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FIELD SURVEY
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PART ONE-THE REPORT
C I N C P A C - C I N C P O A
BULLETIN NO. 3 4 6
15 M A R C H 1946
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HEADQUARTERS,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
1 March, 1946
Officer in Charge, Japanese Defense Study Group.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,
The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,
TRUK, transmittal of Japanese defense study of.
(a) (b) (c) CinCPOA dispatch 162329 of November, 1945.
CinCPOA - - dispatch 220315 of November, 1945.
CinCPOA dispatch 270316 of November, 1945,
NAME WEINTRAUB, Daniel J. GUTHRIE, James T. HELANDER, Melvin ZIRKELBACH, Harry W. NAME POPE, Albert L. CLARK, John A. HURLBUT, Franklin C. EVANS, William A.
RANK Captain, USN Lt.. USC & GS Lt (jg), USNR Ensign, USNR
REPRESENTINq
PHIBSPAC
PHIBSPAC
COMMARIANAS
MEIU 4
REPRESENTING
FMF,PAC
JICPOA
COMMARIANAS
COMMARIANAS
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Subject: References:
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ST. JUKEEN R. MARE
Cblonel, USMC
HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
Confidential 2 March, 1946.
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ORGANIZATION
Oahu Ord. S e r . H d q t e , FMF,PAC Oahu Ord. S e r . JICPOA 3 r d MarDiv
REPRESENTING
AFMIDPAC
FMF,PAC
AFMIDPAC
JICPOA FMF,PAC
Subject:
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ROY S. GEIGER
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF TLR/Jrf CONFIDENTIAL
NAVY
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15 March 1946 - Serial ADM-150802 From:
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Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas* Distribution List. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 3-46, JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. (A) Subject Bulletin.
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1. Subject report, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary.
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L. E. PETERSEN, By direction. DISTRIBUTION LIST Copies 10 10 5 14 2 2 4 2 2 5 2 2 2 10 5 2 2 2 2 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 ARMY ComGenAAF War Dept For: AC/AS Intelligence ComGenAGF Army War College Wash D C ComGenASF War Dept Chief MIS War Dept ChiefofEngrs War Dept ChiefofOrd War Dept ChiefSigOff War Dept Incl: Arlington Hall Station Arlington Va ChiefChemicalWarfare War Dept SurgeonGeneral War Dept ComdtCom&StaffSch Ft Leavenworth Kan ComdtFASch Ft Sill Ofcla COOrdBDCAberdeenProvingGround Aberdeen Md ComdtlnfantrySchool Ft Benning Ga SCAP ClnCAFPAC APO 500 ComGenPACUSA APO 925 ComGenUSAFIK APO 235 ComGenUSAFCTO APO 879 NY ComGenEIGHT APO 343 ComGenMIDPAC APO 958 The EngrMIDPAC APO 958 C030thEngrBaseTopoBn APO 957 C064thEngrTopoBn APO 246 CO AGF APO 246 CO AGF APO' 247 ComGenWesPacBasCom APO 244
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE
GEOGRAPHY SUMMARY A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF TRUK JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE, TRUK ISLANDS PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHIC TERRAIN STUDY ARTILLERY AND "ORDNANCE Sources of Information Development of the Defenses Equipment Available Artillery Tactical Control Artillery Fire Control Artillery - General Remarks Artillery Positions On Barrier Reef Islands Description of Individual Batteries Maintenance and Repair Facilities Total Quantities of Fire Control Items Total Quantities of Vehicles Total Quantities of Weapons and Ammunition ENGINEERING Military Engineering Engineer and Construction Troops Organization of the Ground Fortifications Obstacle Construction Types Searchlights Mines, Mine Warfare, Booby Traps, Explosives and Demolitions Camouflage Chemical Warfare Field Utilities General Construction Roads, Trails, and Railroads Wharves and Docks Bridges and Causeways Installations Underground Installations in General Fixed or Permanent Utilities SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS General Navy Communications Radio Radio Countermeasures Radio Intelligence Radio Direction Finding Wire Radar Summary Power Equipment VIsual Pigeons Codes and Ciphers Air-Ground Communications Meteorlogical Stations Supply and Repair
PAGE NO
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52 58 58 58 58 62 63 67
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100 100
100 100
100 100
TITLE
Army Communications
Radio
Radio Countermeasures
Radio Intelligence
Radio Direction Finders
Wire; Telephone
Radar
Power Equipment
Visual
Pigeons
Codes and Ciphers
Air-Ground Communications
Meteorlogical Stations
Supply and Repair
NAVAL ACTIVITIES
General
Mine Warfare
Defense of the North and South Passes
Details on Minefields in TRUK Atoll
Obstacles
Vessels
Navy Ships and Boats
Naval Communications
Hydrographic Information
Conditions of the Sinking of Submarine 1-169
The Attack on TRUK by the British Task Force
BEACHES General Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. Beach No. AVIATION
General
Construction of Air Facilities
Disposition of Aircraft
Destruction of Japanese Air Power at TRUK MEDICAL & SANITARY CONDITIONS
Introduction General Medical Sanitary Conditions
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III
PAGE NO.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART TWO
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(A) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOF DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, DUBLON
ISLAND, SCALE 1:12,500, CONFIDENTIAL.
(B) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, MOEN
ISLAND, SCALE 1:25,000, CONFIDENTIAL.
(C) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, FEFAN
ISLAND, SCALE 1:25,000, CONFIDENTIAL.
(D) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, PARAM,
UDOT AND EOT ISLANDS, SCALES 1:12,500 AND 1:25,000, CONFIDENTIAL.
(E) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, ETEN
AND UMAN ISLANDS, SCALE 1:12,500, CONFIDENTIAL.
(F) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, NORTH
TOL ISLAND, SCALE 1:25,000, CONFIDENTIAL.
(G) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, WEST
TOL AND SOUTH TOL, SCALE 1:25,000, CONFIDENTIAL.
(H) ENEMY DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS, TROOP DISPOSITIONS, AND FACILITIES, TRUK
BARRIER REEF, SCALE 1:250,000 CONFIDENTIAL.
(I) LOCATION OF GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS, TRUK ATOLL, SCALE 1:96,585, CONFIDENTIAL.
(J) H. 0. CHART 6046, REPRINTED.
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COMMENT
ON T.HE NUMBERING
OF
PHOTOGRAPHS
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Individual photographs, the first of which appears on page 20, are sequentially
numbered to facilitate reference thereto in the written body of the report.
Immediately f 01 lowing th'e sequential number is the "PM" number in par.ent he s is ,
i.e., Picture No. 1 (PM 572), which indicates the basic number of a picture in
APPENDIX III /Ground Photographic Reference Data) and on the map ent it led
"LOCATION OF GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS" in PART TWO. This procedure was adopted in
order to maintain a cross-reference between the 451 photographs appear ing in
this publicat i on and the total of 5 7 5 photographs that were taken and are listed
in APPENDIX III and on the map entitled "LOCATION OF GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS" in
PART TWO. It should be noted that the photographs contained in the panoramic
strips have no sequential numbers since the individual photographs contained-
therein are" not referred to in the written body of the raPort. Aerial Photo-
graphs are given separate numbers, i.e.. Air. Photo No. 1, and appear only in
the sections entitled "BEACHES" and "AVIATION"See APPENDIX III for the lo-
cation of all photographic negat ives in the event copies of phot ographs are
desired.
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946.
GEOGRAPHY
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FIGURE N0.2-CAR0LINE-MARIANAS
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TRUK ATOLL ( I s l a n d s ) MOEN DUBLON FEFAN UMAN ETEN UDOT EOT FALA-BEGUETS TOL PATA (NW p a r t TOL) POLLE (SW p a r t TOL) ONAMUE ULALU KUOP ATOLL . . . . TARIK TSIS PARAM OTTA I . MESAGON I . . . . . UIJEC I* FANAN I . SALAT I . MOR I . PIS I . FALEU I . TONELIK I . OLLAN I . NORTHEAST I , NORTH P a s s - NORTHEAST P a s s SALAT P a s s ULIGAR P a s s OTTA P a s s SOUTH P a s s . . . . PIAANU P a s s
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GEOGRAPHY.
Approximate distances (nautical miles) from TRUK Atoll (ETEN Ancnorage) to:
TRUK Atoll consists of a group of about 84 coral and basaltic islands, A bar rier reef, roughly circular in shape encloses the larger islands in a lagoon about
30 miles in diameter. Six major islands lie within the lagoon. They are DUBLON,
TOL, MOEN, FEFAN, UDOT and UMAN.
The greatest elevation is MT. TUMUITAL, 1,422' high, on the southeast corner
of TOL, Other conspicuous mountains are MT. TOLOMAN on the southwest of DUBLON,
MT. TEROKEN, in the west central area of MOEN and the four summits that extend down
the center of FEFAN. Sand beaches are rare on the large islands, but a few small
beaches are found.
Altogether within the lagoon there are 14 volcanic, basaltic islands and 25
small coral islands. The small islands are surrounded by fringing reefs, and oc casional mangrove growth, but in general have sandy beaches and a low sandy in terior covered with palm trees.
The large islands are fringed by wide reef and mangrove swamps with steeply
rising hills and mountains Just beyond the mangroves. The result is that the
amount of useful land area at TRUK is far less than appears at first glance. Jap anese development fringes the shorelines, considerable areas of the mangroves on
DUBLON and MOEN having been filled for construction purposes. The fill is taken
from the sides of the hills resulting in still steeper hills and cliffs. This is
especially noticeable along the south side of DUBLON, where a cliff rises Just be yond the road.
On the great atoll reef there are almost 50 islets, small and widely separat ed. In the southeast section, there is a group of sand islands which roughly com pare in size and characteristics with islands of the MARSHALL and GILBERT area.
NOMOI PONAPE WOLEAI GUAM SAIPAN KAVIENG RABAUL WEWAK LORENGAU WEATHER.
TRUK lies in the hot, rainy belt of the equatorial Pacific. Temperature aver-
ages 80 with little deviation during the year. Rainfall averages nearly 130" a year. TRUK has a fairly well defined seasonal change from 7" in the driest month (January) to 13" in the rainy summer months. The dry season lasts from January to March and although this period has less precipitation than the summer, rainfall is
still considerable with average amounts of 7 H or 8" and with squalls and overcast
skies not infrequent. The rainy season lasts from June to October.
From December to May the northeast trade blows almost constantly with an aver age velocity of 15 knots, occasionally exceeding 30 knots. During May and June the
northeast trades decrease in frequency and intensity with Increasing winds from
east-southeast. From July to November winds are light and variable with frequent
calms and blowing mostly from directions between east and south. The winds usually
fall off at night and increase again during the morning.
NAURU MARCUS PALAU (KOROR) WAKE TOKYO MOMOTE Airfield ENIWETOK KWAJALEIN HENDERSON Field
PORT MORESBY MAJURO TARAWA (BETIO) ESPIRITU SANTO FUNAFUTI MIDWAY SUVA (VITI LEVU) PEARL HARBOR
1050
1160
1305
1650
1875
2170
2220
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SUMMARY
HISTORY.
On 2 September, 1945, the surrender of all Japanese controlled islands under
the TRUK headquarters was accepted. Prior to November, 1940, TRUK was used chiefly
as an anchorage for the 4th Fleet (organized November, 1939) Little effort was
made to garrison the establishment before January, 1944. At TRUK in June, 1945,
there were 24,061 Navy personnel and 14,299 Army personnel.
The Japanese were engaged in continuous offensive accion from December, 1941,
t ' o February, 1944. After the American task force raid at the latter date, the main
force of the Japanese fleet left TRUK and the naval base was, thereafter, to stand
alone. After the loss of the MARIANAS in June-July, 1944, reinforcement of TRUK
became impossible.
" * * The almost complete isolation of TRUK necessitated the adoption of a defensive
organization to repel any invasion by American forces. The Japanese Army and Navy
exercised a joint command and TRUK was divided into five defense districts. Where
possible, installations were concentrated on the main Islands and in most cases lo cated in caves or bomb-proof structures. In June, 1945, the Japanese reached the
height of their defensive power.
The TRUK garrison lacked adequate quantities of planes, artillery, ammunition
and construction materials, but in spit of this they stated that they were satis fied with their overall situation. They apparently felt their lack of equipment
could be countered by the "Bushldo" spirit.
DEFENSE PLAN,
The Japanese defense plan of TRUK called for a strong defense of MOEN, DUBLON,
FEFAN and UMAN, with units for observation and delaying actions stationed on the
other islands within the lagoon and on the barrier reef. Observations revealed .that
the distribution of men and materiel was carried out in accordance with this plan.
However, the skill with which the organization of the ground and construction work
was carried out depended solely on the ability of individual commanding officers;
apparently the high command allowed considerable latitude for the initiative of
all subordinate echelons.
The guiding principle in defense was to annihilate assaulting forces at the beach. This was virtually dictated by the relatively small land masses involved.
Plans were drawn up to provide for mutual support among the islands by means of
amphibious reserves, and it was highly probable that unless all defending forces
had been pinned down by simultaneous assaults at each island, an assault force
might have found itself under attack on the flank or rear by Japanese troops ar riving by landing craft from nearby islands. Special emphasis was placed on
training in night maneuvers for counter-attack, including the use of landing
craft and tanks, in order to eliminate or contain any airborne attackers who might
land within the defense lines.
A superficial Inspection of the positions and dispositions throughout TRUK
leads to the conclusion that the Japanese had not entirely abandoned the idea of
retaining mobility in order to go underground. It is probable, however, that this
was because they had too little equipment, material and supplies, too few people,
and too little time to complete their underground installations before the end of
hostilities.
ARTILLERY AND ORDNANCE.
TRUK was protected by numerous but relatively light artillery pieces. The
inventory lists 101 Army guns (75 to 105mm.) in 86 battery positions; 85 naval wea pons (75 to 200mm.) in 36 battery positions; and 302 automatic weapons (13 to 25mm.).
Ammunition in varying quantities was on hand for each type of weapon.
Following our air raids of February, 1944, the defensive plan was changed.
Heavy artillery was withdrawn from reef positions and relocated on the principal
inner islands; except for AAA and a few other batteries, most artillery was em-
placed in caves or in cut and cover type emplacements. This program had been cur tailed by lack of time and materials. Only two batteries could fire effectively
beyond the reef. Most of the heavy artillery was for minefield and inshore defense.
General tactical control of artillery was exercised at 4th Fleet and 31st
Army Command Posts on DUBLON, but in the final defense plan each island commander
controlled his own units. Artillery on the various islands was capable of mutual
support.
Modern fire control devices were almost non-existent. There were only four
AAA directors, few range or height finders and no fire control radar. AAA not
equipped otherwise used an improvised forward area sight. Seacoast artillery re lied on registration markers and buoys at known ranges. There were 20 search lights controlled by various gun battery commanders with little central supervision
from the Navy CP on DUBLON.
Ammunition storage was in the battery position cave or in a nearby revetment,
and ready boxes were generally Installed at gun positions.
Intrabattery tactical communication was primarily by telephone supplemented
by buzzer and speaking tube systems. Interbattery communication was principally
by telephone and radio supplemented by runners and carrier pigeons.
Maintenance and repair facilities, until the bombing of 30 April, 1944, were
capable of making very extensive repairs including 5th echelon at the Naval Air force Construction Department and Garrison shops. The bombing reduced these fac ilities to roughly 10 to 20 percent of their former effectiveness.
ENGINEERING.
The Japanese on TRUK, as elsewhere, were trying to conduct a major war with
inadequate military materiel. To this fundamental error they added an unbalanced
sense of proportion which gave all-out backing to naval projects regardless of
their, strategical or tactical value. For example, age old necessities such as
roads were neglected, while heavy weapons were moved over seemingly impassable
terrain into caves.
Organization of the ground, fortifications, and workmanship were generally
excellent, though often lack of attention to routine details such as ventilation,
drainage and personnel safety was apparent. The over-all accomplishment of the
Japanese was but fair in all sorts of fortifications including obstacles, mine
warfare, explosives and demolitions. Camouflage in the tropical terrain was ex-
cellent to superior, though it would be interesting to time the gun crew going
into action against a land target where there were a dozen sturdy banana stalks in
the field of fire of th*ir piece less than 61 from the muzzle.
In offensive chemical warfare the Japanese could do nothing but lay down a
few small smoke screens. Defensively they were only fairly well prepared with
gas masks, collective protectors and properly designed ventilation. Their last-
ditch Installations were located at elevations where it would be very difficult to
achieve lethal concentrations of gafe, and to deliver flame.
