to civic and professional pressure. The law scarcely refers to archives as worthy
of conservation as its definition of heritage is inclined to cultural assets of the nations,
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.
77
The Authority for the Research and Conservation
of Cultural Heritage founded by this proclamation is based in Addis Ababa and has so far
been inactive in the various regions. Again the National Archives and Library Agency,
which has been reestablished in 1993 by Proclamation No. 179/1993, is totally
dysfunctional outside Addis Ababa. Ethno-politics and its institutional and legal
interpretation in federal structuring have particularized history. The Cultural Policy
adopted in 2004 seems to put the onus on ensuring the recognition, respect, preservation
and conservation of the languages, historical and cultural heritages, fine arts, oral
literatures and other features of nations, nationalities and peoples. There is no good
history to be cared for but localized ethno-histories which were counterpoised to national
meta-history. Even the Ethiopian National Museum has been relegated to an insignificant
department because, in the words of its former boss Ahmed Ugaz (Afar), there is nothing
so-called biherawi.
78
In the reigning ideological, legal and institutional confusion, Ethiopia is losing its
historical witnesses which are the unique features of the country in the continent. The
77
%ederal Negarit a!eta, 6
t$
Kear, 7o.3, 27
t$
G-"e 2000. Procla0atio" 7o.20J2000.
7!
=ral )".or0a"t4 a" o..icial i" t$e A-t$ority .or t$e 9esearc$ a"# /o"ser5atio" o. /-lt-ral Heritage,
i"ter5iewe# i" A##is A1a1a, &epte01er 2012.
30!
impact of this state of affairs on the care and preservation of not only of archives of the
relative past but also current official documents can be observed throughout the
country.
79
Cases in point can be the Gambella Regional State and the Amhara Regional
State. Though these widely divergent localities were selected from first-hand experience,
it is evident that the same goes for other regions and localities. The pre-1991 Gambella
archives, only a tiny portion of which were salvaged from destruction during the early
1990s, have been dumped to rot in a junk room in the Regional Council compounds.
80
Likewise in the Amhara Regional State, the localities I endeavored to survey, such as
Dangella, Anjebara and Finoteselam, have virtually lost the entire pre-1991 documents.
Whatever extant archives there were had been carelessly abandoned in an underground
cellar of the old Tsehayu Enquselassie residence at Debre Marqos. More recently, there
has been a salutary effort on the part of Debre Marqos University to rescue these archives
by housing them in its compound.
81
5.2 The Resurgence of Pan-Ethiopianism
The military victory of ethno-nationalism did not mean the resolution of the national
question or the ultimate defeat of Ethiopianism. Force has never been a good solvent to
deep-rooted historical and social problems. Unfortunately, what has been seen in the
post-1991 period was a reversal of roles between primordialist and unification
7
=ral )".or0a"t4 3aeke0aria0 Ae0ro, >e1re ,arBos, represe"tati5e o. Historical A..airs, 2o"al /-lt-re
a"# 8o-ris0 B-rea-.
!0
) $a5e wit"esse# t$is o" 0ore t$a" two occasio"s, w$ile #oi"g 0y ,.A. researc$ i" 2004:6 a"# "ow
a.ter .o-r years i" 0y P$.>. proDect.
!1
=ral )".or0a"t4 Ale0- Ale"e, $istory #epart0e"t, >e1re ,arBos C"i5ersity.
30
nationalisms, as EPRDF underestimated the depth of social nationalism (Ethiopianism) in
the same way the previous regimes failed to understand the persistence of ethnic
identities. Aregawi argued that since its inception in the ESM, the national question has
been distorted and used opportunistically. This had derailed the effort to find a genuine
solution to the question to date. Its analysis could then help to unravel the continuing
engagement between state, social and ethnic nationalisms and shed light on the behavior
of political actors such as the MLLT/TPLF who seem to be bent on redefining popular
demand and exploiting grievances to promote a desire for power.
82
From the outset, the EPRDF demonstrated a willingness to employ ideology for self-
serving pragmatism. In 1991, it went to considerable lengths to resurrect and prop up
weakened ethnic insurgencies such as the WSLF and ONLF. It did not show similar zeal
towards peaceful pan-Ethiopian organizations such as the EPRP and MEISON. The effort
to create every possible obstacle against multiethnic groupings, while sponsoring the
formation of ethnic organizations, narrowed the political foundation of the new
government and led many to doubt its sincerity for meaningful political reform. A part of
the problem emanated from the nature of TPLF, the narrowness of its basis, its political
highhandedness and opportunism. "By taking over the ethnic agenda, the EPRDF has
been able to keep other key issues out of the political limelight."
