DoD Critical Tech

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What is the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL)? It is a documented snapshot in time of the ongoing DoD MCTL Process. The technologies included in the DoD MCTL support the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) objectives. What is the MCTL Process? It is the systematic ongoing assessment and analyses of technologies to determine which technologies are Militarily Critical. How are technologies selected for inclusion in the MCTL? Through deliberation and consensus of working groups of technical experts whose membership comes from Government, Industry and Academia.
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Militarily Critical Technologies (MCT)

Part I: Weapons Systems Technologies (WST)
June 1996 (Through Change 4: March 1999)

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15 9 10 17 58 157 61 43 120 39 Introduction Common Preface Common Master Locator Part I: Table of Contents Section 1 - Aeronautics Systems Technology Section 2 - Armaments & Energetic Materials Technology Section 3 - Chemical and Biological Systems Technology Section 4 - Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Technology Section 5 - Electronics Technology Section 6 - Ground Systems Technology
Last Modified
. 01 / 2000 . . 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99
86 183 70 126 124 77 59 67 185 484 89 29 29 96 53 6
Section 7 - Guidance, Navigation, and Vehicle Control Technology Section 8 - Information Systems Technology Section 9 - Information Warfare Technology Section 10 - Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology Section 11 - Materials Technology Section 12 - Marine Systems Technology Section 13 - Nuclear Systems Technology Section 14 - Power Systems Technology Section 15 - Sensors and Lasers Technology Section 16 - Signature Control Technology, [READ ME FIRST] Section 17 - Space Systems Technology Section 18 - Weapons Effects and Countermeasures Technology Appendix A: Glossary of Acroynms and Abbreviations Appendix B: Definitions Appendix C: Index Appendix D: Explanation of Table Elements
03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 04 / 99 03 / 99 03 / 99 . . . .
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Part I: Weapons Systems Technologies Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies
The Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part I, "Weapons Systems Technologies"

Change 4; Part I - Effective Date: March 1999 Change 3; Part I - Effective Date: June 1998 Changes 1 and 2; Part I - Effective Dates: 1 August 1997, and April 1998 respectively
Change 4
Changes to Table 9.3-1, Optical Countermeasures, page 9-7, Militarily Critical Technology Parameters Addition/deletion of rows in Table 10.1-1, Advanced Fabrication and Processing, pgs 10-4 to 10-9, Militarily Critical Technology Parameters Addition to Table 17.2-1, Optronics, pg 17-6, Militarily Critical Technology Parameters Revision of the Foreword to make it a common portion of Parts I, II, and III New Master Locator The column labeled "Control Regimes" has been changed in all of the tables in every section of Part I to "Export Control References". This was done so that the international and national references that might address the technology were identified. The following references are used: USML: United States Munitions List CCL: Commerce Control List NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission WA: Wassenaar Arrangement Cat: category designation- Dual Use list ML: Munitions List NTL: Nuclear Trigger List (Nuclear Suppliers Group) NDUL: Nuclear Dual Use List (Nuclear Suppliers Group) MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime AG: Australia Group
Change 3
Section 16 Replaced and added a READ ME FIRST File
Changes 1 and 2
Table of Contents Page ix, Section 2, Item 2.4, "Fuzing, Safing, and Arming" changed to "Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing" Figures Page xi, Column 1, Item 2.4-1, "Fuzing, Safing, and Arming Overview" changed to "Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Overview" Tables Page xiii, Column 1, "Fuzing, Safing, and Arming Militarily Critical Technology Parameters" changed to "Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters" 1996 DoD MCTL Master Locator Replaced with a new matrix compatible with Part II. Introduction Page 4, 2nd paragraph, 3rd line, "capabilities are" changed to "capabilities is" Section 2 Page 2-1, Index, Item 2.4, "Fuzing, Safing, and Arming" changed to "Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing" Page 2-10, Figure 2.4-1, Figure title "Fuzing, Safing, and Arming Overview" changed to "Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Overview" Page 2-11, Change name of Table 2.4-1 to ""Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters," Section 5 Page 5-2, left column, 2nd paragraph, 5th line, "radiation effects samples are vacuum tubes, devices using light" changed to "radiation effects are vacuum tubes, and devices using light"
Page 5-8, change entry in Table 5.3-1 for plasma dry etch to read as follows: Under technology it should read "Plasma dry etch batch Processing Equipment." The words "with cassette-to-cassette operation and loadlocks" should be deleted. Under Military Critical parameters, add the words "With cassette-to-cassette operation and loadlocks" as the first entry in that box. Page 5-8, change entry under technology for Plasma Dry Etch Equipment to read "Plasma Dry etch modules/cluster tools." Page 5-9, delete entire entry for "Hetero-epitaxial MaterialsII/VI compounds" in Table 5.3-1. Section 8 Page 8-6, for entry "visually coupled systems," change Control Regimes entry to read "WA ML 14,21." Page 8-22, under column "Militarily Critical Parameters," change 5th line to read "External cryptographic data integrity." Appendix B new definitions, as follows: "Accessories and attachments. Associated equipment for any component, end-item or system, and which are not necessary for their operation, but which enhance their usefulness or effectiveness. (Examples: Military riflescopes, special paints, etc.) (ITAR Sec 121.8)." "Amphibious vehicle. An automotive vehicle or chassis which embodies all-wheel drive, is equipped to meet special military requirements, and which has sealed electrical systems or adaptation features for deep water fording. (ITAR Sec 121.4)" "Component. An item which is useful only when used in conjunction with an end-item. A major component includes any assembled element which forms a portion of an end-item without which the end-item is inoperable. (Example: Airframes, tail sections, transmissions, tank treads, hulls, etc.) A minor component includes any assembled element of a major component. (ITAR Sec 121.8)" "Defense service. (1) The furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad, in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing, or use of defense articles; or (2) the furnishing to foreign persons of any [controlled] technical data whether in the United States or abroad. (ITAR Sec 120.9)" "End-item. An assembled article ready for its intended use. Only ammunition, fuel or another energy source is required to place it in an operating state. (ITAR Sec 121.8)" "Firmware. Includes, but is not limited to, circuits into which software has been programmed. (ITAR Sec 121.8)"
"Part. Any single unassembled element of a major or a minor component, accessory, or attachment which is not normally subject to disassembly without the destruction or the impairment of design use. (Examples: Rivets, wire, bolts, etc.) (ITAR Sec 121.8)" "Significant military equipment. Articles for which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability. (ITAR Sec 120.7)" "Sufficient technology. Technology required for a proliferant to barely enable the production of the Selected Weapons of Mass Destruction or Means of Delivery." "System. A combination of end-items, components, parts, accessories, attachments, firmware or software, specifically designed, modified or adapted to operate together to perform a specialized military function. (ITAR Sec 121.8.)" Appendix B changed definition of "Public domain" to read as follows: (1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; (2) Through subscriptions which are available without restriction to any individual who desires to obtain or purchase the published information; (3) Through second class mailing privileges granted by the U.S. Government; (4) At libraries open to the public or from which the public can obtain documents; (5) Through patents available at any patent office; (6) Through unlimited distribution at a conference, meeting, seminar, trade show or exhibition, generally accessible to the public, in the United States; (7) Through public release (i.e., unlimited distribution) in any form (e.g., not necessarily in published form) after approval by the cognizant U.S. Government department or agency; (8) Through fundamental research in sciences and engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community. Fundamental research is defined to mean basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from research, the results of which are restricted for proprietary reasons or specific U.S. Government access and dissemination controls. University research will not be considered fundamental
research if: (i)The University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of scientific and technical information resulting from the project or activity, or (ii)The research is funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and dissemination controls protecting information resulting from the research are applicable. (ITAR Sec 120.11.) Appendix B changed definition of "Software" to read as follows: A collection of one or more "programmes" or "microprogrammes" fixed in any tangible medium of expression. A set of computer programs, procedures and associated documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing systems, e.g., compilers, library routines, manuals and circuit diagrams. (Joint Pub 1.02.) Includes, but is not limited to, the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems and support software for design implementation, test operation, diagnosis and repair. (ITAR Sec. 121.8(f).) Appendix B changed definition of "Source Code" delete words "(or source language)" and add "(The Wassenaar Arrangement)" at the end of the statement Appendix B changed definition of "Technical Data" as follows Technical data may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. (EAR Part 772). Technical data is defined as: (1) Information, other than software [described in (4) below], which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions and documentation. (2) Classified information relating to defense articles and defense services; (3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; (4) Software directly related to defense articles; (5) This definition does not include information concerning
general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges and universities or information in the public domain. It also does not include basic marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles. (ITAR Sec 120.10.)
The Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part II, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies"
Change 1- Effective Date: December 1999
Change 1 Section 1:
Section 1.1, Page II-1-8, after paragraph two (2), insert the following text (and delete paragraph three (3)): A number of new techniques are available for adapting GPS signals and other supporting navigation and locations systems for high precision use. In addition to reengineering the stored software on a GPS processor, a nation which seeks to upgrade its GPS receivers from coarse/acquisition (C/A-code) levels of performance to precision(P-code) levels of performance may perform postprocessing on the received signals themselves. Post processing assists in position location because a large source of error in a GPS signal is the uncertainty in ionospheric refraction as GPS signals pass through the ionosphere. When a receiver can remove this error from the signals the location uncertainty falls from approximately 20 meters to less than 2 meters. The broadcast ionospheric model is available to all users and is not encrypted. It can account for perhaps 50-75% of the ionospheric error, but cannot handle short term changes in ionospheric conditions. Any other source of information about the ionosphere can be used to correct the time-of-transmission calculation embedded within the C/A-code signal and determine the amount this signal has been slowed from the vacuum speed of light by the charged particles in the ionosphere. One source of correction schemes can be based on differential GPS (DGPS) signals which do not pass through the ionosphere. Even when a DGPS receiver is removed as much as 100 nautical miles from the receiver it can
give an approximate estimate of the ionospheric state provided it is near enough to account for seasonal and diurnal effects. Other schemes include building an approximate picture of electrical flux in the ionosphere by obtaining very accurate ephemeris of the satellite position and post calculating corrections from the expected versus received positions of a precisely located point. While these schemes will not have the same accuracy as the P-code itself, they can approximate the performance or at least improve C/A-code by an order of magnitude. In order to make them useful in a ballistic missile, a nation may write a software routine that allows a launch authority to load ionosphere corrections in at the last moment. In the same way that other targeting data may be included to align the gyroscopes at the last moment before launch, the corrections could be fed into a processor which uses the raw C/A-code values and then corrects them before sending a guidance signal to the thrust vector controls or control surfaces. GPS has significant application for a theater ballistic missile outfitted with a post-boost vehicle (bus) or attitude control module that navigates a reentry vehicle to a more accurate trajectory. Section 1.3, Page II-1-41, Table 1.3-1 Technology: GPS Receivers Column: Unique Software and Parameters: Delete existing text and insert the following: "C/A code ionosphere correction algorithms. C/A code geoid correction algorithms. Operational receiver software which prevents velocity and altitude limitations. Precision (P) code decryption algorithms."
Section 5:
Section 5.2 (Subsection 2), Page II-5-20, Table 5.2-1 Technology: Vacuum Housings Column: Sufficient Technology Level:
Delete existing text and insert the following: "Vacuum vessels large enough to contain two or more sets of injectors and collectors with appropriate beam current geometry. Two or more provide the scaling required for reasonable electromagnetic separation." Section 5.2 (Subsection 2), Page II-5-24, Table 5.2-1 Technology: Vacuum systems Column: Critical Materials Line 2 delete the word "bearing" and insert the word "containing." Section 5.2 (Subsection 2), Page II-5-24, Table 5.2-1 Technology: Shut-off and Control valves Column: Critical Materials Line 3 delete the words "rather than" and insert "instead of" Line 4 delete the words "to isolate the process vacuum system from the atmosphere" and insert "because a bellows seal is the more effective technology." Section 5.2 (Subsection 2), Page II-5-28, Table 5.2-1 Technology: Vacuum systems and pumps Column: Sufficient Technology Level Line 6 after the word atmosphere." Insert sentence "In this context the materials being treated may contain strong acids or fluorine which react with materials in pumps and headers." Section 5.7 (Subsection 7), Page II-5-71, Table 5.7-1 Technology: Radar altimeter sensors Column: Critical Materials Delete existing text and add the following: "Semi-fabricated components of high thermal diffusivity materials
(e.g., beryllium oxide) for efficient heat transfer. Note: Thermal diffusivity is 'the quantity of heat passing normally through a unit area per unit time, divided by the product of the specific heat, density and temperature gradient.' " Section 5.7 (Subsection 7), Page II-5-73, Table 5.7-2 Technology: Radar altimeter sensors Column: Technical Issues Line 1 after the word "Hermetic" add the word "airtight" Line 2 after the word subsystems add the words "for aerospace applications."
SECTION 1MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Scope Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) ............................................. II-1-6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ............................... II-1-21 Cruise Missiles ........................................................................... II-1-34 Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft ...................................................... II-1-46 Artillery ...................................................................................... II-1-58
Highlights
Several means are available to deliver WMD: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and artillery. The delivery means a nation uses depends on the availability of the vehicle, the survivability of the delivery system, the nature of the target, and the objective. Optimum effectiveness might not be the driving factor when selecting a means of delivery. Aircraft generally carry more payload weight than ballistic or cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles which are mobile are less vulnerable than fixed sites to U.S. offensive operations. Modern cruise missiles are generally more accurate and less expensive than ballistic missiles.
BACKGROUND The means that a nation uses to deliver a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) depends in part on the availability of a vehicle, the survivability of the delivery system, the characteristics of its intended target, and the nations military objective (even if the target is civilian in nature). These factors are not mutually exclusive considerations. Many proliferants have demonstrated clever methods to adapt one delivery vehicle, which it can easily acquire, to other applications much different from the original purpose of the vehicle. Similarly, some nations have launched effective attacks against targets that U.S. analysts might initially overlook because of a different perception of the importance of these targets. When a proliferant has invested both the expense and talent to develop a WMD arsenal and the means to deliver it, it does so to be capable of launching a sufficiently effective attack. Consequently, the means of WMD delivery a proliferant selects usually reflects some planning and coordination of its objectives. No strategist can completely rule out an irrational or desperate WMD attack from a proliferant. However, such attacks, because of their very irrationality, will generally not inflict the damage necessary to change the course of a conflict. Nor is the threat of an ineffective and irrational attack likely to serve the goal of deterrence or further the change that a proliferant might pursue. With these restrictions in mind, a nation will select a means of delivery that furthers its goals. This does not mean that the proliferant must seek ways to optimize the effectiveness of a WMD attack, as nations with modernized militaries do. Proliferants might conduct an attack merely to demonstrate an intention or a capability. Certain characteristics of delivery systems and the types of WMD they carry are naturally associated with these goals.
Delivery Systems Considerations for Chemical or Biological Payloads To be truly effective, chemical or biological agents must be spread in a diffuse cloud over a large area. Certainly, any chemical or biological cloud may find some victims, but highly concentrated clouds spread over very small areas or pools of agent puddled on the ground have limited effectiveness because they come into contact with only a small portion of the targeted population or equipment. Meteorological conditions affect the size and concentration of a windborne agent cloud and its durability. Hence, the interaction of the delivery vehicle and the local meteorology is an important consideration when a proliferant contemplates a chemical or biological attack. Some of these conditions even affect the probability that the cloud will reach its target after it has been released from a delivery vehicle. The United States experience in testing windborne agents has shown that a cloud must be released below an atmospheric shear layer or it will disperse before reaching the ground. Most shear layers occur at around 500 feet above ground level (AGL).
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Shifting wind conditions, local topography and micro-meteorology, and the presence of manmade structures also affect the distribution of the agent within the cloud and its dissemination from a delivery vehicle. Biological agents, in particular, decay rapidly in the presence of strong sunlight and quickly become ineffective. Some chemical agents also suffer from degradation in sunlight and from interaction with water vapor and other constituents of the atmosphere. Winds channeled by tall buildings and geographic features may deposit some of the cloud in unexpected locations. Delivery vehicles themselves create a disturbance in the wind field because of the aerodynamic and propulsive effects generated by the vehicle. Since some of these conditions change over the course of hours, an attack that is launched at a particularly propitious time under the local meteorological conditions at the target may not be effective by the time the WMD arrives. With sufficient warning of a chemical and biological weapon attack, a population can take protective measures that may be quite effective. To be effective, a delivery vehicle employed to spread chemical or biological agents must distribute the material in a fine cloud below a certain altitude and above the surface. It should be capable of all-weather operations and should not betray its presence to air defense assets. These traits are considerations that will determine the overall effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack. Proliferants with limited military budgets must also consider the cost of acquiring and maintaining a WMD delivery system arsenal as well as the warheads. This may limit a proliferant to developing or purchasing only one or two types of delivery systems rather than simultaneously pursuing multiple systems. Delivery systems vary in their flight profile, speed of delivery, mission flexibility, autonomy, and detectability. Each of these considerations is important when planning a chemical or biological attack. Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel, unless a warhead maneuvers independently of the missile or some form of terminal guidance is provided. A pure ballistic trajectory limits the effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack because, generally, the reentry speed is so high that it is difficult to distribute the agent in a diffuse cloud or with sufficient precision to ensure a release under the shear layer of the atmosphere. In addition, thermal heating upon reentry, or during release, may degrade the quality of the chemical or biological agent. U.S. experience has shown that often less than 5 percent of a chemical or biological agent remains potent after flight and release from a ballistic missile without appropriate heat shielding. A ballistic missile also closely follows a pre-established azimuth from launch point to target. The high speed of the ballistic missile makes it difficult to deviate too far from this azimuth, even when submunitions or other dispensed bomblets are ejected from the missile during reentry. Consequently, if the target footprint axis is not roughly aligned with the flight azimuth, only a small portion of the target is effectively covered.
A ballistic missile has a relatively short flight time, and defenses against a ballistic missile attack are still less than completely effective, as proved in the Allied experience during the Gulf War. However, with sufficient warning, civil defense measures can be implemented in time to protect civil populations against chemical or biological attack. People in Tel Aviv and Riyadh received enough warning of SCUD missile attacks to don gas masks and seek shelter indoors before the missiles arrived. Even with these limitations on ballistic missile delivery of airborne agents, Iraq had built chemical warheads for its SCUDs, according to United Nations inspection reports. Cruise missiles, in contrast, can be guided and follow almost any course over the ground that a mission requires. The speed of a cruise missile is compatible with an effective dissemination of both chemical and biological agents, although designers generally must plan to release these agents outside of the aerodynamically disturbed flow field around the vehicle. If the cruise missile is outfitted with a sensor platform, it may determine the local meteorological conditions and alter its flight profile appropriately before it releases the agent. Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are naturally more difficult to detect because of their small size and ability to fly below radar horizons. On the other hand, their slow speed increases their vulnerability to defenses. Most nations that manufacture chemical and biological agents produce these agents in large quantities. The delivery system costs can become the ultimate limiting factor. Since cruise missiles are much less expensive than either manned aircraft or ballistic missiles, a proliferant can overcome the liabilities of delivery cost efficiency by selecting suitable cruise missile systems. Manned tactical aircraft and bombers have several of the advantages of cruise missiles, but some additional liabilities. Manned aircraft are expensive to maintain. They also require routine flight operations for crew training, expensive upkeep programs, hangars for housing, and large air bases for basing. If an airplane is lost or shot down, the loss of the pilot complicates subsequent attack planning. Unless a nation has acquired highly capable aircraft or retrofitted its existing aircraft with advanced technology, there may be limitations to all-weather or night operations. Since biological attacks are most effective at night when there is no sunlight to decay the agent and the atmosphere is settling towards the ground as it cools, a limitation on night operations characteristically limits the effectiveness of some biological attacks. The flexibility of flight planning and attack strategy, however, weighs in favor of manned aircraft. A pilot is able to change targets if the battle situation dictates. Delivery System Considerations for Nuclear Payloads Nuclear weapons differ markedly from chemical, biological, or conventional warheads. The principal difference is the size, shape, and inertial properties of the warhead. Generally, nuclear weapons have a lower limit on their weight and diameter, which determines characteristics of the delivery system, such as its fuselage girth. Though these limits may be small, geometric considerations often influence the
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selection of a delivery system. Chemical and biological weapons, which are usually fluids or dry powders, can be packed into almost any available volume. Nuclear weapons cannot be retrofitted to fit the available space; however, they can be designed to fit into a variety of munitions (e.g., artillery shells). Nuclear weapons also have a different distribution of weight within the volume they occupy. Fissile material, the core of a nuclear weapon, weighs more per unit of volume than most other materials. This high specific gravity tends to concentrate weight at certain points in the flight vehicle. Since virtually all WMD delivery systems must fly through the atmosphere during a portion of their trip to a target, a designer has to consider the aerodynamic balance of the vehicle and the required size of control system to maintain a stable flight profile while carrying these concentrations of weight. Chemical, biological, and conventional weapons all have specific gravities near 1.0 gram/cc, so these materials may be placed further from the center of gravity of the vehicle without providing large compensating control forces and moments. In some special applications, such as ballistic missile reentry vehicles and artillery shells, the designer needs to include ballasting materialessentially useless weightto balance the inertial forces and moments of the nuclear payload. Because nuclear weapons have a large kill radius against soft and unhardened targets, accuracy is a minor consideration in the delivery system selection as long as the targeting strategy calls for countervalue attacks. Nuclear weapons destroy people and the infrastructure they occupy. They only require that the delivery system places the warhead with an accuracy of approximately 3 kilometers of a target if the weapon has a yield of 20 kilotons and to an even larger radius as the yield grows. Most unmanned delivery systems with a range of less than 500 kilometers easily meet these criteria. Often, as is the case with ballistic missiles, the quality of the control system beyond a certain performance does not materially change the accuracy of a nuclear warhead, because a large fraction of the error arises after the powered phase of the flight as the vehicle reenters the atmosphere. While this is true of chemical and biological warheads as well, with a nuclear warhead, there is less need to compensate for this error with such technologies as terminal guidance or homing reentry vehicles. A proliferant most likely would not manufacture or obtain nuclear weapons in the same quantities as chemical, biological, or conventional weapons. This may cause a proliferant to place more emphasis on the reliability of the vehicle and the targeting methods it selects to deliver nuclear weapons. Reliability may refer to the delivery system or its ability to penetrate defenses to deliver a weapons load. Many factors contribute to the ability to penetrate defenses, including the proximity of approach before detection, the velocity of the delivery system, and the time to target after detection. Cruise missiles approach much closer to a target before being detected, but their slow speed also means that the defense has time and capabilities to intercept them in a realistic manner once they are detected. Ballistic missiles can be detected upon launch, but their high reentry speed still makes them difficult targets to
acquire and intercept before they reach the target. A proliferant nation must weigh these considerations along with the availability of technologies for building certain delivery systems when it develops a targeting strategy for its nuclear weapons. If a defending country can alert its population of an impending attack, a ballistic missile launch detection system provides about 8 minutes of warning for a missile with a 500km range. Alternatively, the population has 5 seconds of warning for every mile from the target that a transonic cruise missile can be detected. If the defending nation can detect the cruise missile 100 miles from the intended target, it has about 8 minutes to intercept the missile. From the standpoint of defense, stealthy cruise missiles pose the greatest threat as a delivery system, regardless of the WMD type. Manned aircraft, while a serious threat, have other limitations, such as their unrefueled range, their capability or lack of capability to operate in all weather conditions and at day or night, their visibility to defense detectors, and their high acquisition, maintenance, and training costs. OVERVIEW Proliferants that are acquiring WMD have an array of vehicles available to deliver their payloads. The Means of Delivery section covers the primary military methods of delivering WMD. The section focuses on unique aspects of these delivery systems and simple modifications to them that enhance the ability of a proliferant to conduct a WMD attack. Excluded from this topic are adaptations of civilian vehicles, such as automobiles or small boats, which usually accompany terrorist acts. Furthermore, the discussion generally considers only the primary delivery means to carry a weapon to its final target. Except for aircraft carrying WMD bombs or glide devices that steer or fly toward a target after being dropped, the discussion does not treat secondary vehicles that move WMD closer to a target before launch. These vehicles, which include submarines and surface ships carrying ballistic or cruise missiles on board, have such broad military applications that their acquisition cannot be uniquely associated with WMD. This section will first list the conditions for effective delivery of a payload and then its associated influences on the choice of a delivery system. Each of the subsections that follow emphasizes and elaborates upon certain technologies that a proliferant might use to make its delivery system more effective. RATIONALE The ability to produce any of the three types of WMD does not give a proliferant operational capability in that type of weapon. The weapon must be integrated with a delivery system to get the weapon to the intended target. Military systems have been included in this section because they are of most concern. Civilian vehicles (e.g., boats, aircraft, trucks) are not covered because they are so common throughout the world. Yet, they could also be used to deliver a WMD or other significant weapons to
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a particular location, as was demonstrated in the Saudi Arabia bombing in which a commercial truck was used. Some ballistic missiles have been purchased (and possibly modified for longer range), and others have been developed indigenously. Although intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not widespread, proliferants might obtain the technology to produce them. Cruise missiles provide WMD delivery capability with relatively low technology and ease of acquisition. Most militaries have combat aircraft or the means to purchase them. As long as a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon can be developed to be carried on an aircraft and successfully released, it is a threat that needs to be considered. Artillery is common in the worlds armies and can also be used to deliver a WMD. There are many kinds of artillery with varying capability. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological munitions that are usable by many existing artillery systems have been produced. The technology has been available for many years and is quite well understood. Also included in the Artillery subsection is the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.0-1) Over two-thirds of the countries that cause concern have programs to acquire ballistic missiles. Even though short-range anti-ship cruise missiles are widely available, only a few countries possess long-range land-attack cruise missiles. With the success of long-range cruise missiles in Desert Storm and its aftermath, indigenous development programs can be expected among proliferants. Combat aircraft are already available in every country that has or is suspected of acquiring WMD, and many are being modernized. All armies have artillery that could be adapted to deliver WMD.
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Country
Sec 1.1 Theater Ballistic Missiles
Sec 1.2 ICBMs
Sec 1.3 Cruise Missiles
Argentina Brazil Canada Chile China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States
Sec 1.4 Combat FixedWing Aircraft
Sec 1.5 Artillery

some limited
Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities:
exceeds sufficient level
sufficient level
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability. Notes: Each delivery system column reflects the technologies listed in greater detail in the section describing that delivery system. The technology columns listed in the Foreign Technology Sections on the individual delivery systems refer to technologies that one or more of the listed countries may need. Lack of capability in one technology does not indicate a country has limited capability. It may indicate the country is pursuing a different technology solution.
Figure 1.0-1. Means of Delivery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 1.1THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES (TBMs)
OVERVIEW The Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) subsection describes the technologies that a nation can employ to build a TBM and the associated means by which they can use it. The U.S. Government defines a TBM as a ballistic missile with a range of less than 3,500 km. Except where noted, this document will use that definition. This subsection emphasizes those technologies that improve accuracy, reduce intercept at boost, increase lethality, and assist a country in extending the range of its missiles, transporting and launching the missiles clandestinely, and building them in sufficient numbers to achieve its objectives. The tables tabulate technologies or their adaptation to entire missiles and their subsystems. They are ordered as follows: airframe; propulsion; guidance, control, and navigation; and weapons integration. When a proliferant seeks a range extension from an existing airframe, it may need to strengthen the airframe if the original missile had a low factor of safety. This is necessary so the missile can withstand higher aerodynamic loads; change the propulsion subsystem by altering either the burning rate or the duration of propellant flow or by selecting a high-energy propellant; adapt the guidance system to accommodate the new acceleration loads and the higher cutoff velocities; and weaponize the warhead by including thermal protection on the nosetip or modifying the reentry strategy of the missile to withstand the higher aerodynamic heating on reentry. Proliferants can modify or manufacture longer range ballistic missile airframes in several ways. Iraq extended its missile range by reducing the payload and lengthening existing airframes to hold more fuel and oxidizer. Iraq also introduced the concept of strap-ons to extend a missiles range when it launched the al Abid in December 1990. To manufacture the al Abid missile, Iraq strapped five SCUDs together to form a single large missile, theoretically capable of a 2,200-km range. Proliferants can also stage missiles in parallel or serial. The United States used a concept known as parallel staging to extend the range of its Atlas missile. Parallel staging fires several component engines simultaneously at launch. Then, as the missile accelerates, it drops these extra engines. When a nation possesses the technical capability to support extra range, the most efficient way to achieve it is through conventional serial staging, in which a missiles stages fire one at a time in sequence. Some Chinese TBMs, such as the M-11, which may have originally been designed as a multiple-stage missile (and, therefore, has sufficient thrust-to-weight ratio), can be converted to two-stage missiles with minor modifications and modest assistance from technical experts if they are aware of certain design limitations.
Highlights
Chemical and biological weapons are difficult to dispense efficiently from TBMs. Proliferants with just a few nuclear weapons may consider TBM reliability before using this means of delivery. Separating warheads increase the probability of defense penetration. Attitude control modules and post-boost vehicles increase TBM warhead accuracy.
But some constraints, such as avoiding maximum dynamic pressure at staging and timing the staging event precisely enough to maintain control over the missile, are solved when multi-stage missiles are built derived from components which originally came from a multi-stage missile. To extend the range of liquid-fueled and solid-fueled missiles, these missiles require different adaptations to the propulsion subsystem. Liquid-fueled missiles supply fuel to the thrust chamber by turbopumps. To increase the range of an existing liquid-fueled missile, the proliferant must either increase the flow rate of the propellant and oxidizer or allow the missile to burn for a longer period of time. This can be accomplished by adding more propellant, which usually requires a modification to the airframe, and consideration of other factors such as structural integrity, stability, and thermal integrity. If a longer burn time is chosen, many surfaces that are exposed to the combustion process, such as jet vanes in the exhaust flow or components of the thrust chamber, may need to be modified to protect them from the increased thermal exposure. Alternatively, if the missile thrust is to be increased, the combustion chamber must be designed or modified to withstand the increased pressures, or the nozzle must be redesigned with a larger throat area to accommodate the increased mass flow rates. In addition, structural modifications may be required to compensate for the higher aerodynamic loads and torques and for the different flight profile that will be required to place the warhead on the proper ballistic phase trajectory. Usually a country will design a completely new missile if new turbopumps are available. A proliferant that wishes to increase its liquid-fueled missiles range may need to consider upgrading all the valving and associated fluidic lines to support higher flow rates. The
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proliferant will seek lightweight valves and gauges that operate with sub-millisecond time cycles and have a reliable and reproducible operation time. These valves must also accept electrical signals from standard computer interfaces and require little if any ancillary electrical equipment. A country may use higher energy propellant combinations in existing missile designs with relatively minor structural, material, and turbopump modifications. Technology requirements would focus on thermal protection for the thrust chamber and improved injector design. A solid-propellant missile differs in overall operation because it simply burns propellant from an integral motor chamber. A proliferant seeking to make longer range solid missiles generally has to stage the missile (either in parallel or serial); strap on additional whole motors or motor segments; improve the stage fraction; or improve the propellant. When a nation chooses to stage an existing missile, it may be able to procure the first stage of a serially staged design, which is larger and more difficult to manufacture, and simply add an indigenous smaller upper stage of its own. A key determinant of a missiles utility as a first stage is the performance specification of thrust-to-weight ratio. Whole missile systems used as a first stage must produce a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than one for the entire assembled multi-stage missile. Missiles that may fall below the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines are still of interest because they might be used by proliferants as upper stages of serial staged missiles or as strap-ons. Once a country can indigenously produce a solid rocket motor, few, if any, components do not automatically scale from more basic designs. If a proliferant desires a more advanced solid rocket fleet, it may choose to build the missile case from carbon graphite or more advanced organic matrix materials. To support this, it will need to import either filament winding machines, an equivalent manufacturing process, or the finished motor cases. A proliferant might import the finished filament wound cases without propellant if it chooses to use a manufacturing technique pioneered in the former Soviet Union known as cartridge loading. Cartridge loading allows the propellant to be inserted into the case after it is manufactured. The competing manufacturing procedure, known as case bonding, usually requires the case, propellant, and insulating liner to be assembled in close proximity at the same site, though it is still possible to import empty cases for case bonding. Designs employing propellants with higher burning temperatures require many supporting components, including better insulating material to line the inside of the rocket case and stronger or larger thrust vector control actuators to direct the increased thrust. The three separate flight functions performed by the guidance, control, and navigation subsystem generally require separate technical considerations. Guidance refers to the process of determining a course to a target and maintaining that course by measuring position and attitude as the missile flies (while, at the same time, steering the missile along the course). Control generally encompasses the hardware and software used during the missiles burn phase to change the missiles attitude and course in
response to guidance inputs and to maintain the missile in a stable attitude. Navigation concerns locating a target and launch point and the path that connects them in threedimensional space. An effective design requires that all three functions operate in concert before and during flight for the missile to reach its target. Some of the hardware and software in each feature overlaps functions. The aerodynamic and inertial properties of the missile and the nature of the atmospheric conditions through which it flies determine the speed with which guidance commands need to be sent to the control system. First generation TBMs, such as the SCUD and the Redstone, have fins to damp out in-flight perturbations. The rudimentary guidance systems used in these missiles do not support rapid calculations of position changes. When a missiles thrust vector control system becomes responsive enough to overcome these perturbations without aerodynamic control surfaces, these fins are usually removed from the design because their added weight and aerodynamic drag diminish the missiles range. Most TBM designs have a resonance around 10 Hz (cycle time of 100 milliseconds). Calculations to correct disturbances must occur within this cycle time. Guidance and control engineers generally add a factor of safety of two to their cycle time or, in other words, half the cycle time. When thrust vectoring is the exclusive control standard of a missile, the system must respond or have a major cycle time of 50 milliseconds or less. When fins are used, the control cycle time for a missile may be much longer than a second. As the guidance and control subsystems work together to keep a missile stable and flying on its trajectory, all the components of these subsystems must operate within the major cycle time. Guidance computers, for instance, have to accept acceleration, angular position, and position rate measurements; determine if these positions are proper for the missiles course; and correct any deviations that have occurred in the flight profile. Computers of the i8086 class, and later, are capable of making these calculations in the times required. In addition to the calculation procedures, all the control hardware must reliably and repeatedly accept the control signals generated by the flight computer and effect the commands within the cycle time. Since some of these operations must occur in a specific sequence, the sum of all operational times in the sequence must be much shorter than the major cycle time. Therefore, valves, electric motors, and other actuators must produce steering forces within 50 milliseconds to support an unfinned ballistic missile control system. When the missile has fins, the allowable response times increase, permitting the hardware operational specifications to be greatly reduced. In addition to the cycle time, the control subsystem must also hold the missile within acceptable physical deviations from specified attitude and velocity during its short burning period. Missiles with autonomous control systems generally rely on acceleration measurements rather than position measurements to determine attitude and position rates. However, positional indications can be substituted if the positional
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variables can be determined quickly and accurately enough. Position measurements reduce the control system cycle time by generally reducing the computer integration of accelerations that are required to determine position. Positional measurements also do not suffer the degradation in performance that occurs with time, acceleration force, and vibrations on measurement instrumentation that supports acceleration measurements. Multi-source radio signals that allow a triangulation of position offer an alternative to acceleration measurements. Advanced missile powers dropped radio guidance in the 1960s and switched to autonomous inertial measuring units, which are carried onboard the missile. The United States considered radio guidance again in the late 1980s for mobile missiles but dropped the idea in favor of a Global Positioning System (GPS). Nonetheless, if a proliferant chose to build a radio guidance system, it could transmit signals from the launch site, or it may build an accurate transmitter array near the launch site to create the signals. Guidance engineers often refer to this latter technique as using pseudolites. However, radio command and control schemes, because of the immediate presence of a radio signal when the system is turned on, alert defenses that a missile launch is about to occur. However, performance for these systems degrades because of the rocket plume and radio noise. Also, these systems are very much subject to the effects of jamming or false signals. A number of new techniques are available for adapting GPS signals and other supporting navigation and locations systems for high precision use. In addition to reengineering the stored software on a GPS processor, a nation which seeks to upgrade its GPS receivers from coarse/acquisition (C/A-code) levels of performance to precision (P-code) levels of performance may perform post-processing on the received signals themselves. Post processing assists in position location because a large source of error in a GPS signal is the uncertainty in ionospheric refraction as GPS signals pass through the ionosphere. When a receiver can remove this error from the signals the location uncertainty falls from approximately 20 meters to less than 2 meters. The broadcast ionospheric model is available to all users and is not encrypted. It can accont for perhaps 5075% of the ionospheric error, but cannot handle short-term changes in ionospheric conditions. Any other source of information about the ionosphere can be used to correct the time-of-transmission calculation embedded within the C/A-code signal and determine the amount this signal has been slowed from the vacuum speed of light by the charged particles in the ionosphere. One source of correction schemes can be based on differential GPS (DGPS) signals which do not pass throught he ionosphere. Even when a DGPS receiver is removed as much as 100 nautical miles from the receiver it can give an approximate estimate of the ionospheric state provided it is near enough to account for seasonal and diurnal effects. Other schemes include building an approximate picture of electrical flux in the ionosphere by obtaining very accurate ephemeris of the satellite position and post calculating corrections from the expected versus received positions of a precisely located point.
While these schemes will not the same accuracy as the P-code itself, they can aproximate the performance or at least improve C/A-code by an order of magnitude. In order to make them useful in a ballistic missile, a nation may write a software routine that allows a launch authority to load ionosphere corrections in at the last moment. In the same way that other targeting data may be included to align the gryoscopes at the last moment before launch, the corrections could be fed into a processor which uses the raw C/A-code values and then corrects them before sending a guidance signal to the thrust vector controls or control surfaces. GPS has significant application for a theater ballistic missile outfitted with a post-boost vehicle (bus) or attitude control module that navigates a reentry vehicle to a more accurate trajectory. Older, less-sophisticated guidance systems perform less navigation than modern TBMs. In the older TBMs, a launch crew sets the aximuth to the target at a mobile site and the control computer determines when the missile is traveling at the proper velocity and velocity attitude angle to achieve the desired range. These three properties, in addition to random winds at the target and errors that accrue in the guidance instruments, uniquely determine where the missiles land. Any technologies that allow a proliferant to position and target its missiles in the field quickly reduces the time defending forces have to target and destroy the missile. GPS allows a mobile launch crew to operate more quickly in the field when not launching the missile from a pre-surveyed launch site. When no in-flight update of position is given, a crew must set a reasonably accurate azimuth before the missile is launched. To be consistent with the overall accuracy of an older missile, such as the SCUD, which has a non-separating warhead, the crew must strike an azimuth line within 1 milliradian of the actual azimuth to maintain a satisfactory cross range accuracy. With military grade GPS receivers of 13 meter accuracy, the launch crew must survey no further than 1 km from the actual launch point to support a 1-milliradian azimuth. Pseudolites or differential GPS will either reduce survey distance required or increase accuracywhether using military or civilian GPS signals. Any technologies that allow for the separation of a reentry vehicle after the boost phase assist the proliferator in two ways. First, a separating warhead is often more accurate than a warhead that reenters while still attached to the main missile body. Secondly, the separated warhead produces a much smaller radar cross section (RCS), thus making the warhead harder to locate. Technologies that assist a country in separating its warheads and producing a clean aerodynamic shape for reentry include computer aerodynamic prediction routines, nosetip materials that can withstand higher aerodynamic heating, and space-qualified small missile motors that can steer out accumulated error. Hardware that assists in separating a warhead from a booster includes timing circuits, squibs, and other cutting charges, and if accuracy is an issue, an alignment mechanism. This mechanism might be as simple as aerodynamic fins that unfold upon reentry.
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RATIONALE TBMs can carry a conflict outside of the immediate theater of fighting and can usually penetrate to their targets. Iraqs limited capability missiles made an impact by tying up allied air assets on seek-and-destroy missions against mobile launchers and in the other steps taken to calm Israeli and Saudi populations. Extant whole missile systems, such as the SCUD and SS-21, can satisfy the targeting needs for many proliferators. A proliferators potential ability to upgrade existing, outmoded missiles (e.g., shortrange SCUDs) is quite real. Much of the hardware and technology to support many of the modifications described in the Overview are readily available or can be produced indigenously. However, some of the hardware and technology (those requiring more advanced technology, special materials, and/or precise manufacturing) are not readily available and may require special design and production efforts by more advanced countries. A proliferator can achieve an understanding of the most efficient and costeffective methods to extend the range of a missile by using finite element structural and fluid dynamic computer routines and automated codes to predict missile performance and aerodynamic properties. A proliferator can also test and validate the computer routines in wind tunnels and structural laboratories. Since these computer routines reduce the number of engineers needed to modify missiles, they are particularly key to reducing both the unit and system costs. Automated engineering computer routines are ranked at the same level of importance in the technology tables as hardware items. The type of propulsion system selected also affects launch strategy, the second important proliferant capability. Liquid-propellant missiles generally create less of a military threat than solid-propellant missiles. Solid-propellant missiles are stable and storable and do not require fueling before launch, a time when the missile is particularly vulnerable because of its exposure. In addition, solid-fueled missiles have a shorter launch support train than liquid-fueled missiles. Fewer vehicles and less activity associated with the vehicles limits exploitation of acoustic, seismic, and other signatures. The enormous progress made in guidance and navigation with the GPS, particularly in automated design with computer routines such as finite element codes and in materials science with the introduction of composite materials, has further reduced the design burden on proliferants seeking TBMs. Transferred to proliferant nations, these advances streamline the manufacturing processes, which accelerate and expand the potential for a missile arsenal. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.1-1) Several countries purchased SCUDs up to the end of the Cold War, and many of these countries still have arsenals of varying size and threat. These countries include Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The Soviets also sold Syria, Yemen, and possibly Libya, the shorter range SS-21 missile. Egypt, Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea all display the manufacturing base and technical prowess to make range extension modifications similar to those that Iraq accomplished before the Gulf War. In addition to these countries, several nations have built or attempted to build their own TBMs. An inherent capability to produce unique and totally indigenous missiles exists in these countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan, and nearing production in Syria. Iran and Iraq must import the guidance and control systems of these missiles; however, beyond those constraints imposed on Iraq by UN sanctions, it has no limitations on its ability to produce 600-km range TBMs. Systems Both China and North Korea continue to sell missile technology and missile systems. Also, North Korea continues to sell missiles abroad. North Korea has offered the 1,000-km-range No Dong missile, and the Chinese sold between 30 and 50 CSS2s, a 2,200-km-range missile, to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. Apparently, the Israeli government acted as an intermediary for shipping Lance missiles to the Taiwanese. Lances are a short-range nuclear delivery system that the United States based in Europe. They can be reverse engineered to serve as strap-ons for existing missiles. Each TBM may cost as little as $1.5 million dollars, so a proliferator with even modest resources can afford to build a sizable missile force. If a country seeks autonomy from the world market and wishes to build its missile indigenously, it can purchase a manufacturing plant from the North Koreans or Chinese for about $200 million and purchase critical parts, such as guidance systems, elsewhere. To develop complete autonomy requires a capital investment of about $1 billion dollars. Technical Assistance Besides whole systems, many corporations and nations have offered technical assistance during the last 10 years to some emerging missile powers. German firms reportedly assisted the missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and Libya. Italians have offered assistance to Argentina, Egypt, and India, and the French have participated in missile programs in Iraq and Pakistan. Most European countries can lend technical assistance to emerging missile powers. The French have a long history of developing missiles not only to support the Ariane space launch capability but to launch the force de frappe nuclear arsenal. The Italians have participated in the European Union space program that helped design and prototype the Hermes missile. While the British relied on American missile programs to supply their TBM needs in the 1960s, a technical exchange program between Britain and the United States has trained and educated a sizable pool of missile talent from the British Isles. Many Western European nations and Russia are in the process of downsizing their defense industries. As many as 2 million physicists and engineers may become available over the course of the next decade.
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Airframe Country Airframe Extension to LiquidFueled Missiles Post-Boost Vehicles High Energy Solid-Fuel Motors
Propulsion Storable Liquid Propellant Engines Strap-on Boosters
Guidance and Control Floated Inertial Measurement Units Digital Navigation and Control Post-Boost Position Realignment and Spin
Weapons Integration Bomblets or Submunitions TEL Manufacturing Separating Warheads

some

limited
sufficient level
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.
Figure 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference AIRFRAME Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Complete missile systems (Propellants having >86% total solids) NC turning machines or NC turning/milling machines
Capable of delivering >500 kg WA ML 4; to >300 km MTCR 1; USML IV Rotary tables >1.0 m WA Cat. 2B; CCL Cat. 2B; NDUL 1
None identified
None identified
Automatic-guidance/ target-loading software
None identified
Optical alignment and Machine tool control surface finish measuring software equipment; roller and thrust bearings capable of maintaining tolerances to within 0.001 in. Acid baths and handling equipment Thermal and viscosity constant flow controls None identified
Acid etch metal removal
Masking and etching facilities CCL EAR 99 to remove <0.001 in. layers of metal from complex shapes Capability to manufacture curvilinear or cylindrical cross-section parts of 0.1 in. thickness or less Capable of producing longitudinal welds up to 10 m and circumferential welds on 0.8-m diameter or larger cylinders Two or more axis control of filament placement WA Cat. 2B; CCL 2B MTCR 3; NDUL 1 CCL EAR 99
None identified
Spin, flow, and shear forming machines
None identified
None identified
Automated welding equipment
None identified
Jigs and frames to maintain shapes and rotate large cylinders
None identified
Composite filament winding equipment
WA Cat. 1B; MTCR 6; CCL 1B WA Cat. 1B; MTCR 6; CCL 1B WA Cat. 1B; MTCR 6; CCL 1B
Aramid fiber
None identified
Helical winding logic
Composite tape laying equipment
Two axis or more control of tape placement
None identified
None identified
Tape supply and tension numerical controls
Composite weaving or interlacing equipment
Two-dimensional or more automated broad goods production of carbon carbon and woven fabric
Aramid fiber
None identified
Numerical control of the weaving process
(contd)
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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Hot melt prepregs for composite materials
Filament tensile strength WA Cat. 1C; >100,000 psi. and a melting CCL Cat. 1C; or sublimation point >1,649 C MTCR 8 Capable of producing a vehicle pitch rate of 1 deg/sec and control response to <10 Hz perturbations None identified WA ML 4, 10; USML IV; MTCR 10 WA Cat. 9B; MTCR 15; CCL 9B
Prepreg material produced from phenolic or epoxy resins None identified
Hot melt prepreg machine
None identified
Adaptive aerodynamic control surfaces and actuators
None identified
Digital transducer reduction and position measurement (unless analog controlled) Automatic data reduction software that predicts aerodynamic coefficients from subscale model force and moment measurements Software for sequencing of instructions
Mach 0.9 and greater wind tunnels
None identified
Schlieren photography or other flow field phenomena recording instruments
Blow-down tunnels
Blow-down piping and valves to create 1.6 million Re on models of <= 2 in. length
WA Cat. 9B; MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B
High-pressure storage vessels; blow-down piping Low impedance feedback transducers and spectral calibration equipment
Short response time instrumentation
Digital control, closedloop vibration test equipment
Vibration spectrum between WA Cat. 9B; 20 and 5,000 Hz at 10 g's rms MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B
Calibration equipment
Data reduction software employing advanced signal processing techniques such as Fast Fourier transform and "chirp" calculations
(contd)
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Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference PROPULSION Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Solid propellant motors
Total impulse of >1,000,000 lb f-sec
WA Cat. 9A; MTCR 2, 20; CCL Cat. 9A; USML IV
Liners, insulation, High-energy x-ray adhesives, and machines; rocket test case materials to stands; CT machines withstand high pressures (2,500 psi or greater) and temperatures (2,400 F or greater) Valves and piping with flow-control deviation no greater than 0.5% and duty cycle timing deviation <20 msec Appropriately sized, sufficiently pure and uncontaminated oxidizer, fuel, and additives Uniformly fine (5 50 m) ammonium perchlorate or energetic oxidizers such as RDX, ADN, CL-20, HNF, and HAN Rocket test stands; valves and piping with flow control deviation no greater than 0.5% and duty cycle timing deviation <20 msec T cell propellant burners and equipment instrumented to detect flow oscillations in segmented solid rocket grains Electrolytic cells, crystallizer and separator to produce uniform particles of pure AP. Other energetic oxidizers now being considered for ballistic missile application require unique production equipment not yet identified
None identified
Liquid propellant engines Total impulse of >1,000,000 lb f-sec
WA Cat 9A; MTCR 2, 20; CCL Cat. 9A; USML IV MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C; USML V
None identified
Solid propellants
Solid composite propellant that produces a theoretical sea-level Isp of 255 sec
Programs that calculate thrust time traces for given internal grain cutouts
Ultrafine ammonium The principal energetic perchlorate (UFAP) size ingredient within a solidfiltration and size gauges propellant formulation providing oxygen or oxidizing species to react with fuel
WA ML 8; USML V; MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C
None identified
Solid propellant additives Additives used to modify propellant burning rate, viscosity, curing rate, bonding, moisture resistance, chemical deterioration, and aging Turbopumps Shaft speeds >8,000 RPM or discharge pressures >7,000 KPa
WA ML 8; USML V; MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C MTCR 3; USML IV
MAPO, TEPAN, None identified Catocene, Butacene
None identified
None identified
Large torsion shaft dynamometers
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Rocket motor/engine test stands
Test stands capable of withstanding a thrust of >20,000 lb.
MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; USML IV MTCR 2; USML IV
None identified
High frame rate cameras that are shock, vibration and thermal hardened; Thrust measurement hardware Thrust stand with torsional force and moment measurement capability to determine pitch and roll forces and moments
None identified
Thrust vector control (for strap-on or multiple body missiles)
Steering guidance for multiple-body missiles that produces in excess of 1 deg/ sec pitch rate and control for <10 Hz oscillations
High atomic weight injection fluid for steering and pitch control; carbon carbon or other heat and flame tolerant material for jet vanes
Adaptive software to calculate theoretical positional change with measured position change in flight and compensate for the difference Encryption algorithms of DES standard 40 bit and higher
Telemetry or encrypted telemetry data transmission hardware
Transmission rates of CCL Cat.5A-P1; None identified 20 kbit/s or analog equivalent USML X; and operation in a high WA Cat. 5A-P1; vibration environment WA ML 11; MTCR 12 Explosion-resistant equipment designed to handle energetic materials WA ML 18; MTCR 5; USML XXI None identified
Calibration equipment with 100 kbit/s sample and hold capability
Fluid energy mills for grinding and mixing highly energetic materials Inertial measurement units
None identified
None identified
GUIDANCE, CONTROL, AND NAVIGATION
Boost cut off command signals within 0.25 deg of programmed injection angle, 2% of burnout altitude, and 1% of burnout velocity Boost cut off command signals within 0.25 deg of programmed injection angle, 2% of burnout altitude, and 1% of burnout velocity.
WA ML 11; MTCR 9; WA Cat. 7A; CCL Cat. 7A; USML XV
None identified
Vibration environmental test facilities sometimes combined with centrifuges
Efficient software algorithms that support major cycle time of <50 msec.
Radio command guidance
CCL Cat.5A-P1; None identified USML XV
None identified
Efficient software algorithms that support major cycle time of 50 msec
(contd)
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Technology
Ground-based "GPS" systems
Position accuracy of 1 m
CCL Cat. 7A; WA Cat. 7A; MTCR 11; USML XV WA ML 11; MTCR 10; USML XV MTCR 2; USML IV CCL EAR 99
None identified
Calibration test articles that can be placed in and move through the measurement field; time clocks with signal accuracy <1 microsecond Six degrees of freedom computer model
Nonlinear multiple equation solving algorithms based on matrix mathematics and Doppler corrections
Propulsion/airframe/ flight control system integration
Provide optimum system performance within confines of airframe/propulsion system architecture to meet mission requirements Missile pitch rate of 2 deg/sec
None identified
Source code for CAD/CAE
Thrust vector control technologies
None identified
None identified
Efficient software algorithms that support major cycle time of <50 msec None identified
High-frequency piezoelectric instrumentation
Pressure gauges with 25 khz response and 0.1% linearity; Force transducers with <50 Hz response and 0.1% linearity
None identified
Calibration equipment
Servo valves
Flow rates >24 liters per MTCR 3; minute, at absolute USML IV pressures of >7,000 KPa (1,000 psi) and have actuator response time to support control of <50 msec. Warhead separation with no greater than 0.5 m/sec velocity change or 1 deg injection angle change Ablation rates of less than 3 mm/sec at 2 km/sec or greater reentry velocity MTCR 3; USML XV MTCR 2; USML IV
None identified
Hysteresis loop measurement equipment
None identified
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Weapons Separation Technology
None identified
Separation firing circuits Timing circuit and and exploding bridge wire sequencing logic charges with 20 msec. or less deviance Arcjets None identified
Ablative heat shields or whole RVs with ablative heat shields
Carbon carbon or other materials with heat capacities >11 MJ/kg (5,000 BTU/lb)
(contd)
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Technology
Heat sink or whole RVs with heat sink Transporter/Erector Launchers (TELs) for surface to surface missile systems
Material capable of sustaining 1,000 BTU/lb.
MTCR 2; USML IV
None identified None identified
Test ranges Theodolites automatic load levelers and high precision surveying equipment or GPS-based surveying equipment (or equivalent) High energy density batteries and fast rise time firing circuits
None identified Automatic targeting software including geographic algorithms that calculate trajectory corrections for difference in launch and target point elevations None identified
Launchers capable of WA ML 4; leveling to within 0.001 deg of USML IV; Earth-centered ellipsoidal MTCR 12 axis and with firing tables capable of 0.02-deg launch azimuth Multi-step arming devices that arm and fuze based on telemetered radar signals, measurements of g's, barometric pressure, flight time, altitude, or other physical variable with <50 msec response time WA ML 4; MTCR 2; USML IV
Safing, arming, and fuzing for chemical and biological weapons
None identified
Submunitions separation Designed to meet individual WA ML 4; or dispensing system mission performance USML IV mechanisms requirements under worldwide environmental conditions
None identified
Aerodynamic braking hardware, parachutes, split flap control hardware
None identified
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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues AIRFRAME Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Complete missile systems (Propellants having >86% total solids) NC turning machines or NC turning/ milling machines Acid etch metal removal
Longer range missiles can be conRanges above 1,000 km allow structed from existing airframes by proliferants to reach targets of United clustering engines, booster strap-ons, States interest and stretched tanks Bell-shaped missile nozzles are difficult to make without numerical control Control and removal of material All TBM systems
Cruise missiles, manned bombers and tactical aircraft
Non-NC turning/milling machines
Additional payload may replace removed structural and excess structural material mass Increases either range or payload capability Reduces unpredictable flight characteristics improves accuracy High Isp solid-fueled rockets yield significant range increases and are easier to fire and maintain High Isp solid-fueled rockets yield significant range increases and are easier to fire and maintain All TBM systems
Machining of complex contours
Spin, flow, and shear forming machines Automated welding equipment
Designing and forming complex shapes that are required for aerodynamic or structural efficiency Air frames are structurally stronger and aerodynamically smoother with advanced welding techniques Higher strength-to-weight ratio materials allow use of high Isp solid propellants Higher strength-to-weight ratio materials allow use of high Isp solid propellants Higher temperature performing materials Reduces use of more costly and difficult methods to create uniform resin/filament composite Solving the guidance equations in a closed loop(s) to create adaptive changes in near real time
Sheet metal brakes and stamping equipment Conventional welding
Composite filament-winding equipment Composite tape-laying equipment
Steel cases
Steel cases
Composite weaving or interlacing equipment Hot melt prepregs for composite materials Adaptive aerodynamic control surfaces and actuators
Metal or ceramic nozzle throat sections and heat sink re-entry vehicle nose tips None identified
May be used to manufacture solidpropellant rocket cases for higher range and payload performance More accurate boost-phase guidance produces lower CEPs
Open loop guidance with error corrections performed by a postboost vehicle or Attitude Control Module (ACM)
Wind tunnels capable of Mach 0.9 Studies of high ballistic coefficient reentry vehicles requires speeds or greater >Mach 0.9
More accurate reentry vehicles for Flight testing better CEP and maintaining better control by retaining more of the reentry velocity
(contd)
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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (contd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Blow down tunnels
Provision of pressurized gas supply and instrumentation capable of simulating flight conditions beyond those provided by continuous flow wind tunnels Prediction of vibration modes
Indigenous research in aerodynamic variables leading to better flight predictions and lower CEPs
Extrapolations from lower Reynolds number subscale models
Digital control, closed-loop vibration test equipment
Structural efficiency increases range and/or payload capability

