One of the three most profitable multibillion-dollar companies in the E U.S, and a brilliant performer in a dull stock market, Teledyne, Inc. is unique company. In no oy more than in the style and contrary thinking of the man who rufss it. The singular Henry Singleton ‘By Robert J. Flaherty fame, of great corporate entrepreneurs like Alfred P. Sloan Jr, from scratch; and for his almost arrogant scorn for most heads of great American corporations like International Paper, Avon Products, Texas Instruments, Ingersoll-Rand. When the Has Teledyne had setbacks? Indeed it has, but look how it and quit the market. By emphasizing the profitable remainder, Packard Bell is larger and more profitable than ever today. TDY‘s casualty business took a $104 million writeoff. But by they set a new record—$56.7 million. Who is this business genius Henry Singleton, who turns his bachelor's, master's and doctorate of science, all in electri- Teledyne founder and Chairman Henry Siigleton Be stubborn and consider the unthinkable. FORBES, JULY, 1979cal engineering. Educated as a scientist not as a businessman, $2 GtP ot leap into entrepreneurship but trained for it over ts seral decades at the best schools of practical management in BeOS cist as a scientist at General Electric, then as {hanagement man at Hughes Aircraft, chen in the early days at Tittom Industries when founder Charles “Tex” Thorton and Ruy’L, Ash were building one of the first truly “hot” compa- Ae Gf the pose World War Il era. Not until 1960, when he was Bar a singleton found Teledyne. He did so in company with toi A the best brains'of the modem business world: George Kozmetsky, pow dean ofthe Coleg of Business Administ Howat the University of Texas, and Arthur Rock, pethaps the Urs, most imaginative venture capitalist. ‘Maybe because of his unusual background, Singleton has an. alnont uncanny ability to esist being caught up in the fads and fancies of the moment. Like most great innovators, Henry Singleton is supremely indifferent to criticism. During the Sanh Seventies, when investors and brokers alike lost their Giiglasl enthusiasm and deserted Teledyne, Singleton had Tel cane bay up its own stock. As each tender offer was oversub- Scoibed by investors of little faith, Singleton took every share Shey offered. When Wall Street—indeed, even his own direc- tors urged him to ease up, he kept right on buying Between Gktover'1972. and February 1976 he reduced Teledyne’s out- Standing common 64% from 32 million shares to 114 milli, ‘Normally a serious man, Singleton allows himself to laugh when he recounts how his seubbomness prevailed, “In October Yo we tendered for 1 million shares and 6.9 million came in. We took them all at $20 and figured that was # fluke and that Wye couldn't do it again. But instead of going up, our stock went Youn So we kept tendering, first at $14 and then doing two Ponts or-stock swaps. Every time one tender was over the eee would go down and we'd tender again and we'd get anew dleluge. Then two more tenders at $18 and $40.” Shareholders who tendered happily at $14 or $40 watched In dismay as, only a few years later, the shares soared to $130. Henry Singleton had been right. The rest of the ‘worldineiuding some of his own directors—had been wrong "[Qione believe allthis nonsense about market timing,” Single- ton says. “fuse buy very good value and when the market is ready that Value will be recognized.” _ ‘What is most impressive is that Teledyne’ capital shrinkage was not achieved at the expense of growth, or by partially Iquidating the company. All during these years, Teledyne kept sng, Where tn its early days it had grown through acquis Sone f45 in all-in its capitalization-shrinking days Tele- yne grow from within, and steadily. In 1970, when acquis: Ours ied ceased, revenues were $12 billion, in 1974, $1.7 Billtonsin 1976, $1.9 billion, and so on, This year Teledyne will Creative capitalist ‘To put Henry Singleton's achievement ass manager in wome perspective, FORBES charted Teledyac’s do $2.6 billion. Yet in the years sales were more than doubl. from the $1.2 billion level, Teledyne made only one mix sequisition. Nor did Teledyne get deeply into debt, In the ea Stages of his stock-buying program, Singleton did have Te Gyne borrow rather heavily but he paid the debt down 26 sur of cash flow. In the process he wiped out all of Teledyr Cahvertibles and warrants. Dilution? Singleton virtually de Shared Teledyne'’s capital structure. Growing the busin thle shrinking its capital. Quite a trick, Certainly unique qecent business history. When investors, disillusioned with growth, again began be dividend conscious, Teledyne continued to refuse to pa cash dividend, The second-highestpriced stock on the ‘Board [after Superior Oill, Teledyne’s cash yield is zcr0. Buc there were onher reward for investors. With reven growing, profit margins thickening and capitalization shri Bie Teledyne’s remaining stockholders