83
By presenting itself as
the champion of oppressed nations and nationalities, the EPRDF effectively sidelined
pan-Ethiopian social nationalists and denied rival ethno-nationalists, especially the
Oromo and Somali groups, an exclusive identification with the south.
!2
Aregawi, A Political History, p.13.
!3
3o5ise Aale", Ethnic %ederalism in a Dominant Party $tate: the Ethiopian E<perience 57759=>>>*Berge"4
/$ristia" ,ic$else" )"stit-te, 2002+, p.47. ,es.i", Ethiopia +e.yet ,edet, pp.11:24.
310
Hence, opposition to the regime came from both ethno-nationalist and multiethnic
quarters. Some emerged in an effort to counter the divisive and domineering pressure
from predator groups such as the EPRDF and its surrogate PDOs. Western Somalia
Liberation Front (WSLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) agreed to form
a united organization in 1992. Democratic Unity Party (DUP) was another Somali
organization which expressed its major aim as being to create peace and unity among
Somali ethnic groups, to accept the equality and freedom and peaceful coexistence with
other neighboring peoples, and to stand with other democratic forces for the sovereignty
of the country.
84
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Abo also agreed to
collaborate to stem the increasing pressure from EPRDF/ OPDO, before the ultimate
withdrawal of the former from the Transitional Government in July 1992. The two Afar
based organizations, Afar Peoples Democratic Organization (APDO) and its
predecessor, the seat-holding Afar Liberation Front (ALF), also agreed in June 1992 to
work hand in hand for the peace and interest of their people within the Ethiopian
framework.
Other oppositions arose as a reaction to the regimes policies and their impact on the
national interest, unity and destiny of the Ethiopian peoples. One factor should be noted
in order to fully understand the characteristics of the TPLF-led regime. That is, a
secessionist trait lingering from its past among the hardcore Marxist-Leninist League
Tigray (MLLT) members sitting at the helm of power. "In spite of TPLF claims to the
contrary, it is likely that the document [Manifesto 68] did represent the thinking of
important elements within the leadership at the time it was written, and that it continued
!4
A2, 11 -e0atit 1!4.
311
to reflect significant political currents in the leadership."
85
Even among the ethno-
nationalist sympathizers, EPRDFs readiness to sacrifice Ethiopian interest became clear
after the mishandling of the Eritrean issue and the collateral loss of an outlet to the sea.
The Dergs accusation of TPLF as asgentay appeared to hold true though the TPLF
couldnt have stopped it even if it wanted to.
Still others gradually hardened after observing TPLFs partiality to its regional and ethnic
base, the regimes apparent lack of sincerity towards the resolution of the national
question as well as the flagrant abuse of state power by political actors. Even its former
allies deplored the use of the federal structure as a facile device for economic and
political control, and as a means to divide and dominate other ethnic groups, especially to
sow dissension between the Oromo and Amhara.
86
Now it was TPLFs turn to be accused
of Tigreanization of the political and economic structure of the country.
The early 1990s were a period of intense hostility against pan-Ethiopian forces variously
labeled as chauvinists, Dergists, monarchists, etc. One observer explained the
atmosphere thus: Today all history is considered as fabricated history. The unity stand is
considered as basically anti-democratic. To argue for unity is regarded as a design to
oppress the people and to obstruct the attempt of each community to know itself. When it
is said that one official language is necessary, it is denounced as a desire to destroy
others languages.
87
When on 18 July 1991 the then chairman of the Afar Liberation
Front (ALF), Hamfre Ali Mirah, declared that the Afar have come to the July Conference
!5
Go$" Ko-"g, Peasant &evol"tion in Ethiopia: The Tigray People.s ?iberation %ront, 57:@95775*/a01ri#ge
C"i5ersity Press4 17+, p.. Aregawi, A Political History, pp.1!6, 1!7, 1, 200*."+, 201.
!6
>i0a, /o"teste# 3egiti0acy, pp.170, 16, 17. Aale", Ethnic %ederalism, p.3.
!7
A2, 25 -e0atit 1!4.
312
because they believed in Ethiopian unity, it became stunning front page news. Few
thought that support for Ethiopian unity would come from the least expected quarters at
the most unlikely of times.
