www.elsevier.

com/locate/ijintrel

Int. J. Intercultural Rel. Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 753777, 1999 # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0147-1767/99 $ - see front matter

PII: S0147-1767(99)00019-X

A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION BASED ON SCHEMA THEORY HIROKO NISHIDA University of Shizuoka, Japan
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this study was to examine schema theory and its application to intercultural communication, especially to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. Eight primary types of schemas for social interactions were extracted, and these schemas' functions for processing information were investigated. Furthermore, fundamental functional structures of schemas were analyzed when the theory was applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation, and eleven axioms were formulated in the following domains: the development of schemas, internal organization of schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions, and schema modication and change. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

INTRODUCTION
Communication between people from dierent cultures has been investigated in various research areas: for example, (a) the study of psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments such as culture shock (Adler, 1987; Bhatt & Fairchild, 1984; Bock, 1970; Bochner, 1982; Cleveland, Mangone & Adams, 1960; Furnham & Bochner, 1986; Oberg, 1960), U-curve and W-curve (Church, 1982; Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963; Klineberg & Hull, 1979; Lysgaard, 1955; Torbiorn, 1982), and uncertainty reduction (Berger, 1992; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Gudykunst, 1983a,b, 1988; Sudweeks, Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey & Nishida, 1990); (b) cross-cultural adjustment or adaptation (Berry, 1975; Brislin, 1981; Furnham, 1988, 1992; Kim & Ruben, 1992; Nishida, 1992; Spiro, 1955; Taft, 1966; Ward & Kennedy, 1996), and immigrants' acculturation (Brower, 1980; Kim, 1978, 1982, 1987;
I want to thank Vernon Jensen, Dan Landis, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Hiroko Nishida, Faculty of International Relations, University of Shizuoka, 52-1 Yada, Shizuoka-shi, Shizuoka-ken, Japan 4228526.

753

754

H. Nishida

Padilla, 1980; Yum, 1982); (c) intercultural communication competence (Chen & Starosta, 1996; Dinges, 1983; Hammer, Nishida & Wiseman, 1996; Littlejohn & Jabusch, 1982; McCroskey, 1984; Nishida, 1985; Wiseman & Koester, 1993; Wiseman, Hammer & Nishida, 1989); (d) values and value orientations (Caudill & Scarr, 1962; European Value Systems Study Group, 1982; Hofstede, 1984, 1991; Kluckhohn, 1951; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Nishida, 1979; Rokeach, 1973); and (e) verbal and nonverbal interactions (Barnlund, 1975; Burgoon, 1985; Giles, 1978; Giles & Johnson, 1981; Giles, Mulac, Bradac & Johnson, 1987; Hall, 1959; Mehrabian, 1972; Morris, Collett, Marsh & Oshaughnessy, 1979; O'Keefe & Delia, 1985; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). Although we have gained considerable knowledge through these studies, there are few intercultural communication theories underlining them. Without some form of theorizing, research in intercultural communication will not take on specic foci or directions. As Berger (1991) notes, ``It is not enough for researchers to demonstrate that they can use certain methodological tools, even when they are used to study current, highly visible social issues. It is the capacity to sustain theoretically driven, programmatic research that produces signicant insights about communication phenomena in the long run'' (p. 110). In this paper, schema theory is examined in order to explicate the phenomena of intercultural communication, especially of cross-cultural adaptation. The following questions will be discussed: (a) What are schemas? and (b) what axioms can be generated when schema theory is applied to cross-cultural adaptation?

WHAT ARE SCHEMAS?

It is said that when a person enters a familiar situation, a stock of knowledge of appropriate behavior and an appropriate role he/she should play in the situation is retrieved. In other words, every interactant's social world is usually constituted within a framework of familiar and pre-acquainted knowledge about various situations. This familiar and pre-acquainted knowledge is called schemas (or schemata). The concept of schemas is not new, but existed even in the 19th century: German philosopher Immanuel Kant developed the idea that each person's experiences are gathered together in memory, forming higher order concepts (Kant, 1963). And we can nd the concept early in the 20th century, too: Piaget's work in the 1920s investigated schemas in infants, and Bartlett's research in the 1930s tested memory for schemas (Matlin, 1989, p. 223). Furthermore, in the last 25 years, the concept of

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

755

schemas has been used and dened by quite a number of scholars (Cohen, Kiss & Le Voi, 1993; Mandler, 1984; Markus, 1977; Matlin, 1989; Rumelhart, 1975, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Thorndyke, 1984; among others): Cohen et al. (1993) for example, explain schemas as ``packets of information stored in memory representing general knowledge about objects, situations, events, or actions'' (p. 28). Moreover, in Taylor and Crocker's words (1981), a schema is:
F F F a cognitive structure that consists in part of a representation of some dened stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge about that domain, including specication of the relationships among its attributes, as well as specic examples or instances of the stimulus domain F F F . The schema provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which include plans for interpreting and gathering schema-related information. (p. 91)

Schemas, then, are generalized collections of knowledge of past experiences which are organized into related knowledge groups and are used to guide our behaviors in familiar situations. During the period from the late 1970s to the middle of the 1990s, researchers have obtained massive evidence that shows that people's behaviors are deeply related to what they store in their brain. Hudson (1990), for example, clearly demonstrated how schemas are stored in long-term memory and how they are used in the real world. Contrasting preschool children's memories of a specic event, attending one session of a creative movement workshop, with their memories of repeated workshop sessions, Hudson found that the children's memories of details were better for the workshop immediately preceding the test trial, if only one workshop had been attended rather than four workshops. When four workshops had been attended, the children tended to recall the entire sequence of events during the workshop better than when only one workshop had been attended. However, details from workshops 1, 2, and 3 were wrongly remembered as having occurred during workshop 4. In short, with repeated encounters of the workshop, some general knowledge of relationships between activities during the workshop (i.e., a ``workshop'' schema) was built up, but once the schema was formed, memory of specic details declined. Moreover, Hudson and Nelson (1983) found that even young children could repair not-quite-consistent stories with their schematic knowledge of their world. When misordered acts were reported (e.g., a not-quite-right story about a birthday party), children tended to repair them in schematically correct order. These studies demonstrate that even young children's knowledge is organized schematically; that is, children's schemas in memory are simi-