Roads, trails and bridges were poor to fair in construction. Traffic circu lation was Inadequate due to poor drainage, narrow widths and ungraded road metal.
The roads oarrying the least traffic were the best and appeared to be the oldest,
indicating that whatever merit the roads did have was of prewar vintage and not a
characteristic of wartime construction.
Utilities, including water supply, power and light, fire fighting, and preven tion, sanitation and refuse disposal were inadequate. Engineer supply was very poor
both in respect to materials furnished and facilities for their receipt, storage
and issue.
Engineer ana construction troops were inadequate in all three essentials:
staff, trained manpower and equipment. The engineers and "pioneers" lacked the
tools and equipment that should have differentiated them from other combat troops.
The naval construction forces were more numerous and better equipped than the eng ineers or "pioneers" but were too few for the Navy's needs alone.
NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
When the primary mission of TRUK changed to the defense, naval units impro vised weapons, such as the one-man controlled torpedo, and the torpedo-carrying
landing craft. The mine-fields in the passes and inside the reef, and small model
beach mines had previously been the main protection against invasion.
Naval shore establishments were never extensive without drydocking facilities
for large ships and with few repair facilities. Larger ships were refueled from
tankers in the harbor, or by oil barges from an oil pier on DUBLON.
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SUMMARY
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BEACHES,
Suitable sites for landing ships were rare. All the large islands lay inside
the barrier reef and are fringed by wide reefs and mangrove swamps, backed by steep
hills and mountains. Sand beaches were rarely found on the larger islands and those
existing were usually inaccessible to landing ships due to reefs. Dispersal areas
on the whole were restricted by swampy, hilly, or wooded ground, and movement of
vehicular traffic was difficult.
Th smaller islands were also surrounded by fringing reefs and occasional man grove gv- vth, but generally had sandy beaches and a low, sandy, wooded interior.
Attempts were made to approach possible beaches in a Japanese landing craft
"DAIHATSU", but normally the craft grounded on passing over the fringing reef.
Average depth of water- over the reef was 2.5 feet.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS. TRUK was primarily a naval installation and as such the major part of the signal communications was operated and controlled by the Navy. Army communications were limited to tactical use in the atoll inner defense.
Long range and internal administrative communications operated efficiently,
but control of subordinate units during tactical operations was not evident in the
existing signal plan.
The communication equipment was, in general, of fairly good construction and reasonably efficient, although the general design was somewhat out of date. No moisture proofing or fungus-proofing was apparent in any of the equipment, and the
Japanese claimed considerable failures due to moisture.
TRUK had fairly good search radar protection, but the equipment was out of date
No fire control or searchlight control radars were installed, and the search radars
could give little more than the general direction of targets.
The isolation of TRUK since June-July, 1944, had caused shortages of most com munication supplies. However, the Navy system could have operated for several
months with little loss of efficiency and considerably longer without being ser iously hampered. Their main shortages were, battery acid, dry batteries and radio
spare parts, (especially tubes).
Army communications were hardest hit by isolation because they depended extensively on supplies furnished by the Navy. The Navy 1 s shortage of materials and
the lack of close cooperation between the services further aggravated the sit-
uation. Since most of the Army radio equipment was small portable sets employing
dry batteries, and all of their telephones were local-battery, their most acute
shortage was dry batteries. They were also short of spare parts and radio tubes.
The Army communication system was not capable of efficient operation at the end
of hostilities.
Our bombing and shelling of TRUK had destroyed or damaged most of the instal lations above ground with the exception of the radars, which were practically un damaged. Virtually all Important installations had been moved underground prior
to our attacks, so little serious damage to the overall efficiency of the system
resulted.
AVIATION.
TRUK was originally a major staging base to the SOLOMONS, RABAUL, the MARSH ALLS and GILBERTS and was well defended by air, but in the carrier strikes of Feb ruary and April, 1944, such damage was done that the base never recovered. Each
raid destroyed nearly all aircraft on hand at the time, and all air facilities
were severely damaged and much material destroyed. Plans for expanding air facilities were given up since they were hard pressed in repairing what was left. After
the capture of the MARIANAS, American planes methodically destroyed practically all
facilities above ground, and the Japanese found it difficult to keep even runways
operational.
Finally nothing operated from TRUK but a few planes for reconnaissance of ULITHI and the MARIANAS, and the base could have been nothing but a staging point
even if aircraft had been available.
MEDICAL.
The Army and Navy at TRUK maintained separate medical facilities. Each had a ' base hospital on DUBLON with branch hospitals on the larger islands, and sickbays
or dispensaries located near military activities scattered throughout the islands.
Supplies were, in general, adequate; X-ray film and carbasone was available
in limited quantities. There were sufficient medical officers and corpsmen, but
the hospitals were dirty, crowded and unsanitary by American standards.
The most prevalent diseases were malnutrition, beri-beri, tuberculosis, amoe bic dysentery, paratyphoid A, ,and WEIL 1 s disease; dengue was sporadic, occasionally
reaching epidemic heights. No malaria, typhus or cholera were evident.
Sanitation control was noted by its absence. There was little central supervision of sewage and waste disposal, fly and rat control, individual water supply,
or prevention of spread of intestinal diseases.
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On 28 August, 1945, a message was dropped by plane on one of the main islands
of the TRUK Atoll and was followed at 0700, 30 August, 1945, by the arrival of the
USS STACK (DD) and USS OSMUS (DE). The STACK carried Brig. Oen. L. D. HERMLE, USMC,
and a party of 12 officers which informed Rear Admiral SUMIKAWA, Chief of Staff of
the 4th Fleet, and five other Japanese officers of the requirements preliminary to
surrender. This party also handed the Japanese a copy of the Articles of Surrender
which were to be signed at a later date.
TRUK was divided into five defense districtsMOEN, DUBLON, FEFAN, UMAN, and
the Western defense district with Headquarters on TOL Island. The Japanese placed
the stress on the first four of these which were known as the "Season Islands".
The Navy was to take charge of surface and air defense, the stress in the case of
the former being placed on the area inside the atoll. By agreement between the
31st Army and the 4th Fleet, the senior officer on each island was named as the
over-all commander.
DEFENSE DISTRICTS DUBLON (ETEN) MOEN (FALO) UMAN FEFAN PARAM Western(Hq.on S.TOL) S.TOL N.TOL W.TOL UDOT ARMY COMMANDERS
Col.Tameichi SHIBANO
Col.Keizo HAYASHIDA
Maj.Kyuichi KONDO
Maj.Hldeakl MORI
MaJ.Eiji SHIBATA
Maj.Gen.Kanenobu IJUIN
Maj.Jisaku YOSHIDA
Capt.Shigekl MORI
MaJ.Jofuku SAKAMOTO
Capt.Kaneori FUKUTOME
NAVY COMMANDERS
Rear Admiral Hiroshi KOJIMA
Capt. Yoshimitsu IMAZATO
Rear Admiral Tomotaro MIURA
Capt. Furuya YOSHIRO
Capt. Furuya YOSHIRO
Rear Admiral Hiroshi KOZIMA
Aboard the USS PORTLAND on 2 September, 1945, Vice Admiral George D. MURRAY,
USN, Commander MARIANAS, accepted the surrender of all Japanese controlled islands
under the TRUK Headquarters from Lt. G-en. Shunzaburo MUG-IKURA, Vice Admiral
Chuichi HARA, and Mr. AIHIRA, a representative of the South Seas Government sta tioned at TRUK.
Lt. Gen. MUGIKURA, who had assumed command of the 52nd Division in November,
1941, was ranking officer and was appointed commander of the 31st Army on 20 Jan uary, 1945, Vice Admiral Chuichi HARA, Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet, came
to TRUK on 23 February, 1944. The headquarters of the 31st Army and the 4th Fleet
were both on DUBLON.
According to Japanese sources little effort was made to garrison TRUK before
January, 1944, and at the height of its power in June, 1945, the Japanese Navy had
24,061 men and the Army 14,299 men stationed there. The Army and Navy forces were
based as follows:
PERSONNEL Army Navy DUBLON 3,242 4,485 ETEN MOEN 2,962 578 FEFAN 2,914 2,572 PARAM 365 827 UMAN 873 1,417 UDOT 748 1,025
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The Army units on TRUKthe 52nd Division, the 9th Independent Engineer Reg iment and the 51st Independent Mixed Brigadehad the mission of defending TRUK
against the Anglo-American forces by joint action with the 4th Fleet and air forces.
They emphasized the following: anti-tank warfare, well-mined waters and beach ob stacles, strong and persistent delaying actions, strong positions among rocky
cliffs, and steps to make TRUK self-sufficient in food.
The Japanese did not place great reliance on airplanes because of the great
attrition rate and the impossibility of getting more from JAPAN after their com munication lines were cut off. Their plan was to use those planes which were al ready on TRUK until such time as enemy attacks should make it more feasible to
remove them, in which case they would be based at PONAPE, NAMOI and ENDERBY.
In July, 1944, the mounted guns on some of the small islets of the reefs were
removed to the main islands inside the atoll for the following reasons: (1), to
place the batteries in caves, rather than in the open so as to gain more protec tion from bombardment and bomblngj (2), to lay stress on the attack of ships which
might manage to get inside the atoll, and to gain mutual support between batteries;
(3), to protect the main islands as long as possible.
Wire was strung between buoys on the surface at W.MOEN and N.DUBLON. This was
done in front of possible landing points and the aim was to forestall any landing
attempt.
The Japanese expected no great help from their anti-aircraft guns as they were
all short of ammunition. After the loss of the MARIANAS in June and July, 1944,
reinforcement of TRUK became impossible, save by submarine, and the garrison went
on short rations.
The Army and Navy exercised a Joint Commandand the Japanese stated that there
was no serious difference of opinion between the Army and the Navy or between in dividualsbut when land action started, the Supreme Commander was to be Lt. Gen.
MUGIKURA.
In addition to the 9,895 natives scattered over the larger islands there were 793 natives of NAURU, brought to TRUK by the Japanese; 1,590 civilians; 6 Germans; 7 Spaniards; and 1 Swede. They were forbidden to any defense installation. The natives were impressed into semi-slavery used mostly for roadwork.
of TRUK,
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The 17th Naval Air Corps and various other units, which arrived from 1942 to
1944 when the Japanese air arm was virtually inoperative, were combined to form
the EAST CAROLINE Air Unit.
Prior to 15 November, 1940, (the date of the organization of the 4th Defense
Unit on DUBLON) TRUK was used chiefly as an anchorage for the 4th Fleet which had
been organized in November, 1939. The 4th Defense Unit was originally a part of
the 5th Base Unit having headquarters on SAIPAN, and lt had about 850 personnel.
However, in November, 1942, the Defense Unit became the 41st Naval Guard Force,
and was still in existence at the end of the war.
After December, 1941, there was a period of continuous offensive action and
TRUK was used principally as a fleet basethe fleet being engaged in attacks in
the SOLOMONS and MARSHALLS areas. As the advance of the Americans in the SOLO MONS became more and more successful, TRUK was used as a staging area for airplanes
which were to be transshipped into a more active area. After the American task force
raid of 17-18 February, 1944, the main force of the Japanese fleet left TRUK. There after, TRUK was to stand alone.
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The following information on the natives and the history of the Japanese
military activity on TRUK was gathered from an interview with a priest who came to
TRUK in 1927. Some of his statements do not agree with those made by the Japan ese.
The missionaires came to TRUK in 1911 and were followed by the Spanish mis sionaries in 1920. During the war there were about a dozen missionaries scattered
throughout the TRUK Islands and six sisters lived on FEFAN. These sisters, how ever, left in September, 1942, and were thought by the priest to have gone to PO NAPE, followed by two of the brothers.
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The priest stated that when he first came to TRUK the only Japanese present
were civilians. The Navy started fortifications in 1931 and 1932 and the Army in
the latter part of 1942 and 1943 by which time, the priest estimated about 10,000
had arrived. By 1940, the natives and missionaries were made to stop all com munication with the outer world.
According to the priest, the first island on which the Japanese concentrated
their attention was ETEN. They told the natives that they were merely fixing up
the islands for fishing purposes. Then followed in turn, DUBLON, FEFAN, and UMAN.
MOEN was one of the last Islands to receive the attention of the.Japanese, but
according to the priest, when the Japanese did get around to MOEN, they made rapid
progress.
The lighthouse on the east tip of MOEN was erected in 1937, the priest said,
and the airfields were built in 1939. It was in 1940 that the main force of the
Japanese Navy came to TRUK, and the Army arrived in 1943.
Coincident with the expansion of the military installations at TRUK, in 1940
the Japanese stopped all communication between the missionaries and their homes.
Henceforth, TRUK"was to be isolated. Until 1940, the missionaries had been free
to go from island to Island as they pleased. About the latter part of 1940, how ever, they were restricted to one island.
Japan's successive reverses in the Pacific, i.e., TARAWA, KWAJALEIN, SAIPAN,
GUAM, etc., resulted in an emphasis being placed on AT warfare at TRUK. Strong
and persistent delaying actions were to be the order of the day, Instead of the
previous tactics of counter-attacking enemy beachheads. Another lesson driven
home by the previous defeats was the necessity for constructing strong positions
among rocky cliffs in order to be able to withstand artillery bombardments. Be cause of the severance of supply lineo (with the loss of SAIPAN) steps were taken
to make TRUK self-sufficient. To this end, all land was put under cultivation, and
sweet potatoes became the food staple.
The Army at TRUK felt that it could repel an American attack for a very long
period, assuming that ten American divisions were brought against it. The Navy
was not so optimistic, feeling that three months would be the time during which it
could hold out. All resolved to die in their places in order to inflict as many
casualties upon the enemy and gain as much time as possible. It does not appear
that the Japanese ever felt that they could permanently hold TRUK.
Although the TRUK garrison lacked adequate quantities of planes, anti-aircraft
and heavy artillery, ammunition, fortress-construction units, and materials for
such construction, they stated that they were well satisfied with their overall
situationapparently feeling that the lack in material could be countered by the
spirit and determination of all the men. The morale of the Japanese on TRUK was,
at all times, very high, it was stated.
The TRUK garrison received information concerning the activities of the UNITED
STATES forces from the Imperial Headquarters. However, it appears that the com plete story of Japanese Naval reverses was not forthcoming from TOKYO. Any in formation received from TOKYO was considered to be reliable. Such news as the
Japanese on TRUK received from UNITED STATES broadcasts was not wholly ignored
neither was it believed. The Japanese did not place too much credence in these
broadcasts, as they considered them to be propaganda. Such information was "Put
aside for reference".
The Japanese on TRUK correctly estimated that the U. S. forces would attack
SAIPAN and IWO JIMA. It appears that at no time did they anticipate TRUK would be
the subject of the next all-out assault. However, at such times as they were under
attack by out task-forces, they seemingly felt that this was the forerunner of the
invasion attempt. After SAIPAN, they assumed correctly that the weight of U. S.
power would fall to the northwest. But they did not know whether FORMOSA, OKINAWA,
the CHINA Coast or a combination of the three would be the precursor of the attack
on JAPAN. Realization that TRUK had been by-passed came when OKINAWA was attacked,
and it was thought that JAPAN proper would be next.
After August, 1944, no ships were able to get to TRUK from the Japanese home land, and the garrison was completely isolated, save for sporadic visits by sub marines.
TOTAL STRENGTH.
OFFICERS ARMY NAVY TOTALS 741 419 1,160
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
TOTAL
o
14,299 24,061 38,360
ARMY UNITS ON TRUK. UNIT 31st Army Hq # 52nd Div.Hq. 69th Inf.Regt. LOCATION OFF. W.O. DUBLON 31 3 DUBLON 37 10 DUBLON 124 32 (-2 Bn, 2nd Bn on UMAN) MOEN 109 29
NCO
EM
CODE NAME 7920 128 SONAE 4650 298 KASHIWA a 2,694 4654 TOTAL
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150th Inf.Regt. Tank Unit Signal Unit 9th Ind.Eng.Regt . Transportation Unit Over-sea Transport Unit Ordnance Serv. Unit Intendance Serv. Unit Field Hospital
TOL
DUBLON DUBLON DUBLON DUBLON MOEN DUBLON MOEN FEFAN DUBLON
4 8 15 3 32 3 15
2 1 4 1 6 2 4
2,136
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MOEN DUBLON UMAN FEFAN
51
176
418
649
"
4676
4Jan44
TOL
51st Ind.Mixed Brig. 11th Ind.Mixed Regt. TOTALS UDOT
244
63 1,695 2,786
4,788 SONAE
17564
TOL
FEFAN PARAM FEFAN DUBLON
24Mar44 16Apr44
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65 24 420 857
1,366 " 17585 18Sep44 19Jan45 741 185 4,668 8,705 14,299
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The 51st Independent Mixed Brigade was disposed as follows: 336th Ind. Bn. -\ 337th Ind. Bn. - UDOT
338th Ind. Bn. y TOL 339th Ind. Bn. ->__,_.
lst Art. Unit ( 2nd Art. Unit -) FE FAN
51st 1MB Hq. J 340th Ind. Bn. - FEFAN & PARAM.
