,

\
'"
Notes to pp. 30-47
beexpectedtobe more polite thanAto Bbecause she would beof
relatively lowerstatusdue to the contributionofgender;butonthe
otherhand BandCsharinggendermay perceiveless socialdistance,
with the net resultthat Aand Bdonot use perceptiblydifferent
levelsofpolitenesstoC.
22 See Schegloff.in press, however, fora critiqueofthis work,includ-
ingtheobservationthat in theWhite House transcriptsit appears
that President Nixon tended toyield thefloorto hissubordinates,
indicatingpower/statusisn't necessarily directly related tointer-
ruptions. Seealso Lycan 1977.
23 Forexample,there are now empiricalstudiesofgenderstyles(e,g,
Brown 1979, 1980for Tzeltal, Ide 1982. 1983. 1986and Shibamoto
1985 forJapanese, Maltz and Borker 1982,Tannen 1982, 1984a,
and papersinPhilips, Steele and Tanz. in press),which relate the
stylescarefully toethnographicconditionsin an open-minded way.
24 Comparehere Schegloff's(n,d.)observationofa perennialtendency
for 'innocent' utterancesto be interpreted as complaints.
25 Meanwhile,see e.g. Moerman 1977 and in press;Brown 1979;Irvine
1981; Harris 1984;Schieffelin 1979and in press;Ochs 1984 and in
press b;Bayraktaroglu,in preparation;Haviland, in preparation;for
analysisofconversationin non-Indo-Europeanlanguagesthatspeci-
fically addressessomeofthese issues.
26 See especiallyGibbs 1979,Fraser 1980,Stubbs 1983,Holmes 1984,
27 One perspectiveofspecialrelevance is concerned with thesocio-
linguisticdescriptionofstyle;see e.g. Tannen 1984aand references
therein.
28 Seee.g. Mathiot 1982,Slugoski 1985,Scollon and Scollon 1981:171,
respectively. Thisparagraph is prompted by appositeremarksby
Ruven Ogien.
1.00 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Prologue
This paperhas a broad sweep,anda diversity ofmotives. Itwill helphere
at thebeginningtoextractand formulate our majoraims.The foremost
aim is simplytodescribe and account for what is in the light ofcurrent
theorya most remarkable phenomenon.Thisis theextraordinaryparallel-
ism in the linguisticminutiaeofthe utteranceswithwhich personschoose
toexpressthemselves in quiteunrelated languages and cultures.Thecon-
vergence is remarkable because,on the face ofit,theusagesare irrational:
the convergence is in theparticulardivergences from some highly rational
maximallyefficientmode ofcommunication(as, for example,outlinedby
Grice 1967, 1975).We isolateamotive politeness,very broadly and
speciallydefined ~ and then claim,paradoxicallyenough,that the
satisfactoryexplanatoryscheme will include aheavydashofrationalism.
The bulkofthe paper providesevidenceofthe parallelisms,and demon-
stratestheir rationalsources.
But why concernourselveswiththis? Is thisnot a problem for ethology
or psychology?We confesstounderlying motivesofadifferent sort.We
believethat patternsofmessage construction,or'waysofputtingthings',
orsimplylanguage usage,are part ofthe very stuffthat social relationships
are made of(or,assomewould prefer,crucial partsoftheexpressionsof
social relations). Discovering the prinCiples oflanguage usage maybe
largelycoincident withdiscoveringthe principlesoutofwhichsocial
relationships,in theirinteractional aspect,are constructed:dimensionsby
which individualsmanage to relate toothers in particular ways. But what
we present here is the tool, ratherthan its sociological application.
2
Itis
atool for describing,insome much more precise butneverthelesssimple
way,a phenomenon that has been apersistent interest ofanthropologists:
thequality ofsocial relationships. And since thetoolis here presented
with anexplanatoryaccount,we hope that its cross-culturalapplicability
may have more than purelydescriptive status.
Anotherpointofimmediatesociological relevance is methodological:
anthropologistsroutinelymake inferencesabout thenature ofsocial
relationshipsbyobservationsoftheir interactional quality.Theydo this
unreflectingly,onthe basisofimplicitassumptionsabout universal prin-
ciplesofface-to-face interaction.When made explicit these amount to
principles like those here described. Until sociological methodology is
explicit,descriptions will havean uncertain statusandmustbe takenon
the assumption thatotherobserversso placed would similarlyobserve,
Itis against the backgroundofthese broadsociological aims,then,
that theovertgoalsofthis papershould be read. Returningto theovert,
5)
54
. ~ ...
, . w . ; . ~ . ,.".,;;;', ......,...~ ~ , . , . , ___. ,
I
t:."
evident as much in the mannerin which it is doneas in anyovertperfor-
oursubsidiaryaims(or,atleast, pointswe wishtoemphasize) are these:
mative acts. In otherwords,one recognizeswhatpeople aredoingin
(i) We identifysome principlesofauniversal yet 'social'sort,and in so
verbal exchanges(e.g. requesting,offering,criticizing,complaining,sug-
doingprovide a possible social candidate for deep functional pres-
gesting)not so muchbywhat they overtlyclaimtobedoingas in thefine
sures on the shapeofgrammars in general.
linguisticdetail oftheirutterances(togetherwithkinesicclues). For
(ii) We wish toprovidean antidote tothe undervaluation in thesocio-
instance,it is rarelythatpeopleactuallysaythingslike'I hereby
logical sciences ofthe complexityofhuman planning.Thewonders
\
request ...';and yet as soon as onehears things like 'Look,I'm terribly
explored in cognitive psychology,linguistics, or artificial intelligence
sorrytobotheryou,would itbeawfully inconvenient if...' oneknows
have nocounterpartsin social theory(outside perhapsofsome
perfectlywell what sortofinteractional fi", one is in. Or again, even ifone
schoolsofcognitiveanthropology,and ethnomethodology).Here
doesn'tknowthe language,onseeingone person approachanotherwith
we merelyscratch,in agropingway,thesurfaceofoneareaof
thekinesics ofunusual deference(notexpectablesimplybyvirtueofthe
interaction,and we wish todraw theattentionofsocial scientists
statusesofthepair)andspeakto himwith hesitations,umms andahhs
totherichness and complexityoftheassumptionsandinferences
and thelike,we have astrongclue that he is makingarequest ordoing
upon the basis ofwhich humans understand and cooperate withone
something that he considers (orconsidersthat the otherwill consider)
another.Consequently,we wish todemonstratethe role ofrationa-
imposing.
lity,and itsmutualassumption byparticipants,in the derivationof
As we began toformulate an account for ourinitial problem,we saw
inferencesbeyondthe initial significanceofwords, tone, and gesture.
that it suggested asolution tosome further problems. For instance,it is
It is ourbeliefthatonlya rational or logical use ofstrategiespro-
observable thatin many languages(in circumstanceswheresocialstruc-
vides aunitaryexplanation ofsuchdiverse kinesic, prosodic,and
tures permitsuchdistinctions),when formulating asmall requestonewill
linguistic usages.
tendtouse language thatstresses in-groupmembershipand socialsimi-
(iii) Hencewe identifymessage construction(thecross-level structureof
in the inclusive 'we'of'Let'shave anothercookie then'or 'Give
the total significance ofinteractional acts)as the properdatumof
us adime'V When makingarequest thatis somewhat bigger, one uses
theanalysisofstrategiclanguage use. Andsincewesee interaction
the languageofformal politeness(theconventionalizedindirectspeech
as at once(a)theexpression ofsocial relationshipsand (b)cruciall
acts, hedges,apologies for intrusion,etc.). And finally, when making the
built outofstrategiclanguage use,we identifystrategicmessage
sort ofrequestthat it is doubtful oneshould make atall, one tends to use
constructionas thekeylocusofthe interfaceoflanguage and
indirectexpressions(implicatures).Thesame holds,mutatis mutandis, for
society. But to understand sociological aspectsoflanguage use one
criticisms,offers,complaints,and manyother types ofverbal act.What
must first exploreits systematics,as we doin this paper. Socio-
these related problems seem to share is astrategicorientation to partici-
M
linguistics(tocoinaslogan)ought tobe applied pragmatics. And to
pants' 'face', the kernelelement in folk notionsofpoliteness.
show that theslogan can be made aprogramme is oneofouraims.
Ouroverall problem,then,is this: What sortofassumptionsand what
(iv) Afinal goal, perhaps largely unnecessarynowadays, is to rebut the
sort ofreasoning are utilized by participants toproduce such universal
once-fashionabledoctrineofcultural relativity in thefield ofinter-
strategiesofverbal interaction'!We want toaccount for theobservedcross-
action.Weston La Barre (1972), for instance, cataloguesendless
culturalsimilaritiesin theabstract principleswhich underlie polite usage.
superficial differences in gesture as evidence ofrelativism in that
We hope,further,that aformal model that accounts for these cross-
sphere.We hopetoshowthatsuperficialdiversities can emerge from
culturalsimilaritieswill also provideareference modelfor culturally
underlying universal principlesandare satisfactorilyaccounted for
usages: that is,it promises to provide us withan ethnographic
only in relation tothem.
tool ofgreat precision for investigating thequalityofsocial relationsin
any society.