PROPULSION
Analog computers or finite element codes without experimental validation Liquid propellant engines
Solid propellant motors
Casting and curing either case-bonded Indigenous production of second or cartridge-loaded propellant without stages for existing missiles allows a cracking or delaminations proliferant to extend range
Liquid propellant engines
Increasing the propellant flow rate and Engines in existing missiles can be Solid propellant motors combustion chamber pressure/ replaced with higher performance temperature, by using such processes engines for extended range or payload as regenerative cooling, without damaging the engine Increasing the Isp of the propellant Solid propellant missiles are difficult to Liquid propellants locate and target because of their simplicity, storability, and smaller support train Better oxidizers provide a more efficient, longer range missile None identified
Solid propellants
Solid propellant oxidizers
Increasing the oxidizer efficiency and supporting faster burn rates by the reduction in particle size Achieving the desired propellant properties (e.g., burn rate, deflagration control, flow stability) with unconventional materials
Solid propellant additives
Propellant signature modification None identified disguises a launch for cueing satellites, which direct missile defense batteries Ullage tanks
Turbopumps
Increasing propellant and oxidizer flow Modern, higher performance to the thrust chamber turbopumps make liquid propellant missiles more reliable
(contd)
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Accurately measuring the force and torsional response of the stand to generate an accurate thrust time profile Predicting the proper mixture ratios and flow rates under dynamic conditions to precisely control the flight Real time encryption and transmission of data from a moving vehicle Safety of personnel and facilities
Thrust time profiles allow proliferants fly on unusual trajectories (e.g., depressed or lofted) Compensate for misfired cluster engines and control the flight path of the missile Prevents observers from understanding the intention of the missile flight and static test programs Manufacture of high Isp propellants and oxidizers
None identified
Thrust vector control (For strap-on or multiple body missiles) Telemetry or encrypted telemetry data transmission hardware Fluid energy mills for grinding and mixing highly energetic materials Inertial measurement units Radio command guidance
Aerodynamic surfaces
Open channel communication
Older, more dangerous facilities
Low drift rate and g insensitive Reduced CEP to support military response in accelerometers and gyros targeting Line-of-sight command guidance Highly accurate guidance for reduced CEP that does not require extensive improvement in gyros or accelerometers Jam-free, highly accurate, boostphase guidance for reduced CEP
Radio command guidance; Ground-based GPS Ground-based GPS; IMUs
Ground-based GPSsystems Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration Thrust vector control technologies High-frequency piezoelectric instrumentation
Signal timing and transmission
IMUs; Radio command guidance Post boost vehicles and ACMs which steer out boost inaccuracy Aerodynamic control surfaces such as fins Low frequency analog transducers
Aligning guidance and control system Reduced CEP and higher azimuth inertial space reference with geometric accuracy reference of airframe Making adaptive corrections for a variety of flight profiles Reducing or transmitting data and evaluating the data from flight tests, static tests or actual launches Supports real time targeting by allowing variable flight profiles to be used as military situation changes All military air vehicles
(contd)
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Servo valves
Making control loop time constant consistent with flight requirements
Lower time constant servo valves increase the range of the missile by allowing the removal of fins or other aerodynamic controls surfaces or increase the accuracy on finned missiles Separating warheads reduce the CEP error contribution during the reentry phase of flight; complicates defense
None identified
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Weapons Separation Technology
Incorporating separating warheads into the flight profile Reducing ablation rate of the nose tip
Non-separation of warheads
Ablative heat shields or whole RVs with ablative heat shields
Ablative heat shields permit the design Low-ballistic coefficient re-entry of high ballistic coefficient re-entry with blunt-nosed re-entry vehicles vehicles which have better penetration of missile defenses Heat sinks may be used with biological Low-ballistic coefficients reentry warheads when the packing fraction is with blunt-nosed re-entry vehicles not as important as lowering the exposure temperature of a live agent Reduced operation times lower the Fixed launch sites possibility of counter battery fire to destroy the TELs which are high-value components of a missile force
Heat sink or whole RVs with heat sink
Building heat sinks into a warhead without decreasing the packing fraction to unacceptable levels for high ballistic coefficient vehicles Reducing the setup and strike down time for launch operations and remote location azimuth of mobile launches
Transporter/Erector Launchers (TELs) for surface to surface missile systems Safing, arming, and fuzing for chemical and biological weapons Submunitions separation or dispensing mechanisms
Reducing the compound probability of Allows for more accurate and effective Single-stage timing devices, failures of multiple step arming, safing, delivery of chemical and biological g sensors or altimeters fuzing, and firing operations warheads Separating submunitions without Allows for more accurate and effective Maneuvering re-entry vehicles inducing additional velocity or injection delivery of chemical and biological angle error and maintaining the warheads viability of warhead
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SECTION 1.2INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs)
OVERVIEW The Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) subsection continues the description of missile technology that was begun in the TBM section and extends it to the additional technologies that a nation needs to increase the range of its missiles to intercontinental distances (>5,500 km). ICBMs are particularly troubling to the world community because they have few, if any, distinguishing characteristics from space launch vehicles. Many nations can build an ICBM capability while claiming to be building a space launch fleet. Few would question, for instance, Indias assertion about the benefits of a communication satellite to link remote regions in its country or a meteorological satellite to predict the path of monsoons. If a country chooses to further assert that national sovereignty compels it to build its own launch vehicle, the world community has few legitimate reasons to argue. In the last 20 years, several countries have built, or sought to build, missiles with an intercontinental reach, usually under the auspices of a space launch capability. France led the way with the introduction of the S-2 launch vehicle in the late 1960s. Derivatives and motor technology from their S-2 missile assisted France in developing its Ariane space launch vehicle, which competes directly with the American Delta class space vehicles. Israel demonstrated the technical capacity to put a satellite in orbit in 1991, indicating to the world that it could deliver WMD to any spot on the globe. Space launch programs came out of South Africa and India in the late 1980s. The South Africans constructed an especially credible prototype for a three-stage launch vehicle that had immediate use as an ICBM. Finally, Iraq showed that a long-range missile did not necessarily have to be built from the ground up. With the help of foreign consultants, Iraq test fired the al Abid Space Launch Vehicle in December 1990. The al Abid consisted of five SCUD missiles strapped together to form a lower stage, which was designed to boost two upper stages, together with a payload, into orbit. The al Abid did not work as predicted, and, if it had, it would have put only a few kilograms of useful payload into orbit. As an ICBM, though, it established the possibility of building a long-range rocket from dated technology. The various technologies will be addressed as complete systems and as subsystems. Systems Iraq built its al Abid capability with the direct assistance of foreign scientists and engineers and by attempting to purchase technology, such as carbon-carbon materials, for rocket nozzle throats and nosetips directly from foreign companies. The multiple uses for aerospace materials and the development of aerospace consortiums have
Highlights
Strap-on boosters are an attractive method to develop ICBMs quickly. Serially staged missiles deliver the most payload per unit weight, but are more difficult to make. ICBMs cost a proliferant 20 to 60 times as much as a TBM for the same payload. Proliferants will need to manufacture Transporter-Erector Launchers (TELs) if they seek a mobile missile capability, or build hardened shelters if they wish to protect ICBM. Chemical and biological agents are difficult to dispense effectively from an ICBM. A proliferant may solve the ICBM re-entry heating problem by building a less accurate, low ballistic coefficient re-entry vehicle. A post-boost vehicle provides a means of delivering WMD accurately from an ICBM.
multiplied the number of sources of research talent and manufacturing industries that a potential proliferant nation can tap for assistance in building an ICBM. These foreign outlets have also exposed the proliferant world to the high expense associated with building an ICBM. In the late 1980s, Iraq could afford to trade some of its oil wealth for the cost of buying the entire corporate talent of one research and development (R&D) firm. Most economies that can sustain such a high level of funding are either already building space launch vehicles (France and China), are in a multilateral arrangement to build one (Germany, Great Britain, Italy), or have recently abandoned building one because of market forces (South Africa). ICBM attacks must also be effective because a launching nation will get few opportunities to continue the attack. The simple cost of an ICBM limits the total size of a missile inventory. This decreases the potential for sustained firing of ICBMs, a tactic used to disrupt a society by the threat of repeated chemical weapons attacks by longrange missiles. If a country seeks to launch an ICBM, it must either launch the missile from a vulnerable fixed launch site, harden the launch site for better survivability against
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attack, or invest the additional expense in building a mobile transporter-erector launcher (TEL). Use of vulnerable, fixed launch site ICBMs provides opportunity for opposing forces to eliminate most of these sites quickly. Hardened launch sites are difficult to reload quickly and thus damper a sustained firing tactic. Without the use of fixed launch sites, a nation must rely on mobile launchers. Making enough mobile launchers to support a long missile campaign is an expensive endeavor. It also lessens the possibility of a sustained firing. A small ICBM that delivers 500 kg of payload to a distance of 9,000 km will weigh between 15,000 and 22,000 kg, depending on the efficiency of the design and the sophistication of the technology involved. The FSU and the United States have built TELs to handle missiles of this mass. Chemical or biological agents are not spread efficiently by the flight path that an ICBM follows. The high velocity along the flight azimuth makes it almost impossible to distribute airborne agents in an even and effective cloud. Submunitions make the problem somewhat more tractable, but the submunitions still require a very capable propulsion system if they are to cancel the azimuthal velocity and impart a cross range velocity to circularize the distribution of an agent cloud. Other problems abound: U.S. experience with fuzes for ballistic missiles showed that much less than 10 percent of chemical and biological agents survived the launch and delivery sequence. Iraq used fuzing for its chemical warheads on its TBMs that would have allowed less than 1 percent of the agent to survive. The most sensible warhead for an ICBM to carry is a nuclear weapon, and the weaponization section concerns itself primarily with the weaponization of ICBMs to carry nuclear warheads. Subsystems Some of the same technologies for extending a TBMs range provide extra capability to build an ICBM. An ICBM may include strap-ons, a clustered combination of single-stage missiles, parallel staging, and serial staging. Iraq increased the range of its missile fleet by reducing the weight of the warhead in one case (the al Hussein missile) and extending the propellant and oxidizer tanks and increasing the burn time in another (the al Abbas missile). The particular path that Iraq followed in making the al Abbas out of SCUD parts is not technically practical for building an ICBM. An airframe must have a thrust-to-weight ratio of greater than one to lift off, and a SCUD airframe cannot be extended sufficiently to reach intercontinental ranges and still lift off with the current turbopump, given its low stage fraction (the ratio of burnout weight to takeoff weighta strong measure of missile performance). Building a new turbopump that provides the needed take-off thrust and also fits within the airframe is a more difficult task than simply building a new and much more capable missile from scratch. Both strap-ons and parallel staging provide ways for a proliferant to reach an ICBM capability. Many countries have built small, solid rocket motors that can be tailored to fit within the MTCR guidelines. A number of these motors strapped on to a
reasonably capable main stage, such as the S-2, would resemble the Ariane launch vehicle. The country that pursues this path requires a firing sequencer that can ignite all the motors simultaneously. Strap-ons generally operate for a short fraction (roughly one-third) of the total missile burn time of an ICBM. If they are dropped off, the guidance and control requirement can be met by using the main engine thrust vector control to steer the whole assemblage. Aerodynamically, the strap-ons behave much as fins in the lower atmosphere, increasing the amount of total cycle time available for the guidance computer to operate. Parallel staging offers many of the same advantages for liquid rockets that strapons do for solid rockets. The United States built the Atlas missile as a parallel staged rocket because, in the 1950s, it was the quickest path to developing an ICBM to meet the Soviet challenge. A liquid-fueled, parallel-staged rocket draws propellant and oxidizer from existing tanks but feeds it to several engines at once to sustain the proper thrust level. When these engines are no longer needed, they are dropped. The tanks, however, remain with the missile so a parallel-staged missile is not as efficient as a serially staged missile. As many designers already know, and most textbooks prove mathematically, a serially staged missile is the best design to deliver a payload to long distances. Examples of an optimal, serially staged ICBM include the U.S. Peacekeeper missile and the Soviet Unions SS-24. Each of these missiles can reach 11,000-km range and carry up to 10 nuclear warheads. In an optimum serially staged configuration, each stage contributes about twice as much velocity as the stage that preceded it, though many effective ICBMs can be built without following any particular design guideline. To be capable of an 11,000-km range, the ideal ICBM would be composed of four stages. The United States and the Soviet Union both ignored this consideration, though, because of concerns about the overall reliability of the missile. The ignition of each stage in sequence at the staging interval is difficult to time properly, and, inevitably, some period occurs during this staging event when the control authority over the missile is at its worst. To reduce these events and improve the overall reliably of the missiles, the superpowers chose to trade performance for fewer stages. A proliferant that does not buy a fully equipped ICBM must solve this same staging sequence problem. The technologies to build event sequencers and the short duration, reproducibly timed squibs, exploding bridge-wires, or other stage separation shaped charges to support these sequencers are among the most sensitive material to be controlled in trying to prevent the proliferation of ICBMs. If a proliferant clusters existing single-stage missiles together, it must consider the guidance and control implications of the design. Several ordinary single-stage missiles grouped together make a very stout planform with a high lateral moment of inertia. To control this missile, the thrust vector control system has to produce much greater torque on the airframe than it would for an equivalent mass that is long and thin, as are most missiles. The high moment of inertia, in turn, requires either higher
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actuation strokes in a thrust vector control system, which reduces the thrust available for range, or a much larger liquid injection system, which reduces the weight available for propellant and again reduces the range. On the other hand, simple thrust vector control strategies, such as vernier nozzles and fluid injection, can satisfactorily control the missile. A proliferant only needs to build the fluidics to support these schemes: fast acting valves and the actuators to control these valves. The same types of valve and piping concerns that are covered in the tables for TBMs apply to the fluid system of an ICBM. A serially staged missile forces a designer to carefully consider the control of a more dynamically complex vehicle. The stages and interstage breaks make the structure of a serially staged missile behave under some loading conditions as a series of smaller integral segments attached at points with flexible joints. This construction has natural frequencies that are different than a single, integral body, such as a one-stage missile. If flight conditions excite any of these many and complex resonant modes in the missile stack, the guidance and control system must supply the correct damping motion, in frequency or duration, to prevent the missile from losing control. Some of the corrections affect the guidance of the missile, and the flight computer must determine the proper steering to return the missile to its predicted trajectory. A proliferator may use many existing finite element routines and modal analysis hardware to find or predict these frequencies. In addition to the hardware, a requirement exists to test and validate the computer routines in wind tunnels and structural laboratories. Since these computer routines reduce the number of engineers needed to modify missiles, they are particularly key to reducing the cost of individual missiles. For this reason, automated engineering computer routines are ranked at the same level of threat in the technology tables as hardware items. The guidance and navigation systems of an ICBM closely mirror those that are used in a TBM, and anyone who has passed through the phase of building a TBM can possibly scale up a version of the guidance system suitable from the earlier missiles. The mathematical logic for determining range is different for ICBMs than for TBMs if a digital guidance computer is used rather than a pendulous integrating gyro accelerometer, which is the standard for most TBMs. However, many text books derive the equations of motion for digital guidance computers. Errors created by the guidance system feedback instrumentation during the boost-phase can be corrected later in the flight with post-boost vehicles (to be discussed in the weaponization section). Navigation technologies, beyond the issues already discussed for TBMs, can be applied in this same post-boost vehicle. The propulsion system of ICBMs can be either liquid or solid fueled (or in some cases a hybrid of the two). A proliferator that understands the principles of solid fuel burning and how to shape the configuration of the internal grain to achieve the desired thrust/time trace can build any of its stages for an ICBM indigenously. Larger motors, of course, are more difficult to manufacture. The outer case of a solid missile can be
made from any conventional material, such as steel, but better propellants with higher burning temperatures often require the substitution of materials with higher strengthto-weight ratios, such as Kevlar and carbon or glass epoxy. Steel cases can be used with cross-linked, double-based solid fuels, but the need for additional liners and insulation to protect the case against the higher burning temperatures of these newer propellants compromises some of the range that can be achieved by using the better propellant in the first place. Most steel cases must be produced from a material having a thickness that closely or exactly matches the final thickness of the motor case to prevent excessive milling of the material. Filament winding technology may lay the filaments in solid motor cases in longitudinal and circumferential plies, in bias plies, and in the most structurally efficient way of allin helically wound orientations. Any European, former Soviet, or U.S. multi-axis filament-winding machine of sufficient size can be used to wind a solid rocket motor case. The plys winding orientation determines the structural, or stage, efficiency of the solid rocket motor. In a liquid-fueled missile, the supply pressure to feed fuel and oxidizer to the thrust chamber may come either from creating an ullage pressure or pumping the liquids to the thrust chamber with turbopumps. Large volume flow rate pumps, particularly those designed for caustic fuels, have unique applications to ICBM construction. A proliferant may avoid the need for pumps by building tanks within the ICBM to contain an ullage pressure, which forces the liquids into the thrust chambers when the tanks are exposed to this high pressure. In most cases, ullage pressure is structurally less efficient than modern turbopumps because the missile frame must cover the ullage tanks, which are maintained at very high pressure and thus are quite heavy. However, this decrement in range performance is small. Since the technology is simpler to obtain, it may serve the needs of a proliferant. In either case, a liquid missile generally requires valves and gauges that are lightweight, operate with sub-millisecond time cycles, and have a reliable and reproducible operation time. These valves must also accept electrical signals from standard computer interfaces and require little, if any, ancillary electrical equipment. The choice of liquid propellant may also influence other technology choices. Some liquid propellants are storable, and others must be cryogenically cooled to temperatures approaching absolute zero. The cryogenic coolers make the missile less mobile and more difficult to prepare to fire. The superpowers long ago abandoned nonstorable liquid-propellant missiles for these reasons, but a country that can support the technology to manufacture and store liquid oxygen and hydrogen may find this to be one possible path to making an ICBM. The ICBM trajectory creates the most stressing problem for weapons integration, mainly because of the enormous heat load that velocity imparts to the reentry vehicle (RV). A TBM reenters the atmosphere at about 2 km/sec, and an ICBM reenters at about 6 km/sec. This increase in velocity creates more than an order of magnitude increase in associated heating.
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Traditionally, ICBMs have overcome the heat load with two reentry strategies: one using a very high ballistic coefficient and one using a very low ballistic coefficient. The choice has important and mutually exclusive implications for other aspects of the design. If a low ballistic coefficient is selected for RVs, it may only require that the heat shield be built from very simple and easy to obtain material, such as cork and phenolic. These materials provide sufficient thermal protection because the velocity of the RV is dissipated high in the atmosphere and the surplus thermal energy is transferred to the shock wave that the RV creates and the turbulence of the flow in its wake. Since the RV has slowed almost to terminal velocity, the unpredictable conditions of the winds aloft reduce accuracy. A low ballistic coefficient RV may have a circular error probability (CEP) as great as 20 km from the reentry phase of its flight alone. It has, however, slowed to the point where the dissemination of chemical and biological agents is more feasible. On the other hand, if a high ballistic coefficient is selected, the nosetip of the RV must endure temperatures in excess of 2,000 C. Temperatures in this range call for the best thermal insulating materials possible, such as 3-d or 4-d carbon/carbon. In addition to protecting the RV from extreme heating, the nosetip must also experience very little erosion of its contour as it travels through the atmosphere. Materials that provide both of these properties are rare and generally limited to manufacture in technologically advanced countries. Either of these reentry strategies benefits from the aid of a post-boost vehicle (PBV). The use of a PBV makes a high ballistic coefficient RV especially accurate. The PBV operates in space after the missile has burned completely. It steers out the guidance errors that have accumulated during the boost phase of the firing and puts the RV on a more accurate ballistic path. It can also be used just before the RV reenters the atmosphere to correct any errors in the flight path that have occurred because of assumptions about the Earths gravitational field between the launch point and the target. In a sophisticated PBV, the vehicle may realign the RV so it reenters the atmosphere with little aerodynamic oscillation. It may also spin the RV to even out contour changes in the nosetip and, thereby, reduce unpredictable flow fields around the body. The spinning gives the RV a gyroscopic inertia that damps out small perturbations in the attitude of the RV. With a PBV, a proliferator can achieve a targeting accuracy of 500 m over an intercontinental range. In general, the PBV costs about half of the total throw weight of a missile. For these reasons, its use is traded off with chemical and biological agents payload. The tables include technologies for extending range by simple modifications to boosters, separating a warhead so it can re-enter, making a thrust vector control system that is consistent with the higher aerodynamic and thrust loads on an ICBM, and increasing the responsiveness of thrust vector control. The tables list first the most useful technologies for range extension and for building complete motors for an ICBM. Then, they list in descending order those technologies that advance capability to
(1) build a large arsenal very quickly; (2) allow a warhead to reenter the atmosphere without burning up; (3) develop more accurate warheads from the post-boost phase through the reentry phase; and (4) support an ICBM arsenal with other military equipment, such as silos or other protected launch sites. As in other subsections, each of the tabulated technologies, or adaptations of technologies, applies to a specific subsystem of the missile: airframe, propulsion, guidance control and navigation, and weapons integration. The Foreign Technology Assessment paragraphs explore these programs in greater depth and evaluate the technical depth of various nations that are trying to build space launch vehicles and ICBMs. RATIONALE ICBMs create a true proliferation problem because they enable the proliferator to break out of a regional context and move toward potential global impact. Regardless of the origin of a conflict, a proliferator may involve the entire world simply by threatening to spread the war with an ICBM. In 1991, Iraq demonstrated this principle even with the limited-range al Abbas missile. Whatever unspoken protocols existed during the Cold War, they will almost certainly cease to exist when an ICBM-armed proliferator makes threats against a target. Therefore, the ICBM subsection emphasizes technologies that pose the most immediate threat against the United States and its allies, assuming that no ballistic missile defenses are readily available. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.2-1) Systems Seven nationsthe United States, Russia, China, France, Japan, India, and Israelhave launched space vehicles, demonstrating generalized capability to build an ICBM. Israel has demonstrated the clearest link between a space launch program and a missile delivery system with the Shavit, the first Israeli satellite, and a substantial copy and scaled-up version of the Jericho II missile. Although Ukraine has not launched any space vehicles, it has produced large space launch systems as well as the worlds only heavy ICBM, the SS-18. Brazil is developing a sounding rocket that has applications to an ICBM program, and Pakistan has made first-generation rockets that indicate an underlying objective of developing an ICBM. No country has yet sold ICBMs abroad. Under United States pressure, Taiwan all but abandoned its space launch program in 1993. However, a residual infrastructure of knowledge and manufacturing capability remains in Taiwan. South Korea and Indonesia, once ICBM aspirants, have also dropped their development programs in recent years because of U.S. pressure and economic forces. No one purchaser names a possible price for the purchase of an ICBM, since none have been sold as unregulated commodities in the way that SCUDs have. However,
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other sales provide some indication of the rough costs. The Brazilians reportedly expected to receive in excess of $10 million each for their Condor II, whose range of 1,000 km is much less than intercontinental, and the Chinese apparently received about $20 million for each of the 2,500-km range CSS-2s they sold to Saudi Arabia. Many studies within the United States indicate that the Peacekeeper, a highly capable and advanced missile, costs the military about $65 million per copy. At $50 million per missile, a country would need to invest about $2 billion to purchase or build 40 missiles. When this is compared to the roughly $200 million the Iraqis paid to build their Saad 16 missile manufacturing facility, it becomes clear that the economies of many countries cannot support a nuclear weapons production capability and an ICBM launch capability. Existing ICBMs and their countries of origin include: China, the CSS-4; France, the M5 and M4; the FSU, the SS-11, -13, -17, -18, -19, -24, -25, and the SSN-20 and -23; and the United States, the MM III, Peacekeeper, and Trident. Subsystems A determined proliferant can make an ICBM by substituting many technologies for the ones that have been listed so far as being militarily sufficient. The proliferants that have not been named as already capable of building an ICBMIran, Iraq, Syria, and Libyaneed to seek out certain technologies on overseas markets. The nature of an acquisition program need not reveal its intention, if substitutions for certain materials are done properly. Hardware Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya can manufacture or import steel of an equivalent grade to the material found in the early Minuteman II ICBM. If these countries seek to build a composite motor case instead, they must purchase the filament-winding machine from the United States, the FSU, France, Germany, the UK, or South Africa. The Chinese may be able to supply a reverse engineered filament winding machine based on Soviet technology. Other than the traditional solid-propellant manufacturing centers in France, Sweden, Norway, Germany, and the United States, many other European countries with arms manufacturing centers, such as the Czech Republic, have some solid-propellant capability. In addition, Pakistan can manufacture small, solid-propellant motors that can be used as strap-on boosters. South Africa also has an indigenous solid-propellant production capability, which, if it so desired, can export small solid-propellant motors. Proliferators that may wish to follow the liquid-fueled path to ICBMs without using strap-ons are likely to purchase turbopumps primarily from Germany, Sweden, the United States, France, or Russia.
The guidance and control package that a country needs to support an ICBM depends upon the desired accuracy it expects to achieve with its missile. Without a PBV, this accuracy is going to be poor, and more rudimentary technology can be used. Any industrial/advanced nation manufactures equipment and parts that, when properly constructed, can be used to build an inertial measuring unit. In addition to the United States, a proliferant can turn to Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Italy, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, or India. In general, though, a guidance and control unit, using a digital guidance computer and consistent with a staged missile, cannot be built from cannibalized parts of older, analog guidance systems. A PBV requires a small liquid rocket motor, cold gas thrusters, or many small total impulse solid rocket motors. These motors must be supported by a small guidance, control, and navigation unit that flies with the RVs until they are dropped. GPS units have wide application for this particular phase of the ICBM trajectory. Because of existing export controls, a proliferant would have to modify an over-the-counter GPS receiver to operate at high altitude and at ICBM velocities. The knowledge of how to build a GPS receiver is now widespread, however, and many individual hobbyists have built receivers that evade these restrictions. A modified GPS receiver or a GLONASS receiver is completely consistent with the needs of a PBV. Technical Assistance Besides supplying whole systems, many corporations and nations have offered technical assistance in the last 10 years to some emerging missile powers. German firms reportedly assisted the missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and Libya. The Italians have offered assistance to Argentina, Egypt, and India. The French have participated in missile programs in Iraq and Pakistan. Israel has been accused by international arms regulators of participating in technology programs that lend a country the capability to build or modify a ballistic missile. The South Africans reportedly have received significant aid from the Israelis. Most European countries can lend technical assistance to emerging missiles powers. The French have a long history of developing missiles, not only to support the Ariane space launch capability but to launch the force de frappe nuclear arsenal. The Italians have participated in the European Union space program that helped design the Hermes missile. While the British relied on American missile programs in the 1960s to supply their TBM needs, a technical exchange program between Britain and the United States trained and educated a sizable pool of missile talent from the British Isles.
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Airframe Country Serial Staging Parallel Staging Strap-on Boosters HighEnergy Solid Propellants
Propulsion LargeScale Cast Solid Grains Large Turbopumps for Liquid Fuels
Guidance and Control GPS for PostBoost Vehicles (PBV) Small Guidance Computers to fit on PBV
Weapons Integration PostBoost Vehicles Bomblets
Terminally Reentry Guided Thermal Reentry Protection Vehicles Materials
sufficient level
some
limited
Figure 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters

Technology
Small solid strap-on boosters (Solid boosters with propellants having >86% solids) Serial staging hardware
Capable of producing a total system thrust of 10,000 lb (vacuum)
MTCR 2; USML IV; WA Cat. 9A; CCL Cat. 9A MTCR 3; USML IV MTCR 3; USML IV
None identified
Rocket test stands; Shaker facilities for environmental testing
Internal grain burn profile calculation software
First stage thrust level of 100,000 lb (vacuum)
None identified
Rocket test stands; Shaker facilities for environmental testing Rocket test stands; Shaker facilities for environmental testing Environmental test and evaluation
None identified
Parallel staging hardware Capable of producing a total system thrust of 100,000 lb (vacuum) Thrust vector control systems Equivalent to trapped ball joint demonstrated at vector angles of ~5 deg consistent with solid rocket operations Extendible cones that can increase the upper atmosphere expansion ratio to 30:1 Total impulse of >50,000 lbsec
None identified
None identified
PROPULSION
MTCR 2; USML IV MTCR 2; USML IV
None identified
None identified
Extendible nozzle exit cones
None identified
Cold gas generators or dynamic test facilities to reproduce flight conditions and exit pressures High-energy x-ray machines; rocket test stands; CT machines
None identified
Solid-propellant motors
MTCR 2; USML IV; WA Cat. 9A; CCL Cat. 9A MTCR 2; USML IV; WA Cat. 9A; CCL Cat. 9A MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C; USML V
Liners, insulation, adhesives, and case materials to withstand temperatures of 1000 oC or higher None identified
None identified
Liquid-propellant engines Total impulse of >50,000 lbsec
Rocket test stands; valves and piping with flow control deviation no greater than 0.5% and duty cycle timing deviation <20 msec T cell propellant burners and equipment instrumented to detect flow oscillations in segmented solid rocket grains
None identified
Solid propellants
Propellants, dopants and additives that produce Isp = 275 sec or greater in finished missile
Geometrically homogenous aluminum powder and metal hydrides
Programs that calculate thrust time traces for given internal grain cutouts
(contd)
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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
Solid propellant oxidizers Specialty oxidizers that increase burn rate or burn stability
WA ML 8; USML V; MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C WA ML 8; MTCR 4; USML V; CCL Cat. 1C MTCR 3; USML IV MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; USML IV MTCR 2; USML IV, XV
Geometrically homo- UFAP size filtration and genous ultra-fine size gauges (dia. <0.002 in.) ammonium perchlorate or equivalent MAPO, TEPAN, None identified Catocene, Butacene
None identified
Solid propellant additives Additives that modify missile emission spectra, aid in reducing flow instability, contribute to thrust vector control or increase burn rate Turbopumps Shaft speeds >8,000 RPM or discharge pressures >7,000 KPa Test stands capable of withstanding a thrust of >20,000 lb
None identified
None identified
Large torsion shaft dynamometers High frame rate cameras that are shock, vibration and thermal hardened; Thrust measurement hardware Thrust stand with torsional force and moment measurement capability to determine pitch and roll forces and moments Calibration equipment with 100 kbyte/sec sample and hold capability
None identified
None identified
None identified
Thrust vector control
Steering guidance for multiple- body missiles that produces in excess of 1 deg/ sec pitch rate and control for <10 Hz oscillations
High atomic weight injection fluid for steering and pitch control
Adaptive software to calculate theoretical positional change with measured position change in flight and compensate for the difference Encryption algorithms of DES standard 40 bit and higher
Telemetry or encrypted telemetry data transmission hardware
Transmission rates of 20 kbyte/sec or analog equivalent and operation in a high vibration environment
None identified MTCR 12; CCL Cat. 5A-P1; CCL Cat. 5A-P2 USML XV; WA Cat. 5A-P1; WA Cat. 5A-P2; WA ML 11 WA ML 18; MTCR 5; USML XXI None identified
Fluid energy mills for grinding and mixing highly energetic materials
Explosion-resistant equipment designed to handle energetic materials
Frictionless closure valves and valves without pinch closure
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Propellants
Utilization of hydrazine and nitrogen-tetraoxide families
WA ML 8; MTCR 4; USML V
None identified
Propellant scrubbing None identified equipment and vapor control technology; production equipment for hydrazine and nitrogen tetraoxide Valves and valve control Efficient software solenoids algorithms that support major cycle time of 50 msec Flight test vehicles that allow subscale velocity and vibration calibrations; Small computers Digital implementation of common guidance laws such as the Lambert guidance laws. Calculations of positions in space such as the range insensitive axis or the time insensitive axis Nonlinear multiple equation solving algorithms based on matrix mathematics and Doppler corrections None identified
Vernier motor controls
Boost cut off command signals within 0.25 deg of programmed injection angle, 2% of burnout altitude and 1% of burnout velocity IMUs capable of solving the Lambert guidance equations and updating PBV positions in a 50 ms major cycle time
USML XXI
None identified
Small, lightweight, IMUs consistent with postboost vehicles
EAR; MTCR 9; USML XV; CCL Cat. 7A
None identified
Stage timing sequencers Operation times of staging for hot fly out staging events including squib firing in less than 250 ms with a repeatability of error of less than 25 ms Propulsion/airframe/ flight control system integration
USML XXI; MTCR 3
None identified
None identified
Provide optimum system per- MTCR 9; formance within confines of WA ML 11; airframe/propulsion system architecture to meet mission USML IV requirements Nose tip heat protection for RVs with ballistic coefficient in excess of 1,500 psf with 3 mm/sec or less of ablation at 2,000 F MTCR 8; USML IV
None identified
None identified
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Nose tip material
Carbon Carbon material or 3d carbon carbon material that can be exposed to temperatures in excess of 3,500 F
Autoclave and furnaces capable of carbonizing and graphitizing materials
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Radar altimeter fusing
Fusing and firing accuracy of less than 1,000 ft regardless of trajectory or elevation of target
MTCR 2; WA ML 4; USML IV
None identified
Flight test vehicles that allow subscale velocity and vibration calibrations; radar antennas capable of operation in highly ionized environments Aerodynamic braking hardware, parachutes, split flap control hardware
None identified
Submunitions separation Circular pattern dispersal of or dispensing chemical or biological mechanisms submunitions of greater than 0.5-km radius at mean target elevation
WA ML 4; USML IV
None identified
None identified
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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data

Small solid strap-on boosters (Solid boosters with propellants having >86% solids) Serial staging hardware Parallel staging hardware
Integration of booster strap-ons
Ranges above 1,000 km allow proliferants to reach targets of United States interest Maximum range for given missile weight, lower launch accelerations
Parallel staging; Serial staging Strap-on boosters; Parallel staging
Proper sequencing of staging Staging coordination
Reduces overall burn time of ICBM and Serial staging; strap-on boosters therefore complicates tracking
PROPULSION
Thrust vector control systems
Controlling and directing the high thrust Highly capable thrust vector control Less capable TVC systems of an ICBM first stage systems support a variety of targeting adapted from theater missiles with strategies very constrained trajectories Making a lightweight nozzle design that Increases range without motor is rigid enough to accommodate moving modifications on solid rocket motors parts Casting and curing either case bonded Indigenous production of second or cartridge loaded propellant without stages for existing missiles allows a cracking or delaminations proliferant to extend range Larger exit cones and related longer stage lengths Liquid propellant engines
Extendible nozzle exit cones
Solid-propellant motors
Liquid-propellant engines
Increasing the propellant flow rate and Engines in existing missiles can be Solid propellant motors combustion chamber pressure/ replaced with higher performance temperature, by using such processes engines for extended range or payload as regenerative cooling, without damaging the engine Increasing the Isp of the propellant Solid propellant missiles are difficult to Liquid propellants locate and target because of their simplicity, storability and smaller support train Better oxidizers provide a more efficient, longer range missile None identified
Solid propellants
Solid-propellant oxidizers
Increasing the oxidizer efficiency and supporting faster burn rates by the reduction in particle size
Solid-propellant additives
Achieving the desired propellant Propellant signature modification None identified properties (e.g., burn rate, deflagration disguises a launch for cueing satellites, control, flow stability) with which direct missile defense batteries unconventional materials Increasing propellant and oxidizer flow Modern, higher performance to the thrust chamber turbopumps make liquid propellant engines more reliable Ullage tanks
Turbopumps
(contd)
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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (contd)

Accurately measuring the force and torsional response of the stand to generate an accurate thrust time profile; flame containment and explosion isolation Predicting the proper mixture ratios and flow rates under dynamic conditions to precisely control the flight Real time encryption and transmission of data from a moving vehicle Modern solid propellants detonate in shock and spark environments and destroy facilities Adequate production and storage facilities Flow control of steering motors or engines Placing a capable IMU on a small final stage with limited thrust Signal timing and transmission
Thrust time profiles allow proliferants to fly on unusual trajectories (e.g. depressed or lofted)
None identified
Thrust vector control
Control the flight path of the missile
Aerodynamic surfaces
Telemetry or encrypted telemetry data transmission hardware Fluid energy mills for grinding and mixing highly energetic materials Propellants
Prevents observers from understanding the intention of missile flight and static test programs Manufacture of high Isp propellants and oxidizers Increased range and payload
Open channel communication
Older, more dangerous facilities
Other propellants
Vernier motor controls Small, lightweight, IMUs consistent with post-boost vehicles Stage timing sequencers for hot fly out staging Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration
Rocket-powered missiles Highly accurate guidance for reduced CEP Increase reliability of ICBMs
None identified Post-boost vehicles and ACMs which steer out boost inaccuracy
Aligning guidance and control system Reduced CEP and higher azimuth inertial space reference with geometric accuracy reference of vehicle
(contd)
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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (contd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications WEAPONS INTEGRATION Alternative Technologies
Nose tip material
Dealing with severe aerothermal environment associated with high ballistic coefficients Transmitting and recovering signals through a highly ionized environment and through a radar window in the RV
All reentry vehicles
Low ballistic coefficient reentry vehicles with less advanced materials Multiple step firing and fuzing circuits including G sensitive circuits that detect the point where aerodynamic and gravitational forces balance and then time a command signal Low ballistic coefficients reentry with spherical reentry vehicles that reduce the reentry velocity high in the atmosphere. The acceptance of a large loss in accuracy is implied
Radar altimeter fusing
Weapons requiring detonation at specific above ground altitude
Submunitions separation or dispensing mechanisms
Releasing the submunitions at a velocity to disperse agent without destroying it
Increase dissemination efficiency when used in conjunction with low ballistic coefficient reentry vehicles
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SECTION 1.3CRUISE MISSILES
OVERVIEW The Cruise Missiles subsection reviews the many ways a proliferant can construct a cruise missile to deliver a WMD. The term cruise missile covers several vehicles and their capabilities, from the Chinese Silkworm (HY-2), which has a range of less than 105 km, to the U.S. Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which can fly to ranges of up to 3,000 km. These vehicles vary greatly in their speed and ability to penetrate defenses. All, however, meet the definition of a cruise missile: an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target. Proliferants can achieve a cruise missile capability by simply buying existing cruise missiles from supplier states and modifying them to meet a particular need, or they can make a complete system from readily available parts. European aerospace firms, the FSU, and the Chinese have all sold many cruise missiles of one description or another to customers in proliferant and industrialized countries. In most cases, the performance of missiles is range limited and, in some cases, even payload limited, and their use as a carrier of WMD is probably confined to tactical applications. With the introduction of new guidance technologies, particularly the GPS, future cruise missiles will be more accurate and attractive to proliferants. The United States introduced cruise missiles into its inventory when a combination of technologies reached a critical point in their development. Taken together, these same technologies can easily form the underpinnings for a capable unmanned aerial system. Except for Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM), the 1990s have seen these technologies, or the knowledge of how to reproduce them, become widespread among industrialized and newly industrializing nations. The introduction of GPS and GLONASS eliminates the need for a country to rely on TERCOM navigation. A proliferator is not forced to seek out any other technologies to build a cruise missile, though many, such as rocket-assisted take-off units, may give a combatant more flexibility in using a cruise missile for a variety of combat operations. Many proliferants have the scientific and research base to design airframes and build them to meet the needs of a cruise missile program. Arms control officials in the U.S. State Department and many of its overseas counterparts are attempting to reduce high volume serial production of cruise missiles, particularly ones that support a chemical or biological weapons infrastructure. Consequently, the tables identify technologies that assist the mass production of cruise missiles. Once a country has an assured supply of engines and guidance components, the path to a capable cruise missile fleet becomes easier.
Highlights
Existing over-the-counter technology allows a proliferant to assemble a threatening cruise missile. Cruise missiles are ideally suited for the delivery of biological agents. Subsonic cruise missiles can survey a target for meteorological conditions before spreading agent. Supersonic cruise missiles may increase the probability of penetrating defenses. A supersonic/subsonic hybrid cruise missile is difficult for a proliferant to build. Wind tunnels, computer design routines, and spray flow field modeling all assist a proliferant to build a more capable cruise missile.
Of the four major subsystems that compose a cruise missileairframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integrationnone is expensive in and of itself, and a steady supply of each is available. In the late 1960s, the United States first introduced turbine propulsion systems that weighed less than 100 lb and produced many hundreds of pounds of thrust. These turbine engines, or their lineal descendants, powered most of the early U.S. cruise missile designs and were one of the least costly items. Depending upon the range a proliferant desires for its cruise missile, the powerplant may even be as prosaic as a reciprocating engine with a propeller. The latter, of course, has little hope of disguising its signature from defenses, but the mission profile may allow it to disguise itself as another platform. Even if no signature modification is considered, this type of missile has applications in regional wars where the technology of the defense is not as important as it is to an attacking proliferant. Currently, GPS receivers provide more capability and accuracy than any targeting strategy requires of the guidance, control, and navigation subsystem. Cruise missiles,
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being aerodynamic vehicles, do not need the rapid response cycle time that ballistic missiles must have to keep the vehicle under control and on an appropriate track. Avionics systems available for first-generation commercial aircraft are both light enough and accurate enough to keep a cruise missile under control for long periods of time. For navigation, civilian code GPS is priced for the civilian hobbyist market, so purchasing an off-the-shelf navigation unit capable of obtaining 20 m of CEP is within the range of the common pocketbook. This level of accuracy is better than that of the early TERCOM systems installed on U.S. cruise missiles, which made them practical for the first time in the late 1970s. For long cruise missile flight paths, a country without access to GPS systems must develop a mapping guidance logic for its cruise missile or accept highly degraded performance from an inertial measurement unit (IMU). A proliferant using one or two cruise missiles in an isolated attack from a standoff platform can achieve all of its targeting aims with an IMU, but long flight paths allow errors in the IMU to become so great that the missile may stray far from its target. Also, without an updated mapping system, the cruise missile must fly at an altitude high enough to avoid all manmade obstacles, thereby exposing itself to detection. Even with GPS, the autonomous cruise missile carrying an on-board map must be supplied with the latest terrain and physical feature changes that have occurred along its course if it flies near the ground. Updated autonomous map guidance systems require large computer storage memories aboard the aircraft with units that can withstand the flight vibrations and possible thermal extremes of the missile over a longduration flight. These units must be supplied with the latest maps that the delivering nation can obtain. Few nations have the space flight vehicles or high-altitude aircraft to build radar maps from overflights alone. Consequently, these maps will have to be purchased, or the proliferant will have to accept the attrition from missiles lost because of outdated information. The United States and Russia understand the key position that radar maps play in cruise missile guidance and are unlikely to allow the information stored in these maps to be released on the world market. Even if these maps are sold through some clandestine channel, they will quickly become outdated since cultural features change rather rapidly. As an alternative, a country may try to develop another guidance scheme, but the costs for developing a new infrastructure to support a map-based guidance system probably rivals that of the original TERCOM or a GPS constellation itself. In the absence of GPS, the reliability of the cruise missile targeting philosophy becomes increasingly more problematic. As an alternative, a country may attempt to fly its cruise missile with radio guidance or other commands. Usually radio guidance uses frequencies high enough to operate only on line-of-sight reception. If the country expects to operate in hostile territory or attack at very long ranges, it must control the intervening repeater station to contact these missiles by real-time transmission of flight controls signals and position information.
Since cruise missiles fly relatively slowly and with only gentle accelerations, at the entry level, the airframes of these delivery systems can be built out of inexpensive aluminum of a grade as simple as 2024 - T1. Most proliferants with a basic metal production facility and an access to textbooks on metallurgy have a ready supply of this grade of aluminum. As proliferants design and build more sophisticated cruise missiles, they will undoubtedly substitute composite materials and other more elaborate structural elements in the airframe, but, for the most part, these materials are not needed. A cruise missile airframe does not undergo particularly severe stress on its flight to a target, it does not pull any high g maneuvers, and it does not experience propulsion accelerations associated with gun or ballistic missile launches. Virtually any airframe that is structurally sound enough to be used in an ordinary airplane is adequate for a cruise missile. A designer can use factors of safety of 1.5 or 2 in the design to ensure structural integrity under all dynamic conditions without recourse to structural finite element computer codes, which generally only assist a designer to shave four or five percent from the weight of a design. Still, these technologies are included in the tables because their use does allow a proliferant to build a more capable cruise missile. Technologies that advance the large serial production of inexpensive cruise missiles threaten current defenses built against missile attacks. These technologies include sheet metal processing machines that could form complex shapes, such as those found on the airframe or leading edge of cruise missiles; hydraulic presses or stamping mills that shape the nose cones or turbine inlets; and numerically controlled machines for parts production. If a country wants to increase the penetrability of its cruise missiles, it must identify technologies that aid in signature reduction, signature masking, or other means to confuse detection systems. Some of these technologies include radar jamming and spoofing technologies; infrared suppression of engine exhaust; paints and coatings that disguise the thermal signature of leading edges; computer routines that predict the flow field around aerodynamic surfaces and the methods to change those surfaces to reduce heat transfer and turbulent flow fields; wind tunnel technology that supports the computer prediction; and computer routines that predict the RCS from a given geometry and predict redesign methods to achieve certain design specifications. The cruise missile is suited for the delivery of chemical or biological agents if it does not fly at supersonic or transonic speeds. Most cruise missiles designed to fly at high speeds are not similarly able to fly at slow speeds without dramatic changes in the wing planform in flight. These changes in wing planform are generally not consistent with cruise missile geometries or packing volumes in the same way they might be in manned aircraft, such as the FB-111. Supersonic missiles generally cannot dispense chemical and biological agents from sprayers since the airstream itself will destroy the agent by heating or shock, but they do deliver nuclear weapons with great efficiency. None of these considerations are exclusive impediments to a proliferants cruise
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missile development program. It is only a general guideline that high-speed cruise missiles make sense as a means to deliver nuclear weapons and low-speed cruise missiles are better suited for chemical and biological weapons. Bomblets can also be included on transonic or supersonic missiles. These bomblets can be released over a target to ameliorate the airstream problem. After release, the bomblets decelerate, float to the target, and spray their agent into the air. Bomblets reduce the packing fraction of agent within the cruise missile airframe and, therefore, reduce the overall payload of a cruise missile. A subsonic cruise missile equipped with a sprayer dispensing agent from a single tank onboard the missile may simply release the agent into the airstream. In most cases, a large fraction of this agent will be destroyed before it reaches its target. To be more effective, the sprayer must dispense the agent so that it avoids the vortex from the tips of the wings and the disturbed airflow from the fuselage. Technologies that are required to develop bomblets, predict their flight path, or enhance the capabilities of sprayers as a means for a proliferant to deliver WMD from a cruise missile are highlighted. Three key concerns of the cruise missile threat are (1) range extension to ranges greater than 500 km, (2) the ability to penetrate defenses, and (3) any technologies that reduce the cost of manufacture and therefore increase the size of a cruise missile inventory. In order of priority, the tables first list technologies that assist a country in building long-range cruise missiles. The tables then cover technologies that reduce the signature of a cruise missile and list those technologies that decrease the per unit cost or increase the total serial production of cruise missiles for a fixed price. Finally, the tables include support technologies that may make cruise missiles easier to use, package, or launch. As with each of the other delivery systems subsections, the tables are organized by specific subsystem of the aircraft: airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration. Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles as a potential threat because they share so many common technologies with existing vehicles that have been designed for other purposes. As a consequence, a proliferant can obtain much of the hardware to construct a cruise missile by cannibalizing existing commercial aircraft or by purchasing parts and components for the missile from legitimate suppliers. The technology tables serve only as a guideline to alert and inform export control regulators of general categories of technologies as opposed to specific performance specifications. RATIONALE Cruise missiles pose perhaps the gravest delivery system proliferation threat to U.S. worldwide interests. They are inexpensive to build and can, therefore, overwhelm current defenses by sheer numbers. They can be designed to be small with low-thrust engines and can penetrate radar and infrared-detection networks. The technology to build them is simple and available to any country that builds even rudimentary aircraft. Finally, since cruise missiles are unmanned, they require no flight crew training, expensive upkeep programs, special hangars for housing, or large air bases
for basing. These factors make it especially difficult to collect intelligence on the development of indigenous cruise missiles and to anticipate the developing threat. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.3-1) Systems At least 12 exporting countriesGreat Britain, the United States, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Taiwanhave developed cruise missiles with some capability in the hands of proliferants to threaten U.S. worldwide interests. Generally, these cruise missiles are small and have a limited range. While it is possible that they can be converted to deliver WMD, their short range limits their possible targets of interest. They may deliver biological or chemical agents against ports and airfields in regions of concern such as the Persian Gulf, but are not able to attack longer range targets. In addition, cruise missiles, such as the Chinese Silkworm, have many other limitations besides short range that restrict their utility as a WMD delivery system. The missiles leave a turbulent airflow in their wake, which makes it difficult to deliver a sprayed pathogen or chemical agent cloud. They fly along a predictable path towards the target rather than one that can realign itself to match the geometry of the target. The following cruise missiles are a sample of missiles that are available legitimately on the world market and pose less threat as possible candidates for conversion to WMD delivery: the British Sea Eagle, the Chinese Seersucker and Silkworm, the French Exocet, the German Kormoran, the Israeli Gabriel, the Italian Otomat, the Japanese SSM-1, the Norwegian Penguin, the Soviet SSN-2C and its derivatives, the Swedish RBS-15, the Taiwanese Hsiung Feng 2, and the U.S. Harpoon. Older missiles, such as the Silkworm, have cumbersome and slow-moving control surfaces that do not readily adapt to the improvement in position calculation that GPS provides. Moreover, their guidance systems are intended mostly for the missiles in which they are placed and have little transference to a new airframe if they should be cannibalized. In most cases, the ease with which a cruise missile can be built leads a proliferant to build a new missile from scratch rather than attempting to adapt these older missiles for WMD delivery. Even if the missiles do not pose a significant threat against U.S. worldwide interests, some aspects of their manufacturing base may migrate to more capable missiles and require close scrutiny. Missiles that contain small turbojet engines can be cannibalized, and the engines can be used in more threatening applications. A proliferant can also glean the knowledge to build these turbojets by reverse engineering the engines or setting up indigenous co-production facilities. Examples of exported missiles with small turbojet engines include the British Sea Eagle and the Chinese HY-4. Israel is offering an upgraded Gabriel, which features the latest in propulsion technology, to overseas customers. Other missiles in this class include the U.S. Harpoon, the
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Swedish RBS-15, the Soviet SS-N-3, the Soviet SS-N-21, and the Otomat Mark-II. Cruise missiles that have immediate application to nuclear, chemical, and biological delivery include the U.S. Tomahawk and ACM, the Russian SSN-21, the AS-15, and the French Apache. Harpoons have been exported to 19 countries, including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. India has received Sea Eagles, while Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. Italy has Kormorans, and Taiwan, South Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Kenya, Singapore, and Thailand have Gabriel Mark-IIs. Italy has exported turbojet powered Otomats to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, while the Swedes exported the RBS-15 to Yugoslavia and Finland. In addition, the Soviets sold the long-range (500 km, 850 kg) turbojet powered Shaddock to Syria and Yugoslavia. At the next notch down in technological capability, the Soviets have flooded the world market with 1960s-generation liquid-fueled Styx (SS-N-2C) missiles. Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia have the Styx missile in their inventories. As the list of customers for the Styx demonstrates, the cost of a cruise missile is within the financial resources of even the most basic defense budgets. Even highly capable cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk only cost around $1.5 million per copy. This cost reflects the most advanced avionics systems and TERCOM guidance. At least one congressional study has shown that with the substitution of GPS, a proliferant could build a cruise missile with a range and payload capability roughly equivalent to the Tomahawk, for about $250,000. Unlike production of the heavy bomber, many countries have the economic resources and technical base to produce this kind of delivery system indigenously.
Subsystems Though the sale of complete systems on the world market is a concern, that threat is much smaller than the possibility that a country could indigenously design and build a capable cruise missile by cannibalizing other systems for parts it cannot build on its own. Of particular concern are components and parts that reduce the cost of the missile in serial production, reduce the cost of position mapping navigation systems, and increase the range of these missiles. Navigation and guidance continues to be the pacing item in threatening cruise missile development. The Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) is a derivative of the Harpoon and contains in its nose a video camera that acts as a terminal guidance system. If a proliferant adopts this technology and can position a transmitter and receiver within line-of-sight to the missile from anywhere in the theater, it can dispense with the need for any other kind of guidance system. Israel has developed a capable guidance system that can be used in this application. The next major subsystem component that enhances the capability of a cruise missile is the powerplant. The United States pursued the cruise missile long before the development of the first lightweight engine technology, so this is not a critical path item towards developing a cruise missile. Still, more capable engines increase the threat of a cruise missile. First, they reduce the RCS of the missile. Next, they increase the range by reducing the drag and power required for control surface actuation. Finally, they reduce other flight signatures, such as infrared cross-section and acoustic emission, that might be exploited in a defense network.
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Airframe Country Control Surface Actuators High Wing Loading Aerodynamic Designs High Thrust-toWeight Jet Engines
Propulsion Small Turbine Engines
Guidance and Control Advanced Radar Maps High-Energy to Support Fuels Terrcom Digital Topographical Maps to Support GPS Dynamic Test Equipment
Weapons Integration Sprayers Adapted to Airstream Small Nuclear Weapons

some

limited
sufficient level
Figure 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters

Technology
CFD design optimization routines
PC and workstation codes that optimize physical properties such as vehicle weight per payload PC and workstation codes that generate NC machine tool instructions
CCL EAR 99; MTCR 16
None identified
None identified
Operating systems for high speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU Operating systems for high speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU Operating systems for high speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU Operating systems for high speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU Operating systems for high speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU None
CFD inverse design routines
WA Cat. 2D; CCL Cat. 2D
None Identified
High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems None identified
Finite element structural computer routines
PC-based routines capable of CCL EAR 99 making more than 1,000 node calculations and containing automatic mesh generators Codes with automatic equations of state calculations CCL EAR 99; MTCR 16
None Identified
Hydrodynamic computer routines
None Identified
Fluid mechanics finite element routines
PC based routines with mesh generators and Lagrangian logic
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
Metal stamping equipment Composite filamentwinding equipment
Capable of forming fuselages and leading edges in metal of 0.020 in. thickness or less Two or more coordinated axes
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
MTCR 6; CCL Cat. 1B; WA Cat. 1B MTCR 6; CCL Cat. 1B; WA Cat. 1B
None Identified
None identified
NC head control for winding patterns
Composite tape-laying equipment
Two or more coordinated axes
None Identified
None identified
NC feeder controls
(contd)
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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
Composite weaving or interlacing equipment
Two or more coordinated axes
MTCR 6; CCL Cat. 1B; WA Cat. 1B USML XIII; MTCR 17 USML XIII; MTCR 17 USML XIII; WA ML 17 WA Cat. 9B; CCL Cat. 9B MTCR 10; USML IV
None Identified
None identified
NC feeder controls
Radar absorbing material Material that reduces complete design RCS by more than 10 dB Structurally efficient radar absorbing material Coatings and structural shapes that add less than 10% to the gross lift-off weight of an air vehicle IR reduction paints and coatings
None Identified
Radar ranges
Radar signal return prediction software None identified
None Identified
None identified
Aerodynamic design concepts which reduce IR signature Flow instrumentation
Low latent heat of vaporization dopants and additives None identified
None identified
None identified
Sensors, and data acquisition equipment capable of measuring 2 kHz or higher signals in wind tunnels
Sample and hold data acquisition boards for small computers None identified
Data reduction from sample and hold boards
Innovative flow effectors Adequate control power for vehicle range and speed improvement; lateral (directional) control without vertical stabilizers Turbofan engines Lightweight engines with bypass ratios greater than 6% and weights below 400 lb High thrust-to weight ratio engines (5:1) with weights below 400 lb
None identified
None identified
PROPULSION
MTCR 3; USML VIII MTCR 3; USML VIII
None identified
None identified
None identified
Turbojet engines
None identified
None identified
None identified
Ramjet engines
Ramjet engines weighing less WA Cat. 9A; than 1,900 lb MTCR 3; USML VIII USML IV
None identified
None identified
None identified
Small solid rocket engine Motors weighing less 100 lb with thrust in excess of for takeoff assistance 1,000 lb
High specific impulse solid rocket fuels and burn rate enhancers
Rocket motor test stands
None identified
(contd)
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Technology Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Digital radar maps
Digital representations of the Earth's surface with height resolution <=20 m Digital representations of the Earth's surface with height resolution <= 20 m Receiver capable of reducing civil use code signals to position and velocity within 50 msec
MTCR 11; USML XI MTCR 11; USML XV MTCR 11; USML XV; WA Cat. 7A; CCL Cat. 7A
None identified
Methods to measure radar images of the Earth's surface Over the counter high resolution digital topographical maps None identified
Data compression software Data compression software

C/A code ionosphere correction algorithms. C/A code geoid correction algorithms. Operational receiver software which prevents velocity and altitude limitations. Precision (P) code decryption algorithms.
Digital topographical maps GPS receivers
None identified
None identified
Stellar optics
Equipment and hardware MTCR 9; supporting daylight stellar USML XV observations with better than 1 microradian resolution Any complete system or subset with 10 km or less accuracy at a range of 300 km, or 3.33% or less of range over 300-km range Time control along with vehicle trajectory control to provide accurate location information along mission flight path Equipment providing vibration at 10 g rms. between 20 and 20,000 Hz MTCR 2, 9; USML XV
Low chromatic aberration lenses and specialized optical coatings None identified
Optical test benches capable of calibration to within 0.1 microradian; methods to coat optical surfaces Instrument test range
None identified
Other guidance set design and radio inertial guidance
None identified
Propulsion/airframe/ flight control system integration
MTCR 9; WA ML 11; USML VIII, XV MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; WA Cat. 9B MTCR 2, 16; USML XV WA ML 4; USML IV
None identified
Six degrees of freedom computer models
Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques
None identified
Sample and hold data acquisition boards for small computers
Software capable of 4 times oversampling at 20,000 Hz
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Weapons separation design and prediction
Aerodynamic and trajectory prediction codes validated to within 1% of measured properties
None identified
High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems None identified
None identified
Submunitions separation Submunitions with packing or dispensing densities exceeding 75% mechanisms
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Biological sprayers
Specially designed airstream independent sprayers with nozzles and tankage to maintain live agent viability, with a dissemination efficiency of 10% or greater Specially designed airstream independent sprayers with a dissemination efficiency of 10% or greater
USML XIV
None identified
Wind tunnels
None identified
Chemical sprayers
USML XIV
Corrosion-resistant materials
Wind tunnels
None identified
Advanced state vector calculation routines
Codes with validated results WA ML 21; that predict submunition USML XXI bomb case and aero glide vehicle variables within 1% of measured variable
High-speed None identified computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems
None identified
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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data

CFD design optimization routines CFD inverse design routines
Multivariate optimization procedures and their implementation Manufacturability and potential alternatives of design code solutions
All flight vehicle structures
Parallel processors for PCs and work stations
Nozzles, turbine blades, and other Parallel processors for PCs and complex components of cruise missile work stations systems Warhead lethality calculation Effective delivery of chemical and biological weapons Meteorology studies for effective delivery of chemical and biological weapons Production of any vehicle parts that have military applications such as TELs Nozzle and inlet manufacture Parallel processors for PCs and work stations Parallel processors for PCs and work stations Parallel processors for PCs and work stations Conventional sheet metal brakes used with less complex shapes Composite technology and materials Metal fuselages Metal fuselages Metal fuselages None identified None identified
Finite element structural computer Mesh generation and element routines geometry and dimensional parameters Hydrodynamic computer routines Fluid mechanics finite element routines Metal-stamping equipment Proper solution of the energy balance in state change calculations Simultaneous solution of Navier Stokes equations None identified
Spin, flow, and shear forming machines Composite filament-winding equipment Composite tape-laying equipment Composite weaving or interlacing equipment Radar-absorbing material Structurally efficient radar absorbing structure Aerodynamic design concepts which reduce IR signature Flow instrumentation
Proper laminar flow control of material
Control of winding tension and material Missile airframe manufacturing supply Control of material feed tension Geometric and elastic uniformity of supply material None identified Maintaining reasonable factors of safetyfuselage, wing at high stress points Maintaining proper aerodynamic properties under all flight conditions and speeds Control surfaces Control surfaces Low observables or stealth applications Any combat air vehicle
Any combat air vehicle
None identified
Calibration and measurement readings Any combat air vehicle in a dynamic environment
Less capable wind tunnels
(contd)
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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data (contd)

Innovative flow effectors
Vehicle 3-axis stability and control with minimal cross-coupling Inefficiency of low-level cruise flight Long flights increase stress and temperature levels on engines lowers thrust Initial boost to achieve ramjet operating speed Achieving high grain burn rates to accelerate a cruise missile without nozzle erosion or high stress on the missile Making the original radar maps from satellite or other overhead surveillance methods Resolution of maps to achieve flight through high relief terrain, cities, or other cultural clutter Correcting civil use code to protected use code by numerical calculation of ionosphere correction Multiple azimuth shots of known stars without interference of other bodies Communication with the moving platform to make real time corrections Alignment of the guidance set within the airframe and calibration of the control corrections
Increased range, maneuverability, and Traditional vertical tail survivability configuration High- level cruise missile applications Turbojets, ramjets, internal combustion engines
PROPULSION
Turbofan engines Turbojet engines
Better engine performance during long Turbojets, ramjets, internal flights combustion engines Surface-to-surface missiles Longer range, more reliable All other cruise missile technology Air drop from large-capacity airplanes
Ramjets Small, solid rocket engine for takeoff assistance
Digital radar maps
Autonomous guidance of aircraft
GPS guidance
Digital topographical maps
Land-based autonomous navigation
GPS guidance
GPS receivers
Any application requiring precise position knowledge Night-time azimuth sightings for artillery pieces or missile firing tables Autonomous ship and tank navigation High-performance air vehicles
GLONASS receivers
Stellar optics Other guidance set design and radio inertial guidance Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration
None identified Inertial, positional, or way point guidance None identified
(contd)
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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data (contd)

Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques Weapons separation design and prediction Submunitions separation or dispensing mechanisms Biological sprayers
Digital control of shakers and other equipment Flight and mechanical properties prediction None identified Keeping the agent from coagulating or breaking up in the wake of the delivery vehicle Keeping the agent from coagulating or breaking up in the wake of the delivery vehicle Numerical integration algorithms
Environmental testing of equipment in high vibration environments Effective dispersal of weapons Effective dispersal of weapons Effective sprayers for any platform
Extensive flight testing
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Extensive flight testing Cold gas thrusters; extensive flight testing Bomblets or other dispensers that disperse agent after the release from the cruise missile Bomblets or other dispensers that disperse agent after the release from the cruise missile Way point flight with many vehicles
Chemical sprayers
Effective sprayers for any platform
Flight path prediction for cruise missiles
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SECTION 1.4COMBAT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
OVERVIEW The Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft subsection addresses the technologies that a nation needs to deliver a WMD by an aircraft. Unlike the cruise and ballistic missile subsections, which describe the additional burden a country may face to build the delivery system, this discussion assumes that most proliferants already possess aircraft or can purchase them legitimately on world markets. Three key attributes of an aircraft pose the greatest threat: (1) reliable delivery of WMD, (2) ability to penetrate defenses, and (3) all-weather, day and night capability. The aircraft subsection describes and lists those technologies that allow a proliferant to carry out a targeting objective. The tables first list technologies that assist a country in weaponizing its aircraft fleet to accept WMD. Then they cover technologies that enable all-weather, day and night aircraft operations. Finally, the tables address the hardware and technical expertise that are needed to assist in penetrating defenses. Each of the tables is organized to categorize technologies, or adaptation of technologies, under the specific subsystem of the aircraft: airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration. Proliferants can pursue at least four technological advances to manned aircraft: (1) methods to increase range, (2) methods to weaponize WMD for reliability, (3) methods to mask or otherwise disguise flight signatures to detection networks, and (4) methods to launch an aircraft attack around the clock and in all-weather conditions. Methods to Extend Range All the identified proliferants maintain some manned aircraft systems. As total delivery systems, any of these aircraft can carry and drop almost any nuclear, chemical, or biological payload that the proliferant is capable of making or purchasing. Proliferants that possess limited-range aircraft have already begun to upgrade the severity of threat these aircraft pose by investigating the world market for in-flight refueling capability. In 1987, Libya purchased in-flight refueling tankers that are capable of extending the range sufficiently to strike European targets. Libyas only impediment to expanding its aircraft range is the availability of interim staging bases from which the tanker aircraft can fly. Because of the physical isolation and political posture of many proliferants, few, if any, countries will act as host for proliferants to stage refueling tanker aircraft that could aid any WMD strike against U.S. worldwide interests. To do so would invite retaliation from the United States and the probable loss of the asset to U.S. counterforce
Highlights
The widespread sale of manned aircraft throughout the world reduces the need for a proliferant to build its own aircraft to deliver WMD. Existing aircraft can be modified to increase their range. In-flight refueling offers the best method to greatly extend aircraft range. All-weather, round-the-clock WMD delivery with manned aircraft is a significant threat. Technologies that assist a proliferant to acquire glide, terminally homed, and aerodynamically steered bombs can threaten U.S. worldwide interests. Existing and readily available avionics, autopilots, and navigation units are compatible with WMD delivery from manned aircraft.
operations. Given this geographical constraint, a proliferator may undertake to make modifications to an existing aircraft to extend range without in-flight refueling. To accomplish any range extension to its aircraft fleet, the country must add additional fuel tanks, reduce the aerodynamic drag, or change the propulsion system to consume less fuel. Modifications to the airframe or propulsion subsystem of an aircraft may augment its range at the margins, but none of the realistic modifications a proliferant might make add to the range in the same dramatic way that an in-flight refueling capability does. Thus, if sales of in-flight refueling aircraft are limited and the use of foreign airfields for tanker traffic are monitored, the WMD aircraft threat can be limited to a regional theater of operation. The technology tables have been organized to highlight these considerations. Methods to Increase Targeting Reliability With a manned crew, targeting reliability is expected to be high. In the event of any problems en route to the target, the crew may be able to take action to change its target. Similarly, most manned aircraft crews usually visually confirm the position of
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a target (except when dropping stand-off weapons, such as cruise missiles). Guidance and navigation subsystems are important to aid in navigation to the target. Significant errors in targeting occur from unpredictable winds, incorrect fuzing information, or poor aerodynamic design. The proper weapons integration of WMD warheads can eliminate most of these problems. An aircraft can often be tracked and shot down by existing defense batteries. At some point, a proliferant aircraft will likely display itself to any tracking sensor as it approaches a target. A proliferant aircraft may, however, delay this detection to radar tracking networks by following contours in the terrain and by employing electronic countermeasures. Neither of these two changes requires modifications to the aircrafts propulsion or airframe and, therefore, they take less effort. Aircraft can be flown to the target using only visual cues if meteorological conditions permit. A technology that allows an aircraft to operate in any weather condition or during any time of the night or day greatly enhances the threat this delivery system poses. In addition, if a technology allows an airplane to fly outside of its normal operating environment, while following the contours of the terrain, the aircraft then complicates defense strategies. Some technologies that can be fitted onto aircraft to accomplish these objectives are (1) an avionics unit that senses position and position rate; (2) small onboard computers capable of automated flight planning, targeting, en route navigation, and ensured terrain avoidance; and (3) addition of stealth. Many flight-qualified control systems produce sufficient force (sometimes known as command authority) and response time (or phase margin) to steer any existing aircraft autonomously. These actuators must be coupled to a flight computer, which detects position and position rates and compares them to an on-board stored radar or topographical map of the terrain. In a fully autonomous system, the flight computer must predict the course far enough in advance to give the aircraft time to maneuver and avoid any obstacles within performance constraints, such as climb rate and roll rate. Complete guidance and control subsystems and the components that comprise them are sufficient technology to constitute a proliferation threat. Methods to Increase Attack Flexibility Navigation systems traditionally compare either analog or digital representations of the Earths surface to the radar or topographical scene through which the airplane flies. In recent years, these computers have relied almost exclusively upon digital representations. While reversion to an analogue scene comparison is not ruled out, digital maps are by far the most militarily threatening. They have better resolution, are more accurate, and are updated frequently by contractors, which removes from the proliferant the burden of generating the databases for these maps. Computers that support digital navigation and scene generation require highly sophisticated storage devices and rapid random access to the stored information.
Methods to Increase Penetration Once an aircraft is within range of defense radars, it may use electronic countermeasures in several ways to spoof defense assets. Sophisticated countermeasures may alter the signal returned to the defense radar to make the aircraft appear to be some other type of aircraft. This technique is especially effective against radars that present thematic rather than actual RCSs to defense personnel evaluating the surroundings. Simpler electronic countermeasures may make an aircraft appear to be much larger or spread out over a greater region of the sky. Consequently, hit-to-kill interceptors may miss the actual aircraft as they fly to intercept the large region within the predicted target area. A proliferants electronic countermeasures may not prevent the aircraft from being ultimately targeted and eliminated, but they delay the interception to allow the aircraft to release its weapon on the actual target or an adjacent target of near equivalent value. As a result, electronic countermeasures are listed as an important technology to be denied to proliferants. As a last resort, a proliferant may attempt simply to overwhelm the defense by saturating a target with too many aircraft to intercept. This is a less attractive alternative with aircraft than it is with cruise missiles because of the high cost of purchasing the aircraft, maintaining them, and training a capable crew. Moreover, since a proliferant cannot predict which aircraft will penetrate and which will be intercepted, it must equip all of them with WMD. For chemical and biological agents, this may not be too difficult, but few proliferants can currently manufacture nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to threaten a saturation attack. All aircraft require weapons integration, whether they arrive at the point of sale in their weaponized state or not. Indigenously produced WMD will probably differ from their foreign counterparts. A proliferant must discover, on its own, the idiosyncrasies of the interaction of a weapon and the aircraft that carries it to plan for these modifications. For example, bomb bay doors opening at certain velocities sometimes cause severe aircraft vibration. Similarly, once the bomb bay doors are open the airflow around the weapon may cause it to vibrate uncontrollably. Again, modern computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes and their aerodynamic equivalents streamline the redesign process to achieve clean stores separation under all circumstances. Wind tunnels assist a proliferant in estimating the extent of any needed modifications. The weapons, on the other hand, may need to undergo significant refinements, depending on the ultimate intentions of the country. Some simple standoff weapons, such as glide bombs, may provide a proliferant a unique penetration capability. As an example, a country can target its neighbor without violating its airspace by using a glide bomb that has a lift-to-drag ratio of 5 and dropping it from an aircraft operating at a ceiling of 50,000 ft. The girth of the weapon or its aerodynamic surfaces may create a release problem that forces the proliferant to consider designing folded aerodynamic
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surfaces. However, a glide bomb is both more accurate than an ordinary gravity bomb and has a greatly reduced RCS compared to the aircraft which drops it, thus solving many of the problems of penetration. To hit in the vicinity of the target, even a large area target such as a city, the post drop vehicle may need an autonomous guidance and control unit. This unit does not need to meet the specifications of a missile-grade IMU, but it must be good enough to provide simple feedback control to the aerodynamic control surfaces. Systems for aircraft using GPSs are being made available on the world market. Many European and U.S. manufacturers make avionics equipment that can control a split flap or simple aileron. The tables include technology items directly tied to accurate aerodynamic bombs, control surfaces for a bomb, and steerable aerodynamic devices suitable for releasing airborne agents. RATIONALE Fixed-wing aircraft used for the delivery of WMD are of significant concern. Most potential proliferants have reasonable numbers of tactical aircraft and have trained pilots to fly them. The aircraft available usually have a short strike range, suitable for their limited geographical area. Longer range capability, while possible with modifications to existing aircraft and the development of in-flight refueling capabilities, involve introduction of new technologies and systems. With the advent of the GPS, proliferants now have a technique to improve the navigational capability of their aircraft significantly. Also, even though state-of-the art signature reduction is not readily available, more conventional countermeasures would still be of considerable value, particularly in regional conflicts. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.4-1) Systems Since the end of the Cold War, widespread sales have been made of aircraft capable of delivering WMD. China owns SU-27 Flankers, and North Korea has SU-25 Frogfoots. Syria and Libya possess SU-24s, and Iraq, at one time, had the Mirage F1-C. India has 15 Jaguars. The SU-24 has a combat radius of 1,000 km, giving it the most threatening range capability in a regional conflict. However, since they can trade payload, speed, fuel, and range, any of these aircraft can execute a WMD delivery. Effective use of aircraft in a combat role requires ongoing training, maintenance, and functioning of a substantial infrastructure. Key needs include trained people, availability of spare parts, and realistic exercises. The case in which Iran lost U.S. support is instructive in the limits to keeping aircraft viable as a means of delivery.
China, India, Pakistan, and Israel can maintain and support a tactical aircraft infrastructure, train and recruit pilots, and sustain their aircraft in a threatening posture. North Korea has great difficulty in training pilots and maintaining its aircraft but could mount a single attack against South Korea with its SU-25 Frogfoots. As the Gulf War showed, when the coalition achieved air supremacy, Iraq did not mount even a single sortie against a coalition target, and in all likelihood Iran is in similar straits. Syria has the ability to maintain its aircraft with foreign assistance from either the former Soviet Union or elements of the former Soviet Bloc. The United States has no way of limiting this assistance as it did in post-Revolutionary Iran because its does not control the market for parts and personnel relevant to the air fleet. All members of the G-7, Sweden, and Poland can supply technical expertise and maintenance personnel to proliferants. South Africa or its agents can funnel spare parts for aircraft to proliferants facing severe shortages. Former Cold War enemy production entities have created licensed co-production facilities for aircraft in China, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries. Any of these facilities can produce some parts of interest to a proliferator. Many other newly industrialized countriesincluding Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Egyptproduce indigenous whole aircraft. A country with an indigenous aircraft production capability may supply custom-made parts or reverse engineered replacement parts for grounded aircraft. Subsystems Because of the ubiquity of the aircraft industry in the United States, Russia, and many other countries, virtually every nation in the world has available to it tactical aircraft (or civil aircraft of equivalent range and payload capacity) through legitimate purchase. Smaller aircraft, such as business jets and jet trainers, sold overtly to proliferants can be cannibalized for subsystems, particularly navigation and control subsystems. As a result, no proliferant has a compelling need to build an independent, indigenous aircraft industry solely for delivering its WMD by aircraft. In fact, because of the availability of suitable aircraft on the world market, such an independent capability would be a waste of resources and draw funds away from other needs. A proliferant pursuing aircraft delivery systems needs only the capability to make modest modifications to existing military or civilian aircraft, including bomb bays or bomb racks, associated weapons initiation systems, and research flight conditions for delivering weapons. To complete the stockpile-to-target delivery cycle at the subsystem level, a proliferant needs to build and test the WMD device that will be delivered by aircraft. Every nation of the FSU, with the exception of Bulgaria, has a trained work force and either existing wind tunnels or structural dynamics laboratories capable of required testing. In the former Yugoslavia, parts of this infrastructure are scattered about the various component states, with most of the research laboratories concentrated in Croatia
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and Slovenia. India has similar facilities and a tradition of education that can adapt the facilities to unconventional design concepts. The Baltic Republics can perform R&D into flight dynamics and have computer facilities available that can host 1980s vintage U.S. software for advanced structural designs. The industrialized nations of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) are capable of either building comparable facilities indigenously and performing experiments and analyses for a third party or exporting the technical talent to build such facilities elsewhere. These same entities can design and build a variety of warhead systems, consistent with tactical aircraft delivery, including aerial bombs, spray systems, glide bombs, terminally steered or guided bombs, and cruise missiles. These devices have the common requirement of aerodynamic flight through a defined mission profile. For chemical and biological weapons, the designer must also provide some mechanism for air
braking the warhead, such as fins, or other glide devices that allow the warhead to disseminate agent over a broad area, and a method to keep biological agents in an active condition through the delivery cycle. Failing this, the proliferator must accept the greatly reduced efficiency from dissemination initiated by a burster charge. At the most rudimentary level, a proliferator must produce an aerodynamic warhead configuration that has a repeatable and predictable flight profile, does not induce severe vibration from air stream buffeting, and can detonate at a predetermined altitude or upon ground contact. Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic Republics, Pakistan, Mexico, and Cuba can design and build these weapons. Those capabilities that support or further weapon system design are included as sufficient technologies.
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Airframe Country Modifications to Comercial Aircraft LowObservable Modifications to Existing Aircraft
Propulsion Propulsion System Advanced HighEnergy Fuels
Guidance and Control AllWeather Guidance and Flight Modifications Digitally Driven Acutators for Existing Autopilots MilitaryGrade GPS Receivers Bomb Sights
Weapons Integration Simple Steered or Homed Bombs Bomb Flight Mechanics R&D
Argentina Brazil Canada Chile China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States

some

limited
sufficient level
Figure 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters

Technology
Finite element structural computer routines
PC-based routines capable of USML VIII making 1,000 node calculations and containing automatic mesh generators PC-based routines with mesh generators and Lagrangian logic MTCR 16; USML VIII
None identified
High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems Flow tables and hydrodynamic test facilities that exploit the hydrodynamic similitude approximations to compressible flow; highspeed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems Piezoelectric force transducers and sample and hold data acquisition boards for computers; high-speed computers Hot wire anemometers or wind vector and stability devices with directional response <1 deg and time response <0.1 msec. None identified
Operating systems for high-speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU Operating systems for high-speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU
Fluid mechanics finite element routines
None identified
Vibration shakers and other environmental test equipment
Vibration power spectral density output of 10 g rms. between 20 and 20,000 Hz, with forces >=50 kN (11,250 lb)
MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B
None identified
Fourier transform, chirp, and other advanced signal processing software and modal analysis software Finite element and hydrodynamic software
Aerothermal wind tunnels Input heat flux levels >100 BTU/ft 2-sec
MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; WA Cat. 9B
None identified
Conventional wind tunnels
Wind tunnels producing Reynolds Numbers in excess of 2.5 million per foot Glide vehicles with L/D >5 or thrust missile with >0.1 km/ sec velocity change
MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; WA Cat. 9B WA ML 4, 5; USML IV, XII
None identified
None
Structural modifications for thrusted munitions release or glide vehicles with stored aerodynamic surfaces Propulsion/airframe/ flight control system integration
None identified
None identified
None identified
Techniques that provide tradeoffs on range, maneuverability, and safety with complexity and weight
MTCR 2, 9; USML VIII
None identified
Six degrees of freedom computer models
(contd)
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Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
In-flight refueling receiver technology Innovative control effectors
Any technology level is reason for concern Adequate control power for vehicle range and speed improvement; lateral (directional) control without vertical stabilizers Capable of forming fuselages and leading edges in metal of .020 in. thickness or less Structural design with RCS reduction >=3 dB over equivalent volume and give between 1 GHz and 30 GHz
WA ML 10; USML VIII CCL EAR 99; USML XIII
Metal-stamping equipment Low observables external stores carriage
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA ML 17; MTCR 17; USML XIII
Composites
None identified
None
Signature reduction techniques, IR and RF
RCS reduction of 10 dB or WA ML 17; greater across frequency MTCR 17; range of 1 GHz to 30 GHz; USML XIII design and coatings for IR and radar signature reduction Lightweight engines with bypass ratios greater than 6% High thrust-to weight (6:1) engines MTCR 3; USML VIII MTCR 3; USML VIII
Special polymers and fibers
Radar range, IR detectors
RCS, signal return prediction software
PROPULSION
Turbofan engines
None identified
None identified
None identified
Turbojet engines Technology for high temperature and erosion protection coatings for engine parts Inlets for transonic and low supersonic flight speeds
None identified Ceramics (e.g., alumina and magnesia) and ZrO2 + Y2O2 None identified
Temperature change through WA Cat. 2; material >=150 C/in.; erosion CCL Cat. 2 resisting technologies that insulate against temperature of >2,000 C Inlet designs or modifications CCL EAR 99 that reduce the ratio of shock standoff to inlet diameter or turning angle by no more than 10% at constant Mach numbers
None identified
None
(contd)
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Technology
Propulsion integration for Modifications to enable flight subsonic, transonic, and below 200 ft AGL low supersonic flight speeds Thermal spray forming equipment
CCL EAR 99; USML VIII
None identified
Load and load rate force simulators to apply flight conditions to controls surfaces None identified
None
Power levels >150 kW, gas CCL EAR 99 velocities of 3,000 m/sec and spray rates of >15 kg/hr Digital representations of the earth's surface with height resolution <=20 meters Accuracy of <20 m. in position and <200 nanoseconds in time MTCR 11; USML XI MTCR 11; WA Cat. 7A; USML XI; CCL Cat. 7A MTCR 11; USML XI; WA Cat 7E; CCL Cat 7E
None identified
None Identified
Digital radar maps
None identified
Methods to measure radar images of the earth's surface GPS signal simulators
Data compression software Algorithms that use GPS signals to compute steering commands based on the flight characteristics of the bomber Data compression algorithms
Global Navigation System
None identified
Map guidance technology
Automatic terrain avoidance, efficient route planning and defense evasion hardware and software
None identified
None identified
GPS receivers
Receiver capable of reducing MTCR 11; civil code signals to position USML XI; and velocity within 50 msec WA Cat. 7A; CCL Cat. 7A
None identified
None identified
Civil code to protected code calculation algorithms
Full authority flight control systems
Techniques to tradeoff WA Cat. 9D, 9E; None identified stability, maneuverability and CCL Cat. 9D, 9E; safety with complexity and USML VIII cost Equipment providing vibration MTCR 15; at 10 g rms between 20 and CCL Cat. 9B; 20,000 Hz WA Cat. 9B Sample and hold data acquisition boards for small computers
Six degrees of freedom Source codes for control simulation combined with logic pilot in the loop Piezoelectric force None identified transducers and sample and hold data acquisition boards for small computers
Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques
(contd)
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Technology
WEAPONS INTEGRATION
Weapons separation design and prediction
Aerodynamic and trajectory prediction codes validated to within 1% of measured properties
USML VIII
None identified
High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems None identified
None identified
Codes with validated results WA ML 21; that predict submunition USML XXI bomb case and aero glide vehicle variables within 1% of measured variable WA ML 4; USML IV
None identified
None identified
Submunitions separation Submunitions with packing or dispensing densities exceeding 75% mechanisms
None identified
None identified
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Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data

Finite element structural computer Mesh generation and element routines geometry and dimensional parameters Fluid mechanics finite element routines Vibration shakers and other environmental test equipment Aerothermal wind tunnels Simultaneous solution of Navier Stokes equations Producing and measuring frequency response and relating the information to flight performance Generating sufficient cooling and air replacement to prevent temperature change effects on measured parameters Flow straightening and flow visualization of subsonic and supersonic effects Predicting and correcting for flow field on bomb bay doors as they open to release munitions and external stores flow fields in flight Pilot acceptance; maintaining adequate gain and phase margins; incorporating response time in maneuver parameters Carry and deliver equipment; training and rehearsal of flight crews Vehicle 3-axis stability and control with minimal cross-coupling Bending complex shapes in low modulus of elasticity materials Reducing radar cross-section in a manner consistent with low drag profiles
Needed for higher performance engines and airframes Meteorology studies for effective delivery of chemical and biological weapons High performance air vehicles
Parallel processors for PCs and work stations Parallel processors for PCs and work stations Expanded flight test program; subsystem and component testing Expanded flight test program and empirical design modifications
Performance increases
Conventional wind tunnels
Range increase resulting from lower drag profiles for external munitions stores Increased reliability of delivery systems and munitions
Expanded flight test program and empirical design modifications Additional weight and aerodynamic drag for struts, fillets, and other nonoptimum loadbearing surfaces Pilot integration of parameters
Structural modifications for thrusted munitions release or glide vehicles with stored aerodynamic surfaces Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration
Increased range and maneuver performance
In-flight refueling Innovative control effectors Metal-stamping equipment Low observables external stores carriage Signature reduction techniques
Longer range offers more targeting opportunities Increased range, maneuverability and survivability Higher production quantities Better radar penetration to allow aircraft to move closer to target and drop glide vehicle or cruise missile
Drop tanks,extra fuel capacity tanks fitted in the fuselage Traditional vertical tail configuration Simpler contours produced by conventional sheet metal brakes Internal munitions storage at a decreased payload or volume None identified
(contd)
Adding materials and coatings that will All air vehicles not affect structural integrity or flight performance
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Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data (contd)

Technology Technical Issues PROPULSION Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Turbofan engines
Decrease in net thrust at low altitudes makes low level cruise fuel inefficient Thrust is dependent on the maximum stress and temperature levels the engine can sustain for long flights Thrust is dependent on the maximum stress and temperature levels the engine can sustain for long flights Forming aerodynamically sound designs that do not choke
Improved range and ceiling
Any propulsion unit consistent with range and payload needs, e.g., internal combustion engines Any propulsion unit consistent with range and payload needs, e.g., internal combustion engines Ceramics and carbon carbon inserts Increased drag and reduced range None identified
Turbojet engines
Improved range and ceiling
Technology for high temperature and erosion protection coatings for engine parts Inlets for transonic and low supersonic flight speeds Propulsion integration for subsonic, transonic, and low supersonic flight speeds Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) equipment Thermal spray forming equipment
Increased reliability and improved range Increased range and better defense penetration
Upgrading existing airframes with more All air vehicles modern engines that may have higher thrust levels or improved fuel consumption Manufacturing equipment maintenance to ensure reproducibility Maintaining thermal control and flow consistency Reducing radar images to digital representations that can be stored and retrieved efficiently Improved reliability Improved reliability
Digital radar maps
Delivery of a munitions within a lethal radius
GPS topographical maps
Global Navigation System
Time required to calculate position and Delivery of a munitions within a lethal corrections to position to obtain radius desired flight path Resolution of the surface of the Earth Increased operations envelope to particularly in height in order to ensure include night and all weather flight all obstacles are cleared by the flight vehicle Correcting civil code to protected code Navigation Increased reliability and accuracy
IMUs; radio controlled or preprogrammed flight profiles More restrictive operational conditions
Map Guidance Technology
GPS receivers
GLONASS receivers Pilot integration of parameters
Full authority flight control system Maintenance of adequate gain and phase margins; adequate response time over flight envelope; redundancy vs. safety Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques Properly shock isolating the test equipment so that test results are meaningful
Reliable weapons delivery
Flight testing under highly stressed conditions (contd)
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Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data (contd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications WEAPONS INTEGRATION Alternative Technologies
Weapons separation design and flight prediction
Vibration and shock from interference with the main body both upon release and in a bomb bay or cargo hold with the doors open Prediction of non-linear effects from spinning and unsymmetrical parts within the weapon Proper release under realistic conditions
Flight test program to gather information empirically
Advanced state vector calculation routines Submunitions separation or dispensing mechanisms
Delivery within a lethal radius
Conventional bomb sights
Flight test program to gather information empirically
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SECTION 1.5ARTILLERY
OVERVIEW In the Artillery subsection, two military strategies for using artillery to deliver WMD are discussed. Traditionally, artillery has been a battlefield weapon rather than a long-range attack weapon, although the United States, Russia, France, and Britain have demonstrated that conventional artillery tubes can deliver nuclear, chemical and biological agents. Each of these countries had a specific battlefield application for WMD of the 30-km range. Few of the strategic, technical, economic, and political forces that led the superpowers to develop this highly specific capability apply to conditions within proliferants. However, artillery may be attractive to proliferants for other reasons, including the availability of designers and parts and the possibility that a WMD shell from one of the superpowers arsenals could suddenly become available. As an indigenous product, artillery can be applied as a strategic WMD delivery system. Iraq demonstrated imaginative use of artillery in the large investment it made in the Supergun project. In this case, a proliferant chose to develop a strategic delivery system that happened to be a scaled-up version of a well-known artillery delivery system. These vastly different applications of the same basic technology show that a proliferant that pursues artillery as a means of delivery must choose either to use existing artillery pieces and solve the technical problems of designing a shell to accommodate these weapons or design a new weapon for the shell they intend to deliver. The United States, as an example of the former approach, built nuclear and chemical rounds compatible with their existing 155-mm guns. These shells had flight properties that exactly matched the flight properties of conventional ammunition. Iraq, as an example of the latter approach, built the Supergun specifically to fire a single, special nuclear round. Using Existing Artillery Pieces When a country can manufacture a WMD shell to exactly match a conventional round, it solves all of the technical problems of gun manufacture because many suppliers on the world market provide artillery pieces in standard 155-mm, 203-mm, and 406-mm caliber gun tubes. Still, the proliferator must solve unique technical problems associated with the WMD warhead. Nuclear To use existing artillery pieces, a proliferant must be sufficiently advanced in its nuclear design to make a warhead with a diameter small enough to fit a standard caliber tube. Consequently, to be used in a conventional tube, a nuclear round must match
Highlights
Artillery pieces for possible delivery of WMD exist in virtually every military organization in the world. A proliferant must harden WMD shells against high spin rates and accelerations to use an artillery piece to deliver WMD. Existing artillery pieces have insufficient range to allow a proliferant to use artillery as a strategic WMD delivery system except in special circumstances. Nuclear warheads are difficult to fit into existing conventional artillery tubes. Several proliferants have the technical capability to custom-build long-range guns, similar to the Iraqi Supergun, to deliver WMD. Superguns are expensive and have limited sustained firing potential. Use of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems overcomes some artillery limitations.
the inertial and aerodynamic properties of conventional shells and be able to withstand the acceleration produced by the firing charge and the high spin rates (up to 250 Hz) of modern artillery shells. If it does not closely meet these characteristics, the shell will suffer from poor range and accuracy. Since nuclear shells have components made of high atomic-number materials and these materials are traditionally configured in a spherical shape, aeroballisticians must frequently add supplemental materials to match the mass of nuclear artillery shells and the ratios of the moments of inertia. Countries that have solved this problem have used highly dense materials, such as depleted uranium, as a ballast. As an alternative, a country can ignore the question of range loss and high dispersion and accept reduced performance. Often, this means that their military can only fire the shell to its maximum range, and an extensive testing program is required to determine the limits of the dispersion. Since the surrogate shells used in this test program must inertially match the real nuclear rounds and a statistically meaningful
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test program requires many firings, the proliferator must have a ready source of high atomic-number (non-nuclear) material to use in its test rounds. A nuclear-capable proliferant must also be able to build a nuclear round that can withstand the high acceleration produced by the firing charge. For example, in most full-range 155-mm rounds, the initial acceleration on the shell may exceed 10,000 gs. The proliferant that builds its nuclear shell indigenously must be able to form insensitive high explosives in complex shapes that resist cracking and spalling under these accelerations. They must also be able to build a special nuclear fuze, which differs from the fuze in a conventional round, and the fuze electronics that can withstand the acceleration and still perform normally at the end of the trajectory. Since the aerodynamic shape of the shell must also match a conventional round, few, if any, changes can be made to overall shell design. If the artillery shells are made indigenously, the proliferant has the means to make any type of casing for a nuclear shell. For a nuclear shell, a proliferant can make one concession to the warhead when the shell must be stored for a long period of time. The designers may have to substitute a new outer casing material that is less sensitive to embrittlement from a low-level nuclear radiation environment. Chemical Since the specific gravity of most chemical agents is near to that of conventional high explosives, a chemical round for an existing artillery piece requires even fewer design concessions than a nuclear round. With only minimal ballasting, designers can match the inertial properties of chemical and conventional shells quite easily. Because the materials involved have mid-range atomic numbers, ballasting can be made from many materials. In flight, though, chemical WMD, being a fluid, has a tendency to change its inertial properties because of the centrifugal force created by the spinning shell. Binary chemical agents take advantage of this spinning to mix the compounds. But the spinning momentum forces the fluid to migrate to the outer casing wall of the shell and alter the inertial properties in a way that conventional high explosivesmost often being soliddo not. As the shell flies, this fluid migration has a tendency to cause large coning angles and increase the drag on the body. Liquid migration is a function of many properties of the WMD, but the most important is the viscosity of the liquid. Proliferants may solve the variable inertial problem by modifying the viscosity of the liquid with liquid additives or by including internal baffles that dampen the motion of the liquid when the shell is fired. The liquid material is fairly insensitive to the shock of firing and virtually no accommodation needs to be made for WMD rounds beyond that already made in conventional rounds. The fuzing and firing circuits of chemical rounds do not require the high energy and precise timing of nuclear rounds; thus, one can manufacture a high explosive detonator for an artillery shell and use this same detonator on a chemical round with little modification. Both chemical and biological rounds do require
efficient dissemination mechanisms since the agents must be spread over a large area. Submunitions and the technologies that remove them from an artillery shell in flight and decelerate them or alter their flight path support the more efficient dispersion of agent. Radar fuzes or timers that can open a shell and release submunitions must have a firing precision of better than 50 ms to be effective. Biological Biological agents have properties similar to chemical agents and the design considerations for artillery shell delivery follow similar reasoning. Biological toxins generally withstand the shock of firing from an artillery tube with little degradation in performance. Live biological agents, on the other hand, degrade significantly when placed in this high acceleration environment. Virtually any proliferant that can manufacture an artillery shell for special purposes, such as incendiaries or flares, has all of the technological sophistication at its disposal to deliver biological toxins in this manner. On the other hand, the high acceleration experienced by all artillery shells means live biological agents are unlikely candidates for this means of delivery unless microencapsulation or other buffers are used to alter the susceptibility of the agent to shock. Spores of certain pathogens, such as anthrax, resemble toxins in their ability to withstand shock. Most deliverable biological agents, however, have lower specific gravities than existing conventional rounds. The light weight of the biological material, which may include fillers, release agents, protective coatings, and agglutinating matter to accrete a respirable particle, requires a country to consider carefully means to ballast the shell to match the inertial properties of conventioanl rounds. Ancillary Technologies Common to All Types of WMD The two technical hurdles that must be overcome to use WMD in artillery shells protection against acceleration and matched inertial propertiescan be replicated in a laboratory setting or simulated on a computer. Flight trajectory prediction programs with 6-degree-of-freedom modeling will reveal to an analyst the degree of uncertainty in a shells flight path when inertial properties are mismatched with conventional shells. Less computer-intensive point mass models predict with a high degree of accuracy this same information. Since any user of conventional artillery shells knows in advance the aerodynamic properties of the shell, little, if any, need exists for wind tunnels or finite element fluid modeling. Devices that measure the moments of inertia for many applications other than military purposes are easily adapted for use in measuring artillery shells. Any entity that does not already possess this equipment can purchase it legitimately on the open market. Reproducing the high accelerations of a gun launch in a laboratory setting is difficult, so experimentalists often resort to subscale tests using small bore cannon or other energy producing devices such as rail guns. A proliferator that wishes to test the response of a new pathogen to high acceleration can use these techniques and then
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assume that incremental increases in full-scale models follow an extrapolation of the results they have measured. A proliferator with a slightly more advanced design capability can extend the range of the 155-mm shell to approximately 50 km, either by using base bleed supplemental blowing to shape the aerodynamics over the boat tail or by lengthening the barrel. A lengthened barrel increases the spin rate proportionately and exaggerates all of the problems formerly identified with spinning shells. For use beyond 50 km, the proliferant must manufacture both the gun and the shell. Fifty kilometers is sufficient range for a proliferant to threaten coastal cities or an adversarys territory adjacent to a common border. The Foreign Technology Assessment paragraphs will discuss which countries can develop WMD to fit existing artillery pieces. It also discusses which countries have the technical wherewithal to continue to pursue research into a Supergun. The tables that follow this text list, in order of priority, technologies that a proliferant needs to produce WMD artillery shells that fit into existing guns and then cover the more stressing task of building a new artillery piece on the scale of the Supergun. Multiple Launch Rocket System as a Means of Delivery In many cases, the flight dynamics limitations imposed on the use of WMD with artillery shells can be mitigated by employing a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). MLRS batteries launch a salvo of missiles against a target from a collection of launch tubes mounted on, or towed by, a highly mobile vehicle. Generally, the delivery systems constituting a MLRS have a range of less than 50 km, but the exact range can be extended depending on the circumstances. Since the MLRS uses a rocket as its basis, the accelerations that a warhead endures at launch are much less than those for an equivalent range artillery shell. Similarly, the rocket uses aerodynamic stability with fins or airframe shape so the warhead is not subjected to the high spin rates that an equivalent range artillery shell needs to maintain gyroscopic stability. Also, the rocket does not travel as fast as an artillery shell, so fuzing and firing operations can be less precise than with an equivalent artillery shell. This long flight time also gives submuntions an opportunity to be dispensed properly. In the field, the MLRS offers many logistical and tactical advantages for delivering chemical and biological agents. Since the attacker uses the MLRS in a salvo mode, the individual missiles can be launched to cover a large area when they arrive at a target. This could lay down an effective cloud of chemical or biological material, which may deny large areas of a battlefield to a defender. However, care must be taken to ensure that the close proximity of salvo round detonations does not have a negative effect on agent vitality or dispersion. Consequently, this tactic makes MLRS an unlikely choice for nuclear munitions. Since MLRS systems have widespread applications for anti-personnel, anti-tank, and anti-armor operations, knowledge of their design, manufacture, and use is widely
available to many U.S. allies and trading partners. Many derivative versions of the system have been built to accomplish special targeting objectives that have application to the use of WMD. For instance, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) used with the MLRS uses a special, long-range missile while the anti-tank version deploys a submunition in mid-flight, similar to the deployment that would be required to deliver chemical or biological agents efficiently. In the U.S. version of the MLRS, which has been widely studied overseas, the rocket can accept a warhead weight of up to 156 kg on a system with a total weight of 306 kg. This is about twice the payload that a 155-mm shell delivers and at a price of about three times the system weight. Hence, the warhead structural efficiency factor is less than that for artillery shells, but the simplicity of the operation more than compensates for the loss of efficiency. An MLRS rocket, as built by the United States, has a diameter of 227 mm and a length of 3.937 m, making it easy to ship, stockpile, and deploy. The United States has sold MLRS systems that theoretically can be retrofitted for chemical or biological use to many trading partners abroad. A Memorandum of Understanding among the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy allows for joint development, production, and deployment of the United States design. Currently, the United States and others have sold and deployed the MLRS in Bahrain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the UK, and the United States. Russia and the FSU have several variants of an MLRS in production and service. In fact, in the latter half of the decade, a clear competition has emerged between the United States and the Russians to sell MLRS systems as part of their arms packages. The Russian systems are made by the SPLAV consortium and are called the SMERCH: a 300-mm rocket, the Uragan, a 220-mm system, and the Prima, which is 122 mm in diameter. The Russians also wish to market two other systems, which are both 140 mm in diameter. The Russians have sold the 300-mm Smerch to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Uragan system has been sold to Syria and Afghanistan. Many other variants still exist in the former Eastern Bloc states. RATIONALE Artillery shells present the exception to the rule that a proliferant must pursue some technological capability to deliver WMD. Artillery pieces are ubiquitous in any military; thus, armies are fully trained in their use. The United States and the Soviets built a large arsenal of nuclear and chemical shells to fit these existing artillery pieces and designed them so that all of the preparations and firing procedures associated with them closely mirror conventional rounds. The United States is in the process of destroying its chemical shells, but some do exist and many nuclear artillery shells are still in Russia. Consequently, the possibility that a proliferator could find a way to acquire a fully weaponized WMD shell and use it in existing military hardware cannot be ruled out.
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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.5-1) Since virtually every country in the world with a military has artillery pieces and the training to accompany their use and theory of operation, a proliferant must only manufacture the WMD shells for these guns if it intends to deliver the munitions at ranges less than 50 km. As an alternative, proliferants may clandestinely acquire shells to use in their artillery pieces. The United States, Russia, and, by common belief, Israel have made nuclear shells. The United States, Russia, reportedly France, and possibly Israel have made chemical and biological shells. The United States builds its shells in standard 155- and 203-mm caliber. Most European countries use the same bore. In the Russian tradition, the Soviet Union built its shells in 152- and 202-mm caliber. A shell from these stocks fits and can be fired from the larger bore U.S. and European guns, but the reverse is not true. When the smaller Russian shells are fired from U.S. and European guns, there is a small additional blow by and consequent loss of acceleration to the shell. Even then, care must be taken to ensure that the close proximity of salvo round detonations does not have a negative effect on agent destruction or dispersment; therefore, this configuration produces a slight range loss and additional wobble upon exit from the gun. The United States, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Norway, Belgium, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, all the Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, Spain, Greece, elements of the former Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, South Africa, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan have all built artillery pieces or have the infrastructure to build them according to either the U.S. and European standard or the former Soviet one. Most of these countries military officers have been trained on the weapons and are capable of advising a proliferant on methods to either build the guns or obtain them legitimately
from a supplier nation. If a proliferant found itself in possession of a standard WMD artillery shell, any of these countries could supply the gun to fire it for less than $250,000, without even needing to understand the nature of the shell. A proliferator may decide to manufacture its own gun, particularly if it designs a WMD device employing a gun-assembled, as opposed to an implosion, nuclear weapon. An entry-level, gun-assembled, nuclear weapon requires a gun barrel diameter of approximately 650 mm rather than 155 mm. There are some 16-inch (406-mm) guns in many nations arsenals, and an innovative gun-assembled nuclear weapon may have a diameter this small. But the 16-inch guns are not as readily available as the 155-mm guns, and a proliferant would generate the attention of export control authorities if it tried to purchase one. Several proliferants have the technical capacity to build a gun approaching the Supergun if they can find a supplier of specialty steels for the barrel and large action hydraulic cylinders for the recoil mechanisms. The specialty steel tubes must have interior surfaces with deviation in diameter of less than 50 m per 20 mm of tube diameter and deviation from a true longitudinal axis of less than 1 mm per meter of length. Oil-producing nations that produce their own pipelines, as a rule, have no reason to make tubes that meet the standards of gun barrel manufacture. Pipelines generally carry oil under a pressures of several atmospheres, rather than the several hundred atmospheres that are required for a gun barrel. Moreover, there are no stringent requirements on pipelines for interior surface finish, diametrically, and straightness. Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and India either have the capability or could quickly obtain the ability to build large bore gun barrels. Many South American nations, in particular Argentina and Brazil, also have the industrial and metallurgical industry to support large bore gun manufacturing.
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Weapons Integration Country Inertially Matched Shells HighEnergy Burster Charges Fuzing and Firing Circuits That Withstand Spin and Shock
Artillery Place Barrel Extension for Extended Range Indigenous Manufacturing of Gun Development of Firing Tables for WMD
Aiming and Firing Automated Gun Sights Using GPS to Aim Wind Tunnel and Other Laboratory Equipment to Measure Flow Field Indigenous Manufacturing of Large Bore (<400 mm) Guns
Propulsion Indigenous Manufacturing of Propelling Charges Base Bleed Range Extension

sufficient level

some

limited
Figure 1.5-1. Artillery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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Table 1.5-1. Artillery Technology Parameters

Technology
High capacitance batteries
Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA Cat. 3A; and 10,000 g's acceleration, CCL Cat. 3A 30V output @ 300 mA Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, MTCR 11; and 10,000 g's acceleration WA Cat. 7A; CCL Cat. 7A; USML XI Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA ML 11; and 10,000 g's acceleration USML XI
Non-fluid electrolytes, or fluorboric acid in copper ampules None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
Radar altimeters
None Identified
Altitude calculation cycle time <50 msec
Radio timing fuze
None Identified
High-speed data acquisi- Timing accuracy <5% of tion equipment and set time for set times of computer boards 5 to 150 seconds High-speed data acquisi- Event sequencing tion equipment and capability <5 msec. computer boards None Identified None Identified None Identified None Identified None Identified None Identified None Identified None Identified
Electronic timers (e.g., Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA ML 11; US M724 electronic fuze) and 10,000 g's acceleration USML XI Bursters Expelling charges Casing material Dual canister burster charge Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA ML 11; and 10,000 g's acceleration USML XI Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA ML 11; and 10,000 g's acceleration USML XI Resistant to low level radiation background CCL Cat. 1
None Identified
None Identified None Identified Phenolics None Identified
Resistant to 250 Hz spin rate, WA ML 11; and 10,000 g's acceleration USML XI
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Table 1.5-2. Artillery Reference Data

High capacitance batteries
Nuclear firing circuits require high energy initiation, which must be contained in a lightweight package to fit on an artillery shell
Reliable detonation
None Identified
Radar altimeters
Altitude must be sensed with sufficient Chemical or biological weapon accuracy to release aerosol under the detonation atmospheric shear layer but before ground impact Range and range rate must be Any airborne conventional, chemical, calculated in a moving reference frame or biological weapon Designing electronic circuits with piezoelectric crystals that remain unaffected by high shock loads Bursters must not fire prematurely in high shock environment The expelling charge must decelerate submunitions sufficient so that air brakes or parachutes may be deployed; often this must be done in a short times span and high energy charges may damage biological or chemical agents. Embrittlement occurs when some steels are exposed to intrinsic radiation for long periods of time Reliable detonation
Timing circuits, barometric sensors, acceleration detectors
Radio timing fuze Electronic timers (e.g., US M724 electronic fuze) Bursters Expelling charges
Timing circuits, barometric sensors, acceleration detectors High-speed data acquisition equipment and computer boards. Any insensitive high explosives None Identified
Reliable detonation Submunition dispensing
Casing material
Applications requiring resistance to nuclear radiation environments
None Identified
Dual canister burster charge
Binary materials are mixed in flight; in Binary chemical munitions order to be mixed, two canisters are usually opened with shaped charges or other HE technology, but the charge can not compromise the chemical or biological agent
None Identified
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SECTION 5NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13
Scope Enrichment Feedstocks Production ........................................ II-5-10 Uranium Enrichment Processes .............................................. II-5-13 Nuclear Fission Reactors ........................................................ II-5-42 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) .................................... II-5-48 Lithium Production ................................................................. II-5-54 Nuclear Weapons Design and Development .......................... II-5-58 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ........................................ II-5-67 Radiological Weapons ............................................................ II-5-75 Manufacturing of Nuclear Components ................................. II-5-79 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing ................................. II-5-91 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ............... II-5-109 Heavy Water Production ......................................................... II-5-112 Tritium Production ................................................................. II-5-117
Highlights
The design and production of nuclear weapons in 1997 is a far simpler process than it was during the Manhattan Project. Indigenous development of nuclear weapons is possible for countries with industrial bases no greater than that of Iraq in 1990. Given a source of fissile material, even terrorist groups could construct their own nuclear explosive devices. At least two types of nuclear weapons can be built and fielded without any kind of yield test, and the possessors could have reasonable confidence in the performance of those devices. The standing up of elite units to take custody of nuclear weapons or to employ them would be a useful indicator that a proliferant is approaching the completion of its first weapon. The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons.
BACKGROUND General This section examines the technologies needed to construct nuclear and radiological weapons and to employ both kinds of weapons either for military purposes or an act of terror. Since their introduction in 1945, nuclear explosives have been the most feared of the weapons of mass destruction, in part because of their ability to cause enormous instantaneous devastation and of the persistent effects of the radiation they emit, unseen and undetectable by unaided human senses. The Manhattan Project cost the United States $2 billion in 1945 spending power and required the combined efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and a pool of scientists, many of whom had already been awarded the Nobel Prize and many more who would go on to become Nobel Laureates. This array of talent was needed in 1942 if there were to be any hope of completing a weapon during the Second World War. Because nuclear fission was discovered in Germany, which remained the home of many brilliant scientists, the United States correctly perceived itself to be in a race to build an atomic bomb. For many decades the Manhattan Project provided the paradigm against which any potential proliferators efforts would be measured. Fifty years after the Trinity explosion, it has been recognized that the Manhattan Project is just one of a spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the low end of the scale, a nation may find a way to obtain a complete working nuclear bomb from a willing or unwilling supplier; at the other end, it may elect to construct a complete nuclear infrastructure including the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium metal in the fissile isotope 235U, the production and extraction of plutonium, the production of tritium, and the separation of deuterium and 6Li to build thermonuclear weapons. At an intermediate level, the Republic of South Africa constructed six quite simple nuclear devices for a total project cost of less than $1 billion (1980s purchasing power) using no more than 400 people and indigenous technology.
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Although talented people are essential to the success of any nuclear weapons program, the fundamental physics, chemistry, and engineering involved are widely understood; no basic research is required to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a nuclear weapons project begun in 1996 does not require the brilliant scientists who were needed for the Manhattan Project.1 Acquisition of a militarily significant nuclear capability involves, however, more than simply the purchase or construction of a single nuclear device or weapon. It requires attention to issues of safety and handling of the weapons, reliability and predictability of entire systems, efficient use of scarce and valuable special nuclear material (SNM) (plutonium and enriched uranium), chains of custody and procedures for authorizing the use of the weapons, and the careful training of the military personnel who will deliver weapons to their targets. In contrast, a nuclear device used for terrorism need not be constructed to survive a complex stockpile-to-target sequence, need not have a predictable and reliable yield, and need not be efficient in its use of nuclear material. Although major acts of terrorism are often rehearsed and the terrorists trained for the operation, the level of training probably is not remotely comparable to that necessary in a military establishment entrusted with the nuclear mission. Testing of Nuclear Weapons The first nuclear weapon used in combat used an untested gun-assembled design, but a very simple and inefficient one. The first implosion device was tested on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, and an identical physics package (the portion of the weapon including fissile and fusion fuels plus high explosives) was swiftly incorporated into the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Nuclear weaponry has advanced considerably since 1945, as can be seen at an unclassified level by comparing the size and weight of Fat Man with the far smaller, lighter, and more powerful weapons carried by modern ballistic missiles. Most nations of the world, including those of proliferation interest, have subscribed to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which requires that nuclear explosions only take place underground. Underground testing can be detected by seismic means and by observing radioactive effluent in the atmosphere. It is probably easier to detect and identify a small nuclear test in the atmosphere than it is to detect and identify a similarly sized underground test. In either case, highly specialized instrumentation is required if a nuclear test explosion is to yield useful data to the nation carrying out the
1
experiment. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature and signed at the United Nations on 24 September 1996 by the five declared nuclear weapon states, Israel, and several other states. By the end of February 1998, more than 140 states had signed the accord. The Treaty bans all further tests which produce nuclear yield. In all probability, most of the nations of greatest proliferation concern will be persuaded to accede to the accord, although the present government of India has refused to sign. Rate of Change of Nuclear Weapons Technology American nuclear technology evolved rapidly between 1944 and 1950, moving from the primitive Fat Man and Little Boy to more sophisticated, lighter, more powerful, and more efficient designs. Much design effort shifted from fission to thermonuclear weapons after President Truman decided that the United States should proceed to develop a hydrogen bomb, a task which occupied the Los Alamos Laboratory from 1950 through 1952.2 From 1952 until the early years of the ICBM era [roughly to the development of the first multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in the late 1960s], new concepts in both fission primary and fusion secondary design were developed rapidly. However, after the introduction of the principal families of weapons in the modern stockpile (approximately the mid 1970s), the rate of design innovations and truly new concepts slowed as nuclear weapon technology became a mature science. It is believed that other nations experiences have been roughly similar, although the United States probably has the greatest breadth of experience with innovative designs simply because of the more than 1,100 nuclear detonations it has conducted. The number of useful variations on the themes of primary and secondary design is finite, and designers final choices are frequently constrained by considerations of weapon size, weight, safety, and the availability of special materials. U.S. nuclear weapons technology is mature and might not have shown many more qualitative advances over the long haul, even absent a test ban. The same is roughly true for Russia, the UK, and possibly for France. The design of the nuclear device for a specific nuclear weapon is constrained by several factors. The most important of these are the weight the delivery vehicle can carry plus the size of the space available in which to carry the weapon (e.g., the diameter and length of a nosecone or the length and width of a bomb bay). The required yield of the device is established by the target vulnerability. The possible yield is set by the state of nuclear weapon technology and by the availability of special materials. Finally, the choices of specific design details of the device are determined by the taste of its designers, who will be influenced by their experience and the traditions of their organization.
2
When the Manhattan Project began far less than a microgram of plutonium had been made throughout the world, and plutonium chemistry could only be guessed at; the numbers of neutrons released on average in 235U and 239Pu fissions were unknown; the fission cross sections (probabilities that an interaction would occur) were equally unknown, as was the neutron absorption cross section of carbon.
The Mike test of Operation Ivy, 1 November, 1952, was the first explosion of a true two-stage thermonuclear device. The George shot of Operation Greenhouse (May 9, 1951) confirmed for the first time that a fission device could produce the conditions needed to ignite a thermonuclear reaction.
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A Caution on the Use of Authoritative Control Documents and Tables Authoritative lists of export-controlled and militarily critical equipment and materials used in the construction and testing of nuclear weapons necessarily have flaws: They consistently lag the technology actually available on the world market. Some items at the threshold of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use List restrictions may not be available as newly manufactured equipment. On the other hand, it would be improper to place the thresholds higher, since equipment much less sophisticated than can be bought today was used with great success in both the United States and the Former Soviet Union. Second, these limits do not always define the limits at which the technologies have utility to proliferators. OVERVIEW This section will discuss the fundamentals of nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production including the production of special nuclear materials (uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235U, 233U, and for plutonium). It will also look at the other technologies including production of uranium and plutonium metal; manufacturing; nuclear testing; lithium production; safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF); radiological weapons; the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons; heavy water production; and tritium production. It is possible to capture schematically the progress in nuclear weapons technology and the technologies which support nuclear weapons in the following graph (Figure 5.0-1). The X axis is time, beginning in 1942 when the Manhattan Project was fully activated. The top two lines show the development of electronics and the introduction of devices which affected the design of the non-nuclear components of the weapons. The second pair of lines shows the progress made in preparing special nuclear materials, with the processes above the dashed line referring to methods of enriching uranium and those below the dashed line referring to plutonium production and the materials for fusion weapons. The oddly shaped heavy curve shows the rate at which U.S. nuclear weapons scientists made new discoveries and progress. The distance between the two curves represents the rate of progress, while the area between the curves from 1942 to any arbitrary date gives an estimate of the total knowledge acquired. The rate of progress drops almost to zero on 30 October 1958, when the Eisenhower-Khrushchev Moratorium on nuclear testing went into effect. Superimposed on the heavy curve are events of historic importance: the first testing and use of nuclear weapons, the first Soviet test along with the dates when other nations joined the nuclear club, the evolution of hydrogen weapons and boosting, the introduction of powerful computers, computerized numerically controlled (CNC) tools, the year when the IBM PC made its appearance on desktops, tailored effects weapons such as the x-ray laser, and the end of nuclear testing. Specific U.S.
achievements are also noted in the area bounded by the heavy curves. A similar chart could be made for the progress of every other nuclear weapon state, acknowledged or unacknowledged, if the information were available. This chart illustrates several trends which are important to an understanding of the process by which a proliferator might gain a nuclear capability. At the same time, it indicates the few choke points where the control of technologies might be helpful. The top line shows advances over time in electronic components. The second and third lines show advances over time in the production of SNM. All five acknowledged nuclear weapons states (NWSs) are shown to have tested their first devices before computer numerically controlled machine tools and four- or five-axis machine tools were generally available. Modern computers incorporating large amounts of solid-state fast memory did not make their appearance until the early 1970s, and even fast transistorized (not integrated circuit chips) computers were not generally available until the early 1960s. By the time such computers became available to the American design laboratories, most of the fundamental families of modern nuclear weapons had already been conceived, designed, and tested. Computation brought a new ability to design for nuclear weapon safety and a new capability to execute complex designs which might reduce the amount of fissile materials and other scarce fuels used in the weapons. Finally, an inspection of the chart indicates very rapid qualitative progress in the early years of the U.S. nuclear effort, with new design types and wholly new weapon families emerging in rapid succession. In part, this occurred because the creative scientists were given permission to try almost any idea which sounded good, and in part it is because of the rapid interplay between conceptual advances and all-up nuclear tests. During the 195861 moratorium on testing the rate at which new ideas were introduced slowed, although a great deal of progress towards ensuring weapon safety was made. By the early 1970s the era of new concepts in nuclear weapon design had virtually come to an end, although qualitative improvements in yield, weight, and the efficient use of special materials were made. Similar statements, differing in detail but not in outline, could probably be made for each of the five NWSs and any threshold states with active weapons projects. However, it is unlikely that the evolution of nuclear designs, means of assembly, and initiation followed the same course in any two countries. More detailed descriptions of the various components of a nuclear weapons program will be found in the numbered sections below. Production of Fuel for Nuclear Weapons Ordinary uranium contains only 0.72 percent 235U, the highly fissionable isotope, the rest of the material being largely the much less fissionable isotope 238U (which cannot sustain a chain reaction). The fissile material must be separated from the rest of the uranium by a process known as enrichment. Several enrichment techniques have
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been used. The earliest successful methods were electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), in which large magnets are used to separate ions of the two isotopes,3 and gaseous diffusion, in which the gas uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is passed through a porous barrier material; the lighter molecules containing 235U penetrate the barrier slightly more rapidly, and with enough stages significant separation can be accomplished. Both gaseous diffusion and EMIS require enormous amounts of electricity. More efficient methods have been developed. The third method in widespread use is the gas centrifuge [Urenco (Netherlands, Germany, UK), Russia, Japan] in which UF6 gas is whirled inside complex rotor assemblies and centrifugal force pushes molecules containing the heavier isotope to the outside. Again, many stages are needed to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a weapon, but centrifuge enrichment requires much less electricity than either of the older technologies. Atomic and molecular laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques use lasers to selectively excite atoms or molecules containing one isotope of uranium so that they can be preferentially extracted. Although LIS appears promising, the technology has proven to be extremely difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically advanced states. The South African nuclear program used an aerodynamic separation technique in an indigenously designed and built device called a vortex tube. In the vortex a mixture of UF6 gas and hydrogen is injected tangentially into a tube, which tapers to a small exit aperture at one or both ends; centrifugal force provides the separation. The Becker Nozzle Process, also an aerodynamic separation technique, was developed in Germany. The Becker process is not in common use; the vortex tube was used in South Africa for producing reactor fuel with a 235U content of around 35 percent in addition to making 8093 percent 235U for the weapons program. Aerodynamic enrichment processes require large amounts of electricity and are not generally considered economically competitive; even the South African enrichment plant has apparently been closed. Uranium enriched to 20 percent or more 235U is called highly enriched (HEU). Uranium enriched above the natural 235U abundance but to less than 20 percent is called low-enriched (LEU). Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors by bombarding fertile 238U with neutrons from the chain reaction. Since each fission produces only slightly more than two neutrons, on average, the neutron economy must be managed carefully, which
3
requires good instrumentation and an understanding of reactor physics, to have enough neutrons to irradiate useful quantities of 238U.4 A typical production reactor produces about 0.8 atoms of plutonium for each nucleus of 235U which fissions. A good rule of thumb is that 1 gram of plutonium is produced for each megawatt (thermal)-day of reactor operation. Light-water power reactors make fewer plutonium nuclei per uranium fission than graphite-moderated production reactors. The plutonium must be extracted chemically in a reprocessing plant. Reprocessing is a complicated process involving the handling of highly radioactive materials and must be done by robots or by humans using remote manipulating equipment. At some stages of the process simple glove boxes with lead glass windows suffice. Reprocessing is intrinsically dangerous because of the use of hot acids in which plutonium and intensely radioactive short-lived fission products are dissolved. Some observers have, however, suggested that the safety measures could be relaxed to the extent that the proliferator deems his technicians to be expendable. Disposal of the high-level waste from reprocessing is difficult. Any reprocessing facility requires large quantities of concrete for shielding and will vent radioactive gases (131I, for example) to the atmosphere. Tritium for thermonuclear weapons is usually produced in a nuclear reactor similar or identical to that used to make plutonium. Neutrons from the reactor are used to irradiate lithium metal, and the nuclear reaction produces a triton. Lithium-6, an isotope of lithium, is used in some thermonuclear weapons. When struck by a neutron, 6Li (actually the compound 7Li nucleus formed in the collision) frequently disintegrates into tritium and 4He. Thus, the tritium needed for the secondary of a fusion weapon can be formed in place within the nuclear device and need not be transported from the factory to the target as heavy hydrogen. The lighter isotope, 6Li, is separated from the principal isotope, 7Li, in a process which exploits the fact that the lighter isotope more readily forms an amalgam with mercury than does the heavier one. This process is called COLEX (Column Exchange). Lithium hydroxide is dissolved in water, and the aqueous solution is brought into contact with the mercury. Lithium-6 ions in the solution tend to migrate into the mercury, while 7Li in the amalgam tends to migrate back into the aqueous hydroxide solution. The reaction is generally carried out in large columnar processors. While other processes for separating the lithium isotopes have been tried, the United States found COLEX to be the most successful. It is believed that the Soviet Union chose the same process.
The first large-scale uranium enrichment facility, the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, used EMIS in devices called calutrons. The process was abandoned in the United States because of its high consumption of electricity, but was adopted by the Iraqis because of its relative simplicity and their ability to procure the magnet material without encountering technology transfer obstacles.
Note, however, that during the Manhattan Project the United States was able to scale an operating 250 watt reactor to a 250 megawatt production reactor. Although the instrumentation of the day was far less sophisticated than that in use today, the scientists working the problem were exceptional.
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Figure 5.0-1. Nuclear History
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RATIONALE An ordinary atomic bomb of the kinds used in World War II uses the process of nuclear fission to release the binding energy in certain nuclei. The energy release is rapid and, because of the large amounts of energy locked in nuclei, violent. The principal materials used for fission weapons are 235U and 239Pu, which are termed fissile because they can be split into two roughly equal-mass fragments when struck by a neutron of even low energies. When a large enough mass of either material is assembled, a self-sustaining chain reaction results after the first fission is produced. Such a mass is termed critical. If any more material is added to a critical mass a condition of supercriticality results. The chain reaction in a supercritical mass increases rapidly in intensity until the heat generated by the nuclear reactions causes the mass to expand so greatly that the assembly is no longer critical. Fission weapons require a system to assemble a supercritical mass from a subcritical mass in a very short time. Two classic assembly systems have been used, gun and implosion. In the simpler gun-type device, two subcritical masses are brought together by using a mechanism similar to an artillery gun to shoot one mass (the projectile) at the other mass (the target). The Hiroshima weapon was gun-assembled and used 235U as a fuel. Gun-assembled weapons using highly enriched uranium are considered the easiest of all nuclear devices to construct and the most foolproof. Manhattan Project scientists were so confident in the performance of the Little Boy uranium bomb that the device was not even tested before it was dropped on Hiroshima. Because of the short time interval between spontaneous neutron emissions (and, therefore, the large number of background neutrons) found in plutonium because of the decay by spontaneous fission of the isotope 240Pu, Manhattan Project scientists devised the implosion method of assembly in which high explosives are arranged to form an imploding shock wave which compresses the fissile material to supercriticality.5 Implosion systems can be built using either 239Pu or 235U, but the gun assembly only works for uranium. Implosion weapons are more difficult to build than gun weapons, but they are also more efficient, requiring less SNM and producing larger yields. The six bombs built by the Republic of South Africa were gun-assembled and used uranium enriched to between 80 percent and 93 percent in the isotope 235U; Iraq attempted to build an implosion bomb, also using 235U. In contrast, North Korea chose to use 239Pu produced in a nuclear reactor. A more powerful but more complex weapon uses the fusion of heavy isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium to release large numbers of neutrons when the fusile
(sometimes termed fusionable) material is compressed by the energy released by a fission device called a primary. The fusion part of the weapon is called a secondary. In the words of Sidney D. Drell, the physics packages of nuclear weapons are sophisticated, but not complicated. The remainder of the weapon may be quite complicated indeed. Storage and Use Control Issues Regarding Nuclear Weapons The United States has developed a complex and sophisticated system to ensure that nuclear weapons are used only on the orders of the President or his delegated representative. Some elements of the custodial system are the two-man rule, which requires that no person be left alone with a weapon; permissive action links (PALs), coded locks which prevent detonation of the weapon unless the correct combination is entered; and careful psychological testing of personnel charged with the custody or eventual use of nuclear weapons. In addition, U.S. nuclear weapons must be certified as one point safe, which means that there is less than a one-in-a-million chance of a nuclear yield greater than the equivalent of four pounds of TNT resulting from an accident in which the high explosive in the device is detonated at the point most likely to cause a nuclear yield. It is believed to be unlikely that a new proliferator would insist upon one point safety as an inherent part of pit design; the United States did not until the late 1950s, relying instead upon other means to prevent detonation (e.g., a component of Little Boy was not inserted until after the Enola Gay had departed Tinian for Hiroshima). It is also unlikely that a new actor in the nuclear world would insist upon fitting PALs to every (or to any) nuclear weapon; the United States did not equip its submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles with PALs until, at the earliest, 1996, and the very first U.S. PALs were not introduced until the mid-1950s, when American weapons were stationed at foreign bases where the possibility of theft or misuse was thought to be real. Nonetheless, any possessor of nuclear weapons will take care that they are not used by unauthorized personnel and can be employed on the orders of duly constituted authority. Evenor, perhaps, especiallya dictator such as Saddam Hussein will insist upon a fairly sophisticated nuclear chain of command, if only to ensure that his weapons cannot be used by a revolutionary movement. It is also quite likely that even the newest proliferator would handle his weapons with care and seek to build some kind of safety devices and a reliable SAFF system into the units. Developing Technologies On the basis of experience, one might expect to observe significant nuclear planning activity and the evolution of situation-specific nuclear doctrine on the part of a new proliferator who would have to allocate carefully the family jewels. The development of a nuclear strategy might be visible in the professional military literature of the proliferator.
The critical mass of compressed fissile material decreases as the inverse square of the density achieved.
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Use Control and Weapons Delivery Because of the high cost and high value of a new entrants first few nuclear weapons, it is likely that the proliferant state would take great care to ensure that the crews selected to deliver the special ordnance would be highly proficient in the use of their weapon systems. This requires extensive training in the specialized procedures required to place nuclear weapons reliably on target. Nuclear weapons training may be both distinctive and visible, particularly when it involves those parts of the stockpile-to-target sequence which are explicitly nuclear. Some observers believe, however, that such training will be difficult to observe and identify. Expected Rates of Progress for New Proliferants New proliferants with First-World technological bases can probably construct their first nuclear weapons 3 to 5 years after making a political decision to do so, even including constructing an infrastructure to make special nuclear materials, assuming that finances and resources are available.6 The first intellectual steps towards reducing the size and mass of fission weapons should not take more than another 1 to 2 years to master. Boosting and multistage weapons may require anywhere from 3 to 10 more years to develop in the absence of yield testing, and some nations may still fail to succeed. China, however, progressed from a very simple fission design to a two-stage weapon by its fifth full-scale testbut one of the intervening tests was an end-to-end firing of a ballistic missile with a live nuclear warhead in its nosecone. Radiological Weapons Radioactive isotopes suitable for use as weapons include 137Cs, 60Co, 131I, and other short-lived, relatively easy-to-produce fission products. The most readily available source for the materials of radiological weapons is spent fuel from nuclear reactors; indeed, the spent fuel rods themselves are sufficiently hot that they can be used essentially directly, although chopping or pulverization would be useful. Medical isotopes are another readily available source of radioactive material in quantities suitable for spreading terror. Proliferation Implication Assessment Many of the items on which the greatest control efforts have focused, at least in the publics perceptioncomputers, switch tubes, capacitorsare either not control6
lable or, at a controllable level, are far more capable than what is required to design and build a weapon. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Five nations, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are nuclear weapon states according to the definition in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (countries that tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967). All five possess all technologies needed to build modern compact nuclear weapons and all have produced both high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. India detonated a nuclear device using plutonium implosion in 1974. India has held no announced tests since then, although they have on occasion taken steps which would imply that a test is imminent. India does not enrich uranium. It has heavy-water moderated reactors, not all under international safeguards. Pakistan has an operating uranium enrichment plant. Senior Pakistani officials have alluded to possession of a small nuclear stockpile. South Africa constructed six simple gun-assembled uranium bombs but dismantled them and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapons state. The HEU for these bombs was obtained from an aerodynamic isotope separation technique developed indigenously. South Africa has shut down its aerodynamic enrichment facilities, but is developing a molecular LIS (MLIS) process for producing LEU for commercial nuclear power reactors. Israel is believed by some to possess nuclear weapons. It operates one unsafeguarded nuclear reactor at Dimona and presumably is capable of reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium. It is a technically advanced state and probably has all of the electronics needed to build and test nuclear weapons. Its elite air force may be nuclear trained. Iraq had a flourishing nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear program until the 1991 Gulf War. It was able to enrich uranium using EMIS and was pursuing centrifuge enrichment as well. It anticipated constructing implosion weapons using HEU as the fuel. Iran has many components of a nuclear weapons program in place and has been attempting to purchase turnkey nuclear reactors on the world market. North Korea built and operated CO2-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors and had built and operated a reprocessing facility before agreeing to allow the United States and South Korea to replace its gas-graphite power reactor with a light-water moderated unit less suited to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The amount of plutonium it currently has in hand outside of that contained in its spent fuel storage facility is not well known by outsiders. Sweden came very close to building nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many experts judge its weapon designs as sophisticated and efficient; the
Nations such as Germany and Japan, which have advanced civilian nuclear power programs and stocks of plutonium (either separated or still contained in spent fuel) may be able to produce their first weapons in even less time. Countries which have a nuclear infrastructure and which have expended considerable effort in learning how to build nuclear weapons while still not crossing the nuclear threshold (e.g., Sweden) also are in a favorable position to go nuclear in short order.
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country has the industrial base to go nuclear in a short period and has adequate amounts of plutonium contained in stored spent reactor fuel. Switzerland had a nuclear weapons program until the early 1970s. Both Sweden and Switzerland are highly industrialized Western nations with broad access to a full spectrum of modern technology, whether developed indigenously or imported. Both operate nuclear reactors. Germany has developed an indigenous uranium enrichment process (not believed to be currently in use) and has adequate stocks of spent fuel from which to prepare nuclear weapons.
Japan is as far advanced as Germany and also operates a reprocessing plant. Either nation could construct nuclear weapons in a short time. Many other states have capabilities in some or all of the relevant technologies and could assemble a nuclear weapons program in a short time.
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Country
Sec 5.1 Enrichment Feedstocks Production
Sec 5.2 Uranium Enrichment Processes
Sec 5.3 Nuclear Fission Reactors
Sec 5.4 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing)
Sec 5.5 Lithium Production
Sec 5.6 Nuclear Weapons Design and Development
Sec 5.7 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing
Sec 5.8 Radiological Weapons
Sec 5.9 Manufacturing of Nuclear Components
Sec 5.10 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing
Sec 5.11 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control
Sec 5.12 Heavy Water Production
Sec 5.13 Tritium Production
Argentina Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Republic France Germany India Iran Iraq Italy Japan Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States

some

sufficient level
limited
Figure 5.0-2. Nuclear Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 5.1ENRICHMENT FEEDSTOCKS PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW This subsection covers technologies utilized in the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to highly purified uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) for subsequent use as feedstock in a uranium-enrichment process. Gaseous UF6 is used as the feed in the gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion processes, and UCl4 is used as feed in the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) process. Uranium ore concentrates, also known as yellowcake, typically contain 60 80 percent uranium and up to 20 percent extraneous impurities. There are two commercial processes used to produce purified UF6 from yellowcake. The primary difference between the two processessolvent extraction/fluorination (wet process) and fluorination/fractionation (dry process)is whether the uranium is purified by solvent extraction before conversion to UF6 or by fractional distillation of the UF6 after conversion. In the wet process, yellowcake is dissolved in nitric acid (HNO3), and the insoluble residue is removed by filtration or centrifugation. Uranium is separated from the acid solution with liquid-liquid extraction, the uranyl nitrate product is decomposed to uranium trioxide (UO3) via thermal denitration, and the trioxide is reduced to uranium dioxide (UO2) with hydrogen or cracked ammonia (NH3). In most cases, the standard Purex process, using tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) in a hydrocarbon diluent, separates uranium from its impurities in the extraction step. In the dry process, the conversion and purification steps occur throughout the process. If the yellowcake was produced by the alkali-leach process (yields Na2U2O7), the sodium must be removed from the material by partial digestion in sulfuric acid followed by ammonia precipitation of ammonium diuranate [(NH4)2U2O7]. The ammonium-containing uranium salt is decomposed to UO3 by heating, and this oxide is reduced to UO2 with hydrogen or cracked NH3. The remaining steps used to produce UF6 for both processes are similar in that the UO2 is converted to UF4 by hydrofluorination (using hydrogen fluoride gasHF). The UF4 (impure in the dry process) is converted to UF6 using electrolytically generated fluorine gas (F2). In the dry process, the UF6 is purified in a two-stage distillation step. Direct fluorination of UO3 to UF6 has been used, but this procedure is more amenable to relatively small capacity plants.
Highlights
UF6 and UCl4 are the principal compounds used as inputs to uranium enrichment processes. Manufacture of these feedstocks is straightforward industrial chemistry. These processes are unclassified and widely known.
The EMIS uranium-enrichment process uses UCl4 for its feed material. Uranium tetrachloride is produced by the reaction of carbon tetrachloride (CCl4) with pure UO2 at 700 F. RATIONALE A country choosing to join the nuclear weapons community must acquire the necessary weapons (fissile) material (235U or 239Pu). A state selecting uranium for its weapons must obtain a supply of uranium ore and construct an enrichment plant because the 235 U content in natural uranium is over two orders of magnitude lower than that found in weapons grade uranium (>90 percent 235U). Nearly all uranium enrichment plants utilize UF6 as their feed. A country may select the EMIS process, which uses UCl4 as its feed material, for enriching uranium. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) The processes outlined above are unclassified and have been described extensively in the literature on the nuclear fuel cycle. Many countries around the world have extracted uranium from its ores or from yellowcake. The processes for preparing the feedstocks are basic industrial chemistry. The enabling technologies are those which use HF, NH3, F2, CCL4, and precursor uranium compounds to prepare UF6 and UCL4.
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Table 5.1-1. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Technology Parameters

