Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
RELATION
Submitted by:
Name: Ahmad Ali Ansari
Roll No. : 080101028
Batch 07, (AERO)
Submitted to:
Colonel Farooq
Date of Submission:
30th Aprail, 2009.
1
I dedicate this research paper to the people of
Pakistan those who toil, sacrifice, and pray for their
country and who wait patiently for a better future.
AND
To my father and mother who’s both unwavering
faith in me has been the driving force in my life.
ALSO
To both the Pakistani and Indian nations for a
forever friendship.
2
Contents
Page No.
1. Introduction………………………………………………………….................... 4-5
2. Chap No. I: Initial Problems faced by Pakistan (1947 & 1948)……………. …. 6-8
10. Chap No. IX: Survey on relationship between Pakistani and Indians…….. 30-32
11. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………… 33
3
Introduction
The topic of this research paper is “Indo-Pak Relation”. It is a very crucial topic to
discuss. Pakistan and India both came into being on August 1947. Muslims of
subcontinent got Pakistan after long tiring efforts and great many sacrifices. So, they
were very happy after independence. On the other hand people of India saw that
independence as an assault on their nationalism. They even today consider that,
Muslims of Pakistan has just divided their country which they consider as Hindustan
(Land of Hindus). So the entire nation of India is just against Pakistan right form the day
of independence. People of India till now have not accepted Pakistan. Due to this gap
between the people of India and Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and India
has not been good since 1947 upto date. All the types of relationships whether it is
political or economical, whether it is cultural or social, all of them have been
controversial upto date.
Pakistan and India are the inheritors of two of the richest cultures and civilizations of the
world. Along with other countries of South Asia, they are also among the poorest
segments of mankind. Despite enjoyment of independence for over sixty years, they
remain afflicted with mass poverty and all its concomitant ills. It is a tragedy of their
short history as independent states that their mutual antagonism plunged them into
three wars and when not engaged fighting, has kept them close to the brink. The major
conflict between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Besides Kashmir, there are also so
many hot topics to discuss, but due to limitation of research paper’s length and shortage
of time, this research paper will deal with the following chapters:
i. Initial Problems faced by Pakistan (1947 & 1948).
ii. Kashmir Dispute (1948 upto date).
iii. Indus Water Treaty.
iv. 1965 War.
v. 1971 War and Simla Agreement.
vi. Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missiles Program
vii. Kargil War.
viii.Present Situation.
4
ix. Survey on relationship between Pakistani and Indians.
All the above mentioned chapters will cover all the aspects of INDO-PAK Relation.
Whenever you write something limitations are always there. So, I also faced difficulties
in writing this research paper. The limitations were;
1) Approach to the books regarding Pakistan literature was quite difficult as IST’s
library is short of books regarding literature.
2) National Library is quite far from IST’s hostel.
3) Transportation Problem.
4) Short of time.
5) Non availability of internet at IST’s hostel.
6) Power failure problem.
Besides these limitations, I also restricted my mind-set towards Pakistan and India. As I
am, by the grace of Almighty Allah, Pakistani. When I made a survey on internet and
interact with the people of India, they just send me obnoxious sentences rather than
welcome me. So I controlled my feelings and write this research paper as an unbiased
being. But, if I remain inclined towards Pakistan, so it is natural. Just ignore that.
At last I would like to thanks my father and mother who motivated me a lot on writing
this research paper. I would also like to give credit to all my friends who helped me a lot,
especially to Fayyazi, Ubaid-ur-Rehman, Jazib Hassan. I would also like to recognize all
those fellows who assisted me in writing this research paper.
5
Chapter No. I:
1
For detail see D.C, Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations 196-65, (Patna, 1972)
6
According to law made for the partition of the India was:
“To divide up a piece of land into separate portions representing the proportionate
interests of the tenants. It may also consist of dividing a property with common
ownership into identifiable individual ownership”2
According to which independent states of India was given the rights to be part of
India or Pakistan according to their own will. But India refused that and got the
controlled of Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad Dakan and Munavara, which disturbed
a lot the relationship between India and Pakistan.
2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition#Law
3
For detail see Gulab Mishra ‘Prakhar’, Indo-Pakistan Relations (From Taskent to Sima),
Sheetal Printing Press, 1987, chapter five.