1.2Theproblem
Our initial problemderives from theobservation that,across cultures,the
natureofthetransaction beingconductedin averbal interchangeis often
S7
56
,
1.3Method
This is an essay notin analysis, butin constructivism.
4
We attemptto
account for some systematicaspects oflanguage usage byconstructing,
tonguein cheek,aModel Person. All ourModel Person (MP) consistsin
is a wilful fluent speakerofa natural language,furtherendowedwithtwo
special properties-- rationalityand face. By 'rationality'we meansome-
thingvery specific - theavailabilitytoourMP ofa preciselydefinable
modeofreasoningfromendsto themeansthatwill achievethoseends.
By 'face'we meansomethingquitespecificagain: ourMP is endowed
with two particularwants- roughly,thewanttobe unimpededandthe
want tobeapprovedofin certainrespects.
Withthiscardboardfigurewethenbegintoplay: How would such a
use language? In particular,caughtbetween thewantto satisfy
anotherMP'sface wantsandthewant tosay thingsthat infringe those
wants,whatwouldourrational face-endowed beingdo? By a strange
coincidencewe find that a dyadicmodeloftwocooperatingMPs (poten-
tiallywithan audience)accounts forjustthose peculiar cross-cultural
regularitiesin language usage that we have introducedaboveas ourprob-
lem.We canshowthis byderiving linguisticstrategiesas means satisfying
communicative and ends, in astrictlyformal systemof
rational 'practical reasoning'.
In carryingoutthis programmewe lay ourselves open to theattack
that we are here inappropriately revivingtheeconomichomunculus,since
our predictive model is essentiallybuilt on theassumptionofrational
agentswithcertain properties. However,thereisintended noclaim that
'rational face-bearingagents'are aU oralwayswhatactual humansare,but
simplythattheseare !l.ssumptionsthat make themostsenseofthedata,
andareassumptionsthatall interactinghumansknowthat theywill be
expected toorientto.Astronger pointis this: it canbe demonstrated
that inordertoderivethekindofinferences fromwhat is said that
speakerscanbe showntodraw,suchassumptionsSimply have tobe made.
Thisis a technical point first madebyGrice(1967, 1975)when discussing
'conversational implicature'and substantiated byworkin linguisticssince.
IfAsays 'What time is itT, andBreplies'(Well)the postman'sbeen
already"then Aassumesthat what Bsaidwasrationallyoriented to what
Asaid,andhence Aderives from B's utterance the inference that it is,
say,past II a.m. This kind ofinference is what we refer tothroughoutas
'conversational implicature'(c.i.). The wholeexchange is heard as coherent
onlyon the assumption that Bintended to cooperate,andrationallychose
a means thatwouldachieve his cooperativeend.Soin language usage, at
any rate,it is demonstrable that such rational assumptionsare in fact
made.
58
Butour hope is not merelytofactor outthelowest commondenomi-
natorsin someaspects oflanguage usage. We hopethat ourMP will provide
a reference model for thedescriptionofculture-specificstylesofverbal
interaction;we hopein fact bythismeanstobeable tocharacterize to
some extentthe 'ethos'ofacultureor subculture,andthatmostephe-
meral ofethnographicobservations,the affectivequalityofsocial
relationships.
Notethatwe shallbe attemptingherea reductionofsome good, solid,
Durkheimian social facts - some normsoflanguage usage tothe out-
comeoftherational choices ofindividuals.Thechancesare thatifyou
actuallyaskaspeakerwhy hesaid 'Youcouldn'tbyanychance tell me
the time,couldyou?' ratherthan 'Tell me thetime',he'll say he is con-
forming to conventional expectationsofpoliteness. Butalthough,as Lewis
has argued (1969),conventionscan themselvesbeoverwhelmingreasons
fordoingthings(asanthropologistshave usuallyassumed),S therecan be,
and perhapsoftenare,rationalbasesfor conventions.Theobservations
belowinclude,weclaim,examplesofsuchrationallybasedconventions.
We considerthat ifthepredictionsmade byourmodel are borneout
by thedatadrawn from usage in a small sampleofunrelatedcultures
and languages,strongsupport maybe inferred for theoriginal assumptions.
Ourdataconsist in first-hand tape-recordedusage for threelanguages:
bothsidesoftheAtlantic);Tzeltal,aMayanlanguage
in thecommunityofTenejapa in Chiapas, Mexico;and South
IndianTamil from avillage in the Coimbatore DistrictofTamilnadu.This
issupplemented byexamplesdrawn fromournative-speakerintuitions
for English,andbyeliciteddataforTzeltalandTamil.Occasionalexamples
are drawn from secondhand sourcesfor Malagasy,Japanese,andother
languages.We believe it is legitimatetoproject from acarefulthree-way
experiment in three unrelated culturestohypothesesabout universalsin
verbal interaction because,as will become evident,thedegree ofdetail in
convergence lies far beyond the realm ofchance.
2.00 SUMMARIZED ARGUMENT
We outline theargument here,tokeepit from gettinglost in thedetailed
explanationsanddefinitionsthat follow. Conceptsdefinedin thenext
section are in bold type.'S'stands for 'speaker'and 'II' for 'addressee'
thepaper;in this outline,SandHareMPs. AmongMPs, it is
mutualknowledge
6
that forall MPs:
All MPs have positive face andnegativeface,andall MPs arerational
agents Le.choose meansthatwill satisfytheirends.
59
(ii) Given that face consistsin a set ofwantssatisfiable onlybythe
actions(includingexpressionsofwants)ofothers,it will ingeneral
be tothe mutual interestoftwo MPs tomaintaineachother's face.
SoSwill want tomaintain H's face, unless he can get H tomaintain
S'swithout recompense,bycoercion, trickery,etc.
Someacts intrinsicallythreaten face; these 'face-threateningacts'
will be referred to henceforthas FTAs.
UnlessS'swant todoan FTAwithmaximumefficiency (defined as
baldonrecord)is greaterthanS'swant to preserve H's (orS's)face
toanydegree,thenSwill want tominimize theface threat ofthe
FTA.
(v) Given the following set ofstrategies,themorean actthreatensS's
or Hts the more Swill want tochoosea higher-numbered
.strategy;this byvirtue ofthefact that these strategiesafford payoffs
ofincreasingly minimized risk:
Circumstancesdetermining
choiceofstrategy:
Lesser
I. without redressiH action,baldly
/
..w
onrecord /2.positivepoliteness .!:3
M
....
o 0
Do the FTA with redressive action / 0::-
o <II
.- <.>

4. offrecord 3. negativepoliteness
._ e..... 0
]
5. Don'tdo theFTA
Greater
(vi) Sincei-vare mutuallyknown to all MPs,ourMP will not choosea
strategyless riskythan necessary,as thismaybe seen as an indica-
tion that the FTAis more threateningthan it actually is.
60
3.00 THE ARGUMENT: INTUITIVE BASES AND
DERIVATIVE DEFINITIONS
3.1 Assumptions: Propertiesofinteractants
We make the following assumptions: thatall competent adult membersof
asociety7 have (and knoweachotherto have)
(i) '(ace', the public self-image that every member wants to claim for
himself,consistingin two related aspects:
(a) negative face:
8
thebasicclaim to territories, personal pre-
serves,rights tonon-distraction - i.e. to freedom ofaction and
freedom from imposition
positive face: the positive consistent or 'personality'
(crucially includingthedesire that this self-image be apprecia-
tedandapprovedof)claimed byinteractants
certain rational capacities,in particular consistent modes ofreason-
from ends tothemeans that will achieve those ends.
3.1.1 Face.Ournotionof'face'is derived from that ofGoffman()967)
and from the English folk term,whichties face upwithnotionsofbeing
or'losingface'. Thusface is somethingthatis
invested,and thatcan be lost, maintained.orenhanced,and
must be constantlyattended toin interaction. In
(and assume eachother'scooperation)in
such cooperationbeingbased onthe mutual
normallyeveryone's face dependson everyoneelse'sbeing
and since people canbeexpected todefend theirfaces ifthreatened,and
in defendingtheirown tothreaten others'faces, it is in general in every
participant'sbest interest tomaintaineachothers' face, thatis toact in
ways that assure theother participants that theagent is heedfulofthe
assumptionsconcerningface given under(i) above. (Just what thisheed-
fulness consists in is the subjectofthis paper.)
Furthermore, while the contentofface will differ in different cultures
(what the exact limits are to personal territories,and what the publicly
hI
relevantcontentofpersonalityconsistsin),we areassumingthatthe
mutualknowledge ofmembers' publicself-image orface,and thesocial
necessitytoorient oneselftoit in interaction,are universal.
