G.R. No.

183623

June 25, 2012

After careful evaluation and consideration of the evidence on record, we find merit in the instant petition. Contrary to the findings in the assailed resolution, we find that the subject utterances of respondent constitute only slight oral defamation. As alleged by the [petitioner] in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of her complaint-affidavit, respondent uttered the remarks subject matter of the instant case in the heat of anger. This was also the tenor of the sworn statements of the witnesses for complainant. The Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-56224-26, November 25, 1982, x x x held that although abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainants part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, such utterances constitute only the crime of slight oral defamation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we believe that the instant case should nonetheless be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of Book III, Title I, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991). As shown by the records, the parties herein are residents of Las Pias City. x x x The complaint-affidavit, however, failed to show that the instant case was previously referred to the barangay for conciliation in compliance with Sections 408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the Local Government Code, which provides: Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: xxx Section 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or xxx shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. The records of the case likewise show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated under Section 408 of the Local Government Code. Hence, the dismissal of the instant petition is proper. It is well-noted that the Supreme Court held that where the case is covered by P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), the compulsory process of arbitration required therein is a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. Where the

LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE, Respondents. DECISION REYES, J.: On petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated March 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated July 3, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 99626. Petitioner Leticia B. Agbayani (Agbayani) assails the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) which directed the withdrawal of her complaint for grave oral defamation filed against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe (Genabe). Antecedent Facts Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Pias City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, docketed as I.S. No. 07-0013, for allegedly uttering against her, in the presence of their fellow court employees and while she was going about her usual duties at work, the following statements, to wit: "ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG, ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO."3 In a Resolution4 rendered on February 12, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City5 found probable cause for the filing of the Information for grave oral defamation against Genabe. However, upon a petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda (Pineda) found that:

complaint (a) did not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed x x x. While the foregoing doctrine is handed down in civil cases, it is submitted that the same should apply to criminal cases covered by, but filed without complying with, the provisions of P.D. 1508 x x x.6 Thus, in a Resolution7 dated May 17, 2007, the DOJ disposed, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City is directed to move for the withdrawal of the information for grave oral defamation filed against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, and report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.8 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution9 dated June 25, 2007. Consequently, Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the Resolution dated February 12, 2007 of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City in I.S. Case No. 07-0013. She averred that the respondents petition for review filed with the DOJ did not comply with Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, or the "2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rules on Appeal," and maintained that her evidence supported a finding of probable cause for grave oral defamation against respondent Genabe. On March 27, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. Citing Punzalan v. Dela Pea,10 the CA stated that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the complained act must constitute a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as it is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA denied the same in its Resolution11 dated July 3, 2008. Hence, the instant petition. Assignment of Errors

Maintaining her stance, Agbayani raised the following, to wit: I. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT DOJ DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE RESOLUTION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF LAS PIAS CITY. II. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT DOJ'S FINDING THAT WHAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT COMMITTED WAS ONLY SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION. III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT DOJ'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. IV. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 70 (2000 NPS Rule on Appeal) ARE NOT MANDATORY.12 Ruling and Discussions The petition is bereft of merit. We shall first tackle Agbayani's arguments on the first two issues raised in the instant petition. 1. Petitioner Agbayani alleged that Undersecretary Pineda unfairly heeded only to the arguments interposed by respondent Genabe in her comment; and the CA, in turn, took his findings and reasoning as gospel truth. Agbayanis comment was completely disregarded and suppressed in the records of the DOJ. Agbayani discovered this when she went to the DOJ to examine the records, as soon as she received a copy of the DOJ Resolution of her motion for reconsideration. 2. Further, petitioner Agbayani maintained that respondent Genabes Petition for Review13 should have been dismissed outright, since it failed to state the name and address of the petitioner, nor did it show proof of service to her, pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Also, the petition was notaccompanied with the required attachments, i.e. certified copies of the complaint, affidavits of witnesses, petitioner's reply to respondent's counter-affidavit, and documentary evidences of petitioner. Thus, a grave irregularity was committed by the DOJ in allowing the surreptitious insertion of these and many other documents in the records of the case, after the petition had been filed.

In particular, petitioner Agbayani alleged that when the petition was filed on March 22, 2007, only five (5) documents were attached thereto, namely: (a) the Resolution of the City Prosecutor; (b) the respondent's Counter-affidavit; (c) Letter of the staff dated January 2, 2005; (d) her Answer; and (e) the Information filed against respondent Genabe with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. However, at the time the Resolution of the DOJ was issued, a total of forty-one (41) documents14 formed part of the records of the petition. Besides, respondent Genabe's Motion to Defer Arraignment (Document No. 40) and the court order relative to the granting of the same (Document No. 41) were both dated March 23, 2007, or a day after the petition was filed. Agbayani asserted that these thirty-six (36) documents were surreptitiously and illegally attached to the records of the case, an act constituting extrinsic fraud and grave misconduct.15 At the very least, the DOJ should have required respondent Genabe to formalize the "insertion" of the said documents. Petitioner Agbayani reiterated that her version of the incident was corroborated by several witnesses (officemates of Agbayani and Genabe), while that of Genabe was not. And since the crime committed by respondent Genabe consisted of her exact utterances, the DOJ erred in downgrading the same to slight oral defamation, completely disregarding the finding by the Investigating Prosecutor of probable cause for the greater offense of grave oral defamation. She denied that she gave provocation to respondent Genabe, insisting that the latter committed the offense with malice aforethought and not in the heat of anger. We find no merit in the above arguments. It is well to be reminded, first of all, that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle.16 Anent the charge of non-compliance with the rules on appeal, Sections 5 and 6 of the aforesaid DOJ Circular provide: SECTION 5. Contents of petition. - The petition shall contain or state: (a) the names and addresses of the parties; (b) the Investigation Slip number (I.S. No.) and criminal case number, if any, and title of the case, including the offense charged in the complaint; (c) the venue of the preliminary investigation; (d) the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (e) a clear and concise statement of the facts, the assignment of errors, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; and (f) proof of service of a copy of the petition to the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned.

The petition shall be accompanied by legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the resolution appealed from together with legible true copies of the complaint, affidavits/sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in court must also accompany the petition. The investigating/reviewing/approving prosecutor shall not be impleaded as party respondent in the petition.1wphi1 The party taking the appeal shall be referred to in the petition as either "Complainant-Appellant" or "Respondent-Appellant." SECTION 6. Effect of failure to comply with the requirements. The failure of petitioner to comply WITH ANY of the foregoing requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Contrary to petitioner Agbayani's claim, there was substantial compliance with the rules. Respondent Genabe actually mentioned on page 2 of her petition for review to the DOJ the name of the petitioner as the private complainant, as well as indicated the latters address on the last page thereof as "RTC Branch 275, Las Pias City." The CA also noted that there was proper service of the petition as required by the rules since the petitioner was able to file her comment thereon. A copy thereof, attached as Annex "L" in the instant petition, bears a mark that the comment was duly received by the Prosecution Staff, Docket Section of the DOJ. Moreover, a computer verification requested by the petitioner showed that the prosecutor assigned to the case had received a copy of the petitioners comment. 17 As to the charge of extrinsic fraud, which consists of the alleged suppression of Agbayani's Comment and the unauthorized insertion of documents in the records of the case with the DOJ, we agree with the CA that this is a serious charge, especially if made against the Undersecretary of Justice; and in order for it to prosper, it must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, petitioner Agbayani's only proof is her bare claim that she personally checked the records and found that her Comment was missing and 36 new documents had been inserted. This matter was readily brought to the attention of Undersecretary Pineda by petitioner Agbayani in her motion for reconsideration, who however must surely have found such contention without merit, and thus denied the motion. 18 Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal also provides that the petition for review must be accompanied by a legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the resolution appealed from, together with legible true copies of the complaint, affidavits or sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Petitioner Agbayani does not claim

that she was never furnished, during the preliminary investigation, with copies of the alleged inserted documents, or that any of these documents were fabricated. In fact, at least seven (7) of these documents were copies of her own submissions to the investigating prosecutor.19 Presumably, the DOJ required respondent Genabe to submit additional documents produced at the preliminary investigation, along with Document Nos. 40 and 41, for a fuller consideration of her petition for review. As for Document Nos. 40 and 41, which were dated a day after the filing of the petition, Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal provides that if an Information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the Motion to Defer Proceedings must also accompany the petition. Section 3 of the above Rules states that an appeal to the DOJ must be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. While it may be presumed that the motion to defer arraignment accompanying the petition should also be filed within the appeal period, respondent Genabe can not actually be faulted if the resolution thereof was made after the lapse of the period to appeal. In Guy vs. Asia United Bank,20 a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, which was filed four (4) days beyond the "non-extendible period of ten (10) days", was allowed under Section 13 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review and order the withdrawal of an Information in instances where he finds the absence of a prima facie case is not time-barred, albeit subject to the approval of the court, if its jurisdiction over the accused has meanwhile attached. 21We further explained: [I]t is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the Secretary of Justice or the fiscal, as the case may be, to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Now, then, if the Secretary of Justice possesses sufficient latitude of discretion in his determination of what constitutes probable cause and can legally order a reinvestigation even in those extreme instances where an information has already been filed in court, is it not just logical and valid to assume that he can take cognizance of and competently act on a motion for reconsideration, belatedly filed it might have been, dealing with probable cause? And is it not a grievous error on the part of the CA if it virtually orders the filing of an information, as here, despite a categorical statement from the Secretary of Justice about the lack of evidence to proceed with the prosecution of the petitioner? The answer to both posers should be in the affirmative. As we said in Santos v. Go: "[C]ourts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with

the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. xxx [T]o strike down the April 20, 2006 DOJ Secretary's Resolution as absolutely void and without effect whatsoever, as the assailed CA decision did, for having been issued after the Secretary had supposedly lost jurisdiction over the motion for reconsideration subject of the resolution may be reading into the aforequoted provision a sense not intended. For, the irresistible thrust of the assailed CA decision is that the DOJ Secretary is peremptorily barred from taking a second hard look at his decision and, in appropriate cases, reverse or modify the same unless and until a motion for reconsideration is timely interposed and pursued. The Court cannot accord cogency to the posture assumed by the CA under the premises which, needless to stress, would deny the DOJ the authority to motu proprio undertake a review of his own decision with the end in view of protecting, in line with his oath of office, innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious prosecution. As the Court pointed out in Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, the Secretary of Justice would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.22 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied) The Court further stated in Guy that when the DOJ Secretary took cognizance of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he "effectively excepted such motion from the operation of the aforequoted Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70, s. 2000. This show of liberality is, to us, within the competence of the DOJ Secretary to make. The Court is not inclined to disturb the same absent compelling proof, that he acted out of whim and that petitioner was out to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of respondent in filing the motion for reconsideration."23 The case of First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez,24 succinctly summarizes the general rules relative to criminal prosecution: that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized; that courts follow the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by the DOJ, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender; and, that the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the

assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. But while prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, their findings are still subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. Surely, this power of the Secretary of Justice to review includes the discretion to accept additional evidence from the investigating prosecutor or from herein respondent Genabe, evidence which nonetheless appears to have already been submitted to the investigating prosecutor but inadvertently omitted by her when she filed her petition. 3. Coming now to the DOJ's finding that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the CA held that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion in causing the dismissal thereof on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation procedure. Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe are residents of Las Pias City and both work at the RTC, and the incident which is the subject matter of the case happened in their workplace.25 Agbayanis complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation for possible amicable settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 which provide: Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, except: x x x Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or x x x shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. Administrative Circular No. 14-93,26 issued by the Supreme Court on July 15, 1993 states that: xxx I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse

thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the following disputes: [1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules]; [5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos ([P]5,000.00); [7] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the following: [a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law]; [b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf; [c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and [d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice; [10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657]; [11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment]; [12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]." xxx The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed.27 Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated above. Neither has she shown that the oral defamation caused on her was so grave as to merit a penalty of more than one year. Oral defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is penalized as follows: "Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." Apparently, the DOJ found probable cause only for slight oral defamation. As defined in Villanueva v. People,28oral defamation or slander is the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger,

with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.29 We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the alleged utterances were made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in her card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that she had missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task herself. According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these circumstances was the immediate cause of respondent Genabe's emotional and psychological distress. We rule that his determination that the defamation was uttered while the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a state of passion and obfuscation, rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if it had been made with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond the ambit of our review. 30 The CA concurred that the complained utterances constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working environment with her coemployees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed against her "grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct." That there had been a long-standing animosity between Agbayani and Genabe is not denied. 4. Lastly, petitioner Agbayani insists that the DOJ should have dismissed respondent Genabe's petition for review outright pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70. It is true that the general rule in statutory construction is that the words "shall," "must," "ought," or "should" are words of mandatory character in common parlance and in their in ordinary signification,31 yet, it is also well-recognized in law and equity as a not absolute and inflexible criterion.32 Moreover, it is well to be reminded that DOJ Circular No. 70 is a mere tool designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice through appeals taken with the National Prosecution Service. Thus, technical rules of procedure like those under Sections 5 and 6 thereof should be interpreted in such a way to promote, not frustrate, justice. Besides, Sections 7 and 10 of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly give the Secretary of Justice, or the Undersecretary in his place, wide latitude of discretion whether or not to dismiss a petition. Section 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, invoked by petitioner Agbayani, is clearly encompassed within this authority, as shown by a cursory reading of Sections 7 and 10, to wit: SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly

intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. SECTION 12. Disposition of the appeal. The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds: That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof; That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied with; That there is no showing of any reversible error; That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the proceedings based on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question; That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; That the offense has already prescribed; and That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. We reiterate what we have stated in Yao v. Court of Appeals33 that: In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. 1wphi1 In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice, or where the merit of a party's cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. 34 (Citations omitted) All told, we find that the CA did not commit reversible error in upholding the Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the DOJ as we, likewise, find the same to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 27, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99626 are AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 173844

April 11, 2012

LIGAYA P. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ETC., DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and COURT OF APPEALS.Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the 17 January 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 88828. The CA decision held that petitioner failed to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Justice in ordering the filing against the petitioner of forty (40) counts of estafa.2 Culled from the records are the following antecedent facts: On 27 January 1994, Hermosa Savings and Loans Bank, Inc. (HSLBI) availed of forty (40) loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) pursuant to a Subsidiary Loan Agreement.3 In support of the loan agreement and applications, HSLBI, through bank officers Benjamin J. Cruz, Rodolfo C. Buenaventura, Librada Y. Dio, Nilda S. Fajardo, Lelaine V. Fernandez and Atty. Ligaya P. Cruz, herein petitioner, as its legal counsel, submitted the required documents, i.e. project evaluation reports, financial package approval, deeds of undertaking, certificates of registration, promissory notes, supplemental deeds of assignment and Investment Enterprise/sub-borrowers consent. These documents were submitted to assure DBP that the respective Investment Enterprises were actually existing and duly registered with the government; that the subsidiary loan will be exclusively used for relending to these Investment Enterprises and for the purposes stated in the applications; and that the concerned Investment Enterprises are amenable to the assignment of debt in favor of HSLBI. On 31 March 2001, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted an examination of HSLBIs loan portfolio. The BSP found out that most of HSLBIs loan documents were either forged or inexistent. In particular, the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) of properties submitted as collaterals were found to be inexistent, registered in another persons name, or already foreclosed/mortgaged to another bank. The annotations on the TCTs in favor of HSLBI were also inexistent. Likewise, the signatures of sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises appearing on documents were

all forged. Worst, the BSP discovered that the credit accounts assigned to DBP were in the names of non-existing Investment Enterprises. Thus, on 19 December 2001, DBP filed a complaint4 for forty (40) counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents or for large scale fraud or violation of Articles 315, 316(4) [as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689] and 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against the aforementioned officers of HSLBI and herein petitioner Atty. Ligaya P. Cruz (Atty. Cruz). Atty. Cruz was included in the complaint for the reason that she, as in-house legal counsel of HSLBI, rendered an opinion that all the purported Investment Enterprises were duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under Philippine laws and that they have full legal rights, power and authority to carry on their present business and for notarizing two deeds of assignment utilized as supporting documents. In a Joint Resolution5 dated 18 November 2002, State Prosecutors Maria Regina Tordilla-Castillo and Melvin J. Abad recommended the filing of informations for forty (40) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC in relation to P.D. 1689 against the respondent bank officers and herein petitioner. On 11 February 2003, the respondents in the complaint, including herein petitioner, filed a petition for review6before the Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Joint Resolution. In a Resolution7 dated 30 April 2003, then Undersecretary of the DOJ, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed the petition for review. On 15 May 2003, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration8 of the dismissal of their petition. On 3 November 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, issued a resolution9 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART and the assailed resolution is MODIFIED accordingly. The complaint against respondent Atty. Ligaya Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for want of probable cause and the Chief State Prosecutor is hereby directed to file an information for violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a), Revised Penal Code, against respondents Benjamin Cruz, Rodolfo Buenaventura, Librada Dio, Nilda Fajardo and Lelaine Fernandez and to report the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

DBP, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration10 of the 3 November 2003 resolution. By Resolution11 dated 27 January 2004, Acting Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez ordered the filing of informations for Estafa/Large Scale Fraud under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, as amended, in relation to P.D. 1689 against respondents. In the same resolution, she ordered the filing of informations against Atty. Cruz. The dispositive portion of the Resolution of 27 January 2004 reads: WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The resolution dated November 3, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is hereby directed to cause the reinstatement of the forty (40) Informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 1689 against respondents Benjamin J. Cruz, Rodolfo C. Buenaventura, Librada Y. Dio, Nilda S. Farjardo, Lelaine V. Fernandez and Atty. Ligaya P. Cruz, and to report to this Office the action taken within five (5) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis in the original)12 Respondents and herein petitioner moved for reconsideration.13 In a Resolution14 dated 4 January 2005, Secretary Raul Gonzales partially granted their motion and ordered the filing against all respondents of informations only for forty (40) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC and not for large scale fraud under P.D. 1689. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, given the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated January 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move for the withdrawal of the forty (40) informations for violation of PD 1689, if already filed, and to file instead separate informations for violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a), RPC against respondents Cruz, et. al. Report the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.15 Undaunted, Atty. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari16 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA seeking to nullify and set aside the 4 January 2005 resolution of the Secretary of Justice. On 17 January 2006, the CA rendered the assailed decision 17 dismissing the petition. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 July 2006. 18 Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, the issue before us for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the Secretary of Justice in its ruling that there is probable cause to indict petitioner Atty. Cruz. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice for allegedly being devoid of supporting evidence. She based her argument on the alleged conflicting resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice. She argues that she should not be held liable for the offense since she only signed a pro-forma opinion prepared by the DBP and merely notarized the documents submitted by HSLBI to DBP. On their face, she found no indication of any irregularity or any taint of illegality on the documents she signed. She also claims that HSLBI was duly accredited as a participating financial institution of DBP after complying with stringent conditions imposed by the latter. Such accreditation is allegedly reviewed and renewed annually and project visitations of the accounts of sub-borrowers of HSLBI are regularly conducted by the personnel of the DBP. Hence, if there were any questionable transactions or documents, the DBP, in the exercise of due diligence would have discovered these and taken proper actions thereon. She contends that HSLBI should not be made answerable for the failure of DBP to perform its responsibilities. She further argues that even if she is held liable, her liability is only civil and not criminal in view of the creditor-debtor relationship between HSLBI and DBP. The petition is bereft of merit. Jurisprudence has established rules on the determination of probable cause. In the case of Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman, 19 this Court held that: xxx xxx. [A] finding probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. (Italics in the original)20

xxx We affirm the CA decision in line with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the determination of the existence of probable cause. For reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such investigations. 21 In the absence of any showing that the Secretary of Justice committed manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice, courts will not disturb its findings. Moreover, this Court will decline to interfere when records show that the findings of probable cause is supported by evidence, law and jurisprudence. In the instant case, the Secretary of Justice found sufficient evidence to indict petitioner. It was adequately established by DBP and found by the Secretary of Justice that the funds would not have been released pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if HSLBI had no sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not only were the collaterals submitted inexistent, all the purported subborrowers/Investment Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In fact, the signatures of the sub-borrowers and the supporting documents submitted to DBP by petitioner and her co-respondents were all forged. The findings of probable cause against petitioner was based on the document she issued entitled "Opinion of Counsel to the Participating Financial Institution," to wit: xxx In connection therewith and in my capacity as such legal counsel for the PFI, I have reviewed all pertinent laws, rules and regulations of the Republic of the Philippines, and examined the originals or copies, photocopied, certified or otherwise identified to my satisfaction, of the Agreement, the promissory note executed by the PFI (the Note), the Deed of Assignment, and such documents, agreements, records and matters pertaining to PFI and IE as I have considered necessary or desirable for the opinions hereinafter expressed. Based on the foregoing, it is my opinion that: 1. PFI and IE are duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the Philippines, and have their principal offices at the addresses indicated in the Agreement and in other documents submitted by the PFI and IE and are registered or qualified to do business in the jurisdiction where such registration or qualification is necessary.

2. PFI and IE have full legal right, power and authority to carry on their present business, to own their properties and assets, to incur the obligations provided for in the Agreement, the Note, the Deed of Assignment, and any other documents pertinent or relevant thereto and to execute and deliver the same and to perform and observe the terms and conditions thereof. 3. All appropriate and necessary corporate and legal actions have been taken by PFI and/or the IE to authorize the execution, delivery and performance of the Agreement, the Note, the Deed of Assignment, and any other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. xxx 5. All consents, licenses, approvals and authorizations, and all declarations, filings and registrations necessary for the execution, delivery, performance, validity or enforceability of the Agreement, the Note and the Deed of Assignment have been obtained by PFI and/or the IE and are in full force and effect. 6. To the best of my knowledge after due inquiry, except as disclosed by PFI in writing to DBP prior to the date of the Agreement, there is no litigation, tax claim, proceeding or dispute, pending or threatened, against or affecting the PFI or its properties, the adverse determination of which might adversely affect the PFIs financial condition or operations or impair its ability to perform its obligations under the Agreement, the Note, or the Deed of Assignment, or any other instrument or agreement required thereunder. xxx Although this opinion is dated January 28, 1999, you may rely on the correctness of the opinion expressed herein on and as of the date of the initial Availment under the Agreement.22 It is evident therefore that petitioners opinion was instrumental in the deceit committed against DBP. As a lawyer and in-house legal counsel of HSLBI, it is highly doubtful that she would have affixed her signature without knowing that there were defects in those documents. As aptly found by the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor: xxx

Insofar as respondent Atty. Ligaya P. Cruz is concerned, her claim of innocence is difficult to sustain. Being the wife of respondent Benjamin J. Cruz and a lawyer at that, she should have refrained or inhibited from rendering an opinion that is totally in contravention of what had actually transpired. Her legal opinion that the forty (40) loan applicants are legally existing and in good standing necessarily caused damage and injury to complainant DBP. As the wife of then president of HSLBI, her having an in-depth knowledge of the operations and transactions appurtenant to the bank including, but not limited to, the inexistent investment enterprises is not remote.23(Emphasis and underline supplied) Whether or not there was negligence on the part of DBP is of no moment.1wphi1 Petitioner cannot conveniently blame DBP for allegedly not double-checking the documents submitted by HSLBI because by affixing her signature on these documents and negotiating the subsidiary loan agreement on behalf of fictitious sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises, she actively represented that these entities were indeed existing and eligible for the loan. Likewise, she cannot use as a defense the flip-flopping resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The amendments in the resolutions does not mean that there was grave of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice. If at all, it is indicative of the fact that the Office of the Secretary of Justice carefully studied and reviewed the facts of the case in arriving at its final resolution. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the 17 January 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88828. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. G.R. No. 186141 April 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA y CORONADO, Accused-Appellant. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 02348 dated October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No. 04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant: Criminal Case No. 04-2432 That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, direct custody and control a total weight of nine point fourty [sic] two (9.42) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.2 Criminal Case No. 04-2433 That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell, give away, distribute and deliver four point sixty (4.60) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, by then and there agreeing to sell and deliver the said dangerous drug to the proposed buyer PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, but which nevertheless failed to consummate the said sale by reason of causes other than her own spontaneous desistance, that is she got frightened by the presence of police officers at the scene of the crime.3 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64 of Makati City proceeded with the trial of the aforementioned charges. The versions of the prosecution and the defense of what transpired on July 2, 2004, as concisely summarized by the Court of Appeals, were as follows: Version of the Prosecution In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut (P/SUPT. YABUT), Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City and informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain "Baby," later identified as accused-appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT instructed PS/Insp. Pepito Garcia (PS/INSP. GARCIA), PO3 Josefino Callora (PO3 CALLORA) and PO2 Rogie Pinili (PO2 PINILI) to conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information. On June 23, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met with accused-appellant FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan in Taguig, Metro Manila. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA to accused-appellant

FIGUEROA as the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample be of good quality. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 CALLORA through the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu. In the morning of the following day, the Special Operation Unit 1 of the PNP AIDSOTF requested the PNP Crime Laboratory to dust with ultra-violet powder the two (2) pieces of P500.00 bills with serial numbers FG403794 and MY883243 to be used in the planned buy-bust operation against accused-appellant FIGUEROA. On July 2, 2004, at about 12:00 noon, the informant called the Desk Officer of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had informed him that she already had a stock of good quality shabu and asked how much shabu would be bought by PO3 CALLORA. P/SUPT YABUT instructed the informant to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that P10,000.00 worth of shabu would be bought from her. Later on the same day, the informant made another telephone call and relayed the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had agreed to deliver the shabu worth [P10,000.00] in front of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at the corner of M. Almeda and M. Conception Avenues, San Joaquin, Pasig City at about 4:00 p.m. of that day. A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3 CALLORA, was then formed to conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money was prepared. The genuine two (2) pieces of P500.00 bills were placed on top of boodle money to make them appear as P10,000.00. At about 4:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, the team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3 CALLORA arrived in the vicinity of 7-Eleven on board a car driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and met with the informant. PO3 CALLORA and the informant waited for accused-appellant FIGUEROA, who after a few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the window of her car and asked where the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accusedappellant FIGUEROA opened a Chowking plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road. The other occupants of the car were Susan Samson y Figueroa, sister-in-law of the accused, Margie Sampayan y Garbo, Fe Salceda y Resma and Christian Salceda y Resma, a nine[-]year[-]old boy.

PO3 CALLORA immediately boarded the car being driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and gave chase. PO2 PINILI, who was driving another vehicle, joined the chase. Accused-appellant FIGUEROAs vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the intersection of C-5 road. At that time, PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota Revo and threw the Chowking plastic bag to the pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor. PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance inside. PO3 CALLORA and PO2 PINILI introduced themselves as police officers. The Toyota Revo was checked by PS/INSP. GARCIA and PO2 PINILI, which was witnessed by PO1 Alvarado and PO3 Basa of the Makati Police PCP No. 7, MMDA Traffic Enforcers Gonzales and Salvador and a reporter/press photographer of Manila Star named Eduardo Rosales. Retrieved under the floor matting of the Toyota Revo were two heat sealed transparent plastic sachets of undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA was informed of her violation and was apprised of her constitutional rights. She was brought to the office of Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF for investigation. The items recovered from the crime scene were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. Version of the Defense Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met and transacted with PO3 CALLORA regarding the sale of shabu. She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered under the floor matting of the car she was driving as well as the plastic sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic bag found on the pavement of Kalayaan Avenue corner C-5 road. She alleged that between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, she was driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433 on her way to the house of her elder brother at Eco Center, Barangay Calsada, Taguig City to get their mothers allowance. Their mother stays with her at her residence at Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City. With her as passengers were Susan Samson y Figueroa, Fe Salceda y Resma, and the latters nine[-]year[-]old son, Christian Salceda y Resma, and Margie Sampayan y Garbo, accused-appellant FIGUEROAs laundrywoman. They stayed at her brothers house for about twenty (20) minutes. From her brothers house, she proceeded to Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila to bring Susan Samson y Figueroa to the latters house. The other passengers remained in the car. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA then continued driving, taking the C-5Kalayaan Avenue route. When she was about to proceed after the traffic light

turned green at the junction of Kalayaan Avenue, a navy blue car blocked her path. P/SUPT YABUT alighted from said car and was shouting that he was a police officer while approaching accused-appellant FIGUEROA. He ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to roll down her car window. Accused then asked, "Bakit po mister?" P/SUPT YABUT reiterated that he was a police officer and ordered accusedappellant FIGUEROA to get down from her car as they would be searching the same. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were made to stay at the sidewalk for about thirty (30) minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and were told not to do anything while the search was going on. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, "Aantayin muna natin sila." For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk until other persons referred to by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at the scene. After the search, accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were ordered to board the same Toyota Revo, which was driven to Camp Crame by one of the persons who arrived at the scene.4 On May 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision5 acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 04-2432, but convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-2433. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] judgment is rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 04-2432[,] the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado is ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II RA No. 9165 for lack of evidence. The two plastic sachets of containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a combined weight of 9.42 grams are forfeited in favor of the Government. Let the custody thereof be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its appropriate disposition. 2. In Criminal Case No. 04-2433, the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias "Baby" is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00). Let the one plastic bag labeled Chowking containing one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet with 4.60 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for its appropriate disposition. The period during which the accused is detained at the City Jail of Makati shall be considered in her favor pursuant to existing rules.6

Alleging that the foregoing decision was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidentiary records, accused-appellant sought a review of the same with this Court through a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC gave due course. However, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,7 we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. On October 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision, dated May 18, 2006, in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2432 and 04-2433, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is hereby AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.8 Accused-appellant appealed to this Court anew. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief,9 wherein she highlighted the fact that the Court of Appeals did not discuss the first error assigned in her Brief with said appellate court. In the aforementioned Brief10 with the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant submitted the following assignment of errors: First THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE SPECIAL OPERATION UNIT 1 OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE ANTI-ILLEGAL DRUGS SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE WAS IRREGULAR BECAUSE OF LACK OF PRIOR COORDINATION WITH THE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA). Second THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND ACCUSED REGARDING THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU. Third

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND P/INSP. PEPITO GARCIA THAT HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. Fourth THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPT TO SELL SHABU AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 26, ART. II OF R.A. 9165.11 Lack of Prior Coordination with the PDEA In both the Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals and accused -appellants Supplemental Brief before this Court, the main defense proffered by accusedappellant was the alleged violation of Section 86 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, requiring that the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintain close coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters. Accused-appellants contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,13 the Court noted that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court consequently held that "this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible."14 The same conclusion was reached by this Court in People v. Roa,15 People v. Mantalaba16 and People v. Sabadlab.17 Alleged lack of prior agreement between accused-appellant and PO3 Callora. Accused-appellant argues that the alleged sale transaction borne out by the evidence of the prosecution was not between Police Officer 3 (PO3) Josefino Callora and accused-appellant Figueroa, but was instead between the latter and the unnamed informant. Accused-appellant concludes that the testimony of PO3 Callora regarding the alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and without probative value, as it was the informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement to sell drugs.18 We disagree. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay rule does not apply where only the fact that such statements

were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. 19 In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the conversations between the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that said information led the police officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation between the informant and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellants actuations on July 2, 2004, which were all within the personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora and approached them while driving her Toyota Revo;20 (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the informant, accused-appellant asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for the shabu; 21 (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet of white crystalline substance;22 (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accusedappellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove away;23 (5) PO3 Callora and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner Kalayaan Avenue.24 Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 25 This definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus in People v. Laylo,26 we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest. The identity of the white crystalline substance was furthermore established by the testimony of PS/Insp. Garcia, who likewise testified as to the following matters based on his own personal knowledge: (1) after the chase, PS/Insp. Garcia saw a boy (later identified as Christian Salceda) alight from the vehicle and threw a Chowking plastic bag two to three meters from the vehicle;27 (2) PS/Insp. Garcia picked up the Chowking plastic bag from the sidewalk ad found a sachet of shabu inside the same;28 (3) PS/Insp. Garcia later proceeded with the other police officers to their office, where they requested for a laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance;29 PS/Insp. Garcia identified the Chowking plastic bag and the sachet containing white crystalline substance in court. He identified the mark "PEG1" on the sachet as his initial and testified that he was the one who marked the same.30 The prosecution presented as its Exhibit "B" an Initial Laboratory Report.1wphi1 The report states that the heat-sealed transparent plastic bag with

the marking "PEG-1" inside a Chowking plastic bag was found to contain 4.60 grams of white crystalline substance. The latter specimen was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.31 In light of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, which were found credible by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the crime of attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165 was sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt. As for the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we agree with the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that discrepancies "referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair [the witnesses] credibility"32 nor do they overcome the presumption that the arresting officers have regularly performed their official duties.33 In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts in the instant case. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02348 dated October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No. 04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his

conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1 Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him. The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. 2 As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail. After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating: The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3 The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latters neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself." 4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also working near the area.5

The RTC disposed thus: With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 representing death indemnity. There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made. SO ORDERED.6 On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, 8 and Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.10 Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal lacks merit. Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of

assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result. 12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13 Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14 Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple." 15 Relying on Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the latters movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon o f statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows: Q Can you tell what happened on the said date? A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest. Q What time was that?

A 12:50 a.m. Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say? A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako." Q What did you do? A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH. Q On the way to the PGH what transpired? A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca. Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca? A Yes, Sir. Q How long have you known him? A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami." Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him? A Yes, Sir. Q Will you look around and point him to us? A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.) COURT When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition? A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer more. Q What happened when you told him that? A He kept silent.

Q What time did you arrive at the PGH? A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time. Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened? A He was brought to Emergency Room. Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened? A He was pronounced dead.17 It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18 A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. 19 All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or

from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.21 The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25 We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded

when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26 We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were different from the death indemnity. 27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that: xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.1wphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.30 The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31 Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision. G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner, vs. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents. DECISION SERENO, J.:

This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner) against Barangay Captain Edito Aguillon (Aguillon) for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 18661 as amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8249. Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo.2According to him, on 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the municipal station received information that successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Thus, petitioner, together with Police Inspector Idel Hermoso (Hermoso), and Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Arial Lanaque (Lanaque), immediately went to the area to investigate. 3 Upon arriving, they saw Paquito Panisales, Jr. (Paquito)4 standing beside the road, wearing a black sweat shirt with a "Barangay Tanod" print.5 They asked Paquito if he had heard the alleged gunshots, but he answered in the negative. Petitioner, Hermoso, and Lanaque decided to investigate further, but before they could proceed, they saw that Paquito had "turned his back from us that seems like bragging his firearm to us flagrantly displayed/tucked in his waist whom we observed to be under the influence of intoxicating odor."6 Then, they frisked him to "verify the firearm and its supporting documents."7 Paquito then presented his Firearm License Card and a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR). Thereafter, they spotted two persons walking towards them, wobbling and visibly drunk. They further noticed that one of them, Aguillon, was openly carrying a rifle, and that its barrel touched the concrete road at times. 8Petitioner and Hermoso disarmed Aguillon. The rifle was a Caliber 5.56 M16 rifle with Serial Number 101365 and with 20 live ammunitions in its magazine. According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to present a PTCFOR. Petitioner arrested Paquito, Aguillon and his companion Aldan Padilla, and brought them to the Ajuy Municipal Police Station.9 Paquito was released on the same night, because he was deemed to have been able to comply with the requirements to possess and carry firearm. 10 Thereafter, Aguillon was detained at the police station, but was released from custody the next day, 7 August 2008, after he posted a cash bond in the amount of P 80,000. The present Petition does not state under what circumstances or when Padilla was released. On 12 August 2008, petitioner and Hermoso executed a Joint Affidavit 11 alleging the foregoing facts in support of the filing of a case for illegal possession of firearm

against Aguillon. Petitioner also endorsed the filing of a Complaint against Aguillon through a letter12 sent to the Provincial Prosecutor on 12 August 2008. For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully arrested and detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had every right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his firearm within his barangay. 13 According to petitioner, he never received a copy of the Counter-Affidavit Aguillon had filed and was thus unable to give the necessary reply.14 In a Resolution15 dated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo P. Camacho (Asst. Prosecutor) found that there was no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that Aguillon was probably guilty of the offense charged. The Asst. Prosecutor also recommended that the rifle, which was then under the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory, be returned to Aguillon. Petitioner claims that he never received a copy of this Resolution. Thereafter, Provincial Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban (Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban) forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the 10 September 2008 Resolution recommending the approval thereof.16 In a Resolution17 dated 17 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro), approved the recommendation of Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban to dismiss the case. It ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner claims that he never received a copy of this Resolution either.18 On 13 April 2009, Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban received a letter from petitioner requesting a copy of the following documents: 1. Copy of the Referral letter and the resolution if there is any which was the subject of the said referral to the Office of the Ombudsman, Iloilo City; and 2. Copy of the counter affidavit of respondent, Edito Aguillon and/or his witnesses considering that I was not furnished a copy of the pleadings filed by said respondent.19

On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) 20 of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but it was denied through an Order dated 23 July 2009.21 Thus, on 8 December 2009, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari 22 via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. According to petitioner, he was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner also argues that public respondents act of dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon, based solely on insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).23 He thus claims that the assailed Resolutions were issued "contrary to law, and/or jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."24 The present Petition contains the following prayer: WHEREFORE, premises considered petitioner most respectfully prays: 1. That this Petition for Certiorari be given due course; 2. That a Decision be rendered granting the petition by issuing the following: a. Writ of Certiorari nullifying and setting aside the Order dated July 23, 2009 and dated February 17, 2009 both of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB V-08-0406-J and the Resolution dated September 10, 2008 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo in I.S. No. 2008-1281 (Annexes A, C and D, respectively); b. To reverse and set aside said Orders and Resolution (Annexes A, C and D, respectively) finding PROBABLE CAUSE of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294 and other applicable laws and to direct the immediate filing of the information in Court against private respondent EDITO AGUILLON. Such other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for. 25 (Emphasis in the original.) In his Comment,26 Aguillon submits that the present Petition should not be given due course based on the following grounds: a. The Deputy Ombudsman found that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended;

b. The present Petition is "frivolous and manifestly prosecuted for delay;"27 c. The allegations raised are too unsubstantial to merit consideration, because "Petitioner failed to specifically allege the manner in which the alleged Grave Abuse was committed by Respondent Deputy Ombudsman;" 28 and d. The Deputy Ombudsmans findings are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner claims that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban should have given him a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. In support of this claim, petitioner cites Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads: (c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counteraffidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit. Petitioner faults the Asst. Prosecutor and the Office of the Ombudsman for supposedly committing grave abuse of discretion when they failed to send him a copy of the 10 September 2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions. A perusal of the records reveal that in both the 10 September 2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions, the PNP Crime Laboratory and petitioner were included in the list of those who were furnished copies of the foregoing Resolutions.29 Even though his name was listed in the "copy furnished" section, petitioner never signed to signify receipt thereof. Thus, none of herein respondents raise this fact as a defense. In fact, they do not even deny the allegation of petitioner that he never received a copy of these documents. Aguillon does not deny that he never sent a copy of his counter-affidavit to petitioner. For his part, Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban explained in his Comment,30 that he was not able to give petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter affidavit and the 10 September 2008 Resolution, because "when petitioner was asking for them, the record of the case, including the subject Resolution, was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman for the required approval." 31 As further proof that petitioner was not sent a copy of the 10 September 2008 Resolution, it can be seen from the document itself that one Atty. Jehiel Cosa signed in a "care of" capacity to signify his receipt thereof on behalf of petitioner,

only on 23 June 2009 or after the latters 12 April 2009 letter-request to Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban. Nevertheless, the provincial prosecutor is of the opinion that petitioner was never deprived of his due process rights, to wit: 8. Even granting that private respondent Edito Aguillion failed to furnish the petitioner with a copy of his counter-affidavit as required of him by the Rules, petitioner was never deprived of anything. As aptly said by the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman in its Order dated 23 July 2009, "Complainant added that he was never furnished copies of the Counter-Affidavit of respondent nor of the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Posecutor, Iloilo City." "Anent the claim of the complainant that he was not furnished with a copy of the Resolution dated 10 September 2008 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Iloilo City, said Resolution did not attain finality until approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, complainant was not deprived of due process, he can still avail to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which he did, to refute respondents defense."32 We agree. Petitioner insists that Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, was created "in order not to deprive party litigants of their basic constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them."33 Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro contradicts the claim of petitioner and argues that the latter was not deprived of due process, just because he was not able to file his Reply to the Counter-affidavit. The constitutional right to due process according to the Deputy Ombudsman, is guaranteed to the accused, and not to the complainant.34 Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.35 This is a right that cannot be invoked by petitioner, because he is not the accused in this case. The law is vigilant in protecting the rights of an accused. Yet, notwithstanding the primacy put on the rights of an accused in a criminal case, even they cannot claim unbridled rights in Preliminary Investigations. In Lozada v. Hernandez, 36 we

explained the nature of a Preliminary Investigation in relation to the rights of an accused, to wit: It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 716). The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). And rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law". (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122).37 It is therefore clear that because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein depend on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights they believe they are entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase "due process of law." A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Replythis right should be granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban correctly claims that it is discretionary on his part to require or allow the filing or submission of reply-affidavits.38 Furthermore, we agree with Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban that there was no need to send a copy of the 10 September 2008 Resolution to petitioner, since it did not attain finality until it was approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. It must be noted that the rules do not state that petitioner, as complainant, was entitled to a copy of this recommendation. The only obligation of the prosecutor, as detailed in Section 4 of Rule 112, was to forward the record of the case to the proper officer within five days from the issuance of his Resolution, to wit:

SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy of the Counteraffidavit filed by Aguillon, whatever procedural defects this case suffered from in its initial stages were cured when the former filed an MR. In fact, all of the supposed defenses of petitioner in this case have already been raised in his MR and adequately considered and acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."39 We have said that where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latters motion for reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. 40 At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even though the filing of the MR cured whatever procedural defect may have been present in this case, this does not change the fact that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the duty to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case because of the filing of an MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

It is submitted by petitioner that in dismissing Aguillons Complaint, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to consider Memorandum Circular No. 2000-016, which was supposedly the IRR issued by the PNP for P.D. 1866.41 Petitioner fails to persuade this Court. The original IRR42 of P.D. 1866 was issued by then Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Fidel V. Ramos on 28 October 1983. The IRR provides that, except when specifically authorized by the Chief of Constabulary, lawful holders of firearms are prohibited from carrying them outside their residences, to wit: SECTION 3. Authority of Private Individuals to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence. a. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. b. However, the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm outside of residence. c. Except as otherwise provided in Secs. 4 and 5 hereof, the carrying of firearm outside of residence or official station in pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have the prior approval of the Chief of Constabulary. By virtue of R.A. 6975,43 the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority.44 On 31 January 2003, PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane issued Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence (Guidelines). In these Guidelines, the PNP Chief revoked all PTCFOR previously issued, thereby prohibiting holders of licensed firearms from carrying these outside their residences, to wit: 4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:

a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed. b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and regular employees. Section 4 of the IRR lists the following persons as those authorized to carry their duty-issued firearms outside their residences, even without a PTCFOR, whenever they are on duty: SECTION 4. Authority of Personnel of Certain Civilian Government Entities and Guards of Private Security Agencies, Company Guard Forces and Government Guard Forces to Carry Firearms. The personnel of the following civilian agencies commanding guards of private security agencies, company guard forces and government guard forces are authorized to carry their duty issued firearms whenever they are on duty detail subject to the specific guidelines provided in Sec. 6 hereof: a. Guards of the National Bureau of Prisons, Provincial and City Jails; b. Members of the Bureau of Customs Police, Philippine Ports Authority Security Force, and Export Processing Zones Authority Police Force; and x c. Guards of private security agencies, company guard forces, and government guard forces. Section 5 of the guidelines, on the other hand, enumerates persons who have the authority to carry firearms outside their residences, viz: 5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence. a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are under imminent danger. b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided,

that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days. c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration. d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the person. e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry firearms outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines. 45 However, we find merit in respondents contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government Code (LGC). In People v. Monton,46 the house of Mariano Montonthe Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavitewas raided, and an automatic carbine with one long magazine containing several rounds of ammunition was found hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. He was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, but this Court acquitted him on the basis of Section 88(3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983, which reads: In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying of firearms. Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the foregoing provision as reflected in its Section 389 (b), viz: CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. xxx xxx xxx

(b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations. Provincial Prosecutor Dusabans standpoint on this matter is correct. All the guidelines and rules cited in the instant Petition "refers to civilian agents, private security guards, company guard forces and government guard forces." These rules and guidelines should not be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. As barangay captain, he is the head of a local government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities are properly outlined in the LGC. This law specifically gives him, by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not deny that when he found Aguillon "openly carrying a rifle," the latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of the barangay. In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, this Court will give credence to the finding and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation.47 This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory powers.48 It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant this Courts reversal of the Ombudsmans findings.49 This, petitioner has failed to do. The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon for trial. The Dissent contends that probable cause was already established by facts of this case, which show that Aguillon was found carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without a PTCFOR. Thus, Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal Complaint. However, even though Aguillon did not possess a PTCFOR, he had the "legal authority" to carry his firearm outside his residence, as required by P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294. This authority was granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, which specifically carved out an exception to P.D. 1866. Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the authority to disregard existing exemptions, as long as the requirements of the general rule apply. This should not be the case. Although the Dissent correctly declared that the prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a statutory exception without weighing it against the facts and evidence before him, we find that the facts of the case prove that there is no probable cause to charge Aguillon with the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent found that the factual circumstances of the present case show that the conditions set forth in the law have not been met. Thus, the exemption should not apply. Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question as to the fact that Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction when he was found in possession of his rifle. The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his barangay.50 As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangay to maintain peace and order. As to the last phrase in Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, stating that the exception it carved out is subject to "appropriate rules and regulations," suffice it to say that although P.D. 1866 was not repealed, it was modified by the LGC by specifically adding to the exceptions found in the former. Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when Congress enacted the LGC. Thus, Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. 1866, which enumerated the persons given the authority to carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit. The phrase "subject to appropriate rules and regulations" found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has already amended. Indeed, petitioners mere allegation does not establish the fact that Aguillon was drunk at the time of his arrest.1wphi1This Court, however, is alarmed at the idea that government officials, who are not only particularly charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and order within their barangays but are also given the authority to carry any form of firearm necessary to perform their duty, could be the very same person who would put their barangays in danger by carelessly carrying high-powered firearms especially when they are not in full control of their senses. While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it cannot order the prosecutor to file a case against him since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for imbibing liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any law that restricts the kind of firearms that punong barangays may carry in the

performance of their peace and order functions. Unfortunately, it also appears that the term "peace and order function" has not been adequately defined by law or appropriate regulations. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dated 10 September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17 February 2009 and 23 July 2009, respectively. Let a copy of this Decision be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for whatever appropriate action they may deem warranted by the statements in this Decision regarding the adequacy of laws governing the carrying of firearms by local chief executives. No costs. SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Codifying the Law on Illegal/Unlawful Posession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes, 29 June 1983.
2

Rollo, p. 9. Id at 53. Id at 49. Id at 53. Id. Id. Id. Rollo, p. 10. Id. Rollo, pp. 53-54. Rollo, p. 51. Id at 50.

10

11

12

13

14

Id at 10.

34

Id at 92. People v. Valdesancho, 410 Phil. 556 (2001). 92 Phil 1051 (1953). Id at 1053. Id at 79.

15

Rollo, pp. 49-51; I.S. No. 2008-1281, penned by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo P. Camacho.
16

35

36

Rollo, p. 59.
37

17

Rollo, pp. 47-48.

38

18

Rollo, p. 10.
39

19

Id at 60. Rollo, pp. 34-46. Rollo, p. 11. Rollo, pp. 3-26. Rollo, p. 12. Id. Rollo, pp. 25-26. Rollo, pp. 72-74. Rollo, p. 73. Id. See Rollo, pp. 48 and 51. Rollo, pp. 78-82. Rollo, p. 79. Id at 80. Id at 7.

De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167, 171(1953); Embate v. Penolio, 93 Phil. 782, 785 (1953).
40

20

Aguilar v. Tan, G.R. No. L-23603, 30 January 1970, 31 SCRA 205 citing De Borja vs. Tan, supra; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 123 Phil. 413, 417-418 (1966).
41

21

Rollo, p. 13.

22

42

23

24

Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree Number 1866 Dated 29 June 1983 Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes.
43

25

26

An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for other Purposes. Approved 13 December 1990.
44

27

Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 534. Rollo, p. 19. G.R. No. L-48112, 29 February 1988. Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 916 (1996). Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, 12 March 2009, 580 SCRA 693. Ombudsman v. Vda. de Ventura, G.R. No. 151800, 5 November 2009, 605 SCRA

28

45

29

46

30

47

31

48

32

49

33

1.

50

April 1999, 306 SCRA 41, 45.

Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128524, 20

In this regard, Edito Aguillon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294. The last paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended provides: "The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION BRION, J.: I dissent from the ponencias conclusion that the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman (Ombudsman) committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against Edito Aguillon for insufficiency of evidence. The Court consistently adheres to its policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. This policy leaves the investigating prosecutor with sufficient latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the purpose of filing information in court. 1 The inherently executive nature2 of determining the existence of probable cause dictates this judicial course of action. More particularly, the Courts policy of non-interference with the investigatory and prosecutory powers of the Office of the Ombudsman is anchored on the provisions of the Constitution, which guarantees the independence of this office. 3 However, given the Courts own duty under paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans action for the limited purpose of determining whether this action is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.4 In the present case, I find the Ombudsmans dismissal of the criminal complaint tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as the dismissal was not supported by the established facts of the case and was also grossly contrary to applicable laws, rules and jurisprudence on the matter. First, in conducting a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor merely determines whether probable cause exists that would warrant the filing of the corresponding information in court against a supposed offender. In turn, probable cause is simply the existence of such facts and circumstances, sufficient to create the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been committed and that the person charged is probably guilty of the crime charged. 5 The determination of probable cause only requires reasonable belief, not actual certainty, that a crime has been committed and that the person charged is probably guilty thereof.