enjoyed fantastic WME. leverage. During the years 1969 to, 1978 revenues Uitased by 89%, net profits rose 315%. But look at earnings Shute! They soared 1,226%. With all those profits being plo» Sack, Teledyne’s equity per share jumped from $11.38 to petween 1969 and the end of 1978. All through the e Seventies Wall Street ignored the stock. It was a conglomer Ti had four bad years. {t wouldn't pay a dividend. It kept buy its stock against all thyme and reason. Ugh! Scarcely ‘Salyst bothered with it, For years Teledyne was stuck + arrow range, rarely getting above 20. But finally Wall St Caught on. Alter selling as low a8 7% in late 1974, Teled Sea ieaped to over 69 in 1976 and, in 1978, finally passed 100 mark. Teledyne, which broke all the rules, was on’ ‘America’s best-performing stocks. Tee's put Henry Singleton in perspective. During the y when he was all but ignoring Wall Street, many of Ameri Top executives were trimming their sails to Wall Street's s {ng winds. Consider several of the most visible exampl §.'1974 Textron Chairman G. William Miller, now chair, of the Federal Reserve Board, had a brilliant plan to re Gloubled Lockheed at little risk to his own shareholders. Fextron stock dropped because analysts questioned the m a Feeling the pressure, Miller backed away from what we five been a bargain for Textron. Lockheed stock was * felling at $3 per share. Today itis selling at $21 per share. Early this year Chairman James D. Robinson Ill of Amer Express made a tempting tender offer for McGraw-Hill bal publicity blistered American Express and Robinson ba» away, "Jimmy Three-Sticks,” as his Harvard Business Sc! ‘iisemates called Robinson, faced a battle of wills betv himself and McGraw-Hill’s Harold W. McGraw Jr. Faced + MeGraw’s unexpected pluck, American Express backed do — = Se } Sales Bi a0e 64703" pers = TT ‘Teledyne has actually shown slower sales growth than the average big blue chip. The chief factor is {hat in the pest ten years, while many another com- pany has been on an acquisition and merger bingc, Felcdyne has not. All its growth has been internal. a FORBES, JULY,\ ~ in 1968, Xerox, which then had a pricelearnings multiple of '$3 way about to merge with CLT. Financial. Ie was a beautifal Ral Xerox was going to pay $1.5 billion in its stock for CLT, Sev ratio that would have enhanced both Xerox’ earnings and *Bak value. Today the value of that same Xerox stock package fee hnink to less than $I billion in market value, while CLT ’s assets have increased by almost 50% to S#Bilion. At (Ee time, however, investment analysts turned up their noses. Dilute a high-technology stock with a grubby money-lending business? Kerox stock retreated and so did Xerox Chairman C. Peter McColough. Today Xerox’ multiple is down to 11 times ‘camings anyhow. Instead of buying rock-solid CLT, Xerox faid $920 million in stock for Scientific Data Systems, a Fledgling computer company. Wall Street applauded but SDS subsequently all but collapsed. Arthur Rock, Henry Singleton’s | backer and one of SDS’ backers, cleaned up again. t would be hard to picture Henry Singleton trying an Jessel: tc irould be nar tot hin backing away—as American Express did—once he had ‘made an offer. It would be inconceivable for him to back away from the Lockheed deal or the C.LT. deal just because the brokerage fraternity disapproved. He kept buying up his own stock with both hands, when The Street called him crazy. So far, we have not even mentioned what Teledyne makes or sells, That's because what Teledyne makes or sells is less important than the style of the man who runs it, The fact is that Singleton unashamedly runs a conglomerate. What are the products and services upon which Singleton has put his stamp? Oiishore drilling units, auto parts, specialty metals, machine tools, electronic components, engines, high fidelity speakers, ‘unmanned aircraft and Water Pik home appliances. "A conglomerate, of course, but Singleton is not even slightly disturbed by the label “conglomerate.” Says he: “Today, being ‘2 conglomerate is neither a plus nor a minus. While not many companies are called conglomerates, most are.” He ticks off some names: GE, Westinghouse and RCA. ‘This diffuse company is actually quite tightly run, Its board of directors consists of only six people, not the usual dozen or ‘more, and all of them close friends and associates: Singleton; 1978 300-6940" 249+ o7ate Singleton's extraordinartly disciplined pursuit of wide profit margins and high retarns on total assets In each of Teledyne’s family of 129 companies is reflected In their combined profit growth—two times faster than the average Dow company. 3193 $97.02 917.89 9112.70 Singleton's masterstroke in the past decade was to buy in the majority of Teledyne's own shares between 1972 and 1976, when they were undervalued and ‘unwanted, His earnings per share soared 11 times {faster than those of the average Dow stock. FORBES, JULY 9, 1979