Tiu vs Arriesgado At about 10:00 p.m.

of March 15, 1987, a cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m. At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC., against D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear. Issue: Whether or not Laspinas is liable as being the driver of the bus. Whether or not Tiu, as bus operator, overcame the presumption of negligence being the operator of a common carrier. Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. Whether or not Pedrano and Condor are liable as well. What then would be the liability of the insurer. Held: 1) Yes. In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspias claimed that he was traversing the two-lane road at Compostela, Cebu at a speed of only forty (40) to fifty (50) kilometers per hour before the incident occurred. He also admitted that he saw the truck which was parked in an oblique position at about 25 meters before impact, and tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. However, even in the absence of expert evidence, the damage sustained by the truck itself supports the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court, that the D Rough Rider bus driven by petitioner Laspias was traveling at a fast pace. Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspias had more than enough time to swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner Laspias could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and, thus, could have avoided the truck Indeed, petitioner Laspias negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. By his own admission, he had just pass ed a bridge and was traversing the highway of Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision occurred. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner Laspias also violated Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended: Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and or any other 1

condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation 2) No. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier. 3) No. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. 4) Yes. The manner in which the truck was parked clearly endangered oncoming traffic on both sides, considering that the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place occurred in the wee hours of the morning. The Court can only now surmise that the unfortunate incident could have been averted had respondent Condor, the owner of the truck, equipped the said vehicle with lights, flares, or, at the very least, an early warning device. Hence, we cannot subscribe to respondents Condor and Pedranos claim that they should be absolved from liability. 5) As can be gleaned from the Certificate of Cover, such insurance contract was issued pursuant to the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law. It was expressly provided therein that the limit of the insurers liability for each person was P12,000, while the limit per accident was pegged at P50,000. An insurer in an indemnity contract for third party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The respondent PPSII could not then just deny petitioner Tius claim; it should have paid P12,000 for the death of Felisa Arriesgado, and respondent Arriesgados hospitalization expenses of P1,113.80, which the trial court found to have been duly supported by receipts. The total amount of the claims, even when added to that of the other injured passengers which the respondent PPSII claimed to have settled, would not exceed the P50,000 limit under the insurance agreement. Indeed, the nature of Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is such that it is primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The victims and/or their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners. PERLA COMPANIA de SEGUROS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CONSTANTE A. ANCHETA, The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction concerns the ability of insurers under the "no fault indemnity" provision of the Insurance Code. * FACTS: In 1977, in a collision between the IH Scout in which private respondents were riding and a Superlines bus along the national highway in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, private respondents sustained physics injuries in varying degrees of gravity. Thus, they filed with a complaint for damages against Superlines, the bus driver and petitioner, the insurer of the bus. The bus was insured with petitioner for the amount of P50,000.00 as for passenger liability and P50,000.00 as for third party liability. The vehicle in which private respondents were riding was insured with Malayan Insurance Co. Even before summons could be served, respondent judge issued an order for the Insurance Company, PerlaCompania de Seguros, Inc., to pay immediately the P5,000.00 under the "no fault clause" as provided for under Section 378 of the Insurance Code. Petitioner denied in its Answer its alleged liability under the "no fault indemnity" provision and likewise moved for the reconsideration of the order. Petitioner held the position that under Sec. 378 of the Insurance Code, the insurer liable to pay the P5,000.00 is the insurer of the vehicle in which private respondents were riding. Respondent judge, however, denied reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner. However, in respondent judge denied the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the insurer liable to indemnify private respondents under Sec. 378 of the Insurance Code 2

