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Case Digests

Submitted to:
Judge Orlando Gallardo

Submitted by:
Capilitan, Diamer B.
Ditucalan, Sarah Jane B.
Enriquez, Desiree Von D.
Guirnaldo, Onella M.
Macalanggan, Junisah B.

Cases: Page No.
1. Dr. dela Llana vs Rebecca Biong GR. 182356, Dec. 4, 20133
2. People vs Vivencio Sabellano and Wesly Sabellano..5
GR no. 93932-33, June 5, 1991
3. Tating vs Marcella GR No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRa 797
4. People vs Marjorie Castillo GR No 116748, June 2, 1997.8
5. People vs Francisco 105 SCRA 516..9
6. US vs Capa and Carino 19 Phil 125, 1291. .13
7. Pp v. Hodges, 46 Phil. 502, 503.14
8. Pp v. Liera, 82 SCRA 16315
9. Pp v. Muoz, et al. 107 SCRA 313.17
10. Malig v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 313..18
11. Pp v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 525.19
12. Pp v. De la Cruz, et al., 91 SCRA 525...20
13. Pp v. Extra, 72 SCRA 20021
14. Pp v. Alitao, et al., G.R. No. L-74736, February 18, 1991...22
15. Pp v. Bolima, et al., G.R. No. L-96549, March 22, 1991..23
16. Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-68834.24
June 6, 1990
17. Pp v. Tandoy, G.R. No. L-80505, Dec. 4, 199025
18. Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 431..26
19. Pp v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562..28
20. Ortigas v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-2877329
June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 636-637
21. Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino.32
G.R. No. L-38964, June 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 258, 263-26

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 3 of 33

CASE No. 01:
2013-12-04 | G.R. No. 182356

On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving and his sister, Dra. dela Llana,
was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light
turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed the cars rear end,
violently pushing the car forward.
Dra. Dela Llana suffered minor wounds. The traffic investigation report dated
March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero who is an employee of
respondent Rebecca Biong.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate
pain on the left side of hernneck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days
passed by. Her injury became more severe. On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from a
whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left
arm and is required to undergo serious medication to alleviate her condition. Thus she
demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This
made her sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana but was reversed by the CA.

Whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas
whiplash injury and consider her medical certificate as an admissible evidence.

The SC said that the basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted
cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even
if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not
on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince
and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of
In sum, Dra. dela Liana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance
of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Liana's favor.
Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and
has no leg to stand on.
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 4 of 33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 5 of 33

CASE No. 02:
1991-06-05 | G.R. Nos. 93932-33

In Criminal Case No. 65155, On February 6, 1985, Walderita Abrogar was in her
house at 536 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong watching a wake across the street. A game
had then been in progress for about two (2) hours between one Julio Catayong and
Wesly. Julio cursed 'putang inamo' and delivered a fist blow to Wesly. Seeing the trouble
erupt, Salvador pulled out a knife and advanced towards Wesly. Vivencio Sabellano, at
the same time, had also approached and held up Salvador preventing the latter from
attacking Wesly. As this occurred, Wesly went home and after getting hold of a knife,
rushed back and stabbed Salvador twice. Almar, who was then a mere three (3) arm-
lengths (sic) away watching. Salvador asked Almar to fetch a taxi to which the latter
obliged. Wesly confronted Almar and told him not to be involved. Almar ran to the
house and hid. The deceased, Benito Abrogar, was at that time fixing the toilet. Hearing
the commotion, he went out holding a bolo. He was met by Vivencio, Mayoling, Wesly
and Jaime who struck him with a bareta. Mayoling and Wesly mauled Benito while
Vivencio delivered a stab to the back with a 29" knife. He was then picked-up by his wife
who, along with other relatives, took him to Rizal Provincial Hospital and confined for
ten (10) days."
In Criminal Case No. 67688, On March 9, 1986 at 3:45 a.m. met the group of
Vivencio, Wesly, Jimmy and John Doe at a grocery store. Further down the street,
Gertrudes noticed that two (2) joggers. One of the joggers, Wesly, grabbed Walderita
with his left arm around her neck. On the other hand, Vivencio, embraced Benito and
stabbed the latter on the right breast. Jaime and John Doe stabbed Benito in the
abdomen. Wesly released Walderita and stabbed Benito in the back. Walderita tried to
help Benito for home but he died shortly. Gertrudes was only an arm-length away and
was able to recognize the assailants.
RTC decide in Case No. 6515 and Case No. 67688 against Vivencio Sabellano as
Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt for Homicide and Wesly Sabellano for Murder
respectively. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.


The SC ruled that although the records do not show any direct proof showing that
the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano together with his three other companions agreed
to inflict fatal wounds on the person of the deceased, there is overwhelming evidence
from the elaborate testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Benito's attackers were
at the time and place of the stabbing incident that led to the death of the said victim,
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 6 of 33

Benito Abrogar, and that all of them acted in consonance with a common design so that
the guilt of one becomes the guilt of all.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the trial court's decision dated June 6,
1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of increasing the amount of

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 7 of 33

CASE No. 03
G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter,
herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently,
title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the
years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in possession
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she
had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable
her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated
March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as
heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.

Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower

The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the
witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given
probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract
of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 8 of 33

CASE No. 04:
G.R. No. 116748 | 1997-06-02

On or about the 27th day of November, 1990, the abovenamed accused, armed
with a long barrel twelve gauge shotgun, in company with persons whose identities and
whereabouts are unknown, with intent to kill, and abuse of superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and with the use of said
firearms, shoot once ELMA BAULITE who was then holding her daughter GEMMA
BAULITE, hitting and wounding GEMMA BAULITE at the abdomen, and as a
consequence thereof GEMMA BAULITE died thereafter and also hitting ELMA
BAULITE at the upper anterior right arm, thus, performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it due to the timely and able medical attendance given to
ELMA BAULITE, which prevented her death.
Appellant, pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on May 4, 1992. Trial
ensued afterwards, with the People offering the testimonies of two witnesses and four
items of documentary.
The RTC convicted Castillo for the complex crime of murder and affirmed by the
CA. Hence this petition.