Technology
Purification of yellowcake (wet process)
Knowledge of liquid-liquid extraction systems Experience in using HNO3
NTL 8F; NRC J
Yellowcake Nitric acid (HNO3) tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) Refined kerosene Yellowcake (should not contain high concentrations of sodium or magnesium) H2SO4 See citations below H2 NH3
Filters; centrifuges; pulse columns; concentration/thermal denitration systems; tanks resistant to HNO3
Distribution coefficients for many elements Aqueous solubility for many compounds
Purification of yellowcake (dry process: produces impure UO2)
Ability to handle H2 at elevated temperature
NTL 8F; NRC J
Furnace; air filtration None identified equipment; fluidized bed; temperature control; heat exchangers
UO2 preparation
Ability to handle H2 at elevated temperature
NTL 8F; NRC J
Moving bed reactor; None identified rotary kiln; air filtration equipment; fluidized bed; temperature control system Stirred fluidized bed reactors; rotary kiln; moving bed/screw reactor; air cleaning equipment (filters, scrubbers); fluorideresistant equipment Flame tower reactor; fluidized bed reactor; condensers (cold traps); electrolytic cells (for F2 production); highamperage, low-voltage supply (for F2 production); air-cleaning equipment; F2-resistant equipment (Monel); fluoride-resistant equipment; UF6 storage Stirred fluidized bed reactors; rotary kiln; moving bed/screw reactor; air-cleaning equipment (filters, scrubbers) None identified
UF4 preparation
Ability to manage HF at elevated temperature Ability to provide a dry environment
NTL 8F; NRC J
HF
UF6 preparation (used in gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge enrichment processes)
Capability to control quantities of fluorine gas. Ability to operate a flame tower with F2. Experience in removing H2 from electrolytic cells (F2 production) . Experience in operating in an anhydrous environment
NTL 8F; NRC J
F2 HF KF 2HF
Careful temperature control is required for fluorination
UCl4 preparation (used in Water-free environment must be provided EMIS enrichment process)
NTL 8F; NRC H
CCl4
Reasonable control of temperature
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Table 5.1-2. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Reference Data

Purification of yellowcake (wet process) Purification of yellowcake (dry process produces impure UO2) UO2 preparation UF4 preparation
HNO3 solutions are relatively hazardous and require moderate care in handling H2 presents an explosive hazard H2 presents an explosive hazard Inappropriate use of HF can present health problems. Improper operation of tower reactors may cause plugging (caking). Producing F2 is not an easy task. Flame towers can be difficult to operate. Moisture-sensitive material difficult to handle.
None identified
Direct fluorination of UO3
None identified None identified None identified
Direct fluorination of UO3 Step may be bypassed using direct fluorination Step may be bypassed using direct fluorination
UF6 preparation (used in gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge enrichment processes) UCl4 preparation (used in EMIS enrichment process)
UF6 product is feed to most U enrichment processes
None identified
Moisture-sensitive material difficult to UCl4 product is feed to the EMIS None identified enrichment process handle
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SECTION 5.2URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROCESSES
OVERVIEW It is generally recognized that the acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Fissile material production consumes the vast majority of the technical, industrial, and financial resources required to produce nuclear weapons. For example, production of fissile materialshighly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutoniumaccounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.9 billion (1945 dollars) spent on the Manhattan Project.7 Fissile materials can produce energy by nuclear fission, either in nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons. The principal fissile materials of interest are 235U, 233U, and 239 Pu. Uranium-235 is of particular interest because it is the only fissile material that occurs in nature in significant quantity, and it can be used to construct a nuclear explosive device if a sufficient quantity can be acquired. In a typical sample of natural uranium, only 0.72 percent of the atoms are 235U atoms, and it can be assumed that all of the remaining atoms are 238U atoms.8 Higher concentrations of 235U are required for many applications, and the use of uranium isotope separation processes to increase the assay of 235U above its natural value of 0.72 percent is called uranium enrichment. While low-enriched uranium (LEU) could technically mean uranium with an assay anywhere between slightly greater than natural (0.72 percent) and 20 percent 235U, it most commonly is used to denote uranium with an assay suitable for use in a lightwater nuclear reactor (i.e., an assay of <5 percent). Similarly, the term highly enriched uranium (HEU) could be used to describe uranium with an assay >20 percent, but it is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to 90 percent 235U or higher (i.e., weapons-grade uranium). The term oralloy was used during World War II as a contraction of Oak Ridge alloy, and it denoted uranium enriched to 93.5 percent 235U. When plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, inevitably some 240Pu (as well as heavier plutonium isotopes, including 241Pu and 242Pu) is produced along with the more desirable 239Pu. The heavier isotope is not as readily fissionable, and it also decays by spontaneous fission, producing unwanted background neutrons. Thus, nuclear weapon designers prefer to work with plutonium containing less than 7 percent 240Pu.
7
Highlights
The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges are today the technology of first choice for enriching uranium, based on process economics and minimum consumption of electricity. Technologies considered obsolete for commercial uranium enrichment, such as electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), can be employed by a proliferant state at some added cost in electric power and labor requirements. Aerodynamic separation processes developed in South Africa and Germany have proven satisfactory for a limited number of nuclear weapons, despite their high cost to operate. Laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques are based on advanced technologies and represent potential uranium enrichment processes of the future.
Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 1, 1939/1946, University of California Press, a 1990 edition of a book originally published by Pennsylvania State University Press in 1962. Natural uranium typically has a composition of 0.0055 atom % 234U, 0.7205 atom % 235U, and 99.274 atom % 238U. For most purposes, the tiny fraction of 234U can be neglected.
A method for separating plutonium isotopes could be used to remove the heavier isotopes of plutonium (e.g., 240Pu) from reactor-grade plutonium, thus producing nearly pure 239Pu. Uranium isotope separation techniques [e.g., atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS)] might be applied to this task. However, this would require mastery of production reactor and reprocessing technologies (to produce and extract the plutonium) in addition to isotope enrichment technology (to remove the heavier plutonium isotopes). In practice, it is simpler to alter the reactor refueling cycle to reduce the fraction of plutonium which is 240Pu. Manhattan Project scientists and engineers explored several uranium-enrichment technologies, and production plants employing three uranium-enrichment processes electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), liquid thermal diffusion, and gaseous diffusionwere constructed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the period from 1943 to 1945. Centrifugation was tried, but the technology needed to spin a rotor at an appropriate speed was not then practical on an industrial scale. The aerodynamic separation processes developed in Germany and South Africa did not exist during World War II;
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neither, of course did laser isotope separation or plasma separation. The World War II Japanese nuclear program made some attempts to find a purely chemical process. RATIONALE Methods of Separation Electromagnetic Isotope Separation The EMIS process is based on the same physical principle as that of a simple mass spectrometerthat a charged particle will follow a circular trajectory when passing through a uniform magnetic field. Two ions with the same kinetic energy and electrical charge, but different masses (i.e., 235U+ and 238U+), will have different trajectories, with the heavier 238U+ ion having the larger diameter. The different diameters of the trajectories of the two uranium ions allow for the separation and collection of the material in receivers or collector pockets. EMIS is a batch process that can produce weapons-grade material from natural uranium in only two stages. However, hundreds to thousands of units would be required to produce large quantities of HEU because of the processs relatively low product collection rate and the long cycle time required to recover material between runs. In the uranium EMIS process, uranium ions are generated within an evacuated enclosure (called a tank) that is located in a strong magnetic field. For the EMIS ion source, solid uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) is electrically heated to produce UCl4 vapor. The UCl4 molecules are bombarded with electrons, producing U+ ions. The ions are accelerated by an electrical potential to high speed and follow a circular trajectory in the plane perpendicular to the magnetic field. In the U.S. EMIS separators, the ion beam traverses a 180-deg arc before the ions pass through slit apertures at the collector. A major problem with the EMIS process is that less than half of the UCl4 feed is typically converted to the desired U+ ions, and less than half of the desired U+ ions are actually collected. Recovery of unused material deposited on the interior surfaces of the tanks is a laborious, time-consuming process that reduces the effective output of an EMIS facility and requires a large material recycle operation. In the U.S. EMIS program, production of weapons-grade uranium took place in two enrichment stages, referred to as the and stages. The first () stage used natural or slightly enriched uranium as feed and enriched it to 1220% 235U. The second () stage used the product of the () stage as feed and further enriched it to weapons-grade uranium. To allow more efficient use of magnets and floor space, the individual stages were arranged in continuous oval or rectangular arrays (called racetracks or, simply, tracks) with separator tanks alternated with electromagnetic units. The U.S. EMIS separators are referred to as calutrons because the development work was carried out at the University of California (Berkeley) during the early 1940s using cyclotrons. Although most applications of the EMIS process have been applied to the commercial production of both stable and radioactive isotopes, all five recognized
weapons states have tested or used the EMIS process for uranium enrichment. Even with the problems associated with using the process, an EMIS facility could be attractive for a country desiring a limited weapons-grade uranium enrichment program. The process might be especially appealing as a method for further enriching partially enriched material. It has been well documented that EMIS was the principal process pursued by the Iraqi uranium enrichment program. This occurred at a time when EMIS had been discarded and largely forgotten as a method for uranium enrichment because it is both energy intensive and labor intensive, and it is not economically competitive with other enrichment technologies. Thermal Diffusion Thermal diffusion utilizes the transfer of heat across a thin liquid or gas to accomplish isotope separation. By cooling a vertical film on one side and heating it on the other side, the resultant convection currents will produce an upward flow along the hot surface and a downward flow along the cold surface. Under these conditions, the lighter 235U gas molecules will diffuse toward the hot surface, and the heavier 238U molecules will diffuse toward the cold surface. These two diffusive motions combined with the convection currents will cause the lighter 235U molecules to concentrate at the top of the film and the heavier 238U molecules to concentrate at the bottom of the film. The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost, and high heat consumption. Thermal diffusion in liquid UF6 was used during World War II to prepare feed material for the EMIS process. A production plant containing 2,100 columns (each approximately 15 meters long) was operated in Oak Ridge for less than 1 year and provided a product assay of less than 1% 235U. Each of these columns consisted of three tubes. Cooling water was circulated between the outer and middle tubes, and the inner tube carried steam. The annular space between the inner and middle tubes was filled with liquid UF6. The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the 1940s. Today, thermal diffusion remains a practical process to separate isotopes of noble gases (e.g., xenon) and other light isotopes (e.g., carbon) for research purposes. Gaseous Diffusion The gaseous-diffusion process has been highly developed and employed to produce both HEU and commercial reactor-grade LEU. The United States first employed gaseous diffusion during WWII and expanded its capacity after the war to produce HEU. Since the late 1960s, the U.S. facilities have been used primarily to produce commercial LEU, with the last remaining HEU capacity being shut down in 1992. China and France currently have operating diffusion plants. Russias enrichment facilities have been converted from diffusion to centrifuge technology. Britains diffusion facility was shut down and dismantled.
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The gaseous-diffusion process depends on the separation effect arising from molecular effusion (i.e., the flow of gas through small holes). On average, lighter gas molecules travel faster than heavier gas molecules and consequently tend to collide more often with the porous barrier material. Thus, lighter molecules are more likely to enter the barrier pores than are heavier molecules. For UF6, the difference in velocities between molecules containing 235U and 238U is small (0.4 percent), and, consequently, the amount of separation achieved by a single stage of gaseous diffusion is small. Therefore, many cascade stages are required to achieve even LEU assays. The production of a sustainable, efficient separating membrane (barrier) is the key to the successful operation of a diffusion plant. To obtain an efficient porous barrier, the holes must be very small (on the order of one-millionth of an inch in diameter) and of uniform size. The porosity of the barrier must be high to obtain high flow rates through the barrier. The barrier must also be able to withstand years of operation while exposed to corrosive UF6 gas. Typical materials for the barrier are nickel and aluminum oxide. Diffusion equipment tends to be rather large and consumes significant amounts of energy. The main components of a single gaseous-diffusion stage are (1) a large cylindrical vessel, called a diffuser or converter, that contains the barrier; (2) a compressor used to compress the gas to the pressures needed for flow through the barrier; (3) an electric motor to drive the compressor; (4) a heat exchanger to remove the heat of compression; and (5) piping and valves for stage and interstage connections and process control. The entire system must be essentially leak free, and the compressors require special seals to prevent both out-leakage of UF6 and in-leakage of air. The chemical corrosiveness of UF6 requires use of metals such as nickel or aluminum for surfaces exposed to the gas (e.g., piping and compressors). In addition to the stage equipment, auxiliary facilities for a gaseous-diffusion plant could include a large electrical power distribution system, cooling towers to dissipate the waste process heat, a fluorination facility, a steam plant, a barrier production plant, and a plant to produce dry air and nitrogen. Gaseous diffusion is unlikely to be the preferred technology of a proliferator due to difficulties associated with making and maintaining a suitable barrier, large energy consumption, the requirement for procuring large quantities of specialized stage equipment, large in-process inventory requirements, and long equilibrium times. Gas Centrifuge The use of centrifugal fields for isotope separation was first suggested in 1919; but efforts in this direction were unsuccessful until 1934, when J.W. Beams and coworkers at the University of Virginia applied a vacuum ultracentrifuge to the separation of chlorine isotopes. Although abandoned midway through the Manhattan Project, the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process has been highly developed and used to produce both HEU and LEU. It is likely to be the preferred technology of the future
due to its relatively low-energy consumption, short equilibrium time, and modular design features. In the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process, gaseous UF6 is fed into a cylindrical rotor that spins at high speed inside an evacuated casing. Because the rotor spins so rapidly, centrifugal force results in the gas occupying only a thin layer next to the rotor wall, with the gas moving at approximately the speed of the wall. Centrifugal force also causes the heavier 238UF6 molecules to tend to move closer to the wall than the lighter 235UF6 molecules, thus partially separating the uranium isotopes. This separation is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the centrifuge that concentrates enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. This flow can be driven mechanically by scoops and baffles or thermally by heating one of the end caps. The main subsystems of the centrifuge are (1) rotor and end caps; (2) top and bottom bearing/suspension system; (3) electric motor and power supply (frequency changer); (4) center post, scoops and baffles; (5) vacuum system; and (6) casing. Because of the corrosive nature of UF6, all components that come in direct contact with UF6 must be must be fabricated from, or lined with, corrosion-resistant materials. The separative capacity of a single centrifuge increases with the length of the rotor and the rotor wall speed. Consequently, centrifuges containing long, high-speed rotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs (subject to mechanical constraints). The primary limitation on rotor wall speed is the strength-to-weight ratio of the rotor material. Suitable rotor materials include alloys of aluminum or titanium, maraging steel, or composites reinforced by certain glass, aramid, or carbon fibers. At present, maraging steel is the most popular rotor material for proliferants. With maraging steel, the maximum rotor wall speed is approximately 500 m/s. Fiber-reinforced composite rotors may achieve even higher speeds; however, the needed composite technology is not within the grasp of many potential proliferants. Another limitation on rotor speed is the lifetime of the bearings at either end of the rotor. Rotor length is limited by the vibrations a rotor experiences as it spins. The rotors can undergo vibrations similar to those of a guitar string, with characteristic frequencies of vibration. Balancing of rotors to minimize their vibrations is especially critical to avoid early failure of the bearing and suspension systems. Because perfect balancing is not possible, the suspension system must be capable of damping some amount of vibration. One of the key components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant is the power supply (frequency converter) for the gas centrifuge machines. The power supply must accept alternating current (ac) input at the 50- or 60-Hz line frequency available from the electric power grid and provide an ac output at a much higher frequency (typically 600 Hz or more). The high-frequency output from the frequency changer is fed to the
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high-speed gas centrifuge drive motors (the speed of an ac motor is proportional to the frequency of the supplied current). The centrifuge power supplies must operate at high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise control of the output frequency. The casing is needed both to maintain a vacuum and to contain the rapidly spinning components in the event of a failure. If the shrapnel from a single centrifuge failure is not contained, a domino effect may result and destroy adjacent centrifuges. A single casing may enclose one or several rotors. Although the separation factors obtainable from a centrifuge are large compared to gaseous diffusion, several cascade stages are still required to produce even LEU material. Furthermore, the throughput of a single centrifuge is usually small, which leads to rather small separative capacities for typical proliferator centrifuges. To be able to produce only one weapon per year, several thousand centrifuges would be required. The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. Consequently, a centrifuge plant will not have the easily identified electrical and cooling systems typically required by a gaseous diffusion plant. Aerodynamic Processes Aerodynamic uranium enrichment processes include the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube separation process. These aerodynamic separation processes depend upon diffusion driven by pressure gradients, as does the gas centrifuge. In effect, aerodynamic processes can be considered as nonrotating centrifuges. Enhancement of the centrifugal forces is achieved by dilution of UF6 with a carrier gas (i.e., hydrogen or helium). This achieves a much higher flow velocity for the gas than could be obtained using pure UF6. The separation nozzle process was developed by E.W. Becker and associates at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in Germany. In this process, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and H2 (or helium) is compressed and then directed along a curved wall at high velocity. The heavier 238U-bearing molecules move preferentially out to the wall relative to those containing 235U. At the end of the deflection, the gas jet is split by a knife edge into a light fraction and a heavy fraction, which are withdrawn separately. Economic considerations drive process designers to select separation nozzles with physical dimensions as small as manufacturing technology will allow. The curved wall of the nozzle may have a radius of curvature as small as 10 m (0.0004 in.). Production of these tiny nozzles by such processes as stacking photo-etched metal foils is technically demanding. A typical stage consists of a vertical cylindrical vessel containing the separation elements, a cross piece for gas distribution, a gas cooler to remove the heat of compression, and a centrifugal compressor driven by a electric motor.
The Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (UCOR) developed and deployed its own aerodynamic process characterized as an advanced vortex tube or stationary-walled centrifuge at the so called Y plant at Valindaba to produce hundreds of kilograms of HEU. In this process, a mixture of UF6 and H2 is compressed and enters a vortex tube tangentially at one end through nozzles or holes at velocities close to the speed of sound. This tangential injection of gas results in a spiral or vortex motion within the tube, and two gas streams are withdrawn at opposite ends of the vortex tube. The spiral swirling flow decays downstream of the feed inlet due to friction at the tube wall. Consequently, the inside diameter of the tube is typically tapered to reduce the decay in the swirling flow velocity. This process is characterized by a separating element with very small stage cut (ratio of product flow to feed flow) of about 1/20 and high process-operating pressures. Due to the very small cut of the vortex tube stages and the extremely difficult piping requirements that would be necessary based on traditional methods of piping stages together, the South Africans developed a cascade design technique, called Helikon. In essence, the Helikon technique permits 20 separation stages to be combined into one large module, and all 20 stages share a common pair of axial-flow compressors. A basic requirement for the success of this method is that the axial-flow compressors successfully transmit parallel streams of different isotopic compositions without significant mixing. A typical Helikon module consists of a large cylindrical steel vessel that houses a separating element assembly, two axial-flow compressors (one mounted on each end), and two water-cooled heat exchangers. For both of these aerodynamic processes, the high proportion of carrier gas required in relation to UF6 process gas results in high specific-energy consumption and substantial requirements for removal of waste heat. Laser Isotope Separation In the early 1970s, significant work began on the development of laser isotope separation technologies for uranium enrichment. Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include first category atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA) and second category molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS). The systems, equipment, and components for laser-enrichment plants embrace (a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapor (for selective photoionization) or devices to feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation); (b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as product and tails in the first category and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as product and unaffected material as tails in the second category; (c) process laser systems to selectively excite the 235U species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion
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equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any number of available laser technologies. AVLIS The atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process is based on the fact that 235U atoms and 238U atoms absorb light of different frequencies (or colors). Although the absorption frequencies of these two isotopes differ only by a very small amount (about one part in a million), the dye lasers used in AVLIS can be tuned so that only the 235U atoms absorb the laser light. As the 235U atom absorbs the laser light, its electrons are excited to a higher energy state. With the absorption of sufficient energy, a 235U atom will eject an electron and become a positively charged ion. The 235U ions may then be deflected by an electrostatic field to a product collector. The 238U atoms remain neutral and pass through the product collector section and are deposited on a tails collector. The AVLIS process consists of a laser system and a separation system. The separator system contains a vaporizer and a collector. In the vaporizer, metallic uranium is melted and vaporized to form an atomic vapor stream. The vapor stream flows through the collector, where it is illuminated by the precisely tuned laser light. The AVLIS laser system is a pumped laser system comprised of one laser used to optically pump a separate dye laser, which produces the light used in the separation process. Dye master oscillator lasers provide precise laser beam frequency, timing, and quality control. The laser light emerging from the dye master oscillator laser is increased in power by passage through a dye laser amplifier. A total of three colors are used to ionize the 235U atoms. Many countries are pursuing some level of AVLIS research and/or development, and major programs exist in the United States, France, Japan, and probably Russia. Principal advantages of the AVLIS process include a high separation factor, low energy consumption (approximately the same as the centrifuge process), and a small volume of generated waste. However, no country has yet deployed an AVLIS process, although several have demonstrated the capability to enrich uranium with the process. While conceptually simple, the actual implementation of the process is likely to be difficult and expensive, especially for countries with limited technical resources. The AVLIS process requires much sophisticated hardware constructed of specialized materials that must be capable of reliable operation for extended periods of time in a harsh environment. MLIS The idea for the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) process was conceived by a group of scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1971. There are two basic steps involved in the MLIS process. In the first step, UF6 is irradiated by an infrared laser system operating near the 16 m wavelength, which selectively excites the 235UF6, leaving the 238UF6 relatively unexcited. In the second step, photons from a
second laser system (infrared or ultraviolet) preferentially dissociate the excited 235UF6 to form 235UF5 and free fluorine atoms. The 235UF5 formed from the dissociation precipitates from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream. MLIS is a stagewise process, and each stage requires conversion of the enriched UF5 product back to UF6 for further enrichment. CO2 lasers are suitable for exciting the 235UF6 during the first step. A XeCl excimer laser producing ultraviolet light may be suitable for the dissociation of 235UF6 during the second step. However, there is currently no known MLIS optical system which has been successfully designed to handle both infrared and ultraviolet. Consequently, most MLIS concepts use an all infrared optical system. In terms of the gas flow for the MLIS process, gaseous UF6 mixed with a carrier gas and a scavenger gas is expanded through a supersonic nozzle that cools the gas to low temperatures. Hydrogen or a noble gas are suitable as carriers. A scavenger gas (such as methane) is used to capture the fluorine atoms that are released as a result of the dissociation of 235UF6 molecules. There are many complexities associated with the process, and the United States, UK, France, and Germany have stated that their MLIS programs have been terminated. Japan also has had a small MLIS program. South Africa has recently stated that their MLIS program is ready to be deployed for low-enriched uranium (LEU) production. Principal advantages of the MLIS process are its low power consumption and its use of UF6 as its process gas. Chemical and Ion Exchange Chemical-exchange isotope separation requires segregation of two forms of an element into separate but contacting streams. Since many contacts are required to achieve the desired separation, the contacting process must be fast and achieve as much separation as possible. For heavy elements such as uranium, achieving a suitable separation factor involves contact between two valence (oxidation state) forms such as hexavalent [U6+ as in uranyl chloride (UO2Cl2)] and the quadrivalent [U4+ as in uranium tetrachloride (UCl4)]. The 235U isotope exhibits a slight preference for the higher valence, for example, the hexavalent over the quadrivalent in the Asahi process or the quadrivalent over the trivalent (U3+) in the French solvent-extraction process. The chemical-exchange process, developed by the French, is commonly referred to as CHEMEX. It uses the exchange reaction that takes place between two valence states (U3+ and U4+) of uranium ions in aqueous solution. Isotopic enrichment results from the tendency of 238U to concentrate in the U3+ compound while 235U concentrates in the U4+ compound. It is therefore possible to obtain enriched uranium by removing the U4+ ions with an organic solvent that is immiscible with the aqueous phase (concentrated hydrochloric acid). Several possible extractants are available; however, tributyl phosphate (TBP), the choice of the French, is typically used. TBP is diluted with an aromatic solvent, and this organic phase moves countercurrent to the aqueous phase through a series of pulsed columns.
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In the pulse column, the heavier aqueous phase is fed into the top of the column, and the lighter organic phase is fed into the bottom of the column. A rapid reciprocating motion is applied to the contents of the column, providing efficient and intimate contact of the two phases. In an HEU plant, centrifugal contactors might be employed particularly for the higher assay sections, since the stage times and corresponding specific uranium inventory could be reduced significantly. After passing through the column, the enriched and depleted uranium streams must be chemically treated so that they can be recirculated through the column again (refluxed) or sent to another column for additional enrichment. This requires complicated refluxing equipment at both ends of the column. The ion-exchange process was developed by the Asahi Chemical Company in Japan and uses the chemical isotope effect between two valences (U4+ and U6+) of uranium. In this process, the organic phase is replaced by a proprietary ion-exchange resin. The aqueous phase flows through the stationary resin held in a column, and the net effect of all the chemical reactions is a band of uranium that moves through the ion-exchange column. The exchange between the unadsorbed uranium flowing through the band and that adsorbed on the resin enhances the isotopic separation. In this continuous separation system, 235U and 238U tend to accumulate respectively at the entrance and exit ends of the adsorption band. In this process, it is economical to regenerate many of the chemicals by reaction with oxygen and hydrogen in separate equipment. The development and manufacture of the appropriate adsorbent beads are based on technology and know-how gained by Asahi in over 25 years of ion-exchange membrane development and manufacture. The adsorbent is a spherical bead of porous anion-exchange resin with a very high separation efficiency and an exchange rate over 1,000 times faster than the rates obtained in most commercially available resins. The two exchange processes discussed here are representative of exchange processes now under study in several countries. At present, no country has built or operated a full-scale uranium enrichment plant based on an exchange process. The primary proliferation concern is that they are based on standard chemical engineering technology (except for the proprietary ion-exchange resins). Plasma Separation The plasma separation process (PSP) has been studied as a potentially more efficient uranium-enrichment technique that makes use of the advancing technologies in superconducting magnets and plasma physics. In this process, the principle of ion cyclotron resonance is used to selectively energize the 235U isotope in a plasma containing 235U and 238U ions. A feed plate of solid uranium serves as the source of neutral uranium atoms. These atoms are vaporized by bombarding the plate with energetic ions in a process called sputtering. A microwave antenna located in front of the plate energizes free electrons which collide with neutral uranium atoms in the vapor
sputtering off the plate. This in turn displaces electrons from the uranium atoms and produces a plasma of 235U and 238U ions. The plasma is subjected to a uniform magnetic field along the axis of a cylindrical vacuum chamber as the plasma flows from source to collector. The magnetic field is produced by a superconducting magnet located around the outside of the chamber. The high-strength magnetic field produces helical motions of the ions, with the lighter 235 U ions spiraling faster and having a higher ion cyclotron frequency than the heavier 238 U ions. As the ions move toward the collector, they pass through an electric field produced by an excitation coil oscillating at the same frequency as the ion cyclotron frequency of the 235U ions. This causes the helical orbit of the 235U ions to increase in radius while having minimal effect on the orbit of the heavier 238U ions. The plasma flows through a collector of closely spaced, parallel slats, the physical appearance of which roughly resembles a venetian blind. The large-orbit 235U ions are more likely to deposit on the slats, while the remaining plasma, depleted in 235U, accumulates on an end plate of the collector. PSP is a batch process that would require several stages to produce HEU from natural feed. The only countries known to have had serious PSP experimental programs are the United States and France. PSP became a part of DOEs Advanced Isotope Separation research and development program in 1976, but development was dropped in 1982 when AVLIS was chosen as the advanced technology of choice. The French developed their own version of PSP, which they called RCI. Funding for RCI was drastically reduced in 1986, and the program was suspended around 1990, although RCI is still used for stable isotope separation. Proliferation Implication Assessment Uranium gun-assembled weapons are the easiest of all nuclear devices to design and build. It is generally conceded to be impossible to prevent any nation having the requisite amount of HEU from building one or more gun-assembled weapons. Therefore, the acquisition of significant quantities of 235U or a facility in which to separate the fissile material is an indicator that the acquiring state could be in the process of gaining a rudimentary nuclear capability. Because HEU is used in certain research reactors, another interpretation is possible. Because of the weapons potential, the United States and France have sought to replace HEU-fueled reactors with ones using a lower grade (<20% 235U, for example) of uranium which cannot be so readily converted to weapons use. The uranium gun-bomb route was successfully taken by South Africa. Any nation having uranium ore in sufficient quantity, a sufficiently well-developed technological and industrial infrastructure, sufficient electric power, and the desire to acquire nuclear weapons might well choose the uranium gun technology. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) All five nuclear weapon states have demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade. In addition, enrichment is a commercial process in The Netherlands
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and Japan. Germany has also demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium; the South African nuclear weapons were made from 8090% 235U produced indigenously. Brazil and Argentina sought to build enrichment plants but have abandoned the effort. Iraq used EMIS to enrich uranium prior to the Gulf War and was in the process of building a centrifuge enrichment cascade. Iraq produced some enriched uranium (not weapons grade) before the Gulf War terminated its program. Iran has invested large sums in various enrichment schemes, some of which appear to have been clever scams by outsiders, without achieving any significant enrichment capability. Pakistan has built a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, believed to produce material for nuclear weapons.
The nozzle enrichment process was to be used in Germany and in a plant to be built in Brazil by NUCLEBRAS (a Brazilian firm) in cooperation with a German company, Interatom. Neither plant appears to have been completed and placed in commercial service. Germany operates a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant for its nuclear power industry. The Becker nozzle process is not believed to be in use anywhere in the world today.
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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters

Technology
ELECTROMAGNETIC ISOTOPE SEPARATION
Ion Source
Single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapor source, ionizer, and beam accelerator. Capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA
NTL B5; NDUL 3; NRC H
Uranium chloride, graphite, stainless steel, copper, tantalum, tungsten
None identified
Validated ion source models including 3dimensional solution of Poisson's equation for multiple species and taking into account the effect of the accelerating structure. Validated ion beam dynamics software and algorithms that optimize isotope separation design from ion source through vacuum and into collector. None identified
Ion Collectors
Collector plates of two or more slits and pockets for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams, minimize sputtering
Graphite, stainless steel, copper
None identified
Vacuum Housings
Vacuum vessels large enough to contain two or more sets of injectors and collectors with appropriate beam current geometry. Two or more provide the scaling required for reasonable electromagnetic separation. Diameter >2 meters, able to maintain a time-invariant magnetic field within a separator, ability to transfer magnetic field between adjoining separators. Capable of continuous operation, output voltage 20,000 V , output current 1 , voltage regulation <0.01% over 8-hour interval
Nonmagnetic materials (e.g., stainless steel)
None identified
Magnet pole pieces
Low resistance wire, magnet iron
Precision field measurement and adjustment. Precision shaping of pole tips, precisely controlled windings. None identified
Validated 3-dimensional singly (predominant) and multiply charged high current ion beam dynamics codes and algorithms None identified
High-voltage DC power supplies
None identified
DC magnet power supplies
Capable of continuously NTL B5; producing a voltage 100 V, NDUL 3; current 500 , and current or voltage regulation <0.01% NRC H over 8-hour interval.
None identified
None Identified
None identified
(contd)
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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
Vacuum pumps
Input throat size 38 cm, NDUL 3; pumping speed CCL Cat 2B 15,000 liters/sec, vacuum <104 Torr (1.33 x 104 mbar), oildiffusion pump systems of sufficient capacity to provide minimum downtime when removing collectors. Extract enriched uranium in small batches without going critical, efficient chemical processes to extract enriched uranium from graphite collector NTL B3; NRC I
Pumping fluid, such as a hydrocarbon oil
Fast-acting shutoff valves to protect vacuum system and minimize downtime
None identified
Uranium recovery
Cadmium (neutron poison) used to prevent criticality. Must be removed at end of process
Mass spectrometers
None identified
THERMAL DIFFUSION
Thermal Diffusion Columns
Tall columns (1015 meters in NTL B5 height) consisting of three concentric tubes: inner tube copper, middle nickel, outer iron. Small annular gap maintained between inner and middle tube. NTL B5
UF6 corrosionresistant materials
Thermal diffusion test columns for optimizing performance
Thermal diffusion coefficients and performance models
Product and Tails Header Arrays of pipes made of or lined with UF6-resistant Piping Systems materials, fabricated for containment of UF6 liquid at pressures of 7 MPa, and for interconnection of individual thermal diffusion columns at the top and bottom ends. Liquid UF6 Transfer Pumps Pumps capable of pressurizing liquid UF6 to 7 MPa , leak tight and corrosion resistant to UF6. Expansion valves and heat exchangers for cooling liquid UF6 to 65 C and for removal into product and tails cylinders.
None identified
None identified
NTL B5
Materials resistant to UF6 corrosion.
None identified
None identified
Product and Tails Withdrawal Systems
NTL B5
UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources. UF6compatible flow, mass, pressure and temperature instrumentation.
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Cooling Water Systems
Cooling water systems for removal of 200 MW at temperatures of 6770 C
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
Steam Plant
Large steam plant needed CCL EAR 99 even for small uranium enrichment capacity (200 MW for 5,000 SWU/yr in U.S. thermal diffusion plant) Thin, porous filters with small NTL B5; pore size (100 to 1,000 ), NRC C thickness of 5 mm, diameter 25 mm, sufficient mechanical strength, stable, chemically inert to UF6
None identified
None identified
None identified
GASEOUS DIFFUSION
Barrier material
UF6-corrosion resistant metallic, polymer or ceramic materials. Compounds and powders including nickel or alloys containing 60% nickel, aluminum oxide, fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers, etching acid such as HNO3. Nickel-plated steel, aluminum, or nickel alloys containing 60% nickel; special UF6compatible gaskets for bolted flanges
Scanning or transmission microscope, x-ray diffraction system, and other test equipment for measuring the following barrier properties: mechanical strength, corrosion resistance, porosity, and permeability
Barrier performance models
Diffuser Housings
Hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels >20-cm diam. and >70-cm length (or comparable rectangular vessel) having inlet and outlet connections all >5-cm diameter, designed for operation at high vacuum, designed for horizontal or vertical installation
NTL B5; NRC C
None identified
None identified
Gas blowers and compressors
Axial, centrifugal, or positive NTL B5; displacement compressors/ NRC C blowers with suction capacity 3 1 m /min of UF6 and with discharge pressure up to 100 psi designed to operate in UF6 environment. Pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1
Nickel or high nickel alloy casing or plating on casing; rotor blades and impellers of same material or Al alloys.
UF6 test loop and instrumentation to determine compressor performance characteristics
Compressor design and performance models and blade design codes for heavy gases.
(contd)
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Technology
Rotary shaft seals
Vacuum seals with seal feed and seal exhaust connections. Seals designed for a buffer gas inleakage of <1,000 cm3/min. Adaptable to wide range of gas pressures and pressure disturbances, ease of maintenance, and UF6 corrosion resistance. Heat exchangers made of, or lined with UF6-corrosion resistant materials, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate <10 N/m2 (0.0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kN/m2 (15 psi). Process systems including feed autoclaves for passing UF6 to the gaseous diffusion cascades and capable of operating at pressures 300 kN/m2 (45 psi). Cylinders and autoclaves ~ 3-m long and 1.8-m in diameter, and UF6 corrosion resistant. Compression liquefaction or desublimation (cold traps) systems for withdrawal. Cylindrical equipment is ~1 m in diam. when insulated, and 23 m long. For HEU: diam. <12.5 cm, may include Boron alloys to preclude criticality.
NTL B5; NRC C
Materials resistant to UF6 corrosion.
Instrumentation to measure seal feed and exhaust pressures and flows to check seal performance.
Seal design and performance models for heavy gases.
Heat Exchangers
NTL B5; NRC C
Test loop to determine heat transfer coefficients and pressure drop.
Heat transfer codes for compact heat transfer surfaces and heavy gases.
Feed systems
NTL B5; NRC C
UF6 corrosionresistant materials.
UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources. Autoclaves. UF6compatible flow, mass, pressure, and temperature instrumentation.
None identified
NTL B5; NRC C
Nickel, high-nickel alloys, aluminum, or copper
UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources. UF6compatible flow, mass, pressure, and temperature instrumentation.
Compressor design codes and heat transfer design codes applicable to UF6
(contd)
II-5-23
Technology
Sufficient Technology Level
Export Control Reference
Critical Materials
Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment
Unique Software and Parameters
Header piping systems
Arrays of pipes 5 cm in NTL B5; diam. made of or lined with NRC C UF6-resistant materials, normally of the double header system type, fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards, for handling UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades, Large vacuum manifolds, NTL B5; vacuum headers, and NRC C vacuum suction pumps having a suction capacity of 5m3/min or more. UF6 corrosion-resistant positive displacement vacuum pumps that may have special working fluids. Manually or automatically operated, 5 mm or greater in nominal size, made of UF6resistant materials. NTL B5; NDUL 3; NRC C; CCL Cat 0B
None identified Materials resistant to UF6 including stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys, nickel, or alloys containing 60% nickel.
None identified
Vacuum systems
Aluminum, nickel, or None identified alloys containing 60% nickel. Hydrocarbon or fluorocarbon vacuum pump oils.
None identified
Shut-off and control valves
UF6-resistant materials. Bellows seals instead of packing glands because a bellows seal is the more effective technology. Valves and connectors resistant to corrosion from UF6.
None identified
None identified
Product storage and sampling cylinders
Cylinders designed for operation up to 30 atmospheres, with appropriate diameter and length to avoid criticality with HEU
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-24

GAS CENTRIFUGE
Rotating Component: Complete Rotor Assemblies
Thin-walled cylinders (>30 cm NTL B5; in length) or interconnected NRC B thin-walled cylinders up to 15 m in length made from high strength-to-density ratio material.
High strength-todensity ratio (HSD) materials: maraging steel, high-strength aluminum alloys, filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures. HSD materials: maraging steel, high-strength aluminum alloys, filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures. HSD materials: maraging steel, high-strength aluminum alloys, filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures.
Equipment to manufacture, assemble, and balance complete rotor assembly.
Rotor dynamics/stress analysis software
Rotating Component: Rotor Tubes
Thin-walled cylinders w/ NTL B5; thickness 12 mm, diameter NRC B 75 to 400 mm, made from high strength-to-density material, length-to-diameter ratio typically >2
Equipment to manufacture and balance rotor tubes; spin-forming and flow-forming machines, filament winding machines. Spin-testing equipment. Equipment to manufacture and balance rings and bellows. Spintesting equipment.
Rotating Component: Rings or Bellows
Cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm, diameter 75 to 400 mm, made of high strength-to-density ratio material, and having a convolute. Used to provide local support to rotor tube or to join rotor tubes. Disc-shaped high strengthto-density ratio components, 60 to 500 mm in diameter, designed to be mounted in rotor tubes to isolate take-off chamber of rotor tube and/or to assist UF6 gas circulation in main separation chamber.
NTL B5; NRC B
Rotating Component: Baffles
NTL B5; NRC B
HSD materials: Equipment to manufacRotor dynamics/stress maraging steel, ture and balance baffles. analysis software high-strength Spin-testing equipment. aluminum alloys, filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures. HSD materials: Equipment to manufature Rotor dynamics/stress maraging steel, and balance end caps. analysis software high-strength Spin-testing equipment. aluminum alloys, filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures.
(contd)
Rotating Component: top caps/bottom caps
Disc-shaped or cup-shaped NTL B5; HSD components, 75 to NRC B 400 mm in diameter, designed to fit the ends of rotor tubes, contain the UF6 within the rotor, and support the upper bearing elements or to carry rotating elements of motor
II-5-25

Technology
Static Component: Magnetic Suspension Bearings (includes ring magnets)
Homogeneous ring-shaped NTL B5; annular magnet suspended NRC B within UF 6-resistant housing, deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes limited to very small tolerances Bearing comprised of pivot/ NTL B5; cup assembly mounted on a NRC B damper. Pivot is normally hardened steel shaft polished into a hemisphere. Cup has a hemispherical indentation in one surface. Shaft may have hydrodynamic bearing. Cylinders having internally helical grooves and internally machined bores. Grooves are typically rectangular in cross section. NTL B5; NRC B
Ring magnet: samarium-cobalt, Alnico
Precision balancing and magnetic properties measuring equipment.
None identified
Static Component: Bearings, Dampers (for lower end of rotor tube)
Hardened steel, stainless steel, aluminum having high-quality machined surface.
None identified
None identified
Static Component: Molecular Pumps
Steel, stainless steel, aluminum
Precision manufacturing and mensuration equipment.
None identified
Static Component: Motor Stators
Ring-shaped stators having NTL B5; multiphase windings on lowNRC B loss laminated iron core for synchronous operation of AC hysteresis motors in vacuum. Power range is 50 to 1,000 VA for frequencies 600 to 2,000 Hz. Tubes up to 12 mm (0.5 in) internal diameter for extraction of UF6 from within the rotor tube by Pitot tube action and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. NTL B5; NRC B
Low-loss iron core
Precision manufacturing of laminated structure, coil winding and mounting.
Motor design software for unusual motor geometries and high frequency operation.
Static Component: Scoops
UF6-resistant materials
None identified
CFD codes for heavy gases in strong rotation with shocks.
Feed Systems/Product and Tails Withdrawal Systems
Feed autoclaves that pass NTL B5; UF6 to centrifuge cascades, NRC B desublimers that remove UF6 from the cascades, product and tails stations for trapping UF6 into containers.
UF6-resistant materials used in piping
Mass spectrometers/ion sources. Autoclaves. UF6-compatible flow, mass, pressure, and temperature instrumentation.
Heat transfer codes applicable to UF6 desublimers.
(contd)
II-5-26

Technology
Machine Header Piping System
Piping network normally of NTL B5; the triple header system NRC B with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. Line connections at the centrifuge may be individually flanged or combined in a single flange. Multiphase output capable of providing an output of 40 W, operating in the range of 600 to 2,000 Hz, high stability with frequency control 0.1%, harmonic distortion 10%, high efficiency, large MTBF, ability to drive one or more centrifuges. NTL B5; NRC B; NDUL 3; CCL Cat 3A
UF6-resistant materials used in piping
Fabrication techniques applicable to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
None identified
Frequency changers (also called converters or inverters)
None identified
None identified
None identified
AERODYNAMIC SEPARATION
Separator elements: nozzles, jets and vortex tubes
Nozzle: slit-shaped, curved NTL B5; channels with a radius of NRC D curvature less than 1 mm, knife-edge to separate the gas flow. Vortex tubes: cylindrical or tapered, 0.5-cm to 4-cm diameter, length to diameter ratio of 20:1, one or more tangential inlets NTL B5; Designed to reduce UF6 content in carrier gas to NRC D 1 ppm. Use of cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators, cryogenic refrigeration units, separation nozzle or vortex tube units, or UF6 cold traps. Cylindrical vessels >30 cm in diameter and 90 cm in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions. Made of or protected by UF6resistant materials. NTL B5; NRC D
Test facility to measure isotopic separation performance, pressure drops, etc.
CFD software for nozzle design and performance
UF6/carrier gas separation systems
None identified
None identified
Separation element housings
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-27

Sufficient Technology Level Axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers, suction volume capacity of 2 m3/min, typical pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1. Seals with feed and exhaust connections, provide a reliable seal against outleakage or inleakage. Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
UF6-hydrogen (or helium) gas compressors, gas blowers, and rotary shaft seals
NTL B5; NRC D
UF6 -hydrogen test loop and instrumentation to determine compressor performance characteristics. Instrumentation to measure seal feed and exhaust pressures and flows to check seal performance. Test loop to determine heat transfer coefficients and pressure drop. None identified
Compressor and seal design and performance models. Blade design codes.
Heat Exchangers
Provide adequate gas cooling, made or protected by materials resistant to UF6 Manually or automatically operated, 40 to 1,500 mm in diameter, made of or protected by UF6 resistant materials Feed autoclaves to pass UF6 to the enrichment process; desublimers (cold traps) or solidification or liquefaction stations for removal of UF6 from the process, product and tails stations for transferring UF6 into containers
Piping network normally of the double header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each header. Vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m3/ min with vacuum manifolds, headers, and pumps designed for service in corrosive atmosphere. In this context the materials being treated may contain strong acids or fluorine which react with materials in pumps and headers. Pumps may have fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.
NTL B5; NRC D NTL B5; NRC D
Heat transfer codes for compact heat transfer surfaces. None identified
Shut-off, control, and bellows-sealed valves
UF6-resistant materials; bellows seals rather than packing glands UF6-resistant materials
Feed systems/product and tail withdrawal systems
NTL B5; NRC D
Mass spectrometers/ion sources. Autoclaves. Flow, mass, pressure. and temperature instrumentation.
None identified
Process piping systems and header systems
NTL B5; NRC D NTl B5; NRC D
None identified
None identified
Vacuum systems and pumps
UF6-resistant materials. Hydrocarbon or fluorocarbon vacuum pump oils.
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-28

Technology
CHEMICAL EXCHANGE AND ION EXCHANGE
Liquid-liquid exchange columns
Ability to produce pipes of NTL B5; various diameters and NRC E lengths which are internally coated with material resistant to HCl and have mechanical power input systems to provide mixing of two immiscible liquids with residence times of 30 seconds. Capability to build and operate centrifuge systems which disperse and then separate two immiscible liquids with stage residence times of 30 seconds and are corrosion resistant to concentrated HCl. NTL B5; NRC E
Corrosion resistant pipes and their internals made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or glass None identified
Mechanical power systems. Sieve plates, reciprocating plates. or internal turbine mixers
None identified
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors
Contactors made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or with glass
None identified
Electrochemical reduction systems and reduction cells
Skills in the design, produc NTL B5; tion, and operation of NRC E reduction cells that are corrosion resistant to concentrated HCl and prevent the reoxidation of U3+ to U4+ .
Parts in contact with Potentiometers process stream: suitable materials (glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite) to avoid contamination of aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Electrodes (graphite).
Precise control of uranium valence
(contd)
II-5-29

Technology
Feed preparation systems
Ability to prepare high-purity NTL B5; aqueous solutions of uranium NRC E chloride. Concentration of certain metal ions such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum, and other bivalent or higher multivalent cations must be more than a few parts per million.
Parts in contact with Analytical equipment to final feed solutions: monitor purity of suitable materials solutions (glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite) to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. For portions of system processing high-purity U3+ streams: suitable materials (glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite) to avoid contamination Fast-reacting ion exchange resins or adsorbents Potentiometers
None identified
Uranium oxidation systems
NTL B5; Knowledgeable in the operation of systems for the NRC E 3+ 4+ oxidation of U to U . Familiarity with the handling of chlorine and oxygen gases and distillation of HCl solutions.
Accurate control of uranium valence
Ion exchange columns
Ability to design, construct, NTL B5; and operate cylindrical NRC E columns >1 m in diameter made of or protected by materials resistant to concentrated HCl and are capa ble of operating at a temper ature of 100 C to 200 C and pressures >0.7 MPa (102 psi) Knowledgeable in the chemical and electrochemical reduction systems for regeneration of chemical reducing agent(s) in ion exchange NTL B5; NRC E
Provide characteristics of glass substrate and resin
Physical and chemical characteristics of resin
Ion exchange reflux systems
Elements (e.g., Ti, Fe, V) which possess the proper electrochemical behavior to be used in the regeneration steps
Potentiometers, Spectrometers
Careful control of solution chemistry
(contd)
II-5-30

Technology
ATOMIC VAPOR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (AVLIS)
Laser systems
Systems designed for separating uranium isotopes, usually consisting of copper vapor lasers and dye lasers. A spectrum frequency stabilizer is required for operation over extended periods of time. Melting and casting technologies. Vaporization systems containing highpower strip or scanning electron beam guns with delivered power on the target of >2.5 kW/cm. Ability to handle molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for crucibles. Made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance.
NTL B5; NDUL 3; NRC F; CCL Cat 6
Laser gases, laser dyes
Lasers, laser amplifiers, Software for laser safety and oscillators: copper systems, timing systems vapor, argon ion, neodymium-doped (other than glass), dye laser amplifier and oscillators.
Uranium vaporization systems
NTL B5; NRC F
Filaments: tungsten
Electron beam guns
Interlocks between electron beam gun power and magnetic field
Liquid uranium metal handling systems
NTL B5; NRC F
Copper, tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides.
Water-cooled copper crucibles
None identified
Product and tails collector assemblies
Handle uranium metal in liquid NTL B5; or solid form. May include NRC F pipes, valves, fittings, gutters, feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates. Cylindrical or rectangular vessels with multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections, and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. NTL B5; NRC F
Tantalum, yttriaNone identified coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides Austenitic steel Protection from x-rays generated by electron beam guns
None identified
Separator module housings
None identified
(contd)
II-5-31

Technology
MOLECULAR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (MLIS)
Laser Systems
Systems designed for separating uranium isotopes, usually consisting of CO2 or excimer lasers and parahydrogen Raman shifters. A spectrum frequency stabilizer is required for operation over extended periods of time. Nozzles capable of cooling mixtures of UF6 and carrier gas to 150 K and which are corrosion resistant to UF6
NTL B5; NDUL 3; NRC F; CCL Cat 6
Lasing medium: CO2, N2, He, Ar, Kr, Xe, HCl, Cl2, F2
Pulsed CO2 lasers, pulsed excimer lasers, para-hydrogen Raman shifters
Software for laser system frequency control, timing, and safety
Supersonic expansion nozzles
NTL B5; NRC F
UF6 corrosionresistant materials Ar, N2
Test facility to measure diffuser pressure recovery
CFD software for compressible gas flow with shocks and significant viscous effects None identified
UF5 product collectors
Uranium pentafluoride (UF5) NTL B5; solid product collectors NRC F consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof. Compressors designed for NTL B5; long term operation in UF6 NRC F environment. Seals with feed and exhaust connections; provide a reliable seal against outleakage or inleakage.
UF5 / UF6 corrosionresistant materials
Test facility to measure pressure drop as a function of collector loading UF6/carrier gas test facility and instrumentation to determine compressor performance characteristics. Instrumentation to measure seal feed and exhaust pressures and flows to check seal performance.
UF6 /carrier gas compressors and rotary shaft seals
Compressor design and performance models and blade design codes. Seal performance and design models.
Fluorination systems
Systems designed for fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 (gas) for subsequent collection in product containers or for transfer for additional enrichment.
NTL B5; NRC F
Fluorinating agent (e.g., ClF3), corrosion-resistant materials
Equipment for storage Safety systems, thermal and transfer of fluorina- control ting agent and for collection and transfer of UF6. Reaction vessel (e.g., fluidized-bed reactor, screw reactor, flame tower), temperature and pressure probes, cold traps. Equipment for insitu fluorination.
(contd)
II-5-32

Technology
Feed systems/product and tail withdrawal systems
Feed autoclaves to pass UF6 NTL B5; to the enrichment process; NRC F desublimers (cold traps) or solidification or liquefaction stations for removal of UF6 from the process, product and tails stations for transferring UF6 into containers Systems designed to separate UF6 from carrier gas (N2, Ar). NTL B5; NRC F
Mass spectrometers/ion sources. Autoclaves. UF6-compatible flow, mass, pressure, and temperature instrumentation.
None identified
UF6/carrier gas separation systems
None identified Cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators, cryogenic refrigeration units, or UF6 cold traps. None identified Validated algorithms and related computer programs to compute the flow and trajectories of U-235 and U-238 ion isotopes in rf-heated plasma Validated algorithms and related computer programs to compute the flow and trajectories of U-235 and U-238 ion isotopes in rf-heated plasma
PLASMA SEPARATION PROCESS
Microwave power sources and antennae
Producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: >30 GHz frequency and >50 kW mean power output for ion production.
NTL B5; NRC G
None
Product and tails collector assemblies
Assemblies for collecting NTL B5; uranium metal in solid form. NRC G Made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance to uranium metal vapor. Graphite shop, uranium recovery and recycle support facilities. Frequencies of more than NTL B5; 100 kHz and capable of NRC G handling >40 kW mean power. Ability to handle molten NTL B5; uranium or uranium alloys, NRC G consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for crucibles. Made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance.
Tantalum, yttriacoated graphite
None identified
RF ion excitation coils
None
None identified
Particle dynamics, particle interactions None identified
Liquid uranium handling systems
Tantalum, yttriacoated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides
None identified
(contd)
II-5-33

Technology
Plasma generation systems
Systems for the generation of NTL B5; uranium plasma. May contain NRC G high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of >2.5 kW/cm. Superconducting solenoidal NDUL B3; electromagnet with an inner CCL Cat 3A diameter of >30 cm, providing a very uniform magnetic field of high strength (>2 teslas).
Uranium metal
Electron beam guns
None identified
Superconducting magnets
Liquid He, liquid N2
Liquid He and N2 control- None identified lers and monitors, cryothermometers, cryogenic tubing
II-5-34
Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data

Technology ELECTROMAGNETIC ISOTOPE SEPARATION (EMIS) Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Production of HEU for use in nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors Obtaining high U+ beam currents from source, controlling expansion of beam, properly focus ion beam on collector slits, heater life, insulator breakdown, damage to source components due to high energy ions Retain and measure collected uranium, retain shape over wide temperature range, resist sputtering, conduct heat, permit recovery of deposited uranium. Leakage rate; opening and closing with minimum downtime Maintain low magnetic field ripple Maintain stable voltage Maintain stable current Maintain high vacuum in large evacuated region Substantial chemical processing facility required, labor intensive None identified
Other uranium enrichment technologies Several types of ion source exist.
Ion source
Ion collectors
None identified
None
Vacuum housings Magnet pole pieces High-voltage power supplies DC magnet power supplies Vacuum pumps Uranium recovery
THERMAL DIFFUSION
None identified None identified None identified None identified Other isotope separation processes (e.g., AVLIS, PSP) None identified Production of uranium enriched up to 1.2% 235U as feed to electromagnetic separators enriching to weapons grade uranium.
None Superconducting magnets None None None None Other uranium enrichment technologies
Thermal Diffusion Columns
Precisely machined tubing. Operation None identified at high pressures and temperatures without leaks. Maintaining a small gap between hot and cold walls. UF6 freezing and plugging. Minimize leakage and corrosion, sealing and welding technologies Minimize leakage and corrosion, sealing technology None identified None identified
None identified
Product and Tails Header Piping Systems Liquid UF6 Transfer pumps
(contd)
II-5-35
Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (contd)

Product and Tails Withdrawal Systems Cooling Water Systems Steam Plant
GASEOUS DIFFUSION
Minimize leakage and corrosion, sealing and welding technologies Temperature control Large steam plant needed even for small uranium enrichment capacity
None identified None identified None identified Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors)
None identified None identified None identified Other uranium enrichment technologies
Barrier Materials
Fabrication of barrier. Maintain fine None identified pore size, high permeability, and structural integrity over long periods of operation. Control nonseparative flow mechanisms. Procurement of large quantities required, sealing and welding technologies, aerodynamic efficiency, minimum leakage and corrosion. Procurement of large quantities required, blade design, nozzle design, lubrication system for bearings, minimum leakage and corrosion. Procurement of large quantities required, minimize inleakage and outleakage, long-term running reliability Minimize leakage and corrosion, cooling tower design Maintain material balance: reveal cascade leakage, consumption on surfaces or material freeze-outs Maintain material balance: reveal cascade leakage, consumption on surfaces or material freeze-outs. Criticality concerns with HEU. Minimize leakage. Containment and cleanliness. None identified
None identified
Diffuser Housings
None identified
Gas Blowers and Compressors
None identified
None identified
Rotary Shaft Seals
None identified
Hermetically sealed compressors with UF6 gas bearings
Heat Exchangers Feed Systems
None identified
None identified
Vacuum Systems
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-36

Vacuum Systems Shutoff and Control Systems
Minimize leakage. Containment and cleanliness. Procurement of large quantities required, minimize leakage and corrosion, provide proper pressure drop to move UF6 inventory and minimize stage efficiency losses, isolation of stages for maintenance Maintain operational integrity with minimum leakage and corrosion. Criticality concerns with HEU.
Product Storage and Sampling Cylinders

GAS CENTRIFUGE
None identified
None identified
Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors) Rotor dynamics, critical frequencies, proper balancing and damping, continuous operation Material properties, balancing, resistance to corrosion attack, continuous operation, uniformity of manufacture Material properties, balancing, resistance to corrosion attack, continuous operation, uniformity of manufacture Material properties, balancing, resistance to corrosion attack, continuous operation, uniformity of manufacture Material properties, balancing, resistance to corrosion attack, continuous operation, uniformity of manufacture Homogeneity of magnet material, deviation of magnetic axes Prope damping to control rotor vibration and restrain lateral movement Maintain low pressure in casing None identified
Other uranium enrichment technologies
Rotating Component: Complete Rotor Assemblies Rotating Component: Rotor Tubes Rotating Component: Rings or Bellows Rotating Component: Baffles
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Rotating Component: top caps/bottom caps Static Component: Magnetic Suspension Bearings (includes ring magnets) Static Component: Bearings, Dampers (for lower end of rotor tube) Static Component: Molecular Pumps
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-37