The established facts show that Edito Aguillon was found in possession of an M16 rifle with 20 live ammunitions outside his residence. While he was able to present a license to possess the firearm, he failed to present evidence that he had legal authority to carry the firearm outside of his residence. These circumstances alone, to my mind, satisfy the standard definition of probable cause that the acts charged were committed, and that Edito Aguillon was probably guilty of its commission (violation of P.D. No. 1866). Whether or not he is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of this crime is another matter that must be addressed in the trial proper of the criminal case.6 Second, the Ombudsmans dismissal of the criminal complaint based on the finding that Edito Aguillon did not commit a crime, as he was a barangay captain performing his peace and order functions and had a license for his M16 rifle, is contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 and the factual circumstances of the case. The crime of illegal possession of firearm,7 on one hand, and the crime of carrying a licensed firearm outside ones residence without legal authority, on the other, are two separate offenses punished by P.D. No. 1866 as amended. In other words, while Edito Aguillon cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms, sufficient evidence exists to prosecute him for carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority. In Francisco I. Chavez v. Hon. Alberto G. Romulo, et. al,8 we held that the right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, and not a constitutional right; and that the possession of firearms by citizens in the Philippines is the exception rather than the rule.9 Consequently, when a prima facie showing of a violation of the law on firearms is established, the prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a statutory exception without weighing it against the facts and evidence before him; otherwise, he would be committing grave abuse of discretion, warranting the corrective writ of certiorari which brings me to my third point. Third. Undoubtedly, Section 389 (c), Chapter 3, Book III of the Local Government Code (LGC) of the Philippines (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 7160) provides an exception to the rule on carrying of firearms outside ones residence. R.A. No. 7160 is a special law10 that allows the barangay captain (now the Punong Barangay) the right

to possess and carry firearms within his territorial jurisdiction. As expressly stated in the law, however, the exercise of such right is not without restrictions. Section 389 (c) in fact mentions four (4) conditions that restrict the right of the Punong Barangay to possess and carry firearms: "In the performance of his peace and order functions, the Punong Barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations." The four (4) conditions are: first, the right must be exercised in performance of peace and order functions; second, the right must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punong Barangay; third, the firearm must be necessary in the exercise of official functions; and fourth, the exercise of the right is subject to appropriate rules and regulations. The available records do not establish compliance with the above conditions. The records do not show that Edito Aguillon, as barangay captain, was in the performance of official duties to protect and preserve the peace and order of his community at the time the police confronted him. Contrary to the ponencias claim unsupported by law and evidence a barangay captain cannot be performing his peace and order functions 24 hours a day. This is a preposterous claim that effectively says that the mere fact of being a barangay captain characterizes one as an official continuously exercising peace and order functions. At most, perhaps, such a presumption can exist; but a presumption should not apply when the attendant circumstances dictate otherwise. What the records establish are the following: that (i) the police responded to a call for assistance upon hearing successive gunfires; (ii) the police saw and confronted Edito Aguillon, wobbling and visibly drunk, carrying an M16 rifle; and (iii) Edito Aguillon was then and there disarmed of his firearm and brought to the police station. None of these facts was denied by Aguillon. Significantly, Aguillon made no claim, not even a pretense, that he was then in the course of protecting and preserving peace in his barangay at the time he was arrested. Similarly, the second and third conditions were not clearly established. The records failed to show that Edito Aguillon was actually within the territorial jurisdiction of his barangay when the confrontation with the police took place. This is a matter of defense that the one charged must claim and support by evidence. No such effort appears to have taken place. The facts also failed to show how, specifically, an M16 rifle became necessary for the exercise of his official functions - if at all he was exercising his official functions at that time. We can take judicial notice that an M16 (as the prefix "M" denotes) is a military weapon, not a civilian one.

The fourth condition on the "appropriate rules and regulations" is no other than the rules governing the possession and carrying of firearm, which are mainly found in the implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 1866. In this regard, Section 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 impose the following restrictions on persons in possession of licensed firearms: a. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. b. However, the Chief of Constabulary (now PNP Chief) may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm outside of residence. c. Except as other provided in Sections 4 (Authority of personnel or certain civilian government entities and guards of private security agencies, company guard forces and government guard forces to carry firearms) and 5 (Authority to issue mission order involving the carrying of firearm) hereof, the carrying of firearm outside of residence or official station in pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have prior approval of the Chief of Constabulary. Hence, while Section 389 (c) Chapter 3, Book III of R.A. No. 7160 grants the Punong Barangay the right to possess and carry firearms, the very wording of the law did not relieve the Punong Barangay from complying with the rules and regulations involving the possession and carrying of firearms. Specifically, I take exception to the ponencias (i) statement that "[e]ven the IRR of PD 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b)11 of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when Congress enacted the LGC" and (ii) conclusion that "Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of PD 1866." Contrary to the ponencias claim, P.D. No. 1866s IRR could not have been modified by Section 389 (c) of the LGC. On May 12, 1983 Batas Pambansa (BP) 337 (the old Local Government Code) took effect. Section 88 par. 3 of BP 337 similarly limits the punong barangays otherwise broad authority to possess and carry firearms. It was only later (or in October 1983) that the IRR of P.D. No. 1866 was issued. Effectively, the promulgation of the IRR after BP 337 took effect served to limit (and continues to by the re-enactment of the same provision in Section 389 of the present LGC) the Punong Barangays authority to carry firearms. At any rate, even granting that Section 389 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 does not require compliance with the ordinary rules regarding the licensing of firearms under P.D. No.

1866, the facts do not sufficiently show that Edito Aguillon falls within the exception provided under Section 389 (c) of R.A No. 7160 that would exempt him from compliance with the general rule on licensing of firearms. Given that the issue before us is the existence of grave abuse of discretion in the determination of the well-settled concept of probable cause, the petitioners reliance on People v. Monton,12 which already involves the guilt or innocence of an accused, is misplaced. In short, being a matter of exception to the rule on carrying of firearms outside ones residence, the Court cannot simply apply Section 389 (c) of the LGC (as the ponencia did) without regard to the plain qualifications stated in that provision all of which are aimed at serving the interest (maintenance of peace and order 13 ) of the Punong Barangays constituencies and not his personal interests. As an exception, too, the burden lies with the person charged to show that he falls within the exception. No such showing is evident from the records of the case; thus, the application of the exception has no basis. G.R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012

with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73029. The Informations indicting the accused read: Criminal Case No. C-73028 That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) folded aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic lighters, knowing the same are paraphernalias instruments apparatus fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous drug (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into the body. Contrary to law.4 Criminal Case No. C-73029

MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent. PEREZ,* REYES,** DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2009 Decision 1 and the March 9, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957, which affirmed the September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No .. C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y Cayuni (Ambre) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. THE FACTS Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee Mendoza (Mendoza), before the RTC charging them

That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and sniff Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law. Contrary to law.5 When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were meted the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months and a fine of P25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C73028. For their conviction in Criminal Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered their confinement at the Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six (6) months.6

Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the merits ensued. The Version of the Prosecution From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1 Ronald Allan Mateo (PO1 Mateo), PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared that on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp(Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the buybust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu. The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination. Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples taken from Ambre and her coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu while Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the items seized from them were all found positive for traces of shabu. 8 The Version of the Defense Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Through the testimonies of Ambre, Mendoza and Lily Rosete(Rosete), the defense claimed that on the afternoon of April 20, 2005, Ambre was inside the residential compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that her mother asked Rosete to accompany her because Rosetes daughter-in-law, Nancy Buban (Buban), was a resident of Phase 12, Caloocan City, an area inhabited by Muslims; that when they failed to buy malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look for other vendors; that ten minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her; that she was detained at the Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro, Mendoza and Tagoranao; and that she was not brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug testing.

Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong vendors, she returned fifteen minutes later and learned that the policemen had arrested people inside the compound including Ambre. Mendoza, who was convicted in Criminal Case No. C-73029, claimed that no pot session took place on the afternoon of April 20, 2005. She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside the residential compound, when policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at them.9 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted her of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her possession. The trial court adjudged: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1) In Crim. Case No. C- 73028, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165; 2)In Crim. Case No. C-73029, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her to be confined and rehabilitated at the government rehabilitation center in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. The six (6) month period of rehabilitation shall commence only from the time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation center and its promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified. The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with the rules governing the same. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.10 The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Undaunted, Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime. On November 26, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.11 Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9, 2010 Resolution. Hence, she filed this petition THE ISSUES Ambre raised the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON APRIL 20, 2005 (THAT YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA) CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL PROCEDURES IN CONDUCTING A BUYBUST OPERATION. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WERE PART AND PARCEL OF THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR "FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AND HENCE, WERE ILLEGAL. 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING THE ILLEGAL BUY-BUST OPERATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER'S WITNESS, HER CO-ACCUSED, KAYCEE MENDOZA, ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO SUCH ILLEGAL USE, HAD VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT. 5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS REHABILITATION IN A GOVERNMENT CENTER IS A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER R.A. 9165 ("COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002").12

A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves on the following core issues: 1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and 2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence. Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no offense was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged "hot pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. In this regard, Ambre cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City dismissing the case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust operation was highly suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the items allegedly seized from her were inadmissible in evidence being fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that the omission of the apprehending team to observe the procedure outlined in R.A. No. 9165 for the seizure of evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the prosecutions case. Lastly, Ambre maintains that she was not subjected to a confirmatory test and, hence, the imposition of the penalty of six months rehabilitation was not justified. For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision for failure of Ambre to show that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of illegal use of shabu. The OSG insists that Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It is of the opinion that the credible and compelling evidence of the prosecution could not be displaced by the empty denial offered by Ambre. THE COURT'S RULING The conviction of Ambre stands. Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.14

This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In this exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied) Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.16 In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.

Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds that Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea.18 Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.19 Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre, together with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05. It was likewise found that the items seized from the three were all positive for traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 dated April 21, 2005. These findings were unrebutted. Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect, because the evidence against her was obtained in violation of the procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165, is untenable. While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.20 This Court, however, has consistently held that the most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 21 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following items were confiscated from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of

suspected shabu; one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former. All the pieces of evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05." With the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory and delivered them to P/Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who found all the items, except the disposable lighters, positive for traces of shabu. Verily, the prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items. Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as inadmissible, Ambre will not be exculpated from criminal liability. First, let it be underscored that proof of the existence and possession by the accused of drug paraphernalia is not a condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous drugs. The law merely considers possession of drug paraphernalia as prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has violated Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165.22

disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.25 Finally, Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center imposed on her was a nullity, in view of the alleged lack of confirmatory test. The Court is not persuaded. It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of confirmatory drug test conducted on her. Ambre only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed her conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day for her to do so. Wellentrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.26 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 26, 2009 Decision and the March 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957 are hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 193672 January 18, 2012

Secondly, the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with

moral certainty the commission of the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. At this juncture, the Court affirms the RTC's finding that the police officers' testimonies deserve full faith and credit. Appellate courts, generally, will not disturb the trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.23 The Court finds no reason to deviate from this rule in this case. Likewise, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no showing that PO3 Moran, PO1 Mateo, PO2 Hipolito, and P/Insp. dela Rosa were impelled with improper motive to falsely impute such offense against Ambre. As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of denial offered by Ambre must simply fail. Bare denials cannot prevail over positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses.24 Besides, this Court has held in a catena of cases that the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. GLENFORD SAMOY and LEODIGARIO ISRAEL, Accused, LEODIGARIO ISRAEL, Appellant. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the reliability of the identification of the accused involved in a robbery with homicide case three years after the commission of the crime. The Facts and the Case The Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor filed a case for robbery on the highway1 against accused Jonathan Valencia, Glenford Samoy, and Leodigario Israel before the Aparri Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case VI-967. Edmund Addun and Johnny Ventura (Johnny) testified that on the morning of December 27, 1997 they left Tuguegarao City for Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with Rodolfo Cachola, Canuto Forlaje, and Melencio Ventura (Melencio) to buy pigs. They

rode a small Isuzu Elf truck with Johnny on the wheel. They were on errand for spouses Edwin and Elizabeth Cauilan, their employers, who bought and sold hogs. When the group reached the boundary of Barangay Logac, Lallo, Cagayan and Barangay Iringan, Allacapan, Cagayan, three armed men, which included accused Glenford Samoy and Leodigario Israel, flagged them down. One carried an M16 armalite rifle, the second a .45 caliber pistol, and the third a .38 caliber pistol. The accused ordered those on the truck to alight and hand over their money. Melencio, who was in charge of buying the hogs for their employer, immediately handed over the P60,000.00 he had with him. The accused then ordered their captives to get their things from the truck and go up the mountain. When they hesitated, one of the accused fired his gun. This prompted the captives to run for their lives, except Addun who closed his eyes because of a gun aimed directly at him. The accused fired three warning shots to stop those who where running away. When the latter did not heed the shots, the accused fired directly at them, seriously wounding Melencio while slightly hurting Johnny and Forlaje. The robbers then fled to the mountain. Although the robbery victims brought Melencio to the hospital, he was pronounced dead on arrival. The accused, on the other hand, denied having taken part in the commission of the crime. Accused Samoy claimed that when the robbery took place, he was helping out in the wedding preparations of a cousin. He was unable, however, to attend the wedding on the next day because of a hangover he got from drinking the night before. Accused Israel, for his part, claimed that he was planting rice in a farm all day on December 27, 1997. He left home early in the morning and returned home in the afternoon. On July 1, 2003 the RTC found both Samoy and Israel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and meted out to them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC held that the accused committed only one act of robbery and that the prosecution was unable to prove that they organized themselves to commit robbery on the highway. The RTC likewise held them solidarily liable to Melencios heirs in the sum of P1,260,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC also ordered the accused to return the P60,000.00 taken during the robbery to the spouses Cauilan. Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00328 but Samoy escaped from prison on October 5, 2004, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. On June 4, 2010 the CA affirmed the RTC decision with respect to Israel. In addition, it ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 more for loss of earning capacity to correct a discrepancy in computation.

The Issue Presented The only issue presented is whether or not the CA, along with the RTC, erred in finding that accused Israel committed robbery with homicide in company of others. The Ruling of the Court Accused Israel assails the manner by which Johnny and Addun identified him. Three years had passed, he said, before they identified him at the trial as one of the robbers. Israel argues that his physical appearance had surely changed through those years, rendering Johnny and Adduns identification of him inaccurate. Israel also pointed out that the RTC and the CA failed to take into account the witnesses "emotional imbalance," caused by the terrible experience they went through, making their testimonies altogether untrustworthy. The Court disagrees. Contrary to the theory of the accused, victims of criminal violence are more likely to observe and remember their appalling experience rather than ignore and forget them.2 Three years are not too long. Such victims are able to recall the faces of and the body movements unique to the men who terrorized them.3 Parenthetically, the robbery in this case took place in broad daylight, the assailants were not wearing masks or hats, and the frightening episode lasted for several minutes. The offenders tried before fleeing to send their victims up the mountain after robbing them. Accused Israel claims that the CA improperly ignored inconsistent testimonies regarding the question of whether or not he wore sunglasses during the robbery. But the fact is that Addun and Johnny categorically identified him as the robber among the three who was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. That one of these witnesses had the impression that Israel wore sunglasses could not diminish the strength of such identification. For his part, all that Israel could claim is that he could not have been involved in the robbery since he was planting rice elsewhere when it happened. But Israels house was just near the Maluyo highway, giving him an easy access to any public transport which could bring him to the Logac junction. He was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.4 Thus, in the absence of any improper motive to incriminate Israel, the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses must prevail over his mere denial and alibi. The RTC and the CA were likewise correct in finding accused Israel guilty only of robbery with homicide, not of robbery on the highway as defined in P.D. 532. Conviction for the latter crime requires proof that several accused organized

themselves for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately, preying upon innocent and defenseless people on the highway.5 Here, the prosecution proved only one act of robbery. WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00328 dated June 4, 2010. G.R. No. 192274 February 8, 2012

NORBERTO LEE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED BANK, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Norberto Lee (Lee)assails the October 26, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 106247, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and affirmed the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders 2 of the public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to 00-1816. In the questioned interlocutory orders, the RTC denied Lees Motion for Document and Handwriting Examination by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and his subsequent motion for the reconsideration of the denial. The Facts Lee was the New Account Service Representative of Managers Check and Gift Check Processor at the Cash Department of Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank). The bank filed a complaint against him alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of responsible bank officers in several managers checks causing damage and prejudice to it. After the requisite preliminary investigation, he was charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents which were committed on separate dates involving separate instruments in eight (8) Informations.3Except for the details, the Informations were uniformly worded as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of May 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [petitioner], being then the New Account Service Representative of Managers Check and Gift Check Processor at Cash Departme nt of complainant Allied Banking Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy and taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit and false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said complainant in the following manner, to wit: the said accused forged and falsified the signatures of Ketty Uy, Tess Chiong, Manuel Fronda, the approving officers of complainant of the Man[a]gers Check No. MC 0000473205 in the amount of P200,500.00 dated May 20, 1999 payable to Noli Baldonado which was issued by complainant-bank in favor of Filway Marketing, Inc., which is a commercial document, by then and there making it appear that the approving officers of complainant-bank had signed and approved the said Managers Check when in truth and in fact said accused knew, that the approving officers had not participated or intervened in the signing of said managers check, thereafter the accused encashed the said Managers Check and represented himself as the payee thereto and received the amount of P 200,500.00 from complainant-bank and then and there misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Allied Banking Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.4 On February 12, 2007, after the trial had started, Lee filed his Motion for Document and Handwriting Examination by the NBI.5 In his motion, he claimed, among others, that: 1. The record of the preliminary investigation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati shows that Document Report No. 065-2000, dated 16 June 2000, prepared by the officials of the Crime Laboratory of the National Headquarters of the Philippine National Police at Camp Came, Quezon City, excluded and failed to examine the questioned and standard signatures of the accused in relation to the questioned and standard documents and signatures of the other signatories of the subject Allied Bank checks, application forms and related documents. xxxx 6. The accused [petitioner] is suspicious of the credibility, neutrality and sincerity of the PNP Crime Laboratory examiners who had submitted the Report because they seemed to have been prevailed upon and influenced by the officers of the Bank to conduct the partial, biased and prejudiced examination without the participation of and said notice to the accused.

7. In the interest of justice and fair play, there is a need for the forensic laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a new, confirmatory and independent document and handwriting signature examination of the questioned and standard documents and signatures of the concerned officers and staff of the Bank and the Filway Marketing Inc., on one hand, and of the accused, on the other, in a manner that is complete, comprehensive, fair, neutral, transparent and credible.6 On August 22, 2007, the RTC, presided by Judge Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr., denied Lees motion, stating that: After due assessment of the assertions of the contending counsels, the Court is disinclined to grant instant motion. First, the trial of the case is already on-going and the accused has the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense evidence. And second, the Court is called upon to conduct its own evaluation of the questioned signature even with the opinion on the matter coming from an NBI expert. For this purpose, the Court may utilize, among others, the provisions of Sections 20 and 22, Rules of Court, on the rules in authentication of private documents [Rule 132]. "It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon [the] courts. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged Documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting (Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio vs. CA, 300 SCRA, December 1998) A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination on the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2004 Ed., p. 428)." Accordingly, defense motion for document and handwriting examination by the NBI is hereby DENIED.7 Undaunted, Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration 8 on September 26, 2007, or two (2) days after the reglementary period of 15 days. For Lees failure to comply with the rules, the RTC, through Presiding Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, denied his motion for reconsideration. In his petition before the CA, Lee raised the sole issue of whether or not the two questioned interlocutory orders should be nullified for having been issued with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in the interest of fair play, justice, due process, and equal protection of the law. Without disputing the late filing of his motion for reconsideration, Lee sought the CAs liberal interpretation of the rules and the need to decide his case on the merits. He insisted that it was legally and physically impossible for him to secure an NBI witness without a compulsory judicial process or order. In the assailed October 26, 2009 decision, the CA dismissed Lees petition and affirmed the RTC orders. It stated that procedural rules are not stringently applied when an imperative exists and a grave injustice may be committed if applied otherwise. Since, however, no such imperative and grave injustice appeared in the case, the RTC clearly did not gravely abuse its discretion on this point. The CA further stated that the RTC did not err in denying petitioners motion for document and handwriting examination by the NBI, as said motion was intended only to dispute the examination of documents and handwritings conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, which was a matter that may be exercised during the presentation of defense evidence. The CA added that Lee could not claim deprivation of his life, liberty and property with the denial of his motion as both Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 115(g) of the Rules of Court guarantee his right to the courts compulsory processes to ensure the attendance of his witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. Lastly, the CA stated that the trial court did not err, much less gravely, when it denied Lees motion for consideration because it was filed out of time. Persistent, Lee interposed this petition for review on certiorari raising the following: ISSUES9 1. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in ignoring the traditional "doctrine of liberality" in the interpretation and application of mechanical rules of procedure. 2. Whether or not the petitioner was legally entitled to a new and credible NBI document and handwriting examination of all the relevant and material documents relative to the allegedly falsified bank documents and checks with his full participation and submissions, as part of his right to constitutional due process and equal protection rights.

3. Did the RTC and CA gravely err in denying the petitioners motion fo r a credible NBI document and handwriting examination? 4. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in concluding that the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders had attained "finality," as if they partook of the legal nature of a "final and executory judgment" or of a "final order." After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the subject motion and that the CA was correct in affirming the denial. The RTC did not err either in turning down Lees motion for reconsideration for being filed two days late. Contrary to the claim of Lee, the RTC and the CA did not "ignore" the traditional "doctrine of liberality" but merely relied upon the guidelines as to when it is applicable and, after being so guided, chose not to apply it under the existing circumstances. It is true that rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and weights reasons. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.10 In this case, however, Lee did not bother to offer any convincing reason for this Court to relax the rules and just plainly sought its liberal interpretation. The Court, in Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc v. Alberto J. Raza,11 stated: To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantive justice.12 Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.13 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/181688.htm - _ftn At any rate, the Court does not perceive any injustice in the denial of Lee s motion. In fact, the RTC wrote that "the accused has the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense evidence." 14 When his time comes to present evidence, Lee can utilize the NBI by availing of the coercive power of the court. The Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey P. Marquez v. Sandiganbayan,15 where the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the motion of the accused therein to cause the NBI to examine the documents already submitted to the court. In said case, the Court wrote:

In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less than the countrys premier investigative force the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court. At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court.1wphi1 It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules. The Marquez ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. In Marquez, the accused had requested for the examination of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests by the NBI from the beginning. Records of the case showed that right upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, while the case was still with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the accused already sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI for examination. At that stage, OSP denied his plea. In the case at bench, the trial had already started and, worse, the accuseds motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period. At any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was without prejudice as the RTC stated that he could utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense evidence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 106247 is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent. DECISION PEREZ, J.: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos." The fallo of the assailed Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3 Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts: On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment. On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97. Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed. Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000. On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City. In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the

appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet. WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4 Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87. In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action. On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition. In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed. In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that: xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court. The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed. xxx Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended. While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9 The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1wphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases. Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling. Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended. In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law. Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC. The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense. We find merit in this petition. Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG. With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads: SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx. SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases. In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed. The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000. As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent. G.R. No. 197371 June 13, 2012

Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2777, 04-2778, and 04-2779.2 The RTC Decision convicted Joel Ancheta y Osan, John Llorando y Rigaryo, and Juan Carlos Gernada y Horcajo of violation of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. We quote the narration of facts of the CA as follows: [Version of the Prosecution] On 10 August 2004, [Police Officer (PO) 1] Honorio Marmonejo, a police officer assigned at the Makati Police Station Anti Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF), received a confidential information regarding the drug pushing activities of a certain alias "Joker" at Llorando Compound, Barangay East Rembo, Makati City. This alias "Joker" was also listed in the said offices watchlist of suspected drug pushers. Thereafter, an anti narcotics operation was planned by the police officers in order to apprehend alias "Joker". A buy-bust team was formed comprising of four policemen and eight [Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)] operatives from Cluster 5. PO1 Marmonejo was designated to act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team served as his back-up. Thereafter, five pieces of P 100-bills were provided and marked for use in the operation. PO1 Voltaire Esguerra likewise coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) by accomplishing the necessary coordination form which was acknowledged and received by the PDEA. At about 5:45 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at Llorando Compound, 25th Street, Barangay East Rembo, Makati City for the conduct of the buy bust operation. As the rest of the team positioned themselves strategically in places where they can monitor the transaction, PO1 Marmonejo as the poseur buyer, accompanied by PO1 Mendoza and the informant, entered a slightly opened gate through an alley way where they met a man who asked them where they were going. The informant replied that they were looking for Joker as they were going to purchase shabu from the latter. The man asked how much they were going to buy, to which the informant answered him that he was to purchase P 500.00-worth of shabu. The man told them to wait for a while and then called for Joker. The same man thereafter told Joker that there were people who were going to buy from him. Joker asked him how much they were going to purchase, and the man replied that they were going to purchase P 500.00-worth of shabu. Joker came out from inside the house, and it was at this instance that PO1 Marmonejo took out the marked money. Joker, in turn, gave him one plastic sachet containing white crystalline powder. The man they met at the alley took the marked money from him and handed it over to Joker. While the transaction was ongoing, the police officers noticed a man, more or less 3 to 4 meters away from them,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN, JOHN LLORANDO y RIGARYO, and JUAN CARLOS GERNADA y HORCAJO,Accused-Appellants. DECISION SERENO, J.: Before the Court is an appeal from the 30 November 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 affirming the 17 September 2008 Decision of the Makati City Regional

washing clothes. After having received the buy bust money, Joker faced the man washing clothes and gave the latter one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance as payment for his laundry service. The transaction having been consummated, PO1 Marmonejo gave the pre-arranged signal of sending a missed call to PO1 Voltaire Esguerra, one of the back-up police officers. PO1 Mendoza, upon receiving the missed call, together with MADAC [operative Juan Siborboro], immediately went inside the house where the entrapment took place and assisted in effecting the arrest of the accused. PO1 Mendoza held alias Joker, who was later on identified as accused-appellant Joel Ancheta, and placed him under arrest. PO1 Marmonejo, on the other hand, arrested the man they met at the alley, who was later identified to be accused-appellant John Llorando. MADAC [operative] Siborboro, for his part, apprehended the man washing clothes, who was later identified as accused-appellant Juan Carlos Gernada. Recovered from the possession of accused-appellant Ancheta after the latters arrest were the marked money and five (5) other plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gernada yielded one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance when requested to empty the contents of his pockets. After informing all of the accused-appellants of their violations and nature of their arrest as well as their constitutional rights, they were subsequently brought to the office of the Makati City Police SAID-SOTF. Consequently, the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were thereafter brought to the crime laboratory for examination and analysis. The results of the laboratory examination revealed that the substance was positive for "methylamphetamine hydrochloride", otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous drug. Version of the Defense On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses the three (3) accusedappellants. In his defense, the accused-appellant Llorando denied the charge against him and claimed that, at 8:30 p.m. on 10 August 2004, he was cooking inside his house at 25th Avenue, East Rembo, Makati City when three (3) men suddenly entered his house and poked a gun at him and frisked him. When he was subsequently arrested by the three men, accused-appellant Llorando tried to struggle, but to no avail. His brother, who was inside the house, tried to intervene, but was not able to do anything.

Meanwhile, a few meters away from his house lived his brother-in-law, accusedappellant Ancheta and the latters adopted son, accused-appellant Gernada. The accused-appellants Ancheta and Gernada testified that on 10 August 2004, while Gernada was at the kitchen doing the dishes and Ancheta was sleeping in his room with his wife, five (5) men barged into their house without warning and arrested them. They were brought to a white vehicle, where they saw the accusedappellant Llorando, who was likewise apparently taken by the same group. All the accused-appellants were subsequently brought by their unknown captors to the latters office at J.P. Rizal, South Avenue, where they were charged afterwards for their alleged illegal drug activities.3 Thus, the following Informations were filed by the prosecutor before the Makati City RTC: Criminal Case No. 04-2777: The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN alias "Joker" and JOHN LLORANDO y RIGARYO alias "John" of the crime of Violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of R.A. 9165, committed as follows: That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point ten (0.10) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug. Criminal Case No. 04-2778: The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN alias "Joker" of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, committed as follows: That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control a total weight of zero point twenty nine (0.29) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

Criminal Case No. 04-2779: The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JUAN CARLOS GERNADA y HORCAJO of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, committed as follows: That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. Criminal Case No. 04-3015: The undersigned Prosecutor [accuses] JOHN LLORANDO y RIGARYO alias "Jake" of the crime of Use of Dangerous Drug under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, committed as follows: That sometime on or before or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drug, and having been arrested and found positive for use of Methamphetamine after a confirmatory test, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methamphetamine, a dangerous drug in violation of the said law. The RTC Ruling In its 17 September 2008 Decision, the Makati City RTC found accused-appellants guilty of violating Article II of R.A. 9165 as follows: (a) Ancheta and Llorando were found guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 500,000; (b) Ancheta and Gernada were found guilty of violating Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of P 300,000; and (c) Llorando was found guilty of violating Section 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) and sentenced to undergo rehabilitation for a period not less than six (6) months at a government drug rehabilitation. According to the RTC, the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the elements necessary to convict a person of the offenses of illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs. It also gave credence to the arresting officers narration of the incident, as they were pres umed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. It then rejected accused-

appellants claims of frame-up. Llorando pled guilty to the charge of violating Section 15 of R.A. 9165. The CA Ruling On 30 November 2010, the CA issued a Decision affirming the reasoning of the RTC in the latters 17 September 2008 judgment. The appellate court also explained that the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the proper procedure for the confiscation and seizure of dangerous drugs embodied in R.A. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecutions case. The CA then ruled that noncompliance with the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would not absolve accused-appellants of the crimes of which they were found guilty and would not render their arrest illegal or the seizure of the items inadmissible. Since accused-appellant Llorando pled guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 9165, he no longer appealed to the CA his conviction for the use of dangerous drugs. Issue Whether or not noncompliance of the arresting officers with the procedure drawn in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would discharge accused-appellants from the crimes of which they were convicted. Discussion Accused-appellants question the CA affirmation of their conviction by arguing 4 that the arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. They claim that the officers failed to conduct the following: (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items; and (3) establish that a representative each from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had been contacted and was present during the marking of the items. Accused-appellants then contend that the prosecution did not prove that noncompliance with procedure was on justifiable grounds. They also aver that the prosecution was unable to establish that the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the affirmation of the CA Decision by asserting5 that the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs were established beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG insists that the positive testimonies of the arresting enforcers carry more weight than the negative assertions of accused-appellants, especially because the officers were presumed to have performed their duties regularly. It then maintains that there is

no indication that the arresting officers were impelled by improper motive when they testified against accused-appellants. On the issue of noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. 9165, the OSG posits 6 that any failure to conform to the procedure therein would not cause the invalidity of the buy-bust operation and the inadmissibility of the confiscated items as evidence. It stresses that the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items is the most important consideration in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It then claims that the marking of the items ensured that the drugs seized from accused-appellants were the same as those presented during trial. In the very recent case People v. Umipang, 7 we explained that the nature of a buybust operation necessitates a stringent application of the procedural safeguards specifically crafted by Congress in R.A. 9165 to counter potential police abuses. We held thus: At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia: A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.) Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards that are applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment .

The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx

Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations: xxx xxx xxx

Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the prosecutions cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the [2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR)] provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz: xxx xxx xxx

We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable

grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved." To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. In People v. Coreche, we explained thus: The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.) Here, the records are bereft of any indication that would show that the prosecution was able to establish the arresting officers compliance with the procedural safeguards under R.A. 9165. Neither do the records contain any physical inventory report or photograph of the confiscated items. None of the arresting officers testified that they had conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the items. Nor did they state that there was even any attempt to contact a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elected public official. Nowhere can it be found that the marking of the items was done in the presence of any of the said third-party representatives. In all these major lapses, no one gave so much as an explanation of why the procedure was not followed, or whether there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. The arresting officers and the prosecution simply did not bother discussing these matters. The OSG does not dispute these assertions and instead counters that noncompliance was not fatal to the prosecutions case. It then argues that the marking of the confiscated items was sufficient to protect the identity of the corpus delicti.

Though we have recognized that "[m]inor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused," 8 we have also declared that "when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence." 9 We then ruled that such doubt "cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties."10Accordingly, "the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused."11 Indeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items that is of utmost importance in determining the admissibility of the evidence presented in court, especially in cases of buy-bust operations. That is why Congress saw fit to fashion a detailed procedure in order to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items would not be compromised. The marking of the seized items was only a piece in a detailed set of procedural safeguards embodied in R.A. 9165. If the arresting officers were unable to comply with the other requirements, they were under obligation to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience. We now raise serious concerns about the drug enforcement operations of the arresting officers. Records reveal that PDEA and the Makati City Police SAID-SOTF had been keeping accused-appellant Ancheta under surveillance. PO1 Marmonejo testified that he was already on the watch list of suspected drug pushers. Ancheta was known to have been regularly selling shabu at the same location in which he was arrested. Accused-appellants were arrested within the family compound of the Llorandos. These particular facts bolster the impression that the buy-bust operation was a forthcoming action in which the arresting officers had ample time to prepare, plan, coordinate, and follow processes. Their inability, then, to follow the legal procedure in Section 21 under the present circumstances raises more questions on the facts surrounding the buy-bust operation. Consequently, the need to observe procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165 becomes even more important. We reiterate that R.A. 9165 has a strict mandate for the arresting officers to comply with the afore-quoted procedural safeguards. We further note that, before the saving clause provided under it can be invoked, Section 21(a) of the IRR requires the prosecution to prove the twin conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds and (b) preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. In this case, the arresting officers neither presented nor explained justifiable

grounds for their failure to (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items; and (3) establish that a representative each from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had been contacted and were present during the marking of the items. These errors were exacerbated by the fact that the officers had ample time to comply with these legal requirements, as they had already monitored and put accused-appellants on their watch list. The totality of these circumstances has led us to conclude that the apprehending officers deliberately disregarded the legal procedure under R.A. 9165. "These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up."12 Accusedappellants would thereby be discharged from the crimes of which they were convicted. The disposition of this case reminds us of our observation in People v. Garcia, in which we took note of the statistics relating to dismissal and acquittal in dangerous drugs cases. There we mentioned that "[u]nder PDEA records, the dismissals and acquittals accounted for 56% because of the failure of the police authorities to observe proper procedure under the law, among others."13 We then noted an international study conducted in 2008, which showed that "out of 13,667 drug cases filed from 2003 to 2007, only 4,790 led to convictions (most of which were cases of simple possession); the charges against the rest were dismissed or the accused were acquitted."14 Our own data15 on the cases filed with us from 2006 to 2011 show that, out of those in which this Court made acquittals and reversals, 85% involved failure of the prosecution to establish the arresting officers compliance with the procedural requirements outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165. It is truly distressing how courts are constrained to make acquittals, dismissals, or reversals because of the inadvertent failure of arresting officers and the prosecution to establish compliance or justify noncompliance with a statutory procedure. It is even more troubling when those cases involve apparently known or long-suspected drug pushers. Congress was clear in its declaration on the eradication of the drug menace plaguing our country. Yet, also firm and stringent is its mandate to observe the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. This is the reason why we have emphasized countless times that courts must remain vigilant in their disposition of cases related to dangerous drugs. Also, we have already called on the police, PDEA, and the prosecution to reinforce and review the conduct of buy-bust operations and the presentation of evidence.16 WHEREFORE, the appealed 30 November 2010 Decision of the CA, which affirmed the 17 September 2008 Decision of the Makati City RTC, is SET ASIDE. Accusedappellants Joel Ancheta y Osan, John Llorando y Rigaryo, and Juan Carlos Gernada y Horcajo are hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2777, 042778, and 04-2779 on the ground of reasonable doubt.1wphi1

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-appellants from custody, unless they are detained for some other lawful cause. G.R. No. 200030 April 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NELSON BAYOT y SATINA, Accused-Appellant. RESOLUTION PEREZ, J.: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against AAA,3 thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information 4 dated 29 December 1997, which reads as follows: That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will. 5 On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal was simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAAs declaration that she was raped by

appellant was corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates the "sweet heart" defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellants claim of being AAAs lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of his dastardly lust. AAAs immediate response of reporting the rape incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued this case. It bears stressing that despite appellants repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood.6 Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.7 In light, however, of this Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution9 dated 4 October 2004. In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other than the self-serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even the testimony of appellants daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given any considerable weight. Aside from the fact that appellants daughter could not point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident when she allegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of bias and partiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the time of the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of fact.10 However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,11 Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants Certificate of Death. 12 Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal13 dated 31

May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution14 dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court. Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine its effect to this present appeal. Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pe ndency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.15 Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied]. Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, 16 which was cited in a catena of cases,17 had laid down the following guidelines: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x e) Quasi-delicts

ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio. G.R. No. 193362 January 18, 2012

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 18 From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19 Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce,20 it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal. Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People v. Bayotas. In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages had become ineffectual. WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 is SET

EDGARDO MEDALLA, Petitioner, vs. RESURRECCION D. LAXA, Respondent. RESOLUTION REYES, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Edgardo Medalla (petitioner) assailing the Decision1 dated May 17, 2010 and Resolution2 dated August 13, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101818. Sometime in April 1998, the petitioner issued to Resurreccion Laxa (respondent) a Far East Bank Check dated May 5, 1998 in the amount of P742,000.00 as payment of the loan which he obtained from the latter. However, when the said check was deposited by the respondent on May 5, 1998, the same was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. Thereupon, the respondent verbally informed the petitioner of the dishonor of the said check and subsequently sent him a demand letter dated May 7, 1998. Nevertheless, the petitioner failed to pay the amount of the said check. For his part, the petitioner admitted to having issued the subject check but averred that it was not meant to be deposited or encashed, but that it was a mere guarantee for the loan he obtained from the respondent. Likewise, the petitioner admitted to having been informed by the respondent of the fact of the dishonor of the subject check. The petitioner further alleged that he had executed a Real Estate Mortgage over his parcel of land in Bulacan in favor of the respondent with the understanding that, should he fail to pay his loan, the latter would foreclose the said mortgage and apply the proceeds thereof to his loan. Reneging on the said agreement, the respondent opted not to foreclose the mortgage and deposit the subject check instead.

Consequently, in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 0058531, the petitioner was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Metro Manila. After due proceedings, the MeTC of Metro Manila, on July 29, 2003, rendered a Decision3 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He was then sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six months and to pay the respondent the amount of P742,000.00, less the amount of partial payments made by the former, and the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed from the said Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The petitioner claimed that he and the respondent had entered into a novation of contract thereby effectively obliterating his liability for the issuance of the said dishonored check. He pointed out that, during the pendency of the case with the MeTC of Metro Manila, he and the respondent entered into a new agreement with respect to the civil aspect of the case pursuant to which, substantial payments were made by him, with only P25,000.00 left unpaid. On November 21, 2005, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision affirming the July 29, 2003 Decision of the MeTC of Metro Manila, albeit with modification. The RTC of Quezon City deleted the penalty of imprisonment for six months and, instead, imposed a fine in the amount of P200,000.00. The RTC of Quezon City opined that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged. As to the petitioners defense of novation, the RTC of Quezon City held that the substantial payments made by the petitioner to the respondent would not affect his criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 since what is punished by the said law is the issuance per se of a worthless check and not the failure to pay his obligation. A Motion for Partial Reconsideration4 was filed by the petitioner but it was denied by the RTC of Quezon City in its Order5 dated November 27, 2007. The petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA reiterating his arguments before the RTC of Quezon City. On May 17, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision6 dismissing the petition for review filed by the petitioner and affirming the November 21, 2005 Decision of the RTC of Quezon City. On the petitioners defense of novation, the CA found the same untenable and asserted that, for novation to prevent criminal liability, it must occur prior to the filing of Information in court. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the May 17, 2010 Decision but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution7 dated August 13, 2010.

Undaunted, the petitioner instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court asserting the following arguments: (1) the prosecution failed to establish the fact of the dishonor of the subject check beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the novation subsequently entered between him and the respondent extinguished his criminal liability. The petition is denied. A perusal of the arguments set forth by the petitioner in support of the instant petition would clearly show that the same only raised questions of fact. The petition failed to show any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from the established doctrine that findings of fact of the CA are conclusive on the Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. The issue on whether the prosecution was able to establish the dishonor of the subject check is factual in nature and, hence, not a proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that when the trial court's factual findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again except when there is a serious ground to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. To reiterate, our task in an appeal via certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA.8lauuphil Anent the petitioners contention that novation had extinguished his criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22, we likewise find the same utterly specious. The petitioner ought to be reminded that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As astutely opined by the CA, novation may only prevent the rise of criminal liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.9 The fact the petitioner had already made substantial payments to the respondent and that only P25,000.00 out of his total obligation in favor of the respondent remains unpaid is immaterial to the extinguishment of the petitioners criminal liability. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. 10 WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173 March 21, 2012

On 20 February 2007, petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the Ombudsman2 and sought his indictment before the Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor: 1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness; 2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner; 3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.3 Failure to present a material witness According to the Complaint, respondent Velasco, who was the trial prosecutor in a criminal case involving the smuggling of jewelry,4 failed to present a material witness in the aforesaid case.5 The witness, a gemmologist of the Bureau of Customs, was to testify on the type of substance making up the pieces of smuggled jewelry.6 According to petitioner, considering the materiality of the gemmologists testimony, which respondent must have known of, since he was the handling trial prosecutor of the case, his failure to offer the said testimony in court shows that he tried to suppress the evidence in favor of the accused in the said case. This act was alleged to be in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 7 which considers as a corrupt practice the acts of public officers that give unwarranted benefits to any private party through either manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their official functions. 8 The gemmologist, however, was eventually presented as a witness after respondent Velasco had filed a Motion to adduce additional evidence in the said case.9 Insistence on the reopening of child abuse cases The second act complained of refers to respondent Velascos filing of two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases filed against petitioner Judge Angeles. Petitioner was previously charged with inflicting physical and psychological abuse on Maria Mercedes Vistan, her 13-year-old grandniece.10 Respondent was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the Complaint for child abuse and later indicted petitioner for 21 counts thereof. 11 However, the DOJ later on reversed

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Ombudsman; HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman; HON. SYLVIA A. SEVERO, Graft Investigator and Prosecution Officer I; HON. MARILOU B. ANCHETAMEJICA, Acting Director, PIAB-D; HON. JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO; All of the Ombudsman; and SSP EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, Respondents. DECISION SERENO, J.:

The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The Court is once again asked to determine whether the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute criminal complaints. This Petition dated 01 September 2009 seeks to set aside the Joint Order 1 dated 21 March 2007 of the Ombudsman (the questioned Joint Order) exonerating respondent Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco or respondent) from the charges filed by petitioner Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (petitioner Judge Angeles or petitioner). The Facts The Complaint filed with the Ombudsman Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).

respondent Velascos recommendation12 upon a Petition for Review filed by respondent. Consequently, the Informations, which had been filed in the meantime, were ordered withdrawn by the trial court.13 Petitioner later filed an administrative Complaint against respondent for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, and manifest bad faith arising from the alleged malicious indictment. According to petitioner, the move of respondent to reopen the child abuse cases was allegedly meant to exact vengeance for petitioners filing of the above mentioned administrative Complaint.14 Meanwhile, the two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases, which were filed by respondent in the DOJ and the Office of the President, were denied for having been filed in the wrong venues. Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that since respondent Velasco was not the trial prosecutor in the said case, his unauthorized act of filing two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases constituted a violation of Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.15 This code considers as unlawful the acts of public officials and employees engaging in the private practice of their profession, unless authorized by the Constitution or by law.16 This single act of moving to reopen the child abuse cases was the only instance of private practice imputed to respondent Velasco. No other act constituting private practice was cited by petitioner. Falsification of Public Document The alleged falsification of public document arose from the same preliminary investigation conducted by respondent in the child abuse cases mentioned above. According to petitioner Judge Angeles, respondent Velasco made it appear that he had conducted a clarificatory hearing on the Complaint for child abuse on 22 June 1999 as shown in the Minutes17 of the said hearing.18 Petitioner alleges that Leonila Vistan, the witness who supposedly attended the hearing, was seriously sick and could not have appeared at the alleged clarificatory hearing.19 Moreover, respondent had, in fact, resolved the cases two days earlier, on 20 June 1999, as shown by the date on the Resolution indicting petitioner. Thus, the latter alleges, the Minutes of the hearing on 22 June 1999 must have been falsified by respondent by making it appear that Leonila Vistan had participated in an inexistent proceeding. This act is in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,20 which criminalizes it as a falsification of a public document.21 The Decision of the Ombudsman In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against respondent Velasco. It found that after evaluation of the facts and evidence

presented by complainant, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication with regard to the charges. On the first charge of suppression of testimonial evidence in connection with the smuggling case, the Ombudsman dismissed the charge on the ground that petitioner had no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance.22 The Ombudsman explained that petitioner was neither one of the parties nor the presiding judge in the said criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest in it. Moreover, granting that the personal interest of petitioner was not in issue, respondent Velasco acted based on his discretion as prosecutor and his appreciation of the evidence in the case, and any lapse in his judgment cannot be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman said that it had no authority to investigate the prosecutors exercise of discretion, unless there was sufficient evidence that the exercise was tainted with malice and bad faith. 23 The Ombudsman likewise dismissed the second charge of private practice of profession on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.24 It pointed out that petitioner should have first elevated her concern to the DOJ, which had primary jurisdiction over respondents actions and conduct as public prosecutor.25 Moreover, the Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in private practice when he filed the two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse cases against petitioner, since he was the investigating prosecutor of the said cases.26 Finally, on the falsification of a public document, which was also dismissed, the Ombudsman said that the issue should have been raised earlier, when petitioner Judge Angeles filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution of respondent Velasco. Moreover, petitioner should have substantiated the allegation of falsification, because the mere presentation of the alleged falsified document did not in itself establish falsification. The Ombudsman also ruled that with the belated filing of the charge and the reversal by the DOJ of respondent Velascos Resolution indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged falsified document is no longer in issue. 27 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 of the questioned Joint Order, which was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of merit.29 Hence, the present Rule 65 Petition. Issue

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco. The Courts Ruling We dismiss the Petition. I Power of the Court over the Ombudsmans Exercise of its Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition. At the outset, we emphasize that certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. Also, it is meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment committed in the exercise of the discretion of a tribunal or an officer. This is especially true in the case of the exercise by the Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated powers. That is why this Court has consistently maintained its well-entrenched policy of non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.30 General Rule of Non-Interference with the Plenary Powers of the Ombudsman The general rule has always been non-interference by the courts in the exercise by the office of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers. In Esquivel v. Ombudsman,31 we explainedthus: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the

functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,32 we further clarified the plenary powers of the Ombudsman. We emphasized that if the latter, using professional judgment, finds a case dismissible, the Court shall respect that finding, unless the exercise of such discretionary power was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto33 explained the rationale for the plenary powers of the Ombudsman, which is virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Its plenary powers were constitutionally designed to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Accordingly, the Court has consistently respected and recognized, as we do now in this case, the independence and competence of the Ombudsman, as it acts as "the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service." The Discretionary Nature of Preliminary Investigation The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure),34 specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:

Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall

recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto35 and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman36 and Karaan v. Office of the Ombudsman37 that should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may

recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. 38 We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco. II No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Ombudsmans Evaluation of Evidence This Court acknowledges exceptional cases calling for a review of the Ombudsmans action when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.39 The determination of grave abuse of discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of its powers is precisely the province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. However, we highlight the exceptional nature of that determination. In this Petition, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Courts exceptional divergence from the general rule. Notably, the burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has failed to discharge this burden. She merely states why she does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman, instead of demonstrating and proving grave abuse of discretion. In her arguments, petitioner would also have us pass upon the factual findings of the Ombudsman. That we cannot do, for this Court is not a trier of facts.

