1

Little Black Book of

Operations Tradecraft

Parabellum Concepts
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Contents
CIA Secret Weapons Systems – Page 3
Logistics of a Black Bag Job – Page 9
NSA Employee Manual – Page 12
A Study of Assassination – Page 29
Surveillance Recognition – Page 42
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THE CIA'S SECRET WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Exploding wine bottles, guns constructed out of pipes,
bullets made of teeth, aspirin explosives: they sound like
props from a second-rate spy story. Horrifyingly enough,
they are real. The CIA has spent a great deal of its time--
and your money--developing countless bizarre weapons for
assassination, sabotage, and mass destruction. If that's
news to you, it's because the CIA doesn't want these
products, some of which are quite easy to put together, to
fall into the "wrong hands." As for whether they are in the
right hands now--judge for yourself.

The CIA has developed many exotic and sophisticated devices

intended for use in interrogation, sabotage, and assassination.
These weapons are necessary--if you grant that what the CIA itself
does is necessary. If the CIA wants to eliminate a key KGB agent
operating in Hungary, it faces certain problems. It would be
virtually impossible to slip a deadly weapon, such as a gun or
bomb, past Hungarian customs officials. Thus, the CIA assassin
must assemble his weapon from commonly obtainable materials after
he crosses the border.
The CIA agent might decide to construct a urea nitrate
explosive, commonly known as a urine bomb. This weapon is quite
deadly, easily exploded, and consists primarily of nitric acid and
urine. The urine bomb is one of literally hundreds of murderous
weapons in the CIA arsenal.
"The New York Times" of September 26, 1975 revealed the
existence of guns that shoot cobra-venom darts. Then there was the
shoe polish compound intended to make Fidel Castro's beard fall
out, so that he would lose his "charisma." And CIA laboratories in
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey developed the famous rifle that shoots
around corners.
Some CIA weapons are designed to kill many people--deadly germs
can be released in subways; others are intended to kill a single,
specific individual--the Borgia ring contains deadly poison to be
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slipped into a victim's drink; and still others are standard

weapons supplied for such missions as overthrowing the Allende
government in Chile in 1973.
The information about CIA weapons that you will read in this
article generally has not been made public before. It was not
intended to be. But your tax dollars pay for these devices; it is
your right to know about them.
There is a booklet, written in 1977 and distributed to a select
group of U.S. mercenaries, titled "CIA Improvised Sabotage
Devices." This instructional guidebook, part of "the Combat
Bookshelf," was published by Desert Publications, P.O. Box 22005,
Phoenix, Arizona 85028. If you want to know how the CIA turns a
cigar box into an explosive that can destroy a 10,000-gallon
capacity storage tank, then "CIA Improvised Sabotage Devices" is
what you should read. You will need it if you want to build the
"Water-Drip Electric Delay," a bomb that requires little more than
wood scrap, a tin can, and a battery. The "Pocket Watch Electric
Delay" requires little more than a watch, a screw, and a battery.
The "Mousetrap Electric Release" is another bomb, this one
requiring a mousetrap, a trip wire, a battery, and little else. It
is described as "an excellent device to use with bazooka rockets
against trucks, tanks, or locomotives." The "Chemical
Instantaneous Initiator" is made from a sugar-chlorate mix and is
effective in sabotaging trains. The "Martini Glass Shaped Charge"
is a bomb that also can be made out of a beer can. You might want
to try to construct the "Vehicle Booby Trap." The "Potassium
Chlorate and Sugar Igniter" and the "Sawdust, Moth Flakes, and Oil
Incendiary" can be made with only what you see in their titles.
For these and more than fifty other CIA devices, step-by-step
instructions on how to make them and illustrations of what they
should look like when completed are given. Turn a wine bottle into
a bomb. Build a land-mine rocket. Manufacture napalm in your
basement. Even the simple how-tos of causing a dust explosion can
be found in "CIA Improvised Sabotage Devices."
Why is the CIA so deeply involved in sabotage techniques? The
CIA might think it is in this country's interest to delay
scientific work being done by another nation. Or, the CIA might
want to disrupt a nation's economy in the hope that the resulting
chaos will lead to civil unrest and the overthrow of the existing
government (some of this actually happened in Chile). The original
John Rockefeller used such tactics against his competitors. He
simply had their refineries blown up.
Another pamphlet the CIA would not like you to see is titled
"How to Kill," written by John Minnery, edited by Robert Brown and
Peder Lund, and published by Paladin Press, Box 1307, Boulder,
Colorado 80306. The reason the CIA would prefer that you not see
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this eighty-eight-page pamphlet, which is unavailable at bookstores

and newsstands, is because it contains a number of "ingenious"
methods of doing what the title says. Also, Paladin Press, which
published a book called "OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual," is
widely regarded by journalists as an organization with close ties
to mercenary groups and the CIA. Paladin Press doesn't want you to
know that, but how else could they have published the "OSS Sabotage
and Demolition Manual?" The Office of Strategic Services was the
precursor of today's CIA.
This writer's call to Colorado yielded the following
conversation:

"How could you publish the "OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual,"
I asked Peter Lund, editor and publisher of Paladin Press, "if your
organization, at the least, was not dealing with former OSS agents?
And what about "How to Kill?"
"I don't talk to journalists," Lund said.
"You're called the Paladin Press. You must publish books. Can
I order them?"
"No."
"Why not? You're a publisher, aren't you?"
"We're afraid our publications might fall into the wrong hands."
"What are the right hands?" I asked.
"I don't talk to journalists."
"Have you ever heard of Desert Publications?" I asked.
"A fine outfit," Lund said. "If they recommend you, I'll send
you our material."
"That's my problem," I said. "They don't seem to have a phone
number."
"Well, they're a good group."
"Listen," I said, "wasn't your group, and Desert Publications
besides, involved in CIA mercenary activity in Africa?"
"I don't know anything about that."
"Were you in the Special Forces?"
"July 1967 to July 1968 in Vietnam."
"Were you CIA?"
"I was MACV [Military Armed Forces Command Vietnam]."
"You weren't affiliated with CIA?"
"I didn't say that."
"What do you say?"
"We did joint operations with CIA on the Phoenix Program."
"Wasn't that a murder operation?"
"No. It was snatching people."

The Phoenix Program was designed for a job that the CIA
euphemistically described as "eliminating the Viet Cong
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infrastructure." In reality, it was a rampant reign of terror run

out of CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Former CIA director
William Colby later termed the program "effective." The Phoenix
Program was a naked murder campaign, as proved by every realistic
report, ranging from the Bertrand Russell Tribunal to the Dellums
Committee to admissions by CIA agents themselves. The program
killed--and *none* of these killings occurred in combat--18,000
people, mostly women and children.
But what about Peder Lund, editor and publisher of Paladin
Press? The book he edited and published, "How to Kill," outlined a
surfeit of murder methods, horrific techniques of causing people to
die. For example:
"Without getting too deeply into the realm of the bizarre,"
wrote John Minnery, the author of "How to Kill" as he proceeded to
just that, "a specially loaded bullet made from a human tooth
(bicuspid) could be fired under the jaw or through the mouth into
the head. The tooth is a very hard bone, and its enamel shell
would allow it to penetrate into the brain. The intention here is
also to hide the cause of death because the examiner in his search
for a projectile will disregard bone fragments."
One last example from "How to Kill" should give you the flavor
of the book:

Lesson Nine: Hot Wire

"Essentially, the weapon is an electrified grid in the urinal

basin. This can take the form of a screen cover for the drain
. or a metal grill. If the urinal is completely porcelain, the
. screen must be added by the assassin. The drain cover is
. connected to the electrical system of the washroom by means of
. an insulated cord that is hidden behind the plumbing.
"What happens when the subject uses the urinal should be
obvious now. The subject's urine, which is a salty liquid and
. a perfect conductor of electricity, makes contact with the
. charged grid, and the shock will kill him."

This reporter's investigation revealed that the "Hot Wire" was

child's play compared to certain other CIA weapons devices. For
instance, I was able to obtain Volumes One and Two of the "CIA
Black Book" on improvised munitions, volumes that are stamped "for
official use only" on almost every page. It is obvious why the CIA
would like these books to remain secret. With elaborate
instructions, they describe how to make high explosives from
aspirin, how to construct a nail grenade, and how to turn a Coke
bottle into a bomb.
Described in detail in the "Black Book" is the previously
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mentioned urea nitrate explosive, or, as it is known to the pros,

"the piss bomb." Instructions for the preparation of this weapon
assure the maker that animal urine will do as well as human; the
important thing is to have ten cups of it, boil it down to one cup,
and mix it with the nitric acid.
Also described in the "Black Book" is how to construct a pipe
pistol, which, as the name indicates, is a gun constructed out of a
pipe. Other weapons include a cooking syringe filled with poison
that can be stabbed into "the subject's" stomach; a cyanide gas
pistol; a throat cutter gauntlet knife (razor sharp and only an
inch or so in length); and a mixture of fertilizer and aluminum
powder that can be made into a powerful bomb.
Why build murder weapons out of such weird material? Is the CIA
insane?
No. In its own way, the whole thing is perfectly logical.
The pamphlet "How to Kill" explained it all: "As most of these
devices are homemade, this precludes the possibility of their being
traced. They are, in effect, `sanitized' and perfect for
assassinations, where weapons are prohibited, or where customs in
the hostile country are stringent, so these can be made from local
materials."
Being a contract killer for the CIA is not all roses. You
cannot kill in just any way. A number of attempts have been made
on Fidel Castro's life--some with the CIA and the Mafia
cooperating--and some of them may have failed because of
restrictions imposed on the potential assassins. It would be
unacceptable for Castro's murder to be laid at the door of the CIA.
This would make Castro a martyr in the eyes of his countrymen.
Thus, a method that would suggest death by natural causes must be
found.
Abundant speculation and considerable evidence suggest that the
CIA or some other government agency arranged for the "natural"
deaths of David Ferrie, Jack Ruby, George De Mohrenschildt, and
other potential witnesses into the assassination of John Kennedy.
Some methods of killing, like the injection of an air bubble into
the bloodstream, will often go unnoticed by medical examiners.
Another hard-to-trace method of killing is to mail a snake to
the victim. This is known as killing by long distance. A
disadvantage to this method is that the snake might bite an
innocent third party who just happens to open the package. The
advantage is that once the snake has struck, the evidence can
simply slither away.
Sometimes, as the CIA knows, killing has to be done at close
range. For this purpose, a valuable weapon is the ice pick with a
blood arrester attached. The blood arrester is a cloth wrapped
near the tip of the ice pick. When the pick is shoved into the
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victim, the spurting blood is absorbed by the blood arrester.