7
(iii) Evacuee Property Problem:
Owing to the migration of non-Muslims in Pakistan to India and the Muslims of India
to Pakistan on a mass scale the problem of evacuee property also came up causing
serious differences between India and Pakistan. About 79, 00,000 Muslims moved
from India to Pakistan.4These migrants left all their movable and immovable
properties in their native places. About One thousand million rupees were left in
India by the Muslims in terms of Immovable and movable properties.5
To solve the evacuee Immovable property several meetings between the
representatives of Indian and Pakistani Governments took place between 1947-1950
out nothing came out of it. The attempt to solve this problem by the Government of
India in 1953 also failed.6 In 1958 a ministerial level meeting took place but it was
also not fruitful.7
Besides moveable and immoveable property of migrants, Pakistan also faced
problems regarding distribution of national wealth between Pakistan and India. At the
time of partition of India, national wealth was decided to be distributed among both
the nations by British Government.8 Pakistan has to be given 750 million rupees as
his share in national wealth. Also since the capital of Sub-continent was in India
therefore all the capital at that time was in India. India first gave 50 million rupees to
Pakistan and promised to give the remaining soon. But then India refused to give the
remaining amount later. Later by the interruption of Gandhi Pakistan was given 500
million rupees. The remaining is still to be paid by Indian Government.
4
Fr details, D.C. Jha, n. 4, page 308
5
Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Rehabilitation Retrospect, New Delhi,
page 4.
6
D.C.Jha, n.4, page 308
7
Report, 196-61, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, page 24
8
For details, Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable Peace),
Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore.
8
Pakistan and the remaining territory of Pakistan which was at west of India was
named as West Pakistan.
A large number of migrants which was living at East part of India migrate towards
East Pakistan as it was nearer and transportation problem was also there. On the
other hand Non-Muslims of India made it difficult for the Muslims of India to live
there. They assault on their property as well as to their lives. So a large of Muslims
was compelled to leave their native land and migrate to Pakistan. When these
migrants arrived Pakistan (both East and West), then it became difficult for the
Government of Pakistan to manage it. Pakistan had no more resources at that time.
Rehabilitation of migrants was a major problem. Also India refused to hand over the
moveable and immoveable property of migrants to Pakistan. But Pakistani faced this
problem with courage and a determination to lead Pakistan as a most powerful
nation of the world.9
9
My grandmother Zulekha Khatoon (late) (1931-2008).
9
Chapter No. II:
Kashmir Dispute
(1947 upto date)
The major cause of worst relation between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Since the
partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir dispute between
them has become an intractable one. They fought three wars over it in 1947, 1965, and
1999, but have not resolved it the Indians and Pakistanis like Israelis and Palestinians
make claims to the same territory.
Location:
Kashmir is located in the northeast of Pakistan and northwest of Pakistan.
Geographically it has its utmost importance. Most of the rivers which flows through
Pakistan have their origin in Kashmir. So, for Pakistan it is an integral part.
Map of Kashmir10
10
state, resisted the pressure to join either Pakistan or India hoping to get independence
or autonomy from both countries. To buy time and to accomplish this goal, he signed a
standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 16, and tried to sign a similar agreement
with India.
Pakistan claimed this territory, as 72 percent of Maharaja's subjects were Muslim. India
wanted the Muslim majority territory of Kashmir as an emblem of her secularism. The
Maharaja offered a "stand still" agreement to India and Pakistan, as he wanted some
more time to make up his mind. Pakistan signed agreement but India refused. As the
Maharaja continued to dither, violence broke in the Jammu
and Poonch region where sections of local Muslims wanted
to merge with Pakistan. There was a similar revolt in the
northern hill territory of Gilgit. In violation of the "stand still"
agreement Pakistan stopped the passage of food and other
essential commodities to Jammu and Kashmir through her
territory. In September 1947, tribal raiders backed by
Pakistan army invaded the valley.11 (violence in Kashmir)
11
Rathnam Indurthy, Professor of Government at McNeese State University, Kashmir
Between India and Pakistan: An Intractable Conflict, 1947 to Present
12
Dr. Wasim Mallik, REAL STORY OF KASHMIR, [2001-2008]
11
Between 1949 and 1958 UNCIP made several attempts to implement the plebiscite
resolution. Even partition of the territory along the ceasefire line with limited plebiscite in
the valley was proposed at one stage. The intransigence of India and Pakistan defeated
every effort of the UN. India and Pakistan established their political control over the
territories of J&K under their respective control. Thus two separate political entities were
created on the disputed territory -” “Government of Jammu and Kashmir State" on the
Indian side and “Government of Azad Kashmir" on the Pakistani side. Needless to add
that these "governments" were essentially "client" governments. The emergency of
these political entities altered the ground situation as these new "stake holders" started
manipulating the people of the divided territory on the command of their masters in
Delhi and Islamabad. The Kashmiris, who disagreed with New Delhi or Islamabad, were
termed traitors and spies and put behind the bars.