Whether the lower court erred in believing Elma Baulite's supposedly improbable
testimony and in rejecting his defense of alibi.

The SC ruled that having thoroughly examined and objectively evaluated the
evidence and records before us, we hold that appellant indeed committed the crime
alleged in the information beyond any iota of doubt. The SC added that there is
nothing on record showing any improper motive on the part of Elma Baulite to testify
mendaciously against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the crime committed. In
the absence of evidence showing such motive, the logical conclusion is that the principal
witness for the prosecution was not so actuated and that her testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.
The SC further states that, Where an accused's alibi is established only by
himself and his relatives, his denial of culpability does not deserve any consideration,
especially in the face of affirmative testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses. This
bare consideration applies to supporting testimonies made by the friends of the
Where the distance did not render it impossible for the accused to be at the scene
of the crime, the defense of alibi must preclude the possibility that the accused could
have been physically present at that place or its vicinity at or about the time of its
commission. Appellant has utterly failed to prove that fact or impossibility.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 9 of 33

CASE No. 05
People of the Philippines vs Francisco
105 SCRA 516

Defendant-appellant is convicted by the trial court for the crime of Rape against
the prosecuting witness, Mercedita Manito. During trial, the prosecution presented as
their witness Mercedita Manito, the victim; Luciano Manito, victim's father; Dr.
Fernando Viloria, the physician who conducted an internal examination three (3) days
after the alleged commission of the crime of rape; and Lt. Vicente Sosa, the officer-in-
charge of the investigation. The defense on the other hand presented the accused,
Ariston Francisco as their witness.

Complainant, MERCEDITA MANITO's version of the incident follows:
In the evening of January 28, 1972, At about 12:00 o'clock, she and her sister went home
from a Coronation Ball. On their way, appellant and Ruby Poras, who were following
behind, suddenly ran after them and overtook them. Appellant grabbed complainant's
right hand and whirled her around several times and she shouted "Saklolo.! Saklolo.!".
Complainant's younger sister, Roberta, ran away. Appellant then dragged her to a place
where talahib grass grew, while Poras was beside them holding a knife. Appellant
removed her panty, made her lie on her back, embraced her hard and sexually abused
her. During the sexual intercourse, the complainant felt pain while Poras was beside
appellant and was holding a knife. When appellant was through having carnal
knowledge of her, Poras also took his own turn with her. Meanwhile, appellant stayed
beside accused Poras holding an open knife. After Poras had subjected her to the same
carnal treatment, complainant stood up but Poras again embraced her and forced her to
lie down. The complainant fainted.
Complainant declared on cross examination that appellant and Poras were able to
penetrate her private part with their private organs; that she felt severe pain; and that
appellant raped her once while accused Poras raped her twice. When asked whether she
offered any resistance, complainant answered that she became very weak because of the
force they used on her. When complainant was asked whether her private part bled, or
whether she felt her private part bleed during and after she was raped, she answered: " I
do not know." However, on further cross-examination complainant was asked whether
she felt blood oozing from her vagina and she answered in the affirmative, further
saying that the blood spilled on the ground and stained her dress (upper garment).
During the incident, complainant stated that she was wearing a pantsuit with an
upper apparel and panty. Her panty and pantsuit where taken by appellant, who refused
to return them in spite of her demand.
Complainant could not remember when she regained her consciousness but she
was able to go home at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning, without panty and pantsuit
but not naked from the waist down because her upper garment reached down to her
thighs. When she arrived at their house, everybody was asleep, including her sister
Roberta. Complainant went to sleep. At around 6:00 o'clock the next morning, January
29, 1972, complainant washed her stained upper garment because she was afraid the
members of her family might discover what had happened to her. Complainant did not
reveal a thing to anybody after the incident, nor did she relate the incident to her father
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 10 of 33

because appellant and Ruby Poras had threatened to kill her if she did. Finally,
complainant revealed the occurrence to her elder sister, Estrella Manito, who received a
report from their uncle, Maximo Manito, that appellant had told their uncle about what
he had done to complainant. When her father confronted complainant, she told him that
she had been raped.
On cross-examination, complainant denied that she had a prearranged date with
appellant to attend the coronation ball on January 28, 1972. According to her, she had
never met appellant prior to January 28, 1972; the latter had never gone to their place;
nor had visited her; nor had serenaded her; nor had courted her; and never had made
amorous advances to her. 16 She saw appellant watching the dance at the entrance gate
of the premises during the coronation bag and he was not formally dressed.
Complain ant was investigated by Lt. Sosa, a police officer, at the police
headquarters in Bongabon. During said investigation, she was with her father, Luciano
Manito. She executed a sworn statement on February 1, 1972 (Exhibit "B") and another
one on February 3, 1972 (Exhibit "3"). In her latter statement, complainant admitted
that she had one sexual intercourse the year before with Cirilo Francisco, an uncle of
appellant. She also declared that she did not bleed when she was abused by appellant
and Ruby Poras.

LUCIANO MANITO's testimony disclosed that, at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of January 28, 1972, his daughter, Mercedita, asked for permission to attend the
coronation ball at Camantigue. Mercedita went with her sisters Roberta and Estrelia. He
advised his daughters to return at 12:00 o'clock midnight. Estrella returned with her
husband around that hour. Luciano inquired from his daughter Estrella for the
whereabouts of Mercedita and Roberta; Estrella told him that the two were still
attending the coronation ball. When Roberta arrived alone at around 12:00 o'clock
midnight the father inquired about Mercedita. Roberta told him that Mercedita was still
witnessing the coronation ball. He did not notice any more the arrival of Mercedita.
At about 8:00 o'clock the next day, January 29, 1972, Luciano left for Lumboy
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, in order to work. He learned of the January 28, 1972 incident
two days later while he was at Lumboy Roxas, through his daughter Estrelia. When he
returned to Camantigue, Bongabon, on January 31, 1972 22 he confronted Mercedita
about the matter and the latter admitted that she was abused by Ariston Francisco at
midnight of January 28, 1972. Luciano noticed that Mercedita was weak and she
complained that her body was painful.