People who see the victim fall will probably think he has had a
heart attack. While the onlookers try to help the victim, the
assassin uses this valuable ten or fifteen seconds to escape
unnoticed.
Often it is advisable to use what is called in the trade a
"quiet weapon." Silenced weapons can include pistols, rifles, and
even machine guns.
Poison is a quiet killer. Here is a partial list of the poisons
the CIA has become expert at administering: oil of bitter almonds;
ant paste; cadmium, used in vapor form, and death is delayed four
hours; radiator cleaner, also causing a delayed death;
Cantharides (Spanish Fly); ethyl mercury; and freon, heated by a
flame. These poisons and many others are listed in "How to Kill."
The author then cautions the reader:
"Unless otherwise stated, these poisons are either to be
injected into the subject, or taken orally by him by adding it to
his food. Use common sense in the application of these potions
and, if possible, double the O.D. necessary."
W.H. Bowart, in his book, "Operation Mind Control" described the
CIA's use of drugs: "In 1953, the CIA made plans to purchase ten
kilograms of LSD for use in `drug experiments with animals and
human beings.' Since there are more than 10,000 doses in a gram,
that meant the CIA wanted 100 million doses. The CIA obviously
intended to `corner the market' on LSD so that other countries
would not be ahead of the U.S. in their potential for `LSD
warfare.'"
Dr. Albert Hoffman, an early researcher into the uses of LSD,
was horrified by what the CIA was doing: "I had perfected LSD for
medical use, not as a weapon. It can make you insane or even kill
you if it is not properly used under medical supervision. In any
case, the research should be done by medical people and not by
soldiers or intelligence agencies."
Perhaps the most frightening weapon of all is the one that can
be used to alter weather and climate. It was used with
considerable success in Vietnam. It slowed troop movements with
heavy rains, and it destroyed the rice crop, as well. The danger
is that these climatological changes may become permanent,
affecting not only enemies of the United States, but also the
entire planet.
Finally, considerable evidence exists that the United States,
through the CIA, employed germ warfare during the Korean War. A
number of captured pilots testified that germ warfare was used, but
their testimony was dismissed as brainwashing. A Marine Corps
colonel named Frank H. Schwable signed a germ warfare confession
and, according to W.H. Bowart, "named names, cited missions,
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described meetings and strategy conferences."

Schwable later repudiated his confession. But the charges of
germ warfare were taken up in front of the United Nations, and a
number of countries believed them.
The United States, incidentally, was later charged with using
nerve gas in Vietnam.
What you have read on these pages is pretty revolting stuff.
Yet, if the world ought to be saved from Communism, who can say it
is not necessary? One danger, of course, is that these terrible
weapons have been introduced into our body politic and have
produced strange and terrible fruits on our own native soil. When
assassination becomes government policy, when men are trained to
kill in every conceivable way, when morality is set aside for a
"higher good," can even the President of the United States consider
himself safe?

The Logistics of a Black Bag Job

by Wes Swearingen, FBI Whistleblower

1. Identify the subject.

2. Determine target's place of employment and type of employment.
3. Identify the mode of transportation.
4. Identify other residents of the household.
5. Determine whether target has any other visitors in the residence such as
relatives, maids, etc.
6. Identify the landlord if the residence is not a privately owned home or
condominium.
7. Perform a trial run.
8. Start the bag job ...
A. All members of the surveillance team, regardless of their position, must
be in radio contact with one another or in contact with a reasonable relay.
No bag job should start or continue if any member of the team is out of
radio contact. A hostile force, such as another member of the organization
under investigation, local police, or a thief, may have neutralized may
have neutralized one of your teammates and may monitor your movements by
radio.
Everyone involved must be physically and mentally alert, aware of their
surroundings, attentive and aggressive, and a team player.
The successful execution of a bag job depends upon everyone doing their
job correctly. There is no room for error, bad judgment, or heroes. A
successfully planned and executed bag job will never give you any surprises
that you cannot handle. (A locked door should never be taped open as was
done by the infamously incompetent Watergate burglars during the break-in
in 1972 at Democratic Party headquarters in Washington, D.C.
A bag job is a tremendous strain on the nerves. Emotions can run high in
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these tense situations, and each member of the team must be able to control
himself mentally, physically, and emotionally, and have confidence that the
others can do likewise.

B. The surveillance team will follow the subject and any members of the
residence. Depending upon the persons to be followed, no less than two
surveillance agents should be used per person, unless school children are
involved, in which case one agent per child will suffice. In the case of
very young children, it is sometimes advisable to have two agents so as to
avoid the appearance of being a child molester.

C. Once all members of the residence have been surveilled away from the
residence or accounted for in another location, and there are no apparent
obstacles, then the plan is ready for a trial run.

D. When the "ball players" are ready to begin the "game," those agents
designated to telephone the residence of any neighbors in a position to
observe the front should place their calls at a precise moment as
instructed by the "outside man."

E. The "outside man" or "lookout" will call the "inside team" into position
and will alert the various surveillance agents that the "ball players" are
approaching the field. The inside team on the trial run will consist of the
lock picker and one radio person.
Radio transmissions can be received by anyone with the proper equipment,
such as a 200-channel scanning radio, or other similar portable equipment
with a retail price of around $300, so communications must be innocuous.

F. The "pickup man" will deliver the inside team to the front door or to
the most suitable location to avoid attention; this could be the front
door, back door, a nearby alley, or a parking garage. The inside team is
dropped off and the "pickup man" departs the immediate area to stand by for
further instructions through the outside person or lookout.

G. The "inside team" approaches and examines the entrance for obvious alarm
systems. If no alarms are noted, the inside team will make the
surreptitious entry into the residence or office. The radio person of the
inside team will immediately announce to the outside person that "the
players are on the field."

H.The trial run will consist of an immediate search of all rooms for
friends, relatives, housekeepers, or anyone associated with the subject to
be sure the "field" is clear. The inside team will announce to the outside
person some description of the events taking place inside. For example, if
a quick observation reveals no information available for future bag jobs,
the inside person may announce that the game is being called for lack of
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interest in today's game or poor attendance.

If prospects look good, the photographer may be called in through some
phrase such as "Send in the press photographer; we may need photographs for
a starting line-up for future games."
It is important to keep the surveillance agents advised of events as
they happen so they feel they are part of the action. If the surveillance
team does not find out what happened until the end of the day or the next
day, morale will suffer and future bag jobs may be compromised because the
surveillance team will feel they are not qualified to be kept informed of
current events.
If the situation is such that a quick "game" can be played, that is, the
bag job can be done with one quick photographic session, the inside person
will ask the outside person to check with the other players to see if three
or four innings can be played.
If the surveillance team has everyone under control, the outside personannounce
something like, "Weather permitting, the relief pitchers can
go a full nine innings." this alerts the inside team that a regular bag job
of one or two hours can be handled by the surveillance team with no problem.

I. Photographs may be needed to rearrange articles after completion of the

bag job depending upon the inside condition and the number of records to be
examined. A Polaroid camera is ideal for this purpose. Once an examination
of the inside layout is clearly in mind and notes have been taken on
placement of various articles on the desk, in file cabinets, etc., the ball
game can be played. A progress report from the inside should be given to the outside
person
every few minutes. When the inside team is through, they will announce the
completion by saying something like, "The game is in the bottom of the
ninth with two men out and the count is two and two; have the pickup man
ready to transport the players back home."
The outside person may then relay the message to all surveillance units
that they may, "Head for the barn."
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NSA
Employee Manual

SECURITY GUIDELINES
This handbook is designed to introduce you to some of the basic security principles
and procedures with which all NSA employees must comply. It highlights some of your
security responsibilities, and provides guidelines for answering questions you may be
asked concerning your association with this Agency. Although you will be busy during
the forthcoming weeks learning your job, meeting co-workers, and becoming accustomed
to a new work environment, you are urged to become familiar with the security
information contained in this handbook. Please note that a listing of telephone numbers is
provided at the end of this handbook should you have any questions or concerns.

INTRODUCTION
In joining NSA you have been given an opportunity to participate in the activities of
one of the most important intelligence organizations of the United States Government. At
the same time, you have also assumed a trust which carries with it a most important
individual responsibility—the safeguarding of sensitive information vital to the security
of our nation. While it is impossible to estimate in actual dollars and cents the value of
the work being conducted by this Agency, the information to which you will have access
at NSA is without question critically important to the defense of the United States. Since
this information may be useful only if it is kept secret, it requires a very special measure
of protection. The specific nature of this protection is set forth in various Agency security
regulations and directives. The total NSA Security Program, however, extends beyond
these regulations. It is based upon the concept that security begins as a state of mind. The
program is designed to develop an appreciation of the need to protect information vital to
the national defense, and to foster the development of a level of awareness which will
make security more than routine compliance with regulations. At times, security practices
and procedures cause personal inconvenience. They take time and effort and on occasion
may make it necessary for you to voluntarily forego some of your usual personal
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prerogatives. But your compensation for the inconvenience is the knowledge that the
work you are accomplishing at NSA, within a framework of sound security practices,
contributes significantly to the defense and continued security of the United States of
America. I extend to you my very best wishes as you enter upon your chosen career or
assignment with NSA.
Philip T. Pease
Director of Security

INITIAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

ANONYMITY
Perhaps one of the first security practices with which new NSA personnel should
become acquainted is the practice of anonymity. In an open society such as ours, this
practice is necessary because information which is generally available to the public is
available also to hostile intelligence. Therefore, the Agency mission is best accomplished
apart from public attention. Basically, anonymity means that NSA personnel are
encouraged not to draw attention to themselves nor to their association with this Agency.
NSA personnel are also cautioned neither to confirm nor deny any specific questions
about NSA activities directed to them by individuals not affiliated with the Agency.
The ramifications of the practice of anonymity are rather far reaching, and its success
depends on the cooperation of all Agency personnel. Described below you will find some
examples of situations that you may encounter concerning your employment and how
you should cope with them. Beyond the situations cited, your judgement and discretion
will become the deciding factors in how you respond to questions about your
employment.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EMPLOYMENT

Certainly, you may tell your family and friends that you are employed at or assigned
to the National Security Agency. There is no valid reason to deny them this information.
However, you may not disclose to them any information concerning specific aspects of
the Agency’s mission, activities, and organization. You should also ask them not to
publicize your association with NSA.
Should strangers or casual acquaintances question you about your place of
employment, an appropriate reply would be that you work for the Department of
Defense. If questioned further as to where you are employed within the Department of
Defense, you may reply, “NSA.” When you inform someone that you work for NSA (or
the Department of Defense) you may expect that the next question will be, “What do you
do?” It is a good idea to anticipate this question and to formulate an appropriate answer.
Do not act mysteriously about your employment, as that would only succeed in drawing
more attention to yourself.
If you are employed as a secretary, engineer, computer scientist, or in a clerical,
administrative, technical, or other capacity identifiable by a general title which in no way
indicates how your talents are being applied to the mission of the Agency, it is suggested
that you state this general title. If you are employed as a linguist, you may say that you
are a linguist, if necessary. However, you should not indicate the specific language(s)
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with which you are involved.

