DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No.

142295, PARDO, J FACTS: Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly, sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant. Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms. For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search. However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal. HELD: The Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal. True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

VERGARA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 128720, Quisumbing, J FACTS: An information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City charging S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y Abrera, PC and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band. Allegedly, conspiring and confederating with John Doe, they stole from Catherine F. Manalo the payroll money amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued at P17,000 belonging to Manalo. Athough all the suspects were brought into police custody, petitioners co -accused managed to extricate themselves from police control and remain at large. Only petitioner was left to face the charges wherein he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private complainant who testified in court while Vergara claimed an alibi and denied his participation in the offense. Claiming innocence, he presented evidence showing that he was at Pacita Complex at San Pedro, Laguna at the time of the commission of the offense and that being a member of the narcotic operatives he was engaged in a surveillance of a suspected drug pusher at that particular time. This statement was corroborated by no less than the team leader Captain, who was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was physically present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex, San Pedro Laguna at the alleged commission of the offense. The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and disregarded petiti oners alibi. It convicted Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in the information, , but of robbery as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not appellants alibi is bereft of merit. HELD: For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. It is essential that credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable alibi. Petitioner failed to meet this test. While petitioner could have been working as intelligence agent in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 21, 1990, contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime. In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed In the light of private complainants positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the latters def ense of bare denial and alibi must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative testimony. Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused. Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by a credible witness who has no motive to testify falsely.

STATE PROSECUTORS vs. MURO, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876,Per Curiam FACTS: Judge Manuel T. Muro filed a motion for reconsideration against a a per Curiam decision in 1994 that ordered for his dismissal from service and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. The said decision was brought about by his motu proprio dismissal of eleven criminal cases against Mrs. Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank foreign exchange restrictions. Such dismissal constitutes gross ignorance of the law because it was prompted by mere newspapers reports of the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions which were hearsay evidence and without waiting for the defense to fi le a motion to quash nor at least affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter. In pressing for the dismissal of the complaint against him, he maintains that his dismissal of the criminal charges against Mrs. Marcos in the aforedescribed manner was not motivated by bad faith or by any corrupt and insidious intent. And to further belie his imputed "gross ignorance of the law", respondent stresses that "he graduated from the law school, magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed 6th in the Bar examination" ISSUE: Whether or not respondents dismissal of the cases constitutes gross ignorance of the law absent bad faith and ill motive on his part. HELD: This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law. Respondent, in acting the way he did, committed a legal error which usually is remediable by appeal or by any other modes sanctioned by the Rules of Court and "does not raise a question of improper judicial conduct subject to judicial discipline". But egregious legal error, legal error motivated by bad faith, or a continuing pattern of legal error do amount to misconduct subject to discipline, ranging from admonishment to removal from office. And legal error is egregious and serious enough to amount to misconduct when judges deny individuals their basic or fundamental rights, such as when defendants were not advised of their constitutional right to counsel, coerced to plead guilty, sentenced to jail when only a fine is provided by law, sentenced to jail for a period longer than the maximum sentence allowed by law, or particularly similar to this case when defendants were denied a full and fair hearing a constitutional right equally afforded to the prosecution but unceremoniously ignored by respondent. The gravity of his actuation cannot be shrugged off casually. Respondent has followed a course of judicial conduct which is in utter disregard of the law, established rules of practice and basic notions of fair play, and his impressive scholastic record as student of law all the more punctuates his blunder rather than temper it.

ROMUALDEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 161602, Abad J. FACTS: Pursuant to Republic Act 1379, the Republic of the Philippines filed an action for forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired property with the Sandiganbayan against Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc. The filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings. 2 They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing of the case. The Republic, in its Comment pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820 and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case. Sandiganbayan denied the Romualdezes motion, hence they filed petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayans rulings and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case on the ground that e Office of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since its authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before that dateSince the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the absence of a prior valid preliminary investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue. In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their absence. The spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that investigation took place. They were thus denied their right to be heard in that investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the Romualdezes are entitled to a new preliminary investigation. HELD: The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since the y had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes. Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA revolution of February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things shall have stabilized.13 The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the peoples ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served on them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.

NOGALES VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 191080, Mendoza J. FACTS: Special Investigator Garry Meez (SI Meez) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him and his fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) located at Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the items/articles/objects enumerated in his application which were allegedly used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website. The application was granted and the corresponding Search Warrant was issued. Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties which was denied by RTC. Meanwhile,the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against petitioners be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence and the same was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Release Seized Properties manifesting that the complaint against them was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of the seized properties. The Motion to Release Seized Properties is partially granted such that only the monitor sets were released but the CPUs and the softwares were retained under the custody of the NBI. On appeal to CA, it ordered that the CPUs and softwares which were ordered to be retained by the NBI shall be released in favor of the petitioners herein with the condition that the hard disk be removed from the CPUs and be destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by law. On appeal before Supreme Court, petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of pornographic printouts presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 07H-13530. Since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course of business, the destruction of which would violate not only procedural, but substantive due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the destruction of the hard disks and softwares is tantamount to denial of petitioners right to due process. HELD: The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Had it been otherwise, then, petitioners argument would have been meritorious as there coul d be no basis for destroying the hard disks of petitioners computer units. The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files. Significantly, Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit as it directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject law. To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. ALEJANDRO, G.R. No. 176350, Brion J.