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The Headquarters and the 1st Battalion of the 11th Independent Mixed Regiment
was on FEFAN; the 3rd Battalion was on DUBLON.
STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF ARMY FORCES ON TRUK (INCLUDING MEDICAL PERSONNEL). ISLAND MOEN FEFAN DUBLON PARAM UMAN UDOT ULALU PATA N. TOL S. TOL POLLE OFFICERS 146 116 227 20 36 28 3 9 41 81 35 29 45 17 4 4 26 2 2 129 W.O. 29 38 43 6 10 10 0 2 11 14 15 6 8 1 0 0 1 0 0 16 NCO 735 625 697 127 174 181 10 49 237 327 221 85 92 38 8 10 47 5 2 287 ENLISTED MEN 2,052 2,135 2,275 212 653 529 27 156 538 911 503 193 193 103 25 29 129 15 13 700
TOTAL 2,962 2,914 3,242 365 873 748 40 216 827 1,333 774 313 338 159 37 43
203 22 17
STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF NAVY FORCES ON TRUK. UNIT DUBLON ISLAND: 4th Fleet Hq. Judge Advocate 1st Pers. Repl. Dept. 41st Guard Police 4th Comm. Unit 4th Harbor Dept, TRUK Transport Unit E.CAROLINES Naval Air Unit 227th Const. Bn. 4th Naval Stores Dept. 4th Naval Const. Unit 4th Naval Civil Eng.Dept. 4th Naval Hospital 4th Naval Office of Supply and Administration
104th Naval Air Depot 4th Meteorological Unit 10th FPO Unit TOTALS ETEN ISLAND:
41st Naval Guard Force
E.CAROLINES Air Unit 4th Naval Civil Eng.Dept. TOTALS
OFF W t 0. 25 2 2 44 20 4 2 9 16 8 7 11 2 3 1 3 19 2 1 2 4 3 1 1 NCO 104 2 5 567 169 27 6 114 50 14 17 23 2 3 8 EM 69 2 475 153 18 3 110 38 14 8 42 7 5 TOTAL 201 4 9 1,105 344 49 12 235 108 36 35 77 4 14 14 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 5 8 102 2 30 46 5 4 280 461 974 38 46 190 31 16 2,238 GRAND TOTAL 206 12 9 1,207 346 79 58 240 4 388
497
1,009
115
50
204
45
16
4,485
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CIV. PERS. 22 8 155 14 8 1 2 31 158 612 23 GRAND CODE TOTAL NAME 262 U 87 12
u 87 9 1,925 1,075 1,511
1,226 626 534 370 699 2,005
DATE OF ARRIVAL 10Nov43 10Nov43
156
36
1,111
944
a, 247
NAVY UNITS ON TRUK. UNIT OFF W.O. NCO 4th Fleet Hq. 28 7 129 4th Fleet Judge Advocate 2 2 Dept.
1st Pers.Repl.Dept, 2 5 41st Naval Guard Force 61 29 885 43rd Naval Guard Force 28 13 499 47th Naval Guard Force 44 5 546 48th Naval Guard Force 31 13 412 49th Naval Guard Force 21 9 300 4th Comm. Unit 24 5 246 4th Harbor Duty Dept. 11 1 122 TRUK Naval Transp.Dept. 11 2 46 E.CAROLINES Naval Air 50 35 1,033 Unit
227th Const.Bn. 4th Naval Hospital 4th Naval Office of Admin. & Supply
104th Naval Air Depot 4th Meteorological Unit 10th FPO Unit 4th Const. & Repair 4th Const. Dept.
4th Repair Dept.
4th Munition Dept.
85th Submarine Baae
4th Naval Stores Dept. 4th Naval Civ.Eng.Dept. TOTALS 7 24 2 9 2 12 9 43 2 13 17 24 EM TOTAL 76 240 4 2 795 521 908 769 294 228 78 28 864 9 1,770 1,061 1,503 1,225 624 503 212 87 1,982
3 4
1 4 1
37 74 3 114
79 88 167
2 166 168
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30 8 100 58 196 1,223 1,419 20 15 53 17 105 9,293 9,398 419 145 4,486 4,791 9,841 14,220 24,061
u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u
u u u u
225 Dec42
44 15Nov40
504 lDec44
603 20Mar45
624 !May45
625 lMay45
17 14Jan41
88 25Aug41
119 Jul42
453-27 DUBLON
453-53 ETEN
453-222 PARAM
Jul44
389 Mar44 169 21Aug42 59 15Dec40 135 6 " 3 00 60 96 62 146 May42 Uun41 Jan41 Dec40 lDec41 15Dec40 15May42
TONELIK ISLAND:
41st Naval Guard Force
NORTHEAST ISLAND;
418t Naval Guard Force MOR ISLAND:
4th Fleet Hq. 41st Naval Guard Force TOTALS ELI KANIBU ISLAND; 41st Naval Guard Force
SALAT ISLAND: 41st Naval Guard Force OTTA ISLAND: 41st Naval Guard Force FALEU ISLAND: 41st Naval Guard Force FALO ISLAND: 47th Naval Guard Force FALAS ISLAND: 41st Naval Guard Force FANUELA ISLAND; 41st Naval Guard Force
23 3 1 7
41 3 1 5
66
6 3 12 15
66 6
5 -21 26
11
4 8 2 10 16 5 5
2 2 4 20 3
6
10 6 31 20 5 5
6 10 6 31 20 5 5
The 43rd, 47th, 48th and 49th Naval Guard Forces were all formed on TRUK. The 4th Naval Base was established at TRUK in August, 1941. Until May, 1944, the 4th Fleet Headquarters commanded the 4th Naval Base; the 4th Naval Base, in turn, commanded TRUK. When the 4th Naval Base was disbanded, in May, 1944, the 4th Fleet Headquarters directly commanded TRUK.
10
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UNIT
OFF W.O.
5 1 23 1 3 1
NCO
530 32 13 664 11 8 4 10
EM
905 27 13 464 2 18 10
GRAND TOTAL
1,491 75 54 1,196 113 2,161 47 574 7 5,718
UNIT TOL ISLAND: PATA. POLLE: 4th Fleet Hq. 4th Naval Guard Force 43rd Naval Guard Force TRUK Transport Unit E.CAROLINES Naval Air Group 227th Const. Bn. 4th Naval Stores Dept, 4th Civil Eng. Dept, 4th Naval Const. Unit 4th Naval Hospital 4th Meteorological Unit 10th FPO Unit ULALU ISLAND: 4th Comm. Unit 4th Civil Eng. Dept.
OFF W.O.
1 1 22 9 2 7 4 5 2
4
NCO
EM
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
GRAND
TOTAL
o 1 104 848 641 53 880 439 2, 913 225 54 48 14 6,220 68 227 295 15 73 116 25 796 1,025 246 25 143 168 6 5 I
MOEN ISLAND: 43 47th Naval Guard Force 2 4th Comm. Unit 4th Naval Harbor Duty Unit 30 E.CAROLINES Naval Air Unit 2 4th Naval Stores Dept. 3 4th Naval Civil Eng. Dept. 4 4th Naval Hospital 6 104th Naval Air Depot 10th FPO Unit TOTALS 90 BUET ISLAND: 41st Naval Guard Force FEFAN ISLAND: 2 4th Fleet Hq. 3 41st Naval Guard Force 18 48th Naval Guard Force 4th Harbor Duty Unit E.CAROLINES Naval Air Group 5 4th Naval Stores Dept. 4th Naval Construction 2 4th Civil Eng. Dept. 3 4th Naval Hospital TOTALS 35
2 11 1 3 5
34
1,272 1 ,439
1 22 2 2
61 397 40 24 9 20 12 2 6 9 580 23 23 5 40 35 3 3 86 4
2 14 566 860 410 2,889 220 28 33 14 5,036 15 227 242 5 21 789 815 239 24 24
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1 82 437 50 17 3 2 15
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607
PARAM ISLAND: 9 48th Naval Guard Force 5 E CAROLINES Naval Air Group 1 4th Civil Eng. Dept, TOTALS 15
2 5
113 103
255 116
379 229
2 218
1 372
4 612
1 214 215
3 TOTALS 3
58 58 2 2
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TSIS ISLAND: E.CAROLINES Naval Air Group 4th Civil Eng. Det>t. TOTALS
11 11
3 3
14 14 125 125
14 125 139
410 141
4,349 4,729
14,150
23, 779
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3 2 1 1 7 2
1 2 1
41 30 10 6 10 1 98 37 1 1
10 13 9 6 4 42 18
TOTALS
UMAN ISLAND: 21 49th Naval Guard Force 1 4th Comm. Unit 5 4th Harbor Duty Unit E.CAROLINES Naval Air Group 4th Civil Eng. Dept, 4th Naval Hospital 2 TOTALS 29 4th NAVAL HARBOR DUTY: Futakami, FEFAN Tug #3, FEFAN Manshu Maru, DUBLON Dai shin Maru, DUBLON Kotobuki Maru, DUBLON Yachiyo M a ru, MOEN Shinzo, Maru, MOEN
1 1 2 7 7 18
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9 1 1 1
300 22 43 12 4 4
294 21 27 6 1 13
624 45 75 19 6 19
2 38 588 1 629
12
385
362
788
2 20 62
TOTALS
SUBTOTALS
2
9
39 4 137
13 11 7 5 10 6 52 70 14,220
GRAND - TOTALS
419 145
4,486 4,791
ii
A PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHIC TERRAIN STUDY ng~the planning stage of this report, prior to the arrival of the Study Group at TRUK, the decision was made to supplement the written report by the maximum use of photography, thereby visually presenting the exlstant conditions and subjects of Interest. In addition to the treatment of specific subjects by this means, the
decision was made that a series of panoramic photographic strips from critical elevations should be prepared to facilitate the presentation of the terrain and associated features. Panoramic strips were photographed on various Islands as indicated: three on MOEN, three on DUBLON, two on FEFAN, one on UMAN, and one on PARAM. These are presented on the following pages. In order to assist the reader in orienting the panoramic strips and individual pictures contained therein, a map (Figure No. 3 ) , locating the camera stations from which the panoramic strips were taken, is presented below. Each photograph, within the panoramic strips, is numbered and is represented
on the map by a numbered ray from the lettered panoramic station, thereby enabling
the reader to rapidly and accurately visualize the area covered by each photograph.
"F", and " I " each have 360 cov Panoramic strips from Stations "C", "D", " E " , "G". "H, and "J" have 185,
erage. The panoramic strips from Stations "A", "B 120, 270, 300, and 170 coverage, respectively, due to obstructed views.
The numbers of the individual photographs contained In the panoramic strips are
preceeded by an abbreviation, "PM M , which Indicates the basic number of a picture
whether on the Outline Map (Figure 3 - PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHIC STATIONS), In APPENDIX III (Ground Photographic Reference Data), or on the map entitled "LOCATION OF GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS" in PART TWO. Sea "COMMENT Oil THE NUMBERING O F PHOTOGRAPHS" on page iv.
116,117
115
365
363
366
MAN IS.
FALO IS
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361
367
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274
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371
272
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ELEVATIONS
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440
439
TAR K IS.
720'N
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II.
II
PHOTOGRAPHIC STATIONS
TIP OF FALO ISLAND OUTER REEF LIGHTHOUSE R A D 10 S T A T I O N HILL 810 SOUTH RIDGE OF HILL 1200
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PM 293
PM 292
PM 291
PM 290
PM
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PM 286
PM 287
PM 288
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PM 279
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PM 269 CM M O E N ISLAND
PM 270
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SIGNAL
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PM 138
PM 139
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PM 141
PM 143
CONTINUED
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PM 2 7 2
PM 273
PM 2 7 4
PM 275
PM 276
PM 277
CONTINUED
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UDOT
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RADIO ISLAND
STATION
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T O L ISLAND
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PM 133
PM 134
PM 135
PM 136
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PM
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PM 118
PM 119
PM 120
PM 121
PM 122
to Q
CONTINUED
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ETEN
ISLAND
(AIRFIELD)
BASE
UMAN
FEFAN
ISLAND
MT.NISHIKI
(STATION FLOATING
T O L ISLAND
SEAPLANE \
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PM 153
CONTINUED
^1
ARMY RADIO
STATION
PM 122 PM 123 I
PM 110
PM 1 1 1
PM 1 1 2
PiV, 1 1 3
PM 1 1 4
PM 1 1 5
CONTINUED
ANTI-TANK
BARRIERS
SEAPLANE
BASE
MOEN
ISLAND
SIGNAL TOWER
(STATION
"D" )
ISLAND
ISLAND
ANCHORAGE
RADIO STATION
LIGHTHOUSE
PM 1 5 5
PM 1 5 4
PM
PM 1 4 5
PM 1 4 6
PM 147
CONTINUED
TEN
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CL
PM 3 6 9
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PM 3 6 1 j
PM 362
PM 3 6 3
PM 364
CONTINUED
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STATION
"D"tDUBLQN
ISLAND
STATION
"F".DUBLON
ISLAND
FEFAN
ISLAND
TSIS
ISLAND
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PM 4 3 3
PM 4 3 4
PM 4 3 5
PM 4 3 6
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18
CONTINUED
FANEU
ISLAND
OUTER REEF
ISLANDS
o
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O o. Z PM 364 PM 365
PM 366 PM 367 PM 368
CONTINUED
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SMALL BOAT DOCK
T A R IK I S L A N D
PARAM
AIRFIELD
TOL ISLAND
E IOL I S L A N D
UDOT
ISLAND
OS
CO tu CO
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PM 437
PM 439
PM 440
PM
PM 442
CONTINUED
UDOT
ISLAND
I S L A N D
o
OL
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PM 375 PM 376 PM 377
PM 378
PM 379 PM 380 PM 381
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CO
CONTINUED
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Picture Mo. 2 (PM 571) UMAN: mtle offshore to the south. center of the photograph.
from position i
is shown in the
JACK STAFF-AV.R 35
? "DHtDUBLON D R Y DOCK
'Iff /
ISLAND
BASE OUTER
ETEN REEF
ISLAND A / F
FLOATING
STATION
PM 3 6 9 & 3 8 1
PM 370
PM 3 7 1
PM 3 7 2
PM 3 7 3
PM 37U
KJ
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CONTINUED
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to
SIGNAL
TOWER.DUBLON FLOATING
"D")
SEAPLANE
BASE
ETEN
IS.AIRFIELD
OUTER
REEF
UMAN
ISLAND
MT.
ARASHI
TSIS
ISLAND
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PM 387
PM 386
PM 385
PM 384
PM 383
PM 3 8 2
ITEM NAVY
20cm Guns. 15,5cm Guns. 15cm Guns. 14cm Guns. 12.7cm Guns AA (dual mount).
12cm Guns, CD. 12cm Guns, DP. 8cm Guns, CD. 8cm Guns, DP. 75mm, AA, Type 88. 25mm, Mult mount, MG, Type 96, 25mm, single mount, MG, Type 96.
20mm, MG, Type 99 MKI. 13mm, MG. Range Finder (4.5m, 3.5m, 2.5m).
Range Finder, 1.5m. Director Type 2. Director Type 95. Searchlights under 110cm. Searchlights 110cm to 150cm. Searchlight Controllers.
B
4 3 28 0 2 6 29 4 9 73 23
91 115 8 7 1 2 6 3 1 6 4 3 25 6 2 6 29 2 8
O 05
1 1 12 3 1 6 9 1 2
946 773
4 9 2 1 11 4
3 2 4
1 6
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14 14
4 2
1 1
ARTILLERY TACTICAL CONTROL. The seacoast and anti-aircraft artillery was supplied and manned almost entirely
by the Navy. Field and mountain artillery was furnished and manned by the Army.