3.1.2Faceas wants. It wouldhavebeenpossible totreat the respect for
face as norms or valuessubscribed to bymembersofasociety(asperhaps
most anthropologistswould assume). Instead,we treat theaspectsofface
as basicwants, which everymember knowsevery othermemberdesires,
and whichin general itis in the interestsofevery memberto partially
satisfy. In otherwords,we takein Weberian terms the more strongly
rationalzweckrationalmodel ofindividual action,because the wert-
rationalmodel(whichwouldtreat face respectas an unquestionablevalue
or norm)fails toaccount for the fact thatface respectis not an unequi-
vocal right. In particular,a merebow toface acts like adiplomaticdeclara-
tion ofgood intentions;it is not in general required thatan actor
satisfyanother'sface wants.Secondly,face can be,and
ignored,notjust in cases ofsocial breakdown(affrontery)but also in
casesofurgent cooperation, orin the interestsofefficiency.9
Therefore,the componentsof c ~ v e n above in section 3.1 maybe
restatedaIToTIOws. We defifie-:-------- '-----.. '
negativeface: thewantofevery 'competentadult member' that his
actionsbe unimpeded by others.
positiveface: thewantofevery member that his wantsbedesirable
toat least someothers.
Negative face, with itsderivativepolitenessofnon-imposition,is familiar
as theformal politenessthat thenotion immediatelyconjures
up. But positive face, and itsderivative positivepoliteness,are
less obvious.The reduction ofa person'spublic self-imageorpersonality
toawant that one'swants bedesirable toat least someotherscanbe
justifiedin this way. The most salient aspect ofa person'spersonalityin
interaction is what that personalityrequiresofotherinteractants- in
particular,it includes thedesire to be ratified, understood,approvedof,
likedor admired.The next step is to represent thisdesire as the want to
have one'sgoals thoughtofas desirable. In thespecial senseof'wanting'
that we develop,we can thenarrive at positive face as heredefined.To
give thissome intuitive flesh, consider an example. Mrs Bis afervent
62
_L...
gardener.Muchofher timeandeffortare expendedon her roses. She is
proud ofher roses,and she likesotherstoadmire them.Sheis gratified
when visitorssay'What lovelyroses; Iwishourslooked like that! Howdo
youdo it?',implyingthattheywantjustwhat she haswantedand
achieved.
Ourdefinitionofpositiveface is adequateonlyifcertaininterpreta-
tionsare bornein mind.Firstofall,the wantsthat amember wantsothers
tofind desirable mayactuallyhave been satisfied;that is,theymay now
be past wants represented bypresentachievementsorpossessions.
the wantsmaybe for non-materialas wellas material things: forvalues
(love, liberty,piety),or for actions(like going totheoperaortothe races,
or playingtennis).
In addition,on the view that the objectsofdesire are propositionslike
'I have beautiful roses', natural-language expressionsofwantingoften
leave the subjectand predicate unspecified,as in 'Iwant an ice cream
cone.'Thisleaves an ambiguity in our formula for some agent A'sface
want; Awantssome Bto want his wants,but is Bdesired towant'8has
an icecreamcone'or 'Ahas an ice creamcone'or'Everyoneeatsice
creamcones'?Theanswerseems tobe that in differentcircumstances
eachofthedifferent interpretationsmaybe reasonable. For instance,if
amaleadmin,safemale's apparel it would bea naturalinterpretation that
he wanted her apparel for her, ratherthan for himself.
lo
Athird pointis that,in general,personswant theirgoals,possessions,
and achievements to be thoughtdesirablenotjust byanyone,butby
some particularothersespecially relevant totheparticulargoals,etc.(For
instance, Imay wantmyliterarystyletobe admired by writers, myroses
by gardeners,myclothesbyfriends,myhair byalover.)These others
constitute acollection ofsets(extensionallyorintensionallydefined)each
linked to aset ofgoals.
Soour formula is to be interpreted in the light ofthis (grosslyover-
simplified)example:
Hwantssome persons(namely al> a2, a3 ...) to want the correspond-
setofH'swants(wl,w2,w3" .).
Let aI =setofall theclasses ofpersonsin H'ssocial world.
a2 = setofall thepersonsin H's social strata.
a3 = H'sspouse.
LetWI = Hhasabeautifulfront garden;His responsibleandlaw-
W2 = Hhasapowerfulmotorbikeanda leatherjacket.
W3 = His happy,healthy,wealthy,andwise.
These particularfacts are obviouslyhighlyculture-specific,
td
...
and ultimatelyidiosyncratic.Neverthelesstheredoexist(ingeneral)well-
definedareasofcommongroundbetweenanytwopersonsofasociety.
Iftheyarestrangersit maybe reduced toan assumptionofcommon
interest ingood weatherorothersuchsafe topics;iftheyare close friends
it mayextendtoaclose identityofinterestsand desires. Still,however
well-defined theseareasare,toassume that (say) Iam in the setofpersons
who will please youbycommentingonyourclothesis tomake an
extremelyvulnerableassumption,onethat maycause affront. Itis largely
becauseofthis thatattention to positive face in a societyis oftenhighly
restricted.
3.1.3Rationality.We here define 'rationality'as theapplication ofa
specificmodeofreasoning - what Aristotle (1969)called'practical
reasoning' which guaranteesinferencesfromendsorgoals tomeansthat
will satisfy thoseends.Just as standardlogics have aconsequencerelation
that will take us from one propositiontoanother while preservingtruth,
asystemofpractical reasoning mustallowoneto pass from endsto
meansand further meanswhile preservingthe'satisfactoriness' ofthose
means(Kenny 1966).
Thesortsofinferences one wantsasystemofpractical reasoningto
capture are thingslike:
(I) Vote!
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(Votefor Wilson!) or (Vote for Heath!)
Thatis,ifIwantto,or ought to,or have been ordered to,vote,thento
satisfy thatwantorcommand,I ought tovote for Wilson,or Heath,or
anybodyforthat matter.
~
Oragain,takeAristotle's'practical syllogism',which in standard
wouldfollow thefallacious form of'affirmingtheconsequent"
(2) This man is to beheated.
IfI rub he'llbe heated.
Ergo, let me rub him.
Thesehaveacuriousrelationtostandardlogicalinferences.for:
(3) Johnvoted
Johnvoted for Wilson
is certainlynot necessarily true,buttheinverse:
(4) John votedfor Wilson
voted
64
is certainlytrue.This promptedasuggestion ofKenny's that a means to
an end shouldbe considered satisfactoryonlyif, when the proposition
describing the means is true,the proposition describing theend is true.
It turnsoutthat based on thisinterpretation ofpractical-reasoningconse-
quence,a decidable formal systemwith asemanticinterpretation canbe
constructed,and Aristotle's intuitionscan be cast intoa rigorousmould
whichwe dub 'Kennylogic'. (For more details,see section4.00below,
and Atlas and Levinson 1973.)
Afurther aspect ofrational behaviourseemstobe the abilityto weigh
up different meanstoanend,andchoosethe onethatmostsatisfies the
desired goals.Thiscan be capturedbya 'fuzzy'version ofKennylogic,
withan added preference operator(as discussed in4.2 below).Thiswill
treatall preferencesas rationalones,and exclude
wantsorKantian imperatives - for our purposesa perfectlyfeasible move.
While ourformal systemaccounts for muchofthecontent ofthe
intuitive notion ofrationality,the latterdoesseem toincludesome notion
ofmaximization,or minimum-costassessment in thechoiceofmeans to
an end. Forexample,ifIwant adrink ofwater,and Icoulduse the tap
in this roomorthetapin thebathroomorthetapin thegarden,it would
surely be 'irrational'totrotout intothegarden unnecessarily(provided
that Ihave nosecretwant tobein thegarden,etc.). Ifthisis so,we can
it bydefininga perennialdesire ofMPs, in general,not towaste
effort to noavail.
3.2IntrinsicFTAs
Given these assumptionsofthe universalityofface and rationality, it is
the case that certain kinds ofacts intrinsicallythreaten face,
namelythoseactsthat by theirnature run contraryto the face wantsof
the addresseeand/orofthe speaker. By 'act'we have in mind what is
intended tobe done byaverbal or non-verbal communication,just as one
ormore 'speech acts' can beassigned to an utterance. I I
3.2.1 Firstdistinction: Kindsoffacethreatened.We may make afirst
distinction betweenactsthatthreaten negative face and those that
threaten positive face.
Those acts that primarilythreaten theaddressee'snl's)negative-face
want,by indicating(potentially) that thespeaker(S) doesnot intend to
avoid impedingH's freedomofaction,include:
(i) Thoseacts that predicate some future act AofII, and in so
put some pressure on Hto do(orrefrain fromdoing)theact A:
(,S
(a) ordersandrequests(S indicates thathewants Htodo,or
refrain fromdoing,some act A)
(b) suggestions,advice(S indicates that he thinksHought to
(perhaps)do some act A)
(c) remindings(S indicates that Hshould rememberto dosome
A)
(d) threats,warnings,dares(S indicates that he - orsomeone,
orsomething - will instigate sanctionsagainst Hunless he
does A)
(ii) Thoseacts that predicatesome positive future act ofStoward H,
and in so doing put somepressureon H to accept orreject them,
and possibly toincur adebt:
(a) offers(S indicates that he wants Hto commit himselfto
whetherornot hewantsStodo some act for H, withH
thereby incurringa possible debt)
(b) promises (Scommits himselftoa future act for H'sbenefit)
(iii) Thoseacts that predicatesome desireofS toward Hor H'sgoods,
giving Hreason to think that he may have to take action to protect
the object ofS'sdesire,orgive it toS:
(a) compliments,expressionsofenvyor admiration(S indicates
that he likes orwould like somethingofH's)
(b) expressionsofstrong(negative)emotionstoward H - e.g.
hatred,anger, lust (S indicates possible motivation for harm-
ing Hor H'sgoods)
Those acts thatthreaten the positive-face want, byindicating(poten-
tially) thatthespeakerdoes not careabout the addressee'sfeelings, wants,
etc. - that in some important respect he doesn't wantH'swants- include:
(i) Those that showthat Shas anegative evaluationofsome aspect of
H's positive face:
(a) expressionsofdisapproval, criticism,contemptorridicule,
complaintsand reprimands,accusations,insults(S indicates
that he doesn't like/want one or more ofH'swants, acts,
personal characteristics,goods, beliefs orvalues)
(b) contradictions ordisagreements, challenges(S indicatesthat
he thinks His wrong ormisguided or unreasonable about
some issue,suchwrongnessbeingassociated with disapproval)
(ii) Those that showthat Sdoesn't careabout(oris indifferent to)H's
positive face:
(a) expressionsofviolent (out-of-control) emotions(Sgives H
possible reason to fear him orbe embarrassedby him)
66
......1.......