HELD: The key to the resolution of the issue is of courts e Sec. 378, which provides: Sec. 378. Any claim for death or injury to any passenger or third party pursuant to the provision of this chapter shall be paid without the necessity of proving fault or negligence of any kind. Provided, That for purposes of this section (i) The indemnity in respect of any one person shall not exceed five thousand pesos; (ii) The following proofs of loss, when submitted under oath, shall be sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim: (a) Police report of accident, and (b) Death certificate and evidence sufficient to establish the proper payee, or (c) Medical report and evidence of medical or hospital disbursement in respect of which refund is claimed; (iii) Claim may be made against one motor vehicle only. In the case of an occupant of a vehicle, claim shall lie against the insurer of the vehicle in which the occupant is riding, mounting or dismounting from. In any other case, claim shall lie against the insurer of the directly offending vehicle. In all cases, the right of the party paying the claim to recover against the owner of the vehicle responsible for the accident shall be maintained. From a reading of the section 378 of the Insurance code, which is couched in straight-forward and unambiguous language, the following rules on claims under the "no fault indemnity" provision, where proof of fault or negligence is not necessary for payment of any claim for death or injury to a passenger or a third party, are established: 1. A claim may be made against one motor vehicle only. 2. If the victim is an occupant of a vehicle, the claim shall lie against the insurer of the vehicle. in which he is riding, mounting or dismounting from. 3. In any other case (i.e. if the victim is not an occupant of a vehicle), the claim shall lie against the insurer of the directly offending vehicle. 4. In all cases, the right of the party paying the claim to recover against the owner of the vehicle responsible for the accident shall be maintained. The law is very clear the claim shall lie against the insurer of the vehicle in which the "occupant" is riding, and no other. The claimant is not free to choose from which insurer he will claim the "no fault indemnity," as the law, by using the word "shall, makes it mandatory that the claim be made against the insurer of the vehicle in which the occupant is riding, mounting or dismounting from. That said vehicle might not be the one that caused the accident is of no moment since the law itself provides that the party paying the claim under Sec. 378 may recover against the owner of the vehicle responsible for the accident

Vda De Maglana vs Consolacion FACTS: Lope Maglana was an employee of the Bureau of Customs whose work station was in Davao City. In 1978, Lope Maglana, on his way to his work station, driving a motorcycle owned by the Bureau of Customs at Km. 7, Lanang, met an accident that resulted in his death. He died on the spot. The PUJ jeep that bumped the deceased was driven by Pepito Into, operated and owned by defendant Destrajo. From the investigation conducted by the traffic investigator, the PUJ jeep was overtaking another passenger jeep that was going towards the city poblacion. While overtaking, the PUJ jeep of defendant Destrajo running abreast with the overtaken jeep, bumped the motorcycle driven by the deceased. The point of impact was on the lane of the motorcycle and the deceased was thrown from the road and met his untimely death. Consequently, the heirs of Lope Maglana, Sr., here petitioners, filed an action for damages and attorney's fees against operator PatricioDestrajo and the Afisco Insurance Corporation (AFISCO). The court rendered a decision finding that Destrajo had not exercised sufficient diligence as the operator of the jeepney. The defendant insurance company is ordered to reimburse defendant Destrajo whatever amounts the latter shall have paid only up to the extent of its insurance coverage.Petitioners filed a motion for the contending that AFISCO should not merely be held secondarily liable because the Insurance Code provides that the insurer's liability is "direct and primary and/or jointly and severally with the operator of the vehicle, although 4 only up to the extent of the insurance coverage." Hence, they argued that the P20,000.00 coverage of the insurance policy issued by AFISCO, should have been awarded in their favor.n its comment on the motion for reconsideration, AFISCO argued that since the Insurance Code does not expressly provide for a solidary obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint. Issue: Whether or not he insurance company is directly and solidarily liable with the negligent operator up to the extent of its insurance coverage. Held: Based on the particular provision of the insurance policy on which petitioners base their claim leads to no other conclusion but that AFISCO can be held directly liable by petitioners.Jurisprudence provides that "[w]here an insurance policy insures directly against liability, the insurer's liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the injury or even upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on the recovery of judgment by the injured party against the insured." 8 The underlying reason behind the third party liability (TPL) of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is "to protect injured persons against the insolvency of the insured 9 who causes such injury, and to give such injured person a certain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy . . ." Since petitioners had received from AFISCO the sum of P5,000.00 under the no-fault clause, AFISCO's liability is now limited to P15,000.00.