Even if we were to extend liberally the exception to the general rule against the review of the findings of the Ombudsman, an examination of the records would show that no grave abuse of discretion was demonstrated to warrant a reversal of the Joint Order dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco. A. On the first charge of suppression of evidence On the charge of suppression of evidence arising from the failure of respondent Velasco to present the testimony of a material witness, the Ombudsman found and we defer to its findings that he acted based on his discretion as prosecutor and on his appreciation of the evidence in the case, and any lapse in his judgment cannot be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the failure of respondent to present the witness was tainted with malice; or that the failure of respondent to do so gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the formers official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Moreover, in G.R. No. 187596,40 a case involving the same incidents and parties as the present Petition, this Court affirmed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA). We take judicial notice of the CAs factual finding that the charge of suppression of evidence by respondent in the smuggling case was dispelled by the Chief State Prosecutor himself in a Certification dated 17 October 2002. 41 The Certification vouching for the integrity and competence of respondent in his handling of the smuggling case states: This is to certify that I had never called the attention nor even had castigated State Prosecutor EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO with regard to the way he handled the case of People of the Philippines versus Lintag, et al. (Pasay Regional Trial Court, Criminal Case Number 99-0129, for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines) specifically with regard to the aspect of the presentation of one of the prosecutions witnesses, a gemologist (sic). In fact, SP Velasco successfully prosecuted said case.42 Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans dismissal of the first charge. However, we need to clarify that we cannot subscribe to the other reason for the Ombudsmans dismissal of the charge pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act. The provision allows the Ombudsman to decide not to conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of, if it believes that the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance. It is clear that, in relation to Section 19, Section 20 of the

Ombudsman Act applies only to administrative cases. As for Section 19, its subject heading is "Administrative Complaints." It lists acts or omissions that may be the subject of a complaint on which the Ombudsman shall act. On the other hand, the subject heading of Section 20 is "Exceptions." It lists the exceptional situations in which the Ombudsman has the option not to investigate an administrative complaint even when its subject is an act or omission listed in Section 19. That both Sections 19 and 20 of the Ombudsman Act apply only to administrative complaints is made even clearer in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. Their counterpart provisions appear in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure under Rule III which outlines the procedure for administrative cases.43 Clearly, then, paragraph 4, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act applies only to administrative complaints. It should not have been used by the Ombudsman as a ground to dismiss the first charge, since the Complaint filed by petitioner before the Ombudsman was criminal in nature. The criminal nature of petitioners Complaint is clear from its prayer seeking the indictment of respondent before the Ombudsman. 44This lapse notwithstanding, we do not find any arbitrariness or whim in the manner that the Ombudsman disposed of the charge. If there was any abuse of discretion at all, it was not grave. B. On the second charge of private practice The Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in private practice when he filed two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse cases against petitioner on the ground that respondent was acting in his capacity as the investigating prosecutor of the said cases. Again, this Court takes judicial notice of the CAs finding in G.R. No. 187596, adverted to earlier, that respondents isolated act of filing a pleading did not necessarily constitute private practice of law.45 We have, in fact, said so in Maderada v. Mediodea,46 citing People v. Villanueva:47 Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: "Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x." Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination can the act of respondent Velasco be considered private practice, since he was not customarily or habitually holding himself out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for those services. The appellate court also noted that, on the contrary, he filed the motion in good faith and in the honest belief that he was performing his duty as a public servant. 48

Thus, the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the second charge against respondent Velasco. However, we again need to point out that we do not share the Ombudsmans finding that the charge is dismissible on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to paragraph 1, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act. As already explained earlier, the said provision applies only to administrative cases, while the Complaint before the Ombudsman was not administrative, but criminal, in nature. Still, we do not find any abuse of discretion when the Ombudsman proffered this ground for dismissing the second charge. C. On the third charge of falsification of public document Finally, the Ombudsman correctly found that the charge of falsification had not been substantiated, and that the mere presentation of the alleged manufactured document alone would not in itself establish falsification. To recall, petitioner Angeles claimed that Leonila Vistan could not have appeared before respondent Velasco because she was sick, but offered no supporting evidence. Also, it does not follow that a clarificatory hearing could not have been conducted, just because respondent Velasco had prepared a Resolution on 20 June 1999, two days before that hearing. Moreover, as found by the CA in G.R. No. 187596 adverted to earlier, a clarificatory hearing was in fact conducted.1wphi1 The appellate court found that the declarations of petitioner could not prevail over the positive assertion of Percival Abril and Jesusa Hernandez, who testified that they had seen Leonila Vistan before Velasco at the clarificatory hearing on 22 June 1999. 49 However, the Court differs with the Ombudsman on the latters pronouncement that the issue of falsification of public document should have been raised by petitioner earlier, when she filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution of respondent Velasco; and that, consequently, the charge of falsification of a public document was no longer in issue because of its belated filing. We draw attention to the fact that the Petition for Review of respondents Resolution indicting petitioner Judge Angeles was under an entirely different proceeding. The purpose of the Petition was to reverse the aforesaid Resolution, and not to exact criminal liability on respondent for the crime of falsification of a public document, as in the Complaint before the Ombudsman. Thus, it cannot be said that the issue of falsification of a public document in the criminal Complaint was raised belatedly, because the Complaint was not a continuation of the previous Petition for Review of respondents Resolution. The two proceedings were completely independent of each other. This lapse, however, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

In sum, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from its long-standing policy of non-interference in the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers which, as we have emphasized, are plenary. Although the Court diverges from some of the conclusions reached by the Ombudsman, we find that its dismissal of the charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at after a rational deliberation. Such deliberation was shown by its reasoned disposition of the case in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated discretionary powers. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries of its plenary powers and acted within the permissible limits. We do not find any arbitrariness or abuse that was so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its discretion as would warrant this Courts reversal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, we uphold the findings of the Ombudsman. Final Note Finally, the Court notes with strong disapproval both parties resort to abuse of the judicial processes of this Court. This is the third case we know of that the parties have filed against each other, and that has reached the Supreme Court. 50 This fact is especially regrettable, considering that petitioner as judge and respondent as prosecutor should have been well-cognizant of our clogged court dockets and should have thus exercised more restraint in filing cases against each other. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from filing multiple actions arising from the same cause and from misusing court process.51 Judging from the number of cases and the vengeful tone of the charges that the parties have hurled against each other in their pleadings, they seem more bent on settling what has become a personal score between them, rather than on achieving the ends of justice.52 The parties are warned against trifling with court process. This case shall, hopefully, serve as a reminder of their ethical and professional duties and put an immediate end to their recriminations. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari filed by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman in Case Nos. OMB-CC-07-0103-C and OMB-C-A-O7-0117-C dated 21 March 2007 and 30 June 2008, respectively. G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT C. DULAY,* Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) assailing the decision dated March 22, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan1 in Criminal Case Nos. 20345 and 20346 which granted the demurrers to evidence filed by Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez (respondents) and Rafael Zagala. The Facts The petition stemmed from two criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging the respondents with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges arose from the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS Kabisig Program. In Criminal Case No. 20345, respondents, together with Gilbert C. Dulay, were charged with malversation of public funds, committed as follows: That on or about April 6, 1984 or sometime and/or [subsequent] thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such, accountable officers, Imelda R. Marcos being then the Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy Minister of Human Settlements and Gilbert C. Dulay being then [the] Assistant Manager for Finance, Ministry of Human Settlements, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous transactions, abstract the total amount of P57.954 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency from the funds of the Ministry of Human Settlements in the following manner: accused Conrado Benitez approved the series of cash advances made and received by Gilbert C. Dulay, and made it appear that the funds were transferred to the University of Life, a private foundation represented likewise by Gilbert C. Dulay when in truth and in fact no such funds were transferred while Imelda R. Marcos concurred in the series of such cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez

and received by Gilbert C. Dulay and in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash advances and withdrawals, Imelda R. Marcos requested that the funds of the KSS Program be treated as "Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as "Classified Information"; and that the above-named accused, once in possession of the said aggregate amount of P57.954 Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]2 In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents together with Zagala were charged with malversation of public funds under these allegations: That on or about April 6 to April 16, 19843 and/or sometime or subsequent thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such, accountable officers, Imelda R. Marcos being then the Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy Minister of Human Settlements[,] and Rafael Zagala being then [the] Assistant Manager for Regional Operations and at the same time Presidential Action Officer, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith[,] did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous transactions, abstract from the funds of the Ministry of Human Settlements the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency, in the following manner: Jose Conrado Benitez approved the cash advances made by Rafael Zagala and Imelda R. Marcos concurred in the series of cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez in favor of Rafael G. Zagala; and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Imelda R. Marcos in order to camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash advances, requested that funds of the KSS Program be treated as "Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as "Classified Information"; and the above-named accused, once in possession of the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]4 Only the respondents and Zagala were arraigned for the above charges to which they pleaded not guilty; Dulay was not arraigned and remains at large. On March 15, 2000, Zagala died, leaving the respondents to answer the charges in the criminal cases.

After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecutions chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the subject funds.5 The gist of COA Auditor Cortez direct testimony was summarized by the Sandiganbaya, as follows: In Criminal Case No. 20345 [s]he was appointed on March 31, 1986 by then COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. to head a team of COA auditors. Upon examination of the documents, she declared that an amount of P100 Million Pesos (sic) from the Office of Budget and Management was released for the KSS Project of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) by virtue of an Advice of Allotment for Calendar Year 1984. Also, an amount of P42.4 Million Pesos (sic) was separately disbursed for the Kabisig Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements. With regard to the amount ofP100 Million Pesos (sic) received by the MHS, P60 Million Pesos (sic) [was] disbursed through cash advances. Of the P60 Million Pesos (sic) in cash advances, accused Zagala received P40 Million Pesos (sic) in four (4) disbursements while accused Dulay received the remaining P20 Million Pesos (sic) in two disbursements. With respect to accused Rafael Zagala, the cash advances consist of four (4) disbursement vouchers in the amount of P5 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic) and P15 Million Pesos (sic). All of these vouchers are in the name of accused Zagala as claimant and accused Benitez as approving officer and are accompanied by their corresponding Treasury Warrants that were countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Dulay. In contrast, x x x a disbursement voucher in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) was drawn in favor of accused Gilbert Dulay and approved by accused Benitez. Pursuant to this, a Treasury Warrant was issued to the order of accused Dulay, countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Zagala. Another voucher was drawn in favor of accused Dulay in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) and approved by accused Benitez. Again, a Treasury Warrant was issued to the order of accused Dulay in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic), which was countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Zagala. x x x [A]ccused Marcos sent a letter to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos requesting that the fund intended for the KSS Project in the amount of P100 Million Pesos (sic) be deemed as "Confidential Fund".

x x x [T]he liquidation of accused Zagalas account, which was contained in a Journal Voucher dated November 27, 1984, was without any supporting documents. Upon this discovery, witness requested and secured a certification from the Manager of the National Government Audit Office to the effect that the COA did not receive any document coming from the MHS. However, this liquidation voucher which contained figures in the total amount ofP50 Million Pesos (sic), comprised the entire cash advances of accused Zagala in the amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic) and the P10 Million Pesos (sic) cash advance made by accused Dulay. Since the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) was already contained in Zagalas Journal Voucher, the witness and her team of auditors tried to locate the remaining P10 Million Pesos (sic) and found out that accused Dulay had liquidated the same amount. 6(footnotes omitted) According to COA Auditor Cortez, Zagalas cash advances were supported by a liquidation report and supporting documents submitted to the resident auditor even before the P100 Million Kilusang Sariling Sikap (KSS) fund was made confidential.7 The witness also testified that the COA resident auditor found no irregularity in this liquidation report.8 COA Auditor Cortez stated that since the P100 Million KSS fund was classified as confidential, the liquidation report should have been submitted to the COA Chairman who should have then issued a credit memo. No credit memo was ever found during the audit examination of the MHS accounts.9 COA Auditor Cortez admitted that she did not verify whether the supporting documents of Zagalas cash advances were sent to the COA Chairman.10 Respondent Marcos was prosecuted because of her participation as Minister of the MHS, in requesting that theP100 Million KSS fund be declared confidential. Respondent Benitez was prosecuted because he was the approving officer in these disputed transactions. In Criminal Case No. 20346 Regarding the Kabisig Program of the MHS, the COA team of auditors examined the vouchers of the MHS, which upon inspection revealed that there were at least three (3) memoranda of agreements entered into between the MHS and University of Life (UL). With reference to the first Memorandum of Agreement dated July 2, 1985, an amount of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) was transferred by the MHS to the UL to pay for the operations of the Community Mobilization Program and the Kabisig Program of the MHS. Accused Benitez as the Deputy Minister of the MHS and accused Dulay as Vice President of the UL were the signatories of this agreement. Although there is no disbursement voucher in the records, it is admitted that a Treasury Warrant was drawn in the sum of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic). The second Memorandum of

Agreement dated July 10, 1985 provided for a fund transfer in the amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) for the Human Resources Development Plan of the MHS. Accordingly, a Disbursement Voucher certified by accused Dulay and approved by accused Benitez was drawn in the sum of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic). The third Memorandum of Agreement in the sum of P17 Million Pesos (sic) was granted for the acquisition of motor vehicles and other equipment to support the Kabisig Program of the MHS. For that reason, a Disbursement Voucher pertaining thereto accompanied by a Treasury Warrant was drafted. Similarly, the witness declared that although they did not examine any of the records of the UL, the abovementioned sums were not received by the UL based on the affidavit of the UL Comptroller named Pablo Cueto. In the same way, an affidavit was executed by the UL Chief Accountant named Ernesto Jiao attesting that there is no financial transaction on record covering the purchase of motor vehicles. Again, witness Cortez admitted that they did not examine the books of the UL on this matter but only inquired about it from Mr. Jiao. The affidavit of Mr. Jiao with respect to the nonexistence of the purchases of motor vehicles was further corroborated by the affidavit of one Romeo Sison, who was the Administrative Assistant of the Property Section of the UL. The respective treasury warrants representing the various sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic), P17 Million Pesos (sic) and P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) were subsequently deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Shaw Blvd. Branch, Mandaluyong, under various accounts. Soon after, several checks were drawn out of these funds as evidenced by the Photostat copies recovered by the COA auditors. In the course of the testimony of the witness, she revealed that her team of auditors classified said several checks into different groups in accordance with the account numbers of the said deposits. x x x [T]he amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic), the same was intended for the Human Resource Development Plan of the UL. x x x [T]he aforesaid amount is not a cash advance but rather paid as an expense account, which is charged directly as if services have already been rendered. Hence, UL is not mandated to render liquidation for the disbursement of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic). The sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) and P17 Million Pesos (sic) were deposited under x x x the name of the UL Special Account. Out of these deposits, the following first sequence of withdrawals of checks11 payable either to its order or to cash x x x reached a total sum of P5,690,750.93 Million Pesos (sic). The second list of checks12 [which] consists of numerous [Managers] Checks x x x reached the amount ofP18,416,062.15.

A third set of checks allegedly consists of nine (9) ordinary checks and two (2) managers checks in the sum ofP1,971,568.00 and P4,566,712.18[,] respectively. x xx Moreover, [a] witness confirmed that as regards the amount of P17 Million Pesos (sic) intended for the acquisition of motor vehicles, P10.4 Million Pesos (sic) was spent for the purchase of some five hundred (500) units of motorcycles while P2.1 Million Pesos (sic) was used to procure eight (8) brand new cars. The balance of P4.5 Million Pesos (sic) was later refunded to the MHS. As regards the five hundred (500) units of motorcycle, the Presidential Task Force furnished the witness documents attesting to the transfers of some two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycles from the UL to the MHS by virtue of Deed of Assignments allegedly executed on February 17, 1986. However, of the two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycle, only one hundred ninety (190) units were covered with complete documents. With respect to the eight (8) brand new cars, the team of auditors did not see any registration papers. (footnotes omitted; underscorings ours)13 COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task Force.14 She emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles were registered in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS. 15 After COA Auditor Cortez testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and rested its case. Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28, 1998; on January 27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence. 16 The Sandiganbayans Ruling The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002. The dispositive portion of this decision reads: Wherefore, the Demurrers to Evidence are hereby granted. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay are hereby acquitted of the crime of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20435 for insufficiency of evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado

Benitez and Rafael G. Zagala are likewise acquitted of the offense of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20346 for insufficiency of evidence in proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.17 In dismissing these criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report. 18 The Issues The issues for our consideration are: 1. Whether the prosecutors actions and/or omissions in these cases effectively deprived the State of its right to due process; and 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the demurrers to evidence of the respondents. The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the States interest in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case of Merciales v. Court of Appeals19 where the Court nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor. The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the States interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds involved and the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence. The Courts Ruling We do not find the petition meritorious. We are called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the respondents brought about by the dismissal, for insufficiency of evidence, of the malversation charged in the two criminal cases. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.20 Notably, the proscription

against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;21 and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process rights.22 A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal.23 Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.24 Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.25 Mere allegations of grave abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient.26 On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right to a writ of certiorari.27 In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special prosecutors conduct. The special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the States due process rights. There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment.28 An act is done without jurisdiction if the public respondent does not have the legal power to act or where the respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its authority as determined by law, 29 or acts outside the contemplation of law. For the grant of the present petition, the petitioner must prove, based on the existing records, action in the above manner by the Sandiganbayan. I. States right to due process In People v. Leviste,30 we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest.31 The States right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor properly

undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the guilty.32 The prosecutors role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is disposed to do.33 The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the courts mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. 34 In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness.35 The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals36 where we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial courts failure to require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the States right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court. Merciales was followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 37 where we recognized the violation of the States right to due process in criminal proceedings because of sufficient showing that the special prosecutor haphazardly handled the prosecution. In upholding the prosecutions right to present additional evidence under the circumstances, Valencia took into account the fact that the former special prosecutor rested his case solely on the basis of a Joint Stipulation of Facts that was not even signed by the accused. These two cases, to our mind, not only show the existing factual considerations38 that led to the conclusion that the public prosecutor willfully and deliberately failed to perform his mandated duty to represent the States interest, but stress as well that there must be sufficient facts on record supporting this

conclusion. In the absence of these supporting facts, no conclusion similar to the Merciales and Valencia outcomes can be reached. The requirement for supporting factual premises finds complement in the general rule founded on public policy39that the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client. While this rule admits of exceptions40 (as when the gross negligence of a counsel resulted in depriving the client of due process), the application of the exception likewise depends on a showing of facts on record demonstrating a clear violation of the clients due process rights. II. The factual premises cited in the petition and the issue of due process In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be secured. For purposes of clarity, we shall address the instances cited in the petition as alleged proof of the denial of the State s due process rights, and our reasons in finding them inadequate. First. The petitioner bewails the alleged lack of efforts by the special prosecutor to ascertain the last known addresses and whereabouts, and to compel the attendance of Pablo C. Cueto, Ernesto M. Jiao and Romeo F. Sison, UL officers who executed affidavits in connection with the alleged anomalous fund transfers from MHS to UL. The special prosecutor likewise allegedly did not present the records of the UL to show that the sums under the Memoranda of Agreement were not received by UL (based on the affidavit of UL Comptroller Cueto) and that no financial transactions really took place for the purchase of the motor vehicles (based on the affidavit of UL Chief Accountant Jiao, as corroborated by the affidavit of UL Administrative Assistant Sison). We note that, other than making a claim that these instances demonstrate the serious nonfeasance by the special prosecutor, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation showing how these instances deprived the State of due process. An examination of the records shows that the affidavits of Cueto,41 Jiao and Sison surfaced early on to prove the alleged anomalous fund transfers from MHS to UL. The records further show that during the hearing of December 5, 1995 - when the special prosecutor was asked by the presiding judge what she intended to do with these affidavits the special prosecutor replied that she planned to present Jiao and Cueto who were the chief accountant and the designated comptroller, respectively, of UL.42 The same records, however, show that, indeed, an attempt had been made to bring these prospective witnesses to court; as early as April 20, 1994, subpoenas had been issued to these three individuals and these were all

returned unserved because the subjects had RESIGNED from the service sometime in 1992, and their present whereabouts were unknown.43 We consider at this point that these individuals executed their respective affidavits on the alleged anomalous transactions between MHS and UL sometime in 1986; from that period on, and until the actual criminal prosecution started in 1994, a considerable time had elapsed bringing undesirable changes one of which was the disappearance of these prospective witnesses. Significantly, no evidence exists or has been submitted showing that the special prosecutor willfully and deliberately opted not to present these individuals. The petitioner also failed to show that the whereabouts of these individuals could have been located by the exercise of reasonable diligence in order to prove that the special prosecutor had been remiss in performing her duties. We can in fact deduce from the allegations in the petition that even at present, the petitioner has not and cannot ascertain the whereabouts of these prospective witnesses. Further, the records show that the affidavits of these individuals (who denied the transfer of the funds in the amounts of P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million from MHS to UL) were refuted by contrary evidence of the prosecution itself. The records indicate that the special prosecutor presented treasury warrants and disbursement vouchers issued in the name of UL, bearing the respective amounts for transactions between MHS and UL.44 The special prosecutor admitted that the audit team failed to examine the records of UL to support the prosecutions allegation of an anom alous fund transfer. COA Auditor Cortez admitted, too, that the amounts (P21.6 Million and P3.8 Million) were transferred45 to UL46 and that a portion of the amount of P17 Million, i.e.,P12.5 Million, was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight cars, while the remaining amount of P4.5 Million was refunded by UL to MHS.47 Under these facts, and in the absence of indicators too that other persons could have testified, we cannot give weight to the petitioners allegation that no efforts were exerted by the special prosecutor. On the contrary, we find under the circumstances that the special prosecutor exerted reasonable efforts to present these individuals in court, but failed to do so for reasons beyond her control. One of these reasons appears to be the simple lack of concrete evidence of irregularities in the respondents handling of the MHS funds. Second. The petitioner alleged that the special prosecutor failed to present the resident auditor to testify on the physical inventory of the vehicles, or to produce documents showing that an inspection was conducted on the vehicles.

The prosecutions theory, as the records would show, was to prove that there had been misappropriation of funds since the motor vehicles were registered in ULs name instead of the MHS.48 In this regard, the special prosecutor presented COA Auditor Cortez who testified that the audit team did not assail the existence of the motor vehicles and she also did not dispute that the amount of P12.5 Million (out of P17 Million) was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight cars. The witness stated that the audit team was more concerned with the documentation of the disbursements made rather than the physical liquidation (inventory) of the funds.49 The witness further explained that it was the Presidential Task Force which had the duty to keep track of the existence of the motor vehicles. 50 She reiterated that the audit team was only questioning the registration of the vehicles; it never doubted that the vehicles were purchased.51 More importantly, COA Auditor Cortez stated that at the time the team made the audit examination in April 1986, 500 registration papers supported the purchase of these motorcycles;52 none of the audit team at that time found this documentation inadequate or anomalous.53 The witness also stated that the Presidential Task Force gave the audit team a folder showing that P10.4 Million was used to purchase the motorcycles and P2.1 Million was used to purchase the cars.54 Checks were presented indicating the dates when the purchase of some of the motor vehicles was made.55 COA Auditor Cortez also testified that 270 of these motorcycles had already been transferred by UL in the name of MHS. 56 She stated that all the documents are in order except for the registration of the motor vehicles in the name of UL.57 Given these admissions regarding the existence of the motor vehicles, the presentation of the resident auditor who would simply testify on the physical inventory of the motor vehicles, or that an inspection had been conducted thereon, was unnecessary. Her presentation in court would not materially reinforce the prosecutions case; thus, the omission to present her did not deprive the State of due process. To repeat, the prosecutions theory of misappropriation was not based on the fact that the funds were not used to purchase motor vehicles, in which case, the testimony of the resident auditor would have had material implications. Rather, the prosecutions theory, as established by the records, shows that the imputed misappropriation stemmed from the registration of the motor vehicles in ULs name an administrative lapse in light of the relationship of UL to MHS simply as an implementing agency.58 Third. Despite the Sandiganbayans warning on June 7, 1996 that the vario us checks covering the cash advances for P40 Million were "photostatic" copies, the special prosecutor still failed to present the certified copies from the legal custodian of these commercial documents.

The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for failing to present the original copies of the checks drawn out of theP21.6 Million and P17 Million combination account from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), as well as theP3.8 Million expense account with the same bank. The presentation would have allegedly proven the misappropriation of these amounts.59 Records show that instead of presenting the original copies of these checks, the special prosecutor tried to establish, through the testimony of COA Auditor Cortez, that these checks were photocopied from the original checks in the possession of UCPB, which were obtained through the assistance of the UL management.60 Thus, while the originals of these checks were not presented, COA Auditor Cortez testified that the photostatic copies were furnished by the UCPB which had custody of the original checks.61 Further, the witness also testified that at the time she made the examination of these documents, the entries thereon were legible.62 She also presented a summary schedule of the various micro film prints of the UCPB checks that she examined.63 At any rate, we observe that the defense never objected 64 to the submission of the photostatic copies of the UCPB checks as evidence, thus making the production of the originals dispensable. This was our view in Estrada v. Hon. Desierto65 where we ruled that the production of the original may be dispensed with if the opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose would be served by requiring its production. In such case, we ruled that secondary evidence of the content of the writing would be received in evidence if no objection was made to its reception.66 We note, too, that in addition to the defenses failure to object to the presentation of photostatic copies of the checks, the petitioner failed to show that the presentation of the originals would serve a useful purpose, pursuant to our ruling in Estrada. We reiterate in this regard our earlier observation that other than enumerating instances in the petition where the State was allegedly deprived of due process in the principal case, no explanation was ever offered by the petitioner on how each instance resulted in the deprivation of the States right to due process warranting the annulment of the presently assailed Sandiganbayan ruling. Fourth. The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for making no effort to produce the "final audit report" dated June 6, 1986, referred to in the last paragraph of the Affidavit67 dated June 10, 1987 of COA Auditor Cortez. The records show that although this final audit report dated June 6, 1986 was not presented in court, the prosecution questioned her on the contents of this audit report since she had a hand in its preparation. COA Auditor Cortez directly testified on the audit teams findings and examination, which took three hearings to

complete; the cross-examination of COA Auditor Cortez took two hearings to complete; and subsequently, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a clarificatory hearing be held with respect to COA Auditor Cortez testimony. In addition to her testimony, the special prosecutor did present, too, other pieces of documentary evidence (from which the final audit report was based) before the Sandiganbayan. Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to consider the special prosecutors omission as significant in the petitioners allegation of serious nonfeasance or misfeasance. Fifth. The petitioner presents the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrer to evidence as its last point and as basis for the applicability of the Merciales ruling. The failure to oppose per se cannot be a ground for grave abuse of discretion. The real issue, to our mind, is whether the special prosecutor had basis to act as she did. As the point-by-point presentation above shows, the dismissal of the criminal cases cannot be attributed to any grossly negligent handling by the special prosecutor. To begin with, the prosecutions case suffered from lack of witnesses because, among others, of the time that elapsed between the act charged and the start of the actual prosecution in 1994; and from lack of sufficient preparatory investigation conducted, resulting in insufficiency of its evidence as a whole. In sum, in the absence of circumstances approximating the facts of Merciales and Valencia, which circumstances the petitioner failed to show, no basis exists to conclude that the special prosecutor grossly erred in failing to oppose the demurrer to evidence. Neither are we persuaded by the petitioners position that the special prosecutors Manifestation of non-opposition to the demurrer needed to be submitted to, and approved by, her superiors.68 The petitioners argument assumes that the special prosecutor lacked the necessary authority from her superiors when she filed her non-opposition to the demurrers to evidence. This starting assumption, in our view, is incorrect. The correct premise and presumption, since the special prosecutor is a State delegate, is that she had all incidental and necessary powers to prosecute the case in the States behalf so that her actions as a State delegate bound the State. We do not believe that the State can have an unbridled discretion to disown the acts of its delegates at will unless it can clearly establish that its agent had been grossly negligent69 or was guilty of collusion with the accused or other interested party,70 resulting in the States deprivation of its due process rights as clientprincipal. Gross negligence exists where there is want, or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It involves a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 71 As the

above discussions show, the State failed to clearly establish the gross negligence on the part of the special prosecutor (or to show or even allege that there was collusion in the principal case between the special prosecutor and the respondents) that resulted in depriving the petitioner of its due process rights; and, consequently prevent the application of the rule on double jeopardy. If at all, what the records emphasized, as previously discussed, is the weakness of the prosecutions evidence as a whole rather than the gross negligence of the special prosecutor. In these lights, we must reject the petitioners position. III. Grave abuse of discretion Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no obligation to require the parties to present additional evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as the constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily stands in favor of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not result in the impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the right of the State and of the offended party to due process of law. 72 A discussion of the violation of the States right to due process in the present case, however, is intimately linked with the gross negligence or the fraudulent action of the States agent. The absence of this circumstance in the present case cannot but have a negative impact on how the petitioner would want the Court to view the Sandiganbayans actuation and exercise of discretion. The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for good reasons and in the paramount interest of justice.73 As mentioned, the court may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the evidence previously offered.74 In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at that point. We note that under the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what and how additional available evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of justice sought to be achieved. It does not appear that pieces of evidence had been omitted

through inadvertence or mistake, or that these pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence previously offered. More importantly, it does not appear that these contemplated additional pieces of evidence (which the special prosecutor allegedly should have presented) were ever present and available. For instance, at no point in the records did the petitioner unequivocally state that it could present the three UL officers, Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate its possession of or access to these documents (such as the final audit report) to support the prosecutions charges the proof that the State had been deprived of due process due to the special prosecutors alleged inaction. IIIa. Grave abuse of discretion and the demurrers to evidence In Criminal Case No. 20345 that charged conspiracy for abstracting P57.59 Million out of the P100 Million KSS fund, the prosecutions evidence showed that P60 Million of this fund was disbursed by respondent Benitez, as approving officer, in the nature of cash advances to Zagala (who received a total amount of P40 Million) and Dulay (who received P20 Million). To prove the misappropriation, the prosecution tried to establish that there was an irregularity in the procedure of liquidating these amounts on the basis of COA Auditor Cortez testimony that the liquidation should have been made before the COA Chairman (not to the resident auditor of the MHS) because these funds were confidential.75 Quite evident from the prosecutions position is that it did not dispute whether a liquidation had been made of the whole amount of P60 Million; rather, what it disputed was the identity of the person before whom the liquidation should have been made. Before the directive of former President Marcos was made which declared the KSS funds (of which the P60 Million formed part) to be confidential, the liquidation of this amount must be made before the resident auditor of the MHS. With the issuance of the directive, liquidation should have been made to the COA Chairman who should have then issued a credit memo to prove proper liquidation. 76 To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has to prove that the accused received public funds or property that they could not account for, or was not in their possession and which they could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of such public funds or property.77 The prosecution failed in this task as the subject funds were liquidated and were not shown to have been converted for personal use by the respondents. The records reveal that the amounts of P50 Million and P10 Million were liquidated by Zagala and Dulay, respectively.78 On Zagalas part, the liquidation of P50 Million (P10 Million of which was the cash advance given to Dulay) was made to resident

auditor Flerida V. Creencia on September 25, 1984 or before the directive of former President Marcos (declaring the said funds confidential) was issued on November 7, 1984.79 Hence, at the time the liquidation of the amount was made, the liquidation report submitted to the resident auditor was the proper procedure of liquidation. Respondent Benitez, for his part, submitted Journal Voucher No. 4350208 dated November 27, 1984 stating, among others, that as early as June 22, 1984, the supporting papers for the liquidation of the P50 Million had already been submitted to the COA.80 Moreover, even if the liquidation should have been made in compliance with the former Presidents directive, the prosecutions evidence did not sufficiently establish the non-existence of a credit memo. As admitted by COA Auditor Cortez, certain documents they were looking for during the audit examination (including the credit memo) could no longer be located after the (EDSA) revolution.81 She further declared that she did not know if COA Chairman Alfredo Tantingco complied with the required audit examination of the liquidated P60 Million.82 In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents are sought to be held liable under the criminal information for convertingP40 Million (subdivided to P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million or a total of P42.4 Million) to their own use given that these funds were never allegedly transferred to UL, the intended beneficiary. Records show that the disputed amount allegedly malversed was actually P37,757,364.57 Million because of evidence that an amount of P4.5 Million was returned by respondent Benitez.83 As previously mentioned, the documentary evidence adduced reveals the existence of treasury warrants and disbursement vouchers issued in the name of UL bearing the amounts of P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million.84 Documentary evidence also exists showing that these amounts were deposited in the UCPB and drawn afterwards by means of checks issued for purchases intended for the Kabisig Program of the MHS. Except for the appropriated P17 Million, the petitioners evidence does not sufficiently show how the amounts ofP21.6 Million and P3.8 Million were converted to the personal use by the respondents. The testimony of COA Auditor Cortez revealed that documents showing the disbursements of the subject funds were in possession of one Flordeliz Gomez as the Records Custodian and Secretary of UL. For undisclosed reasons, however, COA Auditor Cortez failed to communicate with Gomez but merely relied on the documents and checks, which the audit team already had in its possession.85 This omission, in our view, raises doubts on the completeness and accuracy of the audit examination pertaining to the P21.6 Million and P3.8 Million funds. Such doubt was further strengthened by COA Auditor Cortez testimony showing that P3.8

Million was listed in the books of the MHS as a direct expense account to which UL is not required to render an accounting or liquidation. 86 Also, she admitted that the amount of P21.6 Million was contained in a liquidation voucher submitted by Dulay, which was included in the transmittal letter signed by the respondents to the COA and accompanied by a performance report on the Kabisig Program. This performance report showed that the total amount of P21.6 Million was exhausted in the Kabisig Program.87 With respect to the P17 Million, evidence adduced showed that 270 units of the motorcycles have already been transferred in the name of MHS by UL. 88 There is also evidence that the audit team initially found nothing irregular in the documentation of the 500 motorcycles during the audit examination conducted in April 1986; the same goes for the eight cars purchased. Under the circumstances, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that registration of these vehicles in ULs name alone did not constitute malversation in the absence of proof, based on the available evidence, to establish that the respondents benefited from the registration of these motor vehicles in ULs name, or that these motor vehicles were converted by the respondents to their own personal use.89 In the end, the prosecutions evidence tended to prove that the subject funds were act ually used for their intended purpose.1wphi1 IV. Conclusion In dismissing this petition, we observe that the criminal cases might have been prompted by reasons other than injury to government interest as the primary concern.90 These other reasons might have triggered the hastiness that attended the conduct of audit examinations which resulted in evidentiary gaps in the prosecutions case to hold the respondents liable for the crime of malversation. 91 As matters now stand, no sufficient evidence exists to support the charges of malversation against the respondents. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the demurrers to evidence and, consequently, dismissed the criminal cases against the respondents. We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.92 Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the finality-of-acquittal rule.

G.R. No. 194945

July 30, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEX WATAMAMA y ESIL, Accused-Appellant. DESICION VILLARAMA, JR. J.: On appeal is the March 5, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03295, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Couti (RTC), Branch 103, of Quezon City, finding appellant Alex Watamama y Esil guilty of violating Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. 3 The prosecution's version of the facts is as follows: At around 10 oclock in the morning of September 25, 2005, an informant reported to SPO2 Dante Nagera in the Quezon City Anti-Drug Action Center, PNP Central Police District, Quezon City Hall Compound, that a certain "Alex" was selling drugs in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City. SPO2 Nagera relayed the information to his superior P/Supt. Gerardo Ratuita who then formed a team consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO3 Leonardo Ramos, PO1 Teresita Reyes, PO1 Alexander Jimenez, and PO1 Peggy Lynne Vargas to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1 Vargas was designated as the poseur buyer and was given two P100 bills which she marked with her initials "PV".4 At 12 noon of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at Area A, Payatas, Quezon City. The informant accompanied PO1 Vargas to a house at No. 14 Rosal Street. Upon seeing appellant, the informant introduced PO1 Vargas to appellant as a shabu user. PO1 Vargas asked to buy P200 worth of shabu from appellant. When asked for payment, PO1 Vargas promptly handed appellant the two marked bills. Appellant pocketed the money then took out a plastic sachet containing 0.18 grams of shabu and gave it to PO1 Vargas. PO1 Vargas inspected the contents of the plastic sachet, then gave the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated. Immediately, the other members of the buy-bust team surfaced and arrested appellant. The two marked bills were recovered when SPO2 Nagera ordered appellant to empty his pockets. Appellant was thereafter brought to the police station.5 At the police station, PO1 Vargas marked the confiscated shabu and turned it over to the station investigator Alex A. Jimenez. Jimenez prepared an inventory receipt which P/Supt. Ratuita signed. Thereafter, PO2 Ortiz brought the plastic sachet to

the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. 6 Forensic chemist Leonard Jabonillo performed the examination and found that the contents of the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking PV-09-25-05, weighed 0.18 grams and tested positive for methylampethamine hydrochloride or shabu. 7 On the other hand, appellant claimed that three men in civilian attire with handguns tucked at their waist suddenly barged in his house and arrested him. He was not shown any arrest warrant and nothing was found on him when the police frisked him at the police station. He added that PO1 Jimenez told him that if he wanted to be released he must reveal the identity of a big-time shabu supplier. He denied knowing any big-time shabu supplier and also denied selling shabu. He was then charged with illegal sale of shabu.8 The RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of illegal sale of 0.18 grams of shabu and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000. On appeal to the CA, appellant argued that the arresting police officers failed to comply strictly with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, since there was no proof that they conducted an inventory of the confiscated items, or even marked the same in his presence, or the presence of his representative or counsel, or a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official. As aforesaid, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision.1wphi1 The CA found that the prosecution was able to establish every link in the chain of custody of the shabu from the moment of seizure to receipt for examination and safekeeping in the PNP Crime Laboratory to safekeeping for presentation in court. The CA further held that the marking and inventory of the shabu done at the police station was not fatal to the prosecutions case. Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that in case of warrantless seizures, the marking, inventory, and photograph may be conducted at the nearest office of the apprehending team as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The CA noted that PO1 Vargas adequately explained why the marking was not made at the place of confiscation since there was a crowd of people forming when appellant was arrested. Also, a photograph was taken but the digital camera was lost. The CA also held that the defect in the pre-operation coordination sheet with PDEA would not affect the entrapment operation. The CA explained that Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. It held that Section 86 is more of an administrative provision.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court, essentially questioning the noncompliance by the police with the procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. He claims that the chain of custody was not established by the prosecution and prays for his acquittal. We agree with appellant. In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved. 9 The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is the same substance seized from the accused. While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending to drugs cases, 10 still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. Here, however, they failed to meet these conditions. The prosecution failed to show how the seized evidence changed hands from the time PO1 Vargas turned it over to the investigator up to the time they were presented in court as evidence. The prosecution did not adduce evidence on how the evidence was handled or stored before its presentation at the trial. It is not enough to rely merely on the testimony of PO1 Vargas who stated that she turned the seized item over to the investigator who then prepared the letter of request for examination. There was no evidence on how PO2 Ortiz came into possession of the shabu and how he delivered the seized item for examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Neither was there any evidence how it was secured from tampering. Instructive is the case of People v. Kamad,11where the Court enumerated the different links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.1wphi1 We are aware that there is no rule which requires the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of

the accused and the seizure of prohibited drugs from him. The discretion on which witness to present in every case belongs to the prosecutor.12 Nonetheless, as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received when it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.13 In this case, the over-reliance on PO1 Vargas testimony and the failure to present the investigator and PO2 Ortiz are fatal to the prosecutions case. Since the failure to establish every link in the chain of custody of the drug compromised its identity and integrity, which is the corpus delicti of the crimes charged against appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The March 5, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03295 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accusedappellant Alex Watamama y Esil is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is hereby ordered to release the person of accused-appellant ALEX WATAMAMA y ESIL from custody unless he is detained for some other lawful cause/s. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, is hereby further ordered to REPORT to this Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from doing so. G.R. No. 192591 July 30, 2012

(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner sets forth the following grounds in his motion: I THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR, VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS WHEN IT CONVICTED MAYOR ALVAREZ OF VIOLATING R.A. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718 ON "SOLICITED PROPOSALS" WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WAG WAG SHOPPING MALL WAS AN UNSOLICITED AND UNCHALLENGED PROPOSAL. II THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR COMMITTED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHEN THE LATTER DISREGARDED MAYOR ALVAREZ SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718. III THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF MAYOR ALVAREZ TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WHEN HE ALONE AMONG THE NUMEROUS PERSONS WHO APPROVED AND IMPLEMENTED THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL WAS CHARGED, TRIED AND CONVICTED. IV THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN CONVICTED PETITIONER DESPITE THE CLEAR FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES: (A) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALLEGED GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR MANIFEST PARTIALITY OF PETITIONER (B) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY PURPORTEDLY SUFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT

EFREN L. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. RESOLUTION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated June 29, 2011 affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019

V THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOWING THAT PETITIONER: (A) NEVER ACTED WITH "GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE" AND/OR "MANIFEST PARTIALITY"; (B) NEVER GAVE ANY "UNWARRANTED BENEFIT", "ADVANTAGE" OR "PREFERENCE" TO API. VI THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER IS AN OUTSTANDING LOCAL EXECUTIVE WITH UNIMPEACHABLE CHARACTER AND UNQUESTIONED ACCOMPLISHMENT, PETITIONER IS NOT THE KIND OF INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD ENTER INTO A CONTRACT THAT WOULD PREJUDICE THE GOVERNMENT AND HIS CONSTITUENTS.1 Petitioner contends that bad faith, manifest partiality and gross negligence were not proven by the respondent. He stresses that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7718, and while it is true that petitioner may have deviated from some of the procedures outlined in the said law, the essential purpose of the law that a project proposal be properly evaluated and that parties other than the opponent be given opportunity to present their proposal was accomplished. The Sandiganbayan therefore seriously erred when it immediately concluded that all actions of petitioner were illegal and irregular. Petitioner maintains such actions are presumed to be regular and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondent. Because all the transactions were done by him with the authority of the Sangguniang Bayan, petitioner argues that there can be no dispute that he endeavored in good faith to comply with the requirements of R.A No. 7718. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the non-inclusion of all the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan denied him the equal protection of the laws. In compliance with the directive of this Court, the Solicitor General filed his Comment asserting that petitioner was correctly convicted of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Solicitor General stressed that the findings of the Sandiganbayan and this Court that the requirements of the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law and its implementing rules have not been followed in the bidding and award of the contract to Australian-Professional, Inc. (API) were based on the documents of the project which have not been questioned by petitioner. Thus, despite petitioners claim of substantial compliance and APIs proposal being "complete," it is undisputed that it did not include the required company profile of

the contractor and that the publication of the invitation for comparative proposals, as found by this Court, was defective. These findings supported by the evidence on record were shown to have resulted in the failure to assess the actual experience and financial capacity of API to of rival proposals. Finally, the fact that the Sangguniang Bayan members were not included in the charge does not negate the guilt of petitioner who had the power and discretion over the implementation of the Wag-wag Shopping Mall project and not simply to execute the resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan approving the contract award to API. The facts established in the decision of the Sandiganbayan bear great significance on petitione rs role in the bidding and contract award to API, which also clearly showed that petitioner as local chief executive was totally remiss in his duties and functions. We find no cogent reason for reversal or modification of our decision which exhaustively discussed the afore-cited issues being raised anew by the petitioner. Notably, petitioners invocation of good faith deserves scant consideration in the light of established facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan and upheld by this Court, clearly showing that he acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT project to an unlicensed and financially unqualified contractor. It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not attendant.2 Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable.3 Submission of documents such as contractors license and company profile are minimum legal requirements to enable the government to properly evaluate the qualifications of a BOT proponent. It was unthinkable for a local government official, especially one with several citations and awards as outstanding local executive, to have allowed API to submit a BOT proposal and later award it the contract despite lack of a contractors license and proof of its financial and technical capabilities, relying merely on a piece of information from a news item about said contractors ongoing mall construction project in another municipality and verbal representations of its president. In his testimony at the trial, petitioner admitted that after the awarding of the contract to API, the latter did not comply with the posting of notices and submission of requirements. He simply cited the reason given by API for such non-compliance, i.e., that the BOT law does not provide for such requirements. This clearly shows petitioners indifference and utter disregard of the strict requirements of the BOT law and implementing rules, which as local chief executive, he is mandated to follow and uphold. Petitioners reliance on the representations and statements of the contractor on the compliance with legal requirements is an unacceptable excuse for his gross negligence in the performance of his official duties. He must now face the

consequences of his decisions and acts relative to the failed project in violation of the law. The substantial compliance rule is defined as "compliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute."4 Contrary to petitioners submission, his gross negligence in approving APIs proposal notwithstanding its failure to comply with the minimum legal requirements prevented the Sangguniang Bayan from properly evaluating said proponents financial and technical capabilities to undertake the BOT project. Such gross negligence was evident from the taking of shortcuts in the bidding process by shortening the period for submission of comparative proposals, non-observance of Investment Coordinating Committee of the National Economic Development Authority approval for the Wag-wag Shopping Mall Project, publication in a newspaper which is not of general circulation, and accepting an incomplete proposal from API. These forestalled a fair opportunity for other interested parties to submit comparative proposals. Petitioners argument that there was substantial compliance with the law thus fails. The essential requirements of the BOT law were not at all satisfied as in fact they were sidestepped to favor the lone bidder, API. Petitioner nonetheless reiterates his position that he cannot be held liable for such acts in violation of the law since there was "substantial basis" for the Municipal Government of Muoz to believe that API had the expertise and capability to implement the proposed Wag-wag Shopping Mall project. He points out the time they were negotiating with API, Australian-Professionals Realty, Inc. which is the same entity as API, was involved in two major BOT projects (P150 million project in Lemery, Batangas and P300 million construction project in Calamba, Laguna). We disagree. As extensively discussed in our Decision, petitioner was grossly negligent when it glossed over APIs failure to submit specified documents showing that it was duly licensed or accredited Filipino contractor, and has the requisite financial capacity and technical expertise or experience, in addition to the complete proposal which includes a feasibility study and company profile. These requirements imposed by the BOT law and implementing rules were intended to serve as competent proof of legal qualifications and therefore constitute the "substantial basis" for evaluating a project proposal. Petitioners theory would allow substitution of less reliable information as basis for the local government units determination of a contractors financial capability and legal qualifications in utter disregard of what the law says and consequences prejudicial to the government, which is precisely what the law seeks to prevent. To reiterate, we quote from the Decision the purpose of the bidding requirements:

We have held that the Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should apply to determine the financial capability of a bidder for prequalification purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, that they are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate resources. The evident intent of these standards is to protect the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it that the proponent has the financial capability to carry it out. Unfortunately, none of these requirements was submitted by API during the pre-qualification stage.5 (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner further points out that our Decision failed to consider that the Sandiganbayan disregarded his right to the equal protection of the laws when he alone among the numerous persons who approved APIs proposal and implemented the project was charged, tried and convicted. It bears stressing that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused.6 But more important, petitioner failed to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose in prosecuting him alone despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the Sangguniang Bayan "has conspired if not abetted all the actions of the Accused in all his dealings with API to the damage and prejudice of the municipality" and said courts declaration that "this is one case where the Ombudsman should have included the entire Municipal Council of Muoz in the information."7 As this Court explained in Santos v. People8: The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in

charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials. The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecutions sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws. 1wphi1 There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellants prosecution. While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. Likewise, if the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown. 9 (Emphases supplied.) Finally, the Court need not delve into the merits of petitioners assertion that as a local executive official well-recognized for his achievements and public service, he is not the kind of person who would enter into a contract that would prejudice the government. A non-sequitur, it has no bearing at all to the factual and legal issues in this case. WHEREFORE, the present motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate justice WE CONCUR: TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate justice Acting Chairperson LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate justice Acting Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Senior Associate Justice (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

Designated Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
**

Accordingly, I vote to acquit the petitioner for failure of the State to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Antecedents The petitioner was the Mayor of the then Municipality of Muoz (now Science City of Muoz) when the transaction subject of this case transpired in September 1996. On July 7, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of Muoz (SB) adopted Resolution No. 136, S-951 to invite Jess Garcia, President of the Australian Professional, Inc. (API), to participate in the planned construction of a four-storey shopping mall (Wag-Wag Shopping Mall). On February 9, 1996, the tabloid Pinoy published the invitation 2 for proposals for the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project, giving interested bidders 30 days within which to submit their offers. On April 12, 1996, the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) recommended3 the approval of the proposal submitted by API, the lone interested bidder. On April 15, 1996, the SB passed a resolution authorizing the petitioner to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with API regarding the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project.4 Then, on September 12, 1996, Alvarez (representing the Municipality) and API entered into and executed the MOA.5 On February 14, 1997, the groundbreaking ceremony was held on site, where the old Motor Pool, the old Health Center, and a semi-concrete one-storey building (then housing the Department of Agriculture, the BIR, the Office of the Assessor, the old Post Office, the Commission on Elections, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development) were all situated. API later started the excavation, and a billboard informing the public about the project and its contractor was placed on the site. On August 10, 2006, the petitioner was indicted in the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 under the information that alleged: That on or about 12 September 1996, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the then Municipality (now Science City) of Muoz, Nueva Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EFREN L. ALVAREZ, a high ranking public official, being then the Mayor of Muoz, Nueva Ecija, taking advantage of his official position and while in the discharge of his official or administrative functions, and committing the offense in relation to his office, acting with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give the Australian-Professional Incorporated (API) unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, by awarding to the latter the contract for the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall in the

Designated Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30,2012.
1

Rollo, pp. 336-337. Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 52, 67. Id. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Edition (1979), p. 1280. Rollo, p. 308.

People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 409, 433, citing People v. Nazareno, 329 Phil. 16, 20-23 (1996).
7

Rollo, p. 82.