Static Component: Motor Stators
Provide low-loss, high speed, high frequency, synchronous and uninterrupted service. Aerodynamics and materials Maintain material balance. Criticality concerns with HEU. Minimize leakage and corrosion, sealing, and welding technologies Trouble-free operation for extended periods of operation, no maintenance requirements
None identified
None identified
Static Component: Scoops Feed Systems/Product and Tails Withdrawal Systems Machine Header Piping System Frequency Changers (also called converters or inverters)
AERODYNAMIC SEPARATION
None identified None identified None identified Drive high-speed spindle motors for grinders and machine tools. Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors)
None identified None identified None identified None identified
Separator elements: nozzles, jets and vortex tubes UF6 carrier-gas separation equipment Separation element housings
Precision in fabricating very small nozzles, sophisticated machine shop Large building ventilation system, H2 generating site, explosive mixture concerns Sealing and welding technologies, aerodynamic efficiency, minimum leakage and corrosion. Aerodynamics, rotor dynamics, lubrication, blade/vane stress and vibration, minimize leakage, corrosion, failure rates Substantial waste heat, cooling tower design Minimize leakage and corrosion Maintain material balance. Criticality concerns with HEU. Minimize leakage and corrosion, sealing and welding technologies Minimize leakage. Containment and cleanliness.
None identified
None identified
UF6-hydrogen (or helium) gas compressors, gas blowers, and rotary shaft seals Heat Exchangers Shut-off, control, and bellowssealed valves Feed Systems/Product and Tail Withdrawal Systems Process piping systems and header systems Vacuum Systems and Pumps
None identified
None identified
None identified Valves could be used in other flow systems. None identified None identified Other vacuum systems
None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified
(contd)
II-5-38

Technology CHEMICAL AND ION EXCHANGE Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors) Judicious handling of columns to prevent breaching of interior coating or lining. The instability of U3+ in aqueous solution demands expertise in uranium solution chemistry. Protection of corrosion resistant lining is paramount. The instability of U3+ in aqueous solution demands expertise in uranium solution chemistry. Must prevent reoxidation of uranium None identified
Liquid-liquid exchange columns
Use mixer/settlers or centrifugal contactors.
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors
None identified
Use mixer/settlers or liquid-liquid exchange columns.
Electrochemical reduction systems and reduction cells Feed preparation systems Uranium oxidation systems
None identified
May use other chemicals (zinc) for reduction None identified May oxidize systems electrolytically but process will be more expensive. None identified None identified
Product must be of very high-purity with None identified little metallic contamination. Chlorine gas is highly toxic and must be None identified handled with extreme care. Pure oxygen gas may bring about rapid combustion and fire. The preparation of the resin / adsorbent is the key and has proven very difficult. None identified
Ion exchange columns Ion exchange reflux systems
The appropriate metals to use in the None identified regeneration system have not been well identified. Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors), Pu separation, Li enrichment Precise tuning, control and modulate Lidar wavelengths, sufficient pulse repetition Guidestar frequency and pulse length, laser power per pulse, beam quality, beam propagation, optics None identified
ATOMIC VAPOR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (AVLIS)
Laser systems
None identified
Uranium vaporization systems High power density
None identified
(contd)
II-5-39

Liquid uranium metal handling systems Product and tails collector assemblies Separator module housings
MOLECULAR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (MLIS)
Withstanding heat from electron beam gun and corrosive effects of liquid uranium Uranium corrosion at high temperatures Maintaining a very high vacuum, reliability of large pump system
None identified
None identified
None identified None identified Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors)
None identified None identified Other uranium enrichment technologies
Laser Systems
High energy pulses, high repetition rates, beam quality, beam propagation, optics, para-hydrogen Raman cells, high capacity gas flow systems for lasing gas, gas cleanup systems Specially contoured to produce uniform gas flow in irradiation chamber, provide efficient utilization of laser light, corrosion resistance High UF5 collection efficiency, criticality concerns with HEU collection, corrosion resistance Aerodynamics, rotor dynamics, lubrication, blade/vane stress and vibration, minimize leakage, corrosion, failure rates Efficient removal of UF5 enriched product in a timely manner, corrosion resistance
None identified
None identified
Supersonic expansion nozzles
None identified
None identified
UF5 product collectors
None identified
None identified
UF6 /carrier gas compressors and rotary shaft seals Fluorination systems
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Feed systems/product and tail withdrawal systems UF5 /carrier gas separation systems
Criticality concerns for HEU, corrosion None identified resistance Protection of carrier gases from None identified chemical contamination by processing equipment, removal of reaction products, rebalancing process gas composition, corrosion resistance
(contd)
II-5-40

Technology PLASMA SEPARATION PROCESS SYSTEMS Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear power reactors) or HEU (nuclear weapons, naval propulsion, research reactors) Power input and voltage, plasma density, electron temperature None identified
Microwave power sources and antennae Product and tails collector assemblies RF ion excitation coils Liquid uranium handling systems Plasma generation systems Superconducting magnets
None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified
Criticality concerns for HEU, corrosion None identified resistance Collisional effects, orientation of electric fields, 235U selectivity None identified
Throughput, corrosive effects of liquid None identified uranium High plasma density Strength and uniformity of magnetic field, cryogenic refrigeration None identified None identified
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SECTION 5.3NUCLEAR FISSION REACTORS
OVERVIEW This subsection discusses nuclear fission reactors in general, but emphasizes that the types which have been found most suitable for producing plutonium are graphitemoderated nuclear reactors using gas or water cooling at atmospheric pressure and with the capability of having fuel elements exchanged while on line. The first nuclear reactor, CP-1, went critical for the first time on 2 December 1942 in a squash court under Stagg Field at the University of Chicago. Construction on CP1 began less than a month before criticality was achieved; the reactor used lumped uranium metal fuel elements moderated by high-purity graphite. Within 2 years the United States first scaled up reactor technology from this essentially zero-power test bed to the 3.5 MW (thermal) X-10 reactor built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and then again to the 250-megawatt production reactors at Hanford. The Hanford reactors supplied the plutonium for the Trinity test and the Nagasaki war drop. Clearly, reactor technology does not stress the capabilities of a reasonably well-industrialized state at the end of the twentieth century. Some problems did arise with the scale-up to hundreds of megawatts: the graphite lattice changed crystal state, which caused some deformation, and the buildup of a neutron-absorbing xenon isotope poisoned the fission reaction. This latter problem was curable because of the foresight of the duPont engineers, who built the reactor with many additional fuel channels which, when loaded, increased the reactivity enough to offset the neutron absorption by the xenon fission product. Finally, the problem of spontaneous emission of neutrons by 240Pu produced in reactor plutonium became apparent as soon as the first samples of Hanford output were supplied to Los Alamos. The high risk of nuclear pre-initiation associated with 240 Pu caused the abandonment of the notion of a gun-assembled plutonium weapon and led directly to the adoption of an implosion design. Several distinct classes of reactor exist, each optimized for one purpose, generally using fuel carefully chosen for the job at hand. These classes include the following: (1) Research reactors. Usually operates at very low power, often only 12 MW or less. Frequently uses high-enriched uranium fuel, although most newer models use no more than 20-percent enrichments to make the theft of fuel less attractive. Fertile material (238U for Pu, 6Li for tritium) can be encapsulated in elements known as targets for insertion into the reactor core. The reactor can also employ a fertile blanket of 238U in which plutonium can be bred. Cooling requirements and shielding requirements are relatively
Highlights
Plutonium, used in many nuclear weapons, can only be made in sufficient quantities in a nuclear reactor. The graphite-moderated, air- or gas-cooled reactor using natural uranium as its fuel was first built in 1942. Scale-up of these types of reactors from low power to quite high power is straightforward. Reactors have been built in many countries of the world, including some of real proliferation concern. Reactors using natural uranium can make relatively high quality plutonium. Reactors are generally purpose-built, and reactors built and operated for plutonium production are less efficient for electricity production than standard nuclear electric power plants because of the low burnup restriction for production of weapons grade plutonium.
modest. Some research reactors can be refueled while operating, and such reactors are of special concern for plutonium production because they can limit fuel burnup, which enhances the quality of the plutonium compared to that obtained from reactors that require high burnup before shutdown and refueling. (2) Power reactors. These are used to generate electric power. Few use fuel enriched to greater than 57% 235U. Practical power levels range from a few hundred MW(e) (three times that in terms of thermal power output) to 1,000 or 1,500 MW(e)meaning 3,0004,000 MW(t). Power reactors designs have included water cooled-graphite moderated (the Soviet RBMK used at Chernobyl), boiling (light) water, pressurized (light) water, heavy water-moderated and cooled, graphite-moderated/helium cooled, and liquid metal-moderated. Most power reactors operate under pressure and cannot be refueled in operation. The RBMK and CANDU reactors are notable exceptions to this rule. The CANDU reactor was developed for the Canadian nuclear power program and is a deuterium oxide (heavy water) moderated reactor which can operate on natural uranium fuel.
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(3) Production reactors. These are used to make plutonium (and often tritium) efficiently. Production reactors are frequently graphite-moderated and either air-, CO2-, or helium-cooled. The longer a given sample of fuel is irradiated, the greater the build-up of 240Pu, an isotope which decays by spontaneous fission and which should be minimized in weapon fuel. Consequently, plutonium production reactors usually are designed to be refueled while operating (on-line refueling) so that relatively little 240Pu is found in the spent fuel. (4) Breeder reactors. These reactors generate plutonium at a rate greater (numbers of nuclei per unit time) than they burn their fissile fuel (numbers of nuclei per unit time). Normally, breeders use fast neutrons and irradiate a fissile 238U blanket. Plutonium produced in the fuel generally has a higher fraction of 240Pu than that produced in other reactors, but the Pu made in the blanket of uranium surrounding the core is usually of a high quality, containing very little 240Pu . (5) Propulsion reactors. Primarily found on submarines and large-surface combatant ships, nuclear reactors have given new operational freedom to the underwater navy and deliver increased time on station combined with high speed for both the submarine service and the surface navy. The United States and Russia have built most of the worlds shipboard reactors. The worlds first nuclear powered cargo ship was the U.S.N.S. Savannah; however, nuclear propulsion power has not been particularly successful in the commercial world. Today, the only operating commercial vessels using nuclear propulsion are Russian icebreakers. To keep the core size small, propulsion reactors generally use highly enriched uranium as fuel. In principle, a propulsion reactor core could be surrounded with a fertile blanket and used to produce plutonium. In practice, this has never been done. (6) Space reactors and mobile power systems. Nuclear reactors have been used from time to time, usually by the former Soviet Union, to provide on-orbit electrical power to spacecraft. In principle, they will use HEU as fuel to keep the core mass and volume small. Other spacecraft have been powered by the heat released by the radioactive decay of 238Pu. RATIONALE Plutonium, one of the two fissile elements used to fuel nuclear explosives, is not found in significant quantities in nature. Instead, it must be bred, or produced, one atomic nucleus at a time by bombarding 238U with neutrons to produce the isotope 239U, which beta decays (half-life 23 minutes), emitting an electron to become the (almost equally) radioactive 239Np (neptunium). The neptunium isotope again beta decays (halflife 56 hours) to 239Pu, the desired fissile material. The only proven and practical source for the large quantities of neutrons needed to make plutonium at a reasonable speed is a nuclear reactor in which a controlled but self-sustaining 235U fission chain reaction takes place. Accelerator-based transmutation to produce plutonium is theoretically
possible, and experiments to develop its potential have been started, but the feasibility of large-scale production by the process has not been demonstrated. In addition to production of plutonium, nuclear reactors can also be used to make tritium, 3H, the heaviest isotope of hydrogen. Tritium is an essential component of boosted fission weapons and multi-stage thermonuclear weapons. The same reactor design features which promote plutonium production are also consistent with efficient tritium production, which adds to the proliferation risk associated with nuclear reactors. The size of a nuclear reactor is generally indicated by its power output. Reactors to generate electricity are rated in terms of the electrical generating capacity, MW(e), meaning megawatts of electricity. A more important rating with regard to production of nuclear explosive material is MW(t), the thermal power produced by the reactor. As a general rule, the thermal output of a power reactor is three times the electrical capacity. That is, a 1,000 MW(e) reactor produces about 3,000 MW(t), reflecting the inefficiencies in converting heat energy to electricity. A useful rule of thumb for gauging the proliferation potential of any given reactor is that 1 megawatt-day (thermal energy release, not electricity output) of operation produces 1 gram of plutonium in any reactor using 20-percent or lower enriched uranium; consequently, a 100 MW(t) reactor produces 100 grams of plutonium per day and could produce roughly enough plutonium for one weapon every 2 months. Research reactors using nearly 100-percent enriched material produce almost no plutonium in their fuel because the fertile species, 238U, has been removed. These reactors can, however, be built with a surrounding blanket of natural or depleted uranium in which plutonium can be bred efficiently. The Osirak reactor built in Iraq and destroyed by Israeli aircraft was of this type. A typical form of production reactor fuel is natural uranium metal encased in a simple steel or aluminum cladding. Because uranium metal is not as dimensionally stable when irradiated as is uranium oxide used in high burnup fuel, reactors fueled with the uranium metal must be confined to very low burnup operation, which is not economical for electricity production. This operational restriction for uranium metal fuel results in the production of plutonium with only a small admixture of the undesirable isotope, 240Pu. Thus, it is almost certain that a reactor using metallic fuel is intended to produce weapons grade plutonium, and operation of such a reactor is a strong indicator that proliferation is occurring. Many technologies are useful in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors. The following are nuclear reactor related technologies: Conversion of uranium to the appropriate chemical form (e.g., UO2,) from fluorides or from yellowcake. Fuel fabrication including conversion, melting or casting, alloying, and the production of rods or billets. Operations would include machining, heat treatment, extrusion, and rolling.
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Fuel rod cladding. Control systems and appropriate instrumentation. Cooling systems including those for use in emergencies and, for power reactors, coupling to electrical generation equipment. Containment/confinement structures to minimize fission product release from the reactor site. Refueling equipment. Reprocessing facilities including facilities to chop highly radioactive fuel rods into small pieces, dissolve the fuel in acid, and extract plutonium from the radioactive liquid process streams. Spent fuel storage (temporary or permanent) including facilities to cool the discharged fuel.
The risk associated with a power reactor program is that some of the technology legitimately acquired for the electricity-producing power reactor could be transferred without detection to the construction and operation of a plutonium production reactor. To reduce such risk of nuclear proliferation, nations that supply nuclear-related equipment and materials have joined in an organization known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has published guidelines which trigger the requirement for full scope safeguards to be in place in the receiving nation before the nuclear reactor components of interest can be exported by member nations. These guidelines are referred to as the Trigger List and are designated NTL in the Export Control Reference column of Table 5.3-1. (IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev. 2/Part 1, 17 June 1996. ) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Six countries are known to have detonated nuclear explosive devices. Of these six, five elected to test a plutonium device before experimenting with uranium-based weapons. Only China chose to go the uranium route. Of the suspected threshold states and former threshold states (Iraq, North Korea, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan) which have not exploded a device, three are believed to have pursued the plutonium route as their first choice. South Africa and Pakistan appear to have preferred enriching uranium; after the Osirak reactor was destroyed, Iraq switched to a uranium-based design. Although uranium enrichment (see Section 5.2, Uranium Enrichment Processes) is one way of obtaining the special materials to join the nuclear club, nuclear reactors provide an equally satisfactory route in the event the path to enrichment is blocked or rejected.9 Indeed, in a well-designed production reactor, one uranium fission is likely to produce on average about 0.8 plutonium nuclei, and many fewer atoms of plutonium than 235U atoms are required to make a fission device.10 Many nations (see Figure 5.0-2) have the ability to design, build or operate nuclear reactors. In addition to U.S. firms, Swiss and Swedish (ASEA-Brown Boveri, ABB), French, British, and Chinese enterprises have sold power or research reactors on the international market.
Proliferation Implications Assessment It is unlikely that any nuclear state or threshold state has produced nuclear weapons by diverting material from a safeguarded nuclear reactor or from other safeguarded parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. This result is due in part because the typical power reactor uranium fuel is enriched to only 3 percent to 5 percent, and it is not usable directly in a nuclear weapon; most such reactors cannot be refueled without extended, easily detected shutdowns. While the large quantity of low-quality plutonium produced in civilian nuclear power reactors is of concern because even high-burnup plutonium containing more than 10 percent 240Pu can be used in a nuclear explosive, individual power reactors provide little opportunity for the proliferator to obtain fuel for a weapon. It is difficult to irradiate fertile material in power reactors and uneconomical to shut down frequently to extract the fuel at the low burnup levels that yield highquality plutonium. The existence of a nuclear power industry in a country is, however, proof that the state has the necessary skilled manpower to design and build large parts of the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program. The experience gained operating a civilian power reactor would be valuable should a country elect to pursue nuclear weapons.
Lack of an adequate supply of electricity is one obstacle to a sucessful enrichment program; inability to acquire uranium or specialized technologies can be another. Plutonium and uranium densities are nearly the same, but the critical mass of plutonium is only about 20 percent that of HEU because of plutonium's greater reactivity.
10
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Table 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters

Technology
Power Reactors (Fast): Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR)
Ability to extract plutonium NTL B1; from irradiated fuel or targets. NRC A Liquid metal handling systems, oxide fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment capability.
Fuel: stainless steel clad UO2 /PuO2 fuel pellets. Coolant: usually liquid metal (e.g., sodium).
Equipment specially designed to extract enriched uranium and/or plutonium fuel sources from reactor core; fuel fabrication techniques specially designed for fast reactors. Equipment for handling solid and liquid sodium. Methods for producing cylindrical fuel elements by compacting and sintering cylindrical pellets(e.g., uranium oxide); zirconium alloy (Zircaloy) tube about 13 mm in diameter and 3.7 m long (typical); equipment specially designed to extract fuel from reactor core.
None Identified
Power Reactors (Thermal): Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), Heavy Water Reactor (HWR)
Control criticality, establish uniform temperature rise in reactor core, ability to remove fuel elements and extract enriched uranium and/or plutonium. Heavy water production. Oxide fuel fabrication. BWR and PWR require uranium enrichment.
NTL B1; NRC A
Fuel: basic fission fuels-U-235, U-233, Pu-239; U-238 (for use in creating Pu239), natural uranium, enriched uranium, uranium oxide, alloys of uranium-plutonium, mixtures of uraniumplutonium oxides and carbides, thorium-232 (for use in creating U-233); Moderator: ordinary (light) water, heavy water (deuterium oxide); Coolant: ordinary (light) water, heavy water (deuterium oxide). Fuel: usually Low Enriched Uranium (LEU); Moderator: graphite. Coolant: Helium (HTGR), carbon dioxide (AGR)
None Identified
Power Reactors (Thermal): High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR), Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)
Fabrication of refractory fuel NTL B1; elements from high-purity NRC A graphite. High pressure, high volume coolant gas circulating pumps (turbines).
Specially designed production equipment to fabricate special fuel assemblies. High pressure CO2 or He gas handling equipment.
None Identified
(contd)
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Table 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
Production Reactors
Target and fuel reprocessing facilities to extract plutonium or tritium. High purity graphite. Heavy water production. Uranium metal production.
NTL
Fuel:natural or slightly enriched uranium for plutonium production, HEU and 6Li enriched target for tritium production. Moderator: heavy water, can be graphite. Coolant: air, light water, heavy water Fuel: HEU or LEU; Moderator: graphite, hydrides, organic materials (hydrocarbons), light water, heavy water. Coolant: light water, heavy water
Fuel and target None Identified reprocessing facilities usually located at the same site or nearby. Hot cell facilities. Specially designed equipment for fabrication of fuel elements and targets for breeding plutonium and/or tritium.
Research Reactors
Fuel technology spans light water, heavy water, graphite, organic, and hydride moderated types.
NTL
Equipment configured for None Identified frequent shutdowns associated with insertion withdrawal of target elements. Hot cell facilities to support research and development.
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Table 5.3-2. Nuclear Fission Reactors Reference Data

Power Reactors (Fast) Pu-239 extraction (reprocessing). Nuclear weapons Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Ability to design and fabricate containment vessels and operate safely for (LMFBR) extended periods. Availability of HEU or plutonium. Liquid metal (e.g., sodium) handling. Power Reactors (Thermal): Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) Power Reactors (Thermal): High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR), Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Production Reactors Ability to design and construct pressure vessels and cooling systems. Ability to process highly radioactive spent fuel assemblies Removal of refractory cladding from fuel. Reprocessing facilities. Nuclear weapons
Enrichment technologies, thermal power reactors, production reactors, research reactors.
Enrichment technologies, fast power reactors, intermediate power reactors, production reactors, research reactors Enrichment technologies, fast power reactors, intermediate power reactors, production reactors, research reactors Enrichment technologies, fast power reactors, thermal power reactors, research reactors. Enrichment technologies, fast power reactors, thermal power reactors, production reactors
Nuclear weapons
Methods for extracting Pu-239 and/or tritium from fuel or targets.
Nuclear weapons
Research Reactors
Methods for extracting enriched Nuclear weapons uranium and/or Pu-239 and/or tritium from fuel or targets. Facility for irradiating quantities of fertile material.
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SECTION 5.4PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION (REPROCESSING)
OVERVIEW This subsection covers technologies involved in the recovery and purification of uranium and plutonium in spent (irradiated) reactor fuel and irradiated targets. Unlike fuel from fossil plants that discharge ash with negligible heat content, fuel discharged from nuclear reactors contains appreciable quantities of fissile uranium and plutonium (unburned fuel). These fuel elements must be removed from a reactor before the fissile material has been completely consumed, primarily because of fission product buildup. Fission products capture large numbers of neutrons, which are necessary to sustain a chain fission reaction. In the interest of economic utilization of nuclear fuels and the conservation of valuable resources, several countries have constructed reprocessing plants to recover the residual uranium and plutonium values, utilizing a variety of physical and chemical methods. Plutonium is one of the two elements which have been used in fission explosives. It does not exist naturally in any significant quantities but must be made nucleus by nucleus in a nuclear reactor by the process of neutron absorption on 238U followed by two beta decays producing first neptunium and then plutonium. The plutonium is removed from the spent fuel by chemical separation; no nuclear or physical separation (as for example in uranium enrichment) is needed. To be used in a nuclear weapon, plutonium must be separated from the much larger mass of non-fissile material in the irradiated fuel. After being separated chemically from the irradiated fuel and reduced to metal, the plutonium is immediately ready for use in a nuclear explosive device. If the reactor involved uses thorium fuel, 233U, also a fissile isotope, is produced and can be recovered in a process similar to plutonium extraction. The first plutonium extraction (reprocessing) plants to operate on an industrial scale were built at Hanford, Washington, during the Manhattan Project. The initial plant was built before the final parameters of the extraction process were well defined. Reprocessing plants are generally characterized by heavy reinforced concrete construction to provide shielding against the intense gamma radiation produced by the decay of short-lived isotopes produced as fission products. Plutonium extraction and uranium reprocessing are generally combined in the same facility in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Although the United States no longer reprocesses civil reactor fuel and does not produce plutonium for weapons, other countries have made different choices. Britain, France, Japan, and Russia (among others) operate reprocessing plants. A brief description of the main features/processes (and related technology) of a reprocessing plant follows.
Highlights
Plutonium is extracted from spent reactor fuel and irradiated targets. Fuel choppers can be as simple as a power-driven saw. The most challenging technical component of a reprocessing plant is the separation system (mixer/settlers, extracted columns, or centrifugal contractors). Flow rates must be monitored precisely, the chemistry must be exact, and a critical excursion must be prevented. Although the steps used in reprocessing are standard chemical operations and the literature on the chemistry and equipment required has been widely disseminated, the successful separation of uranium and plutonium is a formidable task.
Heavy industrial construction. All operations are performed in a facility that is usually divided into two structural sections (hardened and nonhardened) and two utility categories (radiation and ventilation/contamination). The hardened portion of the building (reprocessing cells) is designed to withstand the most severe probable natural phenomena without compromising the capability to bring the processes and plant to a safe shutdown condition. Other parts of the building (i.e., offices and shops), while important for normal functions, are not considered essential and are built to less rigorous structural requirements. Radiation is primarily addressed by using 4- to 6-ft thick, high-density concrete walls to enclose the primary containment area (hot cells). A proliferator who wishes to reprocess fuel covertly for a relatively short time less than a year would be typicalmay use concrete slabs for the cell walls. Holes for periscopes could be cast in the slabs. This is particularly feasible if the proliferator cares little about personnel health and safety issues. Fuel storage and movement. Fuel is transported to the reprocessing plant in specially designed casks. After being checked for contamination, the clean fuel is lowered into a storage pool via a heavy-duty crane. Pools are normally 30-ft deep for radiation protection and contain a transfer pool, approximately
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15-ft deep, that provides an underwater system to move the fuel into an adjacent hot cell. Fuel disassembly. Fuel elements are breached (often chopped) to expose the fuel material for subsequent leaching in nitric acid (HNO3). Fuel cladding is frequently not soluble in nitric acid, so the fuel itself must be opened to chemical attack. Fuel dissolution. Residual uranium and plutonium values are leached from the fuel with HNO3. The cladding material remains intact and is separated as a waste. The dissolver must be designed so that no critical mass of plutonium (and uranium) can accumulate anywhere in its volume, and, of course, it must function in contact with hot nitric acid, a particularly corrosive agent. Dissolvers are typically limited-life components and must be replaced. The first French civilian reprocessing plant at La Hague, near Cherbourg, had serious problems with leakage of the plutonium-containing solutions. Dissolvers may operate in batch mode using a fuel basket or in continuous mode using a rotary dissolver (wheel configuration). Fissile element separation. The PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Recovery by EXtraction) solvent extraction process separates the uranium and plutonium from the fission products. After adjustment of the acidity, the resultant aqueous solution is equilibrated with an immiscible solution of tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) in refined kerosene. The TBP solution preferentially extracts uranium and plutonium nitrates, leaving fission products and other nitrates in the aqueous phase. Then, chemical conditions are adjusted so that the plutonium and uranium are reextracted into a fresh aqueous phase. Normally, two solvent extraction cycles are used for the separation; the first removes the fission products from the uranium and plutonium, while the second provides further decontamination. Uranium and plutonium are separated from one another in a similar second extraction operation. TBP is a common industrial chemical used in plasticizers and paints. Solvent extraction usually takes place in a pulse column, a several-inch diameter metal tube resistant to nitric acid and used to mix together the two immiscible phases (organic phase containing TBP and an aqueous phase containing U, Pu, and the fission products). The mixing is accomplished by forcing one of the phases through the other via a series of pulses with a repetition rate of 30 to 120 cycles/minute and amplitudes of 0.5 to 2.0 inches. The metal tube contains a series of perforated plates which disperses the two immiscible liquids. U & Pu product purification. Although plutonium and uranium from solvent extraction are nearly chemically pure, additional decontamination from each other, fission products, and other impurities may be required. Large plants use additional solvent extraction cycles to provide this service, but small plants may use ion exchange for the final purification step (polishing).
Metal preparation. Plutonium may be precipitated as PuF3 from aqueous nitrate solution by reducing its charge from +4 to +3 with ascorbic acid and adding hydrofluoric acid (HF). The resulting solid is separated by filtration and dried. Reprocessed uranium is rarely reduced to the metal, but it is converted to the oxide and stored or to the hexafluoride and re-enriched. Plutonium (and uranium) metal may be produced by the reaction of an active metal (calcium or magnesium) with a fluoride salt at elevated temperature in a sealed metal vessel (called a bomb). The metal product is freed from the slag, washed in concentrated HNO3 to remove residue, washed with water, dried, and then remelted in a high temperature furnace (arc). Waste treatment/recycle. Reprocessing operations generate a myriad of waste streams containing radioactivity. Several of the chemicals (HNO3) and streams (TBP/kerosene mixture) are recycled. All streams must be monitored to protect against accidental discharge of radioactivity into the environment. Gaseous effluents are passed through a series of cleaning and filtering operations before being discharged ,while liquid waste streams are concentrated by evaporation and stored or solidified with concrete. In the ultimate analysis, the only way to safely handle radioactivity is to retain the material until the activity of each nuclide disappears by natural decay. Early plants used mixer-settler facilities in which the two immiscible fluids were mixed by a propeller, and gravity was used to separate the liquids in a separate chamber. Successful separation requires that the operation be conducted many times in sequence. More modern plants use pulse columns with perforated plates along their length. The (heavier) nitric acid solution is fed in at the top and the lighter TBPkerosene from the bottom. The liquids mix when they are pulsed through the perforations in the plates, effectively making a single reactor vessel serve to carry out a series of operations in the column. Centrifugal contractors using centrifugal force have also been used in place of mixer-settlers. The process must still be repeated many times, but the equipment is compact. New plants are built this way, although the gravitybased mixer-settler technology has been proven to be satisfactory, if expensive and space-consuming. A single bank of mixer-settler stages about the size of a kitchen refrigerator can separate enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon in 12 months. A bank of eight centrifugal contactors can produce enough plutonium for an explosive device within a few days and takes up about the same space as the mixer-settler. Hot cells with thick radiation shielding and leaded glass for direct viewing, along with a glove box with minimal radiation shielding, are adequate for research-scale plutonium extraction, are very low technology items, and would probably suffice for a program designed to produce a small number of weapons each year. The concrete canyons housing many smaller cells with remotely operated machinery are characteristic of large-scale production of plutonium.
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Different organic extraction reagents and different acids may be used. Ion exchange can be substituted for solvent extraction, but the exchange materials are susceptible to radiation damage. Nonaqueous technologies have also been studied, including pyrochemical processes in advanced development in the US for EBR-II. Russia and Japan are apparently also interested. Proliferation Implication Assessment Roughly five times as many nuclei of 235U as of 239Pu are required to make a critical mass. A proliferator can choose between laboriously extracting the fissile uranium isotope from the 99.3 percent of natural uranium which is not useful in a fission bomb, or laboriously breeding the necessary plutonium, nucleus-by-nucleus, in a reactor and then extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel. Intense radiation emitted by certain components in spent reactor fuel makes this separation especially difficult and hazardous. The processing equipment must be surrounded by massive shielding; provision must be made to remove substantial amounts of heat that are associated with this radioactivity; and in some instances, damage to chemicals and construction materials become an impediment to a successful separation campaign. However, several hundred metric tons (MT) of both weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium have been separated, and present worldwide reprocessing capacity is >3,000 MT of fuel per year (>27 MT of plutonium). Plutonium-fueled weapons must be assembled by implosion.
RATIONALE The production of weapons-grade uranium is a formidable task because the concentration of the fissile isotope 235U in natural uranium (0.7 percent) is much lower than the concentration normally used in fission weapons (>90 percent), and the enrichment of 235U is difficult because of the very slight differences in the physical and chemical properties of the uranium isotopes. Alternatively, 239PU may be selected as weapons material. The problems associated with enrichment are replaced with those of acquiring plutoniuma man-made element. The element can be produced from 238U during the fissioning process and can be separated chemically from undesirable waste products. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Reprocessing plants have been operated by all five declared nuclear powers. India reprocessed spent fuel for its one nuclear explosion. It is believed that North Korea reprocessed spent fuel from one of its reactors. Iraq reprocessed at least gram-quantities of plutonium according to IAEA inspection reports. Sweden and Switzerland at least considered the design of reprocessing plants for their (now defunct) weapons programs. Germany and France operate reprocessing facilities for civilian nuclear fuel; Japan is constructing such a facility.
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Table 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters

Technology
Heavy industrial construction
Ability to fabricate a facility which will protect workers and the environment from radioactivity and hazardous materials (note: some countries may have different criteria than the United States in this regard).
NTL B3; NDUL 1; NDUL 8; CCL Cat 2B
High-density concrete
Radiation monitoring (applies to all processes) Fuel storage pool Cranes Hot cells Remote manipulators High-density radiation shielding windows Radiation-hardened TV cameras Air filtration Evaporators Remotely operated cranes Specially designed shipping casks Criticality control Cut-off wheel Shear dissolver (for Al cladding) Laser Analytical chemistry facility for fission products, U and Pu
Shielding software Criticality software Radiation generation/ depletion software
Fuel storage and movement
Sufficient storage pool capacity and depth. Ability to move radioactive material. Capability to separate cladding from fissile material mechanically or chemically. Ability to handle highly corrosive liquids containing radioactivity. Adequate knowledge of uranium, plutonium, and fission product chemistry.
NTL B3; NRC A
None identified
None identified
Fuel disassembly (breaching)
NTL B3; NRC A NTL B3; NRC A
None identified
None identified
Fuel dissolution
Nitric acid (HNO3) Hydrogen fluoride (HF) HNO3 resistant tanks of a specific configuration to prevent a nuclear excursion None identified
None identified
Fissile element separation (solvent extraction)
Familiar with liquid-liquid NTL B3; extraction systems. NRC A Understand distribution of uranium, plutonium, and fission products between two immiscible liquids.
Mixer/settlers Pulse columns Centrifugal contactors
Distribution coefficients for many elements. Aqueous solubility for many substances.
(contd)
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Table 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
U and Pu product purification
Cognizant of liquid-liquid extraction systems Familiar with ion exchange resin systems Ability to handle plutonium in glove boxes
NTL B3; NTL 3; NRC A NTL B3; NDUL 2; CCL Cat 1C; NRC A
Tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) Refined kerosene Ion exchange resins HF Reducing agents (high-purity Ca or Mg) CaF2 or MgF2 (used as liner for reduction bomb) Iodine (serves as catalyst in reduction) Resistant to HNO3 (stainless steel, titanium alloys)
Mixer/settlers Pulse columns Centrifugal contactors Chemical holding or storage vessels Drying Furnace; Fluoride resistant (Monel) Furnace capable of reaching 600 F Sealed reaction tube Temperature control/measurement High temperature furnace (arc) Chemical storage tanks
Distribution coefficients for many elements Aqueous solubility for many substances None identified
Metal preparation (Pu exclusively)
Waste treatment/recycle Ability to recycle valuable components (TBP, HNO3) Ability to process streams containing high levels of radioactivity and hazardous materials
NTL B3; NRC A
None identified
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Table 5.4-2. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Reference Data

Heavy industrial construction
Ability to construct a thick-walled, relatively sealed structure with adequate shielding.
Provides shielded facility for all reprocessing operations
May not be needed if nation unconcerned about its workers or the environment and reprocessing is to be a short-term endeavor. Use reactor storage pool if close proximity to reprocessing facility. Possible storage (dry) in specially designed casks. None identified
Fuel storage and movement
Adequate depth of storage pool to None identified shield spent fuel. Sufficient storage capacity for fuel. Cranes of sufficient capacity to handle shipping casks. Capability to remove as much None identified extraneous material from fuel element as possible. Knowledgeable in the construction and use of one of the breaching tools. Ability to prevent a nuclear excursion None identified
Fuel disassembly (breaching)
Fuel dissolution
Several nonaqueous processes have been developed but most are complicated (pyrometallurgical, pyrochemical, and fluoride volatility) Use one of the nonaqueous processes. Replace solvent extraction with ion exchange process. Use a precipitation process (bismuth phosphate). Use one of the precipitation processes (peroxide, oxalate) Electrolytic process (requires molten salts1,300 F). Reduction of other halides Discharge all aqueous waste solutions to the environment. Minimal recycling (expensive but may be used for limited production).
Fissile element separation (solvent extraction)
Ability to prevent a nuclear excursion. Aqueous solution from separation process contains extremely hazardous radioactive materials.
None identified
U and Pu product purification
Ability to obtain a pure product. None identified Availability of ion exchange resins and sufficient knowledge of their use. Produces metallic Pu
Metal preparation (Pu exclusively) Capability to handle molten Pu metal.
Waste treatment/recycle
High level radioactive waste must be handled with extreme care.
None identified
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SECTION 5.5LITHIUM PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW This subsection discusses chemical methods for separation of 6Li from natural lithium, which is predominantly composed of the isotope 7Li. 6Li is a critical material for the manufacture of the secondaries of so-called dry thermonuclear devices, which do not require the use of liquid deuterium and tritium. It is inconvenient to carry deuterium and tritium as gases in a thermonuclear weapon, and certainly impractical to carry them as liquefied gases, which requires high pressures and cryogenic temperatures. Instead, one can make a dry device in which 6Li is combined with deuterium to form the compound 6Li D (lithium-6 deuteride). Neutrons from a fission primary device bombard the 6Li in the compound, liberating tritium, which quickly fuses with the nearby deuterium. The particles, being electrically charged and at high temperatures, contribute directly to forming the nuclear fireball. The neutrons can bombard additional 6Li nuclei or cause the remaining uranium and plutonium in the weapon to undergo fission. This two-stage thermonuclear weapon has explosive yields far greater than can be achieved with one point safe designs of pure fission weapons, and thermonuclear fusion stages can be ignited in sequence to deliver any desired yield. The largest nuclear device ever detonated was a multi-stage Soviet product with a yield of nearly 60 megatons. It was exploded at only half of its design maximum yield of about 100 megatons. Lithium enriched in the isotope 6Li remains a controlled material because of its utility in the production of compact and highly efficient thermonuclear secondaries. Two-stage nuclear weapons incorporating a lithium-deuteride-fueled component can deliver greater nuclear yield from a smaller and lighter package than if a pure fission device were used. The tradeoff is that the design and construction of reliable twostage dry weapons may require significant knowledge of nuclear weapons physics and technology, knowledge which is hard to acquire without a program involving fullyield testing of the fission primary to be used and measurement of its production of x-rays and their transport through a case surrounding both primary and secondary stages. Therefore, 6Li is more likely to be of interest to a state with nuclear weapons experience than it is to a beginning nuclear state. Lithium is a very low-density silvery metal, prone to spontaneous combustion. On the periodic table of the elements it lies directly beneath hydrogen and has but three protons. It is the lightest solid element. The most common stable isotope is 7Li, consisting of three protons and four neutrons; less common, comprising 7.4 percent of normal lithium, is 6Li, which has three protons and three neutrons in its

Highlights
Lithium-6, combined with deuterium, is a key ingredient of modern thermonuclear weapons. Lithium-6 can be separated from the more common 7 Li isotope by purely chemical means using the fact that 6 Li will migrate to a mercury amalgam and 7 Li to a lithium hydroxide solution when the amalgam and hydroxide solutions are intimately mixed. The presence of a 6 Li enrichment facility is a good indicator that a proliferant state has confidence in its fission primaries and seeks more powerful weapons. The United States ceased the production of 6 Li in 1963 because it had acquired an adequate stockpile of the material for the foreseeable future.
nucleus. In a relatively crude sense, 6Li can be thought of as consisting of an alpha particle (4He) and a deuteron (2H) bound together. When bombarded by neutrons, 6Li disintegrates into a triton (3H) and an alpha: 6 Li + Neutron 3H + 3He + Energy. This is the key to its importance in nuclear weapons physics. The nuclear fusion reaction which ignites most readily is 2 H + 3H 4He + n + 17.6 MeV, or, phrased in other terms, deuterium plus tritium produces 4He plus a neutron plus 17.6 MeV of free energy: D + T 4He + n + 17.6 MeV. Lithium-7 also contributes to the production of tritium in a thermonuclear secondary, albeit at a lower rate than 6Li. The fusion reactions derived from tritium produced from 7Li contributed many unexpected neutrons (and hence far more energy release than planned) to the final stage of the infamous 1953 Castle/BRAVO atmospheric test, nearly doubling its expected yield.
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RATIONALE Lithium-6 is most often separated from natural lithium by the COLEX (Column exchange) electrochemical process, which exploits the fact that 6Li has a greater affinity for mercury than does 7Li. A lithium-mercury amalgam is first prepared using the natural material. The amalgam is then agitated with a lithium hydroxide solution, also prepared from natural lithium. The desired 6Li concentrates in the amalgam, and the more common 7Li migrates to the hydroxide. A counter flow of amalgam and hydroxide passes through a cascade of stages until the desired enrichment in 6Li is reached. The 6Li product can be separated from the amalgam, and the tails fraction of 7Li electrolyzed from the aqueous lithium hydroxide solution. The mercury is recovered and can be reused with fresh feedstock. Proliferation Initiation Assessment: Thermonuclear weapons require the acquisition of reliable, compact, and predictable fission primaries. It is unlikely that a proliferator will reach the point of designing
a thermonuclear device until long after it has developed its first family of compact primaries. Accordingly, it is likely that no new proliferator would embark on a hydrogen weapon as its first priority or seek separated lithium isotopes before having an assured supply of HEU or plutonium. Therefore, an attempt by a potential proliferant state to acquire 6Li or the technologies to produce it might well be taken as an indicator that the state has already progressed at least a long way toward obtaining a nuclear capability. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Russia, the UK, France, and China are all believed to be capable of making 6Li in the quantities needed for the manufacture of large nuclear stockpiles. Russia exploded a device making use of 6Li before the United States did; however, the Soviet device was not a true thermonuclear weapon capable of being scaled to any desired yield. United States production of 6Li ceased in 1963.
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Table 5.5-1. Lithium Production Technology Parameters

Technology
Electrolysis
Supply large d.c. currents at NDUL 8; low and variable voltages. NRC 110.8 Provide adequate temperature control. Produce pure lithium salts for feed material. Experience in fabricating columns, trays, etc. Sufficient knowledge of the chemistry of lithium hydroxide aqueous solutions and mercury and its amalgams. Experience in liquid-liquid NDUL 8; extraction systems. NRC 110.8 Expertise in the chemistry of mercury-lithium distribution coefficients. Capability in cascade theory and operations.
Mercury Lithium salts Nickel Carbon steel
Electrolysis cells Liquid flow and pressure control
Voltages needed for electrolysis. Variation of solubility of lithium in mercury with temperature.
Enrichment
Mercury Lithium hydroxide
Packed liquid-liquid exchange columns. Pumps resistant to mercury. Analytical chemistry laboratory. Mass spectrometer. Valves resistant to mercury.
Lithium distribution data (amalgam/aqueous)
Decomposition of amalgam
Knowledgeable in disposing of hydrogen gas. Experience in using packedbed columns. Experience in purifying mercury
NDUL 8; NRC 110.8
Graphite
Packed columns. Voltages needed for Pumps for mercury. decomposition Metallic filters. Evaporators for mercury amalgam. Mercury cleaning system None identified
Mercury recycle
NDUL 8; NRC 110.8
Mercury Nitric acid
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Table 5.5-2. Lithium Production Reference Data
Technology
Technical Issues
Military Applications
Alternative Technologies
Electrolysis Enrichment
Ability to control large d.c. currents at low voltages Adequate supply of high purity lithium salts and mercury. Knowledge of lithium hydroxide/ mercury/aqueous chemistry
Fusion weapons
6
None Electroexchange (ELEX) process using a series of stirred tray contactors. Liquid-liquid extraction systems using marcrocyclic compounds (i.e., benzo-15-crown-5 and cryptands) in a diluent Utilization of newer liquid-liquid extraction systems Discard mercury when it is no longer effective
LiD (lithium-6 deuteride) used as fusion weapon fuel. 6 Li used as target material in tritium production
Decomposition of amalgam
Availability of high-purity graphite. Expertise in preventing hydrogen explosion. Ability to handle corrosive liquids
Fusion weapons
Mercury recycle
Fusion weapons
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SECTION 5.6NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
OVERVIEW Weapons Nuclear weapons are small, light, and inexpensive compared to the conventional ordnance needed to destroy large area targets. Although the infrastructure for a nuclear enterprise is complex, the weapons themselves use relatively straightforward designs. Nuclear explosives enable a single missile or aircraft to destroy an entire city, giving great leverage to a state or subnational group with even a small stockpile of such devices. Nuclear weapons were first developed more than a half century ago with technology and knowledge of physics far less than available today. Identifying some of the key technologies needed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability may allow effective intervention and/or identification of trends of concern. Although a great deal of information, much of which is not correct, on the principles of nuclear explosives is available in the public domain, development of nuclear weapons, even in the early stages, requires an understanding and mastery of the relevant physical principles. Such an understanding, which is necessary even to plan a program to achieve a nuclear weapon capability, contains elements from fields not generally familiar to todays scientists. A number of steps are necessary to develop nuclear weapons, and if these steps are not well understood, false starts will be made, and valuable resources will be allocated to inappropriate tasks. In the worst case, skilled personnel may be lost to radiation or to other accidents. Misallocation of resources can delay, and in some cases prevent, achievement of the goals of a weapons program. The nuclear weapons publicly known to have been fielded use only two fundamental principles for releasing nuclear energy: fission and fusion. Under these major categories, boosting, staging, and the use of either highexplosive-driven implosion or a propellant-powered gun mechanism to assemble a supercritical mass constitute the major elements of the taxonomy of known nuclear weapon types. The various systems may be combined in many different ways, with the single requirement that a fission chain reaction is needed to ignite nuclear fusion in a weapon. Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design One of the key elements in the proper operation of a nuclear weapon is initiation of the fission chain reaction at the proper time. To obtain a significant nuclear yield of the nuclear explosive, sufficient neutrons must be present within the supercritical core at the right time. If the chain reaction starts too soon, the result will be only a fizzle yield, much below the design specification; if it occurs too late, there may be no yield
Highlights
Nuclear weapons operate on the well-known principles of nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. If fissile material is available, subnational or terrorist groups can likely produce an improvised nuclear explosive device which will detonate with a significant nuclear yield. High explosives or propellants can be used to assemble the pit of a nuclear weapon, and there are several ways to accomplish the task. Neutron generators to initiate the fission chain reaction can be purchased or made indigenously.
whatever. Several ways to produce neutrons at the appropriate moment have been developed. Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group Terrorism has become nearly as much of a public and governmental concern in the last few years as proliferation by nations hostile to the United States. Subnational groups of concern may be independent actors (e.g., the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City), those acting to promote a cause with foreign roots (e.g., the World Trade Center bombing), or surrogates for hostile states themselves (e.g., the bombing of Pan Am 103). This section will examine nuclear techniques useful to subnational adversaries. In recent years terrorist acts have escalated from pipe bombs to many tons of high explosives (e.g., the bombing of major U.S. targets including the embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon as well as U.S. forces residences at the Khobar Towers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as well as domestic incidents in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center) and to the explicit use of chemical warfare agents, as in Aum Shinrikyos Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system. For many years it was generally believed that terrorist groups did not seek to kill large numbers of people at a time but rather wished to demonstrate that they could execute attacks at will against civilian (and military) targets. In the wake of the use of Sarin gas in Tokyo as well as the Oklahoma City, Pan Am, and Riyadh bombings, it is no longer possible to assume that genuine mass murder is not an intended component of subnational forcesparticularly if they are acting as state surrogates.
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Since chemical weapons have already been used by terrorists, it may be simply a matter of time before some form of nuclear attack is employed by similar groups. In this context,nuclear weaponry includes radiological weapons as a subset. RATIONALE Weapons This subsection describes the general process and the capabilities required for understanding and designing nuclear weapons. Some of the information and computational tools may be controlled, and some may be generally available on the open market. The paths a proliferator might take can be quite different than the paths that the nuclear powers have taken in the past. The first part of this subsection will focus on the design milestones for nuclear weapons, and on key elements to be achieved. The next part describes neutron initiators, a particular technology necessary for many nuclear weapons and for some technologies unique to nuclear weapons. Finally, the question of nuclear terrorism is briefly discussed and some relevant technologies identified. The tables accompanying this subsection are designed around the following topics, which have been identified by some as being among the more important areas of technology a proliferator must master to be able to convert a supply of special nuclear material into actual nuclear explosives: Fast-fission chain reaction theory and practice, Fast assembly of critical and supercritical masses of fissile material, High explosive (HE) and propellant characteristics and design, HE initiation, Firing sets for HE initiation, Thermonuclear boosting of fission primary, and Thermonuclear/second stage of nuclear weapons. The fission reactions commonly studied in nuclear reactor physics use thermal neutrons, and the cross sections usually tabulated are those for low-energy particles. In a nuclear weapon, the time scales dealt with do not allow full thermalization of the neutrons, hence fast neutrons, that is, the neutrons emitted and interacting at higher energies must be considered. Thus, the important neutron interactions for the weapons designer are those which occur at roughly MeV energies. In addition, reactor neutron transport codes need to be modified to fully account for the different physical regimes. A comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences between nuclear reactor physics and nuclear weapon physics is essential to make progress in nuclear weapon design. For a nuclear weapon to release its energy in a time which is short compared to the hydrodynamic disassembly time, rapid assembly to form a supercritical mass is
essential. This assembly can be accomplished in a linear fashion, as in a gun-assembled weapon, or it can be accomplished in a spherical fashion, as in an implosion weapon. In the first case, two subcritical masses of the fissile material are rapidly assembled into a supercritical mass, one mass being fired by the gun at the other mass. In the second case, the fissile material is initially in a subcritical configuration, and then energy contributed by conventional explosives is concentrated on the fissile material to achieve a supercritical mass. The fissile materials will be driven to high pressure/ high energy conditions by the high-explosive energy. This will require calculations of initial, intermediate, and final configurations, using hydrodynamic programs and appropriate equations of state for these regimes of temperature and pressure. HE or propellants are the means of choice for assembly of most nuclear weapons. Given this, the potential proliferator must understand and master the data and design of systems to accomplish such assembly. Propellants are used to assemble gun-type weapons, and are usually relatively slow burning. Much useful data from conventional artillery tube-fired weapons development is generally available. Much data concerning implosion is also available from the development of modern conventional HE weapons including shaped charges. Special considerations applicable to nuclear weapons development involve shock wave propagation and focusing. Such considerations go beyond much of conventional explosive design work, and would require specialized programs, equations of state in HE pressure and temperature regimes, and data on detonation velocities and strengths. Initiation of the main charge of a nuclear explosive in such a way as to provide the desired final configuration of the fissile material often proves to be a major design challenge. Traditionally, this challenge has been met by initiating the charge at a number of discrete points, and then tailoring the converging shock wave through the use of lenses consisting of slower and faster burning explosives. Such initiation can be accomplished either by electrical signals or by fuze trains, both ending at a detonator which initiates the shock wave at the lens charge. Firing sets for nuclear devices, the means for activating the initiation of the main charge of HE for a nuclear weapon, can also have performance characteristics which lie outside the range of conventional engineering. If the proliferator is relying on initiation at a discrete number of points, then these points must be activated nearly simultaneously to have a smooth implosion. The simultaneity required depends on the internal design of the explosive, but it is common to require a higher degree of simultaneity than is usually the case for conventional explosives. Thus, high energy must be delivered to all the detonators at nearly the same time. This will require high-energy, low-impedance capacitors, and high-current, high-speed switches. Once the potential proliferator has begun to understand the operation of a simple fission weapon, he may well want to increase the yield to make more efficient use of his special nuclear material. One way to do this is to boost the fission yield by
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incorporating thermonuclear reactions into the design of the weapon. Introduction of the neutrons from thermonuclear reactions at the time of supercriticality of the fissile material can have a dramatic effect on the yield. The usual fusion material used for this purpose is a mixture of deuterium and tritium gas. When the proliferator begins to think in terms of greatly increasing the yield of his nuclear weapons, he may consider design and development of thermonuclear and/or second stages. To do this, he would have to obtain and master hydrodynamic computer programs which correctly describe regimes of extremely high temperatures and pressures. He would show interest in equations of state of special nuclear materials under these conditions. He would also be interested in neutron and reaction cross sections for both fissionable materials and thermonuclear materials at these high temperatures and pressures. Finally, he would attempt to obtain lithium (and/or lithium deuteride), tritium and deuterium. Finally, the actual coupling of the nuclear weapon primary with a thermonuclear/ boosted-fission secondary will require mastery of a complex set of physical principles. The proliferator will not only have to understand hydrodynamic calculations under extreme physical conditions, he will have to obtain and understand the flow of energy from the primary to and around the secondary. Energy flow and the behavior of materials under these extreme conditions of temperature and pressure comprise a complex set of problems, well beyond the experience of most of todays physicists. Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design In a gun-assembled weapon, the assembly speed is relatively slow. This requires a strong source of alpha particles such as 210Po or some similarly active alpha emitter. The South African uranium gun-assembled devices did not use any neutron source other than background radiation. An implosion weapon may require a source which can produce a precisely timed burst of neutrons. The type of neutron initiator used in early implosion devices utilized the emission of neutrons caused by bombardment of 9Be or some other light element by alpha particles. This requires a strong source of alpha particles, something of the order of 10 curies of 210Po or a similarly active alpha emitter. This isotope of polonium has a half life of almost 140 days, and a neutron initiator using this material needs to have the polonium replaced frequently. Since the 210Po is made in a nuclear reactor, this means that potential proliferators need either to have a nuclear reactor of their own, or to have access to one. To supply the initiation pulse of neutrons at the right time, the polonium and the beryllium need to be kept apart until the appropriate moment and then thoroughly and rapidly mixed. One of the ways to make an external neutron generator is by using an electronically controlled particle accelerator called a pulse neutron tube. Such a system might use the deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium fusion reactions to produce large
amounts of neutrons. Typically, deuterium nuclei are accelerated to an energy sufficient to cause a fusion reaction when they strike a deuterium- or tritium-rich target. This impact can result in a short pulse of neutrons sufficient to initiate the fission chain reaction. The timing of the pulse can be precisely controlled. Similar devices are used in oil well logging. Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group Nuclear Explosives For most of the nuclear era, it was accepted dogma that acquisition of a nuclear weapon required the construction of either an enrichment plant for uranium or a reactor and reprocessing unit for plutonium. Great care was taken in the design of U.S.supplied nuclear facilities to ensure that neither 235U nor plutonium could be surreptitiously diverted from the nuclear fuel cycle to be used in a weapon, whether built by a state or by a subnational group. One hoped that such measures could severely constrict the illicit or unsafeguarded supply of special nuclear material of a quality useful in a weapon. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the safeguarding of hundreds of metric tons of fissile material has broken down so seriously that in one famous court case a Russian judge remarked (in jest, one hopes), In the Murmansk area potatoes are more carefully guarded than enriched uranium. Further, recent arrests in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) have yielded up gram and larger size quantities of partially enriched uranium and may also have resulted in the seizure of other fissionable materials, including plutonium. Thus, it is wrong to discount the possibility of a terrorist nuclear weapon on the grounds that subnational groups cannot gain access to the fissile material needed to make a device. It is entirely possible that special nuclear material (or even an entire nuclear weapon) may, indeed, become available on the nuclear black market in the foreseeable future. Since 90 percent11 of the overall difficulty in making a nuclear weapon lies in the production of special nuclear material (if no outside source is readily available), a terrorist nuclear device is no longer an impossibility, particularly if SNM can be obtained on the black market and the terrorist group itself need not steal SNM from a poorly guarded facility. Types of Nuclear Design Useful for a Terrorist Uranium Gun-Assembled Devices A terrorist with access to >50 kg of HEU would almost certainly opt for a gunassembled weapon despite the inherent inefficiencies of such a device, both because of its simplicity and the perceived lack of a need to test a gun assembly. Building an
11
More than 90 percent of the entire Manhattan Project budget went to the production of fissile materials; less than 4 percent went to the weapon laboratory at Los Alamos.
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effective gun assembly is certainly easier than demonstrating that a simple implosion system will actually work. The disadvantage of a gun design is that it needs significantly more fissile material than an efficient implosion device of similar yield. This may be important to a subnational group intending to explode a series of devices, but would be of much less importance if only one blast were contemplated. Implosion assembly If the subnational group had only 239Pu or needed to be economical with a limited supply of HEU, then it would likely turn to an implosion assembly. The simplest design of an implosion weapon places a solid plutonium (or HEU) pit at the center of a sphere, surrounded by a certain amount of tamper material such as 238U, to be compressed by the large amount of high explosive filling the sphere. In the design chosen for the first U.S. and Soviet devices tested, the necessary imploding moving shock wave was produced by the use of explosive lenses made of appropriately shaped fastand slow-detonating HE. It is generally asserted in the open literature that 32 lens charges were used for the Fatman device, the charges arranged in much the same way as the segments on a soccer ball. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Weapons Six nations are known to have exploded nuclear devices: the United States, Russia, the UK, France, China, and India. Some suspect that Pakistan and Israel have built nuclear weapons. It is known that South Africa built and then dismantled six gun-
assembled nuclear devices. Many countries, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are believed to have active or recently dormant nuclear programs based generally on older technologies. Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland explored the possibilities of going nuclear during the 1960s and 1970s, and they, Japan, and Germany are generally credited with the ability to build a bomb in a relatively short time. Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, among other nations, have pursued the idea of constructing nuclear weapons but have apparently abandoned their programs. Many countries have the necessary expertise in nuclear technologies to build weapons using their domestic nuclear power experience. Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design Few nations other than the five nuclear weapons states have mastered the techniques of constructing initiators. Presumably the three nuclear threshold states have; Iraq made substantial progress, and South Africa elected not to use an initiator. Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group Efforts directed at preventing the acquisition of fissile material are the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism. The technical problems confronting the designer of an implosion-assembled improvised nuclear device (IND) are relatively simple in comparison to obtaining special nuclear materials, particularly if the IND does not have to be very safe or predictable in yield. Despite fictional accounts to the contrary, it is most unlikely that a terrorist group could fabricate a boosted or thermonuclear device on its own.
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Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference WEAPONS Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Fast fission chain reaction; prompt criticality; high-energy neutrons
Operational understanding; neutron transport theory; high explosive means of device assembly
WA ML 4; USML IV
Special nuclear materials, reliable high explosives and detonators
General machining capability, dimensional mensuration capability; fast neutron and gamma counters capable of handling in excess of one million events total per microsecond. Fast streak and framing cameras (see NDUL) and oscilloscopes. Fast neutron counters, gamma counters to measure effects of reflector parameters. Fast neutron counters, gamma counters; streak and framing cameras; flash x-ray cameras; pinhole gamma or neutron cameras.
Validated fast nuclear reactor operations software, neutron crosssections (fission, scattering and absorption) as a function of neutron energy, neutrons per fission as a function of energy.
Reflector design
Understanding of effects of reflectors on reactivity; ability to cast or machine beryllium or other suitable reflector material
WA ML 4; USML IV
Beryllium, uranium, tungsten, special machining capabilities for refractory materials Beryllium, uranium (>20% U-235) U-233, or plutonium, tungsten, special machining capabilities for refractory materials; energetic high explosives; detonators and firing sets High-energy, high explosives and detonators. Common propellants including, e.g., propellant for gunassembled devices.
Validated nuclear reactor software, neutron crosssections (scattering and absorption) as a function of energy. High pressure/energy equations of state.
Fast assembly of critical mass of fissile material
For simple designs the ability WA ML 4; to construct simple implosion USML IV systems, understanding of interplay of nuclear energy release disassembling device, and continuing HE energy input
High explosives and propellants: characteristics and design
Ability to assemble propellant NDUL 6; or implosion systems incorCCL Cat 3A porating explosives such as baratol and composition B. Fabrication with few voids/ bubbles. Possible vacuum casting or isostatic pressing. Propellant for gun-assembled devices Understanding of HE systems NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A
HE test sites, highspeed photography, flash x-rays, high-speed mechanical and electronic diagnostics including pin-domes. Fractional microsecond timing. HE test sites, highspeed photography, flash x-rays, high-speed mechanical and electronic diagnostics
Validated shock-wave propagation programs, detonation velocities, HE pressure regime equations of state
High explosive initiation
Explosives of varying types and sensitivities; bridge wires; slappers
Validated shock-wave propagation programs, detonation velocities, HE pressure regime equations of state (contd)
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Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
Firing sets
Understanding of and procurement of firing sets. NDUL: 15 microsec pulse, 100 output; rise <10 microsec into load <40 ohms.
NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A
High-energy, lowimpedance capacitor banks; high current, high-speed switches (e.g., thyratrons, krytrons, sprytrons). Thyratrons date from the 1940s. Tritium, highpressure gas bottles and fill systems, both design and utilization capabilities. Welds satisfactory for hydrogen gas transfer systems. Materials compatible simultaneously with fissile metals and hydrogen. Enriched uranium, plutonium, lithium deuteride/tritide, natural/depleted uranium, lithium-6.
High-speed simultaneous measurement devices (e.g., highspeed oscilloscopes, streak cameras, etc.)
Electronic circuit performance software
Thermonuclear boosting of fission primary
Ability to construct or obtain fission devices capable of being boosted; tritium supplies.
WA ML 4; USML IV
High pressure gauges, pin dome diagnostics, flash x-ray diagnostics, neutron diagnostics
Validated thermonuclear fusion programs, deuterium-tritium reaction cross-section tables. Equations of state for hydrogen and Helium-3 at very high densities.
Thermonuclear second stage of nuclear weapons
Understanding of transport physics. Construct compact and efficient fission primary.
WA ML 4; USML IV
General machining capability, dimensional mensuration capability, ability to handle and machine special nuclear materials. See NDUL, Wassenaar Arrangement, and MCTL, Part II, sections on machine tools and mensuration/ metrology General machining capability, dimensional mensuration capability, ability to handle and machine radioactive nuclear materials, fast neutron counters for demonstrating successful operation.
Validated thermonuclear fusion programs, deuterium-tritium reaction cross-sections, neutron cross sections for various isotopes of uranium and transuranics
INITIATORS
Alpha-induced neutron Identification of performance emission (crushable characteristics of alpha-n initiators such as the one initiators. used at Trinity).
NDUL 8; CCL Cat 3A
Radioactive alpha emitting materials (e.g., Po-210 and Pu-238). Target materials (e.g., beryllium).
Beryllium alpha-n crosssections. Alpha range in various component materials.
(contd)
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Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
Miniature linear accelerator to generate DD/DT reactions and resultant neutrons. (Deuteron beam usually bombards tritiated plastic target) Dense plasma focus to generate DD/DT reactions and resultant neutrons.
Identification of performance NDUL 8; characteristics of linear CCL Cat 3A accelerator neutron initiators.
Tritium, deuterium, titanium, plating equipment, miniature power supplies/capacitors
Fast neutron detectors, precision machining capability, precision mensuration capability
Validated ionization and acceleration software, DT reaction rates as a function of center of mass energy
Identification of performance characteristics of dense plasma focus neutron initiators.
NDUL 8; CCL Cat 3A
Tritium, deuterium, miniature power supplies/capacitors
Fast neutron detectors, precision machining capability, precision mensuration capability
Validated plasma ionization and acceleration software, DT reaction rates as a function of center of mass energy
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Table 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues WEAPONS Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Fast fission chain reaction; prompt criticality; high energy neutrons.
Obtaining fissile material of adequate purity and (for uranium) enrichment. Determination by computation and experiment that proposed geometry and fissile material mass are sufficient. Understanding of neutron transport; absorption cross sections and scattering cross sections of reflector material; computation of contribution of reflected neutrons to the chain reaction. Design of gun system for U-235; design and fabrication of predictable, reliable, and compact implosion system for plutonium weapons. Neutron background and spontaneous fission rate in fuel. Introduction of neutrons at correct moment. Safety; energy content; shaping of charges in order to achieve efficient implosion without disruption of the fissile pit. Obtaining adequate simultaneity among many detonators; reliability of detonators. Storage of electrical energy; rapid delivery of sufficient current to fire all detonators simultaneously; pulse rise time.
Fundamental technology of nuclear explosive devices. Provides simple fission weapons.
None identified
Reflector design
Reduces requirements for special nuclear materials; increases efficiency with which fission fuel is burned.
Use additional fissile material and accept significantly lower performance.
Fast assembly of critical mass of fissile material
The critical mass of a nuclear explosive device must be rapidly assembled from a subcritical configuration in order to produce an explosion and not a fizzle.
None identified
High explosives and propellants: characteristics and design
See section on high explosives in MCTL Part I.
None identified
High explosive initiation
See section on detonators in MCTL, Part I. Initiates the detonation of HE used for implosion or the deflagration of the propellant in a gun-assembled device.
Various forms of detonators have been successfully used. Different types of firing sets have proven usable.
Firing sets
Thermonuclear boosting of fission Mixing of pit material and boost gas. primary
Reduces the weight and the fissile No obvious alternative for materials requirements for a (primarily) achieving compact, efficient, high fission weapon; improves yield to yield primaries. weight ratio. By using a fission stage plus one or more thermonuclear stages, the designer can scale the weapon to any desired yield, no matter how large. Useful for attacking hard targets with highly accurate delivery systems or for annihilating large area soft targets. No lower technology substitutes for achieving device yields in the megaton and above range.
Thermonuclear/second stage of nuclear weapons
Compressing and heating of secondary.
(contd)
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Table 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data (contd)
Technology Technical Issues INITIATORS Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Alpha-induced neutron emission (crushable initiators such as the one used at Trinity).
Need to understand physics of alpha-n Neutron initiator capability. Starts reactions and neutron yields from neutron chain reaction at correct time. such reactions. Procurement of suitable alpha-source isotope; ability to replace short half-life materials; mixing of source and target materials on crushing. Heat dissipation. Need to understand yield of neutrons from DD/DT reactions Miniaturized, high output neutron initiator; permits more precise timing of neutron pulse than crushable initiator. Does not take up space within the pit itself, simplifying design, testing, and development of the device. Miniaturized, high-output neutron initiator
Other suitable technologies are more difficult.
Miniature linear accelerator to generate DD/DT reactions and resultant neutrons.
Alpha-induced neutron initiators; dense plasma focus device. Similar devices are used in oil well logging.
Dense plasma focus to generate DD/DT reactions and resultant neutrons.
Need to understand yield of neutrons from DD/DT reactions
Need to obtain materials and/or fabricated devices
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SECTION 5.7SAFING, ARMING, FUZING, AND FIRING
OVERVIEW This subsection describes technologies to (1) prevent an unwanted nuclear detonation and (2) initiate a nuclear explosion in response to proper orders. It also addresses one part of the set of command and control technologies, permissive action links (PALs), which are peculiar to nuclear weapons in U.S. practice. Nuclear weapons are particularly destructive, with immediate effects including blast and thermal radiation and delayed effects produced by ionizing radiation, neutrons, and radioactive fallout. They are expensive to build, maintain, and employ, requiring a significant fraction of the total defense resources of a small nation. In a totalitarian state the leader must always worry that they will be used against the government; in a democracy the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental use must never be discounted. A nuclear detonation as the result of an accident would be a local catastrophe. Because of their destructiveness, nuclear weapons require precautions to prevent accidental detonation during any part of their manufacture and lifetime. And because of their value, the weapons require reliable arming and fuzing mechanisms to ensure that they explode when delivered to target. Therefore, any nuclear power is likely to pay some attention to the issues of safing and safety, arming, fuzing, and firing of its nuclear weapons. The solutions adopted depend upon the level of technology in the proliferant state, the number of weapons in its stockpile, and the political consequences of an accidental detonation. From the very first nuclear weapons built, safety was a consideration. The two bombs used in the war drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki posed significant risk of accidental detonation if the B-29 strike aircraft had crashed on takeoff. As a result, critical components were removed from each bomb and installed only after takeoff and initial climb to altitude were completed. Both weapons used similar arming and fuzing components. Arming could be accomplished by removing a safety connector plug and replacing it with a distinctively colored arming connector. Fuzing used redundant systems including a primitive radar and a barometric switch. No provision was incorporated in the weapons themselves to prevent unauthorized use or to protect against misappropriation or theft.
Highlights
All nuclear weapon possessors will find it important to control access to their weapons. Safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) problems generally have simple engineering solutions.
In later years, the United States developed mechanical safing devices. These were later replaced with weapons designed to a goal of less than a 1 in a 1 million chance of the weapon delivering more than 4 pounds of nuclear yield if the high explosives were detonated at the single most critical possible point. Other nations have adopted different safety criteria and have achieved their safety goals in other ways. In the 1950s, to prevent unauthorized use of U.S. weapons stored abroad, permissive action links (PALs) were developed. These began as simple combination locks and evolved into the modern systems which allow only a few tries to arm the weapon and before disabling the physics package should an intruder persist in attempts to defeat the PAL. RATIONALE The ability of a country or extranational organization to make effective use of a nuclear weapon is limited unless the device can be handled safely, taken safely from storage when required, delivered to its intended target, and then detonated at the correct point in space and time to achieve the desired goal. Although the intended scenarios for use of its weapons and the threat a proliferator perceives (or the region it wishes to dominate) will strongly influence specific weaponization concepts and approaches, functional capabilities for safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) will be fundamental. The generic requirements for these functions are described below.
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SAFF Subsystem Generic Functions Subsystem Safing Generic Functions To ensure that the nuclear warhead can be stored, handled, deployed, and employed in a wide spectrum of intended and unintended environmental and threat conditions, with assurance that it will not experience a nuclear detonation. In U.S. practice, safing generally involves multiple mechanical interruptions of both power sources and pyrotechnic/explosive firing trains. The nuclear components may be designed so that an accidental detonation of the high explosives is intrinsically unable to produce a significant (>4 pounds TNT equivalent) nuclear yield; it is simpler to insert mechanical devices into the pit to prevent the assembly of a critical mass into the pit or to remove a portion of the fissile material from inside the high explosives.12 All U.S. weapons have been designed to be intrinsically one-point safe in the event of accidental detonation of the high explosives, but it is not anticipated that a new proliferator would take such care. Placing the nuclear warhead in a ready operational state, such that it can be initiated under specified firing conditions. Arming generally involves mechanical restoration of the safing interrupts in response to conditions that are unique to the operational environment (launch or deployment) of the system. A further feature is that the environment typically provides the energy source to drive the arming action. If a weapon is safed by inserting mechanical devices into the pit (e.g., chains, coils of wire, bearing balls) to prevent complete implosion, arming involves removal of those devices. It may not always be possible to safe a mechanically armed device once the physical barrier to implosion has been removed. To ensure optimum weapon effectiveness by detecting that the desired conditions for warhead detonation have been met and to provide an appropriate command signal to the firing set to initiate nuclear detonation. Fuzing generally involves devices to detect the location of the warhead with respect to the target, signal processing and logic, and an output circuit to initiate firing.
Arming
To ensure nuclear detonation by delivering a precise level of precisely timed electrical or pyrotechnic energy to one or more warhead detonating devices. A variety of techniques are used, depending on the warhead design and type of detonation devices. Depending on the specific military operations to be carried out and the specific delivery system chosen, nuclear weapons pose special technological problems in terms of primary power and power-conditioning, overall weapon integration, and operational control and security. This subsection also includes technologies for PALs required to enable the use of these subsystems, as well as primary power sources and power conditioning, and technologies for packaging and integration. In particular, one must address component and subsystem technologies for safing, arming, fuzing, and firing a nuclear weapon. In describing the technologies which can be used for nuclear device weaponization, it is important to distinguish among requirements for different objective levels of capability. Not all weapons possessors will face the same problems or opt for the same levels of confidence, particularly in the inherent security of their weapons. One must take care to avoid mirror imaging U.S. or other decisions at any time from 1945 until the present. The operational objectives will in turn dictate the technological requirements (see table below) for the SAFF subsystems. Firing Nominal Operational Requirements Objectives Minimal Requirements could be met by: Surface burst (including impact fuzing of relatively slow moving warhead) or crude preset height of burst based on simple timer or barometric switch or simple radar altimeter. More precise HOB (height of burst) based on improved radar triggering or other methods of measuring distance above ground to maximize radius of selected weapons effects (see section on weapons effects), with point-contact salvage fuzing. Parachute delivery of bombs to allow deliberate laydown and surface burst. Variable HOB, including low-altitude for ensured destruction of protected strategic targets. Possible underwater or exoatmospheric capabilities.
Modest
Fuzing
Substantial
12
Mechanical safing of a gun-assembled weapon is fairly straightforward; one can simply insert a hardened steel or tungsten rod across a diameter of the gun barrel, disrupting the projectile. Because few gun-assembled weapons are believed to be in use anywhere in the world, and are conceptually easy to safe, this section will only discuss implosion-assembled systems unless specifically stated. The safing of the electronics and arming systems is common to both types of weapons.
Whether to protect their investment in nuclear arms or to deny potential access to and use of the weapons by unauthorized persons, proliferators or subnational groups will almost certainly seek special measures to ensure security and operational control of nuclear weapons. These are likely to include physical security and access control
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technologies at minimum and may include use control. The techniques used today by the existing western nuclear weapon states represent the culmination of a half-century of evolution in highly classified military programs, and proliferators may well choose simpler solutions, perhaps by adapting physical security, access, and operational controls used in the commercial sector for high-value/high-risk assets. Preventing access to the development of a minimal SAFF capability will not be feasible. Experts have surmised that barometric pressure switching may have been employed to fuze the bomb used to destroy Pan Am Flight 103. Such a sensor would meet the basic requirements for one potential terrorist use of nuclear explosives. The requirements to achieve a modest or substantial capability level are much more demanding. Both safety and protection of investment demand very low probability of failure of safing and arming mechanisms, with very high probability of proper initiation of the warhead. The specific technologies associated with each of the key elements of SAFF and weapons physical and operational security are addressed in the technology and reference data tables. This level of technology meets the criterion of sufficiency for achieving a usable military capability. The items required to meet this criterion are generally specially designed or not widely available. Licensing may be ineffective as a mechanism for monitoring proliferant activity. By contrast, alternative technologies which might require the proliferator to accept greater risk of failure or misappropriation of his weapons are generally available to any organization desiring to obtain a minimal nuclear capability. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Virtually any country or extranational group with the resources to construct a nuclear device has sufficient capability to attain the minimum SAFF capability that would be needed to meet terrorist or minimal national aims. All of the recognized nuclear weapons states and many other countries have (or have ready access to) both the design know-how and components required to implement a significant capability. In terms of sophistication, safety, and reliability of design, past U.S. weapons programs provide a legacy of world leadership in SAFF and related technology. France and the UK follow closely in overall SAFF design and may actually hold slight leads
in specific component technologies. SAFF technologies of other nuclear powers notably Russia and Chinado not compare. Japan and Germany have technological capabilities roughly on a par with the United States, UK, and France, and doubtless have the capability to design and build nuclear SAFF subsystems. Reliable fuzing and firing systems suitable for nuclear use have been built since 1945 and do not need to incorporate any modern technology, although the substitution of integrated circuit electronics for vacuum tubes will almost certainly occur. Many kinds of mechanical safing systems have been employed, and several of these require nothing more complex than removable wires or chains or the exchanging of arming/ safing connector plugs. Safing a gun-assembled system is especially simple. Arming systems range from hand insertion of critical components in flight to extremely sophisticated instruments which detect specific events in the stockpile to target sequence (STS). Fuzing and firing systems span an equally great range of technical complexity. Very few, if any, countries approach the ability of the United States, UK, and France in terms of safety and reliability of SAFF functions. However, a proliferator would not necessarily seek to mirror-image U.S. practice and may adopt different techniques and criteria. Any country with the electronics capability to build aircraft radar altimeter equipment should have access to the capability for building a reasonably adequate, simple HOB fuze. China, India, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Singapore, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, and South Africa all have built conventional weapons with design features that could be adapted to more sophisticated designs, providing variable burst height and rudimentary Electronic Counter Counter Measure (ECCM) features. With regard to physical security measures and use control, the rapid growth in the availability and performance of low-cost, highly reliable microprocessing equipment has led to a proliferation of electronic lock and security devices suitable for protecting and controlling high-value/at-risk assets. Such technology may likely meet the needs of most proliferant organizations.
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Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters

Technology
SAFING DEVICES
Mechanical devices designed to provide for positive interruption and connection of explosive or pyrotechnic devices Mechanical techniques and devices for preventing assembly or high order (nuclear) detonation of nuclear explosive devices
Any capability is a concern.
WA ML 3; USML III; MTCR 2; USML 121.16 WA ML 3; USML III; USML 121.16
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Devices designed to Simple barometric sensor detect one or more of the Low-cost accelerometer following phenomena: - air flow - linear or angular acceleration - barometric pressure Precision mechanical devices designed to use any of the following: - air flow - linear or angular acceleration - barometric pressure Externally powered (spring or electrical) switches enabled by one or more of the stimuli listed in Technology Column
WA ML 3; USML III
None identified
None identified
None identified
ARMING DEVICES
WA ML 4; USML IV
Long-life lubricating fluids
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
Sufficient Technology Level
Export Control Reference FUZING
Critical Materials
Radar altimeter sensors, having unambiguous range measurement capability at ranges >100 ft.
Radar altimeter with simple height-measuring capabilities
WA ML 3, 4; USML III, IV; CCL Cat 7A; MTCR 11
Semi-fabricated components of high thermal diffusivity materials (e.g., beryllium oxide) for efficient heat transfer. Note: Thermal diffusivity is the quantity of heat passing normally through a unit area per unit time, divided by the product of the specific heat, density and temperature gradient. Solid state laser and optical detector materials. IR window materials to withstand erosion from rain particles, stagnation temperatures, and aerodynamic erosion associated with ballistic reentry. Proprietary electrolyte additives and catalysts for thermal batteries.
Specially designed programmable microwave delay lines
None Identified
Active IR/EO altimeter for low HOB
For low-velocity approach, low-power laser ranging device
WA ML 3, 4; USML III, IV; MTCR 11; CCL Cat 2A
Semiconductor detector and laser manufacturing
None identified
Primary and reserve (including thermal reserve) batteries
Aerospace qualified primary WA Cat 3A; batteries could be acquired and CCL Cat 3A installed as part of the operational deployment sequence Barometric altimeters None identified NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
None identified
Barometric switch
None identified High permeability magnetic materials, designed or charaterized for use in lowloss transformers operating at frequencies above 120 Hz. Low-loss dielectric materials designed to withstand temperatures in excess of 125 C.
Power conditioning systems, Aerospace qualified convenfor producing high voltage d.c. tional power supply and pulsed power for fuzing applications
Microwave antennas
Standard microwave horn antenna
WA ML 5AP1; CCL Cat 5A P1
Antenna and ECM test facilities
Empirically validated engineering models and design databases for waveguide antennas
(contd)
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Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
Compact, highperformance stripline or microstrip microwave components, including-- low-noise balanced mixers - high ratio circulators Capacitive discharge units
Conventional stripline design techniques
None Identified
Low-loss dielectric substrate materials
Swept frequency analyzers Engineering models
None identified
FIRING SETS
Conventional high-voltage (>300 V) capacitors, with capacitance greater than 25 nanofarads Anode delay: <10 microseconds; Peak voltage: 2,500 V; Peak current: >100 Any capability is a concern.
NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A NDUL 6; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
None identified
None identified
Cold cathode tubes and switches
None identified
None identified
None identified
Pyrotechnic logic and delay devices
None identified Specially designed explosive component test facilities or load simulators which do not require the use of explosives
Detonators and initiator Conventional weapons couplers and squibs. connectors, including: - exploding bridge wires - exploding foil - hot wire - semiconductor bridge Lock systems Electronic or physical keyed incorporating combined system. electronic and positive mechanical "keying," useful but not necessary Physical security Fences and guard dogs; commercial intrusion detectors.
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
None identified
None identified
None identified
Encryption
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
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Table 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data
Technology
Technical Issues SAFING DEVICES
Military Applications
Alternative Technologies
Mechanical devices designed to provide for positive interruption and connection of explosive or pyrotechnic devices Mechanical techniques and devices for preventing assembly or high order (nuclear) detonation of nuclear explosive devices Devices designed to detect one or more of the following phenomena: - air flow - linear or angular acceleration - barometric pressure
Ensured reliability of precision mechanical and electromechanical devices None identified
For some delivery methods, components and technologies could be common to conventional bombs and cluster/canister munitions. None. Techniques unique to nuclear explosives.
Electrical switching
None Identified
Selection and design of sensor systems for unique operational conditions
For some delivery methods, components and technologies could be common to conventional bombs and cluster/canister munitions.
Spring- or electrically powered mechanical timing devices
ARMING DEVICES
Precision mechanical devices de- Mechanical reliability signed to use any of the following: - air flow - linear or angular acceleration - barometric pressure Hermetic airtight sealing of highRadar altimeter sensors, having unambiguous range measurement voltage (>300 V) subsystems for capability at ranges >100 ft aerospace applications. Active IR/EO altimeter for low HOB Primary and reserve batteries Thermal management techniques Hermetic sealing, and thermal management, particularly in highenergy density lithium thermal batteries
For some delivery methods, components and technologies could be common to conventional bombs and cluster/canister munitions.
Externally powered mechanisms, operator enabled (including those designed to be powered by chemical, electrochemical, or mechanical energy sources).
FUZING
Possible use as high-altitude fuzing for canister weapons. Conventional free-fall and smart weapons. Other high altitude fuzing and oneshot power applications (e.g., torpedo guidance sets).
Barometric switch
Point contact Commercial primary batteries
Power conditioning systems
Efficient transformation of low voltage Aircraft and other space/weight con(<50 V to high-voltage >1 kV) d.c.-d.c. strained power conditioning requireconversion. ments.
Larger, heavier transformers
(contd)
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Table 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data (contd)
MIcrowave antennas
Antenna must conform to delivery system packaging constraints. Must retain r.f. characteristics after exposure to rain erosion and aerodynamic heating effects Techniques to extend operating bandwidth of low-noise balance mixers and high ratio isolation circulators
Communications and ECM systems
Needed only for radar altimeter fuzing
Compact, high-performance stripline or microstrip microwave components, including: - low-noise balanced mixers - high ratio circulators Barometric switch Capacitive discharge units Cold cathode tubes and switches Pyrotechnic logic and delay devices Detonators and initiator couplers and connectors, including: - exploding bridge wires - exploding foil - hot wire - semiconductor bridge Lock systems incorporating combined electronic and positive mechanical or physical "keying" Physical security
Communications and ECM systems
Coaxial or waveguide components (at severe space and weight penalty). Alternative system concepts.
None identified
Detonation at specific altitude

FIRING SETS
All other fuzing systems None identified None identified None identified Detonating devices derived from commercial civil explosives
Energy density and one-shot reliability Conventional weapons fuzing Energy density and one-shot reliability Directed energy weapons; High pulse power, x-ray machines Characterization of detonation velocity in end configurations Reliability and precision of initiation vs. safety Device design will most likely be specific to nuclear weapon design Technology common to some aimable ordnance warhead concepts
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
Balancing ease of use and reliability against security and probability of unauthorized penetration
Elements of technology may be common to conventional physical security of highly classified or high value/high risk assets
Single-keyed, mechanical system
Probability of detection vs. false alarm Elements of technology may be rate common to conventional physical security of highly classified or high value/high risk assets
Conventional passive infrared and ultrasonic detection, manual backup
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SECTION 5.8RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
OVERVIEW Radiological weapons use the beta rays, neutrons, and gamma rays emitted by the decay of highly radioactive isotopes to kill or incapacitate. In general, the latency period between exposure to high doses of radiation and the onset of symptoms is long (hours to weeks, depending upon dose), but it may be as short as minutes if neutron doses on the order of several thousand rads (whole body dose) can be delivered. However, there is no practical way to transport enough radioactive material to provide doses this high because the amounts of isotopes necessary to inflict reasonably prompt casualties (hours to days) over a large area (square kilometers) on a foe may produce so much heat that it melts even steel bomb cases. Because of the long latency period, radiological weapons are probably of little tactical use on the battlefield except that fear of radiation on the part of the opponent may act to deny areas to him. For area denial to be effective, the opponents troops must be notified of the presence of the agent, because the radiation does not cause prompt casualties. Radiological weapons may have the potential for use against rear areas. The isotopes of greatest concern are those normally produced as fission products in nuclear reactors or which are copiously produced when fertile material is irradiated in a reactor (e.g., 137Cs, 60Co). More rapidly decaying, and hence more potent, radioisotopes generally have short half lives (a year or less), complicating the problem of stockpiling them for later use. Gamma-ray and neutron-emitting isotopes in quantities needed to cause injuries to opposing troops are likely to be very dangerous for the attackers troops to handle. The mass of the required shielding will greatly exceed that of the agent. On the other hand, public fear of radiation is so great that small quantities of radioactive materials dispersed about a city may well induce considerable panic in the populace. Such use of radiological agents would most likely be announced by the attacking force, because the material may not otherwise be detected. Alpha radiation (4He nuclei) is normally not dangerous unless it enters the body and lodges there. Because they are massive (two neutrons and two protons) and slow moving, the particles produced in normal alpha decay stop so quickly that a single thickness of paper is usually a sufficient shield. They also carry a charge of +2, which doubles the force they exert on the electrons in target material compared to a beta ray (electron).13 If, however, correctly sized particles containing alpha-emitting isotopes
13
Highlights
Radiological weapons are more apt to cause civil disruption than destruction. They can be made in almost any kind of nuclear reactor and require far less engineering and research than do nuclear explosives. Radiological agents in quantities great enough to cause promptlethal or prompt-incapacitating effects on the battlefield will likely be too thermally hot to transport.
are inhaled, they tend to lodge in the tissue of the lung where they deposit their energy in a very localized region. This can lead to lung cancer, but with a decades-long latency period. One might conceive of a long-duration radiological weapon suitable only for producing terror and forcing the evacuation of an area by exploiting the dangers of inhaled radioisotopes. Any cancers will be produced with a very long latency period (years), but the mere possibility of such personal catastrophes may be strategically important. An alternative scenario would be to conceal a very intense radioactive gamma source such as 60Co in an area to which many people return on a regular basis, such as a theater, restaurant, or mess hall. If the source were radioactive enough and remained concealed for sufficient time the extended exposures could produce direct casualties with complicated epidemiology. For this to be used as a weapon with shock value, the exposed population would have to be informed of the presence of the source. RATIONALE Although radiological weapons have little or no tactical importance on the battlefield, the fear of radiation has become so widespread and ingrained that if an opponent spreads even small, harmless but detectable amounts of radioactive material in rear
The rate at which a heavy charged particle loses energy is proportional to the square of its charge.
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echelon areas, the action may force U.S. troops to don full protective garb and attempt to operate under that handicap. It is not possible to dispose of radiological agents by burning; they will merely be transferred to the effluent. Neither can radiological agents be sterilized by heat or other chemicals. Decontamination is usually accomplished by a wash-down, with the waste water becoming low-level radioactive waste. Only timethe passing of many half-lives of the isotopes in question and their radioactive daughterscan totally eliminate the hazard posed by radioactive contamination. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Radiological agents can be conveniently and secretly made in any research reactor designed to irradiate material samples. Spent fuel from any reactor can be cut up and the material dispersed without further chemical treatment. Thus, any nation with a research reactor or with civilian power reactors and the capability of discharging
spent fuel from those reactors has the potential to produce material suitable for use in radiological weapons. The fundamental tool for producing radioisotopes, a nuclear reactor, can be found in very many countries. The 44 nations identified in the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as having safeguarded reactors and other fuel facilities provide a good start at identifying possible sources for radiological warfare agents. Actually turning the radioisotopes into weapons may require special techniques for handling the material safely. Similarly, those crews chosen to disperse the material will require protective gear or, alternatively, must be ready to become human sacrifices. Efficient use of radiological material requires converting it from bulk form into a dust or aerosol which can be inhaled and then finding methods to spray the material. These technologies may not be present in every state which can produce radioactive isotopes. On the other hand, they are not required if the aim is merely to cause panic or to force troops to work in protective clothing.
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Table 5.8-1. Radiological Weapons Technology Parameters

Technology
Irradiation of fertile material
Ability to make millions of curies of radioactive material
NTL A1, B1; NRC A, L
Fertile elements Reactor refueling such as Co, Cs to be equipment; remote irradiated handling equipment. Nuclear reactor for irradiation.
Reactor design and operating software with capability to simulate presence of neutronabsorbing nonfissile material; activation cross-sections. Shielding software. Much of this is publicly available.
Transportation and handling of intensely radioactive material
Shielding against gamma photons with energies up to 35 MeV; ability to reduce surface field to safe levels, circa 1 mr/hr in contact with package. Ability to cool isotopes to prevent melting.
NDUL 8; CCL Cat 1A; CCL Cat 2B
Lead and borated materials for radiation shielding; hermetic seals for container; radiationdamage-resistant seals and containers. Absence of plastics likely. Radioactive isotopes; shielding; spraying equipment resistant to corrosion by solvents used to dissolve radioactive compounds. Absence of unshielded plastic and rubber parts probable. Fertile materials; SNM; tritium
None identified
Dispersal of agent
Ability to reduce bulk material WA ML 4; to fine powder or to liquid USML IV solution for aerosol or other spraying operation; ability to transport material in combat aircraft or UAVs.
Corrosion- and radiation- Plume prediction softresistant sprayers, ware. Much of this is pumps, etc. Absence of publicly available. unshielded plastic components likely because of their rapid degradation in presence of intense photon irradiation. Personnel protection as necessary. Sprayers for fertile material solutions None
In situ preparation of radiological agent
Neutron bomb
NTL 1
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Table 5.8-2. Radiological Weapons Reference Data

Reactor irradiation of fertile material Transport of radiological agents
Construct reactors; extract fission products or irradiated target material Shielding; concealment; cooling of large quantities; provision of seals not affected by irradiation Aerosolization of solid agent or dissolving and then aerosolizing of liquid. Spreading of powder Spray area with solution containing activatable material, e.g., cobalt chloride. Then detonate enhanced radiation weapon at appropriate altitude
Prepare radiological agents for use in area denial Bring agent to place of employment
Use of high-level waste from civilian power reactors Accept "kamikaze" tactics for personnel delivering agent Accept "kamikaze" tactics for personnel delivering agent All other methods of obtaining radioactive material
Dispersal of agent
Employ weapon
In-situ preparation of radiological agent
Deny area to foe; provide inherently safe transport of agents
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SECTION 5.9MANUFACTURING OF NUCLEAR COMPONENTS
OVERVIEW This subsection describes the technologies required for the production of equipment used to manufacture nuclear weapons. In most cases, the technologies, the equipment, and the know-how are dual-use and affect civilian applications where, for example, considerations of costs, flexibility, and competitiveness have become major concerns. In some cases, the technologies described here are neither state of the art, nor is the United States the world leader in the technology. The concerns of the United States with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons are no longer directed at the technologically advanced Warsaw Pact countries, but more at developing countries that are attempting to produce weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the United States must adjust its level of concern to the control or monitoring of that machine tool technology actually necessary to meet the U.S. antiproliferation goals, a level which is often significantly less than the state of the art. A number of different technologies associated with a modern industrial base are addressed in this subsection, including many types of machine tools and processing equipment, certain inspection equipment, and certain robots. Manufacturing Equipment This section encompasses both machine tools and equipment for fabricating structures by means of various advanced manufacturing techniques. Machine tools include NC (numerically controlled) machines in which the motions of the various axes are simultaneously and continually coordinated, thereby maintaining a predetermined (programmed) path. This includes turning, milling, and grinding machines and electrical discharge machines (EDM). Advanced manufacturing technique equipment includes spin, flow, and shear forming machines; filament-winding machines; hot isostatic presses; high-temperature furnaces and heaters; equipment for the manufacture of centrifuge rotors; vibration/shaker systems; and flash x-ray systems. It is often suggested that all or even most of these manufacturing and mensuration systems are required to build weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular. A nuclear weapon is a sophisticated device, and depending upon the complexity of the design and the constraints on the designersuch as size, weight, and amount of special nuclear materials which can be usedmay or may not require very precise manufacture.
Highlights
Computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools may speed construction of components of nuclear weapons and reduce the labor costs of such manufacture. Robotic manufacture may reduce personnel exposure to radiation. Precision metrology may make manufacture to tighter tolerances feasible. When testing is not possible, parts made as closely matched to theory as possible provide some assurance of attaining the desired results in nuclear weapons.
At the state of the art, however, factories producing the nuclear components (and some nonnuclear components) of modern devices must be capable of carrying out dimensional measurements which are both precise and accurate. Relative thicknesses must be measured to high precision, and the absolute values of those measurements must be compared to a set of standards with extreme accuracy. It is common, of course, for the most technically advanced nuclear powers to employ all of the modern tools of computer-assisted fabrication, including computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools. Shapes which can be manufactured with a modern 5-axis CNC machine tool can be approximated on a simpler machine if the work can be repositioned during machining or if the component can be made in parts which are later joined together. Significant hand work is usually required in either case. The accuracy of the approximation depends upon the precision with which the work can be repositioned or with which the separate components can be joined and in both instances, on the skills of the engineers/machinists. The history of American nuclear efforts is illustrative. The first thermonuclear bomb was produced in the 19511952 time frame; the first use of 3-axis machine tools occurred in 1952, and the first 5-axis machine tools were used in 1954.
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Metrology Metrology covers technologies for dimensional measuring systems and equipment needed for precise determination of the dimensions of manufactured parts, machine tools, and inspection machines. Included are systems for in-process measurement, as well as post-manufacture inspection. This technology area is of paramount importance for the construction of systems incorporating mechanical or electrical components built to exacting tolerances, whether such hardware is military or civil. It is highly dependent on sensors, positioners, feedback systems, digital computers, and associated components and hardware. Included in the list of metrology equipment are coordinate, linear, and angular measurement machines using laser, standard light, and noncontact techniques. The tolerances of parts measured range from 1 nm (corresponding to an optical surface finish prepared by diamond turning with ion beam polishing) to 10 m(corresponding to more traditional metal machining). Robots The term robots covers the technology for the general category of robots, controllers, and end-effectors, which are used in conjunction with other manufacturing equipment for the production or testing of critical hardware. Robots can essentially be separated into four distinct disciplines, the robot, the controller (computer), sensors (the eyes of the robot), and end-effectors (the gripper). Robots have found a wide range of applications in manufacturing, including welders, sprayers, assemblers, loaders/unloaders, etc. They have also found use in handling hazardous or radioactive materials, transporting explosive weapons, and performing tasks in space. In this subsection, only those robots designed for use in radiation environments are addressed. RATIONALE Manufacturing technologies are fundamental to the national industrial base. As much as any other technology, they are vital for the manufacture of military and civil hardware, and they either enable the manufacture of vital military systems or are essential for the design and manufacture of future military systems. Without some level of manufacturing equipment capability, it would be impossible to produce the military systems used by the worlds military forces. In particular, the technologies listed in this subsection are necessary for the manufacture of modern nuclear weapons. Many listed technologies are far more advanced than those available to the first several nuclear weapon states when they built their first nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, weapons generally considered quite satisfactory for their avowed purposes of deterrence and warfighting. Manufacturing Equipment Modern weapon systems require a variety of processing equipment to manufacture necessary components. For example, machine tools or precision casting are used
in the machining of hemi-shells for nuclear weapons; spin, flow, and shear forming machines are required for the fabrication of thin-walled, long, concentric hollow bodies, such as rotors for centrifuge devices used in uranium enrichment. Superplastic forming/diffusion bonding equipment is used for the fabrication of sheet metal structures of advanced alloys (e.g., titanium, nickel, and aluminum), in which reliability and cost are important factors, and high-temperature furnaces are used for casting uranium and plutonium, both key weapons materials. Metrology Modern precision manufacturing depends upon being able to make a large number of dimensional measurements precisely and accurately, and to know that measurements made at each site can be referred to a set of secondary standards which can, if necessary, be calibrated against the international standards. A centimeter measured in one laboratory must be the same as a centimeter measured with different equipment at another laboratory, and that equality must be demonstrable quickly and economically. In many ways, technological progress has been demarcated by our ability to make precision, standard measurements and to transfer this ability from the laboratory to the production floor. This is the science of metrology. Accurate dimensional inspection is essential for the design, development, manufacture, and use of a wide range of military hardware. Dimensional inspection machines are used for the measurement of centrifuge and nuclear weapons parts; linear inspection machines are used for the measurement of bearing races or shafts (used in advanced machine tools), centrifuges, and nuclear weapons parts. Specialized measuring equipment is critical for measuring hemi-shells. Robots In most advanced manufacturing plants robots have replaced humans in many operations which are repetitive and do not require human intervention. Such applications include welding, painting, surveillance, and pick-and-place assembly. This type of robot is commonplace in industrial countries and is not included in this document. Robots are indispensable in many hazardous military operations, including the handling of munitions, operating in highly radioactive or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) environments, and performing tasks in space. The use of robots in these applications extends the military capability much further than what could be accomplished with protected humans. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Since manufacturing is so fundamental to the industrial base of any country, the availability of machines necessary to produce both military and civil hardware is worldwide. As a result, the technology level of the major industrial countries is very high, with the United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, the UK, the
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Netherlands, and Sweden all having considerable expertise. The technology level in Russia and China is increasing markedly, with some rudimentary 5-axis machine tools becoming available in those countries. France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK are the leading countries with expertise in metrology. Japan is the major competitor to the United States in robotics. France has a significant robotics capability, and Italy is a worldwide competitor. Manufacturing Equipment Japan, Germany, France, and Switzerland are comparable to the United States in certain machine tool capabilities. Indeed, Japan and Switzerland surpass the United States in some categories. Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have extensive capabilities in some of the niche areas. China has developed capabilities in 4- and 5-axis machines, although the degree of their capability, relating to quality and quantity, is still unknown. Japan, Germany, France, and the UK are comparable to the United States in advanced manufacturing.
Metrology A number of foreign countries have developed sophisticated metrology capabilities. Germany and the UK have capabilities across the spectrum of the technology, while France, Japan, and Switzerland have advanced capabilities in most of the technologies associated with metrology. A large number of countries have niche capabilities. Robots A number of other countries have developed sophisticated robotics. Japan, in particular, and Germany have emerged as world leaders in industrial robots. Most all other heavily industrialized countries have capabilities in this area. The United States and Japan are the world leaders in military/nuclear/space robotics. Russia and the Ukraine have considerable capability in robots designed for use in nuclear environments, as used for example in the monitoring of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.
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Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters

Technology
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT
Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by grinding.
Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern.
Spindles with low run-out, tilting spindles, linear and rotary position feedback units, and compound spindles and tables. Spindles with low run-out, linear and rotary position feedback units.
None identified
Control algorithms for the manufacture of specific items of concern.
Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by turning.
None identified
Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by milling.
Spindles with low run-out, tilting spindles, linear and rotary position feedback units, and compound spindles and tables. Spindles with low run-out, tilting spindles, linear and rotary position feedback units, and compound spindles and tables. Rotary axes
None identified
Numerically controlled turning machines or combination turning/ milling machines
None identified
Numerically controlled electrical discharge machines (EDM) of nonwire type
None identified
(contd)
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Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
Numerically controlled spin, flow, and shear forming machines
Such equipment is useful, but not necessary, to enrichment devices and might allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern.
NDUL 1; MTCR 3; WA Cat 2B; CCL Cat 2B
Rotor-forming mandrels designed to form cylindrical rotors of inside diameter between 75 mm and 400 mm
None identified
Numerically controlled composite filament winding equipment
Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 3; not necessary, to enrichment WA Cat 1B; devices and might allow a proliferator to construct more CCL Cat 1B intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 1; not necessary, to build a CCL Cat 2B nuclear weapon and might allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern. Any capability for arc melting NDUL 1; and casting, electron beam CCL Cat 2B melting, plasma atomization or high temperature (>600 K) melting furnaces is a concern. Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; nuclear weapon and might CCL Cat 2B allow a proliferator to construct more intricate devices than would otherwise be possible. Therefore, any capability is a concern.
Glass and carbon fiber
None identified
None identified
Vacuum or controlled environment induction furnaces
Specially designed power supplies with power output of 5 kW.
None identified
None identified
Vacuum or controlled atmosphere metallurgical melting and casting furnaces
None identified
None identified
None identified
Hot isostatic presses
None identified
Control units
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Electrodynamic vibration Reliability may be of little con- NDUL 1; test system cern to certain adversaries. CCL Cat 2B However, the following capabilities would be of value in developing reliable weapons: vibrating a system at 15 g RMS, between 20 Hz and 2,000 Hz, imparting forces of 30kN (5,625 lb) Digital controllers Any capability is a concern. NDUL 1; MTCR 15; CCL Cat 9B; WA Cat 9B NDUL 1; MTCR 15; CCL Cat 9B; WA Cat 9B NDUL 3; CCL Cat 2B NDUL 3; CCL Cat 2B NDUL 3; CCL Cat 2B NDUL 3; CCL Cat 2B NDUL 3; CCL Cat 2B
None identified
Closed loop test equipment, digital controllers, and vibration thrusters.
Special algorithms to generate specific g levels and vibrations that corresponds to weapon system.
None identified
None identified
None identified
Vibration thrusters
Reliability may be of little concern to certain adversaries. However, the capability of imparting a force 30 kN (5,625 lb) would be a concern. Any capability is a concern. Any capability is a concern. Any capability is a concern.
None identified
Closed loop test equipment
Special algorithms to generate specific g levels and vibrations that corresponds to weapon system. None identified None identified None identified
Rotor assembly equipment Rotor-straightening equipment Bellows-forming mandrels and dies for producing singleconvolution bellows Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines for flexible rotors Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines for hollow cylindrical rotor components
Mandrels, clamps, and shrink fit machines. Pneumatic rams Mandrels and dies
None identified
None identified
Control algorithms for the testing of specific items of concern. Control algorithms for the balancing of specific items of concern
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Flash x-ray machines or pulsed electron accelerators
Having either of the following: NDUL 5; an accelerator peak electron CCL Cat 3A energy 300 keV, but <25 MeV; and with a figure of merit (K) of 0.25, where K = 1.7 103V2.65Q; or an accelerator peak electron energy 15 MeV and a peak power >40 MW. Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 8; not necessary for nuclear CCL Cat 2B; programs. WA Cat 2B
None identified
None identified
None identified
Remote manipulators
Able to provide None identified mechanical translation of human operator actions by electrical, hydraulic or mechanical means to an operating arm and terminal fixture. Measurement probes, sensors, etc. Accurate machine tools are required for the manufacture of such equipment, and precise metrology equipment is required to verify measurement capability. None identified
METROLOGY
Numerically controlled dimensional inspection machines
Accurate computer controlled WA Cat 2B; coordinate measuring NDUL 1; machines (CMM) would be a concern.
Control algorithms for the dimensional inspection of specific items of concern.
Linear displacement Non-contact type with a (non-contact) measuring resolution 0.5 m within a devices measuring range of 0.2 mm Linear measuring machines using linear voltage differential transformer systems Having both: linearity 0.5% within a measuring range up to 5 mm; and drift 0.2% per day at a standard ambient room temperature 1 K.
WA Cat 2B; NDUL 1 WA Cat 2B; NDUL 1
Measurement probes, sensors, etc. Measurement probes, sensors, etc.
None identified
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Technology
Linear measuring machines
Having both: a laser, and the WA Cat 2B; capability to maintain, for at NDUL 1 least 8 hours, over a temperature range of 1 K around a standard temperature and pressure, both: a resolution 0.4 m over full scale and a measurement uncertainty (0.2 L/2,000 m) Having an angular position deviation 0.001 deg Capable of measuring hemishells with both a measurement uncertainty equal to or less than 5.0 m per 5 mm and an angular position deviation equal to or less than 0.05 deg WA Cat 2B; NDUL 1 NDUL 1; CCL Cat 2B
Measurement probes, sensors, and lasers
None identified
None identified
Angular displacement measuring devices Systems for simultaneous linear-angular inspection of hemishells
Measurement probes, sensors, etc. Measurement probes, sensors, etc.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
ROBOTICS
Robots (designed to operate in explosive or EMP environments), controllers, and endeffectors
Any capability of operation in WA Cat 2B; an explosive environment is a NDUL 1; concern. CCL Cat 2B
Sensors, end-effectors, ruggedized hydraulic lines (e.g., self-sealing lines), hydraulic fluids with flash points > 839 K (565 C) and closed or open loop servodevices Sensors, end-effectors, electronics capable of operating in radiation levels of 5 104 grays [5 106 rad (Si)] and open or closed loop servo-devices
Machine tools, inspection equipment, and all necessary equipment to manufacture sensors, cameras, etc.
Control algorithms for the motion and operation of the robots
Robots designed for nuclear environments, controllers, and endeffectors
WA Cat 2B; Designed to operate in a radiation environment greater NDUL 1; than 105 rad (Si) CCL Cat 2B
Machine tools, inspection equipment, and all necessary equipment to manufacture sensors, cameras, etc.
Control algorithms for the motion and operation of the robots
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Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues MANUFACTURING Military Applications Alternative Technologies
Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by grinding Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by turning Numerically controlled machine tools for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites by milling Numerically controlled turning machines or combination turning/ milling machines
The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in machining nuclear materials. The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in machining nuclear materials. The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in machining nuclear materials,. The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in machining nuclear materials.
NC grinding machines are an enabling technology for munitions and weapons systems. Nuclear applications include machining hardened materials used in fixturing. NC turning machines are an enabling technology for munitions and weapons systems. Nuclear applications include the manufacture of hemishells, rotors and end-caps.
Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons. Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons.
NC milling machines are a key enabling Numerically controlled, accurate technology for munitions and weapons machine tools are essential for systems. the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons. NC turning/milling machines are a key enabling technology for munitions and weapons systems. Nuclear applications include the manufacture of hemishells. NC nonwire EDM machines are a key enabling technology for munitions and weapons systems. Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons. Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons. Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons.
Numerically controlled The technical issues of general electrodischarge machines (EDM) equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to of nonwire type develop experience in machining nuclear materials. Numerically controlled spin, flow, and shear forming machines The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in producing centrifuge tubes to the accuracies necessary for uranium enrichment. The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in producing centrifuge tubes to the accuracies necessary for uranium enrichment.
Capability to manufacture thin-walled curvilinear or cylindrical cross-section parts for use in seamless rocket motors, nose cones, rocket launcher tubes, rotor tubes for gas centrifuge uranium enrichment systems, and contour shapes in nuclear weapons. Used in the manufacture of fiber composite rotor assemblies for gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment.
Numerically controlled composite filament-winding equipment
Numerically controlled, accurate machine tools are essential for the manufacture of advanced nuclear weapons.
(contd)
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Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data (contd)

Vacuum or controlled environment The technical issues of general equipinduction furnaces ment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in working with uranium and/or plutonium. Vacuum or controlled atmosphere metallurgical melting and casting furnaces The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in working with uranium and/or plutonium. The technical issues of general equipment use are well-known. However, proliferants would need to develop experience in working with uranium, lithium compounds and explosive materials. The technical issues of equipment use are well-known. There would be no major difficulty in transferring knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena. The technical issues of equipment use are well-known. There would be no major difficulty in transferring knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena. The technical issues of equipment use are well-known. There would be no major difficulty in transferring knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena.
Used for casting either enriched or unenriched uranium and for processing plutonium for key weapon parts.
Some type of controlled environment furnace would be necessary to cast the nuclear materials. In lieu of an induction furnace, a plasma, e-beam, or electric furnace might be used. Some type of controlled environment furnace would be necessary to cast the nuclear materials. In lieu of an induction furnace, a plasma, e-beam, or induction furnace might be used. Pneumatic presses might be used; however, the results would be much inferior.
Used for casting either enriched or unenriched uranium and for processing plutonium for key weapon parts.
Hot isostatic presses
Used to increase the density of uranium fuel, cladding reactor fuel rods, pressing plastic-bonded explosives (PBXs) and compacting lithium hydride and lithium deuteride. Testing the effects of shock and vibration is critical in developing reliable nuclear weapons, arming and safing systems. Testing the effects of shock and vibration is critical in developing reliable nuclear weapons, arming and safing systems. Testing the effects of shock and vibration is critical in developing reliable nuclear weapons, arming and safing systems.
Electrodynamic vibration test system using digital control techniques
Analog vibration systems with less stringent requirements could be used to test smaller warheads or manufacture could proceed without vibration testing. Analog equipment could be used.
Digital controllers
Vibration thrusters
Smaller thrusters could be used for smaller loads.
Rotor assembly equipment
The technical issues of equipment use This equipment is used for the are well-known. There would be no assembly of gas centriguge rotor tube major difficulty in transferring sections, baffles, and end-caps. knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena. The technical issues of equipment use This equipment is used for the alignare well-known. There would be no ment of of gas centrifuge rotor tube major difficulty in transferring sections to a common axis. knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena.
Not applicable
Rotor-straightening equipment
Not applicable
(contd)
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Bellows-forming mandrels and dies for producing singleconvolution bellows
While bellows, per se, are common industrial products, bellows of this design, and made of these materials, are not common. The technology to construct them is not common knowledge.
These bellows are components of the gas centrifuge equipment used for uranium enrichment.
Less sophisticated bellows could be used .
Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines for flexible rotors
The technical issues of equipment use Used to balance rotors, rotor sections, are well-known. There would be no and rotor assemblies used in gas major difficulty in transferring centrifuges for uranium enrichment. knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena. The technical issues of equipment use Used to balance rotors, rotor sections, are well-known. There would be no and rotor assemblies used in gas major difficulty in transferring centrifuges for uranium enrichment. knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena. Flash x-ray systems have limited nonmilitary use. However, it would not be difficult to transfer knowledge from the nonmilitary applications to nuclear uses. Used in developing nuclear weapon implosion systems. They provide diagnostic data on non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests of the implosion system. Smaller systems are used in developing precision high-explosive implosion systems. Provide mechanical translation of human operator actions by electical, hydraulic or mechanical means to an operating arm and terminal fixture, used to provide remote actions in radiochemical separation operations or hot cells. Allows for precision measurements of low volume, high precision components used in weapons, weapons control, etc. Nuclear applications include measurement of centrifuge and nuclear weapons parts. Essential for the measurement of very precise parts with simple geometries, such as bearing races or shafts and centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. They also offer improved allignment of components of optical and radar system and sighting mechanisms.
Although the balance of the rotors is critical, smaller and/or lower rpm balncing machines could be used. Although the balance of the rotors is critical, smaller and/or lower rpm balancing machines could be used. There may be no alternate technology to duplicate what can be done with the flash x-ray. Howver, high-speed rotating mirror cameras may perform some of the required tests. Not applicable
Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines for hollow cylyndrical rotor components
Flash x-ray machines or pulsed electron accelerators
Remote manipulators
The technical issues of equipment use are well-known. There would be no major difficulty in transferring knowledge from standard industrial experience to the nuclear arena.
METROLOGY
Computer or stored program controlled dimensional inspection machines [coordinate measuring machines (CMMs)]
Most nuclear applications would not involve measurement of radioactive materials. Therefore, the technical issues of concern would be programming, operation, and interpretation of data, and these are well-known in the industrial world. Most nuclear applications would not involve measurement of radioactive materials. Therefore, the technical issues of concern would be programming, operation, and interpretation of data, and these are well-known in the industrial world.
Satisfactory results could be obtained using uncontrolled CMMs; e.g., they are manually operated, and they have greater uncertainty in measurement.
Linear displacement (noncontact) measuring devices
Many things could be used as alternate technologies: e.g., uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks and indicators, height gauges, Vblocks, micrometers (including depth micrometers), bore gauges, etc.
(contd)
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Linear measuring machines using linear voltage differential transformer systems
Most nuclear applications would not involve measurement of radioactive materials. Therefore, the technical issues of concern would be programming, operation, and interpretation of data, and these are well-known in the industrial world. Most nuclear applications would not involve measurement of radioactive materials. Therefore, the technical issues of concern would be programming, operation, and interpretation of data, and these are well-known in the industrial world. Most nuclear applications would not involve measurement of radioactive materials. Therefore, the technical issues of concern would be programming, operation, and interpretation of data, and these are well-known in the industrial world. Although this is specialized equipment, the operation and interpretation would be straightforward. The imposing technical issue would be the knowhow and interpretation of test results.
Essential for the measurement of very precise parts with simple geometries, such as bearing races or shafts and centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. They also offer improved allignment of components of optical and radar system and sighting mechanisms. Essential for the measurement of very precise parts with simple geometries, such as bearing races or shafts and centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. They also offer improved allignment of components of optical and radar system and sighting mechanisms. Essential for the measurement of very precise parts with simple geometries, such as bearing races or shafts and centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. They also offer improved allignment of components of optical and radar system and sighting mechanisms. Specialized device used in the manufacture of nuclear weapon components
Many things could be used as alternate technologies: e.g., uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks and indicators, height gauges, Vblocks, micrometers (including depth micrometers), bore gauges, etc. Many things could be used as alternate technologies: e.g., uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks and indicators, height gauges, Vblocks, micrometers (including depth micrometers), bore gauges, etc. Many things could be used as alternate technologies: e.g., uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks and indicators, height gauges, Vblocks, micrometers (including depth micrometers), bore gauges, rotary heads, etc. Alternate technologies could include uncontrolled CMMs and rotary heads and measuring indicators.
Linear measuring machines
Angular displacement measuring devices
Systems for simultaneous linearangular inspection of hemishells
ROBOTICS
Robots designed to operate in explosive or EMP environments, controller and end-effectors
Since robots, per se, are universally Such robots can be used both as used, the operation of such equipment replacements for military forces or in would be straightforward. The main hot cells. technical issue would be either the difficulty in procuring such robots or the having technology to design and build them. Since robots, per se, are universally used, the operation of such equipment would be straightforward. The main technical issue would be either the difficulty in procuring such robots or the having technology to design and build them. Such robots are used in nuclear reprocessing and nuclear production reactor facilities. they may also be used in nuclear facilities to reduce occupational radiation exposure.
There are two alternatives to the use of these robots: (1) using commercial type robots, with the understanding that there will be a short mean time to failure, or (2) using humans, with the understanding that they would be expendable. There are two alternatives to the use of these robots: (1) using commercial type robots, with the understanding that there will be a short mean time to failure, or (2) using humans, with the understanding that they would be expendable.
Robots designed for nuclear environments
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SECTION 5.10NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT TESTING
OVERVIEW Nuclear weapons, to quote Sidney D. Drell, are sophisticated but not complicated. That is, the working principles are straightforward, although the equipment needed to make a device function, and function reliably, is quite sophisticated and requires high-quality engineering to design and build. Although it is generally believed that a proliferator need not test a conservatively designed device at full yield to have confidence in it, some experimentation and testing along the way is necessary to demonstrate the behavior of the non-nuclear components including the firing set, detonators, and neutron generators. If there is not to be a full-yield nuclear test, then the non-nuclear experiments must be carried out with greater care and competence. One reason for believing that a full-yield nuclear test is unnecessary is that each of the six states known to have tested nuclear devices has achieved a nuclear detonation on the first try. The term nuclear testing as used here encompasses all experiments in which special nuclear material (or a simulant) is placed in contact with high explosives, which are then detonated, or with a propellant, which is ignited. This limitation deliberately excludes activities which are more scientific in nature and not intimately connected with the progression from fissile material and/or fusion fuel to a nuclear explosive device.14 This definition is far broader than that of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996, which prohibits only nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions.15 Many states of concern for nuclear proliferation16 have subscribed to the CTBT, and may, therefore, find it difficult to conduct full-yield tests either underground or in the atmosphere. India, however, has served notice that it will not sign the CTBT; in 1974 India detonated what it called a peaceful nuclear explosive device. Even under the CTBT, most non-nuclear hydrodynamic implosion testing17 will be permitted. At the lowest end of the nuclear yield distribution from hydronuclear tests, some states might reckon that the knowledge gained from a small explosive release of nuclear energy would be worth the risk of getting caught. Generally, within the U.S. Government, the condition of prompt nuclear criticality distinguishes, under
Highlights
It is possible to make a credible nuclear weapon without ever testing the nuclear parts of the device or producing any nuclear energy release. Hydrodynamic nuclear experiments using flash x-ray cameras to image the imploding material that simulates plutonium or uranium are necessary. American-style underground nuclear testing requires some sophisticated equipment, but bare bones experiments are also feasible and useful. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons. Signatories include all five declared nuclear weapons states, Israel, and Iran. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya have not signed the Treaty.
the CTBT, a prohibited test of an explosively assembled device from one which is allowed. The spectrum of nuclear devices which a proliferant organization could field potentially spans everything from simple devices which scatter radioactive waste (see Section 5.8, Radiological Weapons) to sophisticated weapons incorporating boosted primaries and adjustable yield secondaries. The device actually built by any given proliferator depends on the technological sophistication; size; available budget; availability of special nuclear materials; time scale; strategic or tactical intent; and a host of other exogenous and endogenous considerations, political, economic, and social. There is little doubt that technologically sophisticated nations with well-educated populations and large GDPs, and having an indigenous reactor industry as well as
17
14 15
For example, laser and particle beam fusion. The CTBT, signed by President Clinton on 24 September 1996, obligates each signatory not to conduct nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions on any territory under its control. India, Iraq, and Pakistan are not CTBT signatories; all five nuclear weapons states are.
16
In a hydrodynamic test, inert material (e.g., 238U or a simulant for plutonium) is imploded to determine how well the high-explosive system functions. In a hydronuclear test, fissile material is imploded, but a supercritical mass is not maintained for a long enough time to permit the device to deliver full nuclear yield. Depending upon the conditions of the test, nuclear energy releases may range from the unmeasurably small (milligrams or less) to kilograms or even metric tons of TNT equivalent yield.
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enrichment and reprocessing facilities, could produce nuclear weapons in a very short time. The strategic or tactical doctrine for their use would be vastly different from those of a subnational group developing nuclear capability and probably different from a third world proliferator. The general design of a gun-assembled device is straightforward and based on well-understood principles of artillery weapons; however, the technology for obtaining enriched uranium is complex. On the other hand, implosion-assembled devices using plutoniumwhich could be extracted simply using chemical techniques from reactor rodsare more difficult to manufacture.18 If a nation had an indigenous reactor industry, such extraction would be straightforward. The testing programs required to accomplish the goals of proliferators spread out along the spectrum of technical sophistication and available resources are as diverse as the goals of the proliferant states themselves and the programs to develop the weapons. At the most primitive end of the spectrum, if the device were stolen, yield testing would not be required, but circumvention of possible use controls would be. If the weapon were legitimately acquired from a nuclear power, presumably use control information would be passed on to the purchaser. In neither case is testing required. If, however, a nuclear device is indigenously designed and built, the question to be answered by a full-scale nuclear test is likely to be how much nuclear yield a specific device will deliver, and not necessarily whether it will produce nuclear yield. RATIONALE Fundamentally, test programs can be divided into two major categories: those for an HEU-fueled, gun-assembled device and those for an implosion device using either plutonium or HEU. The first Chinese test was of an HEU implosion device, Iraq intended to develop just such a weapon, and the South Africans conducted no nuclear tests of their gun-assembled devices. Gun-Assembled Devices The testing program for a gun-assembled device is moderately complex, but it is essential to realize that nothing nuclear need be tested to verify the probable operation of such a deviceonly its conventional components. The design of Little Boy, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, had not been proof tested before the war shot.
18
Implosion Devices The testing program for a simple fission device using plutonium must be more extensive than that for a gun-assembled device using enriched uranium. For example, the constructor must know that his fissile pit will be uniformly compressed and that the compression will be rapid enough to minimize the chances for a pre-initiation fizzle, that any neutron generator present will fire at the correct moment, and that compression is likely to be maintained long enough to result in significant nuclear yield. A proliferator hoping to demonstrate its technical prowess may elect to pursue an implosion device despite the availability of enriched uranium. Alternatively, it may choose implosion to achieve greater efficiency in the use of special material. It can be presumed that this type of proliferator will forego the development of thermonuclear weapons. Hydrodynamic Testing The testing program for an unboosted implosion device primarily ensures that the hydrodynamic behavior of the implosion (particularly of a hollow pit) is correct. The simplest way to do hydrodynamic testing is to implode inert pits made of a simulant for fissile material (e.g., natural uranium instead of HEU) while using any of several old fashioned means to observe the behavior of the heavy metal. One such technique is to use a pin-dome, essentially nothing more than a precisely machined insulating champagne cork with a large number of protruding radial pins of different distances placed at the center of the implosion region. Pin dome experiments are probably the easiest hydrodynamic diagnostics available. However, backlighting the pit with a flash x-ray or neutron source to obtain an actual picture of the imploding material is also a possibility. Generally, the flash x-ray source needed has to have very high peak power available in a single pulse, and the timing and firing of the source in concert with the implosion of the device requires very sophisticated system design. Backlighting the imploding system with a neutron source is a bit more straightforward, but requires very sophisticated neutron optics and imaging capability, which could be difficult to obtain. Iraq used flash x-ray diagnostics. The Radio Lanthanum (RaLa) method, which does permit time-dependent measurements of the symmetry of an implosion, should be mentioned because of its conceptual simplicity. RaLa was used extensively during the Manhattan Project, but has probably not been employed very often since then. An intensely radioactive sample of the element lanthanum was prepared in an accelerator or reactor and then quickly inserted into the center of the implosion test device. Highly collimated Geiger-Mueller counters observed the behavior of the material as it imploded. The RaLa technique is inherently fairly crude in its ability to detect asymmetries and environmentally unappealing because the radioactive material is scattered about the test stand. However, the
Some analysts believe that the difficulties of enriching uranium are offset by the simpler weapon designs which enriched uranium allows. In the United States, HEU is considered less expensive to use in a weapon than plutonium. Operation of a reactor to produce plutonium requires the extraction and purification of uranium and, in some cases, at least modest enrichment. Given international safeguards on reactors using enriched uranium obtained from another nation or heavy water moderated reactors, a proliferant may be forced in any case to construct an enrichment facility. The choice is likely to be determined by the indigenous availability of uranium and the national surplus (or shortage) of electricity.
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isotopes have half lives of only a few hours to a few days, so the residual radioactivity decreases significantly in a week or so. Hydronuclear Testing Hydronuclear experiments, as distinguished from hydrodynamic ones, use actual fissile material assembled to form a supercritical mass in which a chain reaction begins. Normally, hydronuclear experiments are designed to use nuclear devices modified in one of several ways, including substituting inert material or less-fissile material for some of the HEU or plutonium in the pit, so that very little nuclear energy release occurs. Yields in experiments described as hydronuclear by various countries have ranged from much less than 1 kg TNT equivalent to many tons. Nuclear Yield Testing The CTBT has created a new international norm against the testing of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it has not yet entered into force, and some of the states of greatest concern are unlikely to sign it in the near future. Therefore, the possibility of a proliferant state carrying out a nuclear explosion with a significant yield remains moderately high. From 1945 through much of 1991, the United States detonated more than 1,200 nuclear devices with yields from a few pounds to about 15 megatons. Until the middle of 1963, most U.S. (and Soviet) tests took place in the atmosphere; some were conducted underground, a few were below the surface of the ocean, and roughly a dozen American shots took place at altitudes above 10 km. The largest test ever conducted, that of a 60-megaton device, was carried out in the Arctic by the USSR. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed in 1963, all U.S., UK, and Soviet nuclear detonations have been underground. The French and Chinese, while not parties to the LTBT, gradually moved their testing from the open atmosphere to subterranean sites in boreholes, mine shafts, and in drill holes beneath the ocean floor. Atmospheric tests are easier to carry outalthough impossible to concealand for technically less-sophisticated powers provide more information in a more direct manner than do underground explosions. A weapon detonated from a several hundred foot high tower or suspended from a tethered balloon permits photography of the evolution of the nuclear fireball and the cloud. The shock wave in air can be observed, and one can determine the effects of the weapon on real targets such as structures and vehicles. It appears likely that the drilling technology needed to emplace nuclear devices and instruments at the bottom of a deep borehole is the most difficult for a proliferator to acquire and use. Such boreholes are frequently a kilometer or more deep and 2 meters or more in diameter. The specialized drilling machinery required for such construction is not commonly available and exceeds what is found in the oil industry.
The development of the fireball and the propagation of a shock wave proceed quite differently when the device is tightly tamped at the bottom of a borehole than when it is detonated in free air. However, when the borehole or mine shaft have been properly stemmed,19 underground experiments have the advantage of not releasing significant amounts of radioactive debris. It is also simpler to place large masses of experimental apparatus close to an underground shot than to locate the same hardware next to a balloon gondola or on the platform of a slender tower, either of which has a limited carrying capacity. In any event, very few atmospheric tests have been carried out during the last three decades, and even the French and Chinese abandoned their atmospheric test programs. Only with a large collection of data derived from yield tests of different types of devices can a weapons designer be confident that he understands the behavior of different possible designs within what is termed the nuclear weapons design space, and only then can he be confident that the computer programs used to predict device performance deliver reliable results. This may be the strongest motivation for a proliferator to test at full yield. However, even a series of full-yield tests may not provide all of the information needed for weapons design. Rudimentary Testing Most nuclear weapon states have constructed underground testing facilities similar to the U.S. Nevada Test Site. That is, weapons development and proof tests are usually carried out in vertical shafts stemmed to prevent the escape of radioactive debris. Power and signal cables for the device are routed up the shaft and fanned out to several instrumentation trailers outside the probable cratering zone. Nuclear weapons effects tests are primarily carried out in horizontal mine shafts sealed to prevent the escape of debris; instrumentation cables are connected to the surface through a vertical bore hole. In both cases, the tests are characterized by the large amount of electronic instrumentation used to study the details of the functioning of the implosion assembly and of the nuclear phases of the explosion. A beginning nuclear power opting for simpler weapons may well choose not to employ sophisticated diagnostic instrumentation, selecting instead to determine the approximate yield with seismographs. The most accurate measurement of yield is through the radio-chemistry studies of device debristhe radioactive isotopes produced in the detonation. No electronics are used to gather the data for such analyses; it is only necessary to drill back into the device chamber and to extract samples for lab examination. A faster but less accurate yield determination can be done using seismographs to measure ground motion, but
19
Radioactive debris from an atmospheric test or from an underground shot which vents can be analyzed by other nations. Much information about the design and performance of the test device can be inferred from the debris.
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such a test would not collect a large quantity of data usually considered desirable by U.S. weapon designers and testers. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) All five nuclear weapons states have tested nuclear devices and presumably retain the technologies needed to conduct underground nuclear explosions should the CTBT be abandoned. South Africa prepared two boreholes in which it could have tested its nuclear devices; those shafts have been filled and the site abandoned. India conducted one instrumented underground nuclear explosion and is believed to have been readying a site for additional tests during 1996. That effort may have been abandoned, but
India has the technologies needed to conduct nuclear yield tests. Brazil drilled a borehole for a nuclear test, but that shaft was closed with great ceremony. The country has the capability to instrument a nuclear explosion to some degree. Sweden carried out some planning for a nuclear test in the 1960s, but apparently those plans were abandoned along with its nuclear weapons program. Most advanced industrial nations have the technology to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests which could be instrumented well enough to aid a weapons program. Very little advanced technology is required by a proliferator wishing to conduct useful atmospheric nuclear tests, but virtually all nations of concern are States Parties to the LTBT banning tests except those conducted underground.
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Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters*