(b) irreverence,mention oftaboo topics,includingthosethat are
inappropriate in thecontext(S indicatesthat he doesn't value
H'svalues and doesn't fear H's fears)
(c) bringingofbad news about H, orgood news (boasting)about
S(S indicatesthat he is willing tocause distressto H, and/or
doesn'tcare aboutH'sfeelings)
(d) raisingofdangerouslyemotionalordivisive topics, e.g. politics,
race,religion,women'sliberation(S raises the possibilityor
likelihood offace-threateningacts(suchas theabove) occur-
ring;i.e.,Screatesa dangerous-to-faceatmosphere)
(e) blatantnon-cooperationinan activity - e.g. disruptively
interruptingH's talk,making non-sequitursorshowing non-
attention(Sindicatesthat he doesn't care about H's negative-
orpositive-face wants)
(f) use ofaddress termsandotherstatus-markedidentifications
in initialencounters(S may misidentifyHin an offensiveor
embarrassingway,intentionallyoraccidentally)
Note that thereis an overlapin this classificationofFTAs,because
some FTAs intrinsicallythreatenbothnegative and positive face (e.g.
complaints,interruptions,threats,strongexpressionsofemotion,requests
for personalinformation).
3.2.2Seconddistinction:ThreatstoU'sface versusthreatstoS's.Secondly,
we may distinguishbetween acts that primarilythreatenH's face(as in
the above list)andthose that threaten primarilyS's face. To theextent
thatSandHare cooperating tomaintain face, the latter FTAs also
potentiallythreatenH'sface. FTAsthat are threateningtoSinclude:
12
(i) Thosethat offendS'snegative face:
(a) expressingthanks(S acceptsadebt,humbleshis ownface)
(b) acceptanceofH'sthanksorH's apology(S may feel con-
strainedto minimize H'sdebt or transgression,as in 'Itwas
nothing,don't mentionit.')
(c) excuses(S indicates that he thinkshe hadgoodreason todo,
or fail to do,an act whichH hasjustcriticized;this may
constitutein turn acriticismofH,orat least cause aconfron-
tationbetween H's viewofthings and S's view)
(d) acceptanceofoffers(S is constrainedtoacceptadebt,and
toencroachuponH'snegative face)
(e) responses toH'sfaux pas (ifS visibly notices apriorfaux pas,
he may cause embarrassment to H;ifhe pretendsnot to,he
maybe discomfited himself)
h7
'-
(I) unwilling promisesandoffers(Scommitshimselftosome
future actionalthough he doesn'twant to;therefore,ifhis
he mayalsooffendH's positive face)
ThosethatdirectlydamageS'spositive face:13
(a) apologies(S indicatesthat he regretsdoinga prior FTA,
thereby damaginghisown face tosome degree especially
iftheapology is at the same timea confession with Hlearning
about the transgression throughit,and the FTAthusconveys
bad news)
(b) acceptance ofacompliment(S may feel constrained todeni-
grate the object ofH's prior compliment,thusdamaginghis
own face;or he may feel constrained to
breakdownofphysicalcontroloverbody,bodily leakage,
orfalling down,etc.
(d) self-humiliation,shufflingorcowering,actingstupid,self-
contradicting
(e) confessions,admissionsofguilt or responsibility e.g. for
havingdone or not donean act, orfor ignorance ofsomething
that Sis expectedto know
(I) emotion leakage,non-control oflaughterortears
These two waysofclassifying FTAs(bywhetherS's face or H's face is
mainly threatened,orby whether it is
face thatisat stake)give rise toa four-way grid which offersthe possibility
ofcross-classifyingat least someoftheabove FTAs. However, such across-
classification hasacomplexrelationtotheways in which FTAsare
handled.
14
3.3StrategiesfordoingITAs
In thecontext ofthe mutual vulnerabilityofface, any rational agent will
seek toavoid these face-threateningacts,orwill employcertain strategies
to minimizethe threat. In other words,he will take into consideration
the relativeweightings of(at least) threewants: (a)the want to com-
municate thecontentofthe FTAx, (b)the want tobe efficientor
urgent,15 and(c)the want tomaintain H's face to anydegree. Unless
isgreater than (c),Swill wantto minimize the threat ofhis FTA.
Thepossible setsofstrategiesmaybeschematizedexhaustivelyas in
Fig, 1. In thisschema,we have in mind the followingdefinitions.
Anactorgoesonrecordin doingan act Aifit is clear to participants
what communicative intention led the actor todo A(i.e., there is just
68
l.....
1. without redressive action, haldly
2. positive politeness
.on record /
Do theFTA // " withredressive action
4. offrecord
negative politeness
5. Don't do theFTA
1. Possible strategiesfor doing FTAs
one unambiguouslyattributable intention with which witnesseswould
concur). For instance,ifIsay 'I(hereby)promise to come tomorrow'and
ifparticipantswould concurthat, in saying that,Idid unambiguously
expressthe intention ofcommittingmyselftothat future act,then in our
terminology Iwent 'on record'as promisingtodoso.
In contrast,ifan actor goes offrecordin doing A, thenthereis more
than one unambiguouslyattributable intentionso that theactorcannot
be held tohave committed himselfto one particularintent.So,for
instance,ifIsay 'Damn,I'moutof Iforgot togo tothe banktoday',
Imaybe intendingtoget youtolend me somecash,butIcannot beheld
tohave committedmyselftothat intent(asyouwould discoverwere you
tochallenge me with 'Thisis theseventeenth time you'veasked me to
lend youmoney'). Linguisticrealizationsofoff-record strategiesinclude
metaphorand irony, rhetorical questions, understatement,tautologies,
all kindsofhintsas towhat aspeaker wantsormeanstocommunicate,
without doing sodirectly, so that the meaningis tosome degreenegotiable.
Doing an act baldly,withoutredress,involves doingit in the most
direct,clear,unambiguous and concise way possible(forexample, for a
request,saying 'DoX!').Thisweshall identifyroughlywith following the
specificationsofGrice'sMaximsofCooperation(Grice 1967, 1975).
an FTAwill be done in thiswayonlyifthe speakerdoesnot
fear retribution from the addressee,for examplein circumstanceswhere
SandHbothtacitlyagree that the relevance offace demandsmaybe
suspended in the interestsofurgencyorefficiency;(b)where thedanger
to H's face is very small, as in offers, requests,suggestions thatare clearly
in H's interestanddo not require great sacrifices ofS(e.g.,'Comein'or
'Dositdown');and(c)where Sis vastly superior in powerto H,orcan
enlist audience supportto destroy H's face withoutlosinghisown.
By redressiveactionwe mean action that 'gives face' tothe addressee,
that is, thatattempts tocounteract the potential face damage ofthe FTA
bydoing it in suchaway,orwithsuch modificationsoradditions.that
()9
indicate clearly that no such face threat is intended or desired, and that S
in general recognizes H's face wants and himself wants them to be achieved.
Such redressive action takes one of two forms, depending on which aspect
offace (negative or positive) is being stressed.
Positive politeness is oriented toward the positive face of H, the posi-
tive self-image that he claims for himself. Positive politeness is approach-
based; it 'anoints' the face of the addressee by indicating that in some
respects, S wants H's wants (e.g. by treating him as a member of an in-
group, a friend, a person whose wants and personality traits are known
and liked). The potential face threat of an act is minimized in this case
by the assurance that in general S wants at: least some of H's wants; for
example, that S considers H to be in important respects 'the same' as he,
with in-group rights and duties and expectations of reciprocity, or by the
implication that S likes H so that the FT A doesn't mean a negative
evaluation in general of H's face.
I
Negative politeness, on the other hand, is oriented mainly toward
partially satisfying (redressing) H's negative face, his basic want to maintain
claims of territory and self-determination. Negative politeness. thus, is
essentially avoidance-based, and realiZations of negative-politeness strategies
consist in assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the addres-
see's negative-face wants and will not (or will only minimally) interfere
with the addressee's freedom of action. Hence negative politeness is
characterized by self-effacement, formality and restraint, with attention
to very restricted aspects of H's self-image, centring on his want to be
unimpeded. Face-threatening acts are redressed with apologies for inter-
fering or transgressing, with linguistic and non-linguistic deference. with
hedges on the ilIocutionary force of the act, with impersonalizing mechan-
isms (such as passives) that distance Sand H from the act, and with other
softening mechanisms that give the addressee an 'out', a face-saving line
of escape, permitting him to feel that his response is not coerced.