The use of service specialty titles which tend to suggest or reveal the nature of the
Agency’s mission or specific aspects of their work. These professional titles, such as
cryptanalyst, signals collection officer, and intelligence research analyst, if given
verbatim to an outsider, would likely generate further questions which may touch upon
the classified aspects of your work. Therefore, in conversation with outsiders, it is
suggested that such job titles be generalized. For example, you might indicate that you
are a “research analyst.” You may not, however, discuss the specific nature of your
analytic work.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR AGENCY TRAINING

During your career or assignment at NSA, there is a good chance that you will
receive some type of job-related training. In many instances the nature of the training is
not classified. However, in some situations the specialized training you receive will relate
directly to sensitive Agency functions. In such cases, the nature of this training may not
be discussed with persons outside of this Agency.
If your training at the Agency includes language training, your explanation for the
source of your linguistic knowledge should be that you obtained it while working for the
Department of Defense.
You Should not draw undue attention to your language abilities, and you may not
discuss how you apply your language skill at the Agency.
If you are considering part-time employment which requires the use of language or
technical skills similar to those required for the performance of your NSA assigned
duties, you must report (in advance) the anticipated part-time work through your Staff
Security Officer (SSO) to the Office of Security’s Clearance Division (M55).

VERIFYING YOUR EMPLOYMENT

On occasion, personnel must provide information concerning their employment to
credit institutions in connection with various types of applications for credit. In such
situations you may state, if you are a civilian employee, that you are employed by NSA
and indicate your pay grade or salary. Once again, generalize your job title. If any further
information is desired by persons or firms with whom you may be dealing, instruct them
to request such information by correspondence addressed to: Director of Civilian
Personnel, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755- 6000.
Military personnel should use their support group designator and address when indicating
their current assignment.
If you contemplate leaving NSA for employment elsewhere, you may be required to
submit a resume/job application, or to participate in extensive employment interviews. In
such circumstances, you should have your resume reviewed by the Classification
Advisory Officer (CAO) assigned to your organization. Your CAO will ensure that any
classified operational details of your duties have been excluded and will provide you with
an unclassified job description. Should you leave the Agency before preparing such a
resume, you may develop one and send it by registered mail to the NSA/CSS Information
Policy Division (Q43) for review. Remember, your obligation to protect sensitive Agency
information extends beyond your employment at NSA.
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THE AGENCY AND PUBLIC NEWS MEDIA

From time to time you may find that the agency is the topic of reports or articles
appearing in public news media—newspapers, magazines, books, radio and TV. The
NSA/CSS Information Policy Division (Q43) represents the Agency in matters involving
the press and other media. This office serves at the Agency’s official media center and is
the Director’s liaison office for public relations, both in the community and with other
government agencies. The Information Policy Division must approve the release of all
information for and about NSA, its mission, activities, and personnel. In order to protect
the aspects of Agency operations, NSA personnel must refrain from either confirming or
denying any information concerning the Agency or its activities which may appear in the
public media. If you are asked about the activities of NSA, the best response is “no
comment.” You should the notify Q43 of the attempted inquiry. For the most part, public
references to NSA are based upon educated guesses. The Agency does not normally
make a practice of issuing public statements about its activities.

GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

ESPIONAGE AND TERRORISM

During your security indoctrination and throughout your NSA career you will become
increasingly aware of the espionage and terrorist threat to the United States. Your
vigilance is the best single defense in protecting NSA information, operations, facilities
and people. Any information that comes to your attention that suggests to you the
existence of, or potential for, espionage or terrorism against the U.S. or its allies must be
promptly reported by you to the Office of Security.
There should be no doubt in your mind about the reality of the threats. You are now
affiliated with the most sensitive agency in government and are expected to exercise
vigilance and common sense to protect NSA against these threats.

CLASSIFICATION
Originators of correspondence, communications, equipment, or documents within the
Agency are responsible for ensuring that the proper classification, downgrading
information and, when appropriate, proper caveat notations are assigned to such material.
(This includes any handwritten notes which contain classified information). The three
levels of classification are Confidential, Secret and Top Secret. The NSA Classification
Manual should be used as guidance in determining proper classification. If after review of
this document you need assistance, contact the Classification Advisory Officer (CAO)
assigned to your organization, or the Information Policy Division (Q43).

NEED-TO-KNOW
Classified information is disseminated only on a strict “need-to-know” basis. The
“need-to know” policy means that classified information will be disseminated only to
those individuals who, in addition to possessing a proper clearance, have a requirement to
know this information in order to perform their official duties (need-to-know). No person
is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of office, position, rank, or security
clearance.
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All NSA personnel have the responsibility to assert the “need-to-know” policy as
part of their responsibility to protect sensitive information. Determination of “need-
toknow”
is a supervisory responsibility. This means that if there is any doubt in your mind
as to an individual’s “need-to-know,” you should always check with your supervisor
before releasing any classified material under your control.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Separate from classified information is information or material marked “FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY” (such as this handbook). This designation is used to identify
that official information or material which, although unclassified, is exempt from the
requirement for public disclosure of information concerning government activities and
which, for a significant reason, should not be given general circulation. Each holder of
“FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY” (FOUO) information or material is authorized to disclose
such information or material to persons in other departments or agencies of the Executive
and Judicial branches when it is determined that the information or material is required to
carry our a government function. The recipient must be advised that the information or
material is not to be disclosed to the general public. Material which bears the “FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY” caveat does not come under the regulations governing the
protection of classified information. The unauthorized disclosure of information marked
“FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” does not constitute an unauthorized disclosure of
classified defense information. However, Department of Defense and NSA regulations
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information designated “FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY.” Appropriate administrative action will be taken to determine responsibility and
to apply corrective and/or disciplinary measures in cases of unauthorized disclosure of
information which bears the “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” caveat. Reasonable care
must be exercised in limiting the dissemination of “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”
information. While you may take this handbook home for further study, remember that is
does contain “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” information which should be protected.

PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
All NSA personnel (employees, military assignees, and contractors) must submit for
review any planned articles, books, speeches, resumes, or public statements that may
contain classified, classifiable, NSA-derived, or unclassified protected information, e.g.,
information relating to the organization, mission, functions, or activities of NSA. Your
obligation to protect this sensitive information is a lifetime one. Even when you resign,
retire, or otherwise end your affiliation with NSA, you must submit this type of material
for prepublication review. For additional details, contact the Information Policy Division
(Q43) for an explanation of prepublication review procedures.

PERSONNEL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

Perhaps you an recall your initial impression upon entering an NSA facility. Like
most people, you probably noticed the elaborate physical security safeguards—fences,
concrete barriers, Security Protective Officers, identification badges, etc. While these
measures provide a substantial degree of protection for the information housed within our
buildings, they represent only a portion of the overall Agency security program. In fact,
 17

vast amounts of information leave our facilities daily in the minds of NSA personnel, and
this is where our greatest vulnerability lies. Experience has indicated that because of the
vital information we work with at NSA, Agency personnel may become potential targets
for hostile intelligence efforts. Special safeguards are therefore necessary to protect our
personnel. Accordingly, the Agency has an extensive personnel security program which
establishes internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and activities.
These policies cover a variety of topics, all of which are designed to protect both you and
the sensitive information you will gain through your work at NSA.

ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS

As a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and by virtue of your access to
sensitive information, you are a potential target for hostile intelligence activities carried
out by or on behalf of citizens of foreign countries. A policy concerning association with
foreign nationals has been established by the Agency to minimize the likelihood that its
personnel might become subject to undue influence or duress or targets of hostile
activities through foreign relationships.
As an NSA affiliate, you are prohibited from initiating or maintaining associations
(regardless of the nature and degree) with citizens or officials of communist-controlled,
or other countries which pose a significant threat to the security of the United States and
its interests. A comprehensive list of these designated countries is available from your
Staff Security Officer or the Security Awareness Division. Any contact with citizens of
these countries, no matter how brief or seemingly innocuous, must be reported as soon as
possible to your Staff Security Officer (SSO). (Individuals designated as Staff Security
Officers are assigned to every organization; a listing of Staff Security Officers can be
found at the back of this handbook).
Additionally, close and continuing associations with any non-U.S. citizens which are
characterized by ties of kinship, obligation, or affection are prohibited. A waiver to this
policy may be granted only under the most exceptional circumstances when there is a
truly compelling need for an individual’s services or skills and the security risk is
negligible.
In particular, a waiver must be granted in advance of a marriage to or cohabitation
with a foreign national in order to retain one’s access to NSA information. Accordingly,
any intent to cohabitate with or marry a non-U.S. citizen must be reported immediately to
your Staff Security Officer. If a waiver is granted, future reassignments both at
headquarters and overseas may be affected.
The marriage or intended marriage of an immediate family member (parents,
siblings, children) to a foreign national must also be reported through your SSO to the
Clearance Division (M55).
Casual social associations with foreign nationals (other than those of the designated
countries mentioned above) which arise from normal living and working arrangements in
the community usually do not have to be reported. During the course of these casual
social associations, you are encouraged to extend the usual social amenities. Do not act
mysteriously or draw attention to yourself (and possibly to NSA) by displaying an
unusually wary attitude.
Naturally, your affiliation with the Agency and the nature of your work should not be
discussed. Again, you should be careful not to allow these associations to become close
 18

and continuing to the extent that they are characterized by ties of kinship, obligation, or
affection.
If at any time you feel that a “casual” association is in any way suspicious, you
should report this to your Staff Security Officer immediately. Whenever any doubt exists
as to whether or not a situation should be reported or made a matter of record, you should
decided in favor of reporting it. In this way, the situation can be evaluated on its own
merits, and you can be advised as to your future course of action.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS

NSA personnel are discouraged from initiating correspondence with individuals who
are citizens of foreign countries. Correspondence with citizens of communist-controlled
or other designated countries is prohibited. Casual social correspondence, including the
“penpal” variety, with other foreign acquaintances is acceptable and need not be reported.
If, however, this correspondence should escalate in its frequency or nature, you should
report that through your Staff Security Officer to the Clearance Division (M55).