While the transitional period promoted the proliferation of ethnic and identity claims at
the local level, it also saw the development of new identification and loyalty at higher
level, particularly in the southern region. In a Peace and Development Conference held at
Awassa that brought together 45 ethnic groups and five regions from 7
th
to 11
th
May
1992, it was decided to merge the seven autonomous units into one united regional state
in accordance with Proclamation No.7/1991. This was a pragmatic decision not only for
administrative efficiency but also for the more urgent task of stopping the rampant ethnic
conflict and bloodshed orchestrated by the OLF, Oromo Islamic Liberation Front (OILF),
Sidama Liberation Front (SLF), and Gedeo Peoples Democratic Organization (GPDO)
and others in the region.
88
Tamrat Layne, then Prime Minister, turned around the implication of the decision as
proof that the self-determination up to secession logic is working, and that voluntary
unity is the model for future Ethiopia. Even though the amalgamation of the seven
regions into SPNNRS was an unexpected regional initiative, its relative success and the
smoothness in which debubness entered into national identity discourse was
surprising.
89
The southern region immediately became a bulwark of Ethiopianism and
confirmed that it was and will remain an integral part of Ethiopia. In March 1993, the
Kembatta Peoples Congress (KPC) issued a historical analysis entitled Kembatta
!!
A2, 5 inbot 1!4.
!
A2, 13 #ia!ia 1!6.
313
beGiragina beOromo Inqsiqase Zemen which argued that Kembatta and other southern
regions were part of medieval Christian Ethiopia.
90
In the early 1990s, there were also widespread efforts to rally the forces of unity both
inside and outside the country. Following the unification of the southern region, the ten
political organizations with parliamentary seats formed a coalition named the Southern
Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Union (SEPDU). In Europe conferences to link the
domestic and diaspora opposition were held in Bonn in November 1992 and in London
on 10 March 1993. The Paris Peace Conference On Ethiopian Peace, held between 10
and 12 March 1993, notably passed a decision calling for the convocation of a peace and
reconciliation conference to amend the wrongs being done by the Transitional
Government (TG). What made the Paris Conference different was the participation of
SEPDU thus sparking a public row between the regime and opposition groups in
parliament. The Council of Representatives demanded the ten coalition members of
SEPDU to explain their actions which allegedly contravened the charter they accepted.
The tension escalated when the Council attempted to divide the SEPDU by apparently
conflicting measures. On the one hand, it released a statement to the effect that half of the
coalition, namely Kembatta Peoples Congress (KPC), Gurage Peoples Democratic
Front (GPDF), Wolayita Peoples Democratic Front (WPDF), Burji Peoples Democratic
Organization (BPDO), and Kaffa Peoples Democratic Unity (KPDU), have escaped
punishment by conceding their mistakes and rejecting the decision of the Paris
Conference. On the other hand, it decided to oust the other half, the Sidama Liberation
0
A2, 14 #egabit 1!5.
314
Movement (SLM), Omotic Peoples Democratic Front (OPDF), Hadiya National
Democratic Organization (HNDO), Yem Peoples Democratic Movement (YPDM), and
Gedeo Peoples Democratic Organization (GPDO), from parliament effective from 1
April 1993 allegedly for persisting to abide by the general decisions of the Paris
Conference.
91
However, nine of the above organizations jointly protested against the
Councils deliberate misrepresentation of their stands, adding grievances such as the
Transitional Governments lack of transparency in handling the upcoming Eritrean
referendum. The GPDF similarly objected the Councils falsification of its views as if the
front had opposed the Paris decisions.
92
In March 1993, the EDU also issued a statement urging a balanced view to the
establishment of sustainable peace in the country. 3HI% 1G 1'1G 1G8G
1JG % KA 1" L / M 8 8 N@ O PQ=
G! N" 1R! 1A- S 0T O+1U N" "%(( That to be
prepared to accept the view about Ethiopians being suppressed, oppressed, denigrated
and dehumanized is not an injustice perpetrated on a single specific nationality or religion
is the direct road to bring tolerance and coexistence.
93
The EDU urged multinational
organizations to let all Ethiopians, regardless of language, race, religion, region and
culture, participate equally in the economic and social affairs of the country and live in
mutual agreement and love. Some of the multiethnic organizations, which were
signatories of the transitional charter, expressed similar hope that they would work within
1
A2, 25 #egabit 1!5.
2
A2, 5 #ia!ia 1!5.
3
A2, 7 #egabit 1!5.
315
the given parameters to disseminate their ideas and counter the threat posed on the unity
and integrity of the nation.
The Ethiopian Peace and Reconciliation Conference, held in Addis Ababa from 18 to 22
December 1993, was another major attempt to pressure EPRDF to be more inclusive in
the political process. About 70 organizations, including 6 which held seats in the
transitional Council, were represented in the conference. As the tenure of the TG was to
expire on 22 January 1994 , the conference concluded by establishing a Peace and
Democracy Alternative Forces Council(PDAFC), commonly known as Amarach
Hayloch, to pave the way for the establishment of an interim government in which all
political parties including EPRDF will be represented.