There is a natural tension in negative politeness, however, between (a)
the desire to go on record as a prerequisite to being seen to pay face. and
the desire to go off record to avoid imposing. A compromise is reached
in conventionalized indirectness, for whatever the indirect mechanism
used to do an FTA, once fully conventionalized as a way of doing that
FTA it is no longer off record. Thus many indirect requests, for example,
are fully conventionalized in English so that they are on record (e.g., 'Can
you pass the salt?' would be read as a request by all participants; there is
no longer a viable alternative interpretation of the utterance except in
very special circumstances). And between any two (or
any utterance may become conventionalized and therefore on record, as
is the case with passwords and codes.
"1....1.>
A purely conventional 'out' works as redressive action in negative
politeness because it pays a token bow to the negative-face wants of the
addressee. That is, the fact that the speaker bothers to phrase his FTA in a
conventionally indirect way shows that he is aware of and honours the
negative-face wants of H.
3.4 Factors influencing the choice of strategies
We have outlined the five possible strategic choices for dealing with FT As
in section 3.3 above. In this section we argue that any rational agent will
tend to choose the same genus of strategy under the same conditions --
that is, make the same moves as any other would make under the circum-
stances. This is by virtue of the fact that the particular strategies intrinsi-
cally afford certain payoffs or advantages, and the relevant circumstances
are those in which one of these payoffs would be more advantageous than
any other.
We consider these in turn first the intrinsic payoffs and then the
relevant circumstances and then relate the two.
3.4.1 The payoffs: a priori considerations. Here we present a fairly com-
plete list of the payoffs associated with each of the strategies, derived
on a priori grounds.
By going on record, a speaker can potentially get any of the following
advantages: he can enlist public pressure against the addressee or in sUJr
port of himself; he can get credit for honesty, for indicating that he trusts
the addressee; he can get credit for outspokenness, avoiding the danger of
being seen to be a manipulator; he can avoid the danger of being mis-
understood; and he can have the opportunity to pay back in face what-
ever he potentially takes away by the FTA.
By going offrecord, on the other hand, a speaker can profit in the
following ways: he can get credit for being tactful, non-coercive; he can
run less risk of his act entering the 'gossip biography' that others keep of
him; and he can avoid responsibility for the potentially face-damaging
interpretation. Furthermore, he can give (non-()vertiy) the addressee
an opportunity to be seen to care for S(and thus he can test H's feelings
towards him). In this latter case, if H chooses to pick up and respond to
the potentially threatening interpretation of the act, he can give a 'gift' to
the original speaker. Thus, if I say 'It's hot in here' and you say 'Oh, I'll
open the window then!', you may get credit for being generous and
cooperative, and I avoid the potential threat of ordering you around.
For going on record with positive politeness, a speaker can minimize
the face-threatening aspects of an act by assuring the addressee that S
70 71
1-
considershimselftobe 'ofthesamekind',that he likes himandwants
hiswants.Thusa criticism,withthe assertion ofmutual friendship, may
lose muchofits sting ... indeed,in theassumptionofafriendly context
it oftenbecomesagame(cf. Labov 1972a)and possiblyevena compli-
ment (asbetween opposite-sexed teenagers). Anotherpossiblepayoffis
that Scan avoid orminimize thedebt implicationsofFTAs suchas
requestsandoffers,eitherbyreferring(indirectly)to the reciprocityand
on-goingrelationship between theaddressee andhimself(asin the
reference toapseudo prioragreement withthen in 'Howabout acookie,
then')orbyincluding theaddressee and himselfequallyas participants
in oras benefitors from the request oroffer(forexample,with an inclusive
'we',as in 'Let'sget onwith dinner'from the husbandglued to theTV).
Forgoingon record withnegative politeness, aspeakercan benefitin
the followingways: he canpayrespect,deference, tothe addressee in
return for the FTA, andcan therebyavoidincurring(or can thereby
lessen) afuture debt;he can maintainsocial distance,and avoid the threat
(orthe potential face loss)ofadvancingfamiliarity towardstheaddressee;
he cangive areal 'out'totheaddressee (forexample,witharequest oran
offer,bymakingit clear that he doesn't really expect Htosay 'Yes'unless
he wantsto,therebyminimizing the mutual face lossincurred ifHhas
tosay 'No');and he can give conventional 'outs'to theaddressee as
opposedto real 'outs',that is, pretend toofferan escape route without
really doingso, thereby indicating that he has theotherperson'sface
wantsin mind.
the payofffor the fifth strategicchoice,'Don'tdo the FTA',
is Simplythat Savoids offendingII atall with thisparticular FTA. Of
courseSalso fails toachieve hisdesired communication,andas there are
naturallynointerestinglinguisticreflexesofthislast-ditchstrategy,we
will ignore it in ourdiscussion henceforth.
Forourpurposes, these payoffs maybe simplifiedtothefollowing
summary:
On-record payoffs:
(a) clarity,perspicuousness
(b) demonstrablenon-manipulativeness
Bald-on-record(non-redressed)payoff:
efficiency(Scanclaim that otherthingsare moreimportant than
face, orthat theact is not an FTAat all)
Plus-redress payoff:Shas theopportunitytogive face
(a) positive politeness to H's face,in some respect
72
(b) negative politeness tosatisfyH'snegative face, tosome
degree
Off-record payoffs:
Scansatisfy negative face toadegree greaterthan that
afforded bythe negative-politenessstrategy
(b) Scanavoid the inescapableaccountability,the responsibility
for hisaction,thaton-recordstrategiesentail.
When theyare considered in thisorder,we can alreadysee thaton
a priori groundsthere is apatternofcircumstancesin whichthe payoffs
would be most advantageous: roughly,themoredangerous the particular
FTAx is, in S'sassessment, the morehe will tend to choosethe higher-
numbered strategy. Runningthroughthe individual payoffswe see why
thiswould be so.
The use ofthefirst strategy(on record,minus redress)leaves Srespon-
sible withoutanymeans to minimize the FTAx. The use ofredressive
action affordsS theopportunitytoplacate Hbypartiallysatisfyingsome
ofhisperennialdesires.The use ofthe second strategy(positive redressive
allows Stosatisfyawide range ofthese perennial desiresofH's
necessarilydirectlyrelated tox), while theuse ofthe third (negative
redressive action)allowsStosatisfytosome extent H'swant tobe left
unimpeded thewant thatisdirectlyinfringedbyx. By indicating
reluctance toimpinge onH, Simplies thatifthematterhad beenless
pressingSwould never have disturbed H(and will notdo so for future
mattersthatare notso pressing). Finally,the fourth strategy(offrecord)
affordsSthe opportunityofevadingresponsibility altogether(byclaiming,
ifchallenged,that the interpretationofx as an PTAis wrong),andsimul-
taneouslyallows Sto avoid actuallyimposing the PTAx onH, since H
himselfmust choose tointerpretx as an FTArather than as somemore
trivial remark.
Note that positive politeness precedesnegative politenessin the con-
tinuumofFTA'danger'for the following reasons. Positive politeness
redresses bymeansoffulfilling H'swant thatsome othersshouldwant
some particulardesiresofhis.To pursue thisstrategySmust make the
that heisamemberofthesetofthese others;theefficacyof
his redressistotallyvulnerable toH's concurrence in thisassumption.
Negative politeness,on theotherhand,isaddressed toageneralized desire
for freedom ofaction;in payingHin thiscurrency,Smakesnovulnerable
assumptionsanddoes noredressiveaction thatis notimmediatelyrelevant
tothe impositionthatx imposes(thusleaving himselfinvulnerable to
chargesofirrelevant flattery,etc.).16
73..
--1
I
II'
,
Whythen,given thedangerassociatedwithFlAs,doactorsnot take
outthemaximum insurance policyand always choose theoff-record
strategy? Theremust besome factors in the circUmstancesorthe payoffs
thatcause a tension in the oppositedirection from the pull thatFTA
dangerexerts.Oneofthese isa purelypractical fUnctional pressure: the
off-record strategyleadstoambiguitiesand unclarities,while redressive
action takestime,foresight, and effort. But anotherseemsto be the
inherent tension betweenan actor'snegative-face wantsand IUs positive-
face wants,for thelatterinclude boththeformer and(typically)contrary
wants.ThusIcanwantsimultaneouslybothtobe undisturbed and tobe
shown tokensofadmiration,care, regard,etc. opposingwantsthat I
will resolve(say)byin general wanting tobe not imposed upon,but in
some circumstanceswantingsome particular persons'expressionsof
regard, care,etc. For reasonsdiscussed above it is safer toassume that H
prefers his peace and self-determination than that he prefersyourexpres-
sionsofregard, unless youare certain ofthe contrary. But most impor-
tantly,since the availability ofthe strategiesand thenatureoffaceand
practical reasoning are mutual knowledge to participants,theywill have
expectationsofcertainestimatesofface risk for particular FTAs in
particular circumstances. Ifan actor uses astrategyappropriate to a high
risk for an FTA ofless risk, otherswill assume the FTAwas greater than
in fact it was,wrule it isS'sintention tominimize rather thanoverestimate
the threat toH's face. Hencein general noactorwill use astrategyforan
FTA that affordsmore opportunityfor face-risk minimization than is
actuallyrequired to retain H'scooperation.