Luciano, Mercedita, and the husband of Estrella together went to the police
headquarters and filed a complaint. Mercedita was investigated by Lt. Sosa. Thereafter,
they went to the clinic of Dr. Viloria where Mercedita was examined. 25

DR. FERNANDO VILORIA, testified that: on February 1, 1972, he conducted
an internal examination of Mercedita Manito and issued a medical certificate recording
his findings of "three (3) old lacerations at the vaginal orifice-situated at 3, 5 and 9
o'clock." Aside from the lacerations, he found no injuries on the body of Mercedita. Dr.
Viloria admitted that the lacerations could have been caused probably by sexual
intercourse. On cross- examination he declared that the lacerations were very old and
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 11 of 33

that it was possible that the lacerations were sustained by Mercedita prior to January
28, 1972.

Lt. VICENTE SOSA, officer-in-charge of the investigation, narrated:
In the morning of February 1, 1972, complainant, accompanied by her father,
filed a criminal complaint for Rape in the Office of the Police of Bongabon. He then had
complainant examined by Dr. Viloria, and thereafter interrogated her and reduced her
statement into writing.
On February 2, 1972, appellant was brought to the Office of the Police by a certain
barrio official of Camantigue. In the presence of another investigator, Corporal Garbin,
Lt. Sosa interrogated appellant, who admitted the commission of the crime. Lt. Sosa
prepared appellant's statement, read to the latter the contents thereof, and asked him
whether he acknowledged the contents. When appellant answered in the affirmative, Lt.
Sosa caused him to thumb mark and sign the statement. Lt. Sosa brought appellant to
Municipal Judge Garcia and left him there "to subscribe his affidavit and later the Judge
called (Lt. Sosa) and informed (him) that there was no truth to the contents of the
affidavit of Ariston Francisco."

ARISTON FRANCISCO, accused-appellant, as sole witness for the defense, he
set up alibi, claiming that at about 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 28, 1972, he was
with his brothers, sisters and parents in their house, which is "far" from barrio
Camantigue, that is, 4 more or less one kilometer" away. Appellant claimed further that
he does not know Mercedita Manito and that the complaint she filed against him is
untrue. He admitted, however, that he does not know of any reason why Luciano Manito
or Mercedita Manito, both of whom he did not know, would entertain a grudge or ill-
feeling against him and charge him in Court.
Appellant rejected his statement claiming that he signed it only because he was
threatened by Patrolman Camacho of the Bongabon Police. Appellant narrated that
before Lt. Sosa took his statement, Patrolman Camacho brought him (appellant) to the
second floor of the municipal building of Bongabon, required him to expose his penis,
and hammered his penis with half a hollow block. However, because appellant's penis
receded before it was hit, it did not sustain any injury except for some bruises (gasgas)
at the tip which left no scar. Appellant did not, however, complain to Lt. Sosa of the
maltreatment he suffered at the hands of Patrolman Camacho. When Lt. Sosa
investigated appellant, the former was alone in the room and the hollow block was lying
on one side of the room.
Aside from facts regarding his personal circumstances, appellant denied having
supplied the contents of sworn statement prepared by Lt. Sosa, alleging that said
statement was a fabrication of the investigator Lt. Sosa. He further denied having
knowledge thereof because he does not know how to read, and he only affixed his
signature because he was required to do so.

1. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the defendant-
appellant is unreliable, doubtful and insufficient to warrant his conviction of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 12 of 33

2. Whether the conviction of defendant-appellant is primarily based on the
weakness of the defendant's evidence and not on the strength of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution.

1. According to the trial Court, it was fully convinced of appellant's guilt after
"thoroughly and conscientiously" observing the demeanor and conduct of complainant
on the witness stand and considering her "straightforward" testimony 'There is no
question that on matters of credibility of witnesses, the conclusions of the trial Court
carry great weight and are entitled to the highest respect by appellate Courts, hence,
should not be disturbed in the absence of proof of misappreciation of evidence.
However, there are certain facts of substance and value that militate against an
affirmation of the finding of guilt in this case, particularly when the evidentiary rule is
recalled that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not
be received with precipitate incredulity; and when the conviction depends at any vital
point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity
and candor are free from suspicion. For rape is an accusation, easy to be made, hard to
be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent."
The foregoing flaws in the complainant's testimony on vital points crucially
destroy her credibility. The improbabilities therein verily defy the "Test of reason." Her
story lacks the stamp of absolute truth and candor.

2. The refusal of the Municipal Judge to subscribe to complainant's affidavit
because of the falsity of its contents bolsters appellant's assertion on the witness stand
that his answers were untrue. Besides, the prosecution failed to present Corporal Garbin
to corroborate Lt. Sosa's testimony that appellant, in his Garbins presence, admitted to
Lt. Sosa the commission of the crime. Neither did the prosecution present Patrolman
Camacho to rebut appellant's assertions that he was maltreated. These witnesses, who
could have strengthened the case for the prosecution, were not presented. As very aptly
enunciated by then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in People vs.
"(I)t is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged;
that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty."
Added to this is the fundamental principle that conviction should rest on the
strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense. The
foregoing indispensable criteria have not been met herein. The prosecution. evidence is
wanting in proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 13 of 33

CASE No. 06:
United States of America vs Capa and Carino
19 Phil 125, 1291

Defendants were charged with the crime of Lesiones Graves for inflicting injury,
particularly on the arm, upon the prosecuting witness, Francisco Garcia. However, it
was only Aurelio Carino alone appealed. The brief antecedents are as follows:
Francisco Garcia came to Ciriaco Capucao's house to where defendants live for
the purpose of getting a fighting cock. However, commotiom stirred between Garcia and
defendant Capa resulting Garcia receiving a blow over his eye and was stabbed by a stick
on his arm. Garcia then sought intervention from a doctor who dressed and treated his
wound. On trial, however, to establish guilt or that the crime of Lesiones Graves were
perpetrated by the said defendants, it was only the testimonies of the offended party,
Aurelio Garcia and Ciriaco Capucao that were offered as evidence.
Hence this appeal.