G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 370-371, citing People v. Dela Piedra, 403 Phil. 31, 54-56 (2001).
9

As cited in People v. Dumlao, supra note 6 at 434-435.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION BERSAMIN, J.: The Majority have voted to deny the motion for reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on June 29, 2011 filed by the petitioner. However, I respectfully dissent and strongly urge that we review and reverse the Decision of June 29, 2011. My re-examination of the records convinces me to conclude and hold that the acts and actuations of the petitioner did not amount to a violation of the letter and spirit of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

amount of Two Hundred Forty Million Pesos (Php 240,000,000.00) under a Buil[d]Operate-Transfer Agreement, notwithstanding the fact that API was and is not a duly-licensed construction company as per records of the Philippine Construction Accreditation Board (PCAB), which construction license is a pre-requisite for API to engage in construction of works for the said municipal government and that API does not have the experience and financial qualifications to undertake such costly project among others, to the damage and prejudice of the public service. CONTRARY TO LAW.6 On September 22, 2006, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued. The State presented several witnesses to prove that Alvarez approved the MOA with API, knowing that API had no capacity to undertake such a big project. Aaron C. Tablazon of the Philippine Construction Accreditation Board (PCAB) testified that PCAB issued the two certifications to the effect that API had not been issued a Contractors License.7 Ma. Chona A. Caacbay of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that APIs application for registration was approved on July 28, 1995; and that its capital stock was P40,000,000.00 and its paid-up capital P2,500,000.00.8Romeo A. Ruiz, the Vice Mayor of Muoz in 1992-1998, recalled that the petitioner had requested the SB to pass a resolution granting him authority to enter into the MOA with API on the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme; and that the petitioner made such request because the PBAC, headed by the petitioner, had recommended the acceptance of the proposal of API. On the other hand, the Defense countered that the petitioner had substantially complied with the provisions of the BOT law. He testified that when he was its Mayor, the Municipality of Muoz borrowed money from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to finance the proposed four-storey Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project; that then Vice Mayor Ruiz and the other members of the SB showed him the Manila Bulletin and Business Bulletin publications of the BOT projects of the Australian Professional Realty Incorporated (APRI);9 that on September 16, 1996, the Municipality issued a notice of award to API; that prior to the start of the project he required API to submit the necessary documents and to post notices; that API did not submit the necessary documents, claiming that the BOT law did not require such documents; that the project was not completed because of the 1997 financial crisis; that then Vice Mayor Ruiz sent a letter to API complaining about the slow pace of the project; and that the letter remained unheeded at that time because the president of API was then vacationing in Europe. 10

The petitioner emphasized that the Municipality suffered no actual damage because the local treasury did not spend a single centavo for the project; that the project was an unsolicited proposal under the BOT law; that API paid a disturbance fee of P500,000.00; that the SB passed a resolution authorizing him to file cases against API with the objective of mutually terminating the agreement; that he, as the representative of the Municipality, and Atty. Lydia Y. Marciano, as the representative of API, mutually terminated the agreement; and that he could not present a copy of the compromise agreement because fire had meanwhile razed the premises of the Regional Trial Court in Balok, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, where the compromise settlement had been filed. 11 The petitioner declared that an annual net income of P5,000,000.00 had been forecast out of the loan of P40,000,000.00 from the GSIS; that he had conducted a study relative to the capability of API, but APRI had not yet completed any project as of that time; that API and APRI were one and the same, although he admittedly did not inquire from the SEC about the status of the two companies; and that he did not determine whether API was a licensed contractor. 12 On November 16, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, convicting the petitioner based on the following findings: (a) the project had no prior confirmation or approval by the Investment Coordination Council of NEDA; (b) a shorter period was given for comparative or competitive proposals; (c) there was failure to meet the conditions for the approval of the contract, including the posting of a performance security; (d) there was no in-depth negotiations with proponent; (e) API did not submit a complete proposal; (f) no clear plan was presented; (g) API was not a licensed contractor according to the PCAB; and (h) the petitioner was totally remiss in his duties under the Local Government Code of 1991. The Sandiganbayan further found that the Government suffered actual damages due to the acts of the petitioner, resulting from the loss of several public buildings as well as the resources from the demolition of such structures, which was quantified at P4,800,000.00, or 2% of the total project cost of P240,000,000.00.13 The dispositive portion reads: ACCORDINGLY, accused Efren L. Alvarez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for [sic] violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and is sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 6 years and 1 month to 10 years. He also has to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to indemnify the City Government of Muoz (now Science), Nueva Ecija the amount of Four Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php4,800,000.00) less the Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) API earlier paid the municipality as damages. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14 On June 9, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.15 Ruling of the Court Thus, the petitioner appealed, raising the following issues: 1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan failed to observe the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in convicting him; 2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the legal intent of the BOT project; 3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan utterly failed to appreciate that the BOT was a lawful project of the SB and not his project; and 4. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan utterly failed to appreciate that there was no damage as contemplated by law caused to the Municipality of Muoz to warrant his conviction.16 On June 29, 2011, the Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. It rejected his argument that he could not be held liable for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because there had been no disbursement of public funds involved. The Court explained that there were two modes of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, namely: (a) "causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government;" and (b) "giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference." The Court discoursed that under the second mode, it was sufficient that the accused gave unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative, or judicial functions; and held that the State successfully demonstrated that the petitioner acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT contract to an unlicensed and financially unqualified private entity. Hence, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending: I THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR, VIOLATED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND BLATANTLY DISREGARDED

THE PRINCIPLE OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS WHEN IT CONVICTED MAYOR ALVAREZ OF VIOLATING R.A. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718 ON "SOLICITED PROPOSALS" WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WAG WAG SHOPPING MALL WAS AN UNSOLICITED AND UNCHALLENGED PROPOSAL. II THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR COMMITTED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHEN THE LATTER DISREGARDED MAYOR ALVAREZS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718. III THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF MAYOR ALVAREZ TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WHEN HE ALONE AMONG THE NUMEROUS PERSONS WHO APPROVED AND IMPLEMENTED THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL WAS CHARGED, TRIED AND CONVICTED. IV THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN CONVICTED PETITIONER DESPITE THE CLEAR FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES: (A) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALLEGED GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR MANIFEST PARTIALITY OF PETITIONER (B) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY PURPORTEDLY SUFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT. V THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOWING THAT PETITIONER: (A) NEVER ACTED WITH "GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE" AND/OR "MANIFEST PARTIALITY".

(B) NEVER GAVE ANY "UNWARRANTED BENEFIT", "ADVANTAGE" OR "PREFERENCE" TO API. VI THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER IS AN OUTSTANDING LOCAL EXECUTIVE WITH UNIMPEACHABLE CHARACTER AND UNQUESTIONED ACCOMPLISHMENT. PETITIONER IS NOT THE KIND OF INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD ENTER INTO CONTRACT THAT WOULD PREJUDICE THE GOVERNMENT AND HIS CONSTITUENTS. Submissions I find and consider the motion for reconsideration to be meritorious. I. Preliminary Considerations In Sistoza v. Sandiganbayan,17 Sistoza stood charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the same offense for which the petitioner herein was indicted and convicted. At the very first sight of lack of probable cause, the Court did not hesitate to spare Sistoza from being subjected to a trial, and in the process uttered the following wise words to caution against insensitive prosecution of supposed official wrongdoings in routine government procurement, stating: There is no question on the need to ferret out and expel public officers whose acts make bureaucracy synonymous with graft in the public eye, and to eliminate systems of government acquisition procedures which covertly ease corrupt practices. But the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who happens to have signed a piece of document or had a hand in implementing routine government procurement, nor does the solution fester in the indiscriminate use of the conspiracy theory which may sweep into jail even the most innocent ones. To say the least, this response is excessive and would simply engender catastrophic consequences since prosecution will likely not end with just one civil servant but must, logically, include like an unsteady streak of dominoes the department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors who, if the flawed reasoning were followed, are equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements they sanction. Stretching the argument further, if a public officer were to personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority, if only to avoid prosecution, our bureaucracy would end

up with public managers doing nothing else but superintending minute details in the acts of their subordinates. It is worth noting that while no charges of violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, were filed against the responsible officials of the Department of Justice and officers of other government agencies who similarly approved the procurement subject of the instant petition and authorized the disbursement of funds to pay for it, all the blame unfortunately fell upon petitioner Pedro G. Sistoza as then Director of the Bureau of Corrections who merely acted pursuant to representations made by three (3) office divisions thereof, in the same manner that the other officials who were not charged but who nonetheless authorized the transaction in their respective capacities, relied upon the assurance of regularity made by their individual subordinates. In truth, it is sheer speculation to perceive and ascribe corrupt intent and conspiracy of wrongdoing for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, solely from a mere signature on a purchase order, although coupled with repeated endorsements of its approval to the proper authority, without more, where supporting documents along with transactions reflected therein passed the unanimous approval of equally accountable public officers and appeared regular and customary on their face. These words uttered by the Sistoza Court have served as my illuminating guidepost in taking a hard look at our Decision of June 29, 2011 affirming the petitioners conviction. In our Decision, we observed that "(a)s to the allegation of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan held that such was adequately shown by the evidence, noting that this is one case where the Ombudsman should have included the entire Municipal Council in the information for the latter had conspired if not abetted all the actions of the petitioner in his dealings with API to the damage and prejudice of the municipality." We should disown such observation because we would thereby be passing an unwarranted judgment of guilt against persons who were never heard, thereby circumventing their constitutional guarantee of due process that all democratic systems, including ours, have held dear and in the highest esteem. Still, the observation only firmed up the logical conclusion that, at the very least, the petitioner should not alone be faulted for the supposedly illegal acts. I want to make it clear that I do not subscribe to the petitioners proposition that "the non-inclusion of the members of the SB in the information constituted a grave violation of his constitutional right to equal protection." The proposition neither

shielded him from criminal prosecution nor rendered him innocent. But it is my humble opinion that his individual participation in the awarding of the assailed contract to API did not call for his criminal conviction, considering that the acts the State established to have been proof of his involvement were only his signing of the Invitation for BOT Project; his causing of the publication of the invitation; his signing of the PBAC Resolution recommending the award of the contract to API; his signing of the MOA covering the project; and his entering into the compromise with API after he instituted a civil action against it. Even assuming that all his acts constituted significant and integral components of some fiasco, which I cannot concede, the Court should not close its discerning eyes to the fact that the WagWag Shopping Mall project had originated as the brainchild of the SB. Specifically, it had been the SB that had invited API to present a proposal; it had been the SB that had resolved to adopt the BOT scheme in the construction of the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall; it had been the SB that had authorized the petitioner to enter into a MOA with API; it had been the SB that had authorized him to file a case against API; and it had been the SB that had authorized him to enter into a compromise with API. Contrary to the stance taken by the Sandiganbayan, what the Court should reckon from the totality of the established circumstances was not a criminal conspiracy among the municipal officials, the petitioner included, but, rather, a conscious effort to faithfully observe the checks and balances within the realm of local governance. The affirmance of the conviction of the petitioner would then be an exaggerated chastisement of his having affixed his signature on the MOA, the very kind of prosecution of a public official that the Sistoza Court eloquently denounced. II. Unsolicited Proposal In our challenged Decision, we initially positioned API against the tapestry that was Republic Act No. 6957,18 as amended by Republic Act No. 771819 (collectively, BOT Law). The Decision began by highlighting that a BOT project could only be awarded to the bidder who met the standards set by the BOT Law; and then went on to find that the undeniable disqualification of API for being an unlicensed contractor required us to rule that API could not properly be the awardee of the BOT project for the construction of the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall because it was not qualified to participate in the bidding. Yet, API was not a bidder because there would be no bidding in which it would participate. Rather, API had been invited by the SB to submit its proposal, and API had accepted the invitation and submitted its proposal. On account of this reality, a review of the Decision is in order.

The Municipality of Muoz viewed the project from its inception under the rules on unsolicited proposals. Several circumstances buttress this conclusion, namely: (a) the SBs classification of the project as "non-priority" in Resolution No. 230, S9520 because the Municipality lacked adequate resources to finance the project and because priority projects were ineligible for unsolicited proposals; 21 (b) the PBACs explicit recommendation of the acceptance of the unsolicited proposal and the awarding of the contract to API pursuant to SB Resolution No. 01, S-96;22 and (c), the Invitation for BOT Project,23 which was an earnest and sincere attempt to give to the interested public a chance to defeat APIs unsolicited proposal. The Court has repeatedly enforced its power to brush aside erroneous legal impressions, however sincerely they might have been made, where the correct understanding of the pertinent laws indubitably painted a different picture of intention on the part of the parties. Consistent with this laudable zeal, we should immediately deem the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project to be the unsolicited proposal that it really was simply because that was the nomenclature adopted by the SB for the project. Indeed, I cannot yet find any indicators that varied at all from the unsolicited nature of the proposal. We have regarded the SBs invitation to API as a symbol of solicitation. That view may be justified because API did not originate the idea for the project. However, the proposal was still unsolicited. To be all too literal about the meaning of the term "unsolicited" might be misapprehended hereafter as forbidding the Government, in effect, from giving even the slightest hint on its pursuits to any potential investor. That misapprehension would be most unfortunate and unjustified, considering that the avowed intent of the BOT Law of promoting private sector participation in development projects did not prohibit any proponent of a worthwhile BOT project from knocking on the Governments door uninvited. That unwarranted interpretation would have the private sector act like a wandering caroler, moving from one house to the next, uncertain whether his caroling would even be listened to; or would have the private sector simply distance itself from any collaboration with the Government because of the uncertainty of partnering with the Government in pursuing development projects, no matter how worthy, thereby preventing rather than forging the partnerships that the law has desired and envisioned. In fact, that the Government first communicates with a prospective investor who then submits an unsolicited proposal has not been unprecedented. The Court actually took note of one such situation in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminal Co., Inc.,24 as the following excerpt indicates: In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up

to the year 2010. The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989. Sometime in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993. On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) Agan, Jr. adverted to the six business leaders approaching President Ramos to "explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal." Ostensibly, they proposed to build the NAIA International Passenger Terminal III without prior solicitation by the Government. Here, however, it was slightly different, with the SB inviting API. But the making of that invitation alone did not make APIs eventual proposal a solicited one. Both Agan, Jr. and this case shared one common circumstance that preliminary communications transpired prior to the submission of the proposal. Unsolicited proposals for projects may be accepted by any government agency or local government unit on a negotiated basis, provided that the following conditions are all met, namely: (a) such projects involved a new concept or technology and/or are not part of the list of priority projects; (b) no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required; (c) the government agency or local government unit has invited comparative or competitive proposals by publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, and no other proposal is received for a period of 60 working days; and (d) in the event another proponent submits a lower price proposal, the original proponent shall have the right to match that price within 30 working days.25 I take the view, therefore, that the Government is not legally precluded from consulting a private entity that possesses the requisite expertise, skills and knowhow on a particular undertaking, even if the consultation is pursued with the end of

ultimately engaging the private entity for the undertaking. My reason for taking the view is that the giving of undue favors that our policies consistently condemn will be thwarted by the laws several protective measures in place to still afford the public an opportunity for fair competition. The BOT Law provides two ways on how the private sector may take on a project, to wit: (a) through public bidding; and (b) through unsolicited proposals.26 In the first way, an identified project is immediately thrown open to the public for competition, while in the second, a proposal is first submitted before the public is given the chance to compete. If the Government chooses to transact indiscriminately with the public through regular bidding, the pertinent rules on unsolicited proposals find no application. Conversely, if at the outset and to the exclusion of the public, negotiations take place between the Government and a specific person, the ordinary bidding procedures are not at play. Rule 9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT Law has the following significant provisions on direct negotiations and unsolicited proposals, to wit: Sec. 9.1. Direct Negotiation. - Direct negotiation shall be resorted to when there is only one complying bidder left as defined hereunder: a. If, after advertisement, only one project proponent applies for pre-qualification and it meets the pre-qualification requirements, after which it is required to submit a bid/proposal which is subsequently found by the Agency/LGU to be complying; b. If, after advertisement, more than one project proponent applied for prequalification but only one meets the pre-qualification requirements, after which it submits a bid proposal that is found by the Agency/LGU to be complying; c. If, after pre-qualification of more than one project proponent, only one submits a bid which is found by the Agency/LGU to be complying; d. If, after pre-qualification, more than one project proponent submit bids but only one is found by the Agency/LGU to be complying; In such events however, any disqualified bidder may appeal the decision of the concerned Agency/LGU to the Head of Agency in case of national projects, or to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) in case of local projects within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of the notice of disqualification. The Agency/LGU concerned shall act on the appeal within forty-five (45) working days from receipt thereof. The decision of the Agency concerned or the DILG, as the case may be, shall be final and immediately executory.

Sec. 9.2. Unsolicited Proposals.- Unsolicited proposals may likewise, subject to the conditions provided under Rule 10, be accepted by an Agency/LGU on a negotiated basis. Section 9.1, supra, actually envisages an ordinary public bidding in which only a lone bidder ends up to be compliant. The offer to the public and the opportunity for competition, two of the three principles in public bidding,27 precede the negotiation. Under the BOT Law, therefore, the private sector may become a partner of the Government in its infrastructure projects only either by participating in a regular bidding or by presenting an unsolicited proposal, where there is likewise a subsequent bidding. The mere fact that the SB invited API did not put APIs proposal outside the purview of an unsolicited proposal. Any private corporation, on whose expertise, skills and know-how the Government relies, if asked by the Government to conduct a study for a project, should not be later on disqualified from making a proposal for the project. Nor should its proposal after the study be immediately considered as outside the scope of an unsolicited proposal only because the initiative has not originated from it. Should that be the case, the procedure for ordinary bidding will apply, and the corporation will just have to find itself on the same footing as its competitors despite having expended so much time, effort and resources on the study, wondering in uncertainty about whether its substantial expenditures will ultimately blossom into a solid investment. Such innate unfairness is precisely what the lawmakers sought to avoid, as can be gleaned from the Minutes of the Senate deliberations,28 to wit: Senator Macapagal: In the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan and the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor, the anchor project of the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor is the Lagindingan International Airport. However, it was very sad to note that in the DOTC public investment program, it was not there. xxx So, the people of Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor were really flabbergasted that a national government agency should completely ignore a particular anchor project. xxx The people in the area started selling the idea to everybody who might be interested and, of course, one very obvious party that should be interested is Ayala Corporation because it owns the land that was identified in the planning as the ideal place for the airport. xxx

As time went on, Ayala got more and more interested because everybody in the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor was telling them that that airport is so crucial in the development of the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor. So, Ayala Corporation started toying with the idea; it started some preliminary casual talks, and then more serious talks with possible Japanese investors. Then they got into the conclusion that there are some things they cannot undertake even in that consortium of two. They got into that some aspects should really be funded by the Government and that therefore, the project should be divided into two parts, one part should be Government and one part should be BOT. All of this conceptualization to be transformed into project specifications would undertake time and, in fact, millions of investment on the part of, let us say, Ayala corporation. If, after spending millions for the project specification, it is simply bidded out in a purely competitive tender, then that is thoroughly unfair to Ayala Corporation. If that is the case provided by law, Ayala Corporation will not even go into the feasibility study. Unfortunately, DOTC does not have the money to go into that feasibility study instead. If that happens, we will have the money to go into that feasibility study instead. If that happens, we will have a Cagayande Oro-Iligan Corridor project that will again be a political wish because the anchor project will not be there. So, Mr. President, it is a situation such as this where we feel that there is certainly merit for the common good in a negotiated contract. This example is what we mean by an unsolicited proposal. Accordingly, any proposal, invited or not, that is introduced where the Government has no prior intention of conducting a public bidding must still be categorized as "unsolicited." This interpretation will not prove disastrous inasmuch as the law itself has provided adequate safeguards. Moreover, the abhorred capricious awarding of a project to a preferred party is effectively hindered by the mandate for a subsequent invitation for comparative proposals. III. Deviations from the BOT Law Having shown that APIs proposal was really an unsolicited proposal, let me next carefully show that the petitioner complied with the BOT Law. In our Decision, we held: The IRR specified the requirement of publication of the invitation for submission of proposals, as follows:

SEC. 10.11. Invitation for Comparative Proposals. - The Agency/LGU shall publish the invitation for comparative or competitive proposals only after ICC/Local Sanggunian issues a no objection clearance of the draft contract. The invitation for comparative or competitive proposals should be published at least once every week for three (3) weeks in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation. It shall indicate the time, which should not be earlier than the last date of publication, and place where tender/bidding documents could be obtained. It shall likewise explicitly specify a time of sixty (60) working days reckoned from the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents upon which proposals shall be received. Beyond said deadline, no proposals shall be accepted. A pre-bid conference shall be conducted ten (10) working days after the issuance of the tender/bidding documents. (Emphasis supplied.) The above provision highlighted other violations in the bidding procedure for the subject BOT project. First, there was no prior approval by the Investment Coordinating Committee of the National Economic Development Authority (ICCNEDA) of the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. Under the BOT Law, local projects to be implemented by the local government units concerned costing above P200 million shall be submitted for confirmation to the ICC-NEDA. Such requisite approval shall be applied for and should be secured by the head of the LGU prior to the call for bids for the project. Second, the law requires publication in a newspaper of general circulation. To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information, that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals. Over and above all these, the newspaper must be available to the public in general, and not just to a select few chosen by the publisher. Petitioner did not submit in evidence the affidavit of the publisher attesting to Pinoy tabloid as such newspaper of general circulation. And third, even assuming that Pinoy was indeed a newspaper of general circulation, the invitation published indicated a shorter period of submission of comparative proposals, only thirty (30) days instead of the prescribed sixty (60) days counted from the date of issuance of tender documents. (Emphasis supplied) I believe that we must thoroughly revisit our finding about the lack of prior approval by the ICC and about the failure of the petitioner to submit the affidavit of the publisher of Pinoy tabloid that would confirm its being a newspaper of general circulation. There was no basis for the finding. Firstly, the finding was unfortunate because it was not for the petitioner to prove that he had complied with such requirements, but rather for the Prosecution to establish the fact of non-compliance with the requirements in a degree that would justify the presence of the elements of the crime charged. We apparently thereby brushed aside the well-settled rule in criminal cases that it was the Prosecution, not

the accused, who has the burden of proof to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.29 Secondly, we have thereby ignored that the vigorous objection raised herein had been only about the publication of the invitation being for a period shorter than the law required, and about Pinoy being a mere tabloid. Anent the requirement for ICC approval, the Decision, citing Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718,30 and Section 2.3 of the IRR,31 held that projects costing over P200 million should be submitted for confirmation by the ICC-NEDA, and the approval should be applied for and secured prior to the bidding by the petitioner as the head of the local government unit. Yet, a closer look readily shows that cited provisions related to priority projects, of which the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project was not. The records indicate that the project was classified by the SB as "non-priority" through its Resolution No. 230, S95 owing to "the large amount of investment therein" that the Municipality could not shoulder. The inapplicability of the provisions was bolstered by Section 2.8 of the IRR, which states: 2.8. ICC Approval of Projects. - The review and approval of projects by ICC, as indicated above, including those proposed for BOO implementation, shall be in accordance with the guidelines of the ICC, attached hereto as Annex B. For publicly-bid projects, the ICC approval of the project should be secured prior to bidding and for unsolicited proposals prior to negotiation with the original proponent. Considering that priority projects were not eligible for unsolicited proposals,32 Section 2.8 should be construed to pertain only to projects other than priority ones. With the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall being a non-priority project, and APIs proposal being unsolicited, what then applied was the requirement of ICC approval prior to the negotiation with API as the proponent. There being no evidence on record that proved non-compliance with the requirements, the Court thus had no real and proper factual bases to find and hold that Alvarez had failed to prove compliance. In its Comment on the petition for review, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) tendered a sweeping statement that "there was no showing that Petitioner [Alvarez] sought the prior approval or confirmation by the ICC of NEDA of the said undertaking." The trial records show, on the other hand, that the Prosecution and the Sandiganbayan heavily banked on the supposed violations of the regular bidding procedures or, in the alternative, on the irregularities in the publication of the

Invitation for BOT Project, without showing that the violations had been actual, or that the publication had been grossly defective and deficient. Anent Pinoy, the petitioners failure to present the affidavit of the publisher attesting to Pinoys being a newspaper of general circulation was fatal to the cause of the Prosecution, but not to the cause of the Defense. There was in favor of the petitioner the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty from his availing of the publication services of Pinoy as a newspaper of general circulation.33 The presumption could be rebutted only by the Prosecution adducing clear and convincing affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.34Towards that end, every reasonable intendment was to be made in support of the presumption; in case of any doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, the construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Without the Prosecution adducing such rebutting evidence, the presumption became conclusive herein. Thirdly, the period of only 30 days for the submission of comparative proposals provided in the Invitation for BOT Project that the petitioner signed being shorter than required should not be a factor of any irregularity. Although an unsolicited proposal for projects may be accepted if, after the publication, no other proposal is received for a period of 60 working days, the BOT Law does not actually provide the time when the 60-day period is to commence. On the other hand, Section 10.11 of the IRR contains the following relevant instructions: 1. The invitation for comparative or competitive proposals shall indicate the time, which should not be earlier than the last date of publication, and the place where tender/bidding documents can be obtained; 2. The invitation shall likewise explicitly specify a time of 60 working days reckoned from the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents upon which proposals shall be received; beyond said deadline, no proposals shall be accepted. 3. A pre-bid conference shall be conducted 10 working days after the issuance of the tender/bidding documents. The Invitation for BOT Project did not state the time when and the place where the tender/bidding documents could be obtained; did not indicate a specific time of 60 working days reckoned from the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents within which proposals would be received; and directed the submission of proposals within only 30 days from the date of its first publication.

Yet, the failure to literally comply with the BOT Law and the IRR was not enough justification to conclude adversely against the petitioner. Let me explain why. Upon being invited to bid, any prospective bidder could not just quickly present himself to the Government with a proposal ready at hand. This is because every knowledgeable bidder was expected to know that it would only be through the bid/tender documents that he would determine how to formulate the bid. Thus, any party interested in the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project had to secure first the bid/tender documents from the Office of the Mayor. The period of 30 days stated in the invitation, instead of being considered as the period for a prospective bidder to submit a proposal, should be understood as referring to the period within which a comparative bidder should obtain the bid/tender documents. In this context, the obtention of the bid/tender documents was, after the publication of the invitation, the next unavoidable step for the bidding process to start rolling. The next step thereafter would be the pre-bid conference, to be conducted 10 working days from the issuance of the tender/bidding documents.35 For the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project, counting the 30 days from the date of first publication (February 9, 1996), the interested public had until March 10, 1996 to obtain the bid/tender documents. That was 16 days from the date of last publication (February 23, 1996). A time frame of 16 days was reasonable, and was in fact even more beneficial to prospective bidders by virtue of their not being limited to one particular day. The time frame was also in full accord with the IRR, whose only parameter being that the time to obtain the bid/tender documents not be earlier than the last date of publication. Another requirement under Section 10.11 of the IRR, was the indication of the place where the bid/tender documents would be obtained. Considering that any interested party could easily infer from the Invitation that any response to the invitation had to be coursed through the Office of the Mayor, that requirement was met in this case, and the place was the Office of the Mayor. But no one went to obtain the bid/tender documents, or even to inquire about the subject of the published invitation. As a result, with the Municipality having no other comparative proposal to consider and pass upon, no pre-bid conference was conducted. Underscoring the other violations attributed to the petitioner, the Decision said the following: There is likewise no showing that API complied with the submission of a complete proposal required under the IRR: SEC. 10.5 Submission of a Complete Proposal. - For a proposal to be considered by the Agency/LGU, the proponent has to submit a complete proposal which shall

include a feasibility study, company profile as outlined in Annex A, and the basic contractual terms and conditions on the obligations of the proponent and the government. The Agency/LGU shall acknowledge receipt of the proposal and advice the proponent whether the proposal is complete or incomplete. If incomplete, it shall indicate what information is lacking or necessary. (Emphasis supplied.) As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, APIs proposal showed that it lacked the above requirements as it did not include a company profile and the basic contractual terms and conditions on the obligations of the proponent/contractor and the government. Had such company profile been required of API, the municipal government could have been apprised of the fact that said contractor/proponent had been in existence for only three months at that time and had not yet completed a project, although APRI, which actually undertook the Calamba and Lemery shopping centers also under BOT scheme, is allegedly the same entity as API which have the same set of incorporators and directors. But more important, the municipality could have realized earlier, on the basis of financial statements and experience in construction included in the company profile, that API could not possibly comply with the huge financial outlay for the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. It could have also noted the fact that the aforesaid BOT shopping centers in Lemery and Calamba being implemented by APRI at that time were not yet finished or completed. In any event, such existing BOT contract of APRI with another LGU neither justified non-compliance by API with the submission of a complete proposal for the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project for a competent evaluation by the PBAC. The findings on the other violations were unfair. It is noteworthy that the petitioners first direct participation in the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project was his signing of the Invitation for BOT Project. Still, we should deduce that by that time, API would have been pre-qualified, its company profile assessed, and its proposal evaluated by the Municipality. We should presume that the SB had undertaken the evaluation because it was the SB, after all, that had invited API pursuant to its Resolution No. 136, S-95,36 adopted the BOT scheme for the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project through its Resolution No. 230, S-95,37 and created a Special Committee on Build Operate and Transfer through Resolution No. 262, S-95 shortly after API had submitted its proposal.38 The function of evaluation appropriately fell on the shoulders of the SB, not on the petitioners, because the project would entail the disbursement of municipal funds. In short, whatever the petitioner had to do with the project prior to his signing of the Invitation for BOT Project should not be left to guesswork. It is true that the IRR contained a directive for the head of the local government unit to secure the ICC clearance for the unsolicited proposal prior to any negotiations with the original proponent.39 But there was no proof adduced by the

Prosecution showing the non-compliance with this requirement. Hence, we should resolve the issue in favor of compliance. The consequence of so resolving is to accept that the petitioner was charged with actual knowledge of the proposal and of the qualifications of API. Nonetheless, despite such actual knowledge, the responsibility for securing the approval should not be thrown exclusively in his direction, for securing the approval was a purely ministerial duty. In this regard, the petitioner had to endorse the proposal to the ICC without yet needing to exercise his discretion. He was under no mandate to review the proposal at that stage. The only time that he, as the head of a local government unit, would use his discretion was after the submission by the PBAC of the recommendation to award, upon which he, as the head of the local government unit, would then decide. 40 Fourthly, we further agree with the Sandiganbayan that "there was no in-depth negotiation as to the project scope, implementation and arrangements and concession agreement, which are supposed to be used in the Terms of Reference (TOR). Such TOR would have provided the interested competitors the basis for their proposed cost, and its absence in this case is an indication that any possible competing proposal was intentionally avoided or altogether eliminated." I am apprehensive that we have thereby allowed ourselves to draw a decisive conclusion even without proper factual support. I have carefully perused the decision of the Sandiganbayan under review and have not come across any portion of it that might have contained the factual basis from which the Sandiganbayan derived its conclusory pronouncement. The absence of the factual basis necessitates a reversal of our affirmance of the Sandiganbayan, for, indeed, the People did not even attempt to make these matters a point of contention. Fifthly, another established act of the petitioner was his signing of the Resolution whereby the PBAC recommended both the acceptance of APIs unsolicited proposal and the awarding of the contract to API. Upon careful analysis, however, I find that his signature on the PBAC Resolution was by virtue of his capacity as the PBAC Chairman, a capacity that he had not arrogated unto himself due to its having been conferred by law.41 As the PBAC Chairman, he could participate in the recommendation in two ways, namely: by signing the Resolution, and, by voting in case of a tie.42 The PBAC Resolution showed six members under the chairmanship of the petitioner. A member, Angelo C. Abellera, had no signature on the Resolution; hence, he did not have any involvement in its passage. Only five members remained, rendering a tie impossible. Based on such circumstances, the petitioner could not have voted for the recommendation in favor of API. Sixthly, the Sandiganbayan further found that the petitioner had requested the SB to authorize him to enter into a MOA with API, for which the SB had then passed the resolution for that purpose.

The finding was of no material consequence. The request and the Resolution were unnecessary and superfluous due to the fact that no other proposal had been submitted to outdo the proposal of API. Under the law, awarding the contract to API was a matter of course. As to this, the Court observed in Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications,43 to wit: xxx In the 18 April 2008 Decision, we have already exhaustively scrutinized Section 4-A of the BOT Law, as amended, in relation to its IRR, and in consideration of the intent of the legislators who crafted the BOT Law. We find no reason to disturb our conclusion therein that: The special rights or privileges of an original proponent thus come into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project. As can be gleaned from the plain language of the statutes and the IRR, the original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within 30 working days from notice thereof, and (2) in the event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the project could be awarded to the original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project. It is without question that in a situation where there is no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT project that the project would be awarded to the original proponent thereof. However, when there are competitive bids submitted, the original proponent must be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid; only when it is able to do so, will the original proponent enjoy the preferential right to the award of the project over the other bidder. These are the general circumstances covered by Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended. (Underscoring supplied) IV Alvarez did not violate Section 3(e) The Decision declared that the petitioner had failed to ensure that API would meet the conditions prescribed by Section 11.7 and Section 12.7 of the IRR, namely: (a) performance security; (b) proof of sufficient equity; and (c) ICC clearance of the contract on a no-objection basis.

The petitioner argues that these requirements did not apply because they were not enumerated in Rule 10 of the IRR, the issuance governing unsolicited proposals. The argument of the petitioner cannot be sustained. Rule 10 provided the procedure in the handling of an unsolicited proposal. Its last three sections related to "submission of proposal", "evaluation of proposals" and "disclosure of the price proposal." If the petitioners argument was followed, nothing could come out of unsolicited proposals because Rule 10 did not provide the mechanism for the awarding of the contract. To answer the hanging question of whether Alvarez observed the IRR in awarding the contract, resort must necessarily be had to Rule 11, entitled "Award and Signing of Contract" and Rule 12, entitled "Contract Approval and Recommendation." The separate processes for unsolicited proposals and for publicly-bidded projects find their confluence in both Rules. In view of the foregoing, we should determine if the petitioner deliberately disregarded the BOT Law and its IRR as to warrant his prosecution for and conviction of a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 states: Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful. xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant or licenses or permits or other concessions. xxxx The State must prove the following essential elements of Section 3(e) offense, as follows: 1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;

2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.44 That the petitioner, being then the incumbent Mayor of his Municipality, was a public official on the date in question showed the attendance of the first element. As to the second element (that the accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence), which involve the three modes of committing the crime, we have enunciated in Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan 45 that the three modes are distinct and different from each other, to wit: The second element enumerates the different modes by which means the offense penalized in Section 3 (e) may be committed. "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are". "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under Section 3 (e) should suffice to warrant conviction. IV.a. Manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence were not competently established In our Decision, we held that "the prosecution was able to successfully demonstrate that Alvarez acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT contract to an unlicensed and financially unqualified private entity". As basis thereof, the Decision cited the petitioners non-compliance with the BOT Law and its IRR, and made the following pronouncement:

Under the facts established, it is clear that petitioner gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to API considering that said proponent/contractor was not financially and technically qualified for the BOT project awarded to it, and without complying with the requirements of bidding and contract approval for BOT projects under existing laws, rules and regulations. The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. As to "partiality," "bad faith," and "gross inexcusable negligence," we have explained the meaning of these terms, as follows: "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." We sustain and affirm the Sandiganbayan in holding that petitioner violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and that he cannot shield himself from criminal liability simply because the SB passed the necessary resolutions adopting the BOT project and authorizing him to enter into the MOA. We find no error or grave abuse in its ruling, which we herein quote: It is apparent that the unwarranted benefit in this case lies in the very fact that API was allowed to present its proposal without compliance of [sic] the requirements provided under the relevant laws and rules. To begin with, the municipal government never conducted a public bidding prior to the execution of the contract. The project was immediately awarded to the API without delay and without any rival proponents, when it was not qualified to participate in the first place. The legality and propriety of the agreement executed with the contractor is totally absent based on the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense. This Court also considers these particular acts significant. First. From the testimony of then Vice-Mayor Ruiz, Jesus V. Garcia, the president of API, attended the SB session after paying a courtesy call to the Accused who was then the Mayor. Second.

It was the Accused who signed and posted the Invitation to Bid (Exhibit N) giving proponents 30 days to submit their proposals. Third. The Accused is the head of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee which according to him recommended the approval of APIs proposal. This was the reason he used in requesting authority from the SB to grant him the authority to contract with API. Fourth. The Accused requested the SB to give him authority to enter into an agreement with API through a resolution (Exhibit S). Fifth. It was the Accused who invited the SB members to go to the Mayors office to witness the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement between the municipality and API. I submit that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and that we should not affirm its error. The established facts showed that the petitioner neither extended any favors to nor manifested partiality towards API. He also did not give any unwarranted benefits to API. As I previously pointed out, the only significant acts of the petitioner proved by the Prosecution were his signing of the Invitation for BOT Project; his causing of the publication thereof; his signing of the PBAC Resolution recommending the award to API of the contract; and his signing of the MOA for the project all of which had mitigating, if not justifying, factors that I already stated in my foregoing discussions. But none of such acts could be read as manifesting partiality or giving unwarranted benefits to API. For one, the Decision declared that "(t)he project was immediately awarded to the API without delay and without any rival proponents." However, the declaration was belied by the fact that the petitioner had to invite investors to "finance, construct and operate"46 the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. The Invitation, despite its faults, was still an invitation, and it unquestionably demonstrated the intention of the petitioner to give the interested public the reasonable opportunity for competition. In the end, because no other company except API showed any interest in the project, no comparative offer was made to surpass APIs proposal. Anent the alleged fault in the Invitation, in that it gave a period of only 30 days from the date of first publication within which the prospective bidders would submit their proposals, the fact that the period was shorter than what the law required should not be seen as a sign of bias or partiality towards API or of giving unwarranted benefits to API. The Invitation was first published on February 9, 1996. Were it true that the petitioner had been biased towards API, would he not have moved at lightning speed, in a manner of speaking, in order to award the contract by March 10, 1996, the end of the 30-day period? The records show that he did not. Instead, he first sought and obtained the recommendation of the PBAC, which recommendation came about on April 12, 1996, or a month after the accrual to API of the right to be awarded the contract. Equally notew orthy was that, despite APIs

proposal being uncontested and the contract could have already been awarded to API for that reason, the petitioner still first secured the express authorization of the SB for him to enter into a MOA with API. He awarded the contract only on September 12, 1996, five long months after the PBAC had made its recommendation on the matter. Moreover, the petitioner himself did not initiate dealings with API. That was done by the SB itself. The SB got him to be interested by showing to him the newspapers advertising the projects undertaken by API in the Provinces of Laguna and Batangas. It was the SB, not Alvarez, that invited API (represented by Garcia) to attend one of its sessions for the purpose of having API share with the SB its knowledge on the proposed project to be pursued under the BOT Law.47 On the other hand, the petitioner deserved credit for two things that indicated he did not extend any unwarranted benefits to API in connection with the project. The first was that he required API to pay to the Municipality the substantial sum of P500,000.00 as a relocation or disturbance fee to compensate for the demolition of the already-condemned structures standing on the project site. There was no question about the structures being already without economic value to the Municipality after they had been declared as a nuisance and duly condemned for demolition. The other was that he prosecuted API by bringing a civil action for rescission and damages when API defaulted on its contractual obligation. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 requires that partiality must be manifest. But the petitioners actuations could not be categorized as manife stly partial. His minimal participation in the transaction could not be characterized by bias. His seeking the intervention of both the SB and the PBAC before taking action in favor of API belied any partiality towards API. He opted to share with the members of the SB and the PBAC the responsibility for making any decision on the project. All these showed that he himself sought and put in place stumbling blocks that did not at all make it easy and simple for API to get the project. In the Notice of Award, the petitioner directed API to submit its performance security, proof of sufficient equity, and ICC clearance of the contract on a noobjection basis. But the requirements were not submitted. The reason for this was that APIs counsel, Atty. Lydia Y. Marciano, insisted that such requirements did not apply because the project did not involve any government undertaking. Apparently, the petitioner relied on Atty. Marcianos representation. Even assuming that the representations of APIs counsel were erroneous, the petitioners reliance upon them was justifiable under the circumstances. Firstly, he was only a layman as compared to Atty. Marciano who was presumed to be possessed of a satisfactory knowledge of the pertinent law. Secondly, he knew that

the Municipality would not be releasing any funds from its coffers intended for the project. I am sure that the impression left by Atty. Marcianos representations was that there was nothing to lose on the part of the Municipality should API fail to perform its obligations. And, thirdly, both the SB and the PBAC previously found API to be qualified for the project. In addition, there were the news reports indicating APIs capacity to undertake the BOT project. Anent negligence, any omissions that the petitioner committed along the way were due only to either mere inadvertence, or simple over-eagerness to proceed with a worthwhile project, or placing too much confidence in the declarations of subordinates and Atty. Marciano. I submit that the omissions would amount, at worst, only to gross negligence, which is want or absence of reasonable care and skill. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 required that the gross negligence must also be inexcusable. In other words, the gross negligence should have no excuse. But that was not so herein, for, according to Sistoza,48 gross inexcusable negligence xxx does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Rather, it refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It entails the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property, and in cases involving public officials it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious.49 In the same case of Sistoza, the Court took the occasion to lengthily discuss why a prosecution for Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 did not lie against Siztoza, viz: Clearly, the issue of petitioner Sistoza's criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be proper. For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been rigged, an issue that we do not confront and decide in the instant case, this pronouncement alone does not automatically result in finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, xxx but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a wellgrounded and reasonable belief that petitioner perpetrated these acts in the

criminal manner he is accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause. As defined above, the acts charged against petitioner do not amount to manifest partiality, evident bad faith nor gross inexcusable negligence which should otherwise merit a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019. It is not disputed that petitioner relied upon supporting documents apparently dependable as well as certifications of regularity made by responsible public officers of three (3) office divisions of the Bureau of Corrections before affixing his signature on the purchase order. Xxx The fact that petitioner had knowledge of the status of Elias General Merchandising as being only the second lowest bidder does not ipso facto characterize petitioner's act of reliance as recklessly imprudent without which the crime could not have been accomplished. Albeit misplaced, reliance in good faith by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests negates an imputation of conspiracy by gross inexcusable negligence to commit graft and corruption. As things stand, petitioner is presumed to have acted honestly and sincerely when he depended upon responsible assurances that everything was aboveboard xxx Verily, even if petitioner erred in his assessment of the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the documents presented to him for endorsement, his act is all the same imbued with good faith because the otherwise faulty reliance upon his subordinates, who were primarily in charge of the task, falls within parameters of tolerable judgment and permissible margins of error. Stated differently, granting that there were flaws in the bidding procedures, xxx there was no cause for petitioner Sistoza to complain nor dispute the choice nor even investigate further since neither the defects in the process nor the unfairness or injustice in the actions of his subalterns are definite, certain, patent and palpable from a perusal of the supporting documents. xxx " when x x x we speak of the law as settled, though, no matter how great the apparent settlement, the possibility of error in the prediction is always present." Given that the acts herein charged failed to demonstrate a well-grounded belief that petitioner had prima facie foreknowledge of irregularity in the selection of the winning bid other than the alleged fact that such bid was not the lowest, we cannot conclude that he was involved in any conspiracy to rig the bidding in favor of Elias General Merchandising. The instant case brings to the fore the importance of clearly differentiating between acts simply negligent and deeds grossly and inexcusably negligent punishable under Sec. 3, par. (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. While we do not excuse petitioner's manner of reviewing the award of the supply of tomato paste in favor of Elias General Merchandising, whereby he cursorily perused the purchase order and readily affixed his signature upon it, since he could have checked the supporting documents more lengthily, it is our considered opinion that his actions were not of

such nature and degree as to be considered brazen, flagrant and palpable to merit a criminal prosecution for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. To paraphrase Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official documents and assessments of his subordinates, but for conspiracy of silence and inaction to exist it is essential that there must be patent and conscious criminal design, not merely inadvertence, under circumstances that would have pricked curiosity and prompted inquiries into the transaction because of obvious and definite defects in its execution and substance. To stress, there were no such patent and established flaws in the award made to Elias General Merchandising that would have made his silence tantamount to tacit approval of the irregularity. (Emphases supplied) IV.b. Dearth of evidence to prove actual injury to any party or to the Government My next submission is that the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the Municipality of Muoz suffered undue injury from the non-performance of the contractual obligations of API was speculative and unwarranted. The injury that Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 contemplates is actual damage as the term is understood under the Civil Code. In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court made this concept of undue injury very clear, saying: Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3 (e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty. In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, or illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property; that is, the invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. In turn, actual or compensatory damages of a person is defined by Art. 2199, Civil Code, as "such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved." xxx Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant s act.

Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages. Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork. They cannot include speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury. In its decision, the Sandiganbayan pertinently held: As a defense, accused claims that there was no undue injury in this case. He said that there was no wastage considering that the demolished buildings were already condemned. The demolition will give way to a dreamed edifice. Disturbance compensation was advance by API to the municipality. This Court finds these defenses bereft of merit. There is no doubt that the Government suffered actual damage due to the acts of the Accused. The damage suffered is visibly demonstrable. The alleged prejudice and damage to the municipal government has been proven by the prosecution with moral certainty. His acts unmistakably resulted in the Governments unlawful loss of several of its buildings or offices. The municipal government likewise deployed its resources including equipments, personnel and financial outlay for fuel and repairs in the demolition of the buildings. Had accused been unfaltering in performing his duties under the law, the government would have not suffered such loss and undue injury and it could have been avoided and prevented early on. Had accused followed the BOT law, API would have been required to post a performance security to guarantee its faithful performance of the obligations under the contract. When API failed to complete the work within the construction period prescribed, the performance security would have been forfeited to answer for any liquidated damages due to the Municipality of Muoz. At the very least, the municipality is entitled to two percent (2%) of the project cost of Two Hundred Forty Million Pesos (Php 240,000,000.00) or an equivalent of Four Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 4,800,000.00).51 xxxx ACCORDINGLY, accused Efren L. Alvarez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and is sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 6 years and 1 month to 10 years. He also has to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to indemnify the City Government of Muoz (now Science), Nueva Ecija the amount of Four Million Eight

Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 4,800,000.00) less the Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 500,000.00) API earlier paid the municipality as damages. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.52 The Decision of June 29, 2011 upheld the Sandiganbayan, as follows: As to the propriety of damages awarded by the Sandiganbayan, we find that the same is proper and justified. The term "undue injury" in the context of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of "causing undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of "actual damage." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by a party as he has duly proved. Liquidated damages, on the other hand, are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of a breach thereof. For approved BOT contracts, it is mandatory that a performance security be posted by the contractor/proponent in favor of the LGU in the form of cash, managers check, cashiers check, irrevocable letter of credit or bank draft in the minimum amount of 2% of the total project cost. In case the default occurred during the project construction stage, the LGU shall likewise forfeit the performance security of the erring project proponent/contractor. The IRR thus provides: SEC. 12.13. Liquidated Damages. Where the project proponent of a project fails to satisfactorily complete the work within the construction period prescribed in the contract, including any extension or grace period duly granted, and is thereby in default under the contract, the project proponent shall pay the Agency/LGU concerned liquidated damages, as may be agreed upon under the contract by the parties. The parties shall agree on the amount and schedule of payment of the liquidated damages. The performance security may be forfeited to answer for any liquidated damages due to the Agency/LGU. The amount of liquidated damages due for every calendar day of delay will be determined by the Agency/LGU. In no case however shall the delay exceed twenty percent (20%) of the approved construction time stipulated in the contract plus any time extension duly granted. In such an event the Agency/LGU concerned shall rescind the contract, forfeit the proponents performance security and proceed with the procedures prescribed under Section 12.19.b.

