QUESTIONS TO DISCUSS 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 83 F. THE DESIGN ARGUMENT FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE Perhaps the oldest argument for God’s existence is the design argument, which rests on the simple intuition that the presence of natural design in the world around us implies the exis tence of some designer, We find hints of this reasoning in the Old Testament Book of Psalms, “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament shows his handiwork" (19:1). Technically, this passage does not argue for the conclusion that God exists, but it states that the grandeur of nature bears the mark of God and, to that extent, is a kind of testament to God's existence. a. Are there any things in the natural world that seem to require a divine designer as an explanation? ». Could God have used evolution as a tool to bring about the design that we see in nature? . Is there anything in the design of nature that requires us to believe that it was created by a single, all powerful God? Along with his cosmological arguments, Thomas Aquinas presented a brief version of the de- sign argument: ‘The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence itis plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intel- ligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. [From Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1266), First Part, Q. 2, Art. 3] More precisely, Aquinas's design argument is this, Objects without intelligence act toward some end; for example, a tree grows and reproduces its own kind. Moving toward an end or acting purposively requires intelligence. Ifa thing is unintelligent, yet acts for some end, then that thing must be guided to this end by something which is intelligent. And this “something” is God. In the centuries after Aquinas, theologians kept pace with the growing body of scientific knowledge. Medieval notions of science and cosmology were discarded and ultimately re- placed with a conception of the universe governed by mechanistic physical laws. The newer theistic proofs were thus scientifically up to date, drawing on the latest contributions of mathematicians, astronomers, biologists, and other physical scientists. By the eighteenth century, the most common versions of this argument were in the form of an analogy between the design that we see in human productions and the design that we see in the natural world. ‘The general form of any argument from analogy is this: 1. Object A has properties f, g, and h and also P. 2. Object 8 is like A in having properties f, g, and h. 3. Therefore probably B has properties P also.84 PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS Following this formula, the design argument from analogy is this: 1. Machines (which have orderly and purposeful arrangements of parts) are the products of intelligent design. 2, The universe resembles a machine (insofar as it has an orderly and pur- poseful arrangement of parts). 3. Therefore, the universe is the product of intelligent design. Proponents of the design argument used a variety of examples to draw out the analogy. For example, they pointed out the intricate mechanisms of human-made watches and compared these with the natural machinery that we see in the operation of the solar system or in the bi- ological make up of the eye or the hand, A? AGAINST THE DESIGN ARGUMENT: DAVID HUME Earlier we examined Hume's attack on the cosmological argument as appears in his Dia- logues Concerning Natural Religion. In that work, Hume takes on the design argument as well, The initial design argument from analogy is presented by the character Cleanthes. CLEANTHES I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great ma- chine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivi- sions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accu- racy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of anal- ‘ogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. [Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 2] ‘89, According to Cleanthes, in what ways Is the world “one great machine”? ‘The Failure of the Analogy. Cleanthes’ design argument is then challenged by Philo—who here represents Hume's views. A central assumption in the design argument is that the uni- verse resembles a machine (premise 2 above). Perhaps there is some superficial resemblance between the two—such as with the circular movement of planets around the sun and the movement of gears within clocks. However, Philo argues that such resemblance doesn’t hold up to close scrutiny. The universe is quite different from human machines. Philo begins explaining a basic principle of logic: The more dissimilar two objects are, the weaker the analogy between those two objects becomes.[pr yer ree 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 85 SDLATIOG UE s coxerauane NATURAL RELIGION. DAVID HUMEDEsq ma LOND Om apetegss Title page of David Hume's Dialogues Con- cerning Natural Religion (1779) first pub- lished two years after Hume's deaih. PHILO... Thata stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have ob- served a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is pre- sented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it toa very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken. If we see @ house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an ar- chitect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider. Narra ‘90. Philo presents examples of weak analogies. Give one of these.