Whether the evidence presented, testimony of the offended and a named Ciriaco
Capucao, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In criminal cases the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt every
essential element constituting the crime, and upon which the conviction and
punishment is based. It was just as essential for the Government to prove that the
offended party, by reason of the blow inflicted by the appellant, lost the use of the arm,
or was hindered in the use thereof, as it was show that the appellant inflicted said blow.
The offended party said that he was under the care of the doctor for eight days
and that the exterior wound at the time of the trial was cured, but that the bones which
have been fractured had not been cured; while the other witness stated that when he
examined the injured party he saw a small wound on his hand. The best evidence as to
the gravity of this wound was that of the attending surgeon. For some reason, which
does not appear in the record, the doctor was not called as a witness. It is clear that this
testimony does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the offended party had lost
the use of his arm, nor was hindered in the use thereof, by reason of that blow. He
himself admits that he was under the medical treatment for only eight (8) days, and it is
difficult to see why the doctor would have abandoned this treatment and the care of his
patient until his arm had been completely cured.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 14 of 33

CASE No. 07:
People of the Philippines v. Hodges,
46 Phil. 502, 503

Plaintiff charges defendant, C.N. Hodges of four separate cases of violation of
Section of the Usury Law. The testimonial evidence of prosecuting witness Leopoldo
Ortiz grounded the charges made by the plaintiff against defendant. Accordingly,
defendant Hodges imposed unconscionable interests in its money lending transactions.
It is alleged that defendant received from Ortiz 1,800.00 as an interest on a 3,250 for
the term of 1 year; 7,344 as an interest on a one-year loan of 13,856; 3,984.55 as an
interest on a one-year loan of 15,713.63; and 300 as an interest on a three-month loan of
Trial Court found defendant guilty and there from appealed the judgment
resulting to the consolidation of these four cases. At the trial of the cases, prosecution
called for a number of witnesses to testify regarding defendant's character and
reputation and their testimony was admitted over the objection and exception of his
counsel notwithstanding the fact that his character had not been out in issue by the

Whether the court erred in admitting the testimony of the witnesses regarding
the defendant's character and reputation.

YES. The court erred in admitting the testimony regarding the character and
reputation of the defendant notwithstanding the fact that his character had not been put
in issue by the defense.
It is elementary rule in criminal procedure that the prosecution is not permitted
to touch upon the character of the accused in the original case and that it is only after
the defendant has elected to put his character in issue by calling witnesses and adducing
evidence in support that the prosecution is permitted to follow and disprove the
evidence so offered. (I Jones Commentary on Evidence, 755-756)
In the present cases the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that most of the
character testimony evidently related to facts ante-dating the Usury Act, appears to have
been its appreciation of the evidence largely thereon.
Ruling out this testimony, as we must, there is practically no evidence against the
accused except the testimony of the prosecuting witness, which, as we shall presently
see, is of a most unsatisfactory character.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 15 of 33

CASE No 08:
People of the Philippines v. Liera
82 SCRA 163

Herein defendant-appellant, Liera, Lara and Guevarra, were charged for the
crimes of Robbery in band with Homicide, for robbing the belongings pertaining to one
Daniela Tindugan and killing his husband, and two (2) counts of Robbery in Band,
thereafter robbing the belongings of it's neighboring houses, one of Tabita Alviar and
Asuncion Gutang, in the barrio of Bogo, Pagadian City. In the course of the trial,
complaint against Marcos Liera was dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence while Carlito Lara was discharged to be utilized as state witness, leaving
Antonio Guevarra ('DEFENDANT GUEVARRA' for brevity) as the defendant-appellant
of the case before the trial court.
Defendant Guevarra interposed the defense of alibi by stating that at the time of
the commission of the crime, he was somewhere else, particularly at his uncle's house in
Tukuran, Pagadian City and that he even presented his uncle, Gregorio Ibanez to
corroborate his claim. He also interposed, through his Counsel de oficio, that there was
conflicting testimonies given by Daniela Tindungan during investigation and her
testimony stating that defendant Guevarra was one of those armed men who ransacked
their place; and that the testimonies given by Carlito Lara stating that defendant
Guevarra was one of the armed robbers during his testimony and the testimony which
he has given to Lt. Silvestre Roda, states none of such fact; and that Tabita Alviar and
Asuncion Gutang failed to recognize any of the armed men who robbed them, thereby
affecting the credibility of the witnesses

1. Whether defendant-appellant's alibi is with credence.
2. Whether the contention of defendant-appellant Guevarra, conflicting or
inconsistent testimonies are without credence, meritorious.