756

H. Nishida

lar both structurally and functionally to the schematic representations of adults.1

Schemas for Social Interactions

Schemas for social interactions are cognitive structures which contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in social environment. An existing literature indicates the formation of schemas for social interactions as follows (Abelson, 1981; Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Cantor, Mischel & Schwartz, 1982; Chi, 1981; Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Hudson & Shapiro, 1991; Mandler, 1984; Minsky, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994): When we interact with the members of the same culture in certain situations for a number of times, or talk about certain information with them for a number of times, schemas are generated and stored in our brain. As we encounter more of these similar situations or as we talk more often about the information, the schemas become more organized, abstract, and compact. Thus, people develop schemas by their direct experience and also by talking about schema-related information. When schemas become tightly organized, the information the schemas contain becomes more usable. They start to be accessed and used as ecient units of information among the members of the culture. As the schemas become more abstract, organized, and compact, our communication becomes much easier through such thus-rened schemas. Furthermore, these schemas come to characterize the behavior of the members of the culture.

Types of Schemas
Schemas for social interactions are classied into several types. Taylor and Crocker (1981), for example, point out the following ve schemas: (a) person schemas which contain knowledge about dierent types of people, which includes their personality traits; (b) self schemas which contain knowledge about themselves; (c) role schemas which represent knowledge about social roles; (d) event schemas or scripts2 which are information about the appropriate sequence of events in common
1

Although children's schemas in memory are similar to those of adults, developmental dierences between them have been found (Crain, 1992; Das Gupta, 1994; KarmiloSmith, 1992; Mandler, 1988; Oates, 1994). 2 ``Script'', a kind of schema, was named by Schank and Abelson (1977). They described the restaurant script which contains a theme (eating in a restaurant), typical roles (customer and waiter), entry conditions (hungry customer), and a sequence of scenes and actions within scenes (ordering, which involves getting a menu, reading a menu, and so on).

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

757

situations; and (e) content-free schemas which are information about a processing rule. Following Taylor and Crocker's classication, Augoustinos and Walker (1995) claim that person, self, role and event schemas are primary types of social interaction schemas. Meanwhile, through experiments on articial intelligence (AI), Turner (1994) found the following three schemas play important roles when ``a schema-based reasoner'' (i.e., AI) solves problems: (a) procedural schemas which contain information about steps to take or hierarchical plans; (b) contextual schemas which contain information about the situation or appropriate setting of behavioral parameters; and (c) strategic schemas which contain knowledge about problem-solving strategies. Procedural schemas in Turner's classication are similar to Taylor and Crocker's fourth type of schema, event schemas or scripts, and strategic schemas are similar to their fth type, content-free schemas. Furthermore, Chi (1981) classied knowledge into the following three types: procedural, declarative, and strategic. According to Chi, procedural knowledge is about procedural information in situations, and declarative knowledge is our knowledge about facts and concepts. Chi names procedural and declarative knowledge ``content knowledge'' which is characterized by domain specic functions (e.g., their situationally-dependent functions). Chi further explains that the strategic knowledge is information about strategies used in various domains (i.e., it is situationally independent), and it can be acquired only after content knowledge thoroughly develops. Here again, Chi's classication overlaps with Taylor and Crocker's and Turner's: Chi's procedural knowledge is similar to Taylor and Crocker's event schemas or scripts and to Turner's procedural schemas; and strategic knowledge is similar to Taylor and Crocker's content-free schemas, and to Turner's strategic schemas. Through the above examination of schemas and other related literature, the following schemas can be extracted as primary types for generating human behavior for social interactions: 1. Fact-and-concept schemas are pieces of general information about facts such as ``Tokyo is the capital of Japan'', and concepts such as ``Bicycles are those vehicles that have two wheels, a seat, and handlebars'' (Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Chi, 1981; Hampton, 1982; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 2. Person schemas contain knowledge about dierent types of people, which includes their personality traits; for example, ``John is neurotic,'' ``Taro is shy,'' or ``Mary is easy-going.'' Since we have some representation of what it is to be ``neurotic,'' ``shy,'' or ``easy-going'' (i.e., person schemas), we tend to classify people in terms of their dominant personality traits (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Cantor &

758

H. Nishida

3.

4.

5.

6.

Mischel, 1979; Shaw & Pittenger, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). In some instances person schemas are linked to stereotypes or prejudice (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Ruble & Stangor, 1986). Self schemas contain people's knowledge about themselves (i.e., how they see themselves and how others see them). Markus (1977), for example, describes self schemas as ``cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual's social experiences'' (p. 64). Thus, self schemas are components of the self-concept which are central to identity and self-denition (Markus, 1977, 1980; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). According to Turner (1987, p. 45), there are at least three levels of self-categorization (self schemas) important in the self-concept: (a) the superordinate level of the self as a human being, the common features shared with other members of the human species in contrast to other forms of life; (b) the intermediate level of ingroupoutgroup categorizations that dene one as a member of certain social groups and not others (e.g., ``American,'' and ``female''); and, (c) the subordinate level of personal categorizations that dene one as a specic individual person (e.g., in terms of one's personality or other kinds of individual dierences). Role schemas are knowledge about social roles which denote sets of behaviors that are expected of people in particular social positions. These refer to achieved and ascribed roles (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Research on ascribed roles have been prolic, especially in the areas of gender and racial stereotypes (Taylor, Fiske, Etco & Ruderman, 1978; Markus, Crane, Bernstein & Siladi, 1982). Context schemas contain information about the situation and appropriate setting of behavioral parameters. According to Turner (1994, pp. 3739), the information contained in context schemas includes predictions about appropriate actions to take in order to achieve goals in the context (i.e., to activate procedure schemas), and suggestions for reasonable problem-solving strategies (i.e., to activate strategy schemas). Procedure schemas are knowledge about the appropriate sequence of events in common situations. They include specic steps to take and behavioral rules for the events. The application of the procedure schemas causes people to take some actions (Bower et al., 1979; Lalljee, Lamb & Abelson, 1992; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Turner (1994, p. 22) argues that procedure schemas are distinct systems and are derived from past planning or past action sequences that worked, or from ``experience'' embodied in societal or other conventions (Turner calls procedure schemas procedural sche-