By 1958, within ten-years of having taken the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations,
and having asked for international intervention in the resolution of the dispute, India
changed its position on outside mediation in Kashmir. As a result, during 1960 and 1964
India turned down the offers of mediation by President Nasser of Egypt, President
Kennedy of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of United Kingdom.
The second Indo-Pak war on Kashmir took place in 1965. The third Indo-Pak war of
1971, which began on the soil of former East Pakistan and present Bangladesh, spilled
over onto the territory of Kashmir. For the last 52 years, India and Pakistan have been
virtually at war with each other. At times this war was fought with guns, but most of the
time it has been verbal devil. The so-called "Kashmir dispute" lies at the very core of this
enmity. Both India and Pakistan feel incomplete without Kashmir. Because of this enmity
the people of the former princely state of J&K have being living under virtual war
conditions.13
13
For details, Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable
Peace), Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore.
14
http://images.google.com.pk/
12
Chapter No. III:
Negotiation:
The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and
Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor
exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers
and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan
has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial
compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern rivers. The countries agree to
exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty. For this purpose, treaty
creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each
country.16
The ensuing negotiations between the two countries did not resolve the problem. The
water flow cut off by India affected 5.5 per cent of Pakistan’s irrigated area and put
tremendous strains on the new country. After nine years of negotiations, the Indus
Waters Treaty was finally signed on September 19, 1960, with the cooperation of the
World Bank.
15
For detail see Gulab Mishra ‘Prakhar’, Indo-Pakistan Relations (From Taskent to Sima),
Sheetal Printing Press, 1987.
16
Adapted from Beach, H.L., Hamner, J., Hewitt, J.J., Kaufman, E.,Kurki, A., Oppenheimer, J.A.,
and Wolf, A.T. (2000). Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, Practice, and
Annotated References. United Nations University Press. Hosted at the Transboundry
Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon State University.
13
17
Salient Features:
The salient features of the Indus Waters Treaty are:
• Three Eastern rivers namely Ravi, Sutlej and
Beas were given to India.
• Three Western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.
• Pakistan to meet the requirements of its Eastern river canals from the Western
rivers by constructing replacement works.
• Safeguards incorporated in the treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters in the
Western rivers.
• Both parties were to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.
• A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the disputes
between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement of the differences
and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes through the International Court
of Arbitration.
Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the Indus
Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective water shares with
the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be administered by the World Bank.
17
Haroon Ahmed, INDUS WATER TREATY BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN, research paper, page 2
14
India claimed that 90 percent of the Tulbul project would be beneficial to Pakistan, as it
would regulate the supply to Mangla Dam, which would increase Pakistan’s capacity of
power generation at Mangla, as well as regulate the irrigation network in the Pakistani
Punjab through the triple canal system. 10 India further suggested that Pakistan should
bear the greater share of constructing the Barrage, as it would be more beneficial to
Pakistan, and would be especially effective in reducing the flow of water during the flood
season.
Pakistan, on the other hand, argued that India had violated Article I (11) of the Indus
Waters Treaty, which prohibits both parties from undertaking any ‘man-made
obstruction’ that may cause ‘change in the volume É of the daily flow of waters’. Further
that Article III (4) specifically barred India, from ‘storing any water of, or construct any
storage works on, the Western Rivers’.