Thusthesetofdiscrete payoffscan belined upagainst a continuumof
opposing forces thatdescribesthe circumstances in whicheach strategy
wouldbe most advantageous.We cansumupthis section
as in Fig.2.
3.4.2Thecircumstances:Sociologicalvariables.In this section we argue
that theassessmentoftheseriousnessofan FTA (that io;: thecalculations
that membersactuallyseem to involves the
factors in
manyand perhapsallcultures:
the 'social distance'
asymmetric relation)
in theparticular culture.
An immediateclarification is in order.We are interested in D, P, and R
totheextent that the actors think it is mutualknowledge between
them that these variables havesome particularvalues.Thus these are not
intendedassociologists' ratingsof actual power,distance,etc.,butonly
74
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asactors' assumptionsofsuch ratings,assumedtobe
atleastwithincertain limits.
Ourargument here has an"'tnniril'" basis,andwe makethe argument
inas stronga form as our datawill allow.I7
3.4.1. J Computing the weightiness of an FTA. Foreach FTA, theserious-
nessorweightinessofa particular FTAx is compoundedofbothrisk to
S'sface and risk toH's face, in a proportion relative tothenatureofthe
FTA.Thusapologiesandconfessionsareessentiallythreatsto S'sface (as
we haveseen),and adviceand ordersare basically threatsto H'sface, while
requestsandoffersare likely tothreaten the face ofboth participants.
However,thewayin which theseriousnessofa particular FTA is weighed
seemstobe neutralas towhether it is S'sor H'sface that is threatened,
orin what proportion.So let us saythat the weightinessofan FTAis
calculated thus:
Wx ::D(S,H)+ P(H,S) + Rx
whereW x is the numerical value that measures the weightiness ofthe
FTAx, D(S,H) is the value that measuresthe social distancebetween
SandH,P(H,S) is ameasure ofthe powerthatHhas overS,and Rx is a
value that measuresthe degree to which the FTAx is ratedan imposition
in thatculture.We assume thateachofthese values can bemeasuredon
ascale ofI ton, where n is some small number.
18
Our formula assumes
that thefunction that assignsavalue toW x onthe basis ofthe threesocial
parametersdoes so on asimple summativebasis. Suchan
seemsto worksurprisinglywell,butwe allowthat in fact somemore
complexcomposition ofvalues maybe involved. In any case, the function

must capturethe fact that all threedimensionsP, D,and Rcontributeto
theseriousnessofan FTA, and thusto adetermination ofthe level of
I
politeness with which,otherthingsbeingeauaLan FTA will be com-
municated.
we mustclarifyourintent. By Dand Pwe intend verygeneral
pan-cultural social dimensionswhichnevertheless probablyhave 'emic'
correlates. I
9
We are not here interested in what factors arecompounded
toestimatethesecomplex parameters;such factors are certainly culture-
specific. Forinstance,P(H,S)may be assessed as beinggreat because His
andinfluential,oris aprince,awitch,a thug. orapriest;D(S,H)
asgreat because Hspeaks anotherdialect orlanguage.or lives in thenext
valley,oris not akinsman. More specifically, we candescribe these factors
as follows.
D is a symmetricsocial dimension ofsimilarity/difference within which
SandHstandfor the purposesofthis act. In manycases(but notall), it
.L.
isbasedon an assessment ofthefrequencyofinteractionand the kindsof
materialor non-materialgoods(including face)exchangedbetween Sand
H(or p'drties representingS or H, orfor whomSandHare representa-
tives). An important part oftheassessmentofDwill usuallybe measures
ofsocial distance based on stablesocial attributes. The reflex ofsocial '
closeness is,generally,the reciprocal givingand receivingofpositiveface. ,1.
P is an asymmetricsocial dimension ofrelative power, roughly in
Weber'ssense.Thatis, P(H,S) is thedegree to which Hcan impose his own
plansand his ownself-evaluation (face)at theexpenseofS'splansand
self-evaluation. In general thereare two sourcesofP, eitherofwhich may
be authorizedor unauthorized material control(overeconomicdistri-
butionand physical force) andmetaphysical control (over theactionsof
others,byvirtue ofmetaphysical forces subscribed to bythoseothers).
In mostcasesan individual's power is drawn fromboththesesources,or
is thought tooverlapthem.The reflex ofagreat Pdifferentialisperhaps
archetypally 'deference',as discussed below.
Risaculturallyandsituationallydefinedrankingofimpositionsbythe
degree towhich they consideredtointerferewith anagent'swantsof
orofapproval(hisnegative- and positive-facewants).
In general thereare probablytwosuchscalesorranksthatare emicaJly
identifiablefornegative-face FTAs: arankingofimpositionsin proportion
tothe expenditure(a)ofservices (includingthe provision oftime)and
ofgoods (includingnon-materialgoodslike information,as well as the
expression ofregard andotherface payments).Theseintra-culturally
defined costingsofimpositionson an individual's preserve are in general
constantonlyin theirrankorderfrom onesituation toanother. However,
even therankorderis subjecttoa set ofoperationsthatshufflesthe im-
positionsaccordingtowhetheractorshave specific rightsorobligationsto
perform the act,whethertheyhave specificreasons(ritual or physical)for
not performingthem,andwhetheractorsare known toactuallyenjoy
being imposed upon in someway.20
Soan outline ofthe rankingsofnegative-faceimpositionsforaparticu-
lar domain ofFTAs in a particular cultureinvolvesa complex description
like the following:
(i) (a) rank order ofimpositionsrequiringservices
(b) rankorderofimpositionsrequiringgoods
(ii) Functionson(i):
(a) thelesseningofcertain impositionsonagiven actordeter-
minedbytheobligation(legally,morally,byvirtue ofemploy-
ment,etc.)todotheact A;andalsobytheenjoyment that
theactorgetsoutofperformingtherequired act
76 77
(b) the increasingofcertain impositionsdeterminedbyreasons
why the actorshouldn't do them,and reasonswhytheactor
couldn't (easily) do them
ForFTAs against positiveface,the rankinginvolvesan assessment of
the amountof'pain'given toH'sface, based on thediscrepancybetween
H'sown desired self-image and that presented (blatantlyor tacitly)in the
FTA.Therewill becultural rankingsofaspectsofpositive face
example,'success','niceness','beauty','generosity'),whichcanbe re-
rankedin particularcircumstances,justas can negative-face rankings. And
thereare personal(idiosyncratic)functionson theserankings;some people
objecttocertain kindsofFTAs more thanothers. Aperson who is skilled
at assessingsuch rankings,andthecircumstances in whichtheyvary, is
consideredtobegracedwith 'tact','charm',or'poise'.
In theargument below we associatewitheachofthesevariables, D, P,
and R,avalue from I ton assigned by an actor in particularcircumstances.
No special substantial claim is intended;the valuation simply represents
the way in which(forinstance)as S's power over Hincreases, theweighti
ness ofthe FTAdiminishes.
21
One interestingside effect ofthis numerical
representation is thatit can describe these intuitive facts: the threshold
value ofrisk which triggers thechoiceofanother strategy is a constant,
independent ofthe way in which thevalue is composed and assessed. Thus
one goes offrecord where animposition is small but relative S-Hdistance
and H'spowerare great,andalso where His an intimateequal ofS'sbut
the imposition isvery great.
3.4.2.2 Context-dependence of P, D, and R. Oursocial dimensionsP, D
and Rcan beviewed in variousways.TakingPas anextendedexample,
we couldarguethat individualsare anabsolute value onthis
dimension that measures the powerthat each individual has relative to
all others.Thusabankmanager might be given ahigh rating, anda lowly
workeralowone.Butwhen the worker pullsagun,or sitson ajury
tryingthe manager, or represents his union, the powermay be reversed.
To save theview that there are absolute(context-free)assignments to P,
we would then have to allow for contextual reclassifications thatadjust
the assignments in certain Circumstances.
A more plausible view would bethat Pis avalueattached not to indi-
vidualsat all,but to roles Or role-sets. Thusin the role-set manager/
employee,or parent/child,asymmetrical power is built in. Then we would
have toallow that thereare role-sets likegangster/victim, in orderto
handle theway in which individualscan find the relative Pvaluesthat
they normallyexpectinvertedbycircumstances. But doall kindsofnaked
powercomeclothed in role-sets? Ifso,the notion ofsocial role must be
78
watereddown.Thereis,moreover,anotherproblemwith thisview. Indi-
vidualsacquiresetsofroles,and highPvaluesin one role docarryover
into the conductofanother.When anewPresident is elected,hisold
friendsmaystillbefriends,buttheyare unlikely toretaintheoldequality.