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

759

mas. However, I will call it procedure schemas to emphasize the contrast with other social-interaction schemas). Tulving (1985) and ZolaMorgan and Squire (1990) also insist that distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge (i.e., knowing what versus knowing how) is important since, for example, knowing the rules and traditions of baseball is not the same as being able to play baseball. 7. Strategy schemas are knowledge about problem-solving strategies (Chi, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994). There is some evidence that in humans, one factor impacting the choice of strategy is the person's expertise. For example, according to Patel, Evans, and Chawla (1987), doctors who are experts in a given type of problem tend to use a strategy called predictive reasoning, which is basically the same as hypothetico-deductive reasoning, but less-experienced clinicians, or those solving a problem outside their area of expertise, tend to use another strategy. One factor to associate with strategy schemas, then, is the experience level of the person with respect to the kind of problem under consideration. Another factor that should be included is problem-solving constraints that are context-independent. Rather than redundantly storing strategy schemas about these constraints with each context schema they aect, the information is instead recorded with strategies useful for coping with them (Turner, 1994, p. 47). For example, a constraint on time may be seen in many dierent contexts, including an emergency situation in a hospital or a situation of being late for an appointment. Recently there has been increasing interest in the aective dimension in schema research. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O'Conor (1987), for example, asked subjects to classify 135 aective words and to describe typical emotional states, and then cluster-analyzed the obtained data. Through the analysis, they found that emotions are schematically stored in long-term memory. Fischer (1991) also argues that aect and evaluation may be accessed via their associative links to other schemas, and therefore we may experience automatic negative arousal at the sight of a prototypical politician, or fear and anxiety in the presence of a dentist. Other studies also indicate that emotion schemas are socially constructed concepts, just as any other schemas (Manstead, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Parkinson & Manstead, 1992). These studies suggest that emotion schemas play important roles in human social interactions, and therefore they should be included: 8. Emotion schemas contain information about aect and evaluation stored in long-term memory which is accessed when other schemas are activated. These schemas are constructed in social interactions throughout one's life.

760

H. Nishida

I will call these eight schemas ``primary social interaction schemas (PSI schemas)'' hereafter.

How Do Schemas Function?

Then, how do these schemas actually function when people interact with each other? Through experiments on AI, Turner (1994, pp. 1522) suggests a process to generate ``behavior'' (in his study, the behavior of AI called MEDIC): (a) When one is in a specic situation, he/she tries to recognize whether he/she knows the situation by retrieving one or more context schemas from memory that may represent the current situation; (b) when an appropriate context schema, which represents similar interaction situations is found, the context schema subsequently suggests a goal to pursue (through an attention-focusing function of the context schema); (c) when a goal is selected, the context schema looks for a strategy usually useful in situations of this sort; (d) the context schema, then, suggests a procedure schema with which to achieve the goal using the selected strategy schema (i.e., the procedure schema is retrieved for taking specic actions; in other words, the schema species steps to take, hierarchical plans or behavioral rules; and (e) the application of the procedure schema causes the one to take some actions such as asking questions of the other interactant, which further causes him/her to specify the current context more clearly; that is, to nd a context schema that is more specic for the situation. When the more specic context schema is applied, the schema further nds appropriate strategy and procedure schemas to apply to the new context. The more specic the current context schema, the better the chance that more specic strategy and procedure schemas will be suggested. In the above discussion, Turner explained only the functions and relations among context, strategy, and procedure schemas. This is because the relations between these three and the other schemas have not been thoroughly investigated. Anderson (1983), however, demonstrated relationships between declarative and procedural memory using a computer model called ACT* (which stands for Adaptive Control of Thought, and the asterisk indicates that this version is a modication of the original ACT model). Declarative memory in Anderson's study corresponds to fact-and-concept, person, self, and role schemas in our classication. Procedural memory, on the other hand, corresponds to procedure schemas. According to Anderson, procedural memory stores production rules and is therefore concerned with actions. Each of the production rules species the exact condition in which an action should take place. This indicates that procedural memory in Anderson's denition contains the functions of context schemas which were described in our classication. For example, if one sees ames coming out of a house, this is

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

761

the condition for the person to take the action of shouting ``Fire.'' The general notion is that behavior is a response to a current situation. In other words, the situation is rst recognized and then appropriate action is taken. This is similar to Turner's (1994) fundamental assumption which is that a context schema is rst activated when a problem is presented, and then the context schema looks for a procedure schema to take an appropriate action. During the operation of the ACT* system, the following processes take place: (a) encoding processes which lay down information about the current state of the external world in working memory3; (b) retrieval processes which access information in declarative memory and place it in working memory; (c) a recognition (i.e., matching) process which compares all the data active in working memory with the condition parts of all the production rules stored in procedural memory (e.g., if working memory contains ``your goal is to buy milk,'' this will match one of the production rules, ``If your goal is to buy F F F''); (d) the action process which deposits the structures produced by the matched production rules into working memory (e.g., if activated, the production rule would deposit ``a goal of buying milk'' into working memory); and (e) performance processes which transform commands temporarily stored in working memory into behavioral action (e.g., ``go to the shop'' would be executed as such a behavioral action). Thus, through experiments on AI, we come to understand how information stored in schemas is transformed into behavioral action. However, a question may be raised as to whether or not AI can simulate human cognitive functioning. Sanford (1985) has described the appropriate relationship between computer programs of cognition and human cognition:
Although the design of F F F programs and the study of the principles behind intelligent programs is a study in its own right, it has fairly obvious implications for the study of mind. It is dicult to write programs which mimic essentially human activities without at the same time studying how humans do things, and it is foolhardy to devise theories of human cognition without considering the computational implementation of the theory. (p. 6)

Furthermore, since these computer models aimed at the construction of comprehensive models of cognition in order to produce rather general theoretical orientations having wide applicability, they use a relatively small set of components (Newell, 1989), and therefore
3

One of the important features in the ACT* system is working memory. Working memory is a complex multi-component system. The concept of a short-term store which serves simply as a temporary repository of information has been replaced with that of an active working memory system with a functional role in a wide range of cognitive tasks (Cohen et al., 1993, pp. 7190).

762

H. Nishida

relationships among various types of schemas have not been thoroughly examined yet. It is, however, expected that future studies on AI will provide us with comprehensive understanding of relationships among various types of schemas.