Technology
HYDRODYNAMIC TESTING
Pin domes
Positioning to better than .001 in. ; time resolution to 10 ns Pressure upper limit on the order of 25 megabar; temperature on the order of 3,000 K. Rise time <<1 microsec. Output voltages >6 V into <55 ohm resistive load with pulse transition times less than 500 ps (defined as the time interval between 10% and 90% voltage amplitude). Satellite TV technology. Cables with 15 dB attenuation per 100 ft at 1 GHz readily available.
CCL EAR 99
Steel domes, pins
None identified
None identified
HE pressure, temperature, and shock transducers
CCL EAR 99
Semiconductor grade quartz; manganin metal
Clean room environments common in semiconductor assembly, most transducers available off the shelf (OTS). None; these instruments can be manufactured domestically with advanced understanding of high-speed circuits or be purchased OTS. None; cables will be procured from the open market. Continuity testers and fast pulse generators used to calibrate None; connectors will be procured from the open market. Continuity testers used to quality check. None; available commercially OTS
Understanding of device assembly dynamic range and timing from model predictions None, although computer modeling codes for high speed circuit performance would be advantageous (SPICE Code, for example) None identified
Pulse generators to calibrate cables, etc.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Coaxial cables
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Cable connectors
Satellite TV technology. N, C, HN, or LC series connectors standard.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
Fast oscilloscopes, usually with storage features
For hydro testing subnanosecond scopes are not required. Many types of digitizing scopes with 110 ns recording times are available. Standard OTS cameras with triggerable shutters.
NDUL 7; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set dynamic range of data acquisition is critical. None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times is critical.
Oscilloscope cameras
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
* Values identical to those in the NDUL do not necessarily reflect the normal TWG process.
(contd)
II-5-95
Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
Transient recorders (flash digitizers)
100 MHz digitizer speed with NDUL 7; 10100 microseconds of CCL Cat 3A memory and 8 bits of dynamic range sufficient for hydro testing. Available OTS, but single cable lengths would be sufficient. CCL EAR 99
None identified
None; available commercially OTS
None identified
Time delay generators
None identified
None identified
None identified
Flash X-ray generators
Peak energy of few hundred NDUL 5; KeV and a figure of merit, CCL Cat 3A K = 1.7 x 103 x V 2.65 Q greater than about 0.25. Special equipment to halt the propagation of physical bomb debris. Medical x-ray technology scaled up to suit size of image. Framing rates greater than 250,000 per second CCL EAR 99
Oxygen-free copper for linear accelerator (mega-volt operation); low loss capacitors. For smaller units marx generator and cables. Dielectric oils, pref. PCB-free.
For megavolt machines based on linear accelerators, ability to machine special copper to near optical finish.
Solutions of Poisson's equation in two or three dimensions, validated against experiments. Radiation shielding codes.
X-ray recording systems (photo)
Medical x-ray None identified phosphors available from several suppliers. None identified None identified
None identified
Mechanical framing cameras
NDUL 5; CCL Cat 3A NDUL 5; CCL Cat 3A CCL EAR 99
None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times is critical. None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times is critical. Data acquisition system capable of reading 1,000+ channels of data to form an image. Some systems commercially available if imaging is required. None identified
Mechanical streak cameras
Writing speeds greater than 0.5 mm per microsecond.
None identified
None identified
X-ray recording systems (digital)
Arrays of photodiodes coupled to inorganic crystals or fiber optic coupled to CCD if imaging is required. Large inorganic crystals for flux measurements. Heavy gas proportional chambers
Inorganic crystals, such as CsI, BGO, LSO or equivalent
None; crystals and PD arrays available commercially. Photomultiplier tubes for big crystals also available.
X-ray recording systems (analog)
CCL EAR 99
Heavy gases such as xenon.
None identified
(contd)
II-5-96

Technology
Multistage light gas guns Acceleration of projectiles to or other high-velocity 2 km per second or greater gun systems (coil, electromagnetic, electrothermal or other advanced systems). Neutron pinex (pinhole) photography None available
NDUL 5; CCL Cat 2B
None identified
None identified
None identified
HYDRONUCLEAR TESTING (up to few ton yield range)
CCL EAR 99
Machinable tungsten alloy for pinhole fabrication. Standard fluors for detectors.
Ability to machine tungsten to high precision at small dimensions, electro machining, for example. Fast video cameras for image recording. Ability to machine tungsten to high precision at small dimensions, electro machining, for example. Fast video cameras for image recording. None; detectors are commercially available. Calibration by use of standard radioactive sources. None identified
Ability to forecast device performance for dynamic range and timing and shock propagation in local geology for standoff time for data acquisition. Ability to forecast device performance for dynamic range and timing and shock propagation in local geology for standoff time for data acquisition. None identified
Gamma pinex (pinhole) photography
None available
CCL EAR 99
Machinable tungsten alloy for pinhole fabrication. Inorganic crystals for detectors.
Gamma detectors (e.g., sodium iodide, GeLi, etc.)
Standard OTS detectors used in well logging or basic research
CCL EAR 99
Large inorganic crystals
Compton current gamma detectors
Pulsed power design techniques
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Ability to forecast device performance for dynamic range and timing and basic pulsed power codes for modeling instrument response characteristics.
(contd)
II-5-97

Technology
Neutron detectors, standard nuclear approaches
Standard OTS detectors used in basic research
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None; detectors are commercially available. Calibration by use of standard neutron sources or generators. None identified
None identified
Cable crush yield measurement
Standard drilling techniques and time domain reflectometry with fast pulsers.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None, but ability to forecast device performance from models and understanding of shock propagation in local geology is critical. None identified
X- and gamma-ray detectors
Standard OTS detectors used in basic research.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None; detectors are commercially available. Calibration by use of standard radioactive sources. None identified
Photomultiplier tubes
On the order of few ns rise time; tube face larger than 20 cm2 Satellite TV technology. Cables with 15 dB attenuation per 100 ft at 1 GHz readily available. Satellite TV technology. N, C, HN, or LC series connectors standard 100 MHz digitizing speed sufficient if local data buffering of high-speed events is available in instrumentation
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
Coaxial cables
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None, but ability to carry higher currents is essential. None, but ability to support connections at higher currents is essential. None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times is critical.
Cable connectors
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-98

Technology
NUCLEAR YIELD TESTING (Underground)
Drilling machinery
Capability to drill holes CCL EAR 99 approximately 2 m in diameter to depths on the order of several hundred meters to 2 kilometers
Hardened drill bits of large diameter. Drill string material capable of functionin deep holes.
Bits, shaft casing, drill rigs capable of drilling large diameter holes to great depths. The combination of diameter and depth is larger than common in the oil business.
Validated codes to simulate pressures and stresses on very deep shafts.
Hole stemming technologies to ensure acceptable containment
Knowledge of soil permeCCL EAR 99 ability; ability to seal boreshaft gas-tight even after the passage of the shockwave from the nuclear explosion.
None, although near None identified device and detector package special material like magnetite with known neutron absorption cross sections could be required. None identified None; detectors are commercially available. Calibration by use of standard neutron sources or generators. None; detectors are commercially available. Calibration by use of standard radioactive sources. None identified
Validated models of the mechanical and thermodynamic properties of the shaft and its stem during the passage of the nuclear shockwave.
Neutron detectors
Standard OTS detectors as CCL EAR 99 used in basic nuclear physics research, but with larger standoff distance and dynamic range. Standard OTS detectors used in well logging or basic research. CCL EAR 99
None identified
Large inorganic crystals
None identified
Pulsed power design techniques
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Ability to forecast device performance for dynamic range and timing and basic pulsed power codes for modeling instrument response characteristics. None identified None identified
Photomultiplier tubes Microchannel plates
Rise time order of 5 ns or better; area > 20 cm2 Rise time order of 1 ns or faster; area > 20 cm2
NDUL 7; CCL Cat 6A WA Cat 6A; CCL Cat 6A
(contd)
II-5-99

Technology
Fast frame-rate vidicon
Vidicon cameras or equivalent with 4-ms frame times or faster. Standard OTS cables from many suppliers.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None, but cameras are special order commercially Optical assembly and test equipment common in communication industry. Precision alignment survey equipment, calibration sources for detector performance.
Detailed understanding of device performance from modeling calculations None identified
Fiber-optic cables
WA Cat 5A P1; CCL Cat 5A P1 CCL EAR 99
None identified
Gamma and X-ray scattering stations
Set-up as for basic research experiment. Precision alignment for lines of sight. Fast data acquisition.
None identified
Detailed modeling understanding of device performance and scattering cross sections for modeling detector response. Detailed modeling understanding of device performance and scattering cross sections for modeling detector response. Detailed modeling understanding of device performance for dynamic range. Detailed understanding of local geology for shock stand-off distance. Detailed modeling understanding of device performance for dynamic range. Detailed under standing of local geology for shock stand-off distance. None identified
Neutron scattering stations
Set-up as for basic research experiment. Precision alignment for lines of sight. Fast data acquisition.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Precision alignment survey equipment, calibration sources for detector performance.
Neutron pinex (pinhole) photography
Spatial resolution 410 times smaller than expected pit diameter at maximum compression. Time resolution on the order of 20 ns. Longer stand-off range than for hydronuclear testing. Spatial resolution 410 times smaller than expected pit diameter at maximum compression. Time resolution on the order of 10 ns. Longer stand-off range than for hydronuclear testing.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
X-ray pinex (pinhole) photography
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Fireball cameras Ability to coat film with three CCL EAR 99 (including special 3-layer layers with different sensifilms) tivities and to embed color couplers in each layer. Sensitivities range from the order of ISO .0001 to ISO 100. Most useful with atmospheric testing but possible underground.
None identified
Modern photographic emulsions useful but not necessary.
(contd)
II-5-100

Technology
Streak cameras
Cameras capable of 50 ns or better time resolution.
NDUL 5; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
None identified
None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times and dynamic range is critical. None, but ability to forecast device performance from models to set trigger times and dynamic range is critical. None, but ability to forecast device performance from models and understanding of shock propagation in local geology is critical. None, but detailed understanding of neutron fluxes at distances from device from model pre dictions and neutron cross sections for rare isotopes. None identified
Framing cameras
Cameras capable of 50 ns or better frame resolution time.
NDUL 5; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
None identified
Local seismic systems
Basic seismographs and recording instruments for ground motion.
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
Radiochemical tracer isotopes
Basic radiochemistry laboratory equipment common in reactor analysis institutions. Some materials available from medical radioisotopes. Basic radio and analytic chemistry laboratory equipment
CCL EAR 99
Special isotopes, some commercially available but rare.
Hot cell handling capability and detailed radiochemistry instrumentation.
Analysis of uncontained gases Oscilloscopes
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
Many types of digitizing NDUL 7; scopes with 110 ns record- CCL Cat 3A ing times; bandwidths greater than 1 GHz will give better alpha data. Satellite TV technology using CCL EAR 99 cables with 15 dB attenuation per 100 ft at 1 GHz, but higher current capability than satellite TV cable may prove necessary.
None identified
None; available commercial OTS
None, but ability to fore cast device performance from models to set dynamic range of data acquisition is critical. None identified
Coaxial cables
None identified
None identified
(contd)
II-5-101

Technology
Cable connectors
Satellite TV technology. N, CCL EAR 99 C, HN or LC series connectors appropriate, but with higher current capability than normal in satellite TV receiving equipment. 100 MHz digitizer rates sufficient if down hole buffering of data is available in instrumentation package. MTCR 14; CCL Cat 3A; WA Cat 3A
None identified
None identified
None identified
Analog-to-digital converters
None identified
None identified
None, but detailed device performance characteristics from model is essential for dynamic range and timing specification.
II-5-102
Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data

HYDRODYNAMIC TESTING
Pin domes
Electrical connections, readouts. Assuring proliferator that implosion Uncertainty of timing after HE initiation system works.
Simplest diagnostic currently used; radio-lanthanum may be substituted. Also the electromagnetic technique could be used. None, although primitive arrays of crushable or frangible materials could be used for coarse measurements
HE pressure, temperature, and shock transducers
Speed, reliability, accuracy
Verifying operation of complex implosion designs
Pulse generators to calibrate cables, etc. Coaxial cables
Repeatability
Facilitating analysis of experiments by None, pulse generators are allowing detailed calibration of cable readily available or could be performance and delays manufactured domestically None, but older type cables may be satisfactory in some cases, particularly if the cable length is kept small. None, but older connectors may provide adequate performance if the number of joints is minimized. Modern oscilloscopes are necessary for precision testing of advanced design weapons, but it must be remembered that most weapon types ever manufactured were tested using oscilloscopes which are no better than those found in commercial applications today.
Low loss over very long runs; Required to bring signal from test consistent impedance; low dispersion. apparatus to data recording Cables with 15 dB attenuation over 100ft Low loss at connections; low dispersion; repeatability Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time Required to link cables
Cable connectors
Principal extreme speed data recording device
Oscilloscope cameras Transient recorders (flash digitizers) Time-delay generators
Triggerable shutter with film cassette Speed, memory capability, computer data acquisition system Accuracy, predictability, and repeatability
Data recording of fast transient events Flash digitizers or storage scopes from scope screen Data recording of fast transient events Scope cameras using digital recording Synchronizing recording devices None, but adequate generators are found in TV stations. In some cases simple cable lengths could be used
(contd)
II-5-103
Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Flash x-ray generators
Photon energy and spectrum; power output; rise time; pulse length; repeatability Sensitivity; uniformity of response over film surface Speed; repeatability; frame-to-frame uniformity Speed; repeatability Linearity of response; response time
Observing interior of imploding system Energy below the 500 KeV of the NDUL will probably be satisfactory Observing interior of imploding system Digital radiographic arrays of scintillating crystals with photodiodes attached Recording one or more frames from xray burst. Observing high speed phenomena Observing interior of imploding systems and recording information for computer analysis Observing interior of imploding systems and recording information for off-line analysis Determining the equation of state of fissile materials at values of pressure, temperature and density found in nuclear explosive devices. Fast video recorders with MCP gating for time elapsed images Electronic streak cameras Photographic approaches
X-ray recording systems (photo)
Mechanical framing cameras Mechanical streak cameras X-ray recording systems (digital)
X-ray recording systems (analog)
Linearity of response; response time
Fast video recorders with MCP gating for time elapsed images or framing cameras EOS data for uranium were published in open literature in 1947.
Multistage light gas guns or other high velocity gun systems (coil, electromagnetic, electrothermal, or other advanced systems). Neutron pinex (pinhole) photography
Muzzle velocity; repeatability; precision of adjustment; sensors in or on test samples.
HYDRONUCLEAR TESTING (up to few ton yield range)
Pinhole size, location from device, data recording system and shuttering
Observing onset of nuclear reactions None identified in imploding device and imaging the imploding system to assess uniformity and deviations from symmetry Observing onset of nuclear reactions None identified in imploding device and imaging the imploding system to assess uniformity and deviations from symmetry Observing onset of nuclear reactions in imploding device Triggered wire proportional chambers; spark chambers. If the yield is large enough simple Compton current detectors can be used Crystal gamma detectors
Gamma pinex (pinhole) photography
Pinhole size, location from device, data recording system and shuttering
Size (large enough to prevent escape of photons); crystal quality; coupling of output signal from detector to photomultiplier or other light-toelectrical transducer. Yield must be high enough for significant Compton currents to be generated
Observing time development of gamma rays from nuclear event
(contd)
II-5-104

Neutron detectors, standard nuclear approaches
Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, high-speed response
Determining rate of multiplication of chain reaction in order to assess degree of implosion and probable yield. Determining rate of multiplication of chain reaction in order to assess degree of implosion and probable yield. Measurement of shock-wave propagation in material near event site Determining rate of multiplication of chain reaction in order to assess degree of implosion and probable yield. (n,gamma) reactions may be easier to measure than direct neutrons. Determine temperature of nuclear reaction. Sensor used in many of the detectors used for particle counting Link test device to electronic data recording instruments.
None. If the yield is big enough, simple faraday cups measuring the proton current from (n,p) reaction in a CH foil could be used Neutron detectors, standard nuclear approaches
Neutron detectors, faraday cup approach
Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, high-speed response
Cable crush yield measurement X- and gamma-ray detectors
Time domain reflectometry of cable during event. Size (large enough to prevent escape of photons); crystal quality; coupling of output signal from detector to photomultiplier or other light-toelectrical transducer.
Neutron measurements or radchem techniques Triggered wire proportional chambers; spark chambers. If the yield is large enough, simple Compton current detectors can be used
Rise time, transit time, noise level, UV sensitivity; reliability in high radiation environment Low loss over very long runs; consistent imepdance low dispersion. Cables with 15 dB attenuation over 100 ft Low loss at connections; low dispersion; repeatability. Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time
None, but satisfactory PM tubes are commonly available, most from Japan. Older cables with poorer dielectric properties, particularly if cable lengths can be minimized. Fiberoptic cables. Older connectors may be used. Modern oscilloscopes are necessary for precision testing of advanced design weapons, but most weapon types ever manufactured were tested using oscilloscopes which are no better than those found in commercial applications today.
Coaxial cables
Cable connectors Fast oscilloscopes, usually with storage features
Link cables to one another and to device and recording instruments Principal extreme speed data recording device
Speed, memory capability, computer data acquisition system
Data recording of fast transient events Scope cameras using digital recording
(contd)
II-5-105

NUCLEAR YIELD TESTING (Underground)
Drilling machinery
Bit diameter; ability to drill to great depths.
Prepare site for installation of nuclear test device
Convert existing mines; use dedicated horizontal shafts excavated with conventional techniques Many types of stemming will probably be reasonably effective. This is a civil construction issue, and has been moderately well documented in the open literature. Fundamental technologies are not exotic. None; if the device yield is great enough simple faraday cups measuring the proton current from (n,p) reactions in a polyethylene (CH) foil could be used. Triggered wire proportional chambers; spark chambers. If the yield is large enough, simple Compton current detectors can be used.
Hole stemming technologies to ensure acceptable containment
Gas tightness; ability to withstand ground shock and effects of device on base of the stem. Ability to contain debris for extended period.
Close borehole so that debris from nuclear test does not escape. Preventing the escape of radioactive debris denies adversaries a valuable look at the performance of the test device. Needed to comply with Limited Test Ban Treaty. Determining rate of multiplication of chain reaction in order to assess degree of implosion and probable yield. Determining rate of multiplication of chain reaction in order to assess primary performance. (n,gamma) reactions may be easier to measure than direct neutrons. Determine temperature of nuclear reaction. Estimate ability of primary to drive secondary. Sensor used in many of the detectors used for particle counting
Neutron detectors
Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, high speed response; calibration and calibration stability
X- and gamma-ray detectors
Size (large enough to prevent escape of photons); crystal quality; coupling of output signal from detector to photomultiplier or other light-toelectrical transducer.
Rise time, size of output pulse, linearity of output pulse size vs. input signal.
Older-design tubes with >1 ns risetime may be useful, particularly for unboosted fission devices. Interstage timing requires higher speed. PM tubes with slower responses
Microchannel plate
Rise time, size of output pulse, linearity of output pulse size vs. input signal. Phosphor type for persistence, readout electronics Loss; dispersion, band width of transmitters and receivers
Faster-responding photomultiplier
Fast frame-rate vidicon Fiber-optic cables
Obtaining images of exploding device Transmitting large amounts of data from down-hole to recording facility. Also for direct transmission of optical output of detectors for up-hole recording.
CCD or CID cameras Coaxial cables
(contd)
II-5-106

Gamma and x-ray scattering stations
Fluxes, detector response for dynamic Observing developing radiation range and bandwidth. without overloading sensors. Scatters small fraction of primary radiation to a sensor which cannot see device directly. Fluxes, detector response for dynamic Observing developing radiation range and bandwidth. without overloading sensors. Scatters small fraction of primary radiation to a sensor which cannot 'see device directly. As above, but for much larger neutron fluences
Not needed for many types of tests. Increasing standoff distance of detector package allows for other approaches Not needed for many types of tests. Increasing standoff distance of detector package allows for other approaches
Neutron scattering stations
Neutron pinex (pinhole) photography
Image device during nuclear explosion X-ray pinex period Image device during nuclear explosion Neutron pinex period Photograph fireball for conventional None, but most underground tests viewing. Special film has 3 layers with do not photograph fireball different sensitivities, typically between ISO 0.001 and 1,000 so that both early and late stages of explosion can be recorded on the same film. Photograph high-speed events during explosion Photograph high-speed events during explosion Make first determination of yield Make most accurate determination of yield Supplements radiochemical analysis and may give details of the performance of a complex device. None, but commercial hardware may suffice None, but commercial hardware may suffice None. Standard seismographic techniques Neutron or photon flux measurements Radiochemical analysis of debris in shot hole
X-ray pinex (pinhole) photography As above, but for much larger photon fluences Fireball cameras (including special 3-layer films) Shutter; film advance mechanism
Streak cameras Framing cameras Local seismic systems Radiochemical tracer isotopes
Device performance forecast Device performance forecast Understanding of local geology Placement of tracers, drill back technology, radiological hazard handling of materials Placement of sample collecting devices
Analysis of uncontained gases
(contd)
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Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time
Principal extreme speed data recording device
Modern oscilloscopes are necessary for precision testing of advanced design weapons, but most weapon types ever manufactured were tested using oscilloscopes which are no better than those found in commercial applications today. Older cables with poorer dielectric properties, particularly if cable lengths can be minimized. Fiberoptic cables. Older connectors may be used. Scopes with scope cameras and digitizing of film
Coaxial cables
Low loss over very long runs; consistent impedance low dispersion. Cables with 15 dB attenuation over 100 ft. Low loss at connections; low dispersion; repeatability. Time response, dynamic range, event performance forecast
Link test device to electronic data recoridng instruments.
Cable connectors Analog-to-digital converters
Link cables to one another and to device and recording instruments. Convert readily made analog measurements to digital values for post-shot computer analysis.
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SECTION 5.11NUCLEAR WEAPONS CUSTODY, TRANSPORT, AND CONTROL
OVERVIEW The enormous destructive power and the small physical size of many modern nuclear weapons has led to the development of stringent measures to ensure against theft or unauthorized use. In addition, much effort has gone into the development of safe and secure methods of transporting nuclear weapons and into the development of training and operational concepts so that, if needed, nuclear weapons will be used to the greatest effect. Generally, these technologies and related processes are not unique to nuclear weapons or necessarily lie on a path to nuclear weapons. The technologies for the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons are all commercially available. DoDs approach to maintaining the physical security of nuclear weapons is manpower intensive. Large numbers of security personnel accompany the vehicle(s) actually transporting nuclear weapons. Civil law enforcement personnel lead the convoy, while a considerable number of military vehicleson the land and in the airare added to handle physical security. Constant secure radio contact is maintained with a home base that is ready to respond with additional security personnel should the need arise. With routings varied and classified, and with massive amounts of physical security, DoD ensures that each nuclear weapon is kept safe and secure while en route to be mated with its corresponding delivery system. Once mated, DoD provides multiple layers of protection, often including roving patrols for nuclear-loaded aircraft. In addition, when missiles were not in hardened silos, multiple guards were required for missiles carrying nuclear weapons. The DoD requires more than one guard for any maintenance actions on nuclear-loaded missiles. Two-man control and no-lone zones apply in nuclear-weapon-related activities; in U.S. practice such operations are unique to nuclear operations. Increased security is also the rule when dealing with nuclear weapons. When moving nuclear weapons on DoD sites, the routes are typically swept and sanitized before the move. RATIONALE As noted previously, all of the technologies involved are commonly available industrial technologies fundamental to security operations worldwide. The entire spectrum of sensor technology and communications technologyboth secure and nonsecurecan be included in the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons.
Highlights
Nuclear weapons must be protected against theft or damage during transport; this function is frequently accomplished by an adequate guard force. Technologically based security is provided by a mix of technologies, no one of which is extremely sensitive. Taken in the aggregate, the methods of securing nuclear weapons are highly sensitive. Most of the technologies themselves are unclassified. Standing up of elite forces to deliver and secure nuclear weapons might be an intelligence indicator that a proliferant was on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons.
Monitoring many of these technologies is difficult, and their acquisition only means that the acquiring state or subnational group has something very important to protectbut it does not have to be a nuclear weapon. Also, procedural changes in security forces which identify uniquely nuclear operations are equally difficult to determine. Since the new proliferant or subnational actor will most likely have a very limited number of nuclear weapons, increased security would be required for protection of the weapons as well as to prevent the use of the weapon FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) The fundamental technologies for custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons can be found in essentially every military in the world, for they simply involve the provision of a well-disciplined guard force in adequate strength to defend against any likely threat. The assessed security requirement will depend upon the country in question. The United States has a long lead over most other countries in technologyintensive ways of protecting nuclear weapons.
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Table 5.11-1. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Parameters
Technology
Motion Detection Sensors/Alarms Laser Detection Systems Temperature Sensitive Sensors/Alarms Radios and Transceivers. Systems, subsystems or equipment developed or modified for security communications networks or C4I systems that perform integrated C4I system security communications network functions Acoustic detection sensors/alarms Pressure sensitive detectors/alarms
Any level which impedes the operations of EOD teams seeking access to IND. Any level which delays or denies access to IND. Any level. Systems engineered to be difficult to detect or which do not transmit in plain language and where decrypting cannot be done in real time.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified None identified Encryption chip manufacture
Any level which impedes the operations of EOD teams seeking access to IND. Any level which impedes the operations of EOD teams seeking acess to IND.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
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Table 5.11-2. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Reference Data
Motion Detection Sensors/Alarms Laser Detection Systems Temperature Sensitive Sensors/ Alarms Radios and Transceivers. Systems, subsystems or equipment developed or modified for security communications networks or C4I systems that perform integrated C4I system security communications network functions. Acoustic Detection Sensors/ Alarms Pressure Sensitive Sensors/ Alarms
None identified None identified None identified Encryption level required to gain tactical security (decrypt time circa 24 hours for someone not in possession of the key).
Security and defensive only. May be used to protect emplaced devices. Security and defensive only. May be used to protect emplaced devices. Security and defensive only. May be used to protect emplaced devices. For this application, security and defensive only. However, any C4I capability can be used offensively to coordinate attacks. Encryption used to gain tactical OPSEC.
Security and defensive only. May be used to protect emplaced devices. Security and defensive only. May be used to protect emplaced devices.
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SECTION 5.12HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW Heavy water, D2O, is water in which both hydrogen atoms have been replaced with deuterium, the isotope of hydrogen containing one proton and one neutron. It is present naturally in water, but in only small amounts, less than 1 part in 5,000. Heavy water is one of the two principal moderators which allow a nuclear reactor to operate with natural uranium as its fuel. The other moderator is reactor-grade graphite (graphite containing less than 5 ppm boron and with a density exceeding 1.50 gm/cm3). The first nuclear reactor built in 1942 used graphite as the moderator; German efforts during World War II concentrated on using heavy water to moderate a reactor using natural uranium. The importance of heavy water to a nuclear proliferator is that it provides one more route to produce plutonium for use in weapons, entirely bypassing uranium enrichment and all of the related technological infrastructure. In addition, heavy-watermoderated reactors can be used to make tritium. Although one speaks of making heavy water, deuterium is not made in the process; rather, molecules of heavy water are separated from the vast quantity of water consisting of H2O or HDO (singly deuterated water), and the dross is discarded. Alternatively, the water may be electrolyzed to make oxygen and hydrogen containing normal gas and deuterium. The hydrogen can then be liquefied and distilled to separate the two species. Finally, the resulting deuterium is reacted with oxygen to form heavy water. No nuclear transformations occur. RATIONALE The production of heavy water in significant amounts requires a technical infrastructure, but one which has similarities to ammonia production, alcohol distillation, and other common industrial processes. One may separate heavy water directly from natural water or first enrich the deuterium content in hydrogen gas. It is possible to take advantage of the different boiling points of heavy water (101.4 C) and normal water (100 C) or the difference in boiling points between deuterium (249.7 C) and hydrogen (252.5 C). However, because of the low abundance of deuterium, an enormous amount of water would have to be boiled to obtain useful amounts of deuterium. Because of the high heat of vaporization of water, this process would use enormous quantities of fuel or electricity. Practical facilities which exploit chemical differences use processes requiring much smaller amounts of energy input.
Highlights
Heavy water is separated from ordinary water by enrichment cascades. The separation factor at each stage is higher for heavy water than for uranium, but heavy water must be enriched far more than uranium. Practical heavy water plants use chemical exchange processes such as H2 S/H2 O (Girdler Sulfide) or NH3 /H 2 . Distillation columns to finish heavy water enrichment to >99.75% are similar to those used in distilling brandy from wine.
Separation methods include distillation of liquid hydrogen and various chemical exchange processes which exploit the differing affinities of deuterium and hydrogen for various compounds. These include the ammonia/hydrogen system, which uses potassium amide as the catalyst, and the hydrogen sulfide/water system (Girdler Sulfide process). Separation factors per stage are significantly larger for deuterium enrichment than for uranium enrichment because of the larger relative mass difference. However, this is compensated for because the total enrichment needed is much greater. While 235U is 0.72 percent of natural uranium, and must be enriched to 90 percent of the product, deuterium is only .015 percent of the hydrogen in water and must be enriched to greater than 99 percent. If the input stream has at least 5 percent heavy water, vacuum distillation is a preferred way to separate heavy from normal water. This process is virtually identical to that used to distill brandy from wine. The principal visible difference is the use of a phosphor-bronze packing that has been chemically treated to improve wettability for the distillation column rather than a copper packing. Most organic liquids are nonpolar and wet virtually any metal, while water, being a highly polar molecule with a high surface tension, wets very few metals. The process works best at low temperatures where water flows are small, so wetting the packing in the column is of particular importance. Phosphor-bronze is an alloy of copper with .02.05 percent lead, .05.15 percent iron, .5.11 percent tin, and .01.35 percent phosphorus.
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The Bruce Heavy Water Plant in Ontario, Canada, is the worlds largest producer of D2O. It uses the Girdler Sulfide (GS) process which incorporates a double cascade in each step. In the upper (cold, 3040 C) section, deuterium from hydrogen sulfide preferentially migrates into water. In the lower (hot, 120140 C) section, deuterium preferentially migrates from water into hydrogen sulfide. An appropriate cascade arrangement actually accomplishes enrichment. In the first stage the gas is enriched from 0.015% deuterium to 0.07%. The second column enriches this to 0.35% , and the third column achieves an enrichment between 10% and 30% deuterium. This product is sent to a distillation unit for finishing to 99.75% reactorgrade heavy water. Only about one-fifth of the deuterium in the plant feed water becomes heavy water product. The production of a single pound of heavy water requires 340,000 pounds of feed water.20 Proliferation Implication Assessment Heavy water is the key to one type of reactor in which plutonium can be bred from natural uranium. As such, the production of heavy water has always been monitored,
and the material is export controlled. In addition, a source of deuterium is essential for the production of tritium and 6LiD, two ingredients of thermonuclear weapons. A nation seeking large quantities of heavy water probably wishes to use the material to moderate a reactor, and may be planning to produce plutonium. However, CANDU (CANadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors designed and built in Canada are used for commercial electric power production. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Heavy water is produced in Argentina, Canada, India, and Norway. Presumably, all five declared nuclear weapons states can produce the material. The first commercial heavy water plant was the Norsk Hydro facility in Norway (built 1934, capacity 12 metric metric tons per year); this is the plant which was attacked by the Allies to deny heavy water to Germany. As stated above, the largest plant, is the Bruce Plant in Canada (1979; 700 metric tons/year). Indias apparent capacity is very high, but its program has been troubled. Accidents and shutdowns have led to effective limitations on production.
20
Isotope Enrichment, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, U.S. Department of

Energy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop. K/NSP-121/PT 5/R3, May 1996 (Unclassified).
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Table 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters

Technology
Pumps for potassium amide/liquid ammonia
Hermetically sealed; capacity NDUL 4; >8.5 cubic meters per hour. NRL-K Concentrated potassium amide (>1%) operating at 15600 atm. Dilute potassium amide (<1%) operating at 200600 atm. Effective assembled diameter of 1.8 m or greater. Fabricated from fine carbon steel (e.g., ASTM A516) with diameters from 6 m to 9 m capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (200 atm) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or more. Note that a sufficient tower may be smaller but probably must operate in a similar pressure range. NTL B6; NRC-K; NDUL 4; CCL Cat 1B
Forgings to withstand pressure
All parts contacting solutions must be free of hydrocarbons and fluorocarbons
None identified
Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns
Blowers and comNone identified pressors for H2S circulation. Throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 cubic meter/s while operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1.8 MPa (260 psi) suction with seals designed for wet H2S service. Note that sufficient pumps may have less capacity but probably operate in a similar pressure range. Stage pumps and contactors to promote intimate gas/liquid contact. Pumps must be submersible. None identified
None identified
Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers
35 m or more in height with diameters of 1.52.5 m capable of operating at pressures >15 MPa (2,225 psi). These towers have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part of the tower in order to insert or withdraw tower internals.
NRL-B6; NRC-K
None identified
Infrared absorption analyzers
On-line analysis of hydrogen/ NTL-B6; deuterium ratios where NRC-K deuterium concentrations are greater than or equal to 90%
None identified
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Table 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
Catalytic burners for conversion of deuterium gas into heavy water especially following the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process Phosphor-bronze mesh packings for use in vacuum distillation of heavy water and chemically treated to improve wettability Cryogenic distillation towers
Possession of catalysts; alternatively, can use simple combustion
NTL-B6; NRC-K
None identified
None identified
None identified
Possession
NDUL 4; CCL Cat 1A
None identified
None identified
None identified
Operate at temperatures NDUL 4; <35 K and at pressures of CCL Cat 1B 0.55 MPa (550 atm). Generally >1 m in diameter and with effective length of at least 5 m. Operating pressure of NDUL 4; 2060 MPa, typically 35 m in CCL Cat 1B diameter and 912 m long.
Fine-grain austenitic None identified stainless steel with an ASTM or equivalent standard grain size number of 5 or greater Stainless steel lining None identified
None identified
Ammonia converters or synthesis units
None identified
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Table 5.12-2. Heavy Water Production Reference Data

Pumps for potassium amide/liquid None identified ammonia Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange None identified tray columns Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers Infrared absorption analyzers Catalytic burners for conversion of deuterium gas into heavy water especially following the ammoniahydrogen exchange process. Phosphor-bronze mesh packings for use in vacuum distillation of heavy water and chemically treated to improve wettability Cryogenic distillation towers None identified
Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors
Hydrogen sulfide process; vacuum distillation Ammonia hydrogen exchange process; vacuum distillation Hydrogen sulfide process; vacuum distillation
Analysis of products from heavy water None identified plants Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Preparation of heavy water for plutonium or tritium production reactors Conventional burning
None identified
Ammonia-exchange or hydrogen sulfide processes
None identified
Ammonia-exchange or hydrogen sulfide processes None identified
Ammonia converters or synthesis units
None identified
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SECTION 5.13TRITIUM PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW Tritium (3H) is essential to the construction of boosted-fission nuclear weapons. A boosted weapon contains a mixture of deuterium and tritium, the gases being heated and compressed by the detonation of a plutonium or uranium device. The D-T mixture is heated to a temperature and pressure such that thermonuclear fusion occurs. This process releases a flood of 14 MeV neutrons which cause additional fissions in the device, greatly increasing its efficiency. The tritium beta decay to 3He (mean beta particle energy 5.7 keV; decay energy 18.6 keV) can be easily detected or can cause some other compound to fluoresce. Tritium is therefore used as a radioactive tracer element in biological research in the form of tritiated water (HTO or T2O) and also used in capsules surrounded by a fluorescing compound (e.g., zinc sulfide) to provide illumination which must be independent of the electricity supply. For example, it is used in emergency exit signs, selfluminous airport runway and helicopter pad lights, and light wands for use in directing traffic. The amounts of tritium in runway lights, helipad lights, and light wands are sufficiently great that they meet the NSG Dual-Use Annex specifications. Emergency exit signs and aircraft emergency exit lights do not contain sufficient tritium to meet the NDUL specifications for control. The low energy of the beta decay means that tritium is not an external radiation hazard because the charged decay products are stopped by 0.2 mil of water or a similar shield. However, tritium can pose an internal radiation hazard if tritiated water vapor is inhaled or absorbed through the skin. Because of its higher mass and consequent lower chemical activity, tritium gas is less strongly absorbed by the body, whether through the lungs or the skin. Nuclear physics experiments in which tritium is compared to 3He have been important to our understanding of fundamental properties of the nuclear force. RATIONALE Tritium is rare in nature because of its 12.4-year half-life. It is produced by cosmic radiation in the upper atmosphere where it combines with oxygen to form water. It then falls to earth as rain, but the concentration is too low to be useful in a nuclear weapons program.
Highlights
Tritium is essential for producing boosted-fission weapons. Practical quantities of tritium must be produced in a nuclear reactor or in an electronuclear breeder.
Most tritium is produced by bombarding 6Li [6Li(n, a)3H] with neutrons in a reactor; it is also produced as a byproduct of the operation of a heavy-water-moderated reactor when neutrons are captured on the deuterons present. It has been suggested that it may be feasible to produce tritium in an accelerator (electronuclear breeder) in which protons bombard an appropriate target. Tritium can be stored and shipped as a gas, a metal hydride (e.g., of titanium) or tritide, and trapped in zeolites (hydrated aluminum silicate compounds with uniform size pores in their crystalline structure). Stainless-steel cylinders with capacities up to 5.6 107 GBq (1.5 MCi) of tritium gas are used for transportation and storage and must be constructed to withstand the additional pressure which will build up as tritium gradually decays to 3He. Tritium is used in boosted fission devices and in some designs for thermonuclear weapons. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) All five declared nuclear weapon states must have the underlying capability to manufacture and handle tritium, although the United States has shut down its production reactors due to safety considerations. Canada manufactures tritium as a byproduct of the operation of CANDU reactors. In principle, limited amounts of tritium could be made in any research reactor with the ability to accept a target to be irradiated.
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Table 5.13-1. Tritium Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials
6
Technology
Elemental tritium Storage and shipping
Any pure quantity
NDUL 8; NRC L
Li for production target; heavy water
Production reactor or electronuclear breeder. None identified
Stainless steel cylinders None identified capable of withstanding at least twice the initial tritium fill pressure. Also metal hydride storage cylinders. Nuclear reactor operating with a surplus of neutrons suitable for irradiating a target. Frequently heavywater-moderated. High current proton accelerator (>1 mA continuous at >100 MeV) NTL B1; NRC A
Stainless steel; titanium or uranium for hydriding tritium.

6
Production reactor
Li targets for irradiation
None identified
Nuclear reactor codes specially modified to take into account neutron absorption in a fertile target. Accelerator design and operating software specially adapted to the case of high current operation
Electronuclear breeder
None identified
High-purity copper or superconducting (usually niobium) accelerator cavities); 6Li
Special accelerator; equipment for construction and test of (usually niobium) superconducting RF cavities; extremely rapid-acting vacuum valves. Cooled lithium neutron target; neutron production target.
Table 5.13-2. Tritium Production Reference Data

Elemental tritium Storage and shipping
Production; transport; use; weaponization
Thermonuclear and boosted fission weapons
None identified
Hydriding of metals; pressure vessels; Gas storage and handling for weapons None identified knowledge of properties of hydrogen and hydrides; pressure-testing equipment Operation of research or production reactors with fertile targets Design, development, and test of accelerator and target systems; supply of electricity; fabrication of copper components or superconducting cavities; target design and construction. Production of materials for TN and boosted fission weapons Production of materials for TN and boosted fission weapons Electronuclear breeder Reactor; usually heavy-watermoderated
Production reactor Electronuclear breeder
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SECTION 9 - INFORMATION WARFARE TECHNOLOGY

militarily critical technologies were identified in two other technology areas: Deception and Psychological Operations. For related technologies see subsection 5 - Electronics, 8 - Information Systems, 15 - Sensors and Lasers, 16 - Signature Control and 17 - Space Systems. Rationale The current concept of IW evolved after Desert Storm, where the use of military and civil resources for communications, sensing and intelligence led to an operational C4I that was unchallenged. This has now evolved into a paradigm integrating civil and military elements and including command, control
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4
Electronic Attack1 ......................................... 9-3 Electronic Protection2 ..................................... 9-5 Optical Countermeasures ................................. 9-6 Optical Counter-Countermeasures ...................... 9-8
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 9.0-1) Information warfare (IW) is defined as actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information based processes, information systems and computer based networks while defending one's own information, information based processes, information systems, and computer based networks. IW is a combination of both old roles and missions, evolving and adapting to a new environment, and new revolutionary capabilities. IW includes both offensive and defensive activities: electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, deception, information attack, psychological operations, operational security, IW protection and security measures. IW depends upon and embodies related information systems and other supporting technologies as illustrated in Figure 9.0-1. Computer hacking is a form of IW just as is bombing an adversary's C 2 facility since both deny the enemy information. Because of the dependency of military C 4 I2 systems on both civil and military communications, the crossover between civil and military communications is transparent. This section focuses on the technology, areas shown in the box above that contain militarily critical technologies. No
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Information Systems Electronics Sensors & Lasers Materials
INFORMATION WARFARE
TREND
Protection of Assets Intrusion/Assessment Operational Exploitation Disruption
1 2
Also called Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Also called Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM).
Figure 9.0-1.
Information Warfare Overview
9-1
Country
9.1 Electronic Attack
9.2 Electronic Protection
9.3 Optical CounterMeasures
9.4 Optical CounterCounterMeasures
and communications countermeasures (C3CM) and electronic warfare command and control warfare (EW/C2W), computer warfare, and national activities. IW enhances the way war is waged. The growing battlefield dependence on information systems presents an inviting target for opposing forces. A computer-savvy force could inject false data into an adversary's battlefield information system, thereby confusing the enemy and/or avoiding battle and resultant friendly losses. Attacking a nation's power grids, telephone systems, radar sites, transportation networks, oil supply lines, and financial networks can severely disrupt military and nonmilitary sectors of a society. The increased dependence on information systems empowers nations that otherwise pose no military threat, terrorist organizations, and even individuals to damage countries electronically. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 9.0-2) Technologies in electronic combat, which include the four technology areas in Figure 9.0-2, are most advanced in the US. Close behind the US are the UK, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia. Most of these nations have developed sophisticated EW suites and maintain high standards for electronic and optical countermeasures.
Australia Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Republic France Germany India Israel Japan Netherlands N. Korea Russia S. Korea UK US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 9.0-2.
Information Warfare FTA Summary
9-2
SECTION 9.1 ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Overview (See Figure 9.1-1) An early historical example of Electronic Attack (EA)1 is the Allies' jamming of the giant German Wurzburg radar. The radio frequency (RF) jamming confused the radar's gating mechanism, making few aircraft appear as many. These measures were also used against anti-aircraft radar with considerable success. The increase in the capability of electronic countermeasures grew with the increased use of radio frequency (RF) devices for guidance and control of weapons systems and the concurrent advances in electronics. Add to this capability the sophisticated countering modulations that can be stored as a library of computer algorithms, and the operations of electronic warfare (EW) take on unusual depth. Thus, since the end of World War II, many complex and intricate techniques have been devised to counter the newest weapons systems. Electronic attack is covered by both the DoD S&T Plan and the Joint Staff Electronic Warfare Plan. Each military Service maintains separate Electronic Warfare Plans. Rationale (See Table 9.1-1) Many of the EW components are part and parcel of electronic systems such as radars, navigation systems, instrument landing system (ILS), identification friend or foe (IFF), and the like. For EA, the difference lies in the sensitivity and capability of the RF devices that must "intercept" the target over a long distance, and if possible, before the target is aware of our existence. EA suites normally contain both receiving and transmitting devices. This combination of intercept and countering makes for a considerable difference in fighting a war. For this reason, several electronic support measures (ESM)2, in the form of sophisticated receiving equipment, exist to provide radar warning and an intercept capability against these foreign EA suites. Because of the many changes in the sophistication of weapons systems that occur during wartime, EA must employ the leading edge of technology to maintain the advantage in battle. The critical technologies listed in Table 9.1-1 are major contributors to that advantage. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 9.0-2) Recognition of the need to counter electronic systems such as radar and telecommunications has led to a profusion of EA suites throughout the world, with major emphasis on aircraft and ships. During the Cold War, NATO countries cooperated in
Electronic Attack
What makes this superior

RF Sensitivity Power Frequency Bandwidth Countering Algorithms Shock Resistance Signal Processing
What systems it supports

Air, Ground & Sea Operations Radar Jamming Command & Control Jamming
Figure 9.1-1.
Electronic Attack Overview
developing EA and ES suites and maintained an awesome presence that was sometimes breached by Soviet Bloc countries. The Russians emphasize high power RF jamming devices and the use of noise generation to disorient the "enemy." Today, the profusion of weapons systems is primary, with EA suites running a close second, and virtually every nation with an arsenal of aircraft and ships is deeply involved with EA, either through outright purchase or development. The use of chaff and decoys are common among all countries. Major players are the US, the UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Israel, Russian, and Japan, with some very interesting systems being fielded by China, India, and South Africa.
1 2
Also called Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Also called Electronic Suppression (ES).
9-3
Table 9.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY ECM ANTENNA AID & DIA: AUTO RECOGNITION SYNTHESIZERS
Electronic Attack Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified ROM DSP DSP UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Compact range None identified None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified None identified None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, B, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, B, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 5A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 5A, D, E CCL EAR 99
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY < 40 dBm > 12 bps and 10 GHz > 60 dBm, 218 GHz
RF: WIDEBAND ADAPTIVE POLARIZERS
Null depth > 25 dB Bandwidth > 20%
None identified
None identified
None identified
DIGITAL RF MEMORIES
Digital memories with clock rate > 200 MHz;
SS power devices
None identified
None identified
SOLID STATE AMPLIFIERS ECM SIMULATION
218 GHz, 10 watt, 40% Simulations incorporating validated algorithms involving one or more operational or developmental military systems. 10 Gbits samples < 15 W @ 8 bits < 0.1 DOA accuracy
Public domain Built-ins
None identified In encryption module
ESM: RECEIVER DIGITIZATION ESM: ANTENNA ARRAYS
Instrumented antenna range Max bandwidth oscilloscope built-in
ESM: RF DELAY LINES
> 2 GHz; < 6 dB NF/g > 500 n sec delay 0.4 dB filter with low sensitivity loss; 20 MHz bandwidth @ 40 dB; 10 sec switching Effective area out of band < effective area in band
HTS materials
Max bandwidth oscilloscope
None identified
ESM: SWITCHED DELAY LINES
HTS materials
Max bandwidth oscilloscope
Steering algorithms
ESM: LOW RCS ANTENNA
HTS materials
Hi tech range (laboratory)
Steering algorithms
HIGH TEMP SUPERCONDUCTING ANTENNA (ESM) ESM: MINIATURE MMW INTEGRATED RECEIVER
Size: < 1/4 wavelength < 5 dB NF; 75 GHz bandwidth
None identified
Hi tech range (laboratory)
Acquisition algorithms Ranging formula
Detector sensitivity Isolation, sensitivity and sel test
PRECISION PASSIVE RANGING
CEP < 0.1% of range
None identified
None identified
None identified
9-4
SECTION 9.2 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION

Overview (See Figure 9.2-1) Electronic Protection (EP)1 are those measures used to defeat electronic attack (EA). The EP device must detect the countermeasure, such as jamming or electronic deception, and use active decoys, RF traps and synchronizers, and devices that read through spectral noise. The vast majority of these "fixes" are derived by the developers and manufacturers of the electronic weapon systems as self protective measures. Major US radar manufacturers, such as Westinghouse, Raytheon, and Hughes, have relied on "inhouse" development of EP "fixes." Rationale (See Table 9.2-1) Throughout the world, a vast difference exists in the quality of EP devices. These differences are largely related to the quality of radars and other RF instrumentation. With greater sophistication in EA devices, more clever and capable EP fixes are needed. The ability to conceive and develop unusual EP devices is critical to the developers of all electronic systems. Intricate circuitry, essential miniaturization, and a fail-safe continuum create a rigid set of requirements resulting in appropriate technologies called "fixes." These "fixes" are the critical technologies of EP. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 9.0-2) For many years, the "fixes" (EP measures) came from a handful of nations: the US, the UK, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. These EP measures were nominally builtin to radars, IFF, and navigation systems. In the past few years, some interesting work has been done "ex parte" by Israel and India (the latter working with former Eastern Bloc countries, and the former with France and England). Recently, US engineers visiting Russia were surprised by the sophistication present in Russian "fixes" for a number of radars offered for sale. Table 9.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY DIGITAL RF MEMORIES
Electronic Protection

RF Sensitivity Power Frequency Bandwidth Countering Algorithms Shock Resistance Miniaturization Signal Processing

Air, Ground & Sea Operations Radar Anti-Jamming Command & Control Jamming
Figure 9.2-1.
Electronic Protection Overview
Electronic Protection Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Compact codes EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, WA Cat 3A, D, E, USML XII CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, WA Cat 3D USML XII, CCL Cat 3D WA ML 11, WA Cat 3D USML XII, CCL Cat 3D
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Digital memories with clock rate > 200 MHz
SIGNAL SYNTHESIS SOFTWARE SEE-THROUGH FILTERING
Accuracy > 98% Comb Filters; Narrow sloped filters < 0.5
Mimic accuracy Filter codes
Also called Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM).
9-5
SECTION 9.3
OPTICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Overview (See Figure 9.3-1) In past MCTL compilations, optical countermeasures were listed under the general field of electronic attack (EA). The increased use of optical devices in many weapon systems necessitated a separate field for this important technology. Optical countermeasures (OCM) include lasers, remote sensing television, the plethora of IR devices, UV sensors, spectrometers, radiometers, and hyperspectral and multispectral devices plus a number of decoys. The OCM field will continue to grow and require more sophisticated answers in the future. The Joint Staff Electronic Warfare Plan and the DoD S&T Plan cover OCM in detail. Rationale (See Table 9.3-1) The importance of OCM in modern warfare cannot be overestimated. Most important have been the rapid technological changes. The advances in FLIRs and IRSTs and focal plane arrays (FPAs) are covered by MCTL Section 15 (Sensors and Lasers Technology). The critical elements for many optical sensors are inherent in superior lensing and engineering; however, for OCM, the use of microprocessors and digital signal processing equipment is critical. The short time interval between target acquisition to "kill" requires that the processing element must intercept, identify, categorize, and counter the weapon in milliseconds. Technologies that have improved weapon systems include surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices and digital signal processors (DSPs). When combined with readout integrated circuits (ROICs), these devices and processors resolve the measures (EP/OCCM) taken to defeat EA, such as dual band and multispectral operations, by accurate and timely identification of the counterthreats. For OCM, optical hardening is very important because of the extreme operational environments.
Optical Countermeasures

Special Materials Optical Hardness Bandwidth Signal Processing

Sensors Airborne Space Land Sea
Figure 9.3-1.
Optical Countermeasures Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 9.0-2) OCM development closely parallels the capability of a countrys optical development posture. Both Germany and Japan have successful optical development companies and advanced OCM equipment. Today's advances in OCM are tied closely to ROICs and DSP in combination with superior optics. NATO countriesFrance, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UKshare development work on FLIRs and FPAs, and the combination with DSPs has provided a large payoff for these devices in OCM. Russia maintains superior high-power laser devices and some less powerful lasers as well.
9-6
Table 9.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY SEMICONDUCTOR LASER: INCL COHERENT AND NON-COHERENT
Optical Countermeasures Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Molecular beam expitaxy production equipment UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS IR jamming techniques. DIRCM pointing/tracking algorithms EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E CCL EAR 99
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY
312 microns; 200 milliwatts avg power; SOURCES 1 watt peak power per pulse; 100 sec pulse width; 75 K operating temperature SOLD STATE LASERS: INCL COHERENT 3 lines in 1.55.0 band AND SS SOURCES > 20 kHz PRF
NON-COHERENT ARC LAMPS
IR DETECTORS AND ARRAYS
OPOs, CW OPO production processes Pump Diodes > 50 C, Dichroric coatings Braze temperature > 1400 C Proprietary High temperature vacuum ovens metalizing and brazing materials EW technical parameters are less stringent than InSe, HgCdTe, Array production techniques IRST or F4R and imaging missile requirements PtSi, Cryo Coolers Photon thruput efficiency > 50 C operating temperatures
IR jamming techniques
IR jamming techniques
UV DETECTOR AND MICROCHANNEL PLATES
CLOSED LOOP IR COUNTERMEASURE
6:1 S/N ratio; > 105 dBm sensitivity
VISUALLY COVERT CHEMICAL

SOURCES
1200 W/sr radiated power in the 35 micrometer band 1:3 side to rear 1:5 front to rear
SPATIALLY TAILORED EXPENDABLE SOURCES; AIRBORNE
SELF IGNITING PYROTECHNIC SOURCES Rise time < 0.2 sec to peak
AIR LAUNCH AND AERODYNAMIC

AOURCES
Operate up to Mach 1.0 at sea level
SPECIALLY TAILORED EXPENDABLE SOURCES
Ratio of 35/23 micrometer band >0.9
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E UV filters Filter production; microchannel plate Critical Element: Temporal; WA ML 11, 21, 22 production and Spatial WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Detectors, Algorithms and software test eq. FFT: analyzers WA ML 11, 21, 22 optics, trackers, WA Cat 6A, D, E FFT processors USML XII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Pyrophoric liquid None identified. Commercially available None identified WA ML 5, 15, 21, and solid Radiometers, spectrometers, 22 radiative sources interferometers and imagers are adequate USML XIII Shielded sources None identified. Commercially available None identified WA ML 5, 15, 21, Radiometers, spectrometers, 22 interferometers and imagers are adequate USML XIII Pyrophoric liquid None identified. Commercially available None identified WA ML 5, 15, 21, and solid Radiometers, spectrometers, 22 radiative sources interferometers and imagers are adequate USML XIII Propelled and None identified. Commercially available None identified WA ML 5, 15, 21, aerodynamic Radiometers, spectrometers, 22 decoys interferometers and imagers are adequate USML XIII Spectrally None identified. Commercially available None identified WA ML 5, 15, 21, matched Radiometers, spectrometers, 22 pyrotechnic interferometers and imagers are adequate USML XIII compositions and pyrophoric materials such as Activated Metal.
OCM/OCCM Rx
9-7
SECTION 9.4
OPTICAL COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES
Overview (See Figure 9.4-1) Optical Counter-Countermeasures (OCCM) are measures taken to counter optical countermeasures (OCM). As with electronic protection (EP), this means building into optically pointed weapons systems devices that can detect and counter or defeat the OCM. Multispectral, multiband, and adaptive frequency devices are common but can sometimes be defeated by wideband, high-power devices. Rationale (See Table 9.4-1) Sophisticated combat requires a catalog of "fixes" for a spectrum of scenarios because of the dynamic nature of weapons systems change, which mandates more complicated "fixes" to meet the technological challenges. In this world, the engineer is faced with all types of optical instrumentation from narrow band, high dynamic ranges to broad frequency search in a single instrument. Success in protecting such devices is limited only to the skills of the engineers. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 9.0-2) OCCM development capabilities vary considerably. Some countries have given little thought to OCCM in FLIRs and the like. Most of the more developed countries have OCCM programs concurrent with sensor and weapon system development. The US, the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have a library of "fixes" to fit most occasions as developed by their major aerospace corporations. The exact position of Russia in the general use of OCCM is not clear, although its laser work is well established.
Optical CounterCountermeasures

Special Materials Optical Hardness Bandwidth Signal Processing

Sensors Airborne Space Land Sea
Figure 9.4-1.
Optical Counter-Countermeasures Overview
Table 9.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY SIGNAL SYNTHESIS SOFTWARE SPECTRALLY MOLDED IR SOURCES
Optical Counter-Countermeasures Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified Pyroten liquids Pyrophoric solids None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XI
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Accuracy > 98% Temperature > 1000 C airborne and Temperature > 350 K shipborne when viewed in 23 and 35 bands FOV 0.5 deg Two-color seeker > 1 kHz bandwidth > 270 deg blanking
SYNTHESIZERS
None identified
Computer target matching
9-8
SECTION 10 - MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY

Rationale Manufacturing technologies are fundamental to the national industrial base. As much as any other technology, they are vital for the manufacture of military and civil hardware, and they either enable the manufacture of vital military systems or are essential for the design and manufacture of future military systems. In particular, the technologies listed in this section are critical for the manufacture of modern conventional weapons and nuclear weapons.
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6
Advanced Fabrication and Processing .................. Bearings .................................................... Metrology................................................... Non-Destructive Inspection and Evaluation ............ Production Equipment .................................... Robotics .................................................... SUMMARY
10-3 10-10 10-12 10-14 10-16 10-19
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Materials Information Systems Electronics Sensors & Lasers
Overview (See Figure 10.0-1) This section describes technologies required for the production of military hardware. In most cases, the technologies, the equipment and the know-how are dual use and impact civil applications where cost, flexibility, competitiveness, etc., have become major concerns. In some cases, these technologies are not state of the art, and the US is not the world leader in the technology. All countries engaged in the production of military weapons, munitions, and systems possess, to some degree, the know-how in the technology areas indicated in the box above. The level of the technology possessed by a country directly affects the level of military hardware that can be produced and the cost and reliability of the hardware. The concerns of the US are no longer directed solely at the former technologically advanced Warsaw Pact countries but also at developing countries that are attempting to produce weapons of mass destruction (see Part II for further discussion). Therefore, the level of concern for machine tool technology necessary to meet the US antiproliferation goals is less than that for the state-of-the-art machine tools. Several different technologies, associated with a modern industrial base, are addressed in this section: many types of machine tools for advanced fabrication, production, and processing; certain nondestructive evaluation (NDE); and nondestructive inspection (NDI) equipment; bearings; and certain robots.
MANUFACTURING & FABRICATION
TREND
Efficiency Economy High/Low Volume Battlefield Performance - Durability - Survivability - Robustness

Figure 10.0-1. Manufacturing and Fabrication Overview
10-1
Country
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) Since manufacturing is so fundamental to the industrial base of any country, the availability of machines necessary to produce military and civil hardware is worldwide. The differences between the manufacturing capabilities of various countries are the level of the machine tools available and the experience and training of the operators. As a result, the level of machine tool technology of the major industrial countries is very high, with the US, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden all having considerable expertise. The technology level in Russia and China is increasing markedly, with some rudimentary 5-axes machine tools becoming available in those countries. In bearing technology, France, Germany, and Sweden are the major countries with advanced capability while Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK have considerable capability. In metrology, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK are the leading countries with expertise. In NDI, France, Germany and Japan have extensive capability. In robotics, Japan is the major competitor to the US, while France, Germany, and Russia have niche capabilities.
10.1 Advanced Fabrication & Processing
10.2 Bea rings
10.3 Metrology
10.4 NonDestructive Inspection & Evaluation
10.5 Production Equipment
1 0.6 Robotics
Australia Austria Brazil Canada China France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Spain Sweden Switzerland UK US
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 10.0-2.
Manufacturing and Fabrication FTA Summary
10-2
SECTION 10.1
ADVANCED FABRICATION AND PROCESSING

Advanced Fabrication & Processing
Overview (See Figure 10.1-1) This subsection encompasses two groups of technologies. The first group includes equipment for fabricating structures of various advanced manufacturing techniques: spin, flow, and shear forming machines; superplastic forming/diffusion bonding; high-temperature furnaces and heaters; and stretch forming machines. These technologies involve such actions as bending and/or stretching finished material to form a desired shape or rolling material over mandrels to form curvilinear or cylindrical cross-section parts. The second group includes the development, refinement, and production of nonorganic coatings for nonelectronic substrates. Such substrates include metal, ceramics, various composites, and optical systems. The technologies cover all pertinent coating design features, such as coating formulation, substrate and source material preparation, and post-coating treatments. Of concern are coatings to (1) protect substrate materials from oxidation, hot corrosion, wear, erosion and fatigue; (2) reduce heat input to the substrate; or (3) modify the reflectance or transmittance of the substrate material. For information on related CAD/CAM technology see subsection 8.2. Rationale (See Table 10.1-1) Modern weapon systems require different processing equipment to manufacture necessary components. For example, spin, flow, and shear forming machines are required for the fabrication of thin-walled, long, concentric hollow bodies such as missile structures, shaped charge liners, and parts for jet engines; superplastic forming/diffusion bonding equipment is used for the fabrication of sheet metal structures of advanced alloys (e.g., titanium, nickel, and aluminum), where reliability and cost are important factors; high-temperature furnaces are used for casting uranium and plutonium, both key weapons parts, and for graphitizing carbon and carbon/carbon composites for rocket motor nozzles; and stretch forming machines require about 70 percent less force than conventional press forming and are used extensively for many critical aircraft structures. Coatings are the only technique to alter substrates to meet specified military requirements. Mechanical coatings are required for radiation hardening, wear and corrosion resistance, and extended-life requirements of items such as sensor systems, structures, power systems, gas turbine engines, bearings, and other components operating in hostile environments. Optical coatings are used to tailor aircraft or missile surfaces as a means of avoiding radar detection.