Athirdview wouldbethatstablesocialvaluations,whetherofindivi-
dualsorofroles,areonlyoneelement thatentersintotheassessment of
P. Othersituationalsourcesofpowermaycontributetooradjustor
entirelyoverride suchstablesocial valuations. Momentary weaknessesin
bargainingpower,strengthofcharacter,oralliances mayall playarole in
theassessmentofP.
It is the last view thatseemsto us mostadequate,even ifit is the least
definitesuggestion.And we shallassume that situational factorsenterinto
the values for P, 0,and R, so that thevaluesassessed hold only for Sand
Hin a particularcontext,and for a particularFTA. Let usjust illustrate
thekindsofways in whicheachofoursocial dimensionsiscontext-
relativein thissense.
Takingfirst the distance variable,note that two Americanstrangerswho
would treat oneanotherwithgreat circumspection and formality in a
chanceencounter in thestreetsofNew YorkCitymight wellembrace
eachotherwithall theexcessesofpositive politenessiftheywere to meet
in the HinduKush.Apossibleexplanationofthis familiar phenomenon
is thatwhereveroneis, all membersofthe local social universe must be
assigned placesacrosstheentirescaleofsocial distance.Soin NewYork
thestrangersareassigned high Dvalues, but in the HinduKush theeven
strangernativesdisplace the Americanvisitors towardseachotheronthe
dimension ofsocialdistance.
The context-relativenessofrelative powerPis demonstrable in the
followingcase. Aman from a lowly caste in South India whoapproaches
a Brahman requiringritualservices will treat himwithgreatdeference.
When the Brahman comestovisit the low-caste man in thelatter'scapacity
as agovernment official,itwill be the Brahmanwhoadoptsthedeferent
oreven servileattitude(Beck 1972:159, nn.34,35). Comparetoothe
switchin deferencein Europewhenonespeakerpassesfrom hisown
field ofexpertise intotheotherspeaker's field. In thesecases,Pvalues
seemtochange as therolesofsupplicant/specialist andexpert/learner
areswitched.
Someofthespecial ways in whichthe rankingofimpositionscan be
inverted have been mentioned. Buteven where the rank
order is maintained,impositionscanstill situationallyvary in value;to
askfor adollar is generally toask for more than to ask for adime,yet to
askforadimejustoutsidea telephoneboothis less than toask for adime
for no apparent reason in the middle ofthe street. Thus the perceived
79
-
I
",.
~
\
situational reasonableness ofthe request enters into an assessment ofits
R value.
3.4.2.3 P, D, and R as independent variables. It might beappropriate tobe
able to demonstrate that ourP, D,and Rfactors areall relevantand inde-
pendent,andare the only relevant ones used by actors toassess the danger
ofFTAs. But ourclaim is not that they are theonly relevant factors, but
simply that theysubsume all others(status,authority,occupation,ethnic
identity,friendship, situational factors, etc.) that have a principled effecton
such assessments. However.we can illustrate their independenceand rele-
vance by the following examples, with reference toour formulaand to
the claim thatW" provides thespeakerwith the majorreason for choosing
amongthe five setsofpoliteness strategies.
Considering first the Dvariable,we cantaketwo cases wherePand R
are constantandhave small values in the estimate ofS - in otherwords,
where the relative power ofSandHis more orless equal.and the imposi-
tion is not great.Suchsmall impositionsare found, for example, in requests
for 'freegoods" those things and services (like a match,or telling thetime,
or givingdirections)which all membersofthe publicmay reasonably
demandfrom oneanother.With Pand Rheld constant and small.onlythe
expression ofDvaries in thefollowing twosentences:
(I) Excuse me.wouldyouby anychance have thetime'!
Got the time, mate?
Our intuitionsare that(I)would be usedwhere (inS's perception)Sand
Hwere distant (strangers fromdifferent parts,say).and (2)whereSand
Hwere close (eitherknown to each other,or perceptibly 'similar' in social
terms).0,then.is the only variable in our formula that changesfrom(I)
to(2),and in doingso lessensWx which provides themotive for the
cularlinguisticencodingofthe FTA,
tothePvariable,suppose D ~ n Rare held constantand have
small values(e.g. ifS and Ii knoweach otherbysight,and the
is a request for free goods):
(3) Excuseme sir, would it be all right ifIsmoke')
(4) Mind ifIsmoke')
Ourintuitions are that(3) might be said by an employee tohis boss,while
(4)might besaid by thebosstotheemployeeIn thesamesituation, Here,
then,Pis theonlyvariable that changes from (3) to(4)(more exactly,P
ofHoverS),and this again lessensWx which providesSwith the reasons
for hischoice between(3)and(4) for hislinguistic encoding.
That R is also independentlyvariable can be similarly demonstrated.
80
SupposeP issmall and0 is great(SandHarestrangers, for example),and
Pand 0 areheld constant.Thencompare:
(5) Look,I'm terribly sorry to bother youbut would there beany
chanceofyourlending mejustenough money toget arailway
ticket toget home? Imust have droppedmy purseand Ijustdon't
knowwhat todo.
(6) Hey,got change for a quarter?
Both might besaidat a railway station by afrustrated traveller toa
stranger,butourintuitionsare thatSinsaying(5)considersthe FTAto
be much moreserious than the FTA' done in (6).Theonlyvariable is R,
and it mustbe because Rx is lowerin(6) that thelanguage appropriate
toa lowWx is employed there.Ourconclusionis that in therankingof
impositionsinAnglo-American culture, asking for a substantialamount
ofmoneywithout recompenseis much moreofanimposition thana
request tosearch in one'spockets for change, In each caseabove,the first
option(examples 1,3,and 5)is a linguistiC realization ofthenegative-
politenessstrategy,and thesecond(2,4,and 6)is a realization ofthe
positive-politenessstrategy.
3.4.2.4Ambiguity and disambiguation as evidence for P, D, and R. One
majorargument that we use todemonstrate thatourformula mustbeat
least a partiallyaccuraterepresentation ofcognitive processis as
follows. Parameterslike P, 0,R must have some cognitivevalidity,since
theyare thebasisofa wide range of'exploitations'discussed in section
6.1 below,Consider thefollowing facts. Our formula is a means ofcom
poundingthe factors that makean FTA dangerous intoasingle indexof
risk,Wx. Wx is thena motive for thechoiceofone ofthestrategies 1-5
in Fig. I (p,69) rather than anyother. Hence the choiceofstrategy will
in general 'encode'theestimated dangerofthe FTA; this is whyone
receiveswith considerableapprehension phraseslike:
(7) I'm awfully sorry to botheryou,and Iwouldn't but I'min anawful
fix,so Iwonderedifby any chance..,
But ifourrepresentationofthe factors underlying theassessmentofWx
is correct,such phrases do not display which variable (0,relative P, or
is primarily responsible for theweightofx. In otherwords,the formula,
in compoundingthevariables into asingle index,makesthesourcesofthe
final assessmentambiguous.Thisis a fundamental fact towhich theexploi-
tationsdescribed in section 6.1,and also the display ofdeferencedis-
cussed in 5.4,arc primarilyaddressed.
Takingdeference tobe thehumblingoftheselforthe 'raising'ofthe
Kl
~
--
~ ~

other that is,claims aboutthevalueofP(H,S) - wecansee thatit may
performthe function ofdisambiguatingwhich factorwas most important
inthe assessment ofWx Forsuppose the choiceofnegative politeness
(strategy 3)oroffrecord(strategy4)'encodes'aweightyWx: thenifS
assertsthatHis relatively muchmorepowerful thanS,he indicatesthat
Wx was assessed cruciallyonvalues ofP,hencethat Rx is probablysmall
(sincea bigger valuewouldsendStostrategy 5,'Don'tdo theFTAat
all').Somemarkersofdeference, then,oughttoease the apprehensionof
theaddresseewhen hehearsa sentencelike example(7)above.
In terms ofour first observation thatWx is compoundedoftherisk of
x toH'sface andtherisk ofx toS's face, ifSindicatesthat H's relative
poweris greaterthanhis,heclaims thatWx is primarilyarisk tohimself
rather than to H. Notethenthatphraseslike(7)above are likely tobe
prologuestoawful impositionsonlywhere Dand relativeP are mutually
known tobe fairly small,leavingonlyRx toaccount for thehigh Wx .
Thelow 0 and Pvalues maybeassumed,orin thecase ofDmaybe
claimedbymeansoffamiliar usages like:
Look, )
(8) Hey, Harry,I'mawfully sorry tobotheryou...
(
My God,
(9) Look,Harry,you'reafriend,so ...
while high Pvalues and lowR values canbeclaimedbyusageslike:
Sir, )
(10) Excuse me, Officer, I'msorrytobotheryoubut I
(
Your Excellency,
wonderifyoucouldjust possiblydo me a small favour ...
Theseexamplesshowthat factorslikeP,D,and Rare involved in the
calculationofWx , andsincethatcalculationcompoundsthem and the
chosenstrategydoes notdirectly reflect them, there would be motivation
for theirvalues to bedirectlyclaimed.
Again,consider threateningsuggestionsorwarningslike (II),(12),and
(13)below,inthelight ofourclaim thatWx is compoundedofrisk to
H'sface andrisk toS'sface:
(II) It's noskin offmy teeth,but Ithinkyou might want to takealook
~ t what yourson is uptoin thegooseberry patch.