Had the requirement of performance security been complied with, there is no dispute that the Municipality of Muoz would have been entitled to the forfeiture of performance security when API defaulted on its obligation to execute the construction contract, at the very least in an amount equivalent to 2% of the total project cost. Hence, said LGU is entitled to such damages which the law mandates to be incorporated in the BOT contract, the parties being at liberty only to stipulate the extent and amount thereof. To rule otherwise would mean a condonation of blatant disregard and violation of the provisions of the BOT law and its implementing rules and regulations which are designed to protect the public interest in transactions between government and private business entities. While petitioner claims to have entered into a compromise agreement as authorized by the SB and approved by the trial court, no evidence of such judicial compromise was submitted before the Sandiganbayan. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2009 and Resolution dated June 9, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-06CRM-0389 are AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.53 I observe that the Sandiganbayan rendered no factual finding of any actual damage suffered by the Municipality. What the decision contained on the requirement of actual damage were mere conclusions of both fact and law. But such conclusions did not satisfactorily meet the standard set in Llorente, Jr. to the effect that: xxx damages must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork. They cannot include speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.54 Speculative damages are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of damages.55 In determining actual damages, the Court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.56 To be recoverable, actual damages must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. The Court cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork in determining the amount of damages. Without any factual basis, it cannot be granted.57 It is true that the petitioner should have required API to post a performance bond of P4,800,000.00, which bond would have been forfeited in favor of the Municipality upon APIs default. But the failure to post the bond could not be the proof of actual

injury because its face amount did not per se establish the actual loss of the Municipality. For one, would undue injury still be deemed established had the bond been posted but the awarding of the contract had nonetheless suffered from other omissions? In that instance, if the Sandiganbayans ratiocination against the petitioner was sustained, a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) committed by causing undue injury to any party or the Government would be futile because the element of undue injury could then be difficult to prove. At most, therefore, the failure of API to post the bond would subject the petitioner to some administrative liability for non-compliance with certain requirements prescribed by other laws in relation to procurement, but not criminal liability under Section 3(e). Even worse was to have the petitioner be liable for the P4,800,000.00 performance bond. The Sandiganbayan apparently did not appreciate the fact that the petitioner, upon the express authority granted by the SB, and API entered into a compromise agreement that finally settled the issues between them and terminated the civil suit brought by the Municipality against API. As such, the Municipality became barred from asserting undue injury under the principle of res judicata,58 and could no longer recover any further from API. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.59 The entering into the compromise agreement served the public policy announced in the Civil Code for the courts in civil actions to endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise.60 In truth, the Municipality did not lose anything of value at all. API paid P500,000.00 as reimbursement for the value of the condemned properties demolished to give way to the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. Hence, for the Municipality to be still paid the further amount of P4,800,000.00, less P500,000.00, would be unjust enrichment. V. Lack of evidence to prove the giving of unwarranted benefits There was no factual basis for the Sandiganbayan to find that the petitioner gave unwarranted benefits to API. The fact is that the petitioner sought better offers from the public, as borne out by his causing the publication of the Invitation for BOT Project. It was further shown that he signed the MOA with API only after it was clear that no other proposals were presented for the Municipality to consider, and that the signing occurred on September 12, 1996, five long months after the PBAC

had made its recommendation on the matter. The regularity of the signing was buttressed by the authority given to him by the SB. Did API derive any benefits from the project? Before giving the answer, I remind that in a BOT scheme, the proponent undertakes to build and operate the project, and to transfer the project to the Government after a certain period of time without need of payment to the proponent. The scheme benefits the proponent only after the finished project starts to operate, and during the operation the proponent earns and recoups its investments. Senator Tatad explained during the Senate deliberations on Republic Act No. 7718 how a project proponent would derive benefit or advantage from the BOT scheme, to wit: Under the build-and-transfer scheme, a project proponent that is the new term used here will undertake the construction of a project, raising its own financing, and upon completion turns over the project to a government agency or to a local government unit which is the party to the contract, according to an agreed schedule of payments. In the build-operate-transfer scheme, someone builds a facility, operates the facility, and then at the end of a given period of time, say 25 years, not more than 50 years, the facility is transferred to the government. It does not cost the government anything.61 Yet, API did not get any benefit from the project because it did not get to finish building the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall, let alone to operate it. Rather to the contrary, API was even compelled to shell out P500,000.00 to the Municipality for the demolition of the dilapidated buildings. The word unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. In that regard, it is significant that the SB and the PBAC gave its official support to the project. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 62 WHEREFORE, I VOTE to grant the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and to vacate his conviction on the ground of failure of the State to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. G.R. No. 170425 April 23, 2012

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, vs. RIZZA G. MENDOZA, CARLITO LEE, GRESHIELA G. COMPENDIO, RAUL RIVERA, REY BELTRAN, REX ALMOJUELA, LINDA P. CAPALUNGAN, HILDA R. RONQUILLO, MA. LODA CALMA, TERESITA P. ALMOJUELA, RUFINA ABAD and AMADOR A. PASTRANA, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the institution of an action for prohibition and injunction filed by the affected party in one court, seeking to enjoin the use of evidence seized under a search warrant issued by another court. The Facts and the Case On March 26, 2001 the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, for the issuance of a search warrant covering documents and articles found at the offices of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. The NBI alleged that these documents and articles were being used to a) violate Republic Act 8799, also known as the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), and b) commit estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 1 The court granted the application. Acting on the search warrant, NBI and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) agents searched the offices mentioned and seized the described documents and articles from them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) against respondents Rizza Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma. Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera, Rey Beltran, Rex Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo, Ma. Loda Calma, and Teresita Almojuela (Mendoza, et al.) for violation of Sections 24.1 (b) (iii), 26, and 28 of the SRC.2 On July 11, 2001 Mendoza, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the NBI and the SEC before the RTC of Muntinlupa.3They alleged that, three months after the search and seizure, the NBI and the SEC had not turned over the seized articles to the Makati RTC that issued the search warrant.4 This omission, they said, violated Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, 5 which required the officers who conducted the seizure to immediately turn over the seized items to the issuing court.

The Muntinlupa petition sought to prevent the SEC and the NBI from using the seized articles in prosecuting Mendoza, et al. and the DOJ from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of their case, using the same.6They feared that the seized articles may have already been tampered with, altered, or augmented by those responsible for seizing them.7 Essentially, Mendoza, et al.s action is one for the suppression of evidence whose seizure had become illegal for failure to turn them over to the issuing court. Opposing the petition, the SEC, the NBI, and the DOJ (the three agencies) averred that injunction may not be issued to protect contingent rights or enjoin criminal prosecution. They pointed out that Mendoza, et al. should have exhausted administrative remedies available to them at the DOJ. Further, the three agencies maintained that Mendoza, et al.s petition for prohibition should have been lodged with the Court of Appeals (CA).8 Simultaneous with the action before the Muntinlupa RTC, on July 11, 2001 two of the respondents who did not join that action, Pastrana and Abad, filed with the Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject search warrant for having been issued in connection with several offenses when the Rules of Criminal Procedure 9 require its issuance for only one specific offense. On July 19, 2001 the Muntinlupa RTC issued a TRO against the three agencies,10 enjoining them from using the seized articles in proceeding against Mendoza, et al. On July 31, 2001 respondents Pastrana and Abad asked for leave to intervene in the civil case in the Muntinlupa RTC, which leave was granted on August 8, 2001. On the following day, August 9, 2001, having assumed as true the uncontroverted allegations in the petition before it, the Muntinlupa RTC replaced the TRO it issued with a writ of preliminary injunction 11 subject to the final outcome of the proceedings before the Makati RTC.12 On August 23, 2001 the three agencies moved for reconsideration of the Muntinlupa RTCs orders granting the intervention and the preliminary injunction. They also moved on September 13, 2001 to dismiss the action. On January 15, 2002 that court issued an omnibus order, denying their motions for reconsideration and to dismiss.13This prompted the three agencies to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, seeking to annul the Muntinlupa RTCs orders of August 8, 2001, August 9, 2001, and January 15, 2002.14 During the pendency of the case before the CA, however, or on May 10, 2002 the Makati RTC rendered a decision nullifying the search warrant it issued and declaring the documents and articles seized under it inadmissible in evidence. The Makati RTC also directed the SEC and the NBI to return the seized items to respondents Pastrana and Abad.15

For some reason, the CA did not mention the Makati RTC order and did not dismiss the petition before it on ground of mootness. On March 24, 2004 it rendered judgment, denied the three agencies petition, and affirmed the orders of the Muntinlupa RTC. The CA ruled, among other things, tha t Mendoza, et al.s action before the Muntinlupa RTC was proper and distinct from that which respondents Pastrana and Abad filed with the Makati RTC.16 The three agencies moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same on November 10, 2005. 17Undaunted, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Issue Presented The issues raised in this petition have essentially been rendered moot and academic by the Makati RTCs decision, which quashed the search warrant it issued and declared the items seized under it inadmissible in evidence. Still, one issue whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.s injunction actionneeds to be resolved in the interest of setting the matter aright and providing a lesson for the future. The Courts Ruling The CA held that the proceedings before the Makati RTC and the Muntinlupa RTC are separate and distinct. The object of the motion to quash search warrant, here filed by respondents Pastrana and Abad with the Makati RTC, the issuing court, was to test the validity of its issuance, given that the warrant was made to cover several offenses rather than just one as the rules provide. 18 On the other hand, the object of the Muntinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seized articles in any criminal proceeding against Mendoza, et al. considering the SEC and the NBIs failure to immediately turn over the seized articles to the court that issued the warrant as the rules require.19 But Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the search warrant and 2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are matters that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in the meantime been filed in court. Thus: Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (Emphasis supplied)

Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et al. filed with the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to prohibit the three agencies from using the items seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as evidence. Consequently, Mendoza, et al. should have filed it with the Makati RTC that issued such warrant. It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the issuance of the search warrant, they had no standing to question the same or seek the suppression of evidence taken under it. Consequently, since they had reasons for questioning government use of the seized items against them, they had the right to bring the injunction action before the Muntinlupa RTC where they resided. But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation of his right by another. The Court clearly explained in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 the nature of a search warrant proceeding. [A] search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action. A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.1wphi1 A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. 21 Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress the use of the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI to immediately turn these over to the issuing court. The issuing court is

the right forum for such motion given that no criminal action had as yet been filed against Mendoza, et al. in some other court. Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the seized documents and articles for months rather than immediately turn them over to the Makati RTC.22 Justifying its action, the SEC said that it still needed to study the seized items.23 Evidently, it wanted to use them to build up a case against the respondents, unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to the court. Clearly, SECs arbitrary action compromised the integrity of the seized documents and articles. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 24, 2004 and its resolution dated November 10, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP 70212 and ORDERS the dismissal of the action for prohibition and injunction that respondents Rizza Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma. Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera, Rey Beltran, Rex Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo, Ma. Loda Calma, Teresita Almojuela, Rufina Abad and Amador Pastrana filed with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case 01-206 for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the same. G.R. No. 177137 August 23, 2012

Criminal Case No. 1292, finding appellant Pedro Banig (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Factual Antecedents
On July 1, 1996, appellant along with one Tony Ginumtad (Ginumtad) were charged with the crime of rape committed against "AAA"3 in an Information4 which reads: That on or about 3:00 oclock dawn of March 28, 1996 in Barangay "XXX", Municipality of "YYY", Province of Quirino, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with prurient desires, and by means of force and intimidation, after conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] "AAA" against the latters will. CONTRARY TO LAW.5 Upon arraignment, appellant and Ginumtad pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits subsequently followed.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented "AAA" as its first witness. She testified that on the night of March 27, 1996, she attended a pre-wedding dance in their barrio which lasted until the early hours of the next day, March 28, 1996. At about 3:00 a.m. of March 28, 1996, "AAA" felt the need to urinate. She thus left the dance hall and went up to a hill about 50-100 meters away. Suddenly, two persons came out of nowhere, held her hands, poked a knife at her thigh, and warned her not to scream for help or else they would kill her. They then pushed her to the ground with her face up and her hands placed behind her back crosswise.6 Appellant proceeded to remove her pants and panties while Ginumtad pressed her shoulders down to the ground. When appellant was already on top of her, he spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Although "AAA" felt pain, she did not shout for fear that the appellant would kill her. After a while, Ginumtad took his turn and also inserted his penis into "AAAs" vagina. After Ginumtads turn, appellant again had sexual intercourse with "AAA" and that was the time that she lost consciousness.7 When "AAA" regained consciousness, appellant was still on top of her making thrusting motions, while Ginumtad was already nowhere in sight. When done, appellant stood up and just left "AAA". Luckily, someone came and brought "AAA"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. PEDRO BANIG, Appellant. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* PERLAS-BERNABE,* DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Weddings are joyous occasions wherein we witness the love and union between a man and a woman. In this case, instead of love, the victim witnessed mans bestiality when during the pre-nuptial dance, herein appellant forcibly had carnal knowledge of her. Worse, appellant used a knife to bring his victim into submission. On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02439, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated July 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino in

to the house of the bride where she slept. The incident was then reported to the police authorities on April 15, 1996. The prosecution then presented Dr. Briccio Macabangon (Dr. Macabangon), a medical doctor who examined "AAA" on April 23, 1996 at the "YYY" District Hospital. He issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings: Laceration, old, at 8:00 oclock. Admits one finger with difficulty.8 As its third witness, the prosecution presented "BBB," the father of "AAA". He testified that Alejandro Pugong (Pugong), the brother-in-law of appellant, approached him during the pendency of the preliminary investigation and asked for the settlement of the case. They offered marriage between appellant and his 20year old daughter, "AAA". This, however, infuriated "BBB," hence, he reported to the police authorities the said offer of settlement. The police then arrested appellant. The last witness for the prosecution is Noel Dunuan, the Barangay Captain of Barangay "XXX". He corroborated the testimony of "BBB" and declared that Pugong and appellants brother, Afeles Banig, came to his office asking for the settlement of the case.

At around 6:00 a.m., appellant took a bath, accompanied by a certain Fernando Ananayo. Thereafter, he proceeded to have breakfast in the house of the bride and groom where he saw "AAA" also having her breakfast with other companions. After breakfast, appellant asked her permission to leave for Pangasinan to attend another wedding. "AAA" replied that if he really loves her, he will come back and talk to her parents. Appellant went to Pangasinan and stayed there for a little over two weeks. Upon his return and as promised, he talked with "AAAs" parents. The mother of "AAA" informed appellant that if the two of them were really in love and wanted to marry, then they should start the process of securing the necessary papers for their marriage.10 Thus, a date was set for the appellant and "AAA" to proceed to the Municipal Hall of "YYY" to apply for a marriage license. On such date, appellant and "AAA" went to "YYY" with "AAAs" mother and aunt. They first had lunch in a restaurant as it was already noon. After finishing their meal, a police officer came over and invited him for interrogation. Appellant obliged but was later arrested and put behind bars. Appellant later learned that "BBB" filed a criminal case against him. According to the appellant, "BBB" must have felt embarrassed by the fact that people saw him and "AAA" embracing each other during the pre-nuptial dance. On that same day, "AAA" visited the appellant. When asked why they were putting him in jail, "AAA" replied that if she goes against the wishes of her father, her parents might disown her. 11

Evidence for the Defense

The appellant denied the charges against him. He unfurled his own version of the events that transpired in this case as follows: Appellant was invited to a pre-nuptial dance and wedding ceremony of Mercy Ananayo and Fernando Witawit. It was during the said dance in the evening of March 27, 1996 that he met "AAA". He danced with "AAA" several times during that night and eventually courted her by professing his love for her. Sensing that she was attracted to him, appellant concluded that he had a chance of winning her heart.9 After dancing for quite some time, appellant and "AAA" stepped away from the dance hall and sat down together in a dimly lit place about 8-10 meters away. Both of them stayed there for about an hour where they chatted and got to know each other better. When appellant sensed that no one was watching, he held "AAAs" hands and kissed her lips five times. They soon returned to the dance hall and continued to dance the night away until around 4:00 a.m. He told "AAA" that he loves her and asked her to wait for him to come back since he had another wedding to attend in Pangasinan. He promised her that upon his return, he will talk to her parents and formally ask their permission to marry her.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 17, 2000, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape while his coaccused Ginumtad was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the judgment of conviction reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds Pedro Banig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as provided for under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition, said accused Pedro Banig should pay the victim, "AAA", the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. As to accused Tony Ginumtad, this Court finds him Not Guilty for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED.12 In finding the appellant guilty, the RTC held that he had sexual intercourse with the victim through the use of force. It gave full credit and weight to the testimony of

the prosecution witnesses, especially that of "AAA". On the other hand, it debunked appellants "sweetheart theory" for being intrinsically weak.

Q: And, what transpired after these two persons placed your two hands at your back? A: xxxx Q: A: xxxx Q: After removing your pants and underwear, Madam witness, what did Pedro Banig do to you, if any? A: He inserted his penis, sir. Who was that person who removed your pants and underwear? They were the ones, sir, Pedro Banig and Tony Ginumtad. When they put my hands at my back they removed my pants and panty, sir.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 20, 2000, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,13 which was granted by the RTC.14 Consequently, the records of this case were forwarded to this Court. Conformably with the ruling of this Court in People v. Mateo,15 however, the case was transferred to the CA for intermediate appellate review. Then on November 13, 2006, the CA rendered its now assailed Decision16 affirming with modification the RTCs judgment of conviction, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the victim, "AAA", P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.17 Hence, this appeal. Issue In his brief, appellant made a single assignment of error that THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT [OF] THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.18 Our Ruling The appeal lacks merit. "In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victims testimony."19 This is so because conviction for rape may be solely based on the victims testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.20 Both the RTC and the CA agree that "AAA" recounted her ordeal in a candid, straightforward and categorical manner. Thus: FISCAL ORIAS:

FISCAL ORIAS Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: Where did he insert his penis? Into my vagina, sir. What did you feel when he inserted his penis into your vagina? It was painful, sir. Did you not shout? No, sir, because they told me that if I x x x shout they would kill me, sir. Was Pedro Banig armed at that time?

ATTY. PAWINGI: Leading, your honor. FISCAL ORIAS: That is a follow-up to what she answered, your honor.

COURT: Let her answer. A: Yes, sir.

FISCAL ORIAS: Q: A: With what? Knife, sir.

she opted to cry for help, because it is just ten to fifteen (10-15) meters away from an inhabited house."28 He also asserts that "AAAs" actuations during the alleged sexual assault failed to show the kind of resistance expected of a young woman defending her virtue and honor.29 To further cast doubt on "AAAs" credibility, appellant points to the fact that "AAA" did not report the offense at the first opportunity.30 Moreover, he questions the conduct of "AAA" as she appeared to be not indisposed in the morning after the alleged rape.31 The appellants arguments are misplaced. The CA correctly ruled that "AAA" could not cry for help as she was intimidated and overpowered by her aggressors who threatened her with a sharp-bladed knife.32 Besides, it is important to underscore that the proximity of an inhabited house to the place where the crime took place does not rule out the possibility of the commission of rape. We have previously held in People v. Mabonga33 that: It is a common judicial experience that the presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing their odious act. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. It is well-settled that lust respects neither time nor place. "There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion."34 What the evidence reveals is that despite the proximity to neighboring houses, the appellant, by means of force or intimidation, did in fact have sexual intercourse with "AAA" against her will. Thus, it is immaterial that an inhabited house was near the place where the crime was committed. This fact will neither render "AAA" any less credible nor make the commission of the crime less conceivable. With respect to "AAAs" actuations during the commission of the crime, it is not necessary on the part of the victim to put up a tenacious physical struggle. As previously pointed out, "AAA" was threatened with a sharp-bladed knife. One shrill cry or a flurry of violent kicks from her could mean the end of her life. In People v. Corpuz,35 we ruled that "physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear." When the sharp point of a knife is staring down the eyes of the victim, struggle is futile and the only option left in the mind of a frightened lady is to submit rather than lose her life. That the victim allowed the entry of her aggressors penis rather than his knife does not detract from the fact that rape was committed by means of force and intimidation and certainly against her will.

Q: What did he do next, Madam witness, when he inserted his penis into your vagina? A: He made up and down movement, sir.21

Aggrieved that he was the only one convicted of the crime charged, appellant argues in his Brief22 that the trial court erroneously concluded that he is the sole perpetrator of the crime charged. He claims that when his co-accused Ginumtad was acquitted, he was made to be the fall guy, "just because he is unrelated by blood to the private complainant."23 A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable.24 As we have previously held in People v. Court of Appeals,25 "a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense."26 True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ of certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, however, we cannot treat the appeal as a Rule 65 petition as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to state that the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of evidence against both appellant and Ginumtad. It is a well-settled rule that this Court accords great respect and full weight to the trial courts findings, unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the case.27 It is not at all irregular for a court to convict one of the accused and acquit the other. The acquittal of Ginumtad in this case is final and it shall not be disturbed. The appellant assails "AAAs" credibility by arguing that the place where t he alleged rape took place "is not one where no other person would be able to hear her had

As to the matter of delay in reporting the rape incident, the same does not affect the credibility of "AAA". "It is not unusual for a rape victim immediately following the sexual assault to conceal at least momentarily the incident x x x."36 "Delay in reporting a rape incident renders the charge doubtful only if the delay is unreasonable and unexplained."37 "There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped."38 In this case, the delay in reporting the incident only consists of a little over two weeks. Such a span of time is not unreasonable when coupled by the fact that the victim "AAA" was threatened by her aggressor. In People v. Dumadag,39 we stressed that "not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone." Still insisting on his innocence, appellant likewise invites this Courts attention to the findings of Dr. Macabangon in his medical report. He argues that it is "highly abnormal and quite amazing for the victim to incur just a single and quite old laceration."40 The contention deserves scant consideration. "It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the [appellant] of the crime." 41 Be that as it may, in People v. Ortoa,42 where the medico-legal findings showed that the victim is still in a state of virginity when she was examined, we held that: The lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape. x x x Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. (Citations omitted.) The laceration found by Dr. Macabangon in the medical examination confirms the victims testimony that she was raped. In his testimony, Dr. Macabangon stated that the laceration of the hymen usually heals in less than 10 days. In "AAAs" case, she was examined on April 23, 1996, or more than three weeks after the rape incident occurred on March 28, 1996. This explains why the findings showed that the laceration of the hymen was old. Appellant further argues that "AAA" agreed to marry him, suggesting that her presence during a meeting with the barangay captain is a sign of his innocence of the crime of rape. We are not convinced. "The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts." 43 Appellants

bare testimony that he and "AAA" are lovers who agreed to get married is insufficient for the defense of "sweetheart theory" to prosper. Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, mere assertion of a romantic relationship would not necessarily exclude the use of force or intimidation in sexual intercourse. In People v. Cias,44 this Court held that "a love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will." With respect to the propriety of the award of moral damages, the CA is correct in awarding "AAA" moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to the award of civil indemnity. "The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon a finding that rape took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent." 45 Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which is the law then in force at the time of the commission of the crime, when the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the crime takes a qualified form and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. In the instant case, we note that the use of the knife, which is a deadly weapon, was not specifically alleged in the Information. However, it was duly proven during the proceedings below that appellant armed himself with a knife which facilitated the commission of the crime. In People v. Begino,46 we held that "the circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. These attendant circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As such, they are in the nature of qualifying circumstances."47 "If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded."48 Consequently, the use of a deadly weapon may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As such, exemplary damages may be imposed on the appellant in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages.49Thus, exemplary damages in the amount of P30, 000.00 is hereby awarded.50 Finally, on the damages awarded, an interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed, reckoned from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 51 Appellant is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.52 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02439 isAFFIRMED WITH MODI FICATIONS that appellant Pedro Banig is not eligible for parole and ordered to further pay "AAA" P30,000.00

as exemplary damages and interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. G.R. No. 181497 February 22, 2012

That on or about 10:00 oclock in the evening of January 12, 2000, at the City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of threats and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lay with, and have carnal knowledge of [his] sixteen (16) year[s] old daughter, [AAA] against her will to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].6 [Criminal Case No. FC-3165] That on or about January 14, 2000, at midnight in the City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lay with, and have carnal knowledge of [his] sixteen (16) year[s] old daughter, [AAA] against her will to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].7 [Criminal Case No. FC-3068] That on or about 2:00 to 3:00 oclock in the early morning of January 14, 2000 at Sinsayon, Santiago City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats and intimidation and by reason of his moral ascendancy and influence as a father, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his 16[-]year[-]old daughter, [AAA], against her will to the damage and prejudice of the latter.8 On July 6, 2000, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges and waived the pre-trial conference.9Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA, 10 the private offended party; and formally offered its documentary exhibits consisting of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Santiago City, 11 the MedicoLegal Certificate12 dated January 17, 2000 issued by the Southern Isabela General Hospital, and AAAs Sworn Complaint13 dated January 18, 2000. On the other hand, the defense submitted the testimonies of accused-appellant14 and his sister, Mary Marquez.15 After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on December 19, 2002 convicting accusedappellant for the crimes charged. The RTC decreed: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Paterno Samandre y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape and hereby sentences him to the penalty of death in each of these

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PATERNO SARMIENTO SAMANDRE, Accused-Appellant. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: On appeal is the Decision1 dated April 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02024, affirming with modifications the Decision 2 dated December 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 of Santiago City, which convicted accused-appellant Paterno Sarmiento Samandre of four counts of rape of his minor daughter. Consistent with the ruling in People v. Cabalquinto 3 and People v. Guillermo,4 this Court withholds the real name of the private offended party and her immediate family members, as well as such other personal circumstances or any other information tending to establish or compromise the identity of said party. The initials AAA represent the private offended party and the initials BBB refer to her mother. Accused-appellant was indicted for four counts of rape qualified by his relationship with and the minority of AAA. The Informations read: [Criminal Case No. FC-3163] That on or about 11:00 oclock in the evening of January 11, 2000, at the City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of threats and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lay with, and have carnal knowledge of [his] sixteen (16) year[s] old daughter, [AAA] against her will to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].5 [Criminal Case No. FC-3164]

four cases. He is also ORDERED to pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in each of these cases.16 Considering that death penalty was imposed on accused-appellant by the RTC Decision, said cases were directly elevated before us for automatic review. The Public Attorneys Office filed the Brief17 for accused-appellant on April 2, 2004, while plaintiff-appellee filed its Brief18 on August 10, 2004 through the Office of the Solicitor General. In our Resolution19 dated September 27, 2005, we referred the present case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo.20 The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated April 25, 2007, recounted the prosecutions version of events as follows: AAA was born on May 3, 1983, as evidenced by a Certification dated January 18, 2000 issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Santiago City and is the eldest child of accused-appellant. AAA and her parents, together with her three (3) sisters and four (4) brothers, reside in a one room house in Sinsayon, Santiago City. AAA, [CCC], her six (6) year old sister, and accused-appellant sleep in one bed, while her mother and her other siblings sleep in a bigger bed. In the evening of January 11, 2000, AAA was awakened by her father, AAA, who told her he wanted to have sex with her. AAA did not say anything and accusedappellant got angry and threatened to hurt her. Accused-appellant went on top of AAA, removed his short pants, as well as AAAs shorts, spread one of her legs and inserted his penis inside her vagina. Because of the pain, AAA cried and tried to struggle with accused-appellant while the latter made a push and pull movement. After removing his penis from the vagina of AAA, he wiped it and the vagina of the latter and then slept beside her. In the evening of January 12, 2000, AAA was again awakened and raped by accused-appellant as what happened the night before. The same sexual molestation was repeated by accused-appellant on AAA at about 2:00 oclock and 3:00 oclock in the morning of January 14, 2000. All of the incidents took place while AAAs mother and other siblings were asleep. On January 14, 2000, accused-appellant brought AAA with him to Cordon, Isabela, to the house of their relative, Lilia Tabuar. That evening, AAA and Lilia went to a wake and the former took the opportunity to tell the latter what her father had done to her. On January 18, 2000, Lilia accompanied AAA to the Philippine National Police in Santiago City, where she executed a sworn statement before PO1 Arlyn Malabad Guray narrating the sexual molestations of accused-appellant. Said sworn statement was signed by AAA in the presence of Lilia Tabuar. 21

The Court of Appeals also presented a summary of accused-appellants defenses, to wit: Accused-appellant denied having molested AAA. He claimed that on January 11, 2000, AAA left their house after he scolded her because she wanted to marry Freddie Fragata, who is already a married man. He went to Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, which is his province, to look for AAA, because she told her mother that she would go there. He stayed in the house of his father until the morning of January 13, 2000 to wait for AAA, but the latter did not arrive. He then returned to his house in Sinsayon, Santiago City. In the afternoon of January 13, 2000, accused-appellant was called to the house of his brother-in-law in order to discuss the marriage of AAA. He went to the house of his brother-in-law where he saw AAA and Freddie. He told AAA not to get married yet and brought her home. He stated that AAA filed the cases against him because she wanted him to go to jail so that she could do whatever she wanted. He tried to show that they have three (3) beds in the house, one bed is occupied by his two (2) sons, the big bed is occupied by him, his wife and their other children, including AAA, and that no one occupies the small bed. Accused-appellants sister, Mary Marquez, testified that accused-appellant stayed in her house at Tukal, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya on January 11, 2000 while looking for AAA, who stowed away; that accused-appellant left the following day; and that her house is quite far from the house of her father. 22 After its evaluation of the foregoing evidence, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on April 25, 2007 affirming accused-appellants conviction for the four counts of rape, but modifying the penalty and awards for damages rendered against him. The decretal portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Paterno Samandre y Sarmiento is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in each case and is likewise ordered to pay AAA, in each case, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case.23 Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution24 dated March 5, 2008, the Court gave the parties an opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs. However, both plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellant manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals and, thus, would no longer file any supplemental brief.25

In his lone assignment of error, accused-appellant professes his innocence of the crimes charged. Accused-appellant highlights the inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, particularly, on whether or not she has a suitor/boyfriend. Accused-appellant asserts that AAAs initial concealment of the fact that she already has a boyfriend supports accused-appellants contention that AAA accused him of rape so he could go to jail and no longer prevent AAA from marrying her boyfriend. The Court sustains accused-appellants conviction for raping his minor daughter on all four counts. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa, 26 the Court held that "in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainants father, would suffice." The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, taking advantage of his moral ascendancy as a father, had carnal knowledge of his 16-year-old daughter, AAA. In her Sworn Statement, executed in question-and-answer form, on January 18, 2000, AAA narrated to Police Officer (PO) Arlyn Malabad Guray that she had been sexually abused by her own father, accused-appellant, since she was 10 years old, and the latest incidents took place in January 2000. Below are relevant portions of AAAs Sworn Statement: Q: What prompted you to appear before the Office of the Investigation section? A: To file a complaint against my father Paterno Samandre, maam. Q: What is your complaint against Paterno Samandre? A: He sexually abused and molested me, maam. Q: When and where did the incident happened?

A: Since when I was still 10 years old up to January 14, 2000 in our house and even in the river bank, maam. Q: How many times did your father sexually abused/molested you? A: He did it for many times, maam. Q: When was the last time that your father sexually abused you? A: On January 14, 2000 at about 2:00 to 3:00 oclock in the morning, maam. Q: Will you please narrate how the incident happened? A: Sometime on the year 1993 we were then living at Tucal, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, and I was then grade 3, while I was in our house one daylight sewing my cloth, my mother and younger brother and sister were out, my father came to me and wanted me to lay down and he will do something to me. Sensing that he is doing bad to me, I hesitated but forced me and laid me down in a bed. He then went on top of me and instructed me not to move. He is then wearing short pants, he removed my panty in my one leg then he removed his short pants and tried to insert his penis but I continuously move my body and pushed him. He told me that the pain was only in the beginning and later on the pain will no longer feel by me. He was able to insert partially his penis on my vagina and when he is about to ejaculate he immediately removed his penis and poured his semen in my vagina. Q: What did you feel then? A: Very painful, maam. xxxx Q: On this month of January 2000, how many times did he abuse you? A: Four (4) times, maam. The last time was on the dawn of January 14, 2000. Q: Will you please narrate what happened on the dawn of January 14, 2000? A: On January 13 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening I slept beside my father together with my sister [CCC], at the dawn of January 14, 2000, my father awaken me to have again sexual intercourse. I refused and pushed him but he got angry so, I did nothing but to [give] myself.

Q: After the incident happened what did you do then? A: I cried, maam and at about 6:00 oclock in the morning of same date he told me that we will go to Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, but we did not proceed to said place, instead we proceeded at Sagat, Cordon, Isabela, at the house of my cousin Lilia Tabuar. And at the evening of same date at around 8:00 PM my cousin Lilia Tabuar invited me to attend the wake of the late mother of Vice Mayor Zuniega at that moment Ive got a chance to reveal what my father did to me. 27 During trial, AAA related more vividly her most recent sexual tribulations at the hands of accused-appellant: Q: In the evening of January 11, 2000, where were you if you still remember Madam Witness? A: I was at our house inside a room, sir. Q: What were you doing inside that room of your house in that evening of January 11, 2000? A: I was sleeping, sir. Q: Who was your companion, if any, at that time inside the room where you were sleeping in the evening of January 11, 2000? A: My father and my younger sister [CCC], sir. Q. How old is [CCC]? A. Six (6) years old, sir. Q. What happened in the evening of January 11, 2000? A. He woke me up, sir. Q. Who woke you up? A. My father, sir. Q. After your father woke you up, what happened?

A. He wanted to rape me, sir. Q. And what did you do when your father wanted to rape you? A. I just did not say anything, sir. Q. And when you did not say anything, what happened next? A. He got angry with me, sir. Q. And what did he tell you when he got angry at you? A. He told me that he will be going to hurt me because he is angry, sir. xxxx Q. And after your father wanted to harm you in the evening of January 11, 2000, what happened next? A. He went on top of me, sir. Q. When your father went on top of you, what did he do next, if any? A. He removed his short pants, sir. Q. After your father removed his short pants, what did he do next? A. He removed my short from one of my legs, sir. Q. When your father removed your short, what did you do? A. He spread one of my legs and inserted his penis, sir. Q. Where did your father insert his penis? A. At my vagina, sir. Q. When your father inserted his penis inside your vagina, what did you feel? A. I felt pain, sir.

Q. What did you do when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina? A. I struggled and crying, sir. Q. Why did you cry and why did you struggle? A. It is painful, sir. Q. And after your father inserted his penis inside your vagina in the evening of January 11, 2000, what did you do next, if any? A. He made push and pull movement, sir. Q. And what did you do when your father made a push and pull move? A. I kept on struggling and crying, sir.

Q. What was that? A. The whitish substance that came out from his penis, sir. Q. Where did it go that whitish substance when you felt it was hot? A. Over my vagina, sir. Q. After that, what happened? A. I kept on crying, sir. Q. Where did your father go after he removed his penis from your vagina? A. He lied down and went to sleep, sir. xxxx

Q. And after that, what happened? Q. Now what happened, if any, in the evening of January 12, 2000? A. He removed his penis, sir. Q. And after your father removed his penis, from where did he remove his penis? A. From my vagina, sir. Q. You are referring to your father, is that correct? Q. After your father removed his penis from your vagina, what did he do next, if any? A. He wiped it, sir. Q. What did your father wipe? A. His penis and my vagina, sir. Q. And what did you feel when your father removed his penis from your vagina? A. It is painful, sir. Q. What else, if any? A. There is something hot, sir. A. Yes, sir. Q. Where did your father rape you again in the evening of January 12, 2000? A. Inside the room, sir. xxxx Q. So, how did your father rape you in the evening of January 12, 2000? A. It is the same, he also woke me up, sir. Q. When your father woke you up in the evening of January 12, 2000, what did you do? A. He again raped me, sir. xxxx

A. I just kept silent, sir. Q. Why? A. Because I do not want him to repeat what he did to me, sir. Q. After your father woke you up in the evening of January 12, 2000, what happened next? A. He got angry with me, sir. xxxx Q. After your father got mad at you in the evening of January 12, 2000 inside a room of your house, what happened next, if any? A. He suddenly went on top of me, sir. Q. And what did your father do after he went on top of you? A. He again removed his short pants, sir. Q. After your father removed his short pants, what happened next? A. He also removed my short pants and inserted his penis into my vagina, sir. Q. And what did you feel when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina? A. It is painful, sir. Q. What did you do when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina? A. I cried, sir. Q. What did your father do after he was able to insert his penis inside your vagina? A. He made a push and pull movement, sir. Q. After that, what happened? A. I kept on crying, sir.28

AAA went on to recall on the witness stand that accused-appellant committed the same bestial deeds against her two more times, at around two and three oclock in the morning of January 14, 2000. AAA further testified that she was only able to put an end to her ordeal when accused-appellant brought her to Cordon, Isabela, to visit their relative, Lilia Tabuar (Lilia). In the evening of January 14, 2000, when Lilia took AAA with her to attend a wake, AAA grabbed the chance to tell Lilia what accused-appellant had been doing to her. Thus, on January 18, 2000, Lilia accompanied AAA to the Philippine National Police in Santiago City, where AAA executed her Sworn Statement before PO2 Guray. AAAs Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Santiago City establishes that she was born on May 3, 1983. The Medico-Legal Certificate dated January 17, 2000 reports that AAA sustained old hymenal lacerations. These documents are consistent with AAAs claim of repeated sexual abuse by accused-appellant on January 11, 12, and 14, 2000, when she was only 16 years old. The Court cannot give much weight to accused-appellants defenses, constituting of denial, alibi, and the imputation of ill motive on AAAs part in the filing of the instant rape charges. We have decreed in People v. Nachor29 that: Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness. Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant], the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.30 The testimony of Mary Marquez (Mary), accused-appellants sister, did nothing to corroborate accused-appellants alibi. As his alibi, accused-appellant claimed that he slept and stayed at his fathers house in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya , from January 11, 2000 until the morning of January 13, 2000. However, according to Mary, accusedappellant stayed overnight at her house also in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on January 11, 2000, and went home the very next day, on January 12, 2000. Mary admitted that her house is quite far from their fathers house. Mary, when confronted with these conflicting averments as to accused-appellants purported whereabouts on January 11 to 13, 2000, remained silent and could not offer any explanation for the same, thus:

Q: Madam witness on the night of January 11, 2000 where did the accused Paterno Samandre sleep? A: In our house, sir. Q: And in the following morning that is on January 12, 2000, where did the accused go, if you know? A: He went home, sir. xxxx

Q: What time did your [brother] Paterno Samandre sleep in your house in the evening of January 11, 2000? A: About 7:30, sir. Q: In the evening? A: Yes, sir. Q: You are very sure of that? A: Yes, sir.

Q: During your direct examination you stated that your brother the accused in this case went to your house on January 11, 2000, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what time, did he arrive at your house on January 11, 2000? A: At about 4:00 oclock, sir. Q: In the afternoon? A: Yes, sir. Q: When he arrived in your house he likewise slept in your house in the evening of January 11, 2000, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. xxxx Q: Now, the house of your father is likewise located at Tukal, Nueva Vizcaya, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: How far is the house of your father to your house? A: It is quite far, sir.

Q: What time did he wake up? A: 6:00 oclock, sir. Q: When your brother Paterno Samandre testified in this case madam witness he stated that he slept in the house of your father in the evening of January 11, 2000, what can you say about that? PROS. DAMASEN: I would like to make it on record that the witness could not answer the question, your honor. COURT: Alright, put there no answer. PROS. DAMASEN: Q: Likewise when your brother testified in this case he stated that he went to Solano and not to Tukal on January 11, 2000, what can you say about that? xxxx COURT: Never mind the implication. So just ask the question.

No answer also? PROS. DAMASEN: No answer, your honor. COURT: Put no answer. PROS. DAMASEN: Q: A while ago on direct examination you stated that your brother the accused in this case went home to Santiago City on January 12, 2000 from Tukal, Nueva Vizcaya, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, when your brother testified in this case madam witness he stated that he went home here in Santiago City on January 13, 2000, what can you say about that? A: Yes, he went home, sir. Q: So you are now changing your previous answer? PROS. DAMASEN: May we spread on record, your honor, that the witness is taking time to answer a very simple question. No answer, your honor. COURT: Alright, put no answer.31 (Emphases supplied.) The inconsistencies in AAAs statements do not destroy her credibility. Whether or not AAA has a boyfriend does not have any relevance to any of the essential elements of the crime of rape. The Court adopts the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this matter:

As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in the appellees brief, the initial denial by AAA that she has a boyfriend is immaterial as it has no bearing whatsoever on the essential elements of rape or the identity of the perpetrator.1wphi1 Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor or insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses credibility. Moreover, no evidence was presented by accused-appellant to support his claim that AAA wanted to marry her boyfriend, Freddie Fragata, and that the latter is married. Thus, the motive imputed by accused-appellant on AAA for wanting him to be jailed is too tenuous to be given credence. As held in People v. Torres: "The attempt of accused-appellant to impute ill-motive on complainant for fabricating the charge of rape against him cannot succeed. Not a few persons accused of rape have attributed the charges brought against them to resentment or revenge, but such alleged motives have not prevented the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examination. Given the naivete of complainant who was only 14 years old at the time of the incident, we are hard put to believe that she could have concocted a tale of pure fantasy, if only to get back at her father for not allowing her to live and study in Manila. Well-settled is the doctrine that no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape, particularly against her alleged father, if such were not the truth, or if justice was not her sole objective. The revelation of a young girl that she was sexually abused cannot be easily dismissed as a mere concoction, considering her willingness to undergo a public trial and relate the details of her defilement. Normally, no woman would be willing to undergo the arduous stages and embarrassing consequences of a rape trial, if not to condemn an injustice and obtain retribution." We thus agree with the following observations of the court a quo: "What does it take for a young daughter to wish her father to stay in jail possibly for the rest of his life or even executed to death? Certainly not for the reason that her father refused to let her marry someone. According to the accused in this case his daughter charged him of raping her because he scolded her and prohibited her to marry her boyfriend who is a married man. This is absurd especially as he did not try to show that his daughter has evil ways. xxxx What lends credence to her accusation is that she immediately reported the matter at the first chance she had. Unfortunately not to her mother because according to her she did not have a chance to do so because her father was always around watching her. This turned out to be right because it happened that her mother was

fool enough to side with her husband when the denouncement was made. [AAA] reported the matter to her cousin (or aunt) Lilia Tabuar when her father brought her to Cordon, Isabela, on January 19, (sic) 2000."32 In People v. Crespo,
33

we emphasized:

It bears stressing once again that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. A woman would think twice before she concocts a story of rape, especially against her own father, unless she is motivated by a patent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her. The issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts"34 and "[a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case."35 The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when the findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 36The Court finds no compelling reason herein to deviate from said findings. Finally, the Court adopts the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-appellant but modifies the damages awarded to AAA. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, the Court of Appeals properly imposed upon accusedappellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the four (4) counts of qualified rape for which he is hereby convicted. In line with current jurisprudence, however, accused-appellant is liable to pay AAA for each of the four (4) counts of qualified rape the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.37 Exemplary damages should be awarded "in order to deter fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon their young daughters."38 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated April 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02024 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Paterno Samandre y Sarmiento is found GUILTY of four (4) counts of qualified rape for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, for every count, with interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow. Antecedents Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred: That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum ofP131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount ofP131,286.97.

Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1 Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work. 2 On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and recrossexamination were completed. The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as

per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.3 During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found. In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. 4With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information. TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies. 5 After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.6 On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted "not to present evidence for her defense" the Prosecutions evidence remained "unrefuted and uncontroverted,"7rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit: Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify private

complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the costs. Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only until the promulgation of this judgment. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004.9 Issues Insisting that the RTCs judgment "grossly violated [her] Constitutional a nd statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty," and that said judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence," petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit: 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER ISESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT

THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. 5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION "REMAINS UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSEDS OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED. 6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING "UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS. 7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT "A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.10 The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows: 1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her customersviolated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information not alleging the falsification; 3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioners guilt for estafaas charged despite their not being duly authenticated;and

4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay. Ruling The petition is meritorious. I Failure of information to allege falsification did not violate petitioners right to be informed of thenatureand cause of the accusation Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification. The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained. The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz: Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:

Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a complaint or information should state the designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7) Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (8) The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.11 Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz: Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. 2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos; 3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means: xxx 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: xxx (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. xxx The elements of the offense charged were as follows: (a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt; (c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and (d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal property.12 According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or

conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her. We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the estafacharged. Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioners concern thuswise: In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecutions evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencans testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused. It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged. Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said

collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the company xxx.13 II Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay, did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. 15In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.16Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof,17that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it. Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information? To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself.18The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive. On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons

other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be crossexamined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. 19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.20 The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. 22 This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.24 Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to crossexamine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.25If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.26It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga partys right to cross-examine her adversarys witness,the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz: Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a) The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the crossexamination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly: Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to

any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a) Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx ," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings. We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.27 Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion. III Lack of their proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives inadmissible as judicial evidence Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz: Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are private. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is selfauthenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;29(c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.31 There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz: Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various receipts, to wit: ATTY. ABIERA: Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts? A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession. Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this (Next Page) ATTY ABIERA (continuing): Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts? A. Yes. Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula? A. Yes. Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case? A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also. Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila

Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the signature? A. Yes, that is her signature. INTERPRETER: Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word "collector". (Next Page) ATTY. ABIERA: Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this case appears? A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts. ATTY. ABIERA: In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit "A" You Honor. COURT: Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A". ATTY. ABIERA: And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1". (Next Page) ATTY. ABIERA:

COURT: Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of that receipt?

Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila Askin.32 xxx As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence. It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997." In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either because she lacked familiarity

with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out: ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss witness? A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last payment. COURT: Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts? A. From the customer. Q. And who issued those receipts? A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula. ATTY. ZERNA: We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit "B-3", receipt number 20441. (Next Page) COURT: Mark it. ATTY. ZERNA: The signature of the collector be marked as Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness) A. Yes.

Q. Whose signature is that? A. Miss Patula. Q. How do you know? A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula. Q. Are you familiar with her signature? A. Yes. ATTY. ZERNA: We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3-a" COURT: Mark it. ATTY. ZERNA: The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the signature as Exhibit "B-4-a". COURT: Mark it.33 xxx ATTY. ZERNA: Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the receipt of your office? A.Yes. Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this? A.Ms. Patula.

Q.How do you know that this is her signature? A.Because we can read the Patula.34 We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on petitio ners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony show: ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75? ATTY. DIEZ: The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record. COURT: Let the witness answer. WITNESS: A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the customers for confirmation. ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. What about the receipts? COURT: Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the customers? WITNESS:

A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of P10,971.75. ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is still P10,971.75 (Next Page) ATTY. ZERNA (continuing): [i]n your office? COURT: That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger. Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you? A. No, Maam.35 (Continuation of the Direct Examination of Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002) ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said? A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the original (Next page) WITNESS (continuing): [r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75). COURT:

Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there? A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the Manila Office. Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a zero balance? A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she has still a balance. xxx ATTY. ZERNA: The confirmation sheet --COURT: The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts, the original receipts? A. This is what I copied from the ledger. Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand something? A. The receipt is no longer here. Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger ? A. Yes.
36

ATTY. ZERNA: CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it now? A It is here. Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her account in your office? ATTY. DIEZ: Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me interpose our objection on the ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who made the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same. COURT: Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court (Next Page) COURT (cont.): because these were the ledgers on file in their office. ATTY. DIEZ That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office. COURT:

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows: (Continuation of the Direct Examination of Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer. ATTY. ZERNA: WITNESS: A Its the office clerk in-charge. COURT: The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk. ATTY. ZERNA: She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of Footluckers. COURT: I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel. xxx ATTY. DIEZ: Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay. COURT: Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted. Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers? A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor, COURT: Alright proceed.