EMBASSY VISITS
Since a significant percentage of all espionage activity is known to be conducted
through foreign embassies, consulates, etc., Agency policy discourages visits to
embassies, consulates or other official establishments of a foreign government. Each
case, however, must be judged on the circumstances involved. Therefore, if you plan to
visit a foreign embassy for any reason (even to obtain a visa), you must consult with, and
obtain the prior approval of, your immediate supervisor and the Security Awareness
Division (M56).

AMATEUR RADIO ACTIVITIES

Amateur radio (ham radio) activities are known to be exploited by hostile intelligence
services to identify individuals with access to classified information; therefore, all
licensed operators are expected to be familiar with NSA/CSS Regulation 100-1,
“Operation of Amateur Radio Stations” (23 October 1986). The specific limitations on
contacts with operators from communist and designated countries are of particular
importance. If you are an amateur radio operator you should advise the Security
Awareness Division (M56) of your amateur radio activities so that detailed guidance may
be furnished to you.

UNOFFICIAL FOREIGN TRAVEL

In order to further protect sensitive information from possible compromise resulting
from terrorism, coercion, interrogation or capture of Agency personnel by hostile nations
and/or terrorist groups, the Agency has established certain policies and procedures
concerning unofficial foreign travel.
All Agency personnel (civilian employees, military assignees, and contractors) who
are planning unofficial foreign travel must have that travel approved by submitting a
proposed itinerary to the Security Awareness Division (M56) at least 30 working days
prior to their planned departure from the United States. Your itinerary should be
submitted on Form K2579 (Unofficial Foreign Travel Request). This form provides space
 19

for noting the countries to be visited, mode of travel, and dates of departure and return.
Your immediate supervisor must sign this form to indicate whether or not your proposed
travel poses a risk to the sensitive information, activities, or projects of which you may
have knowledge due to your current assignment.
After your supervisor’s assessment is made, this form should be forwarded to the
Security Awareness Director (M56). Your itinerary will then be reviewed in light of the
existing situation in the country or countries to be visited, and a decision for approval or
disapproval will be based on this assessment. The purpose of this policy is to limit the
risk of travel to areas of the world where a threat may exist to you and to your knowledge
of classified Agency activities.
In this context, travel to communist-controlled and other hazardous activity areas is
prohibited. A listing of these hazardous activity areas is prohibited. A listing of these
hazardous activity areas can be found in Annex A of NSA/CSS Regulation No. 30-31,
“Security Requirements for Foreign Travel” (12 June 1987). From time to time, travel
may also be prohibited to certain areas where the threat from hostile intelligence services,
terrorism, criminal activity or insurgency poses an unacceptable risk to Agency
employees and to the sensitive information they possess. Advance travel deposits made
without prior agency approval of the proposed travel may result in financial losses by the
employee should the travel be disapproved, so it is important to obtain approval prior to
committing yourself financially. Questions regarding which areas of the world currently
pose a threat should be directed to the Security Awareness Division (M56).
Unofficial foreign travel to Canada, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Mexico does not
require prior approval, however, this travel must still be reported using Form K2579.
Travel to these areas may be reported after the fact.
While you do not have to report your foreign travel once you have ended your
affiliation with the Agency, you should be aware that the risk incurred in travelling to
certain areas, from a personal safety and/or counterintelligence standpoint, remains high.
The requirement to protect the classified information to which you have had access is a
lifetime obligation.

MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS
Within the United States there are numerous organizations with memberships ranging
from a few to tens of thousands. While you may certainly participate in the activities of
any reputable organization, membership in any international club or professional
organization/activity with foreign members should be reported through your Staff
Security Officer to the Clearance Division (M55). In most cases there are no security
concerns or threats to our employees or affiliates. However, the Office of Security needs
the opportunity to research the organization and to assess any possible risk to you and the
information to which you have access.
In addition to exercising prudence in your choice of organizational affiliations, you
should endeavor to avoid participation in public activities of a conspicuously
controversial nature because such activities could focus undesirable attention upon you
and the Agency. NSA employees may, however, participate in bona fide public affairs
such as local politics, so long as such activities do not violate the provisions of the
statutes and regulations which govern the political activities of all federal employees.
Additional information may be obtained from your Personnel Representative.
 20

CHANGES IN MARITAL STATUS/COHABITATION/NAMES

All personnel, either employed by or assigned to NSA, must advise the Office of
Security of any changes in their marital status (either marriage or divorce), cohabitation
arrangements, or legal name changes. Such changes should be reported by completing
NSA Form G1982 (Report of Marriage/Marital Status Change/Name Change), and
following the instructions printed on the form.

USE AND ABUSE OF DRUGS

It is the policy of the National Security Agency to prevent and eliminate the
improper use of drugs by Agency employees and other personnel associated with the
Agency. The term “drugs” includes all controlled drugs or substances identified and
listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended, which includes but is not
limited to: narcotics, depressants, stimulants, cocaine, hallucinogens ad cannabis
(marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil). The use of illegal drugs or the abuse of prescription
drugs by persons employed by, assigned or detailed to the Agency may adversely affect
the national security; may have a serious damaging effect on the safety and the safety of
others; and may lead to criminal prosecution. Such use of drugs either within or outside
Agency controlled facilities is prohibited.

PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICIES

The physical security program at NSA provides protection for classified material and
operations and ensures that only persons authorized access to the Agency’s spaces and
classified material are permitted such access. This program is concerned not only with the
Agency’s physical plant and facilities, but also with the internal and external procedures
for safeguarding the Agency’s classified material and activities. Therefore, physical
security safeguards include Security Protective Officers, fences, concrete barriers, access
control points, identification badges, safes, and the compartmentalization of physical
spaces. While any one of these safeguards represents only a delay factor against attempts
to gain unauthorized access to NSA spaces and material, the total combination of all
these safeguards represents a formidable barrier against physical penetration of NSA.
Working together with personnel security policies, they provide “security in depth.”
The physical security program depends on interlocking procedures. The
responsibility for carrying out many of these procedures rests with the individual. This
means you, and every person employed by, assign, or detailed to the Agency, must
assume the responsibility for protecting classified material. Included in your
responsibilities are: challenging visitors in operational areas; determining “need-toknow;”
limiting classified conversations to approved areas; following established locking
and checking procedures; properly using the secure and non-secure telephone systems;
correctly wrapping and packaging classified data for transmittal; and placing classified
waste in burn bags.

THE NSA BADGE

Even before you enter an NSA facility, you have a constant reminder of security—
the NSA badge. Every person who enters an NSA installation is required to wear an
 21

authorized badge. To enter most NSA facilities your badge must be inserted into an
Access Control Terminal at a building entrance and you must enter your Personal
Identification Number (PIN) on the terminal keyboard. In the absence of an Access
Control Terminal, or when passing an internal security checkpoint, the badge should be
held up for viewing by a Security Protective Officer. The badge must be displayed at all
times while the individual remains within any NSA installation.
NSA Badges must be clipped to a beaded neck chain. If necessary for the safety of
those working in the area of electrical equipment or machinery, rubber tubing may be
used to insulate the badge chain. For those Agency personnel working in proximity to
other machinery or equipment, the clip may be used to attach the badge to the wearer’s
clothing, but it must also remain attached to the chain.
After you leave an NSA installation, remove your badge from public view, thus
avoiding publicizing your NSA affiliation. Your badge should be kept in a safe place
which is convenient enough to ensure that you will be reminded to bring it with you to
work. A good rule of thumb is to afford your badge the same protection you give your
wallet or your credit cards. DO NOT write your Personal Identification Number on your
badge. If you plan to be away from the Agency for a period of more than 30 days, your
badge should be left at the main Visitor Control Center which services your facility.
Should you lose your badge, you must report the facts and circumstances
immediately to the Security Operations Center (SOC) (963-3371s/688-6911b) so that
your badge PIN can be deactivated in the Access Control Terminals. In the event that you
forget your badge when reporting for duty, you may obtain a “non-retention” Temporary
Badge at the main Visitor Control Center which serves your facility after a co-worker
personally identifies your and your clearance has been verified.
Your badge is to be used as identification only within NSA facilities or other
government installations where the NSA badge is recognized. Your badge should never
be used outside of the NSA or other government facilities for the purpose of personal
identification. You should obtain a Department of Defense identification card from the
Civilian Welfare Fund (CWF) if you need to identify yourself as a government employee
when applying for “government discounts” offered at various commercial establishments.
Your badge color indicates your particular affiliation with NSA and your level of
clearance. Listed below are explanations of the badge colors you are most likely to see:
Green (*) Fully cleared NSA employees and
certain military assignees.
Orange (*) (or Gold) Fully cleared representative
of other government agencies.
Black (*) Fully cleared contractors or consultants.
Blue Employees who are cleared to the SECRET
level while awaiting completion of their processing
for full (TS/SI) clearance. These Limited Interim
Clearance (LIC) employees are restricted to certain
activities while inside a secure area.
Red Clearance level is not specified, so assume the
holder is uncleared.
* - Fully cleared status means that the person has been cleared to the Top Secret (TS)
level and indoctrinated for Special Intelligence (SI).
 22

All badges with solid color backgrounds (permanent badges) are kept by individuals
until their NSA employment or assignment ends. Striped badges (“non-retention” badges)
are generally issued to visitors and are returned to the Security Protective Officer upon
departure from an NSA facility.

