Hannah R.

Slane PHIL 201-A05 Response Paper

H. J. McCloskey expressed multiple times in his article, On Being an Atheist, that the classical arguments used as proofs for the existence of God cannot prove with absolute certainty His existence. He specifically mentions the cosmological and teleological proofs for the existence of God. Why might these proofs fail? The answer resides in the fact that theists, Christian theists particularly, believe in an all-perfect, all-powerful, and all-knowing God. McCloskey objects by claiming that the classical proofs for the existence of God cannot establish Him as such - an all-perfect, all-powerful, and all-knowing Being. Furthermore, if God exists and He possesses these character traits, then how could evil exist in the world? Should not God, in His all-perfect and good, all-powerful, and all-knowing nature, eradicate all evil since He clearly could and would? McCloskey thus concludes that atheism remains far more comforting than reconciling the existence of an all-perfect, all-powerful, all-knowing God with the existence of evil in the world. These objections to the existence of God pose a problem for the theist; how should the theist respond to McCloskey? First, the theist must address his objection to the arguments as proofs. Some philosophers would define a genuine proof as one that convinces every sane and rational person who carefully considers the argument.1 If one used this definition of proof in evaluating the classical arguments for the existence of God, the arguments would fail as proofs due to the fact that they are not rationally convincing to every person.2 Should one abandon these proofs then? McCloskey would respond with a yes because he believes that these arguments that theists call proofs cannot establish a definitive case for God; the arguments do not convince him that the God of theism exists and thus cannot be rationally convincing to everyone.

C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2009), 60. 2 Ibid.

One response to the objection posed involves abandoning the notion that these arguments for the existence of God represent proofs. Mark Foreman, professor of philosophy at Liberty University, states that the arguments do not intend to provide 100% proof of the existence of God; instead, the arguments seek to provide the best explanation for events observed in the universe.3 Could theism present a more plausible and reasonable explanation for phenomena in the universe than other metaphysical views? Foreman also informs those that study the classical arguments that no single argument proves the existence of God; rather the arguments in combination with each other make a strong case for the existence of God.4 The arguments mutually support each other in a way that epistemologists would call concurrence.5 As demonstrated here, these classical arguments retain value despite not definitively proving the existence of God. Regardless of whether the arguments provide definitive proof or not, rejecting any one of them results in serious implications for the atheist, for denying P logically requires asserting the opposite, or non-P.6 Denying the cosmological argument results in one making a claim that he or she did not originally intend to, as demonstrated in this next paragraph. The non-temporal contingency version of the cosmological argument states that some beings in the universe exist that could easily not exist.7 Why do these beings exist and not others then? The argument claims that the existence of these contingent beings necessitates the existence of a necessary being or an uncaused being.8 However, McCloskey claims in his objection to the cosmological argument that the mere existence of the world constitutes no reason for believing

Mark Foreman. Approaching the Question of Gods Existence. PointeCast Presentation, Philosophy 201 Online Class through Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, August 8, 2012. 4 Ibid. 5 W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1998), 93. 6 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 67. 7 Ibid, 69. 8 Ibid.
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in the existence of such a being [a necessarily existing being].9 In response to this objection, McCloskey should consider the implications of the claim that no necessary being exists as an uncaused cause. Evans and Manis state that if the cause of a things is something contingent, then the existence of that something will also require an explanation and so on and so forth unless a necessary being requiring no explanation exists.10 Denying the existence of a necessary being requires claiming that this infinite series of contingent beings exists, with each being providing a cause for the next one such that no being lacks a cause.11 Several problems arise from the infinite series view though. First, one could claim that this view only partially explains the existence of contingent beings: contingent being A depends upon contingent being B for existence yet contingent being B would naturally require an explanation also.12 One could see how this results in no ultimate explanation for why contingent beings exist! Second, the Second Law of Thermodynamics makes the infinite series view a scientific impossibility. This law renders the universe finite by essentially stating that nothing physical will last forever; an infinite series of contingent beings thus cannot exist in a finite universe13 Finally, this view provides no explanation for how the series of contingent beings began.14 Since the infinite series view contains multiple flaws, McCloskey could consider claiming an alternative view that some contingent beings exist without a cause, or, as brute fact.15 Even this view cannot provide a better explanation, for the fact that some contingent beings exist without a cause violates the principle of sufficient reason (that everything must have a cause).16 The very definition of contingent