According to sub-paragraph 8(h) of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct
an ‘incidental storage work’ on Western rivers on its side:
• only after the design has been scrutinised and approved by Pakistan; and
• Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acres feet of water.
Whereas the Wular Barrage’s capacity is 300,000 acres feet, which is thirty times more
than the permitted capacity. Regarding the building of a hydro electric plant, according
to the Treaty, India is only allowed to construct a small run-off water plant with a
maximum discharge of 300 cusecs through the turbines which are insufficient to
generate 960 Megawatts of electricity as planned by India.
Bilateral Negotiations:
Pakistan referred the Wular Barrage case to the Indus Waters Commission in 1986,
which, in 1987, recorded its failure to resolve it. When India suspended the construction
work, Pakistan did not take the case in the International Arbitral Court. To date, eight
rounds of talks have been held. In 1989, Pakistan agreed to build a barrage conditional
to Pakistani inspection, which India rejected.
The two sides almost reached an agreement in October 1991, whereby India would
keep 6.2 meters of the barrage ungated with a crest level of 1574.90m (5167 ft), and
would forego the storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet. In return, the water level in the
Barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 ft. However, in
February 1992, Pakistan added another condition that India should not construct the
Kishenganga (390 MW) hydropower-generating unit. India refused to accept this
condition. According to Pakistan, the Kishenganga project on River Neelam affected its
own Neelam-Jhelum power-generating project, located in its Punjab province. The issue
of Wular Barrage was one of the disputes on the agenda highlighted for the Indo-Pak
talks, both at the Lahore meeting in February 1999, and at the Agra Summit of July
2001.
15
Implications for Pakistan:
The control of the River Jhelum by India through a storage work would mean:
• A serious threat to Pakistan should India decide to withhold the water over an
extended period, especially during the dry season. It would also multiply and magnify
the risks of floods and droughts in Pakistan. The Mangla Dam on River Jhelum, which is
a source of irrigation and electricity for Punjab, would be adversely affected.
• Provide India a strategic edge, during a military confrontation, enabling it to
control the mobility and retreat of Pakistani troops and enhancing the maneuverability of
Indian troops. Closing the Barrage gates would render the Pakistani canal system dry
and easy to cross. During the 1965 war, the Indian Army failed to cross the BRB Link
Canal, due to its full swing flow. India is already in control of the Chenab River through
Salal Dam constructed in 1976. Many Pakistanis criticise the conceding of the Salal
Dam to India.
Consequence:
The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully implemented and
upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation was often arduous and
frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and Pakistani delegations, the final
outcome was amenable to all parties. While the World Bank may have underestimated
the political impediments to technical debate and agreement, Eugene Black's desire to
"treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in
nature . . . undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan
are confronted" suggests possibilities for future areas of Indo-Pakistani cooperation.
_____________________
Sources:
Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources," Policy
Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank, May 1994.
Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied
Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
cooperation is vital. The Indus waters are the life blood of Pakistan and much of western
India; functional cooperation was necessary for both sides to survive and prosper. The
example of the Indus Waters Treaty suggests that cooperation between India and
16
Pakistan is possible in cases where the benefits of agreement are plentiful and
pressing, overwhelming the political hedging that prevents other forms of reconciliation.
______________________
Michel, Aloys Arthur, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition, Yale University
Press: New Haven, 1967.
Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New Delhi, 1990.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Waters_Treaty"
17
Chapter No. IV:
1965 War
Background:
The background of 1965 war between Pakistan and India is quite controversial.
Embodied by a presumed victory against India in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965,
Pakistan made plans for “Operation Gibraltar” to recover Kashmir. As it did in 1947, it
first sent Pakistani guerrillas into the Valley in August 1965 hoping that the Kashmiri
Muslims would rise in rebellion against India. Instead, the guerrillas were apprehended
and handed over to the Indian authorities. The situation worsened rapidly.
