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RELEASED IN PART
United States Department of State
The Road to Dayton
-
U.S. Diplomacy and the
Bosnia Peace Process
May-December 1995
Dept. or RPS/IPS. Margaret P. Grafe!d, Dir:.
( ) Relea e ( ) Denv ( ) Declassify
D t I L1 it"?
'11 a e_ -I. V.J Exemption _!.t.1 13).. _
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uNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN PART
United States Department of State
The Road to Dayton
-
U.S. Diplomacy and the
Bosnia Peace Process
May-December 1995
Dept. or RPS/IPS. Margaret P. Grafe!d, Dir:.
( ) Relea e ( ) Denv ( ) Declassify
D t I L1 it"?
'11 a e_ -I. V.J Exemption _!.t.1 13).. _
I 9
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Foreword
In the spring of 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher directed the
Department to undertake an study of America's successful effort to bring peace
to Bosnia. The study would be limited to the period from May through early December
1995, from the end of the cease-fIre in Bosnia to the signing of the Dayton Agreement in
Paris. It would focUs on three periods in particular: the fonnulation of a new U.S.
diplomatic initiative between May and early August; the conduct of shuttle diplomacy
and agreement on broad principles for a peace settlement between mid-August and
October; and the actua1 proximity talks at Dayton in November.
The goals of what was soon to be known as the Dayton History Project were two-
fold: to write a classified history based both on classified documents and numerous
interviews with key participants while their recollections remaine4 detailed and fresh; and
to create a comprehensive archive of these materials. The Project was sponsored by the
Executive Secretary of the William Burns; the Assistant Secrytary for Public
Affairs, Thomas Donilon; and the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs,
John Kornblum. I was privileged to be charged with directing it.
Phase One of the effort began in June 1996. Led by Chris Hoh, a Foreign Service
Officer who had served as Croatia Desk Officer and later as a key member of the Dayton
team, an eight-person staff began to compile the written record from State Department
and interagency files, as well as conduct extensive interviews with officials involved in
the negotiations. In 1996, the second phase began. Derek CholIet, a doctoral
candidate in international relations at Columbia University and a former research
assistant on Secretary of State James Baker's memoirs, began drafting early that month
after participating in the interviews and immersing himself in the documents over the
Work continued on collecting documents, conducting interviews, and
organizing the archive. The draft study was completed in early January 1997 and final
editing in April.
1hls study' is based on an extensive documentary record; the author had access to
every document the State Department could uncover. Moreover, it draws from nearly
sixty hours of formal interviews'with over forty U.S. officials involved in this effort and
countless hours of informal discussions. Several key officials, including Secretary
Christopher, AmbaSsador Richard Holbrooke. and Ambassador Christopher Hill,
reviewed the manuscript for diplomatic and bureaucratic nuance. This study, along with
the archive on which it is based, will be housed at the State Department's Office of the
Historian, where it will eventually provide rich source material for one or more future
volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. '
The purpose of the study is to do much more than simply piece together the
complex events that led to the signing of the Dayton Accords; our aim is to provide a
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narrative analysis that places these evbnts into their broader policy context. At the same
time, the study intentionally focuses on bureaucratic and diplomatic process as much as
on substantive policy. For example, it attempts to shed light on the interplay between the
White House ~ d the State and Defense Departments in launching the initiative; the
interrelationship offorce and diplomacy; the conduct and execution of shuttle diplomacy;
the management of relationships with our European Allies and Russia iIi both the
negotiations and preparations for implementation; and the structure and dynamics of
proximity talks. In each of these areas, the insights gleaned from our Balkan diplomacy
in 1995 may have implications for analogous situations in the future, whether in this
region or elsewhere around the world.
Of course, this study is not designed to be the last word on the subject. But when
declassified, our hope is that it will be the first stop for scholars interested in these issues:
In the meantime, the study and accompanying archive can serve as a useful resource f ~ r
present and future policy-makers, who can gain insights and -inspiration from the
remarkable work described in these pages.
-
ii
Bennett Freeman .
Deputy Assistant Secretary-Public Afffairs
. Director" Dayton History Project
May 1997
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Table of Contents
Foreword
i
Author's Acknowledgments
Chapter 1 The Summer Crisis: June-July 1995
Whither UNPROFOR?
The Elements of a New Strategy
The Fall ofSrebrenica
The London Conference
1
3
10
16
20
Chapter 2 Through the Window of Opportunity: T h ~ Endgame Strategy 25
The Croatian Offensive
31
The American Diplomatic Initiative
35
The Mission to Europe
45
Chapter 3 Tragedy as Turning Point: The First Shuttle, Ml Igman,
and Operation Deliberate Force
49
The Croatians and Bosnians
50 Tudjman: The Master of the Game
52 To the Table With "The Gambler"
54
The Mt. Igman Tragedy
57 Putting the Pieces Back Together
59 Meeting at Fort Myer
61
Laying the Groundwork for Peace
63
Opening the Second Shuttle: Terror Brings Action
68
Chapter 4 The Road to Geneva: The Patriarch Letter and
NATO Bombing
75
The Patriarch Letter
75 A Watershed Day: September I
79
The Contact Group and NAC
&3
Ankara: "Republika Srps1ca" and NATO Bombing
88 Washington at Work
93
The First Stepping-Stone: Geneva
96
Chapter 5 Force and Diplomacy: NATO Bombing Ends,
The Western Offensive Heats Up
100
The Russian Dimension
103
NATO Bombing Nears the End
105
Mitosevic's Surprise
108
Zagreb and Mostar
110
Sarajevo and the Contact Group
112
A Three-Capital Day
lIS
Federation Restmint: Taking Credit with Milosevic
118
?lashington at Work: Organizing fora Settlement
122
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Chapter 6
The New York Agreement, Negotiating a Cease-fire.
and Approaching a Settlement
1 ~ 5
The Bumpy Road to New York
125
Return to the Region
132
Sarajevo-Belgrade-Zagreb
136
A Decision on Venue
140
Negotiating a Cease-lICe
J43
Chapter 7
Preparing for Proximity Talks
149
NATO and IFOR
)49
Russia and IFOR
153
Holbrooke's Fifth Balkan Shuttle
160
HydePcUk
.
162
Clinton, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic
164
Washington at Work: Preparing for Proximity Talks
166
Choosing a Site for the Talks
169
IFOR and Sanctions
171
The Last Push to Dayton
176
1
Chapter 8 Opening Talks and Clearing Away the Underbrush: ~
Dayton, November 1-10
180
Chapter 9 Endgame: Dayton, November 11-21
215
Epilogue
Impleinentation Begins
253
Gaining American Domestic Support
253
Regional Shuttles to Maintain Momentum
255
The Paris Signing
258
A Note on Sources
vii
Maps
ix
Calendars
xi
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Author's Acknowledgments
As in any endeavor, this manuscript would not have been completed without
the extraordinarily generous assistance from many others. Obviously. without the support
of Richard Holbrooke and his core shuttle team -- General Wesley Clark, Brigadier
General Donald Kerrick, Ambassador Christopher Hill, Ambassador James and
Roberts Owen - this task would have been impossible. But equally important were the
nearly forty other U.S. officials, including Secretary of Christopher, Secretary of
Defense Perry and now Secretary of State Albright, who gave their time and recollections
to the Dayton History Project. This oral archive was not only essential to my study, but
will prove to be an invaluable historical resource for years to come.
I am also deeply indebted to my colleagues at the Dayton History Project.
The guidance and support from Bennett the Project Oirector and my editor,
improved the study greatly. -Chris Hoh's leadership during the decisive research phase of
the project set me in the right direction and enabled me to hit the ground I1l1lIling. David
Goldman's exhaustive research, keen eye for detail and rigorous edits added innumerable
improvements to the manuscript; and Pat Attkisson. along with Bettye Mayes and Gloria
Glasgow, made my life much easier with their editorial and administrative support.
William Slany and Paul Claussen's encouragement helped push me along, and Scott
Zeiss's meticulous efforts helped me locate some key documents at the last-minute.
Finally, Steven Engel's initial research in three crucial areas -. the "sununer crisis," legal
issues and Dayton - was critical, saving me much time and sweat.
Several U.S. participants in the negotiations have read all or parts of the
manuscript, and their thoughtful recommendations and insights proved essential. Warren
Christopher, Richard Holbrooke, Chris Hill, Chris Hoh, Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas, Phil
Goldberg, William Burns, John Kornblum and Miriam Sapiro all read my work with
considerable care, and I am grateful for their I am similarly indebted to Robert
Jervis, Jim Goldgeier, Melvyn Leffler and Ernest May, four eminent scholars who
generously provided their comments and suggestions during two lively day-long seminars
to discuss the manuscript. Each has influenced me greatly throl,lgh their own and
their review of earlier drafts helped me refine the text and look for the interesting
questions to ask.
Finally. I would not have survived this five-month flurry of writing ifnot' for
the warm support. good humor and strong shoulders of several friends. Andrew
Carpendale. Aiex Treadway, and. most importantly, Maureen Upton" all made my life a
lot better during this process.
Derek Chollet
May 1997
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iii
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Post-Dayton Bosnia and Bordering States
*ZQgreb
c R o A T 1 A
-. - Inter-entity boundOl'f line
~ Fe<feroUon of Bosnlo . end
raLL'LI Herzegovina (F.B-H.)
~ Republiko Srpsko
~ (Serb Republic) .
o 75 kJomllters
.'---'---'-_.....1'
SetbKI and I.ronlenegro haw cmetted the 'QltllQIIon Clf 0 jo/ftl . stete.
but Ihi:I c:nm, "CIS n<:I\ been '",,"ally e d a. 0 Nt. b, lfIa tJnlbdstatn.
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UnclaSSified
Novi
-Sod
Belgrodes
Serbia
,
-;
~
..
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The Balkans

BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVJNA
Intemotlollol
e Republic.
Q Autonomous province
y 5p I tqo kilometers
o r 5Q
Sorojevo*
SerIIlcl and lIonUMgr"o how. formation of 0 Incf8lMftCftftt .tat.,
but this .. tlly hos not b.tn os Q .tot. by Ih. Unltw Statu.. .
7Th. Fonnv YU90"1211 Rl9Ublic of lIaC8C1cnla.
Serbia'
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Unclassified
Chapter,One
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The Summer Crisis: June-July 1995
"Today, with the Cold War ending, people think Yugoslavia isn't in
a position to do any damage. I think they're wrong. There's a
fault line of instability running through the Balkans. I think events
in Yugoslavia are going to turn violent and to confront the
Western countries, especially the United States, with one of their
biggest foreign policy problems of the next few years."
- George Kennan, to the last U.S. Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, Summer 1989.
1
From the vantage of May 1995, George Kennan's words seemed all too prophetic.
Since 1991, the Balkans had indeed. become one of the greatest - if not the greatest --
foreign policy dilemmas for the United States. Critics claimed that the West's inability to
prevent and then end the bloodshed was the most significant failure of the post Cold War
era. For the Clinton AdmiI\istration, Bosnia seemed to overshadow its entire foreign
policy. During the 1992 presidential campaign, as images of the war in Bosnia filled
American television and newspapers, Bill Clinton railed against the Bush
Administration's tepid response. But as early as the spring of 1993 and increasingly over
the next two years, the Clinton Administration found itself the target of blame -- its
approach toward the conflict was criticized as unfocused, uninspired, and unprincipled.
Newspaper editorials cried that Bosnia was in a "freefall," and the Administration seemed
to be unable to define and pursue a coherent policy? The international community
appeared wjUing only to carry out policies to contain and limit the tragedy, not end it.
The Clinton Administration's policy, pungently characterized by CIA Director John
Deutsch as "muddle through," no longer appeared tenable. On May I, a four-month
cease-fire between Muslims and Serbs ended, and the Croatian troops attacked Serb
positions in the Krajina region, an area once part of Croatian territory. A week later,
Bosnian Serbs began to shell the Muslim-held capital of Sarajevo. and the areas around
Brcko and Bihac were the sites of the worst combat in two years. The Bosnian Serbs had
become increasingly bold in their defiance of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in
the region, known as UNPROFOR? Acting with UN authority, NATO planes had
responded to the Bosnian Serb ~ t t a c k s with a limited air campaign against Serb
amml;lnition dumps and weapons. In retaliation, on May 26 the Bosnian Serbs began to
take hundreds of UN personnel hostage, chaining them to ammunition dumps and bridges
I Warren Zimmermann, Qrieins ora CgtastrQphc. (Times Books, 1996), pSI.
2 See, for example, Washington Post editorial, "Bosnia in a Free Fall," May 2, 1995.
J For an excellent account of UNPROFOR's crisis during the spring ofl995, see lan Willem Honig and
Norbert Both, Srebrenica: RecQrd ora \'Lar Crime (Penguin, 1997), ppI41-159 .

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that were the targets of NATO attacks. By the end of the month, over 350 UN personnel
had been forcibly detained by the Bosnian Serbs, some prominently displayed before
television cameras. A hostage crisis was at hand. The nations who had contributed their
forces to directing UN humanitarian reliefefforts in Bosnia began to discuss openly the
withdrawal of their "blue helmet"" troops, thus precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse.
They had grown increasingly weary of the hostage-taking, potential casualties, the sharp
criticisms by the Western press, and the perception that the UN mission was only
delaying the inevitable victory of the Bosnian Serbs.
4
.
One way or another, it seemed, American troops were going to be on the ground in
Bosnia. With the situation in the UN safe areas deteriorating, the Clinton
recognized that under the auspices of NATO. the United States might soon have to send
in ground forces to help its Allies withdraw. Since 1992, NATO forces had played a
limited but important role in implementing UN Security Council resolutions on the
fonner Yugoslavia. Such operations included enforcing the international arms embargo,
economic sanctions against Serbia and the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia. While the UN had
assumed the lead role with forces on the ground, NATO was critical in supporting these
resolutions as well as providing selective air protection for UNPROFOR troops.s .
Since late 1994, the Clinton Administration had maintained that, should the
situation on the ground prevent UN peacekeepers from carrying out their mission, NA TO
forces would have to help UNPROFOR leave Bosma. This NATO mission, known as
Op-plan 40104, called for 20,000 American soldiers to participate as part of a
person force. U.S. troops had to assist in this dangerous and humiliating effort,
Administration officials explained, because American failure to take part "would
devastate the [NATO] alliance.,,6 The only way for the U.S. to forestall the withdrawal
mission would be for it to push the parties to peace .- preferable to Op-Plan 40104" but
likely still demanding American troops to enforce a settlement.
7
And such a scenario
JooJced far away in the early summer of 1995.
8
4 For details, see John Pomfret. "Sbaky Truce in Bosnia Ends Today; UN Fails to Forestall Resurgence To
War:' Washington Post. May 1, 1995; "1995: The Year in Review," State Department Chronology
(EURJRPM); and "The United States and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: 1980-1995," Chronology prepared
by the US Department of State, Office of the Historian, pp209-219.
S Details on NATO operations in Bosnia from "NATO's Role in Peacekeeping in the Fonner Yugoslav ia."
NATO Basic Fact Sheet, No.4, September 1996.
6 Background on 40104 and US military commitments from State Department memorandum. "Bosnia
Peace Implementation," no author, October 3, 1995; D files.
'In early 1994, when it appeared that a settlement could be reached based on the Contact Group initiative,
NATO undertook planning deployments to implement an accord. This plan, known as Op-plan 40103, was
never finalized, as renewed fighting effectively ended this initiative. When planning had stopped, NATO
planners had not resolved such issues as troop size, participation of non-NATO forces, relationship with
the UN, or chain of command. See Ibid.
a for useful background on US policy toward the fonner Yugoslavia during 1992- )995, see Susan
Rosegrant, "Getting to Dayton: Negotiating an End 10 the War in Bosnia," Kennedy SchoQI QfGQvemment
Case Program (Harvard University, 1996), ppl-12 .
2

p
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2
2 2
Whither UNPROFOR?
In Washington, the Administration's frustration with its Bosnia policy was
growing, as the situation began to deteriorate rapidly after the expiration of the cease-fire.
At the NSC, EUropean security and Balkan experts began to brainstonn about possible
ways the U.S. could, at best, break out ofthis diplomatic morass, and at worst, prepare for
. a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops. If the U.S. was going to get involved,
many at the NSC felt, it should do so on its own terms.
9
Nelson Drew, an Air Force
Colonel who had just joined the NSC staff to work on Balkan issues, begal) work on a
discussion paper in mid-May to probe the Administration's policy options. In his
memorandum, circulated at the NSC on May 17). Drew noted that with the possible
withdrawal of UNPROFOR and insertion of NA TOIU.S. troops, "now is the time to
review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to deteonine the steps
necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation
on the Although UNPROFOR was crippled arid possibly moribund. Drew
argued that it remained in the U.S. interest to try to keep it on the ground: "U.S. interests
are best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a
manner that pennits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and
the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence."
.
Within the range of possible options to save-UNPROFOR, Drew presented as the
only "realistic choice" the idea to "retrench and reinvigorate" the mission: withdrawing
UNPROFOR forces from untenable positions (such as some of the UN "safe areas'" for
Muslims established in eastern Bosnia) while pursuing a "more robust" enforcement of
UN mandates, possibly including NATO airstrikes.
1O
Yet, with UN withdrawal a
possibility. Drew the potential consequences of implementing Op-plan 40104:
how to deal with . unintended consequences of withdrawal operations, under what
conditions withdrawal could take place without 40104 coming into effect, or how to
ensure that actions in preparation for 40104 wouldn't precipitate UN withdrawal itself-
in other words. Drew argued, a "firebreak point" needed to be placed between
UNPROFOR withdrawal and mobilization of U.S. forces. I I
Six days later, many of the points Drew raised were discussed at a Principals
Committee (PC) meeting at the White House.
12
Officials began to confront the
particulars of a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy: what to do about the arms
embargo, possible anning and training of Bosnian forces, and future airs trikes. They also
discussed many of the unanswered questions of 40104 (such as how to handle refugee
movement or Serbian aggression while NATO was in place) and explored possible
alternatives to a NATO-led UNPROFOR withdrawal. Although the bureaucratic wheels
9 Don Kerrick interview, July 15, 1996.
10 The rejected options ranged from doing nothing, to "restabilizing" UNPROFOR with enhanced resources
and more robust mandate, to withdrawing UNPROFOR completely.
n"Bosnia: Strategic Choices: NSC Discussion Paper," NSC memorandUm, May J 7, 1995.
12 The Principals Committee was one ofthe Clinlon Administration's primary forums for high-level
decision-making in foreign policy. Chaired by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, the committee
met in the While House Situation Room and was typically comprised of Cabinet-level officials (or in their
absence, their deputies) from State, OSD, JCS, CrA, USUN, Office oflhe Vice President, and NSC. Other
agencies (such as Treasury or Commerce) would be included depending on the specific issues at hand. The
PC would often work from conclusions that had already been reached by their deputies in the Deputies
Committee (DC).

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began turning on these issues, the Principals agreed that the magnitude of problems associated with 40104 and post-withdrawal planning made UNPROFOR's near-term survival crucial. and that the U.S. government should make a concerted effort to press the
Europeans to keep UN forces in the game. I)
for the U.S.,. pressure was already building among its European Allies- for revamping UNPROFOR. Newly-elected French President Jacques Chi rae, known as the "bulldozet' for his penchant for frank discussion and fast action, was widely known
to believe that the UN operation was weak and. needed to get tougher. 14 His new Foreign Minister Herve de Charette began laying the groundwork for UNPROFOR changes in a series of phone calls with Secretary of State Christopher in late May. While discussing a proposed meeting of the Contact Group, de Charette told the Secretary that "well-defined
- conclusions must be reached ... regarding the need to modify UNPROFOR, whether it be in tenus of mission, means,' or field operations." The French, de Charette said, were anxious to make specific recommendations "to prevent' the further humiliation of
UNPROFOR forces . .,IS President Chirae followed up in a May 27 phone call with President Clinton. explaining to him that the way to solve the UNPROFOR dilemma was to make the force leaner and meaner -- "we need to change its [lJNPROFOR'sj mission, give it more weapons, consolidate the forces in less vulnerable positions, and let them
defend themselves."J6
.
Only minutes after he hung up with Chirac, the President called British Prime Minister John Major, who expressed his support for the French view in principle. But
Clinton and Major each raised concerns about Chiraq's plan: Clinton was worried that if
UNPROFOR consolidated forces. the Bosnian Serbs may perceive a "green light" to take
the eastem enclaves; Major wanted more on Chime's specifics. "What does he mean by
UNPROFOR being 4'beefed up?" Major asked Clinton. "Is this putting people in place to
withdraw? [My agreement] depends on what Chirae means by beefing Up.,,11 Despite
IJ See memorandum from Richard Holbrooke (EUR) to Secretary Christopher, "Principals Committee
Meeting, May 23," May 22. 1995; and "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Meeting on Bosnia," May
23, 1995, NSC memorandum. On arming and training the Bosnians. the principals agreed that if
UNPROFOR withdrew, they would support limited action along with a multilateral lift oftbe anns
embargo. The fact that this decision was made created some confusion among the State Department's
. seventh floor Principals. In a note to Secretary Christopher on June 13, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott
expressed his "puzzlement" from the NSC's Alexander Vershbow that a "lift. arm and train".proposaI had
been agreed to. Vershbow reported that no decision memorandum had been forwarded to the President.
Christopher returned the note to Talbott with a hand-written "let's discuss." See DC/PC folder, Dayton
History Project files. In an interview, Sandy Versbbow explained that at this May 23 PC, "The Principals
did reach a preliminary decision that our policy would be lift, limited ann and train but no commitment to
strike." Christopher recalls that no such decision had been firmly decided, and to call the U.S. position at
the time a commitment "WOUld be overstated."
'4 Chirac had been inaugurated into office on May 17. Sec William Drozdiak, "Bulldozer' Heads for
Halifax; French Leader Chirac Brings Reputation for Frank Talk to Summit," Washington Post, June 14.
1995.
IS See, 'respectively, Memorandum of Telephone Conversations between Secretary Christopher and French
Foreign Minister de Charette. May 24, 1995 (Cable, State 129348); May 26, 1995 (Cable, State 130130);
and May 27, 1995 (Cable, State 13144).
'6 "Tel con wilh President Chirac of France." NSC memorandum, May 17, 1995. 17 "Telephone conversation between UK Prime Minister John Major and President Clinton, May 27, 1995,"
Cable, State 151264, June 22, 1995.
4
&
2
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such concerns, the three leaders had agreed to prod their governments to discuss this
particular issue in more detaiL
The result of these deliberations was a British and French _proposal to create what
became known as the Rapid Reaction Force" (RRF) -- a force of heavily armed mobile
troops that could be called upon to defend UN peacekeepers from Serb attacks. It was not
clear that UNPROFOR's new muscle would bolster the resolve of UN civilian leaders to
stand up to the Serbs, yet it was hoped that it would at least deter the Serbs' from
continuing their humiliating harassments of UNPROFOR. But the RRF was the UN's
last stand. If these forces could not invigorate the UN mission, then it appeared that the .
Europeans would withdraw their troops before the next Balkan winter'set in. 1&
In light of the test of wills between the Bosnian Serbs and the international
community, Secretary Christopher requested that a Principals Committee meeting be
convened to discuss the deteriorating situation and detennine the U.S. position on next
steps in advance of the May 30 Ministerial meeting of NATO's political body, the North
Atlantic Council CNAC). At this rare Sunday, May 28 PC meeting. officials decided to
suspend "quietly" the use of airs trikes against the Serbs forthe foreseeable future, as UN
peacekeepers were just too vulnerable to Serb retaliation.
19
This was a position supported
by Chirac as well as Major (as both expressed to the President the day before). However,
they did not rule out future airstrikes. On the prospects for a potential emergency
UNPROFOR withdrawal, the Principals reaffirmed their pledge to 40104. They agreed
that the U.S. commitment in principle to provide troops for withdrawal should be
extended ''to apply to assistance and relocation" of UN forces from the eastern Bosnian
"enclaves" of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde;. In a decision memo for the President on
this issue, NSC Advisor Anthony Lake explained that "we don't want to see UN
withdrawal from the Eastern enclaves, but if it comes to that, U.S. credibility atrlong
NATO Allies would be seriously damaged" if the U.S. refused to assist allied forces
evacuate from an untenable position and relocate elsewhere in Bosnia. "This wou.ld
support our main goal." Lake wrote, "of maintaining UNPROFOR presence and making
that presence more robust.'s2()
..
At the May 30 NAC meeting in Noordwijk. The Netherlands, Secretary Christopher
reaffinned U.S. support for UNPROFOR, pledging to work to enhance its capability and
strength. Formal agreement was also reached on exploring the Rapid Reaction Force
proposal. In a statement released after a separate meeting between the U.S. and its
IS See Memo from Toby Gati (INR) to Strobe Talbott, "UK/French Plans for the Rapid Reaction Force,"
June 21, 1995.
..
J9 One official who had recommended against such a decision was the Assistant Secretary of Stale for
European Affairs, Richard Holbrooke. Two bours before that Sunday PC meeting, Holbrooke spoke to
Christopher by phone from Budapest (where he was about to be married), recommending that NATO give
the Bosnian Serbs an ultimatum to release all UN hostages: Ifthe Bosnian Serbs failed to comply, he
argued, then NATO air strikes should commence. Holbrookc interview with author (notes), October 17.
1996 ..
20 This decision memo, dated May 28, was presented to the President as a resl!lt of the PC meeting that day.
Because these decisions were considered sensitive by NSC staff, the standard "Summary of Conclusions"
from the PC was not distributed Vershbow interviews, July 23, 1996 and September 26,
1996. Also see Memorandum from John Kornblum (EUR) to Secretary Christopher, "Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 28, 1995."
5
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partners in the five-nation "Contact Group:t21 these nations promised to "examine
promptly" the British-French plan in an effort to take steps to assure UNPROFOR's
freedom of movement and safety.22
On the decision to support UNPROFOR withdrawal, the President agreed.
announcing so publicly in a May 31 speech before the graduating cadets at the Air Force
Academy. "We have obligations with our NATO Allies," the President said, "and I do
not believe we can leave them in the lurch." President Clinton added, however, that any
introduction of U.S. ground troops to support UN withdrawal would be temporary and
that he would seek Congressional approval. That same day ~ UN Secretary General
Boutros-Boutros Ghali turned up the heat on the UN . mission in Bosnia, catling it a
"mission impossible" and urging the Security Council to either scale down peacekeeping
operations or deploy reinforcements. The combination of these two statements triggered
a firestorm of criticism about the possible introduction of American troops into the
region, and Clinton soon stepped his pledge back, explaining that U.S. troops would only
be involved in an emergency extraction operation if UN troops were trapped under 23
~ ~
.
While public scrutiny of UNPROFOR brewed, the diplomatic track appeared
stalled as well. Robert Frasure, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadiari Affairs and the President's envoy to the Contact Group, had met
with Serbian President Milosevic numerous times over the past three months, trying to
negotiate a settlement package worked out earlier by the Contact Group?4 Frasure
21 In 1994, a five-nation body composed of a representative each from the US. UK, France:Gennany and
Russia, was formed to help negotiate a settlement in Bosnia. For background, see Laura Silber and A Han
Little, The Death QfyugQslavia (Penguin Books, 1996), pp335-36.
22 See. respectively, "Contact Group Ministers Urge Strengthening ofUNPROFOR," May 29, 1995; and
Secretary Christopher's "Intervention at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, Noordwijk, The Netherlands," May
30, 1995. US Department of State Dispatch, June 5, J995, pp2-8. .
2J See R. W. Apple, Jr., "Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; Clinton Talks oGround Role in Bosnia,"
New York Times, June J, 1995; Todd Purdum, "US Policy; Clinton, Facing Objections. Refines Narrow
Conditions for Using Troops in Bosnia," New York Times, June 4, 1995. Some on the NSC staff felt that
this speech had been blown out of pr()portion, that the decision was only a subtle change in policy. See
Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996.
14 Frasure's negotiations pre-date the scope of this analysis but constitute the critical context for US
decision-making during the summer and fall of 1995. Frasure's cables offer vivid and fascinating details
of negotiating with Milosevic, as well as deliberations among the Contact Group that spring. See: "Contact
Group -- Milosevic's Proposal," Cable, Belgrade 1050, March 4,1995; "Contact Group Proposal on
Recognition/Sanctions Suspension:' Cable, State 86669, April 8, ] 995; "Milosevic on Bosnia Recognition:
No," Cable, Belgrade 1773, April 12, 1995; "Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper on
Recognition," Cable, Belgrade 1868; "Officia!-]nfonnaJ [message to Milosevic from Frasure)," Cable,
State 10661, May 2, ]995; "May 3 ConlactGroup Meeting," Cable, London 6422, May 3,1995; "Paris
Contact Group Meeting: Deadlock," Cable, Paris 10979, May 5, 1995; "Official-Informal [message to
Holbrooke from Frasure)," Draft Cable, Belgrade, May 8, 1995; "Talks with Milosevic: First Round,"
Cable, Belgrade 2352, May 16, 1995; "The Milosevic Discussions: An Analysis," Cable, Belgrade 2419.
May 19, 1995; "Instructions for your Meeting with Miloseyic," Cable, State 1237 i4, May 20, 1995; "Paris
Wants the US to. Cut a Deal-:- Any Deal-- With Milosevic," Cable, State 124132, May 20, 1995;"Officia]-
(nfonnal [message to Frasure from Jack Zetkulicl," Cable, State 124139, May 21, I 995; "Instructions for
Fourth Round ofNegoliations with Milosevic," Cable, State 124 J 55, May 21, 1995; "Saturday Night with
Milosevic -' 'We Are Right on the Edge of the Blade,'" Cable, Belgrade 2436, May 2], 1995; "A Sunday
Lunch With Milosevic,"Cable, Belgrade 2437, May21, 1995; "Milosevic Discussions -- No Deal." Cable,
Belgrade 2468, May 22, 1995; "Official-Infonnal [message to Frasure from Chris Hill)," Cable, State
124160, May 22, 1995; "Milosevic Expects Release of UN Hostages Today," Cable, Belgrade 2650, June
6
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLAsSIFIED
2 F
offered Milosevic partial relief from the UN sanctions crippling the economy of Serbia-
Montenegro.
25
In return, the Serb leader would recognize the Bosnian state and bring
pressure on his rebel Serb clients to begin serious peace negotiations. But Frasure's
negotiations had stalled over the mechanism for reimposing the sanctions should
Milosevic not live up to his end of the deal.
Moreover, the Serb leader seemed emboldened by UNPROFOR's recent crisis.
Frasure cabled Washington that "Milosevic's position in complicated game has been
immensely strengthened, and he is well aware of that fact." Concerning future
negotiations, Frasure explained, "we face a stark choice: either 'we back off from these
talks -- and run the risk that either the Russians/Bntish/French fill the vacuum, or we
agree to pay the Balkan political hit man the price he now demands for his promise to
resolve our Bosnia problem.,,26 SecretaryChristopher solicited the views of his Contact
Group counterparts on FraSure's next steps, explaining that "Milosevic might interpret
Frasure's continued presence in Belgrade as a sign of our urgent need to conclude the
talks on tenn increasingly acceptable to Serbia." Thus, the Secretary sunnised, Milosevic
. position may only harden?7 Given such unrelenting intransigence, the Principals
Committee decided to Frasure on June 6. Although teclinicaIIy Frasure's talks
were characterized as "at a in fact, the U.S. let the Europeans. led by their new
negotiator Carl BiIdt, assume primary responsibility for the negotiations?8'
As Frasure struggled with Milosevic, former President Jimmy Carter tried to jump-
start the flagging diplomatic process. As he had on other occasions during the Clinton
Administration -- most notably with the cease-fire that had held from January to May
1995 -- Carter offered the President his thoughts and services to broker a peace in
Bosnia.29 In a phone call and subsequent letter to Clinton, the former President argued
that the Contact Group convene talks among all sides (Bosnian Serbs included) with no
preconditions (meaning, using the Contact Group peace plan as a basis for negotiations
but not to accept it in advance). The proposal challenged twin taboos of American
2,1995; "F-16 Shootdown: Meeting with Milosevic," Cable, Belgrade 2667, June 2, 1995; "Milosevic
Negotiations - Demands for More Concessions:' Draft Cable, Belgrade, June 3. 1995; "Conversation with
David Owen -- F-16 Pilot. Hostages, and the Bosnia Recognition Package," Cable, Belgrade 2711, June 5,
1995; and "Farewell Session With Milosevic," Cable, Belgrade 2742; June 7, 1995. For the best public
account, see Honig and Both, ppl6().)74.
Z The United Nations Security Council had voted to place economic sanctions of Serbia-Montenegro on
May 30. 1992. The sanctions called on all member states to sever trade' links, freeze foreign assets, impose
an oil embargo, ban sporting and cultural exchanges, and suspend air travel.
26 "Milosevic and the Good Serb/Bad Serb Game," Cable, Belgrade 2699, June 5, 1995. On Milosevic's
hardening negotiating stance, Frasure had cabled Washington on June I that "on balance, Mjlosevic feels
that the Bosnian airstrike debacle has considerably strengthened his position in" these negotiations, e.g., he
has a stack of west em press clips saying he is the key to peace in the region. In my view, Milosevic sees
the Bosnian Serbs digging themselves even deeper into a pariah hole with their seizure orthe UN hostages.
And the west is even more desperate for.a deal to avoid UNPROFOR withdrawal. Therefore, if the Balkan
spider just sits and wails, more good things will be brought to him. i.e., a nonoperational [sanctions}
reimposition formula." See "Milosevic Talks -- No Movement on Reimposition, Saying the Right Things
on Hostages," Cable, Belgrade 2621, June I, 1995.
27 "Letter from the Secretary Re Contact Group," Cable, State 135194, June 4. 1995.
28 See "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Meeting on Bosnia," NSC memorandum, June 6,1995.
29 In December 1994, Carter's efforts had been instrumental in getting the parties to agree 10 a temporary-
cease-fire Ihat began on January I, 1995. See John Pomfret, "Bosnians Set 4Month Ceasefire; Accord
Skirts Issue of New Peace Talks," Washington Post, January J, 1995.

UNCLASSIFIED
7
UNCLASSIFIED
....
Balkan policy: that the U.S. not negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs. and that the Contact
Group 51-49 territorial division remain unchanged.
3o
. The Clinton Administration viewed Carter's proposal seriously. but skeptically.
Dealing with the fonner President itself had become an exercise in diplomacy. especially
in light of well-publicized strains over Haiti the previous fall. Administration officials,
many of whom had also served under President Carter (Christopher, Lake, and Richard
. Holbrooke, for example), were careful to consult with Carter respectfully but were
likewise concerned that his proposal may undennine their policy? I Some frankly felt
that carter's interventions bordered on meddling. In a return letter dated June 12,
President Clinton thanked Carter for his service and ideas but explained that his proposal
was too soft on the. Bosnian Serbs. "I am sure you must agree that, under the
circumstances, we should not be initiating any course of action that could be seen as a
. reward for such [Bosnian Serb] behavior and intransigence," the President wrote.
"Unfortunately, to now abandon our insistence that the Bosnian Serbs join with the other
p ~ e s In accepting the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations ... would be
seen in Pale [the Bosnian Serb headquarters outside Sarajevo]. as'well as in Sarajevo and
by the international community, as precisely such an award:,32 Bob Frasure talked with
Carter by phone the next morning, briefing him on the talks with Milosevic and trying "to
feed him as much complexity as possible" to convince the former President to disengage
(Carter had told Frasure that in a scheduled appearance on Capitol Hill, he would say
things that would prove "unpopUlar" in the Clinton Administration). During the half-
hour conversation, the fonner President didn't offer any panaceas -- "he has no more idea
what to do than we have," Frasure reported.
33
-
. The next day, June 14, French President Chirae arrived at the White House for his'
first meeting with President Clinton. By this point, Clinton had become increasingly
discouraged by Bosnia. The issue was spilling over into the domestic political arena; the
hostage crisis and recent downing oru.s. F-16 pilot Scott O'Grady had focused public
attention on the President's much-maligned Bosnia policy. and criticism from Republican
members of Congress had intensified - including from Senate Maj ority Leader and front-
runner for the Republican presidential nomination, Robert Dole?4 Hill opposition to
partial u.s. funding of the RRF was holding up Clinton's ability to support it formally
with a UN Security Council vote (under the plan. the U.S. would have to fund thirty-
percent of the force. and Congressional authorization would be required for such an
expenditure). At a morning pre-brief with his top advisors for the day's meeting with
Chirac, the President insisted that "we need to get the policy straight." Without action
soon, Clinton argued, "we're just going to be kicking the can down the road again."
30 Letter from former President Jimmy Carter to President Bill Clinton, June 2, 1995 (COS files).
31 Holbrooke phone interview with author (notes), August 1996.
32 Letter from President Bill Clinton to former president'Ca"rter, June 12, 1995 (COS files).
)3 Frasure reported on this conversation in a memorandum to Secretary Christopher, "Phone Conversation
with Carter," June 13, 1995.
34 O'Grady, a US Air Force pilot. had been shot down by a Bosnian Serb missile over Banja Luka on June
2. This action gained widespread international attention. as O'Grady's whereabouts were unknown for six
days. O'Grady was located and rescued by US Marine helicopters on June 8. See Francis X. Clines, "The
Rescue; Downed US Pilot Rescued in Bosnia During Daring Raid," New York Times, June 9. 1995.
8

o.
UNCLASSIFIED
. UNCLASSIFIED

With the situation in Bosnia festering. the West was directionless: "we've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events:.Js
The Clinton-Chirac discussion was entirely dominated by Bosnia. Chirac, explaining that he had secured the support of Russian President Yeltsin. pushed for a U.S. commitment on the RRF. Clinton was concerned that tfthey pushed a UN vote too soon, it would exacerbate tensions with Congress, which he described to the French President as "the most isolationist Congress since the 1930s." Snapping his fingers, President Clinton'told Chirac "I would vote like this if I didn't have to the money [from Congress]. If we voted tomorrow, it could undermine our ability to keep the word of the United States on funding of the RRF, and it could cause more trouble. That is the only issue."
Chirac told the President that he wanted to take the risk and push a UN Security Council vote soon. "There are two problems, political and financial," Chirae said. "Politically. everyone including the Russians is ready to vote for the resolution. The situation in Bosnia being what it is, I think we should approve the resolution tomorrow - that is, before the G-7 summit [scheduled to begin the next day in fJalifax, Nova Scotia)." Chi.rac warned that if the pace was slowed at the UN, leaders like Yeltsin and Milosevic
would get more "oxygen" to oppose the RRF. Chirac and Clinton agreed to pursue
negotiations with Congressional leaders, particularly Speaker of the' House Newt
Gingrich and Dole, to "tell them that their behavior is helping the Serbs and not the
Bosnians.,,36 The two leaders and their aides proceeded to work the phones to set up consultations on Capitol Hill, delaying talks with an EU delegation, which was anxiously
waiting in the next room?7 .
President Clinton had committed U.S. troops to the UN withdrawal operation months before, but Christopher and his Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, were concerned that the President had not yet
confronted the reality that there were less options than he thought. They planned to alert
the President to the fact that based on previous NAC decisions, U.S. troop deployment
under 40104 would be automatic. In their view, given previous decisions, there was not much flexibility (in tenns of deployment timetable, troop composition, or area of
.operations) in what the U.S. could do.
Later that night, after a private White House dinner with Chirac, they tried to
explain to the President just how constrained the United States really was. Meeting with some of his foreign policy advisors out on the White House's North Portico. Clinton's
thoughts returned to how they might regain control of their Bosnia policy. UMr. President, I'm afraid that we may not have as much flexibility and options said .
J
J$ Bob Woodward, The Choice, (Siinon and Schuster, 1996), p255. See also memorandum from Secretary
Christopher to President Clinton, "Your meeting with French President Chirae," June 9,1995.
J6 See "Memorandum oftbe President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirae of France,
June 14, 1995" NSC memorandum, June 21, 1995; Vershbow interView.
.
37 On Congressional funding. the result oftbese talks was 3. compromise agreement with Congress to delay
the issue. allowing the Administration to promise political but not economic support. This was conveyed
to the President in a June 15 letter from Robert Dole and Newt Gingrich, Despite this compromise, the
legislative-executive battle over RRF was far from over. In a June 29 letteryDole and Gingrich expressed
anger with the President that he had gone ahead to lise "UN assessments funding" to fund the RRF
partially. In a July 1 response leuer, President Clinton argued that the US should support its Allies and .
UNPROFOR, and that "I strongly believe it is in the US interests to make a voluntary contribution (to the
RRF}."
.
UNCLASSIFIED
9.
UNCLASSIFIED
......
Holbrooke. As the Assistant Secretary described that the U.S. commitment to participate
in UN withdrawal under plan 40104, a surprised Clinton responded, "I'll decide that
when the time comes." Secretary Christopher told the President the plan had
been approved by the NAC, and under NATO procedures this contained a "large degree
of automaticity." Given the consequences of reneging on such a pledge, the Secretary
said, no other "practical options existed." The U.S. had committed itself to the
withdrawal mission, and to renege on this pledge now would further undennine the
Administration's credibility in Europe?8
The next day, the 0-7 leaders met in Halifax for their annual summit. Though
Bosnia found its way onto the agenda of the economic meeting, the summit itself broke
little substantJve ground. Observers have described the talks as little more than a
wringing session.'.39. The members of the P-8 (the 0-7 plus Russia) called for a
moratorium on fighting in the region, recommended a UNSC resolution authorizing the
and requested the parties' support for the Contact Group plan. President Clinton.
for his part. publicly stated that he remained committed to lifting the arms embargo
should the UN withdraw. While united in sentiment, the P-8 was far from consensus over
how to translate these hopes into reality. 40
More important, perhaps, was the symbolic outcome of Halifax. Participating in
his first G-7 summit, French President Chirac seemed to outshine his counterparts,
particularly on his concern about Bosnia. To some in the press, Chirac's performance
personified the contrast between fresh French activism and continuing American timidity.
During a live joint press conference, for example, Chirae seized the center of attention by
reading aloud for his counterparts portions of a French intelligence document about the
current situation in Bosnia. As they strained to look over Chirac's shoulder; President
Clinton and the other 0-7 leaders were perceived as simply following the French
''bulldozer.'' Some U.S. officials mused (off the record) that Chirac's
may have helped to dramatize the converging continental consensus that enough was
enough, the Bosnian crisis needed a solution. The message seemed clear: if the U.S.
wasn't willing to lead on Bosilia, others nations like France would.
41
The Elements of a New Strategy '.
The realization that American troops might soon be in Bosnia forced the
Administration to search for new options. At a June 21 "Foreign Policy Team" meeting
in the Oval Office to discuss fundin
y
(or the RRF, officials launched into an imprOlnptu
discussion over long-tenn strategy.4 The President was growing increasingly frustrated
JS Account from Woodward, pp256-257; Vershbow interview. September 26, 1996; Holbrooke interview
with author (notes), October ]7, 1996; and Christopher interview. October 22. 1996.
39 Vershbow interview, July 23, 1996.
40 See David Sanger. "Seeking E"mbrace, Yeltsin is Rebuffed at Talks," New York Times, June 18, 1995.
On June 16. the UN Security Council approved the RRF, atthough it left open the question of how to pay
for the force. See Barbara Crossette. "Security Council Approves Additional Troops for Bosnia," New
York Times, June 16, 1995.
-41 See Anne Swardson, "Chirae, New (0 G-7 Summitry, Proves Top Attention-Getter," Washing/on Post.
June 18, 1995; for impact on US policy-making, see Thomas Lippman and Ann Devroy. "Clinton's PoHcy
Evolution; June Decision Led To Diplomatic Gambles," Washing/on Posl, September II, 1995.
The "Foreign Policy Team" meeting was the highest-level of decision-making among the Principals _
Lake, Christopher, Perry, Shalikashvili, Albright and Deutsch -- and President Clinton and Vice President
IO
I
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

with the UN, claiming that it "is paralyzing our actions and weakening the arguments for
our current policies." Lake explained that the Administration needed to engage in "blue-
sky" thinking on its Bosnia policy. What does the U.S. do if UNPROFOR does become
untenable, Lake asked? Should the U.S. prepare to push for a lift of the arms embargo,
and if so, how hard? Should the West relax its demands that any talks with the PaJe Serbs
be conditional on "their acceptance of the 1994 Contact Group map as the basis for
negotiations (counter to what the President had written Carter a week before)? Should
"the U.S. even be working to forestall the'withdrawal ofUNPROFOR?43
Lake's questions struck a chord with the UN Ambassador. Madeleine Albright.
From her perspective in New York, Albright saw how Bosnia influenced U.S. diplomatic
leverage around the world. "It didn't matter what the subject was we were talking about
in New York," she recalled, "the U.S. position on Bosnia affected it." To Albright, the
unwillingness to take the lead on Bosnia was crippling its foreign policy
more generally. "When U.S. leadership is being questioned in one area, it affects our
leadership in others ... it was important for the President to understand how this subject
affected so many other subjects we were dealing with." SensiJ).g that events on the
ground in Bosnia -- namely, the possible withdrawal ofUNPROFOR -- would force the
Administration to take some action, the UN Ambassador had "agitating" among
senior colleagues about the need for a thorough policy review.
At this June 21 meeting, Albright presented a proposal. "Elements of a New
Strategy," recommending the Administration begin planning for a post-UNPROFOR
environment in Bosnia. "Bosnia is destroying our foreign policy domestically and
internationally. the way Haiti was last summer," she wrote. The present strategy -- then
well known by the sobriquet ""muddle through" -- "makes the President appear weak."
Albright argued that. her proposal "recognizes reality," calling on the President to get
ahead of the game and take steps to lead the alliance. rather than being reluctantly
"sucked [into] much of the same policy decisions." 4S
Albright's position was that whether the U.S. liked it or not, UNPROFOR would
leave Bosnia by the end of the year. The Europeans had simply had enough. And,
because of the Administration's commitment to Op-plan 40104, the situation was already
an American problem. Since the"U.S. was going to be involved militarily, Albright
argued that the U.S. create a policy to do so "on our schedule rather that somebody
else' s. ,,46
Accordingly. Albright advised a bold move: The Americans should press their
Allies to concede that UNPROFOR would withdraw, thus sparking its immediate
departure. The international community would lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian
Government, and NATO would follow up with airstrikes to protect Muslim-held territory.
President Clinton had advocated "lift-and-strike", during his 1992 presidential campaign,
but upon taking office, the Europeans had effectively vetoed the policy, fearing for the
Gore. Depending on the issue at hand, other officials would be included on an ad hoc basis. The meeting
was usually held in the Oval Office or Cabinet Room. ""
43 Vershbow interviews, Jury 23", 1996 and September 26, 1996.
Albright interview; October 28, 1996, .
45 See "Elements of a New Strategy," fax to Albright from Jamie Rubin, June 2 J. 1995. Rubin worked
closely with the Ambassador in formulating this proposal. All quotes below are from this memoralldum
unless otherwise noted,
46 Albright interview.
UNCLASSIFIED
II
"
safety of their troops on the ground. If UNPROFOR Albright believed the
Europeans could no longer block the Administration's policy. Then, the U.S. would
demand (through a emissary than Frasure) that Milosevic accept the
sanctions relief for recognition proposal or else face the consequences of a Bosnia sans
. UNPROFOR: "Either Milosevic agrees to existing sanctions relief for recognition
package or he will face a new dilemma this coming winter; namely. nO.UNPROFOR, a
more powerful army threatening the Bosnian Serbs and a decision by him whether to
intervene on behalf of Pale." Albright recognized that this approach had some potential
downsides: a tougher Bosnian negotiating stance. and U.S. troops in Bosnia during an
election year. The President seemed intrigued by her presentation; although he admitted
that he didn't agree with everything in the memorandum. Not any further.he
said that "liked the thrust of it and ... that it was the right direction to go.'.4
Though Albright's memorandum was not widely discussed at the June 21 meeting,
it began a series of quiet consultations her and Lake that would prompt the NSC
to begin developing its own diplomatic initiative.
48
On Saturday morning, June 24,
Anthony Lake, his deputy Samuel "Sandy" Berger, Alexander Vershbow, Nelson Drew,
and Lake aide Peter Bass sat down in Lake's West Wing office for a brainstonning
session. All had Albright's ideas on their minds. "We cannot go on like this'" the
National Security Advisor said. "We need to think about carrots and sticks and gaining
leverage; we need to get this [Bosnia] thing off the table." Rather than focus on dealing
with the immediate problems at hand, Lake suggested that his staff consider what kind of
Bosnia they hoped to find at the end of the peace process, and to work back from there.
The Administration had to "start thinking about the unthinkable" UNPRO FOR
withdrawal. If that occurred, what wouJd the next steps be? They needed to look at the
conflict comprehensively. figuring out not only how to get things -started, but get them to
the finish line. By formulating a Balkan "endgame," Lake hoped they would be able to
figure out how to get there. Lake charged Vershbow. Senior Director of the NSC's
European Directorate, with drafting a strategy-that would increase the American military
. leverage and flexibility in the diplomatic process.
49
At a morning briefing several days later, Lake briefed President Clinton on this
discussion.
so
He wanted to -gauge the President's willingriess to take a chance on a new
initiative. Failure might damage the Administration even further. and success still meant
sending 20,000 American soldiers into Bosnia during an election year. The status quo
was untenable, replied the President. He was willing to take the risk of new ideas,
because they were not getting anywhere with the old mindset. After this discussion, Lake
continued to brief the President periodically on the drafting status of what the NSC began
to can the "endgame" paper. These briefings served a certain bureaucratic purpose --
they helped assure that the President remain informed on current NSC thinking, allowing
Lake to "prime" the President against the views of other agencies that might run counter
to an emerging NSC strategy.51
47 Ibid.
4' Vershbow'interview, July 23,1996; Peter Bass interview, September 10,1996.
Vershbow interviews, July 23, 1996, and September 26, 1996; Vershbow interview with Brian Lapping
Associates, "Death of Yugoslavia," Roll C1; Bass interview; Woodward, p257-S8.
'0 Episode described in Woodward, p258.
'I Bass interview.
12
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
...
While the NSC began work on its policy review, senior State Department officials
were also exploring ways to break the Balkan impasse. Throughout the spring, top
Department and Administration officials had met informally for their own brainstorming
sessions to discuss the stalled diplomatic program. Several times over the past few
months, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had invited to his house a smaIl group,
including Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff. Deputy National Security Advisor
Berger, Director of Policy Planning James Steinberg, and occasionally CIA Director 101m
Deutsch. On another occasion the same group had met at TamofPs house. The talks
discussed the overall direction of U.S. policy and possible new approaches. Like Lake
and Albright, the sense among these officials was that the Administration's policy on
Bosnia needed to change cQurse. "In a variety of ways," Peter Tarnoff recaIJed, "each of
us came t() the conclusion that there had to be a higher level of U.S. intervention and
therefore a higher level of risk -- political and human -- for the Administration." From
these meetings Steinberg had drafted a summary proposal calling for an- international
conference that would bring the Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian governments to recognize
each other and agree to a common solution for the region.
52
.
Meanwhile, though, officials like Frasure doubted that the' Administration was
willing to risk what would be necessary for peace. His negotiations with Milosevic had
Jed him to believe that the Serbian President's asking price was far higher than the U.S.
was willing to pay. On June 23, he circulated his thoughts to senior State Department
officials, suggesting grimly that the most prudent course for the Administration was to
Uwrite off the Bosnfa policy.',s3 Frasure's memorandum pulled no punches, arguing that
"over the last three years, we have handled this extraordinarily difficult issue ineptly.
Within the Administration there have been competing policies on Bosnia ... we have not
imposed upon ourselves discipline, choice or prioritizing." Echoing Albright, Frasure
argued that as the events on the ground that summer flowed uincreasingly out of our
control," the u.S. "unfortunately no longer cali muddle through." The UN's top political
Jeadership, French and British were signaling that unless things got better fast, they
w ~ n t e d UNPROFOR out -- once they did so, the 40 1 04 "doomsday machine" would start.
With events spinning out of control. Frasure argued, the Administration had no good
options. The only choice to make, in Frasure's memorable phrase, was about ''which
waterfall" it wanted to go over.
54
Observing that "a lingering death" of Bosnia was not in the U.S. best interests,
Frasure argued that the Administration's main priority should be the "avoidance of a
substantial U.S. military- presence in Bosnia, in particular in the extraction of
UNPROFOR, which could lead to casualties and would highlight the reality that we're at
the end of a failed adventure." Frasure suggested a focus on extracting UNPROFOR as
quickly and painlessly as possibleS
5
; forestalling any more American diplomatic missions
n Peter Tam off interview, October 23, 1996; Jim Steinberg interview, August 20, 1996. See memorandum
for Secretary Cbristopher from Steinberg, untitled, May 1995, SIP files.
S} See memorandum faxed to Strobe Talbott. "Bosnia," June 23, 1995. All quotes below are from this
memorandum unless otherwise noted.
~ Chris Hill phone interview with author (notes), December t9, 1996. See also Rosegrant,pl3. 55
-
Frasure had always felt that the RRF was meaningless and UNPROFOR was a "dead duck" and would -
be gone by fall. In this memorandum, he asserted that with UN PROFOR delerioration irreversible, "the
Rapid Reaclion Force should be secn in that lighL We will be scrambling to pay for a force Ihal cannot.
UNCLASSIFIED
13
UNCLAssiFiED
(while allowing' the European negotiator Carl Bildt to push the diplomacy as far as it
would take him -- which, in the view of most U.S. officials, was probably nowhere);
hanging tough on no lift of the arms embargo; pursuing a modest "covert" program to
arm the Bosnians; and emphasizing containment of the conflict
Frasure conceded that the President could gain little by this approach, but it would
minimize the political ~ d foreign policy disaster that might follow if the Administration
fell over another part of the waterfall -- and was sucked into the Balkan whirlpool via
40104 .. "There will be no credit for any of us in this one," Frasure gloomily concluded.
"[The policy] is beyond redemption now and should be brought to an end before the 1996
presidential campaign commences. Otherwise we will be handing a sharp sword to this
Administration's political opponents next year. And we can expect they will use i C ~
As Frasure circulated his memorandmn, Steinberg worked on his own thoughts for
a new diplomatic strategy. He beJieved that there was still hope to salvage U.S. policy.
Drawing on his earlier can for an international conference, Steinberg tried to develop a
plan on how to get there. Steinberg's proposal, circulated to Holbrooke. Frasure, Tamoff;
and Christopher's Chief of Staff Tom Donilon, hoped to combine .negotiations based on
the Contact Group proposal with the sanctions relief-mutual recognition package Frasure
had discussed with Milosevic. Such an approach would, Steinberg argued, bring together
what had been two separately pursued tracks of previous u.s. initiatives in order to
include both Pale and Croatia in the package. The core of the plan was a Presidential
sUmmit where the three Balkan Presidents would recognize each other and agree on a set
of principles to govern negotiations among the Pale and Sarajevo leaders. In return for
Milosevic recognizing his neighbors and bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating
table, the Serbian President would receive some sanctions relief. By combining intra-
Bosnian negotiations with a regional settlemen4 Steinberg hoped to create broader
incentives for the parties to reach agreement. Although Steinberg was not sure his plan
would work, his memorandum reflected the emerging consensus within the
Administration that something new must be done to catalyze the diplomatic process. 56
The Frasure and Steinberg proposals came together after the Department's top
officials met in the office. of the Secretary of State em June 30. This was the first official
meeting of the group that had met at Talbott's house several weeks before. The
discussion focused on amendments to. Steinberg'S initiative, and Frasure offered his
analysis of the situation as well.
s
, The next day, Frasure drafted a new memorandum to
the Secretary proposing an amended version of Steinberg'S paper.58 From a more
optimistic perspective,. Frasure explained that "we probably have one more roll of the
. diplomatic dice." He sought to simplify the Steinberg package by dropping Croatia from
the mutual recognition agreement and installing Milosevic as the negotiator for Pale.
Frasure's amendments avoided the complications of bringing Milosevic to concede
Eastern Slavonia (which would be the prerequisite for his recognizing Croatia) and of
convincing the Bosnian Government to negotiate with the madmen of Pale. Frasure
suggested that in return for Milosevic's assista1?ce, the Contact Group should be more
indeed will not, be allowed to attempt to reverse the deterioration in the UN role . [The RRF} is chapter
one on UNPROFOR withdrawal."
56 "A Diplomatic Initiative for ex-Yugo," no date.
$7 Steinberg interview.
$' See memorandum from Frasure to Christopher, "Bosnia - Choosing Which Waterfall We Will Go
Over:' July I. 1995.
14
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
as &
flexible on sanctions relief, willing to lift the sanctions if necessary. rather than simply
suspend them.
59
As a final note, Frasure reiterated his strong view that the
Administration end its ad hoc approach toward Balkan policy -- "If we decide that the
crisis has now come and at all cost we must avoid.UNPROFOR departurel40104 and we
need a diglomatic solution, then we must make that choice, impose discipline and stay the
course.,,6 ..
This Steinberg-Frasure hybrid proposal was raised by Secretary Christopher in a
July 6 "Night Note" to the President. In one sense, this "Night Note" was the
doc!J.ll'ientary culmination oftbe State Department's policy reformulation effort over the
past few weeks.
61
Chiistopher wrote that after Bildes run with MiJosevic failed (as
Frasure predicted it would), the Europeans would likely ask the U.S. to get involved.
Then, the Administration oould respond with this new diplomatic initiative, increasing
the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and providing "a plausible basis for urging that
UNPROFOR should stay the course.'s62
earlier sentiment that the Administration's main priority should be
avoiding a significant military ground presence in Bosnia reflected the views of many on
the State Department's Seventh floor. From the perspective of officials outside State,
panicularly at the NSC, the Secretary and his top advisors were too cautious to support
U.s. troops in Bosnia - whether to help UNPROFOR withdraw or irnpfement a peace
agreernent.
63
As Frasure's references to the 1996 elections suggest. the Secretary was not
convinced that the American people would support such a move. In the July 6 "Night
Note". the Secretary revealed that his main concern with the "failure lay in
limiting U.S. costs in the event of an UNPROFOR withdrawal mission.
"I think you need a Wider variety of options than now provided by NATO
Operation Plan with its heavy reliance on large numbers of U.S. ground troops,"
the Secretary wrote. "With all respect for the NATO planners, the 'all or nothirig'
character of 40104 does not seem to me to take into account the wide of
circumstances in which withdrawal may actually take place - or the strength of public
and congressional opinion against the commitment of U.S. ground troops." Christopher
felt that the military's 40104 planning was not "sufficiently nuanced; that it was an all-or-
nothing He was troubled by the fact that 40104 "assumed that the NATO
troops would have to fight their way in and fight theirway OUt. [it] assumed the need
basically to occupy the country in order to assure [UNPROFOR} withdrawal." Whereas
the SecretaJ:y of State understood that the U.S. was committed to 40104, he felt that it
"was the worst of all possible choices," as the U.S. "would have to put its troops on the
$9 In his June 23 memorandum, Frasure had suggested that the US remain "alert for a chance to cut a deaJ
with Milosevic some will see it as a craven deal. That will be a less awful waterfall than 40104. But we
will need to make a conscious decision to do this and stop our posturing visavis Milosevic." .
66 In a on Frasure's memorandum. Peter Tamoff wrote 10 the Secretary that "we now need a
more systematic review of the components of an lzetbegovic-Milosevic deal for mutual recognition. as
well as oflhe nature of the Bosnian settlement. We should make every effort to launch the strategy with
the UK, France and Gennanyby the end of the coming w.eek."
61 "Night Notes" were frequently used by Secretary Chrislopher as a way to communicate directly and
often infonnally to the President; typically to raise a specific topic Or two. These were sometimes used in
the fonn of trip reports to the President from the Secretary.
62 Memorandum for the President from Secretary Christopher, "Night Note," July 6, J 995. Vershbow
explains that the proposal did not go very far, and was never pursued fonnally after this.
Vershbow interview. July 23,1996; Bass interview. .
UNCLASSIFIED
15
2
ground to crown a failure and not to achieve a success." 64 President Clinton apparently saw some merit in Christopher's suggestion for more options, as he scribbled "agree" in the margins arid passed the memorandum to his National Security Advisor to take
action.
65
.
The Fall of Srebrenica
While worked to reformulate its diplomacy, Bosnia seemed to slip further away. On July 6, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) began its assault on the eastern Bosnian UN safe area of Srebrenica. The tiqy enclave, located just miles away from the Serbian border, was home .to 40,000 Bosnian Muslims, many of them refugees who had fled there when the Serbs expelled them from their homes in eastern Bosnia. In Api"ir 1993, the United Nations had declared the town and its surroundings a "safe area," which implied that a tiny garrison of Dutch peacekeepers would help protect the refugees from Serb attack. But as the Bosnian Serbs began to close in on the enclave, it soon became clear there was little the Dutch could do. by themselves. The Western Allies hoped that the Serb assault would only shrink: the enclave. not overrun it entirely, but Serb artillery and annor continued to press on the few remaining defenders o( the enclave. The UN soldiers quickly abandoned their observation posts and fled to their base at nearby Potocari. At the last moment, the UN called in NATO close air support, but by this point there was little that could be done. While NATO planes.destroyed two Serb tanks, on
July 11 the Serb forces overtook the town, driving out tens of thousands of refugees and takinAmany more captive - and, as it later came to light, murdering thousands of Muslim
men.
This crisis seemed to hammer the near-final nail in the coffin for the West's Bosnia
policy, highlighting even more for U.s. decision-makers the need to act. Humiliated once
again. the UN began to talk openly of a pullout.
67
The fallout from the debacle -- a
refugee crisis and possible UN withdrawal':" would almost certainly weaken the already
feeble Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia.
68
The .... U.s. sent their Charge in Belgrade, Rudolph Perina, to see Milosevic. The Serb leader was unrepentant, responding to Perina's demarche with a "why blame .me?" attitude, implying he. had no influence
64 See July 6 Night Note; and Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
.
65 The State Department may have done some "priming" ofits own with this memorandum. In a note to
the Secretary offering editorial changes on .he night note, Deputy Secretary Talbott suggested that on
40104, they emphasize the danger-- which Talbott wrote was "acutely on the President's mind" - that the
plan may result in a large number of casualties and a possible quagmire. See nole to the Secretary from
Talbott, no date, cover of draft night note. Despite the President's interest, there is no evidence that the
Pentagon began to explore other planning options; however, Christopher later noted that the "night notes
may have been a spur to energize [the President] to tJy to find a different . See Christopher
interview, October 22, 1996.
.
66 For background, see Honig and Both, pp 1-48; Silber and Little. pp345-36I. See Samantha Power, "Bosnian Serbs Seize 'Safe Area'; Fan ofSrebrenica Enclave Challenges
Prompts WamingsofPullouC," Washington Post, July 12; 1995.
.
61 The Muslim-Croat Federation was the result ofa cease-fire between Bosnian Croat and Muslim forces
and a renewed commitment to restore an alliance between the two sides. This deal, formally inaugurated at
a March 2, 1994 White House ceremony. had been the result of diligent brokering by us officials over the
previous six months. See Memo to Secretary Christopher from Holbrooke, "Srebrenica: Implications for
the Federation," July 19. 1995; and Silber and Little, Chapter 25
16

UNCLASSIFIED
with the Bosnian Serbs.
69
Although it was never proven that Milosevic was involved in
supporting the .assault on the safe area, his attitude only amplified the inadequacy of
Western policy.70 .
As the Bosnian Serb Army began to round up Muslim men and boys and forcibly
deport Muslim women, Western leaders scrambled to figure out how to respond. The
Bosnian Serbs. in perhaps their most flagrant violation of the war, had not simply
challenged the UN mission, they had run right through it. Soon after Srebrenica fell,
another Safe area, Zepa" appeared next. The UN guarantees to protect the enclaves had
proved as the Serbs captured territory right under the. eyes of UN observers.
Now the peacekeepers were forced to be participants in ethnic cleansing, assisting in the
deportation of women, children, and the elderly, in the hope that their presence might
help curb some of the atrocities seen earlier in the war. But as the West would soon xmd
out, the UN presence did little even of that.
French President Chirac responded to the crisis on July 13. with a bold and
somewhat unrealistic proposal to lead the U.S. and other Western Allies in a massive
military intervention to retake the safe area from the Serbs?' In a call to President
Clinton, Chirae said that "the fall of Srebrenica, the probable faU of Zepa tomorrow ?Dd
the threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the UN, NATO and all democracies."
Chirae's proposal amounted to an all-or-nothing approach - either the Allies throw "all
of their forces in the effort" to restore Srebrenica or they pull-out entirely.72. The
initiative itself made little military sense; even if the costs of such an operation were
worth it, it was far from clear what the next step would be. President Clinton
urged Chirae to think more seriously about protecting Gorazde and, importantly, consider
laying out the rules of engagement between the UN and NATO to protect the enclaves.
After t1;te call, Cliriton reacted with incredulity to his aides: "Can you believe he
proposed that? Then what do we do? Do we go out and then they take it back? Or
should we take over the whole country?,,73
As Clinton spoke with British Prime Minister John Major and Gennan Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, they wondered aloud whether the French President was serious, or whether
he was simply bluffing to capture the moral high ground. knowing the other Allies would
69 "Demarche to Mifosevie on Srebrenica," Cable, Belgrade 3374, July 12, ]995. The attitude displayed
that day by the Serb leader was classie Milosevie. former Ambassador Warren Zimmennann has observed
that of Milosevic's character traits, a common one was "the pains be took to avoid direct responsibility for
aggressive actions." See Origins ora Catastropb!(, p125.
70
"Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and French Presl ent acques rrae,
July 13, 1995,"NSCmemorandum,July [7, 1995.
n In retrospect, Chirac' s proposal was previewed three days before in a July 10 meeting in Paris with US
Ambassador Harriman and visiting Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. During this discussion. Chirac
lamented that nothing had happened since the decision to deploy the RRF - "things have to change." See
"Chirae's views on Bosnia," Cable. Paris 16415, July 11: 1995; and "French Views on Bosnia," Cable.
Paris 16445, July II, 1995. In an even earlier conversation with Secretary Christopher, French Foreign
Minister de Charette had likened the current situation to the February 1994 pre-NATO ultimatum period
when UNPROFOR was unable to ensure either peace or the safety of humanitarian convoys into Sarajevo.
See "The Secretary and French Foreign Minister De Charette, July 5, 1995," Cable, State 160553, July 6,
1995.
71 Vershbow interview, July 23, ) 996.
I7
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
stand in the way of such an action.
74
Chairman of tlie Joint Chiefs of Staff Genera1 John
Shalikashvili's conversations with a French counterpart seemed to confinn the latter
view, as French military planners looked beyond Srebrenica to discuss defending the safe
area of Gorazde. But while Chirae's plan might not be the answer, the Allies recognized
they had to do something. On July 14, John Major invited the Contact Group,
and other UN contributors to meet in London the next week. 75
.
Some U.S. officials initially had "mixed feelings" about this idea. Although
Christopher saw this as a "bolder step than [Major} had ever taken," there was some
skepticism that such large, multiIater;:i1 gatherings produced more rhetoric than substance .
. Nevertheless, the Administration decided to accept Major's offer. In doing so, they set
out aggressively to shape what the Allies would agree to at the meeting.
76
As a they
would have to stop blaming each other for their failures.
77
If the West were to come
together and fail to take resolute action. the Allies would once again appear to be fiddling
as Bosnia burned. Yet it was not clear that a consensus would be easily forged. The
French had backed down from their earlier proposal of retaking Srebrenica but were now
arguing for reinforcing UNPROFOR troops in the enclave of Gorazde. - Such a move
would require the United States to use its helicopters to transport 1,000 French
peacekeepers into the enclave through potentially hostile fire. The American military
found this proposal "defective for a variety of reasons.,,78 It would Ilkely result in
American casualties, would force NATO to bomb Serb air defenses in a preemptive
strike. and would not dramatically improve the ability of the enclave to hold out against
Serb anuor and artillery. From Chirac's perspective, the military significance of the act
was not as important as the political gesture. Such a bold move would demonstrate the
West's determination to stand by that safe area.
U.S. officials agreed that they needed to draw a line hold it against further Serb
attacks if they were going to restore any credibility to the UN mission. The overrunning
of Srebrenica, Secretary of Defense Perry believed. presented the U.s. and Europe with a
dichotomous choice: "we reached a point where you either have to declare the UN
mission a failure and pull it out o( there, or you have to be prepared to take strong
military action." Perry and Shalikashvili determined that the only way to stop the
Bosnian Serbs was to threaten them with overwhelming military force. The President
7. Chirae apparently also discussed this with the Bosnians. On July 13, Bosnian PM Haris Silajdzie called
Secretary Christopher to urge that the US support Chirae's proposal, and that protection was needed for
Zepa and Gorazde. See "The Secretary and Bosnian PM SiJajdzic:' Cable, State 169976, July 15, ] 995.
7S See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl ofGennany. July 13,1995). NSC
memorandum. July 15, ]995; and "Telephone Conversation Between UK Prime Minister Major and
President Clinton. July 14. 1995," Cable, State J 75869, July 22. 1995. Clinton and Major also discussed
the possibility that Congress would lift the arms embargo with enough votes to override a veto. "This issue
has me in a fun-house," the President told Major. "Our citizens have good motives. Compassion and neo-
isolationism are leading to support for lifting the arms embargo. They don't want our soldiers there, but
they badmouth Ihe UN and want to give them rums."
See Tamoff interview; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
11 Secretary Christopher said as much 10 his British counterpart, Malcolm Rifkind, during a July 15 phone
call to discuss London. See "The Secretary and British Foreign Secretary RiIkind," C"ble. State 171422,
July 17. 1995.
" As explained by Christopher, see October 22. 1996 interview.
18
UNCLASSIFIED
ONCLXIPllin
ST
concurred, also convinced that the Serbs only understood power. "The only time
ever been effective is when the NATO air threat has been credible," he said.
79
Accordingly, Perry suggested that the goal of should be to present a clear ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs -- "don't even think about going into Gorazde or any other safe areas. If you do, you will be met by a massive air campaign. Not a bomb or two, not a pinprick, but a massive air campaign." To defend the safe areas, Perry argued, they would have to change the rules of engagement. NATO had to be empowered to conduct operations without the UN the system which required UN civilian
approval for use of NATO air power in Bosnia.
8o
..
While the Administration worked on refining its position to defend the remaining
safe areas, the NSC continued on another track to deVelop a longer-term diplomatic strategy to find a way out of the Balkan morass. The President was growing increasingly anxious with the situation; frustrated that his policy was "stuck in a rut." Understanding
. the President's frustration, Lake briefed Clinton on the details of the "endgame" strategy
paper that the staff bad been developing since late June. He showed him a draft of the paper he planned to present at a July 17 Foreign Policy Team breakfast. To add some
drama to the proceedings, Lake asked the President to the morning meeting. 81 The morning of July 17, Christopher. Shalikashyili, Albright and Berger
went to Lake's West Wmg office for the breakfast meeting. presentation
surprised most of the other Principals, whose minds were focused upon the current
Srebrenica crisis and upcoming London conference. Albright expressed her support for
the draft. yet Christopher, Perry and Shalikashvili were skeptical. The strategy risked
drawing the United States .furtller into the conflict, and its provisions on aiding the
Bosnians militarily might further strain relations among the Allies.
82
As Lake planned, the President entered the room and took a seat as his advisors
discussed the document. He spoke briefly, telling his advisors that the present course was
not sustainable, although' he was not sure what to do. He repeated his earlier thought that
to regain leverage, the U.S. had to restore the credibility of NATO airpower. Clinton left
the meeting, and the Principals finished their discussions. Lake asked the other agencies
to prepare their own thoughts on the direction of Bosnia policy. In a few weeks, he said,
they would submit a series of papers to the President in order to develop those
ideas into a new diplomatic initiative . .l
The heart of the NSC's July 17 endgame paper was the risks the U.s. should. be
willing to run in the event that a diplomatic settlement faiJed.
84
If UNPROFOR
withdrew, it argued, the U.S. should insist on a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo or
else. assist the Bosnians through a covert arms program. The U.S. 'should also supply
79 Perry interview, January 13,1997; Vershbow interview,July 23, 1996; Woodward, pp260-61.
S(} Perry interview. The two principal documents underlying the concept are: UN Security
Council Resolution 836, approved June 4, 1993. which authorized the possible use of aiTStrikes 10 support
UNPROFOR's mission; and the August 9 "Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
on 9th August 1993," which approved the operational details for such strikes. The August 9th decision.
eroclaimed that only the UN Secretary General could authorize "the first use of air power in the theater."
I Vershbow interview, July 23, 1996; Woodward, p261.
.
&2 Atop the State Department's copy ofthe Lake draft is Talbott's handscribbled notation: "Sec, Perry.
Shali don't like, Tony and Mad do," See Talbott interview, July 30, J996.
JJ Vershbow interview, July 23,1996; Bass interview; Woodward. p261.
14 "Bosnia Endgame Strategy." NSC memorandum, July 17, 1995.

a
UNCLASSIFIED
19
UNCLASSIFIED
military advisors to train the Bosnians. The aim would be to level the playing field in
Bosnia, to help the Bosnians gain by force of anns roughly what the Contact Group map
had promised them on the negotiating table. To this end, the Americans would be
prepared to support NATO air strikes against the Serbs, but for a limited time. Once the
playing field was leveled, the Bosnians would be on their own. For the
proposal outlined that it was time for him to put up or shut up - any relief from sanctions
would be predicated on his recognition of Bosnia and curbing military support for Pale.
IfMilosevic cOoperated. the U:S. would increase the rewards offered. Suchan approach
entailed a level of commitment from the White House -- and a degree of risk -. that the
Frasure/Steinberg proposal at State did not. At the same time. it provided the Serbs with .
new incentives -- both positive and negative - to negotiate.
The London Conference
Meanwhile, the Administration continued to grapple with the more immediate
problem of the London conference that Prime Minister Major had organized for July 21.
Along with the NSC strategy paper, Lake had presented at the ] 7 meeting an. NSC
options paper discussing how to respond to the French proposal to reinforce Gorazde.
8S
General ShalikashviIi had already met with the French and British chiefs <}f staff on July
16 to discuss options on how to respond to the Serb offensive; the three proposals he took
home from London were 1) the French idea of deploying 1000 reinforcements lifted by
U.S. helicopters and supported by air power; 2) the U.S. proposal of a NATO rigorous air
campaign minus the problematic UN dual-key" decision-making system; or, 3) the
British inclination to preserve the status quo. S6 The military officials did not reach any
consensus, but the French repeated their detennination to make a stand at Gorazde. At the
July 17 breakfast meeting, Lake presented a revised version of these options, excluding
the British proposal. Significantly both options envisaged a more robust air campaign to
protect the safe areas. They decided to discuss these ideas in more detail the next day _
At a breakfast meeting on July 18. the Principals debated these options further.
Vice President AI Gore made an impassioned appeal to urge the President not to
"acquiesce to genocide."s7 The L\dministration could not ignore the horrible images from
Srebrenica, Gore argued passionately. Throughout the U.s., the press had featured a
photo of a young girl. who had hung herself from a tree rather than face the harrowing
fate of the displaced from Srebrenica. Although there was little the Americans could do
to protect the tiny enclave of Zepa, which was now coming under Serb assault, they could
not write off the 65.000 Bosnians of Gorazde. The French proposal, while dramatic. was
too risky - it seemed to set-up a situation ominously close to a past French debacle, Dien
Bien Phu. Instead, the Principals decided formally to push at London the policy of
introducing a decisive, broad air campaign in defense of Gorazde. with preemptive strikes
against enemy air defenses (SEAD, in Pentagonese) and no dual key. This decision set
the stage for the robust new position that was in fact adopted three days later in London.
88
IS "Options Paper: Positioo on French Request for in Defense of Gorazde," NSC memorandum,
July 17, 1995.
. .
!Ii On Sarajevo, Shalikashvili recommended more aggressive air options to reduce the shelling. "CHODs
Meeting in London," memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, July 16, 1995.
17 Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996; Woodward, p262.
U Vershbow interview, July 23. 1996. The Principals had discussed this at the breakfast meeting the day
before, but badn't made a finn decision until July 18. Some at Stale felt that if the Allies could not agree
20
b
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
I
The President understood that such a decision had implicatioris beyond Bosnia; namely, it would shape America's relationship with Europe and role in the post-Cold War world. U.S. credibility, both within the NATO alliance and throughout the international
community. would be on the line. Moreover, the credibility and solidarity of the entire Atlantic alliance was at stake -- if Europe and the U.S. couldn't bring peace to a conflict in their own backyard, what could they do? "The issue was not taking some [UN]
peacekeepers hostage," Secretary Perry recalled, "the issue is taking the whole policy of the international community hostage." Albright said that the U.s. had to be finn with its Allies, almost presenting them with afail accompli. "We need to tell them this is i t / ~ she said. Agreeing, the President told his advisors that they would "need to press the UK and
French to go our way. The U:S. tan't be a punching bag anymore."S?
The Americans bad made a decision; now they needed to get their Allies on board.9i> In a conference call that day, Christopher spoke with the foreign ministers of Spain and Germany, who shared his concern with the "potentially disastrous outcome" of
non-agreement in London.
91
Everyone recognized that they needed to come to a consensus; the Americans' sought to convince their Allies that the U.S. plan was the only
realistic option. The next morning, July 19, Clinton spoke with Chirae in an effort to
convince the French President to support the U.S. approach. "We propose issuing a clear
warning to Bosnian Serbs that any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a
sustained air campaign that will actually cripple their military capability," the President
told Chirac. This strategy would modify the dual-key in order to take the veto out of the
hands of the UN civilian leaders, who had been feckless in responding to Serb
provocations in the past .
. Chirae, however,' expressed concern with the American proposal. The
peacekeepers already on the ground were too vulnerable. "The minute we attack .. they [Bosnian Serbs] will retaliate by taking hostages or attacking with massive artillery."
Clinton responded that Chirac's'point was moot - any French reinforcements would be
just as vulnerable as the troops already there. Prior to any air campaign, UNPROFOR
would have to restructure itselfby moving troops out of vulnerable areas. And the Serbs
might seize on that time to attack Gorazde or Sarajevo, capturing one of the enclaves
before NATO could start bombing. Although they could not reach an agreement, the two presidents ended their conversation by agreeing to talk with their military advisors and
consult eaeh other the next day. 92
.
to the air option: then the UN should withdraw from Bosnia. See memorandum to Secretary Christopher
from Holbrooke (draft), "Options," July 17, 1995. At NATO, discussions had been underway since June
on possible actions, including a more robust air campaign. to restore the Alliancc's credibility and show
the parties that the Allies were serious; see John Feeley interview, September 26, 1996. t9 Perry interview; Vershbow interview, September26, 1996.
. 90 To this end, State Department aides drew up a sixteen point Ugameplan" for lobbying (as would be
expected, very few events coincided with the plan). See "Game Plan," no date, COS files. 91 "Secretary's Conversation with Spanish FM Solana and.German FM Kinkel. July 18, 1995," Cable, State
) 73739, July 20, 1995. Whether bluff or not, Christopher told Kinkeltbat he was so concerned that
London may end in deadlock, he was having second thoughts about attending and asked ifit would be
r:ossible to cancel the meeting (Kinkel said no).
2 "French President Chirac and President Clinton, July 19, 1995," NSC memorandum, July 19, 1995.
After this call, Foreign Min ister de Charette followed up with Christopher. Their conversation proved no
more fruitful. See "The Secretary and FM De Charette, July 19, 1995," Cable, State 174561, July21 ,
1995.
2
21
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLXsIF'IB
The Americans fared somewhat better with the British, perhaps because Her
Majesty's Government feared the French proposal more than the American one. After
getting off the phone Chirac, Clinton called the British Prime Minister. The President
briefed hilll on his conversation with Chirae, and Major responded that he agreed that the
French proposal was too risky. The British would likely support tlie American plan,
which Major said was the best one on the table. Both presidents realized that such a.
strategy was itself a gamble. Nevertheless, Clinton said. "it is better to go out with a
bang than with a whimper; otherwise we go out with ourraH between our legs.>' Major
insisted that they not go down the. military route "one-legged," without a plan Tor a
political settlement. With the current diplomatic policy review likely in mind" the
President agreed that "jf we make a bold military .thrust, we should accompany it with a
bold diplomatic inhiative.,,93
.
Christopher continued his talks with.the allied foreign ministers. The Dutch wer.e
particularly concerned by the London conference. because their 308 peacekeepers were
still" being held near Srebrenica. Their foreign minister, Hans van Mierlo, spoke with
Christopher on July 19 and 20. urging him to prevent the Allies.from taking a strong
position until the Dutch peacekeepers were out of hann's way.94 . By July 20, the Allies
began coalescing around the U.S. plan. That morning. the British formally decided to
support the U.S ..
9S
That afternoon, Chirae called and spoke with Clinton at the White
House.
96
"I am still against airstrikes." the French President said. "But I will not oppose
them. What is essential is to draw a red.1ine around Gorazde and then make sure it is
respected." Though the French had strong reservations with the American plan, they
would back it. "If everyone agrees with your solution and they all agree to reject my
solution, then obviously I won't oppose it because I don't want to take the responsibility
of having tomorrow's conference fail," Chirae said.
97
In London, the U.S. delegation was "pleasantly surprised" at the degree of outrage
and detennination among the Europeans: ' ~ t h e y were at" a point where they too were ready
to admit that the situation was unsustainable ... and that they would be willing to sustain
some greater risk." Nevertheless,' the outcome of London was not assured. French
Foreign Minister de Charette continued to press the French proposal, and he and
93 "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and British Prime Minister Major, .
July 19, 1995:' NSC memorandum, July 20, 1995.
94 See "The s.ecretary's Conversation with Dutch FM Van Mierlo," Cable (draft), July 19,1995; and July
20.1995.
9-' This came with official approval from John Major's cabinet, after a day of talks on Jury 19 in
Washington between visiting British Foreign Secretary Rifkiod and US officials. The UK and the US "Were
already very close on the key issues; and these talks fleshed out some of the detaifs. See UK memorandum
to Christopher, Lake, Tarnoffand Holbrooke from UK Ambassador Sir Robin Renwick,. July 18, 1995.
96 "Memorandum of the President's Conversation with President Chime, July 20, 1995," NSC
memorandum, July 21, 1995. Clinton had also talked with Bosnian President lzetbegovic, to whom he
reassured tbat the US would work bard at London to secure an agreement on airstrikes and elimination of
the dual key. See "Presidential Telephone Call with Bosllian President lzetbegovic, July 20, 1990," Cable,
State 180778, July 28, 1995.
'!T1 Chirac's reluctant support was io contrast to de Charette's message to Christopher earfierthat day.
During a phone call. the French Foreign Minister told the Secretary that he was skeptical that the US plan
would work, and that the "conferees [at London] were unlikely to agree on !he means but at least agree on
the objectives." See "Secretary's Conversation with Foreign Minister de Charette,.July 20,199'5," Cable
(draft),July21,1995.
22

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
6 I
Christopher had several shaxp exchanges.
98
On two occasions, John Major crune to
Lancaster House and privately told Christopher that the meeting might break down. "I
cant, hold this together," the Prime Minister said. After hours of tense debate skillfully-
and in the eyes of U.S. officials. heIpfully--chaired by Malcolm Rifkind, the meeting
achieved consen"sus.
99
As Christopher announced to the press, the six. central
accomplishments of the conference were: 1) unanimous reaffinnation that UNPROFOR
would remain in Bosnia; 2) commitment to defend Gorazde with NATO air power; 3)
RRF actions to stabilize the situation around Sarajevo; 4) support for on-going efforts to
address humanitarian needs; 5) reaffirmation of the desire for a diplomatic settlement;
and 6) steps by UNPROFOR to minimize the vulnerability of its troops. lOG .
Despite such consensus. the results of London did not come without some tough
negotiating.
I01
Although the French and British presidents had backed the Amc;rican'
proposal, their subordinates restated :their lingering doubts as Christopher, Peny, and
Shalikashvili articulated their plan. 'The closer the Europeans to bombing, the more
nervous they get," Secretary Christopher later told the President. 02 Surprisingly,
the Russians, who in principle opposed airstrikes against the Serbs, .did not undermine the
consensus at the meeting. <.'The Russians were not as distant from our position as I
feared," Secretary Perry reported to the President. Russian Defense Minister Grachev did
argue against' airstrikes on military grounds (asserting that they would not deter the
Bosnian Serbs), but he agreed on the basic consensus at London. Perry recalled that "'I
had a long discussion with Grachev, and got some very positive statements from him
[that] we could not let the Bosnian Serbs continue to attack, to violate safe havens; and
the alternative, which was pulling the UN forces out, was unacceptable to them."I03 The
Russians did, however, block the Allies from producing a signed statement (as was
standard diplomatic/practice) from the talks. Instead, the results from London were
announced publicly by John Major in a Statement."I04 .
The conference delegates agreed to the American proposal on Gorazde -- any
confinned attack on the safe area would be met with a "substantial and decisive
u
air
_ campaign. Unlike past NATO strikes, the Allies would not respond with limited
prick" attacks on small targets; they would respond disproportionately with a broad
campaign throughout Bosnia. Although not announced specifically. it was understood
that the dual-key would be modified to remove UN civilian officials :- Secretary General
9J This was the first encounter that Christopher had with de Charette, and he traces their subsequent
troubled relationship to this first difference. As they part company in London, de Charette bitterly told
Christopher that he was going home "without a victory." .
" Tamoff interview.
100 See "The.lntemational Conference on Bosnia: Now We Must Act," Secretary Christopher's press
remarks, July 21, 1995, US Department of State Dispatch, July 24. 1995.
101 Steinberg interview. Along with the Gorazde issue, representatives at London were to discuss Bihac,
the potential for UNPROFOR withdrawal, humanitarian relief efforts, and progress on the Bildt diplomatic
track. See memorandum to the Secretary througb Peter Tamoff from Holbrooke. "Your Participation in
the London Ministerial on Bosnia, July 21, 1995: Scope Paper," July 19, 1995.
IG2 This was during a July 22 meeting with the President to brief him on London results. Christopher was
joined by ShalikashviJi, Lake, Berger and Tamoff. See Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996.
103 See Perry's memorandum to the President, "Special Defense Report -- London Conference," July 21
. 1995; Perry interview.
JI)( See Tamoffinterview; for Major's statement, see "International Meeting on Bosnia, Lancaster House.
London, Friday. 21 July 1995: 'Chainnan's Statement."
r
UNCLASSIFIED
23
UNCLASSIFIED
....,..
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his special civilian representative Yasusi Akashi - from
vetoing the strikes. To emphasize the gravity of these decisions. American, French, and
British military commanders would travel to the Balkans to deliver the ultimatum directly
to Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. 105
The most troublesome issue at the conference came as the assembled diplomats
considered how NATO would sustain the airstrikes in the face of Serh-hostage taking.
While the United States argued vehemently that they could not respond to terror, the fact
that U,S. ground troops were not endangered weakened the force of the American
argument. But ultimately. the group, in the words of Secretary Perry, "swallowed hard"
and accepted the American position, but many hoped the Serbs would never have a
chance to test the Conference's resolve. The second sticking point was the Americans'
desire to apply these rules, later known as the "Gorazde rules," to the remaining safe
areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla(all that Zepa, which was then under attack,
was indefensible). Although no final decision was reached at the the
representatives decided that the NAC would consider expanding the rules as they
hammered out the. details of the agreement in the coming days.
With the threat of comprehensive and robust airstrikeS conveyed, the U.S.
considered the London conference an important accomplishment. Indeed, in retrospect,
Perry Christopher and Shalikashvili refer to London as the "turning point" for the
international community's approach toward Bosnia. To Perry, the Bosnian Serbs had
"overplayed their hand" with the Srebrenica attack; "their strategic judgment that the
international community did not have the will to use military force led them to an action
that [was) so egregious it actually stiffened the backbone of the international
community." Decision-makers at London weren't certain whether'their ultimatum would
successfully deter theSerbs. and realized that any niilitary action would not be risk-free,
"but they just believed that the potential negative consequences of [ military action] could
not be as serious as the consequences of sending NATO forces to pull out the UN forces
in disgrace.,,106 .
.
"The conference was a turning point," reflected. UAt that stage, the whole
international communi!?; said yes ... either we pull out the UN force or we reinforce it with
strong military action." 07
Possibly, with such a signal of resolve, the Allies would see a response at the
negotiating table. But the more fundamental problems remained. <41 fear we are sailinga
course between Scylla and Charydbis," Perry wrote to the President. if the Allies
succeeded in deterring an attack on Gorazde, the London decisions guaranteed neither the
survival of UNPROFOR nor a peaceful resolution to the Bosnian conflict. "We have
avoided disaster for the moment, but we are lurching toward another," Peny continued.
"Our hope is that the momentum from this course change will carry us into a period of
calm where we can bring diplomatic efforts to play."I08 Formulating such an effort was
to be the next great challenge for poJicymakers in Washington.
lOS For readout on the meetings, see Perry's July 21 memorandum to the President; Christopher, Albright.
Tamoff, and Hunter interviews.
106 Perry interview; Perry memorandum to the President, July 21, 1995.
107 Perry interview.
101 See Perry memorandum to the President, July 21,1995. For another readout of London, see talking
points prepared for Congress, "London Meeting on Bosnia," NSC memorandum. July 22, 1995.
24
&
UNCLASSIFIED
..
UNCLASSIflED
Chapter Two
Through the Window of Opportunity:.
The Endgame Strategy
On July 23, two days after the London conference, U.S. Air Force General James
Jamerson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel, accompanied by a
British Air Force Marshall and a French General traveled to Belgrade to meet Bosnian
Serb General Ratko . Mladic and personally deliver the London ultimatum. The
commander of the Bosnian Serb forces had masterminded the Serb assault on Srebrenica
and Zepa I Two days after this meeting, Mladic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic were indicted by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal for genocide ..
The Allied military delegation was met in Serbia with a much warmer welcome
than they had expected. Mladic had planned a fonnal dinner and had made
. accommodations for them to spend the night Realizing that such an invitation was at
odds with the sharp message they had come to deliver, the delegation declined. When
they finally saw Mladic, it seemed as though he did not know why they had come -- he
greeted them wannly. as comrades in anus. As the British chaired the London
conference, Air Chief delivered the message to the Bosnian Serb leader: The Serbs
must understand what will happen if they attack Gorazde. NATO will launch a
comprehensive air attack. and no military targets would be exempted. Mladic must not
mistake their focus on Gorazele for a lack of concern with the other safe areas, added U;S.
General Jamerson. NATO would still take action to uphold UN Security Council
resolutions protecting them as well.
.
Mladic rejected their message with a 90-minute diatribe in Kruzel's words" of
"Balkan history, culture, and politics." Bosnia-Herzegovina had never been an
independent state; the Serbs were doing nothing more than fighting for their own
territory. Though the West had taken actions that were "not quite sensible," the Bosnian
Serbs did not regard them as enemies. Miadic even that his anny had ever killed
an UNPROFOR soldier. The Bosnian Serbs not the brutes the Western press
Claimed; they treated their enemies as they were treated. "As we have, so others will be
given the same," Mladic said. Although the Serb General had heard their ultimatum" he
would not accept it. The Allies should instead press his enemies (the Croats and
Muslims), who were the true foes of peace. The military commanders listened patiently
to Mladic and then departed?
Although the Allies had agreed in principle on the American plan at London,
NATO's political committee, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), still had to implement
the details of the agreement. The U.S. remained at odds with the British and French on
.
.
I As assessed in a State D'epartment INR analysis. See memorandum to Secretary Christopher' from Toby
Gati (INR). "General Mladic's role in the Current Crisis," July 13,1995.
2 For Kruzel's repon of the meeting, see his "Memorandum for the Record," July 23. 1995 .

25
UNCLASSIFIED
-_UNCLASSIFIED
a
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's control over his half of the dual key_The
dual-key system reflected the duplicate hierarchies of NATO and UN commanders in
Bosnia. Before NATO could take any offensive action> the UN leaders would have to
give their assent, and vice versa. The British and French had strongly supported this
arrangex:nent, as it was the safety of their troops that the UN protected. But the
fecklessness of the UN civilian. leaders (Boutros-Ghali and AkashQ testified to
UNPROFOR's appearance of impotence, and the United States believed the removal of
the UN key from their civilian leaders a critical step towards restoring the international
community's credibility.
.
On July 22, NATO leaders in Brussels began fleshing out the technical details of
the London Agreement. In the days since the London conference, the NAC had come
under intense pressure from Boutros-Ghali who had begun calling key allied leaders to
voice his concerns. While not explicitly a<ldressed in the UChainnan's Statement"
swnmarizing London's conclusions, U.S. leaders had left the conference with the clear
impression that an understanding had been reached to modify the dual-key to remove UN
civilian officials from military decision-making. The Europeans _ had consistently been
unwilling to remove the UN's key; however, at London, "they had made very clear that
under certain circUmstances they expected the [UN] key to be turned on automatically.',)
Secretary Perry had reported to the President that a "key feature [of Lontion1 is that we
have agreed to remove the UN civilian authorities from the decision process on
airstrikes," and, in his remarks to the press after the conference, Secretary Christopher
stated that the "existing. command-and-control arrangements for the use of NATO air
power will be significantly adjusted to ensure that responsiveness and unity -- our
pmposes -- are achieved. The new [decision-making] system is a much improved
system.'''' -Since this understanding seemed clear, U.S. officials saw no need to address it -
formally or explicitly in the concluding statement.
Despite u.S. officials' perception of unanimity, others - notably the UN Secretary
General himself - had different views. S . Boutros-GhaIi was genuinely conflicted about
his role in the dual-key system. To U.S. officials, the Secretary General was troubled by
the fuct that he was getting inconsistent advice from the Allies and his UN military
commanders on the ground in Bosnia. "I could see that the British and the French [were]
saying one thing in the Contact Group. another in NATO, and blowing another in
Boutros' ear," Albright recalled. UN military commanders, "who were preoccupied with
the protection of their troops and thus [against1 an air campaign," were also considered a
source of Boutros-Ghali's reluctance. Notwithstanding the inconsistencies among the
AJIies, the bottom-line seemed to be. as Albright later explained, that Boutros Boutros-
Ghali was playing games. "1 don't think we'll ever know,the absolute truth as to whether
Boutros-Ghali was telling the British and French that he was reluctant to [give up his key]
because Akashi was telling him that it would have a certain effect. [But) then, Boutros-
GhaIi blamed it on the British and French to me.,,6
3 Tamoffinterview.
4 Perry memorandum for the President. July 21, 1995; Christopher statement, U$ Department of State .
Dispatch, July 24. 1995. .
S After London, the US believed that Boutros-Ghali would present no problem on relinquishing his key_
Christopher told Clinton this during the July 22 meeting to review London at the White House. See
Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996.
6 Albright interview; see also Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
26
F
UNCLASSIFIED
l
F
On the morning of the 24th. Boutros-Ghali called his counterpart, NATO Secretary
General Willy Claes. In a heated conversation, Boutros-Ghali told Claes that he opposed
the decision on broad airstrikes, which he claimed violated UN. Security Council
. resolutions. Boutros-Ghali protested that the U.S. was rushing the international
community's'ddibenttions in an effort to "force the play before a Senate vote on lift.u1 In
Claes" words, Boutros-Ghali would not agree to relinquish his key witil "he heard
personally" from each head of state, noting that "a decision of your sixteen NATO
ambassadors would not be enough." Aware of the problem Boutros-Ghali could create,
Claes asked the "Quad" NATO representatives -- U.S., UK, France and Germany - to
begin lobbying the UN Secretary General. B
President Clinton and his advisors soon began to consult with their Allies to
where the UN key would go. The President phoned Chimc on July 24 to argue
that the authority should to the British Lt. General Rupert who commanded UN
ground forces in Bosnia. The U.S. expected that placing .the key in the hands of the
military would make the UN less of an obstacle. Chirac shared the President's view, but
he believed it was more logical to assign the key to Smith's superior. General Bernard
Janvier, who was the overall UNPROFOR commander. To Chime, the fact that Janvier
was a French General would no doubt enable the French government to retain a strong
influence over the course of the airstrikes.
.
Additionally, Chirac believed that the UN delegation authority should be split
according to the three phases of the bombing worked at the NAC planning level.
These three "options" organized NATO bombing plans into three rungs of escalation.
Option One airstrikes would target specific military positions involved in attacking a safe
area. This first option offered little more than the Up in-prick" targeting that had defined
past NATO air operations in the region. Chirac argued that authority to conduct these
could rest with the local commander; Janvier could Subdelegate such authority to those on
the ground as necessary. The next level, Option Two airstrikes, were the "substantial and
decisive" airstrikes promised by the London Conference. Thi.s second option expanded
the area of operations and target list to include weapons not directly involved in an attack.
Chirae felt that authority for this option should remain in Janvier's hands. Option Three
was the broadest level of strategic bombing, including attacks on Serb troop
concentrations and equipment throughout Bosnia In essence, this option outlined a full-
throttled bombing campaign, not unlike that directed against Iraqi targets during the Gulf
War. Chirac stressed that power to authorize this must remain in the hands of the UN
7 The US Senate was planning to vote on legislation known as the Dole-Lieberman Bill to lift
the anns embargo against Bosnia. For more details, sec below.
I What the Secretary General told Claes was consistent with a discussion he had had at the UN with
Albright and French and British representatives the night before. See "Bosnia: P-3 Meeting with UN
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali," Cable, State 176444, July 24, 1995. Claes recounted his conversation
with Boutros-Ghali in a meeting with the ambassadors ofthe "4-key Allies shortly after hanging up. See
"Bosnia at NATO, July 24," Cable, USNATO 3029, July 24, 1995. See also, "July 24 NAC on
Implementing London Meeting Conclusions on Bosnia," Cable, USNATO 3027, July 24,1995; "lnfonnal
NAC, 22 July 1995, Situation in the Fonner Yugoslavia," Cable, USNATO 3016, July 24,1995.
9 "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, President Clinton and French President Chirae," NSC
memorandum, July 24, 1995.
a
27
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary General. Requiring a green light from the UN, he would allow other
nations with forces on the ground to have" a voice in a decision to pursue Option Three.
tO
Although the Americans accepted Chirae's conditions on Options One and Two,
they could not agree to his recommendations for Option Three. As Christopher told de
Charette later that day. the Administration wanted to be able to tell Congress that they
had removed Boutros-Ghali entirely from the chain of command. 11 The Senate was then
debating legislation co-sponsored by Republican Majority Leader Robert Dole arid
Connecticut Democrat Joseph Lieberman that would call for the unilateral lifting of the
anns embargo, and Clinton's effort to a veto-proofmajority would require him
to convince the legislatorS that the London agreements represented a new departure in
Western policy. The French Foreign Minister tried to reassure the Secretary that
Boutros-Ghali would not be an impediment to airstrikes, but Christopher responded that
this" was Udirectly contIa.ly to what we agreed to in London ... under your proposai,
[BoUITos-GOOJi] would have veto power over strategic air strikes in Bosnia."
The British again leaned toward the American position on the dual-key, although
Major reiterated that UN military commanders stilI had to have a. significant role: 'It is
they who are best placed to judge when the lives of their troops are at risk," he wrote the
President 12 The British, however, proved troublesome on another front, as they were
resistant to the American hope to expand the "Gorazde rules" to protect the
safe areas. Foreign Secretary Rifkind had expressed as much to ,Christopher in a phone
call on July 23.
13
The British feared particularly that extending the rules to which
was then under heavy attack, would likely draw the Allies into war against the Serbs.
The French, in turn, had given provisional acceptance to the American plan to extend
NATO protections. In his conversation with Christopher on July 24, de Charette
accepted the need :to reinforce the UN commitment to the other enclaves. But the
implementation of that agreement still hinged upon NAC approyal of the London
decisions as they applied to Gorazde alone.
The UN Secretary General was able to use these divisions among the British,
French. and Americans to rationalize delaying his support for the agreement. He refused
to meet with the three UN ambassadors on July 24 until they presented him with a
proposal outHning the likely agreement between NATO and the UN.
J4
That . the
Deputies Committee (DC) met at the White House to discuss Boutros-Ghali's request and
approved a draft of the proposal to be sent to the UN. When British and French
representatives met with Albright to discu"s5 the draft, they reflected the different
10 The specific NAC planning decisions concerning these options were based on plans made in August
1993. For details, see Fax from Bob Clarke (USNA TO) to George Glass (EURlRPM), July 28, 1995,
enclosing NAC decision for the July 25, r 995 meeting; and "Operational Options for Air"Strikes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina." Memorandum of the NAC Military Committee to the [NATO] Secretary General, August 8,
1993.
""The Secrelary and French Foreign Minister de Charette. July 24,1995," Cable, State 178191, July 26,
1995.
11 See Letter from Major to Clinton, British Cable (faxed from White House Situation Room to DoD and
State), July 25,1995.
,
""
13 See "The Secretary and UK Foreign Secretary Rifkind, July 23, 1995," Cable, State 177396, July 25,
1995.
,
14. See "Summary of ConclusionS for the July 24 NSC Deputies Comm.ittee Meeting," NSC memorandum,
July 27. 1995; and "Penn-3 Non Paper For the SYG Regarding Use of Air Power in Bosnia," Cable.
US UN 2907, July 25,1995.
28
2 7
UNCLASSIFIED
ONCLXIFlbb
positions of their respective governments -- the French against delegation below Janvier,
and British against an airstrike mandate wider than the defense of Gorazde. On July
25, Secretary Christopher called Boutros-Ghali to discuss his support for the London
Agreements, but wqile Secretary General avoided the threatening tone he had used earlier
with Chres, he told the Secretary of State that he could not give a "blank-check' to the
Americans until the NAC reached agreement. Likely reflecting the conflicting
recommendations that the British and French were giving hint, . Boutros-Ghali stressed
that while he did not wish to compiicate the situation, he had yet to receive a clear
understanding of where the Allies wanted him to go. Secretary Christopher expressed his
hope for a resolution within twenty-four hours, noting that ''things seem to have fallen
back" since the London Conference. IS
Because of these outstanding differences and the pressure from the UN. Secretary
General, the NAC meeting on July 24 was unable even to discuss the London follow-
On.
16
Thus. the NAC met again on July 25, as the sixteen Allies pursued extensive and
exhaustive discussions both in Brussels and among. their capitals. Early on in the
u.s. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hooter called Washington to tell Assistant
Secretary of State Holbrooke that it was ''fifteen-to-one against the U.S.:' and that he was
worried that the NAC would never agree. Holbrooke recalls telling Hunter to keep the
NAC up all night if neCeSsary. and to accept no less than the decisions authorized by the
London Conference. "Otherwise/' Holbrooke said, "the West's decision would be
revealed as a charade.,,17 Returning to the NAC, HWlter led a marathon meeting. and after
almost thirteen the NAC finally agreed to implement the conclusions. of the
London Conference. J
8
The three substantive issues that had to be settled at this meeting
focused on 1) Concerns about attacking massing Serb trooPS; 2) delegation of authority
for the Option Three airstrikes; and J) possible retaliation to Serb hostage-taking.1
9
On the first outstanding issue, the British were concerned by the American
suggestion that NATO could attack concentrations of Serb troops before they had
attacked a safe area. The U.S. argued that if the Serbs were clearly massing in an effort to
attack the enclave, NATO needed the flexibility to preempt the assault, rather than
waiting until it had already begun. The I:rencb supported the American position, arguing
that it was not realistic to distinguish between attacking heavy weapons and troops. The
British Ambassador, supported by the Italians and Dutch. argued that a preemptive
assault on troop concentrations should require .a NAC decision. But this would
undermine the purpose of the Gorazde rules, which sought to place military decisions in
the hands of the commanders on the ground. The U.S. suggested that since the UN
military authorities would still have to the strikes, the Allies did not have to
worry that NATO commanders would act precipitously. But the British were obstinate,
and it was only after high-level consultations among allied capitals (which included
Secretary Christopher speaking with Foreign Minister Rifkind) that they relented?O It
15 "The Secretary and UN SYG Boutros-Ghali. July 25, 1995," Cable, State 178623, July 26,1995.
16 As explained in "Bosnia at NATO,luly 24," Cable, USNA TO 3029, July24. 1995.
17 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17,1996.
.
II For full review of the meeting. see "July 25 NAC on Bosnia AirOpemtions (Gorazeie)," Cable.
USNATO 3059, July 26, 1995.
.
19 Hunter interview; USNA TO 3059.
20 See "The Secretary and British Forei"gn Minister Rifkind,lidy 25, 1995," Cable, State 178624, July 26,
1995"
E 29
UNCLASSIFIED
F
S
was decided that the military commanders, and not the NAC, would decide when to
initiate an attack on troop concentrations.
Concerning Option Three airstrikes. the French reiterated their position that
authorization must require a UN political decision from Boutros-Ghali. None of the
ambassadors argued against delegating 'Options One and Two authority to the local UN
military commanders (thus taking Boutros-Ghali's civilian key away). However, the
nations with troops on the ground believed that an escalation to Option Three, 'Which
would likely augur all-out war against the Serbs (and therefore leave UN troops
throughout Bosnia vulnerable to "Bosnian Serb reprisal), a crucial political decision
could not be made by the theater commanders alone. In order to avoid scuttling the
entire agreement, the u.s. agreed that this one point could be deferred" for further
discussions?l
The final and most contentious issue debated at the NAC was how to respond to
hostage-taking. This was the subject which had most divided the ministers four days
before in London. They recognized that suggesting that NATO would stop the bombing
if the Serbs took hostages would provide the Serbs incentive to attack UNPROFOR.
They wanted to send the Serbs a strong message that NATO air operations would
continue even in the face of hostage-taking, but those nations with in Bosnia
remained deeply concerned about their safety. Several of them, especiaUythe French arid
British, argued that the Americans had no standing to tell them what to do (without U.S.
troop,s on the ground)_ The NAC finally worked out an ambiguous compromise: the
resolution would include an intra-alliance understanding that recognized the need for
UNPROFOR troops to take risks. but allowed local commanders to suspend air
operations if they determined that the safety of their troops was at stake.
22
In the early hours of July 26, the NAC approved their resolution on defending
Gorazde. The NAC would support the rules agreed to at the London Conference and,
significantly, they charged their military planners' with examining how to extend those
rules to the other safe-areas -- like Tuzla, Bihac, and Sarajevo. The U.S. had tried to get
this done, but agreed to defer the issue because of heavy British opposition.
23
Although
21 Frasure, in a cable to HuntersentJuly 24, claimed that since it would be difficult to get the NAC to
approve a military decision over Option Three;the NSC advised pushing for this deferral. Additionally. a
DC meeting on the morning of the 25th concluded tbat "in light of French opposition to delegating
authority for Option 3 ... to Janvier, wewotild agree to defer a NAC decision on the modalities for UN.:. .
NATO coordination until the time Option 3 authority was sought." See, respectively, Draft Cable froIn
Frasure to Hunter. EUR files, July 24, 1995; "Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of tile NSC Deputies
Committee," NSC Memoranda July 24 and 25; 1995.
II Ambassador Hunter later noted that, although the NAC did not realize it at the time, (he hostage-taking
issue was moot. Due to the fall ofSrebrenica and Zepa and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from
vulnerable areas that had been going on since May 1995. See Hunter interview.
.
D Secretary Christopher told Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic this on July 26. See, "Follow-up to
Secretary's Call with Silajdzic," Cable, State 179135, July 27, 1995. The "Gorazde Rules" were extended
by the NAC on August I to the remaining safe-areas of Sarajevo. Tuzla and Bihac. The decision still left
unresolved, however, the question of who could authorize Option Three bombing. On August 10,
UNPROFOR Force Commander Janvier and NATO Commander Admiral Smith. concluded a
Memorandum of Understanding on proseCuting the air campaign which filled in some of the targeting and
planning details left unaddressed by the earlier decisions. Among these details was the inclusion of close-
air-support for UN personnel theaterwide and making an Option Three decision, vaguely, "subject to .
political approval." See" August I NAC- Texts. Agreed Decisions and IAU on the Safe Areas of Sarajevo,
Bihac and Tuzia," Cable. USNA TO 3107, August I, 1995; and 'Memorandum of Understanding (MO U)
30