1. We find that the alibi of the appellant does not deserve credence.
It has been held that to establish an alibi, a defendant must not only show that
he was present at some other place about the time of the alleged crime, but also that he
was at such other place for so long a time that it was impossible for him to have been at
the place where the crime was committed, either before or after the time he was at such
other place. Needless to state, alibi must be proved by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence. In the instant case, Tukuran, the place where the appellant is claimed to have
been when the crime was committed, and Bogo, where the crimes were committed, are
within the municipality of Pagadian, both accessible to motor vehicles. In view of the
proximity, we are inclined to agree with the Solicitor General that the defense of alibi is
ineffectual especially when considered in conjunction with the positive identification
given by two prosecuting witnesses.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 16 of 33

2. Appellant's contention is without merit.
The fact that Daniela Tindugan did not immediately name the appellant as on of
the malefactors is understandable. She was in a state of shock and could not
immediately associate faces with their names.
The appellant points to an apparent conflict between the testimony of Carlito
Lara and Lt. Silvetre Roda... This conflict is a minor detail which does not affect the
credibility of said witnesses. Such fact might have slipped the mind of the witnesses. The
fact remains that Lt. Rods was informed of the participation of the accused in the
robbery so that he was investigated in connection with these cases and subsequently
charged in court.
Counsel de oficio also contends that the appellant cannot be found guilty of
having robbed Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang in the absence of evidence that the
appellant participated in its commission. Counsel makes capital of the testimony of
Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang that they did not recognize any of the armed men
who robbed them on September 11, 1967; much less point to the accused as one of the
malefactors during the trial.
Indeed, Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang stated during the trial of the case that
they did not recognize any of the armed men who robbed them on September 11, 1967.
Nor did they point to the accused as one of the malefactors. The record shows, however,
that a conspiracy existed and the crimes were committed simultaneously one after the
other and were perpetrated by the same group of armed men so that the identification
made by Carlito Lara and Daniela Tindugan that the appellant was one of the robbers is
sufficient. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution
for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify
the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence
at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 17 of 33

CASE No. 09
People of the Philippines vs. FELICIANO MUNOZ and JUSTO
1981-09-10 | G.R. No. L-38016

Feliciano Muoz alias 'Tony' and Justo Millora alias 'Tito' of the crime of Murder
committed as follows: "That on or about the 22nd day of August 1972 at San Carlos City
in Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, armed with firearms, conspiring together and mutually aiding each other, with
evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one, Ricardo Depacina alias
'Carding', thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his head which mortal
injuries caused the death of said Ricardo Depacina, alias 'Carding', as a consequence.
The lower court found the accused guilty through the testimonies presented by
the prosecution. The accused argued that the testimonies are inconsistent, thus the
credibility of the witnesses is doubtful.

Whether the witness for the prosecution established that the appellant Feliciano
Munoz shot Ricardo Depacina to death through the testimonies of the witnesses.

No. Feliciano Muoz claims that the lower court erred in holding that the
witnesses for the prosecution have established that he shot Ricardo Depacina to death.
Apellant Muoz points out that while prosecution witness Narciso Rosal testified on
cross-examination that the incident in question occurred between 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of August 22, 1972, Dr. Silverio Petrasanta, who conducted a post-
mortem examination on the cadaver of the deceased between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same date, testified, on the other hand, that said deceased had
lready been dead from 2 to 3 hours on that date. Hence, appellant Muoz concludes that
prosecution witness Narciso Rosal was not telling the truth. The alleged contradiction
between the testimony of prosecution witness Narciso Rosal and that of Dr. Silverio
Petrasanta is superficial because if Dr. Petrasanta examined the dead body of Ricardo
Depacina after the latter had been dead for two hours, the time of death must have been
at about 1:30 o'clock p.m. which coincides, more or less, with the testimony of Narciso
Rosal that the victim was killed at around two o'clock in the afternoon. The apparent
difference of thirty (30) minutes in their testimonies as to the time of death is a minor
inconsistency which, as repeatedly declared by this Court, does not affect the witness'
basic credibility.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 18 of 33

CASE No. 10
1988-04-15 | G.R. No. L-71712

That on or about the 15th and the 21st day of March 1983, in the municipality of
Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, accused Honorato Malig and Antonio
Lacson, both duly appointed Senior Technical Property Inspectors of the Commission
on Audit for Region III and as such conduct verification and post inspection of
government infrastructure projects, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully request
Celso R. Halili, President and General Manager of Halrey Construction Inc. who had a
contract with the Provincial Government of Bulacan for the construction of Bocaue-San
Jose Road (Bagbaguin Section) thru his employee to give P20,000.00 in connection
with said contract wherein said accused had to intervene under the law in their official
capacity in violation of RA 3019. The accused argued that the Sandiganbayan erred in
giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which are purely hearsay,
self-serving and incredible.

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.

No. While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
"evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time," the same
Rule also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like." We have carefully
examined in detail the evidence adduced by both parties in the trial of the case under
consideration, but WE failed to uncover any valid and cogent reason to suspect that the
institution of this case has been improperly motivated. While it is true that the accused
endeavored to question the sincerity and honesty of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the reason ventured by the accused in an effort to cash serious doubts on the
credibility of said witnesses, is insufficient to overcome the probable value or weight of
their testimonies which are properly confirmed by the documentary and circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case. All told, the testimonial, documentary
and circumstantial evidence point to the guilt of petitioners-accused beyond reasonable

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 19 of 33

CASE No. 11
1995-02-15 | G.R. No. 106783

"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1988, at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Payapa Ilaya, Municipality of Lemery, Batangas, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another
armed with bolos and a bladed and pointed instrument, with treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with said weapons, suddenly, and without
warning, one Criselda Mundin y Enriquez who at the time was in her third month of
pregnancy, thereby inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds on the different parts of
her body which directly caused her death and as a further consequences thereof, the
foetus inside her womb died. Contrary to law." Only Protacio Alilio stood trial as his two
(2) accused nephews were never apprehended. Appellant Alilio raised the defenses of
alibi and denial. He testified that on 24 June 1988, at about 2:00 in the afternoon, he
was at a chapel located at Arendatis, Payapa, Ilaya, Lemery.

Whether the alibi and denials presented are enough to create doubt on the guilty
of the accused.