H. J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, Question 1 (February 1968): 51. Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 69. 11 Ibid, 73 12 Ibid, 74. 13 Miller, Jeff. The Law of Causality and the Uncaused Cause. Apologetics Press. Last modified 2012, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=1601 14 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 74. 15 Ibid, 73. 16 Ibid, 75.
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demands an explanation for the existence of contingent beings! One final option for McCloskey remains: he could claim that no contingent beings exist at all. This of course would make all beings necessary and force McCloskey into agreement with the cosmological argument that a necessary being(s) exists.17 I clearly demonstrated here that a necessarily existing being provides the most reasonable explanation for phenomena in the universe; denying this would require that McCloskey claim any one of these flawed options discussed. However, McCloskey makes a further objection to the cosmological argument that the theist must address. McCloskey claims that the cosmological argument does not entitle us to postulate an allpowerful, all-perfect, uncaused cause.18 He poses a valid objection here that even theists admit the cosmological argument cannot refute. The arguments for the existence of God do not establish a case for the God of the Bible but rather a minimalistic concept of God as intelligent, morally perfect, personal, and the creator of the universe.19 The cosmological argument alone only claims that a necessary being exists.20 Could this necessary being represent the God of the Bible? Yes, but a necessarily existing being is compatible with many other concepts of God other than that of the Bible.21 At the most the cosmological argument, if successful at convincing a person, would inspire him or her to seek more information regarding God.22 Since McCloskey finds the cosmological argument unconvincing, then this answer probably would not satisfy him. However, I did state at the beginning that the classical arguments do not intend to definitively prove God. The arguments only provide a best explanation for His existence. Aside from his

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Ibid, 72. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 51. 19 Foreman, Mark. Approaching the Question of Gods Existence. 20 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 70. 21 Ibid, 77. 22 Ibid.

objections against the cosmological argument, McCloskey also expresses objections against the teleological argument. One version of the teleological argument claims that nature contains instances of design, and since designed entities require a designer, then nature is probably the work of a designer.23 Some philosophers question whether instances of design in nature represent genuine design or merely apparent design.24 McCloskey references this issue when he claims that to get the proof going, genuine indisputable examples of design and purpose are needed.25 He believes that such indisputable examples of design and purpose do not exist. I would respond by asking McCloskey if he could possibly provide an indisputable example of anything in this world. The word indisputable means beyond doubt or undeniable. One could liken this standard of indisputability to that of some philosophers epistemic standard of absolute certainty, or the belief that knowledge requires absolute certainty in order to count as knowledge.26 Yet the finite nature of humans renders absolute certainty regarding anything impossible! Humans do not possess omniscience and therefore cannot mentally grasp all complex and difficult issues nor can humans possess and objective birds eye view on these issues.27 Instead humans rely on sensual perceptions and reasoning that prove misleading and flawed at times.28 Since the definition of indisputability implies absolute certainty, and humans, in their finite mental state, cannot achieve absolute certainty regarding anything, then humans cannot achieve indisputability regarding anything either. To answer the question I posed earlier, no, one could not possibly