AREA CONTROL
Within NSA installations there are generally two types of areas, Administrative and
Secure. An Administrative Area is one in which storage of classified information is not
authorized, and in which discussions of a classified nature are forbidden. This type of
area would include the corridors, restrooms, cafeterias, visitor control areas, credit union,
barber shop, and drugstore. Since uncleared, non-NSA personnel are often present in
these areas, all Agency personnel must ensure that no classified information is discussed
in an Administrative Area.
Classified information being transported within Agency facilities must be placed
within envelopes, folders, briefcases, etc. to ensure that its contents or classification
markings are not disclosed to unauthorized persons, or that materials are not
inadvertently dropped enroute.
The normal operational work spaces within an NSA facility are designated Secure
Areas. These areas are approved for classified discussions and for the storage of
classified material. Escorts must be provided if it is necessary for uncleared personnel
(repairmen, etc.) to enter Secure Areas, an all personnel within the areas must be made
aware of the presence of uncleared individuals. All unknown, unescorted visitors to
Secure Areas should be immediately challenged by the personnel within the area,
regardless of the visitors’ clearance level (as indicated by their badge color).
The corridor doors of these areas must be locked with a deadbolt and all classified
information in the area must be properly secured after normal working hours or whenever
the area is unoccupied. When storing classified material, the most sensitive material must
be stored in the most secure containers. Deadbolt keys for doors to these areas must be
returned to the key desk at the end of the workday.
For further information regarding Secure Areas, consult the Physical Security
Division (M51) or your staff Security Officer.

ITEMS TREATED AS CLASSIFIED

For purposes of transportation, storage and destruction, there are certain types of
items which must be treated as classified even though they may not contain classified
information. Such items include carbon paper, vu-graphs, punched machine processing
cards, punched paper tape, magnetic tape, computer floppy disks, film, and used
typewriter ribbons. This special treatment is necessary since a visual examination does
not readily reveal whether the items contain classified information.

PROHIBITED ITEMS
Because of the potential security or safety hazards, certain items are prohibited under
normal circumstances from being brought into or removed from any NSA installation.
These items have been groped into two general classes. Class I prohibited items are those
which constitute a threat to the safety and security of NSA/CSS personnel and facilities.
Items in this category include:
 23

a. Firearms and ammunition

b. Explosives, incendiary substances, radioactive materials,
highly volatile materials, or other hazardous materials
c. Contraband or other illegal substances
d. Personally owned photographic or electronic equipment
including microcomputers, reproduction or recording
devices, televisions or radios.
Prescribed electronic medical equipment is normally not prohibited, but requires
coordination with the Physical Security Division (M51) prior to being brought into any
NSA building.
Class II prohibited items are those owned by the government or contractors which
constitute a threat to physical, technical, or TEMPEST security. Approval by designated
organizational officials is required before these items can be brought into or removed
from NSA facilities. Examples are:
a. Transmitting and receiving equipment
b. Recording equipment and media
c. Telephone equipment and attachments
d. Computing devices and terminals
e. Photographic equipment and film
A more detailed listing of examples of Prohibited Items may be obtained from your
Staff Security Officer or the Physical Security Division (M51).
Additionally, you may realize that other seemingly innocuous items are also
restricted and should not be brought into any NSA facility. Some of these items pose a
technical threat; others must be treated as restricted since a visual inspection does not
readily reveal whether they are classified. These items include:
a. Negatives from processed film; slides; vu-graphs
b. Magnetic media such as floppy disks, cassette tapes, and
VCR videotapes
c. Remote control devices for telephone answering
machines
d. Pagers

EXIT INSPECTION
As you depart NSA facilities, you will note another physical security safeguard—the
inspection of the materials you are carrying. This inspection of your materials, conducted
by Security Protective Officers, is designed to preclude the inadvertent removal of
classified material. It is limited to any articles that you are carrying out of the facility and
may include letters, briefcases, newspapers, notebooks, magazines, gym bags, and other
such items. Although this practice may involve some inconvenience, it is conducted in
your best interest, as well as being a sound security practice. The inconvenience can be
considerably reduced if you keep to a minimum the number of personal articles that you
remove from the Agency.

REMOVAL OF MATERIAL FROM NSA SPACES

The Agency maintains strict controls regarding the removal of material from its
installations, particularly in the case of classified material.
 24

Only under a very limited and official circumstances classified material be removed
from Agency spaces. When deemed necessary, specific authorization is required to
permit an individual to hand carry classified material out of an NSA building to another
Secure Area. Depending on the material and circumstances involved, there are several
ways to accomplish this.
A Courier Badge authorizes the wearer, for official purposes, to transport classified
material, magnetic media, or Class II prohibited items between NSA facilities. These
badges, which are strictly controlled, are made available by the Physical Security
Division (M51) only to those offices which have specific requirements justifying their
use.
An Annual Security Pass may be issued to individuals whose official duties require
that they transport printed classified materials, information storage media, or Class II
prohibited items to secure locations within the local area. Materials carried by an
individual who displays this pass are subject to spot inspection by Security Protective
Officers or other personnel from the Office of Security. It is not permissible to use an
Annual Security Pass for personal convenience to circumvent inspection of your personal
property by perimeter Security Protective Officers.
If you do not have access to a Courier Badge and you have not been issued an
Annual Security Pass, you may obtain a One-Time Security Pass to remove classified
materials/magnetic media or admit or remove prohibited items from an NSA installation.
These passes may be obtained from designated personnel in your work element who have
been given authority to issue them. The issuing official must also contact the Security
Operations Center (SOC) to obtain approval for the admission or removal of a Class I
prohibited item.
When there is an official need to remove government property which is not magnetic
media, or a prohibited or classified item, a One-Time Property Pass is used. This type of
pass (which is not a Security Pass) may be obtained from your element custodial property
officer. A Property Pass is also to be used when an individual is removing personal
property which might be reasonably be mistaken for unclassified Government property.
This pass is surrendered to the Security Protective Officer at the post where the material
is being removed. Use of this pass does not preclude inspection of the item at the
perimeter control point by the Security Protective Officer or Security professionals to
ensure that the pass is being used correctly.

EXTERNAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

On those occasions when an individual must personally transport classified material
between locations outside of NSA facilities, the individual who is acting as the courier
must ensure that the material receives adequate protection. Protective measures must
include double wrapping and packaging of classified information, keeping the material
under constant control, ensuring the presence of a second appropriately cleared person
when necessary, and delivering the material to authorized persons only. If you are
designated as a courier outside the local area, contact the Security Awareness Division
(M56) for your courier briefing.
Even more basic than these procedures is the individual security responsibility to
confine classified conversations to secure areas. Your home, car pool, and public places
are not authorized areas to conduct classified discussions—even if everyone involved in
 25

he discussion possesses a proper clearance and “need-to-know.” The possibility that a

conversation could be overheard by unauthorized persons dictates the need to guard
against classified discussions in non-secure areas.
Classified information acquired during the course of your career or assignment to
NSA may not be mentioned directly, indirectly, or by suggestion in personal diaries,
records, or memoirs.

REPORTING LOSS OR DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION
The extraordinary sensitivity of the NSA mission requires the prompt reporting of
any known, suspected, or possible unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or
the discovery that classified information may be lost, or is not being afforded proper
protection. Any information coming to your attention concerning the loss or unauthorized
disclosure of classified information should be reported immediately to your supervisor,
your Staff Security Officer, or the Security Operations Center (SOC).

USE OF SECURE AND NON-SECURE TELEPHONES

Two separate telephone systems have been installed in NSA facilities for use in the
conduct of official Agency business: the secure telephone system (gray telephone) and
the outside, non secure telephone system (black telephone). All NSA personnel must
ensure that use of either telephone system does not jeopardize the security of classified
information.
The secure telephone system is authorized for discussion of classified information.
Personnel receiving calls on the secure telephone may assume that the caller is authorized
to use the system. However, you must ensure that the caller has a “need-to-know” the
information you will be discussing.
The outside telephone system is only authorized for unclassified official Agency
business calls. The discussion of classified information is not permitted on this system.
Do not attempt to use “double-talk” in order to discuss classified information over the
non-secure telephone system. In order to guard against the inadvertent transmission of
classified information over a non-secure telephone, and individual using the black
telephone in an area where classified activities are being conducted must caution other
personnel in the area that the non-secure telephone is in use. Likewise, you should avoid
using the non-secure telephone in the vicinity of a secure telephone which is also in use.

HELPFUL INFORMATION

SECURITY RESOURCES
In the fulfillment of your security responsibilities, you should be aware that there are
many resources available to assist you. If you have any questions or concerns regarding
security at NSA or your individual security responsibilities, your supervisor should be
consulted. Additionally, Staff Security Officers are appointed to the designated Agency
elements to assist these organizations in carrying out their security responsibilities. There
is a Staff Security Officer assigned to each organization; their phone numbers are listed at
the back of this handbook. Staff Security Officers also provide guidance to and monitor
 26

the activities of Security Coordinators and Advisors (individuals who, in addition to their
operational duties within their respective elements, assist element supervisors or
managers in discharging security responsibilities).
Within the Office of Security, the Physical Security Division (M51) will offer you
assistance in matters such as access control, security passes, clearance verification,
combination locks, keys, identification badges, technical security, and the Security
Protective Force. The Security Awareness Division (M56) provides security guidance
and briefings regarding unofficial foreign travel, couriers, special access, TDY/PCS, and
amateur radio activities. The Industrial and Field Security Division (M52) is available to
provide security guidance concerning NSA contractor and field site matters.
The Security Operations Center (SOC) is operated by two Security Duty Officers
(SDOs), 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The SDO, representing the Office of Security,
provides a complete range of security services to include direct communications with fire
and rescue personnel for all Agency area facilities. The SDO is available to handle any
physical or personnel problems that may arise, and if necessary, can direct your to the
appropriate security office that can assist you. After normal business hours, weekends,
and holidays, the SOC is the focal point for all security matters for all Agency personnel
and facilities (to include Agency field sites and contractors). The SOC is located in Room
2A0120, OPS 2A building and the phone numbers are 688-6911(b), 963-3371(s).
However, keep in mind that you may contact any individual or any division within
the Office of Security directly. Do not hesitate to report any information which may
affect the security of the Agency’s mission, information, facilities or personnel.