The War:
On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on
the region referred to by the disputants as either "Azad Kashmir" or "Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir". Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked,[10] while Indian reports cite
the attack as a response to massive armed infiltrations of Kashmir by Pakistan.18
Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important
mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however,
both sides had experienced successes; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as
Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers inside
Pakistani-occuppied territory
18
History Division, Ministry of Defence. Government of India. 1992
September 1995
18
India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6, marking an
official beginning of the war.20 On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian
Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive
counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which
was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was
ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt
to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of
Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore
International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to
allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.However,the Pakistani counter attack took
Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from
Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.As said by Indian Lt.
General Kaul,
"The C-in-C(Indian) got cold feet and decided, while the battle
of Khem Karan was still in progress to take up an alternate
Pakistan's Ichogil position, several miles in the rear which would have meant
giving up some well known and vital places and areas." (Kaul
op. Cit. P478)
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three
tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade: they quickly advanced
across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani
Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively
stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat
Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured 21 the town of
Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter
offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan
Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point.
Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by
ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's
capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from
Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[14] to
Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21
September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani
reinforcements.
20
Story of Pakistan.com
21
Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj
Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
19
On the days following September 9, both nations'
premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the Indian 18th Cavalry
posing outside a captured Pakistani police
India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the station (Barkee) in Lahore District.
Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The
Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by
the Pakistani 6th armoured division (an understrength
formation of few armoured regiments) at Chawinda and
was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of
nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their
success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the
Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st
Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran, with the intent to capture
Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The
Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the
end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain
Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning - "Real Answer",
or more appropriate English equivalent - "Fitting Response"). The area became known
as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani
Patton tanks. 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian
tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured
Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it
didnt see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st
Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.
Cease-Fire:
In January of 1966, at the invitation of Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin, both Shastri and
Khan met in the city of Tashkent (Republic of Uzbesistan) and signed the agreement
known as the Tashkent Declaration. On January 10, the agreement was formalized and
the hostilities ended followed by the withdrawal of the Indo-Pakistani forces to the
previous cease-fire lines.2 Shastri died of a heart attack in Tashkent right after he
signed the declaration and Mrs. Indira Gandhi succeeded him. In 1971 India and
Pakistan fought a third war over Bangladesh’s Independence in which the Kashmir
dispute was only a peripheral issue.
Consequence:
At the end of the war not only India has suffered a lot but Pakistan also. Pakistan
celebrate 6th September as its Defense day and consider 1965 war as to be its victory
while Indians assumed that, that war had no conclusion. Consequently the hatred
among people of both the nations increased by 1965 War.
20
Chapter No. V:
Tensions were alleviated by the Simla accord of 1972 and by Pakistan's recognition of
Bangladesh in 1974, but tensions have periodically recurred.
On July 2, 1972, Mrs. Gandhi signed the Simla agreement with Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
the first President and later Prime Minister of Pakistan who had succeeded the military
dictator General Yahya Khan in 1971. Under this agreement, India and Pakistan, among
others, committed themselves to “settling their differences
through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means
mutually agreed upon between them,” and that the “basic
issues and causes which bedeviled the relations between the
two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by
22
Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 54-pg 55.
21
peaceful means.” They also agreed that in “Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control
(LOC) resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both
sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side." The agreement
became the basis for the renewal of official relations between the two countries both at
political and economic levels, thus ending any role for either the UN or outside powers
including the US. On July 24, 1973, they both signed another agreement in New Delhi
agreeing to repatriate all POW’s except for 195 who were held to be tried but were later
released without trial. While it demanded a plebiscite in the Indian-part of Kashmir,
Pakistan unilaterally detached Gilgit Agency and Baltistan from Azad Kashmir in 1974,
and integrated them into Pakistan. This move ignored the UN Security Council’s
longstanding resolutions in the same fashion that India did when it had integrated
Kashmir into her union in 1956. Pakistan and India also renewed diplomatic
recognitions in 1976.
Consequence:
Unfortunately after 1971 war Pakistan splits into two parts, East Pakistan became
Bangladesh and West Pakistan became remaining Pakistan which was later named as
Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1971 constitution. The involving of India in 1971’s
political situation of Pakistan which later Bangali called as Liberation War raise tension
between India and Pakistan. The relationship between Pakistan and India became
worst. But in 1972 after Simla Accord the relationship between both the nations came
on the track towards peace.
