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DOUBLE JEOPARDY PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. SPOUSES BERMOY G.R. No. 151912 September 26, 2005 Elements of legal jeopardy For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case: a. The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; b. The court had jurisdiction; c. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and d. He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal. Extent of right against double jeopardy The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case. The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which provides that any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case: In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the
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Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused. Void judgments ... the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trial was a sham.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OBSANIA G.R. No. L-24447 June 29, 1968 Waiver of the right against double jeopardy When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. When is an appeal by the prosecution not double jeopardy An appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal complaint) by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal; so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Estoppel Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the second information that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was valid. xxxxxx The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
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the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel". However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court hadjurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon Salico and Labatete, reconciled What in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was the premise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the conclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense. This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an acquittal: If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. PAULIN v. GIMENEZ G.R. No. 103323

January 21, 1993

Double jeopardy on dismissal For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. Acquittal and Dismissal, distinguished Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was

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committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.

court,

or

the

complaint

The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from the charge considering that no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. When can accused invoke double jeopardy even on dismissal with consent of the accused Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself, to wit: 1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. 2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. Void dismissal Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication, the order is null and void (People of the Philippines v. Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98 [1969]). xxxxxx Demurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency pre-supposes that the prosecution had already rested its case (Sec. 15, Rule 119, 1985, Rules on Criminal Procedure). Hence, the motion is premature if interposed at a time when the prosecution is still in the process of presenting its evidence (Aquino v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648 [1989]), as what happened in this case. ICASIANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 95642 May 28, 1992 Double jeopardy does not attached when first case is an administrative case Initially, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case. After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature.

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When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued two (2) orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the Rules. It is only when in appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (petitioner Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders. It is precisely for this reason, among others, that the administrative case against petitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable under R.A 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has found aprima facie case which led to the filing of the information. Double jeopardy does not attached on preliminary investigation In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-8700924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.

LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011 Objective of the rule against double jeopardy

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In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight. Instances where motion for reconsideration after acquittal is allowed Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BALISACAN G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966 Violation of the of the State to due process In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. Right against double jeopardy need not be invoked This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960). Plea when accused plead guilty but invoked self-defense In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
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due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CITY COURT OF SILAY G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976 Dismissal on demurrer equivalent to acquittal It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

ESMENA v. POGOY G.R. No. L-54110

February 20, 1981

Provisional dismissal without consent of the accused The petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional dismissal. The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).
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Dismissal based on the right of the accused to speedy trial tantamount to acquittal The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PINEDA G.R. No. 44205 February 16, 1993 Mere filing of two Informations or complaints not double jeopardy The mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent. xxxxxx In order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent thereafter. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TAMPAL G.R. No. 102485 May 22, 1995 Right of the State to punish the accused should be balanced with the rights of the accused In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. They should balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who violate its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. xxxxxx In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. We reiterate our ruling in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:

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. . . The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, and such factors as length of delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. Requisites of double jeopardy The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: 1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; 2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and 3. A second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy Legal jeopardy attaches only: 1. Upon a valid indictment; 2. Before a competent court; 3. After arraignment; 4. When a valid plea has been entered; and 5. When the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. CARMELO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-3580 March 22, 1950 Rule of identity It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical.

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There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. Supervening event This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. xxxxxx The rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated for the new offense. xxxxxx Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist. Penalty for the lesser offense credited

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Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADIL G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977 Supervening event In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the other hand, whether or not there is actually a deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be determined by the trial court. The only issue We are to resolve here is whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this case out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court. In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case was prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in which it was held: This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect: Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new
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and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RELOVA G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. xxxxxx In Yap v. Lutero: To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance is a violation of the Revised Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or Constitutional Law they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case. Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the sameoffense." (Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not
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include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy. It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. Identity of offenses / Identity of acts The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have
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generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). xxxxxx The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. xxxxxx By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.

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