RULING: No. The denial and alibi of appellant Alilio are simply inadequate to
overcome the positive identification of appellant Alilio and his two (2) nephews as the
malefactors. Denials and alibis are fabricated with ease and rebutted only with difficulty.
Simple denials, like alibis, are inherently weak defenses and cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of credible witnesses that the accused had committed the crime

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 20 of 33

CASE No. 12
1946-02-21 | G.R. No. L-52

At about 8:30 p. m., on July 25, 1945, while Dr. Gregorio B. Sison was closing the
door of his drug store at 389 Dimasalang, Manila, four men armed with revolvers got
near him, stuck revolvers over his ribs, pushed him inside the drug store, and ordered
him and all other persons inside to lie down face downward. One remained to watch the
door, another, who was manipulating his revolver several times, kept watch of the
persons lying down, and the remaining two went upstairs. The one watching the door
called several times the other watching the persons lying down, telling him to shoot
their heads if they moved. The malefactors were able to get P200 from the cash register,
P7,000 in bills, P500 in silver coins, and one pair of earrings with diamonds valued at
P300, all located in one of the drawers in the kitchen. The victims positively identified
the identity of the perpetrators.

Whether the testimonies of the victims are engouh to prove the identities of the

Yes. The analysis of the testimonies given in this case convinces us that appellant
was conclusively identified as the robber who kept watch of the people inside the drug
store while lying down; who, upon entering the drug store, was one of those who stuck a
revolver at the ribs of Dr. Gregorio B. Sison; who, during the watch, was manipulating
his revolver to the extent of dropping two bullets to the floor, and who was being named
as Doro. The fact that the prosecution witnesses singled him out as the only one among
the four robbers they could identify, it appearing that there were circumstances which
made his identification possible, and that no unreasonable motive was shown why they
should point him out, instead of any one of the three remaining gangsters, only serves to
strengthen the credibility of said identification.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 21 of 33

CASE No. 13
G.R. No. L-29205 July 30, 1976

Leovigildo Saligao, Barrio Captain of Putingbuhangin, San Juan, Batangas,
appeared at the PC Detachment Station at Putingbuhangin, San Juan, Batangas, seeking
help from Sgt. Iglesias, Detachment Commander thereat, because according to him
appellant Gerardo Extra alias Handing for no valid reason at all was threatening him
with a firearm. Acceding the request, they proceeded to Putingbuhangin with Saligao
indicating the way. Thereafter, the firing between Gerardo and group of saligao
occurred. After the firing ceased and upon finding that appellant had steady escaped,
they went to the aid of Leovigildo Saligao who was seriously wounded. Chief of Police
Daniel B. Mendoza filed with the Municipal Court a complaint for "Frustrated Murder
with Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority" against Gerardo Extra alias
Handing. For his defense, accused presented an alibi.

Whether the defense of alibi would prosper for the acquittal of the accused.

The defense of alibi must be recalled that in order that an alibi as a defense may
prosper, the evidence to support it must be clear and convincing as to preclude the
possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, while the evidence as
to his identification must be weak and insufficient. The unexplained flight of an accused
from his native town and family following the commission of the crime, and
abandonment of his business, particulars where t is surreptitious, coupled with his
failure to communicate to the authorities his whereabouts, has been considered
indication of consciousness of guilt.

Indeed, the alibi of appellant "has all the
characteristics of a story designed to fit the intended purpose of showing the
whereabouts of the defendant to be in a place other than where the crime was
committed at the time of its commission. Therefore, the trial court did not commit any
error in finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 22 of 33

CASE No. 14
G.R. No. 74736 February 18, 1991

Baltazar Alan Alitao and Henry Occena , both security guards of the Talisay-Silay
Milling Company and a third person, Wilfredo Apungan, were accused of murder for
the killing of Jason Concepcion y Esparista on or about February 24, 1981 in Talisay,
Negros Occidental. The information alleged that "armed with a shotgun and bladed
instrument (and) conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with intent to kill,"
they did "attack, assault, box, strike and stab the victim, Jason Concepcion thereby
inflicting multiple stab wounds and other injuries on different parts of the body of the
latter causing his death.

The trial court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder without the presence of any aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua ,to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and severally. The amount of
30,000 for the death of the victim without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay costs. Hence petition.

Whether the Court erred in not acquitting appellants there being no evidence of
conspiracy or of their individual culpability for the injuries sustained by the deceased.

The existence of a conspiracy among the appellants and Wilfredo Apungan is
further supported by the testimony of the-victim's brother, Ramon Concepcion, who
declared that as the former was being taken to the hospital, he had identified the
appellants and Wilfredo Apungan as his attackers. The Trial Court correctly admitted
said testimony as either evidence of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae and an
exception to the hearsay rule. Conspiracy is also inferentially established by the number
and nature of the victim's injuries which, in the opinion of the medico-legal officer who
issued and testified on the post-mortem report, were inflicted by different means or in
instruments. WHEREFORE, as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellants.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 23 of 33

CASE No. 15
People of the Philippines vs Bolima
G.R. No. 96549 March 22, 1991

Lelis and Bolima were both collectors in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Tabaco. Lelis were allegedly intruding upon Bolimas territory in the collection of fees of
incoming trucks. Because of controversy, Lelis was stabbed and mercilessly killed by
several assailants. In due course, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco, Albay by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, approved by the Provincial Fiscal,
charging Carmelo Bolima, Leopoldo Britanico, Rogelio Britanico, Gomer Bolima and
Domingo Britanico of the crime of murder allegedly committed.The court finds the
accused guilty of the crime of Murder and for lack of evidence to support the conviction
of accused DOMINGO BRITANICO, he is hereby ACQUITTED. Not satisfied therewith
accused Carmelo Bolima, Leopoldo Britanico and Rogelio Britanico appealed to the
Court of Appeals alleging that the court a quo committed the error.

Whether the lower court erred in disregarding or overlooking substantial facts
and material circumstances which if properly appreciated could result in the acquittal of
the appellants.