. UNCLASSIFIED
UNCtASSIfIED
a
things had seemed touch-and-go for much of the lengthy discussion, some believe that
there was actually little danger in leaving the NAC session that night without agreement.
In retrospect, Hunter believed that while the long meeting allowed the Allies to vent their
resentments, they all recognized that they would have to come to agreement. Otherwise,
the West would again be accused of making empty threats?4
Finally, the NAC representatives debated how they should present their decisions to
the UN. Should they "invite" the UN Secretary. General to support the decisions, or <-
should the language in effect demand his The Americans were determined
to remove the UN civilian leaders from the decision-making process and so did not want
to invite defiance, but several of the ambassadors feared pushing the UN into a
confrontation. In the end. the NAC reached a compromise, whereby its resolution would
"stress the importance" of Boutros-GhaIi delegating his authority to. his military
commanders.
lS
..
_ NATO Secretary General Claes called Boutros-GhaJi shortly after the NAC
meeting and sent him a copy of the resolution. But even after the NAC had reached
agreement, Boutros-Ghali still seemed reluctant to delegate his authority, particularly on
Option Three strikes. Early the morning of July 26, Christopher told Holbrooke and Tom
Donilon that in his view, Boutros-Ghali was again his feet" on delegating the
UN authority. Normally, contacts with the UN Secretary General were liandled by UN
Ambassador Albright. But since she was traveling, Holbrooke and Donilonadvised that
Christopher take the unusual step of calling Boutros-Ghali himself. The Secretary of .
State did so, telling the Secretary General that the Administration expected his support.
26
"I told him that the London Conference repreSented the leading participants in the UN as
far as Europe was concerned, and [that] he shouldn't stand in the way of NATO taking
action if there were another safe area attacked," Christopher recalled. Boutros-Ghali.
having abandoned -his threats to confront the Allies. told the Secretary of State that he
would give his consent to the decision, but he needed time to work out the details with his
UN staff. When Boutros-Ghali had taken no action by noon, Christopher called him
again. 27 Boutros-Ghali's wavering was wearing the Secretary of State's patience;
Holbrooke later described these two conversations as "hammer calls", while Christopher
more diplomatically characterized them as "not unfriendly, but- finn." Finally. at 2pm
that afternoon, the UN Secretary General fmany announced that h,e would delegate his
"key" to General Janvier?8
The Croatian Offensive
. On July 22, the presidents of Bosnia and Croatia met in Split, Croatia to discuss
military cooperation. After a long stalemate with the Serbs, the Bosnians were amidst a
. Between CINCSOUTH and FC UNPF Pursuant to the North Atlantic-Council (NAC) Decisions of25 July
1995 and I August 1995 and the Direction of the UN Secretary General," August 10, 1995.
24 Hunter interview.
2S For text ofNAC decision on rules," see "NATO: Text of Decision Sheet on Bosnia Air,"
Cable, USNATO 3044, July 26,1995.
26 "The Secretary and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, July 25, 1995. (9:57am)" Cable, State 179742,
July 27, 1995.
27 "The Secretary and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, July 25, 1995, (I 2:30pm)" Cable, State
179743, July 21, J 995.
.
21 "Bosnia: SYG Statement on Air Strike Authority," Cable, USUN 2938, July 26, 1995

31
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED'
11
series of reverses on the military front. The Muslim Government's major offensive near Sarajevo, which they had launched in June, had. gained no ground. They had lost the Srebrenica enclave, and Zepa's fall would come only in a matter of days (it feU on July 25). Now the enclave of Bihac in northweSt Bosnia was under assault from several fronts. There, $e Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Anny was besieged from all sides by the Bosnian Serb forces,' the Muslim army of separatist Fikret and now the Croatian
Serb Army, operating out of the neighboring Krajina territory . Although the London conference had discussed the safety of Bihac, the volatility of the situation prevented the
United States from gaiI:ting a finn commitment to its defense?9
.
The United States had supported cooperation among Bosnia's MuslimS and Croats, helping to negotiate the '''Federation Agreement" in March 1994. Although criticized by some observers as a "shotgun wedding" amounting to "nothing more than a glorified' cease-fire," the U.S. believed that the Muslim-Croat Federation was the only chance for the Muslims in Bosma to develop the resources to balance Serb power.
30
The Croatian Govenunent wielded a strong influence on the Bosnian Croats, and the improvement of relations between Bosnian President lzetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman could only help ties within the Federation. But the Americans also knew that the 'July 22
meeting meant more than strengthening diplomatic ties. The Croatians had told the U.S.
Ambassador. Peter Galbraith, that they were on sending their forces into Bosnia
in order to relieve pressure on the Bihac enclave. J This meeting between the two
presidents that day in Split ratified the agreement on military cooperation that would
invite the Croatians to reenter the war ..
Now Croatia was willing to come to the defense The fall of the enclave
would connect Serb territories in Croatia and Bosnia, strengthening the Krajina Serb
position and potentially leading to the region's unification with Bosnian Serb territory.
Croatia could not allow.the Krajina tenitory, which accounted for more than 20 percent
of its land and was key to its economy, to remain in Serb hands much longer. President
Tudjman was convinced that he. would have to get it back, one way or another. But first, he had to ensure that the Serb rebels did not strengthen their position by capturing Bihac. Ambassador Galbraith was at the meeting in Split as part of a delegation of foreign
emissaries.
J2
He reported back to Washington on July 23 on the agreements. That same
day, Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbey called Under Secretary Tarnoff to discuss the military pact.' The Croatians \\.'ould attack Serb positions in the Livno River
29 See Silber and Little, pp353-357.
30 One of the more astute critics is the journaJist Misha Glenny. Sce The fall of Yugoslavia (Penguin,
1993)p247.
.
31 Galbraith interview, August 2, 1996; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary. pp19-2L On July 20, Croatian
Foreign Minister Granic sent a letter to the UN Security Council about the situation in Bihac, warning that
jfuthe of Bihac as a safe-area becomes threatened, the Republic of Croatia may be compelled to
undertake necessaty measures to secure its status and security. ". See from Croatian Foreign
Minister Granic on Bihac," Cable, USUN 2867, July21, Also on July 21, Galbraith had met with
Tudjman, Foreign Minister GranIc and Defense Minister Susak on the island of Brioni. While there, the
Croatians infonned Galbraith that they intended to intervene to save Bihac. Galbraith cabled Ihis
infonnation to Washington on July 22. See crTudjman Decides for Direct Military Intervention To Save
Bihac, Says Susak," Cable, Zagreb 2758, July 22, 1995.
32 Galbraith interview; August 6, 1996. At the London meeting. Croatian envoy Miomi.- Zuzul had asked'
Frasure and his deputy, Chris Hill to attend the Split meeting. Frasure and Hill declined, suggesting that
Galbraith should attend in their absence. See Hill comment, Dayton History Seminar.
32
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
willey, south of Bihac, in an effort to draw the Bosnian Serb forces away from the enclave. Tamoff welcomed Bosnian-Croat cooperation in defense of Bihac, but told Sacirbey that the U.S. was concerned "how Croatian troops might be used apart from
Bihac." The U.S. believed that Tudjman might use the defense of Bihac as an opening to attack the Krajina. If he did so, Washington worried, Serbia may be forced to sparking a wider Serb-Croat war,33
In Washington, the interagency DC met on July 24 to discuss how to respond to the Bosnian-Croat agreement The United States was then hoping to convince its Allies to expand the London decision on Gorazde to the other safe areas, including Bihac" but
believed an agreement would take some time to achieve. The Deputies decided that since the international community was not willing to take immediate strong action to protect Bihac, the United States could not justifiably dissuade the Croatians from doing so. However, they also agreed that Croatia should be warned against taking this opportunity to launch an attack against the Krajina.
34
U.S. intelligence estimated that in that event, the Croatians would likely face tough resistance from the Krajina Serbs. While the Croats might ultimately it was thought that the conflict would be protracted and
costly.lS Galbraith was instructed to urge restraint with the Croatians, asking them to limit any military action with Bihac_ When the ambassador delivered this message on
July 25, the Croatians agreed, reassuring him that they had no . intention of expanding their operations into the Krajina.
36
. As the U.S. expected, on July 25 Croatian forces launched an offensive into the
Livno Valley in an effort to save Bihac. In the two years since Croatia had been largely
removed from the war, its military had been rebuilt and modernized, both technologically and strategically. All of this was accomplished in the face of the international anns
embargo on the region. which Croatia easily skirted.
37
Part of Croatia's rearming included the now notorious. flow of weapons from Iran into Bosnia, of which U.S.
intelligence reported that Croatia skimmed nearly Despjte this blatant violation of
n "Under Secretary TarnofPs Conversation with Bosnian FM Sacirbey." Cable (draft), July 23,1995.
:u "Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting, July 24, 1995:' NSC
July27. 1995. Moreover, the July 11 draftNSC endgame paper pointed out that the US should consider
using economic carrots to deter Tudjman from attacking the Krajina in the near term. In a July 28 phone
call with President Boris Yeltsin, President Clinton said that botb he and Gennan Chancellor
Helmut Kohl had cautioned the Croatians "to exercise restraint and avoid a wider war," Clinton urged
Yeltsin to tell the Serbs the same in an effort to prevent a Croat-Serb conflict See "President's Discussion
with Yeltsin on Bosnia, Chechnya, July 23, 1995 .. NSC memorandum, July 31, 1995. 35 Versbbow interview, September 23, 1996; Kerrick interview. July 15,1996; Perry interview with BBC.
January 18, 1996.
36 See, respectively, "Urging Croatian Restraint in Bihac," Cable, State 177066, July 25. 1995; and
"Croatia Welcomes US Demarche," Cable. Zagreb 2785, July 25, 1995; and Galbraith Diplomatic Diary,
US had some knowledge of Croatia's reanning, altbough it remains unclear whether the US actively
helped_ See, for example, Cable, Zagreb 2758 for reports of artillery shipments from Turkey for Croatia.
Also, fonner US military personnel, working as independent contractors, were hired by the Croatian
government to help refonnulate their military strategy. The US knew of these discussions, and often used
these contractors topass back-channel messages to the Croatian government. This was done, for example,
in late August 1995 to send Ihe message of Washington's concerns about continuedsabre-rattJing by the
Croats, and the danger that this may escalate the war. See "MPRI Back to Zagreb," Memorandum to
Holbrooke from Chris Hob (EURlSCE), August 25, 1995; and Roger Cohen, "US Cooling Ties to Croatia
after Winking at its Buildup," New York Times, October 28. 1995.
.
Q a
33
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIfIED
sas
the UN arms embargo. U.S. officials took a ask, don't tell" position toward
Croatia's reanning they understood that restoring a military balance of power among
the three Balkan parties may help bring a From the moment Croat forces
entered the Livno. the reanning effort proved successful. Croatia easily overran the Serb
forces, sending an estimated 8,000 ,Serb troops and civilians fleeing.
39
Soon after Croatia began its' offensive. Tudjrnan's eyes tumed to the prize, Knin.
The small town in the middle of Krajina became a trigger for the disintegration of
Yugoslavia beginning in 1991. when local Serbs declared the region autonomous from
Croatia. On July 29, Croatian forces mobilized around Krajina and began to shell Knin.
Tudjman threatened to retake all ofKrajinaifthe Bosnian Serbs did not end their siege of
Bihac. A peace negotiation game followed, but it appeared clear that Tudjman had no
intention of coming to any deal with the Serbs - he wanted Krajina back.40
On August 4, Croatian troops attacked Krajina.
41
The State Department, again
.instructed Galbraith to advise Tudjrnan against attacking Krajina. a message which the
Croat President disregarded rather cavalierly.42 In a matter 'of days, the military strike
aptly titled "Operation Storm" had run Serb troops and civilians out of Krajina, sending a
stream of refugees out of the area and toward Serbia. The Krajina Serbs did not fight and,
significantly, Milosevic's response to the attack was conspicuously muted. Oil August 6,
a victorious Tudjman raised the Croatian flag over Knin. For the first time in the our-
year Balkan conflict, Serbs were the victims of a massive military defeat. 43
35 For of US intelligence on Croat rearming, see INR's "Morning Summary" for Secretary
Christopher, September 24, 1995; and Galbraith interview, October 2, 1996.
39 See, respectively, "Updates on Livno Valley Bihac," Cable, Zagreb 2805, July 25, J 995; and "Croat
Operation Against'RSK' - Probable, But Only Several Days From Now," Cable, Zagreb 2807, July 26.
1995.
40 Peace negotiations were started by Yasusi Akashi, the UN Civilian Representative for the Balkans.
Akashi formulated a six-point plan for peace, which Tudjman rejected on July 31. According to Galbraith,
Tudjman never really intended to reach a settlement, but rather went through the motions to satisfy the
international See Galbraith interview; "Six Points from July 30 Negotiations in Knin," cable, '
Zagreb 2867, July 31, 1995; "text of SRSG Akashi's Clarification on the SixPoint Plan," Cable, Zagreb '
2872, July 31, 1995; "President Tudjman Responds to Akashi on the Six Points From Knin Negotiations."
Cable, Zagreb 2881, July 31, 1.991; and Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp23-32.
.. I In a letter to Clinton, Tudjman cites the reasons for the attack as: the defense of Bibac; the failure of the
Krajina Serbs to accept peaceful reintegration into Croatia; the inability of Croatian refugees to return to
their homes; military provocation's by Krajina Serbs; and the inability ofthe Croatian economy to develop
normally under the present circumstances. See "Tudjman Letter to Clinton," Cable, Zagreh 2970, August
4,1995; "Croatia Informs USG of Decision to Begin War, Provides Unconvincing'Justification," Cable,
Zagreb 2969, August 4, 1995.
'
-42 Tudjman did admit to Galbraith that the US had not provided Croatia with a "green light." See Galbraith
interview, August 2, 1996; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, Silber and Little, p356. In a July 3 I
meeting in Washington, Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor, similarlycounsefed
for Croat restraint with Miomir Zuzul, Tudjman's Special Envoy to the Federation. See Vershbow
interview, September26, 1996.
'3 See State Department Operations Center Spot Reports, "Military Action in.Croatia," August 4, 1995.
1600 EDT; AugustS, 1995, 1600 EDT; Au ust 7,1995,1300 EDT. For overview of Croat offensive, see
34
a
UNCLASSIFIED
B2
ONctXIfIb
l
The American Diplomatic Initiative
&
Despite American pleas for restraint, the successful Croatian offensive changed the
situation dramatically in Bosnia. "In hindsight, one can see that there were some useful
results accomplished by these offensives in the Krajina:' Christopher recalled, I
think the record would show that we were not supportive [of the Croats] during that
period.'.44 The Bosnian Muslims had appeared only weeks from defeat in when
Blhac was under assault, Gorazde was vulnerable, and UNPROFOR withdrawal seemed
imminent.
4S
the London Conference had placed Gorazde off limits for the
moment, and the Croatian victory had liberate Bihac, resupplying its civilians and
its Bosnian defenders. Now the Croatian military appeared ready to advance wi"th its
Federation Allies deeper into western Bosnia.
46
Diplomatically 7 the Croat offensive
created the ideal opportunity for the Administration to push forth its "endgame"
process.
47
As Perry explained later: "It must have been evidently Clear to the [Serbs) -
with the threat of bombing being real now and with the loss to the Croats on the ground--
that they had already passed their high-water mark and were better off by making peace.
So it seemed to me it was an opportunity to go in with a diplomatic initiative.'048
. Importantly, Milosevic had stood by as the Croatian Aimy rolled into Knin,
producing more than 100,000 Serb refugees. While his forces had mobilized near Eastern
Slavonia, the remaining Serb-held tenitory in Croatia, Milosevic's inaction signaled that
he did not wish to expand the war further.
49
Even before the Croatian offensive,
Milosevic "seemed to have relaxed his position, allowing his negotiations with EU envoy
Carl Bildt to bear fruit. The 46-year-old Bildt, fonnerly Sweden's youngest Prime
Minister. 'had been negotiating with Balkan leaders (including the Bosnian Serbs)
Christopher interview,: October 22, 1996.
45 In mid-July, things looked so dire for UNPROFOR that Holbrooke bluntly told Christopher that
"UNPROFOR is dead," and that the US should begin planning for a "leaner, meaner" UNPROFOR II- See
"The Death ofUNPROFOR, Not ahe Death of Bosnia," Memorandum [0 Christopher from Holbrooke. July
19,1995.
'
46 On August 6. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic told Galbraith that Croatia" and Bosnia would
cooperate militarily in Bosnia, as Croatia would "supplement" Bosnian troops. He stated that this proposed
military follow-through in Bosnia could create conditions for a peace agreement -- "the new realities in
"Bosnia could mean an end to the war by the fall." See "Foreign Minister Says GOC and GOBH
Cooperation Will End the Bosnian War by Fall." Cable, Zagreb 2989, August 6, 1995.
f1 BaSs interview. Only a few weeks prior, internal State Department discussions focused on preparing or
a situation in which diplomatic efforts would implode. Presciently, an internal memorandum read. "in the
short run, our only possibility may be to mark time on the diplomacy until the battlefield situation produces
a new reality." By early August, that new reality was at hand. See "Bosnia - Diplomacy in Crisis," State
Department memorandum. EURISCE (Frasure electronic files), no date.
41 Perry interview with BBC, January 16, 1996.
49 The most MiJosevic did in reaction to the Krajina offensive was to condemn the attack publicly and urge
the international community to stop the fighting; see Cable, Belgrade 3808, August 5, 1995. As the Livno
offensive commenced. the US instructed its Belgrade Charge Rudolph Perina to infonn Milosevic that the
US had urged caution with the Croats, and that he should not let tensions over Bihac escalate into a wider
conflict. See "Urging Serbs Restraint in Bihac and ICff Caution in Serbia," Cable. State 181865 July 29
1995.J
d &
35
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
a
throughout the summer.
so
By modifying the language of the Frasure-Milosevic package, Bildt had managed to secure M'ilosevic's agreement to a complicated, if somewhat Byzantine, agreement that traded recognition of Bosnia for partial sanctions relie:f. But' time was of the essence. As the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade cabled to Washington. the Serb setbacks could evolve into a more realistic attitude toward but could "also develop into a martyr complex and resentment of the outside world that will lead to thousands of more victims before the conflict ends." If anything, it would be vital for the U.S. to move as quickly as possible "to show the Serbs the right direction to take."SI , Bildt's proposal had received approval, but had run aground with the Sarajevo govern.rilent. For itS part, the CHnton Adnlinistration was not willing to settle for the Bildt package. Milosevic's position hadn't changed that much since his negotiations with Frasure -- and Bildt had essentially accepted what Frasure would not.
52
Moreover, too much had'been lost in Srebrenica for the U.S. Government to conclude a deal with Milosevic that would not directly bring peace. "We no longer have the luxury of simply granting Milosevic sanctio.ns relief and hoping that, over time, he will bring what influence he has to bear on the Bosnian Serbs," Steinbez:g advised Christopher during this time. Any sanctions relief for Milosevic must include tangible improvements in Bosnian Serb behavior.
s3

On August 2, Bildt came to Washington seeking the support for his deal with Milosevic: The Foreign Policy Team (minus Secretary Christopher,. who
was then in Southeast Asia) met the day before in the White House to consider how to
respond to the envoy's overtUres. The mood in the room was strongly against concluding
such an agreement; Secretary Perry argued that BiJdt's efforts were a "sideshow" and that
the U.S. should "squeeze off this discussion with minimum damage." The Principals felt that BiJdt's plan allowed ,too much flexibility for Milosevic. There was too much in it for him on sanctions relief with little in return from the Serb leader.
s4
One of the few voices in support of Bildt came somewhat unexpectedly from Assistant SecretaI)' .of State Holbrooke. Holbrooke had been one of the most outspoken
critics of "muddle through" within the Administration, yet he now argued that at this point the U.S. must back the Bildt agreement in order to prevent a "crack-up" with its Allies. He felt that since the Bildt plan would fail without the Bosnian Government's
agreement (which he believed was unlikely), the U.S. should support it for "tactical reasons" to make the Europeans happy. Holbrooke was concerned that if the U.S. cut Bildt off at the Chirae and Major would use it as a pretext to pull out of Bosnia aU
.$(I For details of Bildt's negotiations that see "Bildt's July 6 Meeting with B-H leadership," Cable,
Sarajevo 360, July 7, 1995; "ICFY Chairman BiJdt's July 7 Meeting with Miloscvic," Cable, Belgrade
6403, July 8. 1995; "Message for the Secretary from Carl Bild.," Cable, Belgrade 3432, July 15, 1995;
"Negotiating With Milosevic and Each Other: B;Idt, Stoltenberg and Akashi Meeting," Cable, Belgrade
3434, July 15, 1995; "Message From ICFY Negotiator Carl,Bildt," Cable, Belgrade 3435, July 16, 1995;
"Bildt Close to Agreement with Milosevic on Bosnian Recognition," Cable, Belgrade 3525, July 19, 1995;
"Bildt Report on July 19 Meeting with Milosevic," Cable, Belgrade 6547, july 20, 1995; and Frasure's
readout of Bildt's proposal, "Background Paper: Diplomatic Strategy," July 14, 1995, EUR computer files.
See "Pointing the Serbs in the Right Direction," Cable, Belgrade 3837, August 7. J 995. $2 Chris Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996.
.
jJ Steinberg interview.
54 Vershbow interview, September 26. 1996.
36
6
UNCLASSIFIED
UNctXlPiu

together. ('We should send Bildt back to Belgrade," Holbrooke said, "so the Europeans
can't blame" the U.S. for scuttling the agreement. 5S
White the Principals weren't too interested in accommodating Bildt, they took
seriously Holbrooke's point about not antagonizing U.S. Allies. Accordingly, they didn't reject Bildt's overtures out ofharid, but rather informed him that they would suppprt his initiative only if certain conditions were met. These new conditions became known as the "Bildt Plus" plan. For example, the American reply - contained in an August 4 letter from Acting Secretary of State Tamoff to Bildt -- explained that given events since Frasures efforts that spring, there needed to be sharper focus "on broadening the [Frasure]package to include tangible improvement in Bosnian Serb behavior." Also, the u.s. demanded that 1) Bosnia-Serbia mutual recognition be approved in both Belgrade and Sarajevo; 2) specific commitments by Milosevic on sealing Serbia's. border with Bosnia; 3) a clear path to reimposition of sanctions on Serbia (which would be lifted according to Bildt's plan); 4) a couptry-wide cease-fire and commitment by the Bosnian Serbs to end all offensive operations; and, 5) agreement to resume cOmprehensive negotiations on the basis of the 1994 Contact Group plan. U.S. officials didn't believe that Bildt would ever be able to get the Serbs to agree to tliese positions, but by structuring their response in this'way, t h e ~ assured that the perpetrators ofBildt's failure
would be in the Balkans. not WllShington. 6

While Bildt's plan seemed doomed, the U.S. was instead working on its own strategy for a comprehensive settlement, prompted by Lake's July 17 request for
"endgame" strategy papers. This work had taken on a new sense of urgency, as Congress had recently approved the Dole-Liebermanbill to lift the anus embargo unilaterally. Without any clear diplomatic direction. such a move would'almost certainly prompt the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Clinton promised to veto the measure, but it appeared that
opponents in Congress could muster the votes to override. Congress had adjourned for
the summer and pJanned to take the matter up in September. The Administration figured
that along with the Croatian offensive, the congressional recess had created a window
through which a diplomatic initiative could be sprung.
57
.
'
As each agency worked on its own version of an "endgame" paper, an informal inter-agency group emerged to refine the differences between the four proposals, so that
in the end the President would be presented with distinct options, not just finely nuanced differences. The inter-agency talks began in late July, as Berger and Vershbow at ~ h e
NSC worked with Steinberg, Tamoff, and Frasure from State, and Walter Slocombe and Joe Kruzel- from the pentagon.
58
Not only did such collaboration aim to ensure that each
.
,
5S Vershbow interview. July 23, 1996.
36 The "Bildt Plus" plan was presented in a paper entitled "US Position: Bildt Plus," NSC memorandum.
August 2. 1995. For US response to Bildt, see "Letter from Acting Secretary Tarnoffto EU' Negotiator
Carl Bildt," Cable, Slate 185716, August 4, 1995. See also Vershbow interview. September26,1996;
Holbrooke interview with the author (notes), October 17, 1996.
S7 Background on Dole-Liebennan legislation and its impact on poJicymaking from Elaine SCiolino. "In
Washington, Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban," New York Times, July27,1995; and ,
Lippmann and Devroy. According to Woodward (pp264-65), Dole had told Secretary Christopher that the
embargo vote was intended to provide the Administration some leverage to deal with the Europeans -
Administration officials could now claim that since their hands were being tied by Congress, a bold
diplomatic action was necessary. See also Wendy Shennan interview, December 11, 1996.,
'
" Slocombe was Under Secretary of Defense for Poticy; Kruzel the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for European and NATO Affairs.
2 37
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLA
7 I
paper outlined different approaches, but to produce a three-page cover note to the package
that summarized each paper and highlighted key differences. The product of this work
was the package of "endgame" papers - representing the views of State. DoD
and the Joint Chiefs, and the NSC -- which Lake submitted to the President on August
. These papers were to be. discussed by the President and ris top advisors at a Foreign
Policy Group meeting scheduled for August 7.
The four agencies' papers cOncluded that the U.S. should make a detennined effort
to pursue a diplomatic initiative in.the coming weeks. On the future ofUNPROFOR, all
agencies agreed that, as.had become a mantra that summer, "muddling through" was no
longer an option. If a settlement could not be reached or if UNPROFOR's credibility
continued to stagger, the U.S. should fulfill its commitment to help it withdraw. lift the
anns embargo and move to a strategy (providing. for
training and economic assistance to the Bosnians with NATO air support). 60
Although all the agencies agreed upon the need for a new diplomatic the
major point of divergence hinged' on what kind of Bosnian state any negotiation should
This was primarily a political question, although it obviously had implications on
the parameters of the military support that the U.S. would" need to provide for
implementation. State and Defense argued for a limited commitment: the U.S. should
help the Bosnians consolidate the territory they had, but feared the costs of supporting
Bosnian efforts to recover lost territory. Both agencies worried that if the United States
were to go that route. the U.s. would ruffle relations with its Allies and Russia, and at
worst, become militarily entangled into the Bosnian conflict. The NSC and Albright
papers, on the other hand, supported the view that an initiative should work to preserve
Bosnia along lines broadly consistent with the Contact Group Plan - such as a single
state with roughly .51-49 percent territorial breakdown in favor of the Muslims.
"Anything less," Lake wrote to the President, "would be tantamount to ratifying
aggression and would, in any case, be rejected by Sarajevo:.6J Such support. could be
provided by creating an "ann and train" initiative along with NATO airstrikes against
Bosnian Serb positions.
. The conceptual gulf between the NSCI Albright position and the StateIDefense were
the risks the U.S. should run to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia. Albright felt that the
stakes were so high, the U.S. had no choice but to accept considerable risk. Her view.
which she had forcefully articulated back in June, was that the continued failure to end
the conflict in Bosnia was undennining the Clinton Administration"s leadership, both at
home and abroad. If the President could not bring a solution to Bosnia, then his political
opponents would seize on the issue as evidence of his inability to guide the most
powerful nation on earth. The issue had become bigger than America's more limited
strategic interests in Bosnia -- or even broader interests in Europe. As Albright argued in
her memorandum, the West's approach toward Bosnia has "caused serious erosion of the
credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Worse, our continued
Endgame papers were contained in thirty-one page package sent to President on August 5, 1995. See
COver note from Anthony Lake to the President, "Balkan Strategy: Options for Discussion at Foreign Policy
Group Meeting, August 7, 1995," August 5, 1995.
;so Overview of papers from Lake cover note, August 5, 1995.
61 LaIc
e cover note, August 5. 1995 .
38
....
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

. reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post-Cold War world."
Moreover, on the eve of the 1996 presidential election Bosnia threatened to
. engulf aU other areas of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. "We should recognize that," Albright continued, "notwithStanding our successes in trade, Russia, and the Middle East and despite general agreement regarding Bosnia's complexity -- our Administration's stewardship of foreign policy will be measured -- fairly or unfairly -- by our response to this issue. That is why we must take the lead in devising a diplomatic and . military plan .to achieve a durable peace. If we agree that American troops will be in
Bosnia sooner or later, why not do it on our tenns and our timetable?,,62
In contrast, while both State and Defense recognized the possibility that a renewed . diplomatic initiative could reinvigorate U.S. leadership abroad. their papers were less
ambitious. Their proposals seemed driven by the fear that the U.S. would become' entangled in the conflict. Consistent with the, line Frasure had pushed in late June, the State Department's main objective was to avoid carrying the U.S. over the wrong part of "the waterfall." As the state Department memorandum exp1aine9. the Administration
should pursue a "limited -- working to end tbe conflict, yet doing so without
risking its fundaniental strategic and political interests in the process. The Pentagon plan
concurred, explaining that "the Administration's central problem is to fina a policy that
will meet American goals and get the support of the American public, not that of the
Bosnians." TheDefense Department likewise agreed that the top priority was to avoid a sustained military presence in Bosnia .. DoD planners saw too many echoes of Vietnam in the ann-and-train and airstrike proposals -- they feared that the Bosnians would come to
expect U.S. support to win back lost territory. This was too close to a quagmire scenario for Pentagon poJicY-IlJakers. The U.S. would have to make it clear to the Bosnians that it
would not back a war ofreconquest.
63
While these talks proceeded, Christopher was away from Washington on August 5,
meeting with the Vietnamese in Hanoi to establish American ties for the first time in twenty years.
64
The August 5 NSC decision memo had been faxed to Christopher in Hanoi, and he approved it. Nevertheless, from the perspective of several officials in
Washington, the Secretary feared that the Lake plan might promise more than the United
States could deliver. 6S The American public was wary of intervening in Bosnia, and its European Allies would not support taking a strong role in aiding offensive operations hi
the Balkans. While Christopher supported a new initiative and believed that the Administration should get the Bosnia issue behind it, he urged the President that this
, .
should not be done by shifting attention from its other accomplishments in foreign policy,
such as in Asia or Latin America. Moreover, the Secretary was uneasy with the NSC's willingness to strong-ann the Bosnians to accept an agreement or to modify the Contact Group map. The parties themselves should negotiate the map, Christopher felt, rather
.. 62 for the National Security Advisor," from Albright, August 3,
1995
63 See, respectively, "Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What of Bosnian State?," OSD/JCS memorandum,
August 2, 1995; and "Endgame Strategy: A Sustainable Defense ofa Viable Bosnia after UNPROFOR
Withdrawal:' State Department memorandum. no date.
64 According to State Department Operations Center TeJephone Logs (Shift III, August 5,1995.
2325ED1), Christopher called the President. They discussed the historic events in Vietnam; according toO
Christopher, Bosnia did n.ot even come up.
6S Vershbow interview. Jury 26, 1996; Bass interview.
39
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UNCLASSIFIED
r
than u.s. diplomats proposing new solutions that might be perceived as selling-out the Bosnians. The State Department's more modest goals would Unot only lessen our exposure. but are more likely to enjoy the support of others," the Secretary argued.
66
On August 7, President Clinton met with the Foreign Policy Team - Lake, Albright, Perry, ShalikashviJi. and Peter Tarnoff(in the place of the traveling Christopher) in the Cabinet Room to discuss the endgame strategy papers.
67
Lake presented the options proposed in the four endgame papers. Should. the U.S. risk the commitment advocated by the NSC and Albright, or should it hedge its bets and pursue . t4e more limited objectives proposed by State and Defense? The President's frustration with Bosnia, his determination to take control of the issue, led him to his decision. should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few days," he apparently said. "We've got to exhaust every alternative, roll every dice, take risks.
n68
The London
. Conference, Croatian . offensive and congressional recess had created a window of opportunity that might soon close. The President believed the United States now had the credibility to win a settlement. if they were willing to push hard enough. Clinton decided that the mission would encompass the bold goals set forth in the NSC and Albright papers -- the U.S. would commit itself to a unified Bosnia, and if that were not attainable at the negotiating table, it would be willing to assist the Bosnians in winning their share
on the battlefield.
69
.

After deciding on the broader aim of the mission, the talks turned to its specific fonn. Both the NSC and State endgame papers had detailed the outline of a potential. diplomatic mission. The NSC proposal advocated launching the initiative by visiting
with key European Allies. telling them that the Americans were willing to work on a modified Contact Group plan and to open talks with Pale if necessary .. The idea was to
get the Allies on board first so that the plan could be presented to the parties with a
unified But the paper was vague on how to approach the Balkan leaders. suggesting only that the United States should broaden negotiations with Milosevic --
either with Bildt. or with an American mission - to encourage him to bring his Pale
clients to the negotiating table; should begin a bilateral dialogue with the Bosnians,
pressing them to be more flexible; and should send a secret envoy to open talks with Pale. The State paper presented a modified version of the earlier SteinbergIFrasure
proposal to reach a three-party conference by combining the . Milosevic track with Sarajevo-Pale talks and broadening the negotiations to include Croatia. The goal would be to offer Milosevic the prospect of sanctions suspension once progress was made towards a negotiated settlement within Bosnia. After this. talks would begin between
66 Although Christopher and the President did not discuss Bosnia, talking points for Christopher's phone
call were prepared by Steinberg. See "Talking Points for the Secretary's Conversation with the President
on ex-Yugoslavia." no date. Steinberg SIP files. In an August 13 meeting, Christopher told the President
that "While we urgently need to get Bosnia behind us, we must not neglect the main tbemes [or}
accomplishments of your foreign policy." See Christopher hand-written notes for meeting with the
President, August 13, 1995. Secretary's August 1995 out-box filesIBosnia. In his October22 interview.
Christopher recalls supporting the NSC plan almost without reservation; however, some NSC officials
remember differently.
67 For details, see Tamoff interview.
61 Woodward, pp265.66.
69 The had been receiving regular briefings from Lake since July 17, leading one official to
observe that the August 7 meeting was "pre-cooked" toward the NSC approach. See Bass interview.
70 Bass interview.
40

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UNCLASSIFIED
Izetbegovic and Milosevic on principles for a Bosnian settlement that would govern talks between_ Sarajevo and Pale. The initiative would then be broadened to include Croatia as well.
The Foreign Policy Team finaily decided to combine elements from both papers in developing both the strategic and logistic form of the mission. The initiative would begin, as the NSC bad suggested. With an. American team traveling to at least London, Bonn and Paris. But would the purpose ofthe mission be to seek the Allies views on the American proposals. or would it simply be to infonn them of decisions the U.S. had already made? The Principals debated the issue at length, and in the end, the President
selected the latter.
71
This would not be a mission; as had happened with Secretary Christopher in the May 1993, where the U.S. would allow its Allies to reject its proposals. A U.S. delegation would instead the Allies what actions the President had decided to take, and request their support.
Since Lake was considered the godfather of this initiative. it was agreed (apparently> at Albright's suggestion) that he should be the one to cany it to Europe.
72
He would be accompanied by an inter-agency team, representing the Bosnia expertise of the entire Administration.
73
After the visit to Europe, the Anierican mission would continue on to the region, conducting "shuttle diplomacy" between the three Balkan
capitals. A high-level American delegation would talk directly with the p3rties, pursuing a comprehensive settlement for the entire region. not just in Bosnia. Althollgh the
Principals were willing to relax the strict U.S. policy against talking with they
decided that there was no need to rush things. The shuttle team would meet with the
three Balkan presidents on its first mission. but it had no immediate plans to meet with
the Bosnian Serb leaders.
The Team also-'agreed that it would not be practical for Lake to spend his time conducting the potentially protracted shuttle negotiations that would hopefully fol1o-w his
European trip.. He would bow out after briefing our partners in Europe, and Assistant
Secretary of State Holbrooke would Jead the team to negotiate in the Balkans.
The choice of Holbrooke to lead the mission raised some eyebrows among the President's senior advisors. As the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Holbrooke seemed to be the logical choice. he had the reputation for being something of a maverick within the Administration, and both Lake and Albright expressed some reservations about his taking over the American initiative. Holbrooke had not hidden his disdain with the direction of the Administration's Bosnia policy, nor was it a secret that
he wished to return 10 the private sector in New York City, where his family lived.
74
Newly married, Holbrooke had spent the latter part of July and early August - a time of
71 Steinberg interview; Bass interview.
'12 Vershbow interview; Bass interview; Albright interview; Tamoffinterview.
7J Christopher recalls calling Lake while returning to the US from Asia. ". talked to him about the: basic
thrust the [diplomatic mission 'sJ instructions and urged him to take Peter Tamoff with him, which he
was very glad to do." They also discussed the substance of the as well as the decision to have
Holbrooke lead the Balkan shuttles. Christopher interview, October22. 1996. Note: a record of this can
will not be found in State Department Operations Center Telephone logS; it was placed directly from
Honolulu.
'''Indeed, in a widely quoted statement in the MarchlApril1995 issue oftbe influential journal Foreign
Affairs, Holbrooke had declared that Bosnia represented "the greatest collective security failure of the West
since the 1930's." See Foreign Affairs 74. p40.
s
41
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UNCLASSIFIED
intense political decision - on a long-scheduled vacation. Holbrooke had opted out of
. most of the policy debates on Bospia that summer (deferring to Frasure),. believing that it was mostly wheel-spinning. To him. it was one thing to create tough policies on
but quite another to implement them. Holbrooke still doubted whether the Administration. had the will to implement the tough choices. Lake .was whether or not Holbrooke's "head was in the game." He briefly considered giving the lead to Tamoff. Frasure, or even Charles Redman, the former Balkan negotiator who had replaced Holbrooke as the American ambassador to Germany. Christopher had told the President that he had confidence in Holbrooke and believed that his aggressive Assistant
Secretary would be well-suited for dealing with the equally contentious and stubborn Balkan leaders. In the end, Lake agreed. The President approved Holbrooke as chief negotiator for the initiative.
7S
The meeting adjourned, and that afternoon the President called his three key Allies
- Chirae, Major, and Kohl _. to inform them of his decision and to tell them that Lake and Tamoff would be corning. The President did not discuss specifics of Lake's
presentation, but all three leaders expressed enthusiasm for the Lake visit.
76
Over the course of the next day, August 8, Vershbow and his staff worked with other officials, including Steinberg and Frasure. to draft the talking points for Lake's
effort. The points were carefully crafted, as they were intended to be used as a "script
U
to be read rather than reminders to be referred to.
77
During these drafting sessions, the four
endgame papers evolved into a single U.S. strategy for mission. The talking
points could indeed be read as the fi:nal strategic product of the "blue-sky" thinking Lake
had asked for two months ago.
.
Clinton met with his Foreign Policy Team that evening, where he personally went
over the talking points, focusing in particular on the proposed "carrots and sticks" to be
used in gaining bargaining leverage.
7S
Addressing the absolute worst--case scenario - that the U.S. initiative failed and both Bosnians and Serbs were to thus
undennining the "carrot and stick" approach - the President decided that the U.S. couldn't force UNPROFOR withdrawal on its Allies. "I don't think we would have a strong enough rationale to shoot [UNPROFOR] down'" the President said. Yet, if the
Allies refused to make UNPROFOR more robust, the U.S. would withdraw support.
wiU shut it [UNPROFOR] down in the blink of an eye if it isn't toughenough/' the
President declared.
7$ While away. Holbrooke had deferred most of his duties on .Bosnia to his deputy Bob Frasure. Before
leaving on vacation, the Assistant Secretary had told Tari'lOff that ifhe was not appointed as the chief
negotiator, he would resign from the Administration. Holhrooke felt that he bad been brought back from
Gennany in 1994 to broker a peace in Bosnia. but that the Administration had not given him a chance.
See Holbrooke interview with author, September 19, 1996 (notes); Vershbow interview; Bass interview
(author's notes); Tarnoff interview; Christopher interview; Albright interview.
76 See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President and British Prime Minister Major;
French President Jacques Chirae; and German Chancellor HelmlJt Kohl. August 7 1995,"NSC
Memoranda (3 separate telcons), August 8. 1995. Christopher also cabled his counterparts in Europe to
inform them of the mission. see "Secretary's Letter 10 Counterparts, RE: Lake Trip," Cable, State 190102.
August 10. 1995.
71 Bass interview.
1S Woodward. p266; "Talking Points on Bosnia for Consultations with Allies." Draft version. August 8.
1995.
42
7
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UNCLASSIFIED
..,
On territorial issues, Perry and Shalikashvili stressed that Gorazde was indefensible
and the Bosnians should be pressed to trade it for other areas - thus making Bosnian
territory more militarily defensible. Lake replied that the Bosnians "have a right to
. Gorazeie," but not at the cost of destroying the rest of the plan. They agreed to "punt" the
Gorazde issue for the time being. Moreover, the President decided that if diplomacy
failed, any U.S. military commitment to the Bosnians would,be conditional; acquiescing
to the Pentagon's concerns, the U.S. would not support Bosnian efforts to regain territory
(but would heIp the Bosnians defend the territory they had).79
The Foreign Policy Team met one final time at 7:40am August 9, with the Lake
delegation scheduled to depart at lOam. Although the press had gotten wind of the
upcoming mission, the Administration had been careful not to raise expectations too high.
All that was known was that the Americans were presenting "ideas" to their Allies; as far
as the press knew, they did not have a fonnal plan, nor a new map. The details of s
"script" were likewise kept strictly confidential. ' The, Administration did not want the
press claiming that the Americans had abandoned the Contact Group plan were
betraying their Bosnian partners in the process.
The nine-page "script" Lake would use began with the broad themes under which
the U.S. approached the crisis.
8o
U.S. policy, the points read, "is still guided by several
enduring principles and interests: maintaining our relationships with Allies" and credibility .
of NATO; avoiding conflict with Russia that could undennine reform and international
cooperation; and preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war ....
The points recognized that Croatia' 5 recent action, although "not endorsed by any of us,"
created a unique strategic opportunity by mitigating Bosnian Serb strengths and reducing
their territorial holdings .. 'Lake would tell the Allies that this opening provided a chance
to pursue a bold initiative: "We don't have the time to think in terms of partial solutions
or muddling through. We should think boldly and make an all-out effort to reach a
settlement."
The talking points then outlined the terms for a settlement in Bosnia. In the days
following the August 7 meeting. these tenus had been focused into seven points: 1) The
settlement would be ornprehensive, leading to lasting peace within Bosnia and the
region. 2) It would include three-way mutual recognition among Croatia, Serbia, and '
Bosnia with a country-wide and end to offensiye'militaIy operations. 3) The
Americans would push the parties to negotiate more viable borders reflecting the recent
changes on the ground in Bosnia, but not rejecting the Contact Group map out of hand.
Although the NSC and Defense papers had advocated pressing the Bosnians to trade
Gorazde for Serb-held territory, State officials had. successfully lobbied to tone down the
language. The Americans would suggest flexibility, but not press the Bosnians to trade
Gorazde if they demurred. 4) Constitutjonally. Bosnia would remain one state, but would
be composed of two highly autonomous entities (most likely, one majority-Serb and
another majority-Muslim/Croat), the details of which would be worked out in talks with
the parties. 5) Rather than the limited sanctions_suspension package for Serbia proposed
in the Frasure and Bildt talks, the United States would be' prepared to take a Hbold
approach" to sanctions relief. The Americans would be willing to accept a "suspension"
"19 Vershbow interview. September 26, 1996.
10 "Talking Points on Bosnia for Consultations with Allies: August 10-14, 1995." Final version as
delivered, August 13.1995.
1 7 &
UNCLASSIFIED
43
,/
UNCLASSIFIED
of economic sanctions against Serbia once an agreement was signed, with complete
lifting of sanctions when an agreement was implemented. 6) The settlement must include
a Croat-Serb agreement SID Eastern Slavonja, a sectio.n of resource-rich land between
Croatia and Serbia that the {yIo countries fought over in 1991 and the Serbs now
occUpied. This would, of course. be a prerequisite for winning mutual recognition
between Serbia and Croatia. And lastly the settlement would include a comprehensive
program for regional reconstruction. This last point was particularly significant
to the diplomatic initiative, because although the United States would lead the
negotiations, European contributions to the reconstruction program would be a substantial
"carrot" for agreement.
The keys to this new initiative were the "carrots" and "sticks" that would be used
with both sides to entice them to come to the negotiating table. In addition to economic.
reconsiruction. the carrots were: enforcement of the' peace terms by NATO and military
assistance for the Bosnians; movement toward integration into European institutions for'
the Croats; sanctions relieffor the Serbs; and legal territorial rights for the Pale Serbs. In .
contrast to earlier plans, . the initiative's innovation was its threat .of sticks, which Lake
understood as a valuable tool to gain negotiating leverage.
gt
The- carrots were necessary
for reaching a but not sufficient. Specifically, tbe U.S: would outline to the
Balkan leaderS the consequences of the "failure -- not reaching a" settlement and
UNPROFOR withdrawal. The use of sticks would be calibrated. to the particular failure
scenario. If the Bosnians negotiated in good faith. but the Serbs proved the
Bosnians would get <'lift and strike" and "equip and i.e., NATO air strikes against
the Serbs during UNPROFOR withdrawal, a lifting of the anns embargo, and American
military training. But if the Bosnians were cause for failure, they would be faced with
lift and leave;" Le.; -the U.S. would lift the arms embargo, but provide no airstrikes,
anus, or training. This latter "stick" was crucial, because the Americans feared the
Bosnians would otherwise find the fonner failure scenario -leading to "lift-and-strike"--
more attractive than agreeing to a settlement. The U.S. would have to make it clear to
Sarajevo that American support was not unconditional.
At the morning White House meeting, Lake restated his understanding of the
mission. He was to infonn the Europeans of what the President had decided to do and to
ask them to come on board. . while the Americans were willing to listen to
suggestions, they were committed to go ahead -- with or without their support.
Christopher, who had just returned from expressed his support for the mission,
although he remained somewhat guarded about the difficulties the U.S. would face should
it have to implement the failure scenario. His concerns about the failure scenario
reflected many of those in the room, but they decided to push forward. The President
remained convinced that the United States had to take advantage of this opportunity_If
they did.not act now, they would not have the chance later. The meeting reviewed the
mission one last time, and Clinton suggested that Lake present the Europeans with his
. carrot;5 before the sticks, which he eventually did. Then Lake left for the airport with his
interagency delegation -- Tamoff and Frasure-from State; Vershbow and Peter Bass of
the NSC; Lt. General Wesley Clark of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Joseph Kruzel" tbe
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Affairs.
32
1/ Vershbow 1996; Bass interview.
B2 Woodward. p267; Bass interview; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Tamoff interview .
44

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The Mission to Europe
UNCLASSIFIED

As the Lake delegation departed> the only scheduled stops 'of the trip were London,
Bonn and Paris. They were uncertain about the reception they were going to get,
particularly' in London and Paris, and wanted to test the initiative with these three key
Allies before moving further. In London oil August 10, they met at the
where the British expressed enthusiastic support for the U:S. plan. After the first meeting,
the team understood that the reaction to the plan was likely to be positive. "As we got out
theret Tarnoff recalled, "the idea seemed to gain favor. Tony in particular felt that the
time had come to touch as many bases as possible." Therefore, the delegation began to
add to the schedule visits to Rome, Madrid' (who then held the chair. of the El!
presidency), Ankara, and Sochi, Crimea, where they would consult with the vacationing
Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev.
83
.
. That . the team met in Bonn with the Gennans. While the Germans
accepted the U.S. plan, they "made a slight play" at asserting more leadership. Their
representative to the Contact Group. Michael Steiner, had been one of the more active
members in pursuing a Balkan settlement, and the Gennans $eeined to want to be
included in a diplomatic negotiation. This struck some in the team as an effor:t by the
Gennans to force the . Americans to prove how committed they .really were.
84
Nevertheless, the Gennans supported the plan with some minor suggestions. They were
concerned that the diplomatic "sticks" not be used too forcefully; they did not want the
. BosnIans compelled to accept an "unreasonable" agreement. As a corollary to the arm-
and-train component of the plan, the Gennans suggested creating an anns control regime 15
. for the region. ..
On August 11, the' team arrived in Paris, for what they thought would be the most
contentious of the consultations. During the talks surrounding the London Conference a
few weeks prior, negotiations with the French had proved the most difficult. Chime had
taken an acute and vocal interest in shaping the West's approach toward Bosnia, and the
U.S. feared that the French would have reservations. Surprisingly, French officials
expressed "One-hundred percent support" for the U.S. initiative, welcoming the u new
U.S. d.etermination.,.86 . Yet, the French, like the Gennans, were leery of the perception
that this was an "American" initiative rather than one of the Contact Group or the UN.
They suggested pursuing a joint plan, possibly through the Contact Group, with Carl
Bildt taking a prominent role. Lake reassured them, explaining that the first American
shuttle would be "exploratory:' after which the negotiations would be conducted under
the aegis of the Contact Group.81 This comment was a bit of diplomatic finesse -- the
U.S. had no intention of letting the Europeans lead this negotiating effort, but were
willing to stamp the imprimatur of the Contact Group on the negotiations to satisfy the
Europeans' need to feel involved. The French. who' were also 'impressed by the U.S.
I) The team knew that they wanted to consult the Russians, but were not sure how or where when they
departed Washington; Tamoffinterview; Bass interview:
a. Chu-k interview; September 18, 1996.
IS These points were.fOl:mally relayed to the US a few days later. See "Gennany Supports US Bosnia
Initiative," Cable, Bonn 16359. August 14. J995.
.
16 Repon of Paris meetings in "Lake Delegation's Taiks in Paris, August II," CabJe. Paris 19356, August
16,1995.
17 Clark interview.
& 45
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
s
commitment to deploy 20,000 troops to implement an eventually accepted this approach.
ss
The next day, August 12, the Lake delegation visited both and Rome. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and Foreign Minister Javier Solana
welcomed" the U.S. plan, as did Italian officials Sergio Vento and Salleo. 9 The only surprise of this day was some news the delegation received from back home. Holbrooke, who was supposed to rendezvous with the team in London on August 14 for the "baton-passing," was featured in the New York Times voicing his frustration with U.S. ,policy" 90 When the delegation received this article by faxin Rome, it was met with incredulity, anger and concern. Such a development was exactly what the National Securlty Advisor had feared: the who was supposed to take over, this mission was publicly talking about leaving the Administration. Lake had already planned to have a private meeting with Holbrooke in London, and he knew now that it would be more than a discussion on the substance of the negotiations. It would have to be a frailk discussion
to see if the Assistant Secretary was errtotionaJlyprepared to lead the initiative.
91
From Rome the Lake delegation traveled to the Crimea, where on August 13 they
met with Kozyrev at his beautiful summer home on the Black Sea. Of all the meetings;
this was expected to be the trickiest; the-Russians were hypersensitive partners, and' had
recently sought to carve out a role for themselves in negotiating a BalkaD settlement.
92
They were historically tied to Serbia and had actively engaged the Bosnian Serbs.
Moreover, if NATO troops were going to be used to implement an agreement. the U.S- would likely have to work very hard 10 secure Russia's cooperation. In spite of these
concerns, the talks with Kozyrev went well. As Lake read through the talking the
Russian Foreign Minister was surprisingly placid -- he had fewer with the plan than even the Kozyrev explained to the U.S. delegation Russia's own domestic
pressures (at the time the right-wing dominated Duma was putting pressure on Yeltsin to Jift the embargo against Serbia). On the specifics of the strategy, Kozyrev recommended
that the u.S. deal directly with Milosevic in order to "deliver" the Bosnian Serbs, and
IS During this meeting, Lt. General Clark raised the need to begin looking at what military assistance would
be required to implement a peace settlement. Clark suggested tbat an informal political-military working
roup be created to discuss such issues, to which the French' agreed. See Clark interview; Paris 19356. '
See "Visit of APSNA Lake to Spain, August 12,1995," Cable, Madrid 8551, August 17,1995;"NSA
L*e Meetings with Italian Officials On Fonner YugosJavia." Cable, Rome 11349, August 14,1995.
90 See Tim Weiner, "Clinton's Balkan Envoy Finds Himself Shut Out," New York Times, August 12. f 995.
91 In retrospect, the New York Times incident was more innocent than it seemed' at the time. Holbrooke had
been interviewed over a month earlier for the article, and the reporter had held onto the stol)' since. Early
the morning of August II, Strobe Talbott caJIed Holbrooke ;n Colorado, asking him to return to
Washington to lead the Balkan shuttle. When Holbrooke first saw the Times article. he was already in the
Salt Lake City airport on his way back to Washington. Of course, no one in Lake's group in Rome knew
of these finer points. See Holbrooke interview 3 (notes); Vershbow interview, July 23, 1996; Bass
interview.
92 On August I, Christopher and Kozyrev met in Brunei on the margins of the annual APEC Ministerial
Conference to discuss the Bosnian situation. particularly Kozyrev's recent trip to Belgrade and Russian
, support of the Bildt Pl.an. See "Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev." Cable, SECTO
160 J 9, August 3, 1995; "Your Meeting with Kozyrev: Bosnia:' Memorandum to the SecretaI)' from
Tamoff (P), July 31, 1995. On August 8, Christopher sent a letter to Kozyrev to infonn him thai the US
had crafted a new initiative, and that the Lake delegation may come calling. See "Message for Foreign
Minister Kozyrev," Cable (draft), August 8, 1995.
46
uNCLASSIFIED

urged the U.S. to push for an early cease-fire between the parties.
93
But overall, Kozyrev told Lake that "we don't want to argue about ideas, we just want to engage with you to
search for solutions.,,94
.Following a 'stop in Ankara in which discussions focused on Turkey's participation in the proposed arm-and-train initiative for the' Bosnians, the delegation arrived in London late the evening of August 13.
95
There they were met by Holbrooke and NSC aide Nelson Drew. who were to comprise the regional shuttle team .along with Clark and Kruze1.
96
talks with the European partners had gone very: and the U.S. initiative could now be presented to the Balkan parties with the full.force of the international community behind it.' The next day. which included a brief follow-up meeting with British officials, the U.S. delegation briefed Holbrooke on their trip and reviewed his strategy for his Balkan interlocutors.
91
. Also that morning, Lake and H<?lbrooke went off to a private room in the American EmbaSsy to taik.
By all aCcounts. this "hand-off' meeting was important both strategically and emotionally. Strategically, Lake and HoJbrooke discussed the Allied response, as well as the goals of the regional shuttle. Holbrooke recalls telling Lake that the U.S. needed to prepared for failure: "We should not let expectations outrun reality. We [will} give it our best. but it [will] be a very difficult process." he Lake handed Holbrooke his own talking points for the parties, which had been finalized by the delegation the night before.
The points reviewed the seven texms of the settlement and outlined the "carrots'" and
. "sticks.,,99 Lake urged Uolbrooke to use the points not as guidance. but as a script.
93 As the Lake team brought the initiative to Europe, officials in Washington continued highlevel contacts
with both the Croatians the Bosnians. urging them not to anow the militaty conflict to escalate. While
their military successes had helped open the window. US officials remained concerned that their diplomatic
. efforts would be undennined if tbe Croats an(f Bosnians ovespJayed their hand. In calls to Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman and Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Vice President Gore and Defense Secretary
Peny asked that the Croats cease further militaIy actions, so as "not to lose all the positive benefits of the
last week." They also informed the Croatians of the US initiative and the planned regional shuttle. Gore
repeated these same points in a call to President [zerbegovic. See, respectively. "Telephone
Conversation: Secretaty of Defense Peny and Croatian Defense Minister Susak." DoD memorandum.
August J J, 1995; "Vice Presidential Telephone Call: Vice President Gore, Croatian
State Department Operations Center Tetcon, August 12,1995; "Vice-Presidential Telephone Call: Vice
President Gore and President lzetbegovic of Bosnia, " State Department Operations Center Telcon.
13, "
.
'
94 Clartc interview, September 18, 1996; see also Versbbow interview. September 26. 1996; Bass intelView;
and "KoZyrev-Lake Balkan Meeting in Sochi." Cable, Moscow 26215, August 17. 1995. See "NSA Lake's Meeting with FM Inou," Cable, Ankara 9594. August 17, 1995; and "Official-
Infonnal (memcon of Lake's meeting with PM Ciller)," Cable, Ankara 9384, August 14, 1995.
96 Lake, Vershbow and Bass would return to Washington; Tamoffbad already split off from the trip after
the meeting in Madrid. .
. 97 On August 13, Clinton and Major had discussed the positive response to the initiative, as well as next
steps. See "Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major." Cable. State 19859 J, August 21, 1995. At
the Lake meeting on August 14. British officials raised some questions about Serbian sanctions, the tim ing
of lifting the arms embargo, and the need to push for closure on the map. Lake expressed concern about
General Janvier's reported private comments that an airstrike on Gorazde would rnean the end of
UNPROFOR. If such views were made publicly, Lake asserted. "our deterrence would lose all credibility:'
See "NSA Lake's August 14 Bosnia Meeting with HMG Officials." Cable. London 11621, August 17,
1995.
91 See Holbrooke, "The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker. October 21 & 28,1996. 99 "Talking Points for the Bosnian Government,to NSC Memorandum. August 13. 1995.
z
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.
"

Emotionally, the discussion turned to the opportunity this initiative presented.
Holbrooke and Lake had been linked for over thirty years personally and professionally; both entered the Foreign Service in 1962, served in Vietnam during the 1960s, and held high-level State Department posts in the Carter Administration.
loo
They were simultaneously genuine friends and fierce rivals. After the events of the summer and the
unkept secret that HOlbrooke was unhappy, Lake". wanted to be sure he understood the - stakes. This was what Holbrooke had been preparing for his entire life, Lake told him. This was his moment - he had been trained his entire professional career for such a negotiation. If it went well, he would garner the glory.IOI
/00 Lake as Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Holbrooke as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
Affairs.
..
10/ Details of meeting from Bass interview; Vershbow interview, July 23,1996; Holbrooke interview with
author (notes), October 16. 1996; and Woodward. p p 2 6 S 6 9 ~
48
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Chapter Three
Tragedy as Turning Point: The First
Shuttle, Mt. Igman, and Operation
De'liberate Force
Following the hand-off meeting with Lake in London; Holbrooke departed the afternoon of August 14 with Clark, Kruzel, and Drew for Split, Croatia. The results of the Lake trip had been very positive, with the Allies fmuly in support of the new U.S: initiative. To Holbrooke, the Lake mission successfully represented a new departure in U.S. policy; a departure. significantly, with the imprimatur of President,
Clinton. "The trip by Tony Lake, the President's National Security Advisor, conveyed,
as no, other signal could, that the President was personally behind these' negotiations," Holbrooke has written. "It was a valuable prelude to out shuttle diplomacy, investing it
with far greater credibility than previous American negotiating efforts.,.1
The next and most crucial step was to sustain this momentum with the regional
leaders. The Holbrooke team would not only present the parties with the details ,of the initiative. but outline the array of carrots and sticks that the U.S. and its Allies were
willing to deploy. - Despite the success of mission. Holbrooke remained
pessimistic that an agreement could be worked out. He had told Lake in London that the
chance for success was only "fifteen percent." Holbrooke knew that the parties would
bave to compromise a great deal, and he was not entirely convinced that they were
prepared to do SO.2
That the parties had to change was well understood by officials in Washington. In a detailed "gameplan" paper prepared for the negotiating team, State Department officials in 'the European Bureau noted that "achieving of our goals will require significant changes in the stances of all the parties. The Bosnians will have to adjust their thinking on the map. Croatia will have to accept something short of immediate return of Sector East, [and] MiIosevic will have to adjust his stance on sanctions relief to fit the new situation."
According to the "gameplan," the Holbrooke delegation would have to overcome four obstacles to achieve U.S. objectives: 1) break the logjam over the Contact Group
map by exploring Bosnian flexibility on territorial exchanges; 2) get the Bosnian Serbs' to accept the Contact Group map as a basis for negotiations; 3) solve the Croat-Serbian confrontation in Eastern and 4) fmd some way to get the Bosnian Serbs to engage in serious discussions? The, delegation would have to make it clear to the parties
I Quotc from preliminary draft of H olbr60kc' s memoirs, Chapter 2 (September 21, J 996), pI O.
2 Holbrookc interview 3 (notes).
) The difficulties with the Bosnian Serbs were more than merely getting them to come to the table-
negotiators had to decide how and where to meet them. Slate officials believed that any meeting with
&
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that if they did not negotiate in good faith, "UNPROFOR will leave - with all the consequences that would flow from such a decision." In this sense, U.S. officials believed that uncertainty could work to the advantage of their strategy: if the parties were concerned about the potential consequences of not cooperating, emphasizing specifically "lift-and-leave" - UNPROFOR withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo -- they might be more amenable to approach the peace table.
4
.
o.
The Croatians and Bosnians
. Getting the Bosnian leadership to agree to the principles of the initiative was an important first obstacle for U.S. negotiators. They realized from intelligence reports that many Bosnians were already suspicious of the U.S. ro sal believing that it simply amounted to a "carve-up" of Bosnia.
the Bosnians were angty that they had not been consulted dunng onnation of the U.S. initiative, and felt tliat the plan was "an effort to obtain peace at any price,"s U.S. diplomats reported similar skepticism. On August 14. Bosnian Federation Vice Presi4ent Ejup Ganie voiced his concerns about the initiative to the U.S. Ambassador to Austria. Swanee Hunt. Meeting in a hospital room outside Vienna where he was recovering from a serious auto accident, Ganic claimed that the draft plan "does not look promising." The Bosnians were now
invigorated by the Croat successes in the Krajina and around Bihac, and felt encouraged about their own military possibilities." Likewise; Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed
Sacirbey had hinted as much iIi a telephone conversation with Ambassador Albright on
that same day, indicating that Bosnia planned to continue its militaIy operations in
central, southern, and westcm Bosnia. On a more hopeful note, Sacirbey also told
Albright that President lzetbegovic wanted to avoid another winter at war and that it is
time to make a deal;" . The Holbrooke delegation was ready to test the win behind this
7

assertion.
.
The team intended to present the plan first to the Bosnians. but nature interfered.
On the morning of August 15, the team had attempted to travel to Sarajevo, but after a harrowing two-hour helicopter ride, was turned back due to inclement weather. Unable to get into the Bosnian capital, the team invited Foreign Minister Sacirbey to Split to present to him the key points of the U.S. initiative. Since Sacirbey's drive would take nearly ten hours. the team decided to spend the afternoon with Ambassador Galbraith in the Croatian town of Imoski. There, they watched Assumption Day festivities including a 25,000 person Mass, .and over lunch they met with Croat Foreign Mate Granic
and Tudjman's Special Envoy Miopur Zuzul. Holbrooke and Frasure outlined the peace initiative for the two Croatian officials, who responded favorably. After the meeting. Holbrooke reflected that it been better to present the plan to the Croatians first -- they
Karadzjc or MJadic should take place inside Bosnia, although the prosecutor of the International War
Crimes Tribunal had infonned the US tbat he would "not mind if a meeting were to take place in
Belgradeo
See Siate Department paper, "Proposals for Next Round of Negotiations: GamepJan for Regional Mission
no date. Not clear who saw the memorandum, although was found in EUR. COS. and SIP files.
toMy rou"" m."ting wi.h 0,. Ejup G .. k," Cable, \7" ... 6396, AUg1I IS, 1995.
I
7 "Ambassador Albright's tcleon with Bosnian Foreign Minister Saeirbey." Cable, USUN 3109. August 15.
1995.
50
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Bl
UNcLAsIfIb
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could now tell Milosevic thai Tudjman supported the initiative - referring to the fog that prevented the team from going to Sarajevo as the "fortuitous fog."s
Later that day, the team returned to' Split to see Sacirbey. They met for 2 112 hours in the back of the delegation's military airplane to ensure privacy. The meeting went well, later characterized by. Frasure as "a good start" and "generally constructive;" Holbrooke walked Sacirbey through Lake's seven points, explaining that they had the full backing of the President and that the U.S. would support the goals of the Bosman government within the general framework' of the 1994 Contact Group plan.' As outlined the carrots and sticks, Sacirbey paid particular attention to the subject of lJNPROFOR withdrawal and lift-and-strike. Disturbingly, the Bosnian Foreign Minister indicated that a scenario involving lift-and-strike "might be more interesting for the Bosnians than reaching a peace accord." Sacirbey also complained about the light" received from Washington on Bosnian military advances (presuniablyconveyed during his telephone conversation with Albright the previous day)9; stressed his desire for a strong Bosniac-Croat federation government; reaffmned the integrity of the 51-49 territorial division; and outlined the need for Sarajevo to be under UN control.
On Gornzde, Sacirbey insisted that the Bosnians keep it. Holbrooke agreed, and
therefore did not ask for any changes in consideration ofGorazde's status. To assure that
there was no question about this sentiment, Holbrooke told Sacirbey to deny publicly that the U.S. had pressured the Bosnians to give it up. With the telegenic and
media-savvy Sacirbey
This Gorazde announcement was the first substantive departure from Lake's
seven points, which had outlined that the U.S. would seek to "steer" the Bosnians to trade Gorazde for Serb concessions. Although many U.S. officials, particularly those in the
Pentagon, felt that Bosnian territory ne'eded to be more compact and militarily defensible,
Holbrooke strongly believed that the U.S. could not ask them to give up the safe area in eastem Bosnia. He had told Lake this in London, and the National Security' Advisor did
not push. the issue. With Sacirbey's public statement, Holbrooke hoped that trading
II . . Gorazde would now be off the table.
While Sacirbey's comments that day to the team were supportive of the U.s. approach. Holbrooke. Frasure and Kruzel were troubled bY'his statement that the failure
scenario seemed attractive. They feared that there could be a flaw in the U.S. plan -- the
. Bosnians might misperceive the "stick" of lift-and-leave as a "carrot." The Bosnians possibly did not believe that the U.S. would ever simply lift the arms embargo and walk away; they felt they had too much support in the U.S., particularly on Capitol Hill. Although Sacirbey's comment merely suggested this, the U.S. team knew that they would have to maintain the pressure on the Bosnians and remind them that if their intransigence killed an agreement, they would be left behind.
12
a See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p41; Galbraith intelView 2; Owen interview; Menzies interview; HiIJ
comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke intelView 3 (notes).
9 According to fhe telcon, Albright had urged mat the Bosnian military be careful not to overextend itself in
action around Bihac. She did not threaten Sacirbey, but merely told him continued action might be unwise.
10 See Memorandum from Kornblum (EUR) to Christopher, "Holbrooke Mission: Meeting with SacirbCy ....
(based on FraslJre phone call). August J5, 1995; and, Kruzel notes (both type-written and hand.written)
"Conversation with Sacirbey -- Comments of Peace Agreement," undated.
"Holbrooke interview 3 (notes).
12 Hill. Clark. Kerrick and HoJbrooke comments. Dayton History Seminar.

51
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e
After the meeting in Split the U.S. team left for Zagreb. In contrast to Sacirbey's
generally favorable response to the plan, the teain received a much different Bosnian
reaction when Frasure met that night with Hasan Muratovic. a Bosnian Muslim and
Prime Minister of the Federation. In a passionate appraisal of the U.S. plan, the
Federation minister explained that while it was "interesting," it wouldn't work. In .his
view, there was "not enough in it" for Milosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic .. Muratovic went
on to explain that he .had concluded that the Contact Group plan was dead,
and that the only viable solution was the partition of Bosnia - with a 60/40 breakdown in
favor of the Bosnians. "lfthe Serbs leave," he said, "they don't deserve to take haJfthe .
country with them". Perhaps when the U.s. proposal "runs onto the rocks," Muratovic
mused, "the time will have to approach Belgrade on a partition deal..,13
Tudjman: The Master of the. Game
On the morning of the 16th, the Holbrooke delegation, joined by the U.S.
Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, met with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.
Tudjrnan, a General in the Yugoslav Army, was clearly by recerit Croat
military successes in the Krajiria. Frasure commented that the Croat President was c'flush
with victory." Ambassador Galbraith remarked to the American delegau9n that he had
not seen Tudjman so ebullient in eighteen months. The Croatian President responded
positively but vaguely to the American peace initiative, sharing the U.S. view that recent
Croat gains on the battlefield offered "favorable conditions" for a peaceful solution. He
stressed that Croatia's priorities lay with the situation in Eastern Slavonia (or as the
Croats called it, the territories''), and that he wanted to reintegrate the area into
Croatia. On the Bosniac-Croat federation. Tudjman professed a desire to strengthen it but
expressed that it waS "a heavy cross to bear" -- there was considerable resistance- from
Bosnian Croats to cooperate with Bosnian Muslims. .
Tudjman also asserted that the only lasting solution in Bosnia was territorial"
partition, alluding to his infamous "menu map" of three months earlier as the only
solution in the mutual interest of both sides.
14
Holbrooke firmly rejected this statement,
asserting that "no involuntary dismembennent [of Bosnia] was acceptable to the U.S .. "
Joseph Kruzel reiterated that the purpose of the U.S. plan was to provide Bosnia a chance
to decide its own future. Backtracking a bit. Tudjman said that he supported that idea
"for the time but reminded the delegation that they must keep in mind the
"strategic realities of the future" in drawing the boundaries between the and
"western" worlds:> fatalism concerned the U.S. negotiators. They knew they
'3 "Muratovic Says US Plan Won't Work: It's Time For Partition," Cable, Belgrade 44104, August 18.
1995.
'4 It had been widely reported that Tudjman had foretold tbese intentions during a May6, 1995 V-E
anniversary dinner in London,. where he drew up a rough sketch of his plans on a table menu. The map he
drew partitioned Bosnia in two, between the Serbs and the Croats. Holbrookc explains that to this day
Tudjml!-n claims that he was merely drawing a handwritlen version of an old French map showing the
territorial divisions between Catholicism and Islam. See HolbJOoke interview with author (notes), October
17, 1996; and Thomas Friedman, "Whose Balkan Menu?," New York Times, September27, 1996.
IS This comment retleeted Tudjrnan's nationalist idea that the "west" (meaning Croatia) and the "east"
(Muslims and Serbs) could never coexist, and that eventually, these worlds would have to be divided. 52
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needed to make clear to the Croats that such views were not conducive to the peace
process. I
6
Following a luncheon with Tudjman. the American delegation split uP. with Holbrooke and Clark meeting with Yasusi the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) and Kruzel and Drew meeting with Zuzul, and Deputy Minister Ivo Sanader. Following up on the earlier discussion with Tudjman . Granic said he agreed with the main points of the U.S. proposal, particularly the language on Eastern Slavonia, sanctions lifting, and mutual recognition. Frasure told Granic that Tudjman's"bistorically deterministic" approach toward Bosnia was counterproductive. Backing Frasure, Kruzel posed a simple choice to Granic: play ball or lose .. "Croati.a must decide if it wishes to be viewed as a Western nation, with Western values and respectful of democratic Kruzel said, "or Croatia can forego such Western political, military and economic support should it decide to take advantage of short-term. gains and carve up Bosnia based on fears of an Islamic state in Europe." Kruzel's threats registered with the Foreign Minister - while Tudjman truly believed that his own solution (outlined by the ccmenu map") presented the bes.t result for the West. Granic said Croatia understood the "realities of the situation." Galbraith characterized this comment as evidence that Granic and Zuzul were "clearly uncomfortable with
Tudjman's grandiose strategic designs, recognized the potential difficulty this could and implied that Tudjman's views were not GOe (Govenunent of Croatia)
.policy."'
As the Holbrooke team left Zagreb for Belgrade, they were a bit disconcerted by
what they had seen and beard from the Croatians. Tudjman's boastful
clearly inspired by his military victories, was at best very problematic for the U.S.
initiative, and at wQrst a foreshadowing of renewed Croat-Serb. and possibly Croat-
Muslim conflict. Dizzy with success, the Croat President might push things too far. This'
perfonnance seemed to be the return of the "old Tudjman" the "Red Queen" from Alice in Wonderland. the chauvinistic, aggressive Tudjman of the 1993 Croat-Muslim war.
IS
In Galbraith's view, "with the success of Krajina and his belief that the U.S. is Croatia's best friend favoring it over all other Balkan parties, the old Tudjman has
reemerged with even greater vigor.u Galbraith felt, along with. Holbrooke and particularly Frasure, that Tudjman's recent display was precisely the type of behavior that caused the Muslim-Croat war. While the p.S. considered it unlikely that he would act to capture a slice of Bosnia in the near future, Tudjman's behavior could bring grave
. consequences to the fledgling Muslim-Croat Federation. This potential Tudjman
problem. Galbraith cabled "'needs to be nipped in the bud.',19 Despite these
'6 For Frasure's readout of the meeting, see "Frasure Readout of HolbrookcTudjman Discussion, August
16, 1995," notes taken by Kornblum (EUR); for Galbraith's report, see "Tudjman Hears US Proposal.
'In Principle' But Sees the Opportunities Differently," Cable, Zagreb 3146, August 17, J995; and
Galbraith"s Diplomatic Diary, pp41-42.-
.
J7 "Granic Accepts Main Points of US Regional Peace Proposal," Cable, Zagreb 3150, August 17,1995;
and Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p42.
II In a August 16 memorandum to Secretary Christopher reviewing the Zagreb talks, Kornblum
characterized Tudjman as "chauvinistic and war-happy." For a vivid portrait ofTudjman, see Glenny, p63.
19 "The 'Old' Tudjman Resurfaces in Anti-Muslim Tirade, New Map for B-H," Cable, Zagreb 3151,
August 17, 1995.
?
53
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very real concerns, the Holbrooke team had to deal with the more immediate problem at
hand: Slobodan Milosevic.
To the Table With "The Gambler"
. Milosevic, considered by many analysts the leader most responsible for the
Balkans' bloodshed, would need to be the linchpin in any peace agreement. Milosevic
was the Balkan version of Syria's Assad - a keen, relentless negotiator and ruthless
dictator averse to compromise, but critical to comprehensive peace in the. region. The
U.S. charge in Belgrade, Rudolph Perina, aptly characterized Milosevic as a "gambler" --
a leader desperately wanting a deal to "transfonn his 1.tand into real winnings," but willing
to up the ante and wait if the deal proved unacceptable. "Milosevic the gambler. is also
Milosevic the wily rug merchan4" Perina pointed out in a cable to Holbrooke. "If
[MiIosevic] does not get his bottom price, he will pass on the deal and move to limit his
political damage." Milosevic was prone to behavior captured in the Serb word "inar -- a
word that Serbs use to self-describe their proud, stubborn, all-or-nothing attitude. Perina
noted that while "Milosevic is more cunning and realistic than _most Serb leaders in
coping with pressure, he is not immune to the 'inat' syndrome ... after all he has gambled
over the past year, [he] will be looking for a deal that he can portray as a win, not just an
easing of punishment.,,20

Despite his proclivity for "inal," U.S. analysts felt that in the wake ofKrajina and
crippling interpational sanctions, Milosevic. would Qe ripe for a bargain. He had worlced
for the past year, first through talks with Frasure and most recently with to
negotiate an agreement to get the sanctions lifted. As the State "gameplan"
memorandum observed, "there is really only one issue [with MUosevic], tbe same one
that we have been for months: I
As they arrived in Belgrade, the Holbrooke
delegation felt that the U.S. nowhad the cards to his For HoIbrooke, this was a pivotal meeting. He had never met the Serbian leader
(Frasure and Perina were perhaps the two U.s. officials who Milosevic and
this first encounter would allow Holbrooke to show that there had been a new departure
in U.S. diplomacy. Milosevic had been described by fonner Secretary of State lames
Baker as a ''tough,'' a person who only understood the language of power. Holbrooke,
himself a fonnidable negotiator, knew that he had to deal with him firmly.
One way to play "hardball" with Milosevic, 'as Perina later suggested, would be to
use tactics lethat play upon Milosevic's inherent prejudices, fears, and emotions. Chief
among these were his hatred of Tudjrnan and Karadzic, two men "he considers :far
inferior to himself and yet perceived as successful in defying and upstaging him. His
personification of this conflict is key to his mindset and tactics." Accordingly, Perina
advised Holbrooke to warn Milosevic that any delay on' his part would prolong
circumstances "that allow Tudjman to circumvenfthe anns embargo." and leave open the
threat that Karadzic could be rehabilitated if he proved more forthcoming than Milosevic.
20 "Milosevic the Gambler." Cable, Belgrade 4039, August 15, 1995.
C

.
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Bl
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'.
au
While the u.s. didn't want to deal with the Bosnian Serb leader> Perina explained that leaving this option open would cause Milosevic to worry about being sidelined by Karadzic. Finally, Perina suggested that Milosevic be put on notice that economic sanctions would remain in place until he compromised. "Milosevic should be aware that he is not out of the woods on becoming another Saddam Hussein or Colonel Qadhafi if he
fails to deliver when needed.',22 , .
'
" '
The nearly six-hour August 17 meeting at the Presidency building in Belgrade has been described as an important' "get to know you, session" between Holbrooke and Milosevic. Talking Qver dinner, there'was a lot of banter about New York City and the banking world (Milosevic had once had a brief experience in the New York banking
, community, as had Holbrooke). Substantively, MiIosevic told the U.S. team that he could not recognize Croatia after what had happened in Krajina and, to no one's surprise,. he demanded a full lifting of sanctions against Serbia. 23 Milosevic also argued that any agreement should be put toa referendum of all Serbs as a way to convince Pale to accept it. He tried to distance himself from' the Bosnian Serbs, agreeing with a military assessment provided by Lt. General Wes Clark on the deteriorating situation of the Bosnian'Serb army. repeatedly railing against Karadzic as a crazy, dumb maniac."
Holbrooke bluntly told Milosevic that he had to prove he could handle Karadzic by overtaking him - proving that he alone would speak for the Bosnian SerbS: will not talk to you until you make a deal with the Bosnian Serbs," Holbrooke said. Further" he
warned Milosevic that if the negotiating effort failed, the U.S. would implement 'certain
"sticks." such as lift-and-strike, that would not be beneficial to
,
The Holbrooke delegation reported back to Washington that this first meeting
with the Serb leader was "inconclusive." Milosevic had said virtually nothing new, instead focusing on his referendum proposal, about which Holbrooke was skeptica1.
15
Milosevic's tirade against the Bosnian Serbs was a classic piece of empty showmanship-
, - well known to those with experience dealing with him. Since he had already broken
with Karadzic over the Contact GroJlp plan a year earlier, it was very easy for him to
disparage the Bosnian Serb leader. That night, Holbrooke and Frasure stayed at the Ambassadorial residence with Perina, where they discussed the fact that not much had changed since Frasure and, Perina had last met the Serbian leader in June.
Holbrooke was discouraged that little headway had been made with Milosevic. "Our August'17 meeting depressed me," Holbrooke wrote in his draft memoirs. uIt provided no indication that Milosevic h,ad changed any of his positions since Frasure's last visit [in June]. .. I thought he was playing games with us -- minor word games devoid
of substantive or serious content.,,2& The morning of August 18, the American negotiator
22 Memorandum for Holbrooke from Perina, "Playing Hardball with Milosevic," no date, EURISCE files_
2) It would be over a year later, August 23. 1996. that Croatia and the FRY finally signed a treaty of
normalization and recognition.
.
14 For details on meeting, see Perina interview; "Readout of Holbrooke-Miloscvic Discussions, August
1995 (notes from Holbrooke phone report); General Clark's'Daily Update" to CJCSNCJCS, August 17.
1995; and Holbrooke comment. Dayton History Seminar. -,
'
25 Holbrooke interview, Dayton History Seminar, Following the larger meeting. Frasure and Drew met
with FRY Foreign Minister Milutinovic to discuss this proposal further. Milosevic had initially raised this
with Frasure during their talks in the spring. The proposal had changed a bit since then: rather than simply
a ratification of abe full package, such a vote would be held at the beginning of the negotiating process as a
way to gain leverage over Pale.
26 Quote from preliminary draft of Holbrooke memoirs, Chapter I (July 6,1996), p4.
a e
55
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awoke angry and determined. Listen you guys," Holbrooke said flatly to Perina and
"I'm going back to see Sloboand I'm going to throw a God damn fit this
morning." The three then met in Perina's garden, where Holbrooke explained that he
needed to lay down a marker with MiJosevic, to "scare the hell out of him, to tell him that
lie was doing was totally unacceptatJte!',27 fIolbrooke felt that the large group
meeting had been too unwieldy, and he wanted to establish a more direct relationship
with the Serb leader. reducing the number of people in the room nto create an impression
of greater intensity and intimacy." Holbrooke decided that only Frasure and the -NSC's
Drewwould accompany him.28 .
.
The three-hour meeting.went according to plan. After Milosevic delivered his
standard positions, Holbrooke lit into him with his planned tirade. He told Milosevic that
there was no time for long and that the U.S. needed something more than his
tired demands. The Serb leader seemed unmoved; he only stared back at Holbrooke with
his "penetrating gaze." To the rest of the delegation awaiting in the anteroom, only
shouts could be heard from behint;l the closed doors?9
..
also. demanded that Milosevic secure a through which the
American team could safely travel to Sarajevo. He said that "it was disgraceful, as well
as time-consuming and dangerous to continue to travel from Belgrade to Sarajevo by the
current method -- flying on a USAF plane to Split. conducting a complicated sub-
negotiation with the UN and French for helicopters. taking the choppers over tough
terrain in uncertain weather to ever-changing drop-off points, and then driving in armored
cars and APe's over Mt. Igman." Holbrooke believed that ifMilosevic could secure such
.a it would be seen as a.confidence-building measure and create "a public sense of
progress" toward peace. Mifosevic had said that he was wiliing to work for peace, and
Holbrooke wanted him to prove it.
Holbrooke asked whether a Belgrade-Sarajevo air route would be possible, and
Milosevic immediately, and surprisingly, sent an aide to contact Bosnian Serb General
Ratko Mladic to find out. Despite his claims that he had no control over the Bosnian
Serbs, this action proved that Milosevic at least had the credibility to tIy. As Holbrooke
later reflected, "it was the first time we had seen what was later to become a recurring
pattern in our negotiations -- a direct line between Milosevic ... and Mladic. Sometimes it
produced results, sometimes not." This day it failed_ Mladic replied that he could not
guarantee the safety of air transport, but that he could assure safety on a shorter routf! over
the Bosnian Serb-protected Kisiljak road. EU envoy Carl Bildt bad recently used this
route, as had Holbrooke himself during a trip to Sarajevo as a private citizen in 1992.
Holbrooke now felt that an official u.S. de1egation cou1d not be subjected to numerous
Bosnian Serb checkpoints along Kisiljak. He asked Milosevic to provide his own
personal guarantee (not Mladic's) that the delegation would not be stopped. en route to
Sarajevo. Milosevic refused, and the Holbrooke team decided that they must take the Mt.
Igman route. The delegation would return to Zagreb to brief the Croats that night, and
attempt to travel to Sarajevo on Saturday August J 9. They told Milosevic they would be
back to see him on the 20th. 30
. "
77 Perina interview.
2. .
Holbrooke memoirs, Chapter I (July 6, 1996). pp5-6.
29 Ibid., Perina interview; Clark interview, September 18. 1996.
3D This account from Holbrooke's report ofthe meeting. "The Road to Sarajevo;' undated document. In
this account. he says that he did not expect MiJosevic to agree to this proposal, but rather sought to slart the
S6

&
UNCLASSIFIED
. UNELXsIPlhB
Although the. Milosevic' meetings had been largely discouraging, the team left Belgrade feeling that there had been some substantive movement. All three parties had now been briefed on the initiative's points, and the diplomatic effort was headiQg
forward, jf slowly. No one was quite sure yet where negotiations would lead, all three parties seemed to understand that the West's .patience had run out. Most impoJ1:ant, Holbrooke and his colleagues had established a clear marker with the parties: 0
the U.S. finally meant business and was willing to use "sticks" - economic, political, and military -- if the parties refused to cooperate.
The Mt. Igman Tragedy
The shuttle continued with the team's arrival in Zagreb to discusso the Milosevic talks with the Croats and Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladjzic, who by coincidence was in the Croat capital on his way to the Middle East. Holbrooke reported to Tudjman Milosevic's unwillingness to recognize Croatia in the aftermath of Krajina, and reiterated"
the need for Croat military restraint in Eastern Slavonia.
J1
The delegation also voiced
their concerns about whether the Croats were sincere in supporting the territorial integrity of Bosnia. In response, Tudjman returned to the fatalism shown two days before_ He"
even went so far as to quote back to the American delegation a view attributed. to Henry
Kissinger: "If you couldn't hold together Yugoslavia, you can't hold together Bosnia-
Herzegovjna.,,;12
In many ways. the Croats were responsible for creating the environment that made
the U:S. initiative possible -- their successful lightning strike against Krajina provided the
. final push that convinced U.S. decision-makers to move forth with the mission. With the
Serbs on the run aqd the battlefield a bit more level militarily, the situation had become much more amenable'to negotiations. With that, the fears of many in Washington had
been proved wrong. "In fact," Holbrooke later reflected, ''the Croatian gamble had succeeded. When the local Serbs in the Krajina failed to protect their ill-gotten gains,
Zagreb won an easy, almost uncontested victory which affected the balance of power in the region. Moreover, the unexpected abandonment of the Croatian Serbs by Milosevic
dramatically eliminated one of our greatest fears 0- that Belgrade would send its regulars
back into the war to save fellow Serbs in Croatia.,.3J Nevertheless, the Croats' own success had left them excessively emboldened, and the U.S. delegation was concerned that Croat hubris could scuttle this rare diplomatic opportunity.
In a report to Secretary of Defense Perry, Joe Kruzel elaborated on these concerns.
During the talks in Zagreb, Kruzel had had a long discussion with Croat Defense Minister Gojko Susak as they walked around the grounds of Tudjman's vitia. The Croat military gains in Western Bosnia, Kruzel reported, would allow the Muslim-Croat Federation to bold roughly 51 per cent of thelerritory in Bosnia. This nevireaJity brought both good
process of creating a safer route and learn morc about how much control the Serb leader had over events in
Bosnia. See also Holbrooke, "The Road to Sarajevo"; and draft Chapter 1 (July 6. 1996) of his memoirs.
The other account of this meeting from notes of Frasure phone can with Kornblum, "Report on Holbrooke
. meeting wilh Milosevic, August 18, 1995, 9:00am."
.
31 On August 17. Washington cabled Moscow to infonn the Russians that the US was working to urge
Croat military restraint. and asked if Russian diplomats could do the same with the. Serbs in Belgrade. See
"usa Call for Zagreb's Restraint: Infonning Moscow," Cable, State 195800. August 17. 1995.
J2 "Tudjman reacts to brief on Milosevic meetings:' Cable. Zagreb 6977, August J 8. 1995.
JJ Draft Holbrooke memoirs, Chapter 2 (September 21, J 996), P 13.
7 &
UNCLASSIFIED
57
.
UNCLASSIFIED
and bad news. "The good news is that the Federation is finally at 51% [the Contact
Group plan's goal]. The bad news is that the territory held by the Federation will be
overwhelmingly Bosnian Croat land. The Muslims are severely shortchanged." Susak
had implied that the were not about to swap <their' territory within 51 % for
increases in Muslim territory." Kruzel saw that "the Croats are .now, or will soon be. a
status. quo power in the region, delighted with what they have and .willing to fight to hold
onto it."
In terms of implications for the U.S. initiative. Kruzd was convinced that
Croatia's posture caused big problems for the "lift-and-Ieave" option iftaJks failed. If the
idea would be to provide weapons and training to the Federation to balance the Serbs,.
"that's not possible, because the Croats won't fight the Serbs over the Muslims, [nor1 wHl
they let the Muslims acquire enough weapons to be in a position to pose any sort of
challenge to Zagreb." KruZel saw that the potential for infighting within the Federation
was a "fundamental conceptual flaw" of the U.S. proposal. In this light, facilitating
cooperation would be crucial to any agreement's success.
This
memorandum, dated August 18. was Kruzel's last. By the time Pentagon officials found
it on their desks the morning of August 19, all of Washington was focused on reports ofa
tragedy on Mt. Igman.
34
.
After an overnight stop in Split, Holbrooke, Clark, Frasure, Kruzel, Drew, and
Clark's aide Lt. Col. Daniel Gerstein set off via helicopter for the Mt. Igman road, which
they would take into Sarajevo?S They began to travel up Mt. Igman at lOam Sarajevo
time (4am EST) in two French military vehicles: Holbrooke and Clark in a Hwnvee, and
Frasure, Kruzel, Drew, Gerstein and U.S. Diplomatic Security Agent Peter Hargreaves in
an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).
At 6:15am Washington time the morning of. August 19, John Menzies. the U.S.
Ambassador-designate in Sarajevo, telephoned the State Department Operations Center to
. inform them of reports he received about an accident involving Holbrooke's convoy on
Mt. Igman. In trying to maneuver around a French truck on a narrow mountain bend, the
APC with Frasure. Drew, Gerstein and Hargreaves slipped off a cliff and rolled
, . 36
several hundred yards down the Igman Kruzel, and Drew were killed.
Almost immediately after Menzies' phone officials at the State Department
went into action to respond to the Igman tragedy. Chris Hill, Frasure's deputy in the
European Bureau, called Menzies to get a full read-out of the situation, and then called
Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and Deputy National seCurity Advisor Samuel "Sandy"
Berger (both Christopher and Perry were on vacation). Holbrooke first talked to the
officials in Washington almost two hours later in a call with Talbott. and
General Shalikashvili on the line. he spoke with.the President.
37
in a
calm, voice, Holbrooke told the President that "we must suspend the mission
long enough to bring our fallen comrades home ... you sent us here as a team. We'll come
back as a team, and then we're anxious to resume our mission."
3( "Trip Update" from Kruzel to Secretary Peny, August 18, 1995. The memorandum also went to senior
Pentagon officials Jan Lodal and Joseph Nye. At the top of the memorandum, Kruzel handwrote: "Please
deliver to addresses at Saturday [August 19] opening of business."
lS See Holbrooke draft memoir. 1 (July 6, 1996), ppl 1-12.
A french soldier was also killed/in the accident.
37 Calls detailed in State Department Operations Center Phone Logs, August 19, 1995, Shifts I and II. 58
SF
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
an
"That's fine," the President said. "Come home as soon as you tan, but make it clear that our commitment to the peace effort will continue and that you will lead it. H
After a short and somber meeting with Bosnian President lzetbegovic in Sarajevo,
the delegation departed for Ramstein Air Force Base in Gennany. On August 21:> the .Holbrooke team returned to Washington to bury the bodies of their. colleagues, and the
-
38 U.S. government began to regroup.
I
.
Putting the Pieces Back Together
_ Following the accident, U.S. officials had to decide what the next steps would be. Ironically, the tragedy forced the Administration to consider more deeply the fundamental goals of and prospects for its initiative. In way, the process of regrouping also allowed ali opportunity to assess the status and sharpen the goals of the mission. Had the Holbrooke trip accomplished enough to warrant continuing the diplomatic effort? If so, what should the next U.S. move be? Who should the three lost on Mt Igman? The U.S. had lost three officials whose efforts had been integral to its policy and diplomacy throughout 1995. Bob Frasure had been a key .player in the State Department's policy toward the Balkans, serving throughout 1995 as Christopher and Holbrooke's point-man for the More important, he had had an established
negotiating rapport with Milosevic, whose cooperation would be central to any
agreement.
39
Joe Kruzel, for his part, was Perry's point-man forllie region. Hehad had a
good relationship with Croat Defense Minister Susak and understood acutely the brewing problems with the Federation. Nelson Drew, who had worked closely with Lake, Berger, _
and Vershbow on devising the "endgame- strategy" was the NSC's only link to the initiative it bad launched. While negotiators like Frasure, Kruzel, and Drew could never
be replaced, new people would have to be found to fill their roles.
There was no debate that the u.s. should continue its diplomatic effort with a
newly constituted- team. If anything, the accident seemed 10- embolden U.S. leaders to push forward.
4o
In a phone call with French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette -only
hours after the Mt. Igman accident, Secretary Christopher said that while there would be a pause to bring the bodies home to the U.S., the accident "would cause us to redouble- our
efforts and sharpen our resolve to see peace in the region.',41 President Clinton himself reiterated publicly what he had already told Christopher and Holbrooke privately: "1 think the tbing that they [Frasure, Kruzel and Drew] would want us to do is press ahead,
and that's what we intend to do.'t42 Indeed, while negotiators had been meeting in the region, officials in Washingtmi bad already started working on the structure and content
3. from Holbrooke memoirs. draft Chapter I; "The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker;
Roger Cohen, "Taming the Bullies of Bosnia," The New York Times Magazine, December 17, 1995; and
Holbrooke interview on the PBS television program, CharHe Rose. December 15. 1995, Transcript # 153 J.
39 According to Holbrooke, this was the only shuttle Frasure was to have been on. After introducing
Holbrooke and the team to Milosevic, Frasure was to remain in Washington 10 be the "backstop" for the
shuttle learn. Christopher Hill, Fr:asure's Deputy, was sloned to replace him.
Clark interview, September is, 1996; Bass Interview; Price interview, September 19, 1996 .
1 "Secretary's Conversation with de Charette: August J9, 1995;" Cable. state 198590. August 21, 1995_
Deputy Secretary Talbott expressed the same during a meeting with UK Ambassador Renwick at Ihe State
Department, see "Deputy Secretary and UK Ambassador on Bosnia," Cable, State 20278, August 25, 1995.
42 See John Pomfret, "Three US Peace Negotiators Die in Car Wreck Near Sarajevo," Washing/an Post,
August 20, 1995. Christopher recalled that in a phone conversation with the President" the morning of the
accident, "it was clear that he wanted us to continue this effort." Christopher interview, October 22, 1996_

59
UNCLASSIFIED
-I
UNCLASSIFIED
of a future agreement. Although the Holbrooke mission had revealed problem areas
(with the Croats, for example), there was no reason to believe that it would be futile to
press ahead. In tenns of overall strategy, "once people got themselves together [from the
tragedy of the accident], there was not much question about going
With the "if' question answered quickly ana easily, the next step was to detennine
how to press ahead. Holbrooke reported to Christopher that the talks thus far had been
productive though inconclusive in details. He saw that among the first U.S. challenges on
the next shuttle. would be slowing the Croatian war machine before it sparked a conflict
with. Belgrade or even rekindled tensions with as well as convincing the
Bosnians of the need for territorial compromise.
44
Regarding the Serbs, Holbrooke. told
the Secretary that between Milosevic's desire to see sanctions lifted. and the Bosnian
Serbs' apparent understanding that time is running out,.ufor the first time in four . years,
real pressure may be Pale could either negotiate on the basis of the U.S_ plan
which al10wed for ties with Belgrade and a reasonable division of land, or face the wrath
of Zagreb and NATO. These issues, in addition to the situation in Gorazdeand sanctions
against Serbia, were discussed at an August 22 Principals Committee (PC) meeting.
45
Domestically. the accident quelled criticism that had been bubbling up against the
Administration, particularly from Capitol Hill. On August 11.. President Clinton - in
only the second veto of his Presidency - blocked passage of the Dole-Liebennan bill that
would have unilaterally lifted the American arms embargo against Bosnia. On August
18 .. Senator Dole wrote to Clinton to 'express his concerns about the U.S. initiative,
particularly concerning the sanctions carrots" being offered 10 Milosevic. In an August
28 reply letter, President Clinton wrote that in the aftermath of the Mt. Igman tragedy,
"we intend to persevere in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Balkans
and are exploring with the parties ideas that include both carrots and sticks." On
sanctions. Clinton reassured the Senator that "we are proposing suspension of a broad
range of sanctions - not full lifting as your letter states -- only if there is agreement on a
political settlement in Bosnia" The President wrote that while he disagreed with Dole's
position toward the anus embargo, he: understood that the ultimate purpose was to restore
a balance of power that would hopefully bring peace. Yet, President Clinton concluded,
"I believe we must seize this moment to see if we can achieve a fair and durable
settlement (underlined in letter), without another year of fighting. (hope that you
will give that effort a .full and unencumbered opportunity to he tested and your strong
support if it is successful.,,46
.
Along with the more immediate tactical concerns that the next shuttle would have
totackJe, the Administration began to think more actively about what the shape of a
future agreement might look like. The initiative, as sketched out in Lake's talking points,
U Steinberg interview.
44 On August 18, Iutbegovic had produced a twelve point peace program for Bosnia, which included
points 9n the territorial integrity of Bosnia, adherence to the Contact Group plan, a solution to Sarajevo.
war reconstruction, and war crimes, among others. It also said that Milosevic should be the negotiator for
the Bosnian Serbs. See "OSeE Rep Announces Jzetbegovic's Peace Program," Cable. US Vienna 2335.
August 25. 1995.
-
(S See memorandum to Secretary Christopher from Holbrooke, "Principals Committee Meeting on the
Balkan Crisis, August 22, 1995," August 22, 1995.
46 See Todd Purdum, "Clinton Vetoes Lifting Bosnia Arms Embargo," New York Times. August 12, 1995.
Letter from Dole to Clinton, August 11. 1995; Letter from Clinton to Dole, August 28, 1995 .
60
.....
. UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
E I
envisioned a Bosnian end-state largely consistent with the principles the Contact Group
endorsed the previous year: Bosnia would remain a single ,state, divided into two
autonomous with a special relationship allowed to form between the Bosnian
Serbs and the FRY and the Muslim-Croat Federation and Croatia, respectively.
Holbrooke's first shuttle had focused primarily on broader as negotiators sought to
convince the parties on the mere principle of pursuing a diplomatic settlement.
The opening steps to flesh out the original Contact Group .prinCiples began with
the" decision to make Roberts Owen a part of the reconstituted shuttle team. For some
time, many officials, most notably Christopher. felt that if the U.S. was going to try to
mediate this conflict and help create a new Bosnian constitution, an experienced attorney
should be part of the negotiating team. "It seemed to me," Christopher recalled. "that we
lacked anyone who had had significant experience in drafting international documents,
anyone who was basically an international lawyer." The Secretary- felt that "the things
that [would be] put to paper on the shuttles were going to have a profound affect on the
governing structures of Bosnia.,,47 On August 20, the'day after the Mt. Igman accident,
Christopher called Owen (then on vacation in Maine) to discuss joining the new team.
Christopher and Owen were longtime professional associates and 'personal friends; they
had worked together in the State Department under President Carter (Christopher as ,
Deputy Secretary, Owen as Legal Advisor),. and Owen had played a key role under.
Christopher in negotiating the release of the American hostages in Iran during 1979-80.
Christopher believed that Owen's experience with Iran uniquely suited hini for what
promised to be a long and arduous negotiating process. "1 think. it will keep you busy for
a couple of months ... the Secretary told his friend. Owen, a highly respected Washington
lawyer at Dean Acheson's old law firm Covington & Burling, had been the lead arbitrator
for the Muslim-Croat Federation, and thus was already familiar with the key issues. After
discussing his appointment with Holbrooke on August 22, Owen agreed to join the team
and returned to Washington.
48
;Meeting at Fort Myer
On August over 300 people gathered at the yellow-brick chapel of Fort Myer,
an Anny base across the Potomac River from Washington; to pay tribute to Robert
Kruzel, and Nelson Drew. President Clinton, who had interrupted his
Wyoming vacation to preside over the ceremony, eulogized three fallen officials 'as
"quiet American heroes who gave their lives so that others might know a future of hope
and a land at peace." Following the is-minute ceremony, the President revealed the new
team of envoys Holbrooke would lead to the region -- Clark; Owen; Brigadier General
Don Kerrick, a military intelligence specialist at the NSC; James Pardew, a fonner Army
colOllel who was now director of the Pentagon's Balkan Task Force; and Christopher
Hill, Frasure's deputy at State who was head of the office of South Central European
Affairs.
Following this emotional memorial service, the President and his senior foreign
policy advisors -- Christopher, Perry, Albright, Deutsch;Shalikashvili, Berger, and
Leon Feurth --joined Holbrooke and his new shuttle team in a of the cQapel to
47 Christopher interview, October22,1996 .
.. Details on Owen appointment from Owen interview, September II, 1996; OwenlHolbrooke interview;
Steinberg interview; Sapiro/O'Brien interview:
.6
UNCLASSIFIED
61
UNCLAsSIFIED
. discuss the future of the initiative. Holbrooke presented these officials with a status report on each of Lake's seven points. According to his draft memoirs, Holbrooke's
report went as follows:
49
Eiru. on the point that the diplomatic initiative seek an
"ambitious, comprehensive settlement." Holbrooke. said that . everyone in the region understood that "this effort would be different, an all-out attempt to reach this ambitious
Second, on seeking three-way mutual recognition and a cease-fire, Holbrooke reported that agreement on the former was unlikely until the en4 of the negotiating
process, and that, in his view, pushing the parties toward a cease-fire would be premature as long as the trend on the battJefield was helpful to the Bosnians. On the third point, seeking more viable borders, Holbrooke repeated what he had told Lake and SaCirbey
during his last trip: the U.S. should not press Sarajevo to give up their remaining
. enclaves. To do so would be, Holbrooke argued, "politically and morally unjustifiable:' On the :fmmh and fifth points, oonceming, respeCtively , constitutional arrangements and sanctions relief, work had not yet begun. On sOlving Eastern Slavonia, the
Lakets points, Holbrooke said that while too early to address, the issue would have t9 be
completed for a comprehenSive settlementto succeed.
Most of the presentation provoked little conversation. But the
and final point, regarding economic reconstruction for Bosnia. proved the most controversial. Holbrooke felt -- and argued strenuously that day -- that economic aid to Bosnia would be
critical. to implementing any settlement. Bosnia was not only a state destroyed by three
years of war, but one standing alone after years of dependenCe on Yugoslavia .. Holbrooke
believed that the u.s. would have to bare a substantial part of the financial burden in this aid effort.
.
The problem Vl(as, as Holbrooke later reflected. the political atmQsphere in Washington created'by the "Gingrich earthquake." Congress was typically hostile. to
foreign aid. but in those budget-cutting times, the issue had becomepoiitically lethal. Because of these domestic political implications. neither nor Holbrooke had been
authorized to discuss specific financial numbers with the Europeans or Balkan parties.
However, since this component of the U.S. initiative would be a crucial carrot, Holbrooke
wanted to get the Administration to pledge some assistance soon. "I felt strongly that this
[indecision] reduced our chances of success in the negotiations, and weakened us with
our European Allies [who would also be expected to shoulder a significant financial
burden ].',30
..
.
At Fort Myer, Holbrooke suggested that $500 million would be an appropriate
amount for the first year, with Perry recommending that a more suitable figure would be $1 billion. The President initially seemed amenable to the higher number. "If we get
peace, we should be prepared to put up a billion dollars," Holbrooke recalls him saying.
51
Others in the room added their views, and the sentiment slowly slipped away trom Holbrooke's argument. With a budget crisis looming, the Administration was in no position to request additional expenditures, such advisors as Chief of Staff Leon Panetta exp.lained. To those present, the message seemed clear: the Europeans would have to take the lead financially.
49 Unless noted otherwise, details ofthis discussion from draft Holbrookc memoirs, Chapter 2 (September
21, 1996), I>p24-33.
lllliI. p30
.sl llllit, p32.
62
r I
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UNCLXIflD

After the meeting, Holbrooke was disappointed. "As the discussion ended>" he wrote in retrospect, "I knew we were going to have to fight for any specific number at aU, and that the final amount of American assistance would be far less that I thought desirable for maximum negotiating value!' Nevertheless, in three weeks. the
. Administration began to lobby Congress for $500 million in aid -- the figure Holbrooke had initially proposed.
52
Laying the Groundwork for Peace
" With only four days until they entered the Balkan maelstrom, the new envoys prepared furiously. Roberts Owen immediately joined discussions on fleshing out the Contact Group principles and preparing basic constitutional points to negotiate with parties during the next shuttle. The U.S. effort not only aimed to end the bloodshed, but establish political and legal structures for a lasting democratic settlement. On August 23, Owen met with Holbrooke, BUR Principal DAS John Kornblum,. Washington attorney Lloyd Cutler, and Miriam Sapiro, a lawyer on the State Department's Policy Planfting
Staff.
S
) Holbrooke and Kornblum had decided that an ad hoc y(orking group of legal experts should be created to work with Owen and the shuttle team as they negotiated the political and legal principles of a future Bosnian state. They felt that raf!1er than try to
broker something.'from nothing, file U.S. should draw up proposals for the parties to build upon. In the early stages," this ad hoc group supported Owen infonnally as basic
principles were established with the parties; later, they began translate them into draft terms of a comprehensive settlement. Kornblum led the group, which, to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic. haggling and inertia, existed outside regular State Departn;lent
channels and the process. 54
..
Also that day; Secretary Christopher met with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey. who had come to Washington to attend the Fort Myer memorial service. This was the
Secretary's first meeting with a Billkan official since the diplomatic initiative was
launched. Christopher emphasized to Sacirbey that the negotiations needed to progress as rapidly as possible. and that the Bosnians had to end their haphazard" negotiating style.
He suggested that they "organize a team that we can negotiate with on a regular basis, so we don't have to understand the differing views within the Bosnian government." As far
as the substance of the talks were concerned, Christopher noted that the U.S. approached
the initiative on the same basis as before: a 51-49 division of territory without radical changes to the map. However, the Secretary urged that the Bosnians think about ways to make their territory more compact and defensible. Although this seemed to be a
52
llWl p33. The start ofthe administration's lobbying effort was briefly mentioned in a newspaper article
concerning the broader aspects of the J),egotiations. See Elaine Sciolino, "US Envoy Highlights Fine Print
on Bosnia," New York Times, September 13, 1995.
.
53 Cutlcr, a fonner White House Counsel to both Presidents Carter and Clinton, had consulted with
Holhrooke periodically throughout the year on legal issues in Bosnia, and was asked by Holbrooke to join
informal consultations. He served as a valuable sounding board for Owen throughout the negotiating
process. Lloyd Cut!erinterview, OctoberS, 1996; Owen interview, September I 1. t995; Kornblum
intervieW. July 26, 1996; SapirolO'Brien interview; Price interview.
s.. The ad hoc working group usually comprised Cutler; Sapiro; James O'Brien. an Albright aide in the
State Department's USUN office; Tim Ramish of the Legal Advisor's office; with the assistance of Laurel
Miller. an associate with Covington and Burling; and either Chris Hob, Phil Goldberg, or John Burley. the
State Department desk officers for Croatia, Bosnia. or the FRY, respectively. Details onegal working
group from Kornblum interview; Sapiro/O'Brien interview; Owen interview.
I
63
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
r
complete reversal of the line Holbrooke had just pushed - that the Bosnians not be forced
.. to give up Gorazde -- Christopher assured Sacirbey that it was not intended as such. Sacirbey also stressed his support of the Dole-Lieberman bill and the idea of convening an economic donor's conference, to which the Secretary replied that they shouid first focus on securing a settlement. ss
Sacirbey and Bosnian Ambassador Kasim Trnka also opened it:J.fonnal discussions with Owen; Kornblum, and the legal experts at State. Meeting in Bob Frasure"s old office, these open-ended. meetings aimed to provide the foundation for a more detailed
political .and legal settlement. The parties began the talks by agreeing to the basic
. concepts for a.constitution - preserving a Bosnian state comprised of two entities> the Federation and Bosnian Serb, with internationally recognized borders and a government
able to conduct foreign relations with other.states - and then outlined the issues that remained. More the group discussed issues concerning the future relationship between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb entities. These talks concluded on August 25 with no finn decisions. but with US participants focusing on four models for developing a constitutional framework. S6
.'
Following these meetings, Owen drafted a rather detailed proposal for the structure of a Bosnian state to submit to the working group. Owen viewed the drafting as an initial exercise, a way "of getting something started ... to get ideas organized on paper
and get people talking."s7 The document reflected a variant of a "superstructure" approach in which the Federation and Bosnian Serb entities would be joined at the top by
a Federal Government "superstructure" composed of a weak three-person Presidency and temporary Governing Council (designated by the Contact Group) to conduct foreign
affairs and defense. The members of the Presidency would be democratically elected, as
would local representatives to each "Federation Assembly" - thus establishing a process
to democratic elections, to be monitored by international observers. Owen also recommended that the Governing Council establish commissions on Reparations and
Anns It was with these ideas in mind that Owen took off on his first shuttle mission with Holbrooke.
Also on August 24, senior Washington officials had to make another trip out to Fort Myer. Between the funerals of Nelson Drew and Joe Kruzel. Holbrooke asked the
reconstituted shuttle team to have lunch together at the Officers Club. Although intended
. primarily as a get-to-know-you session for the new team members, Holbrooke had asked
jS In a press conference after the meeting, Sacirbey suggested that the Bosnians would give the American
initiative "a month to two months to succeed," after which the US would have to take "more forceful
measures to the Serbs to accept peace." Also present at this meeting were Holbrooke, UN
Ambassador Albrigllt. and Sandy Vershbow of the NSC. See "Meeting Bctween Secretary Christopher
and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey," NSC memorandum, August 23, 1995. $6 The four models, which differed primarily in the degree of integration between the Bosnian Serbs and
the Federation, were: I) an "Enlarged Federation" including the Serbs, 2} a super-autonomous Serb entity
lacking any role in the foreign or defense policy of Bosnia, 3) a "holding company" central government
with a loose supersl{ucture linking the Federation to the Serbs, with the Federation as the
dominant entity, and 4) the above superstructure approach modified along the lines of the Contact Group's
December 1994 draft Bosnian constitution. recognizing formal equality between the two. A rcview of
these discussions and such options is contained in a "non-paper" drafted by Sapiro. See "Non-Paper on
August 23-25, 1995 Discussions for US delegation."
.
$7 Owen interview, September II. J995.
51 Owen draft document, A Proposal Re the Political Structure of a Bosnian Scate." August 27, 1995.
64
d
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLXsXPIn
Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor and somewhat
intimidating "sanctions czar" oflhe Administration, to join and' brief them on the status of
economic sanctions against Serbia.
Sanctions were perhaps the key ingredient in U.S. bargaining leverage over
Milosevic. Sanctions reliefhad been tbe main component ofthe earlier Frasure and Bildt
negotiations, and would no doubt be important to the current initiative. The sanctions
against Serbia - comprised of an international trade embargo and freezing of assets -- had
been in place' since May 1992,' when the UN voted to impose them in retaliation for
role in the outbreak of the Bosnian war. During these years, this sanctions
regime had helped Serbia's economic ou ut lurnmet by nearly half. with hyper-inflation
peaking at 313 per cent a month.
Finally, sanctions were avmg t e pme mten e: 1 osevlC was
them lifted . His complaints about them had become a constant
in his meetIngs with U.S. and European diplomats. Indeed, to U.S. officials,. the
prospect of Milosevic becoming another Saddam Hussein waS one of his "biggest
nightmares.'S9
.
. Despite such success, the future existence of the sanctions regime remained
uncertain. The Europeans - pa!ticularly the Russians -- were opposed to sanctions. In
Holbrooke's view, if the Europeans were "left to their own resources .. they would have
lifted all or most of the sanctions [in]' return for almost nothing."6O The Clinton
Administraticm, led by Fuerth and Madeleine Albright, was steadfastly opposed to lifting
sanctions absent Serbian flexibility in negotiations. To Albright, sanctions provided '''one
of the few times managed to get the upper-hand and it was a lever I felt was
important ... [1 tried] to maintain them so that we would get the most out ofthem.',6J
However. as international support for sanctions waned, it became increasingly
difficult for the Administration to ward off European opposition: Indeed, intra-Contact
Group relations on this. issue were deteriorating so that some, even including the
stalwart Fuerth, felt that they would have to end sOOIi. Fuerth explained that there was
probably a small window ofiline - possibly closing as soon as the end of 1995 -- during
which sanctions could stay in place. Ironically, the problem with the sanctions
their effectiveness in inflicting pain on Milosevic but with maintaining them. Fuerth had
the "sense that sanctions were becoming a wasted asset... [as] they were beginning to
decay because as time dragged on, [the costs] were increasing for the Allies." To
Holbrooke, the issue threatened to open a wide fissure in U.S.-European relations.
issue in recent memory has caused greater tension in our relations with our European
Allies ... ,62