Dispositions were determined by coordination and agreement between Army and Navy
authorities. Dispositions In the final defense plan were designed for a rigid fixed
defense of the mine fields located at entrances to and within the lagoon, and to
rigid inshore defense of the inner islands. So far as was consistent with this plan,
artillery on the various Islands was to be capable of mutual support. Under the general defense plan for the atoll as a whole, separate Navy and Army Commanders were designated for each of the principal islands. Each Naval Commander controlled his own units under the plan until he was no longer capable of performing his mission, then the remnants were to come under Army control. General fire direction of heavy artillery was exercised at the 4th Fleet and 31st Army Command Posts on DUBLON. Communication with island command posts was maintained by means of sub marine telephone and telegraph cable, radio, visual signals and pigeons. General
search radar was available for surface and air targets and was reported to be sat-
isfactory as to results. For details see communications section In this report.
ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL.
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6 105mm Army Howitzer. 8cm Armstrong Gun (CD). 7 8 75mm, AA', Type 88.
75mm Mtn. Gun, Type 41.
34 46 75mm Mtn. Gun, Type 94
and 75mm Field Gun
Type 38 & 95.
Heavy Range Finder, 2 8yr Type.
Field Range Finder, 30 Type 93.
6 7 11
34
48
1 7 4
34
40
007 341 2,
306 10, 727 540
I:
2 2 3 17
3 6
5 4 2 2 1 2 2 10
9
All types of seacoast and anti-aircraft heavy artillery were very weak in fire
control equipment. There was no fire control radar. The number of range or height
finder8 available was sufficient to equip but a few batteries. Only four anti-air craft directors were available. Anti-aircraft batteries not equipped with directors
and associated data transmission systems had to rely on improvised forward area
type sights. In the case of seacoast artillery reliance was placed principally on
registration on markers and buoys at known ranges. Horizontal base observation
and plotting or prediction systems were not employed. The Japanese reported that
much fire control equipment had been lost enroute to TRUK. Field artillery generally
was equipped with standard panoramic or telescopic sights.
22
Wi *w
At all batteries personnel were quartered in barracks or shacks made of scrap lumber and galvanized sheet metal. These huts varied in size allowing in most cases accomodation of squads and in a few cases accomodation of 150 men. These in addition to galleys, mess halls, and officers quarters, were located in camouflaged defiladed areas adjacent to the gun positions. During bombing attacks personnel lived in the caves and tunnels of the gun positions*
Ammunition was stored in the emplacement near each gun with exoeption of one or two batteries on TOL and the 12.7cm AA battery on DUBLON. At these excepted positions ammunition was stored both in metal ready boxes placed in niches of the cave or revetment near the gun and in well constructed dumps for reserve ammunition. In almost all caves and tunnels temperatures were moderate and stable. However, the atmosphere was quite humid and in many cases water dripped from the walls and was not well drained from the emplacement. Generally, ammunition storage facilities were very poor. Intra-battery tactical communication systems consisted principally of telephone
circuits employing sound powered or battery powered telephones. Phones were installed
at guns, directors, range or height 1 finders, OP 1 s and CP's in the AA batteries and
at guns, range finders, OP's and CP s in the coast defense and field artillery gun
positions. At many of the battery positions the telephone circuits were paralleled
with voice tube8 and buzzer systems. The communlcation listed in description of
Individual batteries refers to intra-battery type.
Communication between gun batteries and the island artillery tactical commanders, both Army and Navy, was by means of telephone and radio principally and augmented by runner and pigeon. Little emphasis was placed on maintaining this communication. In the following table, position numbers refer to Figures 4 through 10 (artillery
and searchlight positions). The letter prefix denotes the island in accordance with
the following code; M-MOEN, D-DUBLON, F-FEFAN, U-UMAN, E-EOT, UD-UDOT, P-PARAM,
T-TOL.
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Direct fire telescopic sights were employed with all weapons. At TONELIK and
FALEU Islands 2.5 meter range finders were employed and at approximately one half
of the other islands 1.5 meter range finders were employed. The Navy controlled
all batteries located on the reef islands and communication was maintained between
DUBIXJN and all islands by use of underwater telephone and telegraph cable and radio.
Positions were of the open type with log and sand parapets. Gun pedestals were
bolted to reinforced concrete platforms.
The searchlights were employed primarily for illumination of sea borne targets
and secondarily as pick up lights for illumination of aircraft. The lights were
emplaoed on small towers approximately 61 high. The lights at TONELIK and FALEU
were equipped with sound locators and comparators, and were tactically controlled
by searchlight officers; all other lights employed hand control only and were
tactically controlled by the battery commanders of the island gun battery. No
attempt was made to control the searchlights from the Navy CP on DUBLON.
DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL BATTERIES.
Maximum and minimum effective ranges were obtained for the Navy weapons by
questioning the Japanese battery and battalion commanders and from maps (believed
to be quite accurate) submitted by the Jap Navy Headquarters Staff; those for
the Army were obtained from Army sources similar to the above Navy sources and
also from knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon (characteristics obtained
from CINCPAC - CINCPOA Bulletin No. 152-45, 1 July 1945). Limiting angles of
fields of fire were obtained for practically all of the Navy emplacements and
about 40# of the Army emplacements by actual measurement and for the remaining
emplacements from the maps submitted by the Japanese*
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EMPLACEMENT,
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M-l M-2 M-3 1 1 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 75mm.Mtn*Gun, T.94 A A A
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Direct Fire. Direct Fire. Direct Fire. 8,000 900 8,000 8,000 900 (8,000)NE (1,300) (8,000)SE ( 700) 10,900 1,200 No No No M-18 M-19 2 1 M-16 M-17 1 1
Type
8cm.Armstrong type Gun. 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 8cm.CD.Gun,3rd yr. type.
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3 caves con nected.
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15cm.,40 cal. N Armstrong Gun. (Some instruc tion plates on gun in Spanish). 1 15cm.,45 cal. N Vickers(B*L.G. Mk H) Gun.
Cave w/gravel Direct Fire;tele filled 55 gal. scopic sights; drum embr.Elev.-telephone & voice tube. 4 to / 20. Cave w/gravel Direct Fire;tele filled 55 gal. scopic sights; RF drum embr.Elev for use of guns at -7 to / 18. positions No.M-5 & M-6,also,which are all connected by telephone. Concrete cover- Direct Fire;tele ed & lined(cut &scopic sights;tele fill type).Elev.phone & voice -7 to / 18. tubes. Cave. Direct Fire. Cave. Cave. Caves w/con crete embrs* Direct Fire. Direct Fire.
Yes
M-20 1 12cm.CD.Gun,3rd N yr. type* 20cm.,40 cal* N Armstrong Tur ret type Gun removed from Jap cruisers IWAMI, IWATE,NISSIN,' KASUGA. 15cm.,40 cal* Naval Gun* 15cm.,45 cal* Naval Guns* 15cm.,40 cal* Naval Guns. N N N
15,400 1,200
Yes
M-21
M-6
Yes
M-22 No M-23 No No M-24 1 2 1
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A A A N
8,000
660
8,000
400
M-ll
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Direct Fire;tele 18,700 scopic sights; 1,000 3.5m.BF in CP be tween guns;tele phone & voice tube s Direct Fire;3.5m, HF;telephones. Direct Fire. 8,000 450
Yes
M-25 Yes
No Yes M-26 Yes Yes M-27 1 1 4 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 12cm.DP.Guns, T.10 A A N
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Cave w/palm log Direct Fire sights embr. Elev. with known refer -10 to / 40. ence points In field of fire; no communication. Cavo w/palm log Direct Fire sights; embr. Elev. no communication. -15 to / 40. Cave w/concrete Direct Fire sights & steel embr. & lm.RF; no comm. Elev .-15t o/40. Alternate posi tion in a cave 50 yds.W.to give field of fire 295 to 20*
18
M-28
Cave w/palm log Direct Fire sights; embr. Elev. no communication. -15 to / 40. Cut type revet- Direct Fire sights; ment. no communication. Palm log cut & Direct Fire sights; cover type cave no communication. w/concrete embr. Elev.-2oto/5. Concrete cut & Direct Fire sights; 16,500 cover w/concrete no communication. 900 embr* Elev* -7 to / 28. Turrets in open Azimuth & eleva 19,800 revetments*Elev. tion telescopes on 1,540 -5 to / 28. each side of gun; 4.5m.RF;oil gears were on each gun, to move it in ele vation & azimuth; telephone & voice tube. Cave w/concrete Direct Fire sights; 10,900 embr. Elev* 900 no communication* -4 to / 10. Cave. Elev. Direct Fire sight; 15,400 -2 to / 20. 1.5m.RF; voice 1,100 tube. Cave.Elev.-2 Direct Fire sights; 12,000 to/20. Another 4*5m.RF;no oom 1,000 gun of this type muni cat ion. on hand& was to have been em placed. Open revetment. None other than Elev. ? to /750, Btry.Comdr. spot ting with 8cm.bin oculars & calling directions to the guns by voice tubes;guns have open type speed ring sights. A Dir ector & HF.never arrived from Japan. Cave. Direct Fire. 8,000 800 Cave w/concrete Direct Fire only; 5,000 embr. Elev. telephone instal 300 -5 to / 2 led. Guns revetted Speed ring sights AA positions 50 only;complete tele yds.apart on phone system insteel sled bases^talled;Btry.QP.5O Elev./3to/75. yds N.of center of Btry.-had B.C*tel escope; hand wrench fuze cutter.
Yes
11 & 12
Yes
4 thru
10, & #40
Yes
No Yes
Yes
24
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Guns,revetted AA positions 20 yds apart;steel sled bases-no concrete.Elev. 0 to / 75. Cave w/2 embrs. 15 yds.apart; gun could be moved to either opening. Elev. -5 to / 10. Connecting caves w/embrs.20 yds. apart & CP .be tween the embrs Elev.-5to/10. Cave. Elev.-3 to / 10.
Fire Control
Speed ring sights
only;no telephones
installed;Section
Chief stood between
guns & shouted;hand
wrench fuze putter.
Direct Fire;lm.RF. 5,000
in S.cave opening; 300
no communication
installed;runner
only.
Direct Fire; communication by runner.
Direct Fire;no telephone installed.
Direct Fire. 5,000
300
Tyue
D-4 3 75mm.AA Gun, T.88 A
4-1 a} aj
Emplacement
Fire Control
Yes
CQ <
M-30
75mm.Mtn.G-un, T.41
Yes
D-5 Yes D-6 2 75mm.AA Gun, T.88 A 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 A
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M-31 2 75mm,Mtn,Gun, T.94 A
Each gun in separate cave; mounts tipped forward to permit lower angle of fli*e. Elev. -10to/5.Cave connected E.& central guns. Cave w/cane embr.and steel doors;cave connected to CP. 10m.W.of gun.
Direct Fire;3m.RF. at W.gun;known reference points;Bn. island CP.was at this position,telephone comm.
Yes
Yes
Elev.-3W6.
5,000
300
8,000 Yes No Newly completed Direct Fire;lm.RF. cave connecting at S. gun. guns;guns 20m. apart;cave en trance 70m.distance on rever se slope of hill;
electric lights
installed.Elev.
5 to -/5
Cave. Elev*. Direct Fire;lm.HF.
-3 to / 10. & known reference
points in field of
fire;telephone to
OP.
Cut & fill-con- Direct Fire;lm.RFv crete w/earth telephone to OP. cover-2 concrete embrs.firing ports in em placements: Elev. -3 to / 3 6 . Cave connected Direct Fire;lm.RF. by tunnel to OP.on hill between position D-7. positions D-7 & D-9; Elev.-5to/3. telephone to OP. Concrete lined Direct Fire. cave w/concrete embr. Elev. -5 to / 5 . Cave. Direct Fire;tele 4,000 phone to Bn. CP. 200 Cave. Direct Fire;telephone to Btry.CP.
Yes
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M-32 M-33
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D-1
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1 12cm.CD.Gun,
11th yr.type (1922).
D-3
105mm.How.,T.91 A (1931).
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caves;1 gun on scopic sights; 3,000
each side of speaking tube,
hill connected
by caves; cave
entrance on S.
side of hill.
Cave also con nected to OP.on
N.side of hill.
Elev.-6 to/30.
Open cave in Direct Fire;lm.RF. 11,000
cliff;guns could at W. gun;0P.in
be moved to ob- separate cave;tel tain max.elev., ephone to OP.
(45);cave con nected guns.
Elev.-3sto/9 in
cave.
Yes
D-7
75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94
Yes
Yes
D-8
75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94
Yes
D-9
Yes
D-lo 1 A
D-ll D-12
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946
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F i r e Control
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8cm.Armstrong A T.,40 cal.,fix ed mount CD.Gun (Believed to be original Armstrong Vickers rather than a Jap copy. 75mm.Mtn.Gun, A T.41 N
Yes
D-25 D-26
1 2
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D-15 D-16 1 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 A A
Direct Fire;tele phone between guns & to CP. Concrete revet- T.95 Director,(AA) ment,w/amrao. & T.94,4.5m.Ster ready chests eoscopic RF;dir around perimeter;ect fire sights on director & RF. guns.Two 60kw.gen on concrete erators for power; blocks above re-data transmission serve ammo.stor-system;speaking age;3 revetmentstube & telephone for gun mounts & buzzer for fire (3rd gun was commands, said to be lost on the way from JAPAN to TRUK. Cave. Direct Fire.
Cave.
D-27 D-28
3 1
Direct Fire. Cave w/steel embr. & door. Elev.-2to/3. 1 mount bombed Probably had dirout Feb.44;l ector. mount bombed out Mar45;open revetments. Open revetment Direct Fire, to fire AA;D-27 & D-28 same btry. Open revetment Direct Fire, to fire AA;D-2^ & D-28 same btry. Cave. Cave. Cave in rock cliff.Elev.-2 to / 8 . Cave in rock cliff w/conc rete parapets. Elev.-5to/10 Direct Fire, Direct Fire< Direct Fire
No No
1 1 2 2
A A A
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D-17
10cm.How.,T.95. A
D-18 D-19
1 1
75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94
Cave,finished Direct Fire.w/pan 6,000 w/concrete & a oramic sights & 100 concrete embr; reference points in tunnel to rear field of fire. of cave w/palm log re-inforce ment. Proposed cave: Direct Fire w/pan 9,500 One cave com oramic sights:lm. 150 plete w/conRF. crete embr; sec ond partially completed. Cave. direct Fire, 8,000
1 2
15cm.,40 cal., N Guns.Stabili ment o-Armstrong Puzzuoli,1902. Removed from old Battleship KASUGA. A 8cm.Gun,Arm strong type. 8cm.DP .Guns, N 10th yr.type. 8cm.Gun,Arm strong type. 75mm.Fid.Gun, T.95 A A
Direct Fire;tele 10,900 scopic sights; lm. 2,200 RF;voice tube only,
Direct Fire. Direct Firejtele scopes; 1^-m. Stereo scopic RF. Direct Fire. Direct Fire. Type 2 D i r e c t o r w/ 4^-m. s t e r e o s c o p i c RF;data t r a n s m i s sion system i n s t a l l e d ; a l s o speed r i n g sight s ; t elephones.
7,700 2,000
No Yes
29 & 38
Yes
F-7 F-8 1 1 6
500
Cave w/concrete Direct Fire & ref 12,000 emfcr. erence points in 1,000 field of fire; OP w/binoculars;tele phone to OP. Cave. Direct Fire. 6,000
No Yes
19
F-9
Cave in rock cliff. Elev. -3 to / 6. 12cm. DP. Guns, N Revetted AA positions. Elev. 10th yr.type w/ 0 to /75. fuze cutters*
No Yes
Yes 30 thru
34
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No No No No Yes
500
Cave. Cave. Cave. Direct Fire. Direct Fire. Direct Fire. 6,000
F-10
500
6,000
Caves in rock D i r e c t Fire;CP l o - 10,900 cliff w/con cated between g u n s . 3,000 crete embrs; caves not con nected. Elev. 2 caves con Direct Firejpan n e c t e d by t u n oramic s i g h t ; l m . n e l i n which t o RF. emplace t h i s weapon. 6,600 600
Yes
28
500
10,000 1,000 F-ll l Concrete lined Direct Fire;lm.RF. caves;2 guns on at saddle crest; E.side of ter- telephone to OP. rain saddle;1 E.-W. tunnel connecting the 2 guns w/embr. on W.side .Elev. -5 to -f 10. 75mm.Mtn.Gxin, T.41 A
Yes
28
Picture battery
No. on
22 (PM DOBLON.
AA GUN, D-14.