(Next Page)

Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule. COURT: Okey(sic), proceed.37 The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows: Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied) If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:38 On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of

steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered. At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial. On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondents documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this point could not be taken at face value. xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of

the steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability. That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.39Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value. Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers "were prepared in the regular course of business."40Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows: (a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 41 The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow. IV No reliable evidence on damage Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the amount of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.1wphi1 WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

Statement of the Facts and of the Case The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3 Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued. During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion. In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent. DECISION SERENO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00). The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law. SO ORDERED.6 Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012. Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition: (i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID. (ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE. (iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. (iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7 Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught inflagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8 We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9 First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11 Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of

issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license. Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints: SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants; At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows: It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a

traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451. Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to

the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.) The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made. It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to

undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody. Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.16 Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18 Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police proced ures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)

the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20 In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown: In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981). Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.24 The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. 26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground. G.R. No. 194445 March 12, 2012

introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.3 Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision4 dated June 17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as to the accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in Criminal Case No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt. Now, the accused-appellants ask this Court for a complete exoneration from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 3490 on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items and to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Antecedent Facts

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, vs. ROGER POSADA y URBANO and EMILY POSADA y SARMIENTO, Accused. DECISION REYES, J.: As we decide this appeal involving a couple who allegedly violated Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, we should bear in mind the words emanating from the pen of former Justice Isagani A. Cruz: We need only add that the active support of everyone is needed to bolster the campaign of the government against the evil of drug addiction. The merchants of all prohibited drugs, from the rich and powerful syndicates to the individual street "pushers," must be hounded relentlessly and punished to the full extent of the law, subject only to the inhibitions of the Bill of Rights.1 The Case Accused-appellants Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490 for selling twelve (12) pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578 grams, in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.2 Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline substance (allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and fifteen (15) pieces of used lighter all of which are intended to be used for smoking or

According to the evidence of the prosecution, P/CI Gil Francis Tria (P/CI Tria), the Chief of Police of Virac Municipal Police Station and representative of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), ordered surveillance on the activities of the accused-appellants and a certain Johnjohn Urbano (Urbano).5 As a result of the said surveillance, PO1 Roldan Area (PO1 Area) was able to buy one sachet of shabu from Emily for P250.00 on August 2, 2005.6 Consequently, after the August 2, 2005 test-buy yielded positive result, P/CI Tria applied for a search warrant, which the Honorable Jaime E. Contreras granted.7 Thus, at noontime of August 3, 2005, P/CI Tria and his team proceeded to Barangay Concepcion and coordinated with Punong Barangay Antonio Asuncion, Jr. (Asuncion) in the operation against the accused-appellants.8 When the team of P/CI Tria reached the place of operation, they found Emily standing in front of her house. PO1 Area, who was the poseur-buyer, called her and when she came near him, he told her that he would buy shabu. PO1 Area then handed to Emily P250.00, consisting of two pieces of P100.00 bill and one piece of P50.00 bill. After receiving the money from PO1 Area, Emily immediately went to her house and got a coin purse. When she returned at the scene of the operation, Emily gave PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which she got from the coin purse. Subsequently, Roger appeared and handed to Emily 12 plastic sachets of shabu which Emily placed inside the coin purse. At this point, PO1 Area identified himself as a police officer while giving the signal to his team that the buy-bust turned positive. He arrested Emily while Roger ran away and went inside their house. PO1 Area informed Emily of her constitutional rights, but the latter failed to utter any word.9

While PO1 Area was holding the arm of Emily, who still had in her hands the coin purse where she got the sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money, P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone while the official photographer was also taking pictures. After the search, a coin purse containing sachets of shabu and a bundle of money was found in Emily's possession.10 PO1 Area then prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (RPS).11Asuncion, Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and a certain Robert Vargas (Vargas) witnessed the preparation of the said receipt.12 Meanwhile, when Roger left Emily at the scene of the buy-bust operation, he went inside his house and closed the door. Armed with the search warrant, SPO1 Salvador Aldave, Jr. (SPO1 Aldave) forced the door open. SPO1 Aldave was the first person to enter the house, followed by the barangay officials and his fellow officers, SPO1 Roger Masagca (SPO1 Masagca) and PO1 Ronnie Valeza (PO1 Valeza). The search warrant was shown to Roger. In his presence and in the presence of Kagawad Jena Arcilla (Arcilla), the raiding team recovered one piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing residue of white crystalline substance, and one small pair of green scissors beside the bed inside a room, and 15 pieces of used lighters from an improvised altar on top of a wooden table. A search of Roger's pocket yielded two pieces of P50.00 bill and one piece of P100.00 bill. SPO1 Aldave as the seizing officer prepared and signed an RPS. Asuncion, Arcilla and Barangay Tanod Juan Gonzales(Gonzales) witnessed the preparation and signing of the said RPS. Roger, however, refused to sign the same. The couple was then brought to the police station.13 At the Virac Police Station, a body search on Emily resulted in the seizure of bills of different denominations, totaling P2,720.00. Some of these bills were identified as those bills photocopied and submitted to the Provincial Prosecution Office. 14 On August 4, 2005, immediately after the operation and the execution of the search warrant, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio [Abao] and Police Inspector Sta. Cruz, J. (P/Insp. Sta. Cruz). The sachet with the initial "R" was the sachet of shabu sold to PO1 Area during the buy bust operation while the sachets of shabumarked as "R-1" to "R-12" were the sachets of shabu which Roger handed to Emily and which were found in the possession of Emily after PO1 Area identified himself as a police officer.15

Subsequently, witness Police Senior Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen), the forensic expert, received personally from the receiving clerk (PO2 Abanio) the above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted laboratory examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings "R-1" to "R-12"), the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R", the one aluminum foil strip, and a small size plastic sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. 16 The accused-appellants were subsequently charged in two separate Informations,17 both dated August 4, 2005, with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which were respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 3490 and Criminal Case No. 3489. The Informations state as follows: Criminal Case No. 3490 The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano and Emily Posada y Sarmiento of Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 5 of said Law, committed as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 at noontime along Imelda Blvd. in barangay Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused without the authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride[,] locally known as shabu[,] with a total weight of 0.9 gram [-] a prohibited drug[,] and several marked money bills.18 [Emphasis supplied] Criminal Case No. 3489 The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano of Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 12 of said law, committed as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 in the afternoon in Barangay Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, province (sic) of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused without the authority of law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and in control of one (1) piece of teared plastic sachet containing residue of a crystalline substance[,] locally known as shabu, (1) piece small aluminum foil, (1) piece small scissors (sic) and 15 pieces of used lighter[,] which paraphernalia are (sic) fit or

intended for smoking or introducing any dangerous drug into the body of a person.19 However, the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490 was later amended,20 to reflect a change in the weight of the seized drugs from 0.9 gram to 0.4578 gram. Meanwhile, on the part of the accused-appellants, they simply denied the accusations against them. Roger claimed that on April 3, 2005 (which was even a misleading date since the event happened on August 3, 2005), at around 12 noon, he was putting his three year-old child to sleep inside their house, while his wife Emily was washing their clothes at his parents' house. He then peeped through the window jalousies when he heard his wife calling out his name. He saw a policeman, later identified as PO1 Area, pulling Emily towards the road. Roger claimed that PO1 Valeza later poked a gun at him, preventing him to move from the window. Thereafter, the door of Roger's house was forced open, allowing SPO1 Aldave, SPO1 Masagca, PO1 Valeza and Barangay Tanod Vic Vargas (Vargas) to enter his house. Inside the house, PO1 Valeza allegedly took down the jackets hanging on the wall and searched them; SPO1 Aldave took pictures while Vargas and SPO1 Masagca went inside the room and searched the cabinets where toys were kept. Roger further claims that nothing was found in his house. After the search, Roger was brought to the patrol car where his wife Emily was taken.21 Meanwhile, Emily testified that on that fateful day of August 3, 2005, she was washing clothes at her mother-in-law's house when a man, whom she could not identify, approached her and asked her if she was Emily Posada. She alleged that the man immediately held her hands, shouting "Police! Police!" after which police officers Tria and Aldave arrived. Her picture was taken. Subsequently, she was brought to the patrol car where her husband Roger later joined her. Both Roger and Emily were then transported to the police station. Roger was placed behind bars while Emily was placed at the detention cell of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).22 The couple claimed that the police officers did not inform them why they were brought to the police station and subsequently detained. Emily denied that a buybust operation was conducted against her, but she was aware of the search conducted in their house because her husband informed her at the police station. Meanwhile, Roger also denied that the police officers presented to him a search warrant. Likewise, both alleged that the money taken from Emily's wallet were the proceeds of the sale of their chickens, which Roger gave to Emily. The said money amounted to more or less P3,000.00.23 Issues

Considering that the accused-appellants did not file a supplemental brief and that appellee People of the Philippines adopted its brief before the CA, we now rule on the matter based on the issues24 which the accused-appellants raised in their brief before the CA, to wit: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED ILLEGAL ITEMS. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25 Our Ruling While we give due credence to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses absent any showing that the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied, we will take pains in taking a second hard look on the issues the accused-appellants raised, considering they are husband and wife whose imprisonment will greatly affect the children they will leave behind once they are declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now, we are going to discuss the case following the issues the accused-appellants raised. The prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items because: (1) The apprehending officers allegedly failed to submit the seized illegal items to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation; and (2) There is an alleged discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen.

On the first factual issue, we find that the records of the case and the testimonies of witnesses belie the accused-appellants' contention. Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and the confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12 noon of August 3, 2005.26 PO1 Area received from Emily one sachet ofshabu and after PO1 Area introduced himself and arrested Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. The said 12 sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money.27 PO1 Area prepared on the same day an RPS28 in the presence of Asuncion, Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas.29 On August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.30 The accused-appellants wanted us to believe that a day had lapsed before P/CI Tria submitted the illegal drugs to PNP Crime Laboratory Service, contrary to the mandate of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They even cited the testimony of P/CI Tria where the latter allegedly admitted submitting the subject seized items on August 4, 2005. However, a close look at the testimony of P/CI Tria 31 will reveal that nothing in it would show that he submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the 24-hour reglementary period. In fact, even the Laboratory Examination Request dated August 4, 2005 does not indicate violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.32 Clearly, from the foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their contention. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies33 in this case. The accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but to respect the findings of trial court and of the CA. Furthermore, the CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers as regards the timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers.34 In this case, the accusedappellants failed to contradict the presumption. What goes against the accusedappellants is the fact that they have not offered any evidence of ill-motive against the police officers. Emily even admitted that she did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer.35 Considering that there was no existing relationship between the police officers and the accused-appellants, the former could not be accused of improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellants. In People v. Dumangay,36 we upheld the findings of the lower court on the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duties because there was no proof of illmotive. Therein, the accused-appellants self-serving and uncorroborated defenses did not prevail over the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses. The same may be said in the present case. Finding the accused-appellants' arguments without a leg to stand on, the apprehending police officers are presumed to have timely submitted the seized illegal items to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation. On the second factual issue, we find the accused-appellants' claim not supported by evidence. The accused-appellants alleged that the integrity of the seized illegal items was compromised and their evidentiary value diminished because of the alleged discrepancy between the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accusedappellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen. They insisted that based on the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 3489 and 3490 and the testimonies of witnesses Asuncion37 and SPO1 Aldave,38 only fourteen (14) plastic sachets were recovered from the accused-appellants, while PSI Clemen allegedly testified that a total of 15 sachets were submitted for examination.39 However, a review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would show that she received one piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R",40 12 pieces small size heat-sealed marked as "R-1" to "R-12"41 and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet 42 totaling to 15 items. PSI Clemen's testimony tallies with the Laboratory Examination Request (Exhibit "J") of P/CI Tria. We reproduce Exhibit "J" below, to wit: Republic of the Philippines NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE Virac Municipal Police Station Virac, Catanduanes MEMORANDUM: FOR : The Chief PNP Crime Laboratory Service Camp Gen Simeon A Ola Legaspi City

SUBJECT : Laboratory Examination request for DATE : 04 August 2005 ---------------------------------------------------------------------1. Request conduct laboratory examination on the accompanying specimen to determine whether the white crystalline granules inside Thirteen (13) pcs small size transparent heat seald (sic) plastic sachets are Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU and also whether the one (1) pc small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size transparent plastic sachet contains residue or granules of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. EXHIBIT "A" QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION One (1) pc small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachet sachet (sic) containing white crystalline substance with marking initial "R" the initial of PO1 ROLDAN AREA who acted as posuer (sic) buyer during the drug buy bust operation. Twelve (12) pcs small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with markings R1-R12 found/confiscated from the suspect during drug buy bust operation. One (1) small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet confiscated/found in the possession of suspect during the execution of search warrant number 37 issued by Hon[.] Judge Jaime E[.] Contreras of RTC Branch 43.

FACTS OF THE CASE: Evidence submitted for laboratory examination was bought and others were confiscated by the PNP team of Virac during Buy Bust (sic) operation and the effect/execution of search warrant number 37 on August 3, 2005 in [B]arangay Concepcion Virac, Catanduanes. 2. Request acknowledge reciept (sic) and furnish this office Laboratory examination result as soon as possible for subsequent submission/filing same in court as supporting documents to this case. GIL FRANCIS G[.] TRIA Pol Chief Inspector Officer-in-Charge43 Based on the cited exhibit, we find that in Exhibit "A" we have the first item, marked with "R". Under Exhibit "B", we have the next 12 items marked as "R-1" to "R-12". Under Exhibit "C", we have the remaining two items submitted to the crime laboratory, namely one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet confiscated and found in the possession of Roger. All these items total to 15 items consistent with the testimony of PSI Clemen. Thus, evidence shows no discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accusedappellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen. Finally, we say that the prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by PO1 Area from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin purse after she received the same from her husband Roger),44 P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone while the official photographer was also taking pictures.45 Then PO1 Area prepared an RPS,46 which Asuncion, Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed.47 Meanwhile, SPO1 Aldave, seizing officer went inside the house of the accused-appellants, prepared and signed an RPS after the raiding team found a piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing residue of white crystalline substance, one small pair of green scissors beside the bed inside a room, 15 pieces of used lighters, and two pieces of P50.00 bill and one piece ofP100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the preparation and signing of the said RPS.48 Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heatsealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz.49 Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen, the forensic

"B"

"C"

SUSPECT/S Roger Posada y Urbano Emily Posada y Sarmiento John-John Bryan Urbano y Zafe COMPLAINANT Officer-in-Charge Virac MPS

expert, received personally from PO2 Abanio the above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings "R-1" to "R-12"), the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R" and the one aluminum foil strip contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.50 In open court, the abovementioned pieces of evidence were identified and marked.51 From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The Supreme Court in People v. Sanchez,52 clearly discussed how chain of custody should be proven, to wit: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.53 In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the corpus delicti, but the testimonies of the people involved in each link in the chain of custody. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of possession of the same number of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we must first take into account a discrepancy in the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said information, the accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet of shabu. However, based on the evidence which the prosecution adduced, Emily sold to PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which was worth P250.00. Then, after she handed the one sachet of shabu to the poseurbuyer, Emily received additional 12 sachets of shabu from her husband Roger and when PO1 Area informed the couple of the buy-bust, Emily had in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.54Subsequently, the confiscated sachets of shabu were marked. The one sold to PO1 Area was marked with "R", while the 12 sachets

of shabu Roger handed to Emily before their arrest were marked as "R-1" to "R12".55 The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging Emily for the sale of the one sachet ofshabu and charging both Emily and Roger for possession of the 12 sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of 12 sachets of shabu. This is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the accused-appellants of selling 12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged of selling one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12 sachets of shabu. They possessed them. Thus, they should have not been convicted for selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However, this was exactly what was done both by the trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact, they convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu. Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not really charge an offense56 or when an essential element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged.57 In the instant case, while the prosecution was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to particularly allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of the sale or the corpus delicti.We must remember that one of the essential elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump together two sets of corpora delictiwhen it should have separated the two in two different informations. To allow the prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of their right to be informed, not only of the nature of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of the offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime. Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused.58 Here, since there exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense charged, it follows that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, from the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit the accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu. Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12 sachets of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that the husband and wife had indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides: SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential

Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos ([P]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos ([P]10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. More, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs can only be successful when the following elements are established, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.. 59 To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and PO1 Area, the prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the sale to PO1 Area was the 12 sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the sachets of shabu which Roger handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but which PO1 Area found in her possession after the latter identified himself as a police officer. In People v. Paloma,60 we acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure to prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs, and we have set the standard in proving the same, to wit: Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, and, finally, the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the informant alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the offense.61 In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the transaction as to the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately testified on the fact that accused-appellant Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin purse. And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police operative, he found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's possession.62 From the foregoing, while the prosecution was able to prove the sale of one sachet of shabu, it is patently clear that it never established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal sale of the 12 sachets of shabu. And failure to

show that indeed there was sale means failure to prove the guilt of the accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually happened, coupled with the presentation in court ofcorpus delicti.63 Here, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu and also to prove that the 12 sachets of shabu presented in court were truly the subject matter of the sale between the accused-appellants and PO1 Area. Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of illegal possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were charged for the sale of illegal drugs, because possession is necessarily included in sale of illegal drugs. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the accused-appellants should be convicted of possession. We have consistently ruled that possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof.64 Then Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale behind this ruling, to wit: The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs.1wphi1 It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.65 (Citations omitted) For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following essential elements must be proven, namely: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not

authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug."66 All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case and we will discuss them thoroughly below, since we are not ready to altogether exonerate the couple. On Emily's Liability To our minds, the testimony of PO1 Area is sufficient to establish concurrence of all the elements necessary to convict Emily of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. PO1 Area vividly narrated the details of the buy-bust operation. He recounted how on August 3, 2005 at around 12 noon, he acted as the poseur-buyer of shabu. He approached Emily, who was then standing in front of their house, and told her that he would like to buy shabu, and then gave her the P250.00. Emily then returned to her house and got a coin purse. Upon returning, Emily handed to PO1 Area a piece of sachet containing shabu. After receiving the sachet of shabu, PO1 Area saw Roger hand the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin purse. After paying for and receiving the sachet of shabu from Emily, PO1 Area arrested the latter and found in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.67From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal possession of shabu, that is: PO1 Area found in Emily's physical and actual possession the 12 sachets ofshabu; such possession of the 12 sachets of shabu was not authorized; and since Emily put the 12 sachets of shabu in the purse after receiving them from her husband, she possessed the same freely and consciously. Furthermore, PO1 Area's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of the following: (a) Barangay KagawadSarmiento who witnessed how PO1 Area caught Emily doing the illegal act; (b) Barangay Captain Asuncion, Jr. who testified that he was with the raiding team when the latter conducted the buy-bust operation and that he witnessed how money changed hands; (c) P/CI Tria who witnessed the buybust operation and was one of the arresting officers; (d) SPO1 Aldave who executed the search warrant; and (e) Barangay Kagawad Arcilla who also accompanied the raiding team in the search of the accused-appellants' house. All these witnesses completed all the angles of the buy-bust operation and the search on Emily's person up to the finding that she possessed the 12 sachets of shabu. Indeed, considering all of the above-findings of facts, we cannot have other conclusion but to find Emily guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of prohibited drugs. Indeed, every accused deserves a second look before conviction. This is the essence of the constitutional presumption of innocence. In the present case, we did not only take a second look at the facts and laws of this case because the accused-

appellants are both parents. We take a third, a fourth up to a seventh look to ensure that no child will be left unattended because his parents were imprisoned based on false accusations. Thus, after reviewing this case, the bare truth is Emily was found in possession of 12 sachets of shabu on August 3, 2005. On Roger's Liability As to Roger, can we also convict him of possession of the same 12 sachets of shabu considering that same had been found in the possession of his wife Emily? We resolve in the affirmative. In United States v. Juan,68 we have clarified the meaning of the words "having possession of." We said that the said phrase included constructive possession, that is, "the relation between the owner of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is not in actual physical possession, but when it is still under his control and management and subject to his disposition."69 In other words, in that case, we recognized the fact that a person remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs although he may not have or may have lost physical possession of the same. To elucidate, we must go back to the circumstances surrounding the Juan case. A Chinaman named Lee See arrived at the Bay of Calbayog, Samar through the steamer Ton-Yek. Upon disembarking, he went to the house of therein appellant Chan Guy Juan, who was living in the town of Calbayog. Lee See and Chan Guy Juan had a lengthy conversation. Chan Guy Juan then hired a certain Isidro Cabinico (Cabinico) to go alongside of the steamer with his baroto, to carry and deliver to him a sack which appellant Chan Guy Juan alleged was sugar. Cabinico went to Lee See to get the said sack. However, on his way to the house of Chan Guy Juan, Cabinico was arrested by the local authorities. Found in his possessions were a small amount of sugar and 28 cans of opium. The opium was confiscated and separate criminal charges were instituted against the two Chinamen and Cabinico. After a thorough investigation, the provincial fiscal dismissed the case against Cabinico because he had no knowledge of the content of the sack, while the two Chinamen were eventually convicted. Chan Guy Juan appealed his conviction arguing that he did not have actual physical possession or control of the 28 cans of opium. But we held that both Chinese had constructive possession of the opium and that they were both guilty as principals.70 Our ruling in Juan applies to the present case. Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. But PO1 Area saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets of shabu to Emily. While Roger had lost physical possession of the said 12 sachets of shabu, he had constructive possession of the same because they remain to be under his control and management. In the Juan case, Lee See gave

the physical possession of the opium to Cabinico while Chan Guy Juan had not yet received the same opium from Lee See, but both were held guilty of illegal possession of opium. Thus, we can liken the instant case to that of Juan because while Roger had lost physical possession of the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained constructive possession of the same. Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession of illegal drugs deprives their children of parents. But if we have to take care of our children and the family where each of us belongs, we are obligated to put in jail all those, including fathers and mothers, who peddle illegal drugs. Finally, we cannot let this case pass us by without emphasizing the need for the public prosecutor to properly evaluate all the pieces of evidence and file the proper information to serve the ends of justice. The public prosecutor must exert all efforts so as not to deny the People a remedy against those who sell prohibited drugs to the detriment of the community and its children. Many drug cases are dismissed because of the prosecutor's sloppy work and failure to file airtight cases. If only the prosecution properly files the Information and prosecutes the same with precision, guilty drug pushers would be punished to the extent allowed under the law, as in this case. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 2010 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants ROGER POSADA and EMILY POSADA ARE FOUND GUILTY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWELVE (12) SACHETS OF METHAMPETAMINE HYDROCHOLORIDE OR SHABU, WITH A NET WEIGHT OF 0.4578 GRAMS AND ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO THE INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY, AS MINIMUM, TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, AS MAXIMUM AND A FINE OFP300,000.00. G.R. No. 192180 March 21, 2012

The CA decision affirmed with modification the November 26, 2001 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The RTC Decision In its November 26, 2001 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA3 that alias Kino Lascano and the appellant took turns in raping her. According to the trial court, the victim recognized her assailants through their respective voices. The trial court held that a public accusation by a blind Filipina whose virtue has been unblemished is worthy of belief. It also disregarded the appellants alibi, as he failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and to pay the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, also for each count. 4 The CA Decision On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of qualified rape. It held that the appellant actively participated with Kino in raping AAA; he tied the victims hands, and then held her feet when Kino was raping her. In addition, AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr . Ethel Simeon. The appellate court also rejected the appellants alibi in light of the victims positive declaration, and for the appellants failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis.5 Our Ruling We dismiss the appeal, but modify the counts of rape committed and the awarded indemnities. Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accompanied such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.6

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ALIAS KINO LASCANO (at large) and ALFREDO DELABAJAN alias TABOYBOY, Accused. ALFREDO DELABAJAN, Appellant. DECISION BRION, J.: We decide the appeal, filed by Alfredo Delabajan (appellant), from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228.

In her September 20, 2000 testimony, AAA narrated in detail how the appellant and Kino threatened to kill her, and then took turns in raping her. AAA explained that she recognized her assailants through their respective voices. We emphasize that the victim, although blind, knew the identities of her two assailants because they were her neighbors. AAA explained that Kino and the appellant often went to her residence in Sitio Maraga-as because they were the friends of her brother. Notably, the appellant admitted that he talked to AAA on many occasions. We view AAAs testimony to be clear, convincing and credible considering especially the corroboration it received from the medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Simeon. Our examination of the records shows no indication that we should view the victims testimony in a suspicious light. It bears stressing that identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a long time;7 for the blind voice recognition must be a special sense that has been developed to a very high degree. Besides, it is inconceivable that a blind woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Thus, to us, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant and Kino succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion that both the appellant and Kino had raped her, as a result of which, she felt pain. She also felt that something "sticky" came out of the appellants and Kino private parts. Second, the assailants employed force, threat and intimidation in satisfying their bestial desires. According to AAA, the appellant and Kino threatened to kill her if she refused to obey them. The Presence of Conspiracy We agree with the CA that the appellant and Kino conspired in sexually assaulting AAA. "Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose."8 In the present case, the acts of Kino and of the appellant clearly indicate a unity of action: (1) Kino and the appellant entered the victims house at around 9:00 p.m.; (2) Kino and the appellant ordered the victim to lie down, and threatened to kill her if she refused to do so; (3) Kino undressed AAA, while the appellant tied her hands; (4) the appellant held AAAs feet, while Kino inserted his penis into the victims private parts; and (5) the appellant raped AAA afterwards. Clearly, the appellant and Kino performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the felony. Thus, they are liable for two (2) counts of rape on account of a clear conspiracy between them, shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate,

one after the other, the rapes. Each of them is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well. The Appellants Defenses We reject the appellants claim that he was gathering coconuts in Sitio Pasakayon on the date and time of the rapes. It is settled that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and easily fabricated, particularly when it is corroborated only by the wife of the appellant, as in this case. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 9 In the present case, the appellant admitted that Sitio Pasakayon is just a 30-minute walk from Sitio Maraga-as. Considering how near he was to the place where the crime was committed, the appellants alibi cannot be given any value. Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the rapes. The Court also finds unmeritorious the appellants contention that AAA had been instigated by Wawing Lascano to falsely testify against him. The appellant alleged that Wawing was mad at him because he struck the latters pigs. Aside from being uncorroborated, we find this claim implausible as the victim has no relation at all to Wawing. It is inconceivable that a young girl would be willing to drag her honor to a merciless public scrutiny, and expose herself and her family to scandal upon the mere command and instigation of a complete stranger. The Other Rapes Not Proven With Moral Certainty As earlier stated, the CA convicted the appellant of six (6) counts of qualified rape. After a meticulous reading of the records, we sustain the appellants conviction for only two (2) counts of rape. It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.10The prosecutions evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellants presumption of innocence.11 AAAs testimonies on two of the sexual abuses were explicit, detailing the participations of the appellant and Kino, and clearly illustrating all the elements of the crime. However, AAAs statements that the appellant and Kino each raped her three times were too general and clearly inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt that each accused committed two other succeeding rapes. Her testimonies

were overly generalized and lacked specific details on how the other rapes were committed. We stress that a witness is not permitted to make her own conclusion of law; whether the victim had been raped is a conclusion for this Court to make based on the evidence presented.12 The Proper Penalty Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed whenever the rape is committed by two or more persons. Since reclusion perpetua and death are two indivisible penalties, Article 6313 of the Revised Penal Code applies; when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, as in this case, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The lower courts were, therefore, correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. It bears noting that under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. However, the information in the present case merely stated that the victim was blind; it did not specifically allege that the appellant knew of her blindness at the time of the commission of the rape. Hence, we cannot impose the death penalty on the appellant. The Civil Indemnities The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1wphi1 Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. Therefore, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, based on prevailing jurisprudence.14 In addition, we likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count of rape.15 The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public example or correction for the public good. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) Alfredo Delabajan is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape; and (b) he is further ordered to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. G.R. No. 182059 July 4, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CAMILO D. NICART and MANUEL T. CAPANPAN, Accused-Appellants. DECISION PEREZ, J.: Before us for final review is the Decision1 dated 25 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01901, which affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated 11 May 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 12625-D and 12626-D. The trial court found accused-appellant Camilo Nicart (Nicart) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 (RA 9165) and accused-appellant Manuel Capanpan (Capanpan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the same Act.3

The Facts
On 4 July 2003, an Information4 charging Nicart and Capanpan with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City. A separate Information5 against Capanpan was also filed on even date for violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act. Nicart and Capanpan were arraigned on 31 July 2003. In Criminal Case No. 12625-D, both pleaded not guilty.6Capanpan likewise entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12626-D.7 On trial, the prosecution presented witnesses PO1 Joy Decena (PO1 Decena) and SPO3 Leneal T. Matias (SPO3 Matias), both of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station. The testimony of P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office in Mandaluyong City, on the other hand, was dispensed with after the public prosecutor and the defense counsel stipulated on the integrity of the seized items, that is, "that Exhibits E-1 and E-2 (the two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets both containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance [which were recovered from the appellants]) were the same specimens mentioned in Exhibit B-1 (the request for laboratory examination dated 3 July 2003) and Exhibit C -1 (Chemistry Report No. D-1271-03E issued by P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro), and that the same were regularly examined by the said chemical officer."8 The trial courts summary of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adopted by the Court of Appeals9 is hereto reproduced, to wit:

On July 2, 2003, at around 10:30 in the evening, a concerned citizen reported to the office of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station that a certain Milo was engaged in drug pushing at Baltazar Street, Bolante, Brgy. Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. The police officers who were then present immediately relayed the information to their Chief, P/Sr. Insp. Jojie A. Tabios, who decided to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap and apprehend the suspect. He formed a team composed of witness PO1 Joy Decena who was designated as the poseurbuyer and PO1 Allan Mapula, witness SPO3 Leneal Matias and PO1 Clarence Nipales as the back-up team. As poseur-buyer, PO1 Joy Decena was supplied with a 100 peso bill. He promptly marked the 100-peso bill with his initials "JD." The concerned citizen joined the group and offered to accompany and introduce poseur-buyer PO1 Decena to Milo who was later on identified as accused Camilo D. Nicart. At around 11:00 oclock that evening, the team proceeded to Bolante to conduct the buy-bust operation. Arriving at the place after 10-15 minutes, PO1 Decena and the informant alighted from the police mobile car and walked towards a sari-sari store. The informant saw a man sitting in front of the sari-sari store whom he identified as Milo, the subject of the operation. The informant and Camilo greeted each other and then the informant introduced PO1 Decena as someone who wanted to buy some items (shabu) from him for the sum of "piso" (100 pesos). Decena handed the marked 100-peso bill to Camilo. The latter then walked to the other side of the street where he talked to a male person. Camilo handed the money to the person who was identified later as accused Manuel T. Capanpan. The latter, in turn, gave Camilo a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Upon receiving the plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu from Camilo, PO1 Decena immediately grabbed the former by the hand and introduced himself as a police officer and that he was arresting him for violation of the dangerous drugs law. He handcuffed Camilo and frisked him. Decena, however, did not recover anything illegal from Camilo except the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that he bought from him. Meanwhile, the back-up team of Decena came forward and upon Decenas urging, arrested the man wearing a striped shirt (later identified as accused Manuel Capanpan) from whom Camilo got the plastic sachet containing suspected shabu that he sold to PO1 Decena. SPO3 Leneal Matias conducted a search on the body of Manuel and recovered another plastic sachet of white crystalline substance that appeared to be shabu. The pocket of Capanpan also yielded the 100-peso bill that poseur-buyer PO1 Decena paid to Camilo. Matias then placed the initials "MCT" on the plastic sachet the he recovered from Capanpan. The one bought by Decena from accused Camilo was marked with the initials "CDN." The two accused, Capanpan and Nicart boarded the police mobile car and were brought to the SDEU office where they were turned over to the police investigator

on duty. The two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were then sent to the Eastern Police District Laboratory Office in Mandaluyong City x x x. The two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, were then examined by P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro, a forensic chemical officer of EPD Crime Laboratory Office, who later issued Chemistry Report No. D-1271-03E with a finding that both specimens contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: (1) Nicart and Capanpan; (2) Maricel Capanpan, sister of Capanpan; and (3) Lorna Guiban, ViceChairman of the Barangay Security Force of Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Below is the summary of the version of the defense lifted from the decision of the Court of Appeals.10 Accused Camilo Nicart essentially testified that he was only buying milk at the sarisari store along Baltazar Street, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, when the police officers arrived and arrested him. After frisking him, he was taken to the police station where he was detained. He averred that he was arrested at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, and not 10:30 as claimed by the prosecution witnesses, and that there were children playing in front of the store at that time. He did not react when he was arrested and brought to the police station nor when he was put in jail because he did not commit any offense. He only got angry during the inquest proceeding when he asked the prosecutor why they were being charged when they did not commit any crime. For his part, accused Manuel T. Capanpan testified that he was just sitting on a bench in front of his house across the sari-sari store when he saw Camilo Nicart being arrested and frisked by the police officers. The police officers then brought Camilo to their vehicle. Thereafter, the police officers went back and arrested him also. He and Camilo were then brought to the police station. He maintained that he and Camilo were arrested at around 8:00 in the evening. He claimed that he was with his neighbors when he was arrested and that there were also several people in the store where Camilo was arrested. He admitted, however, that these people only watched them when they were arrested. The witness also averred that he knew Camilo because the latter was a customer in his beauty parlor. Finally, he admitted that he did not know the police officers previous to his arrest, much less had a prior disagreement with them. Maricel Capanpan testified that on July 2, 2003, at about 10:30 p.m., she was standing beside the door of her house when she saw accused Camilo Nicart buying "gatas", "asukal" at "tinapay" at the sari-sari store located across the street. She then saw four persons in civilian clothes approach and start frisking Camilo. The four persons then handcuffed Camilo and placed him inside a police mobile car.

Thereafter, two of them approached her brother, accused Manuel T. Capanpan, and arrested him. They then brought his [sic] brother to the car and drove away. Finally, Lorna Guiban testified that she was Vice-Chairman of the Barangay Security Force of Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. On July 2, 2003, at around 10:30 p.m., she was buying cigarettes from a sari-sari store at Baltazar Street in Pinagbuhatan while waiting for the person who would give her the key to the barangay outpost she was supposed to open. Accused Camilo Nicart then arrived and bought Nestogen and sugar. Thereafter, two (2) motorcycles arrived and the riders alighted and suddenly frisked Nicart, took his wallet and handcuffed him. She averred that she was a meter away from them when Camilo was arrested. The arresting officers then proceeded to the house across the street and arrested accused Manuel Capanpan, who was sitting in front of his house. The arresting officers then brought Camilo and Manuel to a car and drove away. She admitted that she did not intervene because the two accused did not ask for help. She also admitted that she did not put the incident in the blotter at their outpost. On 11 May 2005, the trial court convicted both Nicart and Capanpan. 11 The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads: WHEREFORE: 1. In Criminal Case No. 12625-D, the court finds accused Camilo Nicart y Dilmonte, and accused Manuel Capanpan y Tismo, both GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and hereby imposes upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos with the accessory penalties under Sec. 35 of said R.A. 9165. 2. In Criminal Case No. 12626-D, the court finds accused Manuel T. Capanpan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Sixteen years, as maximum, and fine of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) pesos with the accessory penalties under Sec. 35 of R.A. 9165.12 On appeal, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto 13 the trial courts Joint Decision of 11 May 2005. Hence, the instant appeal. We also affirm the appellants conviction.

Presence of the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of a dangerous drug PO1 Decena attested that Nicart took his marked money, walked over to Capanpan and exchanged it with a sachet of shabu. Afterwards, Nicart walked back to PO1 Decena and gave the item to him. SPO3 Matias, on the other hand, testified as to the circumstances of the arrest of Capanpan, the recovery of the marked money, and the confiscation of another sachet of shabu in his possession. The seized items, the Chemistry Report issued by P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro stating that the contents of the sachets tested for shabu, and the marked money were all presented in court. These were coupled with the stipulation between the prosecution and the defense that the substances earlier forwarded to the laboratory for examination and those presented in court were the same specimens examined and tested positive for shabu. Thus, present in the instant case are the following requisites for illegal sale of shabu: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; xxx (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing[; and (c)] the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." 14 Likewise present are the essential elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug, to wit: "(a) [that] the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) [that] such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) [that] the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." 15 Credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies Time and again, we hold that the "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings."16 Likewise basic is the rule that "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect."17 Further, after a close examination of the records, we are strongly convinced that the trial court and the Court of Appeals validly gave credence to the testimonies of PO1 Decena and SPO3 Matias. Pertinent portions of the testimony of PO1 Decena (the poseur-buyer)18 read: Q: So, while you were along Baltazar Street and Bolante, you reached a certain store there and what happened, Mr. [W]itness?

A: A man was sitting there. Q: How many individuals did you see in that store, Mr. [W]itness, in that night? A: In front of the store only one (1) person. xxx Q: So, what happened after that, Mr. [W]itness, because you were walking with your informant? A: Sir, our informant binati iyong tao. Q: Iyong nakaupo? A: Yes, sir.

A: Magkano ba ang kukunin? Q: What was the answer of the informant? A: Piso lang. Q: After that statement of piso lang, what did alias Milo do if any? A: Nagtanong kung nasaan ang pera, sir. Q: So, what exactly was the statement of alias Milo? A: Pera, sir. Q: What did the informant do noong sinabing pera? A: Sabi ng confidential informant, pare ko kukuha.

Q: What is the statement made by the informant? Q: And that informant was referring to whom? A: Pare kamusta. Q: What was the answer to that statement by that person greeted by your informant? A: Ayos lang. Q: What happened after that? A: Sabi ni Milo, sir, bakit napa[s]yal kayo. Q: What was the answer of the informant? A: The confidential informant asked Milo kung meron ba tayo diyang items. Q: What was the answer of alias Milo to that statement? A: Meron sir. xxx Q: What happened after that? A: To me, sir. Q: So, what did you do? A: I handed the buy-bust money. Q: To whom did you handed that? A: To Milo, sir. Q: What did you do after that? A: He crossed the road. Q: Sino tumawid? A: Si Milo, sir. Q: Where to? A: Sa tapat.

xxx Q: What happened noong tumawid siya? A: Lumapit pa sa isang lalaki. Q: So, how many persons did you see on the other edge of the road at this point? A: Marami.

A: I marked it. Q: What markings did you put on that object? A: CDN. Q: In what place did you put the markings, on the place of the arrest or in your office? A: In the place of the arrest, sir.

Q: More than ten (10) less than ten (10)? A: 5-6, sir. xxx Q: When Milo approached those guys, what happened Mr. [W]itness? A: Ibinigay, sir, niya ang pera sa kausap niya tapos may inabot sa kanya. Q: So, what happened after that? A: Bumalik po sa amin, sir. Q: Sino? A: Si Milo. Q: Noong bumalik sa iyo si Milo, what did you do? A: Tapos inabot sakin ang plastic sachet ng shabu. Q: How many pieces, Mr. [W]itness? A: One (1). xxx Q: Im asking you on the sachet of shabu that you bought from Milo, what did you do with it? His testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of SPO3 Matias, who further testified on the confiscation of another sachet of shabu in possession of Capanpan.19 Thus: Q: You said that something was handed to alias Milo by Joey Decena, what did that person do? A: He approached another person sir. Q: You said there was only one person standing in front of the store. Where was that second person you are referring to. The one approached by alias Milo? A: He was at the other side of the street. Q: Was the person visible from where you were? I am referring to the second person. A: Yes sir. Q: So what happened when alias Milo approached the other person at the other side of the street? A: They had also a brief conversation. Q: For how long did that conversation last? A: Few seconds only. Q: What happened after that few seconds of conversation with the second person?

A: I saw Milo handed something to the other male person. Q: In return what did that other person do? A: I saw him handed something to Milo. Q: After that, what else Milo do? A: Milo returned to Joy Decena and the confidential informant and handed something to Joy Decena. Q: What did you notice Decena do?

Q: Did he comply? A: Yes sir. Q: What happened after that person complied with your instruction? A: And thereafter I confiscated from his possession from his right hand the buy bust money and another one piece heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undeterminable amount of white crystalline substance. Q: After that what else did you do if any [M]r. [W]itness? A: The evidence confiscated from the accused were marked.

A: After receiving that something from Milo, he immediately grabbed the hands of Milo. Q: What did you and your companions do immediately thereafter? A: We gave support to Decena. xxx Q: Who arrested the second person? A: It was PO1 Nepales who accosted the accused and I was the one who frisked the accused. xxx

Q: You marked what evidence? A: The plastic sachet that I confiscated. Q: You confiscated from whom? A: From accused Manuel Capanpan. Also, during cross-examination, the counsel for the defense attempted but failed to elicit answers inconsistent with the earlier statement of PO1 Decena in his Affidavit of Arrest. This further strengthened the latters credibility. Thus: Q: And you were assigned as poseur-buyer, right? A: Yes, maam.

Q: Who was that person arrested by PO1 Nepales? Q: And you were given 100 peso-bill? A: Manuel Capanpan. A: Yes, maam. Q: You said that Manuel Capanpan was frisked by Nepales? A: I was the one. A: Yes, maam. Q: What happened after you frisked Capanpan? A: After frisking accused Manuel Capanpan, I instructed him to empty his pocket. Q: And upon giving it to you, you put it in your pocket to be used as a buy-bust money, right? Q: You were the first person to whom this Chief first handed that 100 peso bill?

A: No, maam, I put my markings. Q: You put first your markings? A: Yes, maam. (Emphasis supplied)20 In addition, the admission of Nicart and Capanpan that they did not know any of the apprehending officers prior to the arrest ruled out any ill motive on the part of the members of the team to falsely testify against them, for which reason, regularity in the performance of their duties is presumed. In People v. Tion, this Court elucidated: x x x [T]here is likewise no showing that the police officers framed up Joey. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The records do not show any allegation of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the police officers must be upheld.21 (Emphasis supplied) We also reject the contention of the defense that the expertise of the apprehending officers in drug operations affords them the benefit of concocting a story to make it appear that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto. In citing People v. Deocariza,22 where this Court declared that "[c]ourts must hence be extra vigilant in trying drug charges lest an innocent person is made to suffer the very severe penalties for drug offenses,"23 the defense failed to note that the circumstances of that case are totally different from the present case. Unlike the straightforward and corroborated testimonies in the instant case, the Court found the lone testimony of the arresting officer in Deocariza seriously flawed. It observed: x x x The sergeant testified that the accused was caught in the course of a buy-bust operation prepared and planned by Sgt. Bonete. The operation was apparently conceived upon receipt of a report from an undisclosed informant of rampant selling of illegal drugs at a basketball court beside the store where accused was arrested. In a notable departure from the ordinary or standard operating procedure of law enforcement agents in this respect, the "tip" from their informant did not identify any suspect, much less mention the name of the accused. The tip intimated only that illicit drug trafficking was rampant in San Juan, Molo Blvd. Nothing more. Yet no surveillance of that area was first conducted by the law enforcement agents

before the actual "bust." They had no suspect, not even a description of the suspect's face nor a name. Yet the testimony of Sgt. Deocampo clearly stated that as soon as the information was called in, the anti-narcotics agents immediately repaired to the area and conducted a buy-bust operation. We note also that the agents did not meet their informer at the designated place. Neither did their informer introduce the poseur-buyer to any suspect. It is unlikely for officers of the law to deal so cavalierly with "tips" about drug trafficking as not to even concern themselves with securing names and identities of alleged or probable suspects. 24 It also bears emphasis that the law provides for safeguards against the conviction of innocent persons. The rule on chain of custody is one of them. In the case at bar, it is evident that the apprehending officers observed the requirement of unbroken chain of custody when it marked the heat-sealed plastic containers of the seized items with their initials in front of the accused, and transmitted the same to the laboratory for examination. These were in accordance with the following pronouncements of this Court: Early this year, this Court expounded on the requirement of proof of the existence of the prohibited drugs. The prosecution has to establish the integrity of the seized article in that it had been preserved from the time the same was seized from the accused to the time it was presented in evidence at the trial.25 Here, the prosecution established through PO1 Quimsons testimony that he got the two sachets of white crystalline substances from Catentay and marked them with his initials on them, that would have been sufficient to ensure the integrity of the substances until they shall have reached the hands of the forensic chemist. (Emphasis supplied.) The integrity of the seized articles would remain even if PO1 Quimson coursed their transmittal to the crime laboratory through the investigator-on-case since they had been sealed and marked. It does not matter that another person, probably a police courier would eventually deliver the sealed substances by hand to the crime laboratory. But, unfortunately, because the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who opened the sachets and examined the substances in them, the latter was unable to attest to the fact that the substances presented in court were the same substances he found positive for shabu.26 (Emphasis supplied.) Notably, the last requirement, that is, that the forensic chemist should attest to the fact that the substances produced in court are the same specimens she found positive for shabu, had been substantially complied with in the instant case because the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Exhibits "E-1" and "E-2" (the two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets both containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance recovered from the accused), which were presented in court were the same substances subject of both Exhibit "B-1" (the request for laboratory

examination dated July 3, 2003) and Exhibit "C-1" (Chemistry Report No. D-127103E issued by P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro), and that the same were regularly examined by the said officer.27 Finally, the defense posited that appellants were neither caught selling nor in possession of shabu as allegedly testified to by defense witness Lorna Guiban. There were, however, glaring inconsistencies between the testimony of Lorna Guiban and that of the appellants. First, both appellants maintained that they were arrested at 8:00 oclock in the evening. On the other hand, Lorna Guiban testified that the incident took place at a later time around 10:30 in the evening. Second, Nicart, on cross examination, admitted that there were no adults within the vicinity of the store at the time of his arrest. Portions of his testimony read: Q: At the time, when you were arrested there were any other persons within the vicinity of the store (sic)? A: There were children? [Q]: How about adults? [Q]: So you were the only adult in the vicinity? A: Yes, sir.28 Lorna Guiban, on the other hand, claimed that she was more or less one (1) meter away from Nicart in front of the same store and was in fact ten (10) minutes ahead of him in that store. She testified: Q: How far were you from Milo Nicar? A: More or less one meter. xxx Q: Who arrived at the sari-sari store first, you or Camilo? A: Ako po. Q: How long have you been there when Camilo arrived? A: More or less 10 minutes.

Q: What were you waiting for, x x x? A: Yong sukli at yong susi po. Kasi may hinihintay po akong tao.29 Surely, Nicart would have noticed the presence of Lorna Guiban had she been actually one (1) meter away from him. Moreover, we note that Lorna Guiban could not render a full account of what transpired prior to Nicarts arrival at the store so that she may categorically state that no illegal transaction was completed on that fateful night. Thus: Q: Did you know Camilo where came from before he went to the sari-sari store (sic)? A: Nalaman ko na lang po na bumibili siya. Q: You did not notice where he came from? A: No, sir. Q: You did not even notice whom he was talking to before he went near you to the store? A: No, sir.30 All considered, the credible testimonies of the arresting officers and their positive identification of the appellants should prevail over the bare denial of the defense31 nor the conflicting and incomplete testimonies of their witnesses. "Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." 32 Sale of shabu in a public place; sale to total strangers As to the circumstances obtaining in the sale of shabu, we uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Thus: Accused-appellants further contend that the alleged drug peddling took place in a crowded and busy street. Thus, it was improbable and incredible for them to have boldly peddled the dangerous drug within the plain view of the entire community. We are not persuaded.

In the first place, the buy-bust operation took place at nighttime xxx.1wphi1 Thus, the illegal transaction could hardly be said to have been made in plain and public view. Besides, the prosecution witnesses described the place as "parang squatter." It must be observed that in this kind of community, crimes committed brazenly and in broad daylight are not uncommon occurrences. Indeed, in the aforecited case of People v[.] Ahmad, the Supreme Court held: This Court has taken notice that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with ever-increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell for the right price their wares to anybody, be they strangers or not. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Neither is it contrary to human experience for drug pushers to conduct the actual exchange of illegal drugs at their own homes. This may even prove to be a preference by drug dealers, for it gives them a sense of security as they would always have a place to seek refuge in or people to seek assistance from in case a transaction gets bungled up and they get pursued by authorities. 33 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied in the Court of Appeals decision.) We here repeat that "we know that drug pushing has been committed with so much casualness even between total strangers."34 Validity of a buy-bust operation in the absence of a prior surveillance It is a well-settled rule that prior surveillance is not required, especially when the team is accompanied to the scene by the informant. 35 The case of People v. Quintero36 cited by the defense is not on all fours with the present case. In that case, the buy-bust team relied solely on the description given by the informant that the subject was "wearing white t-shirt, khaki pants and tennis shoes" and, without prior surveillance, proceeded to the area unaccompanied by the informant.37 On the other hand, the informant in the case at bar accompanied the team to the area and introduced the accused to the poseur-buyer. Penalties Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is clear that the quantity of shabu sold is not material in the determination of the corresponding penalty therefor. Regardless of the amount of the substance sold, a person found guilty of such unauthorized sale shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).38

On the other hand, under Section 11, Article II of the same Act, the crime of illegal possession of shabu weighing less than five (5) grams carries with it the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).39 Likewise applicable in the determination of the appropriate penalty is the Indeterminate Sentence Law,40 which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 41 Accordingly, with respect to the crime of illegal sale of shabu, due to the absence of any mitigating circumstance,42 the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as these are within the period and range of the fine prescribed by law.43 As regards the crime of illegal possession of 0.3 gram of shabu, the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve years (12) and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, as maximum, and a fine ofP300,000.00, which is within the range of the amount imposable therefor is likewise in order.44 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 25 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01901 is AFFIRMED, and, thereby the 11 May 2005 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 12625-D and 12626-D is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. G.R. No. 194581 July 2, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANILO MlRASOLAGUSTIN alias "DANNY" and GEORGE SALAS HARDMAN, Accused, DANILO MIRASOLAGUSTIN alias "DANNY," Accused-Appellant. DECISION REYES, J.: This case saddens us as victim ZZZ1 did not truly get the full weight of justice because of technicalities and failure on the part of the prosecutor to file the proper informations. We join the trial cowt in its belief that both Danilo Mirasol Agustin (accused-appellant Agustin) and George Hardman (accused Hardman) raped ZZZ for a number of times. But like the trial court, we are saddened that a guilty man

escapes punishment due to the prosecutor's inadvertence to file the proper informations, a knowledge that any prosecutor must possess if our criminal justice system should work.2 Notwithstanding this sorry event, we are tasked to review the present case. The Case We now resolve the appeal under Rule 124 filed by accused-appellant Agustin from the Decision3 dated February 18, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 03518. Antecedent Facts Private complainant victim ZZZ was a 12-year-old girl who was then residing at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her father who had another partner is now deceased, while her mother has another family.4 One day, her stepmother fetched her from her grandmother's house. Her stepmother brought her to Guadalupe in Makati City and was left there. Victim ZZZ then walked towards Paraaque City until she reached a Barangay Hall in that city where she met accused-appellant Agustin. The latter then offered to feed her at his house which was just near the Barangay Hall. 5 Accused-appellant Agustin brought ZZZ to the ground floor of the house he was renting from accused Hardman. She stayed with accused-appellant Agustin for one year, starting from the time accused-appellant Agustin brought her to the house. In her one year stay with accused-appellant Agustin, victim ZZZ was molested by accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman five times on separate occasions. 6 On the first instance, accused-appellant Agustin raped victim ZZZ by inserting his penis into her mouth. On the second instance, accused Hardman inserted his penis into ZZZ's private part after lubricating it with cooking oil and thereafter, Hardman put his penis into ZZZ's mouth. On the third instance, both accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman raped victim ZZZ. While her hands were tied, Agustin and Hardman succeedingly ravaged her youthful body, both inserted their penises into her organ. Accused Hardman even poked his penis into the mouth of ZZZ while it was discharging semen. On the fourth instance, accused-appellant Agustin raped ZZZ again in the former's house. And finally, on the fifth instance, ZZZ was again raped by accused-appellant Agustin at the house of accused George Hardman.7 In all these five instances, victim ZZZ would watch pornographic materials with accused-appellant Agustin. It would happen either in the morning or in the evening at accused-appellant Agustin's house and while his wife was away. As much as ZZZ

would want to escape, she could not do so because the door was closed. Victim ZZZ also did not muster the courage to report to authorities her ordeal because accusedappellant Agustin and accused Hardman warned her against telling anybody, otherwise they would kill her. Accused-appellant Agustin threatened victim ZZZ that she would be riddled with bullets; he even hit her with a belt. Victim ZZZ did not tell accused-appellant Agustin's wife because she believed the latter would not believe her story. Every time she was raped, she felt pain.8 After the fifth instance of rape, accused-appellant Agustin transferred to Purok 4 near the Silverio Compound because accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman quarreled. Victim ZZZ went with accused-appellant Agustin to his new home at the Silverio Compound. It was at that place where victim ZZZ had the courage to report the incident to a certain Ate Lilia, victim ZZZ's neighbor, who subsequently reported the incident to a certain Ate Baby who then reported the matter to the barangay.9 Accused Hardman was the first to be apprehended and was followed by accusedappellant Agustin. Police Officer Tan (PO Tan) and Ms. Cherylyn Tan's (Cherylyn) testimonies were dispensed with after the parties stipulated on them. Meanwhile, Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) testified as an expert witness. Dr. Baluyot's final medical report showed bruises and multiple scars on victim ZZZ's body, while the anogenital examination showed healing abrasion and redness in the perihymenal area fossa navicularis as well as scratch marks and scars on the perineum or the media aspect of the thigh of the child victim ZZZ.10 Accused-appellant Agustin was subsequently charged in an Information11 dated January 28, 2005 with the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 in relation to Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-0143. The Information states as follows: That on or about the 25th day of January 2005, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of force, threats or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with complainant [victim ZZZ], a minor 12 years old, against her will and consent, which acts are detrimental to the normal growth and development of the minor-complainant. CONTRARY TO LAW.12

During trial, aside from the testimony of victim ZZZ, the prosecution also presented Dr. Baluyot who testified on the Final Medical Report on victim ZZZ. Meanwhile, the defense presented both accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman.13 Accused-appellant Agustin in his defense simply denied the accusation against him. He claimed that he reported for work everyday, including Saturdays and Sundays, from 6:00 o'clock in the morning to 6 o'clock in the evening; and that on January 25, 2005, he reported for work at 6:00 o'clock in the morning and went home at nighttime and that he did not go home in the afternoon of January 25, 2005. He also denied that his co-accused Hardman raped victim ZZZ. However, while he was denying the accusation against him, accused-appellant Agustin could not offer any motive or reason why victim ZZZ charged him of rape.14 As to accused Hardman, he admitted knowing victim ZZZ since the latter lived with accused-appellant Agustin at the ground floor of his house; he claimed knowing accused-appellant Agustin for one year. He alleged that on January 25, 2005, he started working at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning and that at around noontime, he was at the corner of Valley 2 and Dr. A. Santos Avenue doing his work as a barker. He asserted that he went home at 6:30 in the evening, rested and did not go out of the house. He was allegedly with his wife, his child, his stepson Joel, a certain Leovina Morong, Jeffrey, Shirley and other unnamed individuals. However, defense did not present any of the named individuals above. He also claimed that he did not see victim ZZZ on that day nor did he go to the house of accusedappellant Agustin. He denied raping the victim.15 The Ruling of the RTC The RTC, after weighing all the pieces of evidence, found accused-appellant Agustin andaccused Hardman guilty of the crime charged. The RTC noted that victim ZZZ recounted several episodes of sexual molestation involving both accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman, but they were indicted only for the rape committed on January 25, 2005. Thus, while the RTC believes that both accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman were found guilty, it only convicted Agustin since Hardman did not conspire with Agustin when the latter raped ZZZ on January 25, 2005.16 On the defense of accused-appellant Agustin, the RTC found it hard to believe his alibi and denial since his statement that he was in some other place was not corroborated by other testimonies. Furthermore, it was also proven that even if he was at work at the time of the rape he could easily go to the locus criminis because of its proximity to his place of work.17

The RTC also gave credence to the testimony of victim ZZZ because despite her tender age of 12 years old, she was able to narrate the event that happened on January 25, 2005. In fact, the testimony of Dr. Baluyot strengthened the claim of ZZZ and belied altogether accused-appellant Agustin's defense.18 On the guilt of accused Hardman, the RTC has this to say: It should be stressed that the Court believes that both accused had molested the private complainant but given the fact that what appeared in the information was only the abuse committed on 25 January 2005 which was proven to have been committed by accused Danilo Agustin, the Court can do no less but acquit the accused George Hardman. If it were the intention of the prosecution to indict the accused of several episodes as narrated by the private complainant, several informations could have been filed, as the molestations committed in this case could not be considered a continuing crime, there having been separate criminal intents, thus: "Where the information against the accused charges only one (1) rape he cannot be convicted of five (5) counts of rape committed on other dates (People vs. Guiwan, 331 SCRA 70, April, 27, 2000)."19 Accused-appellant Agustin was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with the period of his confinement considered part of the service of his sentence and to indemnify victim ZZZ by way of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00. The RTC acquitted accused Hardman of the crime charged in the information because of reasonable doubt on his guilt.20 The Ruling of the CA The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC, reducing the award of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 and directing accused-appellant Agustin to pay civil indemnity to victim ZZZ in the amount of P50,000.00.21 In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA followed the long settled rule that it will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses because it is in a better position to observe the witnesses' candor and behavior in the witness stand. In the instant case, the trial court found ZZZ's testimony credible for being categorical, straightforward and consistent. The CA also stressed the fact that the victim was a minor, aged 12 years old, and that settled is the rule that when a woman, especially if a minor, declares she has been raped she reveals all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. In addition, ZZZ's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Baluyot who conducted the medical examination on her and found that a healing abrasion at 7 o'clock area and redness

at 5 o'clock area in the victim's perihymenal area and fossa navicularis are consistent with ZZZ's allegation that she was raped before the examination. The CA also did not give due credence to accused-appellant Agustin's contention that the RTC should have not believed ZZZ because for more than a year she did not report the incidents of rape accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman committed against her. The CA chose to give weight to the fact that Agustin and Hardman hurt her and threatened her of harm so as to instill fear in ZZZ's young mind, forcing her to keep her silence on her ordeal. Finally, the CA agreed with the RTC in disregarding the defenses accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman raised. It held that denial and alibi are inherently weak and cannot prevail over the rape victim's positive identification of her rapist, and it cannot be believed when accusedappellant failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of rape.22 Issues Considering that accused-appellant Agustin and plaintiff-appellee People adopted their respective briefs23 before the CA, we now rule on the matter based on the lone assignment of error which the accused-appellant raised in his brief24 before the CA, to wit: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25 Our Ruling We dismiss the appeal. After a careful review of the records of this case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the RTC, especially because the CA has affirmed the same, albeit a reduction in the award of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 and an addition of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Accused-appellant Agustin claims that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the victim ZZZ's version despite numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in her testimony. Accused-appellant Agustin further argues that ZZZ's silence and failure to report her ordeal for one year are actions contrary to human

experience. He insists that because of the above arguments, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt with moral certainty. We disagree with accused-appellant Agustin's contentions. Offhand, like the CA, we resolve this case guided by these time-tested principles in deciding rape cases, namely: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.26 With these principles in mind, we agree with the RTC and the CA in finding victim ZZZ's credibility beyond doubt. Our jurisprudence has time and again held that we give great weight to the trial courts assessment when what is at issue is the victim's credibility. The trial court's finding of facts is conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. We hold on to this because the trial court had all the opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. It can better evaluate the testimonial evidence of witnesses than the appellate court can do.27 Furthermore, based on the records and the observations of the court a quo, victim ZZZ who was then only 12 years old graphically narrated the beastly acts done to her, to wit: T: Kailan nangyari yung ginawang masama sa iyo ni Danilo? S: Noong Martes (January 25, 2005). T: Saan naman yun nangyari? S: Sa loob ng bahay namin (Silverio Compound, Purok 4, Bgy. San Isidro, Paraaque City. xxxx T: Paano nag-umpisa yung masamang nangyari sayo? A: Tinawag po ako ni Tito Danilo sa kapitbahay namin, sumigaw siya tinawag nya ako kasi may utos daw sya.