.
I
Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapler 2 (September 21, 1996), p38.
61 Albright interview.
62 Leon Fuerth interview, October 23, 1996; Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 2 (Seplember21, 1996),

.
. 65
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
. Bl
uNcLXIPfun
At the Officers Club lunch, Fuerth and the Holbrooke team discussed all of these realities as well as the suggested sanctions strategy for the upcoming negotiations. Although Fuerth. sensed that Holbrooke wished to have. some. flexibility in negotiating relief with Milosevic' <possibly providing some relief in exchange for negotiatin
5
concessions). he urged that the U.S. hold tight to get the most out of sanctionS. Fuerth believed that the U.S. should maximize the time it had left before maintaining the sanctions regime became too difficult. Holbrooke later acknowledged . that he had ''tactical differences" with Fuerth, hut in the end he agreed not to stray from the Administration's
.
Meanwhile. other aspects of a possible agreement also continued to be fleshed out, particularly on the military side. In an August 18 meeting at the White House, the Deputies Committee (DC) had begun reviewing planning papers on military implementation and the proposal. These planning papers were already sketching out the rules of a future "peace implementation force" (PIF). including rules of engagement, mission specifics, exit strategy, and length of deployment. The DC met again on August 23 to follow-up on the implementation proposals. and officials moved
ahead on drafting detailed memoranda. 65
While the DC discussed PIF plans and Owen and State Department lawyers
worked on the legal and political specifics, others began laying the more strategic groundwork for the next shuttle -- namely, signaling to the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic
that the U.S. and NATO were prepared to act to end any siege on the safeareas. On August 22, in response to a Bosnian Serb mortar attack around Sarajevo that killed. six
people and wounded 38 (including six Egyptian UN troops), French troops who were part of the UN's newly Constituted Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) fired 155mm howitzers upon Bosnian Serb positions.
66
By.August 24, the situation around Gorazde deteriorated
further. As the violence in Bosnia escalated, U.S. officials responded publicly that they
wanted to give their peace initiative a chance. Privately, tension was mounting for a possible NATO military response.
In a meeting with Sacirbey at the State Department on August 25, Holbrooke
reiterated the U.S. and NATO pledge to protect UN safe areas under the "Gorazde rules," and said so after the meeting hi a press conference. The situation in the safe areas was becoming so desperate. U.S. officials were concerned that the Bosnian military would act
6) In his August 22 memorandum to CllristopheT. Holbrooke advised that while sanctions were important,
"we must not Jose sight that sanctions are a means to the end of a negotiated settlement, not an end in their
own right."
.
64 See Fuerth interview; Holbrooke draft memoirs, Cbapter2 (September 21, 1996). p39. 6SThe DC agreed that the PIF would be deployed largely in Federation territory, would have a full mandate
to use force in. self-defense, and would be under full NATO control. DoD that the duration of"
the mission should be nine months. Sec."Summary ofConcfusions orDC meeting on Bosnia," August 18,
1995. The European Bureau at State had also begun thinking about a PIF, allhough their focus was on
what the US would need to do to develop and execute a strategy for building international political support
for such an initiative. An August 22 memorandum from Holbrooke to Christopher outlines what such a
force needs (and the political costs of getting it) and suggests creating a combined task force;witb a
distinct NATO identity but using both NATO and non-NATO assets. The memorandum also lays out
military contingencies for a range of diplomatic scenarios. See memorandum 10 Christopher from
Holbrooke) "Questions at Issue in Organizing a Strategy for the Military Implementation of a Balkan Peac::e
Settlement," August 22, 1995.
. M The attack was a part of increased fighting between Bosnian.Serb and Bosnian Muslim troops around
Sarajevo. See Stale Depal1ment Press Guidance (EUR). August 23. 1995.
66
2
UNCLASSIFIED
.UNCLASSIFIED
S 2
to come to the city's rescue, thus escalating the bloodshed. Holbrooke and others hoped that they cou14 avoid this by sending unambiguous public signals that the U.S. and NATO were committed to protect the safe areas. Holbrooke personally was becoming more and more angry about the continued intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs. In an August 27 interview on NBC's "Meet The Press," frustration was on full display. He suggested repeatedly that the Bosnian Serbs may face NATO airstrikes if there was no progress soon toward peace. As he recalled later, he was purposely trying to convey his extreme displeasure with the stalemate in the peace process, and had discussed making such a comment with Christopher's Chief of Staff Tom Donilon and Under
Secretary Peter Tamoffthat weekend.
67
'.
.
Shortly after his "Meet the Press" interview, Holbrooke and his colleagues departed for Paris, where they would meet with French officials and lzetbegoVic. In less a week, the U.S. had reconstituted its team and sustained the momentum left after the initial Lake and Holbrooke missions. Significant groundwork had been laid on the
specifics of a possible settlement, from basic political and legal relationships to the shape of military implementation. The first shuttle had fulfilleq, a basic aspect of
prenegotiation: to probe each side's interests and intentions. The next shuttle would need to dive deeply into the specifics, hopefully producing a tangible result.
In addition to the numerous negotiating topics packaged in Lake's seven points, 6& perhaps the key issue on the upcoming shuttle waS procedural: how to deal with the Bosnian Serbs. There was evidence that the Bosnian Serb leaders were largely in the
dark about the U.S. initiative, which raised concerns about both Milosevic's reliability to
keep them informed and ability to deliver them in any agreement. This was compounded by the fact that Milosevic had been unable to get them to agree to the Contact Group plan.
which he had agreed to over a year earlier.
69
.
Since the spring of 1995, the U.S. government's position was that the Bosnian Serbs should be isolated out of the negotiating process. Instead. the argument went, aU
pressure should be brought to bear on Milosevic to "deliver" the Bosnian Serbs. This position, referred to as the "Milosevic strategy," was devised and championed by Robert Frasure, who had first implemented it during his negotiations that spring. After seeing how MiJosevic an4 the Bosnian Serb leaders would exploit their own differences to
67 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 18, 1996. Holbrooke's message received wide press
attention, as the reports stated that "the threats are clearly intended to ratchet up pressure on the Bosnian
Serbs before peace talks resume in Europe this week." See Steven Greenhouse, "US Officials Say Bosnian
Serbs Face NATO Attack if Talks Slall," New York Times, August 28, 1995. See also Holbrooke draft
chapter 2 (September 21, (996), pp44-48.
. 61 On August 22, the State Department produced a document outlining the status of the endgame strategy's
seven points after tbe Lake Holbrooke shuttles. On the subject oftbe map (the 2nd point), the
document states that while discussions are in .he early the US would seek to steer both parties
toward a solution that would trade Goqizrle for substantial Serb concessions, yet "we have not pushed this
because of the press play and becausc_. all BosnianS slated they were politically unable to give' up
Gorazde .. however, we will continue to steer in this direction. On Eastern Slavonia ( 6th point), all sides
agreed to the endgame proposal "in principle," and white "the US recognized the issue vitally important, yet
not necessary to resolve immediately as long as peace prevails. Milosevic had said that he recognized that
Eastern SJavonia is part of Croatia, but would say the opposite if pressed in public. See State Department
memorandum, "Status Report on Tony's Seven Points," August 22, 1995. Although this document appears
to be for the shurtle team, Hofbrooke does not remember it and quarrels with its recommendations -
concerning Gorazde. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17, 1996.
Clark comment. Dayton History Seminar.
2
67
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
T
scuttle an agreement, Frasure had come to the conclusion that the best strategy would be
to force the two sides together - linking sanctions relief for Milosevic with cooperation
by the Bosnian Serbs: Moreover, the July indictments of Karadzic and Mladic - the two
most powerful Bosnian Serb leaders - for war crimes made the prospect of negotiating
with them almost impossible. Holbrooke ful1y agreed with Frasure's approach, but
others, including the Secretary" of State, were concerned about relying solely on
Milosevic. As a party to the conflict, the Bo.snian Serbs somehow had to be brought into
the negotiations. If the Milosevicstrategy proved ineffective over the long tenn, the U.S.
would have to consider other ways to include the Bosnian Serbs, possibly by establishing
a second channel. In the short tenn, though, "Holbrooke decided to press the MiIosevic
strategy full-throttle, forcing the. Serb leader to demonstrate he could deliver?O
.
Opening the Second Shuttle: Terror Brings Action As the Holbrooke team traveled to Paris early the morning of August first
reports were coming in of another horrific tragedy on the streets of Sarajevo. After the .
commitments made by NATO at the London conference and after, the constant shelling
and sniper fire that had kept Sarajevans underground for the better' part of three years had
ebbed somewhat Many people had begun to the shops and coffee houses that
had made the city famous before the war and, on that sunny Monday' morning,. the
Markale market was particularly crowded. At 11: lOam. five mortar shells from the hiJJs
above rained on the bustling marketplace, wounding 85 and killing 37. It was the same
spot where 68 people had been murdered in a similar attack on February 5, 1994. A year-
and-a-half later, this nightmarish encore seemed to symbolize tlie emptiness of Western
threats - as the press characterized it, the camageof August 28 "demonstrated how
Western attempts to end the war have gone around in circles, drifting from to new
peace proposals as the killing has continued.'.7J
The immediate response from the U.S. and Allies was outrage, and detennining
blame was the Allies' first priority.n In the 1994 attack, the UN's inability to prove
conclusively that the Bosnian Serbs' had fired the shell sowed division among the Allies
and ultimately prevented a NATO response.
73
Haunted by this failure, UN investigators
and Bosnian police specialists arrived at the market twenty minutes after the blast to 10 The Bosnian Serb problem was best illustrated by an August 22 meeting between British Lt. General ".
Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR head, and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Smith reported to US
officials in Sarajevo that Mladic clearly "had little understanding of the Holbrooke initiative," and
expressed that the US had to open a channel to the Bosnian Serbs. Smith suggested that possibly the US
could set up another channel, at the very least to pass on reliable infonnation and u to tell them wbat is at
stake." Smith recommended either himself. UNPROFOR Bosnia Chief of Mission Antonio Peduaye. or
. Carl Bildt -- and highlighted the advantages of Bildt (not a potential hostage, well-versed on the issues.
strong support staff, and little to lose in terms of relations with the Bosnians or Croats). See "Mladic:
Talking to the Bosnian Serbs:' Draft Cable, Sarajevo (no number), August 22, and "Official
Informal" from John Menzies. charge in Sarajevo. to Chris Hill and Phil Goldberg. EUR, Cable, Sarajevo
485. August 22, 1995. I .
.
, " 7. Roger Cohen, "Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; US Urges NATO to Strike Serbs," New York Times.
August 29, 1995. FOT background on shelling. see "Investigation of Sarajevo Market Attack: 28 August
1995," USUN document (fOIUNP files), September 13, 1995; and "Horror again fills Sarajevo's Market,"
New York Times, August 29. 1995.
n Hunter interview, Bass interview.
7J See Silber and Little, pp309-3} 1; 365.
68

UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
=
UNCLAssiFiEB
begin their analysis. Investigators had every reason to believe that the shells were fired by Bosnian Serbs, but needed to attain UN continuation before a response could be
made.
74

.
The Holbrooke team had learned of the shelling upon arrival in Paris and, confident the Bosnian Serbs were responsible, believed there was no that NATO should strike. "You couldn't let [the bombing go by]. General Clark recalled. "An that mattered," Holbrooke bas written, "was whether the U.S. would. take a decisive leadership role and persuade its NATO Allies to jOill in a meaningful military response -"': the sort of massive air campaign that we had so often talked about but never come close
. to conducting." The attack inescapably became an immediate test of Western resolve -- if the Allies allowed such terror against civilians to go unanswered, as they had in 1994, the commitments agreed to at London would prove mearungless. HoI brooke got in touch immediately with Strobe Talbott to press for airstrikes. Talbott, who was then Acting Secretary of State in absence, felt that a inilitary response was "absolutely critical," but questioned whether an air campaign might negatively affect the
negotiations. Holbrooke. who had long been an advocate of deploying NATO air power
againSt the Bosnian Serbs, "did not have to think about" his replY: He stressed to Talbott
that it was better to risk negotiating failure with bombing rather. than try for progress
without it... simple justice required such a response."7S
.
In tenus orNATO decision-making, the guidelines for how to respond were clear.
The August 1 NAC decision to extend the "Gorazde rules" allowed for a military
response to such an act. 76 By the evening of August 28 (ED1). U.S. officials confirmed that a NATO strike against the Bosnian Serbs was required. The Secretary of Defense
felt that "we [had to] act immediately. We [had to] carry out the threat we made."
. President Clinton, then back on vacation in Wyoming, had long phone conversations with
Tony Lake and Perry in which he approved that the U'.S. ask the UN and NATO to act.
"We have to hit 'em bard," the President
While confident that NATO would tum its 'bombing-key: the Administration was unsure whether the UN military leaders would tum theirs to act with decisive force.
Fortunately for the negotiators. there had been a marked shift in the UN since it last faced such a decision during the Srebrenica and Zepa crises in Following the Serb's
capture of these cities, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, H\Ullan Rights and
Labor, John Shattuck, conducted a 4-day investigation in the region, collecting
.
.
'U By studying the shell's crater and fragments, investigators were able to determine. that the weapon was a
J20mm mortar, typical of those used by Bosnian SerQs. In addition, UN radar had not picked up the
incoming shells, indicating that they would have been fired below radar range from a trajectory originating
in Bosnian Serb territory. For a summary, see "BosniaCroatia: Summary of UNPROFOR' s Investigation
of Sarajevo Market Bombing." Cable, USUN 3492, September J4, 1995 ..
7S interview, July 10, 1996;.Holbrooke interview with October 18,1996;
Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 2 (Scptember 21, 1996), pp:SO-51; Clark interview, Owen interview;
Talbott interview. According to State Department Operations Center Tclepbone Logs, Holbrooke called
Talbott at 7;44am, only ninety minutes after initial reportS of the shelling. See Shift I, August2S, 1995.
76 In an August 14 letter, UNPROFOR Commander Lt. Genera' Janvier officially informed Bosnian Serb
General Mladic of the August I NAC decision to lake "all necessary means to deter attacks against the safe
areas." Janvier explained that operations could be initiated by a variety of possible threats of attack. or
attacks themselves, including shelling." This was reiterated to Mladic by Janvier in a August 30 letter
informing him of the decision to begin airstrikes.
77 Perry interview; Bass interview.
.
69
UNCLASSIFIED.
ONCLXIPlhb
I
. conclusive evidence of Serb atrocities. On August 10, Ambassador Albright presented
this evidence, along with detailed aerial-reconnaissance photography, to the UN Security
Council. As she later recalled, the CoUncil members were "genuinely shocked.... There
was accumulating evidence of all kinds of horrors that made people face the realities--
even those who were the most dubious." The revelations helped most of the
residual UN resistance to bombing and would ease their militiuy leader's decision to tum
their key when the time came.
78
.
"
The brutal mortar attack dominated the delegation's discussions in Paris that
day. Ye4 ironically in light of the terror in Sarajevo, talks were also colored that day by
reports of a possible opening with the Bosnian Serbs through Jimmy Carter. On August
28, Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic sent. Carter a letter
stating that he welcomed the new U.S. peace initiative and was prepared to begin
negotiations which could lead to a union of the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. Carter and
Karadzic had negotiated before -- Carter's trip to Pale in Oecember 1994 was
instrumental in bringing about the four-month cease-fire that ended in May 1995.
Karadzic's letter implicitly accepted the 51-49 territorial mentioned human
rights. At a press conference in Atlanta, Carter stated that this "important statement" .
should be "put to the test!,79 The Holbrooke delegation, unsure of how strong Karadzic's
current position was among the Pale Serbs, felt the letter was but
wanted to see what kind of value it had in the coming days. A Carter aide, Harry Barnes,
had told Holbrooke in a phone call that the fonner President did not want to launch his
own regional mission, so the U.S. team was not too concerned that Carter would scuttle
their own efforts. If anything, this new development exemplified the importance of
solving the negotiating problem with the Bosnian Serbs.
so
.
The Holbrooke delegation's first meeting in Paris was with Carl Bildt. Returning
, to the drawing board after his unsuccessful Washington visit in early August, Bildt's
negotiations had brought little movement, and he was apparently pessimistic' about the
prospects for achieving a settlement. Unlike U.S. negotiators, Bildt had been talking to
Bosnian Serbs leaders (predominantly Bosnian Serb Assembly President Momcilo
Krajisnik), and had pursued discussions with them on his own constitutional and map
proposals. Although he had opened a channel to Pale, Bildt also understood that a'major
problem for any peace process was that there was no credible figure who could agree to
and implement a solution on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs
81
,
71 Albright interview, October 28, 1996. Shattuck recounts the details of his investigation into Ihe
Srebrenica and Zepa atrocities in his July 25, 1996 interview and how tbis evidence led to the August 10
revelations in the UN Security Council in his July 30, 1996 interview.
'
79 On August 28, the letter was faxed to Holbrooke in Paris from Hany Barnes, an aide to the fenner
President at the Carter Center. Carter's comments from Carter Center press release, August 29,1995.
&0 For readout on the delegation's views afthe CarterKaradzic letter, see Jim Pardew's report to Walter
Slocombe. "Peace Initiative in the Fonner Yugoslavia - Paris," August 29, 1995; HoJbrooke interview
with September 19, 1996 (notes); and State Department Operations Center Telephone Logs,
1 1:44am Holbrooke-Bames can, Shift n. August 28,1995. See also Holbreoke draft memoirs, Chapter 7
(December 12, 1996) pp13-15.
,. For Bildt's talks with the Bosnian Serbs, see: "Bildt: Contacts with Pale," Cable, Belgrade Telno
August 15, 1995; "Bildt Offering His OWn Map in the Balkans." Cable, London 11587, August 16,1995;
"Readout of Bildt-Krajisnik Meeting in London," Memorandum to 8/S0 files, August 26, 1995. His '
pessimistic assessment of the prospects for peace were conveyed to the Gennans, see "Bildt Paints Gloomy
Picture of Balkan Settlement Prospects for GermaJ1s," Cable. Bonn 16751, August 18.1995. Foragood
70
---

UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. officials were somewhat skeptical of Bildt, a possible reflection of their own
views about the inability of the Europeans to handle such negotiations. Nevertheless,
Holbrooke had agreed to meet with the fonner Swede Prime . Minister to coordinate
approaches and discuss their respective proposals.
82
The meeting was unremarkable, as
the group only compared notes and shared general thoughts about the prospects for peace.
Some delegation members realized that Bildt's channel to Pale could provide a potential
solution to their negotiating problem, but favored concentrating on
Milosevic.
83
. Following the Bildt meeting. the team went to the Quai d'Orsay to meet with
French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette. Despite recent press reports to the contrary,
de Charette expressed strong French support for the U.S. initiative.
84
On the marketplace
massacre, the Foreign Minister argued that NATO needed to undertake a "stiff response/'
preferably by UN RRF artiller,y (the same French. artillery that had acted days before).
Holbrooke and de Charette also discussed the Pale Serb problem, with Holbrooke
explaining that the U.S. would hold out the carrot of sanctions relief to get Milosevic to
"deliver a Bosnian Serb entity to the table."ss
. Next, the delegation met at the American embassy with AJija who
had considered canceling the trip to Paris in the wake ofthe massacre" 86 For the Bosnian
President, the marketplace shelling brought back to life the three-year"nightmare his
country had endured. lzetbegovic, a quiet and frail man, was uneasy with public
leadership and almost monastic in his demeanor. Infonnally referred to by U.S.
negotiators as "Izzy ," the Bosnian leader has been described by former Ambassador
Warren Zimmermann as a Ill.an who "seemed diminished, rather than inflated" by the
trappings of Presidential power.87 A devout Muslim who had been jailed twice by the
Yugoslav Communist regime, lzetbegovic was a rel,uctant negotiator. The Bosnian
biographical overview ofBildt by the US embassy in Stockholm. see "Carl Bildl as Mediator in Former
Yugoslavia: The 'Besserweisser Moves to the World Scene," Cable, Stockholm 4874. August 15,1995.
12 Bildt bad called Holbrooke on August 25, asking if they could meet when HoJbrooke traveled to Paris.
IJ Pardew saw the possible benefits of Bildt's role, as reflected in his August 29 report to Siocombe.
Holbrooke felt that any contacts other than Milosevic with the Bosnian Serbs would do too much damage
to US credibility with Sarajevo, even through an intennediary like Bildt For Holbrooke, the Milosevic
strategy avoided this problem. since the Bosnian Serbs' would not have an independent voice. [n a
meeting August 29, Bildt approved the American team's idea to propose to Mifosevic that the Pale Serbs
be included in the talks only as part of a delegation in Belgrade; See Clark interview. .
.. The French press had characterized the French leadership as sour to the US initiative. explaining that
France had been marginalized by recent events. French officials had denied this, yet argued that the
American plan had to be folded into a Contact Group approach. See "Scenesetter for Assistant Secretary
Holbrooke's Visit," Cable. Paris 20153, August 24, 1995.
.
85 See" NS Holbrooke's August 28 Meeting with French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette." Cable,
Paris 20536, August 29. 1995. Much the same was also said to Holbrookc in his meeting that day with
Bruno Racine, French Prime Minister luppe's senior diplomatic advisor. See "NS Holbrooke's August 28
meeting with Matignon Adviser Racine," Cable, Paris 20539, August 29. 1995. In separate
meetings, with his French counterparts, General Clark also began to discuss PIF options; see Clark
interview
. &6 Izetbegovic's consideration of skiwing Paris was reported by Pardew in his August 29 report to
Slocombe. Chirae had invited lzetbegovic to Paris during Holbrookc's first shuttle, apparently to send a
signal of France's support for the Bosnian Government and that their opposition to Serb-Croat deal at
Bosnia's expense. See "No French Green Light For Bosnian Military Actions; Chirae Invites Izetbegovic
(0 Paris," Cable, Paris 19434, August 17, 1995.
17 Qrjgins ora CatastrQJ2bc, pJ73.
71
UNCLASSIFIED

2$
President was reportedly interested in the U.S. plan, but was less anxious to move to-ward
a settlement than some of his top advisors.
58
.
'

. . Joined by Sacirbey. the meeting with the Bosnian President lasted for almost three
hours. The Bosnians were very upset about the marketplace shelling; Sacirbey had 'even threatened not to.meet until the bombing started.. lzetbegovic also demanded that that
NATO act: The Bosnian President had had enough. "J don't want to negotiate further
Unless you start bombing." he told HQlbrooke. "It's quite possible that this was deliberately done to disrupt the talks." The Anierie:ans agreed that the egregious .action required a harsh. and immediate response. Holbrooke felt that this horrible tragedy
created a valuable opportunity.to bolster U,S. credibility, but told Izetbegovic he could not guarantee that the would begin. of the possibility that the Bosnians might be more intrigued with. the fruits of failure -lift-and-strike rather "than
reaching a settlement in which they would have to compromist; the team worked to persuade lzetbegovic that Bosnia would be better off with an agreement 'than further bloodshed. Holbrooke emphasized the economic carrots that would be available to the Bosnians 9.D.l:i if they cooperated. They could not stall. blame the Serbs. fail to get an agreement, and still expect unconditional U.S. SUpport.
89
These points seemed to with the Bosnian President.
90
Despite Izetbegovic's threat to stall substantive talks until bombing begari:> the
Paris meetings with the Bosnians were quite productive. lzetbegovic reacted positi vely
toward the comprehensive natUre of the U.S. initiative. On constitutional the
Bosnians surprised Owen and others with their own proposal, which went much further
than anyone expected in granting autonomy to the Bosnian Serbs. It seemed that v.rhile
the Sarajevo did not want a divided state> it was equally unenthusiastic. to
share governmental powers with its Serb enemies. Moreoyer, they appeared to be wi 11 ing
to allow the Bosnian Serbs to have some social, cultural and economi c ties to Belgrade in
exchange for Milosevic concessions, such as sealing the SerbIBosnian. border and mutual
recognition.
91
Thus. the Sarajevo gove.rnn1ent's proposal called for a sort of "loose"
union, in which the Serbs would be essentially self-governing, enjoying such privileges
as being able to station representatives abroad at Bosnian embassies. The Bosnians
rejected most of the more' specific ideas contained in Owen's draft document, instead
seeking simplicity. This squared with Owen's own view that political and legal proposals would evolve, and the U.S. should first get all sides to agree to rather simple
h/
.
. .
I .
'II Clark interview, July 15, 1996; Clark comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke interviewJ (notes);
Holbrooke comments, Dayton History Seminar. On economic assistance for the Bosnians, HoJbrooke had
still wanted to give them specific figures for potential US help, yet he was again told not to pending a
presidential decision. Nevertheless, Talbott had told him that he could be "expansive and assertive on the
issue, emphasizing to the Bosnians that we are absolutely comm itted and serious on the issue." See
"Official-Informal" (Message from Kornblum to Holbrooke), Cable. State 198023. August 19,1995.
W After this initial discussion. the two sides agreed to meet later after a late-night dinner hosted by US
Ambassador Pamela Harrimann. Much to {he chagrin of several dinner guests (including the eminent
Prench philosopher, Bernard-Henri Levy), the elegant French mea I nearly devolved into chaos as
Clark and Kerrick continually left the room to talk to Washington concerning possible NATO
responses. See Holbrooke comments, Dayton History Seminar. Levy recounted Ihis even! in his 1996
memoir, Le l,ys et l.a Cen<1re. See pp464-470.
C
72

UNCLASSIFIED
131.
]31.
UNCLASSIFIED
I
principles that could be used as- building blocks for a more detailed agreement. Owen
- -
wrote in long-hand a set of six principles based upon these discussions at the American embassy, which lzetbegovic approved. He then faxed these back to Washington for
review by the legal working group.92
Territorial issues were not dealt With extensively in these early meetings, although enough was discussed to convince the U.S. team that territorial ownership would be among the most contentious parts of the negotiations. Izetbegovic himself predicted to Holbrooke - as it turned out, prophetically - that "the map" would be far more difficult to resolve than constitutional issues.
93
Concerning the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, the Izetbegovic and Sacirbey wanted it strengthened, and were willing to acCept U.S. meditation between them and Croatia to help do so. They were cautiously optimistic about the Karadzic letter to Carter. The two Bosnian leaders felt that it might provide a new opportunity, but the details would have to be developed and defIned with Belgrade. In tenns of the more central issue-of Bosnian Serb interlocutors, lzetbegovic agreed with Holbrooke's position that the U.S. meet with Karadzic or Mladic only ifthey were part of a Milosevic-Ied delegation in Belgrade.
94
_
On the military response to the Sarajevo massacre, confemng between UN and NATO commanders had begun almost immediately after the shelling. The night of August 28, UNPROFOR commander Ll General Rupert Smith 'Worked with representatives oru.s. and NA ');0 forces to draw up- operational and targeting Key
among these plans was the withdrawal- of 92 UN troops stationed in Gorazde. S UN and NATO planners were determined to avoid the hostage crisis that had prevented airstrikes
earlier that year.
96
By the 29th, the troops were out of danger, and the last hurdle to
airstrikes was removed._ By 5':45 that afternoon (parisIBeIgrade time; 11 :45am EDT), UN
Under Secretary Kofl Annan informed ,the USUN mission that UN commanders had turned their key to authorize NATO airstrikes. The military known as "Operation Deliberate Force," would commence as soon as possible. The airstrikes. Annan
would be more than pinpricks.
97
-
-
When the team finally left for Belgmde the morning of August 30, NATO planes
were eight hours into their bombing campaign against the Bosnian- Serbs.
98
Following
92 Owen learned this "begin simple" approach from his experiences in dealing with negotiations to free the
hostages during the Carter Administration. See Owen interview, September 11. 1996; and Owen fax to _
Laurel. Miller, August 29, 1995. Pardew also faxed-a draft back to the Pentagon. Details from Pardew
August 29 trip report. Owen interview, September I I, 1996 and Holbrooke comment, Dayton History
Seminar.
- 93 -
-
Holbrooke draft memoir, Chapter 7 (December 12, 1996), p7.
?4 Details of meetings from Pardew's report. "Second Meeting with lzetbegovic," August 29, 1995; and
Wes Clark's Update" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. August 28, 1995. On the Federation,lzetbegov ic
and Sacirbey had told US Ambassadol"'Menzies on August 21 that they wanted the US to mediate the
integration oftbe Republic (ofBosniaJ and the [Muslim-Croat) Federation, possibJy doing so through
semi-private talks US. See Cable (no title), Sarajevo 262, August 28, 1995 (EURIFrasure electronic files).
9$ See" August 29 NATO Political Committee Meeting - fonner Yugoslavia," Cable, USNATO 3409,
August 29, 1995.
_

- See fax from Charles Skinner (USUN Brussels) to George Glass at the State Department (EURlRPM).
August 31. 1995; and Hunter interview.
91 "Undersecretary General Annan. Says UNPROFOR to Respond by Air to August 28 Shelling of Sarajevo
Market," Cable, USUN New York 3295; August 29,1995.
9. The first wave orNATO planes left A viano Air Force Base in Italy at 8pm EDT-August 29 (2am, August
30 PariS/Belgrade time), hitting radar, artilfery, and C3 targets. In addition to the US, Italy, France, The
6
73
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLAssiFiED
-
forty months of inconsistent resolve. NATO had stepped squarely into the Bosnian conflict with the largest-military action in the Alliance's history. Diplomatically, talks with the Bosnians had gone surprisingly welL Likely heartened by NATO's response. lzetbegovic and Sacirbey appeared to be convinced that the time to agree had come.
99
Members of the U.S. team were optimistic that "some sort of realistic dear' was achievable. lOG But more important, tbe Holbrooke delegation knew they would now arrive on Milosevic's doorstep with exactly what they felt they needed: bargaining leverage provided by the power to hurt.
Netherlands, Spain. Turkey, and the UK aU contributed aircraft to these initial strikes. Augmenting the air
campaign, French RRF heavy artillery launched a ninety minute barrage from atop Mt. Jgman, hitting
ammunition bunkers and weapons. See State Department Operations' Center Spot Reports, "NATO Action .
in Bosnia." 0300 EDT and 0600 EDT, August 30, 1995. The bombing had almost stalled the negotiations-
- although not because of any adverse reactions among the Balkan parties. Rather, the problem was
logistical: NATO military officials did not want the team flying into a war zone. Late the night of the
August 29, Holbrookc had asked Clark to work out a route-with NATO. After being up most of the night,
Clark was able to do so. See Clark interview. September 18, '1996; and Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter
7 (December 12, 1996), pp25-26.
~ In his own meeting with Izetbegovic on August 29, French President Chirae had also weighed in to
convince the Bosnians to seize the current opportunity. See "Chirae Urges lzetbegovic to Take the Path to
Peace," Paris 20672, August 30, 1995.
100 As expressed by Pardew in his August 29 update to Siocombe.
74
UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter Four
UNCLASSIFIED
Q
The Road to Geneva: The Patriarch
Letter and NATO Bombing
The team arrived in Belgrade on August 30. not knowing what to expect from
Milosevic. During the circuitous flight into Serbia. to avoid the NATO air campaign,
Holbrooke told his colleagues that tlie moment reminded him of another time in which
military actions created diplomatic uncertainty: 1972, when Nixon and Kissinger flew
into Moscow to discuss the SALT negotiations, shortly after the U.S. had mined
Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam. In both instances. U.S. negotiators convened in a
country's capital as the U.S. military exercised force against its clients. Like Nixon and
Kissinger, Holbrookeand his team anticipated a negative response to the military action,
yet remained unsure about what the implications would be. on the diplomatic task at
hand. I But this mission to Belgrade was important for another reason .. For the four new
members of the U.S. negotiating team, this was the first opportunity to see the Serb leader
in action. As they soon found out, he could put on quite a show? ..
The Patriarch Letter
Surprisingly, MiIosevic did not rebuke the U.S. delegation for the bombing.
Indeed, his reaction was quite the opposite. The Serb leader gave the impression that he
didn't really care about either the marketplace massacre or NATO's response. he
began that afternoon with some surprisingly kind words for the three fallen American
diplomats,. speaking with particular sincerity about Bob Frasure .. ""1 was startled to hear
Milosevic talk about Bob's family, his fann and his dream for the future," Holbrooke
recalled. "1 realized, for the first time, that he and Bob had spent a lot of time conversing
about personal matters:')
I
I The expectation that Milosevie would want to talk about the bombing first-thing is reflected by the shuttle
team's talking points prepared for this meeting. According to these points, the bQmbing "I) Was a
necessary reaction to the Bosnian Serb attack on &!nUevo; 2) We had hoped that Karadzic and Mladic
would have distanced themselves vigorously from the shelling attack_ They did not; and 3) Despite the
shelling we are prepared to continue our mission." See "Belgrade TalkingPoints." fax from Pardew to
Slocombe, August 30, ] 995. See also Holbrooke comment. Dayton History Seminar.
Incidentally, Nixon and Kissinger were apparently less concerned about the Soviet reaction in
1972 than Holbrooke recalJed twenty-three years later. Although some had compared Nixon's situation in
1972 (0 Eisenhower's in 1960 (when the Paris summit with Khrushchev was undennin.ed by the U-2
incident), Kissinger later reflected that the mood on Air Force One en route to Moscow "was one of
optimism, even elation ... we were going to Moscow with dignity .. we had behind us a rare public
consensus produced by the stunning events oflhe preceding month ... Nixon was in high spirits." See
Kissinger. Wbite House Yem (Little, Brown. 1979) ppI202-1207.
2 Holbrooke comment, DaytOn History Clark interview.
3 Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 7 (December 12, 1996), p27.
s d 15
UNCLASSIFIED

After this rather poignant opening, Milosevic abruptly changed course. He told
the delegation that he had an unexpected announcement. "While you've been away I've been busy:' he said. 4 He explaJned. that he had just worked out a deal with the Bosnian
Serbs investing himself as the negotiator for aU Serbs - both in Serbia and Bosnia. Handing over to HoI brooke a letter dated August 29 and signed by seven members 'of the Bosnian'Serb leadership and the Patriarch of Serbian Orthodox Church, Milosevic
explained that Karadzic, Mladic and Serbian Parliament President Momcilo Krajisnik bad
agreed to join a negotiating delegation in which he. would have the final and deciding vote.
s
By forging this so-called "Patriarch letter," Milosevic solved possibly the most intractable problem of the negotiations -- how to deal with the Bosnian Serbs. The Serb
leader delivered what Holbrooke had been pressing for since their first meeting; Throughout the Milosevic had always tried to distance himself from the Pale leadership, claiming that he had no control over them.' the Milosevic strategy appeared to be developing brilliantly -- with this Patriarch letter in hand, the Serbian
President tied his destiny directly to his clients in Pale.
6
."
Milosevic's turn was likely motivated by several forces. First, there was ample evidence that he was losing control of the Bosnian Serbs. The marketplace massacre waS a step backward. If such incidents could not be curbed, it would be impossible to
negotiate. Alternatively. there was Milosevic's concern that the Bosnian Serbs could cut
him out of a negotiated settlement. Bildt bad made several contacts with Pale, and the
Carter-Karadzic correspondence produced another possible opening, During this August
. 30 meeting; Milosevic said thathe wouidn't deal with anyone but the U.S .. "When Bildt
comes to see me, I won't tell him anything, I won't go into details until I see you,.'" he'
told Holbrooke? Quite plausibly;. MHosevic was concerned that the Bosnian Serbs might
a deal withQut him -- meaning, importantly, that an agreement would not
necessarily bring sanctions relief. At last, U.S. pressure might have worked. against Milosevic. During the first shuttle" Holbrooke made it clear to the Serb leader that to
enjoy the "carrot" of sanctions relief he had to prove he could speak. for Pale .. It was
bluntly conveyed that the U.S. would no longer accept Milosevic's tired claim that he had nothing to do with the Bosnian Serbs. It seemed. that, finally, Milosevic understood this
g
.
message. "
'
.
.f Kerrick interview; Perina interview; Holbrookc interview. June 18, 1996; Owc:n interview, September .11,
1996.
.
'Sec copy of letter (English translation) in fax to John Kornblum (EUR), August 30. 1995.
6 Reflecting on this event, Rudolph Perina said that he had likely been tipped otT by Milosevic about the
Patriarch letter during an August 29 meeting with the Serb leader and US Senator Robert Kerrey of
Nebraska. Milosevic told the Senator and Perina that Karadzic coUld not speak for the Bosnian Serbs
because he would not politically survive peace in BDSnia. But. the Serb leader said that. he "had some
ideas" for further progress in the peace process. Perina noted later that he was likely referring to the
Patriarch letter, which was signed that day. See "Senator Kerrey Meetings With Milosevic and Chief of
StaffPerisic," Cable, Belgrade 4263, A.ugust 29, 1995; and Perina interview. 7 Clark interview. September 18. 1996.
In their work. Silber and Little report that Milosevic that NATO bombing would begin, and
wanted to grab "the opportUnitY to win his war against the Bosnian Serb According to
Montenegrin President Momir"Bulatovic (who was present when the Patriarch letter was signed), the
Bosnian were basically forced to sign. "They were conscious of all the mistakes they'd made and
that could be destroyed: Republika Srpska could disappear," Bulatovic reponedly said. U(Yetl,
it was difficult for them to sign. This was their political suicide." Silber and Little also' report that there
were possible "secret annexes" to the Patriarch letter. with Miloscvic agreeing to protect certain issues for
76
I
.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Diplomatically, the Patriarch letter opened the floodgates. Milosevic had shown little willingness to respond substantively during the first shuttle; now, he poured forth with commitments and proposals. He repeated his support of using the Contact Group its 51-49 territorial division, as the basis for negotiations. Moreover, he suggested that the Bosnian state should be a "union" within its current boundaries with a Muslim-controlled Sarajevo as its capital. Territorially, he advocated giving the Muslims Gorazde (with a connecting corridor to Federation land); the roads and connecting lands from Tuzla and Kiseljak to Sarajevo; a fifteen-kilometer buffer along the Croatian border from 'the Livno Valley to Bihac; and the northern Bosnian city of Brcko. On Eastern Slavonia, proposed creating a joint U.S.-Russian security guarantee for three years to be followed by a referendum on whether the region would become Serbian or Croatian.
9
Suddenly, concrete progress seemed hand.
IO
After up a huge Milosevic pushed for quickly convening an CC3_by_ 5" international.conference (Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjmanjoined by the Contact Group) to ratify an agreement 'on such a set of principles. hinted that he might explore convening a' conference with the three Balkan foreign niinisters after an agreement was reached on more fundamental principles. Here, . the U.S. wanted to be careful, not committing to anything too sooiI. "In principle, we will have a conference
II
. .
sooner or later," UoJbrooke told Milosevic, "but we are not ready yet." As Pardew later reported to Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe, the shuttle team wanted to wait until
both sides undertook "significant confidence-building measures" and Milosevic arid his "delegation" fonnally agreed to principles.
Only after two hours of talks did the Serb leader bring up NATO airstrikes. With
a conSpicuous . lack ot: pasSion, he asked that the bombing be stopped to help 'the negotiations. Holbrooke explained that while he bad no direct authority to demand a bombing.halt, he. would work with NATO Allies to a "suspension" 01 the
campaign, as long as Mladic ended the Serb shelling of Sarajevo. As he had done when discussing the possibilities for safe travel into Sarajevo during Holbrooke's first shuttle, Milosevic immediately contacted the Bosnian Serb generiU to secure his agreement.
After he did so, Holbrooke promised to seek a suspension. The Assistant Secretary felt
that a temporary pause might help negotiations by providing the Bosnian Serbs a chance to withdraw. Once they had retreated, the U.S. could use the resumption of bombing
leverage to negotiate broader cease-fire teons. 12
'
..
the Bosnian Serbs (such as, they imply, Bosniatt Serb control of Becko). See pp365-66; p379 (fn7). US
. officials have speculated about why Milosevic sought the Patriarch letter, and how he attained it. but with
no conclusions. See Holbrooke, Hill, Pardew comments, Dayton History Seminar. ..
.
9 Details on this meeting from Par dew' s report to SIocombe, "Peace Initiative in the BalkansBelgrade/"
August 30, 1995.
.
10 Milosevic's D1'QtlOSaJs were consistent with what US intelligence had reported he was likely to 00.1
II Holbrooke draft memoirs. Chapter 7 (December 12, 1996). p30.
12 Holbrooke interview, September 30, 1996.

UNCLASSIFIED
77
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
Moreover, getting a halt might enhance Holbrooke's own bargaining leverage
with the Serb leader, proving to Milosevic that the American negotiator could deliver. While Holbrooke knew that his team had no official line of authority with NATO to stop the airstrikes. they cc;mld at least.try.13
.
That night. the team returned to their room in the Belgrade Hyatt Hotel, which they had informed was bugged.
14
MilitarY aides traveling with General Clark set up communications so the team could converse in a secure In a scene rem!niscent of "Get Smart." the team donned voice-shielding nose cones and climbed into a makeshift white:-noise tent to report back to Washington. Holbrooke and Clark contacted Talbott" and Admiral William Owens, the Vice Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs, to report on their talks with Milosevic and to press for a bombing halt. If they could not fulfill their promise and the air campaign continued, the delegation worried that they
would start to have "serious negotiating problems" with the Serbs. IS.
.
. The eight hours with Milosevic that day were truly remarbble. The "gambler" seemed to be playing at the top ofbis game. Pardew characterized Milosevic in this first meeting as "commanding. channing. a convincing debater, obstinate and enthusiastically agreeable -- all in five minutes:' By presenting the Patriarch letter, the Serb leader had completely changed the dynamic of the negotiations. The letter accomplished, in effect.
what both the U.S. (and Milosevic) had been insisting the Bosnian. Serbs-do for over a'
year -- accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations. Shrewdly, Milosevic bad done so while allowing the Bosnian Serbs to save face - theBosnian
Serbs did not have to say publicly that they accepted the Contact Group plan, but merely
that Milosevic would negotiate on their behalf. There was now a basis for negotiations. Although Holbrooke deliberately played down the development publicly as a "procedural
breakthrough" so as not to raise expectations, Milosevic's move opened the door for real
negotiations to begin:6 Following the tragedies of the Mt. Igman accident and the
murderous Sarajevo shelling,. the prospects for peace had suddenly improved. "I've put down the hammer I was using to beat down my optimism," Pardew told Slocombe. "This
may work:,J7
.
The next day. August 31, the team left for Zagreb where they met with Croatian
.officials and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey. They. discussed breakthrough announcement, and some of his initial bargaining positions. On 'Gorazde, Sacirbey remained finn that it be part of Federation-controUed territory. which coincided with Milosevic's expressed flexibiiity on the issue.)
8
With Croat President the team discussed the status of Eastern Slavonia. Milosevic had told the team in Belgrade that he was willing. to defer this issue until Bosnia was solved, but this issue was
enonnously important for Croatia. Acknowledging that the UN protection mandate for the area (known as UNCRO) expired in three months, Ttidjman threatened to use military .
13 Interestingly, Milosevic apparently never believed Holbrooke when he said that he had no authority to
stop the airstrikcs. See Pardew interview, July 26. 1996.
14 See Perina to Holbrooke, "Playing Hardball with Milosevic," no date.
IS.Pardew repon, August 30; see also Pardew's hand-written notes from phone can with Slocombe, August
30,1995; and Clark interview.
16 See Roger Cohen, "Serb Shift Opens Chance for Peace, A US Envoy Says," New York Times, September
1.1995; and Holbrooke interview, Dayton History Seminar.
17 Pardew notes for phone call with Slocombe. August 30, 199.5.
II
.
See note from Pardew to Slocombe, "Gorazde:' August 31, 1995.
78
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
force to retake the area if compromise failed. After talking through the main points of a
potential Serb-Croat agreement (such as extension of the UN mandate, composition of an
implementation force, refugee status, and a potential referendum vote on status), the
American delegation felt that tlie ability to agree came down to two core points: mutual
recognition between Croatia and Serbia and the continued credibility of Croatia's militaIy,
threat. If Serbia and Croatia recognized one another -' which seemeCi likely if Serbia
perceived that Croatia had achieved military parity - there might be enough Common
ground in their negotiating positions to'close a deaJ.
19
, "
Shortly after arriving in zagreb, HoIbrooke and Clark called NATO Commander
U.S. General George Joulwan ahd Admiral Leighton Smith, the Commander of NATO
Forces in Southern Europe, to "lobby for a pause in the air campaign?O They also
discussed this later that, day with UNPROFOR chief Janvier, to find out that he had
already been in contact with the Bosnian Serbs. . When the air campaign began,. Janvier
had outlined in a short letter 'to Mladic three terms on which the bombing could end: the
cessation of attacks against the safe areas; withdrawal of aU heavy weapons from a
twenty-kilometer exclusion zOne around Sarajevo; and and complete"
cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia. As an incentive. Janvier offered MIadic an
immediate "halt" in the air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs would agree to
these tennsin Writing?l Janvier concurred with the U.S. opinion that the
bombing should pause to test Bosnian Serb compliance.
21
"
Interestingly, Janvier claimed that Milosevic had contacted Akashi on August 30
to recommend that Janvier write the letter to Mladic outlining the conditions for a
bombing halt. Apparently. this call was made shortly before the U.S. delegation met with,
Milosevic. During the August 30 meeting, Milosevic had seemed so uninterested in the
bombing that U.S. negotiators were left with. the impression that he actually favored the
air campaign against his Bosnian comrades.
23
If Janvier was right, Serb leader was
more concerned than he appeared. They were unsure what to make of such a claim; it
didn't seem to square with Milosevic's relatively calm reaction, and Milosevic never
mentioned working With UNPROFOR.
24
In any the letter had gone to Mladic" the
U.S. team felt that a pause 'was wise, and Janvier seemed to concur.25
.
A Watershed Day: September 1
After this full day of talks, the team left. Zagreb to return to Belgrade. The U.S.
delegation awoke that morning to -hear the news that as ,of 2am, the NATO bombing
campaign would be halted for at least a day. Janvier and Mladic were planning to meet
soon to discuss the status of Bosnian Serb compliance.
19 As described in "Negotiations on Eastern Slavonia," memorandum for Holbrookc from Pardew, August
31,1995
20 Galbraith interview, October 2, 1996.
21 Letter from Janvier to Mladic, August 30, J995.
12 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
.
23 Holbrookc had conveyed this observation in a pbone call'to Anthony Lake, which Lake later discussed at
a September 5 PC meeting. Vershbow interview. September 26. 1996.
24 "Balkan Intrigues," Pardew memorandum to Slocombe. August 31. 1995.
2S After the talks with Janvier, Clark called the NATO commander in the region, Admiral Leighton
"Snuffy" Smith to tell him that the negotiating team and Jan\'ier felt it may make sense diplomatically to
allow a pause in the bombing. Smith reacted with some hostility to Clark, apparently feeling tbatlhe Lt.
General was meddling in his command area. See Clark interview. July IS, 1996.
7
UNCLASSIFIED
79
UNCLASSIFIED

The Bosnians were absolutely livid that the campaign had been halted. In a call to
Talbott, Sacirbey said that fighting in and around Sarajevo was continuing, and
demanded that the airstrikes be resumed immediately. At first, Talbott explained .that the
cessation was called for technical military reasons. But as Sacirbey . pressed him further,
Talbott admitted that the pause had certain:diplomatic benefits,although the U.S. wanted
. to keep this secret. He reassured the Bosnian Foreign Minister that it was "not, repeat not
a roIling suspension . it is a limited one designed [toJ permit a Mladicllanvier meeting
and to offer Mladic the opportunity to comply with all demands." Yet, to preserve
. NATO and the UN's credibility, Talbott told Sacirbey that the bombing needed to be
portrayed as a military effort, not merely a tool of diplomacy.26
In Belgrade, the shuttle team would try to use the halt to their advantage .. Having
pressed for the pause and now energized t>y the Patriarch breakthrough. they decided to
try to work quietly to gain the public agreement of the parties to a set of pol iticaI
principles. Holbrooke had set out on this shuttle with the intention of getting the parties
to agree on a general legal and political framework; he and Owen thought that it would be
a useful step forward, and officials in Washington anxiously sought a public symbol of
progress?7 After debating the issue, the shuttle team decided to arrange a copference in
Geneva in which the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian foreign ministers could. gather to
bless an interim agreement. "Our theory," Holbrooke later explained, "which was central
to our operating strategy' as we went along, was to use Geneva to create a public and
private sense of momentum ... I wanted to use only for the announcement of those
forward steps (previously] agreed, and then adjourn without getting into unproductive
. arguments."
.
On the plane between Zagreb and Belgrade the previous Owen began to work
on drafting framework political principles to presentto the Serb leader. Loosely based on
the "six points" he had discussed with lzetbegovic two days before in Paris, Owen's first
draft outlined that Bosnia would remain a single state composed of two "constituent
entities>" the Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity. The draft also detailed an
arrangement for a three-person Bosnian Presidency, which would be empowered to
conduct foreign relatioIlS, appoint and supervise a CommissioIi for Disrlaced Persons,
joint public corporations, and an arbitration system to resolve disputes? Holbrooke at
first felt that Owen's work was a bit too spare, but then working along.with Chris Hill,
they developed a package that offered a minimal but realistic target. 30
.
While the rest of the delegation prepared to meet with Milosevic on September 1, .
two members of the delegation, Chris Hill and Jim Pardew, secretly traveled to Skopje,
Macedonia to meet with Macedonian officials on a possible agreement with neighboring
Greece. Since February 1994, Greece had imposed an economic embargo on Macedonia
out of anger that the tiny, land-locked fonner Yugoslav republic had assumed the name of
a Greek region and had used a traditional Greek symbol on its flag. This dispute had
proven one of the more intractable in the region, and the U.S. was concerned that it could
16 See "Acting Secretary Talbott and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey; September I. 1995" Cable, State
209772, September 5, 1995.
.
27 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), September 30, 1996.
II Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 8 (January 21, 1997), p21_
29 See "Constitutional Organization of Bosnian State; Proposed Basic PrinCiples," Draft, September I.
1995.
.
30 Owen/Holbrooke interview. June 18,1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17.1996.
80
F F
UNCLASSIFIED
ONtLXIfThO
escalate into bloodshed. The problem was very tricky: while Macedonia was seen as a likely flashpoint for violence, Greece was a NATO ally and the Clinton Administration was under heavy pressure from vocal Greek-American groups not to press the weak
Greek government.. Nearly 550 U.S. soldiers had been deployed in Macedonia for two years as part of a larger UN "tripwire" force trying to prevent, hostilities from spilling
over from Bosnia .. Over the past few months, the two sides had made some progress in . . talks mediated by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Special Envoy
Matthew Nimetz, and were close to' solving their differences. However, the remaining issues were the most difficult, and' Holbrooke. Hill and Marshall Adair, a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, had decided that the U.S. had to engage at a higher level to try to bring the talks to closure. Holbrooke sensed that "a deal was ready,"
and that a final high-level push would do the job. After a staff meeting the evening of August 31 in the Belgrade embassy's secure "bubble," Holbrooke asked Hill and Pardew
to take the plane to Skopje the next day white the rest of the delegation remained in Belgrade for talks with Mi19sevic.
3I
. .
. The two-hour meeting with Macedonian President l(iro Gligorov went
smoothly.32 Gligorov was eager for a deal. telling Pardewand Hill that "when I learned. you were coming I decided that now is the right moment for agreement." Pardew
showed him the Patriarch letter, which Gligorov said was significant evidence that a deal was possible between Serbs and Bosnians. The three discussed a draft agreement that
Greek and Macedonian negotiators had been working on. at the UN, outlining mutual
recognition, with Macedonia allowed to keep its name given certain conditions. Gligorov
seemed satisfied with the draft, and after two hours of talks, Hill and Pardew returned to Belgrade believing that a settlement was possible. The remaining step was. for Holbrooke
to convince the Greek leadership, which he would try to do during a previously scheduled
visit on September 4.
33
.
.
FollOwing the short flight from Skopje, Hill and Pardew rejoined the team that
afternoon at Dobanovci, a military compound outside Belgrade which Milosevic used as
his retreat. There, at the Serb leader's "hunting lodge," Hill and Pardew found their
colleagues already hours into what Pardew later described as a "day of bonding with the
,Godfather." The Milosevic displayed that day was far looser than his stem reputation. With the Patriarch letter under his belt, Milosevic acted as the Don Corleone of all Serbs. Over the course of twelve hourn,. the delegation saw a Milosevic at once "drunk. ahd
sober, spouting Shake,speare and Latin. overbearing and raging, patronizing and joking. He covered topics from the future of Russia in the post-Cold War world to tlJ.e sexual
preferences of (Bosnian Prime Minister] Haris Siladjzic.,,34 He took Holbrooke and
31 During the summer of 1995, Chris Hill had first mised the idea of working "to close" the deal between
the two sides with Greece Ambassador Loucas TsiJas. Details from HolbrookeIHilI comments, Dayton
History Seminar; Hill interview with author (notes). December 19. 1996.
12 In a letter cabled to Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski that same day. Deputy Secretary
Talbott stressed that "we remain hopeful that a solution is at hand .. at this critical time, anything you
can do to overcome. the remaining obstacles will make a major contribution to stability in the region." This
letter was a response to a letter Crvenkovski sent to Washington on August See "Response to FM
Crvenkovski," Cable, State 207787, September I, 1995 .
.33 For details of Skopje visit, see "T\yo Hours with Gligorov; )2 with Milosevic." Pardew report to
Slocombe. September I, 1995; Juiy 31, 1996; and comments .by Holbrooke, Hill. and .
Pardew. Dayton History Seminar. .
. 14'
Pardew report to Slocombe, September 1. 1995.
$
F
81
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Clark on a long walk around the compound's grounds. where he and Holbrooke talked about everything from international banking and Balkan personalities to duck hunting.
3s
As delegation members later reflected. events of this day changed the character of their bargaining relationship with Milosevic. Particularly for Holbrooke. the informality of the day created a sense of trust with the Serb leader although he was still approached with
healthy skepticism, Milosevic seemed prepared to make a deal.
36
..
Part of what made this day so important was the substantive ground.they covered with the Serb President. Owen presented Milosevic with his paper on political and legal principles. Over cigars and glasses of Wine, Milosevic agreed to all the main points of the draft, asking only for minor changes in language and less specificity on the proposed . Presidency's role in foreign affairs?' The Serb leader expressed most interest any "special ties" the principles permitted between Serbia and the Bosnian Serb entity, seeing in them a precursor to the Bosman. Serb republic'S eventual incorporation into Serbia proper. Such "special ties" had been discussed With Frasure during June, and Milosevic wanted them outlined in these principles.
3S
Milosevic asked that one of the "outstanding issues" outlined in the draft proposal - concerning possible disqualification from the
joint Presidency persons indicted as war criminals - be deferred for later consideration. He seemed concerned that bringing this up would push his Bosnian Serb colleagues too
far, too fast. "In a house of [aJ man just hanged;> don't talk about rope," the Serb leader
told Owen, implying that if war crimes at this point it would be tough to
keep the Bosnian Serbs on board. Although he had the Patriarch letter, Milosevic was
aware that he had to proceed carefully?9
.
When asked by Holbrooke about convening a foreign ministers meeting to rati;70
the principles fonna11y, Milosevic was relaxed_ "It's up to you," he said, "You decide." 0 All Milosevic insisted on was that the U.S. be in charge - he did not want the Europeans
to control the agenda. After confuming the Serb leader's approval, HolbroOke immediately went to an American military phone set up at the hunting lodge to call
Washington. Neither Washington nor the Contact Group had any idea that such a meeting was in the works. and they would have to act quickly. Speaking with Talbott, Holbrooke requested that senior Washington officials start to inform the other Contact Group ministers that the U.S. was convening a meeting in Geneva on September 8. The
Contact Group partners quickly agreed, and later that day Washington made the
announcement
4
! Remarkably, the Geneva meeting had been arranged in a little more than two hours. The meeting would be held under the auspices of the Contact Group. with
Holbrooke. Bildt and Russian representative Igor Ivanov as the co-chairs. Holbrooke had
3$ Clark interview, 1uly 15. 1996; Holbrooke interview. October J 8,1996.
J6 On this note, Pardew wrote to Slocombe on September 1 that "More than anything else, Slobodan and
his buddies remind you of a mafia boss who has decided to make a deal with you. This has all the air of a
predetennined agreement. We just don't know the bounds yet." '7
.
Pardew report. September I, 1995_
.
3S OwenIHolbrooke interview.
39 See "Constitutional Organization of Bosnian State: Proposed Basic Principles," draft presented to
MiJosevic (with Owen's handwritten edits). September 1,1995; and OwenfHolbrooke interview.
Pardew report, September t, 1995 .
, See, for example, "The Acting Secretary and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, September 1,1995:"
Cable. State 209771, September 5, 1995.
82
a
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIfIED
initially wanted Christopher to represent the U.S., but the Secretary decided that it would
be better if the event was handled below the foreign minister leve1.
42
The U.S. diplomatic initiative now had its first concrete benchmark. Although the
team had Milosevic's agreement on their draft paper, they still had not discussed the draft
with the Bosnians or Croats. They now had a meeting scheduled and a week to create
something which all sides could agree to,
September I ended as the most significant day thus far in the negotiations. Over
the course of the past twelve hours, the delegation had seen the Serbian leader in a way
that was entirely unexpected, dramatic and frankly bizarre. With the bombing
the U.S. could now see ifthe Bosnian Serbs ready to deal; would find out the
next day when Janvier would meet with Mladic. With.the Geneva announcement, the
negotiating team marked a goal for all parties to work towaid and, just as important,
provided an image that their talks were traveling toward a solution, if slowly. the
Hill-Pardew visit to Skopje ,to be just enough to pocket asolution to the Greek-
.Macedonian dispute. While the issue was not a central component of the Bosnian
problem. Holbrooke and his delegation realized it had a larger b.enefit. If they could
deliver something on Greece-Macedonia, an issue where resolution had eluded the
international community Jor four years, it would project an image to both the Balkan
parties and European Allies that this U.S. negotiating team was fonnidable.
A3
The Contact Group and NAC
The next day, September 2, the U.S. team started to put the pieces together for
Geneva by traveling to . Bonn, 'Germany. where they joined talks with the five-nation
"Contact Group." Meeting that day in Petersberg, that national state guest house ,?utside
BOIUl, the team the Gennan, French, British and Russian officials on their
discussions in Zagreb and Belgrade. As the primary forum for negotiations during the
past two years, the Contact Group had failed to bring the parties any closer to agreem.ent.
With this .in mind, Holbrooke was already skeptical of the Contact Group's ability to act
decisively. This meeting made him even more so.
While they approved of the scheduled Geneva meeting and seemed encoumged by
the progress so far. the Contact Group officials remained hung up on the process at the
expense of negotiating progress. They complained about the lack of consultation, and
were upset at Holbrooke's decision to hold the meeting in the American mission. in
Geneva rather than a neutral UN site. AIl this grousing accomplished nothing. As
Holbrooke reflected later: "These minor dramas over the hosting and location of meetings
were a constant issue - at times, nearly an obsession -- with the Europeans. It was very
rare for a serious substantive disagreement to reach the levels of intensity that procedure
and protocol routinely triggered within the Contact Group.'M
.2 Holbrookc interview with author (notes), September 20, 1996. In his draft memoirs 8, January
21. 1997), Holbrookc explains that Christopher delegating the Geneva meeting to HoJbrooke was "an
important moment. Not every Secretary of State would have given up the chance to chair the fll'St direct
.. meeting of all three parties in the Balkan wars in almost two years, a meeting certain to attract worldwide
attention. But it was characteristic of Warren Christopher, who firmly believed in the theory of delegating
both authority and responsibility downward to key subordinates, provided they operated within established
policy guidelines."
.
o See Hill and Holbrooke. comments, Dayton History Seminar.
'" Holbrooke draft memoir. Chapter 8 (January 27. 1997), pi J.
d 83
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Although the Contact Group was essential as a to exchange views and
occasionally to bring pressure on the parties, Holbrooke 'and his team really saw it as more of a nuisance. The Contact Group's 1994 plan was indeed the basis for the current n,egotiations, but the endless bickering at its meetings was at best and at
worst counter-productive. Giveh the urgency of current negotiations, Holbrooke felt that the Contact Group wasn't able to function as a productive negotiating partner. colleagues in the Contact Group were disturbed that we planned to negotiate first" and consult with the Contact Group second, reversing the previous procedure in which We tried to work out the Contact Group position internally among the five nations before . taking it to the farties - !! system that had proved to be cumbersome, and
unproductive.,,4 Nevertheless. Holbrooke realized that feeding Europe's hunger to feel involved. -- and to be seen to be involved - in the negotiations was essentia1.
46
Holbiooke and his colleagues knew that the Contact Group could help provide the "public facade" of Russian and allied unity. In late August, Holbrooke summed up the Contact Group dilemma in a note to Secretary Christopher. "We can't live without the [Contact Group]," fIolbrooke explained, but "we can't.live with it .. Ifwe don't meet with
them and tell them what we are they compJain publicly. - If we tell they disagree and leak -- and worse. In the end, we must keep [the Contact Group] together
for public reasons, especially since we may need it later to endorse and 1egitimize any
agreement -. but we must also .reduce significantly the amount of material we share with
them.':r47
When Lake framed the initiative for the Allies in Europe as a Contact Group effort, he was simply building.this "facade" thatHolbrooke described. U.S. officials
hoped that by paying occasional homage to its such as holding the
Geneva meeting under Contact Group auspices, they could gamer the support of their
respective governments. Europe would ultimately play a critical role in implementing any settlement,. from supplying troops for IFOR to providing economic assistance to the
Bosnians. "We must never forget that we.will need them all if there is ever a settlement - - the EU for economic assistance, our NATO Allies for the new post-UN peacekeeping force, the UN for iegitimizing resolutions, the Islamic Conference for additional aid,. and the Russians and Greeks for their influence (however limited) on Belgrade," Holbrooke
explained. Accordingly, the U.S. had to seek its assistance, but in a way that kept the
Contact Group sufficiently distant to prevent it from wrecking the negotiating process_ 4.8. To create sufficient distance, Holbrooke's strategy was rather simple: limit the infonnation that the Contact Group had about his negotiations. In his August
memorandum to Christopher, Holbrooke suggested that the u.s. only providethe Contact
Group a "rough outline of where we are, issue by issue, without revealing anything not already known or agreed by each of the parties. WiUl respect to our future plans, we
4S Holbrooke draft memoir. Cbapter 2 (September 21, 1996) P 17
.f6 Holbrooke comments. passim.
47 Holbrooke wrote this memorandum in preparation for August 23 meeting he and Tarnoffhad with
European representatives at (he State Department before the Ft. Myers memorial service. See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke, "The Contact Group:' no dale. in his draft memoirs
(Chapter 2, September 21. 1996, p21), Holbrooke describes this memorandum,explaining tbat it was sent
to the Secretary on August 23. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references are from this
memorandum.
Clark interview; passim comments, Dayton History Seminar.
84
&
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

intend to keep the focus on the process, and while ,we will be eager to hear from them their ideas for initiatives, we don't intend to share ours to the group." Overall, Holbrooke explained, the "dilemma now is how to keep the actual negotiations in our hands alone." As the Holbrooke delegation was with the Contact Group in Gennany. reports came'in about the discussion between Janvier and Mladic tate the evening of September
1. They were not positive. The two opposing generals met to discuss tenns for a possible cease-fire. It looked as though the Bosnian Serbs were hedging .- it was soon determined that they had only moved around, refusing to "withdraw" them from the
exclusion zone around Sarajevo.4 Moreover, Mladic would only agree "in principle" to a permanent withdrawal of heavy weapons, demanding exchange a meeting with
Bosnian Muslim military Jeaders and a pledge by NATO and the UN to end any future 'military actions.
so
In a September 2 call with President Clinton, NATO General Claes reported that the lanvier-Mladic talks were "very difficult." For Claes, this
was to be expected. "Remember," Claes observed, "we are working with former communists and. their negotiating techniques." The two agreed that if Mladic did not accept the Allies' "very reasonable" terms, bombing would resume .. NATO, Claes noted,
would be ready "within two hours. ,,51
'
For Holbrooke, it was more of1he same from the Pale leaders, who in the past
had often feigned a sincere desire for negotiations only as a delaying'tactic.
52
The
Assistant Secretary had considered the pause a way to gauge the impact of the bombing and secure allied unity (the Allies remained somewhat skittish about bombing). But Dmy.
less than a day after he had pushed for a pause, Holbrooke realized that the calculated
gamble had come up short: Mladic was taking advantage ofthe pause, probably assuming
it 10 be just another example of the Allies' lack of resolve. As Mladic stonewalled a vacillating Janvier, l:Iolbrooke and the team decided that the airstrikes needed to be
resumed at once. Only massive force and decisive action would sway the Pale leaders.
s3
Before the team left Bonn that day for Brussels, Holbrooke and Wes Clark again worked
the phones with their counterparts in Washington and NATO command. This time, however, they lobbied to restart the air campaign. Calling from the delegation s car
4S1 A US review of Bosnian Serb compliance judged that "[the Bosnian Serbs' pUJpose was not withdrawal
of the weapons from the 20KM exclusion zone around Sarajevo, but to provide them more protection
against possible NATO airstrikes and to try to show some heavy weapons movement in order to state that
they (the BSA) really had started to execute the UN requirements. The BSA bad enough time to move
many more weaponsthan they had and were merely changing their positions." See fe02 Assessment about
the Bosnian Serf) HW Withdrawal, September 5, 1995," as QUoted in USAFE Study. August 1996. In his
September 1 phone conversation with Sacirbey. Talbott said the BSA was not withdrawing its weapons.
and tbat if this continued, NATO was prepared to resume strikes.
' 50 As conveyed in a September 2 letter from Mladic in repJy to Janvier's August 30 tener. Characterizing
Mladic's letter. the US embassy in Sarajevo observed that "in essence Mladic is prepared to accept the
WeSt's surrender. He freezes the lines, keeps his gains, strangles Sarajevo, continues to harass the UN with
license; renegotiated the airport deal. reduces the exclusion 'zone to a tiny safe,area (Pale remains exempt),
and reserves the right to launch offensive operations. The letter is an outrage, as a senior UN official put it.
But it will become a crime if the UN accepts it," Forlext and comment, see "MJadic lenertoJanvicr:'
Cable. Sarajevo 52g, September 2, ]995.
51 "Presidential Telephone CaU, September 2, 1995," Cable, State 215056, September 11, 1995.
52 Holbrooke interview with author (noles), September 30, 1996. .
53 Holbrooke interview with author (notes). September 30, 1996; Clark interview. July IS, 1996.
7
b
85
UNCLASSIFIED
!
UNCLASSIFIED

parked on the airport tannac in Cologne, Clark tried to persuade a skeptical Admiral Leighton Smith that resuming the bombing would help the negotiations.
54
Once in Brussels, Holbrooke, Clark and Pardew continued their efforts in a with NAC Briefing the NAC on the recent progress in the
negotiations, Holbrooke began by observing that exactly two weeks prior, he and Clark bad returned to the U.S. with the bodies of Frasure, Kruzel and Drew. Dedicating their efforts to the memory of their fallen comrades, Holbrooke the negotiating team had moved things forward dramaticaily over the past few days. Milosevic had solved the question of who would speak for the Serbs, and the upcoming Geneva meeting aimed to provide inomentwn to the process and set the stage for a Jarger conference. To preserve the positive course of negotiations, Holbrooke asked that the NAC present the Bosnian
Serbs with a firm ultimatum and prepare to resume the NATO air campaign.55
This waS a key moment for the American negotiator. who recognized the considerable advantages bombing brought to his bargaining leverage. The decision facing them, Holbrooke said to NATO's political leaders, was a "classic dilemma in
politica1-militaty relations, one we faced but never solved in Vietnam: the relationship
between force and diplomacy." decision to retaliate for" the Sarajevo massacre bad been necessary and correct, he argued. Now. after the Bosnian Serbs have refused to
take the opportunity to comply, the bombing pause needed to end. "It [is1 now essential
to establisH that we are negotiating from a position of strength," Holbrooke stressed. 56 Despite this presentation, the NAC remained uneasy about resuming the bombing.
The problem, it seemed, was that the NAC partners were getting mixed signals about
what to do. Upon receipt of Mladics written response and his guarantee "not {to]
conduct combat operations or threaten any attack [on the safe areas] except in the case of
self defense," Janvier believed that the pause should continue - indeed, he had already
extended the pause from 24 to 72 hours.
57
Janvier seemed to accept Mladic's statement that as long as the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) did not threaten any safe are!lS, it should be
allowed to asswne defensive positions to protect themselves from NATO U.S. officials in Washington, the Holbrooke delegation, General Joulwan, NATO Secretary General Claes and Acting UN Secretary General Kofi Annan all disagreed.
They believed that Mladic's response to Janvier's demands was totally unacceptable and wanted the NAC to act.
59
S4 According to Clark, Generalloulwan supported the resumption of bombing, but Admiral Smith felt that
rcanning the campaign would hurt the negotiating process. Joulwan asked Clark to call Smith (who
outranked him) to explain to him that Wlt starting the bombing would damage the team's bargaining
position. At onc point, when an angry Smith lashed back at Clark, Holbrooke took the phone himseJf to
insist that the bombing resume. See Clark interview, July 15, 1996; Holbrooke interview (notes),
September 30, 1996.
5S See "Assistant Secretary Holbrooke Briefs NAC on Peace Negotiatiens,n Cable, USNATO 3457>
September4, 1995; and Holbrooke interview (notes), September 30, 1996.
5s lbid; and Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 8 (January 27, 1997), P 18.
51 See Cable, Sarajevo 528.
sa He had apparently told this to US Ambassador Galbraithon Septembcr2 after his meeting with Mladic.
See Galbraith interview. October 2, 1996:
.
.
59 This is described by Talbott in a Sep!ember 2 phone call to British Foreign Secretary Rilkind. This
conversation also reflects the different views of Mladic's response: Rifkind tells Talbot that Mladic showed
"significant progress," although by the end ofthe call he agreed with the US position to press for a NAC
ultimatum. See "Acting Secretary Talbott and HMG FM Rifk ind, September 2. J 995," Cable, State
211971, September7. 1995.
86
7
a
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLAssIFIED
a
Holbrooke asked U.S. Ambassador to NATO Hunter to remain with the NAC and
hammer out ail uItimaturn.
60
Hunter pressed his colleagues to place specific, verifiable
conditions on the Bosnian Serbs - no attacks on any safe area, withdrawal of all heavy
weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone, complete freedom of movement for the UN
and NGOs, and unhindered use of the Sarajevo airport - and with compliance to be
achieved within a "finite" period of time. After a long and "tumultuous" meeting, the
NAC agreed that reply [was] not sufficient and does. not constitute a basis for
tenninating airstrikes/' set the U.S.-proposed tenns for BSA compliance. and announced
. .'
61
that the Bosnian Serbs had another 48 hours' to cooperate.
After Holbiooke's briefing on the status of the talks and resuming th.e air
campaign, Clark and Pardew walked the NAC througIi the key points of a memo recently
through the NSC Deputies Committee on a NATO-led force, now to be known
as an Implementation Force, or IFOR.
62
Stressing that such a force must be available to
deploy quickly following a negotiated they outlined the principles on which
the mission should i)perate: UN-mandated, but operationally under NATO command and
control; capable of combat with a "robust" role; flexible enough to accoinmodate non-
NATO participants; and a limited duration of no longer than one year. Clark and Pardew
recommended that NATO Op-plan 40104 (the UN extraction plan) be used'as a baseline.
for NATO planning, and they discussed. potential structures for political guidance for
IFOR. The Allies were generally supportive of the U.S. and candid about. areas
which would require further discussion. They agreed to meet again during the next week
before submitting a fonnal proposal for NAC consideration.
63
.
. While Clark and Pardew briefed the Holbrooke returned to their hotel to'
Join Owen, Hill and Sacirbey to continue work on the draft principles for Geneva.
Sacirbey remained about the bombing pause, arguing that. it was inappropriate to
give the Serbs any more time to comply with Janvier's terms.
64
On the draft principles,
the Bosnian foreign minister disagreed with the notion that each Bosnian entity would
have the right to maintain cultural and economic ties with other' countries. He correctly
identified this as a Milosevic addition, pointing out that such .arrangements would allow
for the eventual dissolution of Bosnia. He asked that language be added to guarantee that
60 Holbrooke interview (notes), September 30, 1996..
.
6J See "NAC Press Statement," UK Cable, Telno 343, September 3, 1995; and ""NAC Conclusions .... UI(
Cable, Telno 345, September 3, 1995. The Holbrooke team had set out to get the NAC to agree to only a
24 hour pause. See "Proposed NATOR'MC Statement," September 2, 1995 (no author, located in Pardew
notebook, Shuttle II; Book II); and Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
6l This memo, approved on August 30 by the DC, was sent to the Principals on September I for decision.
See "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement," Department of Defense memorandum, revision 30,
September I J 1995. See also "NATO Implementation Forcc (I-FOR)," Pardew' report to Siocombc,
September3, 1995; and Cablc, USNATO 3451.
63 General Clark followed-up this initial NAC briefing with a private meeting with British and French
representatives the morning of September 1. They agreed that the US, French, and British would have to
coordinate planning and come to agreement before any plan was submitted to the NAC. See "rri-Lateral
Discussions (US/UKJFrance) on Bosnia Peace Plan Initiative," Cable, USNA TO 3464. September 4, ] 995;
and Clark interview, July 15, 1996.
64 Sacirbey had again expressed this anger fo Deputy Secretary Talbott in a phone call (prior to Sacirbcy's
meeting with Holbrooke that day), where the Bosnian minister said that "the GOBH is concerned the air
strike pause signifies a pull-back inNATO detennination to press fhe Serbs." See '<Acting Se<:retary
. Talbott and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey, September 2, 1995," Cable. State 211939, September 7.
1995.
..
87
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
--
such ties be consiStent with Bosnia's integrity and sovereignty. Sacirbey didn't seem to care if the Bosnian Serbs actually lived "separately" from the Croats or Muslims, as long as they did so within Bosnian territory with no option to secede. What Sacirbey. was saying was that the Bosnian Serbs could live on a sort of reservation Holbrooke and his team started to refer to his concept as the "Navajo Indian idea.,,6S
. Ankara: "Republika and NATO Bombing
The next day; September 3, the negotiating team split, as Holbrooke traveled to Geneva for a meeting of the Organization ofIslamicCountries (OIC) while the rest of the team flew to Zagreb. The Ole would be essential to the economic component of any .- settlement package by providing economic and military assistance to the Bosnians. Thus, like the European Contact Group, the U.S. needed to keep them. "in the tent" on the diplomatic track but wanted to . do so with as little time and effort as possible. Holbrooke's trip to Geneva aimed to keep the OIC satisfied, hoping to leave the impression that the u.s .. was consulting with them in earnest.
65
While in Zagreb that afternoon, the rest of the team met with UN General Janvier and civilian representative Akashi discuss the new NAC ultimatum. Janvier provided the team with a copy of the most recent letter he sent Mladic detailing the tenns of the
MAC demands.
67
Pessimistically, Janvier told the team that Mladic would likely not'
comply, and that the bombing would therefore have to resume. He also stated that while
Mladic had not yet attacked UNPROFOR on a large-scale, he was concerned that he
might do so when bombing resUmed. After being burned by Mlildic, apparently Janvier
felt that NATO would have to get tougher with the Bosnian Serbs; he told the U.S.
negotiators that he expected NATO to reach the limits of Option Two bombing during the

.
next roun .
/..
.
The shuttle team then continued on to Belgrade .. Their discussions with Milosevic -- which Holbrooke joined midway after arriving from his OlC talks in Geneva - were on the new language about the integrity of Bosnia and possible "special ties" between Serbia and Srpska negotiated with Sacirbey. Milosevic acted confused about the
. rationale for the additions. When the team explained that the new language aimed to prevent secession, he claimed that such a line was unnecessary. Milosevic tried to convince the U.S. that there was no issue; he would never allow a Serb entity to secede, therefore there was no need to even acknowledge the possibility. He clajmed that to
imply that he would allow secession by including such language would sully his honor. Owen and others did not accept his point, and reluctantly, Milosevic finally accepted the changes.
69
The next step for the delegation was to present the draft principles to
Izetbegovic the next evening in Ankara. Turkey.
6S Holbrooke, Hill and Owen comments, Dayton History Seminar.
66 These objectives arc explicitly outlined for Holbrooke in a memorandum faxed to Brussels from Jack
Zetkulic (EURlSCE), "Keeping the OIC Contact Group 'in the tent,'" September 2, 1995. For more on
efforts to gain Islamic support for implementation, see "uis Tamoff Meeting with Egyptian Foreign
Minister Moussa, September 7:- Cable, Paris 2) 826, September 12, 1995; and "Planning for Peace
Implementation in the Former Yugoslavia - A Critical Role For Turkey," Cable, Ankara 10831,
September 20, 1995..
'.
67 See letter from Janvier to MJadic, Zagreb, Septemtier 3, (995.
6J As explained in a note faxed to Slocombe from Pardew (hand-written), September 3, 1995.
69 Details on this meeting from Dayton History Seminar; OwenIHolbrooke interview.
88
s
UNCLASSIFIED
UN CLAIf1llib
. Before stopping in Ankara on September 4, the Holbrooke delegation spent most
of the day in Athens and Skopje to close the Greece-Macedonia agreement. The team
got the two sides to agree to have their Foreign Ministers meet the following week in
New York under the auspices of Cy Vance and Matthew Nimetz to nonnalize relations
formaIly.70 But the deal was in. fact closed in a dramatic series of phone calls and
discussions that day. In Athens. Holbrooke played to the aging Pap andreolI's sense of
history. "It took a Nixon to go to China,>' Holbrooke said, "and history will give him
great credit for what he did. TodaY7 Mr. Prime Minister, you can do the same thing in
regard to Skopje - and at no cost to your nation's interests, only benefit.,,71 .
But the Greek Prime Minister, under considerable pressure from his Foreign
Minister, who strongly opposed any deal, still wanted the U.S. to guarantee that
Macedonia would keep its word. Time was running short, Holbrooke said, as he had to
get to Ankara to meet with Izetbego.vic. Finally Papandreou said he would agree to a
deal if Holbrooke would Call him personally from Gligorovs office in Skopje and,
speaking for the. U.S., "guarantee" that the Macedonians would keep their word.
Holbrooke, who had no problem providing Papandreou with. this bit of theatre,
immediately flew to Skopje, where after several mo're hours of additional discussion.
Gligorovagreed. Holbrooke made the phone call, and the deal was done.72
While the two sides were unable to reach agreement on such contentious issues as
the name "Macedonia" or the Macedonian flag. they decided to discuss these later and
sign an interim agreement. Greece agreed to lift its embargo on . greatly
reducing the .threat of conflict.
73
Although the Holbrooke team expended a relativ'ely
small amount of effort to get this deal, it was clear that their intervention provided the
decisive pressure. The secret trip of Jim Pardew and Chris Hill, later the first U.s.
to Macedonia, paid off. The team hoPed that this. success would create an
image that they were a group who "meant business" and "could get things done."
Milosevic had told them the previous day in Belgrade that they would not be able to solve
the Macedonian issue; they hoped he was watching.
74
The Holbrooke reached Ankara hours later and exhausted. When the
team met with the Bosnians late that evening at U.S. Ambassador Mark Grossman?s
. residence, they found their interlocutors still deeply concerned that the constitutional
principles failed to preserve the legitimacy and integrity of the Bosnian state. In the latest
70 See "Greece-FYROM Agreement," Cable, State 209743, September 5,1995; and Steven Greenhouse,
'"'Greece and Macedonia Ready to Settle Dispute, US Says," New York Times, September 5, J995.
71 Account from Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 8 (January 2 J, J 997).
n Holbrooke intervicw with author (notes), October 17, 1996; Hill interview with author (notes) December
17,1996; and Pardcw interview, July 31, 1996 . For cable reports of Holbrooke's meetings with Greek
Foreign Minister Papoulias and Prime Minister Papandreou. see "Official-Infonnal to Marshall Adair
(EURlSE) from Thomas Miller (DeM Athens)" Cable, Athens 8227, September 4, 1995.
7) See Christopher S. Wren. "Greeks to Lift the Ban on Trade that Crippled Macedonia." New York Times,
September 6. 1995.
.
. 7. As the team left the Serbian Presidency the of September 3, Chris Hill had turned to
MiJosevic and said "by the way. we're off to Skopje and Athens tomorrow. You had better watch carefully
in the twentyfour hours," see Hill comment, Dayton History Seminar. In the final New York
agreement mediated by Vance and Nimetz on September 13, Macedonia agreed to scrap its flag and both
sides agreed to resolve the "Macedonia" name issue at a later date. See "FYROM Agreement: All Cool .
with PM Papandreou," Cable, Athens 8148. September ]2. 1995; Christopher S. Wren. "Greece to Lift
. Embargo Against Macedonia ifit Scraps Flag:' New York Times, September t::t, ] 995.
89
UNCLASSIFIED .
UNCLASSIFIED-
7
draft written after the meetings with Sacirbey and Milosevic, Owen had dropped the
subject of the "Presidency" altogether and focused only on general pdlitical'concepts_
75
When Owen showed Izetbegovic the new draft, the BosnianPresident turned his attention
directly to the references used to describe the Bosnian state and the Serb entity in the
oPening line. lzetbegovic demanded that the Americans change the first line's promise of
the continuation of the "legal entity known as Bosnia and Herzegovina" to the more
concise "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Milosevic had insisted that the. words
"'Republic of' be removed. 'Such a change involved more than semantics; to Izetbegovic,
it reflected that the sanctity ofBosnia's geographic boundaries would be preserved. For
the Balkan leaders, "republic" also connoted sovereignty -- by insisting on continuance of
the republic, the Bosnians' were arguing for a unitary, sovereign state with unchanged

.
borders.
'Similarly, fzetbegovic adamantly opposed referring to the Bosnian Serb entity as
"Republika Srpska." Milosevic had insisted that the name be added. Milosevic's view
.. was that the title alone would not threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia; "what else
should the Serbs can themselves"?, he asked. lzetbegovic was against giving the
Bosnian Serbs a legal role in the new state, but he felt that to a1l0w them to use the tenn
"republic" granted them de facto autonomy. It seemed to legitimize the actions
undertaken by rebel leaders like Karadzic in JanttarY 1992 when they 'declared their
"Srpska" republic independent from Bosnia and part of Serbia.. "That name is like the
Nazi name," lzetbegovic said emotionally. "If you use it, you are letting them win_ It
contains the word 'republic,' so they will appe'ar to a sepa.-ate COlllltry.,,71
Holbrooke and Owen to' convince the Bosnian.President that the name did
not imply a sovereign govenunent but, like the "Republic of Texas" and' the
"Commonwealth of Massachusetts," a separate. entity under a central governmental
structure. An entity's name didn't matter, they argued; what mattered was the political
and legal structures it adhereti to. They battled witll Izetbegovic on this point,
"browbeating" him as one delegation member later recalled. Owen was sympathetic to
the BosnianPresidenCs concerns, but could not see how they could tell the Serbs what to
call themselves. Milosevic had demanded "Republika Srpska" as a price for his
agreement and the U.S. negotiators preferred not to call his bluff.
78
Late that night, after
a great deal of pressure, the Bosnian President finaIly agreed. The RepUblic of Bosnia
would consist. of two entities - the Federation and the Repuhlika Srpska. A fundamental
pillar of an eventual agreement had fallen into place.
79
.
During these tense 'discussions with Izetbegovic, Clark and Kemck
occasionally split off to phone Washington. Even as they fought to' get details with
Izetbegovic, their main focus was to get the bombing resumed. For the past day, the UN
had bee!l receiving conflicting responses from the Bosnian Serbs on whether they would
See "Constitutional Organizalion of the Bosnian State," draft (no date), EURISCE files.
76 Details ofthis meeting, see lIolbrooke, Hill, Owen and Zetkulic comments, Daylon History Seminar.
17 Owen interview, June 18, 1996; Holbrooke; Owen,HiIl comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke
draft memoirs; Chapter 8 (January 27, 1997), pp42-4S. .
7t Owen interview, June 18, 1996; Holbrooke interview, June: 18, 1996.
79 See Holbrooke, Owen, Hill, Clark comments, Dayton History Seminar. Holbrooke also reviewed these
with Jzctbegovic during a September 5 meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in Ankara,
see "AIS Holbrooke's meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ciller," Cable, Ankara 10444, September 12,
1995.
.
90
UNCLA.:S SIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
T
comply with NATO's terms, with political leaders indicating they would and Mladic
indicating the opposite. This transpired first in what HoI brooke " described as an ""idiotic
letter
U
from Bosnian Serb Vice President Nikola Koljevic to Janvier apparently accepting
NATO's terms, shortly followed by a C<literally insane" letter from" Mladic claiming 1:hat
what NATO was doing was worse than the famous .Nazi raid on B eJg"?de during Wodd
War II. In any event." the fact remained that the Bosnian SerbS -were not withdrawing
. weapons from the zone around Sarajevo, and Mladic threatened that he would
strike back. against any NATO attack. 80 " .
Despite the evidence that the Bosnian Serbs refused to comply, there. was
considerable resistance to resuming the bomb!ng. Holbrooke later- reflected that even
though NATO Military Commander (and U.S. General) George Joulwan and Claes
supported resumption, the uN military command "was looking for an excuse to avoid
resumption of bombing. >t What Ho and others had once thought would be a rather
clear-cut strategic decision had now become far less certain.
s,
On that Labor Day in Washington, Talbott; Berger and others survived on take-
out pizzas while staying in almost constant teleph<;me contact NATO officials in
Brussels and Naples," UN officials in New York, Zagreb and Sarajevo, and the shuttle
team in Ankara. Judging that the Bosnian Serbs were not complying, Holbrooke. Clark
and Kerrick stressed that the attacks had to resume during a conference can with Tal batt,
Berger and Walt Sloeombe.
82
Holbrooke explained that if the bombing was not resumed, "our chances lor
success in the negotiations, especially at Geneva, will be seriously .reduced. The
Bosnians are barely on board for our Geneva dra:ft. and when I see Izetbegovic again in
the morning to go over "the draft, the bombing muet have resumed .. _ if we do not resume
the bombing, [then] NATO will again look like a paper tiger. The Bosnian Serbs -will
return to their blackmailing ways." . Finally, in what he .recalled saying
melodramatically" as possible'-Holbtooke stated that "if the bombing does not resum.e,
history will hold us responsible for failure. Give us bombs by moming."g3 .
From the shuttle team's perspective, U.S_ military officials were ambivalent about
restarting the campaign, despite Talbott and sUpport.S4 Yet, after a flurry of
phone calls between Washington and Brussels, the bombing advocates finallyprevailed_
3s
.
When the UN confinned Bosnian Serb noncompliance on September 5, the bOln bing
campaign resumed. . .
Once lzetbegovic>s agreement to the principles in Ankara was secured. the team
returned to Belgrade on September 5 to finalize the document with Milosevic. Bosnian
. I
I.. ee 0 ::: aprer 8 (JanuaI)'21, [997). pSI. ". I .
J2 Holbrooke comment. Da)'ton History Seminar; Talbelt interview; Vcrshbow interview. In phone calls,
Sacirbey had already begun to lobby the US to resume airstrikes, arguing !hat UNA TO mustshow the
triggec can be squeezed" to create a psychological reality of determination. Sacirbey claimed that BSA
heavy weapons had moved aroilnd, but not out See, for example, "The Acting SecretaI)' (Talbott)
and Bosnian FM Sacirbey," Cable, Stale 21 1925. September 7, 1995.
U Details from Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapler 8 (January 27, 1997 draft), pp52-53.
" See Holbrooke comment in Mark McLaughlin, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force:
Harnessing the Political-Mililary Connection." USAF Air fpwer Survey Maxwell AFB (draft). p3.
For full derails of these calls, see State Depanmenl Operations Center Telephone Logs, September 4.
1995, Shifts II and III; and Waller Siocombe interview, January 6. 1997.
a
UNCI ,A SSIFTFD
9l
B2
.
..
UNCLXlPlfb
Serb actions during the bombing pause seemed to throw Milosevic's influence in doubt;
his authority invested by the Patriarch letter didn't help him get Mladic to withdraW' his
weapons. Such events particularly highlighted the stark division among MiIosevic.
KaradZic and Mladic.
86
As Pardew reported back to Washington, '.'[The] Bombing pause
affair has maae clear that Milosevic cannot deliver Mladic and Mladic is who counts
among Bosnian Serbs." This incident revealed that Milosevic had influence 'ever
military affairs in Bosnia, but he would have to get control of MIa die to get a settlement.
These intra-Serb dIsputes. which the delegation planned to raise with Milosevic, cast a
shadow not only on the conditions for 'continued bombing but the politicai talks as well.
. Indeed. the very premise of the Milosevic strategy was that if forced, Milosevic had the
ability to deliver the Bosnian . Serbs. Obviously, if the U.S. had overestimated
Milosevic's power vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs, this approach would be severely crippled.
Pardew questioned, "is there not a risk are negotiating Milosevic on a deal that
won't buy, and that will then serVe as the starting pointfor concessions to Mladic?,,37 .
Holbrooke and others pressed Milosevic on his problems with Mladic. Miloscvic
stillc]early wanted a deal. and Holbrooke played on the leader's desire for
international acceptance, even going so far as to project an image of a White House Rose
Garden signing ceremony, to get him to rein in the beUigerent Bosnian Serb general.
MiJosevic was enraged by the Bosnian Serbs -- the mere mention of Karadzic sent him
off into a tirade. In response to a "short but intense" complaint about resumption of
bombing. Pardew told Milosevic that Defense Secretary Perry was a "soft spoken man
with a tough mind," who favored air power and was "extremely frustrated with the UN's
past unwillingness to use force and the,inability to achieve peace." During a short one-
on-one meeting, Holbrooke got Milosevic to concede nearly all the outstanding issues on
constitutional principles, except for Izetbegovic's desire to have the tenn "Republic"
before "Bosnia" in the first line. They agreed to keep the word out. Finally, after a brief
discussion of some territorial issues, Milosevic agreed to the draft.
88
With Milosevic's agreement, the U.S. delegation now' had a document to be
signed at Geneva in three days. The team briefed Tudjman on September 6 in Zagreb,
receiving his blessing on. the principles and a short statement that Croatia and Serbia
sought a peaceful resolution to the Eastern Slavonia dispute.
89
Then, the team again split
up to consult the Allies on the negotiations and continue planning for military
implementation. On September General Clark and Jim Pardew held an IFOR planning
See report to Secretary of Defense PelT)' from Slocombc, .. Pardew Report at 1400Z." September 1995.
II See report to Slocombe from Pardew, "Meeting withMilosevic," September 5, 1995. Attached to this
reponis the latest version of principles (reflecting Milosevic's deletion of the word "republic") and the
territorial issues raised. These preliminary issues included 51-49 territorial breakdown; a Serb corridor
across northern .territory of Bosnia; agreement that Sarajevo would be capital of Federation; Federation
control ofBrcko; Serb control of the fonner enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa; Muslim control of Gorazdc
with a corridor link to Federation territory; and a similar arrangement with Bihae.
S9 See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, September 6, 1995 entry. pp44-45.
92
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
. !
...
UNCLASSIFIED
.;;, .. .
.. :. ! &
." . i'''
meeting iii with NATO, British French officials. Building on the taJks they
had started four days before, they discussed specifics of an IFOR missioq -- including the
duration of its deploymerit, proposed IFOR tasks, job of theatre commander. and how to
include non-NATO' countries in any decision-making process. The "atmospherics
n
of
these talks were very good, although few specifics were agreed to. on
September 7 Chris Hill joined Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tamoff in
Paris to brief the Contact Group partners on the upcoming Geneva signing. 90
After the shuttle team reunited in Rome oil September'7 (meeting with Italian
officials who remained angry that Italy was left out of the Contact Group), they traveled
on to Geneva to prepare for the minisiers meeting. The next day,. the U.S.
delegation and Contact GtIt>up would witness Croat Foreign Minister
Mate Granic, Serb Foreign Minister Milan and Sacirbey agree . to the
principles.
91
It would be the first time the three Balkan parties had met officially in over
eighteen months. .
at Work
During this' shuttle round, . a decision-making pattern began to emerge.
Negotiating decisions generally did not flow from Washington. Delegation members
checked in by phone several times a day with their respective agencies, 'and Clark and
Pardew provided written reports to their superiors (Clark to General ShaIikashvili
everyday; Pardew to either Secretary Perry or Under Secretary Slocombe whenever
possible). Holbrooke himself called Washington an average of four times a day during
this shuttle round. 92 The lead negotiator; wanted delegation decision-making on
the negotiations kept internal to the oftentimes keeping key decisions from officials
in Washington (such .. as Milosevic's final approval of the principles on September 5). In
effect, many of the-shuttle team's accomplishments were presented to Washington as a
fait accompli. As a consequence, Holbrooke requested to See all written correspondence
to Washington, and the team usually agreed in advance as to what infonnation would be
conveyed verbally.
Holbrooke believed that to preserve the integrity ()f the negotiations -- preventing
leaks, for example - and to maximize the team's bargaining flexibility and ability to
make quick they had to circmnvent the typical deliberative.
process.
93
He was heavily influenced from his days as ajuni9f member of the American
W For details of ClarkIPardew talks, sec Clark interview, July IS, 1996; "Questions for NATO,"
typewritten notes dated September 6 in Pardew's notebook Shuttle II, Book II; "Trilateral Meeting
(USIUKIFrance) cn Bosnia Peace Plan Initiative," Cable, USNA TO 3524, September 8, 1995; and
"Considerations for Bosnia Peace Implementation Plan," Cable, USNATO 3477. September 5, 1995. For
details ofTainoffIHiII talks, sec "September 7 Quad meeting on Bosnia," Cable, Paris 21734, September
II, 1995; and "Readouts orUlS Tarnotrs Paris Meetings," memorandum to KOl11blum from Fletcher
Burton (EURlSCE), September 7, 1995.
91 The UN was not invited to Geneva. On September7, Boutros--Ghali complained to Christopher about
this, to which the Secretary replied that "Holbrooke strclluously rcsistedlnclusion of four or five other .
countries in the Geneva meeting (and1 participation in the meeting bad been detennined in negotiations
with the parties themselves." See Conversation with UN Secretary General Boutros-GhaJi,
September 7, 1995," Cable, State 213440. September 8, 1995. .
92 Average from calls patched through the State Department Operations.Center during August 28-
September 8, 1995. Additional calls likely were made, although through direct dialing.
9J For details, see Holbrooke interview, October 18, 1996.
7
UNCLASSIFIED
93
i ....
UNCLASSIFIED
S 15
negotiating team led by A vereU Harriman that met with the North Vietnamese in Paris in
1968-69. where, in his view, internal divisions of the Harriman's team (particularly
between military and political officials) and the mistrust of officials in Washington had
hindered the negotiations. As Holbrooke later reflected, "no other experience was as
valuable for me in Shaping both the composition and operational style of our [Bosnian
,negotiating] team; I knew that we could not afford any similar internal divisions within
our team, and that the negotiating flexibility we needed could come only with the full
backing of the key members of the Principals COIDlnittee.,,94 Officials in Washington
were aware of this history. and thus willing to trust the team with considerable
making leverage. Consequently, during these early days in September, Holbrooke and
his colleagues did'not seek guidance or approval from Washington on the principles they
were negotiating, they just proceeded. Similarly, while the Greece-Macedonia iS$ue was
watched by officials in Washington, it was HoI brooke and his team who decided to try to
forge a breakthrough, and they did so secretly.9S,
As far back as' July 1995, when the NSC-driven policy review was underway.
Holbrooke believed that regardless of any "finalized" U.S. strategy, the negotiator would
require a great deal of decision-making leverage to succeed.
96
In'other words, while the
broad parameters of the strategy might remain (such as 51-49 or maintaining the
territorial integrity of Bosnia), how the negotiations proceeded or what was finally
approved would be the negotiating team's responsibility. Holbrooke explained this
approach to Lake during their August 14 London meeting, and while Lake urged that
Holbrooke use the talking points as a script initially. he concurred that the lead negotiator
would neoo considerable flexibility. Christopher also felt comfortable leaving the tactical
negotiating choices up to Holbrooke, as long as he operated within the "red lines
t7
of the
U.S. 'initiative.
97
In-this sense, with delegation members representing OSD, JeS, State
and NSC, the inter-agency process was repackaged in miniature on the road. Through
their representatives on the team, each agency. could "clear" negotiating decisions.
General strategy would be disc!lSSed with Washington, but the day-ta-day decisions -
which cities they traveled to, who they negotiated with, and what issues they discussed -
were the sole prerogative of HoI brooke and his team.
On this shuttle, the established an interpersonal rapport and mutual
respect that would serve them well throughout the negotiations. "Our negotiating team
had already developed an internal dynamic that combined bantering, argumentation. and
discipline," Holbrooke reflected. "Complete trust and opermess... was essential if we
were to avoid eriergy-consuming internal intrigues and back channels to Washington."
Holbrooke fostered the idea that Kerrick. Hill, Pardew, Owen and Clark were aU equals
on the team and not simply his supporting players. To avoid the infighting that had
plagued many past negotiating teams, he encouraged infonnality and frankness. "We
94 Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 2 (September 21 , 1996). ppI5-16.
9l According to members ofEUR staff, officials in Washington were confused by Hill and Pardew's Skopje
trip." When one senior State Department official called the Slate Department Operations Center to get the
latest on Holbrooke's negotiations, they Were told that the entire team had Iraveled to Skopje, For a brief
period, it seemed, no one could track down exactly where the delegation had gone. The result ofthis
confusion was that EUR bad to place a staffer in the Operations Center whose sole responsibility was to
keep track of the delegation'S whereabouts. Author discussion with Chris Hoh (EUR/SCE), July 1996.
96 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17, 1996.
97 Christopher interview, October 30, 1-996.
94
UNCLASSIFIED
I
!
UNCLASSIFIED
SF
succeeded in avoiding [internal-divisions], in part because our team was so small, and in
part because we shared all information internally and developed close personal
relationships," Holbrooke has written. Foregoing the more spacious front cabin of the
airplane during shuttle flights, Holbrooke sat in the more cramped quarters with the rest
of the team to discuss strategy, while support personnel sat in front. It was agreed that
everything would be discussed openly within the group, and that would Jfresent
recommendations to Washington as the "consensus view of the negotiating team."
While Washington officials did their be$t to keep up with Holbrooke's progress
and the course of the NATO bombing campaign, they also began important . work
concerning' implementation' of a' possible settlement. At the DC level, officials had been
working since late August to prepare planning papers on such issues as IFOR,
train, Serbian sanctions relief, and anns control.
99
On September I, the Imt
comprehensive paper summatizing the outcome of these discussions was presented to the
Principals. This paper set forth the broad outlines of key issues concerning both the
ongoing negotiations and implementation, including: on sanctionS relief, agreement that
sanctions against Serbia would be suspended once an agreement is reached and lifted
once implemented; on Gorazde, consensus that the Bosnians would not be pressed to give
it up; on economic reconstruction, commitment of U.S. support for a multi-billion dollar
reconstruction program (but no specific financial commitment); on IFOR, approval o:f the
DoD's approach (with which Clark and Pardew had begun consulting with Allies), and;
on equip-and-train, a pledge to lead a multilateral support effort to achieve parity of
forces among the parties.
IOO
. . .
The Principals Committee met to discuss this paper and other negotiating issues at
a White House meeting the afternoon of September 5. This was the first time top
officials met to discUss Bosnia since the August 23 memorial service meeting at Fort
Myer. Joint Chiefs Chairman Shalikashvili opened the meeting with a detailed briefing
on the NATO air campaign, which had restarted shortly after 7am EDT.IOI. The
. Principals agreed that .the U.S. would support the strikes as long as the Bosnian Serbs
refused to comply, even if that meant an exhaustion of Option Two targets. Shalikashvili
pointed out that if NATO chose to escalate bombing and move to Option Three targets
9a See Holbrooke interview with author (notes). October 17.1996; Pardewinterview, June 27, 1996; and
Holbrooke draft memoir. Chapter 7 (December 12,1996), pp43-44. .
99 See. for example, "Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting, August 28, 1995:' .
NSCmemorandum,August 31,1995.
100 See Memorandum for Principals from Deputies Committee, "Achieving a Bosnia Peace Settlement:
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations," NSC Memorandum, September I) 1995. Also attached
was a paper outlining the viability of defending Gorazde, "Ensuring the Viability of Gorazde -
Implications to the Peace Implementation Force and the Longer-Tenn Requirements"; the DoD paper on
IFOR, "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement"; a paper on the ann/train issue for Bosnia, "Equipping
. and Training the Bosnian Federation"; a concept paper of economic assistance, "Post-settlement assistance
package for Bosnia and Croatia," and draft talking points on the Bosnia strategy for Congress. For
Secretary ChristOpher, EUR prepared a paper outlining to NSC paper, "State Views on Achieving
a Balkan Peace. Settlement:' which revealed very few differences with the approach reflected in the DC
Ptaper. . .
OJ Secretaries Christopher Peny were not at the meeting, they were represented by their deputies
Strobe Talbott and John White. For details on this meeting, see "Summary of Conclusions for NSC
Principals Committee Meeting, September 5, 1995," NSC memorandum, September 11. 1995;
Memorandum to Deputy Secretary Talbott from John Kornblum (EUR). "Principals Committee Meeting,
September.5. 1995," no date; and Vershbow interview, September 18. 1996.
--
95
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(which were not covered by the July 26 NAC decision). it would require new NAC
approval and further consultation with the UN. Lake argued that the U.S. needed to be
prepared to "cany the bombing campaign through," whatever that required. Agreeing,
Shalikashvili recommended that if NATO chose to escalate, there must be a pause or
between Options Two and Three.
Concemingtbe DC decision paper, the Principals . on almost all the
proposals outlined, although with some minor additions for clarification. For examplt;
, on IFOR, the Prhicipals made clear that the force would remain in place up to a year or .
when the Bosnians could defend themselves, whichever came They aJso realized
that a NATO-led IFOR could create some friction in the U.S. relationship with
(the Russians apparently had already told Gennan Chancellor Kohl that they objeCted to a
NATO-led IFOR). and therefore, the U.S. should begin to think of ways toincIude the
Russians ill such a force. Realizing that congressional approval would be critical on aU
implementation issues, the Principals finaJly endorsed immediate' briefings on Capitol.
Hill to discuss the air campaign, Holbrooke's progress, and implementation planning.
Many of these issues were raised with the President two days later at a White
House Foreign Policy Team meeting. The President focused particularly on the bombing
campaign's status, arid Shalikashvili and Perry provided the President with an update.
Shalikashvili explained that NATO was currently working to take out all of the Bosnian
Serbs air defenses, particularly in western Bosnia.. Recognizing that targeting was around
the area where U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady had been shot down in June. President Clinton
supported such strikes not only for their strategic benefits, but on, principle." Periy
recommended that NATO attack BSA air defenses around the key stronghold ,of Banja
Luka, and Shalikashvili explained that U.S. cruise missiles would likely be used for such
an attack. Shalikashyili also outlined that NATO could run out of Option Two targets
soon, and that ifth6 Bosnian Serbs had not complied in two to three days, the U.S. would
have' to consider going to the NAC for Option Three 'authorization. They deferred this
d
. &'. th 102
CClSlon Lor e commg days.
The First Stepping-Stone:. Geneva
As President Clinton and his advisers discussed the status of the air campaign, 1he
Holbrooke delegation arrived in Geneva for the Balkan foreign ministers' signing of the
principles. The result of the meeting was supposed to be a foregone conclusion, as the
three Balkan PresidentS had already consented to the document. Yet, as was becoming
clear to HoI brooke and his team. nothing was ever final in Balkan diplomacy.
In a call with Secretary Christopher early the morning of September 8 (EOn,
Izetbegovic expressed dismay that the U.S. had accepted Milosevic's latest demand to
drop the word "republic" before Bosnia He said that Sacirbey would ask to include a
statement that Bosma would remain a whole state" and that all contacts with neighboring
countries would have to be by mutual of both entities. If the ,Serbs rejected such
an addition, ,th<:.Bosnian President said, ''tit!re could be problems.S> Cnnstopher replied
that .the first sentence of the principles a "powerful recognition" of Bosnia's
status as a state, and that the Geneva agreement represented a strong first The .
102 Vershbow inlerview, September 18. 1996.
96
3
"
---f-iffll-N'i8f7ASSIFIED
; : ' .. --
-
... .i'
.
j
:i
UNCLASSIFIED
I
Bosnian President was less optimistic, but agreed to bless the agreement if the Serbs
t d th