TYPE
89:
AA
Picture 12.7cm
No. 23 (PM 59) DIRECTOR, TYPE 9 5 ; AA battery on DUBLON. Posit ton D-14
Used
in
RANGE FINDER, STEREOSCOPIC ,4 . 5 m , AA b a t t e r y o n DUBLON. Pipe m lower through Range Finder p e d e s t a l a n d also r f o r fire commands, Position D - 1 4 .
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P i c t u r e N o . 2 5 (PM 5 1 0 ) 1 2 . 7 c m AA GUN COMMAND POST: DUBLON. Lower foreground is entranee t o Personnel quarters. R e s e r v e a m m u n i t i o n dump l o c a t e d m cave beneath quarters. Posi tion D-14.
FIELD
OF F I R E :
75*
field
Picture battery
No. on
AA
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Picture No. 28 (PM 409) GUN POSITION 3rd yr type gun, position F-10.
IN CAVE
12cm,
10th YR TYPE
GUN:
(PM
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ARTILLERY A N D ORDNANCE
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i 1946.
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A A N
CL
F-17
1 1 1
A A A A A
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M m s: Cave lined w / Direct Fire w/tele- 9,000 reinforced con- scopic sights;range 1,200 crete; concrete to target estimated; embr. Elev. telephone & voice tube to CP. -5 to /14. Cave lined w/ Direct Fire w/tele- 9,000 reinforced con- scopic sights;range 1,200 crete; concrete to target estimated embr. Elev, telephone & voice -5 to / 1 4 5 . tube to CP. Cave. Direct Fire w/pan- 8,000 oramic sight. 300 Direct Fire. 8,000 Cave. 600 Cave w/concrete Direct Fire;tele- 10,900 embr. Elev. scopic sights; tel- 2,500 -3 to /13. ephone and voice tube. 8,000 Cave. Direct Fire. 500 Direct Fire. Cave, 6,000 500 Cave. Direct Fire, 6,000 600 Cave. Direct Fire. 8,800 300 Open emplaceDirect Fire. 6,000 ment on Tsis I ) 300
Direct Fire. 6,000
Emolacement
Fire Control
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U-6 U-7 U-8
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6,000 8,000
d M
-H o
1 S
Yes
1 1 2
Yes
75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41
75mm. Mtn. Gun-, T.94 14cm,,50 cal. Gun,3rd yr. type.Turret mount 15.5cm.,60 cal* Gun.Turret type (From Cruiser NAGAMI)
A A N
No
Yes
Yes
-3 to /35.
Caves connected Direct Fire sights; 18,700 Elev.-5Oto/24. 3.5m.RF.& spotting 1,700
telescope in CP;
comm.by voice tube
& telephone.
On concrete pe- Direct Fire tele- 30,000 destals level scopic sights;3.5m. 1,000 w/ground. Elev. RF;20 power 12cm.
binoculars for
-5 to /55. spotting;comm.by
voice tube,tele phone & buzzer.
Direct Fir*e sights; 8,000 Caves(it was planned to con-lm.RF;communi800
nect the caves). cation between
Elev.T.41,-5to guns by runner.
/40;T.94,-10
to /45.
Caves connected Direct Fire sights; 18,700 1,000
Elev.-3to/23. 2.5m.RF;comm.by voice tube between
guns & to CP.
26
Yes
41 thru
46,& 48
75mm.Mtn*Gun, (1-T.41;1-T.94)
Yes
No No No No No
E-l 4
12cm.DP.Guns, 10th yr.type. U-ll
Yes
37 & 39
Yes
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U-2
1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, 1
T.41 15cm.,40 cal* Gun.Stabilimen-
No Yes
to,Armstrong Puzzuoli*Ser.
745 made in 1900.Pointing & Training accomplished by one man Init ial muzzle velocity 700m. per sec.
Direct Fire using 10,900 1 telescope;range 200 scale on sight; cal-2 to /20. Loading machine ibrated to 10,000m,;
adjacent to em-CP.directly in rear
placement . of gun;no communication..
UD-1
N Cave in rock
Yes
Elev.-5to/15.
U-3
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Rocket Launchers for 60kg* rockete.Local- ly manufactured on Dublon I* 15cm.,40 cal* Gun.Stabilimen-
A In open pit.
350
Yes
20
1 1 1
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U-4
N Open revetted
position.Elev.
-2 to /20.
10,900 500
Yes
UD-5
A A A
Cave. Cave.
2 caves connec- Direct Fire. ted for firing the 1 weapon. 2 caves connec- Direct Fire. ted for firing the 1 weapon.
1 75mm.Mtn*Gun,
T.41
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2,000 300
Yes
8,000 770
8,000 660
6,000 (6,000)
500
(880)
6,000 (6,000)
800
(600)
No
No
No
No
runner.
-3 to 0.
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30
I
4.
"3
10
% *
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C I N C P A C - C I N C P O A BULLETIN 3 - 4 6 , 15 M A R C H 1946;
ARTILLERY A N D ORDNANCE
Army or Navy
Effective
Ranges (Yds)
Max.-Min.
Inspected
Number 1
ICH 1946
(Position
Number
Inspected
Weaoons
iNumber
Wearons
Army or Navy
Effective
Ranges (Yds)
Max.-Min.
Pioture
No,
ition
ber
Type.
Emplacement
Fire Control
Li.
Type,
Emplacement
Fire Control
P-1
in
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P-2
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1 12cm.,45 cal., DP.Gun,10th yr. type. 3 75mm.AA Gun, T.88 2 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94
00 <
P-3 P-4
N A
O a.
Mm %
z
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P-5 P-6
1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41 1 75mm.AA Gun, T.88 1 12cm.DP.Gun, 10th yr.type. 1 75mm,Mtn*Gun, T.94 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 3 15cm.,40 cal, mento,Armstrong Puzzuoli,elec tric firing cir^
WrUnS, uuaDj.ll
P
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A N
Cut type revet- T.2 Director & dirments lined w/ ect fire sights; palm logs. 2m.RF w/altitude convertor;data transmission sys tem; powered by 2 3kw,generators;tel ephone & voice tube comm. Cave-lined w / Locally manufac 10,900 corrugated sheet tured direct fire 2,200 sights;no comm. metal. Elev. -4 to /15. Open revetment. Direct Fire sights; 2m.RF;telephones. Open emplace Direct Fire, 8,000 200 ment (caves pro posed); field of fire to N.by swinging 1 gun around. Cave(on Tarik Direct Fire, 6,000 I.) Open revetment Direct Fire, to fire AA. Cave, Cave, Cave, Direct Fire, Direct Fire* Direct Fire. 13,200 1,000 2,180 330 2,180 435 14,300 2,500
Ye 8
49
T-14
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4
Yes
47 T-18 T-19
Yes
T-20 No T-21 T-22
No No No No
N Cave* 15cm.,40 cal* Direct Fire tele- 12,100 Gun8.Stabiliscopic sightBjl-^m. 1,500
mento Armcoincidence RF* strong Puzzuoli, 75mm.Mtn.Gun, Direct Fire* 7,600 A Cave* T.94 330 76mm.Mtn*Gun, Direct Fire* 2,300 A Cave* 660 T.41 75mm.Mtn.Gun, Direct Fire* 3,300 A Cave* T.41 190 75mm.Mtn.Gun, Direct Fire* A Cave* 2,500 T.41 165 75mm.Mtn,Gun, Direct Fire* 2,200 A Cave, T.41 165 75mm.Mtn.Gun, A Cave, Direct Fire, 2,600 T.41 165 75mm.Mtn.Gun, Direct Fire* A Cave, 2,100 T.41 770 15cm,,40 cal* N Caves w/concrete Direct Fire:tele 10,900 A c rook embrs. scopic eights*3m. 2,000 Gune.Stabili Elev*-4to/17 coincidence RF;tel mento Anastrong Puzzuoli ephone & buazer.
No
No No No No No No No Yes *
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Yes
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T-5
75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41
T-6
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1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.41 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 1 75mm.Mtn.Gun, T.94 1 1
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7 5nm V*~n G u n
Cave connecting Direct Fire* w/alternate position. Cave connecting Direct Fire* w/alternate po sition. Cave, Direct Fire,
C A VP _ vll cw U C -Lie.
2,180 330 Alternate Pos 550 2,180 200 3,000 440 1,600 330 7,600 870 7,600 1,950 7,600 1,100
DjUUU
No
No
No No No No
No
Nn JNO
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T-13
WLWm
Picture Mo. do (PM 333) PARTIAL VIEW OF FIELD OF FIRE 2ocu GUM r. MOEM: Position M-ai.
Cave,
Direct Fire.
No
32
Pioture
No*
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946
Picture No.
1 - Universal grinder, 8" swing X 24" between centers, Br^wn &
Sharpe No. lu.
1 - Radial Drill, 48 w radius X 48" vertical olearance, Minoura & Co., Ltd., individual motor drive.
1 - Shaper, vertical (or Keyway cutter) 26 M dla table, 14" stroke, Kubooho, Tokyo, Individual motor drive.
1 - Pipe threader, i-3/8" diameter capacity, equipped with bolt
thread fly cutters only, Landis Machinery Co., Waynesboro,
Pa., belt drive.
1 - Lathe, 14" swing X 48" between centers, heavy duty, turret type tool holder. J.F.K. Mfg., Osaka, individual motor drive.
2 - Lathe, 16" swing X 28" between centers, gap bed, Japanese manufacture, belt drive.
1 - Lathe, 16" swing X 48" between centers, with taper attaoh ment, Amerioan Tool Works Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. Navy Yard
No. 9-77, Purchased 1931, Cost $3,161.
1 - Boring Machine, horizontal, 51" spindle head to support bearing, the Fairbanks Co., Navy Yard No. 9-5, purchased 1909,
cost $1,125.
1 - Turret lathe, 22" swing X 72" between centers, gap bed, the Rahn Larmon Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, Navy Yard No. 340B-8,
purchased 1921. Property of the U. S. Army, P4299.448C, No.
124 Ordnance Department, belt drive,
1 - Planer, open side, bed 28" X 120", Petrick and Harvey Machine Co., belt drive.
1 - Drill press, sensitive type, 12" swing, floor type.
2 - Lathe, 6fl swing X 12" between centers, bench type, precision,
with turret attachment, not installed to operate motor drive.
1 - Punch and shear, Yamokawa Press Mfg. Co., Individual motor drive.
1 - Sheer, gate, 5 1 capacity 3/8" stock. 1 - Hammer, individual motor drive. 1 - Furnace, heat treating, 18" wide X 24" deep X 12" high.
1 - Forge, anvil, blacksmith vioe, hand tools.
66
61
60
62
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63
64
65
CO
The foundry was reduced to one medium-sized oil-fired cupula (see picture No.
67) from which small xron castings could be produced. It was found at approximately
its original position.
The welding shop, while in its original position, was damaged. Due to the
lack of proper welding rod, soft iron wire cut to proper length and dipped In an
asbestos paste was used. The gasoline-driven direct-current machines were still
in operation. Acetylene welding was stopped with the destruction of the oxygen
and acetylene plants.
Partial destruction of the carpenter shop reduced the production of pattern-
making and carpentry to a hand operati-on.
The above shops each had well-equipped tool rooms with an adequate supply of
micrometers (both inside and outside), verniers, scales, calipers, electric drills,
taps and dies, planes, chisels, carpentry and blacksmith tools.
Following is a list of the principal machine tools with which the above shops
are now equipped and which were in operating condition:
1 - Shaper (Asano-Jyuko) 16" stroke, 1 6 " horizontal and 1 4 W vertical travel table. Individual motor drive.
1 - Lathe, 16" swing X 48" between centers, Monarch Machine Tool
Co. Navy Yard Number 9-104, Back geared, individual motor
drive.
1 - Lathe, 16 l! swing X 60fl between centers, quick change gears,
individual drive, taper attachment, South Bend.
1 - Lathe, 8 I ! swing X 24" between centers, Japanese manufacture,
WSK-3, back geared, taper attachment, turret type tool
holder, Individual motor drive.
3 - Lathe, 8 H swing X 26" between centers, precision type, complete with collet set, Japanese manufacture, individual motor
drive.
2 - Drill press, 22" swing, floor type, movable table, Individual motor drive, power feed, Minoura & Co., Ltd.
1 - Universal Milling Machine, The Kempsmlth Mfg. Co., Milwaukee,
Wisconsin., Navy Yard No. 9-78, year purchased 1921, cost
Si.793. individual motor drive.
Picture No.
57
66
68
69
CO
The 104th Alrforce Arsenal (Navy), prior to 17 February, 1944, was laid out
as indicated in the plan included as a part of the Engineer's annex to this report.
At the time indicated, it was destroyed by bombing. At present, the power-plant
building is standing. Machines in the shops were destroyed and have been removed.
The only indication of the machine tools is the "Wooden Shop" (Carpenter Shop).
The following machinery is in that location but is unserviceable:
2 - bandsaw 36"
1 - Joiner
1 - 1 4 " planer
1 - 1 8 " planer
1 - 16" swing X 36" between centers, lathe
1 - Circular saw and Joiner
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59
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lathe, 18" X 96", gap bed, turret type tool holder, back geared.
Lathe, 18" X 30", gap bed, turret type tool holder, back geared.
Lathe, 16" X 30", gap bed, turret type tool holder, back geared.
Drill press, 22" swing -Tloor type, hand feed.
Milling machine, table 7 W X 29", with dividing head.
Shaper, 18" stroke, with vice.
Grinder, pedestal type, 10" wheels.
PiT r
34
afei.
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Picture ENGINE No. 50 (PM 25) i.oookv GENERATOR l.yoohp DIESEL Picture ENGINE. No. 51 (PM 26) 74kw GENERATOR g-ohp DIESEL Picture lQohp No. diestl 52 (PM 39) engine. 6$kva(ac)
- 65ku>(dc) GENERATOR
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iookva(ac) (unserviceable).
GENERATOR:
150HP
Picture from
No. e nt ranc
54 W e.
35) UNDERGROUND
MACHINE
SHOP:
View
View
in UJ
Picture No. 5 6 (PM 30) RADIAL vert ical c Learance, indiv idua Co., ltd.
DRILL: I motor
No. 5 7 (PM 27) SHAPER: table travel 16" horizontal idua I motor drive.
16" vertical,
LATHE: comtlete-
X 26" col
ftTi
35
A email blacksmith shop, with two forges and two anvils, located adjacent to the machine shop is presently used to store kafir corn. One of the lathes listed
above was equipped with attachments for threshing, and there was a grist mill for grinding this corn. A two-stall garage-type shop was used to repair Construction Department
vehicles, air compressors, bicycles, etc.
CQ
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to
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1 - Lathe, 18" X 36", quick change gears, heavy duty, Jap manufacture
similar to a modern South Bend Lathe, taper attachment, of very modern type, individual motor drive. Picture No. 71. 1 - Grinder, pedestal type, 12" wheels. 1 - Drill press, 22" swing, floor type, hand and power feed. 1 - Saw, band, 36" diameter wheels (woodworking) Individual motor drive. 1 - Circular saw, 12" diameter blade, tilt top, table type, with complete set dado heads (woodworking) individual motor drive. 1 - Planer, 16" blades (woodworking) individual motor drive.
1 - Sharpener for woodworking band saws.
1 - Lathe, 16" X 40" (woodworking) individual motor drive.
1 - Bla.cksmithing outfit complete with forge, anvil, shear, vices and hand
tools.
1 - Furnace (in ground) oil-fired for producing iron castings.
In addition, the shop was equipped for both acetylene and arc welding. A
complete supply of hand tools for use with the above machine tools was on hand.
Evidently a number of machine tools was received from JAPAN which it was
thought best not to install for operation. These were stored in caves and recently
had been moved to this shop for storage. These machines of very recent manufacture
and very modern design are listed as follows:
1 - Lathe, 18" X 48" between centers, heavy duty type, quick change gears,
(similar to Reed-Prentice), individual motor driven.
1 - Lathe, 18" X 30" between centers, heavy duty type, quick change gears,
(similar to Reed-Prentice), Individual motor drive.
1 - Shaper, 20" stroke, with vice, (similar to Cincinnati) Individual motor
drive. Picture No. 72.
1 - Circular saw 12" blade, tilt top table type complete with dado heads,
individual motor drive.
1 - Drill press 22" swing, power and hand feed floor type, individual motor
drive.
3 - Welders, electric, AC transformer type.