T: Pagpunta mo sa kanya ano inutos niya?" S: Chupain ko daw sya. T: Ginawa mo ba? S: Hindi po, tinalikuran ko sya tapos sinampal niya ako. T: Pagkasampal nya sayo ano nangyari? S: Umiyak po ako tapos hinila nya damit ko kaya napunit tapos sinabi niya "ayaw mo ng chupa" tapos hinubad nya po ang short ko pati panty ko. T: Ano yung sumunod na nangyari? S: Pinahiga niya ako tapos pinasukan niya ako, ipinasok nya yung titi nya sa pepe ko. xxxx T: Ilang beses ka ginawan ng masama ni Tito Danilo? S: Tatlo, una noong nakatira kami sa Valley 2 magkasama sila ni Kuya George pumunta sa bahay si Kuya George tapos sabi nya wag daw akong maingay kaya sumigaw ako tapos nagising si Tito Danilo sabi nya wag daw akong maingay kaya sumigaw ako tapos sinabi ni Kuya George na sya daw mauna sa akin kasi sya daw ang may-ari ng bahay pero sinabi naman ni Tito Danilo na sya daw mauna kasi sya daw ang nag-ampon sa akin. Nauna nga po si Kuya George, nagjakol sya tapos sinabi nya "chupain mo, chupain mo" pero hindi ko ginawa tapos pinasok niya na yung titi niya sa pepe ko tapos noong may lumabas na parang sipon sinabi nya kay Tito Danilo na "Danny ikaw naman". Hinawakan yung kamay ko ni Kuya George, pinasukan na ako ni Tito Danilo tapos sinabi ni Kuya George na "bilisan mo lang kasi ako naman" pagtapos ni Kuya George uli pumasok sa akin tapos si Tito Danilo uli. Tapos sinabi ni Tito Danilo na wag daw akong maingay kasi tatadtarin daw nya ako ng bala tapos sabi ni Kuya George "ako din magtagu-tago ka na papatayin kita pag maingay ka". Tapos yung pangatlo yung kinuwento ko kanina. 28 (Emphasis supplied) Rightfully, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the testimony of the victim who did not only narrate her ordeal in a straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner, but also in a graphic and nauseating fashion. Indeed, we cannot imagine that a 12-

year-old girl could describe vividly how accused-appellant Agustin and his coaccused Hardman deflowered and continuously ravaged her. We cannot imagine a child, as young as the victim, could utter words which are unutterable, unless she in fact saw and experienced the same. But the hard truth looks us in the eyes and tells us that victim ZZZ, a child at that time, has experienced the greatest injustice that an adult can do to a little girl to deprive her of her dignity, her childhood and her innocence. From the foregoing, between the alibi and denial of the accused-appellant and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, we cannot but give weight to the latter, especially because the distance between the place where the rape was committed and the workplace of the accused-appellant is simply a walking distance. As we have always held: Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. [S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime. 29(Citation omitted) To escape liability, accused-appellant Agustin also belabors the issue of the victim's failure to immediately report her ordeal. He insists that there is no truth to the victim's accusation because it took one year before she finally had the courage to tell another person of the rape. This argument must also fail. First, we have always held that there is no standard behavior expected of rape victims; depending on the circumstances and their personal and emotional situation, victims react differently. Second, it is not rare for young girls to hide for some time the violation of their honor because of the threats on their lives.30 In the instant case, the victim was a minor and had no family to run to. As such, she only had the accused-appellant to take care of her and to feed her. The accused-appellant and his co-accused also threatened her with harm and even death. Thus, all these justify her silence and the delay in reporting her ordeal. Finally, we reiterate here our dismay for the prosecution's failure to file the proper informations as to the other acts of rape. As shown above, victim ZZZ was violated five times: the first, the fourth, and the fifth by accused-appellant Agustin; the second by accused Hardman; and the third instance by both accused-appellant Agustin and accused Hardman. We can only convict accused-appellant Agustin for the rape committed on January 25, 2005, since it was the rape committed on said date which was properly charged in an information. The trial court was correct in

not convicting accused-appellant Agustin for the other acts of rape because, as held in People v. Guiwan,31 the accused-appellant cannot be convicted of other acts of rape committed on other dates where the information filed against him charges only one (1) rape, which he committed on January 25, 2005. The trial court was also correct in acquitting accused Hardman despite proof of the commission of the acts of rape on the second and third instances because, first, he was not properly charged in those instances and second, he was not present at the fifth or during the January 25, 2005 act of rape. Indeed, this is a great blunder, if not an injustice, committed by the prosecutor against victim ZZZ. One Last Note We cannot close this chapter in ZZZ's life without mentioning the responsibility of her parents on what befell her. Of course, her father has gone to the life beyond. But the violation of her honor could not have happened if her mother did not abandon her for another family and if her stepmother did not leave her alone, like a cat, to fend for herself in the wilderness of the city. We cannot close our eyes and simply decide this case without advocating for a stronger law against parents or guardians who leave a helpless child alone to fend for herself. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 18, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 035 I 8 is hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 181491 July 30, 2012

Henry Arcillas had been convicted of qualified rape by the Regional Trial Court in Masbate City (RTC) and meted the death penalty, which the law in force at the time prescribed. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the finding of guilt, but found him guilty only of simple rape due to his common-law relationship with the victim's mother not having been properly alleged in the information and accordingly imposed reclusion perpetua. He is now before the Court to make his final plea for exoneration. Antecedents AAA,1 allegedly Arcillas step-daughter, brought a complaint dated May 22, 2000 for qualified rape against him.2After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate ultimately filed on August 29, 2000 an information charging him with qualified rape in the RTC, averring: That on or about May 12, 2000 at more or less 11:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at Brgy. Magsaysay, Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the step-father of AAA, with deliberate intent, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own step-daughter, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her will. CONTRARY TO LAW.3 The summary of the parties evidence is rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its decision promulgated June 26, 2007,4 follows: The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of five (5) witnesses, namely: CCC, BBB, Dr. Allen Ching, AAA and SPO4 Aurora Moran. The trial court summarized their testimonies as follows: AAA had just graduated from the Emilio S. Boro Elementary School in Cataingan, Masbate, sometime in March 2000. She was then living with her grandmother, DDD, in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate. Immediately after her graduation, her mother, BBB, fetched her and brought her to Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate, where they lived together along with AAAs siblings and her mothers live-in partner, accused Henry Arcillas. In the evening of May 12, 2000, AAA, then barely thirteen (13) years old, as evidenced by her certificate of live birth, went to sleep in a room shanty located in Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate, together with her two sisters, CCC and EEE, her mother and the latters live-in partner, accused Henry Arcillas. The shanty consisted of a

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HENRY ARCILLAS, Accused-Appellant, DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of her mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable.

single room measuring more or less four (4) square meters. At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was lying on top of her. She found out that accused Henry Arcillas was on top of her. She noticed that she had no more short pants and panties and that she felt pain in her vagina. She also noticed that something had been inserted into her vagina and that the accused was making a push and pull movement on top of her. She then pushed away the accused and awakened her mother Josie, who was just asleep near her. BBB then stood up and immediately lighted the gas lamp. She saw the accused beside AAA still naked. AAA told her mother that she was sexually abused by Henry Arcillas. BBB then grabbed an ax and struck the accused with it but the latter was not hit. Before BBB was awakened, CCC, who was at the right side of AAA, was awakened first because she heard the latter crying. She then saw Henry Arcillas already at the post of their hut. AAA then went out of their shanty and thought of going back to her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate. BBB prevented her from traveling to Cataingan because it was almost midnight, and told her instead that they would have to go to the said place together some other time. Meanwhile, BBB drove Henry Arcillas away. AAA was able to go to her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate only about two weeks after the incident because her mother would not give her money for her fare. BBB explained that she was suffering from fever at that time and no one could tend to her. Thereafter, BBB complained to Jimmy Lorena, the Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. Jimmy Lorena then summoned Henry Arcillas and during the confrontation where AAA was also present, Henry Arcillas was made to sign a statement and was made to promise that he would not do the same act again. Despite the confrontation, however, the victim, with the help of her cousin, Evelyn Daligdig, still lodged a complaint for rape against Henry Arcillas before the Uson Police Station. She was investigated by SPO4 Aurora Moran, who prepared the complaint as well as the victims statement ("Deklarasyon"). The victim was physically examined at the Cataingan District Hospital on May 23, 2000 by Dr. Nerissa A. Deparine, who issued a medical certificate reflecting the following findings: "External: Incomplete healed laceration at 5, 7 and 9 oclock position; Internal: Admits 2 fingers without resistance." It was Dr. Allen Ching, however, who testified on, and interpreted, the findings of Dr. Nerissa Deparine. Dr. Ching claimed that he and Dr. Nerissa Deparine knew each other as both were employed in Cataingan, Masbate, and that he was familiar

with the signature of Dr. Nerissa Deparine since the latter usually referred to him some of her patients. The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: the accused, Henry Arcilla, and Jimmy Lorena, a Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. The trial court summarized their testimonies as follows: Henry Arcillas testified that he was a widower since 1996 although he had a live-in partner, BBB. He admitted that AAA was his step-daughter. In the afternoon of May 12, 2000, Henry Arcillas had a drinking spree in the house of the owner of the thresher where he worked. They started drinking hard liquor (Tanduay) at 4:00 in the afternoon until 6:00, after which he went home very drunk. He then went to sleep together with his live-in partner, BBB, and the latters three daughters, CCC, EEE and AAA. The house where they slept was a one-room shanty. BBB was on his left side while AAA was on his right. At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, Henry Arcillas was awakened when AAA complained to her mother that he held her shorts. At that juncture, his live-in partner tried to strike him with an ax. Henry claimed that he was able to touch the body of AAA but he did not know what part of her body he had touched nor which part of his body had touched AAA. He, however, denied having sexually molested the latter. During the incident, the complainants mother got so mad at Henry Arcillas that she drove him away. After almost two weeks, AAA went to the place of her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate. AAA and her relatives then returned to Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate and lodged a complaint before Jimmy Lorena, the Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. During the confrontation, a certain Belen complained that Henry Arcillas committed acts of lasciviousness upon her niece AAA, who was also present. When confronted about the incident on May 12, 2000, AAA alleged that the accused touched her short pants prompting her to kick him. Thus, the intention of Henry Arcillas did not materialize. Jimmy Lorena claimed that he was able to settle the case amicably in his house.1wphi1 In fact, Henry Arcillas executed an affidavit promising that he would not commit the same offense anymore. A certain Francisco Oliva was the one who prepared said affidavit but Jimmy had lost the copy of the same. The defense claimed that what the complainant AAA alleged in that confrontation was that the accused only touched her short pants but she was not raped. Finally, the accused Henry Arcillas claimed that the motive of AAA in filing the case for rape against him was due to the fact that the complainant was against his relationship with her mother and that she wanted to take her mother from him. Ruling of the RTC

On March 8, 2004, the RTC convicted Arcillas of qualified rape based on the foregoing evidence and meted the death penalty on him,5 disposing: WHEREFORE, being convicted of such heinous crime of Qualified Rape, accused Henry Arcillas is hereby sentenced to suffer the capital penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the said victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (PhP50,000.00) PESOS; to pay the latter the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (PhP50,000.00) PESOS as for moral damages; and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Ruling of the CA In his appeal in the CA, Arcillas assigned to the RTC the following errors, namely: I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE DEFECTIVE ALLEGATION OF RELATIONSHIP IN THE INFORMATION. On June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the finding of guilt against Arcillas but downgraded the crime to simple rape on the ground that the information did not allege that he was her mothers common-law husband, instead of the victims stepfather, the qualifying circumstance the information alleged. 6 It decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 8, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Masbate, Branch 48, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. The CA supported its affirmance in this wise:

xxx We agree with the accused-appellant that the trial court erred in convicting him of Qualified Rape and in imposing the death penalty in view of the defective allegation in the information. Indeed, even the Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point. It must be noted that the Information alleged that accused-appellant was the stepfather of the rape victim. The evidence shows, however, that he was merely the common-law husband or live-in partner of the latters mother. In order that the accused may be convicted of qualified rape, the circumstances of relationship and minority must be jointly alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape where the information alleges that the accused is the step-father of the victim but the evidence shows that he is merely the common-law husband of the natural mother of the victim. In People vs. Escultor, the Supreme Court held: Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the two counts of rape committed by appellant because the two informations in Criminal Case No. CEBBRL-478 and CEB-BRL-479 failed to correctly state appellants relationship with Jenelyn. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender. The information must jointly allege these qualifying circumstances to afford the accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly mandate that the qualifying circumstance should be alleged in the information. Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of (AAAs) mother, what appears in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage. For appellant to be the stepfather of (AAA), he must be legally married to (AAAs) mother. However, appellant and the victims mot her were not legally married but merely lived in common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victims mother. Instead, the two informations erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple statutory rape punishable with reclusion perpetua for each count. (Emphasis Ours) Thus, accused-appellant should have been convicted of simple rape only, punishable by reclusion perpetua. For this reason, We need not disturb anymore the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The rule is that, if the rape was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the

death penalty, the civil indemnity shall be P75,000.00. But since accused-appellant should only be convicted of simple rape, the civil indemnity should only be P50,000.00 as awarded by the lower court. The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is also in order, being in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. In any event, the imposition of the death penalty is no longer allowed in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346 which prohibits its imposition and instead mandates, in lieu of the capital punishment, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Thus, even if the lower court was correct in convicting the accused-appellant of qualified rape, the penalty should still be reclusion perpetua. 7 Issues Arcillas thus assails the CAs decision as contrary to the facts, the law and jurisprudence. Ruling The CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Arcillas for simple rape. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which provide: Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. xxxx Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x xxxx The elements of the offense charged are that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. AAA rendered a complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the accused, whom she positively identified in court. Her testimony was corroborated on material points by BBB and her own sister as well as by the medico-legal evidence adduced. With both the RTC and the CA considering AAA as a credible witness whose testimony should be believed, we accord great weight to their assessment. The trial judge was placed in the unique position to discern whether she was telling the truth or inventing it after having personally observed AAAs conduct and demeanor as a witness.8 The trial judges evaluation, affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court, and cannot be disturbed, least of all rejected in its entirety, unless Arcillas successfully showed facts or circumstances of weight that the RTC and the CA might have overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case differently. 9 Alas, he did not make that showing here. In his defense, Arcillas denied committing rape against AAA. He insisted that he merely touched her body during a moment of intoxication. The RTC and the CA rejected the denial and explanation. The Court holds that both lower courts rightly did so, considering that AAAs positive declarations of what he had done to her in order to have carnal knowledge of her against her will were far more credible that his denial and explanation that were negative evidence by nature. His explanation lacked weight because it was too convenient and too easy to utter. Worse, the explanation did not stand well in the face of the circumstances that transpired. Of great significance was that AAA roused her mother who was slumbering close by in order to forthwith denounce Arcillas. AAAs spontaneity in doing so entirely belied

the explanation. The roused BBB then got up and quickly lighted a lamp, and in that illumination she saw him naked by the side of the victim. Indignant, BBB quickly grabbed an axe and struck him with it, but he was lucky to avoid the blow and to grab the ax away from BBB. Yet, the dispossession of the axe did not deter BBB from angrily banishing him from her home thereafter. To us, BBBs indignant reaction was that of a mother vindicating her young child against his rapacity. Such circumstances reflected the gravity of the crime just perpetrated against her daughter. The CA disagreed with the RTCs pronouncing Arcillas guilty of qualified rape and imposing the death penalty, and ruled instead that he was liable only for simple rape because the information failed to allege his being the common-law husband of the victims mother. As to the penalty, the CA punished him with reclusion perpe tua. We concur with the CA on both actions. Rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victims parent.10 However, an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the circumstances of the victims over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying circumstances.11 As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.12 The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the information that stated that she was "a 13-year-old girl." The Prosecution established that her age when the rape was committed on May 12, 2000 was thirteen years and two months by presenting her birth certificate revealing her date of birth as March 15, 1987. 13 As to her relationship with Arcillas, the information averred that he was "then the step-father of AAA." It turned out, however, that he was not her stepfather, being only the common-law husband of BBB. The RTC itself found that he and BBB were only "livein partners." In addition, AAAs birth certificate disclosed that her father was CCC, who had been married to BBB,14 who was widowed upon the death of CCC in 1996. No evidence was adduced to establish that BBB and Arcilla legally married after CCCs death.15 Arcillas being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the rape, even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the

information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.16 As to the civil liability, both lower courts united in ordering Arcillas to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. They were correct. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape, while moral damages are proper without need of proof other than the fact of rape by virtue of the undeniable moral suffering of AAA due to the rapes. In addition, Arcillas was liable for exemplary damages. According to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."17 The law permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."18 Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of her minority and the common-law relationship between him and her mother. It did not matter that such qualifying circumstances were not taken into consideration in fixing his criminal liability, because the term aggravating circumstances as basis for awarding exemplary damages under the Civil Code was understood in its generic sense. As the Court well explained in People v. Catubig:19 The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For exemplary damages, therefore, the Court holds that the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable and proper. Lastly, the Court deems it appropriate to impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the monetary awards reckoned from the finality of this decision to complete the quest for justice and vindication on the part of AAA. This is upon the authority of Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasidelicts interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2007 in all respects, subject to the modifications that HENRY ARCILLAS shall pay to AAA the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and that he shall be liable for interest of 6% per annum on the monetary awards reckoned from the finality of this decision. G.R. No. 171671 June 18, 2012

That on or about 04 July 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, conspiring and confederating with co-accused RODRIGO MANONGSONG, Municipal Engineer, and CRISPIN EGARQUE, PNP Officer, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their offices, and taking advantage of their official positions, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally destroy, demolish, and dismantle the riprap/fence of the new HONDURA BEACH RESORT owned by complainant EDMUNDO A. EVORA located at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing undue injury to complainant in the amount of P8,000.00 CONTRARY TO LAW.3 Duly arraigned, respondents entered their respective pleas of not guilty to the crime charged against them.4 After pre-trial,5 trial on the merits ensued. To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita), Alexander Singson (Alexander), Edmundo Evora (Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman Concepcion Escanillas (Escanillas). Mercedita testified that she was the caretaker of Hondura Beach Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. She narrated that on July 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a fence made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets worth P5,000.00 on his resort. On July 4, 2000, she found out that the fence that was just recently built was destroyed. Upon the instruction of Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay authorities. On July 5, 2000, Edmundo again caused the construction of a second fence on the same property worth P3,000.00. However, on the day following, the fence was again destroyed. Mercedita stated that she was informed by some people who were there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the ones who destroyed the fence. 6 Mercedita further testified that Edmundo instructed her to report the matter to the police. When she inquired at the police station, Egarque admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of Mayor Atienza. When she asked Mayor Atienza about the incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and that the land was intended for the fishermen association. Mercedita added that Engr. Manongsong admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit and that the land was intended for the fishermen. Mercedita also stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas that it was Engr. Manongsong and Egarque who destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor.7

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D. MANONGSONG, CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents Aristeo E. Atienza and Rodrigo D. Manongsong, which effectively dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: In an Information2 filed on June 19, 2001, respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and Crispin M. Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto Galera, were charged before the Sandiganbayan violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 26678. The Information alleged:

Alexander testified that he and a certain Reynaldo Gumba constructed the fence twice on the subject property. On the morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the fence being destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque. He said that he informed Mercedita about the incident and he accompanied the latter to the police station and the offices of Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. They eventually reported the incident to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas.8 Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the testimony of Mercedita and further stated that due to the incident, he requested the barangay chairman for a meeting. On July 24, 2000, acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas, the barangay secretary, Engr. Manongsong, Mercedita, Alexander, and a certain Aguado attended the meeting at the barangay hall. Edmundo stated that when Engr. Manongsong was asked why Edmundo was not notified of the destruction of the fence, Engr. Manongsong replied, "Sino ka para padalhan ng Abiso?" Edmundo said that they eventually failed to settle the case amicably.9 Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified that Mercedita and Alexander went to her on July 4, 2000 and July 6, 2000 to report that the fence constructed on the property of Edmundo was destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque upon the order of Mayor Atienza. She added that upon the request of Mercedita, she wrote Engr. Manongsong for a meeting with Edmundo, but the parties failed to settle the dispute on the scheduled meeting. All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were marked in evidence and were admitted on September 21, 2005, which consisted of, among others, machine copies of transfer certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay blotters.10 Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,11 which was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. On August 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which petitioner opposed. Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Acquit by Way of Demurrer to Evidence,13 which petitioner opposed. On December 6, 2005, the court a quo issued a Resolution14 which granted the motion. In the same resolution, the court a quo also held in abeyance the resolution of Mayor Atienzas motion for reconsideration of the resolution granting his suspension from office. On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit),15which was anchored on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondents maintain that the evidence presented were not

sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged. On January 19, 2006, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition.16 On January 23, 2006, albeit belatedly, Egarque filed a Manifestation 17 that he was adopting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by his co-accused. On February 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) issued the assailed Resolution which, among other things, granted the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case. The decretal potion of which reads: WHEREFORE, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The bail bonds posted by all accused is hereby ordered CANCELLED and RETURNED to them, subject to the usual accounting rules and regulations. The Hold Departure Order issued by this Court against all of the accused in this case are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Let the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation be notified accordingly. Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration, dated August 31, 2005, filed by accused Atienza regarding his suspension from office pendent lite, is hereby rendered moot and academic. SO ORDERED.18 In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements of the crime charged were established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part of respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not show that the respondents favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant. Hence, the petition assigning the following errors: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE PROCESS WHEN IT RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PROSECUTION AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED MATTERS OF DEFENSE.19 Petitioner contends that the prosecution was not afforded due process when the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence based on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish bad faith on the part of the respondents. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan should have resolved the Demurrer to Evidence based on the argument of the respondent questioning the credibility of petitioners witnesses and the admissibility of their testimonies in evidence, not upon an issue which petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard, thus, effectively denying the prosecution due process of law. Petitioner maintains that contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo there was evident bad faith on the part of the respondents. Petitioner insists that the act itself of demolishing a fence erected upon private property without giving notice of the intended demolition, and without giving the owner of the same the opportunity to be heard or to rectify matters, is evident bad faith. Petitioner also contends that the element of manifest partiality was sufficiently established when the fence was destroyed on the rationale that they do not have a permit to erect the fence; the place was intended for the benefit of fishermen; and it was a tourist spot. Moreover, the demolition was allegedly done in the guise of official business when the fence was demolished on the basis of the above-stated purpose. Finally, petitioner argues that the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy does not apply in the present case. On their part, respondents argue that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissing the case. Respondents allege that the prosecution was not denied due process of law. Respondents maintain that the prosecution was given every opportunity to be heard. In fact, the assailed resolution was issued after the prosecution has rested its case. Moreover, respondents insist their right against double jeopardy must be upheld. The petition is bereft of merit. <="" p="" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128); font-family: arial, verdana; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:

none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); "> SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. This crime has the following essential elements: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.20 In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."21 In Uriarte v. People,22 this Court explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a

state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.23 As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as charged was not sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit: I. The presence of the first element of this offense was not disputed. The prosecution established that accused-movants were public officers, being then the Mayor, Municipal Engineer, and member of the PNP, at the time alleged in the information. II. Anent the second element, did the act of destroying the subject fences on July 4, 2000 and on July 6, 2000 allegedly by accused Manongsong and Egarque, without giving any notice to the private complainant, amount to manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith as indicated in the information? Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each other so that the existence of any of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second element. x x x xxxx Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence adduced did not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant. Eyewitness Alexander Singson categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as the persons who destroyed/removed the second fence. Private complainant lamented that he was not even given notice of their intent to destroy the fence. However, the same could not be considered evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest. In fact, the following testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution itself showed that:

1. Mercedita Atienza revealed that when she confronted Manongsong why he destroyed the subject fences, the latter replied that "You dont have permit and the land is for the fishermen"; 2. Alexander Singson corroborated that Manongsong told them that "they destroyed the fence because it is a tourist spot and it is also a port for the fishermen"; and 3. Mercedita Atienza also testified that when she asked accused Atienza about the incident, the latter told her "Masama and pinabakod mo. Alam mo namang tourist spot ang Puerto Galera at para sa fishermens association yan." III. Considering that the second element was not present, the Court deemed it proper not to discuss the third element.24 Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, the prosecution was not denied due process.1wphi1 It is to be noted that the prosecution participated in all the proceedings before the court a quo and has filed numerous pleadings and oppositions to the motions filed by respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested its case and submitted its evidence when the demurrer was filed. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.25 What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard,26which is not present here. Clearly, double jeopardy has set in. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.27 The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678 against respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of the offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,28 this Court elucidated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is " filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.29 Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer 30 is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.31In the present case, no such circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the general rule and reverse the findings of the Sandiganbayan.1wphi1 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case No. 26678, is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 179265 July 30, 2012

Appellant was charged under the following Information: That on or about September 19, 2000, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, that is commonly known as "shabu" and with an approximate weight of two thousand six hundred twenty-six point forty[-]nine (2,626.49) grams without the corresponding license or authority whatsoever. Contrary to law.3 The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and adopted by the appellate court, are as follows: Around 6:00 P.M. on September 19, 2000, Cabib Tangomay, a Customs Examiner of the Bureau of Customs assigned at the Departure Operation Division of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), Pasay City, received an information from Police Chief Inspector (P/Ins.) Elmer Pelobello, the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Unit, that a departing passenger at the airport was suspected of carrying "shabu". Tangomay, together with the chief of their office, Customs Examiner Boning Benito, the Duty Non-Uniformed Personnel Supervisor PO2 Paterno Ermino, SPO2 Jerome Cause and action officer Jun Fernandez, proceeded to the departure area, specifically near the x-ray machine at the check-in counter situated at the West Lane of the NAIA. About 6:20 P.M. of the same date, a lady passenger bound for Frankfurt, Germany, arrived. About the same time, Lourdes Macabilin, a member of the Non-Uniformed Personnel of the First Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), PNP, was assigned as an x-ray operator at the West Check-in area of NAIA, Pasay City. Her duty was to monitor all baggages brought by passengers that pass through the x-ray machine. While she was manning the x-ray machine and screening the luggages passing through the conveyor at that time, she noticed a black object which appeared on the monitor of the x-ray machine. Macabilin immediately called the attention of her supervisor on duty, PO2 Paterno Ermino, who was about two meters from her, about the black image or object inside a luggage bag appearing in the monitor of the x-ray machine. PO2 Ermino separated said luggage from the other bags in the conveyor. After a few seconds, the owner of the luggage, who had just passed through the walk-thru counter, picked up said luggage. The owner was later identified as appellant Cristina Gustafsson. PO2 Ermino then called Mr. Araracap, a baggage inspector, and asked Customs Examiners Tangomay and Benito to open the luggage in the presence of appellant. They checked the luggage but could not find the object inside appearing with the black image. Thus, they returned the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CRISTINA GUSTAFSSON y NACUA, Accused-Appellant. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Appellant Cristina Gustafsson y Nacua appeals the June 27, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 convicting her of Violation of Section 16, Article' III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

luggage to the x-ray machine. For the second time, they saw on the monitor black images on the shoes inside the luggage. Tangomay opened the luggage, got the two pairs of shoes, together with a car air freshener, and put said items on the xray machine, where black objects appeared on the monitor. Tangomay then opened the soles of the shoes and found plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance concealed therein. The car air freshener was also opened and found to contain the same white crystalline substance. Thereafter, they brought appellant, together with her luggage (specifically, a bag) containing the plastic sachets with white crystalline substance to the First RASO within the NAIA complex. Appellant was officially turned over to SPO2 Jerome Cause at the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group Pildera II, Pasay City. An inventory was conducted on the contents of appellants luggage and her other personal belongings. The authorities placed markings on and signed the plastic sachets found inside appellants bag. The inventory, however, was not finished on said day and was continued the following day, September 20, 2000. After the inventory of the contents of the subject bag had been finished, SPO2 Cause shook the bag in the presence of appellant, PO2 Samuel Hojilla, Tangomay and Benito to show that there was nothing left inside the bag when its wooden support was accidentally detached, revealing a plastic rubber containing four (4) plastic sachets with white crystalline substance. Another inventory was conducted on the four plastic sachets found at the bottom of the bags wooden support. Thereafter, SPO2 Cause and PO2 Hojilla executed a joint affidavit as to the discovery of the four other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Subsequently, P/Ins. Pelobello, as chief of the Intelligence Unit, prepared a report addressed to the Drug Interdiction Task Group (DITG)-NAIA, x x x for the turn-over of appellants custody. Around 9:16 P.M. on September 20, 2000, PO2 Orlando Tanega brought the specimen confiscated from appellant to the NBI, with a request that the same be subjected to laboratory examination. Patricia Ann Prollamante, a forensic chemist of the NBI, x x x asked their offices photographer to take pictures of the specimen. x x x The total weight of all the specimen was 2,626.49 grams. Her chemical testing Marxis and Simons tests x x x and Thin Layer Chromatographic test x x x revealed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on all the specimen. x x x she reduced her findings into writing and submitted the same to their evidence custodian for safekeeping.4 The appellant, on the other hand, gave a different version5 of the incident. She claimed that on September 19, 2000, at around 6:00 p.m., she was at the NAIA, particularly at the conveyor of the x-ray machine, preparing to board a flight bound for Germany. While waiting in line, a Muslim-looking man who had been curiously looking at her, greeted her. She deposited her black trolley bag and black shoulder

bag on the conveyor, while the same man likewise placed his bags numbering about four to five on the conveyor belt. She noticed that one of the mans bags resembled her black trolley bag. All the while, the Muslim-looking man was behind her. After she crossed over the walk-through machine, a civilian airport employee accosted her. At that time, she noticed that the Muslim-looking man was already out of sight. After about twenty minutes, she was told that she was carrying drugs taken from two pairs of sandals found inside her trolley. Appellant immediately professed that she had no knowledge about the drugs shown to her. The bag from where the sandals were allegedly taken was not shown to her. Subsequently, a number of police officers made her sign a document without the assistance of a lawyer. She was told that she could still catch her flight after signing the said document, which she later identified in open court as her purported affidavit. Thereafter, she was brought to the National Bureau of Investigation and to the Department of Justice. In open court, appellant denied that the bag shown to her was her black trolley bag, but admitted that the personal belongings shown in the pictures were hers. Collaborating appellants version of the story was Racquell Redondo. Redondo testified that she knew Cristina Gustafsson personally as she was the friend of her siblings who were all based in Germany. Cristina was in fact a fiance of one of her brothers. Redondo added that Cristina stayed with her at their house at 313 Captain Serino St. Mabolo II, Bacoor, Cavite when she arrived in the Philippines on September 1, 2000. Redondo claimed that she prepared Gustafssons luggage before the latter left their house for the airport. She denied packing an air freshener canister inside the baggage. When shown of the pictures of the luggage confiscated by authorities, she denied that it was the same black bag that Cristina brought with her to the airport. After trial, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The fallo of the Decision promulgated on June 29, 2005 by the RTC reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Cristina Gustafsson y Nacua guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and hereby sentences to a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, the said accused is ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The methamphetamine hydrochloride is forfeited in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.6 The RTC was convinced that the prosecution had adequately proven that the appellant was the one who picked up the baggage and was the one who claimed to be the owner when asked by PO2 Ermino. The charge being malum prohibitum, the intent, motive or knowledge of the accused need not be shown. The trial court also noted that the prosecution witnesses narration of the incident was categorical and free from any serious contradiction. As such, it cannot be overcome by the plain denial of the appellant. In her appeal before the CA, appellant made the following assignment of errors in her Brief: I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES POLICE OFFICERS AND AIRPORT PERSONNEL. III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, RA NO. 6425. 7 Summarily, appellant claimed that the RTC erred in its assessment of the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in applying the principle of regularity in the performance of official duty. Appellant argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who were all police officers and/or customs and airport personnel, lacked credibility and were self-serving. Likewise, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties was wrongly applied considering that the public employees concerned had violated her constitutional right to assistance of counsel and did not apprise her of her right against self-incrimination during her investigation. She also argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not have been taken as gospel truth as prosecution witness Cabib Tangomay failed to identify which of the nine plastic packs of shabu were confiscated from her luggage.8

The plaintiff-appellee, through the OSG, countered that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The OSG noted that when Tangomay, together with P/Ins. Elmer Pelobello, PO2 Ermino, SPO2 Cause and Jun Fernandez, asked appellant if she was the owner of the luggage containing shabu concealed inside some of the belongings therein, she replied in the affirmative. Appellant even acceded when they asked her to open the padlock of the bag. The OSG likewise stressed that the prosecution witnesses regularly performed their assigned tasks during the incident on September 19, 2000 and narrated in a consistent, straightforward and categorical manner how they discovered shabu in appellants luggage. The OSG added that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, appellate courts tend to rely heavily upon the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as trial courts have the unique opportunity, denied to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. As to the failure of prosecution witness Tangomay to identify which of the plastic packs of shabu were taken from which pair of appellants shoes, the OSG considered the failure too trivial an omission to cast doubt on his credibility. The OSG pointed out that Tangomay explained on re-direct examination that despite his failure to identify which of the nine packs of shabu came from which of the two shoes, he was very sure that the shabu came from appellants bag because he had his signature on the nine plastic packs containing shabu. As aforesaid, the CA affirmed appellants conviction in the assailed Decision dated June 27, 2007. According to the CA, contrary to appellants contention, evidence is self -serving only when the statement is extrajudicially made, not when made in the course of judicial proceedings. The CA noted that in this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were made before the court a quo where the defense had the chance to cross-examine the witnesses. The CA also held that the prosecution witnesses who were police officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties absent contrary evidence showing ill motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The appellate court also believed that although the public employees concerned had violated appellants constitutional rights because she was not given the assistance of counsel when she signed the affidavit nor was she apprised of her right against self-incrimination during the investigation, the modern trend in jurisprudence favors flexibility in believing the testimony of a witness. The appellate court stated that a court may accept or reject portions of a witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case.

Undaunted, appellant now comes to this Court raising the same issues and arguments she raised in her brief before the CA.9 We affirm appellants conviction. In the case of People v. Miguel,10 the Court held that for an accused to be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the following elements be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In this case, the evidence on record established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was caught in possession of the shabu found in her luggage. Upon examination by Forensic Chemist Patricia Ann Prollamante of the National Bureau of Investigation, the specimen contained in each of the nine plastic sachets confiscated from appellant also yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.11 Thus, all three elements were duly established. Appellant insists that the prosecutions witnesses lack credibility.1wphi1 However, we see no reason why the Court should overturn the appraisal of the trial court as regards the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. 12Absent any showing in this case that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses. This is especially so in this case since there is no showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by ill motives to impute such a serious crime as possession of illegal drugs against the appellant. Indeed, both courts a quo correctly applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and held the same to prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial.13 Before the RTC, appellant denied ownership or possession of the luggage and suggested that the baggage which she picked up, or was about to pick up before she was caught, might be the one placed on the conveyor by the Muslim-looking man. The RTC correctly gave scant consideration to this contention considering that appellant admitted that some of the personal belongings retrieved from the luggage belong to her. It was highly improbable for a switching of baggage and/or some of the contents of appellants luggage with that of a fellow passenger to have taken place during the time their luggage passed through the conveyor. Aside from the fact that the prosecution evidence showed that appellant was the one who picked up the baggage and was the one who claimed to be the owner when asked by PO2 Ermino, appellant also has not refuted that she was the one who opened the lock, or gave

the key of the luggage inspected by the customs examiners. Given these circumstances, as well as some contradictions in appellants tes timony tending to diminish her credibility, we find that the trial court correctly disbelieved appellant and her defense of denial. Appellants bare denial simply cannot overthrow the clear and convincing testimonies of the five prosecution witnesses as to her culpability. Likewise, we find no merit in appellant's other contention that the RTC should not have applied the principle of regularity in the performance of official duty. Appellant claims that her constitutional rights were violated because she was not assisted by a counsel when she signed the affidavit 14 stating that she was carrying the luggage in which the drugs were found nor was she apprised of her right against selfincrimination during investigation. We agree with the trial court that there was indeed violation of the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent as she was made to admit her participation in the commission of the offense without informing her of her constitutional rights. However, the trial court correctly noted that "the prosecution did not, as it was the defense, who offered the said unsubscribed affidavit because it is inadmissible."15 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01324 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. G.R. No. 177224 April 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JIMMY BIYALA VELASQUEZ, Accused-Appellant. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: On appeal before Us is the Decision1 dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01064 which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 17, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, of Baguio City, in Criminal Case Nos. 17945-R and 17946-R, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Biyala Velasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Section 8, Article II and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC under the following informations: Criminal Case No. 17945-R

That on or about the 11th day of June 2000 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody, and control, one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves having a weight of 826.4 grams wrapped with newspaper pages, knowing fully well that said leaves are marijuana leaves, a prohibited drug, in violation of the abovementioned provision of law. Criminal Case No. 17946-R That on or about the 11th day of July 2000 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control 4.12 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), contained in a heat sealed plastic bag, a regulated drug(s), without the corresponding license or prescription, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.3 When arraigned on September 26, 2000, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.4 After the pre-trial conference conducted on October 23, 2000, trial ensued.5 The following witnesses testified before the RTC for the prosecution: Forensic Analyst Emilia G. Montes,6 the chemist who examined the dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia confiscated from accused-appellant; Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Modesto Carrera (Carrera),7 Police Officer 1 (PO1) Rolando Amangao (Amangao),8 and SPO1 Warren Lacangan (Lacangan),9 members of the 14th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (RCIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Baguio City who searched accused-appellants house and apprehended him for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia; and Barangay Kagawad Jaime Udani,10 who witnessed the said search and seizure. The collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses painted the following version of events: On July 9, 2000, at about 9:00 in the morning, a certain Manuel De Vera reported to the office of the 14th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group that accused-appellant Velasquez is engaged in selling shabu and marijuana dried leaves in his residence at No. 144 Paraan St., Victoria Village, Quezon Hill, Baguio City. De Vera allegedly came to know of the said activities of accused-appellant Velasquez when his co-driver, a certain Arnold, whom he claimed as a shabu user, told him about it. On the same day, SPO1 Modesto Carrera instructed De Vera to buy shabu and gave him P600.00 to verify the truthfulness of the allegations against accused-appellant

Velasquez. De Vera and Arnold were able to buy shabu and marijuana which they gave later to SPO1 Carrera. Thereafter, SPO1 Carrera filed with the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 59, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against accused-appellant Velasquez, which was eventually granted. On July 13, 2000, a team composed of P/Sr. Insp. Castil, PO1 Sawad, PO2 Cejas, PO1 Labiasto, SPO1 Carrera, SPO1 Lacangan and PO1 Amangao was formed to implement the search warrant. They sought the assistance of Barangay Kagawad Jaime Udani and Barangay Kagawad Lilian Somera of Barangay Victoria Village to witness the search. The police officers together with Udani and Somera proceeded to the residence of accused-appellant Velasquez, introduced themselves and presented the search warrant. In the course of the search, PO1 Amangao and SPO1 Lacangan found in the bedroom of accused-appellant Velasquez a plastic bag containing a brick of dried leaves suspected to be marijuana, which was wrapped in an old newspaper. After informing accused-appellant Velasquez that they found illegal drugs inside his bedroom, SPO1 Lacangan arrested him and apprised him of his constitutional rights. When accused-appellant Velasquez was frisked, one transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu was found in his pocket. The search on accused-appellant Velasquezs residence also yielded 36 pieces of rolling papers, aluminum foil and tooter, among others.11 The prosecution likewise submitted object and documentary evidence to support its charges against accused-appellant, which consisted of: (1) the Search and Seizure Warrant for dangerous drugs and paraphernalia at accused-appellants house, issued on July 10, 2000, by Judge Abraham B. Borreta of RTC-Branch 59 of Baguio City;12 (2) the Joint Affidavit of Search dated July 14, 2000 executed by SPO1 Carrera, [SPO1] Lacangan, and PO1 Amangao;13 (3) the Receipt of Items Confiscated and a Certification dated July 13, 2000, executed by Baranggay Kagawads Lillian M. Somera and Jaime D. Udani, attesting to the orderly execution of the Search and Seizure Warrant;14 (4) the Request for Laboratory Examination of the items confiscated, made by P/SINSP Rodolfo D. Castil, Jr. and dated July 13, 2000;15 (5) one brick of marijuana fruiting tops with a weight of 826.4 grams and five plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 4.12 grams; (6) four pieces of cut aluminum foils, one small vial, and three small used plastic sachets, all with shabu residues; (7) Initial Laboratory Examination Report16 dated July 13, 2000 and Chemistry Report No. D-081-200017 dated July 14, 2000, issued by Forensic Analyst Montes, indicating that the brick and sachet contents tested positive for marijuana and shabu, respectively; and (8) Chemistry

Report No. BCDT-266-2000 dated July 13, 2000 issued by Forensic Analyst Montes stating that accused-appellants urine sample tested positive for shabu.18 Accused-appellant,19 for his part, presented his lone testimony and submitted the defenses of denial and frame-up. Accused-appellant narrated that: In the morning of June 11, 2000, accused-appellant Velasquez was in his house at 143 Quezon Hill when his fellow drivers, Rolando and Nelson, went to see him to redeem a cell phone the latter had pawned to accused-appellant Velasquez. Then, someone repeatedly knocked at his door and when accused-appellant Velasquez asked who it was, no one answered. Suddenly, said persons who refused to identify themselves barged into the house of accused-appellant Velasquez by kicking the door open and once inside, they drew their firearms and pointed the same to the accused. The intruders turned out to be Police Officers Carrera, Lacangan, and Amangao, who were there to serve a search warrant on accused-appellant Velasquez. Accused-appellant Velasquez was bodily searched but nothing was found on him. Nevertheless, the police operatives continued their operations inside the bedroom of accused-appellant Velasquez. When SPO1 Lacangan was inside the bedroom, he summoned accused-appellant Velasquez and presented to him something wrapped in a bag. They proceeded to the living room and accused-appellant Velasquez was shown what was found inside his room, a kilo of marijuana. SPO1 Lacangan was allegedly holding the marijuana when he entered the room of accused-appellant Velasquez. Accused-appellant Velasquez claimed that when the conduct of the search started, barangay officials Udani and Somera were not yet present. They appeared only later, about 5 minutes after the search had started.20 Accused-appellant offered no other object or documentary evidence except for Forensic Analyst Montess Chemistry Report No. BCDT-266-2000 dated July 13, 2000, which was previously submitted by the prosecution21and which accusedappellant requested to be also marked as his evidence. The RTC rendered a Decision22 on September 17, 2002. The RTC noted at the outset the variance in the dates stated in the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17945-R and 17946-R. The information in Criminal Case No. 17945-R alleged that the incident happened "on or about the 11th day of June 2000," while the information in Criminal Case No. 17946-R alleged that the incident occurred "on or about the 11th day of July 2000." The RTC declared that the discrepancy was merely typographical as the records and the testimonies of the witnesses established that the incident occurred on or about July 11, 2000, or more precisely,

on July 13, 2000 when the Search and Seizure Warrant was actually served and implemented. The RTC further ruled that after weighing the evidence presented by the parties, accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Jimmy Velasquez y Biyala GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 17945-R, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 17946-R, the accused is sentenced to a prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.23 Accused-appellant assailed the foregoing RTC judgment directly before us. However, pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,24 we referred accusedappellants appeal to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 25 In its Decision dated October 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals sustained the accusedappellants convictions. The appellate court decreed thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 17, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61, in Criminal Case Nos. 17945-R and 17946-R, is hereby AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.26 Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant asserts in his appeal that: 1) There are irregularities in the performance of the duties of the officers; 27 2) There are numerous discrepancies in testimonies of the [prosecution] witnesses;28 and 3) The court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.29 Plaintiff-appellee counters that:

I The search was conducted by the police officers in the presence of appellant and his wife as well as the two barangay kagawad. II Appellant waived whatever objection he had to the implementation of the search warrant. III The court a quo correctly convicted appellant for violation of the dangerous drugs act, as amended.30 The appeal is devoid of merit. Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug." 31 All these elements were established beyond reasonable doubt in the cases against accused-appellant. The prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically testified that pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and seized from accused-appellants house and actual possession a brick of marijuana leaves and heat-sealed sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. SPO1 Carrera related before the RTC how they secured a Search and Seizure Warrant for accused-appellants house, how the Search and Seizure Warrant was implemented, who inventoried the dangerous drugs and paraphernalia confiscated from accused-appellant, and to whom said confiscated items were submitted for forensic examination. Corroborating SPO1 Carreras testimony was Kagawad Udani who personally witnessed the execution of the Search and Seizure Warrant at accused-appellants house. Kagawad Udani recounted: Q Was the door of the house open when Mody Carrera knocked at the door? A No, sir, the door was forced open because there were three (3) persons inside the house and they do not like to open the door, sir.

xxxx Q And how was the door forced open? A Mody Carrera kicked the door, sir. Q And the door was opened? A Yes, sir. Q After the door was opened, what happen next? A They frisked the 3 male persons inside the house, sir. Q Who searched or frisked the 3 male persons inside the house? A Mody Carrera and his companions, sir. xxxx Q Was there anything found from the possession of the 3 male persons when they were frisked or bodily searched by Officer Carrera and his companions? A Yes, sir they were able to find pieces of shabu a white substance in cellophane sachet with money, sir. Q Where did Officer Carrera and his companions find the pieces of shabu and money? A From the pocket, sir. Q Whose pocket in particular? A Pocket of Jimmy Velasquez, sir.32 Q After you saw the CIDG Officer found the two (2) plastic sachets from the front left pocket of the pants, what happened next? A They went to search the room, sir. Q And what happened during the search of the room?