(12) Idon't care,but Ithink maybe you ought tobemorecarefulwhen
youparkyourcar next tomine in future.
Since the initial phrases denyanyrisk to thespeaker's face, and the
strategychosenis offrecord,Wx is high butcanonlybedue torisk to H.
82
Hence thissortofFTAmay bedesigned tocause considerable consterna-
tion to the addressee. Anda threat like(13)again refers tothe factors D,
P, and R,claimingsmall Dwith aninitialaddress phrase,andsmall R
withwordslikelittle andjust, and thusleavingonly avery high relative P
ofSoverH - and not vice versa to account forthechoiceofan off-
record strategy:
(13) Looksonny,it might notbe advisable tojustgo pushing yourlittle
fingers intothis little pie.
3.4.3 The integration ofassessmentofpayoffs and weighting ofrisk in
thechoiceofstrategies.We here explainwhy.asWx increases, arational
agent would tend tochoose touse thehigher-numberedstrategies. Fig. 2
(section 3.4.1 above) summarizes thecircumstancesinwhicheachstrategy
wouldbe mostappropriatelyemployed ona priori grounds.As the FTA
danger increases,thehigher-numberedstrategiesserve best tominimize
face risk. Immediatelywe can see why theobserved factorWx would
correlatewith thechoice ofstrategies, for Wx is an estimateofrisk.
We can nowrelate thea priori andtheSOCiological facts. Any MP with
the properties we have attributed to him (the ability to use practical
reasoning from wantsto means thatwill satisfy those wants,and the
retention ofthespecificwantscalled 'face')wouldemploy the strategies
in thecircumstancesin which the payoffsofeach onewere mostappro-
priate (i.e. would most satisfy his face wants) in fact, as in Fig. 2.
Now, ifit is empirically the case that FTA danger is assessed by
estimating P, D, and R values, then our MP would take the least possible
risk with 'strangers' (high D values) and 'dominant members' (high
P(lI,S) values) when making serious impositions (high Rx values).
Our MP would not do all fTAs with the strategy ofleast risk because
it costs more in effort and loss ofclarity, because he may wish tosatisfy
the other perennial desire ofH's - for positive face but most impor-
tantly because choice ofthe least risky strategy may indicate to H that
the FTA is more threatening than it actually is, since it would imply an
excessively high rating ofP or D or R, or some combination.
In short, our original assumptions that define our MP as a 'rational
agent with face' predict that rational face-bearing agents will choose
ways ofdoing face-threatening acts that minimize those threats, hence
will choose a higher-numbered strategy as the threat increases. This
neatly fits the observational ethnographic fact that as risk estimated in
terms ofsocial variables increases, a similar choice ofstrategies can be
observed.
Because some such weak universal sociological generalizationsappear
)013
~
.." , u
. ,
to be viable (that the danger of an FT A is assessed in terms of factors
like P, 0, R), and because our MP is a reasonable approximation to
universal assumptions, we can account for the fact that an observer in
a foreign culture, on seeing a speaker and addressee interact, feels that
S is (say) not a close friend of ITs (or thinks that H is more powerful
than S, or thinks x is a big imposition) purely from observing the
linguistics of S's FTA. This observation may be made in Chiapas, in
Tamilnad, or in California.
4.00 ON THE NATURE OF THE MODEL
4.1 Remarks on alternative models
One way of thinking about our enterprise is this: we are attempting a
description, in a very limited area, of the principles that lie behind the
construction of social behaviour. There can be no doubt that one reason
that social theory has never come to ground level is the notable lack of
a satisfactory theory of action. The major social theorists (for instance
Durkheim, Parsons, Weber), and indeed analytical philosophers, have
only made crude attempts at the analysis of the single act. Only cog-
nitive anthropologists (inspired initially by Miller, Galanter and Pribram
1(60), cognitive psychologists, and workers in artificial intelligence (e.g.
in Schank and Colby 1(73) have looked at actions in the context of
hierarchical plans which may specify sequences of actions. But how does
one generate plans? How does one mentally check their validity? What
kinds of reasoning lie behind them? These are questions which, com-
pared to the study devoted to deductive reasoning, have received scant
attention since Aristotle (but see for instance K()rner 1(74). Above
a satisfactory account of action in an interactional setting has been
grossly neglected, despite evidence that very special properties of coor-
dination arise in such settings (Grice 1971, 1975: Lewis 1969;
1(60). Indeed, here our own analysis must be found wanting, dominated
as it is by the act-by-act analysis of contemporary philosophy and
we try to make amends in section 6.3.
It is in this context, then, that we propose a general schema for
deriving actions from goals. It is tempting to capitalize on the fascina-
tion that anthropologists have found in the new linguistics, with its talk
of rule-bound creativity, its explicit goals and precise methods. Part of
the glamour probably derives from a misunderstanding of the linguist's
concept 'generative', which non-linguists (aided by Chomsky's own
invocation of Humboldtian and Goethean parallels) have tended to
84
construe more in the image of the dynamo than in the intended quasi-
mathematical sense (of precise and explicit description: Bach 1973:27).
Unlike transformational generative grammar, the system we present in
fact finds both senses of 'generative' applicable. It is a formal system
that has closer parallels in deductive logic, with its axioms and rules of
inference, than in transformational grammar. Given a set of goals
(parallel to the premises of a deductive argument) and rules of inference
(parallel but distinct from rules of deductive inference), one can derive
in this system means that will achieve those goals. The system that
produces these inferences could be said to be generative in an uninterest-
ing but similar way to transformational grammar. But in addition, an
element of the image of the dynamo is indeed appropriate, for the goals,
the things desired, are what constrain the inferences made Gust as the
premises in a deductive argument do). I t is a system driven by inten-
tions and (more remotely) motives. The output of the system is not
then parallel to the output of a generative grammar (the well-formed
sentences of a language) so much as to a model of the process from
thought to sentence. Such a system is much more appropriate for socio-
logical applications than weak metaphors drawn from transformational
grammar. It has indeed very general applications.
22
A short note is in order on our use of the word 'strategy'. We do not
mean to imply that what we dub 'strategies' are necessarily conscious.
For the most part they do not seem to be, but when interactional
mistakes occur, or actors try to manipulate others, they may very well
emerge into awareness. And they are open to introspection, at least in
But the general unconscious nature of such strategies raises funda-
mental methodological problems that we simply skirt. We cannot pretend
to have any special insight into what is probably the biggest single
stumbling block to theory throughout the social sciences: the nature of
the unconscious and preconscious where all the most important determi-
nants of action seem to lie.23 We continue to use the word 'strategy',
despite its connotations of conscious deliberation, because we can think
of no other word that will imply a rational element while covering both
(a) innovative plans of action, which may still be (but need not be)
unconscious, and (b) routines - that is, previously constructed plans
whose original rational origin is still preserved in their construction,
despite their present automatic application as ready-made programmes.
Let us now briet1y turn to possible alternatives to the explanation of
the cross-cultural parallels that we present. One such alternative might
in fact be phrased in terms of norms or rules. This is the way that, for
instance, workers in the 'ethnography of speaking' have talked about
precisely similar kinds of fact: patterns of speaking whose description
H5


Examples of face-threatening acts
Negative FTAs Positive FTAs
Affecting
hearer
Orders/requests
Suggestions/advice
Reminders
Threats/warnings/dares
Offers
Promises
Compliments/envy/admiration
Strong negative emotions
Disapproval/criticism/contempt/ridicule/
complaints/reprimands/accusations/insults
Contradictions/disagreements/challenges
Violent emotions
Irreverence/taboo
Bad news/boasting
Emotional/divisive subject matter
Non-co-operation
Inappropriate terms of address
Affecting
speaker
Giving thanks
Acceptance of thanks/apology
Excuses
Acceptance of offers
Responses to hearers faux pas
Unwilling/reluctant promises/offers
Apologies
Acceptance of compliment
Breakdown of physical control
Self-humiliation/deprecation
Confessions/admissions of guilt
Emotional leakage/non-control of
laughter/tears

(Brown & Levinson, 1987:65-68)
Positive and negative politeness strategies
Negative Positive
1. Be indirect
2. Question/hedge
3. Be pessimistic
4. Minimise imposition (verbally)
5. Give deference/humble oneself
6. Apologise/admit imposition/indicate
reluctance/give overwhelming reasons/beg
forgiveness
7. Impersonalise speaker and hearer
(pronominally/passive voice/indefinites/
reference terms/point of view distancing)
8. State FTA as general rule
9. Nominalise
10. Go on-record with indebtedness
1. Notice/attend to hearer
2. Exaggerate
3. Intensify interest
4. Use in-group markers
5. Seek agreement
6. Avoid disagreement
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground
8. Joke
9. Assert/presuppose knowledge of/concern for
hearers wants
10. Offer/promise
11. Be optimistic
12. Include both speaker and hearer
13. Give (or ask for) reasons
14. Assume/assert reciprocity
15. Give gifts (goods/sympathy/understanding/
cooperation)

(Brown & Levinson, 1987:101-211)