WHAT AXIOMS CAN BE GENERATED WHEN SCHEMA THEORY IS APPLIED TO CROSS-CULTURAL ADAPTATION? The Denition of Concepts
The term ``adaptation'' has been used along with other similar terms such as ``acculturation'' (Kim, 1982; Padilla, 1980; Snyder, 1976; Spiro, 1955) and ``assimilation'' (Gordon, 1964; Johnston, 1965). According to Teske and Nelson (1974), acculturation is a dynamic process that may involve either groups or individuals in direct contact situations between cultures. The changes that take place can occur in one or both cultural groups and changes in values may be involved. Furthermore, they claim that acculturation does not require a change in the reference group, internal change, or acceptance by the outside group or culture. Thus, acculturation is potentially a bi-directional process and does not require changes in values within the acculturating group. On the contrary, assimilation is a uni-directional process toward the dominant host culture, and requires value changes within the assimilating group (Teske & Nelson, 1974). Adaptation, however, refers to ``the process of change over time that takes place within individuals who have completed their primary socialization process in one culture and then come into continuous, prolonged rst-hand contact with a new and unfamiliar culture'' (Kim, 1988, pp. 3738). The term cross-cultural adaptation, therefore, is used here to refer to the complex process through which an individual acquires an increasing level of communication skills of the host culture and of relational development with host nationals. In other words, cross-cultural adaptation can be viewed as transformation of one's own PSI schemas toward those of the host culture and as acquisition of new schemas in the host culture environment. Besides the denition of adaptation, we must specify who adapt to a new (dierent and unfamiliar) environment. A number of dierent groups of people may be subject to cross-cultural adaptation: immigrants, refugees, business people, diplomats, foreign workers, students, and voluntary workers. Among these, business people, diplomats, foreign workers, students, and voluntary workers may be classied as sojourners since they dier from immigrants and refugees in two aspects: (a) Their motives are more specic and goal-oriented, and (b) their length of stay in a new culture is shorter than immigrants and refu-

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

763

gees (Furnham, 1988, p. 43). Sojourners usually spend six months to ve years at a new culture while intending to return to their home countries (Furnham, 1988, p. 43). Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to apply schema theory to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation, and to formulate axioms in this research domain. Before going further, it should be stated that the goal of theory is to provide an explanation of the phenomenon being studied, and therefore some theoretical statements (axioms and theorems) can be generated. According to Blalock (1969), axioms are propositions that involve variables that are taken to be directly linked causally; axioms should therefore be statements that imply direct causal links among variables. Thus, axioms are commonly associated with covering laws theory and causal relationships. Bailey (1970), however, argues that assuming axiomatic theories must express causal relationships will result in either distorted theories or the absence of theories about noncausal relationships. He maintains that axioms may describe causal, correlational, or teleological relationships. In this paper, following Bailey, axioms will express causal, correlational, or teleological relationships. Once axioms are formulated, theorems are deduced from the axioms (Blalock, 1969). Although axioms are not directly testable, they articulate the basic assumptions of the theory. While their validity is assumed, they are also indirectly supported by theorems that are susceptible to empirical verication (theorems are not presented here). In this paper, schema theory is applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation in the following functional domains of schemas: the development of schemas, internal organization of schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions, and schema modication and change.

The Development of Schemas

When people interact with members of the same culture in certain situations or they talk about certain information for a number of times, schemas are generated and stored in their long-term memory. The more they engage in similar situations or exchange similar information, the more organized, abstract, and compact the schemas become. As individuals behave in ways that arm these schemas, the schemas are strengthened as others respond accordingly in a cyclical fashion (Abelson, 1981; Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Bower et al., 1979; Cantor et al., 1982; Chi, 1981; Fivush et al., 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Hudson & Shapiro, 1991; Mandler, 1984; Minsky, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994). Thus, research on schema development implies:

764

H. Nishida

Axiom 1:

The more often a person repeats a schema-based behavior, the more likely the schema will be stored in the person's memory.

One of the characteristics of schemas, according to Chase and Ericsson (1982), is to guide the encoding of information into meaningful chunks. In other words, the performance of people who have well-organized schemas is linked to their ability to perceive and think in terms of meaningful chunks. A study by Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi and Voss (1979) is an excellent demonstration. The subjects in this study were divided into high- and low-knowledge groups on the basis of a 45-item test of baseball knowledge. A baseball text was then presented to them, and they wrote down as much as they could recall from the passage. The highknowledge people recalled more statements about actions that were important to the outcome of the game, and they were also likely to recall the events in the correct order. In contrast, those with less knowledge about baseball were more likely to recall details that were peripheral to the game. This study suggests that the background information (schemas) provides a meaningful context for the acquisition of new information. This suggests the following axioms: Axiom 2: Sojourners' failure to recognize the actions and behaviors which are relevant to meaningful interactions in the host culture are mainly due to their lack of the PSI schemas of the culture. Acquisition of the PSI schemas of the host culture is a necessary condition for sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation to the culture.

Axiom 3:

Internal Organization of Schemas

According to schema theory, any given behavior can be subdivided into schemas forming a ``hierarchy'' (Brewer, Dull & Lui, 1981; Cantor & Mischel, 1979). For example, human behavior in a specic situation can be subdivided into such schemas as context, role, strategy and procedure, and these schemas are further subdivided into subschemas. Near the top of the hierarchy are very general schemas. These in turn organize more specic schemas that can achieve increasingly more specic goals. For example, as cited before, Turner (1987, p. 45) claims that self schemas have at least three levels such as superordinate level of the self as a human being, the intermediate level that denes one as a member

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

765

of certain social groups, and the subordinate level that denes one as a specic individual person. Retrieving information from memory involves working through various levels of the network of schemas, that is, activation of schemas spreads from one schema to related schemas. For example, when the communication-with-family schema (a context schema) is selected, the most appropriate role, strategy and procedure schemas are activated. Thus, when a person retrieves a schema from his/her memory, it has a chunk of related knowledge about the current problem, eliminating the need to search for each piece of that knowledge separately (Turner, 1994, p. 23). An additional benet is that, knowledge that might not otherwise have been retrieved may be retrieved as part of a chunk (Turner, 1994, p. 23). Moreover, when every part of the system is related to every other part, a change in a particular part (e.g., a selection of a specic strategy schema) causes changes in all the other parts and nally in the total system (i.e., in behavior). Research on the internal organization of schemas suggests the following axioms: Axiom 4: Fact-and-concept, person, self, role, context, procedure, strategy, and emotion schemas (the PSI schemas) are interrelated each other, forming a network of schemas, to generate behavior. A change in one schema causes changes in all the other schemas and nally in the total system (i.e., in behavior). Acquisition of information about interrelationships among the PSI schemas of the host culture is a necessary condition for sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation.