A We saw the 1 brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves at the back of the door, sir. Q You said we saw the brick of the marijuana leaves at the back of the door of Jimmy Velasquez? A All of us, sir. Q Including accused Jimmy Velasquez? A Yes, he was also there, sir. xxxx Q After that what happened next? A There was another search and we were able to recover 36 white rolling paper, sir. Q What else? A 1 tooter under the bed, sir. xxxx Q Aside from that what else? A We found at the sala beside the dining table hang a 4 plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, sir. Q Aside from that what else was found? A 1 lighter at the center table, sir. Q Aside from that what else if any? A 3 small used plastic sachet, sir.33 PO1 Amangao and SPO1 Lacangan further confirmed the testimonies of SPO1 Carrera and Kagawad Udani. They also identified the brick of marijuana leaves found in the bedroom of accused-appellants house.

In contrast, accused-appellant only proffered the defenses of denial and frame-up, that the dangerous drugs and paraphernalia were planted by the police officers. However, other than accused-appellant's bare allegations, there is no other evidence on record to corroborate his version of the events that transpired at his house on July 13, 2000. "[D]enial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act."34 Moreover, "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary."35 In the absence of proof of any odious intent to falsely impute a serious crime, the self-serving defenses of denial and unsubstantiated claim of frame-up of an accused can never prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.36 Accused-appellant has made much of what he perceived as inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, as to how the door of the house was opened and who actually witnessed the search conducted in the bedroom of the house. These alleged inconsistencies pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal possession of a brick of marijuana leaves, sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, and paraphernalia by accused-appellant, without authorization or prescription. We have previously held that "discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence." In fact, "such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen the witnesses credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed."37 In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes "a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals."38

We find no cogent reason herein to differ from the findings and conclusion of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Sections 8 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides: SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. xxxx SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. xxxx Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 1. 40 grams or more of opium; 2. 40 grams or more of morphine; 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride; 4. 40 grams or more of heroin; 5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana; 6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil; 7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.1wphi1 Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the law, accused-appellant was properly sentenced in Criminal Case No. 17945-R to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for his conviction for illegal possession of a total of 826.4 grams of marijuana leaves; and in Criminal Case No. 17946-R to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for his conviction for illegal possession of a total of 4.12 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Similarly in order was the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant to pay the fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01064, which affirmed the Decision dated September 17, 2002 of the RTC, Branch 61 of Baguio City in Criminal Case Nos. 17945-R and 17946-R, is hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, vs. BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Resolutions1dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648. The CA Resolution of March 9, 2006 dismissed petitioners' petition for review, while the CA Resolution dated May 22, 2006 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On February 11, 2004, an Information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners.2 On April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause.3 After respondent's Comment/Opposition4 was filed, the MeTC issued an Order5 dated July 9, 2004 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.6 On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment setting aside the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC and directing the said court to proceed to trial.7 Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its presently assailed Resolution 8 dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution9 dated May 22, 2006. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in outrightly dismissing the Petition for Review on the ground that the remedy availed of by petitioners is improper. Strict enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the purposes of justice so require.10

In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the Decision of the RTC is final as it disposes with finality the issue of whether the MeTC erred in granting their Motion to Dismiss. The Court does not agree. The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by the CA in dismissing petitioners' petition for review is the latter's failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2,11 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, they, however, failed to comply with these requirements. Worse, they did not even mention anything about it in the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides: Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.12 An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.13 Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated.14 The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. 15 In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity.16Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.17 In the instant case, petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their nonobservance even when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing their petition. Such obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible. Even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. The factual and legal situations in the present case are essentially on all fours with those involved in Basa v. People.18 In the said case, the accused were charged with swindling and falsification of public documents. Subsequently, the accused filed a

Joint Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged in each Information do not constitute an offense. Thereafter, the MeTC issued an order in favor of the accused and, accordingly, quashed the Informations. The private complainant, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration but the MeTC denied it. On appeal, the RTC reversed the order of the MeTC and directed the continuation of the proceedings. The accused then filed a petition for review with the CA. In its assailed decision, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal from the RTC decision is improper, because the said decision is actually interlocutory in nature. In affirming the ruling of the CA, this Court held that: Petitioners erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. Thus, they filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Section 3 (b), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: xxxx (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. xxxx Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states: Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, x x x. The above provisions contemplate of an appeal from a final decision or order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 resorted to by petitioners is improper. To repeat, the RTC Decision is not final, but interlocutory in nature. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits.

Tested against the above criterion, the RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners' motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e ., the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally render the proper judgment. It is axiomatic that an order denying a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the Informations do not constitute an offense cannot be challenged by an appeal. This Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. The evident reason for such rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. To tolerate the practice of allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.19 (Emphases supplied) In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits. In their second assigned error, petitioners claim that assuming for the sake of argument that the remedy they availed of is not proper, the facts of the case would readily show that there exist just and compelling reasons to warrant the relaxation of the rules in the interest of substantial justice. Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report, submitted as evidence by respondent to the prosecutor's office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard signatures "reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON."20 The Court agrees with the prosecutor's pronouncement in its Resolution 21 dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that "no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein minute details are not clearly manifested," the fact that an expert witness already found that the

questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of falsification of public document. In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,22 this Court held: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.23 In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof. With respect to respondent's legal personality to appeal the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC.1wphi1 Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent "the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled "Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service," which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) "shall have charge of

the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions ."24 In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts.25 Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the same. Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file an information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648, are AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 166758 June 27, 2012

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, represented by MANOLO C. FERNANDO, Petitioner, vs. VICENTE ATILANO, NAZAAR LUIS, JOCELYN DELA DINGCO, SHARON SEE VICENTE, and JOHN DOES,Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) challenging the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84248.

The Facts Petitioner MERALCO is a domestic corporation doing business as an electric utility, and represented herein by its Senior Manager and Head of Treasury Operations Group, Manolo C. Fernando. Respondents are, at the time material to this case, officers of Corporate Investments Philippines, Inc. (CIPI) a duly licensed investment house engaged in securities brokerage, dealership and underwriting services: Vicente Atilano (President); Nazaar Luis (Vice-President and General Counsel); Jocelyn dela Dingco (First Vice-President, Funds Management Group); Sharon See Vicente (Assistant Manager, Funds Management Group); and several "John Does" who are unidentified employees and officers of CIPI. On April 16, 2001, MERALCO filed a complaint for estafa, under Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, against the respondents. MERALCO alleged that in 1993, MERALCO started investing in commercial papers (CPs) through CIPI. As of May 2000, MERALCOs investment with CIPI already amounted toP75,000,000.00. At various points in time, MERALCO delivered funds to the respondents for investment in CPs and government securities (GS). Sometime in May 2000, respondent Atilano, who was at that time the President of CIPI, conveyed to Manuel Lopez, MERALCOs President, that CIPI was facing liquidity problems. Lopez agreed to extend help to CIPI by placing investments through CIPI, on the condition that CIPI would secure these investments with GS and CPs issued by the Lopez Group of Companies (Lopez Group). Pursuant to this agreement, Fernando, who was at that time the Head of MERALCOs Treasury Operations Group, and respondent Vicente, who was the Assistant Manager of CIPIs F unds Management Group, allegedly entered into the following transactions: Date May 30, 2000 May 31, 2000 Amount Invested P20,000,000.00 P45,000,000.00 Term 30 days 30 days Securities GS and CPs of Lopez Group CPs of Rockwell and Benpres Corporation

On June 8, 2000, following CIPIs alleged failure to deliver the subject securities within the period agreed upon, Fernando instructed Manolo Carpio and another staff of MERALCOs Treasury Operations Group to proceed to CIPIs office and demand the proper documentation of the subject transactions. Fernando followed his staff and met with respondent Luis who was at that time the Vice-President and General Counsel of CIPI. According to Fernando, respondent Atilano called him during the meeting to reiterate CIPIs liquidity problems, and to assure him that it was only temporary. He said that respondent Atilano promised to correct the irregularities committed by CIPI by making changes in MERALCOs investment portfolio. MERALCO said that the proposed changes in its investment portfolio, as promised by respondent Atilano, are reflected in the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting, as follows: 1. For its investments, MERALCO shall accept only Government Securities (GS) and Commercial Papers (CPs) of any Lopez Group company as security. 2. As an interim arrangement, MERALCO will accept CIPIs Promissory Notes detailed as follows for investments that are presently without security: Promissory Note No. 10010 in the amount of Pesos 18,000,000 + interest Promissory Note No. 10011 in the amount of Pesos 45,000,000 + interest 3. That this interim arrangement shall be regularized by replacing the aforementioned Promissory Notes detailed in Item #2 above with any security stated in item number (1) above. 4. That Confirmation of Sale No. 29145 covered by securities: PILTEL COMMERCIAL PAPER with a price of Pesos 10,000,000.00 shall likewise be replaced with securities acceptable to MERALCO as mentioned in item number (1) above. 5. That CIPI shall effect the changes stated in item numbers (3) and (4) above not later than 12:00 NN of 9 June 2000.4 The Minutes were signed by respondent Luis and they indicated that the meeting was attended by Fernando, Felix C. de Guzman, Manolo D. Carpio and Malou M. Manlugon, on MERALCOs part, and by respondents Luis and Dela Dingco on CIPIs part. However, notwithstanding the agreed deadline of June 9, 2000, CIPI allegedly failed to fulfill its undertaking. Thus, MERALCO argued that the respondents should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code for falsely

MERALCO further alleged that it informed CIPI of its requirement to have the above-listed securities delivered to it within twenty-four (24) hours after the transaction, which CIPI failed to deliver despite repeated demands. Contrary to its specific instructions, MERALCO alleged that CIPI diverted MERALCOs funds by placing the investments in CIPIs own promissory notes (PNs) and in CPs of companies that are not members of the Lopez Group such as the investment of MERALCOs funds amounting to P10,000,000.00 in Pilipino Telephone Corporation CPs.

pretending that they possess power, influence and qualifications to buy CPs of the Lopez Group and/or GS as agreed upon. MERALCO averred that it entrusted the subject investments to CIPI because of CIPIs commitment to comply with the condition that the investments would be secured by GS and/or CPs issued by a Lopez Group company. MERALCO maintained that by substituting the required securities with PNs of CIPI and CPs of non-Lopez Group companies, the respondents are guilty of converting and misappropriating the subject funds to the prejudice of MERALCO. In a resolution dated February 20, 2002, Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana dismissed MERALCOs complaint for insufficiency of evidence. According to Prosecutor Pastrana, the evidence presented by MERALCO failed to establish that the respondents committed any act that would constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Prosecutor Pastrana said that there is no clear proof that the respondents misappropriated or converted MERALCOs funds the core element in the offense of estafa. He also found that MERALCO failed to prove the indispensable element of deceit as the evidence showed that respondent Atilano revealed CIPIs liquidity problems to MERALCO even before the latter placed its investment through CIPI. Prosecutor Pastrana noted that considering the amount of money that MERALCO invested, there was no documentary evidence to show any specific instruction for CIPI to invest the funds only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group. MERALCO merely relied on the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting to prove that MERALCO indeed made such an instruction. Thus, Prosecutor Pastrana concluded that the transaction between MERALCO and CIPI was a money market transaction partaking of a loan transaction whose nonpayment does not give rise to any criminal liability for estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Prosecutor Pastrana ruled that in a money market placement, the remedy of an unpaid investor (MERALCO) is to institute a civil action for recovery against the middleman or dealer (CIPI) and not a criminal action, such as the present recourse. MERALCO moved to reconsider Prosecutor Pastranas resolution but the latter denied the motion in a resolution dated May 8, 2002. On June 3, 2002, MERALCO filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On December 17, 2002, then DOJ Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez dismissed the petition in accordance with Section 12(c), in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70.5 The Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully examining the petition and its attachments, she found no error on the part of the

handling prosecutor that would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. The DOJ resolution further ruled that the challenged resolution was in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter. The DOJ resolution also noted MERALCOs failure to submit a legible true copy of the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 which was attached as Annex "2" of respondent Vicentes counter-affidavit, in violation of Section 56of Department Circular No. 70. MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied in a resolution dated March 26, 2004. Thereupon, on May 31, 2004, MERALCO filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the December 17, 2002 and March 26, 2004 resolutions of the DOJ. In its decision dated September 29, 2004, the CA dismissed MERALCOs petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. It noted that the DOJ Minute Resolution was not invalidated by the fact that it contained no further discussion of the factual and legal issues because the reviewing authority expressed full concurrence with the findings and conclusions made by the prosecutor. The CA further ruled that the relationship between MERALCO and CIPI is that of a creditor and debtor and, therefore, the remedy available to MERALCO is to file a civil case for recovery and not a criminal case for estafa, citing Sesbreno v. CA. 7 When the CA denied MERALCOs motion for reconsideration, the latter filed the instant petition. The Petition MERALCO argues that (1) the DOJ Resolution violated the requirements laid down under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the jurisprudential pronouncements of this Court on the matter; (2) the said resolution violated the jurisprudential stricture against applying technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice when it dismissed MERALCOs petition for failing to attach an annex of an annex; and (3) the CA erred in affirming the resolution of the handling prosecutor dismissing the complaint for estafa against respondents herein. The Issues

The issues for this Courts determination are: first, whether the DOJ Resolution dated December 17, 2002 complied with the constitutional requirement laid down in Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution8 and the requirement in Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 19879 ; and second, whether or not this Court can disturb the determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor in the case. Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious. A. The December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution complied with the requirement of the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 The December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution was issued in accordance with Section 12(c), in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70, dated July 3, 2000, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration. In dismissing MERALCOs petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, the Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully examining the petition and its attachments, no error on the part of the handling prosecutor was found to have been committed which would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. Thus, the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution concluded that the challenged resolution was in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter. MERALCO considers the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution invalid because of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which it is based, as required under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. MERALCO claims that the requirement to state the facts and the law in a decision is a mandatory requirement and the DOJ is not exempt from complying with the same. In arguing as it did, MERALCO failed to note that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution refers to "courts," thereby excluding the DOJ Secretary and prosecutors who are not members of the Judiciary. In Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio,10 we ruled that "Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution does not x x x extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary." In explaining the inapplicability of Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution to DOJ resolutions, the Court said that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a

prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding. This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,11 where we pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court. 12 "[This] is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions" on determination of probable cause.13 In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents.14 This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties.15 Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court. The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented to him, he should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. Since the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely investigative or inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon which it is based. We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and legal requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying MERALCOs petition for review which is Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ resolution noted that MERALCO failed to submit a legible true copy of the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 and considered the omission in violation of Section 516 of Department Circular No. 70. MERALCO assails the dismissal on this ground as an overly technical application of the rules and claims that it frustrated the ends of substantial justice. We note, however, that the failure to attach the document was not the sole reason of the DOJs denial of MERALCOs p etition for review. As mentioned, the DOJ resolution dismissed the petition primarily because the prosecutors resolution is in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter. At this point, it becomes unnecessary to decide the legality of Section 7 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70 allowing the outright dismissal of MERALCOs petition for review. It is basic that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.17 Also, DOJ Department Circular No. 70 is an enactment of an executive department of the government and is designed for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice; before it was enacted, it is presumed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional.18 Lest we be misunderstood, we do not hereby evade our duty; in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, we merely accord respect to the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers, which has long guided our system of government. B. The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function "[T]he determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice."19 As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, "[c]ourts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch";20 the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. 21 This notwithstanding, we have examined the records and found no error in the public prosecutors determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a criminal complaint. The respondents are being charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code22 (estafa by conversion or misappropriation), the following elements must concur:

(1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.23 The records show that MERALCO failed to prove that the respondents indeed misappropriated or converted its investments. As the handling prosecutor found, aside from the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting, MERALCO did not present any evidence that would prove that MERALCO indeed gave specific instructions for CIPI to invest only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group. According to the CA, the said Minutes do not have any probative value for being hearsay because they attest to the existence of an agreement purportedly entered into between respondent Atilano and Lopez whose testimony was never presented in evidence. While respondent Atilano explicitly denied having received any specific instructions from MERALCO on how its investments would be placed, MERALCO failed to present any contrary evidence. MERALCO could have presented in evidence the testimony of Lopez to prove that he gave specific instructions to CIPI to place its investments only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group, but it failed to do so. Absent any proof of specific instructions, CIPI cannot be said to have misappropriated or diverted MERALCOs investments. We take note that in mon ey market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific securities. Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is when an investor enters into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place investments only in designated securities. Another is when there is no stipulation for placement on designated securities; thus, the dealer is given discretion to choose the placement of the investment made. Under the first situation, a dealer who deviates from the specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil action for recovery of the amount invested.

On the other hand, to be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code24 (estafa by means of deceit), the following elements must concur: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 25 MERALCO argued that the respondents are guilty of falsely pretending that they possess power, influence and qualifications to buy GS and CPs of the Lopez Group, to induce MERALCO to part with its investment. We rule that the argument has no basis precisely because no evidence exists showing that CIPI made false representations regarding its capacity to deal with MERALCOs investments. In fact, the records will show that respondent Atilano disclosed CIPIs liquidity problems to MERALCO even before MERALCO placed its investment. We agree with the prosecutors finding that aside from its allegations, MERALCO failed to present any evidence showing that any of the respondents made any fraudulent misrepresentations or false statements prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of MERALCOs funds to CIPI. Finally, apart from its sweeping allegation that the respondents misappropriated or converted its money placements, the handling prosecutor found that MERALCO failed to establish, by evidence, the particular role or actual participation of each respondent in the alleged criminal act. Neither was it shown that they assented to its commission. "It is basic that only corporate officers shown to have participated in the alleged anomalous acts may be held criminally liable."26 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated September 29, 2004 and the resolution dated January 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. 198589 July 25, 2012

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and .JULIETA G. ANDO, Respondents. RESOLUTION REYES, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by private complainant Willie Tee (Tee) from the Decision1 dated July 2R, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32680, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The November 6, 2008 and May 2, 2008 Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the offenses charged. SO ORDERED.2 Respondent Julieta G. Ando (Ando) was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), Branch 26 of three (3) counts of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In a Decision3 rendered on May 2, 2008, the MeTC found Ando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of making it appear that Tees father, Tee Ong, who was the owner of To Suy Hardware, signed, executed and sworn a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit, and a Transfer of Rights on January 31, 1996. Andos conviction was premised on the following factual findings: (i) Tee Ong was already dead at the time the allegedly falsified documents were executed and notarized on January 31, 1996; (ii) Ando was in possession of the allegedly falsified documents, giving rise to the presumption that she was responsible therefor; and (iii) Ando used the allegedly falsified documents to cause the transfer in her favor of the rights to the business name "TO SUY HARDWARE".4 On appeal, Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila affirmed the MeTCs findings. In a Decision5dated November 6, 2008, the RTC predicated Andos guilt on the falsity of the subject documents as being undisputed and stipulated upon by the parties.6 The CA gave due course to Andos appeal and reversed the RTC Decision dated November 6, 2008. According to the CA, Ando deserves to be acquitted of the charges against her in view of the prosecutions failure to prove that the subject documents were indeed falsified. Specifically, the prosecution did not present any expert witness or caused the examination of the subject documents to determine whether Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature were indeed forged. The CA found

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

the lower courts to have erred in sweepingly concluding that the signatures on the Deed of Sale, Affidavit, and Transfer of Rights were forged on the basis of the undisputed fact that Tee Ong was already dead at the time that such documents were notarized on January 31, 1996. According to the CA the prosecution did not eliminate the possibility that Tee Ong may have signed the said documents before he died on December 15, 1995, thus, clouding Andos supposed guilt with moral uncertainty. What the CA found as certain from the evidence of the prosecution is the notarization of the subject documents after Tee Ongs death and not the impossibility of Tee Ongs voluntary execution thereof before his death. Accordingly, it is the notary public who notarized the subject documents, not Ando, who should be held liable for any irregularities that may have attended the notarization. The execution and notarization of the subject documents are two (2) different acts and the irregularities attending their notarization do not necessarily affect the validity of their execution. In this petition, Tee attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA, alleging that the latter has no reason to reverse the MeTCs and RTCs finding of guilt as the inconsistencies in Andos statements and her possession and use of the subject documents prove beyond reasonable doubt that she was the one who forged Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature. There was likewise no necessity to produce an expert witness to determine if Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature were forged. That Tee Ong was already dead at the time the subject documents were executed and notarized coupled with Andos use thereof to her benefit sufficed to conclude that there was forgery and that Ando was responsible therefor. 7 Tee claimed that he filed this Petition under the authority and supervision of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).8 Tee had also dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the same has been rendered futile by the immediately executory nature and finality of an acquittal.9 The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion10 dated October 6, 2011, stating that it is adopting Tees petition as its own. Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the principle of double jeopardy, making it unnecessary to address and extrapolate on the numerous factual issues raised by Tee against the CAs Decision dated July 28, 2011 and the procedural lapses Ando attributes to Tee. The mere fact that the decision being brought for this Courts review is one for acquittal alerts ones attention to a possible violation of the rule against double jeopardy. In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,11 this Court reiterated that mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled, even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court was

categorical in stating that a re-examination of the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy.12 This petition does not allege a mistrial and the sole challenge posed by Tee and the OSG against the validity of the CAs disposition is the latters supposed misappreciation of the evidence, which is an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction or a manifestation of grave abuse of discretion, hence, not correctible by a writ of certiorari.13 In People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Third Division),14 this Court clarified that for an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecutions right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.15 (Citations omitted) The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecutions right to due process was violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Andos acquittal was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Andos acquittal, absent any showing that the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the CAs findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy. As ruled in the above-cited Sandiganbayan case: Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law and its implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of the prosecutions right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.16 (Citation omitted)

In fine, this petition cannot be given due course without running afoul of the principle against double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 197815 February 8, 2012

In the investigation that followed, AAA positively identified the appellant and his minor co-accused as the perpetrators of the sexual assault. The appellant denied the charge and even denied knowing AAA. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at the wake of his grandfather where he spent the night. He disclaimed knowing why AAA filed the case against him. The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. It found AAAs straightforward testimony more credible than the denial and alibi propounded by the accused-appellant. The RTC decreed: ACCORDINGLY, finding herein accused Julieto Sanchez y Elveza @ "Ompong" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape punishable under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties as provided for by law. Said accused is hereby sentenced to indemnify the private complainant [AAA] the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P75,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.7 (emphasis supplied) The appellant appealed his conviction to the CA which agreed with the RTC on the appellants guilt of the crime charged. However, the CA modified the RTCs deci sion by reducing the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages to P50,000.00 each, and deleting the award of exemplary damages.8 The Issue The sole issue is whether the guilt of the appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.9 The appellant argues that: (1) AAAs testimony suffered from serious flaws and contradictions, rendering it doubtful; (2) there was evidence that another person committed the crime; and (3) he has a strong alibi. The Courts Ruling We find no reason to reverse the conviction of the appellant. The Court is guided by the following jurisprudence when confronted with the issue of credibility of witnesses on appeal:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JULIETO SANCHEZ @ "OMPONG," Appellant. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: On appeal is the decision1 dated December 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03954, which affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, City of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-02-6879. The RTC found Julieto Sanchez @ "Ompong" (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape3 committed on June 20, 2002 against a ten-year old girl, AAA.4 The Facts The records show that the 26-year-old appellant accosted AAA while she was on her way home from school. The appellant (who was with a 14-year old coaccused)5 gave chase, grabbed AAA, covered her mouth with a handkerchief, and dragged her to a bamboo grove. He then tied AAAs hands and feet with a wire, removed her lower garments, and kicked her hard on her back, causing her to stoop down with her buttocks protruding backward and her hands and knees on the ground.6 While AAA was in that position, the appellant removed his lower garments and inserted his private organ into AAAs private organ, causing her pain; thereafter and in the same manner, the minor co-accused likewise had sexual coitus with AAA. With the rape done, the two untied AAA, threatening and warning her at the same time not to disclose the incident. The next day, AAA confided the sexual assault to her mother when the latter inquired about the bloodstains found on AAAs panty and shorts. Her parents, in turn, reported the incident to the police. AAA was thereafter subjected to physical examination, revealing the presence of several lacerations in her vagina.

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. 10 Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.11 And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.12 In this case, both the RTC and the CA found AAA and her testimony credible. Our own independent examination of the records leads us to arrive at the same conclusion. AAAs testimony relating to the identity of t he appellant as the perpetrator was firm and categorical. Her testimony on the details of the rape which established all its elements namely, the carnal knowledge, the force and intimidation employed by the appellant, and AAAs young age was clear and unequivocal.13 AAAs credibility is further strengthened by her clear lack of ill-motive to falsify. The inconsistencies found in AAAs testimony did not discredit her credibility. The pointed inconsistencies - whether AAAs lower garments were first removed before she was tied up - are too trivial in character and have no bearing in the determination of the appellants guilt or innocence. The sequential order of the acts which immediately preceded the commission of the sexual assault by the appellant did not negate AAAs testimony on the material details of the rape. We note, too, that AAAs testimony was corroborated by physical evidence. Similarly, the appellants imputation that another person might have committed the crime was not supported by the evidence on record. What is clear is AAAs unwavering identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the rape. In addition, AAA denied that a person known as "Pogi" was her rapist. She also explained that the notion that one "Pogi" raped her was merely concocted by the mother of the minor co-accused. Lastly, it is a settled rule that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.14 Under the circumstances, the alibi of the appellant is weak. The alibi was not corroborated; it also failed to satisfy the requirement of physical impossibility and the lack of facility to access the two places.15The records, in this regard, show that the place of the wake of the

appellants grandfather and the place of the rape were located in the same barangay.16 Given these considerations, we find that the appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1Accordingly, we uphold the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC and the CA. We, likewise, uphold the awards by the CA of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, we modify the CAs decision by additionally awarding to AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence.17 The award of exemplary damages is justified under the circumstances to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, to vindicate the undue suffering and wanton invasion of AAAs rights and to punish the highly reprehensible and outrageous conduct of the appellant.18 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated December 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03954. Appellant Julieto Sanchez @ "Ompong" is additionally ordered to pay the private complainant P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. G.R. No. 194721 August 15, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA a.k.a. JAO MAPA, Accused-Appellant. VILLARAMA, JR.* DECISION PEREZ, J.: Once again, on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, we uphold the state's compliance with the chain of custody rule and sustain the conviction 1 of accusedappellant of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu.

The Facts
Accused-appellant identified himself as "John Brian Amarillo, 25 years old, a resident of Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, single, a washing boy."2 The records do not indicate when, how and upon whose liking the a.k.a. "Jao Mapa" came to be associated with the accused.

"Jao Mapa," the "washing boy" who was acquitted for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2044-45,3in 2004, and whose name appeared in the drugs Watchlist of Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City,4 was again charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu this time allegedly committed in 2006. The accusatory portions of the separate Informations both dated 10 April 2006 filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati read: [Criminal Case No. 06-751] That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao Mapa/Jao"], without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug. CONTRARY TO LAW.5 [Criminal Case No. 06-751 That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao Mapa/Jao"], not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control the following items with markings, to wit: "JAO 1" 0.03 gram "JAO 2" 0.02 gram "JAO 3" 0.02 gram "JAO 4" 0.02 gram "JAO 5" 0.02 gram "JAO 6" 0.02 gram "JAO 7" 0.02 gram "JAO 8" 0.01 gram "JAO 9" 0.02 gram "JAO 10" 0.03 gram "JAO 11" 0.02 gram "JAO 12" 0.02 gram "JAO 13" 0.03 gram

"JAO 14"

0.02 gram

with a total weight of zero point three three (0.33) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.6 On 8 May 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During pretrial, the forensic chemist and PO2 Rafael Castillo, the police investigator assigned to the case, appeared in court. The parties stipulated on the following: "qualification of the forensic chemist as an expert witness; existence of the documents relative to the examination conducted by the forensic chemist; substance, subject matter of [the] case; existence of the Final Investigation Report; and Acknowledgement Receipt,"7 after which, the court ordered that the testimony of the forensic chemist and the police investigator be dispensed with.8 On trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO1 Percival Mendoza9 (PO1 Mendoza) and PO3 Julius Lique10 (PO3 Lique), both of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force of the Makati Central Police Station; and Barangay Captain Angelito Gatchalian11 (Barangay Captain Gatchalian) of BarangayGuadalupe Viejo. The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused as its lone witness.12 The Court of Appeals summarized the version of the prosecution in the following manner: xxxx On April 8, 2006, PO1 Mendoza x x x received a telephone call from an informant that a certain Jao Mapa (later identified as the Accused- Appellant) was selling prohibited narcotics at Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. Immediately, a briefing for a buy-bust operation was conducted. The buy-bust team prepared Three Hundred Pesos (PhP300.00) worth of marked money and designated PO1 Mendoza as the poseur-buyer. The other members of the team were PO2 Lique, PO1 Randy Santos, and PO1 Voltaire Esquerra. The team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency before proceeding to the target area. At around 9:15 oclock in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to the basketball court inside Laperal Compound where the Accused-Appellant was sighted. Once inside, PO1 Mendoza and the informant, with the help of sufficient lights coming from the nearby shanties and sari-sari stores, saw a man wearing a

camouflage short pants and a dark t-shirt casually standing beside one of the basketball courts post while talking to two (2) men. The informant called the attention of the Accused-Appellant and introduced PO1 Mendoza to the latter as a buyer intending to purchase Three Hundred Pesos (PhP300.00) worth of shabu. PO1 Mendoza then handed the marked money to the Accused-Appellant who, in turn, took from his right pocket a small plastic sachet allegedly containing shabuand gave it to the former. Upon receipt, PO1 Mendoza examined the contents thereof and asked the Accused-Appellant, "Panalo to ha?" The Accused-Appellant replied with "Ako pa! Amin ang pinakamagandang bato dito." When PO1 Mendoza was certain that the plastic sachet contained shabu, he lit a cigarette, a pre-arranged signal, and motioned to his team members to arrest the Accused-Appellant. PO1 Mendoza subsequently introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the latter. A few seconds later, his other team members arrived. A procedural body search was conducted resulting in the discovery of a small Mercury Drug plastic bag containing seventeen (17) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with suspected shabu, the marked money, and several Peso bills of different denominations. The confiscated items were immediately marked, photographed, and inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Gatchalian. The photographs of the seized items were taken by PO3 Lique. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant was brought to the Makati Police Station for further investigation. Subsequently, the seized plastic sachets were brought to the Crime Laboratory to determine the presence of shabu. The results thereof showed that the substances therein were positive for Methylamphetamine,Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.13 The version of the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the sole testimony of the accused, to wit: The Accused-Appellant testified that, on April 8, 2006, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was watching a game at the basketball court in Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, when several men arrived and asked him if he knew the whereabouts of a certain Alvin. When he could not give any information, they brought him to the Makati Police Station. It was only after he was detained that he learned that charges were being filed against him for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs.14 After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.15 The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 28 July 2008 reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 06-750, finding the accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 5,

Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00); 2. In Criminal Case No. 06-751, finding the same accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) days as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to pay a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).16 On appeal, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED17 the decision of the trial court. Hence, this automatic review of the accused conviction.

Our Ruling
We sustain the conviction of appellant. To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.18 And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence.19 In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant, not being authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza in a buy-bust operation. PO1 Mendoza testified that, during the buy-bust operation, the informant introduced him to accusedappellant; that informant asked accusedappellant if he could help PO1 Mendoza buy shabu; that accused-appellant agreed to sell him Three Hundred Peso-worth ofshabu; that PO1 Mendoza, counted the pre-marked bills in front of accused-appellant and gave them to him; and that accused-appellant, in turn, handed him a small transparent plastic sachet, which he took from the pocket of his short pants, and which tested for shabu based on the result of the laboratory examination. PO1 Lique corroborated the testimony of PO1 Mendoza by stating that he saw accused-appellant hand something to the poseurbuyer. Further, the seized items, together with the result of the laboratory examination and the marked money were all presented in court . As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, the prosecution clearly proved the presence of the following essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug."20 After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen (17) heat-sealed sachets of white substance were found in his possession.

The chemistry report showed that the white substance in the plastic sachets tested for shabu. And, there was no showing that such possession was authorized by law. We find no merit in the arguments of the defense that the arresting officers did not testify that the marking of the seized items were done in the presence of the persons mentioned by the law and its implementing rules; and that testimonies on how the confiscated items were turned over to the investigator for examination were lacking. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest21 executed by PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Randy C. Santos, the allegations of which PO1 Mendoza affirmed and confirmed during his direct testimony, is clear on two points: (1) that the seized items were marked and inventoried at the place where accused-appellant was arrested; and (2) that the integrity of the seized items was preserved. Thus: 4. That immediately thereafter, together with the confiscated pieces of evidence marked and inventoried at the place of suspects apprehension, the confiscated pieces of evidence, together with suspect AMARILLO, were immediately brought at SAID SOTF office, for formal dispositions and proper investigations. 5. That, before the SAID SOTF office, the investigator on case acknowledge the complaint, and in preparation for the formal filing of formal charges against herein suspects, same was subjected to the procedural Drug Test at SOCO/SPD and mandatory MEDICO LEGAL examinations at OSMAK Malugay as assisted by the same arresting officers, xxx. The confiscated pieces of evidence, only in so far with the suspected illegal drugs and the small white plastic Mercury Drug were referred at SOCO SPD for laboratory examinations and safe keeping.22 The Joint Affidavit of Arrest is consistent with the following testimony of PO1 Mendoza on direct examination: Q: Mr. Witness, after the inventory what did you do next, if theres any? A: We proceeded to our office, SAID SOFT office, sir. Q: And what did you do when you reached your office? A: We made the necessary documents for filing the case, sir. Q: What did you do with the items you recovered from the accused?

A: We turned it over to the investigator together with the subject person to SOCO crime laboratory for drug test examination and for laboratory examination, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.) The testimony, in turn, is well-supported by a copy of the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit "A") showing that it was PO1 Mendoza himself who brought the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Stamped on the face of the receiving copy of the request were the following: PNP CRIME LABORATORY SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT OFFICE F. ZOBEL, MAKATI CITY CONTROL NO. 1204-06 T/D RECEIVED: 11:55 PM 8 APRIL 06 RECEIVED BY: NVP DE RANIA DELIVERED BY: PO1 PERCIVAL MENDOZA CASE NO. D-284-0624 (Emphasis supplied) As to the required "presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official," Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 specifically provides: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. x x x:

1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) This has been substantially complied with after the prosecution was able to show that the accused, the arresting officers and a public official were all present during the inventory of the seized items as evidenced by the testimonies of the witnesses, the photographs, and the Acknowledgement Receipt of the items seized. Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of these were defective for one reason or another, the defense failed to consider the following well-settled principle: The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. xxx25 The Court has long settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken.26 As to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, we hold, as we have done time and again, that "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect" 27 and that "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings."28 Also, after a thorough examination of the records, we find the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution credible. For instance, after the cross examination of Barangay Captain Gatchalian, the presiding judge asked him a number of clarificatory questions, which he readily answered in a straightforward manner. Thus: Q: May we know xxx if you knew all along before the buy bust operation where to be conducted by the said anti-narcotics team? A: Yes, sir, because I am the Cluster head, every time we have an operation beforehand they tell me the operation. Q: So you knew all along that you will be called to act as the witness when the inventory would be prepared?

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: When you reached the place where the incident happened, was the inventory sheet already accomplished wherein the items allegedly seized from the accused were listed? A: Not yet, when I arrived, thats the time they prepared the inventory sheet, so, when I arrived, then they started to write the items.29 (Emphasis

supplied)

PO3 Lique corroborated material facts in the testimony of PO1 Mendoza, to the effect that the sale of shabubetween accused-appellant and PO1 Mendoza was consummated, and that Barangay Captain Gatchalian was present during the inventory of the seized items. The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is likewise applicable in the instant case there being no showing of any ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse accused-appellant of the crimes charged. In fact, he himself testified that "he did not know any of the persons who arrested him and that he did not also have any misunderstanding with any one of them."30 The Court elucidated: xxx. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed. 31 Finally, we find the penalties imposed by the trial court in order. Under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, a person found guilty of unauthorized sale of shabu shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).32 On the other hand, under Section 11, Article II of the same Act, the crime of illegal possession of shabu weighing less than five (5) grams is punishable by imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the determination of the appropriate penalty,34 the trial court correctly imposed the following penalties: (1) in Criminal

Case No. 06-750 for the crime of illegal sale of shabu, life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.000.00) considering that these arc within the period and range of the fine prescribed by law 35 and (2) in Criminal Case No. 06-751 for the crime of illegal possession of 0.33 gram of shabu, imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), which is within the range of the amount imposable therefor. 36 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 May 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03579 isAFFIRMED, and, thereby the 28 July 20C'8 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 06-750-751 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. [G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO BELOCURA Y PEREZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Case Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789,823 grams of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[1] On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006.2 Hence, this final appeal for his acquittal. Antecedents Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through the information: That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red and white, with label

SHIN TON YON, containing the following: One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuanafruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams; One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuanafruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams. With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug. Contrary to law.[3] After Belocura pleaded not guilty,[4] the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness. I The States Evidence On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to form a team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD. After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before 1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached the jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate. They arrested him.

PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the drivers seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper disposition.[5] Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were in civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the bag in his presence.[6] SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation.[7] He conceded that he was not present when the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the police station.[8] Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the General Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic bag labeled SHIN TON YON containing two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually wrapped in newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March 23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking RB-1 and weighed 830.532 grams while the other bore the marking RB-2 and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823 grams. She conducted a chemical examination of the marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested positive formarijuana, a prohibited drug.[9] II Evidence of the Defense Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that of the Prosecution, was as follows. On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of duty from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-type jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He introduced himself to them as a police officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members of the CIS. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where they locked him up in a room that looked like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged involvement in a robbery hold-up. They informed him of the drug-related charge to

be filed against him only three days later. Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for the first time only in court. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found under the drivers seat of his jeep on account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three inches. At the time of his arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e., blue pants with white side piping and blue T-shirt) because he was reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly because he had incurred the ire of a superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to incur the ire of a superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct 2, but the suspect turned out to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that on the day following the arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn that the suspect had already been released.[10] Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his arrest,[11] or the other arresting policemen. He mentioned that his owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had attached the plate number assigned to his old vehicle pending the registration of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a violation of law; and that the incident involving the arrest of the nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could think of why charges were filed against him.[12] On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of marijuanawhether at the time of his arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed to the jeep, the bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the drivers seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were intact.[13] On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000.00.[14] As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.[15] Issues Belocura now submits that:
[16]

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE DRIED BRICKS OF MARIJUANA PLACED UNDER THE DRIVERS SEAT (sic). II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected under Section 17, Article III ( Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;[17] and that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocuras arrest and the ensuing search of the jeep were valid, the search being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest; that the arresting policemen had a reasonable ground to effect his warrantless arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful arrest to conduct the warrantless search not only of the person of Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within his reach, which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks ofmarijuana from under the drivers seat; and that any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocuras failure to object to the validity of his arrest before entering his plea and by his submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his plea and participated in the trial.[18] Ruling After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified and called for.

No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz: Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Section 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person, namely: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: ( a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;[19] (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances.[20] In these

exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with. Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating bricks of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for anything. The argument of Belocura does not persuade. Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code).[21] In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption.[22] Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal. [23] In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[24] What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession. Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2

Santos, a member of the team, who had discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. Excerpts of Chief Insp. Divinas relevant declarations follow: ATTY LEE: q Mr. Witness, it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents of the plastic bag. That is correct? a I had testified that it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents. q Okay, it was Mr. Rojas who retrieved the plastic bag? Is that correct? a No sir, It was not SPO1 Rojas. q It was not you who retrieved that plastic bag from the jeep? a No, Sir. I was not the one. q It was Dela Cruz? a No, Sir. q Who retrieved the plastic bag from the jeep? WITNESS: A It was PO2 Reynaldo Santos, Sir. ATTY LEE : q It was Santos who brought the plastic bag to the headquarters. Is that correct? A Yes, Sir. q And you never had a chance to examine that plastic bag, the contents of that plastic bag is that correct? a I had a chance to see it at the place where we had flagged down a vehicle. q You saw only the plastic bag. Is that correct? a No, Sir. When the bag was recovered from under the drivers seat and when it was opened, I had the chance to see it. THE COURT: q Including the contents? WITNESS: a Yes, your Honor. ATTY LEE: q It was not you who bring that bag to xxx THE COURT: Already answered. ATTY LEE: q And after that, you never had the chance to see that bag again. Is that correct? a Not anymore Sir.[25]

The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he

provided no direct evidence about the possession by Belocura of the confiscatedmarijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not witness the recovery of themarijuana bricks from Belocura, viz: PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q While you were taking the gun of this accused what were your other companion specifically Major Divina doing? WITNESS: a Since I was the first one who approached Reynaldo Belocura I was the one who took the gun from his waistline and I informed Major Divina that I already took the gun and place it inside the Tamaraw FX and when I left the members of the SWAT arrive at the scene and I dont know what transpired. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q And where was Major Divina then? a Beside the owner type jeep, sir. q You are referring to the owner type jeep of the accused? a Yes, sir. q Did you go back to the said jeep? a I did not return there anymore sir because the members of the other group surrounded the place, sir. q Since you were then at that scene did you come to know if there is any other thing that was retrieved from the herein accused in the said vehicle?[26] xxx WITNESS: a Yes. When I was there according to them marijuana was taken from the owner type jeep. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q Who said that?[27] xxx WITNESS: a The member of the SWAT and other team, sir were there. q And then what else happen after such recovery? a Actually sir at the scene I did not see anything recovered but it was only in the office that I heard their conversation about it. q What did you see or observe while in your office? a He was investigated. q Investigated for what? a According to them the recovery of the plate number and the expired MR of the gun and the marijuana recovered. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q Before whom was he investigated? WITNESS:

General Assignment Section, sir.[28] xxx

On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not actually witness the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocuras possession, to wit: ATTY LEE: q Mr. Witness, so you did not see the actual the alleged recovery of marijuana, is that correct? WITNESS: a Yes sir. ATTY LEE: q And you have never that marijuana? WITNESS: a Yes sir. But only in the office. q What do you only took from the accused is a gun, is that correct? a Yes sir. q So you cannot say positively that there was a marijuanarecovered from the accused because you did not see? a I just got the information from my co-police officer, sir.[29] xxx PUB. PROS TAN, JR: q Were you able to see the marijuana in the police station? WITNESS: a Yes sir. q You mean to say that was the first time that you saw themarijuana? a Yes, sir.[30] The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of themarijuana bricks from Belocura. Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuanabricks from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his ownperception.[31] Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of themarijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos as a witness against Belocura.

Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos because his testimony would only be corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish Belocuras guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The OSGs contention is grossly erroneous. As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as SHIN TON YON. Without PO2 Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red plastic bag from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was worthless. The explanation why none of the other police officers could credibly attest to Belocuras possession of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly performing different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was competent to prove Belocuras possession. Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence. In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence.[32] It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.[33] Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp. Divina bear out, to wit: PUB. PROS TAN, JR: q How about the plastic bag containing the suspected stuff, what did you do with the same? You did not know? WITNESS: a I think it was turned over to the investigator of the General Assignment Section who made the proper disposition. q Who is the investigator again, Mr. witness?

a q

I remember SPO4 Boy Guzman Did you know what SPO4 Boy Guzman did with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff? xxx WITNESS: a The items upon turn over to the investigator on case were handed to the custodian with proper receipt and after those disposition, there were case filed against the subject. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR: q Were you able to know what did they do with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff if you know? a I remember appearing in the MTC court Br, 20, I saw the exhibits, firearm and plate number, two blocks of marijuana. I dont have any idea where did the investigator brought them or have done.[34] xxx q You never had a knowledge of what happened to that bag and the contents thereof? a I learned later that the items that were confiscated were turned over to the General Assignment Section which held the investigation. q So, it was not your group who conducted the examination and the alleged things that were recovered from the alleged accused?[35] xxx a No, Sir. q How about the things that were allegedly recovered from the accused? a I just said that it was the General Assignment Section who handled the investigation.[36] The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks ofmarijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens ofmarijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the samemarijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.[37] The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of

the evidence are removed.[38] The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002),[39] by reason of Section 21[40] of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the requirement, stating: xxx (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. xxx That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other.[41] The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.[42] The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People:[43] As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.[44] The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuanabricks were turned over to the General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas testimony contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records[45] showed that the marijuanabricks were forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who received the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of the marijuanabricks,[46] which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuanabricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocuras arrest and the seizure of themarijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief

Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks. Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny. Thirdly, Belocuras denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecutions weak incriminating evidence. In that regard, Belocura denied possession of the marijuanabricks and knowledge of them as well, to wit: q Were you able to view the alleged marijuana that were confiscated from you? a: I saw it for the first time when it was presented in Court, Sir. q: Now, according to Inspector Divina, it was police officer Santos who was able to recover from your vehicle these two bricks of marijuana. What can you say about this? a: At first, I did not see this marijuana, Sir, that they are saying because they immediately handcuffed me and disarmed me even before I could board my owner type jeepney.[47] The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal should follow, for, as the Court fittingly said in Patula v. People:[48] xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.[49]

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 23, 2006; ACQUIT accused REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; DIRECT the immediate release from detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he is also detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith implement this decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this court within 10 days from receipt. [G.R. Nos. 166948-59, August 29, 2012] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, MANUEL S. SATUITO,**** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, JOELITA TRABUCO, ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y. VILLAROSA, RAUL APOSAGA, HERMIE BARBASA AND ROSARIO BARBASAPERLAS, RESPONDENTS. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges filed against the Legal Department Head of the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesRetirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused. The Facts and the Case In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the AFPRSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes. The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,[1] Sections 3(e) and 3(g).

Acting on the Committees recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC. Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges such order. The Issue Presented The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled corporations. The Ruling of the Court In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[2] On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its position and ruled that AFPRSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public function. Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads: Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours) Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word manager used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment. The Sandiganbayan cited Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support this definition.[3] After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the Court finds this additional definition of manager: A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of its businesses, or of its branch establishments, divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.[4] The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes divisions, or departments, which are corporate units headed by managers. The United States case of Braniff v. McPherren[5] also referred to divisions and departments in relation to the position of manager. Under this definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term manager, he having charge of the AFP RSBS Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place. In clarifying the meaning of the term manager as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is associated.6 Given that the word manager was in the company of the words presidents, directors or trustees, the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term manager to officers who have overall control and supervision of government owned and controlled corporations. But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section 4(a)(1) should be understood to refer to a range of positions within a government corporation. By the variety of the functions they perform, the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers cannot be taken to refer only to those who exercise overall control and supervision of such corporations. The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board, the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement. Since managers definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a corporations divisions or

departments. This brings Bellos position within the definition. Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction over him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of Police Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information does not charge him for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a manager of the Legal Department of AFP -RSBS, a government-owned and controlled corporation. What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the offense described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in relation to the office being held.[7] Here, the OMB charged Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the prejudice of the government. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposagas motion for reinvestigation.