SECURITY-RELATED SERVICES
In addition to Office of Security resources, there are a number of professional,
security related services available for assistance in answering your questions or providing
the services which you require.
The Installations and Logistics Organization (L) maintains the system for the
collection and destruction of classified waste, and is also responsible for the movement
and scheduling of material via NSA couriers and the Defense Courier Service (DCS).
Additionally, L monitors the proper addressing, marking, and packaging of classified
material being transmitted outside of NSA; maintains records pertaining to receipt and
transmission of controlled mail; and issues property passes for the removal of
unclassified property.
The NSA Office of Medical Services (M7) has a staff of physicians, clinical
psychologists and an alcoholism counselor. All are well trained to help individuals help
themselves in dealing with their problems. Counseling services, with referrals to private
mental health professionals when appropriate, are all available to NSA personnel.
Appointments can be obtained by contacting M7 directly. When an individual refers
himself/herself, the information discussed in the counseling sessions is regarded as
privileged medical information and is retained exclusively in M7 unless it pertains to the
national security.
Counseling interviews are conducted by the Office of Civilian Personnel (M3) with
any civilian employee regarding both on and off-the-job problems. M3 is also available to
assist all personnel with the personal problems seriously affecting themselves or
members of their families. In cases of serious physical or emotional illness, injury,
 27

hospitalization, or other personal emergencies, M3 informs concerned Agency elements

and maintains liaison with family members in order to provide possible assistance.
Similar counseling services are available to military assignees through Military Personnel
(M2).

GUIDE TO SECURITY
M51 PHYSICAL SECURITY 963-6651s/688-8293b (FMHQ)
968-8101s/859-6411b (FANX)
CONFIRM and badges Prohibited Items
(963-6611s/688-7411b)
Locks, keys, safes and alarms SOC (963-3371s/688-6911b)
Security/vehicle passes NSA facility protection and compliance
Visitor Control
Inspections
Red/blue seal areas New Construction
Pass Clearances (963-4780s/688-6759b)

M52 INDUSTRIAL AND FIELD SECURITY

982-7918s/859-6255b
Security at contractor field site facilities
Verification of classified mailing addresses for contractor facilities

M53 INVESTIGATIONS 982-7914S/859-6464B

Personnel Interview Program (PIP) Reinvestigations
Military Interview Program (MIP) Special investigations
M54 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 982-7832s/859-6424b
Security counterintelligence analysis Security compromises
M55 CLEARANCES 982-7900s/859-4747b
Privacy Act Officer (For review of security files) Continued SCI access
Contractor/applicant processing Military access

M56 SECURITY AWARENESS 963-3273S/688-6535B

Security indoctrinations/debriefings Embassy visits
Associations with foreign nationals Briefings (foreign travel,
Security Week ham radio, courier,
Security posters, brochures, etc. LIC, PCS, TDY,
special access, etc.)
Foreign travel approval
Military contractor orientation
Special Access Office (963-5466s/688-6353b)
M57 POLYGRAPH 982-7844s/859-6363b
Polygraph interviews
M509 MANAGEMENT AND POLICY STAFF 982-7885s/859-6350b
STAFF SECURITY OFFICERS (SSOs)
Element Room Secure/Non-Secure
 28

A 2A0852B 963-4650/688-7044
B 3W099 963-4559/688-7141
D/Q/J/N/U 2B8066G 963-4496/688-6614
E/M D3B17 968-8050/859-6669
G 9A195 963-5033/688-7902
K 2B5136 963-1978/688-5052
L SAB4 977-7230/688-6194
P 2W091 963-5302/688-7303
R B6B710 968-4073/859-4736
S/V/Y/C/X C2A55 972-2144/688-7549
T 2B5040 963-4543/688-7364
W 1C181 963-5970/688-7061

GUIDE TO SECURITY-RELATED SERVICES

Agency Anonymity 968-8251/859-4381
Alcohol Rehabilitation Program 963-5420/688-7312
Cipher Lock Repair 963-1221/688-7119
Courier Schedules (local) 977-7197/688-7403
Defense Courier Service 977-7117/688-7826
Disposal of Classified Waste
Paper only 972-2150/688-6593
Plastics, Metal, Film, etc 963-4103/688-7062
Locksmith 963-3585/688-7233
Mail Dissemination and Packaging 977-7117/688-7826
Medical Center (Fort Meade) 963-5429/688-7263
(FANX) 968-8960/859-6667
(Airport Square) 982-7800/859-6155
NSA/CSS Information Policy Division 963-5825/688-6527
Personnel Assistance
Civilian 982-7835/859-6577
Air Force 963-3239/688-7980
Army 963-3739/688-6393
Navy 963-3439/688-7325
Property Passes (unclassified material) 977-7263/688-7800
Psychological Services 963-5429/688-7311

FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS/DESIGNATORS

ARFCO
S
Armed Forces Courier Service (now known as DCS)
AWOL Absent Without Leave
CAO Classification Advisory Officer
COB Close of Business
CWF Civilian Welfare Fund
DCS Defense Courier Service (formerly known as ARFCOS)
DoD Department of Defense
 29

EOD Enter on Duty

FOUO For Official Use Only
M2 Office of Military Personnel
M3 Office of Civilian Personnel
M5 Office of Security
M7 Office of Medical Services
NCS National Cryptologic School
PCS Permanent Change of Station
PIN Personal Identification Number
Q43 Information Policy Division
SDO Security Duty Officer
SOC Security Operations Center
SPO Security Protective Officer
SSO Staff Security Officer
TDY Temporary Duty
UFT Unofficial Foreign Travel

A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION

DEFINITION

Assassination is a term thought to be derived from "Hashish", a drug similar to

marijuana, said to have been used by Hasan-Dan-Sabah to induce motivation in his
followers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders, usually at the cost
of their lives.

It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal
jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been
selected by a resistance organization for death, and who has been sele cted by a resistance
organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that
organization.

EMPLOYMENT

Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine operations. It

should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U.S. Headquarters,
though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by membe rs of an
associated foreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing
communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or
recorded. Consequently, the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be
reached in the field, at the area where the act will take place. Decision and instructions
 30

should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one person will be
involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be pr operly covered by normal
news services, whose output is available to all concerned.

JUSTIFICATION

Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has
knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization if divulged. Assassination of
persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just puni shment.
Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the
cause of freedom may be held necessary.

But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are
morally squeamish should not attempt it.

CLASSIFICATIONS

The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware of his
danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be affected by whether or not
the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereafter, assassinations in which the subject
is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will
be termed "chase"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."

If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "lost." If the assassin is to
escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no compromises should exist
here. The assassin must not fall alive into enemy hands.

A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the subject was
actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. If such
concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret" ;; if concealment is
immaterial, the act will be called "open"; while if the assassination requires publicity to
be effective it will be termed "terroristic."

Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe, simple, and
terroristic, while that of Huey Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successful
secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. [Illeg] o f Thailand and
Augustus Caesar may have been the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination.
Chase assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal
organizations.
 31

THE ASSASSIN

In safe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine agent. He
should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and physically active. If
special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have
outstanding skill with such equipment.

Except in terroristic assassinations, it is desirable that the assassin be transient in the area.
He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the rest of the organization and his
instructions should be given orally by one person only. His safe evacuation after the act is
absolutely essential, but here again contact should be as limited as possible. It is
preferable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering
action which may be necessary.

In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics, religion, and
revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is unstable psychologically,
he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the iden tities of the other
members of the organization, for although it is intended that he die in the act, something
may go wrong. While the Assassin of Trotsky has never revealed any significant
information, it was unsound to depend on this when the act was p lanned.

PLANNING

When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the operation must be
planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to that used in military
operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in information and possibly indicate
a need for special equipment which must be procured or constructed. When all necessary
data has been collected, an effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be
mental; no papers should ever contain evidence of the oper ation.

In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal. Since this

requires advertising to be effective, the resistance organization must be in a position to
warn high officials publicly that their lives will be the price of rep risal action against
innocent people. Such a threat is of no value unless it can be carried out, so it may be
necessary to plan the assassination of various responsible officers of the oppressive
regime and hold such plans in readiness to be used only i f provoked by excessive
brutality. Such plans must be modified frequently to meet changes in the tactical
situation.

TECHNIQUES

The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human being may be
killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those who may be emotionally
unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to commit. The spe cific technique
 32

employed will depend upon a large number of variables, but should be constant in one
point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler's life failed because the
conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention.

Techniques may be considered as follows:

1. Manual.

It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough to do it
well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has
absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local tools a re often much the most
efficient means of assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, fire poker,
kitchen knife, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. A length of
rope or wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised
weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent innocence. The
obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an item of sporting goods
succeeded.

In all safe cases where the assassin may be subject to search, either before or after the act,
specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the lost case, the assassin may
accidentally be searched before the act and should not carry an incrimin ating device if
any sort of lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally
carries weapons because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and
implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his ident ity.

2. Accidents.

For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most
effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little excitement and is only
casually investigated.

The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a
hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair wells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve.
Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting with the subject
may be arranged at a properly-cased location. The act may be executed by sudden,
vigorous [excised] of the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin
immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horrified wit ness", no alibi or surreptitious
withdrawal is necessary. In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the
subject before dropping him. Care is required to insure that no wound or condition not
attributable to the fall is discernible after death.
 33

Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot swim. It will
be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure of
the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable al ibi.

If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used [2 words excised] to
prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind.

Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing and can
seldom be free from unexpected observation.

Automobile accidents are a less satisfactory means of assassination. If the subject is

deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and investigation is likely to be
thorough. If the subject's car is tampered with, reliability is very lo w. The subject may be
stunned or drugged and then placed in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can
be run off a high cliff or into deep water without observation.

Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a burning building.
Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible.

3. Drugs.

In all types of assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very effective. If the assassin
is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and
rare method. An overdose of morphine administered as a sedat ive will cause death
without disturbance and is difficult to detect. The size of the dose will depend upon
whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice.

If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing
out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute alcoholism.

Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strychine, are effective but their possession or
procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical. Poison was used
unsuccessfully in the assassination of Rasputin and Kolohan, though the latte r case is
more accurately described as a murder.

4. Edge Weapons

Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain minimum of
anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability.
 34

Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The
heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate.

Abdominal wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has
made this no longer true.

Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This
can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or hatchet.

Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both
sides of the windpipe.

If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either of the
above methods can be used to insure death.

5. Blunt Weapons

As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge for effective
use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A hammer may be picked up
almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and [illeg] bats are very widely dist ributed. Even
a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured,
carried or subsequently disposed of.

Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the
lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very heavy, any portion of the
upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the head, from th e eyes to the throat,
can withstand enormous blows without fatal consequences.

6. Firearms

Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The assassin usually
has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of weapons, and expects more
range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliability. Since certainty of
death is the major requirement, firearms should be used which can provide destructive
power at least 100% in excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half
that considered practical for the weapon.

Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They may be
difficult to obtain. They require a degree of experience from the user. They are [illeg].
Their [illeg] is consistently over-rated.

However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient than any
other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject,
or comparative physical weakness of the assassin, as with a woman.
 35

(a) The precision rifle. In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target

rifle should always be considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can
nearly always be achieved at a distance of one hundred yards. In ideal
circumstances, t he range may be extended to 250 yards. The rifle should
be a well made bolt or falling block action type, handling a powerful long-
range cartridge. The .300 F.A.B. Magnum is probably the best cartridge
readily available. Other excellent calibers are . 375 M.[illeg]. Magnum,
.270 Winchester, .30 - 106 p.s., 8 x 60 MM Magnum, 9.3 x

62 kk and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers, since
ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type, whereas most
ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not sufficiently let hal. Military
ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling bullets, as this will adversely affect
accuracy.

The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in
any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to
group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 21/2" groups are adequa te. The sight should
be telescopic, not only for accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light
or near darkness. As long as the bare outline of the target is discernable, a telescope sight
will work, even if the rifle and shooter are in total darkness.

An expanding, hunting bullet of such calibers as described above will produce

extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. If a man is struck just once in the
body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain.

Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if
a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propaganda value of
this system may be very high.

(b) The machine gun.

Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is applicable. Usually,
this will require

the subversion of a unit of an official guard at a ceremony, though a skillful and

determined team might conceivably dispose of a loyal gun crow without commotion and
take over the gun at the critical time.

The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed
subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky. The automatic feature
of the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second
 36

burst on the subject. Even with full jacket ammunition, this will be absolute lethal is the
burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In
ideal circumstances, a properly padded and targeted ma chine gun can do it at 850 yards.
The major difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine
gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This will not do in
assassination as the subject will not wait.

(c) The Submachine Gun.

This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and
"machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination. Unlike the rifle
and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it fires pistol ammu nition, much
less powerful. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest,
though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing efficiency than
the 9 mm European arms.

The assassination range of the sub-machine gun is point

blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards
or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the
5MG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the hands of a capabl e gunner, a
high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed of execution is most desirable,
particularly in the case of multiple subjects.

The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is
to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of sub-
machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be
"purifico" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated
below.

While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridges, the higher cyclic rate of
some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern
density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Danish
Madman? SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and
concealable. The Russian SHG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small,
light protective which requires more kits for equivalent killing effect.

(d) The Shotgun.

A large bore shotgun is a most effective

 37

killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used
only on single targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully. The barrel may be "sawed" off
for convenience, but this is not a significant factor in its killi ng performance. Its
optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot
size for a twelve gage gun, but anything from single balls to bird shot will do if the range
is right. The assassin should aim for the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close
range and can easily [illeg] the head.

(e) The Pistol.

While the handgun is quite inefficient as a weapon of assassination, it is often used,

partly because it is readily available and can be concealed on the person, and partly
because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While many well kn own
assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln, Harding, Ghandi), such
attempts fail as often as they succeed, (Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill).

If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just beyond reach.
The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun
is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily conceale d.

In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and
not usually available for assassination missions.

.45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Kly, .45 A.S.[illeg] (U.S. Service) and .357 Magnum are all
efficient calibers. Less powerful

rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .25s
should be avoided.

In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete reliability.

(f) Silent Firearms

The sound of the explosion of the proponent in a firearm can be effectively silenced by
appropriate attachments. However, the sound of the projective passing through the air
cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases w here the velocity of
the bullet greatly exceeds that of sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that
of the explosion. Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per
second, they cannot be silenced.

Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound of their
flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort of improvised
carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenc ed. The user should
 38

not forget that the sound of the operation of a repeating action is considerable, and that
the sound of bullet strike, particularly in bone is quite loud.

Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have been widely
publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, effective precision
range is held to about 100 yards with rifle or carbine type weapons, while with pistols,
silent or otherwise,

are most efficient just beyond arms length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree
of safety to the assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough
hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pisto l combines the
disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine purpose.

A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet of great

weight, and built for accuracy, could be very useful to an assassin in certain situations. At
the time of writing, no such weapon is known to exist.

7. Explosives.

Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in
assassination. Such devices, in terroristic and open assassination, can provide safety and
overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have often been the imp lement of
lost assassinations.

The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for assassination. the
charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the
assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosi ve charge is highly
unreliable as a cause of death, and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone
to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death
of casual bystanders can often produce public reacti ons unfavorable to the cause for
which the assassination is carried out.

Bombs or grenades should never be thrown at a subject. While this

will always cause a commotion and may even result in the subject's death, it is sloppy,
unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never
sure of: (1)reaching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close en ough to the target
and (3) firing the charge at the right time.

Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge of proper size to be

employed, but requires accurate prediction of the subject's movements.
 39

Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is
explosive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any hard, [illeg] material as
long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock fragments should be walnut-size
rather than pen-size. If solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1"
thick, gives excellent fragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical
for use in assassination. Homemade or improvised e xplosives should be avoided. While
possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive
missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse
them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly
good. Anti-personnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both
large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.

The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment
of detonation.

A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type

[illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range,
pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at lea st 1" of
seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability. Any firing device may be used
which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military explorer
is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the
system. The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide
exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages olitary or commercial high explosives are practical for use in assassination.
Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerful, they
tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent,
provided the assassin has sufficient techn ical knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82
mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel
shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be
completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.

The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment
of detonation.

A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type

[illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range,
 40

pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at lea st 1" of

seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability.

Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary
commercial or military explorer is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous
action with no time fuse in the system.

The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing
from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed positions of the ass assin and the
subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the charge from a variety of possible
positions.

The radio switch can be [illeg] to fire [illeg], though its reliability is somewhat lower and
its procurement may not be easy.

EXAMPLES

([illeg] may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following
assassinations and attempts:

Marat Hedrich
Lincoln Hitler
Harding Roosevelt
Grand Duke Sergei Truman
Pirhivie Mussolini
Archduke Francis Ferdinand Benes
Rasputin Aung Sang
Madero [illeg]
Kirov Abdullah
Huey Long Ghandi
Alexander of Yugoslvia
Trotsky
 41

CONFERENCE ROOM TECHNIQUE

1. 2.

(2) Opens fire on first subject to react. Swings

(1) Enters room quickly but quietly
(2) Stands in doorway
across group toward center of mass. Times
burst to empty magazine at end of swing.
(1) Covers group to prevent individual
dangerous reactions, if necessary, fires
individual bursts of 3 rounds.

3. 4.

(2) Finishes burst. Commands"Shift." Drops (1) Finishes burst. Commands "shift". Drops
back thru [sic] door. Replaces empty magazine. back thru [sic] door. Replaces magazine.
Covers corridor. Covers corridor.
(1) On command "shift", opens fire on opposite (2) On command, "shift", re-enters room.
side of target, swings one burst across group. Covers group: kills survivors with two-round
 42

bursts. Leaves propaganda.

5. 6.

(2) Leaves room. Commands "GO". Covers

rear with nearly full magazine.

(1) On command "GO", leads withdrawl,

covering front with full magazine.

Surveillance Recognition
by U.S. Dept. of State
Surveillance is required for successful terrorist planning. Experience has taught us that
terrorist attacks are generally preceded by pre-operational surveillance in which terrorists
gather target intelligence. Surveillance is defined as the process of keeping facilities,
vehicles and persons under observation in order to obtain detailed information. Any
indications of surveillance should be reported immediately to the the security office of
your organization and/or the police. All training programs designed to protect individuals
from becoming victims of terrorism recommend that people be alert to surveillance. This
is excellent advice, but, unfortunately, in most instances it is insufficient, because people
have had no training in detecting surveillance, and terrorist organizations are often
relatively sophisticated in their surveillance methods. Detecting surveillance conducted
by trained experts is not as easy as most Hollywood films would lead us to believe.
Fortunately, however, the type of surveillance conducted by terrorist organizations is not
normally as elaborate as that done by intelligence organizations nor does it involve as
many people or as much equipment. Nevertheless, for people to have a reasonable chance
at detecting most forms of surveillance they would have to be somewhat familiar with the
techniques used. The purpose of surveillance is to determine (1) the suitability of the
potential target based upon the physical and procedural security precautions that the
individual has taken and (2) the most suitable time, location, and method of attack. This
 43