22
Chapter No. VI:
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new
momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium
enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who
brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired
through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the
Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment
technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating
Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction,
Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary
materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear
tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests
conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total
yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a
boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.23
23
For details see, Munir Ahmed Khan, NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL
AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS REGIONAL STUDIES, Autumn 1998
23
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12
kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed
tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional
device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced
underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be
independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern
Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by
Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were
actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan.
However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in
the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a
clear seismic signal.
24
YIELD YIELD
DEVICE DATE
[announced] [estimated]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as
well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those
claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total
seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May
30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.
24
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
24
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests
of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they
would respond to India.25
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements
between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence
building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation
of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year
were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure,
Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a
military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
25
For details see, Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUGGLE: India and
Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation, , August 2002
25
Chapter No. VII:
Pakistan Missile Test
Kargil War
Location:
War:
As a backup t understanding the Kargil conflict stressed that Kargil was not a ove off operation,
but the latest in a series of moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan
along the line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound Northern Aras, India would capture a
location where they felt that our presence was thin, and vice-versa.28
During and directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent
Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by
Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani
paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. In addition, since Kashmir is under
Pakistani control, Pakistan was able to deploy Kashmiri fighters to fight alongside its
26
http://kargil.nic.in/profile/profile.htm
27
http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2000/fjul2000/f210720001.html
28
Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 87.
26
regular forces. The Indian Army, supported by the Indian Air Force, attacked the
Pakistani positions and, with international diplomatic support, eventually forced
withdrawal of the Pakistani forces across the LOC.
July 4 marked a cease-fire, negotiated by President Bill Clinton with Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, International pressure for a cease-fire was intense. President Clinton was the only
statesman who had influence with both Pakistan and India.29
There are two ‘truths’ about Kargil. The first one is the version of defeatist Pakistanis
who can’t see us doing any good. And the second truth is the Indian one.
Surprisingly, some fair minded former Indian army officers are willing to give a balanced
verdict on the Pakistani performance in Kargil than the ridiculous assessments of some
defeatist and self-hating Pakistanis who have no problem making fun of their homeland
and their military just because they differ politically with Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
Read the letter below by retired Col. Harish Puri from the Indian army’s Corps of
Signals. He uses many of the Indian propaganda lines that raise doubts about the end
result of the Pakistani operation, how the Indian people came together in those days to
support their military, and how Islamabad underestimated the Indian response.
All propaganda points. But then he makes two points very clear that I wish some of
those self-hating defeatist Pakistanis, especially the ones in our English-language
liberal newspapers, read and feel some shame – just a little – about how they have
been putting Pakistan down whenever discussing Kargil and facilitating the propaganda
victory of the other side.30
29
Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 95.
27
The two points that Col. Puri makes are:
• The Pakistani military in professional terms ranks among the best in the world,
along with the Indian army according to Col. Puri. The implicit irony here is that India is
five times larger than Pakistan. For Islamabad to create this balance of power in just five
decades is a Pakistani achievement.31
This is not about clearing the name of Gen. Musharraf. History, and military analysts,
will do that. Our job here is just to tell those few, self-bashing, defeatist-minded
Pakistanis this: Please spare us your self-hatred. We are good at anything we want to
be good at if we put our mind into it. Celebrate your strength instead of wallowing in
your weaknesses.
30
For details see, Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan
Army From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999)
31
http://www.friendskorner.com/forum/f39/real-truth-kargil-war-48790/
28
Chapter No. VIII:
Present Situation
The Indo-Pak relation is still crucial. All the efforts made for a better relation between
both the countries proved to be failed yet. Whenever the relationship between both the
nations goes towards betterment, there happen some terrorist activities in India or in
Pakistan such as Bombing in Calcutta, Dehli,
Bombing in Samjhoota Express (India) or Blast in
Meriot Hotel, Lahore, Karachi, Wazeeristan crises
(Pakistan) etc and then all such activities make the
relation between both the nations again crucial.
Now a day’s India has suffered from Mumbai Attack
which it blames on Pakistan to be involved in that.
Taj Hotel where terrorist attacked
Change in India Pakistan Relations Post Mumbai Attacks:
India and Pakistan is the end product of the two nation theory. The bilateral relationship
between India and Pakistan has always been marred with violence and constant
disbelief of each other’s intention to bring an ever lasting solution for Kashmir conflict.