Axiom 5:

Schema-Driven versus Data-Driven Functions

One of the most important assumptions of schema theory is that schemas are built up through many encounters with similar events or information. Once a schema is developed, information tends to be processed through the schema. These are referred to as top-down or schema-driven processes. On the contrary, if people are inuenced by the nature of the information itself, their schemas are not applied. These are referred to as bottom-up or data driven processes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Forgas, 1985). Through research on person prototypes (person schemas), Forgas (1985) found that the more culturally salient and consensual the stimulus, the more likely schematic processing was to be activated, whereas

766

H. Nishida

information with low cultural salience was more likely to be data-driven. Other ndings (Bower et al., 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1984), however, indicate that ambiguous information can either be data-driven or schema-driven; that is, ambiguous information directs a search for the relevant data to complete the stimulus more fully (i.e., data-driven), or it can be lled in with ``default options'' or ``best guesses'' of the schema which is activated (i.e., schema-driven). Bower et al. (1979), however, argue that people have a tendency to reorganize what they have heard or seen to t with their schema-based expectations; that is, they insist that humans tend to use schema-driven processing more often than data-driven processing. This is because schema-based processing consumes less time and eort than data-based processing (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Regarding data-driven and schema-driven processing, Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) nding may provide us with an answer: schema-based processing is used when the data are unambiguous and relatively unimportant to the person, whereas data-driven processing is used when the data are less clear and are of considerable importance to the person. What is important here is that data-driven processing is individuating and piecemeal processing, and therefore requires attention and eort, whereas schema-based processing is eortless and sometimes unconscious. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) emphasize that most person impressions are initially schema-based. If, however, one is motivated to pay detailed attention to the target person, then information about the person is processed in a piecemeal fashion. This aspect is also suggested by Taylor and Altman (1987). They insist that as relationships develop, communication moves from relatively shallow, non-intimate levels to deeper, more personal ones; that is, individuating piecemeal processings. The following axioms are suggested in this domain of research: Axiom 6: People use both schema-driven and data-driven processing to perceive new information, depending on the situation and their motivations.

Axiom 7:

If one has well-organized schemas, schematically salient information is more likely to be processed through the schemas, whereas ambiguous information will either direct a search for the relevant data to complete the stimulus more fully, or it will be lled in with default options of the schemas.

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

767

Axiom 8:

Sojourners who lack the PSI schemas of the host culture are more likely to employ data-driven processing which requires eort and attention.

One important aspect in this line of reasoning is that data-driven processing is linked to self-schemas. As Fiske and Neuberg (1990) claim, data-driven processing is used when the data are of considerable importance to the person, and when he/she is motivated to pay detailed attention to the target person. This implies: Axiom 9: When information is data-driven, a self schema plays an important role.

Schema Modication and Change

In schema theory, an environmental change elicits a change in a context schema, and this further changes role, strategy, and procedure schemas. In other words, schemas regulate themselves. This self-regulation is related to ``homeostasis'' which means the self-righting adjustments of schemas in order to prevent a rapid disintegration of their parts when they are subjected to stress (Cannon, 1968, p. 258). When people encounter unfamiliar situations in the host culture where they lack appropriate schemas, they are subject to stress because of the disintegration of context and other related schemas. What they usually do is that they selectively direct their attention, through the attention-focusing function of their context schemas (Turner, 1994, pp. 53, 57), trying to provide integration of information using their native-culture schemas. This is an example of homeostasis or self-regulation. However, people are subject not only to self-regulation or homeostasis, but also to selfdirection to a changing environment, so that they may change or elaborate their internal structures (i.e., pre-existing schemas which are their native-culture schemas) as a condition of survival. These aspects have been explained by Rumelhart and Norman (1978) as tuning, accretion and restructuring. Tuning refers to slight adjustments in schemas that are made on a temporary basis to meet a transient problem. The schemas metaphorically stretch and shape themselves for a moment to accommodate to the novel situation. For example, an American who is visiting Australia would tune his/her schema for the wolf or the rabbit familiar to North Americans in order to understand a Tasmanian wolf or a rabbit bandicoot. His/her perception and memory of these animals would depend on simply ne-tuning pre-existing schemas. Accretion refers to a gradual and permanent modication of a

768

H. Nishida

schema. Each time a schema accommodates to a novel object, event, or situation, it registers the results. Slowly, the shape and complexity of the schema modify itself to the requirements of the environment. A good example of this process is the situation in which sojourners who have stayed in the host culture for a prolonged period of time (e.g., more than ve years) cannot distinguish their native culture schemas from those acquired in the host culture because of their prolonged exposure to the host environment. Finally, restructuring is an abrupt and massive change in existing schemas. According to Rumelhart and Norman (1978), restructuring may come about spontaneously after enough exposure to discrepant experiences, through conscious reection on one's experience, or through active eorts to reorganize what one knows. The last case includes formal education in which teachers try to impose schemas. Thus, the following axioms are included: Axiom 10: In the host culture, sojourners experience the stages of self-regulation and self-direction. In the stage of self-regulation, they try to resolve ambiguities and to establish integration of information using pre-existing schemas (their native-culture schemas) by gradually modifying them. In the stage of self-direction, on the other hand, they actively try to reorganize their native-culture schemas or to generate new schemas in order to adapt to the host culture environment. In the host culture, sojourners' initial experiences are manifested as cognitive uncertainty and anxiety because of their lack of the PSI schemas of the culture.