FACTS: Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and was sentenced to life imprisonment. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the Exhibits whereby they agreed on the admissibility of the request for laboratory examination of the submitted specimen and on the findings of the forensic chemist. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling that appellant cannot be allowed to question, on appeal, the identity and integrity of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from the appellant by members of the entrapment team after stipulating its admissibility during the pre-trial. The CA added that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who handed the plastic sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on their part On appeal, the he appellant claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failu re to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the integrity of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure of the apprehending police to mark it ISSUE: Whether or not integrity of seized item is compromised by the failure of the apprehending officer to mark it.

HELD: The Court resolved to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails. In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the seized items with th he police did not only fail to mark the specimen immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to identify the police officer to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the police station. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and, later on, presented in courteir initials immediately upon confiscation. In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his possession. However, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the police to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized item

PEOPLE VS. ALIVIO, G.R. No. 177771, Brion J. FACTS: During a buy-bust operation by the Pasig City Police, Arielito Alivio and Ernesto de la Vega were apprehended after having seized one plastic sachet of shabu on the person of Dela Vega and drug paraphernalia at Alivios residence which were correspondingly marked. During the trial, the appellants anchored their defense on denial and frame-up. Alivio additionally asserted that he could not have sold shabu to PO2 Laro since he knew him to be a policeman. Alivio claimed that he was a former driver of Atty. Nelson Fajardo whom he used to accompany to the police station where PO2 Laro was assigned. The RTC convicted the appellants of all charges laid. The RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the buy-bust operation and the lack of improper motive on the part of the police officers. The RTC rejected the proferred denial and frame-up as defenses as they are inherently easy to concoct, and found that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the appellants as perpetrators. His decision was affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the identities of the subject shabu were not sufficiently proven since the seized items were not marked at the time the appellants were apprehended. HELD: In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items. In this case, although the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the buy-bust team under the chain of custody rule. Under the circumstances, the prosecutions evidence clearly established an unbroken link in the chain of custody, thus removing any doubt or suspicion that the shabu and drug paraphernalia had been altered, substituted or otherwise tampered with. The unbroken link in the chain of custody also precluded the possibility that a person, not in the chain, ever gained possession of the seized evidence.

VALLENO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 192050, Perez J. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Naga City found petitioner Nelson Valleno y Lucito guilty of violation of Section 11 of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (Illegal Possession of Shabu) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine. During the enforcement of thesearch warrant in the reseidence of Valleno, he was found in possession of 9 nine transparent plastic sheets containing shabu. During trial, petitioner Valleno interposed denial and claimed that upon showing the search warrant , the policemen asked him to come out of the house and thereafter the police officer emerged and told him that they had found a tawas-like substance and he was asked to sign an inventory receipt which he did not understood. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, before the Supreme Court, Valleno raised the following arguments: 1) there was failure to present the alleged photographs of the seized substance in court; 2) there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of the inventory of the seized items; 3) there was a major contradiction from among prosecution witnesses on who actually brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and 4) the manner of conducting the physical inventory of the alleged drugs taken from petitioners house appeared to be irregular as the seized items were allowed to be handled by persons not authorized to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to submit the required physical inventory would render the seized item inadmissible.

HELD: The Court ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the absence of a member of media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.33 In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. Clearly, the recovery and handling of the seized illegal drugs were more than satisfactorily established in this case.

LUCAS VS. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, NACHURA, J. FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. In this petition, Jesse Lucas claimed that Jesus Lucas was his father. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. Respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment and averred among others that that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptabilit y of DNA evidence. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and opined that the petitioner must first establish the four procedural aspects as laid down in the case of Herrerea vs. Alba before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. However, upon motion for reconsideration of petitioner, the trial court set aside its previous order and dismissed respondents arguments. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondent and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case. ISSUE: Whether or not DNA testing can only be ordered upon establishment of prima facie case of filiation. HELD: The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at the initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

HERRERA VS. ALBA, G.R. No. 148220, CARPIO, J. FACTS: Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner Rosendo Herrera. Likewise, he also filed a Motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate proceedings. However, petitioner denied that he is the biological father of respondent and he also denied physical contact with respondents mother. He also opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and asserted that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional. However, said motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and ruled that the proposed DNA testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. ISSUE: Whether or not DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity. HELD: The laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity. Thus, parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. However, the court ruled that despite the relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

RP VS. MARCOS, G. R. No. 171701, SERENO, J FACTS:

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to their mandate, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. Thereafter, petitioner Republic of the Philippines presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals. After RPs presentation of the evidence, the respondents filed Demurrer to Evidence.The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, which granted all the Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. Petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there was a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III had connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render an accounting and to return the ill-gotten wealth. Said motion was later denied by the Sandiganbayan and it pointed out its reservation in its Resolution, wherein it said that it would still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. On appeal, the Republic assailed the resolutions issued by Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Marcos siblings collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. HELD: It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and i n what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents. First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioners allegations.Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them. Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couples alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth However, since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos,the Court ruled that iit is imperative that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Because of this, the Court take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In sum, the Court ruled that the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.