103 coopera e on elr sovereIgnty statement.
As officials converged on Geneva, the last minute theatrics reflected the
difficulties of these negotiations and the deep suspicion held by each side. To begin,
Sacirbey threatened to .derail the t,dks by calling from his hotel to announce that he would
not attend the meeting. The Bosnians were still upset about the removal of the word
"republic." Holbrooke quickly put that fire out, telling Sacirbey tersely that he would not
serve his country's interests well by boycotting. Once the meeting was finally underway
the Bosnian Serbs became the problem. Attending as part of the Serb delegation but not
allowed to speak (Serb ForeignMinister Milutinovic would speak for them), the Bosnian
Serbs were not even seated at the table with the Contact Group representatives.
Holbrooke and the three foreign ministers.
H14
Bosnian Serb Vice President Koljevic
tried t() make an opening statement anyway. A break was called in the meeting,. and
Holbrooke took the. Bosnian Serbs into a private room. Furious, he told them that they
could leave if they wanted, but they would not be allowed to speak. With MHutinovic's
support, Holbrooke told Koljevic that he was "certain" that Milosevic didn't want the
Bosnian Serbs to walk out, but they could of course do so if they Wanted to. After what
others only heard as a "heated shouting match," the Bosnian Serbs returned to the room
and agreed to abide by the original condition that they be represented by Serbia. lOS
Once the principles were formally approved. a discussion ensued which revealed
just how far the parties had left to go to achieve true peace. As a way to break the ice,
Holbrooke asked for the representatives' informal views on one aspect of the agreed
principles, the formation of a commission to preserve national monuments. Sacirbey
thoughtfully observed that the was, in some ways, a "substitute for national
institutions." Since..,mosques, churches, bridges. and other national monuments were
spread around Bosnia, the commission would help preserve them all for posterity and
possibly help build some trust along the way. Milutinovic, though, immediately linked
the commission to ethnicity and territory: before one could decide which monuments to
preservc; one had to determine to whom they belonged, because only their ethnic owners
would really care about preserving it. The discussion went on for some time without
resolve before Russian Contact Group representative Igor Ivanov finally ended it by
. saYing it was useful to gain some insight into their thinking and to see what negotiating
tracks would not be fruitful.
.
IOJ "The Secretary's Conversation with Bosnian President lzetbegovic, September 8, 1995," Cable.. State
213439, September 8, 1995. Christopher conveyed similar sentiments to Bosnian PM Siladjzic minutes
later; see "Secretary's Conversation with Bosnian PM SiJajdzic, September 8, ) 995," Cable, State 213441,
September 8,1995. .
.
1M Reminded of the debates over the table shape and seating arrangement from his days as a junior aide at
the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, Holbrooke intentionally left the Bosnian Serbs out.
10' Details of Geneva meeting from "September 8 Meeting Between the Contact Group and the Foreign
Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY," Cable (draft), Geneva 6808, September I I, 1995;
Holbrooke comments, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke interview with author (noles), October 17,
1996.
.
3
2 97
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Geneva Principles, as this agreement came to be known, was a modest but
important step on the road to peace. By getting the parties to agree to the basic concepts-
-. the recognition of Bosnia as a single state with its present borders and negotiations
based on 51-49 per cent tet:ritorial division - the U.S. had belped lay the foundation for
future talks on a more specific settlement: With Milosevic as their negotiator and
spokesman, the Bosnian Serbs were now engaged in the process, finally accepting
concepts they had .reSisted for the better part of two years. The Principles outlined the
framework for a Bosnia divided between the Muslim-Croat Federation and Serbs; a
Bosnian state with free elections, human rights standards, binding arbitration of disputes,
ability to establish "parallel special relationships" with neighbors, and country-wide
institutions on monuments, human rights and displaced persons. Yet, the Geneva'
Principles ;were silent on exactly how this was to be achieved. While less ambiti.ous than
many had hoped, a State Department assessment recognized that the principles could.
provide "a dynamic basis for stopping the fighting and allowing the communities to work
together."I06 More would have to be accomplished, in creating the federal
institutions and rules which would govern this now official bi-national state.
When the Holbrooke team returned to Washington after Geneva, they believed
that, for the moment, negotiations had been pushed as far as possible. As Pardew
reported to Secretary Perry: "Holbrooke achieved everything that was possible to achieve
at this point in the negotiations. The mistrust, hatred, and maneuvering among the parties
will not allow a single, big-bang settlement.,,107 Nevertheless, the delegation had
accomplished quite a bit without providing Milosevic the sanctions relief he so deeply
coveted_ The Bosnian Serbs, who had pushed the Allies too far with the marketplace
shelling, were again experiencing the full fury of NATO. The NAC was aware of U.S.
thinking on IFOR. and the Contact Group and OICwere supportive, at least for the
moment. The Greece-Macedonia settlement, While not central to the Bosnian problem,
symbolized the "can-do" nature of the shuttle team and helped make the Balkan cauldron
a bit cooler. lOS
Milosevic had provided the real breakthrough with the Patriarch letter; yet,.
Bosnian Serb belligerence during the bombing pause renewed specUlation about bow
much influence Milosevic actually wielded, particularly over Mladic_ Nevertheless,
Milosevic seemed to have developed a real rapport with the U.S. team, particularly with
Holbrooke personally. This relationship would no doubt be testecl mightily in the coming
weeks. The Croatians were for the most part agreeable. Although Zagreb leaders were
key in the Muslim-Croat Federation, they were most concerned with Eastern Slavonia.
Tudjman's Napoleonic attitude had quelled, at least for the moment. The most arduous
negotiations were with the Bosnians. Believing that they deserved the most out of a
settlement, the Bosnians would resist anything they interpreted to be remotely close to a
concession.
106 See ,,; Agreed Basic Principles' For a Peace Settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Analysis,"
memorandum drafted by John Kornblum and Jack Zetkulic (EUR), September 8, 1995_
107 Pardew report to Perry and Slocombe. "Balkan Peace: Initiative: Round II," September 10, 1995.
101 This "can-do" nature oflhe Holbrooke-Ied team also began to gamer some attention in the U.S. press.
See, for example, Carla Anne Robbins, "OutspOken Holbrooke's Skills Face a Major Test as Foreign
Ministers Meet on the Bosnian War," Wall Street Journal, September 8,1995
98

a
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
r
Holbrooke intended to wait at least a week before bringing the team back to the
region. 109 When that time they would have to deal with more contentious issues
like specific governing arrangements for Bosnia (such as the Presidency, foreign p<>licy
structure, and elections) and territorial control. . "[Shuttle] Round III will be even harder
as we move from concept and future structures to the territorial issues that represent
reality to the people in the Balkans/' Jim Pardew observed. J 10 ..
109 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October J 8, 1996.
110 d
Par ew report, 10.1995.
UNCLASSIFIED
99
Chapter Five
UNCLASSIFIED
SK
Force and Diplomacy:' NATO
, Bombing Ends, the Western,
Offensive Heats Up
As the Holbrooke team regrouped in W3.$hington over the weekend of September
9-10> UN military leaders on the ground in "Bosnia began to question the duration and
scope of the NATO air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. Lt. Bernard Janvier,
who had reluctantly agreed less than a week earlier to turn the airstrikes back on, .
remained skeptical about their and worth. Seeing that the I30snian Serbs
had still yet to .comply witI! NATO's the French General believed that the
bombing thus far had produced little tactical or psychological value. As conveyed to the
U.S. team earlier that week, Janvier still doubted that the Bosnian Serbs would succumb
to NATO under the current "Option Two" targeting scheme. He argued that the. air
campaign should continue at a "modulated intenSIty," but ultimately, in order.to.make a
differerice, NATO would likely have to escalate to "Option Three:' the broadest targeting
range approved by the NAC. Janvier doubted that political authorities would authorize
such escalation, but believed that they should be prepared to do so "despite international
criticism." The UN military commander in Sarajevo> British General Rupert Smith,. also
worried that NATO was running out .of Option Two targets. H.owever, he was more
concemedthat the political advantages of bombing were waning, arguing that if the
Bosnian Serbs perceived that "Holbrooke doesn't have his hand 'on the [bombing] lever,
they will refuse to talk." Smith recommended that the bombing campaign pause a second
time to organize the political-military strategy. 1
Similar concerns' were relayed to the U.S. Secretary of Defense by his Under
Secretary for Policy, Walter Siocombe. Following meetings with NATO air commanders
in Aviano, Italy, Slocombe emphaSized the lack .of political-military coordinati.on 'in a
September 8 memorandum to Perry. Slocombe felt that the air campaign's "fundamental
problem" was the lack of a clear policy objective. "We clearly' have moved beyond
retaliation for the market attacks and even beyond stopping the shelling of Sarajevo, U he
explained. "Our explicit demands are weapons withdrawal [from around Sarajevo] and
full access [to Sarajevo], but these take Bosnian Serb agreement; it is dubious whether
this will be forthcoming." With the air campaign's inithil objectives achieved, there
seemed to be confusion about hQw long bQmbiilg should last, and to what end. "Is it then
I See respectively,
nd "General Smith:
What Does Ho rooke Want Us to Do?," Cable, Sarajevo 555. September 10, 1995.
100
UNCLASSIFIED
B1
UNCLASSIFIED
our intention for bombing to continue indefinitely?" Slocombe asked. "Unti] we yet
agreement on this, it will be difficult to make decisions on the future C)fthe campaign."
On September lO, Janvier again met with Mladic to try to persuade the Bosnian
Serb General to withcIraw his weapons from Sarajevo. This meeting, held in the
Bosnian Serb border town of Mali Zvornic, was arranged by French President Chirae and
Milosevic, both of whom supported a second pause in the air campaign. The Bosnian
Serbs were supposed to provide Janvier with details of how they intended to withdraw
their weapons from around Sarajevo. However, by all reports, the meeting did not go any
differently than the others between these two generals. Mladic, unrepentant and bullish
as ever, threatened to unleash all of the BSA forces against the remaining enclaves. ,He
asserted that the Bosnian Serbs would only continue negotiations after airstrikes ended,
not before. Janvier rejected his arguments, and left the general after the short meeting
with a promise tbat the Campaign would continue.
3
'.
.
With Mladic continuing to defy NATO, it appeared that Milosevic's hold on the
Bosnian Serbs had not improVed much since Holbrooke had last asked him to apply
. pressure on them September 5. According to Milosevic's Foreign Minister Milan
Milutinovic, the Serb president had pushed for the lanvier-Mladic meeting because, in his
view, the resumption of bombing had only emboldened the Bosnian Serbs.' Mihitinovic
had told U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies that on the day of the Janvier meeting,
Milosevic had had a "very heated" discussion with the Bosnian Serb general, who refused
to cave-in to NATO. In addition, noted that the air campaign was proving counter-
. productive, claiming that "they [the BSA] like it, they are in their element." Milosevic
and Milutinovic argued that in the siege environment created by the air campaign, their
Bosnian colleagues would not cooperate. Accordingly, Milutinovic recommended
another pause to aliow discussions with Mladic in a "calmer environment... before the
stand-off escalates and damages the peace .
.
Despite these concerns abOut the political implications of the campaign, NATO
pressed on, broadening the use of weapons available hi its repertoire. Shortly after the
discouraging meeting between Janvier and Mladic, the U.S. Navy cruiser Normandy fired
thirteen Tomahawk cruise missiles at ten Bosnian Serb air defenses around Banja Luka in
, northwest Bosnia. Militarily, this attack represented two significant departures in the air
campaign: it was the first outside the primary area of operations in eastern Bosnia, and it
. was the first time these radar-guided, $1.3 million dollar weapons with 700-polind.
warheads had .been fired at BoSJ!ian Serb targets. General Shalikashvili had informed the
President and his top advisors of such an operation during their September 7 Foreign
Policy Team meeting, and NATO command had been planning the attack for several
days.s NATO commanders had officially approved the strike the day before, but decided
to wait to inform other NATO Allies and await the outcome of the Janvier-Mladic talks.
6
2 See Siocombe interview, January 6, 1997. These quotes arc from Slocombe's memorandum to Pcrry. .
"Trip Report: September 8, 1995, which he read aloud during interview.
3 "September 11 Meeting With FRY Foreign Minister Milutinovic." Cable, Belgrade
4442, September 11, 1995; "lanvier-Mladic Mceting Deemed Disappointing by UN,"Cablc, L;agrcb 3499,
September 11, 1995; and "Pennreps Express Concern Over Possible Escalation in Air Strike Operation
Wilh Usc of Cruise Missiles," Cable, U.S. NATO 3555, September 11,1995.
4 See Belgrade 4442, September I J, 1995.
S On September 8, Siocombe reported to Perry that the Banja Luka strike had been initially intended or
September 7, but had been delayed at the request of Janvier. According to Slocombe, the French
.' &
UNCLASSIFIED
101
I
UNCLASSIFIED
The Tomahawk strike upset many American Allies. At a special NAC meeting
the next day. several allied representatives complained that the attack represented an
unauthorized escalation to "Option TlU-ee" targeting. U.S. and NATO military planners
believed that the Tomahawks themselves were authorized by the current NAC decision,
and that the targeting in northwest Bosnia was justified to destroy Bosnian Serb
command and control} "We got criticized fairly heavily for [not checking] more
carefully with our Allies," Perry. recalled. "We figured that the authority that NATO had
given to go ahead was a broad enough authority that we did not have to go back and
check on every mission that we bombed.''! However, France, joined by Spain, Canada
and Greece, argued' that the attack "jnsidiously slid" the air campaign from Option Two
to Option Three, and warned the U.S. against pursuing a strategy of creeping escalation.
9
Although the U.S. military believed that they were authorized to conduct the
Tomahawk strike, Perry did admit that the operation was "a significant escalation in the
perception of what we were doing." In terms of potential, the Tomahawks
were less powerful than the hundreds of 2,OOO-pound bombs being dropped by U.S.
planes. Nevertheless. Peny explained, the escalation perception was created by the
"effectiveness" -- and technological superiority - of these weaponS.
IO
'
The NATO air campaign coincided with Federation advances on the ground.
During this time, Bosnian Muslim and Croat military forces were on the move in western
heading .toward the' key town of Donji Vakuf. The Bosnian Government had
pledged that they would not take advantage of NATO air operations by attacking areas in
and around NATO targets, but still pursued offensive operations in northwest Bosnia,
away from the air campaign. II . Nonetheless, such Bosnian, gains, while relatively small
thus far. fed another perception -- that NATO was acting on behalf of the Sarajevo
government. NATO 'and UN officials admitted publicly that airs trikes "clearly play" to
the Bosnian Government's advantage. Yet, they also recognized that such continued
successes on the ground would complicate NATOs effort by fraying the already unstable
UNPROFOR commander had done so "ostensibly to avoid interference with the MJadicMilosevic
meeting. but I strongly Janvier's actio!! reflects Paris' reluctance to see the geographic scope of the
campaign widened even for air defense." Slqcombe interview, January 6,1997.
6 See Chronology, w; and Eric Schmitt, "NATO Shifts Focus onts Air Attacks on BoSnian
Serbs," New York Times, September 11, 1995. The decision had also leaked ,to the press by September 9,
see "The Fighting: U.S. Officials Say Campaign Might Shift Bombing Targets," New York Times,
Septem,ber 9, 1995.
7 In his SePtember 8 report to Perry. SJocombe explained that attacks on air defenses around Banja Luka.
"do not require additional political approval. Carrying them out would step up the pressure without a
substantially greater risk Qf casualties, and [by removing Serb air defensesJ would allow NATO planes to
reach targets in the Sarajevo ZOA by a more direct route." See Slocombe interview. January 6, 1997.
Perry interview.
'
9 For ,a report of the NAC meeting, see U.S.NATO 3555. ,
10 Perry interview.
,-
,
II lzetbegovichad pledged this privately to Menzies on September 10. During this conversation, he
cautioned that without airstrikes there would not be a continuation' of negotiations: "the Serbs won't be
interested," he said. Later that day, he 'made the pledge not to take advantage of the NATO strikes
publicly. althOUgh he was careful not to say that the Bosnians would cease attacks in the West. See
"Izetbegovic: 'You Can Expect a Statement by Late Afternoon,''' Cable, Sarajevo 554, S.eptember 10.
1995.
102
&
UNCLASSIFIED.
UNCLASSIFIED
consensus in support of the bombing.
12
This was certainly the case with America's
onetime adversary. Russia.
The Russian Dimension
With a history of cultural identification and political alignment with the Serbs,
Russia's policy usually translated into sympathy for Serbia and skepticism about any
action (such as the economic embargo or NATO strikes) that "unfairly punished" the
Serbs. Despite Russia's biases, it seemed that as long as the U.S. was able to sen its ideaS
to Belgrade, Russia could not oppose a settlement as unfairly anti-Serb. Yet, substance
alone was not the problem with Russia. Along with being a de facto ally of Serbia,
Russia was also struggling for acceptance as a great power. State Department
intelligence analysts observed that the "Russians [were]genuinely angry at being
sidelined" in the peace process. I) The Russian leadership saw that the futUre of Power
relations in Europe were being shaped by the Balkan conflict, and that if "marginalized
now, Russia [would] have to live with the consequences for years:,14 Although its
Balkan diplomacy was neither strong nor consistent (reflecting the disjointed decision-
making environment in Moscow), Russia could not be left out of the process.
Accordingly, the Holbrooke delegation had been advised that the of Russian
inclusion in .the process - achieved through such means as "timely consultations" - was
as important as any actual substantive input they might have.
ls
Holbrooke understood that as with the rest of the Contact Group, Russia needed to
be perceived as being involved in the negotiations. "Moscow's primary goal was neither
torun nor wreck the Holbrooke reflected later. "In the wake of their
dramatic fall from superpower status at the end of the Cold War, what the Russians cared
most about was to restore some sense
7
however symbolic, that they still mattered in the
world." In general. Holbrooke felt that leaving the.Russians outside CCthe process risked
12 The Administration was concerned that Federation and Croatian forces would exploit !he NATO air
campaign. By September 12, it appeared that they had partially heeded calls for restraint, but !hat more
would need to be done (possibly with Russian help) to make negotiating prospects more attractive to the
parties than military action. For a review of the U.S. warnings to Bosnia and Croatia on these points. sec
memorandum for Talbott (no author), "U.S. CalIs for Restraint by Sarajevo and Zagreb," September 1995.
Also see Kit Roane, "Bosnian Muslims Said to Push Back Rebel Serb Forces," New York limes, September
13,1995.
.
13 See memorandum to Talbott from Toby Gati' (JNR), "Bosnia -- How Mad Are the Russians and What
Can They Do?," September 13, 1995. This analysis estimated that although the Russian were angry. both
Yeltsin and Koz:yrev "still see the remedy in active participation in the peace process. They want the
bombing stop but think that, at some point, they will be drawn back into play. If engagement bears no
fruit, they will have to take demonstrative steps to part company with the West, since Yeltsin's electoral
fortunes and Kozyrev's job are at stake. Moscow can do several things (some of which !hey might have
done anyway, but will now tie NATO actions in Yugoslayja): spojl the Euro-architecture game; deny us a .
sucCessful October summit; and tie up a range of regionid and anns control actions."
J.C Of) this point, U.S. intelligence explained that Russia's "failure to influence events is one more reminder
that Russia has lost its great power status and has been relegated to the sidelines while NATO, led by the
U.S., takes the lead." See Balkan Task Force Intelligence Report, attached to note for Secretary
Christopher (and passed to Holbrooke) from INR, September B. 1995.
IS For more details on how the U.S. planned to handle the Russians, see memorandum to Holbrooke from
John Herbst (SlNIS), "Managing the Russian Side Balkan Diplomacy," August26. 1995.
J03
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
provoking them into trying to wreck it simply to get attention, while bringing them in was
primarily a procedural tactic that would make it easier to control them ... 16
But the Russians were having problems with the bombing. On September 7.
Russian President Yeltsin had written Clinton to eXf.ress his concerns about the course of
the bombing effort and the negotiations.
7
On September 8, Russian .UN
Ambassador Sergei Lavrov said that the' strikes were "punitive measures
n
that
undennined the peace process, and the next day, the Russian Ambassador to NATO and
the EU Vitaly 'Churkin told NATO Anibassador Hunter that the Bosnians Serbs would
not comply with NATO's demands, and that Russia could .not convince them.
Nevertheless, Churkin offered to' meet with Mladic if NATO was willing to pause the
bombing. Characterizing NATO actions as anUall-out war" against the Serbs, Churkin.
said that if the bombing continued, Russia would reassess its role in the Contact Group
and, most concerning, "aid the Serbs.',8 Holbrooke, who had met with Churkin in
Brussels two days earlier, considered his statement irrelevant -- not much more than an
attempt by the Russian Ambassador 10 reinsert himself into the peace process.
19
The Russians were particularly rumed by the appearance of coordination between
the recent Muslim-Croat gains in western Bosnia and the NATO Campaign. On the day
after the Tomahawk attack, Defense Secretary Perry discussed the campaign with Russian
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Over the course of the last year, Perry and Grachev had
established a strong and productive working relationship, them to discuss issues
and convey concerns frankly. Throughout the bombing campaign, Perry tried to keep an
open line of communication with the Russian Defense Minister, letting him know Uwhat
we were doing and why we were doing it." Perry realized that consultations were
never "fully to [the Russians] satisfaction -- they wanted to be in on the
In this September) 1 photie conversation, Grachevexpectedly complained that it
seemed as though NATO and the U.S. had taken the side of the Muslims and in
. the fighting, and that the airstrikes should have been halted immediately after the Geneva
agreement. Continued bombing could sour U.S.-Russian relations; "if the fighting
continues," Grachev warned, "we will have to help the Serbs in a unilateral way."
Claiming that the West was using a "double-standard" by punishing the Serbs but not the
Croats and Muslims, Grachev said that "ignoring Russian opinion casts doubt on the
16 Holbrookc draft memoirs, Chapter 7 (Ja"nuary 27, 1997). pp 12-13.. .
17 In President Clinton's September 9 response to thcRussian President, he largely sidestepped
disagreements and thanked the Russians for their support. See Message from Clinton to Yeltsin, Cable.
White House 92005, September 9, 1995. The Russians had complained about the bombing from the
moment it $rted. Sec, for example, the Moscow embassy's report ofthe Russian reaction, contained in
"Secretary's Message on Bosnia Delivered," Cable, Moscow 28034, September 1. 1995. .
II For Lavrov comment, see "Security Council 9/09/95: Bosnia-Herzegovina Debate and Adoption of"
Presidential Statement," Cable, U.S.UN 3433, September 9, 1995. Cburkin provided little detail on what.
be meanl by "aid," althougb he implied that it perhaps would not even be rclated to the providing of
weapons. In his reporting cable to the State Department, Hunter admitted that these comments might be
more, bluster than substance. "As is often the case with Churkin," Hunter explained. "it was not obvious
which of his comments were instructed and which wcre his own amplification. He did make clear that his
instructions encompassed his emphasizing the gravity of the situation, the threat of 'aid' for the Serhs. and
the judgment that the Bosnian Serbs would not withdraw the heavy weapons. Beyond these pGints, it was
not clear that even his proposal to meet with Mladic was instructed." See "Russian AmbassadGr Churkin
on NATO Bombing," Cable. U.S.NATO 3531. September 10. 1995.
Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
20 Peny interview.
.
104
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UNCLASSIFIED
7
sincerity of West em intentions to settle the warfare.
u
Peny and Grachevagreed to stay in
close contact, but Russia had already begun formal moves to assert its role in the. process.
Within .a day, Russia tried to get the UN Security Council to order an immediate halt to
the bombing, orily to be rebuffed.
21
.
In a further attempt to assuage Russia's discontent, Strobe Talbott planned to'
travel to Moscow on September 14 for what he described as "quiet consultations at a time
of scratchiness in the [U.S.-Russian] relationship over Bosnia'" In meetings with Russian
officials, Talbott hoped to show that the U.S. wanted to improve consultations between
the two sides. The basic message was that while the U.S. understood that NATO
bombing was hard for Russia to swallow. aIJowmg the Bosnian war to continue would be
worse. "If Bosnia were to fester;" Talbott's talking points read, "it would drive an even-
deeper wedge between Russia and the West; it would continue to' make Russia look
desperate for a deal. that favors the Serbs; [and] it would continue t() undermine the
credibility of the UN, in Which Russia is heavily invested." The bottom-line the
U.S. needed to make the case for U.S.-Russian cooperation on the issue.
concentrate oil fixing the problem rather than the blame," Talbott's points stated.
22
While most of Talbott's discussions that day focused on Russian support for the
current peace negotiations, there were some preliminary discussionS of a Russian role in
implementing a settlement. . On this latter issue, Talbott felt the talks went well. "There
will almost certainly be a Russian role in the follow-on arrangements toward peace,/' he
told the press in a background briefing. "In sum, Talbott characterized his discussions in
Moscow as . evidence that despite recent friction, the U.s. and Russia ''will be able to do
important and effective work together on bringing peace to the fonner Yugoslavia.',,23
NATO Bombing Nears the End
All of these" developments. including a read-out of the HoI brooke team's
negotiations and their next steps, were discussed at a September 11 PC at the White
House. With the President and the entire negotiating team in attendance, Holbrooke
explained the progress recently made in Geneva and some of the goals for the next.
shuttle. From Holbrooke's perspective, the last round of talks "drew the lines on the
field, established the team rosters, and wrote the rule book for the next round of
negotiations .. Now the IOUgh and tumble game begins." Specifically, Holbrooke outlined
several "clusters" of issues to handle, including: opening discussions on the map;
negotiating a cease-tue (when the "time is right"); working to organize NATO
implementation; and beginning to flesh out the Geneva principles into working
government structures.
24
..
The discussion then turned to the NATO air campaign's strategic goals. President
Clinton asked whether Holbrooke thought that the campaign had "reached the point of
21 See Telcon, September II, 1995 (Pardew notebook; Shuttle 2; Book 2); Christopher
Wren, "Russia Fails in UN to Bar Raids on Serbs," New York .Times, September J3, 1995; and Rick
Atkinson and Daniel "NATO Rejects Demand tf) End Bombing; Russia Warns Alliance on
Bombing Campaign," Washington Post, September 12,1995.
.
22 These points were contained Talbott's briefing packet, which also detailed a "basic script" that the
Deputy Secretary could use when meeting with the Russians. See "Moscow Mission; September 14-15 -
Talking While Bombing." EURIRPM files, September 1995. .
2J See "Transcript of Talbott Briefing," Cable. Moscow 29798. September IS, 1995.
24 See Memorandum for Christopher from Holbrooke. "Principals Committee Meeting: September I I
1995," September II, 1995.
UNCLASSIFIED
:
UNCLASSIFIED
... n ........ " 'I1' ......
diminishing returns." Holbrooke responded that the bombing was still advantageous to
his team's diplomatic effort. "We want it to continue," he said. "We believe that we
should tough it out The U.S. has gained leadership. Izetbegovic would not have come
as far as he has without the bombing." Holbrooke did however, that they may
reach a point where continued bombing wouid hurt the initiative, but "we're not. there
yet" Christopher concurred with his Assistant Secretary; "The bombing should continue.
through Option Two targets ... it would be bad to back off." The President but
expressed frustration that the air campaign was not better c3.Iibrated with the diplomatic
effort. It's triCkY2" Holbrooke responded, well aware of.the challenge of trying to
orchestrate the bombing to complement the negotiations.
25
.
Such strategic questions as the duration and policy goals of the air were
soon answered by militaiy realities. Perry and Admiral William Owens, the Vice
Chairman of the Chiefs, informed the meeting that NATO wou14 likely run out of
Option Two targets in two to three days. This news seemed to take some officials by
surprise; although U.S. military leaders had let everyone know th.at the target list was
nearing. its end. some officials, including Christopher and Holbrooke. did not expect the
end to corne so soon. Indeed, Christopher remained skeptical that the military had
actually Hexhausted all thetargets.',26 If the U.S. wanted NATO to continuethe bombing,
it would have to go back to the NAC and the UN to receive approval for Option lbree
targeting?' General Shalikashvili had raised this point with the President his
advisors four days earlier, and they had decided to defer such a decision. Now the point
to decide was them.
The problem was that it would be very difficult to get new NAC and UN approval
before NATO ran out of targets. Recalling the arduous process to get the NAC to
approve Options One.and Two following the London decisions in July, there waS no good
reason to believe it possibleto secure the controversial Option Three decision anytime
soon. if at alL U.S. Allies had already expressed skepticism that such an agreement could
be reached, and now Russian sensitivity seemed particularly problematic.
28
Moreover.
after almost two weeks of casualty-free bombing, many civilian officials believed that the
U.S. military commanders and Secretary Perrywerereluctant to press forward with more
ambitious attacks. Pentagon officials absolutely dismiss this charge. but the perception
As Holbrooke later reflected, the military a deep of what they called
25 Vershbow interview; December 17, 1996. Vershbow was the notetaker in this meeting.
26 Christopher interview, October 30. 1996. 27 On September 8, the U.S. mission to the UN judged that an escalation to Option Three strikes would not
only require a new NAC decision. but another UN Security Council resolution. Since "there are a number
of differences in a smooth transition to explicitly [Option} III operations," U.S.UN (Ccommended that
decision-makers focus on "!he more liberal approach to [Options] I and 11:' such as expanding the zone of
operations around Sarajevo, seeking UN authorization for additional types of targets within the current
zone of operations, or hitting air defenses outside the cUlTent zone by claiming !hat tbe Bosnian Serbs were
threatening NATO aircraft (as had been done in the Banja Luka Tomahawk strike). See "U.S.UN
Secretariat Understanding of Category III Air Strikes," Cable, U.S.UN 3422. September 8, 1995.
U For example. in a Jetter to Christopher on September 8, BritisbForeign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind
doubted that getting further NAC approval would be possible. See cable, State 95171 O. September 20,
1995. Further, NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter had said that such a decision would be impossible. See
Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar. For Russian opposition 10 Option m. see Gati to Talbott,
September 13, 1995.
19 See, for example. Siocombe interview.
106
3
a
UNCLASSIFIED
1
1
1
1
1
I
I
I
I
I
!
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
UNCLASSIFIED
the 'slippery slope' or 'mission creep' ... when they talked about Bosnia, they thought of
Vietnam or Somalia," Finally, infonned by their own contacts with Serbian military
officials, some in the U.S. military command may have felt that continuing or escalating
the bombing may hurt; not help the prospects for. negotiating success. This view was
even shared by the Pentagon's representative on the shuttle team. Jim Pardew.
3o

Secretary Christopher and Holbrooke felt very strongly that if the NATO attacks
paused or ended because of alJied inability to approve escalation, it would undemiine any
bargaining leverage the U.S. had vis-a-vis Bosnian Serbs, "I thought it was important
to carry on the bombing campaign to the point where it would achieve real effectiveness,
[and] that the Bosnian Serbs would be impressed with the willingness of NATO to bomb
on a continuous Christopher reflected, If the air campaign was going to end
he and Holbrooke contended, then the U.S. should try use the little t.ime
remaining to get something for it. Since the Bosnian Serbs did not know of NA TO's .
targeting problem, the U.S. should try quickly to a negotiated settlement. on them to
lift the siege of Sarajevo. the U.S. would be without the leverage of military

.
.
. Christopherand Holbrooke pressed the military leaders to extend the bombing for
a few days to buy the negotiating tcam some time to get back out to the region to meet
with Milosevic. "If you paus.e the [boJl?bing campaign] now you are going to risk losing
the Sarajevo government; and if it takes place [as we're] flying in we won't get any credit
for it [the pause] with Belgrade." Holbrooke said to Admiral Owens. "We need to find a
way to leverage the end of the bombing." The President agreed, teIling his advisors that
he hadno problem with continuing the campaign. We can't look weak:; wecan't look
like we're kicking the can doWn the road:' he said. if we're having problems with
the Russians, we have to stay firm." The military leaders agreed to extend the bombing
for another 72 hours, and the negotiating team moved up its schedule, leaving the next
day for Belgrade. If they weren't successful, the NATO air campaign would have to
pause until the NAC and UN authorized escalation?'
30 For Hoi brooke see "The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker, October 21 &26,1996; and
Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar. On U.S. military contacts with Serbian commanders.
Admiral Owens had been in contact with the General Perisic, the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav (Serbian)
Anny. In a phone call at 4pm September) J (a half-hour before the White House PC meeting), Owens and
Perisic discussed the course of the bombing campaign. Perisic said that the "further dimension of the
RAMs (Tomahawks) further exacerbated the situation and that it is imperative [0 the overall peace
process that we achieve a cease-fire." }teassuring Perisic, Owens said that his "efforts will wntinue in
Washington." emphasizing that "it was NATO. not Washington, making the specific militasy decisions on
the use of weapons in the theater." See "Ow.ens-Perisic Telcon," Cable. VCJCS Washington] 11853.
September 11,1995. In bis September 10 memorandum to Perry and Siocombe reviewing the second
shuttle, Pardew observed that "the bombing generally strengthened the diplomatic process, but the
command and control of the process is. too cumbersome to link the bombing directly to the diplomatic
The longer the bombing lasts, the mor.e the BSA will adapt to it and discover that militlU)'
operations can continue while bombing continues. Continued bombing will prevent serious negotiations
on the map by strengthening the position of both Serb and Bosnian Government hard-liners. We need a
face-saving way to suspend them for the time being to move forward with territorial discussions."
31 Vershbow interview. December 17, [996; HolbrookefOwen interview; Holbrooke, Owen, Hill. Clark.
Kerrick comments, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke, "The Road to Sarajevo (unedited pre-
publication draft), The New Yorlcer.
101
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Milosevic's Surprise
Two hours after landing in Belgrade the afternoon of September 13, the
Holbrooke team met with Milosevic in his hunting lodge.
32
The team was ready to try to
cash-in on what would likely be the last bargaining chip provided by NATO bombing.
When they sat down to meet, the Serb leader seemed to have read their minds. InsIsting
on addressing the NATO J:mmbing campaign before any oilier issue, Milosevic said that
o the situation needed and that he thought he could get the Bosnian Serbs to
agree to 0 lift the siege of Sarajevo in return for a pennanent cessation of bombing.
Teievision cameras from" the ABC program ''Nightline.'' in Belgrade with White House
clearance for a story on the peace negotiations. filmed about ten minutes of this early'
exchange. After Holbrooke' asked the cameras to leave the room, Milosevic made an o

unexpected announcement to the U.S. team: Karadzic, MJadic and other Bosnian Serb
leaders were in a viJIa two hundred meters away and.ready to meet with them.
Fortunately, Holbrooke later reflected, the delegation was prepared for such a
surprise. On.the flight to Belgrade that day, they had discussed the prospect of meeting
Karadzic and Mladic, deciding that they would talk with the two iIidicted war criminals if
it would help the negotiations. However, as Holbrooke told Milosevic that day, the team
decided that they would meet with the Bosnian Serbs only if the three" conditions were
met: that Milosevic be recognized as the head of the delegation; second, that they be _
willing to engage in "serious discussions," not digressing into their typical and highly
emotional historical monologues; and third, that MiIosevic secure their agreement to
these conditions prior to with the U.S. team. They wanted to make sure that
Milosevic understood that the U.S. held him responsible for the behavior of the
Serbs. The Serb leader agreed to talk. to them, and Holbrooke led his team into the
woods outside the villa to wail
A few minutes after the Bosnian Serbs arrived at the U.S. team
called in. The delegation :(aced Karadzic and Mladic warily; some members shook
their hands, others didn't. From the moment the meeting opened, it was clear to the U.S.
team that despite some intelligence reports to the contrary, these men were effected by the
NATO bombing campaign. They were visibly shaken by the airstrikes; the Bosnian Serb
Vice President Nikola Koljevic complained that the use of Tomahawks was "no fair
n
and
that it was "an outrage" that American jets had struck 150 meters from his offiCe.
Karadzic launched into a self-pitying diatn'be about the bombing, referring often to the
"'humiliation the Serbs are suffering." Overall, the group appeared "staggered" by the
bombing and the losses in western Bosnia. "The atmosphere in the region indicates a
general breakdown of Bosnian Serb will." Pardew reported back to Washington. "{The
Bosnian Serbs] argued long and hard, but primarily wanted a face-saving Way out of the
bombing. They were very concerned with 'humiliation' of the Serbs."
clearly the leader of the motley group, did most of the talking. Mladic,
dress,ed in battle fatigues. looked iike the perfect "bad guy" sent from central casting. He
32 Holbrooke presented a ';ivid portrayal this meeting in his New Yorker articie; see also Holbrooke draft.
memoirs, Chapter 10 (February 18, 1997). Other details of this meeting from: HolbrookelHiII interview;
Holbrooke, Hill, Clark, Kerrick. Owen, Pardew comments, Dayton History Seminar; Pardew reports to
Slocombe, "Meeting with Milosevic," September 13, 1995; "OPS Report 111I1800L," September 13, 1995;
"Meeting with key Bosnian Serb Leaders," September 14,1995; and Kerrick personal notes, September 13,
1995.
108
UNCLASSIFIED
,
I

UNCLASSIFIED
a &
did little except engage in occasional stare-downs with his American interlocutors
across the table. At one poin4 Karadzic threatened that if he did not get what he wanted
from Holbrooke, he would call the last leader he had been in contact with, Jimmy
Carter. Holbrooke responded finnly that while he had worked for President Carter fifteen
years ago, theAmerican team worked only for Clinton. Later, Milosevic told
Holbrooke that it was good to clear this. up for Karadzic. "You know," the Serb president
said, "that was very smart the way you handled Jimmy Carter. Those guys are sceut off.
from the world they think Carter can still decide American policy."
After hours of haggling, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow th(: Americans
to draft a document that outlined the tenns for an end to the bombing campaign .. General
Wes Clark joined Owen, Pardewand Chris HilI to Write the document. A half-hour later,
Clark stood to read the draft to the Bosnian Serbs, while Holbrooke and Milosevic looked
on. As Clark read, the Bosnian Serbs, particularly Mladic, became increasingly angor,
complaining that the tenns were unfair and neglected Serbian pride. Looking as though
he was going to.boil over, the general burst into a fuqous claiming that the
bombing was a criminal act and that the U.S. needed to punish .all sides, not just the
Serbs..Seeing that things were spirming out of control, Holbrooke interrupted. turned to
Milosevic, and stated bluntly that "we had an agreement. This behavior clearly not
consistent with it If your do not wish to have a serious discUssion; we will
leave now."
Milosevic quickly caucused with his Bosnian colleagues, and they agreed to calm
doWn and rejoin the discussions on American tenns. At three o'clock that morning" the
Bosnian Serbs accepted the U.S. plan: Specifically. they pledged to cease all offensive
operations around . Sarajevo and begin immediately to relocate their heavy weapons.
Further, they would allow unimpeded road access to Sarajevo, and open the Sarajevo
airport for humanitarian traffic within 24 hours. In exchange, NATO bombing wouJd be
suspended for 72 hours, after which their compliance would be assessed. If the Bosnian
. Serbs cooperated, bombing would end indefinitely and the. agreement would be
. fonnalized with the Sarajevo govermnent. Holbrooke called Washington to infonn his
superiors of the accomplishment and to recommend a bombing pause effective
immediately.33 Wanting to be able to present the document as a unilateral concession
from the Bosnian Serbs. Holbrooke refused to sign. He only promised to deliver the
paper to Janvier as a "recommendation" from the U.S .. Accordingly, the Bosnian Serbs
alone signed the document, with Milosevic as a witness.
After four years, the U.S. was. thus able to forge a fonnal end to the siege of
Sarajevo. The delegation had set out to Belgrade to try to use their remaining leverage to
negotiate an end to the bombing, and surprisingly remarkably, Milosevic delivered in
spades.
34
Once again, when doubts had emerged that Milosevic was losing control .ofhis
)) See "A Framework for A Cessation of Hostilities Withi!l the Sarajevo TEZ," document faxed to
Washington by Kerrick, 3: September 14,.19.95. Holbrooke discussed the document in a conference
call with Christopher, Lake, Perry and Tamoff. See call at 2123 EDT, September 13, 1995, from "Bosnia
Action Log, September 13-14, 1995," EURIRPM files. .
.
)4 This was fortunate, since the U.S. soon learned that the fact that NATO was running Oul of targets was .to
go public. On September) 4 Embassy Zagreb reported that UN Generals Janvier and Rupert Smith were
preparing a letter for public release indicating that there were no more Option Two targets. They woo Id
not make any recommendations for further action, but would delineate "what would occur if the response
2 7
109
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I
i
UNCLASSIFIED
Bosnian brethren, the Serb leader demonstrated himself to be the master manipulator?5
Although some had raised questions about the air campaign's military effectiveness. it
seemed clear from this meeting that the Bosnian Serb Jeadership as well as their chief
patron wanted the bombing to end. To the. shuttle' team, there was no doubt that the
bombing had enhanced their bargaining power. Now the Holbrooke team had what they
felt was a good agreement to lift the siege of Sarajevo. The next step would be to sell it
to the Bosnians, .'
Zagreb and Mostar .
, Shortly after 9am the next morning, September 14, the Holbrooke delegation
presented the document to General Janvier in Zagreb. HoIbrooke asked the French
general not to see this as a SerbU.S. but as a message to the UN from the
Serbs. Although stunned, Janvier welcomed the message, saying that it seemed to be the
"right approach" and an acceptable response to the terms of his September 4 letter to
Mladic. Janvier said that the first 72-hour suspension would begin that evening.
36
. The Croatian leadership had no real reaction to the Bosnian Serb
discussing instead the progress the Muslim-Croat Federation forces were making against
the Serbs on the ground in western Bosnia. The Croats had already promised the U.s.
that the Federation military campaign would be limited, aiming only to stabilize the
confrontation line.
37
Yet, recent actions proved otherwise, The Federation continued to
press on toward Banja Luka, sending as many as 40,000 Bosnian Serbs fJeeing.38 The
Bosnian Serb Army was in great disarray. and the Croats confmned reports that BSA
soldiers were shooting their officers. Bolstered by these successes, President Tudjman-
mused whether the Feqeration should -try to take Banja Luka. Holbrooke cautioned
TudJinan against doiIig so, arguing that they would create huge numbers of refugees and
have to give up the city in a settlement anyway. Instead, Holbrooke and General Clark'
discussed with Croat Minister SuSak the areas that Federation forces should fight
to take, suggesting, for example, that the area around Bosanski Petrovac looked good.
Briefly switching the subject to !!astern Sbivonia. Holbrooke mentioned that a Serb-Croat
in Bosnia moved on to Option Three:" See "Janvier and Smith Preparing a Letter on Next Steps," Cable.
Zagreb 3536, September 14, 1995. .
ESec Ho!brooke """m .. 0.".... "",ory Scmi""; Kemck not"" ScpI<mbcr 14. 1995; .rul"''''ew
report, "Meeting with key Bosnian Serb Leaders," September 14, 1995.
)7 During a visit to Washington on September 12, CroatFM Granic pledged that the
Federation would use restraint in these actions. Meeting with both Secretary Christopher at the State
Department and Anthony Lake at the White House, Granic reaffinned Croatia's willingness to reach a
comprehensive peace settlement. When pressed on Croatian humanitarian violations against Krajina Serbs
(which Galbraith characterized to Washington as "appalling"). Granic replied Ihat while such problems
were hard to avoid in war, the'situation was stabilizing. See "A Topic For Your Meeting with FM Granic:
Croatia's ,Appalling Treatment of the Krajina Serbs," Cab ie, Zagreb 3501, September) I, 1995; "Granic
Tells Christopher Crolltia Need Slavonia Settlement. Will Support u.s, Peace Initiative," Cable (draft).
September 13. 1995; and "Meeting Between National Security Advisor Lake and Croatian FM Granic.
September 12, 1995," NSC memorandum, September 21, 1995.
)I For details, see Mike O'Connor, "Bosnian Serb Civilians Flee Joint Attack," New York
Times, September 14, 1995; and Paul Wood and Bruce Clark. "Serbs Flee Homes as Bosnian Forces
Advance," Financial Times, September 14, 1995
llO

UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
&
settlement on this issue must be part of any peace agreement. Tudjrnan agreed with
Holbrooke's view that Milosevic was prepared to give up the disputed territory, but was
looking for way to "save face.,,39. .
That afternoon the team left Zagreb by" convoy to meet with the Izetbegovic and
Prime Minister Haris. Silajdzic in Mostar, the ancient city on the N eretva .River which had
been nearly decimated in 1993 during the Muslim-Croat conflict.
40
The U.S. expected
that the Bosnians would not be pleased that the bombing against their Serb enemies was
\ .
ending. In a call earlier that daY,Secretary Christopher had urged the Bosnian
President to support the Bosnian Serb agreement: Izetbegovic was
explaining that he had not yet seen the draft.
41
Yet, from the very beginning of the
meeting, it was clear that the Bosnians were very upset that the bombing had ended. To
the U.S. delegation, the Bosnians themselves as close to a military success
against the BSA. Accordingly, they wanted the air campaign to continue so they. could
press their advantage. lzetbegovic even indicated a willingness to have Sarajevo undergo
a few more days of shelling in return for more NATO bombing. Already fatigued from
the late-night in Belgrade, Holbrooke characterized this discussion. with the Bosnians as
"long and difficult." Haris Silajdzic angrily stated that the cessation paper was "totally
unacceptable." Holbrooke explained that while he understood their frustration, they
really had no choice; NATO was running out of targets, and the next level of bombing
would require UN and NAC approvaL
42
: The Bosnians seemed to understand that they
had no real control over the issue, and gave their grudging support.
Yet, Izetbegovic and Silajdzic did raise four specific objections 10 the Bosnian
Serb proposal. First, tbey the French Rapid Reaction Force troops to protect the
newly opened road routes into Sarajevo. Second, Izetbegovic strongly'objected to the
word "humanitarian'" rather than the word "civilian" to define the kind of goods that
could be transported into Sarajevo. He was concerned that "hwnanitarian" could be
defmed too narrowly, thus leaving out certain goods - as cement, glass, shoes and
radios. Holbrooke claimed that this was merely a drafting error. and agreed to obtain
Milosevic's agreement that "humanitarian goods" meant everything but military supplies.
Third, the Bosnians wanted the U.S. to commit. to assess Serb compliance and resume
airstrikes if MIadic "plays games." . Fina1Iy, they objected to the de:fmition of Serb heavy
weapons. which the draft agreement described as .. artillery greater than lOOmm [and]
mortars greater than 82mm." They felt, and the U.S. delegation agreed, that. by
inadvertently omittinf the phrase "or equal to" when describing the caliber, the definition
was too pennissive.
4
On all these points, Holbrooke promising to get what
lzetbegovic wanted from Milosevic.""
39 Details of meeting from Pardew report to Slocombe, "Federation Offensive in Central B-H," September
14, 1995; Kerrick notes, September 14, 1995; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, ppSO-Sl; and Clark report to
CJCSNCJSC. "Daily Negotiations Update, 14 September."
40 The lown was under provisional EU Administration and divided between Bosnian Muslims and Croats.
41 "The Secretary and Bosnian President lzetbegovic," Cable, State 218658, September 14, 1995.
42 At this point, Holbrooke read to the Bosnians quotes from a New York Times article explaining the
political realitiesof continuing the air campaign. See Kerrick notes, September 14, J 995; and Eric
Schmitt, "NATO Commanders face Grim Choices," New York Times, September 14,1995.
43 Earlier that day, General Clark bad realized that tbis error had been made, and Perina in
. Belgrade to make sure the change was made with Miloscvic. Yet, the Bosnians did not know this. and
while the team was on its way to Mostar (and out of radio contact), they relayed their objections to
Washington. The press also picked up on tbis error, explaining (mistakenly) tbat this represented a "big
$ a
. UNCLASSIFIED
III
UNCLASSIFiED
&
The discussion turned next to constitutional principles and Roberts Owen. The
Geneva points had set out the broad framework for a Bosnian constitution, yet did' not
address exactly how this would operate. The next step was (0 flesh this agreement out.
Accordingly, the team aimed to get the parties to agree to specific governmental
structures that would, in a sense, serve as the connective tissue to hold Bosnia t9gether.
Using the Geneva principles as a template. Owen had prepared a drntt document of
.. further agreed principles" outlining the superstructure of a Bosnian state. The Principles
called for elections i ~ Bosnia as soon as conditions pennitted; a joint presidency that
. would govern the state; and provisions for creating a new Bosnian parliament.
4S
Owen outlined his proposal for a three-person Presidency that would sit atop the
Bosnian government. ~ u c h an idea had been discussed earlier during- the negotiations
that led to Geneva, but was not included in the agreement by Milosevic's request.
Visibly. angry, SiIajdzic said that any consideration of an electoral process or joint
leadership would legitimize Serbian etlmic cleansing. In the Prime Minister's view,
elections would not be just until' refugees were allowed to resettle in their own land - a
process, he pointed out, that would likely take 5-15 years. The U.S. team agreed that the
current leadership in Pale would make poor partners in. a unified government, however,
they hoped that by forcing the Bosnian Serbs to democratize through elections, more
reasonable leaders would emerge in the future.
46
Silajdzic also reopened the "Republika
Srpska'" issue which the U.S. team had fought so hard over in Ankara, claiming that the
title recognized the "fascist" Bosnian Serbs. Overall, Izetbegovic and Silajdzic seemed
most concerned over issues related to the joint presidency. particularly over which
governmental structure woulq control foreign policy.47 .
Sarajevo and thE{Contact Group
Following this discouraging session, the U.S. delegation saw that Silajdzic could
be a problem. Thus far .. he was clearly the most vocal critic of the U.S. plan, and seemed
to be the most adverse to any sett1ement with .the Bosnian Serbs. Of the three primary
Bosnian interlocutors, the team felt most comfortable with Sacirbey and Izetbegovic. In
tlie past they had worked very closely with Sacirbey on constitutional issues, and were
optimistic that the Foreign Mirrlster would be able. to bring Izetbegovic around to an
agreement.
48
They were less hopeful about Prime Minister SiIajdzic, who seemed to
distrust the U.S. and had a poor relationship with Holbrooke. Realizing this, Holbrooke
asked Owen and Hill to drive to Sarajevo with SiJajdzic the next morning. Holbrooke
hoped that by traveling together during the five-hour trip over Mt. Igman. the two
concession" to the Bosnian Serbs. See James Rupert, "U.S. Shift Allowed Face-Saving Exit by Serbs:"
Washington Pest, September 16, 1995; and Clark comment, Dayton History Seminar.
4( For details of meeting, see Pardew report to Siocombe, 'Discussion of NATO Air Strikes with
Federation:' September 14, 1995; Kerrick notes, September 14. 1995; Holbrooke phone readout,
September 14. 1995 (EUR files); and Clark report to CJCSNCJSC. September 14. 1995. .
.4$ Owen had discussed this approach during a September 12 meeting in Washington with Kornblum and
the legal working group. See llandwritten notes (unidentified author) from September 12 meeting between
Kornblum and Owen, EUR files.
-46 Owen interview, June 18. 1996 .
7
Sec Clark CJCSNCJSC report, September 14, 1995; Holbrooke phone report (EUR files), September 14,
1995; Kerrick notes, September 14, 1995; and Hill interview. .
4J Indeed, many of the ideas Owen had placed into his draft of "further agreed principles" were raised
during his initIal meetings with Sacirbey in Washington during August 2325.
112
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
- Americans and Silajdzic could establish a of trust. Hill and Silajdzic both
had a background in U.S.-Albanian relations (Silajdzic had written a thesis on it, while
Hill was considered an Albanian expert), and Holbrooke hoped that this common interest
could break the ice.
49
. . .
On September 15. Hill and Owen left with Silajdzic for Sarajevo while the rest of .
. U.S. team departed for Geneva to attend a Contact Group meeting. That night in the
Bosnian capital, Owen and Ambassador Menzies' met. with Silajdzic over dinner
where they went over the draft "further agreed principles." The two key areas of
negotiation were over elections and the presidency. Milosevic had pressed to hold
elections 'sooner rather than later. Through the ballot, he hoped to remove his Bosllian
Serb rivals, namely Karadzic. Thousands of Bosnian Serb refugees were living in
Belgrade, andthe Serbian President expected that his influence would tum their vote
against the Karadzic-dominated Pale government. In contrast, the Bosnian as
previewed the day before by. SiIajdzic in Mostar, was to delay elections J,IIltil Bosnia
returned to its pre-war nonnalcy demographically. If the thousands of Muslim refugees
were allowed to return to their home throughout Bosnia, SiJajdzic .hoped that they could
regain control over much of the country through democracy. .
That evening, Hill and Owen convinced Silajdzic that it was in Sarajevo interest
to hold elections while an international presence - presumably NATO-led - was still in
Bosnian territory. An outside presence such as the OSCE could monitor refugee return
and human rights during a transition period, and then oversee the elections to assure that
they are free and fair. Silajdzictentatively agreed to these points but nothing definitive
was decided on the timing of elections. The draft principles outlined only that they
would take place "as as social conditions pennit." .
On the joint presidency, Owen's initial idea' of a three-person body was.expanded
to a six person body comprised of two DJembern from each ethnic group. Decisions
would be made by majority vote, and the group would have the powers appropriate for a
central government, including command over foreign relations, trade, and customs.
However, the specifics of the presidency's power remained vague, particularly on how its
decisions would relate to a new Bosnian parliament and what powers would be reserved
for the two entities.
By the next day, SiIajdzic had agreed to the points on elections and the joint
presidency which Owen had incoIporated into his draft. Hill and Owen felt that they had
made a good deal of progress in these talks. SiIajdzic seemed looser and more
comfortabie with them, and his attitude was less edgy and combative. For the morn.ent.
the Prime Minister wasn't the problem they thought he would be. He now supported the
. "further agreed principles," and Hill and Owen believed that they had created a draft that
Milosevic could live with. If the Serb leader agreed to these points, it could lay to rest
most of the core constitutional issues. The details would have to be sorted out later,
probably at a peace conference.
so
While HilI and Owen were with Silajdzic in Sarajevo on September IS, the rest of
the delegation attended a Contact Group meeting in Geneva. by the Russians,
HolbrookelHiU interview.
)0 Details ofthese talks from Hill interview; Owen/Kornblum interview. For the version of the principleS
that came out of the HilT/Owen talks in Sarajevo, see "Eyes Only" fax to Secretary Christopher from Owen,
September 16, 1995. .

113
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Holbrooke had to (lttend this meeting to help douse some of the Great Bear's recent
frustrations concerning Bosnia. This was a prime 'example of the utility of "process" to
make up for Russian dismay over substance. In the heavily publicized meeting held at
Russian mission in Geneva, the Contact Group .pressed for convening a peace
conference.' Holbrooke noted that' aU three Balkan Presidents had expressed interest in
such an event, but since they remained divided by so many issues, any conference in the
near future would be doomed to fail. The Americans briefed the group on the Bosnian
. Serb commitments, and they discussed the eventual lifting of sanctions on "Serbia.
Holbrooke suggested that the Contact Group agree to meet at another meeting, similar to
the one in Geneva, later that month at the UN in New York.
51
.
Froni Geneva, the Holbrooke delegation returned to Belgrade, where they reunited
with Hill and Owen on September 16 .. With Milosevic, they needed to clarify the
changes to the Bosnian Serb on Sarajevo and begin negotiations on the
draft "further agreed principles" Hill and Owen. brought from Sarajevo. Joined by
General Perisic, the Serb Military Chief of Staff, Milosevic listened to the team's
refInements on the weapons withdrawal agreement. Followin.g the September 13
meeting, Mladic had fallen ill with kidney stones and was iii a Belgrade hOsfital .
. Milosevic offered to let the U.S. delegation visit the general, but they declined.
s
In
Mhidic's absence, MiIosevic and Perisic agreed to the specific conditions for BSA
compliance. To emphasize the seriousness of this commitment, Holbrooke bluntly told
them thilt "if the Bosnian Serbs do not comply viith their commitments, the air strikes
will resume." Throughout this discussion, Holbrooke kept a line open to Lt. General
Rupert Smith (who, as commander of UN forces in Sarajevo. would monitor
compliance), and relayed each new Serb concession to him. Smith, who had seen such
"agreements" from the Bosnian Serbs come and go. was skeptical. but agreed to test the
conditions the next day with the BSA cOmmander in the Sarajevo area. On the "further
agreed principles," Milosevic showed little interest. Hill and Owen walked him through
what they had accomplished in Sarajevo, but the Serb leader simply did not focus.
53
The next day. the Holhrooke delegation planned to travel to all three Balkan
capitals, the flrst time anyone had made such a one-day shuttle: The Muslim-Croat
offensive in western Bosnia continued to and the U.S. team wanted to remind
Zagreb that they did not think it wise to take Banja Luka. Then, the delegation planned to
fly into the newly re-opened Sarajevo airport. They wanted to send the same message of
military restraint to the Bosnians. At the same time; Holbrooke believed iliat this leg of
the trip could have a certain dramatic value. The very act of flying into an airport they
51 The team first attended a Quad meeting (U.SJUKlGennany/France). See Kerrick notes, September 1.5,
1995; "September 15 Group Meeting," Cable, 7052, September 1 S. 1995; and
HolbrookeIHilI interview.
52 ft lYas later learned that Mladic's sray may have had more to do with a "diplomatic illness" than
kidney stones.!
L..-._,....-______ -"This view was shared by other contacts, as "even nonnally restratnec1
practitioners of Balkan conspiracy theories find the timing ofMladic's purported operation too unlikely to
be true." See "Speculation on MJadic continues," Cable, Belgrade 4598. September 20. 1995 .
. U See Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapler 11 (February 19, 1997). ppI2-13; Holbrookc, Hill, Pardew
comment, Dayton History Seminar; HolbrookelHiIJ interview; Kerrick notes, September 16, 1995; and
Pardew report to Siocombe, "Meeting with MiJosevic," September 16, 1995.
114
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Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
....
had helped re-open would symbolize histeams accomplishment and potentially improve
their relationship with Sarajevo, which had been a bit frayed since the end of NATO
bombing. Finally, they planned to complete their 24 hour diplomatic trifecta with
Milosevic in Belgrade.
54
_
A Day'
the day began in Zagreb at . 9:00am, with Holbrooke meeting privately with
Tudjman and Pardew and Kerrick meeting with Defense Minister Stisak. With
Tudjman. Holbrooke reviewed the paSt few. days of negotiations. including the
refinements of the withdrawal agreement and the status of the constitutional talks.
Holbrooke then raised the militarY situation on the ground in Bosnia. He and
Ambassador Galbraith had already told Tudjman, on direCt instructions from
Washington, that Croatia be careful in conducting jts offensive, but there was little sign
of it abating. Washington had asked Galbraith to approach the Croats on a few days
before; he did, but little was resolved. The western press began to tum its attention. to the
quickly moving offensive. describing the effort as the creation of. "Greater Croatia.',ss
When Holbrooke raised Banja Luka that morning. Tudjman's tone left him less than
convinced that his earlier message of restraint had even registered. 56
The U.S. was concerned about Banja Luka for several reasons. First, and most
basic, was Holbrooke's initial advice to Tudjman that taking Banja Luka would be
useless, since the Croats would have to give it up in a negotiated settlement. and
more strategically significant, was the concern that an attack on Banja Luka would bring
a near-catastrophic defeat for the Bosnian Serbs, thus drawing Belgrade into the war.
Milosevic had not hinted one way or the other, but the impression was that the Serbian
military might feel Compelled to intervene to stave off!i complete BSA collapse. Third,
even jf an attack on Banja Luka didn't spark a wider war, it seemed certain that it would
create a massive Serbian refugee crisis. The UN estimated that 250,000 refugees could
be sent streaming into Serbia, which on top of the refugees from Krajina. would create a
profound humanitarian crisis.
s7
Such fallout might significantly disable MiIosevic's
ability to negotiate; even the Bosnians realized that sp8xking a massive refugee flow was
not desirable. Finally. taking Banja Luka might exacerbate the already tense relationship
between Muslims and Croats. The problem, it seemed, was that the Muslims and Croats
were fighting over the spoils. With the Bosnian Serbs ori the run, the essential Federation
partnership threatened to be destroyed by each side's diverging battlefield objectives.
Territorial greed could rip this "shotgun marriage" apart. If these differences split the
54 HolbrookeJHiIl interview;
See, for example, Roger Cohen, "Croatia Expands Its Power in Bosnia," New York Times, September 16,
1995; and Chris Hedges, "Tensions Ease in Sarajevo, But Fears Rise on New Front," New York Times,
September 18, 1995.
56 See Galbraith Diplomatic Dicuy, pp5SS6; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December20, 1996.
57 U.S. inteJligence estimated that Belgrade's policies to resettle the Krajina refugees alone "threatens to
upset the delicate ethnic balances and 6roaden ethnic conflict in the Balkans," and that a new refugee flow
"would present a major budgetary challerige
U
to Milosevic and spark Serb ethnic hostility in other areas,
such as Vojvodina in Eastem Sfavonia and Kosovo. See "Serbia: Krajina Serb ResettlementThreatens
Broader Balkan Conflict:' JNR Intelligence Warning, September 21, 1995. This new refugee problem had
been tracked by the U.S. since shortly after the Krajina attack. See, for memorandum to .
Secretary Christopher from Toby Gati (INR), "Resettlement Options for Krajina Serb Refugees," August
17.1995 .
.
-
UNCLASSIFIED
115
UNCLASSIFIED
Federation and sparked renewed Muslim-Croat fighting, then the entire peace process
would unravel.
S8
.
Like Tudjman. Susak's military hubris was in full bloom that day. Before Clark,
Pardew, or Kerrick even had a chance to speak, the Croat Defense Minister was on his
feet, enthusiastically gesturing a map to explain how his army was close to taking
Banja Luka. Susak was clearly invigorate4 by Croatia's recent successes, pointing to
Bosnian Serb positions as though he "were a kid in a candy store.>,59 Clark,
Pardew and Kerrick each pressed him to cease the fighting and not take Banja Luka.
Susak reacted angrily. After considerable debate, he did pledge that the Croatians would
not go "one inch further" in this operation.. Pardew then raised U.S. concerns over
reports of. clashes between Muslims and Croats, stressing the importance of maintaining
comity within the Federation. Susak reacted strongly to what he described as a U.S.
"lecture," stating emotionally and bluntly that the Federation meant more to Croatia than
the u.s.. He claimed that the problems were with the Muslims, whose combat logic was
"to go as far as possible but cry foul when [they] tun into trouble:' Susak did say that
Muslim and Croat military leaderS had met recently in an effort calm and,
observing that "it takes two to make the Federation work," asked that the U.S. press the
. Muslims to cooperate.
6D

.
Despite Susak's pledge that things would calm down, the U:S. delegation
remained uneasy about the threat to Banja Luka and the possibility for renewed Muslim-
Croat fighting. The self-interested Croatians had been less than reassuring, and the team
was concerned that their efforts were perilously close to being undennined. Holbrooke
wanted to reduce the temperature of the intra-Federation rivalry; and proposed that
Tudjman and lzetbegoyic get together soon to sort things out. They agreed, scheduling to
meet September 19'inZagreb under the Holbrooke team's auspices -- an unusual
arrangement, but indicative of the critical role the Americans played to keep the
Federation together.
61
.
After a brief visit with Janvier, the team left shortly after noon for the second leg
of their three-capital shuttle.
62
Flying in a C-130 military cargo plane with F-16 escorts,
5' Explication drawn from Holbrooke, ,Hill, Clark comments, Dayton History Scm inar; see also Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary, pp55-56. During this time, officials in Washington wanted the fighting stopped, but
never ordered the team to accomplish this. Rather, it was simply conveyed as "guidance." Holbrooke
comment, Dayton History Seminar. The u.s. knew that the Federation was heading for trouble, with
Tudjmanless reliant on Bosnia military cooperation and the rise of Muslim nationalism in Bosnia, The
concern was that the focus on the peace process necessarily diluted the focus on the improving the
Federation. One n,commendation was to convene talks (chaired by Roberts Owen) to check on compliance
of the Washington Agreement and explore possibilities for merging the Federation with the Bosnian
Republic. See memorandum to Holbrookc from Charles Thomas(EUR) and Daniel Sewer (EUR), "The
Bosnian Federation: Acting Now to Shore it Up," September II, 1995.
Kerrick interview.
60 See f'Meeting: Croatian Minister of Defense Susak LTG Clark, BG Kerrick and Mr. Pardew; 17
September 1995; Croatian MOD, Zagreb," Typed meetingnotes (no amhor), September 17, 1995; Pardew
report to Slocombe. "Defeat of the Bosnian Serb Anny in the West." September 17. 1995; Clark
CJCSNCJSC update. "Daily Negotiations Update, 17 September 1995"; Kerrick notes. September 17.
1995; Clark, Kerrick, Pardew comments, Dayton History Seminar; Kerrick interview.
"Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20. 1996.
62 Janvier bad judged that while the BSA bad not yet completed withdrawal, they had shown good faith and
therefore deserved a 72hour extension in the bombing pause. The UN commander outlined BSA progress
116
1&
UNCLASSIFIED
0
UNCLASSIFIED
2
the U.s. team arrived in Sarajevo for the fU'St time by air. As a precaution, the Air Force
crew captain asked that the team wear helmets and flak jackets for the flight. To the
people of Sarajevo. the act of traveling to Sarajevo by air clearly had the intended effect:
when the team arrived at the Bosnian Presidency building, the crowd gathered outside
63
0
showered them with cheers. .
- .
-
delegation hoped that _ such goodwiIJ would translate with the Bosnian
leadership. Unfortunately,1t didn't. lzetbegovic and Silajdzic remained unconvinced
that the Bosnian Serbs would comply- with the teons for weapons withdrawal. They
queried the team on every minute detail of BSA compliance, reopening issues that had
been resolved only days before, such as the definition of "humamtarian." Frustiated,
Holbrooke sternly rebuked the Bosnians. 0 By only concentrating on the "smaller picture,"
he said, lzetbegovic and Silajdzic were missing the opportunity to move forward on what
could be a highly-favorable settlement. With the discussion of BSA compliarice
dominating most of the discussion, the team was unable to get much more done on the
"further agreed principles." This was probably for the good, as the Bosnians were so
argumentative that the discussion would have likely been counter-productive. On Banja
Luka, the Bosnians listened to the call for restraint but were noncommittal. The U.S.
would have another chance to press them on this with Tudjman in Zagreb.
64
After this aggravating meeting, the team discussed Bosnian Serb c6mpliance with
UN general Rupert Smith and the civilian head of the UN mission Antonio Pedayue at
UNPROFOR headquarters. _Smith explained some difficulties "communicating" this new'
approach to his troops, describing how they were conditioned -to do certain things like
stop at Serb checkpoints. In time, Smith -said, UN forces would become Jess sensitive
and thus be more abJ.e to exploit the freedom of movement mandated by the withdrawal
agreement.
6S
The U.S. delegation then left Sarajevo Belgrade, where they met with
Milosevic at 10pm.
-
Reviewing the day's events, the U.S. team made it clear to Milosevic that while
NATO bombing had been suspended,_ the '1ury was still out" on whether bombing would
resume. Full BSA cOmpliance was expected within the next three days, they said.
66
for the Holbrooke team in Zagreb, following-up with a letter to Admiral Smith. The second pause was
-See Janvier letter to Smith: Zagreb. September 17. 1995.
.
Pardew. Owen comments, Dayton History
-
-
64 See Pardew report to SJocombe, "Sarajevo," Clark CJCSNCJCS September 17 update; Kenick notes,
Septcm\Jer 17. 1995; Holbrooke1HiIJ interview; Holbrooke. Hill, Pardew, Clark comments, Dayton History
Seminar.
.
65 See Pardew report to Slocombe, September 17, ) 995; Clark CJCSNCJCS September 17 update; and
Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar_ Evidence soon emerged that Janvier was reluctant to allow
Bosnian trucks to use the Kiseljak Road into Sarajevo and declined to allow Bosnian aircraft to use the
Sarajevo airport. Apparent1y, the UN military commander was concerned that the Bosnian Serbs would
shoot at the trucks or planes and thereby increase pressure for a resumption ofNA TO airstrikcs. During a
September 22 meeting with Boutros Gbali in New York, Holbrooke and Albright pressed the UN Secretary
General to get the UN to "test" the Seib commitment to end the siege of Sarajevo - such as sending
Bosnian trucks through Serb Checkpoints or resuming flights into the Sarajevo airport. See "NS
Holbrooke Presses for UNPROFOR's Full Implementation of the Sarajevo Agreement During September
22 Meeting with UN SYG Boutros Ghali," Cable, U.S.UN 3669. September Zl. 1995.
66 Before meeting with the U.S. team, Milosevic had British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind.
Interestingly, Milosevic discussed with Rifkind the constitutional principles (such as the joint presidency)
as though they were the Serb leader's idea. See "Rifkind Visit To Belgrade," Cable, Belgrade 4556.
September 18. 1995.
a
117
_ UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
They explained that the Sarajevo governnient was still unhappy with the and
wanted the campaign to resume "at all costs." Surprisingly .. the Serb leader seemed
utterly unstressed about the military situation in western Bosnia. After the team told hirn
that things I()oked desperate for the Bosnian Serbs and that Federation forces smelled
Milosevic confidently stated that the commander in the area "would bring things
under controL" Rather than talk about the fighting in the west, Milosevic was anxious to
discuss the future negotiations; particularly, the prospect of convening a three-president
"Camp David" style summit as soon as possible. While the had always envisioned
such a summit to conclude the negotiations, Holbrooke and his delegation believed that it
would be ill-advised to announce one (as Milosevic wished) lUltil all the parties proved a
willingness to compromise. yntil as l101brooke characterized it to Milosevic" such
a summit would. be too riskY, akin to C&Evil Knievel trying to leap over the Grand Canyon
in two jumps" - a:. favorite Milosevic metaphor. Despite Holbrooke downpiaying any
consideration of a summit until more was accomplished, he did discuss with Milosevic
some important details (such as a possible site of outside New York, where the press
would be shut-out; a duration around tWo-weeks; and the likely composition of the
Serb delegation, in which Karadzic and Mladic would be excluded).67 Three hours later,
the team's three-capital day ended. But the time for rest was short. They would return to
Zagreb the next afternoon to prepare for the Tudjman-lzetbegovic meeting:
Federation Restraint; Taking Credit with MiJosevic
. In Zagreb, the Holbrooke team hoped to get the two presidents to agree to a joint
statement reiterating their commitment to the Federation and intent on military
collaboration. When the tWo. leaders met at the Croatian Presidency the afternoon of
September 19, any semblance of goodwill that might have existed between them qui-ckly
disappeared. Tudjman erupted during the first twenty minutes, angrily berating the
Bosnian president on the need for restraint and to take Banja Luka. Tudjman's
lecture stood in stark contrast to his bluster of the previous days. But his forces had
recently suffered a setback tryiOfs to cross the Una river, and two Dutch UN peacekeepers
had been killed in the crossfire. II With these losses, the Croat leader seemed to have lost
his for conquest. When the Bosnian President resisted, Tudjman furiously yelled
that the Bosnians had no piace to talk, since Croat forces had suffered casualties to
liberate "eigbty percent" of the land. Looking on, Ambassador Galbraith observed that
Tudjman "could barely contain his contempt [for the Bosnians)" and "had the
aspect of superiority while lzetbegovic seemed quite beaten The shouting match
proceeded for some continuing on as the Americans were not even in the
See Pardew report to Siocombe. "Three More Hours with Milosevic," September 17. 1995; Clark
CJCSlVCJSC September 17 update; Kerrick notcs, September t 7, 1995; and Hill comment, Dayton -
HistorY Seminar.
-
61 Prior to the meeting, a Croat official had told Galbraith that the Una crossing had been a disaster,
reporting that twenty-five men had died and fifty were trapped on the opposite bank. Sec Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary, p57. For reports on UN peacekeepers, see "Two Danish Peacekeepers in Croatia
. Eight Wounded, By Serb Shelling," Cable, Copenhagen 4856, September 19, 1995; and "More Danish
Casualties in Croatia: Serbs Attack Again, Danes Soldier On, Demin Angry at UN," Cable, Copenhagen
3843, September 20,
118
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
room. As Galbraith noted, "it was like observing a therapy session through a one-way
glass mirror. ,,69
.
Despite the poisonous envkoninent, Tudjman and lzetbegovic did to a joint
statement on coopezation that their foreign ministers had worked on the previous day.
Couching their decision in teons of their support for the American peace initiative the
two presidents promised to slow their offensive and not take Banja Luka, asking
Holbrooke to make the announcement public. They reaffirmed the commitments made in
the (July 1995) Split agreement and declared that their strategic partnership would
continue in an effort to liberate "occupied territory." Finally, they agreed that the
ownership of any territory taken by the offensive would be settled tmough a political
dialogue and without regard to the ethnicity of the conqueringanny. Since most of the
territorial gains thus far had been accomplished by Croatia, this was of particular interest
of the Bosnian government At least on paper, the Bosnians and Croats remained
Unfortunately, as the discussion that day proved, the reality remained much more
M .
.
tenuous.
. .
. With the threat to Banja Luka in check, Holbrooke stiJl. believed that further
military gains by the Federation in western Bosnia could have major diplomatic benefits.
He was not entirely comfortable with Washington's guidance to get Tudjman and
Izetbegovic to stop completely. In a message written for Secretarj Christopher,
Holbrooke obseIVed that "contrary to many press reports, the military offensive has so far
helped the peace process." ToUolbrooke, the tough negotiations over territory were .
"taking place right now on the battlefield. and So far, in a manner beneficial to the [51-49]
map." Indeed, by September U.s. intelligence cartographic analyses showed thai the
Federation now controlled 51% of Bosnia to the Serbs 48%.71 The issue, then, was how
far they should be allowed to go. Washington and the Holbrooke team concurred that
. attacks on Banja Luka and Eastern SIavonia were off-limits. Concerning other areas,
however, Holbrooke argued that the negotiations would benefit from Federation victories
around the towns of Sanski Most and Prijedor. Both were part of Federation territory
under the Contact Group plan, and both were areas which Milosevic said he would not let
go. Accordingly, Holbrooke advised that the U.S. shou!d get out of the "traffic light
game:' In the past, he wrote to Christopher, "we have weakened our credibility by
flashing so many 'red lights' that no one knew which ones we meant and bow seriously
we meant Win or lose, Holbrooke asserted that Federation attacks on these areas
would, paradoxically,. be better "for the negotiations (although [the U.S.] would exploit
See HolbrookelHiII interview; HoI brooke, Hill, Clark, Kerrick. Pardew comments, Dayton History
Seminar; Kerrick notes, September 19. 1995; and Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp57-58.
111 See statement from meeting in Pardew notebook, Shuttle III; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp56-57.
For press reports of agreement. see John Pomfret, "Bosnia, Croatia Agree to Halt Offensive," Washing/on
Posl, September20, 1995; and Stephen Kinzer. "Bosnia Vows Not to Attack Serb Town," New York Times,
September 20. 1995. .
.
71 These figures reflected dramatic changes since June 28, 1995. when the territorial breakdown was 63-37
in favor of the Serbs. See memorandum to Talbott from toby Gati (lNR), "Bosnia: The Pendulum
Swings:' September 19,1995..
.
12 This was particularly the ease, Holbrooke explained, with the Croats, who had routed the Serbs in
Krajina despite U.S. warnings to the contrary. As Holbrooke observed in.his note, "tbe low point ofthe
[traffic-tight] process, which has left an enduring legacy, was when Peny and ShaH told Susak in Munich
in February 19951hat if Croatia attacked Knin they would lose. r was there, and Susak enjoys reminding
me of the meeting."
.... 119
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLAssIPiED
....
them quite differently) than restraint imposed by the U.S . In one way. this
recommendation to the Secretary of State was somewhat post hoc: earlier that day,
Holbrooke had already received Susak's promise that Croatia would provide artillery
cover for Muslim attacks on both areas.
74
Immediately after the raucous Tudjman-Izetbegovic Holbrooke and his
team shuttled to Belgrade. Before ldurning to the U.S., Holbrooke wanted to tell
Milosevic personally that the U.S. had gotten Izetbegovic and Tudjrnan to stay away from
Banja Luka. The Ari'ierican negotiator wanted to make sure his team'" was credited with
the accomplishment .. He told Milosevic that while lzetbegovic and Tudjrnan understood
all the military and strategic reasons why not to pursue Banja Luka, the main reason they
had pledged not to. attack was because "the U.S. had told. them not to.7>75
Finally, they closed the meeting by discussing the "further agreed principles."
Since Hill and Owen's talks in Sarajevo, the principles had evolved a bit further, anci the
U.S. team continued to hope to finalize an agreement later in the month. Taking another
look at the principles on the Milosevic supported the but said that he needed
help bringing his Pale partners-around. He asked Holbrooke if Owen could return to
Belgrade to work on "technology" with the Bosnian Serb leadership. To Milosevic.
"technology" meant "theater," and he explained that a "procedure must take place" for the
Pale leadership to sign on to these principles. Such a meeting would not be a negotiation,
but rather a chance for the U.S. to walk the Bosnian Serbs through an agreement to which
they would be a party. Agreeing to satiate Milosevic's need for drama, Holbrooke said
that he would send Owen, Hill and Pardew back to. Belgrade over the weekend of
September 24_25.
76
. .
When the Holbrooke team arrived home in Washington early September 20, they
believed that once again, things were modestly moving forward. The NATO bom.bing
campaign had finally ended.
71
The siege of Sarajevo Was over .. MiIosevic again proved
he was ready to compromise. forcing the Bosnian Serbs along if necessary. A follow-nn
to Geneva was near approval, with closure expected soon. And the Croats and Bosnians
71 This message, dated September 19, was hand-written by Holbrooke. This message was faxed to the
Secretary that day. Holbrooke phone interview with author, September 17, 1996; and Christopher
interview, October 30, 1996.
74 Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p57.
7S Holbrookc, Clark: comment, Dayton History Seminar.
75 For details of this meeting, see HilllHolbrooke interview; Holbrooke, Clark, Hill. Pardew comments,
Dayton History Seminar; and Kerrick notes, September 19, 1995.
n After a second 72 hour pause, the NATO air campaign officially came to an end on September 20. See
"Joint Statement by Admiral Smith and General Janvier," September 20, 1995 {EURIRPM files). I
____ __
assessment ot the bombing campaign, see "September 20 NAC - Fonner Yugoslavia Topics," cable,
U.S.NA TO 3723, September 22, 1995 .
120
.....
UNCLASSIFIED

' .
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED '.
E
appeared to understand the need for restraint. Notwithstanding all these
accomplishmentS, the closer the U.S. got to the parties toward agreement, the more time
seemed to be of the essence. Pardew reported to Secretary Peny that "The overall
momentum in the Balkans is shifting dramatically toward a peaceful solution ... the next
thirty days are critical. A settlement is possible within a month, although Milosevic
wants it to happen before then. Ifno settlement can be reached in that time, I'mafraid we
are in for another long winter in Bosnia.,,78
Over the past week, Milosevic had displayed a great desire to end the conflict. He
seemed anxious to enjoy the fruits of a settlement, especially sanctions relief as wen as.
political relations with West. Further, he struck some team members as motivated by a
personal need to enhance his own image, to be viewed as an international statesman_ "He
is increasingly insistent on a Balkan summit which he hopes will be in the U.S.," Pardew
reported- Understanding these goals, Holbrooke wrote to the Christopher that his team
had "deliberately stalled" discUssing an international conference in order to "see how
much we can get from him.',79
.
In an odd the Serb leader was much easier to deal than the Bosnians.
Infuriated by the end of the NATO campaign. they paid almost no attention to its
consequences -- the improvement of life in Sarajevo. Finally enjoying military success,
they displayed little desire to settle an agreement anytime soon as long as the new
situation continued to work to their advantage. As negotiating . they
remained moody. disorganized and conflicted about both objectives and tactics.
the Holbrooke delegation had to calibrate their message depending on
which of the Bosnian leaders they were with, whether 'Sacirbey> Silajdzic or
lzetbegovic.
8o
. .
.
.
. . Tudjrnan. it rel]1ained the swing-man for any agreement. His anny's
successes were again critical; the delegation felt that they boosted the negotiating process
by pressuring Belgrade and Pale.
8
) Yet, the Croat president's openly contemptuous
attitude toward the Bosnians was undermining their already fragile alliance. Further.
Eastern Slavonia remained a for Tudjman. As Holbrooke wrote to
Christopher, "1 must warn that [Eastern Siavonia] is a very explosive issue on which we
must make major progress if we want to have a Bosnia settlement. The concern was not
only that Milosevic would balk at giving it up, but that Tudjman may actually want to
take it by force. "rrudjrnan) might rather liberate it by force,t> Holbrooke wrote,
get it peacefully, since another military victory which also drives more Serbs out of his
country may be more appealing to him than a peaceful but protracted settlement.>,82
Keeping the Croat leader in check would be a critical challenge for the U.S. in the corning
weeks.
71. Pardew report to Perry and SIOcombe, "Balkan Peace Initiative -- Round III," September 20, 1995_
Before Pardew had written this report, Siocombe provided Peny with a similar overview ortbe shuttle
(based on phone conversations with Pardew). see memorandum SecDef(Perry) from Slocombe, "Bosnia
Developments," September 20. 199.5.
.
79 Pardew report, September 20. Holbrooke hand-written report to Christopher, September 19.
199.5.
10 Ibid.
1I See Pardew report, September.20, 1995.
n Holbrooke message to Christopher, September 19,1995.
J21
.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
.-.
Washington At Work: Organizing for a Settlement
While the Holbrooke delegation Was in the region on this third shuttle,
policymakersin Washington continued to prepare for a possible settlement. In
the legal working group at the State Department began to think about the different aspects
of a comprehensive agreement, and the types of substantive and procedural issues that
needed to be addressed. Since late August, John Kornblum had thought that given the
complexity of the negotiations and that fact that the signatories would vary according t()
each particular issue, an agreement should be modeled after the 1971 Quadripartite
on Berlin, in which the U.S., U.S.SR, Britain and France agreed to establish
basic governing provisions for the divided German city.S] Kornblum, heavily influenced
by his days as a junior Foreign Service Officer involved in the Berlin negotiations and
later as CSCE {now OSeE} Ambassador, felt that what was needed was a "chapeau"
document with various attachments akin to side agreements - on specific issues.
like the Berlin agreement, a Bosnian peace would have a general framework agreement
detailing the basic principles of a settlement that all sides would adhere to, such as those
agreed to in Geneva. Then. there would be various annexes covering the specifics of a
comprehensive settlement, such '38, for the internal political structure of Bosnia,
an arrangement for rnilltary implementation, separation of forces in Bosnia, and
resolution of the Serb-Croat dispute in Eastern Slavonia Not all the partIes would have
to sign each annex -:- it would depend on whether it was an internal Bosnian issue or an
external regional issue.
84
Along these lines, State Department lawyers Miriam Sapiro, Jim and
Tim Ramish began to work the direction of Kornblum to flesh out what such a
document might contain. By mid-September. they had put together a draft paper
- outlining a vision of how an overall peace settlement in Bosnia could be structured_ As
_ Kornblum had recommended, the proposed settlement' would contain a relatively short
framework document, accompanied by several annexes referring to specific
arrangements. Such a structure would provide maximum flexibility. matching particular
aspects of implementation with the appropriate parties and helping with timing issues -by
implementation into discrete phases. Of course, there was not yet any guarantee
that there would ever be an agreement to settle -- the shuttle team was still in the process
of getting the parties to agree to stepping-stones like Geneva and the "further agreed
principles.',ss
.
But as Kornblum and Holbrooke had discussed, the moment was nearing in which
the U-S. would have to prepa:e for a possible peace conference and comprehensive
n For details on the Berlin Treaty and negotiations. see Dennis L. Bark, Agreement on Berlin: A Study of
the 1970-n Quadripartite Negotiations. AEI-Hoover Policy Study 10, August 1974; and Honore M.
Catudal, Jr., The Diplomacy ofllie Quadripartite 00 Berlin (Berlin Verlag, 1978).
'" See Kornblum interview; Sapiro/O'Brien interview. This drafting process apparently began during the
September 12 meeting between Kornblum and Roberts Owen. Sec hand-written notes (no author).
September 12. 1995, EUR files.
_
IS This draft paper, first presented to by Miriam Sapiro on September 13 and discussed on .
September 15, had gone through several iterations since the September 11. See, for example, Jim O'Brien
email to Sapiro and Ramish on "peace pieces," September 11, 1995; "Peace Settlement" e-mail, no author
(L files). September 13, 1995; memorandum to Kornblum from Sapiro. "Outline of a Peace Settlement."
September 13, 1995; and "Structure of a Peace Settlem-ent for Bosnia-Herzegovina," Sapiro memorandum,
September 15, 1995. See also hand-written notes (no author) from Kornblum, Sapiro, O'Brien meeting.
September 15. 1995; Kornblum interview; SapirolO'Brien interview.
122
I
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
On September 17, Holbrooke had infonned Kornblum that "we are fast
. approaching a time when. in order to move this strange and chaotic process we
should start tabling specific U.S. drafts of key The U,S. must "be prepared,"
Holbrooke explained. to offer the three parties such documents to prod them toward
specific decisions. "Our talks so far have been useful in clarifying positions and even
narrowing many of them. but we must now move to specifics and that requires a U.S.
draft." Following Holbrooke's Kornblum and the legal team began fleshing out
more precisely the contents of a.comprehensive settlement, beginning with the "chapeau
u
framework agreement.
86
.
Meanwhile, Washington policymakers also worked on provisions for politiCal
implementation of any agreement. The DC had begun to discuss a possible arrangements
- .such as the appointment and duties of a civilian implementation coordinator. and
possible funding - in early September.
S7
These talks were far enough along that by
September 18. JolID Kornblum hosted meetings in Washington with French arid Russian
officials on civilian and military planning for implementation. These discussions were
only preliminary, as the U.S. wanted to get a sense of potential of agreement.
88
In
a very welcome move, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali made clear that he would be
glad to be rid of the former Yugoslavia. to allowthe organization for all aspects
of implementation to be placed outside the UN. 9 And by September 21;the Principals
Committee began to focus on settlement implementation plannIng (including increased
congressional consultations), although nothing finn decided upon.
90
The September 21 PC also returned to the issue ofllow to handle the Muslim-
Croat ground offensive. Despite the September 19 agreement not to take Barya Luka .. the
. question remained abQut how far Federation forces should go -- and Washington officials
remained very divided about the answer. At the. PC, Lake emphasized ,the importance of
the "red lights" the U.S. had given the Bosnians and Croats to end their offensive.
Holbrooke strongly disagreed.. Voicing aloud what he had Written to Christopher
privately, Holbrooke said that "we haven't given them any 'red lights' outside of Banja
Luka ... I made no effort to discourage them about Prejidor and Sanski Most." Lake was .
concerned. particularly about the. prospect of the Administration being blamed for
"encouraging" further bloodshed. He urged that the their "public line" should be "'no
more offensive operations." .
6 Message from Holbrooke to Kornblum. OfficialInformal," Cable, Zagreb 3622. September 17,1995.
17 See "Summary of Cone Jus ions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee," NSC, memorandum,
September 8.1995.
n See "Summary of Conclusions for SVTS Meeting of the Deputies Committee," NSC memorandum,
September IS. 1995; "U.S.-French Talks on Bosnian Settlement Implementation Planning, September 18,"
Cable. State 227479. September 23. J995; and memorandum for Albright and Ambassador Rick Inderfurth
from Jim O'Brien, "U.S.-Russian Consultations on Bosnia Peace Plan, Septem ber 21, 1995," September
21,1995. .
t9 He did so formally in a September 18 letter to the Chair of the Security Fransesco Paolo
Fulci. that the Contact Group take the lead to create a mechanism to oversee the political
side of peace implementation. Two days Iater, Boutros-Ghali discussed this arrangement further with
Albright. Sec "Bosnia Peace Process: Amb. Albright's Dinner with the SYG," Cable, U.S.UN 3672.
...
90 See memorandum for Secretary Christopher from Kornblum, "Principals Committee Meeting,
September21, 1995," with attacbedpaper on "Implemenlation Structure in a Bosnian Settlement,"
Seplcmber20, 1995; and Slocombe memorandum. "Notes for PC on Bosnia. 21 Sept 95."
UNCLASSIFIED
123
UNCLASSIFIED
"We should emphasize peace," Lake said to Holbrooke. "It may be your view on
Sanski Most and Prejidor, but you should say it in a way that doesn't exacerbate
differences on other fronts." The Russians were becoming increasingly sensitive about
the offensive. and CIA Director Deutsch added that Federation attacks on these two areas
would spark huge refugee flows.
91
With Christopher agreeing with the National SecuritY
Advisor, Holbrooke conceded that restraint would be the public line. Moreover. he said,
if the current military situation stabilized and tensions rose, "then next
week may be the time to push for a cease-fire." Holbrooke explained that up to that
point, lzetbegovic and Tudjman weren't interested in a "but changes in the last.
few days may be tipping things.,,92
-
_ 91 On September] 9, the day of the Tudjman-lzetbegovlc "summit," the Russians had presented a
resolution before the UN Security Council demanding an end to the Western offensive. The U.S. rebuffed
this effort. See "Bosnia/Croatia: Russians Push a Draft Resolution Demanding an End to Bosnian/Croat
Offensive, Settle for a Presidential Statement But Will Reraise Resolution on September ]9," Cable,
U.S.UN 3771 ,September 19. 1995.
92 Details from Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996. Vershbow was-the notetaker during thismeeling .
.124
UNCLASSIFIED
'-
Chapter S.ix
UNCLASSIFIED
...
The New York Ag.raement,.
Negotiating a and
Approaching a
While Washington was preparing for a settlement and the Principals' debated. over
military traffic lights, the most immediate step was putting the finishing touches on the
"further agreed principles" the shuttle team had begun negotiating in the region. Bosnian
Foreign Minister Sacirbey would be in Washington on September 22, and Owen, Hill and
Pardew would visit the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade the weekend of September 23-24. The
negotiators hoped that between these two visits. they would be abJe to finalize the
principles in time for another foreign ministers event scheduled on the margins. of the
September 26 Contact Group meeting in New York.
The Bumpy Road to New York.
During the two days since the team had returned froro the last shuttle on
September 20, and his legal advisors had made some .slight changes to the
principles. Only hours after they had returned from the airport, Owen and Hill met with
the legal group to discuss what needed to be improved. Owen explained that each
delegation had approved this draft. and that there was a deal unless a major flaw was
uncovered. For the most part, the group was encouraged by the progress the shuttle team
had been able to make, but advised that they seek some revisions -- specifically. better
defined powers of the joint presidency, cle.arer separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches. and, upon Lloyd Cutler's recommendation, creation of
a constitutional court. I .
At the State Department on September 22, Sacirhey met with Secretary
Christopher but spent most of the day with Owen, Hill and the legal team. The.Bosnian
Foreign MiniSter agreed to most of the American revisions, including the constitutional
court. His own revisions. such as clarifying that the parliament be elected by "direct,
popular vote" and empowering the government to raise revenues. provided Dlore
specificity to the principles, but little substantive change. As the U.S. negotiators were
I During the last shuttle, Owen had faxed the draft principles back to John Kornblum on September 18
7
and
the legal team reviewed them. See fax from Owen to Kornblum. "Constitutional Principles," September
18, 1995. Details of September 20 meeting from hand-written notes, (L files), September 20, 1995. Owen
and HiJl were joined by Cutler,lames O'Brien of U.S. UN, and Serbian desk officer John Burley. See also
Miriam Sapiro/James O'Brien interview; Cutler interview.
125
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..
learning, Sacirbey didn't favor their tactic over potentially contentious points
with ambiguity. he aiways wanted the points to spell things out to every detail?
. Also that day, Sacirbey met for a half-hour in Strobe Talbott's office with the
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgi Mamedov.
au tt described the two men as "tense," they reiaxed enough to agree
that their countries would cooperate further - pressing soon for a cessation of hostilities,
moving toward a full political settlement, and, somewhat ironically, working together to
promote Bosnian Serb political forces friendly to Milosevic.
3
. .
After incorporating Sacirbey's to the "further agreed principles,"
Hill and Pardew left for Belgrade, where they met with the Bosnian Serbs on September
23. Although these have been referred to as "secret talks," they're more accurately
describeq as "quiet" :- there were 'press reports about the trip, but few described that they
would be meeting With Bosnian Serb leaderS. Joined by Charge Rudy Perina and the
State. Department's Serbian Desk Officer Jolm BUrley, they began the day with
. Milosevic. The Serb leader previewed what the Pale Serbs would likely complain about
and what their opening positions would be. revealed that- Karadzic would join the
talks, which Chris Hill responded was fine as long as he wM not the head of delegation.
Explaining that he was sending a message from Holbrooke, Hill described for MiIosevic
that after these principles were approved in New York, the full team would return to the
region for a short and soon after they hoped to announce an international peace
conferenCe.
After a brief discussion of Eastern Slavonia and a possible framework agreement
for a peace settlement, Milosevic reviewed the latest text of the further agreed principles.
He told them he had no problem with the joint presidency, but predicted that the Bosnian.
Serbs would have difficulty accepting the entire concept of a presidency. He was also
2 See HiIlIHolbrooke interview. Sacirbey's changes reflected in draft of agreed principles presented in
. Belgrade on September 23. See "Further Agreed Principles," Pardew notebOok. Shuttle III. .
3 In an attempt to loosen things up, Talbott told them that they had something in common: Ihey both had
Muslim heritage and had the same name (MamC<iov = slavicized version of Mahmed, which" Mohammed.
which apparently triggered the following exchange: Sacirbey:- "So, you're one of us? Mamedov: "Well,
by way of Baku." Sacirbey: "Baku! That means you're more communist than Muslim." Mamedov:
"Well, we've got a lot of Muslims and a lot of Communists in Russia." Sacirbey: "Yeab, I know, 20
million Muslims. So you don't need to be so afraid of us.'" Mamedov: "Maybe 'hat's wbyweare afraid of .
you.") For detail of meeting, sec "Sacirbey-Mamedov one-on-one, with Strobe Talbott sitting in"; D
office; Friday, September 22, 1995, 2:45-3: 15pm," D files.
126
?
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HI
/
..
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concerned about the call for direct elections for parliament, language Sacirbey had added
in "This will go too' far," he said. ''It's too much for the beginning.',4 .
The trip to Belgrade was supposed to have been simply "technology." but ftom
the moment the American negotiators sat down. with the Bosnian Serbs, they realized
they had reverted back to sticks an.d stones. Their Pale interlocutors - Karadzic,
Kraijinik, Koljevic, . and Aleksa Buha -- wanted to renegotiate the Geneva principles.
Clearly, they bad not yet accepted the main provision of Geneva:. that .Bosnia would
remain a single. sovereign state. The Bosnian Serbs bad little interest in the principles
Milosevic had negotiated, and they had no interest in working with the Federation. They
asked when the Bosnian Serbs could vote to decide whether they even wanted to be in a
union. When rebuffed. they tried to shape the principles so that their entity would be as
independent from the Federation as possible.
On elections, for the Bosnian Serbs rejected the idea that both entities
would go to the ballot simultaneously. Karadzic claimed that simultaneous elections
would remind his people of the "old days," the time when Bosnia was a Federal Republic
of Communist Yugoslavia. By holding elections concurrently with the Federation, the
Bosnian Serbs would be admitting a political union they wishCd to ignore. Owen
responded that in this peace agreement, Bosnia would continue as a single state. They
must recognize that the two would work together under a' governmental
superstructure.
\..
The Bosnian Serbs didn't seem to hear. Their antipathy extended toward the
proposal for direct elections. As Milosevic had said. Pale was not ready to empower its
people to elect a central "Bosnian" government. Rather, they expected that the Srpska
government would its delegates to the central government, much as a state sends an
ambassador to an international organization. They did not wish to see even the weak
national govenunent of the plan, nor did they wish to have an elected national
parliament. In fact, the Bosnian Serbs rejected all of the central political functions that
Milosevic had accepted .. To them. the joint presidency's control over "foreign affairs"
referred not to external relations, but Internal ones among the entities. Karadzic
even complained that the joint presidency, or, as he called it, the <Cone-half ofhell/' was
unaq;ep1able. Any common ties, save the UN seat, were unacceptable - quite
the Serbs wanted their own state.
The U.S. team had to enlist Milosevic's help. explaining to him that his
colleagues' attitudes were entirely counterproductive and damaging to the peace process.
Once again, the burden was on Milosevic to deliver the Bosnian Serbs. By Sunday
morning, August 24, he orchestrated an endgame in which he joined the talks shortly after
the u.s. had tabled a new draft and bullied the Bosnian Serbs into agreement. This
worked flawlessly. All the Bosnian Serb bluster had gone for naught -- the final text was
only moderately altered from the one presented by the U.S .. The word "simultaneous
U
was removed from the elections, as was the call for holding them "directly." The
Bosnian Serbs accepted the joint presidency and. the parliament, although the nwnber
within the presidency reduced to three (it had' been six).. The functions of the central
government were trimmed, leaving only foreign affairs and international financial matters
as enumerated powers. Finally, they rejected Sacirbey's proposal to empower the state to
4 See "Meeting with Mifosevic. September 23. 1995." type-written notes by John Burley.
127
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UNCLASSIFIED

raise revenues, ensuring that they would not be held Hable for any debts of the Sarajevo
governInent.'
While Hill. Owen, and Pardew were on .their way back from Belgrade on
September 24. Sacirbey sat down at the White House with Tony Lake and Peter Tarnoff. 6
This Sunday afternoon meeting was to be the final "systems-check" before the Bosnian
Foreign Minister went to New)'ork for the Coming week's events. at the UN. Sacirbey
explained that the "further agreed draft - the one he had seen before the
Belgrade talks - was a good one. However, he said that he had .JuSt talked with
Izetbegovic, who was very concerned that Owen, Hill and Pardew had gone to Belgrade
to meet with the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnians were worried that the U.S. team had been
contaminated with "Belgrade air," and insisted that the three visit Sarajevo immediately
to review the changes. "President Izetbegovic is not going to tolerate your people going
and dealing with Milosevic/' Sacirbey said. is not a deal between Milosevic
and you, but- between all. of us. The optics look bad; you need to spend more time in
.. Sarajevo to show balance." Lake tried to reassure Sacirbey, promising that Holbrooke
would visit Sarajevo first during the next shuttle round?
After the meeting, U.S. officials wondered whether this would be enough to
satisfy the Bosnians. They did not want to scuttle an agreement in New York because
they had overlooked Sarajevo for Belgrade. lzetbegovic then made the decision for them.
In a public announcement, he said that due to the "'lack of progress" in the constitutional
. talks. the Bosnians would boycott the 'New York meeting. Clearly. the Bosnians were
prepared to scuttle the entire agreement to get Hill and Pardew back to Sarajevo.
Late Sunday afternoon. Holbrooke reached the three envoys by phone' while they were
refueling 1n Shannon, and asked them to return to the Balkans.
8
Arriving in Sarajevo the morning of September 25, the three tired and unhappy
U.S. negotiators met with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic to"review the latest draft principles .
. S Details of these meetings from "Meeting with Bosnian September 23-24, 1995," type-written notes
by John Burley; Holbrooke, Hill, Pardew, Owen comments, Dayton HistOIY Seminar; HolbrookeIHiII
interview; and Pardew report to Peny, "Sccret talks in Belgrade.," September 24. 1995. Pardewalso
reported that he had held preliminary tillks with the Bosnian Serbs on the map. in which he observed that
they seemed more interested in trading Gorazde than Milosevic. On 51-49, Pardew said that "my guess is
that they will take [itl easier than the Federation right now. both Milosevic and
Karadzic also engaged Pardew several times on a NATO implementation force. They both seemed fearful
of it, with Milosevic urging that it be small. "l:'lo on [sic] will cbaJIenge even a small NATO force .. we
. want peace, not war with NATO," Milosevic told Pardew. Pardew responded that a large force was
necessary, but that "if there are no problems, [NATO] forces can go home quickly." For details of
territorial talks, see, respectively, "Draft Republika Srpska Territorial Proposal"; "Territorial Principles";
and O<Republika Srpska Territorial Points," all datCci September 24, 1995, Pardew notebooks, Shuttle III.
6 Lake and Tamoffwere Joined by Don Kerrick, the NSC's Alexander Vershbow, and Leon F\lerth of the
Vice President's office. For details of this meeting, see Kerrick comment, Dayton History Seminar;
Vershbow interview, December 17. 1996; and Kerrick notes, September 24, 1995.
7 Kerrick interview; Vershbow interview, December 17,1996.
I Immediately after the White House meeting with Sacirbey. the State Department had prepared a cabJe for
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic explaining that the talkS in Belgrade had gone well but thaI due to
. logistical reasons, Owen, Hill and Pardew would not be able to visit Sarajevo, but it would be the first stop
of the next shuttle. Before the cable went out. the decision was made to tum the delegation around. See
"OfficiaHnfonnal." Cable (Draft), September 24, 1995; EUR tiles. For details of decision to tum the team
around, see Holbrooke, Hill. Kerrick comments. Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke/HiII interview .
For announcement of Bosnian pullout, see Kit Roane. "Bosnian Says it Will Shun Peace Talks in U.S. ..
New York Times, September 25. 1995.
128
SF
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UNCLASSIFIED
The Bosnians challenged some of the changes, particularly the removal.of elections
for parliament. Silajdzic was highly critical. But as he described his problems, the U.S.
team saw that the Prime Minister was not upset over the changes made in Belgrade, but
with Sacirbey's changes made the Friday before in Washington (September 22).
Sihijdzic objected to the presidential bias of the principles, where the joint presidency
would have exclusive responsibility over such areas as foreign relations and international
financial matters, as well as the ability to appoint a cabinet. The .prime minister favored
an arrangement closer to a parliamentary system, where the legislature would appoint a
cabinet and the joint presidency would act as the head of state with little real governing 9
.
power.
.
To break this impasse, the Americans suggested some slight compromises, such
as complete separation between the joint presidency and and made some
minor concessIons, such as retUrning the provision for direct. elections. In other at:eas.
they fell back on old negotiating staples - deferral and ambiguity . Rather than making
the joint presidency responsible to appOint a cabinet, the principles simply stated that a
cabinet would exist. Foreign policy remained as the only specific polici area the
government was empowered to run, though it was made unclear .whether control would
be executive or legislative: The provision for raising funds was dropped entirely.
Finally, the principles outlined that all other aspects of the and operation of
. the government would be negotiated in "the immediate future.';1 . After some prodding,
Izetbegovic agreed to these pri.Iiciples. In the end, the three Sarajevo leaders had done
more to change the principles (that were predominantly theirs in the first place) the
Bosnian Serbs.
.
Shortly after lOam (EST) on September 25. Owen called Secretary Christopher in
New York to on the changes and announce that lzetbegovic and SiIajdzic had
agreed to the new text. HilI immediately faxed the draft to Holbro6ke, and Christopher
called lzetbegovic to thank him for his cooperation. The Bosnian President assured the .
.
. . 11 .
Secretary that Sacirbey would attend the next day's meeting. . But, as what was
becoming a Balkan pattern to the U.S. negotiators; the "final" agreement was hardly the
last word. When Holbrooke received the draft principles tha( morning, his aide Philip
Goldberg grimly said that the Serbs would never accept the Bosnian revisions. He was
right. 12 .
.
Holbrooke and his aides began to work the phones, contacting Milosevic. in
Belgrad(! to try to work out another compromise. Christopher and Holbrooke briefed the
President and the rest of the Principals via video teleconference on the troubled
negotiations. I) In separate afternoon meetings with the three Balkan Foreign Ministers to
discuss the overall progress of the peace process, Christopher, Albright and Holbiooke
urged that the remaining differences ori these principles be cleared away. Turning to
other issues. the Americans expressed concern about the continuing offensive in western
Bosnia .. The Muslim-Croat division remained apparent.. Croat Foreign Minister Granic
9 HiJIIHoJbrooke interview.
.
10 See "Further Agreed Principles:\ Working Draft as 0[2030 September 25, 1995.
II HilllHolbrooke interview; for teleoD of phone call, see "The Secretary and President A. lzetbegovic.
September 25. 1995," Cable, State 229436. September 27, 1995.
12 HolbrookelHiII interview. .
IJ See memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum, "Principals Committee Meeting. September 25.
1995." September 23, 1995.

UNCLASSIFIED
129
1
:f
I
UNCLASSIFIED
~
said that Zagreb's support for the offensive was over, while Sacirbey raged that a cease-
. fire would freeze an unjust status quo. (Although the Bosnian Foreign Minister had told
the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov only three days before that the Bosnians
would work for a cease-fire soon, they clearly weren't ready yet.) Finally, when the
Eastern Slavonian issue was raised, all agreed that its resolution was essential to the
peace process. However. no one seemed eager when Holbrooke'suggested Concrete ways
th
.. ~ ard 14
' to move ese negotIations LOrw
' '
1'bi-oughout the remainder of that day and into the night, U.S. officials in New
York worked to hammer out the "further agreed principles." .Whether by phone or' in
person, these were difficult negotiations. The concept of direct elections remained a non-'
starter for MiIosevic. He asked that the provision for elections "by popular vote"- which
had been readded in Sarajevo - be removed. The Serb leader also argued' against
exclusive" foreign policy powers of the new government. The Geneva agreement had
stated 'that eacheritity could make certain international arrangements, particularly
economic ones. with outside countries, and the word "exclusive" seemed to limit that
right. In several phone calls that night, Holbrooke tried to cajole the Seroian leader.
dangling ambiguously the carrot of "good things" to follow if they solved the problem.
particularly the "exclusive" issue:
s
.
'
Milosevic's objections ran aground with the Bosnians. In a meeting that night in
his suite at the Plaza Hotel in New York, Holbrooke pressed Sacirbey to concede
Milosevic's point on direct elections. The Bosnian Foreign Minister argued that the only
way democracy could work in Bosnia was if leaders were popularly decided. He claimed
that otherwise. the Bosnian Serbs would be able to ~ t a g e sham elections to legitimize
their illegal control. Nonsense, Holbrooke rejoined. the Bosnians already had guarantees
(in the Geneva agre,ement) that an international body would supervise these elections to
assure their legitimacy. Even the United States did not insist on purely direct elections
for its president, Holbrooke explained, Sacirbey stood his ground, explaining as well that
his government would not accept dropping exclusive foreign policy powers .. The meeting
got very tense, with, both Holbrooke and Sacirbey losing their tempers. In the heat o:f the
shouting match, Sacirbey threatened to leave.
16
As the evening wore on Christopher and
Holbrooke saw that nothing was going to get solved that night. .It was getting late (past
2am in the Balkans)>> and they decided to call it a day. They infonned Milosevic and
Izetbegovic that the next morning, their telephonic diplomacy would begin again at 6am
EST.
IT
'
Ie "Secretary's Meeting with Balkan Foreign Ministers, September 25, 1995, Waldorf-Astoria, New York,"
Cable, State 233299, September 3D, 1995.
'
IS HolbrookelHiIJ interview; Holbrookc detailed these disagreements to Perina in Belgrade and
Ambassador Menzies in Sarajevo. See Fax to sw6 Operations Center (to be passed to Embassy Belgrade
and Sara' eva from Holbrooke Se tember 25, ) 995, 9:40 m EST,
15
130
-w
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Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
Before seven the next morning, Cluistopher and Holbrooke were on the phone
with Izetbegovic.
18
Christopher demanded that the Bosnian President give in, and
lzetbegovic finally conceded. The word "exclusively" was dropped concerning foreign
policy powers. as well as the reference to elections. But the game was not over
yet. Two hours later, as Christopher, Holbrooke, and other U.S. officials prepared for the'
talks on the 12th floor of the U.S.UN mission, Sacirbey called to say that the Bosnians
had changed their mirids. Apparently he had called his president and talked him out of
his pledge to the Secretary of State. Outraged, Christopher and Holbrooke immediately
summoned the Bosnian Foreign Minister to with them in Madeleine Albright's
office.
The Secretary of State was getting his. first real taste of Balkan negotiations:> and
he was not Indeed, Holbrooke later reflected that he had never seen him so mad. 19 ,
When Sacirbey arrived, Christopher ignored his outstretched hand, and sternly asked-
''what the hell is going on here?" The Bosnian President had made a deal; and now. with
time running short, Sacirbey was backing him out of it. Christopher proceeded to have "a
firm exchange" with the 'Bosnian Foreign Minister "about the that this had been
agreed [to] by his president and we would proceed on that basis." Without resolutipn,
they had .to attend a previously scheduled Contact . Group meeting where the Balkan
foreign ministers were supposed to signal their assent Christopher, Holbrooke and
Sacirbey went into the meeting as pJanned, but with none of their differences solved.
None of the other representatives were aware of the new problems. and convened
thinking a deal was ready. CQristopher opened the meeting, allowed the press to take
some pictures, and then adjQurned it quickly. With-the other Contact Group members
utterly confused, the Americans and Sacirbey returned to Albright's suite to continue
their talks. .
Christopher proceeded to press the Foreign Minister, but to no avail. The
morning's talks were interrupted several times as both the Secretary and Sacirbey had to
attend other meetings. At one point, Sacirbey left to deliver a speech before the UN
General Assembly, returning later to argue with Holbrooke. When the Secretary
returned, he and Holbrooke told Sacirbey that the time for hedging was over. In several
hours, they said, President Clinton would make an announcement from the White House.
He would either praise the New York agreement or criticize the Bosnians for their
obstinance - it was up to Sacirbey and his president to decide which message Clinton
would deliver. Sacirbey called lzetbegovic, relating the American ultimatum: Shortly
thereafter he told Christopher that the Bosnians would return to' the pledge Izetbegovic
had made that morning. In exchange. the Americans promised to pursue "direct"
elections later in the negotiations, and allowed Sacirbey to speak of an undivided
Sarajevo in his acceptance announcement,20 The Contact Group and Balkan Foreign
Ministers were quickly reconvened. and the "further agreed principles" were blessed?1
II See State Department Operations Center Telephone Logs, Shift I, September 26, 1995.
19 Some press reports explained the significance of Christopher's involvement in the negotiations, and his
role as the "closer." See Elaine Scialino, "To, Spur Talks. Christopher Jumps Into the Bosnia Effort: New
York Times, September 26, 1995.
10 For details of these talks, see Christopher interview, October 22,1996; Holbrooke comments, Dayt.on
History Seminar; HolbrookelHiII interview.
21 For final copy of Further Agreed Principles and accompanying joint slalement. see U.S. Department of
State Dispatch, The Dayton Peace March 199.6.
2
131
UNCLASSIFIED
i
. UNCLASSIFIED
Shortly before President Clinton made the formal announcement from the White
House Briefing Room?2.
.
Substantively, the agreement to the "further agreed principles
n
-- or "New York
principles" -- was a significant accomplishment For the first time> the parties had agreed
to shared institutions of power - a joint presidency, a national parliament, . and a
constitutional court. These New York principJes proVided the state instittJ.tions vital to
.establishing and maintaining the broader concepts -- such as a single Bosnian state -
outlined over two weeks before in Geneva Yet, both agreements were only initial steps.'
Alone, they could not assure a lasting peace .. But they dld bring the parties closer
together, and the U.S.' hoped that each side would view them as a reason to engage in
further negotiations, possibly at an international peace conference. Holbrooke planned to
return to the region in tWQ days, hoping to begin to lay the groundwork for the final stage
of negotiations.
But the road to New York also provided a. glimpse of .the challenges ahead.
Perhaps the most troublesome was the festering division of the Bosnian camp. The
gyrations of the past 48 hours had not been about problems the Serbs, but over
Izetbegovic and Sacirbey's rivalry with Silajdzic. Although Sacirbey had complained
. about Milosevic's changes, the American negotiators had the impression he was more
angry with Silajdzic's alterations?3 It seemed that with the New York the
three Muslim leaders began to see how their decisions would a.ffect their own personal
positions in a future Bosnian state: Accordingly, they each tried to mold the principles in
ways that would best reflect their futurestatus. The U.S. found itself not only serving as
mediator among the three Balkan parties, but among the competing personalities and
interests within the Sarajevo government itself.
. Return to the Region
Two days after the agreement to the New York principles, the Holbrooke
delegation returned to the region for the fourth time. In Geneva and New York, the U.S.
had successfully gotten the parties to agree to critical steps toward a final, comprehensive
settlement. Now, they believed, was the time to push the parties to convene at a peace
conference overseen by the U.S.. President Clinton had expressed as much in a
September 23 call to Gennan Chancellor Helmut Kohl. "Many serious issues remain, but
lthink a settlement can be reaciied in the weeks," the President said. "1 believe
now we can bring negotiations to a conclusion."
Shuttle diplomacy had produced the building blocks of a future Balkan state> but
as was obvious, major differences remained. Many difficult.issues that had been left out
of the Geneva and New York agreements would need to be settled, as well any
22 See "Remarks on the Peace Process in Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters," September 26, J 995.
Weekly Compl/alion of Presidenlial Documents. ppl714-1715.
2.l Holbrooke!HilI interview. I
.
24 "TelC<ln with German Chancellor Kohl. September 23. 1995." NSC memorandum, September25, 199.5.
132
7
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
...
. discussions concerning territory, which promised to be the most contentious. The shuttle
team believed that the best way to bridge these final gaps was to convene a peace
conference. The model in mind was for "proximity talks," in which the three Balkan
. presidents would meet and be housed in the Same area for the duration of the talks. With
the parties lodged in separate buildings in close proximity to each other, tbeU.S. could.
continue its shuttle diplomacy; but by foot rather than by plane. In this way,. the
conference would allow for several weeks of intensive negotiations in which maximum.
pressure could be brought to bear on the parties.
Holbrooke believed that in. order to maximize U.S. proximity talks
should be held on American soiL However, he realized that such a decision would likely
further agitate the He first discussed this with French Foreign Minister de
Charette during a September 27 meeting in New York. who made a "big pitch" to have
the conference in Evian. France.
2s
Before leaving for the Balkans that week, Holbrooke
also raised the issue with MiJutinovic and Sacirbey. In what Holbrooke described as a
joint meeting "with much agreement and Uttle rancor," the two foreign ministers
expressed a strong preference for an American site. They said that U.S. prestige was
. needed for a settlement to be reached, and that a European venue would be too easy to
leave if the talks broke down. Milutinovic "heaped scorn" on holding the conference in
France, stating that Evian was the "last place" the Serbs wanted to go. "'Who' do .they
think we are, the Algerians?," he quipped to Holbrooke?6 Moments before he left on this'
fourth shuttle, Holbrooke also called Vice President Gore from New York's La Guardia
Airport to discuss the issue. The Vice President concurred that the logic for a U.S. site
. was strong, and that he would discuss the issue with the President. 27 . .
The timing and. venue were formally described for the Principals in an
"interagency document" that represented the "unanimous views" of the negotiating team?8
In it. they outlined that the talks should 'be held in the U.S., recommending a place close
to a major metropolitan area such as New York City. By holding the talks in relative
isolation outside New York, the memorandum argued, the parties could be sealed off
from the press, but close enough to Washington that the talks could benefit from higb-
level intervention (such as Secretary Christopher or NSC Advisor Lake). While the three
parties would be represented by their presidents, the conference would be co-chaired by
Holbrooke, Bildt, and Russian Contact Group envoy Ivanov. If an agreement was.
reached at the talks, a signing sUinmit could .be held in Washington, with President
Clinton presiding"?9 .'
.
25 "AfS Holbrooke's September 21 Meeting with GOF Foreign Minister de Charette:' Cable,State 233374,
September 30, 1995.
26 Account from memorandum for Christopher from Holbrooke. "Meeting with Sacirbey and
September 29, 1995.
27 Philip Goldberg interview, October 31, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20,
1996.
.
2& Although presented as an "unanimous this propo.saJ was based on Holbrooke's views.
jim par-dew, for example. had advised Holbrooke that proximity talks be held below the presidentiallevef.
and then the three Balkan presidents could convene to finalize the agreement at a peace conference.
Pardew suggested that the ta\Jcs could be held at a Eurllpean locale such as Italy. See memorandum to
Holbrooke from Pardew, "Next Steps," September 28; 1995.
29 State Department Chief of Staff Tom Donilon had called Holbrooke on September 30 to say tha.t
Washington officials needed a decision memorandum on the proposed site for peace talks. Holbrooke then
had Don Kerrick call Vershbow at the NSC to briefhim on the team's views, and asked that Vershbow and
7 133
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED.