Axiom 11:

Implications
Implications of this study will be drawn when other studies are examined from the perspective described here. As an example, this paper will analyze intercultural communication studies which have been intensively studied by Gudykunst and his colleagues (Gudykunst, 1983a,b, 1988, 1991, 1993; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984, 1986, 1989; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985). Through these studies, Gudykunst (1993) claims that ``eective [intercultural] communication is moderated by our ability to mindfully manage our anxiety and reduce our uncertainty about ourselves and the people with whom we are communicating'' (p. 38). The underlying theoretical propositions of his claim come from uncertainty reduction theory developed by Berger and his colleagues (Berger, 1979,

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

769

1992; Berger & Bradac, 1982; Berger & Calabrese, 1975). When people interact with a stranger, they may have a strong desire to reduce uncertainty about that person. Their attempts to reduce uncertainty in a novel situation involve a pattern of information-seeking (uncertainty reduction) and tension (anxiety) reduction. Primarily, uncertainty reduction theory deals with interpersonal communication between people of the same culture. This indicates that the theory has two major presuppositions: (a) Interactants share the PSI schemas of their culture; and (b) interactants manage to reduce their uncertainty by gaining missing data about the stranger mainly through data-driven strategies. Intercultural communication, however, diers from interpersonal communication in three aspects: (a) Interactants in intercultural communication may not share the PSI schemas of each other's cultures; (b) uncertainty and anxiety may be the resultant psychological states when strangers (both sojourners and immigrants) do not have appropriate schemas of the host culture; and (c) information-seeking behavior of strangers is not limited to gaining data about the other interactant, but can be found in the situations where they try to acquire the PSI schemas of the host culture: for example, reading books about the host culture, attending an intercultural communication training, or talking with friends who have lived in the host culture for a prolonged period of time. These dierences may indicate that we must be cautious of the direct application of uncertainty reduction theory to the domain of intercultural communication because the theory does not cover strangers' information-seeking behavior about the PSI schemas of the host culture. Human communication must be accurately documented and analyzed before useful theories can be developed, rened and sometimes rejected in the light of new ndings about human communication which are inconsistent with them. We now know that human memory selects, abstracts, integrates and normalizes information. Inconsistent information may be forgotten, while consistent information may be generated at later recall. All these various phenomena can be conveniently summarized by a schema theory. Le Voi (1993) claims:
There is an intimate relation between the theory [schema theory] and the phenomena, and because schema theory captures many dierent facts about memory, we follow a long tradition and claim that this theory is an explanation of those characteristics. Of course, it may not be the only possible explanation, or even the best one, but if one theory accurately describes several disparate facts F F F we can propose it as an explanation. (p. 176)

Thus, the application of schema theory to sojourners' cross-cultural communication may be a necessary step for us to accurately document and analyze the phenomena.

770

H. Nishida

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to examine schema theory in order to explicate the phenomena of intercultural communication, especially of sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. Eight primary types of schemas, which are central to human social interactions, were investigated, and these schemas' functions for processing information were examined. Furthermore, when applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation, schema theory suggested eleven axioms in the following functional domains of schemas: the development of schemas, internal organization of schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions, and schema modication and change. In future studies, theorems must be generated and tested in the eld in order to verify the axioms formulated here. When this is done, the theory can be used for the design and implementation of cross-cultural studies to facilitate individuals' adaptation to the host culture environment.

REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715729. Adler, P. S. (1987). Culture shock and the cross-cultural learning experience. In L. F. Luce & E. C. Smith (Eds.), Toward internationalism (pp. 2435). Cambridge, MA: Newbury (Original work published 1972). Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Andersen, S. M., & Klatzky, R. L. (1987). Traits and social stereotypes: levels of categorization in person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 235246. Augoustinos, M., & Walker, I. (1995). Social cognition: an integrated introduction. London: Sage. Bailey, K. D. (1970). Evaluating axiomatic theories. In E. F. Borgatta (Ed.), Sociological methodology (pp. 4871). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Barnlund, D. (1975). Public and private self in Japan and the United States. Tokyo: Simul. Barsalow, L. W., & Sewell, D. R. (1985). Contrasting the representation of scripts and categories. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 646665. Berger, C. R. (1979). Beyond initial interaction: uncertainty, understanding, and the development of interpersonal relationships. In H. Giles & R. St. Clair (Eds.), Language and social psychology (pp. 122144). Oxford: Blackwell. Berger, C. R. (1991). Chautauqua: why are there so few communication theories: communication theories and other curios. Communication Monographs, 58, 101113.

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

771

Berger, C. R. (1992). Communicating under uncertainty. In W. Gudykunst & Y. Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers: an approach to intercultural communication (pp. 516). New York: McGraw-Hill. Berger, C. R., & Bradac, J. J. (1982). Language and social knowledge: uncertainty in interpersonal relations. London: E.E. Arnold. Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human Communication Research, 1, 99112. Berry, J. W. (1975). Ecology, cultural adaptation, and psychological dierentiation: traditional patterning and acculturative stress. In R. W. Brislin, S. Bochner & W. L. Lonner (Eds.), Cross-cultural perspectives on learning (pp. 207228). New York: Sage. Bhatt, A. K., & Fairchild, H. H. (1984). Values of convergence for Indian students in the United States. Psychological Reports, 55, 446. Blalock, H. H. (1969). Theory construction: from verbal to mathematical formulations. Englewood Clis, NJ: Prentice Hall. Bock, P. (Ed.) (1970). Culture shock: a reader in modern anthropology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Bochner, S. (1982). The social psychology of cross-cultural relations. In S. Bochner (Ed.), Cultures in contact: studies in cross-cultural interaction. Oxford: Pergamon. Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for texts. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177220. Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer Jr. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 136). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brewer, M. B., Dull, V., & Lui, L. (1981). Perceptions of the elderly: stereotypes as prototypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 656670. Brislin, R. W. (1981). Cross-cultural encounters. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon. Brower, I. C. (1980). Counseling Vietnamese. Personal Guidance Journal, 58(10), 646652. Burgoon, J. (1985). Nonverbal signals. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of interpersonal communication. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. Cannon, W. B. (1968). Self-regulation of the body. In W. Buckley (Ed.), Modern systems research for the behavioral scientist: a sourcebook (pp. 256 258). Chicago, IL: Aldine. Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1979). Prototypes in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12). New York: Academic Press. Cantor, N., Mischel, W., & Schwartz, J. C. (1982). A prototype analysis of psychological situations. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 4577. Caudill, W., & Scarr, H. A. (1962). Japanese value orientations and culture change. Ethnology, 1, 5391. Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A. (1982). Skill and working memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 158). New York: Academic Press.