Of late Kashmir has been regarded as an area buzzing with terrorist activity, loosing
thousands of innocent lives to such barbaric acts year after year.32
32
M.S. Kiran, How Global Jihadi websites see Mumbai Attack, December 4, 2008
29
Pakistan after a decade of dictatorship was also considered as a great impetus for
peaceful relationship between the two nations.
33
For details see The News, “Interior Ministry says Maulvi Fazlullah killed”, December 3,
2008.
30
Chapter No. IX:
ans_ahmad15: Yup
diyadel4u: talk to me
ans_ahmad15: ok..
diyadel4u: but its true and u also know dat ur country caised such a damage for us
ans_ahmad15: I am talking to whole chat room and trying to convince that we can minimize distance
people of both nation.. but I have gotten nothing but just obnixious words and sentences
31
diyadel4u: but it went to extream point
ans_ahmad15: Yup..
ans_ahmad15: I am trying it my best level... but I have realized that there is great distance between both
nations people..
ans_ahmad15: thats not the point to remember.. My country has also gotten wounds from India .. the
point to be noted that what can we do now for the betterment of both the nations
diyadel4u: pppl over here will insult u a lot so pls leave dis room
(mentioned avoided): I‘ll not tell u only my thinkings but also my nations v jst hate Pak… Goto Hell…..!!!
good play; yup but now living in South Africa, Johnsburg Are u Paki
ans_ahmad15: Yes I am Pakistani.. Can you help me out I am writing a research paper on Indo-Pak
relation…?
32
good play; Yup.. ofcourse.. But don’t take it to heart. Most people in India are miserably against Pakistan.
They want to demolish and abolish pak… They consider paki to be responsible of Mumbai attack.
These are the few conversations which I quote in Research Paper. The rest are not
suitable to write. One can conclude the feelings of Indians towards Pakistan via above
conversation. Personally which I felt, while talking to Indians that they hate Pakistan so
much and there is a great gap between both the nation’s people. The feelings of
Pakistani towards Indians are the same. Both the nation’s people hate each other due
to which the Indo-Pak Relation has been crucial since 1947 upto date.
33
Conclusion
The INDO-PAK Relation can be concluded as that the relation which has been crucial
and critical for the last sixty years. The International community has tried a lot to bring
harmony and peace between the people of India and Pakistan. But people of both the
nations decline to accept that. Now a day’s durable peace between India and Pakistan
is far so necessary, not only for both the nations but also for the entire world, because
another confrontation between them can’t be afforded by both nations and humankind
also, as both of them are nuclear power.
The key to the improvement of relation between Pakistan and India on a permanent
basis lies in the acceptance by policy makers and thinkers of deep-rooted historical
realities and factors which gave slapped the great South Asian Muslim and Hindu
cultures. Once it is realized particularly by Bharati strategists, that Pakistan and India
gave no other peaceful choice except to co-exist on equal footing, the way will be paved
for the settlement of all existing disputes. The future holds a changing opportunity to
those two South Asian giants either to become a self-reliant force for durable peace and
prosperity or to plunge the region into fresh conflicts and disturbances which may give
rise to new global and region power association.
I think I am running out of my time. I would like to end by saying that neither India nor
Pakistan can afford a war. In the final analysis, it is in India’s long term interest to have a
strong friendly relation with Pakistan as its neighbor. And I hope we will continue our
peace offensive, because I am sure, sooner or later, the both Indian and Pakistani
leadership will recognize the value of strong and friendly relations as neighbors.
34
35
Bibliography
Articles and Books:
Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers,
New Delhi, 2006
Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation,
Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
Haroon Ahmed, INDUS WATER TREATY BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN, research paper
Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations 196-65, (Patna, 1972)
Michel, Aloys Arthur, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition, Yale
University Press: New Haven, 1967.
Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New Delhi, 1990.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Waters_Treaty
M.S. Kiran, How Global Jihadi websites see Mumbai Attack, December 4, 2008
Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army From
Independence to Kargil 1947–1999)
Munir Ahmed Khan, NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS REGIONAL STUDIES, Autumn 1998
Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable Peace),
Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore
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