Ibid, 80. Ibid. 25 McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 64. 26 Mark W. Foreman and James K. Dew Jr., How Do We Know? A Short Introduction to the Issues of Knowledge, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2012), 64. 27 Ibid, 68. 28 Ibid.
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provide indisputable examples of anything in this world! For this reason I would call the standard of indisputability set by McCloskey unreasonable and impossible to achieve. Despite the fact that one cannot find indisputable evidence of design in the universe, I do believe that strong evidence of a designer exists. Evans and Manis provide the example that animals possess many parts and systems (such as hearts and lungs) that contribute to an overall goal of maintaining existence and reproducing.29 Consider one such animal: the bird. Many different systems work together in order for a bird to fly. Even slight differences in the DNA of a bird could alter the shape of the wings or distribution of feathers in such a way as to make flight impossible!30 Even preening affects whether a bird may fly or not! Preening repairs destroyed microstructures in the feathers that would inhibit the bird from flying; yet if the bird could not rotate his neck 180 degrees, he could not preen all his feathers!31 The bird possesses no intelligence yet he will fly and preen his feathers in order to accomplish some end, in this case survival and reproduction. Since Thomas Aquinas claims that an unintelligent being cannot move toward an end, then an intelligent designer must have designed the bird with exactly the feather shape, wing size, and feather distribution needed for flying, as well as all the other physical systems that support this task.32 However, McCloskey would perhaps claim that evolution produced this rather than an intelligent designer. McCloskey claims that so many things which were, before the theory of evolution, construed as evidence of design and purpose, are now seen to be nothing of the sort.33 He assumes here that the theist cannot reconcile evolutionary theory with his or her view of an

Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 78. Charles Detwiler, Kimberly Mitchell, and Norman Reichenbach, Life By Design (Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2012), 460. 31 Detwiler, Mitchell, and Reichenbach, Life By Design, 457. 32 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 77-78. 33 McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 64.
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intelligent designer. Indeed, the Darwinian theory of evolution would rather explain the order observed in the universe using random variations and natural selections than intelligent design.34 As a theist I could respond (if I believed in evolution) by conceding that an evolutionary process occurred but that mechanistic terms alone cannot explain this process; instead an intelligent designer guided the process.35 Alternatively I could claim that an intelligent designer, God, designed evolution for actualizing His purposes in the universe.36 In either case I am not denying evolution as a valid process at work in the world but am proving that evolution need not replace the need for a designer. McCloskey presents another reason for objecting against the teleological argument aside from the one previously discussed. He claims that theists carry on as if the existence of evil in the world did not seriously tell against the perfection of the divine design or divine purpose as revealed in the world.37 I see one major problem with this statement: the teleological argument never concludes with the existence of a perfect intelligent designer. Even a theist would admit this! The teleological argument merely concludes that an intelligent designer probably exists.38 As I discussed previously, the classical arguments cannot directly prove the all-perfect, allpowerful, and all-knowing God of theism; these arguments only provide a minimalistic concept of God that excludes important aspects such as His all-perfect, all-powerful, and all-knowing nature.39 I am not claiming that the God of theism lacks these attributes altogether, I am merely claiming that natural theology cannot and should not supply the detailed knowledge of God that special revelation or religious experience could.40

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Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 82-83. Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 64. 38 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 86. 39 Foreman, Mark. Approaching the Question of Gods Existence. 40 Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 86.

What of the problem of evil that McCloskey raised then? He claims that No being who was perfect could have created a world in which there was unavoidable suffering or in which his creatures would (and in fact could have been created so as not to) engage in morally evil acts, acts which very often result in injury to innocent persons.41 This represents the logical form of the problem: that the existence of God and occurrence of evil logically contradict each other and therefore God cannot exist.42 This demands that I, as a theist, demonstrate that the existence of God and occurrence of evil do not logically contradict each other. I do not need to know Gods exact reason for allowing evil; I simply need to know possible reasons for why He would allow evil.43 For example, certain goods, called second-order goods, would not exist without the presence of evils.44 Sympathy would not exist without the unavoidable suffering that McCloskey mentions.45 This suggests that God allows evil in order to create an environment that will facilitate the development of these second-order goods.46 Of course, not all humans choose to do these second-order goods because God gave humans free will. Free will represents another valid reason for God allowing evil in the world. He desired that humans freely choose Him rather than forcing His creatures to love Him and obey Him, but this also allowed for the possibility that His creatures would use free will for evil purposes.47 Both reasons mentioned here provide a sufficient enough defense against the logical form of the problem of evil that McCloskey argues. McCloskey argues further for the incompatibility of God and evil by asking, might not God have very easily so have arranged the world and biased man to virtue that men always freely

McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 65. Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 158. 43 Ibid, 167. 44 Ibid, 161. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid, 162. 47 Ibid, 163.
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chose what is right?48 I would propose in response to this question that this world represents the best possible world of all the worlds God could create. Why would I say this? Suppose that any free being God created would eventually misuse free will regardless of the world that God created.49 In such a scenario God could only prevent evil by not creating free beings; the world that McCloskey suggests proposes this exact scenario. If God biased man to virtue such that man would always freely choose the morally right option then this would negate free will entirely. Essentially this would require that God create a world where only morally right options exist for man to choose. If this were the case then man would not freely choose to love and obey God; man would choose to obey God since that option would represent the only option for him to choose! God thus justified evil by deciding that a world with free beings and evil represents a better world than one without free beings and thus without evil.50 One must remember that this only represents a possible reason for God allowing evil and not His actual reason.51 In a similar manner one must remember that God truly possesses reasons for allowing all types of evil; no person could claim that evil exists without a reason as humans are not in a position to perceive the reasons that God allows evil.52 Despite theists reconciling the existence of God and the occurrence of evil, McCloskey claims that he finds atheism more comforting than believing in a God who allows pain and suffering in the world. However, living without God results in serious consequences. First, one could consider humanity doomed and condemned to death with no hope for an eternity with God or immortality.53 What significance would life possess then? None at all, for if each person lives
McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 66. Evans and Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 165. 50 Ibid, 166. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid, 170. 53 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3 rd Ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008), 71.
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and then passes out of existence at death, then whether he even existed in the first place matters not.54 Even if one helped others or impacted the world in some manner, this would only provide relative significance to his life; his life would appear significant in relation with others.55 However this relative significance provides no ultimate significance for his life, no reason for living.56 This brings me to my second point: without God, one exists as an accident or a result of chance.57 Accidentally one comes into existence, a strictly material being no different from a fly or a pig. Why? Well, all come to the same end: death. Third, morality cannot not exist without God.58 Without God your behavior will not affect your destiny at all; you could commit horrible acts yet God would not exist to punish you or hold you accountable.59 Therefore no objective right or wrong would exist and each person could decide for him or herself which actions constitute right or wrong.60 Unfortunately relative moral standards would prevent you from ever condemning actions such as genocide, infanticide, or torture as wrong or immoral.61 After considering the implications of living without God, would McCloskey still claim that this presents a more comforting option than theism? In conclusion, theists do possess many good reasons for believing in the existence of God despite the presence of natural and moral evil in the world. These reasons do not always come from a proof or argument for His existence; most theists believe in God as a result of faith, special revelation, or religious experience. However, the classical arguments for the existence of God still remain for those such as H. J. McCloskey that deny that such a God could exist. As I

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Ibid, 72. Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid, 71. 58 Ibid, 74. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, 75. 61 Ibid.

demonstrated here, these arguments do not definitively prove that the God of theism exists but instead that these arguments provide the best explanation for the phenomena observed in the universe. After all, I would rather believe that I exist for a reason and not as a result of a cosmic accident! As a final note, one should always remember that denying any one of these arguments results in asserting a rival metaphysical view thus refuting arguments for the existence of God remains difficult!

References Craig,William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd Ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008. Detwiler, Charles, Mitchell, Kimberly, and Reichenbach, Norman. Life by Design. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2012. Evans, C. Stephen, and Manis, R. Zachary. Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2009. Foreman, Mark. Approaching the Question of Gods Existence. PointeCast Presentation, Philosophy 201 Online Class through Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, August 8, 2012. Foreman, Mark W., and Dew, James K. Jr. How Do We Know? A Short Introduction to the Issues of Knowledge. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2012. McCloskey, H. J. On Being an Atheist, Question 1 (February 1968). Miller, Jeff. The Law of Causality and the Uncaused Cause. Apologetics Press. Last modified 2012, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=1601 Wood, W. Jay. Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1998.