772

H. Nishida

Chen, G., & Starosta, W. (1996). Intercultural communication competence: A synthesis. Communication yearbook (Vol. 19, pp. 353383). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Chi, M. T. H. (1981). Knowledge development and memory performance. In M. P. Friedman, J. P. Das & N. O'Conner (Eds.), Intelligence and learning (pp. 221229). New York: Plenum Press. Church, A. T. (1982). Sojourner adjustment. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 540572. Cleveland, H., Mangone, G. J., & Adams, J. G. (1960). The overseas Americans. New York: McGraw Hill. Cohen, G., Kiss, G., & Le Voi, M. (1993). Memory: current issues (2nd ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Crain, W. (1992). Theories of development: concepts and applications. Englewood Clis, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Das Gupta, P. (1994). Images of childhood and theories of development. In J. Oates (Ed.), The foundations of child development. Oxford: Blackwell. Dinges, N. (1983). Intercultural competence. In D. Landis & R. Brislin (Eds.), Handbook of intercultural training: issues in theory and design (Vol. I, pp. 176 202). New York: Pergamon Press. European value systems study group (1982). Main European Report, Amsterdam. Fischer, A. H. (1991). Emotion scripts: a study of the social and cognitive facets of emotions. DSWO Press. Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes: Inuences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 174). New York: Academic Press. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Fivush, R., Hudson, J., & Nelson, K. (1984). Children's long-term memory for a novel event: an exploratory study. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 30, 303316. Forgas, J. P. (1985). Person prototypes and cultural salience: the role of cognitive and cultural factors in impression formation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 317. Furnham, A. (1988). The adjustment of sojourners. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), Cross-cultural adaptation (pp. 4261). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Furnham, A. (1992). The adjustment of sojourners. In W. B. Gudykunst & Y. Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers (pp. 336345). New York: McGraw-Hill. Furnham, A., & Bochner, S. (1986). Culture shock: psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments. London: Routledge. Giles, H. (1978). Linguistic dierentiation between ethnic groups. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Dierentiation between social groups (pp. 361393). London: Academic Press. Giles, H., & Johnson, P. (1981). The role of language in ethnic group relations. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup behavior (pp. 199243). Oxford: Blackwell.

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

773

Giles, H., Mulac, A., Bradac, J. J., & Johnson, P. (1987). Speech accommodation. In M. McLaughlin (Ed.), Communication yearbook (Vol. 10, pp. 13 48). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American life. New York: Oxford University Press. Gudykunst, W. B. (1983a). Similarities and dierences in perceptions of initial intracultural and intercultural encounters. The Southern Speech Communication Journal, XLIX, 4965. Gudykunst, W. B. (1983b). Uncertainty reduction and predictability of behavior in low- and high-context cultures. Communication Quarterly, 31, 236251. Gudykunst, W. B. (1988). Uncertainty and anxiety. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), Theories in intercultural communication. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gudykunst, W. B. (1991). Bridging dierences: eective intergroup communication. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gudykunst, W. B. (1993). Toward a theory of eective interpersonal and intergroup communication: an anxiety/uncertainty management (AUM) perspective. In R. L. Wiseman & J. Koester (Eds.), Intercultural communication competence (pp. 3371). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1984). Individual and cultural inuences on uncertainty reduction. Communication Monographs, 51, 2336. Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1986). Attributional condence in low- highcontext cultures. Human Communication Research, 12, 525549. Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1989). Theoretical perspectives for studying intercultural communication. In M. Asante & W. Gudykunst (Eds.), Handbook of international and intercultural communication (pp. 1746). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gudykunst, W. B., Yang, S. M., & Nishida, T. (1985). A cross-cultural test of uncertainty reduction theory: comparisons of acquaintances, friends, and dating relationships in Japan, Korea, and the United States. Human Communication Research, 11, 407455. Gullahorn, J. T., & Gullahorn, J. E. (1963). An extension of the U-curve hypothesis. Journal of Social Issues, 19(3), 3347. Hall, E. T. (1959). The silent language. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Hammer, M. R., Nishida, H., & Wiseman, R. L. (1996). The inuence of situational prototypes on dimensions of intercultural communication competence. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27(3), 267282. Hampton, J. A. (1982). An investigation of the nature of abstract concepts. Memory & Cognition, 9, 149156. Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: international dierences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill. Hudson, J. A. (1990). The emergence of autobiographical memory in motherchild conversation. In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in young children (pp. 166196). New York: Cambridge University Press.

774

H. Nishida

Hudson, J. A., & Nelson, K. (1983). Eect of script structure on children's story recall. Developmental Psychology, 19, 625635. Hudson, J. A., & Shapiro, L. R. (1991). From knowing to telling: the development of children's scripts, stories, and personal narratives. In A. McCabe & C. Peterson (Eds.), Developing narrative structure (pp. 89136). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Johnston, R. (1965). Immigrant assimilation. Perth, Western Australia: Paterson Brokensha. Kant, I. (1963). Critique of pure reason (2nd ed.) (N. K. Smith, Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1787). Karmilo-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kim, Y. Y. (1978). A communication approach to acculturation processes: Korean immigrants in Chicago. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2(2), 197224. Kim, Y. Y. (1982). Communication and acculturation. In L. A. Samovar & R. E. Porter (Eds.), Intercultural communication: a reader (3rd ed., pp. 359368). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Kim, Y. Y. (1987). Facilitating immigrant adaptation: the role of communication and interpersonal ties. In T. C. Albrecht & M. B. Adelman (Eds.), Communicating social support: process in context (pp. 192211). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Kim, Y. Y. (1988). Communication and cross-cultural adaptation. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Kim, Y. Y., & Ruben, B. (1992). Intercultural transformation. In W. Gudykunst & Y. Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers: an approach to intercultural communication. New York: McGraw-Hill. Klineberg, O., & Hull, W. F. I. V. (1979). At a foreign university: an international study of adaptation and coping. New York: Macmillan. Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and value orientations in the theory of action. In T. Parsons & E. A. Shilds (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action (pp. 388 433). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kluckhohn, F. R., & Strodtbeck, F. L. (1961). Variations in value orientations. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. Lalljee, M., Lamb, R., & Abelson, R. P. (1992). The role of event prototypes in categorization and explanation. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (vol. 3, pp. 153182). Chichester: Wiley. Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. American Psychologist, 46, 819834. Le Voi, M. (1993). Overview. In G. Cohen, G. Kiss & M. Le Voi (Eds.), Memory: current issues (2nd ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Littlejohn, S. W., & Jabusch, D. M. (1982). Communication competence: model and application. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 10(1), 2937. Lysgaard, S. (1955). Adjustment in a foreign society: Norwegian Fulbright grantees visiting the United States. International Social Science Bulletin, 7(1), 45 51. Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, scripts, and scenes: aspects of schema theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