However, we cannot agree that AFISCO is likewise solidarily liable with Destrajo. While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the insurer, however, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on tort. Petitioners herein cannot validly claim that AFISCO, whose liability under the insurance policy is also P20,000.00, can be held solidarily liable with Destrajo for the total amount of P53,901.70 in accordance with the decision of the lower court. Since under both the law and the insurance policy, AFISCO's liability is only up to P20,000.00, the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the decision in question may have unwittingly sown confusion among the petitioners and their counsel. What should have been clearly stressed as to leave no room for doubt was the liability of AFISCO under the explicit terms of the insurance contract.In fine, we conclude that the liability of AFISCO based on the insurance contract is direct, but not solidary with that of Destrajo which is based on Article 2180 of the 12 Civil Code. As such, petitioners have the option either to claim the P15,000 from AFISCO and the balance from Destrajo or enforce the entire judgment from Destrajo subject to reimbursement from AFISCO to the extent of the insurance coverage.

JEWEL VILLACORTA, assisted by her husband, GUERRERO VILLACORTA, petitioner, vs. THE INSURANCE COMMISSION and EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondents. FACTS: Complainant [petitioner] was the owner of a Colt Lancer car insured with respondent company for P35,000.00 Own Damage; P30,000.00 Theft; and P30,000.00 Third Party Liability. While the vehicle was in the custody of the Sunday Machine Works, for general check-up and repairs, the car was allegedly taken by 6 persons and driven out to Montalban, Rizal. While travelling, the car figured in an accident, hitting and bumping a gravel and sand truck parked at the right side of the road. Complainant, thereafter, filed a claim for total loss with the respondent company but claim was denied. Hence, complainant was compelled to institute the present action. Respondent insurance commission dismissed petitioner's complaint for recovery of the total loss of the vehicle against private respondent, sustaining respondent insurer's contention that the accident did not fall within the provisions of the policy either for the Own Damage or Theft coverage, invoking the policy provision on "Authorized Driver" clause. Respondent commission upheld private respondent's contention on the "Authorized Driver" clause in this wise: "It must be observed that under the above-quoted provisions, the policy limits the use of the insured vehicle to two (2) persons only, namely: the insured himself or any person on his (insured's) permission. Respondent commission likewise upheld private respondent's assertion that the car was not stolen and therefore not covered by the Theft clause. According to respondent commission, the fact that the car was taken by one of the residents of the Sunday Machine Works, and the withholding of the same, for a joy ride should not be construed to mean 'taking' under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether the authorized driver clause bars petitioner from claiming against private respondent HELD: NO. The main purpose of the "authorized driver" clause, is that a person other than the insured owner, who drives the car on the insured's order, such as his regular driver, or with his permission, such as a friend or member of the family or the employees of a car service or repair shop must be duly licensed drivers and have no disqualification to drive a motor vehicle. A car owner who entrusts his car to an established car service and repair shop necessarily entrusts his car key to the shop owner and employees who are presumed to have the insured's permission to drive the car for legitimate purposes of checking or road-testing the car. The mere happenstance that the employee(s) of the shop owner diverts the use of the car to his own illicit or unauthorized purpose in violation of the trust reposed in the shop by the insured car owner does not mean that the "authorized driver" clause has been violated such as to bar recovery, provided that such employee is duly qualified to drive under a valid driver's license. Secondly, and independently of the foregoing (since when a car is unlawfully taken, it is the theft clause, not the "authorized driver" clause, that applies), where a car is admittedly as in this case unlawfully and wrongfully taken by some people, be they employees of the car shop or not to whom it had been entrusted, and taken on a long trip to Montalban without the owner's consent or knowledge, such taking constitutes or partakes of the nature of theft as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence does not warrant respondent commission's findings that it was a mere "joy ride". From the very investigator's report cited in its comment, the police found from the waist of the car driver Benito Mabasa Bartolome who smashed the car and was found dead right after the incident "one cal. 45 Colt. and one apple type grenade," hardly the materials one would bring along on a

"joy ride". Then, again, it is equally evident that the taking proved to be quite permanent rather than temporary , for the car was totally smashed in the fatal accident and was never returned in serviceable and useful condition to petitioner-owner.

Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmens Insurance Co., Inc. Facts: Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc., a domestic religious corporation, having an insurable interest in a Chevrolet Carry-all, 1955 Model, insured it with the Fieldmens Insurance Co., Inc under its Private Car Comprehensive Policy against loss or damage up to the amount of P5,000.00. Through plaintiffs representative, Dr. Antonio Lim, the Chevrolet Carry-all was placed at the Jones Monument Mobilgas Service Station at Davao City under the care of said stations operator, Rene Te so that said carry-all could be displayed as being for sale. Romeo Catiben, one of the boys at the Jones Monument Mobilgas Service Station, and a nephew of the wife of Rene Te, took the Chevrolet for a joy ride to Toril, Davao City without the prior permission of either the plaintiff or its representative Dr. Lim, or Rene Te and on its way back to Davao City, said vehicle, due to some mechanical defect, accidentally bumped an electric post causing actual damages valued at P5,518.61. The trial court ordered defendant insurance company to pay plaintiff association P5,000 as indemnity for the damage sustained by the vehicle. Dissatisfied, the insurance company filed an appeal to the appellate court. Issue: Whether or not there must be a prior criminal conviction for theft in order for the damage to the vehicle to be compensable under the Policy. Held: NO. The comprehensive policy issued by the insurance company includes loss of or damage to the motor vehicle by burglary or theft. It is settled that the act of Catiben in taking the vehicle for a joy ride to Toril, Davao City, constitutes theft within the meaning of the insurance policy and that recovery for damage to the car is not barred by the illegal use of the car by one of the station boys. There need be no prior conviction for the crime of theft to make an insurer liable under the theft clause of the policy. Upon the facts stipulated by the parties it is admitted that Catiben had taken the vehicle for a joy ride and while the same was in his possession he bumped it against an electric post resulting in damages. The act is theft within a policy of insurance. In a civil action for recovery on an automobile insurance, the question whether a person using a certain automobile at the time of the accident stole it or not is to be determined by a fair preponderance of evidence and not by the rule of criminal law requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, there is no provision in the policy requiring prior criminal conviction for theft. ANDREW PALERMO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PYRAMID INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant- appellant. Facts: Palermo after having purchased a brand new Nissan Cedric de Luxe Sedan car from the Ng Sam Bok Motors Co. insured the same with Pyramid insurance company against any loss or damage for P 20,000.00 and against third party liability for P 10,000.00. While driving the automobile in question, Palermo met a violent accident. Andrew Palermo, filed a complaint against Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc., for payment of his claim under a Private Car Comprehensive Policy issued by the latter. In its answer, the appellant Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc., alleged that it disallowed the claim because at the time of the accident, the insured was driving his car with an expired driver's license. Pyramid alleges that the trial court erred in interpreting the following provision of the Private Car Comprehensive Policy: AUTHORIZED DRIVER:Any of the following:(a) The Insured.(b) Any person driving on the Insured's order or with his permission. Provided that the person driving is permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle and is not disqualified from driving such motor vehicle by order of a Court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf. Issue: Whether Palermo was not authorized to drive the insured motor vehicle. 5