surveillance may last for days or weeks depending upon the length of time it takes the
surveillants to obtain the information that they require. Naturally, the surveillance of a
person who has set routines and who takes few precautions will take less time. The
people undertaking the surveillance will often not take part in the attack, nor will the
attack take place while surveillance is still in progress. Before undertaking surveillance
most experts gather information about the subject from other sources. Public records of
information made available to the terrorist organization from a sympathetic individual
within an organization, local police, or other government office may reveal useful facts
about an individual such as the names of family members, an address, a description of
vehicles and license numbers, photographs, etc. The surveillants will also make a
reconnaissance of the neighborhood in which the target lives and works. This permits
them to select positions of observation, the types of vehicles to use, the clothing to be
worn, and the type of ruse to use that will give them an ordinary or normal appearance
and plausible reasons to be in the area. There are basically three forms of surveillance:
foot, vehicle, and stationary (generally categorized as either mobile or static). A brief
description of the most common techniques used for each of these forms and methods for
detecting each one follows:
One or more individuals may undertake foot surveillance. One-person foot surveillance is
rather complicated and fairly easy to detect. The surveillance must remain close to the
target, particularly in congested areas, to avoid losing him or her. In less congested areas
the surveillant can maintain a greater distance, but the lack of other pedestrians makes the
surveillant that much more noticeable. The one complicating factor is the use of a
disguise to make the surveillant look different (perhaps a uniform). One possible use of a
disguise is a shopping bag or some other container for a change of clothes, particularly if
the shopping bag is from a store not found in the area or the container somehow seems
out of place. Where a disguise is suspected, pay particular attention to shoes and slacks or
skirts. These items are less easily and, therefore, less commonly changed. In elevators,
watch for people who seem to wait for you to push a button and then select a floor one
flight above or below yours. Two-person foot surveillance is more effective in that the
second surveillant provides greater flexibility. Normally, one surveillant remains close to
the target while the other stays at a greater distance. The second surveillant may follow
the first on the same side of the street or travel on the opposite side. Periodically the two
surveillants change position so that if the target spots one of them, that one will soon be
out of sight, leading the target to think that he or she was mistaken. Obviously, spotting
this form of surveillance is more complicated, but individuals who are alert to the people
in their vicinity will eventually detect the same surveillant over a period of time. Foot
surveillance with three or more people uses the most sophisticated techniques and is the
most difficult to spot. Generally, one surveillant remains behind the target close enough
to respond to any sudden moves. A second surveillant remains behind the first on the
same side of the street with the first surveillant in sight. A third surveillant travels on the
opposite side of the street parallel with or just behind the target. In areas where the target
has few paths to choose, one surveillant may walk in front of the target, where he or she
is least likely to cause suspicion. The positions of the surveillants are frequently changed,
most commonly at intersections. The surveillant directly behind the target may move to
the opposite side of the street, while another surveillant moves in close behind the target.
With the additional surveillants, any surveillant who feels that he or she has been
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observed may drop out of the formation. The use of this sophisticated technique requires
that people be alert not only to those people behind them but also to those across the
street and perhaps in front of them. If the same person is seen more than once over a
certain distance, surveillance may be suspected even if that person is not continuously
seen. Common methods for detecting surveillance apply to all three forms of foot
surveillance. The most effective are: 1. stopping abruptly and looking to the rear, 2.
suddenly reversing your course, 3. stopping abruptly after turning a corner, 4. watching
reflections in shop windows or other reflective surfaces, 5. entering a building and
leaving immediately by another exit,
6. walking slowly and then rapidly at intervals, 7. dropping a piece of paper to see if
anyone retrieves it, 8. boarding or exiting a bus or subway just before it starts, and 9.
making sudden turns or walking around the block. While taking these actions, watch for
people who are taken by surprise, react inappropriately, suddenly change direction, or
give a signal to someone else. Surveillants will not normally look directly at the target,
but they may do so if they are surprised or unaware that you are observing them. Foot
surveillance is often used in conjunction with vehicle surveillance since it is likely that
the target will use a combination of foot and vehicle transportation. Vehicles used for
surveillance are inconspicuous in appearance and of a subdued color. Frequently, the
inside dome light is made inoperative so that it will not illuminate the interior of the car
when the door is opened. Vehicles will have two or more people in them so that if the
target parks his or her vehicle and walks away, the surveillance can be resumed on foot
while the driver remains with the vehicle. While moving, the driver gives full attention to
driving while the observer operates the radio, watches the target, and makes notes on the
target's activities. Sometimes it will be necessary for surveillants to break traffic
regulations to avoid losing you. If you see a vehicle run a red light, make an illegal
U?turn, travel over the speed limit, or make dangerous or sudden lane changes in an
apparent effort to keep up with you, you should, of course, be suspicious of that vehicle.
The distance between a surveillance vehicle and the target will vary depending on the
speed at which the vehicles are traveling and the amount of traffic. Surveillants will try to
keep one or two vehicles between themselves and the target. As with foot surveillance,
vehicle surveillance may be undertaken using only one vehicle or using two or more
vehicles. One-vehicle surveillance suffers from the same drawbacks as one-person foot
surveillance. The target has to be kept in view at all times and followed by the same
vehicle. Surveillants can try to overcome this advantage somewhat by changing seating
arrangements within the vehicle; putting on and taking off hats, coats, and sunglasses;
changing license plates; and turning off onto side streets and then turning back to resume
the tail. This makes it necessary for a person suspecting surveillance to remember aspects
of a following vehicle that cannot easily be changed such as the make, model, and color
of the car and any body damage such as rust, dents, etc. The use of two or more vehicles
permits surveillance to switch positions or to drop out of the surveillance when necessary.
One vehicle follows the target vehicle and directs other vehicles by radio. The other
vehicle may follow behind the lead surveillance vehicle, precede the target vehicle, or
travel on parallel roads. At intersections, the vehicle following directly behind the target
vehicle will generally travel straight ahead while alerting all other vehicles of the
direction in which the target vehicle has turned. Another vehicle in the formation will
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then take a position behind the target and become the lead vehicle, taking over the
responsibility for giving instructions to other surveillants. The
former lead vehicle then makes a U?turn or travels around the block to take up a new
position ready to resume the lead vehicle position again when necessary. People who
have well established routines permit surveillants to use methods that are much more
difficult to detect. If, for example, you leave the office at the same time each day and
travel by the most direct route to your home or if you live in a remote area with a few or
no alternate routes to your home, surveillants have no need to follow you all the way to
your residence. An alternative method of surveillance in such situations is leading
surveillance and progressive surveillance. In leading surveillance the surveillant travels in
front of the target while the observer watches for turns. When the target turns, this is
noted. The next day the surveillant makes a turn where the target did the previous day.
Over a period of time the surveillants will discover the entire route to the residence while
still driving in a position that creates much less suspicion. There are two forms of
progressive surveillance. In the first form, surveillants are placed at intersections along
the probable routes of the target. When the target makes a turn, this is noted and the
position of the surveillants is adjusted to check the next intersection. Eventually, this
method leads the surveillants to the residence. In the second form or progressive
surveillance, a vehicle will follow the target for a short distance and then turn off. On
successive days the surveillant picks up the target where he or she left off the previous
day. Leading and progressive surveillance are extremely difficult to detect, but you
should not give anyone the opportunity to use these methods. The most effective methods
for detecting most forms of vehicle surveillance are: 1. making a U-turn where it is safe
to do so, 2. making a turn to the right or left (in general, right turns create greater
complications for surveillants because of oncoming traffic that may delay a turn), 3.
going through a traffic light just as it is turning red, stopping just beyond a curve or hill,
and circling a block. In each case, watch for the reactions of any vehicles that you may
suspect. Any vehicles that make unusual maneuvers should be carefully noted. Do not
forget to check for motorcycles or motorbikes, since in many parts of the world they
seem to be favored by surveillants because they move easily through heavy traffic.
Stationary surveillance is commonly used by terrorist organizations. As mentioned
earlier, most attacks take place near the residence or office because that part of the route
is least easily varied. Most people are more vulnerable in the morning when departing for
work, because morning departure times are more predictable than are evening arrivals.
Surveillants seek a position that permits them to observe the residence or office clearly
without being observed or suspected. Surveillants want to identify observation points that
afford the best view of the target. Foot and vehicular traffic, buildings and terrain around
each government facility vary with each location. Pedestrian traffic, rush hour traffic
flow, temporary street closure, etc. will affect observation points. If the surveillants
decide that it is best not to be seen, they may obtain an apartment or rent office space in
the area that provides for an adequate view, but such apartments or office space may not
be available and the renting of an apartment or office space could provide clues for a
subsequent investigation. The use of an apartment or office space for surveillance, while
possibly the most difficult to detect, is generally not the easiest or safest method. Many
surveillance teams use vans with windows in the side or back that permit observation
from the interior of the van. Often the van will have the name of a store or utility
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company to provide some pretext for its being in the area. The driver may park the van
and walk away, leaving the surveillance team inside. Some teams use automobiles for
stationary surveillance, parking the vehicle far enough from the residence or office to be
less noticeable, using other vehicles for cover, facing the vehicle away from the target,
and using the rear view mirrors to watch. Where it is not possible to watch the residence
or office unobserved, surveillants must come up with a plausible reason for being in the
area. The types of ruses used are limited only by the surveillant's imagination. Some of
the more commonly used covers are automotive repairs due to engine trouble or a flat
tire, door to door sales, utility repair crews, lovers in a park, walking a dog, construction
work, or sitting at a cafe. Women and children are often used to give a greater appearance
of innocence. Some things to check for are parked vehicles with people in them, cars with
more mirrors or mirrors that are larger than normal, people seen in the area more
frequently than seems normal, people who are dressed inappropriately, and workers who
seem to accomplish nothing. If you become suspicious of a van, note any information
printed on the side of the van, including telephone numbers. Check the telephone book to
see if such a business exists. Note the license numbers of any suspicious vehicles and
provide them to your security office so they can be checked. Make a habit of checking
the neighborhood through a window before you go out each day. Detecting surveillance
requires a constant state of alertness and must become an unconscious habit. We do not
want to encourage paranoia, but a good sense of what is normal and what is unusual in
your surroundings could be more important than any other type of security precaution
you take. Above all, do not hesitate to report any unusual events to the police. Many
people who have been kidnapped realized afterwards that their suspicions had been well
founded. If those suspicions had been reported, their ordeal might have been avoided.
Since surveillance attempts to determine the suitability of a potential target and the most
opportune time for an attack, it is crucial to avoid predictability. Although the
recommendation to vary routes and times of arrivals and departures has become trite,
implementing it in one's daily schedule has proven to be effective in deterring sufficient
terrorist planning. Varying times and routes apply to jogging, shopping and all activities
where a pattern can develop.