The shuttle team departed for Sarajevo the evening of September 28. In addition
to seeking agreement to begin proximity talks, the shuttle team aimed to broker a
country.wide cease-fire?O A cease-fire supposedly had been one of the central"
components of the u.S. peace initiative -- indeed; it was outlined clearly in Lake's
August taiking points. Led by Holbrooke. the shuttle team had thus far resisted this
pledge to end the fighting, and Washington had deferred to them despite many views to
do otherwise?l In Holbrooke's view, as long as the Muslims arid Croats were successful
and remained within certain bounds (such as not taking Banja Luka), the negotiation was
being decided on the battlefield, improving the chances for a settlement. Although
Holbrooke had written to Christopher on September 19 that the Muslim-Croat gains were
helping the peace process, by the end of the month he began to consider the timing of a
.possible ceasefire.
32
.'
.
Several factors fed into this consideration. First, as waS evident from the
comments expressed during the September 21 PC meeting, most officials in Washington
were uneasy with encOuraging more violence in Bosnia, even if it was in favor of' the
Muslims and Croats. Aware that their superiors were worried about. the fighting, : the
shuttle team sought to link' a conference announcement to' a cease-fire. They
recommended that if a cease-fire agreement was reached during this negotiating round,
the President announce the achievement and outline the U.S. plan for peace talks.
Secondly? as evidenced by Tudjman's perfonnance with Izetbegovic on
September 19, it appeared that tolerancefor sacrifices was waning. Apparently
accomplishing most of their strategic objectives, the Croatians weren't enthusiastic about
risking their own troops to help the Bosnians. "Frankly, we have one basic problem," a
u.S. official was quoted saying in the press, "Tudjman just does not particularly like
Muslims:,33 . Foreign Minister Granic had .told Chrfstopher and Holbrooke at their
September 25 meeting in New York that Croatia was rio (onger providing artillery
the N;:;C's John Schmidt draft the decision memo for the Principals. See "Issue for Decision: Venue ["or
. Balkans Proximity Peace Talks," no date, no author. However. the opening sentence of the memorandum
reads: "This memorandum contains the unanimous views and recommendations of all Interagency
Principals on the Bosnia Delegation. See also Vershbow interview, December 17. 1996.
30 Holbrooke outlined these.twin goals - proximity talks and cease-fire - in a September 291etter to
Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov. "With the agreed basic principles' guiding our
discussions, I plan to initiate a cease-fire discussion among the panies," Holbrooke wrote. "I feel this is the
next logical step in the process. All patties have an interest in establishing a cease-fire soon and the coming
onset of winter gives them an additional reason to agree .. If all goes well on these discussions. our next
focus will be an agreement on proximity talks. Though the substantial remaining differences among the
parties makes a peace conference premature. proximity talks provide an opportunity to keep momentum
going and provide a psychological incentive to make progress." See "Briefing Contact Group on Ongoing
Negotiations, Cable, State 232176, September 29. 1995.
)1 Holbrooke had resisted this since the beginning of his shuttles. As he later reflected, he told the
President had his senior advisors as early as AuguSI23 that "unless we were given specific instructions to
the contrary .. our negotiating team was not going to seek a cease-fire just when the trend on the battlefield
was fJnally helpful to the Bosnians." See Holbrooke memoirs, draft Chapter 2, Scptember21, 1996. pp2S-
26.
'
.
. n Indeed, on September J 9 INR drafted for Holbrooke a memorandum outlining the differences between
"cease-fires" and agreements on "cessation of hostilities." The ten-page paper outlined the historical
evolution of these .tenns of art. and also delineated legal issues that may arise in connection with brokering
a cease-fire or cessation ofhostiJities agreement. See memorandum to Holbrooke from Toby Gat; (INR),
"Bosnia - Cease-fire Consideration," September 19, 1995.
)) See Roger Cohen, "A 'Piecemeal' Peace," New York Times, September 28, 1995.
134
. ,
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
E
support for the Muslims, and had explained to the press that since the successful military
offensive had "established a new reality," it should end. "We believe that this is the right
time for the end of war and for a final just peace," Granic told the Washington Post.
34
On the other hand. the Muslims were happy tQ be finally scoring victories, and wanted to
press forward. The team was concerned that these diverging objectives almost
guaranteed bad news for continued fighting. Without Croat support, they feared that the
Muslims would begin to suffer defea1$ against the Bosnian Serbs. Every time the
Muslims fought without Croat they "got their assess handed to them," Chris Hill
recalled.
3s
And, as Tudjman's outrageous display on September 19 showed, if Sarajevo
to act against Zagreb's wishes, the Federation's problems would certainly get
worSe. Clashes had already occurred between Muslim and Croat troops; resulting in
several deaths:
36
In New York, 'Sacirbey had told Holbrooke how much he distrusted
, Tudjman. stressing that "the peace process could beheld up by differences in the
President himself understood this problem, explaining in his
September 23 phone call with Kohl that a "strong Bosnian--Croat alliance is critical to the
success of the peace process," and that "it [the Fed.eration] must nQt blowup. We don't
want to snatch defeat from the jaws ofvictory.,,38 .
Fueling these concerns was the third factor, the apparent revival of the Bosnian
Serb Anny. By September 24, the battle lines had stabilized, and the UN reported that
the BSA was mounting successful counterattacks against Croat and. Bosnian forces.
39
There was evidenc!! that Belgrade's cooperation with BSA, which was apparently
minimal earlier that month. had resumed significantly. U.S. intelligence reported that the
,cooperation between the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb armies was "very good and stronger
than ever.,,40 To Holbrooke, the situation metaphorically resembled the moment of a
perfect tennis serve,"in which ball is momentariiy stationary over a player's head; itSs
no longer rising. it's not beginning to fall yet.
41
In other words. the Federation appeared
to be reaching what the classic Prussian military strategist Karl von Clausewitz called the
"cwminating point of victory," after which an attacker might take on 'more than can be
managed and, therefore, suffer a reverse in gains. Thinking that the Bosnians may not see
that they were near their culminating point, the u.s. believed that it would be better for
the Federation to stop before the "ball" began to drop.42
34 For quote, see lohn Pomfret. "Bosnian Serb Losses Could Aid Peace Efforts; Officials Begin to See The
Right Time' for End to War, but Settlement Hurdles Remain," Washington Post. September 2S, 1995.
35 Hill interview with author (notes). December 19,1996.
36 Holbrooke interview, July 10, ) 996; New York Times. September 28, 1995. U.S. intelligence reported
that the strains within the Federation were very evident, and that "the only apparent antidote to polarization
is international pressure!' See "Bosnian Federation: International Pressure is Still the Only Counterweight
to Increasing Polarization," Cable, Madrid 10242, October 2, 1995.
37 Holbrooke to Christopher. September 29. 1995.
38 Clinton.Kobi teleon.
39 See, for example, Reuters report, "Serbs Reported to Recapture Town in Northwestern Bosnia," New
York Times, September 24, 1995. -
40
41 0 roo e interview, u Y. ;. c also Glark interview, July 15,1996. .
41 To Clausewitz, recognizing that an attack hd reached its culminating point was difficult. He explained
that "it is even possible that the attacker, reinforced by the psychological forces peculiar to attack, w ill in
spite of his exhaustion find it less difficult to go on than to stop - like a horse pulling a load uphill... this
demonstrates how an ;tttacker can overshoot the point at which, if he slopped and assumed the defensive.
135
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UNCLASSIFIED
Sarajevo-Belgrade-Zagreb
As pledged earlier that week after the fracas surrounding the HiIl/OwenIPardew trip to Belgrade, the Holbrooke team's first stop was Sarajevo. It would be important to show the Bosnians that the U.S. had not been "contaminated" by the Serbs. Holbrooke believed that the Bosnians were "pathologically unnerved" by the amount of time his team had spent in Belgrade, and tltis image had begUn to erode their sense of trust in the Americans. Pardew expressed a similar view, recommending to Holbrooke that the team
spend more time with the Bosnians rather than Milosevic, because "compared to
Sarajevo, Belgrade will be easy the rest of the way.'''')
. . When the delegation sat down with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic the morning of September 29, they discussed the cease-frre and next steps for the negotiationS. Without committing himself to a cease-fire, Izetbegovic outlined three terms as preconditions for his agreement: restoring utilities to Sarajevo; assuring the full demilitarization of Banja
Luka; and opening a road .to Gorazde for humanitarian relief.44 All three seemed fair to Holbrooke and his team. Holbtooke then outlined three ground rules for a future peace
conference: that each delegation would. be empowered to decide for their government (in other words, no ratification process); that delegations could not threaten to leave the talks;
and that no press would be allowed. Also, Holbrooke said that there Could not be a separate Bosnian Serb delegation - Milosevicwould have to negotiate on behalf ox the
Bosnian Serbs.
.
Finally, the Holbrooke team and Bosnians discussed the role of a NATO-led military force in implementing a settlement. , At that time, NATO planners in Brussels
were already in the process of planning for an impiementation force, or IFOR. 4S Again, the Bosnian president presented his opening position, )isting that a NATO force must
perform such duties . as: enforcing the withdrawal of BSA forces from Federation
territory; providing protection. for elections; guaranteeing freedom of movement,
humanitarian relief, and the return of refugees; and defining and enforcing the Bosnia's border with Croatia and Serbia. This last request had not yet been considered by military
planners as an IFOR role, and Pardew warned Holbrooke that this would be a hugely expensive and dangerous undertaking. Holbrooke's first impulse was to support this
. proposal, but agreed to consider it more carefully.46 .
lzetbegovic's vision of NATO's implementation tasks meant that the Bosnians expected IFOR to deploy in Serb:"held areas, not Just Federation territory. Up to that point. NATO military planners had pushed to limit IFOR's responsibilities only to Federationlands, in order to avoid the threat from conducting activities in "hostile" Serb- controlled territories. It now seemed likely, however, that in order. for Bosnia to remain
tliere would still be a chance of success." See Carl von Clausewitz, Qn..Yim:, Peter Paret and Michael
Howard, ed .. (Princeton University Press, .(984) pp566-573.
. ",. "
43 memorandum to Holbrooke, September 28, 1995.'
44 Although the siege of Sarajevo had been lifted by the 13 agreement, the city still bad no gas
supplies.
43 See, for example, "September 8 Trilateral Meeting at NATO on Bosnia Peace Plan Implementation:'
Cable, U.S.NATO 3525, September 8, 1995.
.
46 Details from this meeting from Pardew phone can to KC Brown, OSD (Dale Waters [EUR/RPM] notes),
September 29, 1995; and Kerrick notes, September 29, t 995. Sec also Bruce Clark and Harriet Martin.
"Bosnians Take Tough Ceasefrre Slance," Financial Times, October I, 1995.
. .
136
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
undivided, NATO troops would have to be deployed in both the Federation and Srpska.
As General Clark reported that day to Shalikashvili, "there is a risk that IFOR would
inadvertently solidify the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina" if its deployment was limited
to the Federation.
41
Clark also described the implications of NATO support for elections security,
refugee return, and freedom of movement. Obviously. such tasks entailed a far more
intrusive mandate for IFOR than mere separation of forces or securing cease-fire
and the military was understandably concerned that such duties put troops at greater risk.
"Providing security to the elections process in the -Serb entity would entail additional
risks for our forces," Clark explained. "It will require a degree of international election
and police support which will be difficult to muster. _ Although the total population is
only about 60% of Haiti's or Cambodia's. the terrain, returning refugees. and ingrained
hatred will add immeasurably to the difficulties in preventing incidents.."
Although a peace agreement was still far from guaranteed, the negotiations had
'entered a phase in which the military would have to make some hard choices about the
risks they would be willing to run to implement a viable settleII.1ent. The diplolDatic
initiative was premised upon a military commitment to Bosnia -- whether in support of a
UNPROFOR pullout under 40104 or to implement a peace settlement - the specific
decisions about the snape and scope of the commitment were critical fo the dangers
troops _ would face. Determining IFOR's tasks and area of deployment were not just
questions of military logistics. Such choices cut to the core of the Administration's
commitment to this effort: how much was the U.S. prepared to pay in blood and treasure
for lastjng peace in Bosnia? ,For the time being, such critical answers could be deferred.
Clark suggested that the Holbrooke delegation would continue to explore needs in the
region. NevertheleSS, he said, "[We] would appreciate any rudder" Washington could
provide. .
Beyond the significant substantive ground covered, this Sarajevo meeting also
helped to reduce some of the tension in the U.S.-Bosnian relationship. Silajdzic, who had
-been the most recent winner of the Bosniac intramurals, was much more cheerful and
cooperative than before. As Ambassador Menzies has relayed to Holbrooke the day
before, Silajdzic was pleased with the results of New York and was attempting "to salve
b!lateral bruises" recently inflicted on the relationship.-48 On the other Mo
Sacirbey's perfonnance earlier that week had cast great doubts about his reliability. After
New York, Pardew noted that Sacirbey was "inconsistent... seized with the public
- limelight for its own sake, and outsider in Sarajevo." Although the team had once
been wary of Sacirbey's rival, SiJajdzic, some now believed that he could be the least
troublesome Bosnian negotiator. "If we convince Silajdzic and stay with him in dealing
with Izetbegovic," Pardew had advised Holbrooke, "our troubles with the fractious
Sarajevo govefIlllient will be reduced." Holbrooke apparently was willing to explore this
avenue, joining Silajdzic that night for a private dinner .49
_ - The next day, September 30, the HolbrQoKe team left Sarajevo for Belgrade. En
route, they stopped in Zagreb, where they met with Assistant Secretary John Shattuck.
47 Memorandum to CJCSNCJSC from "Daily Negotiations Update,2!) Sept," October 2, 1995.
Unless otherwise noted, all references below are from this document
411 See "SiJajdzic Makes Nice," Cable, Sarajevo 666, September 28, 1995.
49 Pardew observations from his memorandum to Holbrooke, Septembcr28, 1995.
UNCLASSIFIED
137
UNCLASSIFIED
For the past two days, Shattuck had been in the region to human rights.
particularly those in the wake of the July massacre at Srebrenica. He and Holbrooke had
discussed this trip in New York on September 27, where they decided that any
infonnation uncovered by Shattuck would be passed on to Holbrooke for use in his
negotiations. As Shattuck later reflected, these investigative missions to the region
provided the "opportunity to help U.S. negotiators raise the price of criminal conduct'" by
atrocities against civilians the moment they occurred, securing
commitments from leaders to end atrocities or face additional NATO bombing or
sanctions, moving the War Crimes Tribunal to center stage as a way of raising the
p_ersonal costS of criminal leadership, and refusing to negotiate -with indicted war
criminals." Holbrooke could use Shattuck's discoveries to prod the Balkan leaders --
particularly Tudjman and Milosevic - to end the .etlmic atrocities thathad COme "to
characterize Yugoslavia's dissolution. Both Shattuck and Holbrooke, therefore, felt it
was essential to be "even-handed" in these investigations. pointing up Croatian anq
Bosnian abUses as well as Serb. As a result, the two Assistant Secretaries decided that it
was imperative for Shattuck to go to the Krajina and get proof that the Croats too were
culpable.
With his public fact-finding trips, mere presence in the region was a
useful reminder to the f.arties that the U.S. was watching and prepared to punish them for
human rights abuses.5. There were, however, lingering concerns from some in the State
Department that focusing on hwnan rights would the negotiations and draw
attention away from the more important strategic components of a settlement. such as
creating a government and territorial borders. Many also argued that these high-level
missions were dangerous and"better handled by the embassies in the region. as Galbraith
had already been doing in the Krajina. But Christopher and Holbrooke wanted to show
that this was not 'business as usual: They believed that Shattuck's investigations would
bolster the negotiating effort by providing both symbolic power and strategic leverage. In
his memoirs, Holbrooke reflects that while Shattuck's role was "sometimes
controversial/' he proved indispensible to the negotiations: "His trips were a constant
public statement that even as we sought peace, we were not abandoning the quest for
justice. In the end, even the skeptics, who at first argued that the human rights mission
-could be handled by the embassies in the region, saw the value that came from a special
emissary with a single focus.',sl " "" " "
During the hour-long meeting at the Zagreb airport, Shattuck and Ambassador
Galbxaith explained to the delegation the evidence of Croat human rights abuses againSt
Serbs in the Krajina. Galbraith, reiterating a point he had often made publicly, said that
there could be no peaceful reintegration of the Krajina into Croatia unless the Serbs felt
so Ambassador Galbraith and Shattuck had also discussed an exploratory trip to" Croatia earlier that month.
specifically to investigate alleged Croat abuses against Krajina Serbs. Shattuck had begun pressing the
Croats on human rights abuses during a September 27 meeting with foreign Minister Granic at the UN.
See message from Galbraith to Shattuck, "Official-InfonDal," Cable, Zagreb 3508. September 11, 1995;
Shattuck to Galbraitli, Cable, State 217607, September 13, 1995; and "Assistant
Secretary"Shattuck Raises Human Rights Concerns with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic," Cable, U.S.UN
3742, September 28, 1995. For details of the U.S. human rights strategy in Bosnia and how it related to the
negotiations, see Shattuck's unpublished report. "From Nuremberg to Dayton: The Struggle For Peace
With Justice in Bosnia," and Shattuck interview. Jury 30. 1996.
)1 For background. see Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter J3 (AprilS. 1997), pp12-15.
138
UNCLASSIFIED -
i .
" UNCLASSIFIED
that they would be treated as equal citizens of Croatia. Unfortunately, he explained:> this
prospect appeared far off. " Also, they discussed the recent new round of ethnic cleansing
perpetrated by Serbs against Muslim civilians around Banja Luka. The primary CUlprit
was suspected to be Zeliko Raznatovic, commonly known as Arkan. This Serb
paramilitary leader was considered one of the most murderous Serbs in Bosnia. It" was
widely suspected that Arkan had connections to the Serbian Interior Ministry in Belgrade,
and Holbrooke promised to raise his activities with Milosevic.s
2
"
.
That evening in Belgrade, Milosevic brushed aside the Arkan problem, telling the
delegation that the Serb thug was a "peanut'issue" and would be handled. Turning to
Izetbegovic's. proposed teoos for a cease-fire, Milosevic was generally cooperative,
agreeing to explore for: providing gas to Sarajevo. As expected, he Was
similarly agreeable on the issue of proximity talks, saying it. was now time to convene a " D
.
conference.
Ser1:Js were generally satisfied with the
outcome of the New York meeting, although they felt they had compromised more than
others. Overall, indications were that Belgrade was ready to conclude a deal. Milosevic
reportedly was "pleased" by the way talks had gone thus far, and -had judged that C"there
are no significant problems with the U.S .. " Perhaps such comphicency was the reason
why Holbrookedecided to tweak MiJosevic on war crimes. In any event, the Serb leader
seemed ready to signa peace agreement and, importantly, "benefit from the suspension of
sanctions," which he wanted lifted before the outset ofwinter.
S4
.
The next morning, October 1, the U.S. team returned to Zagreb to. meet with the
Croatian leadership. Holbrooke and Galbraith with Tudjrnan. while the rest of
the delegation met With Defense Minister Susak. Tudjman was clearly irritated by
Shattuck's public assertions about Croatian human rights abuses, exclaiming that he cwas
surprised" by the criticism. While Croatia sought "paitnership and friendship" with the
U.S., Tudjman explained, he could not accept such bad publicity. On Eastern SlavoJiia,
he agreed once more to cooperate with the U.S., and with almost no discussion, he agreed
to attend. proximity talks.
Despite all the talk in Washington. Belgrade and Sarajevo about a cease-fire,
Holbrooke still believed that they should still try to squeeze a few more advantageous
drops from the drying military fruit In his view, the Federation's culminating point was
near, but had not yet arrived. In a private meeting with Tudjman that day, Holbrooke
discussed the prospects for a cease-fire, which he said he expected in ten days. Yet,
stressing that some valuable territorial gains were left. Holbrooke urged the Croat
President to "do whatever you can militarily in the next week." As he had done before,
Holbrooke recommended key towns to the Croat leader: "I would hope that you can take
Prejidor. Sanski Most, and Bosanski Novi. If you take this, you will have land to give
away." Tudjman listened carefully to Holbrooke's recommendations, explaining that he
32 Acc;ount of Shattuck and Galbraith's search for human rights abuses from Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary, pp63-64; and Shattuck interview,July 25. 1996.
S3 For details of this meetin ,see Kerrick notes, So tember 30, 1995.
3.
-
UNCLASSIFIED
139
Bl
BI
..:
UNCLASSIFIED
..-r
would consider undertaking jofnt with the Muslims, since "they can '"t take
territory on their oWn." Later that day, Susak promised to raise this issue with his
Bosnian counterparts.
5S
.
A Decision on Venue
Following a luncheon meeting. with UN Civilian Representative Akashi,the team.
departed for Sofia, Bulgaria, where they met with Bulgarian officials including President
Zhelyu Zhelev, who was thought of as a genuine democratic reformer .. The trip 'to
Bulgaria was not directly related to the Bosnian peace PlVcess; Holbrooke felt that since
he was in the region, a quick visit to Bulgaria,; one he had previously promised to tnake,
was. feasible. Such a trip would go far in shoring up relations with the fonner comrn unist
In these talks, .the primarily other European security issues,
particularly NATOexpanslOD. 6 . . .
. '.
As the team settled into Sofia Sheraton Hotel the night of October 1, Holbrooke
. called Strobe TalbOtt for an update on Washington's decision-making concerning the
location of proximity talks. Talbott explained to Holbrooke that while . senior
Administration officiiUs supported his call to convene proximity talks, almost no one
favored the idea to hold them in the U.S.. Apparently Gore's support had waned. nThe
vote is nine to one against an American venue," Talbott explained, "and i'm one of the
nine." He said that only Lake supported Holbrooke, with others preferring that talks be
held in Europe. Infonned that the issue would be taken up at a PC meeting during the
next two days, I:Iolbrooke requested that he be allowed to state his case via secure phone.
Talbott demurred, suggesting that Holbrooke instead outline his argument in a cable.
After he hung up, Holbrooke spent most of the rest of the night drafting the cable, vvhich
he dis.cussed and cleared with his team on the flight to .Sarajevo the next day. Returning
to Bosnia on October 2. Holbrooke sent the message to Washington from the Sarajevo
embassy.s7
Presenting the "unanimous views" of the negotiating team, Holbrooke's cable
elaborated on the rationale to hold talks on American soil. "Given the difficulties we will
face," Holbrooke explained, "Washington readers of this message may well wonder why
they should agree to allow any tripartite negotiations anywhere near the u.s .. In our
recommendation is derived from the difficulties we fate." Holbrooke stated that having
the talks at an American site outside of Washington would significantly enhance "the
chances for success -- "In the U.S., we will have full control of the process; elsewhere,
we will probably lose much of our control, reducing our leverage dramatlcally."
Holbrooke described how all the parties wanted to have talks in the U.S., as they felt that
it would enhance the prospects for success ultimately, guarantee that an
agreement would be respected once signed. .
One way an American site would enhance U.S. leverage was by enabling senior
officials -- such as Christopher, Perry and Shalikashvili - to udrop-by" the talks to
55 Fo; details oflhis meeting, see Galbraith Diplomiltic Diary, p65, and addendum p2.
U Holbrooke comment, Dayton History "Possible Visit to Bulgaria," CabJe, Sofia 6782,
September29, 1995; "AlS Holbrookc's to Bulgaria: Scenes etter," Cable, Sofia 6804,September"29,
1995. For.details of these meetings, see Kerrick noles, October 1-2, 1995.
57 Holbrooke commenl, Dayton History Seminar. According to State Department Operalions Center Phone
Logs (Shift HI), Talbott and Holbrooke talked at 1748 EST. Later that evening (2218 EST; 4:18am in
Sofia), HoJbrooke called Christopher'S Chief of Staff Tom Doni/on.
140
R

UNCLASSIFIED
\.
\
oNctAIfIEb
provide extra boosts when needed. For example. Holbrooke explained, "Christopher was
indispensable in the difficult morning hours in New York last Tuesday; his a.vailability on
short notice was critical. and will be again during the talks in ways that are not easily
compatible high-profile and hard-to-schedule transatlantic travel... this U.S. drop-in
advantage, we strongly believe, would immeasurably improve our chances of success."
Also, Holbrooke wrote, the rules of the planned conference (no press, and no leaving the
conference site) would be very dif,ficult to enforce outside the U.S.. .
To preempt the anticipated concern that an Ameriym venue increases the costs of
failure to the U.S . Holbrooke argued that. "such a risk-adverse ca,lculus misses the main
point; this Administration's prestige and standing is already fully engaged in the eyes of
both the American public and 'the world. will be approximately the same whether
we meet in New Jersey or New Caledonia. We must maximize the chances of success,
not reduce them.in anticipation of possible failure." Even if talks were to fail, Holbrooke
believed that given nature of the problem, "the world will still give the U.S. credit for its
efforts/' and the Sarajevo cease-fire, Geneva and New York agreementS would still stand.
Finally. Holbrooke concluded, .the parties willingness to further chances for
peace "will hinge to a great extent on their. perception that we -- and not the Europeans -
are driving the process/' If the U.S. gave away the process to the Europe, Holbrooke
it would "stop us in our tracks." The Europeans would undoubtedly complain
(particularly the French, who were "making an all-out bid to take over the process by
hosting the talks"), but Holbrookeadvised that "they will respect us and come along."
Since the. American peace effort first began back in August, "it has been viewed by the
parties as a powerful signal that, as de Charette said last week, 'America is back.'
Similarly, the choice of venue will be seen as a critical indicator of whether we are
committed to see this<'process to its conclusion.,,58 .
. Holbrooke's proposal was considered by senior Administration' officials at a PC
meeting the afternoon of October 2.
59
Secretary Christopher urged his colleagues to take
the shuttle team's yiewsserioqsly. In addition to Holbrooke's cable, Holbrooke and
Roberts Owen had spoken with Christopher by phone, and the Secretary had agreed to
lobby in support of their position. Cluistopher felt that the decision should really be the
lead negotiator's call: "he had been with the parties; he had a firm recommendation as to
where we could be most effective, and that was in the U.S .. " The SecretaIy did, however,
address the downsides to hosting a conference in the U.S.. "Although the team denies
this," he told his colleagues; "the consequences of failure would be greater because it
would be viewed as 'our conference.' We would be rolling the dice." Second,
Christopher pointed out that the President could "be drawn into this," that he could not be
isolated from a such an important event on American soil. Finally. the Secretary
explained that such a decision would likely cause a "rift" in the Contact Group_ UThe
allies and Russians will go bananas if we're seen as hijacking the process," he warned.
Although Christopher supported Holbrooke's recommendB:tion. his concerns
resonated with Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, who emerged as the leading
skeptic about a U.S. site. 'Berger was concerned that an American venue would become a
. ,
.51 See "October 3 Principal's Committee Meeting," Cable, Sarajevo 637, OClober 2, 1995.
'9 In addition to Holbrooke's cable, the PC had the interagency document, "Issue for Decision: Venue for
Balkans Proximity Talks." See memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum (EUR). "Principals'
Committee Meeting: October 2. 1995,'3 October 2, 1995.
141
UNCLASSIFIED
/'
UNCLASSIFIED
...
media-circus and increase tensions with Congress. Moreover, he too believed that the
Europeans would be very angry: possibly creating problems with critical implementation
issues -- such as support for IFOR. Albright concurred with Berger on his latter point,
explaining that "the level of hostility against us is incredible." In her view, a
.. U.S. site "would only magnify our differences over implementation." She also expressed
concern that the U.S. would have difficulties allowing suspected war criminals - such as
. most of the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic himself - on American soil.
Lake up in support of the U.S. site, arguing that no matter how angry the
Europeans might becOme, they would still participate in implementation. As a way to
. assuage dismay, Lake suggested that the U.S. structure a peace
conference, possibly having some portion of the talks (such as a signing ceremony) in
Europe .. Although Perry, ShaJikashvili and Deutsch supported Lake and the
group decided to delay sending a decision to the President for a few days. Instead, Lake.
suggested, they should think harder about "a plan to ameliorate European concerns"" and
brainstonn about possible venues other than New York or Washington.
60
. .
On October 4, the Principals recOnvened at the White HO}1se to make the final
decision on proximity taJkS.
61
After a relatively brief discussion, they agreed to hold the
talks at a secluded location in the U.S . removed from Washington or New York but close
enough to pennit "drop-ins" by senior U.S. officials. In a nOd to the E'uropeans, they
decided to leave open the possibility that an agreement would only be initialed at U.S.
talks, with an official signing ceremony held at a European venue. Lake lobbied Jbr ,
final signing at aU .S. summit hosted by the President, but others felt that-''the downsides
(presumably from Europe) would be too great." Nevertheless, a final decision was
deferred for later. 62 AJso. the Principals decided that the Holbrooke team should work
with Contact Group- partners to develop options for possible follow-on events -- such as
"implementation talks" - in European capitals or Moscow. Soon after this meeting,
officials from the NSC. State Department and Pentagon began to consider possible
sites.
63
..
While the decision on venue was made, there was still some debate about whe.ther
an announcement for proximity talks shouJd be linked with a Country-wide cease-fire_ To
the Holbrooke team, getting a cease-fire was a sine qua non for announcing proximity
talks. Holbrooke believed that there could riot be peace talks if the parties were still
fighting .on the ground. He was concerned that if the fighting continued, talks woUld
inevitably be delayed - and possibly postponed -- while the parties jockeyed for miJitary
60 Details of meeting from Vershbow interview, December J 7, t 996 (Vershbow was the only notelaker at
this meeting). See also Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History
Seminar; and Kerrick notes from "PC debrief: From TL (Tony Lake)."
61 In the meantime, others had already begun thinking about other possible sites. Forexample,.Dan Spiegel
ofthe U.S. UN office in Geneva wrote Tom Donilon on October 3 that if Geneva was chosen, be would
need to know soon in order to secure several large villas in and Geneva, as was done for tbe 1986
Reagan-Goroachev talks. See "Venue for Bosnia Peace ConferenCe," memorandum to Donilon from
Spiegel, October 3, 1995.
.
61 See notes of October 4 Principals meeting, EU RlSCE electronic files; and Vcrshbow interview, .
December 17, 1996.
61 See "Summary of Conclusions for Meeting ofthe NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
October 4, f995."Oclober 12 . 1995.
142
??
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~
!
UNCLASSIFIED
?
advantage on the ground. Moreover, the Bosnians mifltt begin to lose, weakening the
relatively strong negotiating position they currently had. .
The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were sympathetic but less
categorical about linking the two. Perry argued that "we should push like hell to get i t : ~
with Christopher explaining that a cease-fire would be beneficial but not essentiaL "We
should not rule out proximity talks if we don't get it,,' Christopher s a i d ~ Curiously" Tony
Lake, who only days before had pressed Holbrooke to flash "red lights" to halt the
Bosnian-Croat offensive, was strongly opposed to making proximity talks contingent on a
cease-fire. "We should press for [a cease-fire}," be said at the October 4 PC, "but not
. make it a precondition." Indeed, according to the "Summary of Conclusions" frOnt the
October 4 PC, the Principals in fact decided to support Lake's recommendation.
6S
Negotiating a Cease-fire
.
By October 2, the military situation in western Bosnia had begun to take a turn for
the worse. In a counter-offensive, the BSA retook land conquered the previous month by
Federation forces. To use Holbrooke's metaphor, the Muslim-Croat ''tennis baH" had
reached its apex and was on its way down. Despite Washington'S sentiment to de-link a
cease-fire and proximity talks,Holbrooke was determined to forge a end to the fighting
that could be announced simultaneously with a decision to convene a peace conference.
Indeed, he had told Washington that if he were unable to get a cease-fire; he would hold
off on announcing proximity talks and.instead continue shuttle diplomacy.66
When the Holbrooke delegation sat down with lzetbegovic and Mo Sacirbey . the
afternoon of October 2 in Sarajevo, they raised these setbacks, pressing the Bosnians to
consider an immediate cease-fire. Izetbegovic and Sacirbey were reluctant, but reiterated
that they might be interested if the Serbs could meet the terms they outlined several days
before. Believing that he was on the brink of another military success, Izetbegovic
requested that they wait another ten days before agreeing to a cease-fire. Holbrooke
countered that to let the fighting continue would be a "big risk," and that the Bosnians
should accept that they've gained all they could. The Sarajevo leadership remained
noncommittal. On his way to Zagreb that night, Holbrooke told the press that while the
"two sides remain in significant disagreement over the type of cease-fire ... the talks will
goon:,67 .
.
The team spent October 3 . in both Zagreb and Belgrade negotiating with the
Croats and Serbs on the tenus for a possible tease-fire. Meeting with Croat Defense
64 Holbrooke later explained that he was influenced in this decision by a similar situation concerning
negotiations over Vietnam. In March of 1968, President Johnson had announced that he was ready to
convene talks with lite North Vietnamese. but the two sides wasted valuable time deciding when and where
to meet as the fighting raged on. For details, see Clark Clifford's memoirs (which Holbrooke c0-
authored), Counsel to the President (Anchor. 1992), ppS27-533.
6S Details of meeting from Vershbow interview, December 11, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author
(notes), December 20, 1996; Hill interview with author (nQtes), December 19. 1996. Also see
memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum. "October:3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia:-
October 3, 1995; and October 4 "Summary of CQnclusions."
6& See Kornblum to Christopher. October 3, 1995.
67 As quoted in "Bosnian Truce Effort Set Back In Talks and on the Battlefield," New York Times, October
3,1995; see alsoJobn Pomfret, "Serbs Counterattack to Retake Territory; UN Officials Say Terrain Under
Threat Includes Sites of Alleged Massacre of Muslims:' Washing!on Posl, October 3.1995. For details of
meeting. see Kerrick notes, Odober2.1995; HoJbrooke interview; Pardewinterview.
L
143
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEP
Minister Susak and Milosevic, the American team searched for a way to stop the fighting.
To Milosevic, Holbrooke said that the U.S. was ready for a cease-fire. The Serb leader
agreed that the time was right. The Croats, who only days before Holbrooke had advised
to press forward and the" MuslimS militarily, were eaSily convinced that the
fighting should now end. 8 The key, then, was the Sarajevo govenunent Holbrooke was
pessimistic about outlook for success, explaining" to Tony Lat<:e that the chances of a
"cease;,.fire were 20% at best.
69
Publicly, the Holbrooke team played down the prospects
for getting a cease-fire -- but they planned to return to the Bosnian capital the next day to
make a strong push for an agreement.
70
""
"
On October 4. the U.S. delegation arrived in Sarajevo. In addition to the meetings
that day,. Holbrooke would swear-in John Menzies as the first U.s. Ambassador to
Bosnia. For almost a year, Menzies had been the U.S. charge in Sarajevo, pending Senate"
confirmation to be Ambassador. When the Senate vote came through, Holbrooke decided
that he would swear Menzies in during a special ceremony held at the Bosnian
Presidency. Although the decision to hold the event was routine, Holbrooke saw its
possible utility: swearing-in the first U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia wi!h much fanfare might
" help to reassure the Bosnians that the U.S. was on their side and. more
convince them to agree to Holbrooke's proposal for a cease-fire.
71
Throughout the day "in the U.S. delegation, joined by 'EU negotiator
Bildt, pressed the Bosnians on the need for an immediate cease-fire.
72
In response, the
Bosnians said that while they agreed on a cease-fIre "in principle," their problem was
over the implementation date. They only wanted to commit to "stop" fighting "once their
"preconditions - such as opening roads and gas lines to Sarajevo -" were fulfilled.
Izetbegovic sensibly argued that without gas and open access, peace mean little to
Sarajev'ans. Holbrooke and other delegation members believed that such remarks,
the Bosnians President still held out the hope for further military gains. "
To quell this view. Holbrooke and Don Kerrick met with lzetbegovic privately
after the Menzies at Konak House. Holbrooke wanted to utilize Kerrick's
intelligence background (although the Brigadier- General was the NSC representative on
61 For details ofMiIosevic meeting, see Kerrick notes, October 3. 1995.
69 Vershbow interview, December 17,1996.
70 On October 3. Holbrooke said about the cease-fire: "I don't think it's an impasse. I think both sides" want
a cease-fire. But tqe details of how it's arranged arc tricky and important." See Chris Hedges, "Negotiator
Says Ceasefire in Bosnia is Unlikely Soon," New York Times, October 4,1995.
.
71 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Menzies interview.
72 Bildt conducted his own talks with the Bosnian leadership that day. With Silajdzic, Bildtsaid tfiat
Europe was preparing to supply the region with reconstruction assistance, but that Bosnia would need a
strong central government - with more authority than agreed to in New York - tbat would be competent
enough to bandle such assistance. SiJajdzic said that this would be done, but predictably, in a way that did
not allow a strong presidency. On elections, Bild! agreed with Si/ajdzic that to allow people only to vote
where they presently were would ratify. ethnic cleansing, and that some system had to be fonnulated to
allow one's vote to count where one wanted. Foreign Minister Sacirbey said that government strength was
needed in areas that mattered most - in his view, foreign relations, international economic relations and
monetary policy. He said that each national group would get a certain percentage of ambassadors, but that
the Foreign Minister should always remain a Muslim. Sacirbey also mentioned that a human rights
commission was "desperately needed. With Federation President Kresimir Zubak, Birdl beard that he and
(zetbegovic were detennined t9 make the Federation work, and that they would not push to establish
confederal ties with Croatia." See "Bildt Meeting in Sarajevo," Cable, Geneva 7579, October 5,1995.
1:J See Kerrick interview; Kerrick notes, October4, 1995. "
144
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
&
the team, he. was loaned to the NSC from. U.S. Army Intelligence) to explain to the
President that further military action was ill-advised. Although Kerrick was then p!ivy
only to the same infonnation as other team members, Holbrooke theatrically emphasized
his experience as an "Anny intelligence specialist" to explain to Jzetbegovic that the
Bosnians had surpassed their military culminating point, the Croats would no longer
support them, and that further action would debilitate their ability to consolidate: gains
already made.
'4
They discussed not only specific intelligence but the common tendency
of Generals to go too far -- "[the Bosnians] annies were tired, they weren't well trained,
. they didn't have the support and Banja Luka for them would be that one battle tOQ fai,
would. turn the momentum back to the' Bosnian Serbs." Also playing tip his
connection to the White House and his role as President Clinton's "representative" on the
team, Kerrick described for lzetbegovic the President's "strong de'sire'" for a cease-fire.
Holbrooke, never shy of the . melodramatic, laid it out for lzetbegovic plainly: "Mr.
President,' he said, plaYing craps with your nation's destiny:75 .
lietbegQvic agreed to meet the U.S. half-way: he would accept a cease-fire,. but
only if it took effect in several days. The Bosnian. Serbs, he needed to prove that .
they would comply with the cease-fire terms In good faith. The fighting would not end
until Sarajevo had gas and a road was opened to Gorazde. Ii:etbegovic asked that
Holbrooke go to Belgrade to get Milosevic's' commitment. While Holbrooke, Clark,
Kerrick and Owen met with Milosevic that night in Belgrade, Hill and Pardew negotiated
in Sarajevo with Izetbegovic and Sacirbey on the final language of the proposal. As the
these last tenus were being discussed, Holbrooke and Hill worked together for over three
hours on an open phone line, and Holbrooke called back to Washington to consult with
Christopher and Lake. The result of these discussions was an agreement' with. the
Bosnians on a cease';'fire that would take effect in five days. If gas supplies were not
turned on by then, the agreement would not take effect. A road to Gorazde would'
opened, but since mine-clearing would take a few weeks, this condition would not be
linked to the cease-fire (though the Bosnians did make the opening a requirement to
attend a peace conference). The cease-fire would last for sixty days or untii the
completion of proximity talks and a peace whichever came later.
76
In Belgrade, Holbrooke got Milosevic to agree to the cease-fire as a "witness:'
who in tum got Karadzic, Krajisnik. and Mladic to sign the document. Also, Milosevic
74 In addition to what tfie croats had told the U.S., Federation President Zubak had told Bildt that day that
the Croatia "had stopped their offensive in Bosnia but the Government forces had not." Ye4
"Croatian forces could not stay in their current defensive posture long, without a cease-tire." See Geneva
7579.
7S See Holbrooke Comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; Kerrick
interview; Kerrick notes, October 4, 1995.
76 According to State Department Operations Center Phone Logs, Holbrooke informed both Christopher
and Lake of his progress in Sarajevo that day including two conference calls with both (743 and 2022
ED1). During one of the calls with Christopher, Milosevic approached Holbrooke (who was calling from
the presidency in Belgrade) as though he wanted to speak to the Secretary. Holbrooke said. "Chris. I'm .
talking to the President of Serbia here," as Milosevic half-reached for the phone. The Secretary apparently
did not want to talk to Milosevic. See Holbrooke interview. Details of progress in Sarajevo from "Read-
out from Sarajevo: October 4. 199?, I :55am," memorandum from EURlSCE files. Attachcd to this memo
was the draft cease fire agreement (as of October 4, 1350 Sarajevo time) and the draft proximity talks
agreement. Further details on Sarajevo-Belgrade negotiations from Holbrooke interview; Kcrrick notes.
October 4, 1995.
R
145
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
approved a written agreement to convene proximity talks in the u.s. (as the Serb
negotiator for peace talks. he approved on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs). During the
team's negotiations over the past four days, all three parties had agreed in principle to the
terms to convene peace talks; when a cease-fire resolution seemed near, the U .S_ team
had prepared a document on a conference for the parties to agree to formally. The draft
document stated that talks would commence "on or about" October 25 in the U.S_. and
that the parties would commit to three tenns: each delegation would b.e empowered to
negotiate a final settlement; the talks would be continuous and threats to leave were not
allowed; . and the talks would remain isolated from the media. Holbrooke infonned
Washington of Milosevic's approval of these two documents early the moming of
October 5, although he warned that they had been only verbally agreed to by the
Bosnians. They reserved the right for revision and, as Holbrooke explained in a message
to Christopher and Lake, "any changes in Sarajevo could cause a serious last minute
. problem!' At noon that day, Holbrooke arrived in Sarajevo to get the Bosnians
signature.
71
.
. The Bosnians had no problem with the talks but remained
uneasy with the cease-fire. As shown over a week ago in New York, the Bosnians
suffered cold feet when the endgame was near. The U.S. had been able to get Serb
agreement to the Bosnians' terms.' Sa.rajevo would get electricity and gas and a road
would be secured to Gorazde. But lzetbegovic remained reluctant to sign. Froln the
shuttle team's perspective. the agreement ended the conflict. From lzetbegovic's
the agreement ended his chance for retribution -- the momentum had shifted
in Bosnia, NATO was finally willing to act against his adversaries. and the Bosnians
Serbs were .on the nm ... His enemies were now enduring a taste of the suffering th!}t they
had meted out to his people. As Jim Pardew later reflected, "it takes a lot of courage for
these men to pick up a pen and sign something that we had negotiated with their arch
enemies.,,78
Placing a final roadblock in the way. Izetbegovic said that he agreed in principle,
but refused to add his signature to the cease-fJre docwnent alongside those of his Bosnian
Serb enemies.
79
Unrelenthtg, Holbrooke had a photocopy made of the agreement with
the Bosnian Serb signatures and said to the Bosnian President that now he had
no excuse not to sign.sO Izetbegovic tried one last tactic, saying to Holbrooke. "1 don't
see your signature on this, Mr. Ambassador." Holbrooke dramatically grabbed his pen
signed the document, and pushed it back to the stunned President. He told lzetbegovic
that the U.s. had to leave Sarajevo to get to Zagreb and Rome. He either signed now or
the war would continue. With five minutes to spare, his hand shaking.
signed the paper. The parties had agreed to a ce3l)e-fire.
81
At Ilam Washington time,
President Clinton announced from the White House that a cease-fire would take effect on
71 Holbrooke faxed the latest texts ofbotb the cease-fire al)d proximity talks agreements early the mom ing
of October 5 (7am Belgrade time). See handwritten note to Secretary Christopher and Tony Lake
(apparently also delivered to Talbott, Tamoffand Korriblum) from Holbrooke, October 5,1.995.
78 Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.
79 Kerrick interview; Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.
10 Holbrooke judged that since the agreement would not have fonnallegal standing anyway, it wouldn"
matter if the parties didn't sign the exact same document, as long as they had agreement.
II DetaHs from Holbrooke interview. July 10, J996; Kerrick interview; Pardew interview. July 31, 1996.
146
II
UNCLASSIFIED
-'
UNCLASSIFIED
October 10, and that the parties would convene in the U.S. around the end of the month
for'proximity talks. 82
.
Following a quick stop in Zagreb to finalize plans with Tudjman, the U.S.
landed in Rome for an important meeting with the Contact Group. The Europeans had
been briefed about the cease-fire and venue issues, had not been fully consulted. As a
gesture to the Europeans, the team had decided that the proximity talks would be
followed by an "international peace conference" in Paris. The Principals in Washington
had decided at the October 4 PC to leave this issue open, but Holbrooke went mead and .
made it part of the fonnal announcement, effectively lockingin some sort of European
event. -Although described as a "peace conference," the U.S. intended to' have tlle
detailed negotiating done at the proximity talks. In Holbrooke's view. the agreement
would be fonnally blessed in Paris, but not reached In this, way, the u.s. eQuid
maintain .control of the negotiating process while keeping its European partners behind'
the process. "We concluded tha.t there could be a ceremonial event' in Paris as a way to
give recognition to the European role and the sacrifices Europe made in contributing to
this endeavor over the years and would contribute the future." recalledP
The President had announced this in his s.tatement on October 5, 'and Christopher called
his German, French, and British counterparts to infonn them of the decision.
84
. .
While these key U.S. allies supported the cease-fire and pushing the negotiating
process to the next level, the British. were angl:y that Paris had been chosen as the
conference site without their consent. Foreign Minister Rifkind told the Secretary on
October 5 that his government had assumed that a peace conference would be held in
Geneva or another "neutral" location, and that the President had acted too hastily by
announcing PariS.
85
In a conversation the following morning, Cb.ristopher explained to
Rifkind that the decision was in part based on one made at the original conference on the
former Yugoslavia held in London in August 1992. whete an agreement had been reached
that Paris would be the site for a peace conference; Moreover, French Foreign Minister
de Charette had told Christopher that Chirac personally "placed great importance hosting
. the peace conference." Rifkind tolerated. this explanation, but hinted that London might
want to host an "lmpiementation" conference after a signing to discuss issues related to
IFOR, coordination of international organizations,. naming a senior implementation
coordinator, and the particulars pf a reconstruction package. Explaining that President
Clinton would be amenable to such an idea (as such foUow-on events had been
considered), Christopher agreed that the two should explore this issue further. The next
day, he called Rifkind back to confinn U.S. support for the idea.
86
.
12 See Weelc/y Compilation ofPresic/ential Documents, October 5, 1995, p1765; and Alison Mitchell,
"Bosnian Enemies Set a Cease-fire; Plan Talks;' New York Times, October 6, J 995.
IJ Christopher interview. October 30, 1996.
It On October 4, Christopher had talked with the French Defense Minister and Ambassador about having a
peace conference in Paris. He discussed this with Foreign Minister de Charette the next day. See "The
Secretary and French FM de Charette, October 5, 1995:' State 238061, October 6,1995. For
Gennany's response, see "The Secretaty and German Foreign Minister Kinkel, 'October 5,1995," Cable,
State 238062, October 6, 1995. .
.
.
IS "The Secretary and British Foreign SecretaJy Ritkind. October 5, 1995," Cable, State 238063, October 6,
1995.
16 "The Secretary and British Foreign Secretary Ritkind, October 6, 1995," Cable, State 238692, October 6,
1995; and uThe Secretary and FS Malcolm Rifkind, October 7, 1995" Cable, State 240785, October 11.
1995.
. 2
147
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED_
When the Holbrooke team returned to they had accomplished what
they had set out to do - get a cease-fire and set the timing for proximity talks_ Yet
problems remained. Although a cease-fire had been agreed to, the fighting continued
.during the five days before scheduled implementation.
87
It soon became obvious that
while Izetbegovic had asked for extra days to verify Serb compliance, his unspoken
agenda was to give his generals a few more opporturiities to win some territory back.
After the Bosnian Serbs attacked UN troops an4 refugees, NATO jets were called in
again - this time, hitting a BSA command post with laser-guided missiles. As if this
wasn't enough, by October 10, gas lines had not yet been opened to Sarajevo.
ss
Ambassador Menzies and UN civilian representative Antonio Pedauye conducted final
negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs at the Sarajevo airport, and' in two
days, they finally agreed to implement the cease-fire. This was the 35th nationWide
cease-fir(! since the Bosnian conflict started in Apnl 1992 .. It was hoped that it would be
the last. 89 . .
.
87 This occurred despite the positive response in Belgrade, in which the official press hailed the cease-fire
(and, expectedly, Milosevic's role in achieving it). The U.S. embassy in Belgrade commented that
"Belgmde is signaling its commitment to carrying out the provisions of the accord fully. Milosevic clearly
believes he has Karadzic, Mladic and company completely on board or be would not have identified .
himself as so personally responsible for achieving not just another cease-fire, but an historic step finally to
bring the conflict to an end." See "Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs Hail CeaseflCe Agreement for Bosnia and
Praise u.s. Mediators," Cable, Belgrade 4955, October 6, 1995_
sa See Chris Hedges, "Bosnian Serbs Hit a Refugee Camp, Killing 6 Civilians," New York Times, October
. 9, 1995; and John Pomfret, TO Qombs Serbs; Truce is Postponed; Gas Supplies Fail to Reach Bosnian
. Capi!al," Washington Post, October )0, 1995, On October 4, NATO planes hit three Bosnian Serb surface-
Io-air missile positions after Bosnian Serb radars had locked in on NATO jets perfonning routine missions.
See Tracy Wilkinson, "NATO HilS Serb Missile Sites in 'Self-Defense,'" Los Angeles Times, October 5,
1995.
&9 For details, see Menzies interview; John Pomfret, "Bosnia Cease-fire Accord Takes effect; During Two-
Day delay, Thousands Faced Expulsions, Fled Offensive," Washington Post, October J 2, 1995; and Kit R.
Roane, '<Bosnia Cease-fire Goes Into Effect as Pact is Signed," New York Times, October 12, 1995.
148
a
UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter Seven
UNCLASSIFIED
2
Preparing for.Proximity Talks
The OCtoberS agreements on a cease-fire and proximity talks gave the U.S.
government less than a month to prepare for what it hoped would be the final stage Qf the
Bosnian peace process. Not only did American officials need to .locate the site and' make
the considerable logistical and diplomatic arrangements for the peace talks, but they had
to draft the texts that would be the basis for negotiations. Fortunately, many o:f these
efforts were already in progress by early October. Inside the U.S. Government, detailed
planning for the structure and substance of a possible settlement had been u n d e ~ a y for
. several weeks. However, with the conference only three weeks away, this drafting effort
would have to intensify. In addition, more work needed to be done in both Washington
~ d European capitals to create the arrangements for implementing the P!ace. Much of
this latter effort focused on the military implementation of an agreement, particularly the
scope and structure of NATO's role.
NATO and IFOR
. In mid-September, the U.S. began to push the negotiating process with "its Allies
on forming the parameters for NATO's role in military implementation. Since the
beginning of the diplomatic initiative. Pentagon officials "bad no doubt" that the U.S.
would assmne the lead in drafting the military component of a peace agreement.
"Particularly after UNPROFOR, we wanted to make sure that there would be no question
about the authority of a military force," Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter
Siocombe recalled. "It had always been our position that we would write it."( But, as
had been the ease with the decisions to implement the "London rules
n
in July, the U.S.
, would have to .work within the NAC to gain approval for a NATO deployment into an
implementation force. or IFOR. In many ways,'the debate on the scope and structure' of
IFOR transcended Bosnia; it would do much to set the course for the Alliance in the post-
Cold War world. "As NATO prepares to implement a Bosnian Peace plan," NATO
Ambassador Hunter cabled to Washington, "it faces some of the most consequential
decisions of its history, especially in tenns of how it is organized and how it operates.,,2
Such decisions involved, for example, the UN role in a NATO-led implementation force,
the latitude afforded to theater commanders to make tactical decisions and, crucially ~ the
relationship between NATO and non-NATO countries --.such as Russia - participating in
IFOR
.
t Slocombe interview, January 6. 1997,
l"Planning for Peace Implementation in the .Former Yugoslavia," Cable, U.S.NATO 3626, September 15.
1995.
a
149
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
I
Russia wanted to be involved in military implementation; but just how was not
certain. From Secretary Christopher's perspective, Russia:s "principal goal was to be a
major player and not excluded from the [implementation] process." As of the middle of
September, the Yeltsin government had noloffered any specific ideas on how they, might
be involved. yet remained "clearly discomfited by the prospect of being left out of a U.S.
or NATO-led IFOR." Not wanting to create another UNPROFOR, the U.S. insisted that
IFOR be led by NATO.
The problem was, however. that the Russians were in the grip of their "chronic
allergy to NATO," flaring most acutely around talk of expanding the Alliance to include '
fonner Warsaw Pact nations? Russia wanted to be a part of the peacekeeping mission in
BoSI}ia, but not under NATO command,. "The big problem was that NATO's activism in
Bosnia would exacerbate' Russianconcems about NATOpower,Y' Strobe Talbott
reflected.
4
Accordingly. U.S. planners at the Pentagon and State Department began to
,devise models for Russian participation that' might mollify such worries. These models
differed on the extent of Russia's integration into NATO -- ranging from
complete independence (with R!lssian forces performing "parallel tasks" not assigned to
IFOR) to Russian acceptance of full operational control (or OPCON)" by NATO
, command, to Russian participation under a U.S. commander.
5
Since the IFOR issue
promised to be a vel}' difficult one - with a fundamental impact on the U.S.-Russia
bilateral relationship - it would be treated on a separate track from the rest of the IFOR
,negotiations. Thus) as the U.S. began to engl,lge the Russians. negotiations intensified
among NATO Allies in Brussels:
During the week of September 24. while most U.S. officials focused on the New
York meetings and 'Christopher and Holbrooke's efforts to secure the "further agreed
principles," Slocombe joined Wes Clark and John in Europe to begin high-
level consultations with NATO Allies on IFOR. Ori September 20. NATO military
leadeJ;S had officially begun the planning process, and were scheduled to deliver an initial
report to the NAC on September 29.
6
The delegation planned
to Use their trip to consult with key Allies individually on these issues as well as to
present a full briefing to the NAC on the status of HoI brooke's peace negotiations.
Discussions with the British, French and Italians revealed broad agreement on the
basic organization and mission for IFOR. .The main differences between the U.S. anc:J its
Allies concerned 1) the UN's overall role in civilian and militii:y implementation 2)
the levei of decision-making coordination between political and military officials within
NATO itself. All sides concurred that there should be a civilian coordinator to supervise
non-military compOnents of a peace settlement, such as elections and refugee return.' The
3 See memorandum for Deputy Secretary Talbott and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tamoff
from Andrew Weiss (SIP), "Engaging the Russians on Bosnia Settlement Implementation:' September J 3.
1995.
C Talbott interview, July 30. 1996; see also Perry intervi,=w; Siocombe interview.
S See, for 'example. Weiss memorandum; memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward
Warner, JII to Strobe Talbott, "Russians and IFOR," September 13, 1995; and "Russian Participation in
IFOR." Joint Chiefs of Staff Position Paper, September 23, 1995.
6 "NATO launches Planning Process for Implementation of Peace Settlement in the Former Yugoslavia,"
Cable, U.S.NAT03709,September21. 1995.
150
7
UNCLASSIFIED
..
2.
civilian coordinator's authority would not interfere with any military decision-making, as
.
7
had been the case with UNPROFOR There would be no dual-key. However, the
French, backed to a certain degree by the were adamant that IFOR and the
civilian coordinator "wear a highly-visible UN hat," and be designated by the UN
Secretary GeneraLs The U.S. beIievedthat the civilian coordinator, like the NATO
commander of IFOR, should only be "validated" by the UN Security remaining
independent of the international In this way, the civilIan coordinator would lead an
autonomous multilateral coalition of volunteer participants. "The U.S. accepts the
necessity .ofNATO Slocombe told British and French representatives in Paris.
on September 26. "but if there is even a whiff of UN oversight of NATO, congressional
approval [for an IFOR mission] would be extremely difficult to win.,,9 .
. Moreover, U.S. officials believed. keeping implementation operationally
independent of the UN would bolster the overall peace process. Rather than have the UN
manage peace implementation -- as had been the case with UNPROFOR _. the u.s.
argued that the implementation structure (both military and aspects) should be
built into the peace agreement itself. In this sense, an would have the parties
"request" that NATO and the international community enforce its terms. Kornbluni
explained that while much of this nuance, "it is important for the autliority of peace
implementation to come from parties and from the peace process -- and not iqlposed from
above." Nevertheless; European Allies remained concerned that they be guaranteed
politica1 oversight of IFOR operations. Citing the lack of political coordination within
NATO during the air campaign (as shown, they argued, by the dispute about the
Tomahawk strike), the British suggested appointing a special political representative of
the NATO SecretarY General to work alongside the !FOR military commander in Bosnia.
The U.S. opposed this, countering that arrangements' for political-military coordination
already existed in NATO - the NAC -- and that establishing any new arrangement
amounted to creating another chain of command, leading to competition between civilian
and military decision-rilaking channels: 1-0
.
On September 21, the Slocombe delegation visited the NAC. For the past few
days, NATO military planners in Brussels had been working on an IFORdecision sheet
71n consultation with the Europeans. U.S. planners soon began devising the function ofa "Senior
Implementation Coordinator." or SICOR. The office later took on the more European title offlhigh
representative." See. for example. "SICOR Structure," October J9, J995 draft; no author, U.S.UN files.
As a State Department assessment explained, "The French emphasize an expanded UN role ... [their]
effort seems to dilute the NATO military command structure as much as possible. The proposal to position
Janvier as overall Deputy CINC with control of all ground operations (including U.S. forces) and aU
previous UN forces will be very controversial. This would effectively provide a French 'dual key' for the
ground operation." See "French Proposals on IFOR." EURIRPM (Dale Waters) files,
no date (though based on translation of September 11 French paper circulated at NATO).
9 "French.Hosted Trilateral on Bosnia Peace Implementation Force - September 26." Cable, Paris 23323.
September 29. 1995..
.
10 For details of these discussions, see Paris 23323; "U.S.-UK Senior LevelConsultations on IFOR:' Cable,
London 13401, September 27, 1995; and "U.S.DP SIocombe Delegation Meeting With Italian CHOn
Venturani -- September 26," Cable, Rome 13287, September 27. 1995.
&. 151
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

. for the September 29 NAC meeting. I
1
In a briefing before an infonnal NAC session on the 21th, Wes Clark summarized the status of Holbrooke's negotiations. Time was of the
essence, the General explained. Since there could be a peace conference as early as mid- October, NATO needed to make some decisions soon. Reiterating what he had said in a similar briefing to the group earlier that Clark explained the importance aU parties, "Milosevic, the Bosnians, and' Tudjman -- attach. to NATO - not UN -- .
implementation." NATO SecretaIy General Claes emphasized that the U.S. had the full support of the Alliance. When the time came, Claes promised, NATO would be ready to
implement a settlement 12
'
.

.
When the NAC met on September 29, it approved the fundamental components of an !FOR mission and asked that. military planners begin organizing for possible
deployment The most significant disagreements. as before, concerned the level of UN
. involvement in' ci"vi Ii an implementation and the structure of political-military decision- making within NATO. On the former, the main difference remained between the French
and British (who wanted a more active UN role) and the U.S .. (who did not). In a compromise, the NAC agreed that the Civilian implementation coordinator would have
authority granted by the UN Security Council. but would not be a "UN representative." On the latter issue of political decision-making within the NAC decided that
political guidance would' be conducted through the existing chain of not a
special representative. 13
'
.
. Based on these consultations and the broad parameters that had already been
established by the U.S. government's inter-agency deliberations, Slocombe, Clark and
Kornblum began to draw up the rough draft of a military "annex" for a compreliensive
peace settlement On .the fljght home from Brussels" they began to edit a draft that had
been sketched out by Clark's staff. When they returned to Washington, most of the
drafting was turned over to officials on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They completed a
preiiminary cut by October 3, which was then circulated inter-agency. 14 State
Department officials felt that while the document was raw, it was an important start.
With at least a few weeks before the start of a peace conference. NATO was well on its
way to fonnulating a plan for implementing a settlement.
IS

The next step was a two-day meeting during October 5-6 of NATO Defe.nse
MWsters held in Williamsburg, Virginia-During the day of talks. President Clinton made the announcement that the cease-fire agreement had been reached in Bosnia. This
news. Secretary of Defense Peny reported to the President, "added urgency" to' the
J J For reports of these deliberations, see "September 25 gpCJR Discussion of Draft Decision Sheet for
September 29 NAC," Cable, U.S.NATO 3765, September 26, J 995; and "September 26 SPClR (AM
Session) on Draft Decision Sheet on TO's Role in Implementing a Peace Agreement," Cable,
U.S.NA TO 3767, September 26, 1995.
12 See "September 27 Informal NAC: LTG Clark Briefs on Negotiations and Implications for Cable. Slate 230519, September27. 1995; "September 27 NAC -- Fonner Yugoslavia
Topics {Except LTGEN Clark Briefing)." Cable, U.S.NATO 3784. September 27, 1995. 13 Sec "September 29 NAC Authorizes NMA's to Develop Concept for Peace . Implementation," Cable. U.S.NA to 3322, September 30. 1995; and "Council Decisions on NATO's Role
in Implementing a Peace Agreement." DOD Document, Pardew Notebook, Shuttle 5. 14 Bosnia Peace lmplemenlation Agreement" (Draft)," Joint Staff Document, October 3, 1995 .
. IS See Kornblum interview. Clark interview.
152
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
...
Williamsburg discussions. Building on the NAC's decisions of late September, the
meetings went very well, and were marked "by a strong sense ofuility and purpose:' To
Peny, the NATQ ministers conveyed that the Alliance had "emerged from a long dark
tunnel and irresolution. 'The cure was American.leadership;,,16
. NATO commander General George 10ulwan briefed the ministers on the status of
military.planning for the IFOR operation." While the planning had gone well thus far,
Jotilwan .emphasized that they "seize tlie moment" and commit to troop and financial
numbers soon. Joulwan's concept for IFOR entailed a force of 50-60,000 ground troqps
iIi Bosnia, deployed into three zones Jed by separate American, French, and
British divisions. Almost all sixteen NATO nations wanted to contribute to the force,
leading Perry to note that "it is amazing what American leadership has done to bring in
other countries." In terms of U.S. commItmentS, Joulwan explained that the American
military would provide roughly one-third of the total troops, at an estimated cost of $1.5
billion. .
. To Perry's surprise, the discussion on Bosnia at was relatively brief.
As he explained to the President, this fact seemed to reflect-the that the time for
discussion and debate has passed. The ministers want to get on with the operation. n
Russia and IFOR
While negotiations with European Allies on IFOR were well on track. there was
still much to be done to work out the role Russianiight play. The NAC had agreed that
the Aliiance should prepare to include non-NATO forces into IFOR, but to defer
decisions on specifics to U.S. and Russian negotiators. The issge would be engaged at
the highest levels. /In a September 27 telephone conversation with President Clinton,
President Yeltsin stressed energetically the importance his government put on NATO
issues, including lFOR. While discussing the agenda for the upcoming U.S.-Russia
presidential summit in Hyde Park, New York, Yeltsin abruptly interrupted the interpreter
to stammer ''NATO. NATO, NATO, NATO! This is one of the most difficult issues we
will have to diSCUSS!,,18
The critical issue was not Russian participation per se, but devising a way in
which Russia could participate without appearing subservient to NATO. This challenge
. was particularly acute given the upcoming parliamentary elections in Russia. IIi a
September 28 meeting at the White House. Russian Foreign Minister KOzYrev told
President Clinton that a NA TO-only force would create great internal pressures for the
Yeltsin government. "We can't put our troops under NATO command," Kozyrev said.
"President Yeltsin would be under great pressure." President, Clinton explained that
while he realized that NATO command and control was problematic for Russia, the U.S.
could not recreate the conditions of more recent - and less successful - military
operations. "We had some problems in Somalia with ambiguous command and control."
16 Memorandum for the President from Secretary Perry, "Special Defense Report," October 10,1995. All
detaiis from this meeting are from this repOrt. unless otherwise noted.
17 For document on which Joulwan briefed, see "SACEUR Concept of Operations for Peace
Implementation in the Fomter Yugoslavia," October 6, 1995. . .
II "President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Bosnia, CFE. Hyde Park and a Vice Presidential Meeting with
Cbemomyrdin, September 21, 1995." NSC memorandum, September 28. 1995.
7

UNCLASSIFIED
[53
UNCLASSIFIED
F
the President said. I believe'that in part due to this 18 American soldiers died there ... I am sensitive to Russian concerns, but we need to ensure that we have a practical arrangement, so that we don't get kids Agreeing to work with the U.S., Kozyrev said that "what's important is a nod toward Russian public opinion." The President agreed. "I know the laSt couple of months have been tough for you and that our actions haven't helped," he said. "We want to heip you now as we make peaCe in Bosnia. I want
to help your situation." 19
U.S. officials viewe4 Russian participation in IFOR,. not only as a problem to be .
an opportunity to be. seized. If the coordination problem was solved, it might help soothe bilateral relations more generally. IFOR could become an example of the benefitS of U.S.-RU$sian partnership .. "Really the principal motivation for 'bringing [Russia] into Bosnia was sO that:we would have something practical from which to build on this priority relationship/' Secretary of Defense Perry explained. To Strobe Talbott, the way to ''jujitsu'' this difficult issue was "to make NATO's activism in Bosnia proof of the proposition that NATO and' Russia could cooperate and that we could tum the
Bosnian experience into a reassurance as far "as the Russians were concemed.,,20
In addition to salving bilateral ties, including Russia in IFOR'would be a way for
the West to integrate its former global adversary into the security architectiJreofEurope. "We saw that IFOR was a metaphor for solving difficult security problems in Europe," Perry we.wanted toilave Russia as part of the solution ... not as a nation
creating problems [or] standing oUtside and watching." If NATO and Russia couldn't
cooperate on Bosnia, Peny I}elieved, "you couldn't do it in the rest of Europe." In this sense, a Russian role in IFOR was more about Bosnia alone; it would have profound implications for the" future of European security relations. U.S. officials. felt strongly that
. success in structuring $uch a role could contribute'to anatmosphere conducive to.
resolving other key issues on the U.S.-Russian agenda - such as NATO enlargement,
revisions to the CFE treaty, and de-nuclearlzation throughout the fonner Soviet states.
21
At this point, the Administration was heavi.ly engaged in three parallel
negotiations: while the Holbrooke team continued to negotiate with the Balkan parties, the Slocombe-Clark-Komblum delegation consulted with NATO Allies, and Talbott and
Perry handled the Russia portfolio.
22
On October 8 in Geneva, Perry discussed the IFOR issue with his Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.
23
While it had
19 "Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. September 28, 1995" NSC memorandum of
conversation, September 29, 1995.
20 Perry interview; Talbott interview.
.
21 Perry interview; Talbott interview; SIocombe interview. Secretai)' Christopher made 21 similar point to
British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind during their September 26 meeting at the UN" See "Secretary's
Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, September 26, 1995, New York," Cable, State
233721. September 30,1995.
22 Russians also pursued mid-level discussions witb European members" of NATO. Such talks were
I;u-gely jnconclusive; as were rarely discussed. 'See, for example. "Russians Meet in Paris on .
IFOR; GOF Official Reviews Bosnia Reconstruction," Cable, Paris 23877, October 4. 1995. 2l The u.s. parameters for the Russian role in JFORon which Perry negotiated had been cleared by the
Deputies on October 6. In sum. these parameters were: that IFOR be NA TOted with no dual
key, an other options would be characterized simply as "cooperation witb"IFOR; that Russia could work
within (FOR. but not have its own separate lOne of operations; that Russian troops could only be under
154
a
a
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
appeared that Russia was willing to work with the U.S. on IFOR, recent discussions had led Perry and Talbott to believe that Russian military officials - notably Grachev -- did
not want to expend scarce military resources in Bosnia. and were pressuring Yeltsin against participation. Thus; along with finding a mutually acceptable formulation for Russia's participation, Secretary Perry was in the odd position of having to convince Grachev that the cause was even worth the effort?"
..
According to Perris report to the President, the meeting with Grachev waS "surprisingly positive even if it did not resolve the essential issues.
u
Grachev signaled a willingness to subordinate Russian troops to a U.S. General. but was opposed taking orders from NATO. Russian domestic politics was the underlying factor. "[Orachev] was emphatic that it would be political dynamite for Yeltsin to agree to political subordination under the explaining that Such an arrangemeneCmight well produce a communist victory in the coming elections," Perry reported. "This would set Russia back seventy years, and we'll be back in the Cold War," Grachev had explained .. The Russian Defense minister emphasized that "optics" were important: To avoid even the 'appearance that Russian forees were under NATO, he urged the U.S. not to refer to IFOR as a ''NATO force" but 'rather an "International Implementation Force.'.2S
Grachev's comments confrrmed U.s. officials' suspicions - a perception of equality was all Russia really needed. As a Pentagon strategy explained, "a good
cosmetics job ... could tip the balance" toward Russian acceptance?6
.
Talbott, who also attended these Geneva discussions, had a more sanguine
outlook on the prospects for success. As he told Secretary Christopher over the phone
. and in a follow-up memorandum, the talks in Geneva showed that "there is a significant
chance that we can't get there from here - that it may simply be too hard for the
Russians to participate in, or even cooperate with" a'NATO-led IFOR." Once again, Talbott saw the internal divisions of the Kremlin leadership at work. "I suspect that what
Bill [Perry] saw in Geneva was Grachev's own bottom-line [against a NATO-led IFOR]. What's not so clear is whether it's Yeltsin's. It's certainly not Kozyrev's: he's got in mind a much mQre modest (and realistic, and to us acceptable) Russian force that could
fit alongside IFOR in a non-combat capacity." Most of the final decisions, both Talbott
Russian national command only for "non-core .IFOR tasks; that the NAC would be the sole . .
decision-making body for JFOR; that any ad hoc planning group established to incluc;ie .non-allied.
participants would only consult the NAC but not make decisions without or for it; and thaI NATO meetings
at a 16-plus-Russia would be Ulilized as a forum for consultation. See "Summary of Conclusions fOT
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, OctobCr 6, 1995," NSC memorandum. October 12, 1995.
24 Talbott had learned of this problem during an October 3 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Mamedov. Apparently, the Russian Foreign Minisky, Jed.by Kozyrev. was pressing Yeltsin 10 cooperate
with the U.S., hut was meeting resistance from Grachev and others. See "Talbott-Mamedov meeting:
October 3, 1995," undated notes, EURfilcs.
'
,
25 See Perry to Clinton, Defense Report." For extensive delaiis of meeting. see Secretary Perry's
"Trip Report: Meeting with RussianMOD Pavel Orachev,.Geneva,'8 Oct 95," October 8,1995; and
"DiscUssions During 8 Oct Peny-Grachev Meetings," DoD memonmdum (draft), October 8, 1995. For
Perry's talking points, see "SecDefTalkers for I-on-l wi Grachev," Strobe Talbott draft, October 7, 1995.
See also "Options for RllSsian Relationship with IFOR," no author, no D files; and "Two options [on
IFOR} from Perry-Grachev Trip," no date, D files.
.
.

16 See "Russian Participation in the Bosnia IFOR: Strategy for SECDEF-MOD Grachev Meeting, 8
October 1995," 000 October 5, 1995.
155
UNCLASSIFIED
t ,
and Petry would have.. to be taken up by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin when
they met on October 23 in Hyde Park. The key. Talbott felt, was "to ascertain whether
Yeltsin's going to stick with Grachev's position or take a deep breath and go With
Kozyrev. and we've got to try to do that before Hyde Park.,,27
As Talbott had surmised. the bureaucratic .infighting in Moscow intensified in the
days following Geneva. After meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov on
October 10, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Thomas:Pickering reported that Grachev and the
Russian Ministry of Defense were trying "to s.addle" Kozyrev and the Foreign'Ministry
with the' hard' decisions on' WOR command and control.
esplte t ese
pro ems, arne ov sugges etas ongas USS18 co say It was bemg treated as an
equal, they could come to an agreement on IFOR. "The importarlt thing is that Russia
can be portrayed for a Russian audience as being more or less on the same footing, as
NATO, under the blessing of the UN," he emphasized to Pickering .. "The rest is
negotiabJe.',23
'
, .
.
.
, Part of the problem with this negotiating process was that the Russians felt they
had been neglected by Holbrooke.
29
Indeed, several Contact Group partners had begun to
voice their concerns about the lack of consultation. Holbrooke's strategy of controlling
the Contact Group by,limiting the information it received about his negotiations 'was
beginning to rub ilieEuropeans' nerves.
30
There was concern that the U.S.
would cut a deal on Bosnia without properly consulting Europe.
3
In a conversation with
11 "private" to Christopher, attached to Perry October 8 trip report.
21 "Mamedov on Bosnia," Cable, Moscow 32623. October II, 1995.
'
29 The Russians had even begun to itrgue that such neglect would hurt the peace process. For example.
Ivanov had passed word to Holbrooke that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had [old him that the
only way the Bosnian Serbs would accept a final map was if the U.S. and Russia "are together on the
details and make it clear to him that he has no alternative but to accept what we have agreed on." See
"Bosnia. Map," Cable, Moscow 32626, October II. 1995. .
,
30 Holbrooke did recognize that the Europeans - particularly the Russians were angry. At the beginning
of his third Balkan shuttle of Holbrooke wrote a conspicuously complimentaty letter to
Ivanov, updating him on the status of the talks, and praising the Russian Federation's contribution as 'key
to continued momentum and progress . your counsel and support have been critical to the success we have
achieved thus far. J am. profoundly grateful for your efforts during this arduous negotiating process. Sec
State 232176. September 29. 1995.
31 For example, in a September 22 meeting with American embassy officials in London, British officials
described that they did not feel adequately briefed on U.S. negotiations with the parties. "While they
recognize the need to keep our cards 'close to the cbest,' tbey do not wantto be in the position of 1ean1ing
about agreements on the constitutional arrangements and ,a map - which they would have a role in
implementing - only after the fact," an embassy report noted. These officials suggested that the Britisb
government, "absent a better understanding of the negotiations, 'You1d begin to reserve its position on its
role in implementation:' See "September 25 U.S.-UK,BilateraI on Implementation of a Bosnia Peace
Settlement," Cable, London 13181, September 22, J 995. In his September 27 meeting with Holbrooke at
tbe UN. French Foreign Minister de Charette angrily stressed that &cit was important that the U.S. better
coordinate its efforts with its Contact Group partners ... it is very importanttbat the U.S. keep its European
156
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED

Pickering on October 12, Yeltsin aide V.iktor Ilyushin stressed the . importance the
"Russian leadership" (i.e., Yeltsin) attached to "avoiding situations in which decisions on
Bosnia or European Security issues are taken without the Participation of Russia." 32
To carve out a more prominent role in .the Bosnian peace process, Yeltsin
proposed summoning the three Balkan presidents to Moscow before proximity talks to
"set the stage" for detailed negotiations. Such a meeting, the Russians argued,. woul<l
"pind" the parties to negotiate in good faith. Moreover, it would provide Yeltsin an
important boost politically. The U.S. initially was opposed -- officials worried that
bringing the Balkan leaders together in an ''uncontrolled'' envirorunent could ali
explosion that would derail the peace initiative. Publicly, however, the U.S. remained
non-committal. Washington strove to meet the Russians concerns while stressing. the
need to avoid a media circus that would complicate proximity talks. In any event,
Yeltsin planned to take the issue up with Clinton in Hyde Park?) The Russian leadership
also hoped that prior to Hyde officials could devise ''workable mechanisms" for
Russian participation in IFOR which the two presidents could bless.
34
. .
With only a week to go before Hyde Park,' the U.S. intensely engaged the
Russians both on IFOR and the peace process. Following meetings in Paris with French,
British and Gennan leaders on October 16. the Holbrooke team traveledto Moscow to
meet with the Contact Group.3S Holbrooke walked the Contact Group through an outline
of the draft peace agreement, describing for his countetparts how the procesS was
proceeding and what a fmal proposal might look like. He also promised that the draft.S
would be shared with the Contact Group before the conference convened: During the
. meeting. the British and the French jointly announced their support for Carl Bildt to
become the senioF,"civilian coordinator in Bosnia jf there was a peace agreement.
Although some American officials had misgivings about Bildt, Holbrooke agreed to his
Contact partners infonned as quickly as possible ",bout developments as they occur rather than D
Charette explained that "[the] French media was claiming that the U.S. bad taken over the negotiations illld
France was standing On the sidelines. This situation did not contribute to good relations and France hoped
the U.S. would do something about this." Holbrooke replied that the problem of coordination was not as
bad as de Charette claimed. but that "any mistakes in the past were unintentional and that we will double
our efforts to coordinate better with our European Allies." See State 233374. The UN leadership was also
upset about not being' properly informed of negotiating progress, although their complaints were less
problematic because the UN would not be as critical in implementation.' Sec "SYG's Leiter to the
Secretary Expressing Disappointment at Stoltenberg's Exclusion From the September 8 Geneva Meeting."
Cable, U.S.UN 3451, September II, 1995; and "Bosnia/Croatia: UKUN Convenes a Meeting ofU.S-p
French and German Pennreps to Discuss Next Steps Re Bosnia in New York:' Cable. U.S.UN 3537,
September 16. 1995.
32 "Viktor Ilyushin Emphasizes Russian Role in Decision-making on Bosnis," Cable. Moscow 32118.
October 12, 1995. I1yuchin went on to explain that while the Russian political landscape was dominated by
the upcoming parliamentary elections - which created rhetoric "that is sharper than it might otherwise be"
- Yeltsin was seized with the NATO issue and wanted to see it solved.
33 The message was conveyed in a letter to the President from Yeltsin. See memorandum for BUR/SeE
fromJohn Klekas (P). "Russian Ambassador Vorontsov's Call on UlS Tamoff - Yeltsin's proposal for a
meeting in Moscow by Izetbegovic. Tudjman and Milosevic brlore the Proximity Talks," October 13.
J 995. For letter, see Yeltsin to Clinton. October 12, 1995.
34 Cable. Moscow 32778.
)5 For details of the Paris meetings - with Chimc, de Charette and British, French and Gennan officials --
see Kerrick nOles, October 16, 1995.
-
151
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
nomination, feeling that "to do otherwise would provoke a huge breach with all the other
members of the Contact Group.',36
To the Holbrooke delegation, the Moscow. Contact Group meeting was notable in
that the members reflected a "general agreement... on the need for a bold, comprehensive
approach to a settlement.,,37 Holbrooke explained to the group that they should follow
such an ambitious agenda because "what is not agreed on during proximity talks will
never be agreed." While they discussed possible scenarios for various folIowon
implementation conferences after proximity talks, Holbrooke stressed that "we are a long
way from peace." And peace, he explained, is what the parties and Contact Group needed
to be most concerned about at the moment. "If there is peace," he said, "we will work on
how to implement [it] together." While the upcoming talks would undoubtedly be
Holbrooke said that his team had a mandate "to go for broke." They hoped that EUrope
was prepar<:d to respond inkind.
38
.
.'
, That afternoon, a delegation led by Strobe Talbott and Walt Slocombe the
Holbrooke team in Moscow for bilateral discussions with the Russians. The main topic
was IFOR The talks were described as cordial but unproductive, With both sides' merely
repeating their standard positions.) As a,small step forward, Russian Foreign Ministry
officials asked the U.S. to provide it with four assurances concerning iFOR: I) that
Russia be involved in planning for its role in IFOR; 2) that Russia be able to approve the
plan prior to NAC approval; 3) that there be official ofunderstap.ding"
between Russia and NATO on Russian participation; and 4) that there be a Illechanism
for on-going consultations between the two sides. All four were consistent with current
U.S. planning, and Talbott and Slocombe approved them. 39
In a later meeting with Russian military General Clark discussed possible
Russian interation 'into the NATO command and the size ofa Russian troop
deployment
4
Grachev had been pushing for a entire division of Russian troops, while
the U.S. felt a more a modest size would be sufficient. To Clark's surprise, however, the
Russian officers responded favorably to his suggestion that a smaller force - such as a
)6 See Holbrooke interview with author (notes), 1anuary 9, 1997; and Kerrick notes, October 17, 1995_
)7 As described by Wes Clark in his report to the Pentagon. See Memorandum for the CJCSIvCJCS,
"Daily Negotiations Update,. 17 October 1995," October 17, 1995.
'
31 For details of this meeting. Kerrick notes, October. 11. 1995; and "Contact Group Press ConferenCe
Transcript,' Moscow, October 17," Cable, Moscow 33454, October 18. 1995.
After the Moscow meetings. the U.S. developed a draft statement outlining these four assurances for
possible releasc at Hyde Parte. See "Ivanov's Four Questions (with U.S. responses)," October 18, 1995; D
files.
co At that time, there was still considerable debate within the Clinton Administration aoout what possible
compromise command structures 'For example, one option considered was a "UN hybrid"
structure, in which Russian troops would answer to a NATO General who would also wear a UN hat. The
Joint Chicfs of Staff strongly resisted this. however. arguing that such an arrangement provided UN
officials (specifically. General Janvier} an opening to meddle in the NATO operation. In other possible
amuigements. officials considered establishing a "senior council" to consult the NAC on IFOR or
have Russian 'troops work under the Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (or SA CEUR), General
1oulwan. By thc time for thesc talks in Moscow, however, a final decision in the inter-agency process had
not yet been made. See Official-Informal No: 203, Dated) 0/16/95; from Kornblum to Talbott,
Holbrooke and Jim Collins (SlNIS)," Cable. State 245887, October 17, 1995; and "Bosnia: Russian Role in
!FOR," by George Glass (BUR/RPM) for Talbott. October 2, 1995.
158
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
brigade -- might be better. "May your remark be a whisper in the ear o{God,' they said,
urging him to stress the same points to Grachev.
41
.
These meetings made clear that Russia's position on IFOR had developed little
since the Perry-Grachev in Geneva. "Clearly the Russians want to be part of the
operation," Slocombe wrote Perry, "but they have not yet really. changed their position on
political control, independence of action, and a [Russia-only] geographiCal As
Talbott told the NAC on October 19. was now "much.clearer how unclear the situation
is ... no decisions have been made." Russian attitudes and policies toward a possible .
IFOR remained very much in flux, still riddled by bureaucratic infighting. While
consultations should continue, Talbott explained. it seemed . as though things would
remain static until Hyde Park.
43
"President Yeltsin is reserving for final say
on what has been an extremely contentious issue both within his Administration and in
the legislature," Talbott said. A large part of the problem was the landscape of Russian
domestic politics. "Virtually every contentious issue [in Russia]2
U
Talbott told the NAC.
"is the subject of intense debate and exploitation by the government's opponents as
further proof of Yeltsin's selling out Russia's interests." 44 -Although -this was an
understandable.excuse for indecision) Talbott had made clear to the Russians that the U.S.
would not support Yeltsin's proposed summit of the three Balkan leaders unless the IFOR
issue was settled.
4s
. . .
In the wake of these meetings, U.S. officials saw three possible options for a
Russian role in IFOR. First, that Russia participate as a full member of with
"political advice" given to NAC by an ad hoc council of IFOR nations. SeCond, that
Russia participate in functional, non-combat roles, such as military construction, transport
and engineering. And finally, that Russia not participate in military implementation at
al1.
46
The U.S. position, Talbott explained to the NAC, was to have Russia involved --
either as a full participant or in a non-combat role- as long as the fundamental policy of
having a NATO-led IFOR remained intact.
47
'Russian participation. is extremely
41 details of these meetings. see memorandum for Perry and Deputy SecretiU)' of Defense
lohn White from Walter stocombe. "Moscow Meeting: 17 Oct 95," October 18, 1995; "Deputy Secretary's
10/J7-18 Meetings with DFM Ivanov and Afanasyevskiy," Cable, Moscow 33943, October 23, 1995; .
Clark report to CJCSNCJCS. October 17. 1995; and Kerrick notes. <xtober 17, 1995.
42 Slocombc to Perry and White, October 18, 1995. . .
.0 Consultation did continue. Almost immediately after the U.S. team finished their briefing, the NAC met
in a special" J6-plus-t" session with Russian Ambassador Chwkin. While this meeting did open the
dialogue somewhat, "it provided no answers on the flexibility of Russia's position:' See "NAC 1 0 October
95: '16-pluslWith Russia," Cable. U.S.NAT04137. October 20, 1995.
44 Slocombc and Wes Clark, who were with Talbott that day, also briefed the NAC. See "Deputy Secretary
Talbott and Under Secretary Siocombe Brief the NAC on Talks in Moscow," Cable, U.S.NATO 4171.
October 25, 1995. .
k
Clar reporttoCJSClVCJSC.October 17.1995.
46 For an explanation of these options, see "IFOR and Rlissici," undated document. no author. P files.
47 In an October 12 memorandum. John Kornblum outlined for Talbott the fundamental objectives for U.S.
policy: I) complete autonomy for NATO as the organizer of the IFOR; 2) an indirect link to the United
Nations, without requirements for UN oversight of either the military or civilian components; 3) a me.ans of
integrating non-NATO participants, especiaUy Russia. into the I FOR. on the basis of NATO command and
control; and 4) a credible central civilian implementation structure which does not become embroiled in the
159
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
q
desirable but not necessary," Talbott said. Of the three possible options. "in, with, or
not in" he said that the U.S. considered the first most desirable and the second most
JikeIy.48
Holbrooke's Fifth Balkan 'Shuttle
After the first plenary meeting with Talbott and the Russians in Moscow, the
Holbrooke team (minus Wes Clark.) left for Belgrade. To present the p/Pties a united
Contact Group front -- and, nodoubt, to ease intra-Contact Group tensions Holbrooke
invited Carl Bildt and Igor Ivanov, who would co-chair the proximity talks along with
Holbrooke, to travel with the U.S. team during this fifth and last shuttle. This trip would
be the shortest of Holbrooke's efforts thus far; lasting only 48 hours, it was onlymeant to
be a urma) systems check" with the three parties before negotiations resumed at the
proximity talks.
49
.
. .
During the two stops in Belgrade (October 17 and 19), the U.S.-Contact Group
delegation encountered a feisty Milosevic. The Serb. leader much of his time
complaining -. about Muslim-Croat cease-fire violations, the site for proximity talks. and
sanctions. Over the past week, MiIosevic said. forces had violated the cease-
fire, continuing offensive actions in northwest Bosnia. He had recently quipped to Rudlo
Perina that it was "now Holbrooke's turn to discipline lzetbegovic and TUdjman." 0
Repeating this line to Holbrooke. Bildt and Ivanov, the Serb leader said that since recent ,
. Federation violations far outweighed anything the Serbs had the international
community should be "e:ven-handed"when assessing cease-fire implementation.
Holbrooke told Milosevic that the U.S. was "extremely unhappy" with Tudjrnan, and bad
made this very clear: to him. In a meeting in on October 18, the Croat leader
pledged that he would not press the BSA any 1Vrther in Western Bosnia.
51
.
The team also infonned the three parties of the site for proximity talks. After a
week reviewing possible facilities. the State Department had chosen Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base outside of Dayton. Ohio.
52
While Tudjman was agnostic about the choice,
Izetbegovic and Milosevic seemed disappointed. Izetbegovic and Sacirbey left the clear
impreSSion that they wanted easier access to the American media to dnun up public
pressure on their. behalf. Ppon hearing that the talks would be held not in bustling
,midtown Manhattan but sleepy mid-Ainerica, Milosevic said "you can't contIne Us to a
politics of the UN, the EU or other organization. See:' A Mu Itilateral Framework for Bosnian Peace
fmplemcntation:' October 12, 1995 .
. .q U.S.NAT04171, .
9 As described by Pardew in his trip report to Peny. Sec "Peace Initiative in the Balkans- Round V."
October 19, 1995.
.
.10 For Serb complaints about cease-fire violations, see "Discussion with Milosevic about Cease-fire
Violations and Banja Luka Ethnic Cleansing," Cable, Belgrade 5030, October 12. 1995; and "Milutinovic
Says 'Everything is Threatened by Continued Muslim-CJ'!)at Offensive," Cable, Belgrade 5045, October
13.1995 ..
51 Holbrooke also had told Milosevic tbat U.S. intelligence supported MiJosevic's claim that Croatia had
been deploying troops into the cease-fire area, but that they "didn't know why" Tudjman was doing so.
See "First Joint Meeting of Proximity-Talks Co-Chairmen with Milosevic," Cable, Belgrade 5122, October
18,1995; Kerrick October 17-18, 1995; and Pardcw report, October 19, 1995.
'l For details on the choice of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, see discussion below.
160
2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
T
military base."SJ The Serb leader wanted to' be closer to New York and Washington,
where he could enjoy the high:-life no doubt. also play to the media. "l want to smell
the air of .New York again," the one-time Manhattan banker had once remarked to
Holbrooke.
s4
He also insisted on meeting President Clinton.
55
MiIosevic believed that a
Clinton meeting was an important component of mending his image. As Pardew had
observed. "if [Milosevic) can be rehabilitated as a peacemaker. he potentially gains the
international respectability he seeks."S6 Recognizing that this motivation could provide
useful leverage for the U.S., Holbrooke kept the carrOt dangling. "The President will not
be involved in the talks," Holbrooke responded. However, if agreement was reached, the
U.S. would "consider't having Clinton participate in a signing ceremony.S7
. Milosevic preSsed the Americans the hardest on sanctions relief since his first
. meeting with Holbrooke in August. "On sanctions, Milosevic has finally taken the gloves .
. off," Pardew reported to Perry. Calling this the "question of aU questions,"the Serb
leader stressed that they were lJIljustified given his country's cooperation in the peace
process. He argued that sanctions should be suspended before proximity talks convened,
and then fully lifted once an agreement was signed. Holbrooke; -according to
rejected this demand:> explaining that the issue could oilly be decided by the UN. "'We're
not the UN sanctions committe<;u Holbrooke said.
s8
.
Holbrooke also returned to the issue of Serb human rights abuses in Bosnia
While Croatia had its share of violations, such as not. allowing the return ofKrajina Serb
refugees, human rights were a particular problem with Belgrade.
59
Once again, the major
problem was Arkan. U.S. intelligence reported that the Serb terrorist was brutalizing
c.vilians and detaining thousands of Muslim men near Baqja Luka at the behest of
Milosevic. Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck had returned to the region,
reporting to Holbrooke that "several thousand lives" were now at stake in the area.
Holbrooke warned Milosevic that Arkan's activities "raised the specter ofSrebrenica. It
is essential that Arkan be stopped and these people released.,,60
- To no one's surprise, Milosevic responded defensively. arguing that Arlcanwas
not responsible for the dire situation. He refused to acknowledge Arkan or Serb war
crimes generally as legitimate issues. "countering with lectures on crimes committed by
53 When Milosevic heard the news, he exclaimed: "What. you're going to me locked up in Dayton,
Ohio? I'm not a monk you know!" Chris Hill interview with author (notes); also see Roger "U.S.
Envoy in Bosnia Helps to Free Colleague (From an Ally)," New York Times, October 19,1995.
,. Sec Pardew memorandum to Perry and Slocombe, "Motivation of the Parties in Bosnia," October 11,
1995; Holbrooke interview with author, (notes). December 20. 1996.
5S Kerric.k notes. October 17-18, 1995. .
56 Pardew memorandum, October II, 1995.
5-1 . .
Kerrick notes. October ]7-18,1995.
51 For details, see Pardew report, October 19, 1995; Kerrick notes, October 17-18. 1995; and Belgrade
5122: .
59 When the Holbrooke team visited Tudjman on October 19, they delivered to him over 3000 refugee form
filled out by Krajina Serb refugees who wished to return to their homes. See "Krajina Serb Refugee Forms
Delivered to Zagreb," Belgrade 5135. October 19, 1995.
60 See Belgrade 5122; "Arkan said to be Charged with Keeping the Population from Fleeing a Chaotic
Banja Luka," Cable. Belgrade 5125, October 18, 1995; and Shattuck interview, July 30,1996.
?
iJNCLASSIFIED
161
/.
UNCLASSIFIED
Muslims and Croats and the impact of sanctions on his people.,,61 Milosevic also denied
that he had any control over Arkan. Anticipating this line of argument, the U.s. tea,rn had
asked prepare a memorandum outlining Arkan's activities and his links to .the
Affairs Ministry. ... ...
Durmg a meal in Belgrade the evening of October 19. Holbrooke pressed the
Arkan issue again, eliciting the same response from the Serb 'leader: "No,no
7
no."
Milosevic chuckled. the U.S. had it all wrong. With cue, Holbrooke said that Pardew
had a piece ofpaper--i . . . 1-- outlining how the U.S.haditright. .
Vlhen Pardew. as planned. placed the folded paper on the table next to Milosevic.
the result was revealing. The Serb leader refused to look at it or touch it. His body
language leaned away from it As the U.S. team reflected afterward:.- this choreographed
act was truly revealing. It seemed as MiIosevic saw the paper itself as the
"smoking gun that connected him to. all of this. And that, of course, is his greatest fear."
If Milosevic:was connected to war crimes, his entire'strategy of rehabilitation and
international acceptance would be completely undennined.
63
After the rneal,Pardevv left
the paper at Milosevic"s place .. A Serb aide told the American negotiator !hat he had
forgotten something. "No, I didn't forget it," Pardew said. "It's for [MilosevicJ. He can
have iC,64 .
Hyde Park
On October23. Clinton and YeItsin met at FranklinD.RoosevelCs eslatein Hyde
New. York .. Going this long-anticipated summit, the atmosphere was a bit
tense; in a speech before the United Nations the day before, Yeltsin had said !hat Russia
was concerned that the UN Security Council had been "put on this sidelines" in decision-
rt October 19
ardew interview, June 27. ) 995.
162
7 a
lJNrr ,A SSTFIED
]31
:81
.BI
UNCLASSIFIED
....
making on IFOR. Moreover, recent press reports stated that YeItsin was preparing to
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, one of the West's best friends in the Kremlin. 6S
Despite these ominous signals. the Clinton-Yeltsin talks that day were jovial.
Reflecting on the meeting, Talbott (who was the notetaker for. the pres!dents' one-on-one
meetings) felt that the meeting was "one of the. best between these two presidents, both
atmospherically and psychologically, despite . expectations that it would be one of the
worst.,,66
. .
On lFOR, Yeltsin agreed that, at a minimum, two battalions of Russian troops -
up to 2000 soldiers .- would participate in various non-combat roles, such as mine:.
clearing, reconstruction, and airlift. He had apparen!ly lobbied for a more substantial
Russian role, but Clinton explmned that it could only be done under NATO command.
Clinton outlined this option -- the second of the "in, with, or not in" .possibilities Talbott
had earlier described - as the best compromise. In this way, Russia could work uwith"
NATO. but not "in" NATO. The proposal fell between the two "red lines": Russia's
desired autonomy from NATO command and the U.S. desire for unified NATO control.
67
This was the critical breakthrough on the IFOR issue. Aftei weeks of stalling, the
Russians had agreed to the size" and function of its contribution to IFOR, as well as its
broad relationship with NATO. Despite this welcome development, the two leaders did
not reach a decision on the specific command structure for - IFOR. These thorny
operational decisions could still threaten Russian participation, but with the goodwill
generated from the presidential summit, it seemed unlikely that the Russians would
renege.
68
Clinton and Yeltsin decided to leave these details up to Perry and Grachev,
who were scheduled to meetat Fort Kansas at the end of the week.
69

. . .
.
Clinton had-'Gone his best to talk the Russian leader out of his wish for a pre-
Dayton summit. Milosevic, Tudjman and lzetbegovi6 all opposed the meeting. and the
U.S., especially Holbrooke, feared that the distraction would further complicate the peace
6' Yeltsin was at the United Nations as part.ofthe organization'S 50th anniversary celebration.
respectively, Barbara Crossette. "The UN at 50: The Overview; Hope and Disappointment Mingle at UN
Celebration," New York Times, October- 23. 1995; and David Hoffman, "Yeltsin Plans to Replace Kozyrev;
Foreign Minister Drew Fils for Pro-West Views." Washington Post. October 20, 1995. In a recent meeting
with French President Chirae, Yeltsin had also hinted that Russia would send a large force to IFOR-
possibly as much as 20-25,000 troops. This led Chirae to decide that deserved its own zone.
something that the U.S. government vigorously opposed. Sec "YeltsinlChirac Summit," Cable, Paris

66 Talbott expressed this to the Gennan Foreign Ministry's Poliiical Director (schinger during an October
24 phone call. See "The Acting Secretary and German Foreign Ministry Political Director Isthinger,:>
Cable, State 253723, October 27, 1995..
-
07 As outlined in Clinton's talking points for the summit. Sec "Proposed TP's on Russial1FOR for
POTU.SNeltsin." Pardew notebook, Shuttle 5; and State 25723.
61 In subsequent talks, however, some foreign ministry officials did try to backtrack on some of their
President> s commitments. But Talbott. who sat in on the Clinton-YellSin one-on-one meeting, quickly
this attempts. See Perry iriterview.
.
Yeltsin also insisted that Russia's participation not be referred to as "auxiliary operations," as the U.S.
had proposed, but "special operations!' For details, see :Lunch with Boris Yeltsin. President of the
Russian Federation, October 23. 1995: NSC memorandum. November I, 1995. A memcon from the two-
hour one-on-one meeting could not be located.
a

163
UNCLASSIFIED
.. t
UNCLASSIFIED
2 I
talks.
70
Clinton explained that the Moscow talks presented tremendous logistical
difficulties and that any' missteps couId pose serious risks to success in Dayton.
Nevertheless, the American president said that he realized how important such an event
would be for Yeltsin politically. and that if he insisted, the U.S. would by to help make
them work. .yeltsin asked that it do so.1I
. . .
Clinton, Tudjman, and lzetbegovic
Following' the success in Park, Clinton met on October 24 with Tudjinan
and Izetbegovic together in New York.72 With only seven days to go before proximity
talks opened, this was intended to be more of a pep-talk than a negotiating session_ . cThis
meeting provides the needed opportunity to finn up Bosnia's and Croatia's commitment
to our peace process," Secretary Christopher explained to the President in a briefing
memorandum. "We start with a large degree of credibility with Tudjrnan and
Izetbegovic, whose unlikely alliance is largely U.S. made." Despite such leverage.
Christopher pointed out. getting to peace would be a tougher job. "Our two regional
partners have not always acted wisely, and they have difficult decisions ahead. Only a
skillful combination of U.S. pressure and reassurance can keep them on.the right road."
One of the most critical issues, Christopher explained, was shoring up the dangerously
frail Muslim-Croat Federation. 73
Joining the two Balkan presidents in a suite at the Waldorf-Astoria, President
Clinton sought to frame Bosnian peace in an historic context. "We have .seen things in
the last few years that we never expected to he said. "Israel and the PLO sitting
down after 30 years 9f fighting; the 1* laying down its arms: .. but what the world' wants
more than anything else is for a resofution of the wru:: in Bosnia." As Christopher had
recommended, Clinton raised the Federation, pralsing their successfuJ cooperation thus
far: "The significant strengthening of the Croatian and Bosnian armies has helped make a
decent peace possible. Without that I am not sure that the NATO bombing or Dick
Holbrooke's diplomacy would have worked; the differences might have been too great.',74
Both lzetbegovic and Tudjman stressed their commitment to . the peace process
and . hope for success in Dayton. However, tensions between. the two leaders were
evident .. Izetbegovic raised his concerns 'aboutthe Federation. While .eall
the parties present here support the in words," Izetbegovic explained, "the
process of implementation [such as allowing freedom of movement and return of
refugees] has not taken place as it should have." Tudjman didn't take the bait, choosing
instead to make a pitch for including resolution of Eastern Slavonia - the last Serb
70 Sec Pardew report. October 19, 1995.
71 State 25723. For a press report on the outcome of Hyde Park, see John Harris. "Clinton, Yeltsin Huddle
on Bosnia; Determined Good Cheer Produces Little," Washington Post, October 24. 1995; and Elaine
ScioJino, "Russians May Get Supporting Role For Bosnill Peace." New fork Times, October26, 1995_
72 Clinton was joined by Lake, Christopher, Albright, Holbrooke and the NSC's Sandy Vershbow.
7J Memorandum for the President from Secretary Christopher, "Meeting with Presidents Alija lzetbegovic
of Bosnia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia." October 24. 1995.
7. "Meeting with Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman
of the Republic of Croatia. October 24, 1995," NSC memorandum, October 30. 1995. Unless otherwise
noted, all quotes from this conversation are from Ihis memcoo.
164
UNCLASSIFIED
.,/
.r'
UNCLASSIFIED
occupied area of Croatia -,. on the negotiating agenda in Dayton_ Agreeing with Tudjrnan
on that point, Clinton reiterated the importance the U.S. placed on a strong Federation:
The two leaders' comments on -the issue "illustrate my point," Clinton said. "'We need
more personal contacts between your to make the Federation work on the
ground. Getting a settlement will depend on the two of you having trust. Strength lies in
genuine unity." .
.
Following this large-group meeting, President Clinton took lzetbegovic and
Tudjmari aside for a private diScussion. Clinton told them that he had had a very positive
meeting with Yeltsin at Hyde Park, and that the Russian President was very supportive of
the peace process. What Yeltsin' needed, though, waS an event to show Russia was 'an
integral part of the 7S "He is under pressure at home over the NATO issue
and because of your recent gainS on the battlefield. To help him strengthehhis political
base and make sUre his opponents don't interfere with the peace process and with
implementation, Yeltsin proposes holding this meeting in Moscow," the President said.
Moreover, he Yeltsin might be able to put more press.ure on the Serbs to
cooperate. ,
'
,Clinton asKed the two presidents to travel to Moscow for a brief meeting before
talks began in Dayton. 111is would merely be a'photo-op for Yeltsin; nothlng substantive
would be discussed. I think it would be beSt to get the visit over with," Clinton
stressed. "If we do not go berore the Duma elections - that is, before the first week of
December -- we could' be inviting the Russians to screw up the peace process or the
implementation of a settlement There were some "bad guys" in Russia who wanted to
any chance peace. "We don't want those forces to win the Duma elections on
December 17."
Both Izetbegovic and Tudjman accepted the President's request, agreeing to go to
Moscow on October 31.
76
Holbrooke, who the President had asked to join the discussion,
reiterated that the Moscow meeting was for show, not substance. Ambassador Pickering
would represent the U.S., and there would be no, joint statement released. The sole
purpose of the' meeting, President Clinton concluded, was "to enable Yeltsin to send a
signal to the Serbs arid. for Russia to be seen to be involved in the process." ,
, , Two days later, October 27, Perry and Grachev announced' a preliminary
agreement on Russian participation in IFOR.
77
Two-thousand Russian soldiers would
participate in a "special operations unit" under the command of U.S. GenernI George
)oulwan and a Russian military deputy. The jujitsuing as Talbott would say, was in
the "hats" Joulwan wore. As the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe,
Joulwan would be the NATO commander of IFOR. But to rationalize their position
under him, the Russians would only recognize his position as the head of u.s. forces.
Perry had initially thought that offering to put Russian troops wider 10ulwan's,corn.m.and
15 On his October 24 memorandum to the President. Christopher 'band-wrote that "We need to presS them
about an October 30 session in Moscow - .
76 In order to assure quick travel- and deal with Izetbegovic's claim that he could not go to Moscow
because of the toll such a trip would have on his poor health - Clinton offcred to transport the two
fresidents in U.S. military jets.
7 According to Igor Ivanov, Grachev got his "marching orders" directly from Yeltsin. Sec "10125 Meeting
with Ivanov on Bosnia:' Cable, Moscow 34260,October 25, 1995.
,
165
UNCLASSIFIED
..
UNCLASSIFIED
would have been a "complete nonstarter,"-but surprisingly, it worked. "The Russians'
were unbelievably, surprisingly. sanguine about being under American command,"
T;Ubott recalled .. "It was being under NATO command - NATO being a fourletter vvord
in Russia '';- that bothered them." For the first time. sinCe Worid War II, Russian and U.s .
troops would conduct operations together under a single command stnlcture. 71
. Bunhat day, the' most important news coming out of Russia was not about
Bosnia. Yeltsin's health. . Shortly after returning from the U.S., Yeltsin had been
hospitalized - for .the second time in months - for severe trouble. Details of
his problepls.were ambiguous, but his condition was indeed serious.
79
Since Yeltsin's
doctors insistid that he be under "close medical supervision" for at least six the
Moscow "preproximity talkS" summit Much to the relief of the Ameri can
.. and ijartieS a!ike, Moscow was off. B? . .
'.'
Washington at Work: Preparing for Proximity Talks .
.
With proximity talks scheduled. to .begin at the end of October, the U.S.
government scrnmbled to prepare. This was both a substantive and logistical challenge.
71 See Peny interview; interview. That afternoon, Talbott called to tell him of the
successful outcome of the Pc:nyOrachev talks. See "The Deputy Secretary and Russian FM Kozyrev .
October 27, 1995" Cable, State 256907, Octolx:r 31, 1995. For press reports of the meeting, see Bradley
Graham, "U.S., Russia To Set Up B!>soia Unit; NATO Command Role Remains To Be Settled,"
Washington POSI, October 28, 1995; James Brooke, "Stalemate Ends Over Russia's Role in
New York Tima, October 28, 1995.
.
.
79 For press accounts o'fYeltsin's condition. see Steven Erlanger, "Yeltsin in Hospital After New Bout: 0 r
Chest Pains," New York Timt!.S, October 27. ] 995; and Erlanger, "Doctors Say Yeltsin Will Need at Least 6
Weeks to Recover:' New York Times October 28, 1995.
166
c
&
TTNr.T.A
:81
UNCLASSIFIED --