No. While on the one hand, the appellants doubt the veracity of the testimonies
of said prosecution witnesses that Leopoldo Britanico hacked Generoso Lelis, on the
other hand, they give weight to the testimonies of the same witnesses that the place was
dark.Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses were more apparent
than real. The assault upon the person of Lelis did not occur in one place. In fact, the
whole incident was ambulatory, occurring as it did in various places. Thus, while it is
true that Atun testified that the place of the incident was dark, referring to the place
where the bolos were sold, yet Nipolo said the place was well-lighted, as he was referring
to the place in the supermarket where the victim ran and was pursued by his assailants.
As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, suffice
it to say that the same relate to minor matters. Rather than affect the credibility of
witnesses, they are badges of their truthfulness and candor. WHEREFORE the Court
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 12, 1990 with the
modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
Costs against defendants-appellants.SO ORDERED.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 24 of 33

CASE No. 16
Tan vs Intermediate Court of Appeal
G.R. No. L-68834 June 6, 1990

Plaintiffs Policarpio Martos, Lourdes Martos and Victoria Martos de Aquino are
the surviving children of the deceased Pedro Martos and Dalmacia Madali. Plaintiff
Berlina Rodeo is the wife of Policarpio Martos. Policarpio, Victoria was informed only in
the year 1975 by Policarpio and Lourdes of the mortgage of their inherited property to
Felicito Tan for One Hundred Fifty Pesos. Said brother and sisters are co-owners of a
parcel of coconut land. On January 28, 1968 Policarpio and Lourdes encumbered said
property to Tan. On April 24, 1975, Policarpio Martos, Berlina Rodeo and Lourdes
Martos, private respondents herein, filed with the Court of First Instance of Romblon,
an action for recovery of real property with rescission and annulment of contract with
damages against Felicito Tan The trial court rendered decision in favor of plaintiffs
which was affirmed in toto by court of appeal. Hence,The motion for reconsideration
filed by defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, was denied by respondent appellate
court in its resolution, thus, this petition for review filed with the Court.

Whether the questioned loan documents are binding and enforceable against
respondents Policarpio Martos, Berlina Rodeo Martos and Lourdes Martos.

YES. The fact that Policarpio Martos, with his wife Berlina Rodeo and Lourdes
Martos did execute the application for loan, the real estate mortgage securing the loan of
P2,400.00, the promissory note, and the supplement to real estate mortgage, has been
established by the testimonies not only by the government officials whose presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty has not been rebutted but also by the notary
public before whom the notarized instrument was verified which is admissible as
evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the
truthfulness of its contents, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. All these unquestionably overrule the uncorroborated and self-serving denials
of Policarpio Martos of his participation in the questioned documents and the
improbable declarations of Berlina Rodeo that she signed the documents and
thumbmarked them for Policarpio Martos, as requested by Felicito Tan without
knowing that she was executing an application for loan. Furthermore, the notary public
who notarized the documents, Lorenzo J. Morada, testified that all three private
respondents appeared in his office in connection with their application for a loan with
the PNB, which they personally presented to him together with two other documents-a
real estate mortgage for P2,400 and supplement to real estate mortgage-for

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 25 of 33

CASE No. 17
People of the Philippines vs. Tandoy
G.R. No. L-80505, Dec. 4, 1990

On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation,
whereby Detective Singayan to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along
Solchuaga St in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the
store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked
Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor? To this, Detective Singayan answered yes. Two P5.00
bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were exchanged for two rolls of
marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy.
The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscted from Tandoy and
an information was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425.
Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actully bet money and that, under the
best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of the marked bills were inadmissible in court.

Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills?

No. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are
the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was
actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five
specified instances. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose
of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary
evidence, such as Xerox Copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the
original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy bust money was not
indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of marijuana had been
sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and
the marijuana actually sold had been submitted as evidence.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 26 of 33

CASE No. 18:
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 431

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of
Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio
Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere
employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint
against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and
the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong
Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of
the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and
profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired
by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and
with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others
born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and
as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were
all given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter
sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the
above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the
import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI
sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the
common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former
had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.

Whether the evidence presented by Tan Put establishing the validity of her
marriage to Tee Hoon can be admitted in court to support her claim from the company
of Tee Hoon's share.

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by
the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence,
the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification
of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its
non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 27 of 33

certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent
Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no
showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity
of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant
provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his
office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law
marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this
document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also
settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings
held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal
of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent
court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of
the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay,
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently
enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein
indicated. Costs against private respondent.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 28 of 33

CASE No. 19:
People of the Philippines vs. Castaneda
88 SCRA 562 (1979)

Edmundo Enriquez became a victim of a robbery-killing. He was beaten and
stabbed on the different parts of his body which caused his subsequent death. His wallet
containing P60.00, his wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, were all taken from him.
Teresita Nobello, a deaf-mute, while walking along Taft Ave. and E. delos Santos Ave.,
allegedly saw the incident. When she reported it to the police, investigation and taking
down of sworn statement took place but nobody was arrested. Castaneda was then
arrested at the iceplant where he works, admitting the crime and pointed two others
Juanito and Benedicto. He alleged that it started when they were drinking when they
saw Enriquez (deceased) at the nearby table and Benedicto approached him and asked
for money but instead Enriquez gave him a cigarette. When Enriquez passed along a
dark alley, the accused and companions beat and stabbed (causing death) Enriquez with
pipe and took the wallet containing P60, ring, watch and shirt. Teresita, as a witness,
said Castaneda acted as a lookout while the others beat and stabbed the victim. RTC
held that Juanito and Castaneda shall be punished with DEATH discrediting their

Whether the trial court erred in admitting extrajudicial admission and testimony
of lone evidence Teresita.