The alternative way was thought to be imperative due to EPRDF/TPLFs record of
compromising the sovereignty of Ethiopia particularly in its unbalanced relations with
Eritrea, its factional and ethnic exclusiveness, its monopoly over the political and
economic spheres as well as total control of one ethnic group within the army, the police
and security apparatus. Moreover, EPRDFs attempt to present one group (the Amhara)
as a historical enemy of the other nations and nationalities was considered as a recipe for
bloodshed. Its undue emphasis on group rights rather than individual rights was also
deemed undemocratic.
94
According to the conferences spokesmen, the seven political
organizations which formed the Paris Peace Conference (March 1993) did not take part in
the deliberations, though they were in agreement with the move to bring back home the
Ethiopian political opposition initiative from the diaspora.
4
Tobia, 14 Tahsas 1!6. Tobia, 12 #es0erem 1!7.
316
The two platforms for political opposition during the constitution drafting process were
the inclusion of the secession clause and the so-called joint ownership of land by the
state and the public which was regarded as a euphemism for state control.
95
EPRDF was
so uncompromising on both points that in December 1993 the Ethiopian National
Revolutionary Party (ENRP) withdrew from the Constitution Drafting Commission
complaining that the political direction of the TG is contrary to the interest and view of
the Ethiopian people. Similarly, a member of the Council of Representatives and
chairman of the KPC, Tesfaye Habisso, opposed the inclusion of the rights of
nationalities up to secession in the constitution (on 19 March 1994) because its liability to
abuse by ethnic entrepreneurs.
96
More importantly, on 2 April 1994, KPC and four other organizations with parliamentary
seats, the Ethiopian National Democratic Organization (ENDO), the Ethiopian
Democratic Coalition (EDC), GPDF and WPDF, established the Ethiopian National
Democratic Party (ENDP) with Dr Fekadu Gedamu as president. In its program, the party
opposed the constitutional endorsement of secession and noted that current concern
should be on promoting the common interest of the Ethiopian peoples. It also argued that
ethno-nationalism is a route to serious conflicts and civil war, which the regime should
do well to counterbalance by promoting cohesion and unity.
97
Etyopiawinet had been
perhaps the only organization of such a name expressly formed to counter the
disintegrative and ethnocentric politics unleashed by the transitional charter and the new
5
Pa-l H. BrietFke, ?t$iopiaLs 3eap i" t$e >ark4 6e#eralis0 a"# &el.:>eter0i"atio" i" t$e 7ew
/o"stit-tio", (o"rnal of African ?a/, 3*1+, *15+, p.25.
6
A2, 14 #egabit 1!6.
7
A2, 27 #egabit 1!6. A2, 2 #ia!ia 1!6. A2, 1 #ia!ia 1!6. A2, 24 inbot 1!6. Tobia, 2! #egabit
1!7.
317
government. According to its leader Bitweded Zewdie Gebre-Silassie, the cardinal aim of
the civic organization was to make Ethiopians aware and be proud of their history of
freedom and unity and consolidate it in popular democracy.
98
The EPRDF deployed its surrogate organizations to counter dissident voices in and
outside the parliament. This set off a string of demonstrations and oppositions, as
discussed above, orchestrated by the PDOs. For instance, KPCs opponent the Kembatta
Peoples Democratic Organization (KPDO) publicly expressed its support to the
secession clause.
99
The regime also turned a deaf ear to all calls for political inclusiveness
and national reconciliation. The EPRDF line had been that there was a reign of peace and
democracy in Ethiopia and, therefore, national reconciliation where there is no conflict
is irrelevant. This was reminiscent of Dergs stubborn idiom politics is not a quarrel
between husband and wife. Some radical ethno-nationalists, notably OLF, also
denounced the effort of pan-Ethiopian organizations as neftegna caucuses aimed at
removing the secession clause from the charter and possibly from the upcoming
constitution.
100
Though the OLF itself had been ousted from the transitional government
exactly after a year, it considered the right to secession as its signature achievement.
The three major contenders of the period, EPRDF, OLF and AAPO, represented so
sharply contrasting views that they could not come together to the negotiating table
throughout the transition period. For instance, the Atlanta Conference held at the Carter
Center on 7 and 8 February 1994 was the last chance before the approval of the EPRDF
!
A2, 16 #ia!ia 1!6. Tobia, 25 Tir 1!7.