As Holbrooke and Kornblum had decided in September, the U.S. would push an
ambitious agenda - rather than having the parties negotiate a short. basic agreement, the
goal would be a detailed, compr.ehensive settlement. As he had explained to the Contact
Group in Moscow, Holbrooke felt that they had one good shot at getting an agreement;
those issues not handled at proximity talks would never be resolved. In this way,.
Holbrooke believed it better to try to get everything - expecting some failure - rather
. than not try at all. "We knew we wouldn't be able to solve he reflected, "but
we knew that we had no chance [to reac.h agreement]. on issues if they weren't even
propOsed.,,!l With these marching orders, Administration officials intensified their
efforts to produce draft documents reflecting such a comprehensive agreement.
Since mid-September, the working group at the State Department had
been working on draft . They proposed starting with the "framework
agreement," which would be the "chapeau" document of the package of annexes which
would deal with varying issues and parties involved. By early October, work began on .
drafting details of the various annexes. At that point in Roberts view, "the most
daunting problem [was] the amount of concrete drafting work that need[edlto be done:'
As a way to get started, the group produced annexes fleshing out commitments made in
the Geneva and New York principles - such as a constitution, electionS provisions,82
commissions on human rights and refugees, an arbitration system, and map rules. S3 They
also considered other issues that would have to part of a comprehensive such
as Eastern Slavonia. economic reconstruction, arms reductions, and lifting of economic
sanctions. The drafting of these' documents was initially handled within this closely-knit,
ad hoc State group.
The only annex handled separately was the first one
t
which concerned IFOR.
From the Pentagon's perspective, the IFOR annex had to be handled differently.
"Broadly speaking," Slocombe later explained, "anything Holbrooke could get the parties
to agree to was OK, but on WOR, we had a big interest in how this came out We would
write it, and the parties would agree to it" After the Jes reworked the initial draft that
had been edited by Slocombe, Clark and Kornblum during their September trip to
. Europe, Komblwn had asked that a Pentagon staffer temporarily move to the State
Department to assist in drafting the IFOR annex. Unlike most of the other annexes) this
one was regularly vetted by the DC or PC. 84
.
To support this drafting eifort, Holbrooke and Kornblum decided to create a
special Balkan peace "task force." that would temporarily function outside the normal
'I Hoibrooke comment. Dayton History Seminar.
&2 To help draft elections provisiOns for a peace agreement. Holbrooke had asked Tim Camey. the U_s.
Ambassador to to come to Washington. Carney was considered an elections expert. and had been
involved with setting up the Cambodian eJection process that the UN had administered. For an example of
:5 advice, see "Bosnia Election: UNT Ac Lessons," State.234 195, October 2. 1995.
On"October 4. Owen faxed to the State Department his thoughts on what annex documents would be
necessary for a settlement. Sec fax to Jack Zetkulic (EURISCE) from Chris Hiil (sent nom Sarajevo
embassy). October 4, 1995. For another example of the "open issues" left from Geneva and New York that
would have to be resolved in these annexes. see "Checklist of Unresolved Issues Under Further Agreed
Basic Principles:' October 2. 1995. Sapiro files .
.. Sfocombe interview; Sapiro/O'Brien interview; Kornblum July 26. ) 995.
167
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
. .. H
bureaucratic structures of the State European Bureau. Kornblum oversaw
this effort, managing the work through an executive secretary in control of document
productioIL ,The ''task. force" aspect of this . was that the executive secretary was
empowered to maintain control of the paper flow.
86
It also provided another senior
official who could represent Holbrooke at the proliferating number of meetings on:
and could ensure definitive answers to particular. questions from senior
Administration officials. Explicitly part of the Holbrooke-Komblum strategy for
"mana&i.ng such a system helped reassure NSC and Seventh Floor State Department
. officials about preparation efforts. In this way, the ''task foree
n
was really not a new,
independent bureaucratic organ ...:. it was simply a mechanism to keep control of things
outside the nonna! process. .
As the negotiations became more complicated, .this organization helped cCback-
stop" the shuttle team. Now, with proximity. talks scheduled, it helped organize the.
drafting process, mainly by establishing small working groups:to draft. the various
annexes. Thus, as document production expanded outside the legal team - as
staffers from EUR/SeE, EURlRPM, the Human Rights Bureau (DRL), the office of the
Legal Advisor, and other State Department bureaus got involved -- this system assured
that tasks were getting completed and that the necessary clearances were attained. An
organizational timeline was created. to set goals' and keep track of the process.
81
. Holbrooke and Kornblum controlled this"system tightly. and personally, shepherding the
process with what Holbrooke later admitted was sheer "bureaucratic brufality." Most of
the organizational meetings were held in. Holbrooke's conference room on the State
Departmenfs sixth :f.loor. The invitation list to these events served as a way to limit the
number of officials involved --. for those not invited (even from within the State
Department it was very difficult to see how the process unfolded. Remarkably.
not only was the drafting itself restricted to this system, but few outside agencies even
had an opportunity to clear these preliminary annexes (!FOR being the major exception).
The NSC was usually represented at these but was not actively involved in the
detaiJed drafting.
88
as This idea was first presented to Secretary Christopher in mid-September. See memorandum to
Christophel" from Holbrooke, "Organizing for the Balkan Peace Initiative," September 14,1995; and
memorandum to Richard Moose (M) froll?- Kornblum, "Staffing for Bosnia Peace Task Force," September
20,1995. .
II> The first executive secretary was Elizabeth Jones, who was awaiting Senate confinnation to become
Ambassador to Kazakhstan. She was replaced by Nancy Ely-Raphe!. See interview, July 26,
1996; and notes from October 5, J99S meeting (no author1 L files. .
17 The first timelinc was created to map events from October 11 to' the start of the talks, originally
scheduled for October 31. It outlined tasks for nine working groups: site selection/preparation; peace
treaty; constitution; elections; IFOR; economic reconstruction; refugees and humanitarian assistance;
congressional consultations; and Federation building. See "Working Group Tirneline," EURISCE Chris
Hoh files; for a more recent copy, see Pardew notebook, Shuttle V.' .
as .The only exception' was Robert Malley, an NSC staffer who belped on human rights. See Holbrooke
interview with author (notes), January 9, 1997; Miriam Sapiro conversation with author, February 23,
1997. Also see, respectively. "Legal Working Group." no date, EURISCE-Zetkulic files; "Proximity Talks
Roadmap: Tasking Checklist," October 1995, L files; and "Outline ofa Peace Settlement:' October 1995,
L files. .
168 Q
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
a a
Drafting work proceeded during the first two weeks of-October, with most of the
annexes being produced by their respective working groups. Then, on Sunday, October
IS, word carne that the lead negotiator wanted to see the agreement as a complete
. .
package. Holbrooke and his team had just departed for Paris on their fIfth shuttle. and he
wanted to see the documents in Paris by Monday morning. Working late into Sunday
night at the State Department. the core legal team -- Jim Miriam Sapiro and Tim
Ramish -- edited the annexes into a draft peace agreement and faxed it to the U.S.
embassy in pariS.
89
.
This 38-page Bosnian peace agreement -- comprised of the framework agreement
and 7 annexes - was the first rough draft of what would be negotiated at the proximity
talks.
90
Whereas the fralnework agreement was cast as an agreement between . tbiee
independent states (Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia), the annexes were written as
commitments between the Bosnian parties - the Federation and Srpska. The U.S. and the
Contact Group would sign the Framework document as "witnesses." Holbrooke and the
team were reportedly pleased with the progress thus far, save for. some minor editorial
changes. much drafting remained, and the working groups continued their efforts,
aiming to complete the text about a week before the start of the talks.
91
Choosing a Site for the. Talks
. Shortly after the October 5 announcement that peace talks would occur in the
U.S., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Patrick Kennedy had begun the
search for an appropriate site.92 He discussed possibilities with Holbrooke and other
members of the Bosnia team, such as Wes Clark, Chris Hill and Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas,
Holbrooke's logistician and right The was even daunting for
" SapirolO'Brien interview; Ramish interview.
90 See fax to Roberts Owen from Jim O'Brien. Miriam Sapiro and Tim Ramish, 15, 1995 (package
with cover memorandum attaChed). The seven annexes covered: 1) cessation of hostilities and
disengagement; 2) constitutional structure; 3) aIbilration tribunal; 4) commission on human rights; 5)
commission on refugees and displaced persons; 6) commission to preserve national monuments; and 7)
political implementation of a peace settlement. The annexes not contained in this package (but to be
included eventually) concerned IFOR, elections. public corporations. and new constitutional provisions for
the Federation and Serb entities.
" See Sapiro/O'Brien interview; and Sapii-o, O'Brien, Ramish commenls.October 31 group interview. For
the Holbrooke team's response and suggested edits. see "The Wisdom of Holbrook e." O'Brien computer e-
mail, October 18. 1995. For an update on the progress of preparations from Washington to the Holbrooke
team. see "Official-Infonnal," Cable. State 245826, October 17, 1995.
92 For press reports of the search, see Elaine Sciolino, "Wanted; A Hideaway To Hatch a Peace," New rork
Times, October 12, 1995. When it was announced that talks would be held in the U.S., the Statc
Department Legal Adviser's office prepared several memoranda outlining the legal issues raised. For
eX8JJl.ple, they looked into the possibility that some of the delegates - particularly the Bosnian Serbs and
MiJosevic - were at risk of litigation orice they were in the U.S.. Milosevic's presence risked action by
plaintiffs (such as Bosnian refugees or human rights groups) seeking an opportunity to initiate litigation
against him personally or the FRY government.. These risks would be significantly reduced - although not
entirely eliminated - if Milosevic confmed his travel to Wright-Patterson. See memorandum to Kornblum
from Jonathan B. Schwartz (L), "Legal Issues Raised by Proximity Talks in the U.S .... October 6, 1995;
and memorandum for Roberts Owen from Schwartz, uMiloscvic's Litigation Risk- if He Flies to New
York," October 21,1995.
J
F
J69
UNCLASSIFIED
... ./
UNC.LASSIFIED
the highly experienced Kennedy, who had helped plan the 1991 Madrid Middle East
Peace Conference. Not since Camp David had such an important peace conference taken
place on U.S. soiL Given the desired parameters - an isolated area; separate, identical
quarters for each of the parties in close proximity to each other; ability to accommodate
five delegations of up to 100 people each; an hour flight time to Washington; a relatively
open-ended time frame; and, of low costs - Kennedy and his staff were drawn
. toward U.S. military facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had tasked a review aU U.S.
military sites, recommending that Langley Air ForCe Base in Virginia was the most
appropriate.
93
Kennedy considered several other locales, including West Point iIi upstate New
York, Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
outside Dayton, Ohio. After visiting Langley and' he detennined that
the DaYton site' was best suited to fit the requirements. The conference facility and
sleeping quarters were close to one another and 'easily isolated, creating the closed
environment that Holbrooke felt was necessary., The dormitory-like quarters were
identical and set in a quadrangle -- an arrangement very conducive to proximity shuttling.
Importantly, the media could be restricted to an entirely facility several miles
away from the negotiating area. The flight time from Washington was a little over an
hour, making "drop-by" visits by senior officials possible. After discussing Dayton with
Holbrooke. Kennedy pasSed his recommendation to Secretary Christopher on October 16,
who approved. Wright-Patterson was not "particuJarlypretty," Kennedy but Ujt
comes closest to meeting our. needs." The decision was made publi(: on October 18_
94
During this !ime, negotiations continued with Contact Group Allies about the
timing of the varioUs European follow-on confer"ences. With four of the five Contact
Group members planning to host some sort of Balkan peace conference (only Gennany
had not announced such plans), there was concern that the diplomatic effort could suffer
from problem of "conference proliferation.
tt
Accordingly, each meeting needed to be
carefully timed with a specific focus. "Otherwise," a State Department analysis
suggestecL "the governments and organizations involved will be tempted to put off
necessary commitments because 'there's always the next conference.'" The State
Department attempted to impose some order on the process, beginning to consider
potential scenarios for conference scheduling.
95
The British initially wanted the Russians
to host an arms control conference, but this had been overtaken by Yeltsin's proposal to
hold the pre-Dayton sum.tUit
96
The British continued to press the U.S. to set the timing
for a London follow-on conference. which would focus on implementation and
In two conversations with British Foreign Secretary Rifkind, Christopher
91 See Patrick Kennedy interview, July t 9, 1996'-
94 For Kennedy's recommendations. see memorandum to Secretary Christopher from Kennedy. "Proximity
Talks -- Site Selection," October 16.1995; and memorandum to Tom Donilon from Kennedy, "Proximity
Talks- Site Selection," October 16.1995; see also Kennedy interview. For press reports,sec Michael
Dobbs, "Ohio Air Base Selected for Bosnia Talks," Washington Post, October 18, 1995. .
9S See "Gameplan for Balkan Peace Conference." drafted by Chris Hoh (EUR/SCE), October 16, 1995; D
files.
96 See message from British National Security Advisor Roderic Lyne to Anthony Lake, White House
Situation Room Cable. October 6, 1995.
170

UNCLASSIFIED
'.
.
I
UNCLASSIFIED

said that given the uncertainty surrounding the length and outcome of proximity talks, it
would be "premature and unwise" to set elates for a London conference. First, the
Secretary recommended, they should wait to see if there would even be an agreement to
implement.
97
..
the French were rumbling about the U.S. promise to have an
"internatiorial peace conference" Paris to sign a peace agreement. In an October 16
letter to Secretary Christopher, U.S. Ambassador to France Pamela Harriman raised
concerns that Administration might choose to hold a signing ceremony in the U.S ..
. Even though the. President had made a notional pJedge to have a signing in Paris,
Harriman said there were nmiors that the U.S. wanted to renege. At the NSC
officials, especially Tony Lake, remained to committing to Paris; the President
had publicly promised to have a u peace conference" in France, not necessarily a signing
ceremony. At the very least, many White House officials felt, the U.S. shouJd to hold on
to the possibility of a Rose Garden event if an agreement was reached.
98
.
If this were indeed the case, Harriman warned, "we WOl;lld experience a very
negative political counter-reaction," which would throw into question French cooperation
in implementation. Almost alone in Washington, Holbrooke agreed with his close friend
in Paris. He felt that particularJy "with a Republican Congress that would oppose almost
any financial request for Bosnia," the U.S. needed Europe for civilian implementation.
As Harriman wrote, "it is thus essential that we continue to co-opt the French and
Europeans. We simply cannot eXpect them to 'buy in' if we are not willing to share with
them tbepoIitical limelight. ..
99
While the possibility of President Clinton visiting the
proximity talks rell?-ained open, Holbrooke felt it necessary to give the French the theater
they wanted. Firullly, the Administration came to a conclusion.. If an agreement was
achieved, it would be initialed in Dayton. and formally signed in Paris.
IFOR and Sanctions
In the two weeks before talks began in Dayton, U.S. officials spent a great deal of
time refining the U.S. role in IFOR. The military had devised IFOR's basic structure, but
as was clear after high-level offiCials were briefed on the "substantial issues of
policy and pmctice" remained. loa Military planners could detennine the logistics, but
97 See "The Secretary and British Foreign SecrelaIy Rifkind. October 12, 1995." Cable, State 243428, ,
October 13, 1995; and "The Secretary and Foreign Secretary Rifkind, October 16. 1995," Cable, State
245838, October 17, ) 995. During October 17-18, National Security Advisor Lake visited London for
further consultatiOns on Bosnia and other. European issues. On the timing of European conferences, Lake
agreed that while they should await the outcome of peace talks, the conferences should come soon after
conclusion so as to continue any momentum. See "National Security Adviser Lake's October 17 Meeting
with Foreign Secretary Rifkind," Cable, London 14341, October 18, 1995; and "National SeCurity Adviser
Lake's October 18 Meeting with FeO Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones," Cable, London 14348.
October 18, 1995.
91 interview, December 17,1996.
99 Letter to Secretary Christopher (and 'Tom Donilon), from Ambassador Pamela Harriman, October 16,
1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), January 9, ) 997
. 100 1:bis was raised. for example, after an October 12 briefing by the Joint Chiefs for Secretary Christopher,
Talbott, Holbrooke. the NSC's Sandy Berger, and others. See "Memo for the Record: Notes from briefing
of IFOR preliminary planning to Sec. Christopher," no author. October 13, 1995. 0 tiles .
.... 2
- 171
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
needed more political guidance on the specific objectives and limits of IFOR. Many of
. these questions were very basic operational concerns -- what, for example, would IFOR's
role be in elections security or refugee retwn? Would IFOR be involved in Eastern
Slavonia? How would the civilian administrator and the IFOR commander interact?
Will IFOR deploy into Serb areas?lOI
Other questions -- the most difficult ones -- addressed the level of
commitment the Clinton Administration was willing to gamble on this very risky effort.
How would IFOR avoid "mission creep/' or becoming drawn deeper and deeper into a.
quagmire? What was the "exit strategy" for withdrawing forces? What constituted a
"violation" of the peace agreement? Who would decide? What would IFOR's response
be? . How would IFOR be "even-handed" in dealing with SIpska and the Federation'
would there be a "threshold". of non-compliance after which IFOR would use force
against the Muslim-Croat Federation?
Although such questions had been a frequent topic of conversation throughout the .
autwnn, the Deputies Conunittee began to consider them fonnally in hite October.
I02
The State Department, NSC and JCS each put together lists of unresolved issues on IFOR
which officials discussed. The papers addressed nine main areas of concern: mission,
non-compliance, election security, deployment, area of operations,' timing, exit,
Congressional strategy, and public outreach. 103 After two DC meetings, a memorandum
101 In mid-October, Pardew outlined his views on many ofthesc issues in a four-page memorandum to
. Peny and Slocombc. "From my experiences in the negotiating process," Pardew wrote, "I see the functions
of the IFOR are two-fold: 1) stop the killing and 2) stabilizing the security situation in Bosnia to enable
peaceful political and military institutions to develop and to allow nonnallife to resume. All three
populations arc fearful, suspicious, and in many cases, gUilty. These people will look to IFOR to do what
. UNPROFOR could not do - provide the security necessary to lead nonnallives." Pardcw recommended
that (FOR present an overwhelming force in size and scOpe. He also advised that (FOR not mount a
comprehensive military defense of the' internal Federation-Srpska border: "In fact, these borders should be
politically acceptable, physically identifiable - even defensible - but they also should be as transparent as
possible in other ways to promote a free travel of trade and travel throughout the country!' He .
recommended that IFOR be deployed throughout af! of Bosnia, "which is required to provide an
atmosphere of security for any non-Seth population stiIl.left in Srpska. Such a presence also will help to
validate the recognized borders of Bosnia, and to avoid the image of partition." Finally, Paroew predicted
that "force will prevail quickly in Bosnia. We can expect localized resistance on a limited scale to teSt the
IFOR but not a major confrontation with the Serbs. The more diffICult part of implementation will not be
the combat tasks but the other requirements on the force. Existing and new politicaJ institutions will be
weak. the populations exhausted and the UN is inefficient and mistrusted. Until these conditions are
reversed, the IFOR will be the dominant institution in the area looked to for all solutions and to all .
problems - and there. are many." Pardew memorandum to Peny and Slocombe. "Military Roles in a Post
Settlement Bosnia," October 13, 1995. .
101 See "Summruy of Conclusions for October 18 Deputies Committee on Bosnia," NSC memorandum,
October 26, 1995.
103 For the respective lists, see NSC memorandum; "Revised List IFORlUnresolved Issues (draft)," drafted
by John Feeley. no date; JCS "Infonnation Paper" on Bosnia, October 20, 1995, drafted by John Roberti;
and State paper, attached to memorandum to Talbott from Kornblum, "Deputies Committee Meeting,
October 20, 1995," October 20, 1995.
112
7
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCL IFIED
outlining the DC's conclusions and recommendations was prepared for consideration by.
, the PrincipaJs.'04
.
The Deputies reached agreement on most ofthe key issues - including how IFOR
would avoid "mission creep," relate with civilian agencies, 'provide elections security.
and handle war criminals. Several unresolved questions were left for the Principals
Committee to debate. These primarily concerned such issues as: the area of IFOR's
,deployment, cantonment of Srpska and Federation forces, and IFOR's presence along
Bosnia's external borders.
IOS
These last issues had to be decitled soon. In Brussels,
NATO planners werea)ready suffering from a lack of guidance from Washington, and
without a final decision, Kornblum informed Christopher, "they will fall further behind
the curve:,I06
, ' "
Meeting on October 25, the PC approved the conclusions the Deputies' had
reached on the simpler questions.
107
Regarding the more difficult issues, the basic
disagreements were between the State Department and the Pentagon. Specifically, the
State Department wanted the parties mandated to accept cantonment of their forces and a
20km weapons exclusion zone along the Srpska-Federation bOrder: 109 Arguing that IFOR
would not have the forces sufficient to monitor and enforce such provisions, DOD wanted
parties to agree to these tenns volUntarily. Merely asking the parties to cooperate was
a recipe for disaster, Holbrooke and his team argued. "The parties have repeatedly shown
reluctance to comply with agreements that are not mandatory," Secretary' Christopher's
briefing paper explained. "By requiring the parties to comply with the tenTIs ... rather than
asking them, we keep IFOR from an ambiguous, possibly untenable position. If the
settlement clearly Ia.ys outwhat the parties must do, IFOR will have a more flexible
position, allowing it to respond fully to violations of the agreement."I09 The Pentagon
104 For details DC meetings, see "Swnmaty of Conclusion for October 20 Meeting of the Deputies
Committee:' NSC memorandum, November 3. 1995; Memorandum to Talbott from Kornblum, "Deputies
Committee Meeting, October 24, 1995," {)ctober 23. 1995; and "Summary of Conclusions for October 24
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee," NSC memorandum, November 2, 1995.
lOS See Memorandum for Principals from Sandy Berger, "IFOR Issues," October 24. 1995.
106 As described in Memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum, "Principals Committee Meeting,
October 27, 1995," October 26, 1995. For an update on the status of NATO s planning. see "NATO:
Pennrcps Lunch, October 24," Cable, U.S.NAT04185, October2S, 1995. Although officials in Brussels
were concerned about the IFOR issue, at that time they were worried about the surprise reSignation of
NATO Secretary General Wily Claes as a result of a scandal.
107 See "Summary of Conclusions for October 25 Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee," NSC
Memorandum. November 9, 1995.
lOS "Cantonment" meant that the entities would redeploy forces to specified areas they could be
easily monitored by IFOR.
109 Kornblum to Christopher, October 26. 1995. Importantly. this view was shared by James Pardew. the
DOD member of HoI brooke's shuttle team. "I understand prudent military planning," Pardew wrote, "but I
side with State on this one. Withdrawal of heavy weapons is in our interest for troop protection, but I do
not believe that voluntary withdrawal is practical in this Further. the U.S. military position is
worst-case planning which envisions a scenario of confrontation all along the border. We must be capable
of reacting to violations, but violations are not likely to be pervasive. If they are, the entire peace
agreement is invalidated. Finally, the peace settlement constitutes the act of volunteering to withdraw
weapons. If we can get them to agree to that. enforcement is our issue and not subject to the leons of the
agreement. n See memorandum to Secretary Peny and Siocombc from Pardew. "IFOR Issues for peL
Breakfast and PC. Tomorrow." October 26, 1995.
r J73
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
also resisted State's recommendation to place an IFOR presence on Bosnia's external
border. The military was concerned that such a mission would make IFOR troops
susceptible to hostage-taking .. State's proposal was made at Izetbegovic's request; it
assumed that DOD's fears were greatly exaggerated. Moreover, without IFOR protection
of the external border, the Serbs would never alJow Bosnian forces to regulate official
bo d
. S' sk 110
r er crossmgs mto rp a..
On October 27, the PC took up these issues, and the results were a compromise
between the DOD and State positions. On a weapons-frt:e border, they
. agreed that, at a minimum, IFOR would require the parties adhere to a 4km zone. .
Reduced from the original 20km zone, a 4km zone was small enough to satisfY the
military's concerns about having enough troops for enforcement. The. PC tasked DOD
and State to "study further" the possibility of having a 20km and cantonment
system. On external border security, the PC decided to have IFOR provide "a presence"
at crossings whe!e heavy traffic in support of the IFOR mission occurs. FinalJY7 the
Principals discussed what a "clear and defensible" end-state IFOR Ylould seek to achieve
before departing. In other words
t
what should the expectations be for an end-state after
one year of IFOR? Although they didn't reach a conclusion on the issue, they began to
consider what "milestones" would have to take place to measure the "success" of the III
-
mISSIon.
Despite these compromise decisions, some civilian officials, particularly
Holbrooke, were deeply by the Pentagon's reluctance to accept more
responsibility. He was worried that if military officials remained unwilling to take
necessary -. and, in his view, reasonable -:- risks, then it would be very difficult for a
settlement to suCCeed.
1I2
'.
In addition to these decisions on IFOR, the Principals also had to decide what to
do about economic sanctions against Serbia. Since the diplomatic initiative was
launched, the Administration's policy on sanctions was simple: sanctions would be
. suspended if a peace agreement was signed, and permanently lifted once an agreement
was implemented. After his last shuttle to the region. however, Holbrooke believed that
this policy should be slightly modified. Milosevic had begun pushing 8ublicly and
privately for sanctions relief, claiming he already had a commitment to it. I Although'
Holbrooke had told Milosevic that there was nothing he could do about sanctions, he was
concerned that the Serb leader be less willing to compromise at Dayton 'if he did not
receive some relief soon. The sanctions had been successful at getting Milosevic
See Ibid. On this issue, Pardew also with the State Department's position.
. III See "Summary of Conclusions for October 21 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia," NSC
Memorandum. October 30. 1995.
112 Holbrooke interview with author (notcs). January 9, 1997.
III In accepting the invitation to attend peace talks, Mifosevic bad written that it was "understQOd" that
sanctions would be suspended at the beginning of peace talks and fullliftcd at the moment a plan was
signed. This assertion puzzled U.S. officials, who were unaware of any such arrangement. In a comment
sent to Peter Tamoff, Kornblum wrote that "EURISCE does not know what 'understanding,' ifany. was
reached by Holbrooke wilh Miloscvic on sanctions relief. It could well be that Milosevic is making an
assertion here that is not based on any fact." See Letter from MiJosevic to Christopher, October 19. 1995.
174
2.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
'--'
to the peace talks, the argument went, but it now had to be reconfigured for maximum
utility during the talks. I 14
"
'
Holbrooke proposed accelerating the timetable for sanctions relief, suspending
sanctio"at the beginning of . If a peace agreement was reached in Dayton,
suspension would Continue until.implementation. Early suspension, Holbrooke argued,'
would help Milosevic domestiGally, allowing him to address dire humanitarlan needs
(exacerbated by the Krajina refugee crisis) while also strengthening him against domestic
critics who opposed an agreement. Furthermore, the proposal would place more pressure
on Milosevic to reach a deal. By this logic, letting him nibble on the CarrQt of sanctions
relief would increase his desire to have'the whole thing. For the Bosnians, the proposal
would put them, on notice obstructionism, on their part would mean that Serbian
sanctions would not be reimposed.
lIs
Suspending sanctions during the height of the U.S.
mediating effort., Holbrooke argued, would create a more even-handed atmosphere"
enhancing the U.S. role as honest broker. Finally. there was the concern that
sanctions relief, Milosevic might even refuse to attend the Dayton J 16 ,
Some in the Administration had serious doubts about Holbrooke's suggestion.
Most adamant about adhering to the current policy were the two Administration officials
perhaps most familiar with the sanCtions issue -- UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright
and Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth. Both felt that by
giving in on sanctions, the U.S. would fritter away its leverage. "The [sanctions] lever
was fully in our hand," Albrifht reflected, "and if we were to give it up, it had to be given
up for something good."JI Moreover, they argued, sanctions would be tough to
reimpose, and Serbia could 'blunt the effect of reimposition by stockpiling during the
sUspension period. __ ' Sanctions relief was not needed to "help" Milosevic compromise;
U.S. intelligence assessed that,the Serb leader faced "remarkably little" internal political
pressure to achieve immediate sanctions relief, and it would not enhance his bargaining
position over the Bosnian: Serbs. Lastly. such a decision would have 'troublesome side-
effects -- it would directly contradict the President Clinton's commitment to Congress
that sanctions relief would come only with an agreement (made most prominently in his
August 29 letter to Robert Dole), and damage relations with the Bosnians and
Croatians. 118
. .
At the October 27 PC. the Principals decided that sanctions relief should not be
granted until an agreement was' reached. Sensing formidable bureaucratic opposition,
114 See Kornblum to Christopher, October 26, 1995; and attached "Sanctions Relief Talking Points."
J IS Moreover, there were hints that h:etbegovic would accept some fonns of sanctions relief for MiIosevic -
- particularly if Serbia guaranteed a road to the Goradzc enclave. See Vershbow inteNiew, December 17.
1996.
.
116 See Kornblum 10 Christopher, October 26, 1996; and attached "Sanctions ReJiefTaiking Points."
117 Albright interview; sec also Fuerth interview.
.
lIS The President had made this assurance to Congress in an August 28 letter'to Senator Dole. On October
23. Tudjman Slated thaI Croatia would be forced to attack"Eastern SJavonia if a decisiori were made to ease
sanctions on Belgrade before reaching an agreement. See Cable. U.S.UN 4140. October 23, 1995. For
various interagency papers outlining the pros and cons ofHolbrook'c's proposal. see "Reimposition
Mechanisms," State Department paperdrafted by E. Bloom (L). October 26, 1995; "Options for
Suspension of Sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro," Slate Department Sanctions Task Force paper drafted by
Angel Rabasa (no date), and "Sanctions Relief," NSC memorandum, October 24, 1995
... 175
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Holbrooke himself had decided to let the issue rest. "In light of the situation," he told the
PC, "I'm holding off on my recommendation. It's too much water to carry:,119
Nevertheless, the Principals pledged that they would be prepared to revisit the issue if
Holbrooke requested.
12o
..
. .
. As expected, Milosevic was very angry with the decision. In a meeting with U.S.
Charge Rudy Perina in Belgrade, his Foreign Minister said that now there &'was
absolutely no incentive for Milosevic" to negotiate further, and that therefore the Serb
leader might not make the trip to Dayton. Thinking that Milosevic had too much to lose
by not attending peace talks - such an act would guarantee his international pariah status
indefinitely -- U.S. officials were not concerned by such threats.
121
The Last Push to Dayton
Five days before the Dayton talks were scheduled to begin, the working groups
had produced a revised draft of a peace agreement .. The document had been expanded to
92-pages and 9 annexes.
122
To prepare internally for the upcoming .taiks - and introduce
other officials to the specifics of the drafiagreement - the State Department organized
several large inter-agency meetings. On October Holbrooke and lead members of the
drafting team held a briefing for senior officials in Secretary Christopher's conference
room at the State Department 123 The next day,. this group held a "off-site"
meeting in Warrenton. Virginia, by Secretary Christopher, to. review the draft text
and the general strategy for the talks. .
.
The Warrenton meeti,ng dealt with the logistical planning for Dayton as weIl as an
of the proposed text. For many senior officials, this was the first
opportunity to review the complete package. There was a discussion of the general
framework agreement mid annexes on the constitution. elections, and IFOR. To senior
officials who were first being introduced to Holbrooke's self-described "iron-fisted"
preparations for Dayton, Warrenton was not the venue to raise fundamental questions.
Rather, the meeting provided the opportunity for officials to acquaint themselves with the
results of the drafting process and "fonnally bless" the draft.
124
.
The Warrenton talks were also used as a dress rehearsal for Dayton. As the host,
the U.S. would take the lead in presenting these annexes to the parties and shepherding
through the negotiating process in Dayton. Holbrooke outlined the sequence of events for
the first day; when Secretary Christopher would arrive, the plans for an opening
'19 Versbbow interview, December 17, 1996:
120 See "Summary of Conclusions" from October 27 PC. For press account of this decision, see Elaine
Sciolino, "Administration Rejects Call to Lift Serbia Sanctions During TalkS," New York Tunes, October .
29,1995:
.
'21 Milosevic's Foreign Minister, Milan Mi)utinovic, complained about press reports that the proposal had
not even reached Clinton's desk - even after the President himself bad met with Izetbegovicand Tudjman
at the UN. See "FRY Foreign Minister Says Mi(osevic MayNot Go To Dayton:' Cable, Belgrade 5336,
October 29. 1995.
. .
In In addition to the seven annexes contained in the October 15 draft. annexes had been added on
elections; an international police task force; joint public corporations; and a map. .
121S 10'B" .
aplro Clen mtervlew.
124 See memorandum to Christopher from HOlbrooke, "Bosnia Off-Site: An Annotated Agenda," October
24,1995. See also Gallucci interview; Vershbow interview. December 17,1996; lohn Price interview.
176
J
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED.
7
ceremony, and how negotiations would begin. The U.S. would layout the whole package
on day one. "The parties expect extemalleader-ship, and the European don't understand .
the need to lean on' the parties," HolQrooke said.
l25
....
.
. That Saturday, October 28, Holbrooke met with Bosnian o.fficials atlhe u.s. UN
mission in New York. Joined by Roberts Owen, Jim O'Brien and Jack Zetkulic, the lead
American negotiator went over the cqnstitutionaldraft and elections annex with Mo
Sacirbey and 'Paul Williams, an American laWyer hired by the Sarajevo gdvernipent.
. Since early October, both the u.s. and EU had worked with Bosnian . legal. experts in an
attempt to get the Bosnians prepared for Dayton. Rather than have the Bosnians shnply
reacting to outside proposals. ''we them t<;> .begin. m'ore seriouslt about
. they wanted out of an agreement: John MellZles recalled. 12 The UN meetmg 'W'as .
. ' to be a final push in this effort; a "desperate 'attempt," Holbrooke recalled, to get
the Bosnians to "think more strategically" about these issues and make sure they "Were
prepared for the talks. 127 " .' .'
.
Foremost on Sacirbey's mind, however, was the grave condition of the Muslim-
./' Croat Federation. The Bosnian Foreign Minister' insisted that the U.S. do something
about this. . Otherwise, he warned. the Bosnians would delay talks on other issues.
Sacirbey's' comments were only the most.recent warning aooutthe sony slate of this
alliance; Izetbegovic hiniselfhad told President Clinton on October 24 that the Federation
was in trouble. Both State DepartIDent and DOD assessments were very pessiJnistic
about the entity;s future viability. uA peace agreement in Bosnia removes the
tactical basis for [the Federation's]' a DIA analysis explained. "Even w-ith
moves to strengthen the' Federation, I have doubts about its long-tenn prospects," a State
Department plarmer warned.
12
l!
. . _ '
.
In reality, little had chariged since Joe Kruz.cl first outlined his concerns about the
Federation during the initial Holbrooke shuttle. "The Federation is seen as a marriage of
convenience:" he had . written. Now, on the eve of Dayton, it seemed that "the
"fundamental conceptual flaw" Kruzel had described - the Federation's weakness -
could bring an agreement down in flames.
129
The peace being brokered by the U;S. relied
125 Vershbow interview. D.ecember 17, 1996.
.
12.6 Menzies had led this effort from Sarajevo. See Mcniies interview; and "EU Prepared to Help Bosnians
on Constitution," Cable, Brussels 1043&, October 6, 1995:
.
127 Holbrooke interview with author (noies), November26. 1996.
In
See Kruzel "Trip Report" to Perry, Augusl 18, 1995.
T ThTrT A TliTL'n
177
:81
:81
UNCLASSIFIED
upon a healthy, fully-functioning Federation. Yet at that point, no such entity existed.
From lzetbegovic and Tudjman on down, the Muslims and simply did not
-each other, and implementing FedeJ:'ation structures had been very slow. However, as
long .as their mutuai needs were being met, the Muslims and Croats had proved
could work together. Holbrooke understood that to have any--chance for success at
Dayton, they would have to work immediately to rebuild this relationship.- One of" the
first the U.S: would do in he . decided, a\5;ernent
COIDlmttmg the Bosmans and Croats_ to creating a-VIable, functIOnIng Federation.
The last organizational events prior to Dayton were October 28-29 meetings vvith
the Contact Group representatives at the State Department. - gimiJarto !he talks in
Warrenton. these sessions were to introduCe the Europeans to the texts to be
negotiated in Dayton. 131 True to form, the Europeans were displeased with the drafting
thus far - they complained bitterly that they had been shut:out of drafting
agreements to which they would be a party. They were particularly concerned with the
IFOR annex. In discussions led by Wes Clark. the EuroEeans and .Americans perfonned
an exhaustive, line-by-line mark-up of the IFOR annex.' 2 . Others' went over the po Ii ticai
and civilian iIl1plementation annexes, with the Europeans playing close attention to those
concerning civilian implementation and an international police force. The Europeans
wanted special annexes on these and after a day offierce debate, the u.s. agreed
to work with them on these in Dayton. Although much was that weekend,
it was clear to U.S. negotiators .that more would need to be done in Dayton to assuage
European concerns and, where necessary, bring them into the process. 133
The morning. o( October 317 the Holbrooke -team joined the President and oilier
Principals for a Foreign Policy Team meeting at the White House. 134 This was tbe final
(and only) briefing session for the President before Dayton. Christopher began _ the
meeting by laying out for the President the planned schedule for Dayton as well- as the
rules the negotiations would follow. "There will be radio silence after the opening
ceremony," the Secretary said. Holbrooke urged the need to lower expectations for the
conference. "We're on our own 30-yard line," he stressed. Although he didn't know
-
-
how long the ta1ks would 1ast,-there were "practical limits" to how long they could go.
"We'll hit awall by day ten," he said, explaining that they would use the upcoming travel
-of Clinton and Christopher- (in mid-November, both were scheduled to attend an APEC
Ministerial and state visit in Japan) to set benchmarks for progress. "Even if we fail,n
Holbrooke "the U.S: can be proud," The Geneva and New York principles
provided a soWld political foundation to build upon, Sarajevo _ was at peace, and a
IJO Holbrooke interview, November 18, 1996. For the Sarajevo reporting on the Federation. see
"The Bosnian Federation: Of Critical rmportance, Yet in Critical Condition," Cable, Sarajevo 666, October
14,1995.
JlI fts
For dra of annexes presented to Ihe Europeans that see package of drafts from October 27-
28,1995; UEURfiles. _
_ -
III Sec Draft Ann'ex I: "Military Aspects of the Peace Agreement," Revision IS, October 29,1995; UEUR
-
-
J)J For details, see Pardew interview, June 26, .1996; Kornblum interviews; SapirofO 'Brien interview; Hoh.
Goldberg, O'Brien comments, Oclober 31, 1996 inlelView; and Versbbow interview. Dccemberl7. 1996.
Details from this meeting, unless othenvise noted, are from Vershbow notes of meeting. See Versh bow
interview, December 17, 1996.
178

"
. UNCLASSIFIED
2
cOuntry-wide cease-fire had been reached, "Dayton's a gamble, but the shuttle phase has
been exhausted."
.
President expressCd concern. over IFOR. If Dayton was successful,
Clinton faced a prospect that no president ever welcOmed:. sending thousands of
American soldiers in a dangerous, possibly hostile environment. This decision weighed
heavily on his mind. particularly. events under similar circUrtlstances earlier in
his presidency. "Given Somalia. we must have a clear mission so there's no 'miSsion'
creep, , he said. Moreover, Congress was becoming a real problem, and IFOR threatened
to hurt 'the President Politically. The day before, in a vote that House Speaker Newt
Gingrich called "a referendum on this' Administration' s inCapability of Convincing anyone
to trust them/' the House 'passed overwhelmingly a non-blnding resolution siating that the.
U.S" should not serld troops to Bosnia Without approval. 135. . . . .
. . On the substance of what would be negotiated in DaytoD, the 'President said that
. he felt that Sarajevo shoUld remain unified .. "1 have strong feelings about Sarajevo,,"" he
said. "It would be a mistake to' divide the city. We don't want ano,:ther Berlin." He also
,,' suggested that negotiators not feel constrained by artificial deadlines. He advised that
they. continue the stepping-stone approach utilized during the'shuttles, assuring that at
least some agreements were locked-in if talks failed. "If you can't get aU the way to a
final agreement, the credibility of an interim agreement will depend on .whether there are
concrete confidence-building measures without an aversion to slaughter and chaos.'p On
Serbian sanctions,. the. President,stated his view that the U.S. not provide relief unless
they were sure lyIilosevic would honor a . peace agreement. . "But we can't ignore the
negotiating dimension, .Secretary Christopher responded., "We need to keep Milosevi c
the reservation. We want to be able to say to hhn that when we initial Ianagreernent]
we'll start a process of suspension." With Lake and Holbrooke supporting this
viewpoint, the President agreed.
.
Following this briefing, HoJbrooke and his delegation departed for Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base. "This is the best chance we've had for peace since the 'W'ar
began,". President Clinton said to the press that day. UIt may be the last chance we have
had for a very long time."J36 The time for preparation was over. After four long and
bloody years in Bosnia, the eyes of the world turned to Dayton, Ohio'.
IlS Sec Elaine Sciolino, "House Tells Clinton to Get Approval to Send Troops to Bosnia," New York Times.
October 3 I, 1995; and John Yang, "House Votes to Limit Role of U.S. Troops in Balkans," Washing/on
Post, October 31,1995.
/U "Statement by the President," Oclober 3 I, 1995; White House Press Office. See a Iso John Harris,
"Clinton Asserts Role for U.S. Troops; Wishing Balkan Negofiators Well," Washington Post, November I.
1995.

179
UNCLASSIFIED
d 2
Chapter Eight.
Talks and Clearing'. Away the
Underbrush:. Dayton, N ovem b.er .1.1 0
.The delegations began to amve at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside
Dayton, Ohio on the afternoon of October 31, the day before QIe opening of what Was
officially called the "Proximity Peace Talks." Wright-Patterson was one of the major Air
Force bases' in the l).S. - partly named for the Dayton-born Wright brothersp the
enonnous.fadlity housed USAF test pilots in the 1950's and later served as a training
center for NASA's Mercury astronauts. While the distance from Washington and
seclusion afforded by the military base were similar to the conditions Camp David
provided President Carter 17 years before, the austere, spartan of
Wright-Patterson were in sharp contrast to the cozy, relaxing atmosphere of the .
retreat Since early October, Holbrooke had regarded Camp David as the
model for these talks. He had ryad William Quande s 1986 book on the and
sought-the advice of his fonnerCarter Administration colleagues about how the situa'tibn
at Camp David shaped"their goals and tactics that led to the historic agreement bet-weeri
Israel and Egypt.
l
Shortly before traveling to .Dayton, HolbroQke spent an hour on the
phone with Carter himselfto discuss the comparisons.
2
. . .' . . .
Like Camp David, the taiks in Dayton were to be conducted with great privacy,
allowing the media little access to the proceedings. Under the rules of the conference,. the
delegates were' not allowed to talk to the press; as Christopher had told the President,
there' would be "radio silence" once the opening ceremony was over. Holbrooke
convinced the three presidents that the u.s. alone should speak p1J.blicly each day for all
. the. delegations. Thus, State Department Spokesman Nicholas BU{DS' daily press
briefings .:- whether in Washington or Dayton were the only on-the-record press
statements; The went so :far as to issue press statements thrOl.Jgh him. In part,
I Quandt, who serVed at the NSC in !he Carter Administration. was part oflhe U.S_ negotiating team at
Camp David. See Camp Dayjd: Peacemakinu and Politics (Brookings, 1986).
2 Holbrooke intclView, October 25, (996 (notes). In an October 18 memorandmll to Holbrooke, Associate
Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff Dan Hamilton summed up the general points from
these consultations: first, no media contact had helped the and leaks had been surprisingly minilnat;
second. the effect of sequestration was less "to build down walls than to create 3Jl intensity of" .
purpose," and that people stared to get edgy after 5-6 days; third. despite Carter's hopes, the C07:j Camp
David atmosphere did not help the participants relax, and that attempts to create intimacy or infonnal
relatjonships between the Pflrties did not wO.r-k (but the U.S. had to get along well with all sides); Fourth. the
U.S. always made sure that each party had a shar-ed vision of an agreement; choosing to handlclhe detaifs
later; fifth, all sides ate at the same facility. although there was no pressure to mingle; and sixth, in tenus of
the social setting, activities were offered (such as movies) as a release for the participants. although work
often continued late into the night.
180

1 IN(I,ASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
these strict rules were necessary to keeP the delegates themselves - many ofwhorn. had
already proved adept at using the American press --away from Complete
seclusion would let the negotiations proceed with minimal concern about how victories or
concessions might play in the next day's papers. In this way, U.S. hoped that
the talks would be based solc;Iy on the basis of the issues, not on outside pressure created
by leaks to the press.
3
.' . . .
. . In many waYS7 Dayton was not only radio siient to the public
7
but.to officials back
in Washington. As with the negotiations during the team's shuttles that :faIl,
. officials' in Washington were not always kept infonned of the precise substance of
discussions. Although Dayton negotiators were in frequent phone. contact 'vvith
Washington, it was almost impossible for Washington' officials to keep in step with the.
fast-paced talks. Information Was 'not systematically shared from Dayton to' relevant
. throughout the WashingtDn and only the most sensitive negDtiating
decisions were submitted for high-level review. Indeed, as the' eleven annexes" vvere
. . 4
developed at there was only one known up-to-date draft in all of Washington.
Among the entire U.S. negotiating delegation, only General Wes Clark, Don Kerrick and
. . .
Jim Pardew regularly prDviqed brief written reports for their superiors in \V.ashington,
and Holbrooke asked to clear them all.
Like the shuttle efforts, the Dayton talks Deeured within clear pollcy"red lines" .
that negotiators could not surpass without clearance from Washington (such as sanctions
relief for Serbia or specific U.S. miJitaty commitments on IFOR). Inside these
boundaries, team were free to' use their own tactical
judgement on how to proceed. 'Although 'such senior officials. as Secretary Christopher
did "watch the negDtiations very closely," receiving daily telephone updates from
Holbrooke or others, they rarely intervened from Washington unlessasked.
s
. When senior
Washington offiCials did visit Dayton, they assumed roles like Admirals of the fleet
visiting a ship .:.. as Dayton's captain, Holbrooke' made every tactical decisiDn 'that
determined the course of the negotiations, they seldom tried to steer him differently.
6
While HolbrDoke and his core team -- Owen, Hill, Clark and Kerrick -
would conduct the negotiations, they would be accompanied at Dayton by most of the
talented staff that had served ,as their "backstops" in Washington that fall. In this
Dayton became a sort .of autonomous bureaucracy. capable of making most decisions
3 As might expett, many in the press were not satisfied by the limited access. One prominent
example was New York Times rCPQrter Elaine ScioIino, who broke the ground-rules and shouted a quest:ion
al Secretary Christopher on the issue as he walked out of the opening ceremony_ Christophern:mained
unflappable, although he jokingly asked "can' t we pull her press pass?" For an exam pte ofthc press s
reaction (and useful historical background on secrecy in negotiations) see Sciolino. "Gag Orders Can Do
Wonders for a Peace Talk. New York Times, November 5, 1995; and Nicholas Bums interview, July 26.
1996_ .
4 This draft. was in the hands of John Price of the State Department's European Bureau, who was the
EURISCE member designated to stay behind and "backstop'; the talks from Washington. He would receive
periodic updates to the annexes by phone, and annotate tfie changes on his copy. Once word got out that
he was doing so, several senior officials (both within the State Department and from other relevant .
agencies) would call Price for updates. See Price interview.
, See Christopher interview. October 22, J 996.-
, If Holbrooke was AdmiraJ, Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas served as his chieflogistical officer. Assuming the
role she had throughout the she shadowed the lead negotiator a\ almost every step. taking on the
daunting responsibility of making sure the Holbrooke train ran on time.
$

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
? E
without support from Washington. Indeed, since of that month was a. dme of
government shutdown due to the fierce budget battle, the "Dayton bureaucracy" waS one
of the only units _ of government at work. John Kornblum and the ad hoc legal working
group responsible for drafting annexes were there. as well as numerous officials from
the State Department"s EUropean Bureau Jo assist on specific aspects ofthe'negotiations '
(such as those who specialized in elections or the Muslim-Croat, Federation): The three
U.S. ambassadors in the region - Perina. Menzies; and Galbraith -- were present,. and
would help negotiate With their respective Balkan 'rountewarts. Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights John'ShattuCk: and Ambassador-at-Large Robert Gallucci also
came to assist in their areas of expertise. 'The Pentagon sent several several StafferS to
assist with the military aspects of the negotiations, and U.S. intelligence persoJUlel vvere
7
'
located on site as well.,
'
, 'fheBosruan, Croat, Serbian and European delegations were' of a similar size; in
all, neai-ly 200 offichils were present to support the negotiations. In addition,hundreds of,
U.S. personnel"':' from administrative aides and public liason officers to,
communications specialists and security guards - were involved_ in the talks. While
many of these people were loaned from Wright-Patterson, aconsiderabJe number of them
had come from their offices in Washlngton.
The area around the sprawling, military base was typical of" the
American midwest - flat, sparse, and in November, cold and bleak. ,Ohio itself was far
larger than Bosnia (and U.S. negotiators had created a map showing such), and far a-way
from the New York. air that Milosevic wantooso badly to smell. Dayton, like xnany
communities in middle was a quiet city, large enough to have its own
station but small enougllto Still have a threatre. Although ddegates rarely
strayed far from base, the city enthusiastically'played host, and it was east to see Dayton '
Chamber of Commerce members envisioning a revived tourist industry of a new city of
"international peace."
The five'delegation,s were housed in' Wright-Patterson's Visiting Officer
or VOQs. The VOQ area -- which was roughly three square blocks -- had been fenced off
from the rest of the base, and security checkpOints had been constructed 10 regulate
access. These modest two-story accommodations were very functional, looking a lot like
college Gorms. They had sleeping quartcrs- for the delegates, as well as offices and
conference rooms for negotiations. In the fifteen days since Wright-Patterson had qeen
chosen, Air Force creWs worked roUnd-the-clock to spruce-up the suites that would house
the heads of deJegation - Milosevic,Izetbegovic, Bildt and Holbrooke. The
idea was to make the accommodations more "presidential": While not Versailles, 'the
VOQ's were nicely improved from what was before circa-1970 military housing.
, Notwithstanding these renovations, the housing struck Bosnian Foreig-n Minister Sacirbey
as "a little like Motel 6.''&
.,
The VOQ area was to the primary location of the "proximity" talks; the Croat"
Bosnian, Serb'and quarters faced one another in a quadrangle (the Russians and
Europeans were housed in a building .adjacent to the quadrangle). Here is where
7 As further evidence of Dayton's autonomy, the Slate Department arranged for the facility 10 be able to
receive and send classified cables 10 Wasbington or embassy posts abroad. A new localor line was created
temporarily for such cable fraffic - "U.S. Office Proximity Talks:'
For quole, see Michael Dobbs, "Bosnia Talks Open With Warning to Leaders; Failure to Reach
Agreement Could Lead Europe to Wider War, Christopher Says," Woshingfon Post, November 2. 1995_
J82
UNCLASSIFIED
.'
.

negotiators could shuttle back and forth among the delegations. Yet, unlike the lush
lawned quadrangles that grace many university campuses, this quad was a parking lot:.
About a hundred yards away from the VOQ complex sat the Bob Hope Hotel and
Convention Center. A path, known as the "peacewalk," had been constructed by
the Air for the short stroll between the. VOQ and rhe aope . complex. Like a
university campus' student union, the Hotel was the central 'place where the'
delegates could meet; eat and occasionally work.The main eating facility for the :talks
was also in the Hope Hotel, at a sports-bar named Packy's, where CNN played alongside
sporting events on its wide-screen TV's. The Officers Club, which Was off/he official
negotiating site but only 'a short driving distance from Hope Hotel,' also served as a 'place'
where high-level officials could eat . Office suites for U.S. support st:aifhad beeh created
in the Hope and the convention center would hold any large group meetings;
starting with the opening session.
. .
Day One: Wednesday, Novemher 1
"The eyes of the world are on Dayton, Ohio," Secretary CJu:istopher said from the
tarmac shortly after arriving at Wright-Patterson that chilly and grey Novembermorning.
"We have come to the 'heartland of America to by to bring peace to the heart ofEurope.,,9
Holbrooke and the rest of the U:S. team had arrived in the day beforetowdcome
the visiting delegations and make arrangements for the opening ceremony. Shortly. after
arriving, Christopher, accompanied only by HoJbrooke, met privately with each of" the
BalkanPresiderits 'and with the Contact Group to insure that each party would respect the
.. groundrules (such as nqt talking to the press) and, hopefully, 'establish a serious and
positive tone for the negotiations.
IO

- .
.
.
These opening meetings gave the Secretary a chance to outline a few key issues
that the U.S. hoped each leader would confront the resolution of which would be
critical to an overall agreement "You will need to make clear to all the parties that they
. will each be required to' make compromises and sacrifices," a State Department stra:tegy
paper to 'Christopher stated. "In bilateral meetings, you will want to underscore. the
importance of each coming to the table with their own reasonable proposals." Yet, the
U.S. understood that the odds weighed against a comprehensive settlement. The
challenges facing the conference were daunting. uBosnianofficials, buoyed by their
battlefield are ambivalent about any agreement which in their view. would
rescue the Serb entity from collapse. Meanwhile, the Serb side is'deeply distrustful of the
and' Mirosevic will have h'is hands full delivering the Bosnian Serbs into a
unitary state with the sort of superstructure which is envisioned in our draft
Given the remaining divisions on map and constitutional issues, U.S. intelligence analysts
were skeptical that a fully satisfactory agreement could be reached in Dayton - out the
.stakes were-too high for any side to be seen as responsible for failure. II "Working out
9 See "Statement by Secretary Christopher upon arrival at Wright.Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton. Ohio,
November I, 1995," U.S. Department of State Dispaldl, December 1995. .
10 This was explained by State Department spokesman Nicholas Bums during a press briefing 10 revieVol' .
these opening meetings. See State Department transcript, November 1,1995. See also Nicholas Burns
interview.
7
a.
. T ThTrT A <:!<:!TliTPf)
183
]31
n
agreeable solutions to the numerous contested issues is likely to extend beyond the 1-2
weeks which the parties appear prepared to spend in Dayton:' one such memorandum
read.
12
.
The "piecemeal" negotiating process of shuttle diplomacy had brought the parties.
within close mnge of a .but many contentious issues had not yet even been
addressed. The Geneva and New York Agreeinents created a strong political and legal
framework for a future Bosnian state, but constitutional details would have to be fleshed
out further. Moreover, perhaps the most critical issue - tenitory - had been left entirely
for proximity talks .. Holbrooke's strategy throughout the shuttles had been to tackle the
"easier" issues first. By doing so, he had hoped to facilitate. a sense of trust among the
parties as well as bolster his own team's credibility as a mediator, both of which would be
essential as the parties moved to the ''tough'' issues at Dayton.
l
) . .' .
Christopher's first bilateral was with Tudjman. The Croat President's overriding
concern going into. Dayton was to get Eastern Slavonia back from the Serbs, if necessary
by force. During Holbrooke's shuttles, Tudjman was disinterested about almost
everything but Eastern Slavonia (the only exception being the. Federation milit&-y
offensive). However, the U.S. believed that since Tudjman desperately wanted Croatia to
be accepted as of Western Europe - thus being eligible for financial support. and
participation in defense programs like NATO's "Partnership for Peace" - he would
cooperate on other issues as long as he got a favorable resolution in Eastern Slavonia.
The Secretary .told Tudjman that EastemSlavQnia had to be settled in the
framework of current negotiations -- he would only get a deal if he cooperated on other
issues. For example, Christopher pressed Tudjrnan to support' the
Federation. Recent tensions in the Federation, With Bosnian concerns about
Croatia (as lzetbegovic expressed to the President on Octob"er 24 and Sacirbey discussed
with Holbrooke on October 21) , placed strengthening the Federation at the top of the
Dayton agenda. 14 U.S. intelligence reported that while Tudjman was "sitting on the
. fence," he would likely support the Federation as "the lesser of two evils."ls The State
Department's European Bureau contended that "Zagreb fonnally supports the Federation
but shows little interest in looseniog its hold over areas controlled by the Bosnian Croat
and regular Croatian forces.,,16 Given this attitude, Christopher wanted to reiterate to
I
,..------:---------'
i2 See Ibid.; and Memorandum to Christopher from John Kornblum. "Scope Paper: Your Participation in
the Opening of Bosnia Proximity Talks," October 31, 1995.
13 The potential of such a "piecemeal" negotiating approach has been described by severallcading theorists
of strategic interaction. Basic bargaining theory has shown that, even ifeach side's preferred choice is to
take advantage of tile other - which was certainly the case among the three Balkan parties. mutual
cooperation can be achieved when big transactions are broken up into a series of small ones. See, for
example, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books. 1984); and Thomas Schelling.
Stratec QfCQnflict (Harvard University Press. 1960), Chapter 2; U
. .
.
For a press report on the tenuous nature of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, see Raymond Bonner. "Along
Bosnia Dividing Line, Federation Is Only On Paper," New York Times, November 4, 1995 .
. C S .... L..ornndum 10 Chri"ophcr from John Kornblum. ''Your Moeting willi Croatian ","de'" Tudjman
at the Proximity Talks . Wright-Patterson AFB. November I, 1995." .October 31. 1995.
184

UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
Bl
Tudjrnan what President Clinton had. told him personally only eight days before -- that
the U.S. looked to his country, "as the stronrer party" of the Federation, to use its
considerable weight'to make the aIliance work.'
The Secretary next met with Milosevic. The Serb leader reportedly understood
the bottom-line was that he could not leave Dayton without a settlement. He recently
signaled his own flexibility on such key issues as Eastem Slavonia. and apparently felt
that the elements of an agreement were less important than the act of agreeing itself.
ls
The State Departmenes European Bureau described Milosevlc as a leader squeezed on all
sides. Under pressure from defeats and the international community,
he still had to confront a Bosnian Serb leadership "that is trying to walk back
commitments contained in the Geneva and New York principles, and the nationalist
opposition in Serbia [that] is accusing Milosevic of seIJing out." The Bosnian Serbs
continued to give him problems, and it remained an open question whether he could
deliver them on issues they considered vital to their interests. By this view, U.S. officials
believed that "Milosevic has already taken a major leap by agreeing to represent the Serb
side in Bosnia, and he probably believes that now is the tilIl<E to cut deal.,,19 .
Milosevic started the meeting in his typical blunt and a bit crude. Having
already tasted the cuisine at Packy' the Serb leader complained about the "shit
but commented favorably on a friendly waitress named Vicki (which With his accent,
Milosevic pronounced as "Wieki''). Turning to serious issues, Christopher pressed the
Serb leader on human rights, reminding him that the U.S. was warning all sides about
continued human rights violations. Some had criticized the decision to allow Milosevic,
considered by many a war criminal, to come to the U.S:. Throughout the past week both
the Washing/on Post and New York Times had run lengthy articles outlining Serb
atrocities in Srebrenica during July 1995?O Information for these articles provided in
part by the State Department, and their publication catised Milosevic to complain bitterly
to Christopher and Holbrooke about a "media conspiracy.';!1 Although "conspiracy" is
too strong a word, the U.S. did want to use this ,press,ure to their advantage. Their
opening strategy was to make clear to the Serb leader that his presence at Dayton was
itself an act of goodwill on their part. Further, the negotiators intended to play on
Milosevic's well-knoWn desire for bilateral relations with the U.S .. Christopher's points
outlined that "a successful conference will be an important first step on the road to
nonnal relations," reminding him that sanctions would be suspended once an agreement
was initialed. As he had done with Tudjman, Christopher also pressed Milosevic on
17 See talking points, "Meeting with Tudjman." Pardew notebook from Dayton. no date.
II For intelligence reporting on Milosevic's rather flexible negotiating stance entering Dayton, see
"Mifoscvic's Goal: Get an Agrcement," Cable, Belgrade 5408, November 1, 1995.
See memorandum to Christopher from Kornblum, "Your Meeting with Serbian President Milosevic at
the Proximi Tal Wri t-Patterson AFB November 1 J 99 5 " October 11 1995' sec also
osman r s y own ar ers or. ayton, e,. e gr c ,eto er. .
20 See Michael Dobbs and Jeffiey Smith, "New Proof of Serb Atrocities; U.S. Analysts Identify More Mass
Graves." Washington Post, October 29, 1995; and "Massacre in Bosnia; Srebrenica: The Days of
Slaughter," New York Times. October 29, 1995. In a press conference before Dayton. Holbrooke
welcomed these articles and explained that they had been written with the full cooperation of the State
Department.
[1
?
UNCLASSIFIED
185
131
B1
7
Eastern Slavonia, asking that a deal be reached within the timeframe of the Dayton

. .
For the Bosnians. by far the most relucta.nt and divided of the parties, the U.S.
aimed to reassure them that their sacrifices were weli understood 'and would not be
forgotten. "They want peace, but not at any price," the U.S. Sarajevo
described. "and they distrust deeply the Serbs and, to a lesser degree, the Croats. ,.23 As
. the opening of the conference neared, lzetbegovic was apparex:itly tired, distracted and
deeply ambivalent about ending the war juSt as his side began fighting back successfully;
At one point, he even considered not attending. Silajdzic, himself pessimistic that a deal
Could be reached, had earlier characterized the prospects for success as "somber, unclear, .
and uncertain.,,24 In an attempt to brighten this dour outlook. Christopher and Holbrooke
wanted to reiterate that with "good faith negotiations," the Bosnian war could be brought
to a just conclusion. Additionally, they" wanted to remind the Bosnians about the
"carrots" for cooperation...;. such as equip-and-train and economic reconstruction - that
had been initially outlined. in the Lake plan.
25
As he had with Tudjman, Christopher also urged to cooperate t() shore
up the Federation. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic agreed, but countered that that a new
Federation agreement - one that provided a specific governing structures and an
implementation outline - be reached before most key issues with the Serbs were
addressed. This Bosnian demand for an .additional set of negotiations was. not a part of
the initial gameplan, but. unless they patched-up the alliance, any'
agreement reached at DaYton had no chance of succeeding. Holbrooke knew, however.
.
.
.
that the task would slow down the. main issues of the negotiations. In order to assure that
he and his team spent most of their energy on, the core issues, Holbrooke delegated
primary reponsibility' for the Federation talks to Michael the well-trusted and
highly capable German representative to the Contact Group?6
.. Finally, Christopher demanded that Izetbegovic curb the support the Bosnian
military was receiving from Iranian-backed Mudjahadeen fighters. The British had
recently raised similar concerns with the Bosnians, stating that if such forces were not
. withdrawn from Bosnia, they would consider withdrawing aid workers and support for'
Bosnian reconstruction efforts?7 For his part, the SecretaI}' explained that the
. Administration could not justify either to Congress or the American public helping the
22 See talking points, "Meeting wilh Milosevic," Pardew notebook from Dayton, no date.
n "Bosnia: Peace Agreement Faces Tough Sales Pitch, But IFOR and Economic Aid Arc Key Trumps:'
Cable, Sarajevo 733, November I. 1995.
LA dOt 0 d tho h fi K bl" fO
I
COOl' mg 0 a memoran um to nstop or rom om urn, assurance 0 generous reconstruction
package will be a strong inducement for [Izetbegovic] to sign on to a peace plan." See "Your Meeting with
President Izetbegovic at the Proximity Peace Talks. Wrigbt Patterson AFB, November I, 1995:'
October 31. 1995; also see Sarajevo 733. . .
.
26 Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20. 1996.
27 Apparently British soldiers and aid workers had recently been subject to Mujahadeen surveillance.
Details on these concerns had been conveyed to the State Department by the British embassy on November
I. See memorandum for Chris Hill from BiJJ Mozdzierz (EURlSCE), "UK Warning to Bosnia on .
Mujahedin," November I, 1995.
186
&
7
UNCLASSIFIED
BI
.',
UNCLASSIFIED
tJ8III
Bosnians militarily - whether by stationing U.S. troops or participating in an equip-and-
train program .- under such circumstances. "I must be very clear with you," he said,. 'one
Mudjahadeen is too many.,,28
, The Secretary of State's final meeting before the official opening ceremony was a
working'lunch with. Carl' Bildt and the Contact Group representatives. Although Bildt
and Russian representative Igor Ivanov were, along with Holbrooke, the co-chairs of the
conference, they had no clear role in the negotiations. Similar to the shuttle negotiations,
almost all of the planning and organizing for Dayton had been done by the U.S.; the
Europeans had seen the first drafts of the' negotiating texts only the previous weekend.
State Department officials expected that the Contact Group would press the Secretary to
outline a role for them in the negotiations. to be certain "that they are kept fully in the
loop as develop." Christopher planped to stress the importance of working closely
together and delivering a unified message to the parties. He also tty to reassure
them that while "some of us" were not happy with the various aspects of negotiating
process, "it is a result we are all pursuing together. That result has to be a peace
agreement that works. Let us not lose sight ofthat."029
_
. Following these preliminary consultations, Christopher and Holbrooke joined all '
delegations at 2:30pm in the "B:.29 Superfortress" Room of the Hope Convention Center
-- all of the conference rooms were named for a U.S. military plane - for the fonnal
opening ceremony. At the center of the large fIourescent-Iit ballroom, Christopher and
Holbrooke joined French representative Jacques Blot. British
representative Pauline Neville-Jones., Gennan representative Wolfgang Ischinger and the
three Balkan Presidents around a circular table. Their respective delegations filled
the rest of the room. and the' press was isolated in the back. This was the only planned
open-press event of . the faIks.
When everyone was seated. Secretary Christopher rose to motion the three Balkan
leaders to shake hands -- without himself getting caught shaking Milosevic's hand. Like,
the 1993 handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House's South the
image of these three men clasping hands was the photo-op and symbol the U.S. wanted
the talks to begin on. The embrace, like Rabin and Arafat's, was equally awkward and
dramatic. "We it would be a constructive Secretary Christopher - .
recalled. "It seemed likely there would 00 a good deal of tension in the room when they
fIrst got together, so it would be symbolically important for them to shake hands.,,3O , .
In his carefully drafted opening address, Christopher tried to set the agenda both
thematically and substantively. C&We have an urgent and importallt purpose today," he'
began. "We are here to give and Herzegovina a chance to be a country at peace,
not a killing field." In order to do so, he stated that four key conditions needed to be met:
fust, Bosnia was to remain a coherent state with "a single international personality;"
second. that a settlement must take into account "the special history and of
Sarajevo; third, that human rights r.nust be respected and that those resPonsible' for
atrocities be held accountable; and finally, that a -solution must be brought to Eastern
l& See points, "Meeting with lzetbegovic." Pardew notebook from Dayton, no date; and Holbrooke
interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996. ,
'
29 See memorandum and talking points to Christopher from Kornblum, "Your Meeting with Contact Group
Representatives at the Proximity Talks, Wright-Patterson AFB, November I, 1995," October JI. J 995. -
30 Christopher interview, October 22, 1996. The moment had also been carefully planned and rehearsed by
U.S. officials, who wanted to be sure that opening went off without a hitch .
.... 187
UNCLASSIFIED
Slavonia. All of these issues had been raised privately earlier in the day, but now the
Secretary had presented them publicly as the necessary ingredients for an "enduring
peace.,,31
After this ceremony. Christopher asked Milosevic and Tudjman to join him in an
. opening discussion on Eastern Meeting in the living room of the "Carriage
House," asmaU military VIP cottage about a mile from theVOQ area, the two Presidents
faced each other while Christopher and Holbrooke sat together on a couch. Milosevic
arrived late, but seemed very relaxed. He had just come from the Officers Club, and as
be sauntered in, it was clear th.at he had been drinking; He greeted Tudjman and his
delegation (including Foreign Minister Granic and Defense Minister Susak) infonnally
by first-name. Already feeling loose
p Milosevic ordered a glass of red wine. Christopher
and Holbrooke each joined in with a glass ofwhite.
U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith was asked to open the meeting by.
describing the state-of-play on Eastern Slavonian negotiations. Galbraith explained that
the two Presidents needed to act to overcome their remaining (and, in his view, small)
differences. Tudjman responded that these "techriical" matters were no the
issue was whether the Serbs would accept the reintegration of-Eastern Slavonia into
.Croatia MiIosevic did not see the remaining issues as merely "technical." As the
conversation heated the two Presidents began to talk to each other in
while the interpreter tried to keep up. Seeing that the interpretation was becoming an
impediment to :their conversation. Christopher asked the interpreter to stop trying.
Although'the Americans, with the exception of Chris Hill, couldn't understand what was
being said. it didn't matter - getting the two sides to talk face-to-face was 'the point of
being there. As the Americans looked on, Milosevic tried to bully Tudjman into
accepting some of- his proposals, such as leaving the territorial decision to a local
referendum. The Croat President' responded coolly, not giving in to Milosevic's .
overtures . Holbrooke' remembered this as a ''wild meeting:' characterized by the two
Presidents "screaming and each other." To Galbraith, it seemed that the
"Tudjman [that] Milosevic encountered at this meeting was not the same one he had last
seen years before. Milosevic's style, numbed by alcohol [which apparently was more /
than a bottle by the end 'o(the meeting]. wasn't working.'.J2
Although Galbraith - who had labored for months on Eastern Slavonia - felt that
a deal seemed only days away, others remember the meeting differently. Holbrooke and
Chris Hill Saw the discussion only as an ice-breaker that left the two sides far apart on
Eastern SIavonia. Galbraith's overall assessment about the prospects for an Eastern
Slavonian agreement, which Holbrooke and Hill had often disputed over the past few
months. seemed too optimistic.
33
The only new development appeared to be that
Milosevic was finally willing to accept the fact that Eastern Slavonia had to be included
in an overall settlement in Dayton. Up to that point, Milosevic had refused to involve
himself with problems in Eastern Siavonia; these were iSsues, he contended, between
JI Sec "Statement by Secretary Christopher at the Opening of the Balkan Proximity Talks," U.S.
Departmen! of state Dispatch. December 1995. For an example of a press report. see Elaine Sciolino.
"Three Balkan Presidents Meet in Ohio to Try to End War." New York Times. November 2, 1995.
)l See Christopher interview, October 22. 1996; Galbraith interview. October 2. 1996; Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary. pp77-78; and Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20. 1996.
J) For an example of HoI brooke and H!lI's differences with Galbraith. see "Item for HoI brooke," note to
HoI brooke from Hill, October 30, 1995. EUR electronic computer tiles, SEEYUG Library.
J88
?SF
-UNCLASSIFIED
/
UNCLASSIFIED
Zagreb and the Serbs in EaStern SIavonia.
34
Now, Milosevic agreed to negotiate
something in Dayton which he could then "recommend" to the local Serbs to accept.
Although a small step, Holbrooke and Hill it was at least something to start with.
That evening, Secretary Christopher returned to Washington. His trip to open the
talks was largely a success: the opening ceremony set the desired tone of hope and
cooperation and a substantive foundation had been established with all the partiesp That
the U.S. presented the delegations the draft Framework Agreement and annexes on
the constitution, elections and IFOR.
. Day Two: TilursdaY7 November 2
After opening day, negotiations began in earnest: Holbrooke had devised a multi-
tiered approach to . conduct the talks, in which he and his core team would begin
negotiating political and constitutional issues with the parties, deferring the "map taIkS
n
--
which he suspected would be the most contentious - for the very end. Alongside these
efforts would be two parallel negotiations. in which the Holbrooke team would
participate when necessary:. talks to secure agreements on Eastern Siavoniaand the
Federation .. At the Holbrooke's primary objective was to avoid early setbacks and
let the talks evolve naturally. As in the game of football; he later recalled, the goal at .
Dayton was "of course to score touchdowns to win the game. But first, you have to get
some first downS.,,3S . .
Work began almost immedialely on the Federation. Throughout the morning and
afternoon, Holbrooke and Michael Steiner mediated lengthy meetings between
Izetbegovic, TUdjman.and Federation President .Kresimir Zubak to establish broad
parameters of a proposa1.
36
..' . . . . r
During orie of these meetings, Holbrooke asked Jo1m. Shattuck to join the
discussion to report on his investigations of human' rights violations and stress the
importance orhis gaining access to key areas of western Bosnia. In addition to enSuring
Shattuck access for further investigations. Holbrooke thought that they would also be able
to forge a deal to provide the Muslim and Croat refugees the right to return to their homes
in four select towns in western Bosnia (Jajce, Bugojno, Travnik and Stolae). Although
the refugee numbers would be relatively insignificant, Holbrooke hoped that such a
confidence-building measure would help improve Bosniac-Croat relations (since these
refugees were a product ofllie Muslim-Croat war) and smooth the Federation
talks along?? .. .
Both Iutbegovic and Tudjrnan .put up "incredible resistance" to the refugee
proposal. Tudjrnan claimed that such an agreement would be "absurd" this early in the
negotiations. Visibly annoyed and wishing to emphasiu that this was a poor
Holbrooke abruptly got up and them that if they could not even agree to this minor
34 For an of the U.s. trying to convinee Milosevie that he should be concerned with Eastern
Slavonia, sec Belgrade 5122. See also meSsage for from Chris Hill, "OfficiaJ-rnfonnal," State
250182, Oetober2), 1995. . .
35 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
36 ACcording to Don Kerrick's report that evening to Anthony Lake, the three Presidents agreed to consider
the relationship between Bavaria andGermany, wherein Bavaria has quast-independence, but bas
responsibilities such as revenue-raising to help the Germ.an state. See Kerrick to Lake, "Dayton SITREP
#1. November2,1995, 9:00pm.". .
nShattuck interview, July 25,1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20, 1997.

7 189
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
F
he might as well call in the press to tell them that further negotiations would be
fruitless. Putting on his coat as if to leave, Holbrooke said that "I've got this human
rights guy (Shattuck) who's willing to risk his life to visit these areas, and you can't even
assure us that you can get a few people to relocate." After this outburst, Izetbegovic and
Tudjman agreed to the proposal, signing a paper that briefly outlined the relocatjon
arrangement. 33.
.. .
.
Later that day. Holbrooke got Milosevic to guarantee access for .shattuck to the
main Bosnian Se.rb city in Bosnia, Banja Luka. Holbrooke and Shattuck also presSed the
leader on the whereabouts of David Rohde, an American joum31ist for the Christian
Science Monitor who had been missing in Bosnian Serb territory since October 30.
Rohde's status had become a major issue for the media, who were camped out at Dayton
en masse and starved for stories: Milosevic agreed to work with the Bosnian Serbs on the .
issue .. With the and Milosevic's cooperation in pocket.
Shattuck left.that evening for Bosnia.
39
.
..
The Serbs and Croats met to discuss Eastern Slavonia:. For the second
consecutive day, Tudjrnan and Milosevic got together (without U.S: mediators) to discuss
this issue over lunch at the Officers Club. According to Croatian debriefings for both
Holbrooke and Galbraith, a deal on Eastern Slavonia "was there." It appeared as though
an agreement would be centered around electIons in Eastern Slavonia Within one year,
with a UN-sponsored military force (separate from IFOR) to implement an agreement.
As Pardew reported to Secretary Perry that day. ()ne proposal- which had been floated in
Perry-Grachev talks earlier that fall - was that this UN force would consist of a U.S. and
Russian battalion, which both Tudjrnan and Russian representative Ivanov tentatively
agreed to. But the duration 'of the UN implementation phase remained hotly contested.
TItat evening, Tudjman left Dayton (as scheduled) to retwn to Croatia for their national
elections. In order to continue negotiations in the region - as Milosevic insisted --
Holbrooke asked Galbraith and UN representative ThorvaId Stoltenberg to travel with the
Croat J?resident back to Zagreb and go on immediately to Eastern Slavonia. 40
. While the Croats and Galbraith were confident that a deal was at band, Holbrooke
and Hill remained skeptical. They had always assumed that the key issue would be the
length of time -for the retmn of Eastern 'Slavonia to Croatia -- Tudjman wanted the
process completed in one year, Milosevic insisted on three years -- and neither side
seemed ready to compromise. Although Galbraith had been sent back to negotiate with.
the local parties, Holbrooke knew that the'real action would remain in Dayton. He sensed
that Milosevic realized he would have to concede Eastern Slavonia, but was looking for a
3J See Shattuck interview, July 25, 1996; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary. p78. For agreement, see "Displaced
Persons Agreement. 2 November 1995, Dayton Ohio."
Shattuck interview, July 25, J 996; and Shattucks"Weekly Report" to Under Secretary of Slale for
Global Affairs Tim Wirth, November 2, J 995; and Elaine Sciolino, "Rights Issues Complicating Bosnian
Talks," New York Times, November 4, 1995. On Rohde's situation. see "CSM Correspondent Davjd
Rohde," Cable, Belgrade 5431. November 2, 1995. .
40 On the plane that night to Zagreb, Galbraith worked up his draft of an agreement and briefed 'rudjman.
As he reflected in his diary that day, "My hope is the Serbs will be able to accept it if there is no explicit
mention of reintegration and with the access guaranteed to tbe FRY. should accept since it will be
able to get what it wants on 'time period' [of reintegration] in the subsequent negotiations, especially since
the international force will not last more than one year. However, when I read my handwritten notes to
Tudjman on the plane, be insisted on one year." See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp78-79; and Galbraith
interview. October 2. 1996.
J90
-
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

way to do so without aggravating the Serbs in the area. Regardless of what Galbraith
could negotiate. in the region, a deal would be real only with Milosevic's blessing. Thus,
while Galbraith and Stoltenberg worked in the region, Holbrooke and Hill pressed
Milosevic and Serb Foreign Minister Milutinovic in Dayton.
41
.
On the annexes. initial discussions opened with the parties on the constitution,
elections and IFOR annexes, which they had recieved the previous night. These talks,
while preliminary, were as "constructive in nature," with none of the parties
"react[ing] stronglyn to any particular issue, clarified questions each party had about
specifics. "They all simply asked questions/' Pardew reported to Perry. "The tough
negotiations will come when they have the time to fully evaluate it." The Bosnians did,
however, argUe that any anns control regime should encompass the entire region
(including Serbia and Croatia), not juSt Bosnia. Further, they wanted the antis embargo
lifted no later than sanctions against Serbia, and asked for the specifics of the
"equip-and-train" initiative to be included in an agreement.
42
For an early assessment of
territorial issues, Holbrooke had Pardew begin discUssions with the Serbs in their VOQ.
Although many variations were discussed, at the end of the day, nothing was
accomplished. As Holbrooke expected, no one - Croat, or Muslim - was ready to
pursue a serious discussion on the map.43
U.S. officials also spent a great deal of time that day consulting with the
Europeans on the remaining draft annexes. Before any of the annexes could even be
presented to the parties, . the U.S. wanted to make sure that the Europeans concurred, in
order to maintain appeanurce on Contact Group unity; The U.S. had briefed its
. European partners on the mil,itary, constitution, and elections the weekend prior
to DaYton. but had not yet given them the remaining documents. some of which were sHU
being finalized within the U.S. team. This was left for the first few days of the
negotiations. As Holbrooke later observed, not only was the U.S. negotiating with the
three Balkan delegations, but ''we were trying to negotiate with and within the Contact
Group," obviously slowing the entire negotiating process down. The u.s. set up a daily
coordinating session at 9am with the Contact Group representatives in the Hope Hotel.
but the meeting was overcrowded. unwieldy and time-consuming, quickly taking on the
ponderous a4- of a UN General Assembly session.
44
The Russian presence further
complicated matters. Maintaining Russian approval would remain critical. particularly
for such issues as the military annex. In talks with Ivanov that day, it seemed that while
he was personally uncomfortable with some aspects of U.S. plans, the RussianS at Dayton
would not disrupt the negotiations.
4s
.
. .
41 Holbrookc interview with author (notes). December 20, 1996; HilI interview with author (notes)
. December 5,1996.
.
.
42 For summaries of these initial meetings, see Kerrick SlTREP #1. and Pardcw Novcmber2 report to
PerI)'.
'
43 For details of these talks, see notes, &!Serb Map Discussion of November 2, 199.5," Pardew Dayton
notebook; and Pardew November 2 report to Perry
. Holbrooke comment; Dayton HislOry Seminar.
4S As Tom Lynch, the head oftbe State Departrrient's Russia Desk observed from his talk with Ivanov that
day: "Ivanov is on good behavior. It's not clear how much fuss he will make about Annex 1 and IFOR as
he takes a basically helpful approach to the East Slavonia operation - obviously, as Yeltsin foreshadowed
at Hyde Park. grudging or conditional consent for IFOR is politically sensible in Russia. Whatguidance
Ivanov does have- J doubt there's much at the momenl- seems to be to engage Russia cautiously. try to
some oversight for it on IFOR, allow fOJWard movement on Easlem Siavonia but put the militarY in
191
UNCLASSIFIED
,
i
UNCLASSIFIED'
....
The atmospheIics throughout this first day of "serious were
characterized to officials in Washington as "generally positive ... even lighthearted.'
Kerrick reported to Lake that "all sides seem willing to deal - even anxious to do so.",
The U.S. considered, the Milosevic-Tudjrnan lunch discussion a welcome
revealing the two sides could work together, and far, no real problems had emerged
over the three annexes presented to the parties; Milosevic: for his part, had demonstrated
his desire for successful negotiations. As Pardew observed, "Milosevic is maneuvering at
every level to move toward an agreement while he keeps the Pale Serbs under control and
away from the decision-making process." Overall, the Dayton talks were off to a, goOd,
start. 'Yet, as everyone there knew
6
it would take several days to see if these initial
positive steps would lead anywhere.
4
.
Dill Tll.ree: Friday, November J '
The day began with a 9am plenary meeting between the U.S. and Contact Group
delegations. Sitting in the "B-29 Room" at the Hope Convention Center, the two sides
finalized the draft annexes on human rights, refugees, and national monuments, which
were now ready to be presented to the parties ....
7
Work continued on the civilian
implementation and a Bosnian police force annexes, and several issues remained to be
worked out with the Europeans until drafts were ready. On the police the
Europeans were concerned that international police in Bosnia would have too much
responsibility and too little real power. They were particularly interested, though. in the
civilian implementation annex, considering the senior civilian official -- which they had
already decided would be Carl Bildt - as their link to implementing any settlement
IFOR would be overseen by 'the Arnericans
1
but the ,Contact Group wanted to make sure
that the civilian process would be under European oversight. This was apparently one of
their only ccinslrUctions" from the EU Council of Ministers going into the Dayton talks.
4
!
Robert Gallucci, the lead U.S. diplomat in the 1994 negotiations with North Korea over
nuclear fuel and now Secretary Christopher's "Ambassador-atLarge," had arrived in
Dayton the day before With John Shattuck, and took the lead in working' with the Contact
Group on these two annexes.
49
Immediately after this meeting with the Europeans, Holbrooke and his core team
met for four hours with Milosevic in the American VOQ. In contrast to his rather cocky
'and loose of the past few days, that morning Milosevic was prickly
the decision-making role, and limit the cost to Russia in terms of resources." See, memorandum for
Holbrooke, Chris HilI, Wes Clark and Jack Zetku)ic (EUR), from Tom Lynch, "Talk with Ivanov,4:15pm
November 2," November 2. 1995. This report was also sent from Pardew to Secretary Perry.
See Kerrick SITREP III; Pardew November 2 report to Perry.
-47 The conference rooms the Hope Hotcl wcre named after U.S. military planes. Prior to the conference,
European delegation head Carl Bildt stated that he objected to having meetings for a "peace conference"
held in rooms that commemorated weapons of war. His complaint was rejected. Not only was the request
impractible, Rolbrooke felt. if anything, these reminders of U.S. air power would be useful. See Philip
Goldberg interview, October 3 I, 1996: Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
-4. As explained in Pauline NeVille-Jones, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia," Survival 38
(Winter I 996-97) p50.
'
See "November 3 Dayton Update," no author. EUR/SeE files; Gallucci interview.
192
I
UNCLASSIFIED
,-.:-
..
( .
,
.:
UNCLAIfIeD

insecure. so . He the meeting by griping about the beating he was taking in the U.S.
press, claiming that these stories were part of a U.s.-Bosnian coordinated effort to soil the
Serbs. Milosevic was particularly angry with an article in that day's New York Times
about the Hague War Crimes Tribunal's to link any peace agreement to the
sUrrender of Serbs indicted for war crimes. I The article also stated that Mllosevic
himself remained a suspect for war crimes. He was also bitter about Roger Cohen's
'recent New York Times profile of him, especially the portion concerning his father's
suicide. The. Serb dictator was clearly not comfortable with the realities of a free press.
S2
Although Holbrooke pressed him on it. he was concerned that Milosevic would be
linked to :war crimes -- if firm evidence emerged of his involvement during Dayton.
continued 'negotiationS with him would be problematic. However, as of that day. the U.S.
inteUigence community had no reliable evidence connecting Milosevic or his inner circle
'directly to ethnic cleansing or other war crimes.
S3
. Holbrooke assured Milosevic that,
unlike the articles on Srebrenica and Zepa, these recent stories were not part of' any
intentional leaks to the press, and that he could.n't control everything the media reported:
Holbrooke also pressed the Serb leader to deliver the early, unconditional release
of David Rohde. That day, Rohde, imprisoned in a jail in the nortnwest Bosnian town of
Bijeljina, was fonnally convicted With illegally entering Bosnian Serb territory. and
falsifYing ID papers. . While serving a two-week sentence for these crimes, there were
reports that Rohde could be charged with espionage. which would carry a sentence of five
years. Holbrooke admonished Milosevic about Rohde, firmly explaining to the Serb
. leader that they could never announce any agreement while an American journalist was
. . ed.
S4
Impnson
.
.
The discUssion then turned to the draft Bosnian constitution and other annexes.
Milosevic seemed generally supportive of the draft "framework agreement:' the broad
statement of principles to which the eleven annexes, would be attached. However, he
argued that Karadzic. should be permitted to participate in future elections. Allowing this,
he asserted, would avoid making Karadzic a martyr to the Bosnian Serb cause. Since
L Stophen EngeJba& .. e1 Seeks u.s. on s ..... War Crimm""" New York "-. November 3.
1
J995..
.
'1 To see how the Sab leader dealt with the' free press over a year later, see Jane Perlez. "Journalists
Prepare to Take On Serb President," New York Times. February 27. 1997.
53 In a memorandum to State Department Chief of Staff Tom Donilon, Toby Gati (INR) reported that "the
intelligence community for three years has looked for definitive evidence of President Milosevic's personal
involvement in managing ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. and has come up empty handed." Sec
"War Crimes and Milosevic," November 3, J 995. Attached to this memorandum are two older INR
analyses which support this point. See memorandum to Conrad Harper (L) from Philip Wilcox (lNR).
"Bosnia -:- Update on Actions Contributing to Genocide," August 21.1993; and memorandum to Arnold
Kanter (P) from Douglas Mulholland (INR), "Bosnia - Actions Contribuling to Genocid'c," January ] J.
1993. For the most part,. these reports that the U.S. did not have evidence linking genocidal
actions to Serb leaders, local Bosnian Serbs and militias were actively engaged in a range of activities
contributing to genocide.
$4 See Kerrick notes from meeting, November 3, 1995; Holbrooke interview witb author (notes), December
20,1996. On November 3, UNPROFOR officials in Bosnia met with Bosnian Serb officials in Pale .
discuss Rohde. See "Rohde in Bijelina Jail, Convicted of Illegal Entry, Doctored Papers," Cable. Sarajevo
749. November 4. 1995. .
a 193
UNCLASSIFIED
BI
UNCLASSIFIED
Milosevic did not believe that the Bosnian Serb could win an election, he argued that
forcing l<.aradzic to face the ballot was a way to get rid of him. With all thefocus on war
crimes, this idea was out of the question for the U.S., and Holbrooke rejected it.
55
While Holbrooke, Hill, Owen, Clark and Kerrick met with Jim Pardew
was with the Bosnjan Serbs in their VOQ to continue discussions on the map. Like the
day before, these talks went nowhere; it was becom;ng clear that Milosevic had done very
little to facilitate Bosnian Serb support for even the most basic principles of the peace
process. They remained suspicious of U.S. intentions.
56
Bosnian Serb head
MomciloKrajisnik tabled a proposal for a divided Sarajevo. arid explained that the
Sarajevo airport should be moved to provide for a Serb "Sarajevo center." They rejected.
c;mtright the idea' of a joint Administration for the city, 'as Krajisnik said that the U.S.
would "make a very big mistake if you try to force a unified state [in Bosnia]." After five
hours of talks, Pardew had not brought Krajisnik an4 his cohorts 311Y closer to an
agreement the Bosnians could accept. Telling them that their proposals were completely
unrealistic, Paroew offered to rull them by the Bosnians anyWay.57
Work also continued on an 'Eastem Slavonia agreement. From Zagreb, 'Galbraith
cabled to Dayton the draft text he put together on the plane the previous day. In it,
Eastern Slavonia would be progressively reintegrated into Croatia. A UN "transitional
authority" would be created to oversee this and both the Croats arrd Serbs would
commit to observe human rights, allow refugees to return. and establish joint
commissions. The OSCE would be asked to supervise elections to be held no longer than
thirty days after any transitional period, and the agreement would coincide with mutual
recognition between Serbia and Croatia. Holbrooke and Hill liked some of Galbraith's
ideas, but still believed that the decisions would have to be made in'Dayton.
S
!
, 'That evenitig; the U.S.' hosted a dinner for the senior delegation members at
Wright-Patterson's Air Force Museum. Holbrooke had wanted to have a fonnal event
during the beginning of the talks. believing it would be a nice way to unwind after three
full days iIi. Dayton. The setting for the first formal dinner of this peace conference was
irQnic; held in the cavernous main room of the Museum. the guests dined in the shadows
of an enormous B-29. several Stealth F-1l7 fighters, and. appropriately to some, a
Tomahawk cruise missile that seemed to be pointed right at Milosevic's table. ' The
symbolism was welcome but coincidental -- Holbrooke had simply intended to stage an
" For details, sec Kerrick notes and "November 3 Dayton Update."
56
Sec "Serb Map Discussion 0 Novem
1995.
.
" See "New Draft Eastern Slavonia Agrecment." Cable, zagreb 440 I, November 3, 1995; Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary, pp78-79; and Galbniith interview, 2.1996. That day, an State Department
inelligence report for Talbott outlined the following analysis on the prospects for success in Eastern
Slavonia. It confirmed much of what Holbrooke and Hill suspected: "The Croats <:an be deterred from
exercising a military option for Sector East solution if good faith negotiations make swift progress.
Milosevic holds the key to this effort: .. [he) could press the Sector East Serbs to sign on to the 'best
possible' deal now being promoted by Embassy Zagreb and fCFY negotiator Stoltenberg. Milosevic may
now have decided in Dayton that the local Serbs should sign on to a deal quickly." See Gati to Talbott.
"The Sector East Situation." November 3. 1995
194

UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED

elegant event, not send the parties a The Europeans were sure, however that
the setting reflected Holbrooke's deviousness. An Air Force orchestra was on hand to
belt out big band music in the style of Glenn Miller. The night apparently produced some
interesting face-to-face (for ex,ample, between.Milosevic and Izetbegovic), as
Bosnian, Serb and Croat delegates were intermingled at the tables. As Kerrick reported
the next day to Lake. the mood of the evening was one of "laughter and camaraderie
amongst both sides."S9 . . . .
Day Four: Saturday, November" .
On the Saturday of the talks, some of the participants hoped to get some rest.
The U.S. organiied a bowling trip for anyone interested, and provided soccer balJs and .
footballs for use. Mo SaCirbey, a fonner football player at Tulane University in New
Orleans. took Izetbegovic to see his alma mater play nearby Louisville. That night,
Milosevic hosted the. U.S. delegation at the Officers Club for a lobster dinner, with the
food shipped in from Maine' by Chris an American citizen and fonner New
Hampshire Democratic Party' leader who was at Dayton as an advisor to' the. Serb
delegation. Although the cold and midwest winter weather was settling Don
Kerrick reported to Lake that the "parties remain warm and receptive to one another, but
[are] showing almost no movement on key issues - yet.',60 .
Despite the perception that tbiscrisp autumn Saturday was a day of "recreation,
Kenicicpointed out, "serious talks. continued on the map. constitution, and the
Federation." Before lzetbegovic and Sacirbey departed for the Tulane football game,
they met with Holbrooke, Hill, Owen and Kerrick. Holbrooke began with a brief probe
. on the map; at that point, only Pardew and the Bosnian Serbs had seriously discussed the
- .
map. Sacirbey responded that since there "wasn't a better place to s:tart," the talks should
stick to the map created for the i 994 Contact Group plan. The rest of the discussion that
morning focused on lzetbegovic' s views on the structures of a democratic Bosnian state -
- the parliament, and national elections. As Kerrick reported, "Milosevic and
Izzy retain opposite views on election of national parliament and presidency." Nothing
much had changed in their respective positions since the negotiations over the New York
principles.in late September. The Bosnian President still supponed broad powers for a
federal presidency and parliament, both of which would be elected directly. Milosevic
wanted narrowly defmed powers without direct elections. When Holbrooke asked
. .
Izetbegovic what the solution should be, the Bosnian President apparently responded
honestly: "cbnvince one side [to] compromise to our position." To try to bring some
movement on these issues, Holbrooke urged the Bosnian President to meet privately with
Milosevic. Izetbegovic seemed willing, and said he would try to Sunday. 61
Although the Bosnians bad tried to prepare substantively for Dayton, even hiring
a leam of international lawyers to assist them in the negotiations, they struck many: U.S.
negotiators as ill-prepared and unwilling to compromise. On the bright side, it seemed
. that the internal divisions that had pJagued the Bosnian delegation were waning, at least
for the moment. After the talks that day, Don.Kerrick, observed that the "Bosnians [are]
39 Kerrick to Lake, "Dayton SITREP #2; November 4. 1994. I0:20pm"; Holbrookc interview with author
(notes), December 20, 1996.
c.o Ibid. Kerrick's report that day and notes he took during a morning meeting with the fiJosnians are the
only substantive items available thaI review the day's events.
6J For details of meeting, see Kerrick SITREP #2 and Kerrick notes, November 4. 1995.
R
UNCLASSIFIED
19S
'. UNCLASSIFIED
7
making significant progress on developing internal positions, but differences remain
evident'.62. .
. U.S. negotiators also expended considerable effort that Saturday dealing with the
David Rohde situation. Holbrooke was worried that if Rohde's status - ifhe
were held indefinitely or even sentenced for espionage -- the media outrage would
seriously sidetrack the negotiations.
63
Ten members of Rohde's family.had come to
Dayton on Friday to plead for their son's and Ambassador Menzies had. spent
most of his time during the past few days with them. Niko)a Koljevic, the Bosnian Serb
Vice President, joined Menzies to meet with Rohde's family for seventl hoUIS_ He
arranged a phone call with the imprisoned Rohde, and both Menzies and several fanuly . -:
members spoke with him. Holbrooke also met with Rohde's family, providing the moSt-;
recent news and reassuring them that the U.S. was working for his release.
64
_
TragicallYt the biggest news of the day at Payton had nothing to do with the
Balkans. -As these would-be peacemakers worked -or rested that Saturday an
accomplished and acclaimed peacemaker, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,. was
killed in Tel A vi;'. Rabin was widely considered a. bold. brave leader who accepted
considerable risk to compromise and make peace with his neighbors. For all these
attributes, hehad been gwmed down by the hate and violence that his leadership had tried
so hard to overcome. The assassination hit close' to home for the Balkan leaders at
Dayton; it seemed to remind them of the real risk these negotiations presented.
_ Day Five: Sunday, November 5
On discussions resumed on the map. in particular, Par,dew. Kerrick and
Sacirbey grappled with possible arrangements for the future status of Sarajevo. Pardew --
explained the Bosqian Serb map proposal he had received on Friday. As expected, ---
Sacirbey dismissed the pian with little consideration. The Bosnian Foreign Minister
explained that the night before, he, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and-Defense.
Minister Susak agreed that the 1994 Contact Group map should be the baseline for any
terrjtorial negotiations. "[The] quality of territory under the Contact Group plan [is]
better," Sacirlley With this, the Bosnian Foreign Minister outlined his position:
Sarajevo would be a unified city, and the Muslims would be compensated fairly for the
areas around Srebrenica and Zepa, which. were Muslim under the Contact Group map.
Sacirbey argued- that any trades had -to be "adequate" in, for example, vital resources
economic value. The Muslims had to get something in exchange for their.
losses - "[one] shouldn't assume [that the] Serbs can enjoy success [in this] peaCe plan,"
Sacirbey apparently said. - .
On Sarajevo, U.S. negotiators raised the -idea of keeping the city unified but
politically neutral - like Washington, DC, it could be a separate federal capital. The city
could be divided into several semi-autonomous political districts (called Opstinas) and,
like the proposed Bosnian presidency, have a three-person mayoral position whose
62 Menzies interview; Kerrick SITREP #2.
63 Sec Menzies interview. .
64 See Kerrick SITREP #2; Menzies interview; and Kit Roane, "U.S. Reporter Held in Bosnia Said to Be
Well," New York Times. November 6, 1995. That day. U.S. embassy officials in Sarajevo were supposed
to have met Pale authorities, but canceled the meeting when they refused to assure that Rohde would be
present. See "Pale Rejects U.S. Terms For Attending Meeting Re Jounialist David Rohde," Cable,
Sarajevo 745, November 4. 1995.
196
2
UNCLASSIFIED -
UNCLASSIFIED
chairman would rotate among the three ethnic groups. The murucipal govemm.ent would
be responsible for such city-wide services as transportation, and sanitation, while
the local Opstinas would control education, cultural services, and local health services.
The city would be policed by a multiethnic which the international community
could help train and monitor. Sacirbey agreed to consider the proposal, giving the U.S.
approval to draw up a formal plan. As a condition, he said that the Serbs had to announce
that non-Serbs would be welcome to live in Serb areas, and that security would be
guaranteed for all. In addition, Milosevic had to be told that under no circumstances
could Sarajevo be divided - "[he] muSt accept a unified city .',65
Work continued on an Eastern Slavonia agreement, with Chris Hill, assisted by
Chris Hoh, shuttling between the Croats and Serbs. Foreign Minister Granic and Defense
Minister Susak led the Croatian team, and Serb Foreign Minister Milutinovic was the.
main Serb interlocutor. Milutinovicparticipated in these talks provided that the
Americans and Croats maintained the fiction that he was not negotiating. on the East
Slavonia Serbs behalf, but rather only helping them determine '"recommendations"
from Belgrade they would likely accept.
Progress was difficult, as the Serb side objected to eveiy implication in the
complicated draft that the territory was under Croatian sovereignty, while the Croats
sought additional language implying that Belgrade accepted claim on the area.
The Croats were willing to be flexible on many details, including Serb rights and an
international transitional administration. but they were nOlfrepared to foresake the threat
of the military option without some kind of recognition. Milutinovic maintained that
the local Serbs had good reason to fear Croatian control. Any precipitous move to put
Easteni Slavonia under Zagreb would spark another sutge of refugees into Serbia and, he
suggested,jeopardizeMllosevic's ability to play peaeemaker.
67
In a private meeting that day with Susak, Pardew discussed CrQatia's views on the
role of international troops in implementing an Eastern Slavonian peace. Tudjman was
scheduled to return to Dayton 'on Wednesday, November 8, and Pardew explained to
Secretary Peny that "we can expect quick decisions on both the Eastern Slavonia and
Federation arrangements." Susak expressed to Pardew his optimism that an agreement
would be achieved between Belgrade and Zagreb. He believed that an implementation
force for Eastern Siavonia should be simply part of IFOR, and thus framed within an
M The only infonnation from this meeting is Kerrick's notes, November S, 1995. For a first draft of the
U.S. proposal for Sarajevo, see "Agreed Principres on Sarajevo." November 6, J 995 draft, Pardew Dayton
notebook.
"
&7 Chris HirI interview with author (notes). December 19, J 996; Chris Hoh cOl!1ments to author, passim.
,
197
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
&
, overall settlement. Susak wanted u.s. troops to be part of such a force. ''To Susak,. the
requirement for U.s. troops [in Ea;;tern Slavonia] is tied directly to the Serb demand for'
the Russian battalion to remain in Eastern Slavonia," Pardey.' reported'to Perry. uHis
logic is this: If the Russians must be there, the Croatians want an equivalent NATO force;
Russians will not accept NATO and col!trol, therefore, a Russian anangement
with the U.S. is required." The Croat Defense Minister struck Pardew as more interested
in U.S. command than a large number of U.S. yet, Susak "does believe truit some
U.S" troops would be required to justify the command position." Holbrooke supported
the idea of making an Eastern Slavonia part ofIFOR command, but the Pentagon dictated
, strong opposition to the idea.
68
.
, ,
That evening, Chris Hill joined U.S. delegation members Jim Tim
Ramish and Chris Hoh to continue to work on the text of the Muslim-Croat Federation
and Eastern agreements. Michael critical efforts on the'
had produced an arrangement for a joint presidency between the and and '
the tWo mayors ofMostar (a key Federation city and likely capital) were expected to
in Dayton to push the negotiations along. HiII and the' made some minor
edits to Steiner's draft, but were generally satisfied with its substance. Steiner's
accomplishment, Hill explained to the U.S. delegation during a staff meeting later that
night, could be a ""major breakthr:ough" for the Federation. By the end of the weekend,
Steiner's progress left, the U.S. delegation confident that a Federation agreement was
near;69 J
LJay Six: Monday, Novemher 6
Holbrooke began this sixth day in Milosevic's suite, where he was joined by Hill,
Owen, Kerrick, and Rudy Perina.. The main issue on the table was sanctions. Over the
weekend, Milosevic had asked Holbrooke that Serbia De allowed. to get some sanctions
relief in. order to deal with an energy crisis plaguing Belgrade. Time was nmning short,
and Milosevic insisted on relief before the harsh Balkan winter set in. Although this
directly contradicted with the Administration's policy reaffinned immediately before
Dayton - lifting sanctions only upon initialing of a final peace agreement - Holbrooke
relayed this request back.to Washington. The Principals had decided that sanctions relief
could be revisited.at Holbrooke's request, and he explained that Milosevic's willingness
, to bargain on other issues was being affected.
'
During the morning meeting, Milosevic and Holbrooke rehashed the, problem,
with both sides merely repeating their standard arguments. Milosevic threatened that it
would be hard for him to agree to anything without some immediate sanctions relief.
Holbrooke explained that sanctions would not be negotiated as a part of a peace deal, but
would be lifted as a result of one. IfMilosevic cooperated, the U.S. negotiator explained,
he would get a11 the sanctions relief he needed. The "real point is [to 1 get real peace,"
Holbrooke said. Then u.S.-Serbia relationship could be restored with "no restrictions:'
Dangling the carrot in front of MiIosevic, Holbrooke repeated that the "sanctions issue
[is] easier to deal with if [there is] real progress;"
6i Details of this discussion from report to Perry, "Dayton Talks -Implementation Forces in
CroatiaIMap," November 5, 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20. 1996.
See Kerrick notes. :'StaffMecting - November 5," and O'Brien and Hoh comments, interview ..
198

"UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
spent] six days here," Holbrooke said. "[We] can't stay forever. You
may want to stay to make Dayton your capital --1 want to go home. [We1 can't stay , 70
. beyond November 15."
. '
From the perspective of the U.S. in Dayton, the sanctions problem embodi.ed
three discrete issues. ' As Don Kerrick explaine.d in a memo to Strobe each
, required action in Washington to detennine the u.S. position?' The first issue wits the
UN Security, Council's consideration. Qf humanitarian agencies' emergency request to
allow 23,000 tons of heavy heating oil into Belgrade. Officials in Dayton felt that the
u.s. should support this proposal, urging Washington to direct New York to 'make this
happen soon. The second issue concerned natural gas supplies for Belgrade. According'
to the October 5 Bosnian cease-fire agreement which reopened natural.gas supplies to
, Sarajevo, the same access was supposed to have been guaranteed to The
Bosnians concurred that' this was the arrangement. The problem waS that the RUssians
(who were Belgrade's chief gas supplier) believed that they needed authorization of
the UN sanctions committee to supply Serbia. In their view, the U:S. was blocking a
decision. According to Kerrick. Milosevic claimed that he "concrete action for
people in Belgrade (now in subzero weather) while he is in beautiful, sunny Dayton.
[The U.S.] delegation believes that even after discounting exaggeration. this argument has
validity." Therefore, negotiators in Dayton pushed to get unrestricted natUral gas access
approved, "but not communicated to [the] UNSC until team can use for
maximum effect during Tuesday afternoon meeting with Milosevic.,,7
The third and final sanctions issue raised by Milosevic was a proposal to export a
limited amount of grain to pay for fuel imports. The Serb leader claimed that he could
not pay his main energy supplier. Russia, for fuel he desperately needed' for winter
heating. He had initially made this request in an October 26 letter to the
UN Security Council. but now pressed for immediate action. In Washington, Leon
Fuerth produced a detailed assessment of Milosevic's, proposaL In his view, Milosevic
was being disingenuous. The amount of fuel requested "far exceeds the narrowly defined
uses cited and, in fact, meet or.exceed overall FRY pre-embargo import requirements,"
Fuerth explained. He believed that even the grain Milosevic proposed to sell would be
worth more than the cost of the fuel he chlimed was needed, and that Serbia could profit'
between $20-$80 million onsuch a deal. Nevertheless, Fuerth concluded that "given the
onset of the heating season, increased numbers ofrefugees, and the continued degradation
of Serbia's eJectric power grid, the FRY government does . face a serious problem in
providing enough fuel for domestic heating needs this winter." While he thought
Milosevic's request was excessive, he agreed that "a tightly controlled [relief] package
could be to meet the most immediate needs without seriously Wldennining the
overall sanctions regime_" The delegation in Dayton concurred, recommending that
WaShington authorize to trade a more limited level of grain for less fuel.
73
70 Oe'tails on meeting from Kerrick notes, "Meeting with Milosevic," November 6. 1995.
71 Kerrick to Tall:iott. "Sanctions Issues Checklist." faxed to Washington at 12:22am on November 7. 1995.
During his visit to Dayton that day. Talbott had asked that Kerrick prepare this memorandum for him (sec
below).
'llbid.
73 See "A Grain-for-Oil Swap," memorandum drafted by Leon Fcurth, November: 5. 1995 (faxed to Dayton
on November 6); and Kerrick to Talbott. November 1,1995
... 199
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
For the most part, offlcials at the NSC supported Fuerth's analysis and
recommendations. In a phone call that day with Kerrick, Sandy Vershbowargued that
the issue wasn't as Uhumanitarian" as Milosevic was framing it. Nevertheless, Vershbow
said the NSC was reviewing ideas in the context of a larger agreement, and that Lake was
"seized" with the issue. Things seemed to lean towards scaled back plan, and
apparently he was trying to get the "definitive ansWer" that day. They were "prepared to
do something," Kerrick records Vershbow as saying, "but less than what Milosevic
wants. [The] President is taking [aJ hard line.,,14 .
' .
Deputy Secretary of State (and Dayton native) Strobe Talbott also became
involved with the issue. That afternoon, he arrived in Dayton' as the 'first of what
Holbrooke pJanned as a series of "drop-by" visits by senior Administration officials.
Holbrooke designed these visits to impress upon the parties that "full weight of the
U.S. government was behind the negotiating team" and, to "educate Washington officials
on the 'complexities and realities of these negotiations.,,1S . .'
Since the PC planned to discuss the sanctions issue soon, the U.S. delegation in
Dayton' urged Talbott to press die parties. The Bosnians the importance of
Talbott's visit. Over a dinner that Holbrooke hosted that night in Talbott's honor.
lzetbegovic and told the two American officials - in MiJosevic's presence --
that the October 5 ceasefire agreement mandated unrestricted gas flows to both Serbia
and Bosnia and that ccmillions of people are freezing in both countries." To help guide
the decision-making process in. Washington, Talbott asked draw up a
of sanctions isSues and what the negotiating team wanted. As Kerrick wrote
the next day, "[We] 'need help to clear decks on sanctions issues tOday. [The] goal is.to
have U.S.G position by COB. . Position should be sent to Dayton for leverage in
negotiations.',16 ./
.'
Work also progressed on Eastern Slavonia, although fitfully. In Holbrooke's
morning meeting with Milosevic; the Serb leader complained that he was confused by
. way the negotiations were split between Dayton and the Galbraith-Stoltenberg efforts in
the region.
71
Holbrooke and Hill shared this view, realizing that they would have to start
acting independently of Galbraith's efforts. Galbraith's negotiations were not going well,
and even he realized that the local Serbs would only cooperate if "instructed
n
' by
Milosevic. In an effort to move the talks forward, officials at Dayton wrote a new draft
agreement. . Written mainly by Chris Hill, this new draft reworded and simplified most
Galbraith's original text, but was substantively very similar (such as provision for a UN
implementation force).78 The most significant change was the elimination of the
provision for mutual recognition between Croatia and Serbia, which Holbrooke and Hill
74 According to Kerrick's notes from that day. be left the morning meeting with Milosevic to talk with
Vershbow about sanctions. See Kerrick notes, November 6, 1995; and "Sanctions Update," paper prepared
bl. Chris Hoh, November 6. 1995. 2:00pm.
1 interview with author (notes). December 20. ] 996.
76 This is the memorandum that oulJined the three sanctions issues for decision. See Kerrick to Talbott.
November 7.1995; Talbott interview; Kerrick interview; and Holbrooke interview with author (notes),.
Deiember20.1996.
71
.
. Kerrick notes, November 6. J 995.
71 Galbraith had cabled anothervcl'sion of his dlaft text on November4. See "Revised Eastern Slavonia
Draft Agreement, Cable, Zagreb 4403. November 4, 1995; Hill interview with author (notes), December
1.9,1996.
.
200
3
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED


believed should be negotiated separately from but parallel to an Eastern SJavonia .
agreement. 79
Negotiations also proceeded on the future status of Sarajevo. Based on the
discussion with Sacirbey the day before, Owen, Pardew and Miriam Sapiro had written a
. paper outlining ten principles of a "District of Columbia" plan for the Bosnian capital. so
Their talks with the Bosnians continued throughout the day, resulting in. some slight
revisions to Owen's draft .. This most recent paper maintained the main compontmts of
the. earlier plan - such as a city council, rotating mayor, unified police force, and local
control of educational, cultural and religious activities -- but added, among other things,
that the city had. to be demilitarized. Milosevic was still opposed to the idea; over .Iunch
that day, Holbrooke dramatically responded to Milosevic's complaints about the plan by
disowning it and tearing the up in front of him. Despite the Serb President's
resistance, Holbrooke and Owen hoped that at least some variant of the "WaShington,
DC" plan would work.
8l
.
Despite these occasional flare-ups, the atmosphere among the delegates in Dayton
remained congenial. The Talbott dinner that night seemed to be the. pinnacle of goodwill;
. the evening's aura was later described as "giddy." Milosevic and Izetbegovic spent much
of the night sharing jokes in Serbo-Croatian. To Holbrooke, Izetbegovic's comment that
Serbia deserved gas supplies was reason for optimism. "That was a draniatic momen!,"
he reca1led. "For the first time. it seemed that Milosevic and Izetbegovic had :found
common ground on an issue." Holbrooke reflected that Talbott "went. home [to
.Washington) completely blown away" by the good cheer found in his hometown. We
oftentalked [since Dayton) that his visit was the high emotional point."B2 .
,.. Day Seven: Tuesday, November 7
.While spirits. were high, substantive accomplishments were low. As Kerrick
reported to Lake that morning, after a week in Dayton, genuine movement over
contentious issues - such as the constitution and the map - had not yet occured. "All
going well," Kerrick wrote, unclear where all is going.,,83 The parties seemed so
loose. that Holbrooke and others began to fear that they were enjoying themselves too ..
much. While it was good that the parties were talking to one another, Holbrooke wanted
to see more movement toward a settlement. He felt that this "ice-breaking" -- although
necessary given the hostility among all three sides - had gone on long enough. Based on
his study of Camp David, Holbrooke assumed that a conference could not last any longer
than two weeks. While he knew the first week would be slow, he had planned to end the
.".
.
See "Eastern SJavonian Talks Deadlock Over Serb Intransigence," Cable, Zagreb 4441, November 6,
1995. For new draft agreement, see "Basic Agreement on the Region of Baranja and Westem Sinnium
(Eastern Slavonia]," November 6, 1995. .
ao See Holbrooke, Owen and Pardew comments, Dayton History Seminar.
II That day. Pardew sent Owen's latest draft back to Secretary Perry in Washington. asking him "not to
disseminate further" because "this proPosal is very close hold at this point" PMdew added, somewhat
cryptically. that the solution for Sarajevo ''will be found in a combination of territorial identity and
administrative structures." See Pardew report to Peny. "Sarajevo," November 6, 1995.
.
12 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; intervieW wilh author (notes), December 20,
1996.
tl See Kerrick report 10 Lake. "Dayton SITREP #3; November 7, 1995:9:00am:' and unidentified notes.
no date, attached to Kerrick report to Talbott. November 7, 1995.
20)
UNCLASSIFIED
.'
UNCLASSIFIED
conference around November 14, to coincide with Secretary Christopher's travel to Asia .
.It now seemed, though, that this timetable would not be met. .
Negotiations on the annexes had been sidetracked by the Europeans as well as
work with the parties on the Federation and Eastern Slavonia. Because the U.S. had to
prenegotiate with the Contact GrouP on each annex even before it went to the parties, the
progress on the texts were much slower than anticipated.
84
And, while the Federation and
Eastern 'Slavonia were critical to a final settlement, the partieS essentially used them as
excuses not to move in other areas. To many in the U.S. delegation, each party,
and European alike, were unwilling to engage tough issues. "[There is] no evidence
anyone parties or Euros - want to close a deal," Kerrick reported' to Washington that
morning. On top of all this, the shuitling process itself was . very tedious and time-
consuming. Despite their close proximity, the parties rarely agreed to meet together, .
instead insisting that Jhe U.S. mediators peddle every particular negotiating item to each
party individually.8s ....
.
.In an attempt to get things rolling, the U.S. team ratcheted up the pressure to come
to agreement, starting with Holbrooke's one-on-one meetings and Milosevic.
Accordlng to a written report he sent to Washington that night (his first of the
negotiations), the American negotiator told both that "after one week of increasingly
good vibrations without any significant progress on core issues, it wlis time to get
serious."B6 At Holbrooke's urging, the two Presidents had met privately several times
since Sunday. These discussions had yet to produce anything significant "Although
they are both sometimes giddy after their private Izzy-Slobo meetings," Holbrooke
explained, ''three days of these have done nothing more than create a better atmosphere." .
As a way to. make these taiks more productive. Iioibrooke got the two PresidentS to
pledge to continue their private dialogue, but now mediated under "U.S. only" auspices.
The first meeting, scheduled for the next day in the 'Hope Hotel, would focus on the
constitution, map and electoral issues. It was agreed that after two hours, the U.S. would
: allow the Bosnian Serbs to participate. Holbrooke anticipated that the talks would last
about seven hours. "If this happens," he reported back to Washington, "it will mark a
clear transition to a second phase here.',87.
.
.14 Holbrooke with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Phil Goldberg, Chris Hob. Jim O'Brien'
comments, group interview, <xtober 31. 1996
s Kerrick SITREP #3. A somewhat more optimistic assessment was provided by the State DCpartmcnt's
European Bureau as part ofa weekly update for the Secretary: "Though there not even the outlines 'ofa
deal yel, the level of engagement in the whole range of issues by the parties and Contact group delegations
bodes well for future progrcss . among the important steps forward during the initial stage of talks was the
clearing away of'underbrush' - primarily Federation and Eastern Slavonia issues, that qetracled from the
primary issues at hand." See "Current Issues: Balkans Update." drafted by John Price. EUR/SeE computer
files.SEEEYYUG Library, November 7, 1995.
.
U During his visit to Dayton the previous day, Talbott bad urted Holbrooke to provide Washington with a
one-page report each night; Apparently, DOD officials hlJd felt that insufficient infonnation from the head
of ddegation (Holbrooke) had contributed to the "panic" at the Pentagon. As Talbott wrote in a personal
note to Secretary Christopher (which accompanied the first of these daily reportS), "I hope you agree it's
useful in several respects. rd like to invoke your name in saying it's appreciated." To Lake, Kerricks
response was that "[it's1 not clear an additional report will make issues any easier," See Kerrick SITREP
114; November 4. 1995, 1:00am.
J7 See Holbrooke report to Principals and Deputies, "Dayton Update: Tuesday, November 7. 1995,
I 1:50pm"; and Kerrick SITREP's #3 and #4.
202
s
UNCLASSIFIED
", UNCLASSIFIED
For. the second day, Serbian s.anctions were a major topic of conversation; but
this time, most of the action was in Washington. That afternoon, the PC met at the White
House 'to discuss the issue.
s8
This was the first PC meeting since Dayton began.
Holbrooke joined the meeting via video teleconference to provide an update on
negotiations and to lobby for some sanctions relief. On the table was Leon Fuerth's
limited relief plan. which he had fleshed .out 1Il0re specifically for the meeting.
39
11Ie
Principals decided to recommend this plan to the President.
9o
Holbrooke later reported
both the Bosnians and Serbs were unhappy with the delay. uSlobo was increasingly
angry today about the sanctions issue. SiJajdzic repeated to me again (after PC) that his
government wanted movement on unrestricted natural gas and generous heating oil as a
confidence-building measure.'.9J .
.
In addition to the sanctions question, the Principals discussed several other issues,
. including the Bosnian equipand-train program and options for a combined Russia-U.S.
military force to implement an. Eastern Slavonian settlement. On equip-and-train . the
Principals reviewed the Pentagon's plan, which outlined that the Administration should
develop a 'program utilizing contractors rether than military perso:pnel.
92
Christopher's
briefing memorandum from John Kornblum described succinctly the .importance the
Administration' attached to equip-and-train. "We have consistently maintained that the
major factor affecting military stability will be the creation of .a stable military
. environment with a roadmap for increasing confidence among the the
memorandum read. "We should consider equip-and-train in. the context of an overall
package that reduces the imagined perception of threat, establishes a sense of
builds coiUidence. and spotlights the high cost of military adventurism:" . To get the
project moving, a team of civilian contractors from the Institute. of Defense Analysis
(IDA) was scheduled to go to Dayton the next day to talk with the Bosnians. Next, the
IDA team would travel on to Bosnia to assess the costs of the project.
93
.n See memorandum for Secretary Christopher from John "Principals Committee Meeting. .
November 7, 1995," November 7, 1995. Attached to this document were seven policy papers for
consideration: Fuertb' 5 sanctions paper; a State Department paper on economic assistance for the Bosnians;
an OMB paper on funding implementation; a Pentagon paper on equipand.train; a Pentagon paper on
"follow-up" issues; a Fuerth paper on Bosnian anns control initiatives; and a Pentagon paper on Eastern
Slavonia.
'..
19 Fuerth had reworked his paper to include various options (rather than recommendations), each more
limited than Milosevic'$ request See "A.Grain for Oil Swap," memorandum for Principals, November 6.
1995.
W This was reported the next day during the inteNgency video teleconference (SVTS) on Bosnia. See
"Bosnia SVTS, November 8, 1995:' State Department computer electronic mail files, Megan E. Driscoll
(PM-ISP), November 8, 1995.
91 Holbrooke report. November 7, 1995.
92 On November I, the DC had reviewed an earlier version of this paper, recommending a few changes
before it was considered by the PC. See memorandum forTalbott from Richard E. Hecklinger(EUR),
"Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 1,1995," November 1,1995; and "Summary of
Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on NSC memorandum, November 8, 1995 .
93 The Pentagon paper outlined that equip-an(i.train would be an important corollary to a regional anns
control initiative. Specifically, the paper summarized its proposal in this way: "The u.S. will lead a
modest, low-profile, international effort to equip and train selected clements ofthe Federation's military
. forces to their ability to defend Federation territoI)'. The wili also be designed to improve'
the internal cohesion ofthe Federation anned forces and to avoid substantially increasing Federation .
offensive capabilities, but not to create a viable defense capability against ils militarily powerful neighbors.
F
203
UNCLASSIFIED
I .
UNCLASSIFIED
..
Turning to Eastern Slavonia. the PC cQnsidered a Pentagon proposal which
estimated that the conditions were appropriate for an effective and safe U.S. military role
in implementation. The Russians were enthusiastic about participating, and Defense
. Secretary Perry planned to raise the issue with,Russian Defense Secretary Grachev.
Despite these Pentagon officials argued.that U.S. domestic support for such an
effort was lacking. The State Department recommended that the Administration continue
developing the concept but hold off on a final decision. "We may want to avoid a
premature' commitment to this proposal," Christopher's briefing memorandum read,
"[But] we should expect problems with the Russians, and perhaps the Serbs, if we walk
away from it.,,94
. .
In any event, an Eastern Slavonia agreement still seemed far away. Chris Hill and
others had again. reworked the draft agreement. < .It now projected that the transitional
period (during which UN forces would oCeu the l' ion would be two ears and that
durin this time elections would be held.
Since Tudjman had left Dayton, the
__ -T __
oats e ectlve y.re se to negotIate,c almmg that only he could make the decision
whether to accept the new draft. Discussion on the issue would wait UIitil the Croat
President returned to, Dayton on November 8.
95
.
On other negotiating fronts,' the day brought some progress. Holbrooke reported
that the parties were close to solving a Federation agreement. The U.S. continued to
press the Bosnians and Croats to assure that their November 2 refugee relocation
. commitments (referred to as the Jajce-Bugonjno Accord) were implemented. Talks
began between the Croats and Muslims on the divided city of Mostar, whose resolution
.would help the prospects for the Federation's success. The three mayors who
administered the city -- Muslim, Croat, and the EU representative -- had been summoned
to Dayton. .
The U.S. also began discussions about creating a central bank for Bosnia, but with .
limited Bob Gallucci continued to negotiate with the Contact Group on the
. police annex, which had emerged as the most troublesome as far'as allied relations were
concerned. The U.S. was pushing for a strong police force; the Europeans, led by the
British, arguing that an international police force should only monitor civilian
violations but not have enforcement capabilities. Given the Administration's reluctance
Croatia and Serbia. Sec "Sustaining a Peace Agreement ill Bosnia -- Military Stabilization Measures:
Equip and Train," attached to memorandum from Kornblum to Christopher, November 7,1995;
See "Peace Operations in Eastern SJavonia:' attached to memorandum from Kornblum to Christopher,
. (""ber7' 1995.
"
204
.-
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
to pledge funding for a robust police force - the bitter budget battle with Congress was
then in full fury - Gallucci was playing with a weak hand.
96
.
Finally, the David Rohde problem lingered, as the journalist still sat in jail in
Bijeljina. He was reportedly in good health, but was still unaware of his exact sentence
or charges.
97
Although Holbrooke believed that. Milosevic was trying hard to get
Rohde's release, he figured that a little more U.S. pressure on the Serb leader might
help.98 Menzies continued to work with the and Holbrooke even dispatched his
new wife, Kati Marton, a journalist and activist for press freedom. to preSs Milosevic.
99
During Monday night's dinner, Talbott had raised the issue with the Selb President .. Now
HoJbrooke wanted Secretary Christopher to in. Although Talbott's intervention
had "laid down a strong marker over our concern for Rohde's wellbeing," Holbrooke
drafted a tough letter from Christopher to Milosevic.
1oo
Upon returning to Washington
from Yitzhak Rabin's funeral in Israel, Secretary approved the letter, and Holbrooke
presented it to Milosevic that inornmg..
. .
Addressing Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's claim that he had no' control
over Rohde's situation. the Christopher letter to Milosevic stated. that "it is clear .that
Karadzic is attempting to interfere with the peace process now underWay in Dayton. We
are detennined not to allow him to succeed. You can help us in this effort by using your
influence with Karadzic and his in Dayton." In closing, Christopher .outlined
the stakes for Milosevic plainly. "Let me reiterate what Dick Holbrooke has told you:
while it is not our intention to allow this matter to affect the talks in Dayton, so long as
Mr. Rohde's detention continues, it will necessarily distract us from our .principal purpose
and create a negative climate for our continuing work. It is ioaH our intereststo-iake'
those steps you consider neCessary to effect Mr. Rohde's release:,lol. The letter seemed
to have an immediat-eeffect on Milosevic. Late that night, he told Holbrooke that Rohde .

would be released at 6:00am the next morning.
96 Review from Holbrooke report, November 7. 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (noles), December
20.1996.
97 See "Arrest Case of Christa in Science Monitor Journalist David Rohde; Consular Visit In Bijelina."
Cable, Sarajevo 751. November 6,1995.
91 .
Holbrooke report, November 7, 1995.
99 Marton was the chairperson of the Committee to Protect Journalists. According to press accounts,
Marton told MiJosevic chat the "full weight of the American media would come down on the Serbs in
. general for holding this nian." See Michael Dobbs, "For Rohde. the Power of a Well-Placed Writer Paid
Off," Washington Post. November 9, 1995. '.
.
100 See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke. "Draft letter to President Milosevic Regarding
David Rohde," November 7. 1995. Holbrooke explained to the Secretary that since time of the
essence., they would be unable to run the letter through the formal approval system or get a signed copy.
Holbrooke intended to give the unsigned letter to Milosevic ".at the earliest possible opportunity" the
morning of November 7.
.
101 See letter from Christopher to Milosevic dated November 6, 1995. In a November 6 letter
to Antonio Pedauye, the Chief Civilian Al!thority ofUNPROFOR, Karadzic claimed that ". have no
possibility to interfere at Ihis phase of legal proceedings; .. regally and politically it is not possible for
anyone to act arbitrarily and bring decisions prematurely or converse the raw. AliI can do is to try to
quicken the aforementioned proceedings:' uDavid Rohde Case: Karadzic Raises the Ante," Cable,
Sarajevo 762, November 6, 1995.
102 Holbrooke report, November 7, 1995. See also Kit Roane, "Bosnia Serbs Free U.S. Newsman After 9
Days," New York Times, November 9, 1995.
205
, UNCLASSIFIED
/
.
I
. i
:/
UNCLASSIFIED
7
Day Eigltt: Wednesday, Novemher 8 . .
Milosevic delivered as promised. That morning, the delegationS' awoke to _ the news that David Rohde had been released by the Bosnians Serbs. His family, still holding a vigi[ in Dayton. was and asked Holbrooke to pass on their thanks to President Clinton and Secretary Christopher called Rohde and spoke to him just after he arrived at the U.S. embassy in Belgrade. Admirably. Rohde told them that he hoped his situtation had not "screwed up" U.S. efforts in Dayton. Holbrooke also talked to Rohde by phone that day. and reported to Washington that the journalist would
consider coming to Dayton once he returned to the U.S .. 103 .
. The day began with the U.s.-mediated negotiation between lzetbegovic and Milosevic in the Hope Hotel's B-29 Room. This the first major one held with the parties in the Hope Hotel rather: than the VOQ's. focused almost entirely on the map . The U.S . .team wanted this event to mark the beginning of the secOnd phase of the negotiations -- "the period of bringing the parties to closure."I04 But rather than signaling the beginning of the end, talks revealed how far the parties had to go.
"This six-hour map marathon was one of the great revea1!ng meetings for us," Holbrooke reflected. "Up to that point, these people had been reaSonably cordial to each
other -- but the sight of the maps drove them nuts." Kerrick described the scene as __
"reminiscent of The Godfather. [with] Don Slobo and outcast Bosnian Serbs, Don Izzy
and the Federation.
n
Astonishingly. at one moment the parties would be glaring across
the table [at each other], screaming. while, minutes later they could be seen -smiling and joking together refreshments."
Most of this map discussion centered on Sarajevo and the "Washington:> DC"
plan. "Despite hours of heated, yet. civii exchanges," Kerrick reporttd, "absolutely
nothing was -The parties stuck to their known positions -- the Serbs wanted a divided Sarajevo and the Bosnians wanted the whole city. The two sides just talked - or rather yelled -- past each other. 'For example, Bosnian Serb leader Ktaijsnik gave a long monologue on the benefits of a split city, while Sacirbey explained that the Bosnians
would leave Dayton and return to war rather than accept division. lOS
U.S. negotiators planned'to submit their own map'proposal to serve as the basis for discussions, but were reluctant to do so with Ute parties still so far apart on basic concepts. As' the day wore on. the Serbs eventually came around to accept the
"Washington. DC" concept for Sarajevo in principle. With this breakthrough, the U;S. presented its revisions to the 1994 Contact Group map, identifying Sarajevo as a federal
city and reflecting changes as a result of the lost Bosnian enclaves (Srebrenica and Zepa)
and the gains from the Federation offensive. Milosevic reacted favorably to this plan. 106 Pardewexplained that the U.S. "win hold serious map talks with [the parties} tomorrow
now that we have an agreement on a concept for a unified Sarajevo:' Others were less
103 For a report on Rohde's release see Holbrooke report to Principals and Deputies, "[jayton Update:
Wednesday, November 8, 1995, lO:OOpm." 10
.
Pardew report to Perry. "Dayton Talks - Update," November 8, 1995.
IDS
.
.

Holbrooke mterview wirh author (notes). December 20, 1996; Holbrooke report, November 8, 1995;
Kerrick notes, November 8, 1995; and Kerrick report to Lake, "Dayton SlTREP #5, November 9, t 995,
2:00am."
L
206
UNCLASSIFIED'
Bl
/
UNcLXIflhB
a
optimistic that an agreement "in principle" on Sarajevo meant that a. genuine conSensus
had t>een reached. Kerrick reported to Lake that it was "not clear (whether] Sarajevo is
solvable," and Holbrooke's report to Washington stated only that on the map, "we have
decided to go back to a shuttie."lo7
The "good news" of the day was on the Federation. At long last, Steiner's
negotiations produced an agreement on building a stable fully functioning Muslim-
Croat entity in Bosnia. Starting with:tbe premise that "strengthening the Federation and
building trust between its constituent peoples has still not produced satisfactory results,"
. the text outlined steps to integrate the entity economically, politically and socially. The
agreement created a federalist separation of powers between the Federation and the future
central government of. the Republic of Bosnia; split customs revenues between the
Federation and the Republic; and provided a new governing s.tatute for Mostar, 'Which
would be the Federation's Although u.S. negotiators belieVed that
"implementation will requ,ire lots of international pressure,n achieving. a stronR
Federation was "a must [to] make progress in overall talks." With Tudjman returning to
Dayton that night,preIiminary initialing was planned for the next. day. They hoped to
reach final agreement in time for Christopher's second trip to Dayton, scheduled for
FridaY,November 10.
108

While the map and Federation dominated the day. progress in other areas was
slow. Chris Hill continued to work on the revised text for Eastern Siavonia. Completion
of an agreement in Dayton seemed near, but the negotiations were maddeningly up and
down. To avoid the problem of u.s. military implementation in .the near term, . U.S.
negotiators decided to avoid defining the implementation force's. composition in the
agreement. Progress was expected to accelerate. with Tudjman in t()wn. On the. civilian
implementation and. poiice annexes, Galhicci remained mired in battle with the Contact
who wanted a bigger role for the UN cParticulady for police enforcement) and
more oversight power for a senior civilian representative.
109
Talks proceeded Qn creating
a central bank and single currency for Bosnia, with David Lipton, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Treasury for East Europe and the former Soviet Union, coming to Dayton to
discuss the issue over dinner with an intrigued Milosevic. The Serb leader loved to talk
and he, Lipton and Holbrooke had a series of "intense" discussions on the
issue:
iO
.
. .
Another American lumirnuy who arrived in Daytpn that day was Richard Perle; a
aide to Senator Scoop Jackson an<:l Defense Department official in the Reagan
107 See. respectively, Pardew report to Perry. NovemberS, 1995; Holbrookereport. NovemberS, 1995; and
Kerrick SITREP #4.
101 "Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of9 November
1995"; fax to Komblum from Daniel Serwer, "Federation Agreement Ready for Signature
November 8.1995; and Holbrooke report, November 8,1995. Wordoftliis near-breakthrOUgh bad also
reached the press. See Michael Dobbs, "Bosnians, Croats Apparently Near Agree!'llent; Sources Say They
Expect Signing Today in First Real Breaktbrough of Dayton Talks," Washington Post, November 9, J 995.
109 On November 6, Gallucci left Dayton to attend meetingS at the UN in New York, where he discussed
implementation with UN officials. While the Contact Group pushed for more active UN
involvement, reports of Gallucci's meetings in New York provide little evidence that the UN wanted such a
role. See "Bosnia Implementation: Ambassador At Large Gallucci's Conversations With UN
Cable, U.S.UN 4639. November 18,1995.
.
110 Holbrooke report, November 8, 1995; Pardew report to Perry, November 8, 1995; Holbrooke interview
with author (noles), December 20, J 996.
.
207
UNCLASSIFIED
I.
i
I
I
;
.r"
UNCLASSIFIED
- Administration. Perle, referred to by some as the "Prince of Darkness" for his chilly
disposition and hawkish views, joined the Bosnian delegation as an advisor on military
issues. Before accepting the Bosnian invite, Perle had called Holbrooke to discuss his
role. Holbrooke "strongly endorsed" Perle's participation, believing that (Jespite- White
House conceIllS about his presence, his aqvice "would help bring the rigor and discipline
to the Bosnian camp." II I . . . . _
.
The Bosnians were unhappy with the draft annex on IFOR that had been
discussed among the military experts in Dayton. Their response was as
"short of outright rejection,n but wanting a more robust IFOR than NATO was willing to .
provide - includmg a mandate.to arrest war criminals, commit to elections protection,.
and guarantee the return of refugees. Some U.S. officials, inclucling Holbrooke, agreed
that IFOR's mandate should be tougher, but knew that he would have to overcome fierce
. resistance from the Pentagon. "We are going to havebig problems with them Oil these
issues in the next few days," Pardew reported to Perry, and Kerrick waned Lake that the
PC might have to take up the issue soon. I 12 That night, Perle told Holbrooke and General
Clark - who had taken charge of the IFOR talks -- that the draft . annex
would be the basis for moving forward, but hinted that he would advise changes. I 3
Sanctions remained a problem, and Holbrooke complained to Washington .that the
issue continued to hinder U.S. efforts. "While we tried to shift gears today," Holbrooke
"we had a difficult time due to the sanctions issue which turned the day into a
shambles." . Milosevic seemed to be interested in little else_ As exemplified in
this day, the Serb leader would only engage the few issues he cOnsidered
critical, such as sanctions, the map and IFOR. In an effort to eliminate any excuse not to
move forward in other areas, t1!e U.S. delegation pressed Washington to provide some
limited sanctions relief for fuel for Belgrade. .Finally, after Tony Lake's critical
intervention, Washington agreed to allow a limited supply of natural gas to flow to
Belgrade for home heating. However, they the proposed "grain':'for-oi}"swap_ If
Milosevic agreed to the former deal, Holbrooke described in his memorandum that night,
"we might have more luck." The next day, Milosevic angrily accepted this offer. I J4
As the negotiations in Dayton dragged on; important components of
implementation continued to fall into place; That day in Secretary of Defense
Peri-y and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev announced that they had reached
III Holbrooke interview with (notes); December 20, 1996.
III See. respectively, Pardew report to Perry, November 8, 1995; and Kerrick SITREP
113 Perle and the Bosnians also met that day with representatives from the InstitUte for Defense Analysis.
the civilian contracting finn who was to begin managing the Bosnian equip-and-train program. Apparently
the Bosnians were "clearly oriented toward Western equipment rather that East European gear. [Also).
Perle asked about parallel efforts to determine funding available for equipment and the availability of
training facilities in Europe." See Holbrooke report. November 8. 1995; and Pardew report to Peny.
"Dayton Talks - Updat.e," November 7, 1995 (mis"ated, November 8, 1995).
114 See Holbrooke report, November 8,1995; Pardew report to Pmy, November 8, 1995; Kerrick SITREP
tiS; and Michael DObbs. "u.s. Announces Easing of Fuel Sanctions Against Yugoslavia." Washington
Post. November 10. J995. Milosevic accepted the deal only after making what was to be an "ugly
scene" when Prcsented with the decision. This was in an inter-agency secure video
. teleconference on November 9. See "Bosnia SVTS 11/9/95," State Department computer electronic mail.
(no author) PM-JSP. November 9, 1995. For status offuel flow into Belgrade after this decision. sec
"Gas Pipeline to Serbia and Bosnia: Gas Flowing At Maximum Rate Allowed By UN Security Council:' .
Cable, Budapest 9843, November 9, ]995; and "Gas Reported Flowing Again Across Serbia," Cable.
Belgrade 5533, November 10, 1995.
208

. UNCLASSIFIED
uNl5tXsIPIED
final agreement on Russian participation in !FOR. In what Perry later described as a
"truly historic he, Grachev, U.S. General George Ioulwan and Russian General
. Shevstov signed the organizational chart military leaders had created for Russia and
IFOR. According to the compromi.se plan, Russian troops would be under tactical control
of the U.S. Division Commander in the region. not NATO. I IS ...
Day Nine: Tllursday, November 9
After Wednesdays acrimonious "map marathon between lzetbegovic and
Milosevic, negotiators in Dayton hoped that Tudjman's arrival and a Federation
agreement might provide a boost for the talks. "President Tudjman's retUrn to Dayton
November 8 begins a .critical phase of the proximity talks," Secretary Christopher
reported to the White House. "The parties need to move from discussion and engagement
on the issnesto reaching specific agreements." In the next two days, the U.S. wanted to
forman Eastern Siavonia settlement along. with finalizing the Federation agreement
Christopher's own return on Friday established a goal-line for such work. "There are still
major obstacles ahead," the Secretaxy wrote, "and we should not. assume a successful
outcome. I plan to travel ro Dayton November 10 to try to give the 'parties a push.',l J6
In an attempt to accomplish as much as possible before arrival,-
Thursday was a day of intense negotiations. Holbrooke decided to reslime proximity
shuttling between the parties. tvJilosevic had warned Holbrooke about the potential for
trouble in Wednesday's map session in the Hope Hotel. and told him afterwarqs not "to
try this again." Holbrooke agreed. Therefore, while .the Balkan parties remained in their
VOQ's, U.S. negotiators traveled back and forth, delivering various proposals onsuch
issues as the constitution, Sarajevo, eleCtions and the map. In Kerrick's words.toLake
that night, the U.S. teain conducted"a full court press." Yet, while both Izetbegovic and
. Milosevic were "fully enRaged," movement in theSe areas amounted to "some progress,
but no agreed decisions:'. 7
. Once again, the territorial issues dominated many of the negotiations that day, as
the Serbs presented their counter-proposal to the U.S. map. It seemed that this
propoSal/counter-proposal process on the map would continue for severnl days, nwith
each side likely to hold key concessions until other issues unfold." Sarajevo continued
to be one of the issues blocking progress on the map. Reversing his earlier decision.
Milosevic told Holbrooke. Owen and Kerrick that while a Serb goal was to "finish maps
they could still not accept the proposal for the "Washington, DC" plan.
Holbrooke pressed the . Serb President on this, only to hear that be didn't think his
Bosnian Serb colleagues would buy it - they would never agree to share administrative
powers as outline4 in the plan. The critical i.ssue was who would control the city's local
political districts, or Obstinas. Since Milosevic could not come up with a better idea
JJ$ For press accounts, see "Joint Press Availability at NATO. HQ by Secretary of DefenSe Perry and
Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev," November 8, 1995; and Craig Whitney, "Russia Agrees to
Put Troops Under U.S., Not NATO," New York Times, November 9. 1995. Under Secretary of Defense
Slocombe later explained the details oftbc Perry-Grachev agreement to Belgian officials.
Slocombe Briefs Belgians on IFOR Planning, Croatian Sector East. Bosnia Reconstruction," Cable,
Brussels 11552, November 9. 1995; and Perry interview.
116 See Christopher's Mem.orandum for Leon Panetta, The White House, "Weekly Report from the State
Department." November 9, 1995.
IJ1 Kerrick report to Lake, "Dayton SITREP #6; November 10, 1995, 1:30am .

209
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLAIPIQb
...
(when pressed by Holbrooke to do so), he reluctantly agreed to make another run at
th B S rb liS
.
convIncmg e osman e s.
With the negotiators now facing the tougher issues, decisions seemed to weigh
more heavily on each Balkan Over lunch that day, Milosevic implied that he could pay the ultimate price if he gave -away too much. Kerrick," the Serb leader said, "while America's professional prestige is on the line, my head and life are at stake -:-literally." It was hard to tell whether Milosevic genuinely believed this or was
merely posturing to strengthen his bargaining leverage. The Serb President vacillated from being the uGodfather" of the Serbs to the vulnerable martyr for peace. . The . character he assumed depending upon how badly he wanted a particular deal. KerriCk told Lake that fC[Milosevic] wants us to believe that Krajisnik and others are capable and willing remove him if he goes too far," and Holbrooke dismissed such comments as "theatre." Nevertheless. as Kerrick pointed out, it seemed that for many of those at
Dayton, "Rabin reniains a memory .
0

With Tudjman back, the Federation agreement was initialed. . A formal. signing
. ceremony Was planned for the next day in which Christopher would preside. On Eastern Slavonia, talks continued without resolution. As Kerrick reported; "its impossible to tell
whether today's events foreshadow breakthrough when Christopher arrives or are simply
SLOBO-DRAMA:,120 Galbraith's efforts in the region had broken doWn completely. The Ambassador had" cabled to Dayton that "Milosevic clearly sees the Eastern Slavonia
card as a valuable one, and will play it when it will have maximum impact in the overall negotiations." The Croatians seemed to be ratcheting up the -pressure as
reports came in that they were moving forces closer to the Eastern Slavonian border. While CIA analysts djd not anticipate violence in the near-tenn, they predicted that
Croatia would solution" by the end of the year. Recognizing this, Galbraith noted that while Milosevic "must be mindful of looming Croatian military
action, he does not yet appear ready to settie."J21 .
.
Richard Perle to work with the Bosnians on the IFOR annex, and the
U.S. delegation problems. For the most part, the annex had remained unchatiged since it was first ,Presented to the Contact _ Group the weekend before
Dayton. J2.2 But with Perle's presence, Kerrick described, "stonn clouds [begin to] thicken
over IFOR." General Clark led extensive discussions with Perle and the Bosnians over
the annex. The main thrust of Perle's revisions was to raise IFOR's obligations
. particularly Qn securing Bosnia's border and providing security for elections. In its current fonn, IFOR would be authorized.to do almost anything but obligated to do very little. Perle strongly supported IFOR, but believed it had to have a Ustronger mandate" - meaning. more obligations -- to be effective.
The U.S. delegation now began to worry that the Bosnians would hold an
agreement hostage to their.o demands for' a more obligated and IFOR. Realistically, the could make such conditions the price for compromise on
III F()r details on Milosevic meeting sec Kerrick noles, November 9, J995; and Kerri* SITREP #6.
IJ9 Kerrick SITREP "6
.'
. 120 Ibid.

.
.
..

1_-
interview, July 26, 1996; Pardew interview, lune 27,1996
210
....
UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
UNCLASSIFIED
issues like the map, constitution and elections. Kerrick warned Lake that such a trade-off
might be looming, and that Washington would need to decide how to respond. "While
Perle's presence seemed to incrc:ase the possibility of a trade-off, gaining his support was
seen to have value. With the President and other senior Administration officials currently
involved in tough negotiations with Congress over the scope of U.S. in
IFOR, Perle's Republican credentials could provide valuable help_ "The potential benefit
. of Perle's involvement, " Kerrick wrote to Lake that night, "is. his willingness to
influence key members on [Capitol] Hill in favor of strongU.S. participatioil."l21 .
While the talks continued that day in Dayton, John Shattuck set out for Banja
Luka, the site of the most recent ethnic where he aimed to. gain access. to
hundreds of.missing persons and detainees. He also monitored the November 2 Jajce-
Bugonjo Accord.
124
Milosevic and B.osnian Serb Vice President Koljevic had personally
assured Shattuck's safety into Banja Luka, and Shattuck's convoy was escorted by the
"Red Guards" qfBelgrade's special military forces_. To those in Dayton and Washington,
Shattuck's trip provided another chance to show that the U.S. would aggressively explore
human rights violations. Also, by asking for infonnation on rights violations and
demanding the release of detainees, Shattuck's intervention tested the parties' willingness
to "come and implement the human rights elements of an agreement.
12S
Day Ten: Friday, November 10
. Shortly before 9:30am Friday, Secretary Christopher returned to Wright-
Patterson. After a forty-five minute briefing with the U.S. delegation in the Hope Hotel,
123 Details ofPcrlc's involvement from Kerrick SITREP #16. In his November9 memorandum to Panetta,
Christopher explained the consultations with Congress: "I met With the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee on November 9. Depuly Secretary Talbott met with freshmen members November: 8.
We have launched an inter.agency effort (State, DOD, and NSC) to keep in touch with every Member of
Congress. Senior officials at each agency have been assigned lists for meetings and calls; see "Elements
For D Remarks to Hill Freshmen," EURISCE computer files, SEEEYYUG Library, October 30, 1995. A
first round of has taken place, and based on feedback, we are constantly widening the circle of
contacts." For further details on the consultations with Congress on lFOR, sec "Bosnia SVTS
11/9/95."
124 As was reasonably expected, implementation of the accord was slow. Under U.S.
pressure, the parties agreed to begin implementation on November 8, with a follow-up report to the U.S. on
November 12. Sec "DP Reblms to Jajccand Bugojno: Non-Implementation of 1112 Dayton Agreement.;"
Cable, Sarajevo 757, November 6, 1995; wop Returns to Jajce and Bugonjo," Cable. Proximity Talks
000005. November 8, 1995; "DP Returns to Jajce and Written Commitment," Cable, Proximity
Talks 000017, November 10, 1995; and "J;uce-Bugonjo Shuttle Diplomacy," Cable, Sarajevo 778,
November 12,1995. .
12$ For Washington reports of Shattuck's trip. see Christopher's November 9 memorandum to Panetta; and
State Department memorandum to Under Secretary TIm Wirth (O) from Steve Coffey (DRL), "Weekly
Report." November 9, 1995; "Bosnian MFA Hails A1S Shattuck's Travel Aims in Region," Cable,
Sarajevo 770, November 9. 1995. For fascinating accounts ofShaUuck's visit to Banja Luka, see Shattuck
. interviews. July 25, 1995, and July 30,.1995; "Visit of DRL AlS Shattuck to Banja Luka," Cable, Sarajevo
760,.November 6, 1995; "AlS Shattuck Reaches Banja Cable, Sarajevo 768. November 13, 1995;
and Shattuck's personal report to Secretary Christopber;nFrom Dayton to 8anja Luka in Search of Human
Rights and Peace," Cable, Sarajevo 779, November 12,1995. Around thattime, the Administration had
come under fire in the press for not sharing sensitive intelligence information with the War Crimes
Tribunal. In his November 9 memorandum to Panetta. Christopher wrote Ihat "John's hard work in this
area underscores the inaccuracy and unfairness ofpress reports that the U.S. is not sharing information
about war crimes in the fonner Yugoslavia." For an example of such press coverage, see Elaine ScioHno.
"U.S. Says It Is Withholding Data From War Crimes Panel," New York Times, November 8, 1995.
211
UNCLASSIFIED
. d -= .
. :
/
UNCLASSIFIED
Christopher and Holbrooke headed for the VOQ quad to meet with the three Balkan
Presidents before that afternoon's Fooeration signing ceremony. Beginning with
Tudjman in the Croatian VOQ, Christopher sought to praise the Federation agreement for
sending a "clear mesSage to the Serbs and other groups in the region that tWQ of the three
constituent peoples of' the Yugoslavia plan to Jive together in peace."
Unfortunately, Tudjman said, problems with the agreement remained. He complained
that the draft text, there was no guarantee that a Croat would hold one of the top three
posts - President, Prime Minister or ,Foreign Minister. Christopher had planned'to tell
Tudjman that he, would press lzetbegovic on the issue, offering the idea that a C!oat
Prime Minister should serve alongside a Bosniac President. But Tudjinan upped the ante,
explaining that it would be' hard for the Croats to sign unless administrative equality was , 126
guaranteed.
'
,
"
. Given threat to scuttle the agreement, Chrlstopher'smeeting with
Izetbegovic tOok on greater importance. Meeting across the quad in Bosnia's VOQ,
Christopher and Holbrooke pressed the Bosnian President to' compromise- and allow a
Croat Prime lzetbegovic demurred, but agreed that_ the issue could be
"delinked" and resolved later. Christopher also encouraged the Bosnian President that
with the Federation agreement near completion. he be willing to conclude other key
,issues, like the map. The Secretary did not let the Bosnians off the hook: "territorial
issues are in a deadlock," he said, "in good measure due to'your side's failure to make
offers." He reminded the lzetbgeovic that a fundamental tenet of the American
diplomatic initiative was - the U.S. would not support the Bosnians if
they were, the source of diplomatic failure. "I know that these issues are difficult/'
Christopher's talking points read, "but given our original carrots and sticks apptoach for
peace last August, we do not want to get into a position where Sarajevo is responsible for
failure to'reach agreement.,,121
.
With MiloseVic. Christopher raised the issue of the War Crimes Tribunal, urging
that the Serb leader provide his fun cooperation. The Secretary warned Milosevic that, as
he had recently told the press, the U.S. might not participate in IFOR unless indicted war
criminals Karadzic and go. Milosevic had earlier considered that it would be
"craZy" for NATO to send troops to Bosnia while these two were still in pOwer; now he
to balk at guaranteeing their ouSter.
12S
Parrying Milosevic's oft-stated view that
the best way to eliminate such . leaders was through democratic elections (arguing that
they would lose), ChPstopher and Holbrooke made clear that "quite frankly, we are not
going to organize, pay for and supervise elections that allow these kinds of people to
participate." They explained that the Serbs had to come up with solutions that bypassed
Karadzic and Mladic - "the same sort that you [Milosevic] worked out with the
Patriarch's agrcement.,,129
.
126 See Christopher's talking points, "Points for Tudjman," Padrew Dayton Notebook; and Kerrick report to
Lake/'Dayton SITREP #7; November J 1, 199.5, 9;10am.'
,
m See Christopher's talking points, "Points for Izetbcgovic," Pardew Dayton 'Notebook; Holbrooke
interview with author notes December20 1996.
121
See Christopher's talking points, "Points for MiJosevic," Pardew Dayton Notebook. Details also from
, Nicholas Bums Press Briefing, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. November 10, 1995.
212
-
, UNCLASSIFIED
Bl
/,
..
UNCLASSIFIED
....
The Croats' warning not to sign the Federation agreement had Christopher and
Holbrooke's "blood pressure up" with, they felt, good reason. However, as Kerrick
explained to Lake the next day, "[The] Croats have a point. [It's] hard to justify Muslims
holding all three [positionsJ.,,130 Prior to the scheduled ceremony at the Hope
Conference Center, Christopher met briefly with Kresimir Zubak, a Bosnian Croat who,
as the current President of the Muslim-Croat Federation, was the source behind
Tudjman's earlier compliants. The Secretary. told Zubak that lzetbegovic had offered to
.
.
"delink" the issue, setting it aside for now but solving it before leaving Dayton. With this
pledge, Zubak agreed to sign the document as long as the problem was resolved soon.
Christopher reiterated many of his private comments to the Balkan Presidents in
. his public remarks at the signing ceremony in the B-29 Room. "As to day's
agreement will bring the Federation to life," he said to the delegates and press gathered at
the Hope complex. "It will create common political and economic institutions that will .
unite the two communities. It will be a model for inter-ethnic cooperation and
trust in a country that is sorely in need However important the paper signed that .
day Christopher did acknowledge that the ''true test" of the agJ;eement lay in the way
it was carried out. lzetbegovic echoed this sentiment, saying that history would judge the
accord according to "what is done" rather than ''what is said."m
Following the ceremony, Christopher had.lunch with the Contact Group, where he'
briefed them on his discussions that morning and heard their thoughts about the progress
of the negotiations. Then, as he did during his first visit to Dayton, Christopher joined
Milosevic and Tudjman to discuss Eastern Slavonia. Since that first meeting, Chris Hill's
mediation had brought the Croats and Serbs close to an agreement, but some contentious
issuesremained.
132
made it clear to both Presidents that the time for.hedging
was over. the u.s ... : wanted these matters settled. Turning to specific problems, they
resolved almost every outstanding issue of the mutual recognition and Eastern SIavonia
agreements. This included drafting a complicated clause. setting aside the issue of Serbia
state "continuitY" in Eastern Slavonia without prejUdice to either side's position. But the
'Presidents still still disagreed over the duration of Eastern Siavonia's reintegration into
Croatia (Milosevic now wanted at least tWo years while Tudjman wanted one) and the
. timing of regional elections.
Shortly after Christopher made clear that the U.S. was growing impatient with the
deadlock. the breakthrough occurred. As the Secretary met with Holbrooke and his core
team in the American VOQ, they looked out the. window to an "unforgetable scene":.
across the quad. Milosevic arid Tudjman were walking side-by-side toward the American
. no Kerrick SITREP 1#7.
m For Christopher'S remarks at the signing ceremony. see "The Federation: An Essential BUilding Block
of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," State Department December 1995. pi O. In addition to
being the first officiaJ breakthrough of the talks, it was also the first media event since the opening
ceremony. See Michael Dobbs, "Bosnian Muslims, Croats to Establish Administration for Joint Territory;
Pact Eliminates Customs Barriers, Other Obstacles to MoYement," Washington Post. November 12, 1995;
and Roger Cohen, "Tenns of Muslim-Croat Alliance Arc Set at Dayton Talks," New York Times, .
November 12, 1995. For implementation recommendations, see "Bosnian Federation: Dayton Agreement
Requires Follow-up," Cable. State 26703, November IS, 1995.
132 Galbraith was not happy with. Hill' s text, and expressed unsolicited concerns that some "points in the
Dayton draft will make our selling ofa document more difficult than it needs to be." His comments were
largely ignored by negotiators in Dayton. See "Comments on East Siavonia Draft," Cable. Zagreb 7977,
November 10. 1995; and HiJI interview with author (notes), December 19. 1996 .
.... 213
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
VOQ. Entering Holbrooke's conference rooin .the two Presidents sat next to each other
on a couch and said that "we have solved' Eastern Slavonia." They would conclude the
agreement largely as drafted, and initial a document on mutual recognition to be signed
and made public at a later date. Milosevic argued that this staged approach would give
the East Slavonia Serbs time to adjust to the new realities. The only hitch was that the
leaders needed a "face-saving" solution to the timing of which would be
overseen by a UN transitional authority. Christopher came up with a. lawyerly
compromise -- split The transitional would govern the area for
one year but its mandate could be extended for another year if requested by either of the
partieS. Milosevic insisted that the agreement not be announced at Dayton but in the
region -- he. wanted to maintajn the illusion that he was not in control of the Serbs in
Eastern Slavonia. The U.S. object to this 'bit of theatre, but Christopher told
Milosevic that by the time he returned to. Dayton on November 14, he wanted an
agreement completed. J3). . . .'
".
Christopher's visit to Dayton that day was successful in that he helped put the
finishing touches on the Federation and brought Milosevic and Tupjman to the doorstep.
of announcing an Eastern Slavonian deal. Yet, the parties willingness to make decisions
"on the core issues remained unproved: The overall mood in Dayton was still positive, but
it seemed that the talks constantly teetered on collapse. After ten days, Kerrick observed
that the parties were "still enjoying each other's company. but [the] more they see of each
other, [the] more they seem to be willing to chuck it all and return to war." The.chances
for success at Dayton seemed to come. and go like" the tide - "every twelve hours [we're]
sure we will fail onIy to fmd real chances for success at next high tide."I34
m See Christopher interview, October 22. 1996; Holbrookc Comment. Dayton History Seminar; Hill
inte,;"iew with author (notes), December 5, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20,
1996; Chris Hoh comments to autbor, passim.
1)4 Kerrick SITREP tn.
214
p
UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter Nine
UNCLASSIFIED
....
Endgame: Dayton, November 11-21
. Days Eleven and Twelve: Saturday and Sunday, November 11-12
The weekend of November 11-12 was in many ways the intermezzo between the
two acts of Dayton. It had taken ten days.to clear away such issues as the Federation and
Eastern' Slavonia. Duriilg this time, the 'parties had gotten comfortable with" the
surroundings and each other. There had been some progress in areas like the IFOR annex
and elections. Yet, despite hours'and negotiating and significant prodding by the U.S .
most of the core issues remained untouched. This true on the map.
There had been some discussion about. topics reJated to an overall arrangement
- such as the status of Sarajevo -'with little success. The problem was that the parties
were still taiking past each other -- no one had yet offered a proposal that could be
reasonably considered a compromise. I The Sarajevo government had not tabled anything
serious, and the Bosnian Serbs, while "theatrically engaged" with all their historical maps
and emotional lectures, had ''yet to seriously present a rational proposal." With the two-
week mark approaching fast, the U.S. wanted to use the weekend's talks to jump-start the
negotiations. "Sattm!ay:" Kerrick infonned Lake, a day ofmaps:.2
.
Unfortunately. the weekend produced nothing new; the map talks went nowhere.
In a Satui-dar meeting with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic in Holbrooke's suite. negotiators
. pored over the maps in detail, but agreed to nothing. Izetbegovic did little but state that
the Contact Group map would be the basis for negotiations. "They would not discuss the
map for a long time, arguing that there is only one map. and thats the Contact Group
map/' Chris Hill recalled.
3
This map still included the lost enclaves of Srebrenica and
Zepa, areas that although the Bosnians had no hope of getting back at Dayton, they still
insisted on claiming. As long as unrealistic options were the only ones on the table. these
talks with the Bosnians weren't negotiations - they were hand-wringing seSsions.
4
. .
The' Serbs 'were no better. With the Bosnians so unreasonably stubborn.
Milosevic had no reason to be flexible. The Bosnian Serbs were even more problematic.
Although they had been left out"ofmost of'the other negotiations at Dayton, the map was
the one area where they had been included. Pardew had spent the most time with them
during the first week, and Holbrooke had allowed Krajisnik to have the floor during
1 Despite such pessimism on the u.s. side, some negotiators leaked to the press that the negotiations would
succeed. "Dayton wiJI not end in failure:' one such' story .read. 'That would hurt everybody. It is
something that nobody can afford." Accordingly, some stories described bow the parties were looking to
the U.S. to set drive the agenda. "It is up to the Americans to decide whether there will be a peace
agreement or not," said one unattributed source. See Michael Dobbs, "In War and Peace Talks, Bosnian
Conflict Is About Land," Washington Post, November 12, 1995.
2 Kerrick.8ITREP #7. .
3 Chris Hill comment, Dayton History Seminar.
of See Kerrick notes, November 1 i, 1995.
--
UNCLASSIFIED
2!S
, .
=
UNCLASSIFIED
....
November 7th's acrimonious "map marathon." But with the negotiations ailing, the
intractable Bosnian Serbs were not the remedy.' '
After' enduring hours of lectures about the sanctity of Serb land and the threat of
encroaching Islam, Pardew did not need to be told that the Bosnian Serbs were not" the
. most reasonable of interlocutors. Moreover, he had seen firsthand instances of doWJ)right
bizarre behavior. Some Bosnian Serbs had apparently loaded up on hunting knives and
.camouflage gear at the Wright.Patterson PX where all delegates ha4 purchasing rights),
althou the line was drawn at fireanns.
s
-
From the outset, Ho brooke ad Iieve e Mdosevlc strategy -- m 109
Milosevic deliver Pale - should continue to govern the U.S .. negotiating approach.
Although he had asked Pardew to talk to the Bosnian Serbs to ptobe their views on the '
map. these talks proved inconclusive. Therefore, that weekend Holbrooke asked Pardew -
not to meet with the Bosnian Serbs anymore. Pardew a8reed that there was no way the
Americans could bring them around. How the Serbs were involved would be up
to Milosevic.
The map talks that weekend seemed to destroy all the goodwill of the previous
week. The parties were and ill-prepared. "Both sides are in over their
heads," Kerrick reported to Lake. "Shouts, anger highlight talks." In another attempt to
gain some bargaining traction, the U.S. team began to prepare yet-another map. This
effort proved to be risky. As Kerrick predicted. Will make no one happy, and may
drive Izzy public - which he has threatened to do." _
-
As relations between the pa.t1ies took a tum for the worse, so did the Europeans'
attitude toward their American partners. The Contact Group had never been entirely
happy with a U.S.-led peace process - they felt slighted, and complained of never being
allowed to participate in serious negotiating at Dayton. Fundamentally, they disagreed
with the U.S. goal of an ambitious, comprehensive settlement. "The British, French and
Russians seemed ready to accept outcomes that would increase the chances of a C greater
-Serbia,'" Holbrooke Thus, from the American of view, the Contact Group
was a problem to be managed'rather than a partner to be included -fully. Aside from
Michael Steiner's important work -on the Federation, many U.S. negotiators felt that,
more than anything else, the Europeans at Dayton had done more to sabotage the talks
than help.8 Accordingly, the U.S. wanted to do the minimum- necessary to keep the
, Wben hearing ofthese shopping excursions. U.S. $tatrbegan to that this was an early version of the
equip-and-train program although for the wrong side, See Goldberg interview.
6 Pardew report to Perry. November 8, 1995; and Pardew comment. Dayton History Seminar.
7 See Kerrick report to Lake, "Dayton SITREP #8, November 11-13, 10:30.
Holbrooke interview with author (notes). Novernber26. 1996; Hill. Owen comments, Dayton
History Seminar.
-
216

UNCLASSIFIED
:81
UNCLASSIFIED
---
Europeans on board. They were effectively cut out of most of the key and
consulted only when they had to be.
9
.
The Contact Group's accommodations at Dayton symbolized the role they would
play: their VOQ was not a part of the quad, but adjacent to it. They complained of
Second-class treatment: unlike Holbrooke and the Balkan heads of' for
example, the Contact Group members were subject to searches at the securitY
checkpoints. This unintended slight greatly offended the Europeans, particularly E'rench
representative Jacques Blot At one point, the U.S. delegation received word that Blot
would be unable to attend a meeting "because he could not pass through the security
checkpoint to be allowed on base. The Frenchman refused to be searched by the bomb-
sniffing dogs, and the guards wouldn't Jet him in. When U.S. officials arrived on the
scene. they found a livid Blot. "For the dignity of France." Blot yelled in his accented
English, "I will not be For the moment, the guards agreed to waive the
. securitysearch.
lJ
.
By that weekend the effects of neglect -lx?th perceived and real -t>egan to show
on the Europeans. "These were relatively officials who were at a negotiation
with no negotiating power; they were there just to bear witness," Bob Gallucci observed.
"It really tough on their egos.ut
2
European delegates began to rumble even
about their treatment. They left many at Dayton with the impression that they did not
. wantto be there -- they seemed angry about being in the U.S. and anxious to get off the
cramped and uncomfortable military base. RumQr spread that Carl Bildt might .leave
The French complained loudly about "heavy-handedness," characterizing
the U.S. approach to Bosnia as "we t3ke the credit, you get the bill." At their
unhappiness was translating'into real problems for the negotiations. particularly on the
annexes where Europe would have to playa key role - such as the anneXes on police,
civili.an implementation, and OSCE monitoring of the elections.
13
.
HoI brooke was spending an increasing am6unt of time everyday - starting with
the large and cumbersome Contact Group meeting L taking care of the Europeans. In an
attempt to free up bis own time and keep the Contact Group under control, Holbrooke
asked John Kornblum to take 'over the Contact Group portfolio. As an old European
" hand, Kornblum an uncanny knack for soothing the Europeans. He was a good
listener. once described as having a Buddha-like quality for sitting through the Contact
Group's tirades without either exacerbating their anger or giving in to their For
the rest of the negotiations. KOptb1utll was the primary daily interface With the
Europeans, keeping them infonned of overall progress, negotiating select issues with
9 1n an article written in the journal Survival, British representative Pauline summed up the
European role at Dayton this way: "The elaborate American [negotiating} construction enabled the U.S.
negotiator, supported by a very large team, to organize the agenda and run the negotiation as he wished,
with the acquiescence of the rest. They were informed but not consulted, and their primary role was to
assist as far as needed. witness and ratify the outcome. But they were not to interfere." See Neville-Jones,
ro!"olbrooke interview with author (notes). November 26, 1996; Holbrooke, Hill, Owen comments.
Dayton History Seminar. .
.
II This anecdote attained near legendary status among the U.S. delegates at Dayton.
12 Gallucci interview, October2, 1996.
.
o For a report on these problems, see memorandum to Holbrooke from Jack Zetkulic, "Euro-Handling: I}
OSCE'Consultations; 2) 8i1dt's Pique." November 12, 1995; and "French Line on Bosnia: U.S. Wants the
Credit But Not the BiU." Cable. The Hague 5952. November 8. 1995.
.
217
UNCLASSIFIED
1
UNCLASSIFIED
them, of course. receiving healthy doses of their anger. Hoi brooke joined these
meetings occasionally, but Kornblum's presence in Dayton substantially freed him to
focus on the Balkan parties themselves.
14
..
Despite the lack of progress on maps and problems with Europeans,. the
weekend brought one positive development:. a final agreemenf on Eastern The
parties delivered the text Saturday in Dayton, and on Sunday it was signed by Galbraith.
Stoltenberg and local officials in Zagreb and Erdut. As Christopher .and Holbrooke had
'negotiated two daYs before. the final document struck compromises on the last dividing
issues. The UN Transitional Authority would govern the area for at least twelve months
'. but no longer than twenty-four months. When the UN's mandate the region
would be reintegated back into 8roatia. Local elections would be held toward the end of
the transitional period; and the international community would monitor human rights and
refugee reloCation. IS
.
,
The. Eastern Slavonia agreement was hailed from Washington by President
. Clinton and Secretary Christopher as a source of momentum for the negotiations. J
6
Yet,
the one issue that remained mutual recognition between Serbia and Croatia.
During their Friday meeting with Christopher, Milosevicand Tudjman had said that they
had reached an agreement "in principJe
u
on mutual recognition to be announced at a later
date. But as of Sunday. there was no. fmal text, although Croat and Serb experts had
. convened to go over a draft. The U.S. wanted to make sure that an agreement. was
finished before the end of Dayton. If this did not get done, one analysis explained, we
leave the door open to backsliding by Belgrade. which would be grounds for Zagreb to
renounce the East Slavonia agreement. The results would be disastrous .for the people of
the region, for our diplomatic prestige.,,17 These concerns turned out to be partially
correct:. mutual recognition negotiations did indeed' become protracted, continuing long
after Dayton; but neither side reneged on the Eastern' Slavonia agreement. The Croats
and Serbs finally agreed to mutual recognition on August 23,1996.
14 See Holbrooke interview with author November 26, 1996; Holbrooke, Owen, Hill
Dayton History Seminar; KornblUm/Owen interview, June 18. J 996; Kornblum interview,luly 26, 1996;
Zetkulic interview. July 19, 1996; Gallueei inteJViewi and War Report, pp34-3S.
IS For text. see "Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sinnium.
u
.
November 12, 1995 .. See also "Fact Sheet on Eastern Slavonia:' no author, Pardew Dayton Notebook; and
"GOe and Eastern Siavonian Serbs Sign Agreement on Eastern Slavonia,i> Cable, Zagreb 4509, November
12, 1995.
.
. . See "Statement by the President," White House Press OffICe, November 12, 1995; and "Statement by the
Secretary of State Warren Christopher," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, November 12,
1995. .
17 Along with mutual recognition, the U.s. had to begin planning With the UN on the specifics of an
implementation force, which, according to lbissame analysis, "needed to demonstrate that this operation is
different from unsuccessful UNPROFOR and UNCRO. operations in Croatia rand] is a credible military
. force that can deal decisively with breaches of govemmen!- Provision or U.S. forces would provide such
credibility ... {butJ obviously, the U.s. troop question requires high-level consideration in Washington:' See
memorandum to Holbrooke from Chris Hoh (EURlSCE), "East Slavonia Issues." November 12, 1995. For
Galbraith's assessment of the tasks ahead for implementation, see "Implementation ofthe Eastern
Siavonian Accord," Cable, Zagreb 4509, November 14, 1995; and "Further Views on Implementing the
Eastern Siavonian Agreement," Cable, Zagreb 4561, November 15,1995. For U.S.UN's views, see
"U.S.UN Views On How to Implement the November 13 Agreement On Eastern Siavonia," Cable, State
267095, November 14.1995. ..
.
218
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
7
a
'.
The families of Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel and Nelson Drew visited' Dayton
that Sunday. It was an emotional moment, serving as a stark reminder of the real human
sacrifices that were behind this 'massive negotiating effort. There was a small luncheon
for them with the U.S. delegation, and they met with the three Balkan Presidents in their
respective VOQs.
.
Day Tllirteen: Monday, Novembe;.13
In preparation for Christopher's return to Dayton, the pace of negotiations that
day was hectic on all fronts. The drafting experts from an delegations worked to get as
many' of the annexes cleaned up as possible, while Holbrookeand his core team
conducted intense shuttling between the three Presidents on the map. Despite their ability
to get along cordially in social settings, such camaraderie had yet to translate into the
negotiations.l! . The Bosnians and. Croats continued to bicker over niany issues
. Izetbegovic was reportedly in an awful mood,. refusing to see either Tudjrilan or
Milosevic . while Tudjman refused" to see Milosevic. "That is why they call these
proximity talks, of course" Holbrooke wrote to Christopher that night. "But it did
constitute retrogression.,,19
.
While all three parties were difficult, the Bosnians were proving the most
aggravating. lzetbegovic was still unable to bring his delegation to a united position.
Holbrooke referred to the Bosnian delegation as a "mini-Yugoslavia" in constant internal
dispute. Silajdzic emerged briefly as the most level-headed. and cooperative. But every'
time the Prime Minister tried to!11ove forward and conduct a coherent he was
by either I:zetbegovic' or Sacirbey?O 'Time andagain,n Holbrooke reflected.
"Silajdzic's frustrations became so intense that his emotions took over and prevented him
frommaking rational decisions." Seeing the psychological toll such constant under-
cutting was having.on the PrimeMinister, Holbrooke tried to help him relax, taking him
for a mid-day walk that Monday around Wright-Patterson's grounds?1
.
. As they strolled along the perimeter of the VOQ area, Holbrooke told the Bosnian
leader that as "the leading proponent at Dayton of a multi-ethnic Bosnia," Silajdzic had " .
an "historical role" to play. Ifprogress was not made quickly, Holbrooke said, Secretary
.Christopher would consider ending the talks with serious consequences for the
Bosnians. Silajdzic exploded, angrily saying that he should never threaten a Bosnian in
such a manner; "it would only stiffen their spines.'" After an hour of this rather sullen
conversation, Holbrooke tOld Silajdzic that the U.S. would finally put forth another JllaP
that afternoon. "I told him that we would no longer negotiate from their map, or
Milosevic' or the Contact group map.',22
After the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians saw the map that afternoon, American
negotiators spent the rest of the day peddling different ideas and options back and forth.
" had hosted a dinner on Sunday night for. as Kerrick put it. his "two amigos" - Mi(osevic and
Izelbegovic. As Kerrick explained to Lake, the team "remain[ed} amazed at their ability to tum the charm
on socially while spouting venom in negotiations." See Kerrick report to Lake, "Dayton SITREP #9;
November 14. 1995, 1:10am."
.
Mcimorandum for Christopher from Holbrookc, "Your Long Day in Dayton, November 14:' Novembec
14, 1995.
Holbrooke and Hill comments, Dayton History Menzies interview_
21 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), November 26, 1996.
2Z As KerriCk infonned Lake the previous day, the U.S. team had already planned to put forth their own
map. Holbrooke also told Christopher that the delay in presenting a U.S. map "were caused by G B-H
(Bosnian) to talk about lhe map until after the Federation agreements were completed."
UNCLASSIFIED
219
, UNCLASSIFIED

The Bosnians pressed for swaths of land in northwest Bosnia (for key railroad lines) and
areas south of Gorazde (for key power plants). They insisted on having the northeast
Bosnian town of Brcko. Milosevic fought all of these <Iemands. only giving up areas
were already in Federation hands that he had intended to relinquish anyway. The
, one bright spot was on Sarajevo. while unresolved, consensus seemed to be fonning
. around the "Washington, DC" option.
23
By the time the map negotiations ended around midnight, most: of the U.S.
delegation was fed up with the Bosnians. They exhibited a great ,reluctance to
compromise on anything, leaving some American negotiators with the impression that
they were "clearly prepared' to return to war." Yet, oddly enough, SilajdZic himself
thought that the negotiations that day had taken a tum for the better. Earlier, lIolbrooke
found the' Prime Minister "emotional, gloomy, and threatening." But during a second
walk with HolbroOke that night,SiJajdzic said that "it had been the best day of Dayton so
far." Holbrooke. tired and frustrated,' "thought [Silajdzic] Jllust be on some conttoJIed
substance, since it seemed to me that the tortoise of our progress was being outrun by the
hare ofthecaIendar. But he was serious. and perhaps he is righC.24
,
While these map talks' were underway, officials in DaYton and Washington
conducted an important review of the IFOR annex. On Sunday, the U.S. delegation had
sent back to Washington the Bosnian and Russian edits of the draft military annex back to
Washington for review. Since the comments dealt with the U.S. military role in
implementation, they had to be subject to high-level review. The Bosnian changes were
, primarily the handiworkofRichardPerle, and had been vetted by both Holbrooke'and
General Clark. Holbrooke explained in a memorandum' to the DC, that their review had
been aimed 'at preventing changes that would entangle U.S .. forces into a 'Bosnian war
through "mission Some of the Bosnian suggestions, Holbrooke explained, could
be accepted <Cat no cost to the key elements ofthe annex," while ,the delegation strongly
recommended rejecting others?S
The "Perle markup," as the American delegation had begun to call it, reflected the
Bosnians desire for a stronger. more interventionist IFOR Perle had 'added
Il!11guage that wOl.dd oblige the IFOR commander to carry-orit the force's mandate Clto the
maximum extent consistent with its resources" to improve the climate for elections, ,
. remove the one-year limit for deployment and apprehend war criminals. Although
Holbrooke and Clark warned that several of these suggestions were the ingredients, for
mission creep, some items (like elections protection and removing the one-year limit for
IFOR) were acceptable.
27
The Russian edits, in contrast, emasculated tailoring the
2l For details on discussions that day, see memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke; and Kerrick
SlTREP#9.
.
24 Ibid.
.-
U Memorandum for the Deputies Committee from Holbrooke and the U.S. Delegation, "Changes to the
, Military Annex to the Peace Plan," November 12,1995. For Holbrooke and Clark's line-by-line response
to the Bosnian changes, see "Delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Proposed Changes to Annex It"
November 10, 1:30pm. Holbrooke and Clark respoUded to the changes in three ways: changes tbat
they would approve but had to be cleared by Washington; changes that they approved that could be done in
Dayton without Washington's clearance; and changes diat should be rejected outright.
26 See Pardew interview, July 26, 1996.
27 The Dayton delegation strongly supported language on threatening non-military sanctions for non-
compliance and for full investigation and apprehension of war crimes suspects, but recommended that it be
placed in the Framework and Human Rights annexes, respectively.
220
UNCLASSIFIED
..
UNCLASSIFIED
agreement to provide for a larger UN role, curtailing the authority of IFOR's commander, ani:llimiting the use of force to self-defense only (not enforcing the agreement)?& .
That afternoon, Clark and Pardew joined the DC meeting via video teleconference to discuss the "Perle markup:" The RusSian changes were. not dealt with extensively, instead being handled directly with the Russians by DOD and State charuiels (Talbott. took the lead on this; if any changes came out of these talks, Holbrooke simply asked to be informed). The DC took many of Holbrooke's recommendations'on the Bosnian only rejecting provisions that radically altered the scope of !FOR (such as the removing the force's one-year limit, or creating a "mechanism" to irivestigate suspected war criminals). Perle's efforts bad succeeded in bringing some specificity to IFOR's mission, but it still essentially remained a force of nearly unlimited authority with few concrete responsibilitieS. With the draft now cleared by Washingtol4 neg9tiators in
Dayton began work to put on the finishing toucbes.
29
'.
.
'
. Also that day in Washington, President Clinton sent a letter to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich which outlined the rationale for the and future U.S. role in the Bosnian' peace process. This nine-page letter was considered the President's "strongest and most detailed case" yet as to why the U.S. should be'involved.
3D
Although the Administration had been keeping of the status of the shuttles that
fall, it began a concerted effort in late October gain Congress' support for the
negotiations in Dayton. Christopher and Perry both testified on Capitol Hill, and officials. from State, DOD and the NSC began to contact former officials and other
opinion leaders to seek their help to speak out in support or the Administration's efforts ..
Further, a "buddy-system" strategy was established in which officials frOm each agency and the .White House were assigned to stay in touch with each member of Congress.
31
The most critical c9aller;rge concerning Congress. was attaining legislative support for U.S. troop participation in IFOR, which Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Dole had.
said was "virtually nie.32 That week, the White House bad held several briefing sessions
2. for an overview of the changes and the sec memorandum 'to Talbott from Kornblum,
."Deputies' Commiuee Meeting. Monday, November 13, J995," and attached "Checklist to Military Annex
I (Bosnian Comments)" and "Checklist to Military Annex I (Russian Comments)," both drafted by George
Glass (EURJRPM).
,
29 Pardew interview, June 27, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 19, 1996; Slocombc
interview; Perry BBC interview
. 30 Sec Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton M3kes Case to Congl."css For Putting U.S. Troops in Bosnia." New York
Times, November 15, 1995.
.
JI Some deiails of the Administration's Congressional strategy were 10 be discussed at the November 7 pc.
see memorandum to Christopher from Kornblum, November 7. 1995; and Wendy Sherman interview.
December 11. 1996. For Secretary Christopher's testimony in October, see "The United Slates Must
to Lead in Bosnia," Statement before the House lntemational Relations Committee, October IS,
1995. U,S. Dispatch, October23, 1995. pp755-756.
. 32 Apparently the secrecy oftbe negotiating prOcess upset many members of Congress. Secretary
Christopher reflected that "there was always some tension in that we were not disclosing the twists and
turns ofthe process to anyone, particularly when operating under the Dayton rules of confidentiality. But
with Congress having been pressing us on [Bosnia J for years, I thOUght it was time to respond by saying.
'We're doing something about it; we need your support." Christopher interview, October 30. 1996.
7
221
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
q
on the subject with the President, Vice President and .other senior officials for key
members ofCongress}3 .
The Pr:esident's November 13 letter was in response to an October 26 letter from
Gingrich which was co-signed by .the House Republican leadership. Stating that
would be a grave mistake" to introduce U.S . militMy forces into Bosnia without
Congressipnal approval, the Gingrich letter asked over forty questions in twenty-two
different areas concerning U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Most of questions dealt with
IFOR including such issues as the timing and dUration of deployment, cOmmand and
control of forces, role of Russian troops, funding sources, and impact on U.S. military
readiness worldwide. Other questions concerned areas like economic reconstruction aid, .
regional arms control, the Federation's viability, and the equip-and-train initiative.
34
.
In 11l1l. the Gingrich letter was one of the most exhaustive probes of U.S: policy on
the issue, and the Administration decided to reply in kind. Thddea was to respond with
a comprehensive statement "that could then be Used subsequently as the Administration.
something which we could use to. explain we're sending your kids and
money to a strange place a long ways away.,,3S Almost immediately, the State
Department's European Bureau began to work on the response; 'and a first draft was
completed on the eve of Dayton.
36
In the meantime, the President sent another letter to
every Member of Congress outlining briefly the Administration's rationale"and asking for
sUpport?1 While the negotiations were underWay in Dayton, officials at the State.
Departinent's European Bureau continued to work with their NSC .counterparts to fine-
tune the response. Finally, by the weekend of November 11-12, the comprehensive letter
was ready to go.38 . .
The letter framed peace in squarely within U.S. interests. If the
negotiations underway in Dayton were successful, the President explained, the had a
"real opportunity not only to end the dreadful hunianitarlan suffering andoutiageous
atrocities that we have seen in Bosnia, but also to advance our goal of an undivided,
peaceful and democratic Europe -- with benefits for our own security and prosperity.,.
this result, however, can only be achieved by U.S. leadership." The President also
outlined specifics, pledging to seek Congressional support for [FOR, and projecting that
the force would be deployed for approximately one year at the price of $1.5 billion.
Although "atrocities unknown if! Europe since the Second World War have n the
President would "not allow 'mission creep' that could involve IFOR in a nation-building
role." In the Jetter stated that the U.S. would seek to balance military forces in
3J This sentiment was expressed in a letter sent to the President also on November 13. For details of this
letter and the Administration's efforts to attain Congressional support, sec Helen Dcwar, "In Bid for HilJ
Backing on Troops. Clinton Faces.Tougher Task Than Bush:' Washington Post. November 14, 1995.
:u See Letter to President Clinton from Newt Gingrich, et aI., October 26, 1995. That week. the President
also published a brief article in Newsweek outlining his rationale for U.S. involvement in Bosnia. See
"Why Bosnia Matters to America," Newsweek. November 13. 1995, p55. .
3' John Price interview.
U . .
John Price of the State Department's European Bureau was the primary drafter of the reply letter, On
October 31. he faxed bis draft to Holbrooke in Dayton. On the cover-sheet message, Price wrote that the
NSC wanted the letter to go out the next day. See fax to Holbrooke from John Price. "Draft Gingrich
Letter:' October 31, 1995 (distributed at Dayton to Hill, Clark, Kerrick. Pardew. Jack Zetkulic and Aric
Schwan lEUR/PAl. For details. see Price interview; Shennan interview.
37 See letter from President Clinton. Novembcr 2. 1995, "
31 Price interview; Shcrman interview.
222
.
UNCLASSIFIED
Bosnia by lifting the UN anns embargo, pushing for regional arms control, and
employing an equip-and-train effort. For economic reconstruction and relief, the
Administration would ask Congress for $500-$600 million.
"Unquestionably, there are costs and risks to all involved making peace," the
President wrote. But the costs of not trying to make peace, he argued, would be far
greater.
"The human costs of continued war in Bosnia would be another cruel winter of
starvation and suffering. followed by a Spring of renew cd, bloody conflict. The
economic costs of a continued war wourd be additional millions of dollars in
humanitarian aid. in funds for ongoing sanctions and No-Fly-Zone enforcement,
and in the efforts of our Allies to accommodate hundreds of thousands of
refugees Ihroughout Europe. The security costs would involve the risk of wider
and even more dangerous conflict. as well as serious damage to the credibility
. and effeCtiveness of NATO and u.s. leadership ifthcwar resumes. Moreover;.
if the war resumes, NATO and the U.s. could be called upon to undertake a
potentially dangerous mission involving the withdrawal of UNPROFOR under
hostile circumstances:,39
.
The next the President met with members of Congress in the White House to
present and discuss the details of these intentions.
40
Within two days, the contents of this
letter were leaked to the press."! Although the President stated that. he reserved final
. judgment until the terms of an agreement were clear, the very act of writing this letter, in
effect. established public parameters - stich as $1.5 billion for IFOR; 12-month
deployment; 20,000 U.S. troops; $500-$600 million in economic aid -- for U.S_ role
in impiementing any settlement.
.
Finally, November 13 also saw the return of Assistant Secretary Shattuclc. to
Dayton, fresh from his investigations into atrocities in the Banja LUkaarea. Shattuck
remained through November 2i. working with the legal team on the Human Rights annex
and the role of the War Crimes Tribunal in the final settlemenl As Shattuck recalled,
prior to -Dayton there were concerns within the human rights community that the role. of
the Tribunal "might be dealt away" in the effort to reach an accord_ But both Christopher
and Holbrooke fully supported it. As Shattuck notes, Holbrooke believed the Tnounal
would have a "very important practical ... value," in that he could use it "to isolate
Karadzic and Mladic." Christopher, on the other hand, ''took a broader
believing that the institution itself had to be defended and language included in the
agreement requiring all sides to cooperate in its investigations. In fact, as Shattuck notes,
this was. "one of [the Secretary'sJ ... non-negotiable" demands. Shattuck also used his
remaining time in Dayton to lobby the three Balkan leaders personally to release war
prisoners.
42
.
..

19 Letter from President Clinton to House Gingrich, November 13, 1995_
.co Vershbow interview. July 23, 1996.
.
41 In addition to the article (cited above), see Michael Dobbs and Thomas Lippmann, "Cost of'
U.S. Bosnia Force Put at $ J oS BilliQn; Clinton Raises Estimate in Letter to Gingrich; Saying Some
Personnel May Be Sent Before Debate," Washington Post, November ]5, 1995.
42 Quotes from Shattuck interview, July 25, 1996. See Shattuck interview July 30, 1996.

UNCLASSIFIED
223
UNCLASSIFIED

Day Fourteen: Tuesday, lVovemher 14
When Christopher arrived in Dayton for the third time, the mood. was turning
quickly from frustration to desp.eration. The press described his visit as a "last ditch
attempt" to prod the parties toward an agreement.
43
Such a characterization was
consistent with the private views of the U.S. delegation. "There is a certain feeling
among most people that 'successhere is highly likely because of the momentum we had
going into Dayton and the effort and commitment of the U.S.G hasput into these talks,"
Holbrooke wrote Christopher in a briefing memorandum. "As you know, I do not share
this view -- and not because I am 'low-balling' expectations."
To Holbrooke, progress had been achieved at Dayton, but much too slowly. 'My
concern over the situation here is based on the amount of time we have lost on such
issues as sanctions arguments, the time spent on Federation-building (although it was
productive and unavoidable.' it consumed eight days), and, above all; the immense
difficulty of engaging the Bosnian Government in a serious negotiation ... So, on Day 14,
vie are about where we should have been on Day 8 or 9." Each of the parties challenged
the prospects for success in their own way: the Bosnians were disorganized. Milosevic.
dishonest, and Tudjman disinterested. "While the Bosnians are the 'sort of friends that try
one's patience. Milosevic has often lied outright about factual data or changed .his
position after we thought we had locked something in. As for Tudjman, he is fast
becoming the King of Dayton (well, only after [Dayton native] Strobe moved to
Cleveland, of course)."
. Initially, the Secretary planned to visit Dayton on his way to Asia to. close a deal.
But given the remaining differences on almost all the core issues, the negotiations needed
a middle-reliever. not a closer. "We have to recast your trip," Holbrooke wrote to the
Secretary. "Initially conceived as a closer trip, it now becomes a last warning to get
serioiIs." Christopher would leave Dayton that night to attend the APEC ministerial
meeting in Osaka. After APEC, he was supposed to the President in Tokyo for an
official state visit. However . given the bleak status of the negotiations, he decided to cut
his Asia trip short to return to Dayton immediately after APEC.
44
Thus, Holbrooke
advised the Secretary to leave the parties "with the clear messagethat when you return
[from Japan) we must have either closure or close-down ... That, pure and simple, is the
message of your trip." . .
. Holbrooke hoped that "by a combination of pressure, rhetoric, and [his]
involvement," Christopher could break the logjam on some issues. Holbrooke wanted the
Secretary to concentrate on the oig problems - such as the map. elections, and Sarajevo --
whjlealso quickly finishing some small ones. By doing so, Christopher could uestablish
his ability to move the process forward." Holbrooke still believed that the parties
genuinely wanted peace. They just didn't know how to get there. "They look forward to
your helping them stop killing each other _. and so do we.',4S
In preparation for Christopher'S return, the U.S. delegation dfafted a detailed
status report on the General Framework Agreement and eleven annexes. None of the
u Roger Coben, "Christopher Sets a Last-Ditch Push for Bosnia Peace," New York TimeS, November
14,1995
4 In the end, President Clinton canceled his own visit to the APEC summit, remaining in Washington to
deal with the budget crisis. Vice President Gore participated in his place.
Us d .
ee memoran urn to Chnstopher from Holbrooke, "Your Long Day.in Dayton, November 14,"
November 14, 1995 .
224
...
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
.-
annexes had been completed. but most had been approved at the working level and were
in the latter stages of negotiating. Among these nine annexes - on the constitution,
arbitration, human rights. refugees, national monuments, public services, civilian
implementation, police, and IFOR - the Secretary did not need to intervene as they could
be managed by the experts in Dayton. The areas in which Holbrooke wanted
Christopher's involvement were those that had the talks during the past few
. d . 46
days - the map, the elections annex, an Sarajevo. . .
After a morning briefing with the U.S. delegation at the Hope Hotel, Christopher
and Holbrooke headed to the VOQ's to begin the :fIrSt of three separate meetings with.
each of the Balkan Presidents. Shuttling. almost continually until he left around midnight,
Christopher saw both the highs and lows of Dayton. As Holbrooke had recommended,
Christopher made clear to the three Presidents that when he returned from Japan, "we had
to agreement or [the talks] would be closed down.',47 Although he left that night
withno real breakthroughs, Christopher reported to the President that tbe.day "offered
tantalizing hints that a peace agreement might indeed be possible. ,,48 .
As planned, Christopher and Holbrooke's bilaterals concentrated on the map and
. Sarajevo. The map talks were where the spiraling relations between-the parties were most
apparent. Christopher prodded Izetbegovic and Milosevic to begin exploring possible
territorial trade-offs. Although doing so "in an angry and vitriolic manner," he found that
the two Presidents exposed enough common ground to provide a glimmer of hope. "It is
possible. in the good moments, to see the final share of the final map," Christopher Wrote
to the President. "But .it is a very fragile system.'A .. .
The Bosnians and Serbs were deadlocked on Sarajevo. The Bosnians supported
the most recent variant oftheU.S.-fonnulated "Washington, DC" plan, in which Sarajevo
would be a federal city. However, Milosevic remairied skeptical,
tabling yet another proposal that tried to compromise between the division: and
. '. . .
unification of the city. This latest idea called. for a central multiethnic government to
. oversee such city-wide needs as utilities and transportation, but would allow the citizens
of each Opstina.to .decide if their .local government would operate under the laws of the
Federation or Srpska. In this way, Sarajevo would remain undivided through its
.municipal government, yet remain divided in its national politics, culture and legal
system.
so
Holbrooke saw this as. a non-starter, certain to be rejected by lzetbegovic.
Christopher, however, seemed somewhat amenable to this compromise. describing. to
PresidentClintoJl that it "may be attractive when we understand it more fully."S)
In terms of the other annexes, Christopher's report to the President. that night
echoed Holbrooke's own assessment. . Most annexes were generally in good shape. .
Negotiations would continue among the various working groups, with high-level
46 See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke, "Briefing Materials for Your Visit to Dayton,
November 14," November 14, 1995.
C7 Christopher interview. October22, 1996. .
U Memorandum for the President from Christopher, "Night Note en route to Osaka," Noveinber IS. 1995.
'Ibid. For a similar assessment, also see Kerrick report to Lake, "Dayton SITREP #10; November 14,
1995, II: lOpm."
$0 For the two proposals on Sarajevo, see of Agreed Principles on Sarajevo {Bosnian Position),"
and "Agreed Principles on .Sarajevo position)," both attached to memorandum to Christopher
from Holbrooke. "Briefing Materials for Your Visit to Dayton."
$1 Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20, 1996; Christopher to Clinton, "Night
-.
225
UNCLASSIFIED
ONCLASSIFlhb
intervention as necessary. The only issues the Secretary raised specifically with the
.President concerned the military components of an agreement. He asked that
comments on the IFOR annex be handled outside of Dayton through the Peny-Grachev
or Talbott-Mamedov channels, and that the Administration to closure on an equip-
d
.' fc th B . S2
. an -train program or e osruans. .
Christopher recognized that while the issues atone were difficult, the parties'
internal divisions weren't making things any easier. As Holbrooke had forewarned. the
Secretary found that the problem was particularly acute with the Bosnians. "The
Bosnians are very divided among. themselves and still not fully convinced that a peace
agreement is in their interest," Christopher explained to the President. He believed that
Izetbegovic was most reluctant because "he was giving up sole leadership of his country-
- flawed as it. was. - for a power-sharing arrangement."S3 During one of their three
meetings that day, Christopher had had a "hem-to-heart" discussion with.tbe Bosnian
. President ''to remind him .of all the benefits that a genuine peace would bring." He also.
wanted to reiterate the stakes involved for noncooperation -- that President Clinton had
"put an enormous amount on the line for peace" to save Bosnia. and therefore would not
assist the Sarajevo leadership ifihey blocked a reasonable settlement. 54
When the Secretary departed that night, it was clear to him that whether heading
toward success or failure. the talks had entered the endgame. He later characterized that
day "as' one of those times when you can feel [that] the negotiation is either going to
succeed or fail in a few days." He could see the fatigue on the faces of the Balkan leaders
as well as those of his own delegation. Despite the camaraderie generated during the past
two weeks, Christopher thought that "they were the point where they. were
getting on each other's nerves. However attractive Dayton was ... they were beginning to
get "cabin fever'; itwas begiIllling to get cold."s5 Thus, as Christopher and Holbrooke ..
had previously arranged, the Secretary informed the President that he would cut short his
Asia trip to return to Dayton. Christopher told the President that "I believe we should
take a shot at bringing these [talks] to a conclusion." Although he admitted that success
was c'a very optimistic scenario that may well not happen," he rated the "prospect good
enough to justify missing the state visit to Japan." If talks were successful, Christopher
suggested that they aim to conclude them as the President returned from Tokyo. "so that
you could be involved in any possible announcement." On the other hand, if they failed
to reach closure by early the next week, "it will probably be necessary to suspend the
negotiations on the best basis ,,56.
Day Fifteen: Wednesday, November 15
. While in Japan, Christopher hoped that under Holbrooke's "aggressive tutelage,"
would be able to "fiU in the success" of his visit.
s1
Yet, at the end of the
fifteenth day, little had changed. The- American team st111 felt as though things were
going in circles. "Everyone has a sense of progress." Kerrick reported to Lake that night,
"but [ies] hard to put a finger on concrete achievement... [we] seem to be near a deal. but
.: ."
$2 Christopher to Clinton, "Night Note,"
Christopher interview. October 30, 1996.
34 Christopher to Clinton, "Night Nole:'
jj. Christopher interview, October 22. 1996.
S6 Christopher to Clinton, "Night
S7 lbid.
226
...
UNCLASSIFIED'
..
UNCLASSIFIED
..
far away at the same time." Moreover, as the weather at Dayton got colder and more
blustery, the "temperature in negotiations [was] not much warmer.'oSs
As the map talks stifled. tlie drafting experts continued to work on the annexes.
The Bosnians showed some renewed" flexibility on the elections annex, as did both the
Contact Group and the Serbs on the most recent IFOR draft (incorporating the
recent alterations).59 For the final editing of the annexes, the Serhian delegation
suggested that the drafting experts meet in plenary workirig sessions rather than in U.S.- .
led individual" meetings with each ofthe parties. This would not help only streamline the
process, guarantee that each parties' views were heard. "If we could hear each other
and hear the arguments of other parties," the proposal explained, "maybe the delegations
could revise their respective attitudes and accept the attitudes of other The
Americans thought the idea was a good one; it would help reduce the amount of tirrie-
consuming shuttling. They planned to begin such in the next few days.6O "
The Bosnian Serbs, who Christopher had described to in his "Night Note" to
President Clinton as "present but quite invisible/' began to clamor more loudly for
attention.
61
By this it was no secret to anyone that Milose:vic was ready to sell
them out for any deaL
62
Although he was the head for all Serbs, Milosevic
was rarely seen with them. Looking for an outlet for their frustrations. the Bosnian Serbs
began to offer unsolicited suggestions directly to the AmeriCans. In a memorandum" to
Roberts 'Owen that day, Bosnian Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik commented on the
"wiacceptable provisions" of the latest draft constitution. This memorandum showed' that
the Bosnian Serbs remained opposed even to "the most fundamental aspects of an
agreement; most of their changes wouJd have reversed the Geneva principles, and every
one of their changes further divided Bosnia. Complaining" of being shut out of the
process, Krajisnik . .said he "wondered whether there is any paine' iii making any
comments, observing that the "method of work adopted by the international mediators is,
needless to say, seriously threatening to undermine the overall peace effort in Dayton.
. In Washington that day. the Principals Committee met at the White House to
discuSs the progress of Dayton and related implementation issues.
64
They were briefed
by General Wes Clark, John Kornblum and Bob Gallucci, who participated from Wright-
Patterson via secure video .. The PC reaffinned the U.S. to coordinate an
equip-and-train program, decided that any AIDerican military role should be ubehind
the scenes," with. the weapons supplied by others. While overseen by the U;S.
51 Kerrick report to Lake. "Dayton SITREP #11; November 15. 1995. 9:10pm'"
"See. respectively, memorandum to Holbrooke from lack Zetkulic, "Elections Update,"November 15.
1995, 5:00pm; and Kerrick SITREP 1111." .
60 The prC?posal was explained by Serb Foreign Minister in a November 15 letter to
Sec Letter to Holbrooke from Milulinovic, November 15, 1995.
61 See Christopher to CI inton, UNight Note." .
61 This was not only obvious to the negotiators. but had been widely reported in the press. See, for
example, Roger Cohen, "Draft Charter For Bosnia Bars Leader of the Serbs." New York Times. November
6. 1995; and Christina Spolar, Say Milosevic Would Back Oustcr of Bosnian Serb LeadeB.
Washington Post. November 12,1995.
63 Memorandum to Roberts Owen from Momcilo Krajisnik. "Remarks on Draft Constitution' of 12
November 1995," November 15,1995.
64 For background, see memorandum to Talbott from Richard E. Hecklinger(EUR). "Principals Committee
Meeting, Wednesday, November 15,1995," November IS, 1995; and NSC memorandum. "Bosnia Issues
for Discussion at November 15 PC Meeting:' November 15. 1995
..
221
UNCLASSIFIED
i
.
i
i
..
UNCLASSIFIED
Government. the program would be implemented mainly by contractors. On economic
sanctions against Serbia, the Principals reaffinned that they would ask the UN to suspend
them upon the- initialing of a peace agreement and to lift them fully upon implementation ..
The -lifting of the anns embargo would be similarly phased; although juridically
tenninated with a peace agreement, any anns shipments would be prohibited during the
first 90 days oflFOR deployment, with larger equipment baruied for six
The PC also discussed Gallucci's efforts at Dayton on the_ police and civilian
. implementation annexes. While deciding to keep the mission of an police
task force separate from IFOR's(except in the event of gross human rights violations or
attacks on civilian aid organizations), they approved GallUCci's drafts. With this in hand,
Gallucci was able to go back to the parties the next day -in Dayton for the_ finishing
touches. Shortly after midnight the morning of November 17, the parties reached- final-
agreement. Of the eleven draft annexes, these were the first two finished.
66
- _ _
Lastly, the -PC assessed the- details of implementing the Eastern Slavoi'lia
agreement The-Croatians wanted implementation to begin as soon as possible. -On his
way o.ut of Dayton that night for the second time (this time to oversee the opening session
of the Croatian Parliament),:Tudjman announced that he wanted the command structure
of the UN Transitional Authority (to be acronymically referred to as UNTAES) to have
both a civilian implementation chief and senior military Since a u.S. officer
would be Unacceptable for the Russians, the Croats Wanted an American civilian chief.
The PC agreed to both these points. deciding to begin work with the UN Security Council
.
to draft the mandate for this new peacekeeping force.
Day Sixteen: TI,ursday, November 16
With Christopher scheduled to return Friday evening, Holbrooke hoped to use
several "drop-by" visits by other senior U.S. officials to help push the talks toward
- conclusion. The purpose of these high-level visits was not to engage in actual
negotiations. Holbrooke wanted such officials there to achieve two goals: strategically. to
impress upon the parties that the negotiations were in the endgame, and bureaucratic;:aIly.
to "educate" these officials and provide them with the sense that they were involved in
the process.
os
Lake would arrive that afternoon, and Secretary of Defense Perri. NATO
Commander General George Joulwan, and Major General William Nash, the Commander
of the First Annored Division in Europe, were scheduled to come -the next day. As_ the
senior U.S. military leaders in Europe. Joulwan and Nash would lead the IFOR
Before Lake arrived, the U.S. team helped to orchestrate an important tete-a-tete
between Milosevic and Silajdzic. For the past few days, Holbrooke had hoped that the
Bosnian Prime Minister would emerge as the key to a settlement. On the big issues that -
remained -- the map and Sarajevo - lzetbegovic and Sacirbey were unrealistic and
- .
6S See "Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1995,
November 15. 1995)"NSC memorandum. No.vember 18. 1995.
See Ibid; and Gallucci interview. _._
67 The U.S. would later name Jacques Klein, a Foreign Service Officer who was also a Major Genera I in
the U.S. Air Force Reserves, as head ofUNTAES. See Memorandum to SlocOrnbe from Panlew, "Forces
in Sector East," November 15, 1995; ''Tudjman: Mutual Recognition With FRY. Belgian/Russian Troops
in Eastern Siavonia, Blaskic Relieved of Command," Cable. Proximity Talks 000021, November 16, 1995;
and the NSC's "Summary of Conclusions," November 15,1995. -
61 Holbrooke interview, November 18. 1996 .
228
..
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLAiPiED
R
b
unyielding, while"Silajdzic would at least listen to compromise offers. The problem was,
as the intra-Bosnian struggle escalated, so did the psychological toll on Silajdzic. He was
exhibiting mercurial, somewhat manic-depressive behavior. To John Menzies, who had
had a lot of experience with the Prime Minister, Silajdzic had so much nervous energy
that at tjmes he was like a "caged panther/' But as he continued to be undercl,lt by
lzetbegovic and Sacirbey, Silajdzic grew more depressed and fatalistic. Oftentimes, the
Prime Minister would simply go into a deeply depreSsive funk, essentially disappearing
" "
Considering that Silajdzic had emeiged as the most reasonable of the Bosnian
negotiators, Holbrooke waS conoomed by his depressed state. He had asked Menzies and
Rosemarie PauliMGikas to befriend the Prime Minister to heJp him relax, spending time
. with him, taking him for. walks, joining him for a meals, or talking with him about his
family and future. Holbrooke's wife, Kati Marton, also befriended they
talked about her books or ones he wanted to Write. On Wednesday night, Holbrooke and
Marton had even taken off-base for a private dinner at Auberge, the best
French restaurant in Dayton. 0 " "". "" "
On that bitter cold Thursday morning, Menzies and Pauli-Gikas took Silajdzic for
a walk outside the VOQ compound. Holbrooke and Hill, meanwhile, set out with
Milosevic on a long stroll around the base, ending up at the Officers Club for lunch.
Sensing that the talks were going "nowhere. and that the Bosnian delegation's negotiating
troubles were not improving, Holbrooke wanted to enlist Milosevic to push things
forward. Braving the winter weather, the Americans. asked the Serb leader what kind of
gestures he could make to break the map impasse. They did not press for any specific
territorial" concession, but rather a symbolic goodwili gestUre, "ala Anwar Sadai" to show
the Bosnians that he: was willing to go the distance and make real sacrifices. One idea
was to offer a special highway connecting Sarajevo' to Belgrade." Milosevic seemed "
amenable, replying that he was "also ''thinking'' about what kind of move he could make.
71
Holbrooke, Hi117 and Milosevic arrived at the Officers Club. shortly before noon.
The Club was becoming sort of a second home to the Serb who seemed to enjoy
the country club ambiance (the club was on a golf colttSe) compared to the crowded VOQ
quad and bar-food cuisine at Packy's. Soon after they arrived, Menzies and Pauli-Gikas
came in with Silajdzic from their walk and sat at the opposite end of the large, wood-
paneled dining room. Before he had left with Milosevic that morning, Holbrookc had
called PauliMGikas to tell her where he was going, and she had decided to.invite Silajdzic
to the Officers Club. At oQ.e point over lunch, Holbrooke went over to Silajdzic's table .to
say hello, and they began to discuss some points Milosevic had raised on the status of
Gorazde. They began to draw different options out on table napkinS and, as other diners
69 Menzies interview; HoIbrookc intcrvi"ew. November 18,1996.
70 Ibid. This internecine struggle within the Bosnian delegation was also being played out through press
leaks. particularly through New York Times reporter Roger Cohen. On November 16. Cohen reported
had emerged as the "swing man" for anyagreeJpcnt, causing" Sacirbey to claim angrily to
Holbrooke tltat "President lzetbegovic is the only swing"man Jtere." For the next few days, Cohen's reports
were scattered with Sacirbey's gibes against SiJajdzic as someone who "wants to claim all the credit he
can" for any agreement. See. for example. "Bosnia Asks U.S. Arms Aid as Part of Any Peace Accord,"
New York Times, November 19, 1995; and "For Bosnia's President. An Agonizing Choice," New y;'rJc .
Times. November 20. 1995; and comment. Dayton History Seminar. .
71 See Holbrooke and Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke interview. November 18. 1996;
Hill phone interview with author (note:. December S, 1996.
229
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
..
looked on in astonishment. HOl'brooke the ideas between the two leaders: After
several trips back and forth across the dining room, Holbrooke finally got Silajdzic to join
Milosevic at his table. Sitting down together for one of the few since the Bosnian
war had begun, the two leaders talked in Serbo-Croatian about a land corridor between
GoraZde and Sarajevo. Although nothing waS solved, the conversation served as a useful
ice-breaker for the two. Miloseyjc, chann machine in full-gear, at one point told Silajdzic
that after withstanding three years of shelling by "Bosnian Serb cowards," the Muslim
government had "earned" Sarajevo.72
After this dramatic lunch, Tony Lake and SandyVershbow arrived at Wright-
Patterson. Holbrooke took Lake to meet with IZetbegovic and Milosevic (fudjman was
still away), while the rest of the U.S. team provided Vershbow with a crash review on the
status of the annexes.
73
.
.
With both Presidents. Lake strongly emphasized .the need for cloSure in the next
few days. America's patience with. the entire effort was Lake explained, and if
success was not achieved here, then Europe would assume more responsibility in any
future negotiations. "Tony said there no second chance for .the U.S.," Holbrooke
described in a report to Christopher that night. "[He that this was our last, best shot
and that Congress was going south on us; that if they don't reach agreement when you get
.here we will tum them overto Pauline [NeVille-Jones, the Bntish Contact Group
representative], Jacques [Blot. the French representativeJ, and Wolfgang the
German representative], and.our role will greatly. diminish." The parties took this:threat
very seriously. No one not Milosevic, not Izetbegovic - wanted the Europeans to be in
charge .. After two years of European ineptitude, the parties believed that their respective
interests were best served with U.S.-brokered settlement. As an additional carrot,
explained that if succeeded in reaching agreement that weekend> President Clinton
might visit Dayton. This point intrigued Milosevic (who dreamed of being a pariah-
tumed-partner, like Yasir Ararat). but not Izetbegovic.Instead, the Bosnian President
asked ifit would be possible to visit Congress after Dayton.
14
.
As expected, Milosevic pressed Lake on sanctions, precipitating what Holbrooke
described as a "fierceargumenl,,7S "r understand the most in
Washington," Milosevic said to Lake with his typical brio. The National Security
Advisor explained the policy that had been reaffinned the day before in the PC: while
suspension would come with initialing, complete lifting of sanctions. would only C9me
with full implementation. Milosevic finally agreed to accept this (apparently calculating
that in real tenns, suspension, hot lift, would bring relief to Serbia), but then argued with
n See Menzies interview; Holbrooke interview; Holbrooke, Hill, PauliGikas comments, Dayton History
Seminar.