Held: NO, there is no merit in the appellant's allegation that the plaintiff was not authorized to drive the insured motor vehicle because his driver's license had expired. The driver of the insured motor vehicle at the time of the accident was, the insured himself, hence an "authorized driver" under the policy. The requirement that the driver be "permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle and is not disqualified from driving such motor vehicle by order of a Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf," applies only when the driver" is driving on the insured's order or with his permission." It does not apply when the person driving is the insured himself. While the Motor Vehicle Law prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle on the highway without a license or with an expired license, an infraction of the Motor Vehicle Law on the part of the insured, is not a bar to recovery under the insurance contract. It however renders him subject to the penal sanctions of the Motor Vehicle Law. Tanco vs. The Philippine Guaranty Co. FACTS Plaintiff's automobile, while being driven at the southern approach of the Jones bridge by his brother Manuel Tanco on September 1, 1959, figured in a collision with a pick-up delivery van, as a result of which both vehicles were damaged. Plaintiff paid for repairs the total sum of P2,536.99 and then filed his claim with defendant company under a car insurance policy issued by the latter. The claim was rejected, whereupon suit was commenced in the Municipal Court of Manila, whence it was elevated on appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which gave judgment for plaintiff in the amount stated, plus interest at 8% and P500.00 as attorney's fees. Appeal was taken by defendant directly to this Court. There is an exception clause, however, in the policy which provides that "the company shall not be liable in respect of any accident, loss, damage or liability caused, sustained or incurred ... whilst (the insured vehicle) is ... being driven by or is for the purpose of being driven by him in the charge of any person other than an Authorized Driver." The policy defined the term "Authorized Driver" to be the insured himself and "(b) any person driving on the Insured's order or with his permission, provided that the person driving is permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle or has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf from driving such Motor Vehicle." At the time of the collision plaintiff's brother who was at the wheel, did not have a valid license. ISSUE: W/N the Tanco can claim HELD: No. The exclusion clause in the contract invoked by appellant is clear. It does not refer to violations of law in general, which indeed would tend to render automobile insurance practically a sham, but to a specific situation where a person other than the insured himself, even upon his order or with his permission, drives the motor vehicle without a license or with one that has already expired. No principle of law or of public policy militates against the validity of such a provision. In the case before Us now appellant's defense does not rest on the general proposition that if a law is violated at the time of the accident which causes the damage or injury there can be no recovery, but rather on a specific provision in the policy that appellant shall not be liable if the accident occurs while the vehicle is being driven by any person other than an authorized driver and that an authorized driver, if not the insured himself, is one who is acting on his order or with his permission, provided he is permitted to drive under the licensing laws. NO. The policy sued upon covers, up to a certain limit, loss or damage to the insured vehicle as well as damage to property of third persons as a consequence of or incident to the operation of said vehicle. However there is an exception clause which provides that "the company shall not be liable in respect of any accident, loss, damage or liability caused, sustained or incurred ... whilst (the insured vehicle) is ... being driven by or is for the purpose of being driven by him in the charge of any person other than an Authorized Driver." The policy defined the term "Authorized Driver" to be the insured himself and "(b) any person driving on the Insured's order or with his permission, provided that the person driving is permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle or has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf from driving such Motor Vehicle."

At the time of the collision plaintiff's brother who was at the wheel, did not have a valid license as required by section 31 of the Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992. That section states that any license not so renewed "shall become delinquent and invalid," and section 21 states that "except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act no person shall operate any motor vehicle on the public highways without having procured a license for the current year, nor while such license is delinquent, invalid, suspended or revoked." In rendering judgment for plaintiff the trial court adverted to the absence of evidence that Manuel Tanco had been "disqualified by order of a court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf from driving such motor vehicle," and ruled that if there is any ambiguity in the definition of the term "authorized driver" in the policy the ambiguity should be construed in favor of plaintiff, since the policy had been prepared in its entirety by defendant. The trial court's advertence is true as a matter of fact; and its ruling is correct as a matter of law. But neither one nor the other is relevant in this case. Appellant does not rely on the portion of the proviso in the policy quoted by the court but on that which states that "the person driving is permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws." And as to this there is no ambiguity whatsoever, because the Motor Vehicle Law expressly prohibits any person from operating a motor vehicle on the highways without a license for the current year or while such license is delinquent or invalid. That Manuel Tanco renewed his license one week after the accident did not cure the delinquency or revalidate the license which had already expired.