It is felt that prior to the bombing of 30 April 1944, the maintenance and
repair facilities of TRUK were such that very extensive repairs, including fifth
echelon, were possible and had been accomplished. Probably the most serious
handicap was the difficulty encountered with procurement of supplies from supply
bases In JAPAN due to the distance to be traveled. This lack of supply became more
serious as our attacks reduced the tonnage of Japanese shipjjing of manufactured and
raw materials which was getting through to TRUK. After the bombing of 30 April 1944,
the maintenance facilities were curtailed to a large extent, until they were re located and re-established as indicated in the above paragraphs. However, they were
never able to approach the capabilities which were formerly enjoyed. It is felt
that their facilities are roughly 10 to 20 per cent of what they previously had
been. By observation and conversation with Japanese officers, it is concluded that
maintenance was practically at a standstill due to the lack of fundamental supplies.
Little or no stock of major items, assemblies, sub-assemblies or raw materials
existed at the cessation of the war.
to
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X 2 8 " b e t w e e n bel't d r i v e .
P i c t u r e N o . 6 4 (PM 3 J ) T U R R E T L A T H E : 2 2 " s w t n f X 7 2 " b e t w e e n c e n t e r s , g a p b e d . The Rahn Larmon C o . , C i n c i n n a t i , Ohio, Navy Yard N o . 3 4 0 B - 8 . p u r c h a s e d 1 9 2 1 , P r o p e r t y of U.S.Army P4299. 448C, N o . 1 2 4 Ordnance D e p a r t m e n t .
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s i d e , b e d 2 8 " X Machine C o .
P i c t u r e ,1,0. 6 6 d r i v e , Yanojawa a r e a .
I n l i v i l u a l r e p a i r
m o t o r
Picture area.
No.
67
(PM
41)
COPULA:
Oil
S civ y
r e p a i r
shop
37
o
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Quantity 3 2 1 1 1 5 4 1 8 13 2 752 3 3 9 15 5 15 1 2 4
Item
Gunner's slide rule.
Calculating boards.
Type 98 Fire calculating board.
Type Mark I Plotting board.
Type Mark II Plotting board.
Goniometer.
Protractor.
Trajectory and wind plotting board.
Stop watch.
Portable thermometer.
Type 93 Height finder.
Type 98 Night compass.
Type 1 Plane altitude measuring instrument.
Type 2 Plane altitude measuring instrument.
Type 97 Rifle type stereoscopic sight.
Type 97 Stereoscopic sight.
Type 98 Target range finder.
Gun sight direction block.
Clinometer.
Clinometer spectacles.
Mil slide rule.
Ul
TYPE
Safety 3rd yr. Safety Safety
CALIBER
WEAPON 20cm Gun 15,5cm Gun 15cm Gun 15cm Gun 15cm Gun
14cm Gun 12cm Gun 12cm Gun 12.7cm Multiple Mount DP Gun 12cm AA Gun 8cm AA Gun 8cm AA Gun 7cm AA Gun 8cm Mortars 47mm Mobile Gun 37mm Anti-Tank Gun 30mm MG, fixed 20mm MG
20mm MG 25mm Multiple Mount MG
25mm Single Mount MG 13mm Multiple Mount MG
13ram Single Mount MG 13mm Quad. Mount MG
7.7mm Single Mount MG
7.7mm Flex, Mount MG 7.7mm MG
7.7mm Flex. MG
Heavy MG Light MG
PICTURE NO.
4
3 13
4 4
0
41
3rd yr.
45 60 40 45 40 50 40 40 45 40
Short
946
773
3,103
3,706
3,855
2,780
<
7
3
2
29
3
41 89
10th yr. 3rd yr. 5th yr.
262
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The following inventory was compiled by the Japanese. Two Inventories were
submitted, one showing total quantities at TRUK, the other showing quantities on
each island. Discrepancies exist in comparing the two. The following is believed
therefore to be only fairly complete and accurate.
Navy Vehicles;
Quantity 196 34 15 13 Vehicle
Trucks.
Personnel carriers.
Fire trucks.
Motorcycles with side cars
(believed to be motor tricycles).
Sidecar (with motorcycle).
Machine gun carts.
Tractors.
Three-wheeled fire cart.
Trucks equipped with crane.
Fuel oil trucks.
Ambulances.
Air charging truck (torpedoes).
Ditchers.
Sprinkler truck.
Trucks for transporting torpedoes.
Oxygen generating truck.
Searchlight truck.
Water supply trucks.
1
9 23 2 2 1 1 91 73 23 3 89
CD
AA
AA
609 CD
2,122 AA
132
3,237
3,957
3 1 94 2
99 MK 1
272
1,984
1,700
47,207
472,835
265,064
1,137,094
272,928
51,100
96 96 93 93
Hotchkiss
1
140 28 1 8 31 177 1 15 3
6,567 1,214
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UI
1 7 11
1
5
11
2
2
5
1
2
1
1
4
Army Vehicles;
Quantity
75
3
1
7
3
1
94
92 92
Lewis Model 1
92 99
3rd yr.
96 11 99 38
MG
Light MG
Light MG
Rifle Rifle Rifle Pistol Pistol Automatic Pistol Very Pistol
Flame Throwers
Flame Throwers Bomb Rocket Launchers Bomb Rocket Launchers
for land use.
Heavy Grenade Dischargers Grenade Launcher
AA MG for land use.
AA MG for land use.
1,369,197
1,120,401
9 W
189,443
Vehicle
Trucks.
Type 96 Trailer car.
Ambulance.
Passenger car.
Type 95 wheel drive passenger car,
Light repair truck.
Type 39 Trucks.
27 325 45 56 25 10 7 26 11
I
14
Army
85
78
20, 82
7,064
BE
100
Large Model Locally Manuf.
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89 100 95 2
100 211 2 1
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946
Army Ordnance Equipment; (Continued) TYPE QUANTITY TYPE 3rd yr. CALIBER 81mm Mortar WEAPON AMMUNITION (ROUNDS) PICTURE NO,
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QUANTITY TYPE CALIBER
15cm How. (4th yr) Type 97 Automatic Gun, HE shells Type 92 Infantry Gun Sound Shells Experimental Sound Sphere Type 90 Booster Charges Type 91 Smoke Shells Type 89 Smoke Shells Mod. 1 Signal Shells Torpedo Firing Charges Signal Lights (flares) Slow Fuzes Smoke Shells Signal Rockets Launching Charges All types of Fuzes All types of Primers Types 91 and 96 Booster Charge Cylinders All types of Booster Charges Ordinary Primers Electric Primers Type 88 Explosive Charge MK 2 Demolition Hooks Land Demolition Charges Land Fuze Safety Fuze Type #6 Land Explosive Charges
12 15 23 42 81 37 41 34 9 18 3 3 2 6 7 8 46 27
97 97 92 94 1 94 41 98 99 98 38 95 91
Armstrong
90mm 20mm 70mm 37mm 47mm 75mm 75mm 37mm 81mm 20mm 75mra 75miu 105mm 8 cm 75mm
Mortar Automatic Gun Infantry Gun Anti-Tank Gun Anti-Tank Gun Mountain Gun Mountain Gun Anti-Tank Gun Small Mortar Automatic Cannon Improved Field Gun Field Gun I'^witzer 8cm 40 cal. Gun
AA Gun Flame Thrower Flame Thrower
4,680 (also for type 99) 5,557 57,646 (also for auto cannon) 21,003 40,568 17,590 77,516 10,727 6,334 4,680 (also for type 3) 57,646 (also for auto gun) 3,031 3,067 3,341 2,306 5,474 Cartridges
88 93 100
QUANTITY
1,272 63,900 63,763 7,045 2,585 2,945 2,677
TYPE
DESCRIPTION Hand Grenade For hand throwing Hand Grenade and grenade dischargers TI and Grenade and launchers. Small Smoke Candle Large Smoke Candle Floating Smoke Candle Self-projecting Smoke Candle Training Smoke Candle Experimental Smoke Grenade Incendiary Grenade Frangible Incendiary Grenade For Bomb-throwing Mortar Yellow Explosive Block Yellow Explosive Stick Anti-Tank Mine Anti-Personnel Mine Bangalore Torpedo Yardstick Mine Demolition Can Fine grained Powder Explosive Can Improved Land Mine Dynamite Karitto Powder Incendiary Powder Primacord Signal Shell Flare Hand-launched Molotov Cocktail
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Infantry Rifle Cavalry Rifle Short Rifle Pistol Pistol Pistol Pistol Grenade Discharger Grenade Discharger Rifle Grenade Launcher Grenade Discharger Barrage Mortar Light MG Light MG Light MG Heavy MG Heavy MG AA Machine Gun Fixed Machine Gun Flexible MG Mobile Heavy MG Single Mount MG Mortar
AMMUNITION
(ROUNDS) PICTURE NO
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38th yr. 38th yr. 99 26th yr. 14th yr. 94 Various 10th yr. 89 100 2 11th yr. 96 99 92 92 92 92 92 97 93 97
660,125 3,887,222 (also for L.MG) 4,819 41,718 3,038 Listed In next paragraph
211
1,392 2,155 2,458
91 97 99 94 94 94 99 94
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2,147
60 Kilo
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7,120 5,657
97 97 93 99
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3,887,222 (also for rifles) 134,244 4,485,489
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10,069 31,583 2,220 Meters 4,292 1,778 2,449
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946.'
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URE NO. 7
ISLAND
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SEARCHLIGHT ARMY ARTILLERY AND FIELD OF FIRE NAVY ARTILLERY AND FIELD OF FIRE OBSTRUCTION IN FIELD OF FIRE
JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946
MILITARY ENGINEERING
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559 564
109 109
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Engineer supply for both Army and Navy was lumped with other supplies under
one supply service for each.
In general, craftsmanship was excellent. However, the very limited amount of
construction machinery handicapped any large construction program. To construct
the airfields, thousands of laborers moved large quantities of earth by hand. An
unbalanced sense of the relative strategic or tactical importance of things led the
the Japanese to place emphasis on novel installations and to neglect commonplace
essentials. Army officers stated that, under an agreement witn higher headquarters,
the 4th Naval Construction Unit performed Army work upon request. There was some
evidence of a lack of cooperation between the Navy'and Army with respect to this
agreement. For example: A Japanese Army officer reported than an Army request for
tools with which to.expedite completion of the Army underground divisional CP was
denied because the tools were needed on the Navy1s nearby underground CP. It ap pears that there \reve other naval needs for the tools after the Navy CP was finish ed. The Army CP is still far from completed.
ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND.
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After the loss of the MARIANAS and the consequent cutting-off of incoming
supplies, the Japanese plans for the defense of TRUK called for a long term, pro tracted resistance* The defense aimed at: minimizing damage from our air attacks
by use of the terrain and protective shelters; annihilating our Invading force at
the beaches; and maintaining the defense as long as possible. Defensive positions
were selected to take advantage of the terrain against all forms of attack and to
annihilate the assaulting force at the beach. How well these plans would have succeeded is, of course, a matter of conjec ture, but, in view of the types of emplacements constructed, it is considered
likely that naval and air bombardment would have taken a heavy toll of the defen sive positions on and near the beaches. Troop dispositions, as indicated on the
maps in PART TWO, provided generally for a defense in depth based upon the four
main islands, MOEN, DUBLON, UMAN, and FEFAN, and token resistance or delaying
action on the remaining islands. Considerable emphasis was placed on the ability
of the beach defenders to withdraw should our initial assaults succeed. Final re sistance lines or areas were to be near the summits of mountains on each island.
However at the end of the war these last-ditch strong points were Incomplete. For
example: only a portion of the division battle CP at the summit of MT. TOLOMEN,
DUBLON, had been excavated and the post in actual use was at RARA, roughly in the
center of DUBLON and only a few feet above sea level. The Navy battle CP near the
peak of MT. TOLOMEN, DUBLON, was completed in July, 1945.
Officer Senior Civilian Junior Civilian Petty Officer Seaman Workers Total (Branch)
8 4 5 11
11 6 11
29
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DCBLOM: Mote view
of fire along shore
of P i l l b o x removed
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MACHINE GUN PILLBOX ON BEACH d o u b l e e m b r a s u r e and pr.oximity and camouflage have been re-
P i c t u r e N o . g o (PM 1 5 2 ) 37mm AT GUN P I L L B O X , SOUTH BEACH,UMAN: Interior, view. Note d o u b l e e m b r a s u r e and l i m i t e d headroom. W a t e r a n d mud on f l o o r s h o w p o o r d r a i n a g e . Note also -oof support. G r a s s b l o c k e d f i e l d of g r a z i n g fire.
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P i c t u r e No. 9 2 (PM 4 0 5 ) 12cm GUN, MT. MISHIKI, FEFAN: Typical naval a r t i l l e r y cave emplacement. E n t r a n c e to p o s i t i o n is by t u n n e l to r e a r . R o c k wall at f r o n t a f f o r d s some p r o t e c t ion f r o m s n a i l arms fire but a l s o limits d e p r e s s i o n of g u n .
Picture No. 9 9 (PM 4 4 3 ) 12cm AA GUN IN CAVE, PARAM: Originally gun was part of 6 - g u n b a t t e r y with AA m i s s i o n , later emplaced to fire on s u r f a c e c r a f t n o r t h of PARAM. Note use of s t e e l rails and sheet m e t a l for roof re m f crement and protection.
Picture. No. 9 4 (PM n o ) 14cm NAVAL GUM CAVE EMPLACEMENT; UMAN One of a p a i r of CD gun c ove ring SOUTH Pass. Gun originally on a s h i p . Half drums c o n t a m e d growing native vegetation to camouflage position.
47
MILITARY ENGINEERING
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naif way up the slope* Caves and dugouts provided cover for nearly every weapon.
A large number of small air raid shelters were found scattered throughout the area.
Battalion officers stated that even with these many shelters, some 20 men were
killed there as a result of US bombing. Extensive communication trenches in ex cellent condition linked positions on the lower slope. In the rocky areas near
the summit, tunnels connected the cave positions. Some of the machine guns were
placed so as to fire from caves on low flying aircraft only. No anti-aircraft
artillery was located in the immediate vicinity but batteries on adjacent islands
could provide ack-ack support. Unit officers stated also that, seventy knee-mor tars were available in the MT. KONGO area in addition to those weapons shown on the
weapons disposition map.
FORTIFICATIONS.
Permanent: Lt Col YAMAMOTO, Chief of Staff, Japanese 52nd Division, stated
there were no permanent fortifications when his unit arrived at TRUK in January,
1944. An extensive fortification program was started then with the construction
of pillboxes and blockhouses on the seashore as first priority. For concrete con struction they used a 1:2:4 mix with beach sand and crusher-run basalt rock. Steel
reinforcing bars 20 mm in diameter were placed 25 cm apart in the conventional
right angled grid* Typical pillboxes found on the beaches are shown in Picture
Nos. 86, 87, 88, 89, and 90* Picture No. 91 shows an ant1-ricochet type embrasure
noted at several emplacements. The idea was to reduce the number of email arms
ricochets glancing into the emplacement. Some pillboxes were constructed so near
the water, or so low in it, that seepage or flow through the embrasures flooded
the interiors. Eventually the lack of cement halted concrete construction* At
the time of the inspection several stockpiles of reinforcing steel remained at
various locations on several islands*
Nearly all of the larger naval artillery pieces, except anti-aircraft batteries,
were placed in caves or dugouts typical examples of which are shown In Picture Nos.
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, and 101. Figures 11 and 13 show details of typical con nected cave emplacements. Picture Nos. 98 and 105 show an exception to the usual
emplacement in that this weapon was located only 50* from the seashore on LIGHTHOUSE
Hill, MOEN. Typical accessories, such as observation posts and ammunition storage
facilities, for artillery pieces located in caves are shown in Picture Nos. 99, 100,
102, and 104.
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Picture No. 98 (PM 261) 12cm GUN EMPLACEMENT, LIGHTHOUSE HILL MOEN: Mission: to Provide supporting fire on troops assault' and rear in? DUBLOh. Note angle embrasure exit. Re xnf or.ced concrete roof, 2 thick, catuouf lagei with native grass.
No. 9 9 (PM 333) OP, 14cm GUN BATTERY, UMAN: Note of G-eneral DAVIS for size. C ommun ic at i on was by teleand voice tubes (1 to left, 9 to right) to the gun 1ons.
No. 100 (PM 332) RANGE FINDER, 14cm GUN BATTERY, Picture finder Range in operating position with canvas cover in Cave provided cover while m storage Position. Retraction propelled cart on small railway track. hand
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No. 101 (PM 336) 14cm GUN(U-8), UMAN: No. 2 gun of battery. Note rear of turret and use of steel reinr.ods and mesh to prevent caving and wooden shield to spalls falling from overhead during firing.