73 In his report to Lake the night before, Kerrick recommended that he send such a signal: U[I} suggest yoU
be prepared to discuss views on how to close Dayton either with or without an agreement:' See SITREP
#11.
.
7. See to Christopher from Holbrooke, "Closure or Close-down: The Situation as of2
November. 17, 1995. Kerrick's view, as reported to Lake,was that regardless of the outcome in Dayton, an
announcement must come from the White House. See SITREP #11.
75 Although the Serbs expressed happiness that the U.S. had decided to allow limited gas flows in Belgrade,
they still asked to conduct a grain-for-oil swap. As earlier, the U.S. refused this request -Ihe American
embassy in Belgrade explained that "while it is true that Belgrade lacks the hard currency to pay for fuel...
[their plea] strikes us as another lever for asserting pressure to lift sanctions." Sec "Belgrade Reaction to
HumaniJarian Fuel:' Cable. Belgrade 5616, November 15. 1995.
230
n_
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIfIED
Lake and Holbrooke about the exact meaning of "'implementation." After debating this
for awhile, they could only agree to discuss the issue fater. Holbrooke worried that the
iSsue could explode again. and later advised Christopher that he would have to deal with
MiIosevic on it Work in New York on a Security Council resolution to remove these
sanctions was underway (which would be needed on any sanctions deal, since they were .
administered by the UN), although Albright's efforts bad hampered by mixed
messages from At the end of the day. Holbrooke and Lake agree4 to
recommend that Albright divide her efforts toward two UN resolutionS: one sole.? on the .
sanctions questions, and the other on lifting the arms embargo and other matters? .
Throughout the day, another. unfolding drama was the threatened resignation of
Federation President Zubak. Although he was still angry at his Muslim counterparts over
the lack of Croatian representation in the Federation, Zubak's ire was focused more
toward his Croat brethren from Zagreb.. With his Eastern Slavonia prize pocketed"
Tudjman was . ready to leave the Serbs key territorial areas in the now Federation-held
Posavina "pocket" in northwest Bosnia (where ZubaK was from). Zubak insisted that the
Federation hold onto the land, and in a fit of anger that day, that he would
resign arid leave Dayton. He apparently felt that the Croat President had sold him and the
BOsnian Croats out Holbrookes instinctive first response was good riddance. Zubak
had been a problem throughout the negotiations, and they frankly didn't have time :for his
antics. Croatian Defense Minister Susak had told Holbrooke to ignore Zubak. that
someone else from the Federation could Yet, lzetbegovic and some U.S. team
members disagreed, urging that Zubak _be brought back into the fold.. Such open
dissension c<ouId not help the Federation. Later, after and Susak talked to him,
ZubaIc grudgingly agreed to remain in Dayton.
77
.
'
That after dinner with Milosevic, Lake and Vershbow left Dayton. But
the night was far from finished. During the meal, Holbrooke had invited MiIosevic over
to the American VOQ to negotiate further on territorial issues, particularly the Sarajevo-
Gorazde land corridor they had discussed at the Officers Club with Silajdzic. In the
"map room" set up in the U.S. VOQ, General Clark used the Defense Mapping Agency's
highly technical, highly classified 3-D imaging system called "PowerScene" to show
Milosevic the terrain between Sarajevo and Gorazde. In September, this $400,000
computer system helped NATO choose targets in the bombing .campaign;
it helped negotiators at Dayton plan for peace.
78
By rendering scenes from actual ter;rain
down to two yards in enabled the negotiators to "travel"
through Bosnia in virtual reality, visually surveying the geographic details via computer.
All the delegations at Dayton were completely fascinated with the u.s.
quickly sawthat the computer program had at least as much value psychologically as it
76 SlTREP# 1. See also Vershbow interview, July 23, 1996; Fuerth interview. The sanctions and anns
embargo resolutions were eventually treated as two separate issues by the UN Security Council. See .
"Sanctions Suspension Resolution," November 19,1995, I :45pmdraft, COS files. Also see Albright
interview; and "Bosnia: Contact Group Counsellors 'Brainstorm' On The SuspensionILifting of FRY
Sanctions," Cable, U.S.UN 4620, November 17, 1995. ' '.
77 See Holbrooke to Christopher, November 17, 1995; Holbrooke interview, November 18, 1996;
Vershbow interview, December 17,1996; and War Report, pp36-37. .
7& For a press account of the wonders of PQwerScene, see Eric Schmitt, "High-Tech Maps Guided Bosnia
Talks," New York Times, November 24. t 995. Not surprisingly, the technology was used later durin g
!FOR's deployment. See Dana Priest, "For Bosnia Pilots, Virtual Reality is Reality; Air Force Launches
Devices That Simulate Terrain. Detail Ground Action:' Washington Post, December 12. 1995.
231
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
E
did substantively. It was an impressive of American
.prowess, and representative of the U.S. commitment to Peace. PowerScene also became
one of the rare fonns of entertainment for many at Day ton, who passed what little spare
time they had "flying" through Bosnia. The map room became such a popular attraction
that the U.S. delegation began to refer to it as the "Nintendo Room." . "
had offered the Bosnians a thin, frail two-mile "road corridor to connect
Sarajevo to Gorazde, wl1ich, as Clark's PowerSeene tour of the mountainous terrain
revealed; was almost completely unviable. Two hours and a bottle" of Scotch (of which
Milosevic had four gJasses) they reached an agreement on a wider comdor thai
would vary with the mountainous terrain. After checking with the Pentago14 . Clark
promised that NATO would upgrade the dirt road in the corridor. Bec"use of the
circumstances surrounding this event, many began to call this agreement, suitably, as"the
"Scotch or the "Clark Corridor." Although Holbrooke deliberately downplayed
this as a "minor concessiori," it did represent the first substantive breakthrough on :a key
issue in days. The U.S. team hoped that it might be the first crack in the dam blocking a
final settlemenl
'9
"
As the negotiations entered their. third week, the key question was rather simple:
Whether these leaders would summon the courage and will to make the final decisions
necessary to reach an agreement.
ao
Each day brought more evidence that of all the
parties, the were furthest from a decision. In many ways, the problems the
Holbrooke team. had "run across during the two months of shuttle diplomacy were
replayed more intensely in Dayton. Tudjman, who had already gotten his primary
objective in Dayton -- Eastern Slavonia "-- astutely played along, helping the" Bosnians
when it was in his interest" but remaining aloof. His lack" of interest in the
details of other issues was evident in the amount of time he spent away from Dayton -
ten of cIays. Milosevic. on the other . hand, had intense interest in success at
Dayton. Desperate for sanctions. relief and acceptance from the West, he had proven
willing to make" concessions. His idiomatic (and frequently" vulgar) command of the
English language and desire to please the U.S. made him. in many ways, the easiest of
:interloeutors. The Bosnians, with their internal strife and uncertain goals, seemed
dangerously close to torpedoing the peace, however flawed it may be, that Milosevic" and
Tudjman were ready to give them.
"The Bosnians still wish us to believe that they are getting a "lousy
Holbrooke Wrote Christopher that night. "But they know it is not only a good deal "but
the best they will ever get." While Holbrooke believed that it would seem logical that the
Bosnians take this best chance for settlement, their diverse personalities and competing
visions of a just peace made success a very call. To Holbrooke. lzetbegovic was .
more of a leader th,an a practical "govemi"ng" leader. ulzzy spent rune years
of his life in jail," Holbrooke wrote to the Secretary, "he has no understanding or
interest in, economic development or modernization - the things that peace can bring." .
Izetbegovic struck Holbrookeas concerned not about the Bosnian people, but about an
79 For details of this meeting, see Kerrick repon to Lake: "Dayton SITREP #12. November 17,1995,
II: lOam," and Holbrooke to Christopher, November 17, 1995. This meeting also received considerable
attention in the BBC television documentary, "Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation;' Episode 6; War Report,
&39; and New York Times. November 23. 1995. . "
See memorandum to Secretary Perry from James Pardew and Mark Sawoski. "Dayton Talks-
Beginning the Third November 16, 1995.
232
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIfIED
abstract idea: "He shows remarkably little concern for the suffering his people have
endured; after all, he has suffered greatly for his ideals. To him, Bosnia is an abstraction,
not several million people who overwhelmingly want peace." SiJajdzic, on the other
band, seemed to be more realistic about governing, and had concentrated on establishing
viable political structures and engaging such issues as economic reconStruction. Yet,
SiIajdzic's mood swings undermined .his ability to take the iead. nIt-Haris did oot have
such an unpredictable personality, he wouldhave played .the hero here; we still have
hopes that he will do so." Finally, Sacirbey, who had assumed such an important role
when America's shuttle. diplomacy was' launched in August, had beCome
isolated as Dayton went on,. creeping further behind Izetbegovic's shadow. Holbrooke
saw Sacirbey as driven by tW9 contradictory' motives: "he wants to be . liked by the
AmeriCans, but his primary goal seems to be to undennine Haris at all times."" In all,
Holbrooke thought that Christopher's return to Dayton might force the Bosnians to unify,
as least momentarily, to finish a deal.
81
'.' .'
Day Seventeen: Friday, November 17. .
..
Defense Secretary Peny and Under Secretary Walt SIocoinbe arrived at Wright-
Patterson shortly before lOam that morning. Generals loulwan and Nash arrived at noon.
Holbrooke planned this. display of U.S. military leadership to impress the other parties -
Balkan and European alike -.-"that we were serious" about using U.S. troops. to lead
military implementation. Moreover, like Tony Lake, Perry and.loulwan could continue
to ratchet up the pressure on the three Balkan. leaders to close a deal. 82 "Lack of a
Settlement woulq be a problem for the U.S .. It would be a catastrophe for your country,n
Perry's talking points for Izetbegovic and Milosevic read.
83
.
Perry's meeting that day was with lzetbegovic. The Bosnian leader was
prickly> probing the-:Secretary of Defense 90 U.S. military commi1ments toward Bosnia.
Perry confinned thatthe U.s. would honor its promise to help the Bosnians restore their
anny through an program, as long as the parties agreed to a suitable arms
contiol agreement. " "1 told them that I believed, and that our government that
the imbalance offorces back in 1992 had been a contributing.factor to the war starting in
the first place," Perry recaJ.Jed. "Therefore, when NATO forces left in a year, we.did not
want to leave an imbalance ... we would work with them to get a balance of forces.',ss .
In a Izetbegovic told Perry that he could not'be a partyto
an agreement by the Bosnian Serbs; like the Nazis, he said, the agreement should
be imposed on them. In response, Perry bluntly said that unlike Allied Forces during
II See Holbrooke to Christopher, Novemba" 17, 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December
20,1996.
12 Holbrooke interview, November 18.1996. In a memorandum to SJocombc, Pardew recommended that
- Peny stress four main points to Holbrooke during meetings that day. First. to assure that the parties agree
.to map boundaries precisely defined on'a J :50,000 scale map signed by all parties; second, that Milosevic
should sign the militaJ)' annex as a participant. not witness; third, that Miloscvic and the Bosnian Serbs
offer explicit assurances that the BSA will not threaten .FOR troops; and fourth. to force Milosevic to
prove that he can actually force the Pale Serbs to implement an agreement. See Pardew memorandum to
Slocombe, "SECDEF Visit to Dayton," November 16,1995.
U "Talking Points for SECDEF at Dayton," Pardew Dayton notebook. For a similar sentiment on this visit,
see Kerrick report to Lake, "DaYton SITREP # 13, November 17. 1995, 7pm."
14 Sec Jbid., and Cohen, New York Times, November 19, 1995.
IS Perry in!etview with BBC, January 18, 1996, transcript.
233
UNCLASSIFIED
::
uNcLAsIPiED
-.
2
World War n, the Bosnians had not defeateQ theBSA militarily.86 Bosnian "occupation"
was no option - the Sarajevo and Pale leaders would have to learn to eohabitate. Both
Joulwan and Nash reemphasized this last point in a brief meeting with the Bosnian Serbs,
who were visibly nervous in their presence.
87
. .....
While Holbrooke and his core team were involved with these high-level
work continued on the By the evening of the 11th, five of the eleven annexes-
those covering Human Rights, Refugees,. National Monuments, Civilian
and Police - were" completed. The General Framework. Agreement, plus annexes
concerning Arbitration and Public Services, were near completion. Most of the work on
the military annex was finished; the big remaining issue was whether anns control
provisions should be covered in a separate annex, as the Europeans wanted. That
the U.S. agreed to do this. and the military annex beCame two, Annex IA and lB.ss. : .
The three most contentious issues remaining were the constitution, elections and,.
of course, the map. Drafting on the constitution Was almost complete, although some at
Dayton wondered whether it would ever be worth more than the paper it Was on. Roberts
Owen, the chief constitutionalnegotiator, felt that the document ha4 yielded more than he
initially expected. although not enough to guarantee an effective central government.
While it looked good in principle, mc;>st U.S. negotiators realized that. like the Geneva
and New York agreements, the constitution masked fundamental disagreements between
the Bosnian Serb and Sarajevo leaders on the desirability. and role of a centlal
government. Quite simply, the Bosnian Serbs had not yet accepted that Bosnia would be
a unified state controlled by the center. "The Serbs would prefer to give maximum
powers to Republika Srpska but know that this is out of the question," Pardew reported to
Perry. _ "So they have sought to sabotage. the central governnle!lt ... [keeping its] the
powers limited." Q.n-the positive side, while the constitution alone could not guarantee a
viable. multiethnic and democratic Bosnia, it would "provide the Bosnians the
opportunity to build such a state." But "for this opportunity to be realized," Par dew
observed. "the current leadership in Pale will have to change; this. either through election
or indictment.'.B9
. - .
.
On the elections annex, the Bosnians and Serbs were at loggerheads over two
issues: voting rights for refugees or displaced persons and the responsibilities of the
OSeE in overseeing the elections. Holbrooke considered the first issue a potential deal-
breaker. Milosevic was taking .the hard-line .position that voters must be physically
present to register to vote. The Bosnians, in contrast, wanted voters registered (and have
their votes applied) to where they Jived in 1991, the last time a census was taken in
yugoslavia. The U.S. had tabled a compromise solution, recommending that voters
themselves be able to detennine where their votes would be applied. If both sides
remained inflexible, a fail-safe option would be to defer the issue for decision by the
OSeE. On the latter point, though, the Serbs were reluctant to allow the OSCE full
oversight for the elections - handling the ballot boxes. u.s. negotiators felt
a& See handwritten notes (no author) from Secretary briefing at the Hope Hotel. November
17, 1995. EUR files.
17 Pardew interview, JUDe 17, 1996.
.
II Update from "Status Report" prepared for Secretary Christopher's arrival, November 17, 1995; and "List
of Peace Settlement Documents," U.S. Delegation, Miriam Sapiro files, November 11, 1995; ) 1:30pm. .
. - For separation of anns control component of Annex I, see Kornblum interview; and NeVille-Jones, pSI.
U
. .
Sec Pardcw report to Perry. November 16, 1995.
234

UNCLASSIFIED
they needed to be finn in order to assure that the elections were free and fair and to keep
election protection with the OSCE, not IFOR, but agreed to additional language about
relying on "local authorities" as much as possible. In any event, both election issues were
considered important enough that Holbrooke wanted to use Christopher's visit to close
--
The issue of the OSCE's role in the Bosnian elections had provoked two long-
running debates -:- one with the Europeans, especially the French; the other with
Milosevic. In both cases the U.S. wanted a strong hand for the oseE in conducting-the
elections, as the EU and Belgrade sought to minimize the role of outsiders. In addition,
Holbrooke had some of his _ own disagreements with other U.S. offi.cials on this point.
For example, UN Ambassador Albright argued for the UN to conduct the elections, as
they had in Cambodia, but Holbrooke and Kornblum -. a fonner Ambassador- to the
OSCE - held out for th'e OSeE, believing that it would be a way to strengthen the
organization.
91
- ..
Both the EuropeanS and MiIosevic argued vehemently with Holbrooke on the
exact nature of the OSeE's role in the elections. -Each sought to their role to that of
"Qbservers and monitors." Holbrooke, who had examined the UN's more active role in
Cambodia, believed that such a passive role for the OSCE would doom the elections -
perhaps the most critical political benchmark of any settlement. Holbrooke stood finn for
words that gave the OSeE responsibility for "supervising" the elections. Since the word
"supervise" could be interpreted in different ways, Holbrooke argued that no matter
which other civilian implementation jobs were headed by Europeans, the OSeE
representative overseeing elections had to be an American.
92
-
-- On territorial issues. the Bosnians had yet to approve MiloScvic's concession on
the "Scotch Road," although Silajdzic seemed, to like it. In exchange, Milosevic began to
press for a wider corridor south of the town ofBrcko. ,Discussions on Sarajevo bad been
at a standstill since Christopher left on the 14th; however, it seemed that the Bosnians
might accept Milosevic's variant of the "Washington, DC" plan, in which there would be
a weak central government empowered only to regulate city-wide services. Essentially,
this plan would cause ethnic zoning of Sarajevo, as citizens of each local Obstina 'Would
90 EXplanation of elections issues from "Status Report," November 17, 1995; Pardew to Pc:ny.
16. memorandum to Holbrooke from JackZclkuJic, "Elections: Endgame Tactics," November
1995; and Zetkulic interview. On war criminals running for office (that _day. the International War Crimes
Tribunal formally indicted Karadzic and Mladic for genocide). Zetkutic advised that as longes language
prohibiting such was contained in the constitution. there was no need to repeat it in the elections annex. On
a related point, Sacirbey wrote a letter to the U.S. and Contact Group that day fonnally requesting that any
agreement, but particularly one that "relates to any potential easing of sanctions," include a commitment
from the parties to cooperate with the Tribunal and its orders. See Sacirbcy letter to u.s. and Contact .
Group, November 17.1995; EUR files.
9) Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20. 1996.
92 Ibid. The issue of OSeE representative waS not resolved until December 13. when Holbrooke met
privately- in Paris with French Foreign Minister de Charette and warned him that when President Clinton
arrived the next morning he would take the issue up with President Chirac. As they waited for the
Presidents the next day. de Charette told Holbrooke that they would accept an American diplomat, Robert
Frowick, as the senior OSeE representative in Bosnia. For an update on OSCE planning for peace
implementation, see "OSCE: Role in Bosnia Taking Shape," Cable. State 268884. November 17,
1995. For a European view. see Neville-Jones. pS2
....
235
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...
be able to decide whether they wanted to be governed under the laws of the Federation or
Srpska.
93
The U.S. delegation hoped that all of these issues would be closed by the end of
the weekend, so that they could get home in time for Thanksgiving. "Saturday,"
Holbrooke wrote to Christopher, "will shape up as the decisive day of Then, for
.. the first time, the Assistant Secretary suggested that the U.S. consider setting a finn
deadline to end the talks, to "make them realize we meanit is our only chance for
success." After two days of warnings by high-revel V.S. officials, Holbrooke saw that
"both sides are fully primed for this [deadline] approach; indeed, they h:alf dread it."
Holbrooke recognized this as "a high-risk strategy," but he now thought it was probably
going to be essential. The Secretary of State returned to Wright-Patterson from his
72-hour trip to Osaka around 5:00 that afternoon, shortly Perry and
Joulwan left Following quick "rin back" meetings with Izetbegovic and MiloseVic,
. Christopher joined. the rest of the senior delegates at the Officer's Club for the second
lobster dinner hosted by Milosevic and Chris Spirou. In many ways, this dinner provided ..
94 .
a slight respite before the final drama.
.
Day Eig/lteen: Saturday, November 18
Starting at 8:00am that morning, Christopher and the. rest of the U.S. delegation
. began what they promised to be the final weekend of negotiations -- succeed or fail. As
he had during his three previous.visits to Dayton, the of State spent the full day
shuttling among the parties, devoting most of his time on the elections
constitution, and the map. As a negotiating ploy, Holbrooke and Christopher decided to
tell the parties that the talks would end at midnight Sunday.95 Holbrooke had always .
the U.S. might to consider forcing the parties into a "payor play, dropdead time'" to
close the talks. "These people had fought one another for a long time," Holbrooke
recalled, "and were ready to sit in Dayton for a long time ahdjust argue." In addition to
the parties evident intransigence, Holbrooke was influenced by his experiences in the
corporate world, where such deadline-oriented negotiations are more commonplace than
in diplomacy. That night, the U.S. delegation began to organize for completing the
document production and conducting a signing ceremony.96 If the talks were successful,
9l See "Status Report." November 17. 1995.
.
See Holbrookc to Christopher, November 17, 1995; Kerrick SITREP #13; anI! Holbrooke interview with
author (notes), December 20, 1996.
95 Holbrooke interview with author (notes). November 26, 1996. For press reports, see Michael Dobbs,
"Negotiators May Be Near Bosnia Deal; U.S. Sets Deadline As Dayton Talks Reach a "Defining
Moment,'" Washington Post, November 20, 1995; and Elaine Sciolino. "U.S. Tells Leaders of Balkan
States to Wind Up Talks," New.Yorlr. Times, Novembcr20, 1995.
96 Most of the work was doncby the inter-delegation "Document Preparation Group," chaired by John
Kornblum but conducted pnmariIy by !riiriam Sapiro. This group met several times that day to go over all
annexes and discuss otitstanding items for decision. See "Summary of Plenary Meeting of Document
Preparation Group: re: Outstanding ltems."Novcmber 18,1995 4:00pm; and Ibid; November 18,1995;
11 :OOpm; and "Documents for Concluding Ceremony of Proximity Peace Talks." no date, Sapiro files.
Also that day, Secretary Christopher called French Foreign Minister de Charette to discuss the
arrangements for initialing an agreement. The French had suggested that iran agreement was achieved at
Dayton, there be a series of conferences to sign an agreement held in different Contact Group capitals.
Asserting that although an final deal should be far from assumed. Christopher stressed that he would not
want to take the risk of leaving Dayton without an initialing. De Charette then added two points: I) that a
meeting '"of experts" be held in Paris to discuss any issues left unresolved at Dayton. and 2) in order to
236
..
UNCLASSIFIED
/
.. UNCLASSIFIED
3
&
one draft plan for a ceremony had President Clinton traveling to, Dayton to oversee the
signing.
97
.
While stiU whittling away on territorial issues, Christopher. Holbrooke and Owen
. worked to close the door on the constitution. Late Friday the Bosnian delegation
again threatened not to sign the constitution on undiSclosed "political -
presumably. because the Bosnians Serbs would sign as well. Additionally, the Bosnians
,proposed that the chair of the tlrree-person joint presidency be the member who receives
the most votes in country-wide elections. Because the largest vote-getter would likely
always be a Muslim, the Croats and Serbs wanted to have a regular rotation. The
compromise struck was that the first chair would be the highest vote-getter (presumably
Izetbegovic); after two years, the method of selecting a chair "by rotation or otherwise,"
would be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly.98 .
Not much had changed in the elections annex. In led by U.S.
Delegation' member Jack Zetkulic, the three parties had come back with "minor and
teclmical" changes to the draft text. The Bosnians insisted that the OSCE run the local
eJections (regardless what the OSeE wanted to do). In a message
expJaineq. that the Bosnians had to be told not to ,let the "perfect be the enemy of the
good. Bang' may" not happen at all if the OSeE is .compeUed to run local elections.
Let's leave this up to the OSCE.,,99 On the rights of refugees to vote, what Holbr06ke
considered the "most difficult aspect of the election issue," both sides remained fixed.
Judging that the issue could be solved only at the highest levels, Zetkulic turned the
remaining negotiations over the Christopher and Holbrooke.
1oo
The Bosnian Serbs also resurfaced,. trying to assert themselves on elections issues.
" IIi one of two letters that day' to Roberts Owen, Bosnian Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik
,complained that he ,had not been allowed to discuss with Holbrooke his position on the
topic. To no one's surprise, Krajisnik was opposed to the most fundamental aspects of
the annex. Although the Bosnian Serbs' intransigence was their
obvious neglect was concerning. Milosevic's method' of "handling" his Bosnian Serb
delegation was merely to ignore them. To the U.S. team, letter was "more
proof of how the Bosnian Serbs are cut out of the process" - and further
evidence that they could be a sigirlficant "problem when it comes to initialing.'" I
For now. the U.S. team's main concern was getting the. Sarajevo government to
In an attempt to allay some of the Bosnians' ,concerns, Holbrooke asked
Menzies to put together a sales pitch 10 present to lzetbegovic and Silajdzic. In it, the
U.S. listed eight ways in which the would benefit under what had already been
provide some "content" to the Paris signing. hosting a meeting of the Contact Group and Organization of
Islamic Commenting that these proposals were worth discussing, Christopher explained that he and
the u.s. team was "crashing" to finish Dayton and they would have to take the issue up later. See "The
, Secretary and Foreign Minister de Charette. November] 8, 1995" Cable, State 269204, November 19,
1995.
97 See "Closing Scenario for Proximity Talks," November 18, 1995 draft, 7:00pm. .
9a "Constitutional Issues for lzetbegovic," November 18; 1'995; R. Pauli files.
99 Memorandum to Holbrooke ftom Zetkulic, "Elections Update - Saturday, November 17. 6:00pm'"
100 Ibid; and Zetkulic interview; Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20. 1996.
JOJ The second Krajisnik letter that day concerned IFOR. in which he ridiculously insisted that NATO
troops in IFOR not be deployed on Bosnian Serb territory. For letters. see Pardew Dayton notebook; for
details, see Zetku/ic hand-written note to Holbrookc. November 18,1995; Zetkulic to Holbrooke.
"Elections Update"; and Zctkulic interview.
7
237
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agreed to at Dayton: .1) a single national.govemmentwith democratic constitution and
central institutions; 2) an economic reconstruction package; 3) a NATO-led
implementation force under an American command; 4) a greatly strengthened Federation;
5) a territorial gain from 50% !,f Bosnia to over 55% during I?ayton. 6) an extensive
civilian structure, 7) additional human rights protections, and 8) a commitment by
Belgrade to nonnalize relations, including additional confidence building measures. That
afternoon, the U.S. delegation presented this package to the Bosnians with tWo large
charts. which they left behind with Izetbegovic. .
In addition to this effort, Christopher and Holbrooke. enlisted several key
international allies to weigh in with the Bosnians. That. night, -British Prime Minister
John Major'called Izetbegovic. The British Prime. Minister emphasized that "now was .
the time to an agreement. If this mOl;l1ent was lost, the opportunity might not
easily comeagain.
u
The Bosnian leader resppnded that although Milosevic had given
them a wider Jand corridor to Gorazde, they needed more land to make up for the.lost
enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. His delegation could not go back and tell their people
that they had given these up for nothing. Major did not specific negotiating,
but rather reassured Izetbegovic that Great Britain would provide' public support as well
as a significant number of troops to IFOR.
102
.
Holbrooke also asked that the French and Turkish governments also lobby the
Bosnians to sign. As a key Muslim country and NATO ally. Turkey's suppOrt for the
Bosnians would be essential for any agreement. The Turks and the Bosnians had already
begun to coordinate economically and militarily, and Turkey would a critical role in
an equip-and-train program. Halbrooke hoped that a phone can from President pemeriel
would convinCe Izetbegovic riot to leave Dayton empty_handed.
l03
.
That" night. _.Milosevic delivered a critical and totally unexpected concession.
After dinner, the Serb leader paid Holbrooke an uharmounced visit in the VOQ.
Without prompting, Milosevic began to discuss Sarajevo, explaining his to keep it
unified. Holbrooke welcOmed the discussion, but was surprised. He thought that
Milosevic's previous idea to create maximum local control'of the city would be. the
compromise solution. The Bosnian delegation seemed to like i4 as long as each local
Obstina (whether Federation or Srpska) was allotted equal Now, though,
Milosevic wanted to talk about unifying the city and he was prepared to give total
control to the Muslim government. I D4 '. .
The Bosnians wouldgei Sarajevo. Hearing words that he thought would never be
uttered from mouth, Holbrooke pressed for details. To Milosevic, it was
quite simple: in exchange for some minor territorial concessions in northwest Bosnia, the
102 "Bosnia: Prime Minister's Conversation with President lzetbegovic," UK memorandum written by
Roderic Lyne. Resident Clerk, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 10 Downing Street. London;
November 18, 1995.
10] Oeffieriel did callizetbegovic that weekend. See fax to Ambassador Marc Grossman, U.S. Embassy
Ankara. from Jack Zetkulic. NovembCr 1995. For Turkey's support for Bosnia, see, for example, .
"Ankara to PIa Active Role' to Establish Order in B-H ,. Cable FBIS Tel Aviv.18573 November I 1
t
'ror::;--;-;--;;----.--: ....... Holbroo e interview Wit aut r, ovem r ,
See Holbrooke, HI , ardew, Owen comments, Dayton History Seminar; Menzies interview; Holbrookc
interview with author, November 26, 1996. This meeting has also been wellreported in the press. See, for
example. War Report, pp37-38; New Times, November 23. 1995; and BBC television program,
"Yugoslavia: Death ofa Nation:' Episode 6. .
233
....
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...
Federation would get total control over Sarajevo. No "Washington, DC" plan no
ethnically divided city. Holbrooke "could not believe what was happening." With one
dramatic decision. Milosevic simply caved hi on one ofthe most divisive issues of these
negotiations. By doing so, he also completely undercut his Bosnian Serb colleagues. In
retrospect, Holbrooke believed that .IDove had more to do with internal
dynamics of post-Dayton Serbian leadership than a genuine desire to reach agreement
with the Bosnians. This was "a strategic decision to break the base of the Pale
Holbrooke reflected later. In this way move aimed to weaken the CUITent
Srpska leaders (namely, Karadzic and Krajisnik --who had pledged to make Sarajevo
their own) thus, importantly, preserve Belgrade's power over Serbs in Bosnia.. At that
time, Holbrooke could not see how Milosevic would convince the Bosnian Serbs to
accept this asymmetrical "deal" without having a mutiny on his Clearly aware of
this, Milosevic asked Holbrooke not to tell them anything about this conversation - he
would have to break the news to them himself.los
However welcome it was. Milosevic's dramatic concession on Sarajevo did not
resolve the issue. In addition to the territorial concessions he wanted from the Federation
in northwest Bosnia, he had carefully omitted from his version of Sarajevo the
area of Grbavica, more properly known as "sniper's alley," that gave the Serbs a clear
line of fire into downtown Sarajevo. Milosevic had also withheld key parts of the hills
that surrounded the city, including aVolkswagen factory and a critical hillside southeast
ofthe city!06 . .
.
When Holbroo.tce presented Milosevic's new proposal to Izetbegovic. the Bosnian.
President. reacted favorably Qut hardened his position at the same time. Sensing that
Milosevic was now making his greatest concession, Izetbegovic pressed for.more. Not
he rejected. Milosevic's offer unless it included Sniper's Alley, the VW
plant, and the southeastern hills. Milosevic reacted angrily when .Ho!brooke retumed
with the news, but kept his promise to cede Sarajevo proper and continue to negotiate on
trading these other areas. to?
'. .
Crescendo - Days NiJ)eteen and Twenty: Sunday and Monday, 19-20' .
With the deadline set' for midnight, Sunday promised to be a day of furious
negotiating. To add to the atmosphere of impending closure. Christopher and Holbrooke
asked the U.S. delegation to pack their bags, requesting that the other delegations do the
same. They also told everyone that the phones be discOnnected the next day. and
began to colIect bills. As the suitcases lined up outSide the VOQ. it became
clear that the other delegations saw riffiht through the bluff. Deadline or not, they didn't
take the U.S. threat to leave seriously.' g
'.
It was by now obvious that in terms of success at Dayton, it really didn't matter
what the parties agreed to on the various political or legal issues, no matter how
important they would be for the future of Bosnia. The negotiations hinged on territory.
These people fought for three years about land - if they could not reach consensus on
!OS Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar .
106 Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20. 1996.
107 Ibid.
. .
lOS Holbrooke. Pauli-Gikas comments, Dayton History Seminar. Indeed, the bluff had made in such
haste that the bags on the second floor of the U.S. VOQ were not collected - causing some in the U.S.
delegation to become concerned that they would be left behind.
--.
23?
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
...
a map. then there would be no peace. Given this 'fact, while talks continued at the
working levels to finalize annex language and organize for a ceremony, Christopher and
Holbrooke zeroed in almost exclusively on the map. But for every step forward, they
seemed to take two back. That weekend, Milosevic's two significant territorial
concessions - on the Gorazde corridor and Sarajevo -- came back to haunt them. This
was not the outcome of any ill intent on the part of any of the parties. Rather, it was the
result of plain bad luck.
For the U.S. presentation outlining 'the reasons why the Bosnians should sign an
agreement, the Wright-Patterson graphics staff had produced large posterboards detailing'
. the After the presentation, Holbrooke and Menzies left posters with the
Bosnians, who innocently- placed them near the couch in Izetbegovic's suite. On
Saturday night, Milosevic entered IzetbegoviC?' s suite for a meeting. From behind the
couch, onlytbe' top edge of one poster could be seen - 'what the Serb President Saw, in
large-bold letters, was: "Federation Territory has been increased from 50% to 55% during
- -
Dayton Talks." Milosevic stopped dead in his tracks. His concessions over the last few'
days had meant that Slpska .would get less territory than allotted by the 51-49 Contact
. Group plan, and his Sarajevo concession made the percentages even worse. Furious, the
Serb President went right to Holbrooke's suite, complaining that the Americans had
tricked him (for the past day. the U.S. delegation, knowing they had gotten the Bosnians
55% of the territory, had deliberately wi1hheld the percentage from Milosevic). Anything _
other than 51-49 was totally unacCeptable. he said. He could compromise a great "eal,
but uhe would not be .able to survive or impose a deal" which was not based on the 5i49 .
Contact Group map.. Once again, since Christopher had personally signed the' 51-49
atyangement at Geneva in 1994; he and Holbrooke felt they had no choice but to yield.
As Holbrooke later_recalled, the somewhat arbitrary division of the Contact Oroup map
had become "theological" to Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs. In order
. Milosevic from reneging on his key territorial concessions, Cbristwher and Holbrooke
worked with Wes Clark and others to shave the map back to 5149. J
As if to even the score, Milosevic again asked for a wider land corridor in
northeast Bosnia, near Brcko, the thinnest part ofSrpska territory (at the time of the talks,
the corridor was only Skm Wide).- Under the origfnal 1994 Contact Group map, the Broko
corridor, also referred to as the "Posavina corridor," would narrow to about thirty meters,
consisting entirely of an underpass below a railroad bridge. It was clear that the Serbs .
would never accept this incredibly thin "land corridor,". but Izetbegovic held :finit in
insisting on it, reminding Christopher each time they met that the Secretary had agreed to
this personally in 1994. From Milosevic's point of view, a wider corridor would reduce
the vulnerability of dividing Srpska in two (and isolating the Banja Luka region within
the Muslim-Croat Federation). Holbrooke concluded that, given the immense amount of
bloodshed over the corridor, maintaining the status quo - a 5km corridor - would likely
be the solution. In discussions with Milosevic that day, Silajdzic agreed to be flexible on
the corridor, and, apparently with the approval of lzetbegovic, conceded to the
109 For details, see Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrookc interview with author (note.!)
November26, ]996; Menzies interview; Silber and Little, p374; and SSC television program,
"Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation:' Episode 6
240
...
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Serbs the town of Brcko. As it turned out, Izetbegovic had not really signed on to
Silajdzic's concession -- but the deal was done. no
Beginning at 8:30am Sunday morning, "the map talks went almost continuously
throughout the day and into the night. Christopher and Holbrooke tried aU "sorts of
negotiating combinations, whether meeting separately" with Izetbegovic or Milosevic,
bringing the two of them together, or including SiIajdzi& and Sacirbey.111 Tudjrnan
returned to Dayton" shortly before lOpm that night, and Christopher and Holbrooke met
with him for" an hour. Finally. at around 11:30pm Sunday night, Holbrooke had
Milosevic and Silajdzic come to the U.S. conference room. While Holbrooke,
Christopher, Wes Clark and others waited down the hall in Holbrooke's suite, Milosevic
and set out to finish" the "map. Chris Hill, who was fluent in
moderated the meeting.
1I2
"
," '
" Milosevic and Silajdzic began horse-trading, seeking to gain slivers of land"
oftentimes more valUable symbolically than strategically. Milosevic asked to have
Mladic's hometown back; and Silajzdic searched to acquire as many historically Muslim
areas as possible. At one point, when ,Silajdzicasked for a town witlt an old Mosque,
Milosevic said it was no use: "Oh Hans:' Milosevic "didn't y'ou hear those [Bosnian
Serb 1 idiots blew it up.nIl.} Silajzdic held finn against giving up any more territory in the
and conceded "to give up sniper's alley and some of the key hills
around Sarajevo. They decided on the final shape of the Gorazde Pocket, and
concluded the lines for the "Scotch Finally, the discussion turned to Milosevic's
desire to assure that Serb territory reached 49%. As Hill recalled, it was clear that-if
Silajdzic couldn't deliver on this, it would be hard for the Serbs to concede.
1I4
"According to Christopher's schedules, these talks broke off shortly after 2am
Monday morning so- tlUlt Silajdzic could get some maps. While they waited to resume,
Holbrooke asked to see the draft "failure" statement. Over the laSt few days, Christopher
"speechwriter Tom Malinowski worked with John Burley of the Bureau to draft
two statements - one praising success, another regretting failure -- that Christopher could
read at the conclusion of the talks. Malinowski, who kept both draft with him,
had become a sort of Dayton weather-vane; many gauged the prospects for an agreement
by whether Secretary Christopher or Holbrooke wanted to see the u success" or "failure"
statement. At this late hour, things looked bad. Holbrooke asked to look at the failure
statement, and after giving it a: quick read, he threw it up in the air. As the pages
liD On the Sava river. Brcko was supposed to have been tbe Muslim's foothold in Posavina. As such, it
had been considered a deal-breaker for the Bosniacs. However, apparently realizing that Milosevic could
not concede any more and needed something in exchange for Gorazde and Sarajevo, Silajdzic was given
clearance to deal on Posavina and Brcko_ Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20. 1996;
Hill interview with author December 19. 1996. See also Silber and Little. p31S; and WI1J'Report,

11 Late the night of November 17. Sacirbey nonchalantly announced that he would resign his pOst as
foreign minister in order to make way for an ethnic Croat: He did so while drinking with journalists in an
hotel bar -- a blatant violation of the conference's media restrictions. See Michael Dobbs. "BoSnia
Foreign Minister Resigns; Ethnic Rivalries Emerge as Final Push Begins at Peace Talks," Washing/on Post,
November 19. 1995.
112 Chris Hill phone interview with author (notes), December 5. 1996.
113 See Hill comment, Dayton History Seminar; and War Report, p38.
114 Chris Hill phone interview with author.
UNCLASSIFIED
241
..
"I
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a
to the ground, he said the statement was not "final" enough: the parties needed to be told that the U.S. was out of the game.
.
Standing over a computer in the U.S. workroom, a agitated Holbrooke
dictated the ianguage to Malinowski while other U.S. delegation members looked on, some in astonishment. His redraft reflected the frustration of the moment.' "1' () put it simply," the statement concluded, "we gave it our shot. By their failure to agree, the parties have made it very clear that further U.S. efforts to negotiate a settlement would be fruitless. Accordingly, today marks' the end of this initiative: . the special role we have played in the recent' months' is over. The leaders here today must live with the
consequences of their failure:'JIS '.
. -
. .
.
.
But that night's roUer-coaster ride was not over yet. The momentum suddenly shifted. After the 45-minute break, Milosevicand Silajdzic got back together in the American VOQ with maps and an interpreter. This time, the two joined Christopher, Holbrooke, Hili and Clark in the conference room, while other staffers waited in the .0 corridor. Silajdzic had an idea how to get the Serbs up to 49%. The Federation would
give Srpska a'wide swath of territory in'a mountainous, relatively unpopulated area in western Bosnia. Since the area had few towns (which both sides were loath to give away), the exchange seemed acceptable to bOth. Suddenly, slightly before 4am. Milosevic and Silajdzic shook hands, turned to .the Americans, and said they had a deal.
Christopher had a bottle of his favorite California Chardonnay opened to celebrate the
breakthrough.
.
.

Silajdzic went off to get lzetbegovic.Minutes later, the Bosnian President
appeared; clearly annoyed and sleepy, wearirig. an overcoat over his pyjamas. Meanwhile, Christopher, Holbrooke, Clark and Hill studied Milosevic and SiIajdzic's map. . Upon inspection,' Christopher and Holbrooke were troubled by their
agreement. "It didn't look quite right," they felt, and 'even as they dran!cChristopher's wine, they sent Chris Hill into the night to get Tudjman or Granic. Since Silajdzic had
conceded Federation territory, Croatian approval would be needed. I 16
. Hill returned to.the American VOQ with Foreign-Minister Granic, who explained
that Tudjman was Sleeping. Granic refused a drink, asking only to see the map. As soon as it was explained to him, the celebration bubble burst "Impossible, impossible,"
Granic yelled, slamming his hand against the map. "Zero point zero. zero chance that my President will accept this." He left abruptly, got DefeIise Minister Susak, and returned. to
continue his tirade.
Somewhat deviously, Silajdzic had given away predominantly Croat-held territory. land conquered by Croat forces during that fall's western Bosnia offensive. Christopher, Holbrooke and Hill had been worried about how the Croats would react, but did not expect such a venomous outburst from the nonnally mild-mannered Dr. Granic.' The foreign minister was beside himself that Silajdzic had the audacity to trade terntory that the Croats had won back. "You have given away the territory we conquered," Granic
screamed at Silajdzic.
.
, Despite Granic's emotional rejection, Holbrooke still hoped that a compromise could be salvaged. He thought' that as long as they altered the territol}' to even the
lIS For details ofthis episode. see Tom Malinowski interview, October 30, J995; and draft failure
statement. no dale (John Burley EUR/SeE files; Malinowski PAIS files; COS files). 116 Holbrooke interview with author(notes). December 20, 1996; Christopher jnterview. October 22. 1996
242
...,
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" .
balance of sacrifice between Croats and Muslims, "shaving a little but here and a little bit
there," they could finish a map by ,sunrise. 'While the fuming Granic paced
Holbrooke turned to Izetbegovic to ask what he thought lzetbegovic told the group that
he concurred with Granic. "I cannot accept this agreement," he said quietly. "l stand
_ with our Croatian allies." At this point, Silajdiic exploded.' He had once again been
undercut by his President. this time in front of the Americans, Croats, and Milosevic.
can't take this anymore," be screamed, throwing his papers down on the
Glowering at Izetbegovic, Silajdzic stormed out of the room' and . into the night. The
"agreement" had liyed a life of37 minutes.
1I1
.
What little optimism that had existed at 4am. was completely shattered; These
early morning hours seemed to encapsulate all the anger and passion of the Balkans.
Chiistopher, still remarkably composed and impeccably dressed at such a late hour went
back to his suite,' showered, changed Clothes, arid 'prepared to return to the drawing
board}IS '. .
When clearer heads (following some sleep) prevailed, U.S. negotiators saw that
their initial hunch was right: Silajdzic's "concession" had been a bit too devious. And as
long as the Croats were angry, there was no way the "37 minute-map"couJd be the
solution. As Holbrooke reflected, Izetbegovic "couldn't endorse it. because he knew it
was a non-starter as far as the Croats were concemed.,,119 lzetbegovic had supported
Silajdzic against the Croats, the Federation would've been doomed. "If he had said
anything else," Menzies recalled later. "the Federation would've collapsed at Dayton,
right then, right there. If [Izetbegovic] had si4ed with Milosevic against Granic ,and
Susak, people upon wh()m, the Bosnians had to rely on for their existence, the peace
process would've been over.,,120 The challerige, then, would he to get the Croats to agree
to the territoriar
. Shortly aftei'"daybreak Monday morning, and Holbrooke resumed
talks, first with lzetbegovic, then with Milosevic. Since the midnight deadline-had long
passed, they decided that the parties would be given one more day. If things were not
solved by Tuesday morning, the talks would end.
Christopher and Holbrooke decided that after the "37-minute map" debacle,
President Clinton needed to get involved. That morning, they called the President and
"told him that this was a time when we thought his intervention would be very
important" They recommended that the President call both Izetbegovic and Tudjrnan,
wanting him to press the two to accept the' territorial proposal agreed to by Silajzdic and
Milosevic only hours before. Christopher believed that Tudjman's "desire to make
Croatia part of the community-of Western Europe wOuld make a call from President
very effective.,,121 Pressure also needed to be, brought on Izetbegovic.
117 For details, see Holbrooke, Hilt comments, Dayton History Seminar; Christopher interview, October 22,
1996; Hill interview, December 5,1996; BBC television program; War Report, p39; Silber and
p376; and New York Times, November 23, 1995. Details ofthis event were a)so leaked to the press the
next day. See RogerCoben, "The Mirage of Peace," NeW-York Times, November 21, 1995.
III Christopher interview, October 22, 1995. . .
119 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar;
120 Menzies interview. In addition, the incident provided dramatic evidence of the bitterness between
Izetbegovic and Silajdzic, who, only ten months later, would run against each other for the Bosnian
Presidency. .
III Christopher interview, Cktober22, 1995; see also Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
UNCLASSIFIED
243
" ./
UNCLASSIFIED.
7 E
"Izetbegovic is' on the verge of collapse," Tom Donilon reported that night to Vershbow.
"iCs clear that Izzy has zero commitment to life in one [multiethnic] state." From
Washington, Lake strongly opposed a Presidential call to Izetbegovic, fearing the
appearance of undue Americanpressure on the Bosnians to concede. Finally, officials in
,Washington and Dayton decided that. Clinton would only call Tudjman and try to get him
to agree to the "37-minute map." Kerrick and Holbrooke wrote the talking points and
. 122
relayed them to Washington. -
.
"1 must say I'm impressed with how much has been achieved in the overall
agreement and the benefits that wilI come to all of the .parties:' President Clinton said to
Tudjman in a phone call that afternoon. "I understand a very difficult trade-off will have
to be made to resolve the map. I'ni calling you again to ask you to give back a small
percentage of nori-traditional Croatian territory in western Bosnia to bring the map back
in line with the baSic 51-49 territorial concept." Surprisingly. Tudjrnan told the President
that the Croats had already made such a proposal, explaining that they hoped to reach
final agreement in one to two hours. Thanking Tudjman for his cooperation, Clinton
urged him to close things out. "We have to get an agreement. We want to go back
to the killing:,J2l .
.
-'. .
What Tudjman 4idn't tell the PfCSident was that his. proposal had a price - he
would only agree if the Bosnians also made some minor territorial concesSions. Once
again, the burden was placed on the fractured Sarajevo leadership.
By 9pm Monday night, it looked as though the negotiations would end in failure.
The U.S. had tried to get the Bosnians to give up some land. but they were reluctant to
budge. The only compromise they offered was to sign an agreement without a a
choice.that was unacceptable to aU the other parties at Dayton. When the U.S. core team
gathered in their VOQ that night, they discussed what the next steps in the peaCe process
should be. Ironically, they reflected, the "good" guys and the "bad" guys had reversed
roles in Dayton. While the Serbs and Croats were tl).e main perpetrators of the the
Bosnians had become the chief impediments to the peace agreement. This was an
excruciatingly frustrating moment for the Americans. The Bosnians. who the U.S .
. supported for both political and moral reasons, seemed blind to the fact that the
agreement, while not perfect, was 'a good one. Indeed, it was the best offer they would
ever get.
. The question they debated that night was what the level of
involvement should be in any future diplomatic efforts. Was it in the U.S. national
interest to purSue peace if the parties weren't genuinely committed to it? And, crucially,
. if Dayton failed, how much control would the U.S. retain over any future negotiations?
Holbrooke argued that they should terminate the talks and step aside from Bosnia
altogether; as his version of the failure statement read, the u.s. had given its best shot,
and it was time to back off. "Holbrooke doesn't want to restart shuttle - he
says this should be the end of our initiative," Donilon reported to Vershbow by phone.
Secretary Christopher, on the other hand, felt that U.S. should keep the process,going,
122 See Holbrooke. Kerrick comments, Dayton History Seminar; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996;
Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20. J 996.
123 "Telephone Conversation with Croatian President Tudjman. November 20. 1995" NSC memorandum,
December 4. 1995.
244
a
UNCLASSIFIED
.'
lJN.CLASSIFIED
a
that they could agree to preserve the cease-flre (whic,b. was scheduled to end on December
11 if peace talks failed) and possibly resume shuttle diplomacy.124 .
The Americans that the Bosnians deserved one last chance to
compromise. That the U.S. would present them with one last ultimatum: they
would have one hlJur to decide, after that, the conference was over. On a secure
line, Christopher called President Clinton at 9:30pm to ask his approval. "[I] Told the
President that there was a very substantial chance that we would not succeed,"
Christopher recalled. "Basically, he gaye me authority to do the best I could. In my
judgment, trying to keep it going longer would there [in Dayton] would set the
ultimate [peace] process. ,,115 With the green light from the Christopher' and
Holbrooke prepared to meet the Bosnians.
Shortly after lOpni Monday ,night, the two senior American negotiatorS met with
Izetbegovic, Silajzdic and Sacirbey in the Bosnian VOQ. For the Secretary of State, this
was the last straw. He tried to persuade Izetbegovic that the agreement was a good one,
and th.at the U.S; had obtained almost everything he had asked for. Yet, the Bosnians
President remained unwilling to commit. Visibly angry, ordinarily reserved
Christopher raised his voice and told IzetbegQvic that they had one hour to deeide.
126
Five minutes after Christopher and Holbrooke left the Bosnian VOQ, Silajdzic
burst into Holbrooke's suite in a rage, almost completely ont 'of control. "You and
Christopher have completely ruined eveything," he screamed at Holbrooke. "We can't
ever give in to a U.S. ultimatum, we can't ever accept it." Firing back, Holbrooke told
Silajdzic that the Bosnians had 95% of what they sought from Dayton, and that the u.s.
was not about to "piss it away." ,He asked Silajdzic to leave and use the next hour to get
his President to accept this final offer before it was too late. 127
, As the hour -mark approached, Holbrooke and others put the finishing touches on
the failure statement. Based on Christopher and Donilon's suggestions, thefatalistic tone
of Holbrooke's earlier effort that morning was scaled back considerably, and they'
returned to Malinowski's original draft. This statement was a better reflection of
Christopher's views - that Dayton was largely a success, that the parties work to build on
the progress' achieved there and continue the peace process. Explaining that' they had
reached an understanding on every major issue but the map, the statement read that "'the
future of these negotiations is wrapped in the details of the map we are negotiating. But
we did not want.an agreement that was artificially for such an agreement would
surely fall aparl."They decided that if the talks indeed failed, the parties would sign an
interim 'agreement to extend the cease-fire, reafflItn the Eastern Slavonia and Federation
agreements, lock-in the commitments made in, Geneva and New York, and pledge to
resume negotiations at a later date -- but not in the U.S.. "In the final analysis," the draft
statement concluded, "as our experience in Dayton makes so very clear, only the parties
124 For details of this meeting, see Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas notes, Dayton notebook 3; and Christopher
interview,October30, J995. See also Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996. .
an Christophednterview, October 30, 1995; and Holbrooke, Hill and Kerrick comments, Dayton History
Seminar. '
126 See Christopher interviews, October 22 and 30, 1995; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
111 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
245
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

can make the critical choices that peace requires. We will continue to help them in any
way we Can.",28
At 11 :30pm. John Kornblum went to the Bosnian VOQ to get their 'answer.
Meeting Kornblum, Sacirbeyappeared in the hall and announced that the Bosnians would
agree to a final settlement only on one condition: that they get Brcko. In a heated;
'discussion, Kornblum told Sacirbey that this was a new condition. Brcko's status bad
already been decided -- the Serbs would get it -.: and could not be reopened. Komblum
then gave the draft failure statement to Sacirbey. As Kornblum later recalled: "I said that
we h3d been trying valiantly all day, [but] there just seemed to be too many issues that
could not be bridged, inp8rticular, that the Bosnians had just been coming up with one
point after another." Sacirbey refused to accept the deal without Brcko, and Kornblum .
told him that the talks would be over the next morning.
Kornblum returned to tell the rest U.S. delegation that the Bosnians would
not agree without Brcko. Holbrooke'called Christopher -- who had gone off to his suite
in the HopeHotel for some needed and well-deserved rest - to tell him "it's over but it's
not over," pending a miracle concession on Brcko . ." "I you get some sleep,
,and keep working it from here.'" Christopher, though, felt that the introduction of
Brcko into the endgame was "finally the After long hours of negotiating
in other areas, this issue, in addition g:neral be
the final straw," Clmstopher later recalled. Chris Hlli dehvered the farlure statement
to the Croats, who were in the middle of a card game. Tudjman, relaxed and confident as
ever, chuckled when he read the statement, asking Hill if the U.S. was really prepared to
blame the Muslims publicly for faiiure. Hill responded that tbeybad not decided bow to
handle that aspect of closing the talks.
13o
. .
In the final before going to bed himself:' Holbrooke asked Hill, Kerrick and
Pardew to deliver the failure statement to Milosevic. They did, and were later joined by
Kornblum, Rudy and Wes Clark. Holbrooke, who felt that he should not go
himself to avoid engaging in another negotiating session, asked them not. to presSure
Milosevic directly. but merely tell him that Dayton was over unless the Serb leader took
action immediately. When presented with the news, Milosevic was very upset.
can't do this," he said. almost desperately. "We've got this agreement, you can't let this
happen. You're the United States, you can't let BQsnia push you around that way_ Just
go back and tell them the way going to be." The group responded that the U.s. had
dpne all it could; incredulous, Milosevic pleaded, ''you try some more, you try some
Around 2am; they left, telling Milosevic that he had to be the one to try more:
"we've done everything we can.,,131 '
,
The End - Day Twenty-One: Tuesday, November 21
At daybreak on Tuesday, November 21, the weary negotiators awoke to a fresh
blanket of snow on the ground. It seemed as a fitting note to end on, as if mother nature
herself was telling everyone that it was time to go home. At 6:30am, the phone blared in
121 See draft "failure" statement. PA Malinowski files; for interim agreement, see "Draft Closure
Statement," Pardew Dayton notebook.
Il9 Christopher interview, October22, 1996.
130 Holbrooke, Hill comments. Dayton History Seminar.
131 For details, see Kornblum/Owen interview, June 18, 1996; and Holbrooke, Kerrick, Hill, Pardew
, comments. Dayton History Seminar, J-!i11 phone interview with author (notes)
246
..
UNCLASSIFIED
Holbrooke's room. On the line was David Martin of CBS News. It was the first time a
reporter had been able to get through directly to Holbrooke's room; but that moming, it
really didn't matter. Martin said that Sacirbey had been at the Holiday Inn all night and
was telling everyone that the U.S. had give!) them an unacceptable ultimatum. Dayton
had failed. Holbrooke didn't confinn story, but implied it was true, saying
"we're at the critical moment" A press conference was planned for where
Christopher would announce that Dayton was over but had not "failed." As Holbrooke
dressed that moming. he prepared in his own mind a personal statement announcing that
he had done the best- he could, but was now turning over the negotiations to the
Europeans. Thinking the talks were over, most negotiators in Dayton finished -packing,
and several in the U.S. delegation met at Packy's for a last breakfast. In Washington,
Sandy Vershbow told his NSC colleagues during that morning's staff meeting that the
talks had broken down over Brcka. Everyone should start thinking about next steps. 132
But soon after Holbrooke dressed that morning, Chris Hill burst in to tell him that
Milosevic had gone to see Tudjman, apparently to suggest th.at the two of them sign the
agreement -- with or without lzetbegovic. Milosevic had mentioned this the night before,
but at such a hour, the U.S. negotiators hadn'! really taken him seriously. Holbrooke
wasn't sure whether-this was acceptable, but at least it was another opening. As he and
Hill discusseq, it would put incredible on lzetbegovic - enough so that he might
actually break down and sign.
l3J
Holbrooke notified Christopher immediately. and then
joined the rest Qf the senior delegation for the 8am staff meeting - which was
supposed to be the "shut-down" meeting.
IM
The Americans debated the merits of Milosevic's gambit. Christopher strongly
. opposed the idea. He felt that it directly contradicted the U.S. goal of only accepting a
comprehensive pea<;e; He believed that the talks had gone too far to simply give up and
exclude the Bosnians. Moreover, from a legal perspective, the Secretary argued that you
could not have a viable contract with only two of ttu-ee parties as signatories. And,
finally. he was uncomfortable -with the position in which lzetbegovi'c would be left. The
Secretary saw the move for what it was: a desperate t:actic by Milosevic to put l'ressure on
the thlrd party. a party that the U.S. had entered the peace process to protect
l3
During the morning staff meeting in the American VOQ, Holbrooke's Kati
Marton, burst into the conference room to tell them that a coatless Milosevic was
standing alone -outside in the snowy parking lot. He wanted to see Christopher and
Holbrooke immediately. Marton ran out in the quad to catch Milosevic (who had already
turned around to leave), bringing him back to Holbrooke's suite. In the room alone with
Christopher and Holbrooke. Milosevic made his proposal that the Serbs and Croats sign
without Izetbegovic. Christopher rejected it. Pushed to this last brink. Milosevic made
final offer: that the status of Bxpko be deferred for later, pending the decision of an
. d' . 1 b' 136 appomte mtemabona ar Itrator. _
132 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Versh!;ow interview, December 17. 1996; Holbrooke
interview with author (notes), December 20. 1996.
J)) Hill phone interview with author {notes}.
.
134 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
In Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; and Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas, Dayton notebook 3.
136 Holbrookc comment, Dayton History Seminar; Christopher interview October 22, 1996_ There is some
debate on exactly who came up with the arbitration idea. The BBC has reported that the idea actually came
7 L
247
. UNCLASSIFIED
'.
UNCLASSIFIED
2
Christopher felt that this would be enough to bring the Bosnians back. (Milosevic] was prepared to agree to arbItration and did not insist on trying to define the
[Brcko) corridor, [which would] enable us to reach agreement."JJ1 Milosevic asked
Christopher to be the arbitrator. Christopher explained that he couldn't be, but would support an arbitration process headed by an respected international lawyer. The Secretary then asked Roberts Owen to draw up the language for an arbitration clause for Broko, to
be decided within one year. Working with Jim O'Brien, Owen drafted the language.
Meanwhile, Christopher and Holbrooke went to see Tudjmim.'38
-
Tudjman, hearing Milosevic's arbitration offer, said .emotionally that the Americans had to "get peace now" by forcing lzetbegovic to accept They agreed. Christopher and HolbroQke walked through the light snow to the Bosnian VOQ where- - they met with lzetbegovic, SiJajdzic and Sacirbey in lzetbegovic's suite. As they met, over 700 journalists waited at the press center across the base, all reporting imminent failure. The press conference was scheduled for 1 t am; it was already after 9am.
139
Christopher and Holbrooke outlined the latest offer froin Milosevic, urging
lzetbegovic to accept. Everything to at Dayton would be he explained, but Brcko, whose future would be decided by arbitration. Otherwise, the end of Dayton would be announced in less than two hours. Christopher said that there was no
more time for new deadlines. They needed a response immediately. a long pause; .
lzetbegovic said "it's an peace." Then,- as if forcing the words out, he quietly
muttered his answer: "but my people need peace." The Bosnians had agreed. Holbrooke,
realizing that things could quickly unravel if he and Christopher stuck around to talk
about details. he whispered to the Secretary, let's get out of here fastl ..
14o
Christopher and Holbrooke called President Clinton. who said that
he was ready to fly to Dayton to participate in the announcement. Feelmg that this
was too risky, theY' recommended that the President stay in Washington to_ make the
announcement from the Rose Garden. "Mr. President," Holbrooke-said, "you don't want
to be anywhere near these people today. They are wild:' The President said he would
make the announcement as soon as possible, in order to lock-in the agreement and avoid
any last minute shenanigans befQre the afternoon signing ceremony in Dayton.'41
With the parties finally in agreement on the core issues, there-were still severo
other issues that needed to be ironed out before the signing ceremony that aftemoOn.142
from Tudjman and Granic, who in tum gave it to Milosevic. U.S. officials recall that the idea came froin
Milosevic. See BBC television program; and War Report, p40.
m Christopher interview, October 22, 1996. -
_
131 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and KomblumlOwen interview. 119 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 1996.
140 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar, Kornblum/Owen interview. Before the signing
ceremony. Policy Planning Staff Director Jim Steinberg told Menzies to tell lzetbegovic not to repeat the
"unjust peace" line in his closing remarks. Nervous how the Bosnians were going to portray the agreement
to the world, Steinberg did not want them to create the impression that the U.S. had strong-almed them into
a bad deal. Despite Menzies' request, Izetbegovic went ahead and publicly made the comment anyway;
and the sky did not fall. Tom Malinowski interview witb author (notes), January 23, ) 997. 141 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar. According to Secretary Christopher, there was always
the: possibility that President Clinton would come to Dayton. To prepare for such an even', the White
House even dispatched an advance team to Dayton. In the end. though, "scheduling problems" got in the
way of a Clinton visit See Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
.
142 Owen and O'Brien bjld finisbed the Brcka arbitration text, which was then placed into Article V or the
map annex. Since tbey were unsure of exactly what the "Brcko area" was to be arbitrated. they asked Wes
248
7
UNCLASSIFIED -
UNCLASSIFIED

Wes Clark and Mo Sacirbey got together to shave the map by a percentage point -
reflecting the Bosnian sacrifices that Tudjman had demanded -- to guarantee 51-49.
143
Kornblum. Owen and Miriam Sapiro brought the three ;Balkan foreign ministers to the
American VOQ to conclude tho final details on the text. The legal experts had already
conducted a line-by-line edit of every annex. and this meeting was intended to close-out
the few issues left. The refugee voting issue had been solved the over the weekend (with
both sides accepting U.S. compromise language) and the !FOR annex had been
approved.
144
Of the four remaining issues left on the the group waS able to
come to agreement on three (on weapons ratios for the aims control annex, rotation of the .
presidency's chair. and arbitration rights). The only remaining issue was Serbia's
reluctance to recognize fonnally Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework text.
Kornblum decided he would have to take this to the Presidents. 145
President Clinton made the preliminary announcement from the White House
Rose Garden at 11 :40 that morning. as Christopher, Holbrooke and Donilon watched on a
television in the Secretary's Hope Hotel suite. "After nearly four years of250,OOO people
killed, 2 million refugees. and atrocities that have appalled people all over the the
people of Bosnia finally have a chance to from tlie of war to the promise' of
peace," the President stated. With an agreement achieved, he called on the American
people to support implementing peace -- particularly through the use of U.S. troops in
IFOR. "We are at a decisive moment," he said. "The parties have chosen peace.
American must choose peace as well. Now that a detailed settlement has been reached,
NATO will rapidly complete its .pJanning for IFOR. . Now American leadership --
together with our allies - is needed to make this peace real and enduring. Our values, our
interests. and our leadership all over the world are at stake."J46
Milosevic was absolutely ebullient about the deal. When Christopher and
Holbrooke met with'hlm to explain Izetbegovic's agreement,. the Serb leader could
contain his excitement. He told Christopher that "they will hang your portrait in
and, for some reason, hugged Don Kerrick.
147
.
, .
At noon, Christopher and Holbrooke briefed the Contact Group representatives on
the details of the final compromises. 'Throughout the tumultuous last few days,. the
Europeans had been completely isolated from the Americans' last-ditch negotiating
Clark to help put together a map to be included in an annex. Thcy never did get a map, and almost a year
later, the parties sti1l dispute what the Brcko boundary lines arc. On arbitration timing, Owen had written
that the decision must be completed no later than one year after the agreement entered into force. The
night Qfthe 21st. as Christopher and Owen discussed the agreement in the Secretary's car in Washington,
they realized that Christopber had meant for Owen to write the language so that arbitration would begin.
not end, in one year. See Owen comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Owen/Kornblum interview.
14) Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.
.
1 On'solving the elections annex, see Zelkulic interview; Kornblum/Owen interview. The issue of voter
eligibility was solved by outlining that citizens would be "expected" to vote in the region where they
resided in 1991 (wbat the Bosnians wanted), but that they may apply to an electoral commission to attain
the right to cast their ballots elsewhere (what the Serbs wanted).
14' These four remaining issues had lingered for the last day. See "Open Issues as of Monday November
20 at 6am," Miriam Sapiro files; "Unresolved Issues: 4:00am," Sapiro fileS; and Sapiro, Kornblum. Owen
comments, Kornblum/Owen interview.
146 See Statement by President Clinton, 'Agreement Reached on Peace in the Balkans," U.S. Department of
State Dispatch, December 1995, piE. .
147 Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20. ) 995.
d 249
UNCLASSIFIED
I
UNCLASSIFIED

effort. and at best, had heard only snippets of rumored details about an agreement. They
had been neither consulted nor infonned about the negotiating endgame.
After Holbrooke and Christopher's quick briefing for the Contact Group, they
joined the three Balkan Presidents in the Hope Hotel for a celebratory lunch. President
Clinton called, and over a congratulated the group on the accomplisiunent
"Following this long. scratchy negotiation," Christopher reflected, "there was an aura of
some modest good feeling.,,148 .
As the Presidents ate, KornblUm and Owen entered the room to announce that
they had just finished meeting with the three Balkan foreign ministers, and there was one
issue left hanging -- mutual recognition between Bosnia and Serbia.
149
Holbrooke and
Kornblum blocked the door so that no one could leave the room until it" was resolved.
lzetbegovic already had his coat on to leave. and Milosevic asked to have his
minister deal with it Kornblum said no, "your foreign minister just told me to tum . it
back to you."
" Milosevic backed down, revealing that he had already worked up a draft text on
the subject. Pulling a tattered sheet of paper from his jacket pocket, Milosevic read the
language to the group. lzetbegovic immediately rejected Milosevic's proposal. "I can't
buy that," he said. "It makes.it sound as if [Bosnia] seceded illegally from Yugoslavia." .
"Well, you Milosevic rejoined. It was as if the two of them" were about to
return to the origIDs of the war and start all over again.
Komblwn suggested that they solve the problem by placing a very general
statement in the frainework agreement. As Kornblum thought out loud, Christopher
grabbed a yellow pad and began to. write out some suitable language. The result was
"simple. Bosnia and Serbia would recognize each other as sovereign. independent 'states
within their international borderS with "other aspects" of mutual recognitioI) to be
"subject to subsequent discussions." The two sides agreed to the. compromise, and the
new language was rushed down to the U.S. staffers Who were furiously preparing the
official text for the initialing ceremony:so Meanwhile, Holbrooke drafted additional
letter from each Balkan President to President Clinton giving a personal pledge as to the
safety of U.S. and NATO troops that would be deployed in Bosnia. The letter-was
designed to bolster U.S. public support for the agreement.
JSJ
The initialing ceremony took place at 3pm, in the same room where the
conference had opened three long weeks before. The small circular table from 'the
opening ceremony had been repJaced by a long table where the three Balkan Presidents
sat alongside Christopher. Holbrooke and Bildt on a dais facing an enonnous crowd. The
room seemed twice as packed as three weeks before, with hundreds of journalists
wedging into any tiny space they could find. While Holbrooke had advised against
President qinton's attendance, he did ask several senior Washington officials, including
General John ShaJikashvili and Deputy Secretary of Defense (then Acting Secretary) Jolm
White, to fly out to Dayton that afternoon.
Consistent with almost every other step in this peace process, the ceremony went
while chaos raged on the sides. before the event began, Milosevic
In Christopher interview, October 22, 1995.
149 For details of this episode. see Kornblum/Owen interview.
151) The text became Article X of the framework agreemenL
lSI Holbrooke interview with author (notes). December 20, 1996; and Michael Dobbs. "U.S. Gains
Assurances on Troops; Balkan Presidents Security," Washington Post. November 24, 1995.
250
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
presented the maps to the Bosnian Serbs. Until that moment, they didn't know that he
had given away Sarajevo. When the Krajisnik saw the map -- and the fact that not only
had he lost Sarajevo, but his cherished v.illa in western Bosnia -- he fainted. When asked
what happened, Milosevic chortled, "he went into a coma." By all accounts, the Bosnian
Serbs were outraged by what Milosevic had done -- not only on the map, but on the
elections, constitution, -_and the IFOR annex. Accordingly, they refused to initial the
Dayton agreement, and would not participate in any part of the closing ceremony.
Reminded that the U.S. held him responsible for their actions, Milosevic promised that he
would get their signature within the next week.
152
-
-
"Today, you_ will leave Dayton with a comprehensive agreement in hand,"
Secretary Christopher said to the teeming crowd in the Hope Convention center's B-29
the three Presidents at. the dais looked on. "On this Thanksgiving weekend,
our joint work has made it possible for the people of Bosnia to spend New Year's Day in
peace for the first time in four years." Then, in a scene that filled the next day's airwaves
and newspapers arourid the world, the three Presidents initialed the Dayton agreement.
1S3
* * *
Although most of the comments made at the ceremony that afternoon reflected the
sense of accomplishment and relief -brought by success, everyone recognized that the
challenges ahead were the most important. Indeed, the American diplomatic effort bad
brought a comprehensive agreement, but its value was nothing more than the paper it was
on until its terms were implemented on the ground. President Clinton expressed as much
that morning from the Rose Gaiden, and Christopher and Holbrooke reiterated this point
-
-
that afternoon in Dayton. "The agreements and territorial arrangements initialled today
are a huge step the biggest by far since the war Holbrooke said in his
concluding remarks. "But ahead lies an equally daunting task: implementation. On every
page of the many complicated documents and annexes initialled here today lie challenges
to both sides to set aside their their differences, which are still raw with open
wounds ... To make [peace] work is our next and greatest challenge."
Secretary Christopher echoed this sentiment. "This victory will not be secure
- unless we all get to work to ensure that the promise of this moment is realized. The
parties have put a solemn set of commitments on paper. In the coming days .md weeks.
U2 See Owen, Pardew comments, Dayton H-istory Seminar; and Pardew interview, June 27, 1996.
Ironically, while Milosevic's played peacemaker in Dayton that week, Belgrade was talking about the
recently published memoirs ofMilosevic's fonner deputy and close confidant, Borisav Jovic. As the U.S.
mission in Belgrade observed, "'Milosevic's attempt over the past year to discard his nationalist past and _
redefine himself as a peace-minded progressive figure is not well_ served by Jovic' s memoir. Jovic, who
loyally belped Mifosevic break up Yugoslavia and consolidate power in Serbia by waving the nationalist
flag, is an awkward reminder of those days that Milosevic and his wife [Mira Markovic, the influential
bead ofthe nco-communist Serbian left] would like to forget.' "Belgrade Buzzing Over Memoirs of
Milosevic Crony," Cable, Belgrade 5680, November 20, 1995_
." The Europeans continued to create problems to the bitter end - even as the ceremony was undeIWay
and everyone was seated on the dais. At his tum to initial the framework agreement, Ivanov said -- in
contrast to his cooperative behavior earlier in Dayton (sec fn 45) -- tbat he could not initial Annex 1 (the
!FOR annex) because ofits references to NATO. Since this clearly reopened an issue that had solved
at higber levels (and likely reflected bureaucratic differences internal to the government), the
Americans agreed to let him initial the agreement and write "except for Annex J" below his signature. In-
Paris on December 14, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Cbemomyrdin formally signed the agreement
without this caveat.
251
UNCLASSIFIED
UNcLXIMQu
they will have to put them into practice -- extending them to every mayor, every soldier.
every police officer in their territory." In three weeks. President Clinton would join the
rest of the C o n t ~ c t Group leaders in Paris to witness ,the formal signing of the Dayton
Accords. But on November 2 2 ~ the next stage of the U.S. diplomatic initiative had
already begun.'S4
1$4 Holbrooke and Christopher quotes from U.S" Department of State Dispatch. December 1995, pp 14- 17.
252
2
-UNCLASSIFIED
Epilogue
UNCLASSIFIED
~
Implementation Begins
With the conclusion of the Dayton talks, the implementation phase of the peace
process began. Although implementation would not officially begin until the fonnal
signing at the Elysee Palace in Paris .on December 14, the next three weeks would be
critical for all sides -- .the Balk3.n leaders, the United S t a t e s ~ the Europeans and NATO --
to prepare for the ambitious peace Dayton outlined. Each Balkan leader had returned
borne with much of what they wanted. Tudjman got Eastern Slavonia, MiIosevic
received "sanctions relief. and the Bosnians gained an equip-and-tr!lin program, over fifty
per cent of Bosnian territory, and a unified Sarajevo. However, there were aiso some
serious losers, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, who had stonned out of Dayton with just
about everything but peace on their minds.
" American officials were satisfied that they had forged an enonnous diplomatic
achievement. This sense of accomplishment, however, was offset by the daunting
commitment and countless uncertainties that lay ahead. Twenty-thousand U.S. troops
would be in Bosnia by early .1996. The Clinton Administration, often criticized for being
a prisoner to polls and domestic politics, had defied the conventional wisdom by putting
combat forces in a dangerous environment during an election year. Therein lay one of the
great challenges ahead. Before the Paris signing and IFOR's deployment,. the
Administration had to set out to "seil" this policy to the American people.
The Europeans also had a great deal at stake. Although their influence throughout
the negotiating process had been limited, their role in implementation -- in which they
would man the bulk of IFOR and run civilian implementation -- was to' be paramount.
They had left Dayton bruised but relieved, setting out to organize three "implementation
conferences" to be convened before the end of December!
.
Gaining American Domestic Support
After Dayton. the Clinton Administration intensified its efforts to convince the
American people and skeptical members of Congress to support the numerous military
and economic commitments made in the agreement - above all concerning the 20,000
troop commitment to IFOR.
2
Earlier that autumn, the Administration had judged that it
I These included a December 8 implementation conference in London. a December 18 anns control
conference in Bonn, and a December io economic reconstruction conference in Brussels. "
:t The President also sought to clarify the Administration!s position on the equip-and-train program for the
Bosnians. In a December 10 lener [0 Senator Robert Dole. llie President explained"that "the Bosnian Serb
advantage in heavy weapons !'Clative to the defensive capability of the Bosnian Federation has been a
major reason for the fighting in Bosnia and remains a potential source ofinstability. We believe that
establishing a stable military balance within Bosnia by ~ e time IFOR leaves is important to preventing the
war from resuming and to facilitate {FOR's departure .. Even willi Anns Control. we anticipate there wiU
253
UNCLASSIFIED
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2
did not need formal congressional approval to authorize U.S. participation in IFOR.
However. like the Bush Administration's approach toward a Democratic Congress during
the. 1990-91 Persian Gulf the Clinton Administration decided that it wanted
approval from the new Republican Congress to guarantee that the mission had bipartisan
support.
In early November, senior officials began a vigorous lobbying campaign directed
at Capitol Hill. This included inviting key members to the White House to meet with the
President, conducting an exhaustive telephone campaign to lobby pthers, and sending
such officials as Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili to
Capitol Hill to appear before congressional committees. The Administration also helped
organize numerous congressional delegations, or CODELS, to visit the Balkans and meet
with Bosman, Croat and Serb leaders. T.broughout early several CODELS
traveled to the region, receiving assurances from all three sides that they wanted peace
and, importantly, would do all they could to reduce the risks to IFOR troops.)
Further, the Administration launched an .intensive media to rally public
suPPOrt. with officials appearing on television shows and writing 'op-ed articles to argue
the case for Dayton implementation.
4
Significantly, this media effort embraced such 50-
called "new" media outlets as talk radio and the Internet. Almost everyone involved in
the Dayton peace effort participated at one point or another, with such officials as Jim
Steinberg facing skeptica1listeners on radio call-in shows or Strobe Talbott answering
questions in one of America Online's cyberspace "chat-rooms'" This massive outreach
campaign - which alsO included officials from the NSC and Pentagon - was launched by
the State Department's Public Affairs bureau. coordinated by spokesman Nick Burns and
his staff.
s
./
..
The most imPortant public articulation of America's interest in implementing the
Dayton agreement was President Clinton's prime-time televised address to the nation the
evening of November 27. In the speech, he sought to ease concerns that the IFOR
mission was a dangerous. open-ended military effort. "America's role will not be about
fighting a war," the President began. "It will be about helping the people of Bosnia to
secure their own peace agreement. Our mission will be limited, focused, and under the
command of an American General." The President's remarks placed participation
squarely within the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world: commitment to
ieadership will be questioned if we refuse to participate in implementing a peace
agreement that we brokered right here in the United States, especially since the presidents
be a deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly. we have made a commitment to the Bosnian
Federation that we will coordinate an international effort to ensure that the Federation receives the
assistance ':lccessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves." See Clinton Letter to
Dole, December 10. 1995.
3 Sec Wendy Shennan interview; Phil Goldberg interview with author (notes), January 6, 1997.
4 See, for example, Op-eds by Lloyd Cutler, "Our Piece of the Peace; Sending Troops to Bosnia: Our Duly,
Clinton's Call," Washington POSI, November 26, 1995; and Warren Christopher. "No Troops, No Peace," .
New York Times, November 27, 1995.
5 For press reports of these efforts, see Elaine Sciolino, "To Confront Callln Critics, U.S. Aides Take 10
the Ailwaves," New York Times, December 7, 1995; and Michael Dobbs, "In Selling Policy to the Public.
State Department Enters a New Stage," Washington Post, December 13. 1995. See also Nicholas Burns
"interview; Wendy Shennan interview.
254
L
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UNCLASSIFIED
4-.r
of Bosnia, Croatia" and Serbia.all asked us to participate," he said. "When
partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it our ability to secure
our interests and to convince others to work with us ... when America does not the
consequences can be very grave, not only for others, but eventually for us as well!'
'Finally, he asked every American -- and, importantly, every Member of Congress,
and Republican alike - to make "the choice for peace" and support U.S.
participation in IFOR
6
.
'.
While impressive in scope and energy, the Administrarion's media campaign did
little to dent the public's skepticism about sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. Public opinion
po11ing showed that the American people remained concerned that a Bosnia mission
would tum into another Somalia, or worse, another Vietnam. Sharp divisions remained
on Capitol Hill, where Senator Robert Dole grudgingly supported U.S. deployment while
other Republicans - particularly those on House side were opposed.' Despite
these difficulties, Congress narrowly blessed the Bosnia mission on December 13" 1995.
The voted 69 to 30 to support the troop deployment, while the House voted 287 to
141 to oppose the President's policy while supporting the troops. Both chambers rejected
measures to cut off funds for the Bosma mission. White House Press Secretary Michael
McCuny explained that such lukewarm results were "probably the strongest statement of
support they could possibly make. Having voted overwhelmingly not to shut off funding
is, in a sense, supporting the judgment.',8
Regional Shuttles to Maintain Momentum
. In the turbulent Balkan the weeks between Dayton and Paris
provided the a dangerous amount of time to scuttle the agreement. After
twenty-one fast-:paced Dayton had ended' suddenly, and not everyone was
completely happy with their concessions. U.S. officials were understandably concerned
that some of the parties might begin to backtrack. . Moreover, Dayton had ended
incompletely -- one party to the settlement, the Bosnian Serbs, had not yet signed the .
agreement Milosevic had assured. Christopher and Holbrooke not to be concerned,
pledging to have their initials on the agreement within ten days. He got their agreement
6 For President's rcmarks. Support for Implementing The Bosnian Peace Settlement," u.S .
. Department of State Dispatch, December 1995, ppI9-21. See also BlaineSciotino. "Clinton's Bosnia
Stand: Political Risks Remain," New York Tnnes, November 29. 1995.
7 For press rcpOrts, see Dana Priest, "Fear of Casualties Drives Bosnia Debate; After Recent Troop
Missions, Americans Expect Almost Bloodless Battles," Was{lington Post, December 2, 1995; Katherjne
Q. SteeIye, "Ctlngrcss and White Housc Barter Over Support for U.S. Mission," New York Tt'?les,
December 5, 1995; Elaine Scionno, "Dole Backs Plan to Send u.s. Force on Bosnia Mission," New York
Times, December I, 1995; Steelye, "Some GOP Senators Refusing to Back Dole on Bosnia Mission,'" New
York Times. December 7, 1995; Steelye, "Nearly Half of House Members Sign Letter Opposing Bosnia
Deployment," New York Times, December 8, 1995; Stephen Engteberg. "Bosnia Highlights A
Republican Split." New York Times, December 10, 1995.' See also Shennan intcfView. .
a For press reports on debate and results, see Helen Dewar, "Senate Set For Debate on Bosnia; Republican
Aadressed By Clinton," Washing/on Post, December 12, 1995; Dewar, "Dole Predicts Mixed
Message From Senate on Deployment," Washington Post, December 13, 1995; Dewar and Guy Gugliotta,
, "Senate Backs Troops to Bosnia; House Retreats on Fund Cutoff." Washington Post, December 14. 1995;
and New Yor:/, Times editorial, 'Congress and Bosnia," December 1 S. 1995.
.
255
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UNCLASSIFIED
E
in two. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serbs were clearly unhappy about the peace Milosevic
had signed. This was particularly the case with his concession on Sarajevo, where in
early December violence had already broken out between Muslims and Serbs.
9
.
In order to assure that momentum created by Dayton remained strong through
the Paris signing, two U.S. delegations conducted shuttles in the region. During
November 29 and December<t, a delegation including Hill, Pardew and Kerrick visited
the three Balkan capitals. To the their surprise, all three parties seemed happy with
Dayton's outcome. "The war is over," Milosevic told the .team during their first meeting
on November 29. As Pardew later reported back to Washington, this "was a them.e
reflected by Izetbegovic and Tudjman as welt" Milosevic was and positive,"
saying that the Dayton Agreement and sanctions suspension were well-received 1?y the
Serb public. .Izetbegovic and TudJrrian expressed similar sentiments, and Pardew
described them "as aQimated andjovial as I have ever seen them. They are all looking
forward to Paris and implementation."lo
'.
. . In Belgrade, Milosevic said that he thought the Serbs were coming
around to accept Dayton. Three months after Milosevic presented Holbrooke with' the
Patriarch letter, the U.S. was still unsure exactly what leverage Milosevic had (or was
willing to use) over the Bosnian Serbs. I) He had delivered them at every critical point of
the negotiations thus far, and his continued support throughout implementation would be.
essential to Dayton's success. In meetings on November 29 and December I, Milosevic
, All the Pale leaders except for General Mladic, who bad an aide sign instead.
10 See Pardew report to Peny and Siocombe, "The War is Over:' December I, 1995.' ForChris Hill's
readout ofthese talks see memorandum from Chris Hoh (EUR) to Distribution (including Talbott, Tamoff,
Steinberg, Donilon, Bradi:Jcc, Scheffer, Gallucci, ElyRaphel), "Report from Chris Hill," November 29,
1995; and "U.S. Talks witb Bosnian Officials," Cable, Zagreb 484'1, December I, 1995.
II A State Department lNR report judged that Milosevic still retained some ability (0 influence Pale's
policy decisions, although he had no alternative to the present Pale leaders. The report Slated that while
Milosevic was relatively secure in power, he "would risk reaction from his hypemationalisls. especially in
. the VJ (Yugoslav Army], ifhe furthCl" 'betrayed the brother Serbs of Bosnia. " In tenns of Bosnian Serbs
leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the report estimated that Milosevic had several options to
remove them from Bosnia -=- including assassination (which was doubtful in order to avoid creating martyrs
to Serbian nationalism) or, more likely, offering them sanctuary outside Bosnia. Finally, the report
concluded tbat"Miiosevic will want the peace process, including the IFOR mission, to proceed as
smoothly until he is confJdent that sanctions and any other strictures on the "FRY" have ended irreversibly.
Confident of his leading role in Serbdom, Milosevic has a major interest in containing Bosnian Serbs
. rebe!liousness; Over the longer tenn, MiIosevic'S primary concern must be with hjs realm, currently
SerbiaIMontenegro. where he continues to consolidate his power. As for expanding that realm, well.
tomorrow is another day," See memorandum to Secretary Christopher from Toby Gati (lNR), "Strings and
Levers -- Miloscvic's Options in Bringing Bosnian Serbs Into Line on the Peace Agreement," December 1.
1995.
MiJosevic's effort to consolidate power at home was evident in a November 28 purge offive
leading members of his ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). jncluding fonner top aide Borislav Iovic. As
Embassy Belgrade cabled to Washington, "In the best Orwellian fashion, MiIosevic is attempting to
remove all traces of his nationalist past. Just as he used Serbian nationalism ruthlessly to defeat rival
Serbian Communist Party leaders in 1989, he bas now returned to the policies that he then ridiculed .. For
the moment, MiJosevic has sent a powerful signal that he is in complete control as the Dayton Accords
move towards implementation and that opposition. even from old comrades, will not be tolerated." See
"Milosevic Coup From Above Signals he Will Brook No Opposition To Implementation of Peace," Cable.
Belgrade 5899, December J, )995.
256
7
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2
pledged that he would get the Pale leaders to supporfIFOR publicly. and would require
them to request formally that IFOR deploy in Republika Srpska.
12
Further, he promised
to work to calm tensions in and around Sarajevo and rein in the Bosnian Serbs who were
. bl 13
creatmg pro ems .
. .In Sarajevo, Izetbegovic and Sacirbey explained that despite some "pockets of
opposition," the Dayton Agreement was .well received throughout Bosnia. Of all the
issues discussed during that hour-long meeting - including the situation in Sarajevo the
progress of implementing the Federation agreement - the most sensitive concerned the
continuing presence of Iranian-backed Mujahadeen fighterS in Bosnia. While die Dayton
Accords mandated that all' foreign troops leave Bosnia, the Mujahadeen were viewed as
the greatest threat to IFOR troopS.14 Congress was particularly concerned about such
forces, demanding assurances that these troops would be out of Bosnia by the time U.S.
troops hit the ground .. When pressed, IZetbegoVic reassured the u.s. team' tbathe couId
control the Mujahadeen .;.. he knew their number.and whereabouts. He pledged th:at they
would depart within thirty days (as mandated by the Dayton stating plainly
that '"if there is peace. these peOple willleave."ls
.
True to fonn, Tudjman showed littie interest in anything other than Eastern
Slavonia. Nevertheless, his general enthusiasm about Dayton's outcome, combined with
the high spirits in Belgrade and Sarajevo, gave the U.S. team reason to feel optimistic. "I'
come awaY from this quick visit through the capitals in the fonner Yugoslavia much
more optimistic about reaching a settlement and peaceful implementation than before I
Washington," Pardew explained. "The Bosnian Serbs are still an issue, but the
general atmosphere in the area is positive and the leaders seem to be looking toward
implementation and.beyond.,,16 .
Many of these issues were revisited a week later, when Holbrooke and his core
team reunited for their sixth and last three-capitalshuttIe to the region. Meeting briefly
with the three Balkan leaders during. December 8-9, Holbrooke wanted to make sure that
there were no loose ends before they joined the five Contact Group Presidents for the
tl See Pardew to Perry, December 1, 1995; "Report from Chris Hill," November 29, 1995; and Pardew
Report to Perry, "Meeting with Milosevic." November 29. 1995.
"
.. . In a letter dated December 2, Holbrooke expressed to Milosevic that "I am extremely concerned by
credible reports of Bosnian Serb agitation against the Dayton Accords. particularly the Sarajevo provisions.
It is essential that the peace process be managed smoothly, as any action that enflames the situation could
be devastating. Vice President Gore, Chris HilJ and I have all stressed to senior members of the Bosnian
Government the absolute necessity of making public, reassuring statements to th e Serb populition of
Sarajevo that they can remain and live in peace with full respect for their rights. But we cannot ask the
Bosnian government to make the necessary statements and decisions if Bosnian Serb leaders continue to
. foment fear and unresl" See "Message to MiIosevic on Sarajevo," Cable, State 278882, December
1995. When given the letter later that day, Milosevic responded that he "had been meeting with Jrosnian
Serb leaders all week, pressing lhem to go along with the Dayton Accord." See "Message to Milosevic on
Sarajevo," Cable, Belgrade 5939. December 4. 1995.
14 For press reports of the Mujabadeen presence, see "Dana Priest, "Foreign Muslims Fighting in Bosnia
Considered 'Threat' to U.S. Troops," 1!'ashington Post, November 30, 1995; and Elaine Sciolino, "What's
(ran Doing in Bosnia Anyway? New York Times, December 10, 1995.
IS See Pardew report to Perry, "Mujahadecn Presence in Bosnia:' November 30. 1995; Pardew report to .
Peny, December 1, 1995; and Zagreb 4841.
16 Pardew report to Peny, December I. 1995.
& &
257
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a
fonnal signing in Paris. In they pressed ,MiIosevic on the lingering Serb unrest
in Sarajevo and handling Mladic and Karadzic; in Zagreb,' they discussed with Tudjman
issues related to Eastern SIavonia and the future of U.S.-Croatian military relations;
in Sarajevo, they discussed the'Federation with Izetbegovic and insisted that he do more
- 17

to address the MujahadeenprobJem.'
,
Of all the meetings during this forty-cight hour swing, Holbrooke was most
iInpressed by the change of among the Bosnian leaders. "The mood in
Sarajevo is dramatically different than in the past." he reported to Secretary Christopher
that night. "Izetbegovic seemed a different man than he had been either in Dayton or my "
earlier trips here: Almost upbeat at times, he was unexpectedly focused, took notes as we
talked
t
and responded reasonably precisely to our comments and, questions." Izetbegovic
'remained angry about the continuing presence of Hague-indicted war criminals, stressing
that if "Karadzic and Mladic go; reconciliation can move rapidly." Notwithstanding
these legitimate concerns, Holbrooke was encouraged, by what he saw in the Bosnian
capital, satisfied that there was sufficient momentum for: imp!ementation- to begin
succesSfully. Yet, he recognized that "eyerything depends on a vigorous implementation
by IF-OR from the fast _day. A slow start would be a mistake.,,18
,
The Paris Signing
On December 14., the three ,Balkan presidents joined President Clinton, Prime
Minister Major, ChanceJlorKohl,' President Chirac, Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin and' EU negotiator Carl Bildt at the Elysee Palace in Paris to sign the
Dayton Accords. After the -dramatic end of Dayton, the Paris event -seemed almost
anticlimactic. This _waS exactly the way the U.S. wanted it -- Paris was to be nothing
more than a formal bJessing, a bit of diplomatic theater- to launch the peace that was now
known simply as
Before the official signing ceremony. President Clinton met with the three Balkan
Presidents at Ambassador Harrimann's residence. Although these meetings were
important to all three Balkan leaders - each- regarded a meeting with the American
President as an important symbol of international prestige and legitimacy - the U.S. did
not want to draw significant press attention to preferring ,instead to focus the
spotlight on the Elysee signing.
The President began by -meeting all three presidents at once. He urged them. to
adhere to every aspect of Dayton. '''There can be flexibility in he said,
"but we should not change the terms of the Dayton agreement. Genuine freedom of
movement needs to be guaranteed as soon as The elections need to be carried
out. -The removal of foreign forces is very important ... [as is] 1he right of refugees to
return; the protection of the human rights ,of every ethnic group; and the ability of" the
work of the War Crimes Tribunal to go forth and be respected.'tl9
17 For full details of these meetings, see Pardew report to-Perry. "Final Peace Shuttle to the Balkans,"
December 9, ]995; and Kerrick's personal notes, December 89. 1995. .
JI Message to Christopher from Holbrooke, "Official-lnfonnal," Cable, Zagreb 8296, December 8, 1995.
, 19 Christopher, Lake. Holbrooke, Berger and Vershbow attended these meetings, with the President. See
"Memorandum of Conversation: Quadrilateral Meeting with Presidents Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, A1Ua'
Izetbegovic of BosnIa-Herzegovina, and Siobodan Milosevic of Serbia, December 14, 1995," NSC
258
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
&
lzetbegovic. mentioned that "perhaps the niost important provisions of all"
concerned the future electio.ns in Bosnia President Clinton agreed fully. "The electio.ns
are important only to eIiminatuig those who. may not run for office from poiitical life,
but to show every ethnic group that their vo.ices will be heard," he responded. "One o.f
the missio.ns o.fIFOR is to create a secure environment so. that the elections can be held.
We want the IFOR to be tenninated in an appropriate way. We can't do that
unless free elections are a fact." .
MiIosevicand Tudjman concurred with these comments. "After the first
eJections, i'm convinced that we will be able to define the situation as normal. Elections.
. will be a turning point," the Serbian President said. "It is also. important that all three
constituent peeples be equal during' and after the elections," the Croatian President
explained. "[This equality] is important for Bo.srua's future."
'President Clinton also outlined the importance of fecusing on' the "good news"
during - the three presidents, he explained. needed to. "find ways to
demonstrate to the people who live in the regio.n and throughout the wo.rld that ordinary
people want peace." Similarly, he closed the meeting by stressing the critical role of
public perceptions. By publicly communicating their confidence for success, he said.
"y<?u can change the psychology of the situation." Comparing the situation to Northern
Ireland, President Clinton said that "now that we have had over fifteen months without
fighting, it is unthinkable for most people.that they could go. back. With the growth in
confidence, the whole situation had changed. In the face of skepticism about peace in
Bosnia, you need to voice co.nfidence in your public statements."
After this twenty-five ptinute quadrilateral meeting, the President spent ten
minutes with each leader in onc.on-one "pull-aside" meetings. Such "pull-asideS> were
standard tools of diplomatic art. Well short of a fonnal bilateral, they were more
symbolic than Both sides would have an opportunity to raise' only one or
two important issues. These brief meetings were. chosen intentionally - they were just
enough to suffice the three Balkan leaders desire to have a private audience with the
American Presiden4 but sufficiently short to guarantee that the parties couldn't engage in
any last-minute negotiating.
The first "pull-aside" was with Tudjman?O As he had at almost every tum
throughout this peace" effo.rt, Tudjman raised his concerns about East Slavonia. As
Pardew reported to Perry. "Paris was not Tudjman's theater. The event was about
BOsnian Tudjmanwas happy that the U.S. civilian administrator - Retired Air Force
General Jacques Klein -- had been named to. administrate the UN Transitional Authority,
but expressed dismay about the number of troops the UN planned to deploy in the region;
When Secretary Christopher raised the Federation, Tudjman simply said that 411 am. sure
the Croats [in Bosnia] will do all they can to make the Federation work. [But] you need
Memorandum, December 29, 1995. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations following quotations arc from
this document.
20 Tudjman was joined by Granic. Susak. and Zuzul.

259
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

For example, there need to be more Croats
to convince the Muslim leadership'-
representing the Federation abroad." I
Nex4 the President met with Izetbegovic?2 While the Bosnian leader had .seemed
"almost upbeat" during Holbrookc's meeting with him five days prior, his dour and aloof
disposition had returned. President Clinton sternly pressed the Bosnian leader to take
action against the Mujahadeen elements in Bosnia. "If a,ny action were taken by these
forces agaulst our. troops," he said, it could shatter the whole . It could
jeopardize our ability to equip and train your forces ... I want to do what I promised to do.
but this is the one area that could undermine my commitment." Izetbegovic assured the
President that these forces bad been completely dismantled giving his word that a
majority of such personnel "have already left." On the Federation, Secretary Christopher
stressed that "providing a real role for the Croats is going to be very important.
u
The
Bosnian President responded th3.t "things are moving forward" on organizing. fully
functioning Federation structures.2J
.
Finally, the President met with Milosevic?4 While President Clmton had met
several times before with Izetbegovic and Tudjman, this was 'his first meeting. with
Milosevic. Of aU three meetings that morning, this one was the most carefully
engineered to avoid pUblicity -- officials were wary about photos of the two men sbaking
hands appearing in the press.
15
Although far from a Rose Garden handshake Holbrooke
had tempted the Serb President with months before, Milosevic was "ecstatic" with being
on the world stage in Paris, trying to chann the Western leaders at every tum. "The Paris
signing placed Milosevic on the same international agenda as President Clinton," Pardew
wrote to Perry. "He was at center stage with the most significant presidents and. prime
ministers in the Milosevic clearly saw this as a major step toward his goal
. of international respectability." The Serb leader was so pleased, Pardew reported. that he
had given up his effort to quit smoking. As Pardew described t!J Perry
"the Serbian President was last seen in the magnificent hall of the Quai d'Orsay puffing
on a cigar' half the, size of a fence post while making one last - but futile - effort to
charm the U.S. President:.25
During the "pull-aside," President Clinton reminded Milosevic that he had an
important role in implementing Dayton. "I just wanted to say that I know this agreement
would not have been possible without you, Whatever our differences in the past, you
made Dayton possible. Now it is important to make it work." The President said that he
was counting on Milosevic to keep the Bosnian Serbs from derailing and
21 See Pardew report to Perry, "Atmosphere at the Paris Signing," December J 5. } 995; and "Memorandum
of Conversation: Pull-Aside Meeting with Presidenl Franjo Tudjman ofthe Republic of Croatia. December
J4,1995,"NSCMemorandum, December29,1995.
22'zetbegovic was joined by Zubak, SaciJbey and Hasan Muratovic.
2J See Pardew report 10 Perry, December 15, 1995; and "Memorandum of Conversation: Pull-Aside
Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. December 14,1995.""
NSC Memorandum, December 29, 1995.
24 Milosevic was joined by Bulatovic, Milutinovic, and Goran Milinovic.
2$ See Vershbow interview, December 19,1996.
26 Pardew report to Perry, December IS, 1995.
260
F
..
UNCLASSIFIED
I
I'
I
I
I
UNCLASSIFIED
3
urged him to work with Izetbegovic and the Bosnian leadership to assure that the
Sarajevo situation remained calm.
Milosevic conceded that the "only dangerous spot" was Sarajevo. but that the key
to 'solving all problems are in the Dayton agreement" The Serb ieader finally
President Clinton to restore full nonmilization of ties between the U.S. and Serbia. Now
he had brought the Serbs. to an . agreement, Milosevic wanted the payoff. Full
normalization was entirely out of the Question for the U.S., and Clinton and Christopher
2'
.
deflected the Serb President's request.
* *
Immediately following these meetings, thefotir presidents departed foithe Elysee
Palace. There, during a brief ceremony in the Palace's ornate ballroom, the three Balkan
leaders put their signatures on Dayton Peace Accords. However imperfect the peace the
parties for the moment preferred it to the resumption of a bitter war with all its costs.
"You have seen what war has wrought. You know what peace can bring. Seize this
chance and make it work." President Clinton implored the parties.
28
.
Within two da1s, U.S. General George Joulwan fonnaIly ordered NATO forces to
deploy into Bosnia.? Over four years after then-Secretary 01 State James Baker
proclaimed that the U.S. "didn't have a dog" in the Yugoslav fight, over 20,.000
American troops were on the ground in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration had indeed
gone over the Balkan "waterfall," but it had steered a course that few thought was
possible during the summer of 1995. With Dayton, there was now geQ,uine hope that a
lasting peace could be accomplished. Implementing the Dayton peace would not be
simple; as Warre!! .. Zimmermann aptly noted. the agreement "mirrored all the
complexities and contradictions
v
of the Balkans?O Beginiting with Tony Lake"s trip in
August and ending with that ceremony in Paris, U.S. negotiators had spent over eighteen
weeks preparing this complex blueprint for peace. Now they had to set forth and build it.
27 Sec "Memorandum of Cpnversation: Pull-aside Meeting with President Siobodan MiJosevic of ,
December 14.1995,"NSC Memorandum. Deccmber29, 1995.
.
21 For-details of the signing. see Craig Whitney, "Balkan Foes Sign the Dividing An Unpaeified
Bosnis," New York Times. December IS, 1995; and William Drozdiakand lohn Harris, "Leaders Sign Pact
to End Bosnia War," Washington Posl. December 15. 1995.
29 The mission had been fonnally endorsed at a 5 meeting of NATO foreign and defense
. ministers in Brussels.
30
S
z ..
ee Immermann, pXII.
261
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
..
A Note on Sources
Most of the sources used for this study were those collected and organized for the
Dayton History Project's archive. In June 1996, the Dayton History Project gained full
access to Department of State files, including, for aU cables from the central
records management system (RMD), all EUR' files (including' e-mail and computer,
databases), INR memoranda, Operations Center Watch Reports and Telephone Logs,
"out':'of-system" documents, and personal notes and memoran<Ja of nunierous senior
officials, including those of Secretary Christopher, Strobe Talbott, Tom Donilon, and
Richard Holbrooke. Although the Dayton }Iistory Project staff did not attain full
to NSC, DOD or CIA materials. the archive does include any such materials tluit were
sent to the State' Department originally (the NSC's "Summary of Conclusions" from
Deputies or Principals Committee Meetings, for example) or provided by individuals
specifically for this project (such as Jim Pardew's memoranda to Secretary Perry). A
more detailed description of the materials used here can be found in the Dayton History
Project archive's "finding aid."
In addition to this substantial documentary collection - which fills more than ten
file-drawers' - this study is based on nearly sixty hours of interviews with over forty
officials involved in the negotiations. Such interviews enabled me to bring the
documents to identifying ones of particular importance and placing them in the
context with which they were used or read. A complete list of these along
with transcripts and original tapes> can be found in the Dayton History Project archive.
Notable among these is a day-long, video-taped seminar held at the Foreign Service
Institute on June 26, 1996, in which Holbrooke;HiII, Clark, Kerrick, Owen, Parde'W and
Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas joined several other State Department officials to diSCUSS the
events leading to Dayton. Along with these official I spent many hours
discussing these events and issues With several officials, particularly Richard Holbrooke
and Chris Hill. Important or interesting details from such discussions, while not part of
the official archive. are noted in the footnotes.
"
To supplement the classified official record and interviews, I turned to numerous
"secondary" sources - including newspapers reports, journal articles and books - to help
fiU in gaps or provide contextual detail not found elsewhere., Further,. I was able to use
material from several works in progress. In particular, I benefited from drafts of the U.S.
Air Force's survey of "Operation Deliberate Force" provided by Major Mark McLoughlin
of Maxwell Air Force Base's Air Power School, as well as Dr. Henry Narducci's official
history of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base's' efforts to support the peace talks. Most
important, however, Richard Holbrooke graciously permitted me to quote from several
draft chapters of his memoirs, scheduled to be published in January 1998.
vii
"UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Although I had more resource material than most historians dream of, one of the
more discouraging aspects of this project was learning about documents or records that I
could not attain. As is inevitable in any attempt to recreate the past, this product is
limited by the resources of the present. In teons of documents, the obvious areas for
further reSearch are NSC and DOD files. Within these respective agencies, researchers
shou,ld pay particular attention to Alexander Vershbow's remarkable personal notes
,
,
(which offer a near-:verbatim account 'of critical DC and PC's) and General Wesley
Clark's daily reports to General John ShalikashvilL I used some of these records -
during the Vershbow interviews. he read from his notebooks; and a few of Clark's reports
were found in State Department files - but not aU. Unfortunate omissions also appear in
, the oral history archive. ' Anthony Lake, Sandy Berger, General Shalikashvili. Admiral
Leighton S'mith, General George Joulwan, Tom Donilon and, of course, President Clinton
and Vice President Gore were unavailable to he interviewed. In addition, numerous other
officials - including Strobe Talbott, Jim Steinberg, and Walter Slocombe --were
interviewed but future research would undoubtedly benefit from further discussions with
them. My hope is that by identifying these resources left to be mined. future researchers
will be better able to build upon this story, hopefully mending the n u m e r o u ~ gaps my
. work bas revealed.
viii
UNCLASSIFIED
, DAYTONlliSTORYPROJECT
JULY 1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
1
.
" , "
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
UH I!XTEHDS. BOSHIAHSERBS
ECONOMIC SAHCT10HS BEOIH SHELLING
ACIAIHST SERBIA 8Re9RENICA
UHTIL DN11M
.
9
10 11 '12 13 14 15
BOSNIAN SERBS
LAUNCH FULL-SCALE
SREBREmCA
BRmSH CALL FOR
CIFF1!HSIVE ON FALLS
LONDON
SFlEDAEfUCA; ON BOSNIAH
SEI2EDtlTCH SIlUAlJON
PEACEkEEPERS
16 17 18 19 20 21 22
BRITISH, AlENe", AND NSC PRESENTS PRINCIPALS LONDON cONFERENce
u.s.1WTAR't LEADERS rrs LONa.mW ADVOCATE AIR POWER
.
ON BOSMA ISSUES
UET IN LONbONlO "ENDQAMti" STRATEGY TO DEFEND CORAZOE GORAZDE ULTIMATUM
DISCUSS pmNCIPALS
OPTlOHS
23 24
HAC MEETS Olf 25 SENATE PASSes 26
27 28 29
GORA2DE ULllMAMI
DOLE-UEBEIlMAN BILL
CROATlA MASSES
ZEPAFALLS
BOuTnos GHAU
TROOPS AROUND

REUHOUISHES
ICIIAJlNA ULlIMATW
30 31
LAUNCH
"DOMBlHG KEY"
AHfI.SERB OFFENSIVE
IH1"O UVNOVAI.LEY, NACISSUES
BOSNIA
wOOR.AZDE RULES-
DAYTON mSTORY PROJECT
AUC;UST 1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
,.
HOUSE PASSES
1 2 3 4 5
DOLE-UEBERMAN
CROAnAHS
LAUNCH KRAJINA
.
HAC.EXTENDS
OFFeNSiVE
-
"GORAZDE
TO ALL SAFE AREAS"
KARAOZJC REUEVES
MLADIC Of COMMAND
,
'.
....... M ....... _ .. to.
o __
. .. _.-
6
PRINCIPALS
7 8
SILAJD21C
9
Utf&NATO
10
CUNTON VETOES 11
12
ENDORSE"ENO RESIGNS
GAMa"STRAn:OY_
AGFlEE TO TERMS FOR
DOLIi-IJEBERMAN
LAKE-
LAUNCHING AIR
BILL
-
TARNOFf
CAMPAIGN
..
HOLBROQKE CHOSEN
MISSION
.-
TO LEAD SHUTT1.E . ALBRIGHT ReLEASES
NEGOlTAlTONS SENATE HOLDS
SREBRENICA PHOTOS
HEARtNGSON
ATRocmes (LONDON-BONN)
(PARts)
--"_.'.-.. -
13 14 15 16 17 18
19
-
MT.IGMAN
-
ACCIDENT
SHUTTLE
..
-
ROUND'1

(lDNDOH.QIIUT)
(lMOSI<I.s:r
(ZAeR'EB) (l!Et.GIIADE) . __
1').QRED
HOL8ROOKE "
20 21 .22
CHRISTOPHI;R 23
24' 25
26
BOSNIAN, SERBS, "
MEETWJTH
RRFEXCHANGE
CONTACT QROUP
,
CROATIANS a:
-
RRE IN SARAJEVO;
MEMORIAl. SERVICE
KRAJINA SERBS
-
PEACE KEEPERS
SlGNTRUCS
KILLED. CLARK. OWEN,'"
KERRIOK JOIN
(RAIotSTEIN)
SHUTTLE TeAM
- -
BOSMAN SI;RBS 29
MILOSIMC
. TEAM LOBBIES
'27 28
ANNOUNC'eS
30 31 SIGN
PAmlARCH
FOR BOMBINQ
SAAAJEVO PATmARCH t..ETTER
AGREEMENT
PAUSE
MARKET
CONTACT NATO AIR
MASSACRE
...
GROUP
CAMPAIGN
...
MSmHQ
(.AM EDT, al2g)
..
SHlnTLE
ROUNon
.JAPfYIEA urrrtlfl
-
TOMLAtliC
(PARIS) (BaGftAll) (ZAQREB-8!:LGRADE)
. ---
"
......... _-_ ... _----,-----------------
DAYTON mSTORYPROJECT
. SEPTEMBER 1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
"
BOMBINQ
1
CONTACT
2 PAUSE
GROUP
H1LLNAROEW
MEETING
TOSKOP,JE
JANVlERlMLADIC
TEAM BRIEFS HAC
SHUTTlE MEETJHQ
ROUND 12
-
(continued)
....
(llelt1RADm

_ ........... '- .
HOLBROOKE 'BRIEFS 3
4 5
<:uRIC, PARDeW,
6 HlUlrARNOFF 7 GENEVA 8 9
OIC IN GEVEVA
KERRICK MEETWINATO BRIEF CONTACT PRINCIPLES SIGNED
TEAM LOBBIES AIR CAMPAIGN IN BRUSSELS ON IFOR GROUP IN PARIS
CLARK,PARDEW .\ TO RESUME BOMBING RESUMES
...
KERRICK CONTINUE
-
NATO MEETINGS
-
HAC ISSUES 4I-ftR
,
-
ULTIMATUM
-- -. "".""" (AlHENS-SKOP,/E-AHIiARA) _ '. IIlOME-GEHEVA)
(QEHl:VA) (WASfIHCJ1ON)
. BOSNIANoSERBS NJITOANHO-UNC1:S
_ ......
JAHVlERlMLACCC 10
11 12
SUFFER MAJOR' :13 3-DA\"8OMBIHG 14
CONTACT 15 16
LosSES IN BOSNIA PAUse
GROUP
MEETING
ORKMACEDONIA
- AGREEMENT SlGNED-
-
MEETING
CRUISE MlssaLE
HOLBROOKS BRIEFS
SHUTTlE
.....
STRtKEON
PRlHCIPAI.S;
ROUND.3 BOSNIAH-SERBS
.HIU,OWENI
BANJAluKA
DECIDE TO PUSH
AGREE yo EHD
SlLAJDZlC TRAvel.
FOR CEASEFIRE
WHITEHOUSE SARAJEVO SlEOE
TO SARAJEVO
BRIEFS CONORESS
ON IFOR PLANS (Ba.GIIADEi (ZAGREB-JIOSTAR) (CEHl!VA) (BELGRADE)
. -._--".
..
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
-
HATONN EXTEND
---
.
FEDERAnON AGRE'eS NATO" UN END
OWEN, HILL
PAUSE! FOR 3 DAYS NOT TO TAKe
..
BOMBING
PAROEW ____
BANJA-LUKA INDEFINITELY
IN
WIPALE SERBS
LOSSES AT UNA RIVI'lR
WASHINGTON
FOA HIGH.t.EVEI.
(ZAGRElI) (ZAGRaJ.e1!LGRAIlE) (WA5H1fIIOTOH)
M\!emlGS
....
-
-
!!E_1.GIWle)
FROHTSIN
24 NEGOnATOH OM -25 26 27 28
CONTON, PERRY, 29
30
WES1l:RN BOSNIA
"FURTHER AGREED
-FURTliER AQREED
l CHRISTOPHER LOSm
STABUZE
PRINCIPLES-IN H. Y.
PRlHaPLES" SIGNeD
SHUme CONGRESS ON IFOR
..
l WASHINGTON
-
ROUND ...
HAC APPROVES
-
SlOCOMBE. CLARK &! CONCEPT
I KORNBLUM-IN -
-
EUROPE FOR IFOR
-
..
TAl.KS
(SlfJ\NNOH AIRPORT
SHATTUCK ReTURHS

(BELGRADE) .... __ ._ (HeWY'ORIQ
TOBALICANS
(SARAomYO)
-_.
. _._-_ .. -_.,....,-----'-----------------

DAYTON mSTORY PROJECT
OCTOBER 1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
1
2 3
SHl1TT1.E
USl.UN DISCUSS IFOR

BOSNIAN SERB ARMY
(contInued)
LAUHCfIES
COUHTER-oFJ'ENSrIE
(V.GReNORA)
..


8 9 10
BOSNIA DELA VS

PERRY GRACHEV
MEET IN GENEVA
ALLEDGE
8ERBETHNiC
CLEANSING
tN DANJA LUKA
..
15
SJfATTUCKIN
16
CHRISTOPHER,
BOSNIA PERRY, SHAU AT 17
HOUSE
TALBOTT JOfHS
TEAM
CONTACT
GROUP MEETlNQ
SHUTTLE
ROUNDts
CLARK a TALBOTT
REMAIN IN MOSC9W
(PARIS)
.


22 23 24
u.s"
TUDJMAN&
RUSSIAN
SUMMIT
IZiITBEGOVlC
W/CUNTON
IN NEW
- .. -
CROAnAHOLOS 29
ROHDE
30 31
LEGlSLAllVE
RSPORTEO
ELECTlONS . PtISSINQ
PREoCONFERCHCE
-
ARRANGEMENT IN
-
HOUSE PASSES
DAYTON
NON-BINOING
RESOLUlTON ON
BALKAN PRESIDENTS
TROOPS
ARRIV1! IN DAYTON
4 NATO MEETING 5
PRINCIPALS DECIDE IN WIWAMSBURG
ON PEACE TAUCS DISCUSS !FOR
MENZIES CEASEARE
SWORNIH AGRSalENT

11 12
NATO ANNDUNC!S CIiASI!FlRE
IFORPLAHS
TAKeS EFFECT
..
18 19
CHRISTOPHER,
PERRY
& SHAlJ AT HOUSE
-
BlLJ)T-.\ IVANOV
-
J91N1l:AM
IZACREB-8I!LGRADE)
PEAce TAlKS
25
WARREtn'ON
26
POSTPONEO UNTlt. MEETrNGS
NOYEMBER,ST
GINGRICH LEl'TeR TO
CUNTON
6
-
=
-
CONTACT
GROUP
MEEnl'lG
(ROME)
13
CONGRESSIONAL
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.
-
20
CUES'RESIGNS
.
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QAAH18 SHATr1JQ( 7
ACCESS TO SERB 2
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SUMMIT
P1lRY-'GRACH!!V AGREE
.

7
14
21
28
PRINCIPALS AGREE
TO MAINTAIN
SANcnOHS:
IFOIi DtSCUSSED
TALKS wtTH CONTACT
GROUP ON DRAFT .

DAYTON mSTORY PROJECT
EARLY DAYTON: NOVEMBER 1 'NOVEMBER iI, 1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY . THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
EASTERN SUVONIA
NEQO'IlATiONS
IN EROOT. iASTeRH
SLAVONIA
5
6
TALBOTT VISIT
SANCllONS orscussroN
MOSTAR MAYORS ARRIVE
TALBOTT DINNER
7
1
DAYTON OPENS
2
DRAFTS ON FRAMEWORK. DRAFTS ON HUMAN
1iLEC110N8, I MlUTARY RIGHTS, REFUGEES'
3
CHRISTOPHER MeETS "HAnoNA!. MONUMENTS
wmr BAlKAN PRESIDENTS MlLOSEVIC-lUDJMAN
.
"
. LUNCH OISOUSSION
SHATTUCK VISIT a
,GALLUCCI ARRtWS
lUDJIlAN LEAVES
WITH GALUJIWnf
-1-____ _
8 9
MUSEUM DINNeR
10
DRAm ON ARBITRATION SERBS RELEASE ROHDE FEDERAll0N ACREEMENT CHRISTOPHER VISIT
&1"RANSPORTATIOH INmALED
FRENCH OINNER
B-H .. SERS PRESIDENTS
orscuss MAP WAR CRIMES mrBUHAL
INDICTS 3 YUGOSLAV
TUDJMAN RETURNS OFFICERS
FEOSRATIOH AQREEMIiNT
SIGNED .
MllOSEVlC .\ TUDJMAN
REACH EiASTERN
'SLAYOHIA AOAEEUEH1'
'---------,_. -.. - ._-----'------
4
RABIN ASSASSINATeO
seRBIXNNER
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DA YTON mSTORY PROJECT
LATE DAYTON: NOVEMBER 12- NOVEMBER 25,1995
SUNDAY MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY
12
13 14
15
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18
FRASURe, KRl1ZEl, DRAFTS OF IoIAP. CHRISTOPHER MEDIATES llJDJMAH LEAVES \.AKI.j VISIT
PERRY. SLOCOMB&.
BOSNIANS GET SARAJEVO
DREW FAMlLJl;S VlSfr
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EASTERN SLAVONJA
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ROAD
ARMS CONmOLMADE CROAT DlHHeR
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SEPARATE ANNEX .
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
WAR CRIMES
INDICTS KARAD2IC .. HOUSE! VOTES TO
mlDUHALtHDICTS e
MlADIC FOR SREBRENICA PREVENT DEPLOYMENT
SOSNWf..CADATS
OF u.s. TROOPS
2ND SSRB DINNeR



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TUOJMAH RETURNS
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DAYTON mSTORYpR.OJECT. ...
'AF'fER DAYTON: NOVEMBER 26.
THURSDAY
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TUESDAY
WEDNESDAY
FRIDAY
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NATO SIiCHETARY
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CONFSRENCE
SHUTTLE . HATOAUTHORI'ZES
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CUNTON REQUESTS BOSNIANSERBS
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FUNOING OF TROOPS :
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18
19 BRUSSElS
20
21
22
CONTROL MEE111lG RECONSnwcnON
CONFERENce ,
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