775

Mandler, J. M. (1988). How to build a baby: on the development of an accessible representational system. Cognitive Development, 3, 113136. Manstead, A. S. R. (1991). Emotion in social life. Cognition and emotion, 5, 353362. Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 6378. Markus, H. (1980). The self in thought and memory. In D. M. Wegner & R. R. Vallacher (Eds.), The self in social psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. Markus, H., Crane, M., Bernstein, S., & Siladi, M. (1982). Self-schemas and gender. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 3850. Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: a social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299337. Matlin, M. W. (1989). Cognition. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. McCroskey, J. E. (1984). Communication competence: the elusive construct. In R. N. Bostrom (Ed.), Competence in communication (pp. 259268). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Mehrabian, A. (1972). Nonverbal communication. Chicago: Aldine. Minsky, M. L. (1977). Frame-system theory. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: readings in cognitive science (pp. 355376). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Morris, D., Collett, P., Marsh, P., & Oshaughnessy, M. (1979). Gestures: their origins and distribution. London: Jonathan Cape. Newell, A. (1989). Unied theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nishida, H. (1979). Variations in Value Orientations and Cultural Change in Japan and the USA: An Intercultural Perspective. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Nishida, H. (1985). Japanese intercultural communication competence and cross-cultural adjustment. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 9, 247269. Nishida, H. (1992). Gokai no kouzou: America-jin to hataraku toki no chishiki to gijutu no reporto [The structure of misunderstanding: A report on knowledge and skills for working with Americans in the U.S.A]. Tokyo: Diamond-sha. Oates, J. (Ed.) (1994). The foundation of child development. Oxford: Blackwell. Oberg, K. (1960). Cultural shock: adjustment to new cultural environments. Practical Anthropology, 7, 177182. O'Keefe, B. J., & Delia, J. G. (1985). Psychological and interactional dimensions of communicative development. In H. Giles & R. St. Clair (Eds.), Recent advances in language, communication and social psychology (pp. 4185). London: Lawrence Erlbaum. Padilla, A. M. (Ed.) (1980). Acculturation: theory, models and some new ndings. Washington DC: Westview. Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1992). Appraisal as a cause of emotion. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 122149. Patel, V. L., Evans, D. A., & Chawla, A. (1987). Predictive versus diagnostic reasoning in the application of biomedical knowledge. Proceedings of the

776

H. Nishida

Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Seattle, Washington, 221233. Pichert, J. W., & Anderson, R. C. (1977). Taking dierent perspectives on a story. Journal of Educational Psychology, 69, 309315. Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press. Rosch, E. H., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573605. Ruble, D. N., & Stangor, C. (1986). Stalking the elusive schema: insights from developmental and social-psychological analyses of gender schemas. Social Cognition, 4, 227261. Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: studies in cognitive science (pp. 211236). New York: Academic Press. Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 3358). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (1978). Accretion, tuning, and restructuring: three models of learning. In J. W. Cotton & R. Klatzky (Eds.), Semantic factors in cognition (pp. 3753). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Sanford, A. J. (1985). Cognition and cognitive psychology. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Script, plans, goals and understanding: an inquiry to human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Conor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: further exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 10611086. Shaw, R., & Pittenger, J. (1977). Perceiving the face of change in changing faces: implications for a theory of object perception. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting and knowing: toward an ecological psychology (pp. 103132). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Snyder, P. Z. (1976). Neighborhood gatekeepers in the process of urban adaptation: cross-ethnic commonalities. Urban Anthropology, 5(1), 3552. Spilich, G. J., Vesonder, G. T., Chiesi, H. L., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Text processing of domain-related information for individuals with high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 275290. Spiro, M. E. (1955). The acculturation of American ethnic groups. American Anthropologist, 57, 12401252. Sudweeks, S., Gudykunst, W. B., Ting-Toomey, S., & Nishida, T. (1990). Developmental themes in Japanese-North American relationships. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 14, 207233. Taft, R. (1966). From stranger to citizen. London: Tavistock. Taylor, D. A., & Altman, I. (1987). Communication in interpersonal relationships: social penetration theory. In M. E. Rolo & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Interpersonal processes: new directions in communication research (pp. 257 277). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information processing. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cogni-

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication

777

tion: the Ontario symposium (Vol. 1, pp. 89134). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S., Etco, N. L., & Ruderman, A. J. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 778793. Teske, R. H. C., & Nelson, B. H. (1974). Acculturation and assimilation: a clarication. American Anthropologist, 1, 351367. Thorndyke, O. W. (1984). Applications of schema theory in cognitive research. In J. R. Anderson & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), Tutorials in learning and memory (pp. 167192). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Torbiorn, I. (1982). Living abroad: personal adjustment and personnel policy in the overseas setting. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40, 385398. Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Turner, R. M. (1994). Adaptive reasoning for real-world problems: a schemabased approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Ward, C. A., & Kennedy, A. (1996). Crossing cultures: the relationship between psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of cross-cultural adjustment. In J. Pandey, D. Sinha & D. P. S. Bhawuk (Eds.), Asian contributions to crosscultural psychology. New Delhi, India: Sage. Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. H., & Jackson, D. (1967). Pragmatics of human communication. New York: Norton. Wiseman, R. L., & Koester, J. (1993). Intercultural communication competence. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Wiseman, R. L., Hammer, R. R., & Nishida, H. (1989). Predictors of intercultural communication competence. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 13, 349370. Yum, J. O. (1982). Communication patterns and information acquisition among Korean immigrants in Hawaii. Human Communication Research, 8(2), 154 169. Zola-Morgan, S., & Squire, L. R. (1990). Neurophysiological investigations of memory and amnesia: ndings from humans and nonhuman primates. In A. Diamond (Ed.), The development and neural bases of higher cognitive functions (pp. 434456). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.