Picture No. 102 (PM 444) ENTRANCE, 12cm GUN EMPLACEMENT, Note coconut log shoring an.' use of steel railway rails beams. Entrance gives access to tunnel to gun position no. 93. in picture
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No. 103 (PM 446) 6" ARMSTRONG CD BATTERY, P4LLE in niche off tunnel c onnect magazine ing pieces-
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 0 5 (PM 2 6 2 ) ENTRANCE TO 1 2 c m GUN EMPLACEMENT, LIGHTHOUSE HILL. MOEN: Note c o c o n u t l o groof s u p p o r t , s h a l l o w e a r t h o v e r h e a d c o v e r , and d r ym a s o n r y s i d e w a l l r e v e t m e n t .
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P i c t u r e tfo. 107 (P# 258-/ 20cm CO G M , MOEM: One of f o u r s i m i l a r heavy c r u s i e r t u r r e t s a n d puns i n open p i t emplacements T u r r e t of 1 " a r m o r p l a t e p r o t e c t e d p u n c r e w a n d a p o r t i o n of the ammunit 1 on.
2 0 c m CD GUN, MOEN: N o . 2 g u n of t h e P i c t u r e N o . l o g (PM 2 5 7 ; O P , 2 0 c m CD B A T T E R Y , LIGHTHOUSE HILL, of t h 1 s t u r r e t . Earth embankment MOEN: N o t e s t e e l p i p e c o l u m n s u p p o r t i n g roof, sodand earth Entrance was by roof cover, and banana trees f o r camouflage. e i t h e r of t w o t u n n e l s f r o m m a n h o l e s a b o u t 5 y d s a w a y .
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 1 1 (PM 3 4 5 ) AMMUNITION STORAGE, B A T T E R Y , UMAN: N o t e h e a v y c o n c r e t e a r c h e d roof, cessed doorway, elevated deck, andearth cover.
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r e N o . 1 1 2 (PM 3 5 > O P , l ^ m m B A T T E R Y , UMAN: This er housed t h e battery's BC s c o p e . Steel anqle c o l support 1 4 " t h i c k c o n c r e t e roof. Entrance by cov Pas sage way from rear.
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 1 4 (PM 3 4 6 ) AMMUNITION STORAGE, l ^ ^ m m BATTERY. UMAN: I n t e r i o r of i n s t a l l a t i o n s h o w n m P i c t u r e N o . 1 1 1 . Excellent handcraft shown i n timber, storage shelving a t right. Note overhead e l e c t r i c lighting.
1 5 1 ) RANiit. P l N U b K , 1 5 5 m m B A T T E R Y , UMAS: w a l l ar o u n d o p e n p i t e m p l a c e m e n t . Tracks s h e l t e r f o r range finder. Mound i n b a c k o n post shown m Picture No. 1 1 2 .
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 1 6 (PM 4 0 1 ) 6 - G U N , 1 2 c m AA of t h e 6 g u n s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d easily; emplacement locations. Individuals are munications room. BATTERY, FEFAN: 2 cleared area shows standing over com Picturfi No. n y (PM 4 0 2 ) 1 2 c m AA GUN, FEFAN: Gun mounted on t rune a t e d c o n e - s h a p e d s t e e l f o u n d a t i o n pedestal 1 met e r high. Underground s h e l t e r d i r e c t l y behind e lev at ing gear. P i c t u r e N o . 1 1 8 (PM 4 0 4 ) AIR RAID SHELTER, 1 2 c m AA BAT TERY, FEFAN: Timbers for support ing roof appeared to b e of m s u f f ic lent s t r e n g t h and P o o r l y s e l e c t e d . Note cover. r o c k a n d e a r t h o v e r he a d
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Pic ture No. n g (PM 480) BTRY CONTROL, 12cm AA, EOT: Type
open pit (observer); 2 f ire director (foreground); r e m o t e
controls for 150cm searchlight (bac kground); BC 's post
and scope (left bac kground).
Picture DUBLON:
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Picture No. 122 (PM 61) CG's AIR RAID SHELTER, ISION BATTLE CP, DUBLON: Photo shows the niche General reclined during air raids. Excavation rock approximately 20 meters underground.
Picture No. 123 (PM 62) DIVISION BATTLE CP, DUBLON: Interior view. Debris marks end of uncomp letei tunnel Form nails imbedded in ceiling a definite overhead hazard.
P i c t u r e N o . 1 2 4 (PM 4 8 1 ) 1 2 c m AA GUN, EOT: A l l 4 g u n s of t h i s b a t t e r y were emplaced m open p i t s with c o n c r e t e r e v e t t e d w a l l s . Vails had numerous s h e l v e s f o r "ready" ammunit 1o n .
51
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Typical of the coastal defense gun emplacements found at TRUK are those for
the 4-gun battery of 20cm. pieces on LIGHTHOUSE Hill, Picture Nos. 107, 108, 109,
110, and the 3-gun, 155mm. battery, south UMAN, Figure 12 shown also in Picture
Nos. Ill, 112, 113, 114, and 115.
Figure 14 shows a 6-gun, 12cm., This battery position was landscaped of a public park. Picture Nos. 116, ilar 4-gun, 12cm. AA battery located AA battery located on MT. NISHIKI, FEFAN.
very neatly and gave the over-all appearance
117, and 118 are of the same battery. A sim on EOT is shown in Picture Nos. 119, and 124.
Figure 16 shows the plan of a battalion command post near the summit of MT.
FUOUKANAN, DUBLON. Again the excavation was in solid rock with thick overhead
protection. Figure 17 shows a battalion command post found on MT. UBUN, FEFAN.
Field Fortifications: In general no unusual field fortifications were found
at TRUK. Many of the coconut log and earth emplacements and shelters were de stroyed after the surrender and prior to arrival of the Study Group. Picture Nos.
121, 125, and 127 are typical examples. Infantry units constructed their own
fortifications from local materials and, generally, by hand labor. Picture No.
129 of the interior of a 47mm. AT gun emplacement at the 4th Fleet Road crossing,
DUBLON, shows where a portion of the roof has collapsed by reason of the rotting
of the coconut logs used to shore it. Entrenchments noted were of good design.
No revetment work was needed to prevent cave-ins on the two communication trenches
observed.
OBSTACLE CONSTRUCTION TYPES. (For locations see Maps in PART TWO.)
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Figure 15 depicts the permanent type battle CP of the Japanese 52nd Division
on DUBLON. Picture Nos. 120, 122, and 123 are of this same installation. It was
used during the periods of actual US air and British naval attacks only. In gen eral the tunnel is 10 meters underground in solid rock with an arched concrete
roof. Living quarters for the commanding general ana his staff are provided in
the shelter and storage and communication facilities in rooms off the main tunnel.
Overhead electric lighting provided illumination. One hundred men labored daily
for six months to construct this CP.
Figure 18 shovrs the Navy battle command post at the summit of MT, TOLOMEN,
DUBLON. The parallel tunnels have exits on both sides of MT. TOLOMEN. The en-
trances are roughly 20 meters underground with overhead cover of solid rock in-
creasingly thicker as one proceeds towards the center of the mountain. Work was
started in July, 1944, and completed in July, 1945. Some 31,000 man hours of
labor were required to excavate the 2,100 cubic meters of solid rock. For this
excavation of a 380 cfm-lOO# compressor, belt driven by a vertical diesel engine,
was located 100 down the slope. The air was piped uphill to three rock drills
at the worksite. About 6,300 kilograms of dynamite were required for blasting the
rock. Spoil was carted by hand from the tunnel in small cars or wagona on indus trial railway track. Extensive communication facilities were provided in the in stallation. The reported capacity of the two tunnels was 600 men. The use of
power tools when available to speed construction is typical of all naval forti fication work at TRUK.
No inshore obstacles were observed, they were removed shortly after the sur render, but It was reported that various steel rail anti-tank and anti-boc?.t ob stacles had been emplaced. These obstacles were not completed when hostilities
ceased.
The only type of beach obstacle observed was a rock wall, anti-personnel and
anti-walliator"~, approximately 51 high and 8 1 wide at the base. Picture No. 126
shows an example of tills type obstacle. Pillboxes were placed so as to cover with
enfilade machine gun fire both faces of the wall.
No anti-personnel or anti-tank mines were found inland and it was reported that
there had been none there. However various anti-tank obstacles, located to take
maximum advantage of the terrain, such as walls and trenches, were found. Figure
19, and Picture No. 128 show an anti-tank wall constructed of earth and faced with
rock-filled oil drums across a low flat area near DUBLON Town.
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INDIVIDUAL AMMO. DUMP "C" 3.0M FRONTAGE DEPTH HEIGHT THICKNESS OFCONCRETE EARTH MOUND I.OM I.7M 0.2 M 0.5 M GENERATOR
ROOF 5M THICK SECTION- CC
HEIGHT 1.8 M THICKNESS 0 .3M OF CONCRETE 1.0 M EARTH MOUND FIRE CONTROL CENTER "D" FRONTAGE DEPTH HEIGHT THICKNESS OF CONCRETE EARTH MOUND CHAMBER "E" 1.6 M 3.0 M 2.3 M 3.3 M I.6M 0.3M 2.0M
FRONTAGE DEPTH
2.8M 8.8M
53
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FIGURE NO. I4-(FEFAN ISL) 5TON WATER COOLING TANKS O VENTILATION OPENING 25 KVA GENERATORS 90 CM SEARCHLIGHT
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AMMUNITION STORAGE
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FIGURE NO. 13
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AMMUNITION STORAGE
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SWITCHBOARD
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STAFF ROOM
COMMUNICATIONS
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(DUBLON ISLAND)
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BATTALION COMMANDING OFFICER
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NOTE : LIVING CAPACITY 100 MEN-WOODEN PLATFORMS FOR SLEEPING. ALL DIMENSIONS IN METERS
55
NOTE- TO IS 35 METERS
o o X
NOTE-DOTTED LINES INDICATE PROPOSED PLAN OF CONSTRUCTING ROOMS.END OF THE WAR DISMISSED ALL PLANS.
m
FIGURE NO. 17
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FIGURE N0.I8
o
FIELD KITCHEN 280 M. '' 2 5 M M MACHINE GUN ^GENERATOR ROOM BATTE FUEL ST ONS COMMliN I CATION^ ARSENA OPERATIONS a STAFF RM. CHIEF OF STAFF 1.5 M
OS.
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FOOD STORAGE 2 8 0 M. FOOT TRAIL
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56
In a l o w a r e a
P i c t u r e N o . 1 2 8 (PM 1 0 3 ) AJT W A L L , D U B L O N : at
approx. 100 yds m length, 8' a c r o s s at t o p a n d 2 0 ' e a r t h
base. S l o p e g r a d e d t o 1 on 1 on o p p o s i t e s i d e of f \ lied d r u m s .
a.
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 3 2 (PM 256) 150cm SEARCHLIGHT SHELTER, LIGHT HOUSE HILL, MOEN: S e a r c h l i g h t w a s m o v e d to o p e r a t i n g po sition shown m P i c t u r e N o . 1 3 5 by h a n d c a r on n a r r o w g a u g e
track. H ot e c o n c r e t e r o o f a n d r o c k s i d e w a I I f a c i n g .
9 0 c m
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to
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P i c t u r e N o . 1 3 4 (PM 997; 75cm SEARCHLIGHT, MT. NISH1KI, FEFAN: P l a t f o r m f o r m s r o o f of p e r s o n n e l s h e l t e r directly b e n e a t h a n d of t h e s a m e s i z e . Note exce I lent h a n i c r a f t m p l a t f o r m rail c o n s t r u e 1 1 on.
1 9 5 (PM 255) 150cm SEARCHLIGHT, LIGHTHOUzb T h i s s e a r c h l i g h t w a s l o c a t e d at t h e 20cm Light was r e t r a c t a b l e into cave shown m 112Note seashore m background.
P i c t u r e N o . 1 3 6 (PM 445) 150cm SEARCHLIGHT, PARAM: p l a c e m e n t of c o c o n u t logs housed searchlight which u.as r e m o t e l y c o n t r o l l e d f r om p o s i t i o n c^o y d s a u ; a y . Steel rails support camouflage net.
57
00
<
a .
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P i c t u r e No. 1 3 7 (PM 3 3 4 ) R A N G E F I N D E R , 14cm B A T T E R Y , UMAN: Natural camouflage. A b u n d a n t g r o v t h of v i n e s f r o m v e r t i c a l c l i f f c o n c e a l e d cave mou+h. Vines were pushed aside easily to P e r m i t i n s t r u m e n t to be r o l l e d into ope rat ing p o s i t i o n .
P i c t u r e N o . i 3 8 (PM 3 5 3 ) E X T E R I O R VIEni 3 7 m m AT GUN P I L L B O X , UMAN: C l o s e i n s p e c t 1 on r e v e a l s e m b r a s u r e i n d i c a t e d by marginal arrows. Excellent natural camouflage. See P i c t u r e N o . go for i n t e r i o r v i e w .
S h o w i n g one of
P i c t u r e N o . 2 3 9 (PM 2 3 9 J S E A P L A N E B A S E , M O E N : s e v e r a l c a r s m o u n t ing p a i n t e d e a r t h f i l l e d b o x e s s u r m o u n t e d by
gas d r u m s s p r o u t i n g n a t u r a l c a m o u f l a g e . Cars c o u l d be r o l l e d
a c r o s s cave e n t r a n c e
on i n d u s t r i a l r a i l w a y t r a c k .
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SEARCHLIGHTS.
The only army searchlight unit on TRUK was the 4th Battery, 25th AA Unit.
Five Type 93, 150cm, searchlights were utilized, four of them were emplaced in
open pits on DUBLON and one on FALO. For location of these searchlights see
Artillery Disposition Map, Power for searchlights was furnished by truck mounted
generators. One Type 90, sound detector, was used in conjunction with the search-
lights.
Table A-2 shows the type and number of Navy searchlights at TRUK, Picture
Nos.
131, 132, 133, 134, and 135 show typical searchlight emplacements. The Artil-
lery Disposition Map shows the location of the naval searchlights on the various
islands,
TABLE A-2 Inventory of Searchlights on TRUK (Nav.v) Island MOEN
MOEN
MOEN
MOEN
DUBLON
FEFAN
FEFAN
UMAN UMAN S. TOL N. TOL
POLLE
FALO
TONELIK
EOT
PARAM
PARAM
PARAM
PARAM
Battery 7cm, AA
12cm. AA
12cm, AA
20cm. CD
12.7cm. AA
12cm, AA
8cm, AA
15.5cm. CD
14cm. CD 15cm. CD 15cm, CD
15cm. CD
12cm. AA
7cm. AA
7cm. AA
12cm. AA
12cm. AA
Type
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Number 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
96 96(w/truck
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& controller) Su
96 92 92 9 2
96
96(w/truck)
Su
96(w/con troller)
96(w/con troller)
92(w/
troller)
Su
92
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IEW
HEL
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xo o-n oil 2o
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1
MILITARY ENGINEERING
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Picture
C O M M U N I C A T I O N
U n d e r g r o u n d room contained i n t r a b a t t e r y
telephone switchboard, data t r a n s m i s s i o n
e q u i p m e n t , and r a d i o for c o m m u n i c a t i o n
L a d d e r s lead t h r o u g h 24"
to D U B L O N . c o n c r e t e .
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60
; 4
P i c t u r e N o . 1 4 8 (PM i 9 9 ) WATER STORAGE TANKS, MT. NISHIKI, FEFAN: These t w o tanks f o r c o l l e c t i n g rainwater had a stcr a g e c a p a c i t y of > t o n s e a c h . Tanks had sheet-metal linings and roofs.
1 4 mpl ed hin
9 (PM 4 8 4 ) TROOP SHELTER, UDOT: Structure c o n e wooden framing with thatched grass s idewaI Is sheet metal roof. Note overhead s h e l v e s f o r g and equipment . Reported occupancy 1 0m e n .
P i c t u r e N o . 1 ^ 0 (PM 4 5 2 ) NAVY GUN CREW BARRACKS, Barrac ks f o r 1 4 0 m e n . This area had n o t been US bombing.
NORTH disturbed
TOL, by
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Picture No. 151 (Pm 14?) Note grass floor sleeping I tght ing, and, a rarity,
155mm nets,
BATTERY, electric
UMAN:
CD B A T T E R Y , suitchboard,
NORTH
c e n t e r ;
CD B A T T E R Y , cooling water
NORTH
t a n k s
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Picture FEFAN:
No. Note
AA
MT. >n
NISHIKI, revetment.