No. Trial court is correct in its decision. Extrajudicial confessions of the accused
in a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible evidence against him and this
rule is based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself
unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession
constitutes an evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and his conscience. The trial court is not bound to believe all
that the witness has said, but it may give weight and credence to such portions of her
testimony as it may deem worthy of belief and disbelieve the other portions of her
testimony. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that a witness has said; they may
accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what
seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances, to be the truth. Even when
witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some particulars, the jury are not
required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such
portions as they may deem worthy of belief. In this regard, it would suffice to state that
the trial court by reason of its proximate contact with witnesses, is in a more competent
position to discriminate between the true and the false, and in the case at bar, we find no
reason to disturb its conclusion that the said witness of the prosecution saw the incident
in question.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 29 of 33

CASE No. 20
Ortigas vs. Lufthansa German Airlines
G.R. No. L-28773, June 30, 1975
64 SCRA 610, 636-637

Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German Airlines, appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay
plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply with its obligation to give first
class accommodation to a Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was due to
giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its agents in dealing
with him which was filled with discrimination.
During the trial, there were several postponements of the trial from both sides.
Three hearings were postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the request of both
parties, and 10 on the request of respondents.
Due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the no-show
of their European employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their
witnesses was stricken from the list due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-
exam on him was to be finished and the judge moved for a finality regarding the
postponements (ie. no postponements were to be made again)
Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination against him took place.
Moreover, when he asked for a seat change to first class during the stop overs, he wasnt
given any. He was only given the option when he was already in Hong Kong, about 3
hours only from Manila.

1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
defendants motion for postponement on Sept 24, 1966.
2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the testimony of one of the
defendants witnesses even if his testimony was not finished
3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant pay indemnities.

No to all. Judgment modified raising damages from 100k to 150k.
1. The case had been pending for about three years and had actually suffered
during that period even more than the usually permissible number of continuances,
quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's counsel. Notice of the September 28,
1966 schedule had been served on counsel the month previous. It must be assumed that
due preparations and arrangements were to be made since the receipt of that notice to
insure the presence in Manila for the expected witnesses on the date set. Under the
circumstances, the excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not leave their
respective stations and places of work to attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There
was enough time and opportunity for defendant to have made the corresponding
adjustments in the assignments of its personnel so as to enable its witnesses to be in
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 30 of 33

As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the exercise of discretion on the part
of the trial judge in a manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed because of the
absence of evidence only when such absence is justified. Mere absence is not a
justification in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this point. It provides
that "A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted
only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and
that due diligence has been used to procure it." This means that it must be shown to the
court that due diligence had been exercised in either securing the presence of the
evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof.
Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on September 24, 1966 the court
would have been as well justified in denying the requested postponement. We cannot
see any reason why, despite its having knowledge of the date of the hearing about a
month before, defendant did not see to it that its expected witnesses were not assigned
to do duty on the day they were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe
Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple adjustment of its personnel had
to be "impossible."

2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is
invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in
criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution
does not render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to
appropriate supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of
its being unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the
witness against self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted harassment and
embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-examination as prescribed
in Section 8 of Rule 132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the
direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test
his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." Until such cross-examination has been
finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in
deciding the case.
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-
examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-
examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the
party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not opted not to rely
exclusively on the foregoing considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not
defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the impugned action of the trial court
relative to the testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same gone over the
transcript thereof. After considering the same, they claimed that even his direct
testimony, without taking into account anymore his answers to the cross-examination
questions of counsel for plaintiff, cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses
in defendant's answer.
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 31 of 33

However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive
or as amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a
logical consequence of the previous order denying defendant's motion for
postponement. With such denial, the next thing in order was to declare the presentation
of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it was necessary to determine
what evidence could be considered to be for the defendant. And so when counsel for
plaintiff asked the court to strike out the testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was
practically no alternative for the court but to grant the same. Indeed, defendant's
counsel could not and did not offer any objection thereto.

3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas
to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered to so
Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed plaintiffs in a predicament
that enabled the company to keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist class,
thereby retaining the business and promoting the company's self-interest at the expense
of, embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part of the plaintiffs.
These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square to herein plaintiffs case.
Defendant's liability for willful and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with
plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 32 of 33

CASE No. 21
G.R. No. L-38964 | 1975-01-31

September 27, 1972, the Savory filed a complaint charging LAKAS PILIPINO,
with unfair labor practice for having violated certain provisions of Republic Act 875
(Industrial Peace Act). To sustain its charges, petitioner presented Atty. Emiliano
Morabe as a witness. Atty. Morabe had allegedly taken charge of the labor-management
problems of the petitioner and had thereby acquired first-hand knowledge of the facts of
the labor dispute. Accordingly, the cross-examination of Atty. Morabe was re-scheduled
for several times, but when such date arrived, Atty. Amante did not appear and so the
cross-examination was once more transferred to March 17, 1973, with the warning from
the court that "should the respondents still fail to cross-examine Atty. Morabe, the right
to cross-examine him will be deemed waived."
Atty. Morabe succumbed to a heart attack on March 31, 1973. On April 12, 1973,
LAKAS PILIPINO filed a motion to strike out the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe from
the records on the ground that since cross-examination was no longer possible, such
direct testimony "could no longer be rebutted." On June 14, 1973, private respondents
filed another motion seeking the recall of petitioner's witness Bienvenida Ting for
further cross-examination. Mrs. Ting was presented as a witness by the petitioner on
March 27, 1973 and was cross-examined by the private respondents on June 4, 1973. In
an Order dated May 3, 1974, respondent court granted the two motions. Thereupon,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order but the same was denied
in a resolution en banc dated July 5, 1974.

Whether respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion when the latter
ordered that the direct testimony of its principal witness, Atty. Morabe, be
stricken off the record.

The SC ruled that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part
of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying
the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to himself alone.
Rules on Evidence Case Digests Page 33 of 33

The instant Petition presents a clear case of grave abuse of discretion which
justifies the Court's intervention at this stage of the proceedings in the court below.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the
Orders of respondent Court of May 3, 1974, and July 5, 1974, under review are hereby
set aside.