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61
MILITARY ENGINEERING
o ^* o I Equipment: ARTICLE Small sound alarm Portable sound alarm Simple meteorological apparatus Type 95 decontamination powder Type 98 Unit Gas Mask Testing Machine, Mk 1 and Mk 2 for personnel Gas Masks for personnel Canisters (for exchange) Type 96 Complete Gas Protective Clothing
Type 96 Light Gas Protective Clothing Gas-Protective Shoe Cover (A) Gas-Protective Shoe Cover (B) Substitute GasProtective Clothing Gas-Protective Coat Observation Eye-Glasses Anti-dim Plate Repair Kit for GasProtective Clothing Unit Gas Medicine Pannier Medical Unit Gas Pannier Hospital Gas Medical Pannier Gas Medical Treatment Kit A Gas Medical Treatment Kit B Gas Medical Treatment Kit C Mark 1 First Aid Kit Mark 2 First Aid Kit Gas First Aid Kit Gas Masks for wounded Personnel decontamination Pouch Decontamination Pouch A Medical prescription B Medical prescription Eye lotion Nose lotion Chlorine suction tube UNIT Item Item Set Can
TABLE A-5
. Lj.st of Army Chemical Warfare Materiel
ARTICLE QUANTITY 40 210 18 450 NOTE Gas Masks Containers and Fittings for Gas Masks Light Gas Clothing Gas Clothing Gas Detector Gas Covers Mk-3 Decontamination Kit Mk-4 Decontamination Kit Mk-5 Decontamination Kit Oxygen Gas Masks Oxygen Generator Air Filter
TABLE A-4
List of Navy Chemical Warfare Materiel
UNIT Each Kit Each Each Each Each Kit Kit Kit Each Each Each QUANTITY
11,071
79
2,064
161
90
9,941
159
395
100
5
20
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Set
Item Item Set
40
15,617
487
1,105
14,481
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FIELD UTILITIES.
Except where dispersed Army units had rainwater cisterns, springs, or shallow
wells, water supply was primarily a Navy function. (See General Construction).
Rainwater was collected by means of systems of troughs, gutters and pipes from
nearly every roofed building, hut, and shack. Normal precipitation in this area
is sufficient to supply small isolated groups but inadequate for such concentrated
installations as the"battle CPs on MT. TOLOMEN, DUBLON. There, water supply would
have become a serious problem In the event that hostile troops held the surrounding
lowlands. The caves were too near the relatively small peak or summit to tap sub-
terranean basins or flows. By collecting rainwater, the Japanese reduced consider ably their need for filtering and purifying equipment. Boiling was prescribed as
the approved standard method for purifying water for drinking. The army had 472
cases of amoebic dysentary in 1944 and 266 cases in 1945. In view of the widespread
use of night soil for fertilizing, these cases should not be attributed exclusively
to impure drinking water. Picture No. 148 shows two typical 5 ton capacity rain water storage tanks at an anti-aircraft battery on MT. NISHIKI, FEFAN. Picture No.
140 shows collection of water dripping from the interior of a cave on FEFAN. The
Japanese claimed that US bombings interfered with their search for additional water
sources and with their further exploitation of those they had.
The main installations were dependent upon a central source of electrical
power. Smaller units, such as anti-aircraft troops, had standard 17.5, 25, and
40kva dlesel engine driven generators. Picture Nos. 141 and 143 show typical equip-
ment. In nearly all cases these generators were in unprotected frame buildings lo-
cated near searchlights. Some truck mounted generators were available for use with
searchlights.
In general, there were no enforced sanitation or refuse disposal regulations.
Individuals relieved themselves wherever they pleased. Flies were everywhere in
abundance and especially near latrines. Picture Nos. 144, 145, and 146 show a
latrine used by naval officers of the 155mm. gun battery on south UMAN. The most
elaborate field latrine found was that for the 155mm. gun crews on UMAN. (See Picture
No. 147). Fecal matter from oil drum type latrines was used freely as "night soil"
or fertilizer and any remainder was buried.
Housing for dispersed units and small groups was, by our standards, highly
unsatisfactory. Overcrowded shacks of salvaged materials with twigs and branches
for flooring were standard. No screening was observed on any of the islands. Some
mosquito bars were noted however. Picture Nos. 149 and 150 show some of the better
type of shelters observed.
150 420
1,935 47 896 410 10 Since most of these have deteriorated and cannot be used, only the reserves are shown.
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2 7
31 32 208 102 287 29
38
18,000 About 25,000 Since their use has been discontinued it is difficult to give accurate figures*
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550
2,300
1,100
1,100
500
This table gives the total of all chemical warfare material for the various
Army units at TRUK.
This table is based on reports for July, 1945. Because of bombing, depreciation,
etc., the present totals will be somewhat different.
Usually the shelters for signal communications facilities were rooms off the
main tunnel In a cave. Picture No. 142 shows a signal communication center room
for AA battery.
62
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P i a l t h f o
P i c t u r e
Ho.
1 5 8
(PM
1 0 2 )
DUBLON:
T y p i c a l
r o c k
c r u s h e r
P i c t u r e s h o w i n g
r o c k a n d
c r u s h i n g c r u s h e r ,
p l a n t r i g h t
CD
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engine
p r i m e
Picture N o . 1 6 2 (PM 237) MOEN: shown m Picture No. 159. Crush on narrow gauge track which are of ptctur.e) for hand Ioading m t
p l a n t
c a r s
( o u t
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One of t h e P i c t u r e No. 164 (PM 72) DUBLON: engine driven narrow gauge locomotives used for hauling rock, supplies, etc.
50 as
D U B L O N :
P i c t u r e N o . 1 6 5 (PM 82) 4TH SHIP REPAIR BASE, Mobile unit for shtpside^ repairs; a 100-ton barge w i t h
40 HP c o m p r e s s o r and 45kw g e n e r a t o r for arc w e l d i n g .
63
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
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to
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a: P i c t u r e No. 166 (PM 7 0 ) SUBMARINE BASE, DUBLON: Interior of cxygen g e n e r a t i n g e q u i p m e n t cave showing distilling tank, left, ani r e c e i v e r t a n k , r i g h t . Note s h o r i n g of c o r r u g a t e d sheet iron canopy p r o t e c t i n g e q u i p m e n t from seepage. P i c t u r e No. 167 (PM 7 1 ) SUBMARINE
of oxygen g e n e r a t i n g e q u i p m e n t
l e f t , and c ompre ss or, r i g h t .
cave BASE, DUBLON: Interior showing purifier tanks P i c t u r e No. 168 (PM 6 6 ) SUBMARINE loading pier. Note n a r r o w gauge leg d e r r i c k and f l o a t i n g I r y d o c k BASE, DUBLOS: Torpedo railway, 2&-ton stiff(background, right).
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rVt^1 ' ft.
Hand ophandling
P i c t u r e No. 170 (PM 6 8 ) SUBMARINE BASE, DUBLON: Torpedo loading pier. Note 2 ^ - t o n s t i f f - l e g d e r r i c k for h a n d ling torpedoes. Only two l i g h t e r s could be b e r t h e d here at a t i m e .
BASE, DUBLOS:
North
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ACID STORAGE
^ 300 Ton WATER TANK BATTERY CHARGING EQPT for ELECTRIC TORPEDOS
DISPENSARY
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SUB REPAIR PARTS D STORAGE AREA 1 |OXYGEN GENERATORS TORPEDO WARHEAD STORAGE FUSE STORAGE
BARRACKS AREA
MACHINE SHOP'
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MACHINE SHOP
J I SUPPLY CAVES
WARHEAD STORAGE
POLICEMANS STATION
BASE
NAKAMURA SHIRAHAMA
|CD| AIR RAID SHELTER WATER TANKS ANTI -TANK OBSTACLES EARTH MOUND-BARRICADE
ORE NORTH\(~~~^i\
/TAKAO MARU
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V ^ F U J I MARU
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^-UDOT /URIKAI
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HOZAN-MARlfl < NETON
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PAF
FLEET. TORPEDO SHIP REPAIR, CHARE\DUBLON \ SOUTH TRANSPORT AIR GROUP CHURCH WATA\AIR DEPOT SEAPLANE BASE
30 t
BATTERY
Y /
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/ ^-^
FIGURE NO.21
BATTERY
65
DISPENSA
TELEPH0N
E REPAIR SHOP
/ ^ A R P E N T E R SHOP
\y\STORE
3 0 0 T MARIN
RAILVi^Y
(NOT COMPLETED)
FIGURE N0.23
DUBLON ISLAND,TRUK
CAROLINE ISLANDS
0
10 20 30 40 B O 60 70 10 90
ATOLL
==
SCALE IN METERS
66
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
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TABLE A-5
DEPTH ALONGSIDE (METERS) NUMBER OF CAN IT CARRY LIGHTERS ACCOMMOTOR MODATED VEHICLES? DUBLON
KOHATSU TRANSPORT JETTY CHARE AIR DEPOT NAICAI SEAPLANE BASE SHIP REPAIR TORPEDO PIER GARRISON FLEET CARGO
HANDLING
EQUIPMENT DEPTH ALONGSIDE (KST2RS)
o
TYPE OF
CONSTRUCTION
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2.5 3.5 4.0 2.0 4.0 1.7 6.5 1.5 4.6 4.0
4 3 4 2 1 1 4 1 2 4
Yes
1 2 1
No No Yes TOL
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
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Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock, wood end.
Concrete slab.
Concrete slab.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
Piled Rock.
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HMACHIYAN
ORE
BATTERY NET ON 31SU MARU FUJI MARU TAKAO MARU
4.0 2.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 1.5 1.2 0.8
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
No No No No No Yes No Yes No No
ULALU
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NO. 2 BASE JETTY NAKAMURA KAMENKO BATTERY SHIRAHAMA POLICEMAN'S STA. WATER SERVICE
2 3 2 1 1 1 5
No
ETEN
Piled Rock.
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4.0
Yes
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Water discharge
fill.
2.0
2 1 1
Yes Yes No
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2.1
3.0
3.0 2.0
2.0
1.0
0.6
Yes
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3.0
Yes
Timber.
67
-V
FUEL OIL TANK FARM AND OIL SUPPLY PIERS .NOT TO SCALE
NOTE I OPERATION OF TANK FARM CEASED APRIL 1944, DUE TO EXTENSIVE DAMAGE FROM BOMBING 2 IO>UNDERGROUND OIL LINE 3 EARTH OYKES AROUND ALL TANKS 4. ALL TANKS RIVETED, STEEL PLATE CONSTRUCTION
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NANKO
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SUPPLY OFFICE - 4th MUNITION DEPT OFFICE-NANKO SUlSAN CO @REFRIGERATOR BUILDING SUPPLY STORES BARRACKS
FIGURE NO. Z5
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72
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45 M MAST
351
TRANSMITTING
ROOM NO 2
BARRACKS TOILET
TRANSMITTING ROOM
FIGURE NO 2 4
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946.'
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
o
o
No. 181 (PM 86) NANKO DOCK Picture showing dry rtorage Left, and cold Photo shows 1 / 9 of former m s t a LLat able after US bombing.
inland
right.
oper
Rock facility
Pictur.e No. 183 (PM 85) NANKO DOCK from pier, showing slip, foreground, structed timber wharf, middleground,
INSTALLATIONS.
DUBLON;
The 45, 65, and lOOkva generators were removed from their respec tive base site buildings and Installed in caves in the adjacent hillside. A typ ical underground installation is shown in Picture Nos. 172 and 173.
Two small sawmills were operated by the base personnel cutting 24"
imported hard wood logs and local soft wood breadfruit trees.
The 300-ton marine railway, 36* wide, 250' long, built on a 1 to 15
slope of 4 1 thick concrete slabs, was never completed. (See Picture Nos. 174 and
176).
A floating drydock, 117 meters in length and 18*7 meters in breadth,
lay inshore at the base and was reported to have been used for docking destroyers,
submarine and small craft* The dock could be sunk 4*8 meters below normal dis placement* (See Picture Nos* 177, 178, 179, and 180)*
4th Communications Unit Transmitting Station-The layout of this stacion
is shown in Figure 24* All buildings were of frame construction* The two-story
barracks were set on concrete piers* After US bombing began these facilities were
salvaged and crude open barracks built for them in the adjacent wooded areas*
The two power plant buildings with concrete decks, 4 1 high sill walls
and wooden superstructures were totally destroyed by US bombing* The Japanese had
anticipated severe bombing attacks and had removed all machinery and transmitting
equipment to a prepared underground site and so suffered little interruption to
their signal communications.
The ruins of the former transmitting rooms showed evidence of hand
rubbed finish on the Interior of the concrete walls as well as on the interior
wood trim. Glass sash had been provided*
Three steel 45-meter masts set in concrete foundations supported the
antennae.
The newly prepared underground site Included a power house, two
transmitting caves and provided only the bare essentials. The entrance to one of
the transmitting caves is shown in Picture No. 184.
The power house sheltering the 65 and 60kva generators was of heav ily reinforced concrete construction with 18" walls, 36" roof slab, and concrete
deck. The entire building was oovered with earth and sodded. No ventilation was
provided and the air inside was hot and smelled of grease. The two cut-and-cover
transmitting shelters, of reinforced concrete construction and of horseshoe cross
section, were 601 long, 12* wide, 81 high and had walls 12" thick. A 12" X 12"
combination ventilation duct and escape hatch made these units quite habitable.
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4th Ship Repair Base-This base was equipped to make minor repairs to all
ships and major repairs and adjustments to vessels up to and including the destroy-
er and submarine classes. The base was operated by 1,000 workers of all required
skills, trades and crafts. All structures, Including one-story barracks, shops and
warehouses, were of wood construction on concrete decks or sill walls. Only the
two-otory barracks had wood decks on concrete piers elevated for dryness. All ship
repairs were accomplished while vessels were anchored in the lagoon. This required
the use of many tugs, barges, cranes and lighters. Two 100-ton barges, one equipped
with a 40 HP compressor and a 45kw generator for electric welding machines shown in
Picture No. 165, the other a deck barge used for transporting heavy loads (as gun tur rets), were available. A 30-ton self-propelled floating crane was used in con-
Junction with the drydock which lacked crane facilities of its own. The other com-
ponent parts of the base are shown in Figure 23. The principal items were:
A substantial machine shop was reported to have been equipped fully
with 20 engine lathes, several heavy duty drill presses, moulding and punching
equipment, milling machines, shapers, oxygen generating equipment and all pertinent
hand tools. After US bombing attacks, about one fourth of this equipment was sal vaged and installed in a nearby cut-and-cover shelter which provided the usual ex tremely poor working conditions. (See Picture No. 172). Lathe operators and mach inists stood on duck boards to keep out of the standing water. The atmosphere was
stale and damp in spite of the ventilation ducts or pipes to the air above.
70
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JAPANESE DEFENSES ON TRUK ATOLL, CAROLINE ISLANDS. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 3-46, 15 MARCH 1946
TO
BRANCH
OFFICES
II
L_J
OFFICERS OFFICERS
NL6L I OFFICE I
i i I
BARRACKS
l
BARRACKS
1 1 II
ii
HEADQUARTERS OFFICE
SHELTER NO. I
SHELTER NO. 2 TO SEAPLANE_BASE WORKER'S BARRACKS
7 , 0 0 0 ton
WAREHOUSES
BARRACKS WAREHOUSES
CD
FACTORY
10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
SCALE I N METERS
73
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OFFICER S AREA
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MEDICAL WARD
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BATH HOUSE
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STORAGE
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SURGICAL WARD XRAY ROON OPERATING WC OFFICERS ROOM WC ADMINISTRATIONS PHARMACY
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ICE STOREHOUSE
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STORAGE
o STORAGE WC
ID a:
i
STORAGE
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GARAGE
STORAGE
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DUBLON
LZTZI
GALLEY BARRACKS
nmfm
OIL TANKS
DISPENSARY PROPOSED EXTENSION BOMB STORAGE PLANE HANGER BOMB STOREHOUSE OIL TANK WELDING SHOP I I
=1
[ ] BARR/
COAL TORE
GARAGE |J
CARPENTER SHOP SHOP OIL STORAGE PLANE REPAIR LZH WELDING I I REPAIR PARTS
ORDNANCE
REPAIR PARTS
OIL STORE
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UNDERGROUND HANGER-I PLANE CAPACITY
LU CO LU
75