Tolerance Levels Application Processes Quality Speed Economy of Scale Producability

Systems/Equipment Air Ground Sea Space
Figure 10.1-1.
Advanced Fabrication and Processing Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 10.0-2) Several other countriesJapan, Germany, the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland, in particularhave developed extensive capabilities in various phases of coating technologies. Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Italy have capabilities in most of the coating technologies.
10-3
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY SPIN, FLOW AND SHEAR FORMING
MACHINES
Advanced Fabrication and Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2B, D, E MTCR 3 NDUL 1.1 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA0 Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.4 CCL Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.8 CCL Cat 2B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Equipped with numerical or computer controls, containing > 2 axes contouring control and capable of applying a roller force > 60 kN.
SUPERPLASTIC FORMING/DIFFUSION BONDING (SPF/DB)
Capable of bonding certain alloys (primarily titanium, nickel, aluminum and titanium aluminides) in a single heat cycle. VACUUM OR CONTROLLED Diameter 600 mm inside the induction coil, ENVIRONMENT INDUCTION FURNACES Operating at > 850 C using 0.5 kW power supplies VACUUM OR CONTROLLED Arc melt and casting furnaces with consumable ATMOSPHERE METALLURGICAL electrode capacities >1,000 cm3 and MELTING AND CASTING FURNACES < 20,000 cm3 and operating at temp >1,700 C. Electron beam melting and plasma atomization and melting furnaces with power 50 kW and temperature >1,200 C CHEMICAL VAPOUR DEPOSITION (CVD) Either high vacuum rotating seals (< 0.01 Pa) or EQUIPMENT in situ coating thickness control. ION IMPLANTATION EQUIPMENT Beam current > 5 mA.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc.
PHYSICAL VAPOR DEPOSITION (PVD): E-BEAM EVAPORATION (EB-PVD)

EQUIPMENT
Power > 80 kW, a liquid pool level laser control system for regulation of the ingot feed-rate and a computer controlled rate monitor (principle of photoluminescense of the ionized atoms in the evaporant stream). Grid or electric fields for steering control of the arc on the cathode. Vacuum of 10-3 torr, or better, a substrate to plasma bias of 15 to 20 V and An overall capability to deposit film with a uniformity of +/- 1.0 percent over the substrate surface. Substrate temperature; laser wavelength, power density, pulse length and repetition rate; and the ability to automatically manipulate the workpiece. Pack composition and formulation; Carrier gas composition: Time-temperature-pressure cycles.
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 3B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 3B, D, E WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B
PHYSICAL VAPOUR DEPOSITION (CATHODIC ARC DISCHARGE)

EQUIPMENT PHYSICAL VAPOR DEPOSITION (PVD): RESISTIVE HEATING PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc.
WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B
PHYSICAL VAPOR DEPOSITION (PVD): LASER VAPORIZATION
None identified
Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc.
None identified
WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B
PACK CEMENTATION COATING

EQUIPMENT
None identified
Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc.
None identified
WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B (cont'd)
10-4
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY SLURRY DEPOSITION COATING
EQUIPMENT
Advanced Fabrication and Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (contd)

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Composition of powder; Application technique: Drying procedure: Temperature cycle. Either operation at reduced pressure controlled atmosphere (< 10 kPa) measured above and within 300 mm of gun nozzle in a vacuum chamber capable of 0.01 Pa; or Incorporating in situ coating thickness control. Capable of current densities > 0.1 mA/mm2 at a deposition rate > 15 micrometer/hr. Either operation at reduced pressure controlled atmosphere (10 kPa measured above and within 300 mm of gun nozzle) in a vacuum chamber capable of 0.01 Pa; or Incorporating in situ coating thickness control. Capable of measuring reflectance/transmission to better than 1 part in 1,000 absolute accuracy or Absorption/scatter to better than 1 part in 100,000. Capable of producing cooled turbine blades with stress rupture life exceeding 400 hours at 1273 K (1,000 C) at a stress of 200 MPa. Three or more coordinated axes. CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B None
THERMAL SPRAY EQUIPMENT
None identified
None identified
SPUTTER DEPOSITION EQUIPMENT PLASMA SPRAY EQUIPMENT
Surface analysis techniques; e.g., Auger analysis, SIMS, etc. None identified
WA Cat 2B CCL Cat 2B WA IL Cat 2
METROLOGY EQUIPMENT FOR

SPECTRAL CHARACTERIZATION OF REFLECTANCE, TRANSMISSION, ABSORPTION AND SCATTER.
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
SINGLE CRYSTAL ALLOY CASTING

EQUIPMENT
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 9B, D, E CCL Cat 9B, D, E WA Cat 1B, D, E MTCR 6 CCL Cat 1B, D, E WA Cat 1B. D. E MTCR 6 CC: Cat 1B, D, E WA Cat 1B, D, E MTCR 6 CCL Cat 1B, D, E WA Cat 1B, D, E CCL Cat 1B, D, E
COMPOSITE FILAMENT WINDING EQUIPMENT
None identified
None identified
None identified
COMPOSITE TAPE LAYING EQUIPMENT Two or more coordinated axes.
None identified
None identified
None identified
COMPOSITE WEAVING OR INTERLACING Ability to perform multi-directional and multiEQUIPMENT dimensional weaving or interlacing.
None identified
None identified
None identified
EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCING PREPEGS Ability to manufacture prepegs with a specific None identified BY THE HOT MELT METHOD tensile strength > 17 104 m and A specific modulus > 10 106 m or A melting, softening or sublimation point >1,922 K (1,649 C). EQUIPMENT TO MANUFACTURE FIBERS Capable of converting polymeric fibers (such as None identified polyacrylonitrile, rayon, pitch, or polycarbosilane) into carbon fibers or silicon carbide fibers.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
(cont'd)
10-5
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS SPECIALLY DESIGNED
Advanced Fabrication and Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1B, D, E CCL Cat 1B, D, E
TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF METAL ALLOYS AND METAL POWDERS. EQUIPMENT FOR THE Ability to manufacture micromechanical devices None identified MANUFACTURE OF with dimensions 1 micron. MICROMECHANICAL DEVICES, INCLUDING LITHOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT, ELECTRON AND ION BEAM MILLING-ETCHING-GRINDINGPOLISHING MACHINES, CHEMICAL VAPOUR DEPOSITION AND ETCHING EQUIPMENT. DEEP HOLE DRILLING MACHINES Computer controlled and having a maximum None identified
Capable of maintaining a contamination level < None identified 3 non-metallic particles larger than 100 microns in 109 alloy particles (for nickel).
Material removal and assembly None identified equipment including lithography, electron and ion beam milling, grinding, etching, polishing, chemical vapor deposition and etching; and tooling and fixturing
WA Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 3B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 3B, D, E
None identified
None identified
depth-of-bore > 5,000 mm. HYDRAULIC STRETCH FORMING MACHINES PYROLYTIC DEPOSITION Capable both of exerting a stretching load of None identified greater than 300 tons and forming sheets larger than 2 meters by 3 meters. Ability to produce pyrolytically derived materials None identified (e.g., pyrolytic graphite), from precursor gases which decompose in the 1300 to 2900 C range, at pressures of 1 mm Hg to 150 mmHg. Prevents degradation of engine and missile Substrates: Carbon-carbon, parts at temperatures > 1600 o C; ceramic and metal matrix composites; ceramics; superalloys; titanium alloys; and refractory metals (and alloys); None identified None identified
WA Cat 1B, D, E CCL Cat 1B, D, E None
None identified
None identified
MTCR 7 CCL Cat 1B, D, E WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E
TECHNOLOGY FOR HOT-SECTION COATINGS:

CORROSION RESISTANCE
Chemical vapor deposition (CVD); Physical Vapor deposition, electron beam and cathodic arc discharge; thermal spraying; sputter deposition and pack cementation.
Not applicable
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR HOTSECTION COATINGS:

HIGH TEMPERATURE PROTECTION
Permits engine and missile parts to operate at temperatures > 1600 o C.
Coatings: Silicides, alloyed silicides, carbides, other refractory metals, aluminides, alloyed aluminides, MCrAIX, modified zirconia, borides, nitrides, abradable nickel graphite, abradable Al-SiPolyester and abradable materials containing Ni-CrAl. Substrates: Superalloys Sputter deposition Coatings: Zirconia
Not applicable
WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E (cont'd)
10-6
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAR/EROSION RESISTANCE:
ENGINE PARTS

CRITICAL MATERIALS Substrates: Titanium alloys, superalloys, carbon-carbon, metal matrix composites and refractory metals. UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Ion implantation, thermal spraying, sputter deposition, physical vapor deposition-electron beam and cathodic arc discharge, chemical vapor deposition, pack cementation and slurry deposition. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Not applicable EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Extended life of turbine blades and vanes, fuel nozzles, seals, etc.
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAR/EROSION RESISTANCE: DIESEL ENGINES.
Extended life of diesel engine valves, cylinder heads and exhaust passages.
Coatings: abradable Sl-SiPolyester and abradable materials containing Al-Si-Al , borides, silicides, carbides, diamond-like carbon, boron nitride, alumi. Substrates: Aluminum alloys, Thermal spraying carbon-carbon, ceramic and metal matrix composites.
Not applicable
WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAR/EROSION RESISTANCE: BEARINGS.
Coatings: MCrAIX, modified zirconia, silicides and mixtures Extended bearing life, resulting in reliable Substrates: High temperature Ion implantation motion of moving parts in engines, missiles and steel bearings, beryllium, inertial guidance systems; beryllium alloys and ceramics. Coatings: Chromium, tantalum, niobium.
Not applicable
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR THE

PROTECTION OF FIBERS USED IN COMPOSITE MATERIALS.
Prevents degradation of the fibers, whiskers or particles of the composite material, resulting from reaction with the matrix or the environment. Operation in unfriendly environments.
Substrates: Carbon-carbon, ceramic and metal matrix composites.
Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), Not applicable sputter deposition and physical vapor deposition electron beam, resistive heating, and laser vaporization. Not applicable
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF ORGANIC MATRIX COMPOSITES.
Coatings: Silicides, carbides and refractory metals. Cleanliness of substrate, Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), overall environment, control physical vapor deposition: cathodic of substrate temperatures gas arc discharge. composition and cathode material for PVDC-cathodic arc discharge.
10-7
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Not applicable EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR ANTIErosion protection against dust, sand and water REFLECTION AND RESISTANCE TO particles (sensors and domes); EROSION AND ABRASION ON INFRARED Anti-reflection coatings. (IR) DOMES AND SENSOR WINDOWS
Substrates: Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), alumina, gallium physical vapor deposition-laser arsenide, gallium vaporization. phosphide, germanium, sapphire, silicon, zinc selenide, zinc sulfide, and hafnium and zirconium fluoride metal halides.
Coatings: boron phosphide, diamond-like carbon, germanium, magnesium oxide, thalium fluoride, various metallic oxides and dielectric layers. COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR SELECTIVE Coatings which either transmit or reflect Substrates: WAVELENGTH TRANSMISSION AND radiation through or from the surface of domes alumina, gallium REFLECTIVITY: DOMES AND SENSOR or sensor windows. Such films transmit the arsenide, gallium WINDOWS desired radiation for the operation of the system phosphide, electronics, but reflect the radiation that would germanium, degrade system operat sapphire, silicon, zinc selenide, zinc sulfide, and the following halides: hafnium fluoride and zirconium fluoride. Coatings: various metallic oxides and dielectric materials. Substrates: Lightweight, erectable composite matrix structures and films (e.g., mylar). Coatings: Aluminum, gold and dielectric layers.
Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), physical vapor deposition-laser vaporization; equipment for measuring absolute reflectance to an accuracy of 0.1%.
Not applicable
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR SPACE Scatter - 10-3 w/cm2 and absorption < 10-3; OPTICS COATINGS - EROSION Broadband and multi-wavelength reflective PROTECTION AND HIGH-REFLECTIVITY, coatings.
PARTIALLY TRANSMISSIVE OR SELECTIVE WAVELENGTH COATINGS
Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), sputter deposition and physical vapor deposition electron beam, resistive heating and laser vaporization.
Not applicable
10-8
Table 10.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR COATINGS ON OPTICAL SUBSTRATES; O EROSION PROTECTION; O OPTICAL CHARACTERISTICS; O MIRROR FORMATION.

CRITICAL MATERIALS Substrates: Low expansion glasses, cemented tungsten carbide, molybdenum (and alloys), berylliu7m (and alloys), silicon carbide and carbon-carbon, ceramic and metal matrix composites. UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), sputter deposition and physical vapor deposition electron beam, ion beam enhanced deposition, ion plating and laser vaporization. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Not applicable EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Selectable or variable bandpass in 0.2 to 20 micron spectral range; High transmission for very narrow bands in this spectral range; Broadband and multi-wavelength reflective coatings.
COATING TECHNOLOGY FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF SUBSTRATES WHICH PROVIDE SIGNATURE REDUCTION.
Extend operational performance of signature reducing substrates.
Coatings: aluminum, beryllium, boron nitride, silicides, carbides, and dialectric layers. Cleanliness of Chemical vapor deposition (CVD), substrate, overall physical vapor deposition: cathodic arc environment, discharge control of substrate temperatures gas composition and cathode material for PVD-cathodic arc discharge
None identified
10-9
SECTION 10.2
Overview (See Figure 10.2-1) This subsection covers various types of bearings and the technology required for their development and manufacture. Bearing types have proliferated as the applications for their use have developed, particularly in advanced machines where the relative motion between two parts must occur smoothly, quietly, and reliably and with a long time between failures. In general, bearings can be categorized as either sliding surface, rolling element, or magnetic. Sliding bearings may incorporate self-lubricating materials or introduce a lubricant between the moving parts. When load capacity is obtained because of the dynamic motion within the bearing, it is known as a hydrodynamic bearing. Rolling bearings, however, may use either balls, cylindrical rollers, tapered rollers, spherical rollers, or needle roller elements. The lubricant, bearing design, materials, and operating environment are usually important parameters in the development of a thin lubricant film between the rolling elements and the mating surfaces within the bearing. Magnetic bearings are manufactured using magnetic materials and operate in a mode in which the surfaces do not physically slide or roll on each other but are separated by the strength of the magnetic field. Bearings addressed in this subsection include the following types: Sliding bearings - fluid film, gas film, and fabric-lined Rolling element bearings - precision, hostile environment element anti-friction, low-torque anti-friction, and extreme precision Magnetic bearings - active. Rationale (See Table 10.2-1) Bearings are key components in military equipment that use rotating elements and in precision machine tools and metrology equipment used for manufacturing military hardware. Bearing quality has a primary effect on the reliability and operating life of mechanical, electrical, and electronic equipment and in the power conservation of such equipment. Rolling element bearings are critical for aircraft engines, missiles, inertial guidance and tracking systems, and fire control systems. Sliding bearings are used in precision machine tools and guidance systems where lubrication is difficult. Low-torque bearings are critical to the operation of gyros and accelerometers. Active magnetic bearings are used in precision machine tools and are being developed for aircraft and ship propulsion systems.
BEARINGS
Bearings

Increased Reliability Longer Operating Life Power Conservation

Propulsion Navigation Pointing and Tracking
Figure 10.2-1.
Bearings Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) The US is the world leader in bearings, although a number of countries have extensive capabilities. France, Germany, Italy, and Japan have capabilities across most of the spectrum of the technology, with France having the broadest capabilities, particularly in active magnetic bearings.
10-10
Table 10.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY
Bearings Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy. Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy Grinding, lapping and honing machines and fixtures; gaging and metrology equipment for curved geometry measurement to 1 inch accuracy UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE NTL B5 CCL 2B, D, E
BEARING, BALL
Manufactured for use in a radioactive environment Tungsten carbide, synthetic sapphire, OR SOLID at temperatures > 300 C either by use of special Monel, beryllium, M50 NiL steel, Stellite, ROLLER, EXCEPT materials or by special heat treatment. Inconel, beryllium copper or silicon TAPERED. nitride. BEARING, BALL Having lubrication elements or modifications that Tungsten carbide, synthetic sapphire, OR SOLID enable operation at speeds > 2.3 million DN. Monel, beryllium, M50 NiL steel, Stellite, ROLLER, EXCEPT Inconel, beryllium copper or silicon TAPERED. nitride. BEARING, BALL For 0.5 inch-pitch-diameter bearings with 5 104 Tungsten carbide, synthetic sapphire, OR SOLID Monel, beryllium, M50 NiL steel, Stellite, radial play, operate at slow speed (14 RPM) ROLLER, EXCEPT 400 gram thrust load friction torque < 0.6 gm cm; Inconel, beryllium copper or silicon TAPERED. nitride. For other sizes, loads or clearances, a starting torque < 4,500 milligm-mm. BEARINGS, Having tolerances of ABEC 9. ABEC 9P, ISO Tungsten carbide, synthetic sapphire, PRECISION BALL Standard Class 2 or 2A, or better. Monel, beryllium, M50 NiL steel, Stellite, Inconel, beryllium copper or silicon nitride. BEARINGS, Having tolerances of ANSI/AFBMA/ISO Class Manufactured from M50 NiL steel, or SOLID TAPERED 0 inch or ANSI/AFBMA Class B/ISO Class 4, or silicon nitride, with lubrication elements ROLLER better, with lubrication elements allowing speeds allowing speeds > 2.3 million DN and a fracture toughness of > 2.3 million DN. 45 ksi square root inches. BEARINGS, Having tolerances of ANSI/AFBMA/ISO Class M50 NiL steel, or silicon nitride, for SOLID TAPERED 0 inch or ANSI/AFBMA Class B/ISO Class 4, or operation at temperatures < 54 C or > ROLLER better, for operation at temperatures < 54 C or 150 C. > 150 C and having a fracture toughness of 45 ksi square root inches. BEARINGS, Having a fracture toughness of 45 ksi square root M50 NiL steel. NEEDLE ROLLER inches. BEARINGS, GAS- Operation at temperatures > 288 C and a unit Gas; e.g., helium. LUBRICATED load capacity > 15 psi ( 01 MPa) and, FOIL In machine tools, permits runouts of 0.0004 mm (about 1/2 that of precision rolling bearings). BEARINGS, Having flux densities of 2.0 teslas, or greater, and High-saturation flux-density magnetic ACTIVE Yield strengths > 414 MPa. materials; e.g., Vanadium Permandur, MAGNETIC Hiperco 27. BEARINGS,
ACTIVE MAGNETIC
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
None identified
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Having all electromagnetic 3D homopolar bias designs for actuators
Magnetic materials with load carrying capacities > 70 psi and rare-earth high density materials. Magnetic materials with load carrying capacities > 70 psi and rare-earth high density materials.
None identified
BEARINGS,
ACTIVE MAGNETIC
Having position sensors capable of operation at temperatures > 177 C.
None identified
WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E
10-11
SECTION 10.3 METROLOGY

Overview (See Figure 10.3-1) This subsection covers technology for dimensional measuring systems and equipment needed for precise determination of the dimensions of manufactured parts, machine tools, and inspection machines. Included are systems for in-process measurement and postmanufacture inspection. This technology area is of paramount importance for the construction of systems incorporating mechanical or electrical components built to exacting tolerances, whether such hardware is military or civil. This technology is highly dependent on sensors, positioners, feedback systems, digital computers, and associated components and hardware. Included in the list of metrology equipment are coordinate, linear and angular measurement machines using laser, standard light, photogrammetry, and noncontact techniques. The tolerances of parts measured range from 1 nm (corresponding to an optical surface finish prepared by diamond turning, with ion beam polishing) to 10 m (corresponding to more traditional metal machining). Rationale (See Table 10.3-1) Accurate dimensional inspection is essential for the design, development, manufacture, and use of a wide range of military hardware. State-of-the-art aircraft, missiles, navy vessels, quiet propellers, bearings, avionics, and other military hardware require precision measurement for the development and manufacturing control. Such measurements are critical for both in-process control and measurement of the finished product. Dimensional accuracies required for the interchangeability of components critical to the maintenance and reliability of equipment in the field can only be ascertained by state-of-the-art metrology equipment. Recent advances in laser metrology have opened new applications for metrology equipment. For example, laser-based measurement systems can be used to scan and digitize a parts geometry and produce a computer program to create duplicate parts. This capability permits rapid, accurate, and cost-effective testing.
Metrology

Accuracy Determination Dimensional Surface Planarity

Manufacturing Tools Jigs Test Equipment End Product Components
Figure 10.3-1.
Metrology Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) Several foreign countries have developed sophisticated metrology capabilities. Germany and the UK have capabilities across the spectrum of the technology, while France, Japan, and Switzerland have advanced capabilities in most of the technologies associated with metrology. Many countries have niche capabilities, e.g. Israel has capability in laser based metrology.
10-12
Table 10.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Metrology Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Laser interferometer measuring equipment with accuracies < 1 m UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.3 CCL Cat 2B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY
COMPUTER, NUMERICALLY OR STORED Computer controlled coordinate-measuring machine None identified PROGRAM CONTROLLED DIMENSIONAL (CMM) with both: INSPECTION MACHINES 2 axes; and a one dimensional length measurement uncertainty (1.25 + L/1,000) m, tested with a probe with an accuracy of < 0.2 m (L is the measured length in mm). LINEAR DISPLACEMENT (NONNon-contact type with a resolution 0.2 m within a None identified CONTACT) MEASURING DEVICES measuring range of 0.2 mm. Linearity 0.1% within a measuring range up to 5 None identified mm; and Drift 0.1% per day at a standard ambient room temperature 1 K. Laser, and None identified The capability to maintain, for at least 12 hours, over a temperature range of 1 K around a standard temperature and pressure, both A resolution 0.1 m over full scale and A measurement uncertainty (0.2 m + L/2000 m). ANGULAR DISPLACEMENT MEASURING Angular position deviation 0.00025. None identified LINEAR MEASURING MACHINES USING
LINEAR VOLTAGE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSFORMER SYSTEMS LINEAR MEASURING MACHINES DEVICES
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.3 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.3 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.3 CCL Cat 2B, D, E
None identified
None identified
METROLOGY EQUIPMENT FOR

SPECTRAL CHARACTERIZATION OF REFLECTANCE, TRANSMISSION, ABSORPTION AND SCATTER LASER LOCATION SYSTEMS
Capable of measuring reflectance/transmission to better than 50 ppm absolute accuracy or Absorption/scatter to better than 10 ppm.
None identified
None identified
None identified
Automated, laser measuring system that uses optical None identified triangulation to achieve high accuracy of 3 dimensional positions, with The capability to measure 10 points per second. NON-CONTACT PROBE MEASUREMENT 5 Angstroms (5 10-8 cm) accuracy None identified
EQUIPMENT SOLID MODEL FITTING TECHNIQUE
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.3 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 6B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 6B, D, E CCL EAR 99
None identified Machine tools, very accurate bearings and races, and laser measuring equipment
None identified Solid model fitting software
CCL EAR 99 WA Cat 2A, B, D, E CCL Cat 2A, B, D, E
An advanced means to evaluate conformance to None identified design. Utilize randomly measured points described by three-dimensional standard coordinates, adjusts for misalignment of model, and reports deviations.
10-13
SECTION 10.4
NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION EQUIPMENT
Overview (See Figure 10.4-1) This subsection covers technologies for the non-destructive detection and characterization of flaws, such as cracks, porosity, inclusions, and delaminations, and for the non-destructive measurement or prediction of mechanical properties, such as bond strength or elastic moduli in materials, components, or structures. The technologies also involve the means for interpreting the significance of detected flaws so that an immediate accept/ reject decision can be made or incremental changes can be made to correct a flawed or out-of-control process. In many instances, they provide the basis for the design and the determination of reliability and maintenance requirements for military systems, including ordnance, vehicles, ships, submarines, aircraft, and missiles. Rationale (See Table 10.4-1) The optimal use of structural materials, as well as the introduction of high-performance systems for military applications, is critically dependent on the ability to detect and characterize strength-limiting flaws and defects. The technologies addressed in this subsection are used in developing new materials and in manufacturing hardware. They are unsurpassed in detecting problems in design or manufacture and in minimizing latent failures in delivered hardware systems, i.e., they minimize unexpected structure failure. The technologies make possible the calculation of fracture residual-life prediction and, on occasion, the life extension of mechanically critical components in aircraft, ships, and vehicles, thus enhancing military readiness. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) Several other countries have developed sophisticated NDE capabilities. Germany and France have capabilities across the spectrum of the technology, while Australia, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK have advanced capabilities in most of the technologies associated with NDE.
Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment

Non-Destructive Nature Advanced Sensing Techniques Increased Quality and Reliability

Figure 10.4-1.
Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment Overview
10-14
Table 10.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF ADAPTIVE
MOTION CONTROL FOR SCANNING COMPONENTS WHOSE NOMINAL ENVELOPE MAY VARY. NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEMS IN MORE THAN 4 INTERPOLATING AXES WHICH CAN BE COORDINATED SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR CONTOURING CONTROL COMPUTER-BASED AUTOMATIC INSPECTION EQUIPMENT HAVING DEDICATED CIRCUITRY, HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATIC COLLECTION, REDUCTION, ANALYSIS AND ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA, AND CAPABLE OF PROCESSING DATA IN REAL TIME.
Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE Special algorithms to control CCL EAR 99 inspection
2 axes with adaptive control, allowing feedback action and equipped with sensors to allow examination of item to be inspected.
> 4 interpolating axes that can be coordinated simultaneously for contouring control
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
Complete hardware/software system to allow None identified control of equipment, as well as performing complete data collection, reduction and analysis, whether in real-time or near real-time.
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
10-15
SECTION 10.5
PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
Overview (See Figure 10.5-1) This subsection addresses machine tools used for the production of military systems and components. The individual machine tools provide the foundation of a manufacturing base. The equipment includes both numerically controlled (NC) and non-NC machines. NC machines are computer controlled so that the motions of the various axes are simultaneously and continually coordinated to maintain a predetermined (programmed) path. This machinery includes turning, milling, and grinding machines, electrical discharge machines (EDM); water and liquid jet machines; and electron beam and laser cutting machines. The non-NC machines include single point diamond cutting and fly-cutting machine tools. Such tools have wide application in the production of optical-quality surfaces. Rationale (See Table 10.5-1) NC machine tools are used widely in the defense and aerospace industries. Their ability to produce complex shapes with minimum set-up time and fixturing makes them critical to the batch processing of components for modern weapons systems. These machines are vital for the manufacture of aircraft structures, submarine and ship propellers (particularly quiet propellers), turbine and compressor blades, etc. Certain machine tools are critical for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Non-NC machines, such as single point diamond machines and fly-cutting machines, are used to produce Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) components, windows, and seekers for missiles. Other applications of equipment manufactured with these machines include IR optics, missile domes, grazing incidence X-ray optics, alignment fixtures for high power lasers, etc. In short, machine tools are an essential part of the US industrial base.
Production Equipment

Number of Axes Positioning Accuracy Contour Control Quality and Reproducibility

Figure 10.5-1.
Production Equipment Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) Japan, Germany, France, and Switzerland are comparable to the US in certain machine tool capabilities. Indeed, they surpass the US in some categories. Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have extensive capabilities in some of the niche areas. China has developed some capabilities in 4- and 5-axis machines, although the degree of their capability, relating to quality and quantity, is still unknown.
10-16
Table 10.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY MILLING MACHINE FOR REMOVING OR CUTTING METALS, CERAMICS OR
COMPOSITES MACHINE TOOLS FOR REMOVING OR CUTTING METALS, CERAMICS OR COMPOSITES BY TURNING, GRINDING OR MILLING
Production Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.2 CCL Cat 2B, D, E CCL EAR 99
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY More than 4 axes which have simultaneous contouring control, including rotary axes.
Two or more axes which have simultaneous contouring control and either Tilting spindles, Camming > 0.2 m, Run-out < 0.2 m, or Positioning accuracy on any rotary axis < 0.001 GRINDING MACHINE FOR REMOVING OR Two or more axes which have simultaneous contouring CUTTING METALS, CERAMICS OR control and COMPOSITES A positioning accuracy < 4 m. MACHINE TOOLS FOR REMOVING OR Two or more axes which have simultaneous contouring CUTTING METALS, CERAMICS OR control and COMPOSITES BY TURNING OR MILLING A positioning accuracy < 6 m. ELECTRODISCHARGE MACHINES (EDM) Five or more axes for contour control OF WIRE-FEED TYPE ELECTRODISCHARGE MACHINES (EDM) Two or more rotary axes for contour control
OF NONWIRE TYPE
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B. D. E CC: Cat 2B. D. E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.2 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
None identified
None identified
None identified
MACHINE TOOLS FOR REMOVING METALS, CERAMICS OR COMPOSITES, BY MEANS OF WATER, OTHER LIQUID JETS, ELECTRON BEAM OR LASER BEAM. SPINDLE ASSEMBLIES, CONSISTING OF
SPINDLES AND BEARINGS AS A MINIMAL ASSEMBLY, SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR MACHINE TOOLS DESCRIBED ABOVE. LINEAR POSITION FEEDBACK UNITS (E.G., INDUCTIVE TYPE DEVICES, GRADUATED SCALES, OR LASER SYSTEMS). ROTARY POSITION FEEDBACK UNITS (E.G., INDUCTIVE TYPE DEVICES, GRADUATED SCALES, OR LASER SYSTEMS). SLIDE WAY ASSEMBLIES CONSISTING OF A MINIMAL ASSEMBLY OF WAYS, BED AND SLIDE.
Two or more rotary axes, that can be coordinated simultaneously, and A positioning accuracy of better than 0.003 Run-out or camming < 0.0006 mm (0.6 m) in one revolution of the spindle.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
An overall accuracy < [(800 + (600 L 103)] nm, where L is the effective length in mm. An accuracy < 0.00025.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Yaw, pitch or roll < 2 sec. of arc TIR total indicator reading; horizontal straightness < 2 m/300 mm length; and vertical straightness < 2 m/300 mm length. SINGLE POINT DIAMOND CUTTING TOOL Flawless and chip-free cutting edge when magnified 400 INSERTS. times; Cutting radius from 0.1 to 0.5 mm, inclusive; and Cutting radius out-of-roundness < 0.002 mm TIR.
None Identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
Diamond cutting None identified tools
None identified
CCL EAR 99
(cont'd)
10-17
Table 10.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY NON-NUMERICALLY CONTROLLED
Production Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY
Slide positioning accuracy < .0005 mm/300 mm of travel; None identified MACHINE TOOLS FOR GENERATING Bidirectional slide positioning repeatability OPTICAL QUALITY SURFACE USING A < .00025 mm/300 mm of travel; SINGLE POINT CUTTING TOOL. Spindle run-out and camming < .0004 mm; Angular deviation < 2 sec. of arc; and Perpendicularity < .001 mm/300 mm travel. NON-NUMERICALLY CONTROLLED FLY- Spindle run-out and camming < 0.0004 mm TIR; and None identified CUTTING MACHINE TOOLS FOR Angular deviation of slide movement (yaw, pitch and roll) GENERATING OPTICAL QUALITY < 2 seconds of arc., TIR, over full travel.
SURFACES MACHINE TOOLS SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR CUTTING, GRINDING, HONING AND FINISHING OF HARDENED SPUR, HELICAL AND DOUBLE HELICAL GEARS.
None identified
None identified
Ability to produce hardened gears (Rc 40) with a pitch diameter > 1,250 mm and A face width of 15% of pitch diameter, or larger, finished to a quality of AGMA-14, or better (equivalent to ISO 1328 class 3). HOT ISOSTATIC PRESSES Chamber cavity whose inside diameter 406 mm; a A working pressure > 204 MPa; and Thermal environment >1,773 K; GRINDING, LAPPING AND HONING Capable of manufacturing precision bearings with radial MACHINES FOR PRECISION BEARINGS run-out of 8 microinches, or better. SOFTWARE FOR NC'S/PC'S THAT HAVE The ability to control a machine tool having 4 axes, such 4-AXES SIMULTANEOUS CONTOURING that the movement on each axis can be simultaneously CONTROL. contour controlled. SOFTWARE FOR NC'S/PC'S THAT HAVE Ability to modify machining instructions, as a result of REAL TIME PROCESSING OF DATA BY measuring > 1 variable, and ADAPTIVE CONTROL WITH MORE THAN Capable of changing one, or more machining instructions.
ONE PHYSICAL VARIABLE MEASURED AND PROCESSED BY MEANS OF A COMPUTING MODEL TO CHANGE ONE OR MORE MACHINING INSTRUCTIONS.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.5 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
None identified
None identified
Software which allows real- WA Cat 2B, D, E time modification of the tool CCL Cat 2B, D, E path, feed rate or spindle data.
10-18
SECTION 10.6
Overview (See Figure 10.6-1) This subsection covers the technology for the general category of robots, controllers and end-effectors used in conjunction with other manufacturing equipment for the production or testing of critical hardware. Robots can essentially be separated into four distinct disciplines: the robot, the controller (computer), sensors (including cameras), and end effectors (the "gripper"). Robots have found a wide range of applications in manufacturing, including welders, sprayers, assemblers, loaders/unloaders, etc. They have also found use in handling hazardous or radioactive materials, transporting explosive weapons, and performing tasks in space. Rationale (See Table 10.6-1) Robots have found wide use in most advanced manufacturing plants where they have replaced humans in many repetitive operations that do not require human intervention. Such applications include welding, painting, surveillance, and pick-and-place assembly. This type of robot is commonplace in industrial countries and is not included in this document. Robots are indispensable in many hazardous military operations, including handling munitions, operating in highly radioactive or EMP environments, and performing tasks in space. The use of robots in these applications makes it possible to avoid the danger and cost associated with using "protected" humans. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 10.0-2) Several other countries have developed sophisticated robotics. Japan, in particular, and Germany have emerged as world leaders in industrial robots. Most all other heavily industrialized countries have capabilities in this area. The US and Japan Table 10.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY ROBOTS (DESIGNED TO OPERATE IN EXPLOSIVE OR EMP ENVIRONMENTS), CONTROLLER AND END-EFFECTORS ROBOTS DESIGNED FOR NUCLEAR
ENVIRONMENTS
ROBOTICS
Robotics

Less Expensive Product Application in Hostile Enviroments Explosive Environment Nuclear Environment

Manufacture of Systems/ Equipment Battlefield Weapons Delivery Nuclear Facilities, Military or Civil
Figure 10.6-1.
Robotics Overview
are the world leaders in military/nuclear/space robotics. Russia and the Ukraine have considerable capability in robots designed for use in nuclear environments (i.e., the robots used in monitoring the Chernobyl nuclear plant).
Robotics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE Machine tools, inspection equipment and None identified all necessary equipment to manufacture sensors, etc. Machine tools, inspection equipment and None identified all necessary equipment to manufacture sensors, etc. Machine tools, inspection equipment and Operational software all necessary equipment to manufacture sensors, etc. WA Cat 2B, D, E NDUL 1.6 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2A, B, D, E NDUL 1.6 CCL Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Incorporating protection of hydraulic lines and Using fluids with flash points > 839 K Designed to operate in a radiation environment greater than 5 105 rad (Si) Designed to operate at altitudes exceeding 150 miles.
None identified
ROBOTS DESIGNED FOR SPACE

APPLICATIONS
None identified
10-19
SECTION 17 - SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

Rationale The importance of space and space systems technology to provide global reach and global power is captured in the statement by Air Force Secretary Widnall: "Control of space and access to it are fundamental to economic and military security." To the military commander, space provides the advantages of viewing areas of interest, knowing the weather, being able to navigate and accurately locate areas of concern, and the ability to command and control operational forces anywhere to support national security goals and objectives. To withstand the space environment, components must operate in conditions of extreme thermal cycling and exposure to radiation. Reliability requirements are measured not in days but in years. The bottom line is that the unfriendly environment of space and its impact on space systems is a significant technological challenge.
17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5
Electronics and Computers ................................ 17-3 Optronics .................................................... 17-5 Power and Thermal Management ........................ 17-7 Propulsion for Space Systems ............................ 17-8 Sensors for Space Systems................................ 17-11 SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 17.0-1) Space and space technology are vital for the military and economic security of the US. Consequently, the US has played a dominant world role in developing and using space technologies. If the US is to maintain its military space leadership, the DoD must ensure that military space science and technology requirements are identified and documented so that appropriate space development programs receive the required resource support. Recent studies have shown that approximately 95% of space technologies can be categorized as dual use. The majority of the military technologies that fall in this category require greater radiation hardening than their commercial counterparts. The large number of numerous commercial communication satellites will in many cases drive the capabilities of many of the space technologies, which will then be used in all military space systems. This section covers critical space technologies: Electronics and Computers, Optronics, Power and Thermal Management, Propulsion and Sensors. Though there are many significant space technologies not listed, in Part III Critical Emerging Space Technologies, the following areas will be found: Astronics, Launch Vehicles, Qualification and Testing, Signature Control and Survivability, Space Structures and Space Systems Integration. Note: The term "Space Qualified" is no longer used and specific qualified/parameter levels are now used to describe when the item is militarily critical.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Fabrication & Manufacturing Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Information Systems Sensors & Lasers Materials Signature SPACE SYSTEMS Reduction
TREND
Broad Band Communication All Weather Intelligence Meteorology Real Time Information Warfare Systems Environmental Monitoring 3D Navigation
Figure 17.0-1.
Space Systems Overview
17-1
Country
17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 Computer Optronics Power & Propulsion Sensors & Thermal for Space for Space Electronics Management Systems Systems
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) The US share of the global aerospace market has dwindled significantly in recent years. This market shrinkage has had a direct impact on the US space industry as a whole, a fact emphasized in the Space Industry Study chaired by the Vice President of the United States. In addition, the European and Pacific Rim countries are mounting state sponsored efforts to become leaders in the global aerospace market, particularly where there appears to be a commercial payoff (i.e., space communications and launch services). Substantial investments have been made there to support research development, test and evaluation facilities and to educate scientists and engineers. Business leverage alliances and partnerships are growing among government, industry, and their educational institutions. If this trend continues, the United States could be relegated to second place or lower in many categories of the world aerospace market early in the 21st century.
Belarus Canada China France Germany I srael I ndia I taly J apan Netherlands Russia Switzerland UK Ukraine US
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities:
All
Majority
Some
Limite d
Figure 17.0-2.
Space Systems FTA Summary
17-2
SECTION 17.1 ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTERS

Overview (See Figure 17.1-1) This section covers critical discrete device and integrated circuit (IC) technologies (e.g., high-voltage analog circuits and digital signal processors) that are essential for our ability to deploy highly accurate ballistic missiles, and intelligence and surveillance satellites. Critical technologies in this area are focused on radiation hardening of the architecture and electronic components that fly in space. Rationale (See Table 17.1-1) Although most space and missile electronic components perform the same function as traditional military components, the space and missile versions must operate reliably in different environment: high vibration and stress during launch, radiation, thermal cycling, etc. Component reliability is the key feature required for space operations. It is important for two major reasons: (i) military necessity and (ii) little or no opportunity to repair high-valued assets if device failures occur. This requires special adaptive or redundant architectures at the component, subsystems, and system levels. However, the environments of space where these systems have to operate affect component reliability. For example, the components must operate in both the natural radiation environment of space and, in some cases, in weapon enhanced radiation environments. Those environments impose electromagnetic pulse, ionizing total-dose, dose-rate, and single-event-effects hardness requirements as well as the ability to withstand attack from RF or laser weapons. Radiation hardening approaches result in increased spacing between devices and additional devices in the integrated circuit (which reduce the number of functions on the IC) and increased design and processing steps (which increases the cost of the IC). All of these improvements (reliability, radiation hardening, etc.) have to be accomplished in conjunction with efforts to limit the size, weight, and power requirements of the devices since increasing those parameters increases the cost of deploying the satellite or missile system. Finally, the additional operational requirements (reliability, radiation, vibration, thermal) require novel and comprehensive testing for verification. Each of these special requirements is unique for space and missile electronic and computer components and collectively they are critical to maintaining our dominance in ballistic missile systems and the exploitation of space for national security purposes.
Electronics & Computers

Ruggedness High Reliability Low Power/Weight Radiation Hardening Throughput (MOPS)

Satellites Satellite Bus Systems Payload Systems Ballistic Missiles Guidance RV Launch Vehicles Interceptor Missiles
Figure 17.1-1.
Electronics and Computers Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) In the area of radiation hardening technology, the US is the clear leader. Currently, France, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland produce radiation hardened electronics; however, the feature size, and therefore the performance of the resulting circuit, is not as advanced as is available from US manufacturers. Over the past several years, Japanese manufacturers have been actively seeking information on developing hardened microelectronics.
17-3
Table 17.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURE - DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSORS
Electronics and Computers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Specific to each application EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E
ARCHITECTURE - HIGH SPEED DATA B USES
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Rad hard > 1 Mrad(Si) Throughput > 1 Million Operations Per Second (MOPs) Single Event Upset (SEU) (Linear Energy Transfer (LET) = 80 MeV cm2/gm Reprogrammable SEU Resistant Rad hard > 1 Mrad Throughput > 1 MOPs
None identified
None identified
Packet switching
RAD HARD ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY - CRYOGENIC ELECTRONICS RAD HARD ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY - FIELD PROGRAMMABLE DEVICES RAD HARD ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY - NONVOLATILE MEMORY RAD HARD ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY - PACKAGING MATERIALS - DIELECTRICALLY ISOLATED (SOI) SOFTWARE
Rad hard > 500 krad
None identified
None identified
None identified
Rad hard > 500 krad Density > 5k gates Rad hard 1 Mrad Retention > 10 years Endurance > 1012 cycles Rad hard > 10 Mrad Hermetic seal Density improvement > 10 X Film thickness < 0.3 mm Uniformity > 95% Defects, 10/cm2 Fault-tolerant Reprogram < 5 sec after detection On-orbit reprogrammable
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E WA Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E WA IL Cat 3
None identified
None identified
None identified
Thin film SOI
Rad hard test facilities
Not applicable
None identified
Software for analysis of dose - rate upset and survivability SGEMP None identified
WA Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL EAR 99
WA Cat 3E CCL Cat 3E CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
17-4
SECTION 17.2
Overview (See Figure 17.2-1) The critical space optics (optronics) technologies can be divided into four classes. The first is the design of the optical systems and components. The second area involves production methods for highly accurate, lightweight optical components. The third area is the specialized, sometimes exotic materials used for these optics. The fourth area is precision metrology associated with the fabrication and certification of space optics and the in situ characterization of the surface during operations. Optics are grouped as either cooled or uncooled. Cooled optics are most commonly used in military High Energy Laser (HEL) applications. Uncooled optics fall into two basic categories. First, mirrors for surveillance, reconnaissance, acquisition, pointing, tracking and communication applications. Most of these optics require high reflectivity coatings, partially transmissive or selective wavelength coatings, or coatings with holographic elements. Most of the optics in this category are dual use. The second category consists of the advanced transmissive component typified by single-crystal silicon optics, which allows for the substitution of very expensive, complex, heavy components with lightweight, inexpensive components. It is this category of optics that are used exclusively in military applications. What makes space optics (optronics) unique are the demanding environmental conditions in the launch-phase and when on-orbit. These conditions involve launch loads up to 20 g; vibration > 120 dB; contamination on orbit by outgassing of satellite systems; atomic oxygen attack; and degradation due to the impact of micrometeorods and space debris. Rationale (See Table 17.2-1) Optronics are the critical components of surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. These technologies set the limits of possible target detection, identification and resolution. Optical components are also the critical elements in projected space-based High Energy Laser systems. If these optics do not have the proper figure (shape) and finish (polish) and cannot survive operational power levels, the laser system cannot perform as required. Low-power, relatively large optical elements are required for space power, relay, and communication systems. Another critical optronics area is the projected manufacture of the optical elements for materials in space. This includes manufacturing membrane or lightweight optics (that are either too large or fragile to be launched from earth) and processing optical materials in space.
OPTRONICS
Optronics

Low Absorption Light Weight Broad Bandwidth Minimal Scatter

Ballistic & Theater Missile Defense Space Sensors
Figure 17.2-1.
Optronics Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) Laser technology and modern digital computers have radically expanded the number of applications of optics as well as revolutionized the measurement and fabrication of optics. This revolution has occurred both in the military and commercial applications. France, Japan, Russia and the UK have vigorous optronic development programs and in many areas rival US capabilities. Other countries possessing some niche optronic technologies are China, Czech Republic, and Germany.
17-5
Table 17.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTED ENERGY OPTICS
Optronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 19 WA Cat 6A, B, C, E USML XV CCL Cat 6A, B, C, E WA ML 19 WA Cat 6A, B, C, E USML XV CCL Cat 6A, B, C, E WA ML 19 USML XV WA ML 19 WA Cat 6A, B, C, E USML XV CCL Cat 6A, B, C, E WA ML 19 USML XV
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY < 103 Absorption w/cm2 > 104 w/cm2 Incident Radiation
LIGHTWEIGHT SPACE OPTICS
< 20% Bulk wt 30 kg/m2 arial density total wt >10 kg > 1 m aperture
None identified
Tooling accuracy and foot print pressure Optical figure testing
None identified
PASSIVELY & ACTIVELY COOLED OPTICS ADAPTIVE OPTICS - COOLED AND UNCOOLED
> 104 w/cm2 Incident Radiation for 30 sec > 10 cm Aperture 100 Hz bandwidth 1/2 1 flatness for > 100 Hz Bandwidth 10.5 mm
None identified Controller
SILICON OPTICS
OPTICAL COATINGS SEGMENTED OPTICS
Single crystal substrate w/optical coating, < 200 ppm absorption total > 25 cm aperture > 200 ppm optical scatter Scatter, 103 w/cm2 and Absorption < 103 (For surface > 30 cm dia) > 1 m aperture equivalent
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified Controller
WA Cat 2E, 6E CCL Cat 2E, 6E WA ML 19 WA Cat 6A, B, C, E USML XV CCL Cat 6A, B, C, E None
ASPHERICAL OPTICAL ELEMENTS (LENSES AND MIRRORS
Having a surface roughness less than 0.25 mm (RMS) at mid-spatial frequencies and 0.1 nm (RMS) at high optical frequencies and an optical aperture greater than 20 cm.
Light-weighted high quality glass, fused quartz, or other optical materials used either as substrates (for mirrors) or transparent
Diamond turning machines and special None identified final finishing techniques and procedures
17-6
SECTION 17.3 POWER AND THERMAL MANAGEMENT

Overview (See Figure 17.3-1) The key features of power sources for spacecraft are efficiency, light weight, long-duration and reliability. For most of these systems both the technology and products will be available in the international marketplace. Withholding the production technology for as long as possible yet aggressively selling the products will offer the best chance for the United States to maintain a lead in space power. For thermal management numerous new technologies are being integrated not only to manage the heat transfer but to greatly reduce the weight. Rationale (See Table 17.3-1) Power and thermal management technologies are key for effective use of the space environment. Future space applications, both military and commercial, will require high power (greater than a kilowatt), long duration operation (greater than 3 years), and controlled operating temperatures. These demanding requirements lead to a preference for passive systems that operate maintenance free, provide heat rejection by radiation, require low mass and volume, and are capable of reliable autonomous operation. Power generation, other than photovoltaic, requires thermal management at high temperatures while sensors, electronics and crew support require thermal management at moderate-to-cryogenic temperatures. Solar cells mounted on the surface of the spacecraft or deployed on solar arrays are highly reliable and account for the majority of power generation systems flying today. Todays state-of-the-art cells include lower cost silicon which is 14 percent efficient, and more radiation-resistant gallium arsenide with efficiencies of up to 19 percent. Advanced cells, including thin-film, poly-crystalline (or amorphous) silicon, and multi-band-gap (MBG) cells, are being developed to lower cost, increase efficiency and provide higher radiation resistance. The US currently leads in most solar cell developments.
Power & Thermal Management

Long Life Duty Cycles Low Temperature & Temperature Cycling Compatibility Light Weight, High Efficiency Power Sources

Satellite Communications IR Sensors Cryo Temperature Compatibility Buses
Figure 17.3-1.
Power and Thermal Management Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) The US leads the world in photovoltaic technology for longer life and lower mass systems. In batteries, Japan and various European countries have significant government programs providing substantial battery R&D support. In solar cell development France, England, Germany and Russia trail the US by one generation while the rest of the world is at least two generations behind. For cryogenic cooling the US appears to be ahead of others, in part due to our reliance on longer lived systems (cryogenic dewars work from 1 to 2 years).
Table 17.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY SOLAR - PHOTOVOLTAIC
Power and Thermal Management Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, E USML XIII CCL Cat 3A, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Specific Power > 300 W/m2 Beginning of Life (BOL) at 28 C at cell level
17-7
SECTION 17.4
PROPULSION FOR SPACE SYSTEMS

Propulsion for Space Systems
Overview (See Figure 17.4-1) Emerging critical propulsion technologies are grouped in three basic categories: chemical (which includes liquid, cooled and hybrid systems), low-thrust electrical, and nuclear thermal. Electric propulsion can provide efficient station-keeping and maneuvering capabilities. Each of these technologies has considerable potential and R&D growth. Low-cost solids and low-pressure, high-tolerance liquid propellant systems or hybrids are the leading candidates to meet our projected first stage propulsion needs. Nuclear thermal propulsion appears to be very attractive for high-energy upper stage propulsion and for co-generated electrical output systems; however, it must overcome additional environmental challenges to reach its full space potential. The majority of the propulsion technologies are dual use. Areas of further development include high-energy density propulsion materials, improved propellant bonding, and advanced cryo-cooling and storage. These technologies all have weapons of mass destruction implications. For most applications an adversary does not need this level of sophistication to achieve a respectable propulsion capability. The dynamics of this is provided in the MCTLWMD volume. Rationale (See Table 17.4-1) Propulsion technologies are required for ballistic and space vehicle applications. In the case of the ballistic systems, specific pulse levels are required to achieve required accuracies on the target envelope; for space systems the target is the ability to insert the payload in the proper orbit at the required velocity. It is only these few technologies that will provide the United States a capability that is categorized as militarily critical. As shown in Figure 17.4-1, these include better propellant bonding systems to extend the life of military systems and increase their reliability rates; motor casings with higher strength to weight ratios; nozzles with reduced corrosion; and environmentally neutral propellants. For radiation hardened electronics, see subsection 5.5.

Thrust to Weight Ratio On-Orbit Service Life Storage & Refrigeration for Cryogenic Propellants Directional Control Safety Environmentally Neutral

Rocket Solid Liquid Hybrid Satellite Control & Maneuvering
Figure 17.4-1.
Propulsion for Space Systems Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) The Russians have a lead in many propulsion technologies and are making every effort to exploit this advantage in the commercial field by forming many strategic partnerships with many Western countries.
17-8
Table 17.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY PROPULSION, ELECTRIC
Propulsion for Space Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS High temp. > 3000 C materials for anodes, cathodes and windows. Dimensionally stable thermal protection materials None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE CCL EAR 99
STORAGE AND REFRIGERATION, CRYOGENIC PROPELLANT PROPULSION, SOLID ROCKET
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Low power 1.5 to 10 kW High power > 10 kW >1500 hour life Loss rate < 30%/yr Temperature < 100 K I(t) > 1.1 MN F(vac)> 220 kN I[sp(vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg Stage mass fraction > 88% Propellant solids loading > 86% Diameter > 0.61m PV/W > 2.54 106
COMPOSITE MOTOR CASES
Resins, high-strength fibers, high-temp. resins (> 200 F), long shelf life resins.
Production - stir friction welding equipment for cryogenic storage tanks. High temp. ablators. Production: large scale mixing, casting, fabrication facilities and equipment. Test: specially designed development and testing (sea level and altitude) facilities. Production - 4 and 5 axis filament winding machine, 3, 4, and 5 degrees of freedom braiding mach., large winding and curing equipment.
None identified
WA Cat 9A, B, D, E CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 9A, B, D, E MTCR 2 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 9A, B, D, E MTCR 2 USML VIII CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E
Validated data: Service life, flaw effect, and other specialty analysis codes, mission analysis codes Specially developed design and analysis codes, controller software used in manufacture. Software to control winding mach., resin manufacturing, and impregnation, resin transfer molding and similar technologies Control software and specially designed analysis codes
THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS
Total angular distance > 5 degrees Angular velocity > 20 deg/sec Angular acceleration > 40 deg/sec2
NOZZLES
Thrust > 45 kN Max. erosion rate < 0.075 mm/sec Production times < 36 months for carbon-carbon to densities > 1.7 g/cc
HIGH-ENERGY PROPELLANT I[sp(vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg INGREDIENTS
Any high-temperature and erosion resistant metal, metal matrix or ceramic matrix composites for intrusive vane based TVC. High-temp. composite materials and insulators/shim materials (> 2000 F). Carbon-carbon, hi-temp., low erosion materials (> 2500 C). The material chosen can depend upon the exhaust environment. Siliconbased nozzle materials may work well with hybrid rockets; they do not work well with SOTA solid rockets. CL20, RDX, HMX, ADN, TNAZ, HADN, Fine Iron Oxide, advanced energetic oxidizers, fuels, and binders. Fuels and Oxidizers and additives for liquid propulsion systems
Production - special machining or forming of high-temp, erosion-resistant materials, shim manufacture, controllers, special manufacturing processes associated with the type of TVC concept. Test - high-temperature strain gauges and thermocouples. Production: Equipment for manufacturing of carbon-carbon material. Composite curing equipment. Equipment for depositing films of metal, diamond, etc. onto substrates. Large curing and winding machines, 3, 4, and 5 degrees of freedom braiding mach.
WA ML 4, 22 WA Cat 9A, B, D, E MTCR 2 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E
Design codes, Finite Element analysis and thermal analysis codes, control software used in design, test, and fabrication
WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 9A, B, D, E MTCR 2 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E
None identified
Chemical analysis, reaction analysis codes, chemical structure, est. of chemical and physical properties of energetic molecules, quality control, performance prediction.
WA ML 8, 21, 22 MTCR 4, 16 USML V, 121.16
(cont'd)
17-9
Table 17.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY LAUNCH VEHICLE PROPULSIONREUSABLE LO2/LH2
Propulsion for Space Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS See Subcomponents for liquid propulsion UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Production - stir friction welding equipment for tank fabrication. Electrodeposition, electro-discharge or other special equip. for prod. of adv. thrust chambers or micro-orifice, liq.-prop. injectors. Production - stir friction welding equipment for tank fabrication. Electrodeposition, electro-discharge or other special equip. for prod. of adv. thrust chambers or micro-orifice, liq.-prop. injectors. Production - stir friction welding equipment for tank fabrication. Electrodeposition, electro-discharge or other special equip. for prod. of adv. thrust chambers or micro-orifice, liq.-prop. injectors. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Specially designed launch and cost-analysis codes EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 4, 22 WA Cat 9A, D, E MTCR 2, 3, 16 USML IV, 121.16
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY 5 re-uses w/o refurbishment 0.9995 reliability I(sp) > 450 kN 250 k/lb thrust
LAUNCH VEHICLE PROPULSIONEXPENDABLE LO2/LH2 UPPER STAGES
> 550 k/lb sea level thrust 450 sec I[sp(vac)]
See Subcomponents for liquid propulsion
Specially designed launch and cost-analysis codes
WA ML 4, 22 WA Cat 9A, D, E MTCR 2, 3, 16 USML IV, 121.16 CCL Cat 9A, D, E WA ML 4, 22 WA Cat 9A, B, D, E MTCR 2, 3, 16 USML IV, 121.16 CCL Cat 9A, B, D, E
LAUNCH VEHICLE PROPULSIONEXPENDABLE LO2/LH2 BOOSTER
> 300 k/lb sea level thrust 275 sec I[sp(vac)]
See Subcomponents for liquid propulsion
Specially designed launch and cost-analysis codes
17-10
SECTION 17.5
SENSORS FOR SPACE SYSTEMS

Sensors for Space Systems
Overview (See Figure 17.5-1) Current electro-optic sensors allow the United States to examine activity at any point on or near the earth. The electronic readout capability of the newer sensors gives the satellite an essential indefinite life on station as compared to earlier systems that used film and were limited by the magazine size. In cases where scattered sunlight or thermal radiation is not adequate to form images of sufficient detail and clarity, laser illumination can be used. These capabilities are central to the US early warning capability for missile launchers and locating nuclear detonations and are also a major component of tactical and strategic data collection. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is well-suited for space applications since the distance from the target has less of an impact on imagery resolution than with most other radar systems. The most common ELINT satellites are designed to receive radio and radar emanations of ships at sea, mobile air defense radars, fixed strategic early warning radars, and other vital military components for the purpose of identification, location, and signals analysis. Some critical astronautic technologies are: Space, IR Sensors, which are the key element in sensor systems such as the Defense Support Program (DSP), that monitor missile launches. IR detector arrays, sometimes referred to as focal plane arrays (FPAs), including one-, two-, three-dimensional arrays enabling imaging analogous to the vidicons in the visible spectrum, which provide the ability to "see" at night, and an improved ability to penetrate cloud cover.

IR Spectral Sensitivity High Responsivity High Density Focal Plane Arrays Radiation Hardening

Surveillance Meteorology Environmental Mapping
Figure 17.5-1.
Sensors for Space Systems Overview
Though all of these technologies have dual-use capability the active sensors are more limited in their applications. Rationale (See Table 17.5-1) Two of the Joint Chiefs of Staff priorities for the future are Provide the commander real time understanding of the battlefield" and "Control of space" will require that the US maintain its lead in space sensors. Infrared Detector Arrays will provide a considerable amount of the sensor data needed to satisfy these requirements with the continued military concern for launch detection of both strategic and tactical missiles. Infrared sensors provide the key technology today to provide all-weather capability in detecting these launches. In addition, these sensors have the capability to supplement meterology observations and environmental mapping.
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 17.0-2) In the development and production of Infrared Space Detectors, France and Japan have world class capabilities. They have continued pushing the state-of-the-art. Other countries with lesser capability include Belarus, Canada, China, Israel, Russia and UK. Russia and France are the only members of the European-Asian space community known to operate ELINT satellite systems. Two of the three ELINT networks established and maintained by Russia are believed to be global in nature (i.e., they are designed to detect land-based as well as sea-based electronic signals). The third Russian ELINT system is devoted to ocean reconnaissance. France deployed Cerise, its first ELINT satellite, on 7 July 1995. This satellite is a test to aid in developing a much more capable satellite named Zenon. A second satellite, named Clementine, will complement the work of Cerise and is scheduled for launch in 1998. The United States, Russia, European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, and Canada have all launched SAR-equipped satellites with imagery resolutions of 10 to 30 meters. The primary countries involved in ESA's SAR sensors are the UK, Germany, and France.
17-11
Table 17.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY SENSOR - INFRARED DETECTOR ARRAY
Sensors for Space Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Impurity Banded Materials (SI:As) UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Processing for Binary compounds (HgCdTe) UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 15, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, C, D, E USML XXI CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY One or more elements 128 x 128 array level Rad-Hard > 500 krad (Si) Single event rate < 1 frame/30 frames
PREFACE
A . THE LIST OF MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIESOVERVIEW The list of Department of Defense (DoD) militarily critical technologies is published in three parts: Part I, Weapons Systems Technologies, details critical technologies with performance parameters that are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems. Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies, addresses critical technologies required for development, integration, or employment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. This document is not oriented toward U.S. capabilities; rather, it addresses technologies that proliferators might use to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It provides technical information to assist various DoD entities in developing, supporting, and executing counterproliferation initiatives. Part III, Developing Critical Technologies, lists technologies that will produce increasingly superior performance of military systems or maintain a superior capability more affordably. It focuses on worldwide technologies that will become available in the future for incorporation into U.S. weapons systems.
B . THE DoD MCT PROCESS The DoD MCT process is a continuous, analytical, and information-gathering process that refines information and updates existing documents to provide thorough and complete technical information. This process provides a systematic, ongoing assessment and analysis of technologies, assigns values and parameters to technologies, and covers the worldwide technology spectrum. Technology Working Groups (TWGs), which are part of this process, provide a reservoir of technical experts who can assist in time-sensitive and quick-response tasks. TWG chairpersons continuously screen technologies and nominate items to be added or removed from the list of militarily critical technologies. TWGs are comprised of about 1,000 technical experts from government and the private sector. In general, TWG members are drawn from military Services, DoD and other federal agencies, industry, and academia. A balance is maintained between public officials and private sector representatives. TWGs maintain a core of intellectual knowledge and reference information on an array of technologies. The data are used as a resource for many projects and other assignments, and TWG members are available to the national security community as technical experts. Working within an informal structure, TWG members strive to produce precise and objective analyses across dissimilar and often disparate areas. Currently, the TWGs are organized to address 20 technology areas: Aeronautics Lasers, Optics, and Supporting Technology Armament and Energetic Materials Manufacturing and Fabrication Biological Marine Systems Biomedical Materials and Processing Chemical Nuclear Systems Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Positioning, Navigation, and Time Electronics Sensors Energy Systems Signature Control Ground Systems Space Systems Information Weapons Effects
III- -iii
C . USES AND APPLICATIONS The action plan accompanying the 23 January 1995 Deputy Secretary of Defense Tasking Memorandum states that the list of militarily critical technologies is used as a: Technical foundation for U.S. proposals for export control in the Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group (AG), and other nonproliferation regimes Technical reference for licensing and export control by Customs officials, DoD, the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Department of Energy (DOE) Technical reference for contracts and scientific papers prepared by government, industry, and academia Technical reference and guide for intelligence activities. In addition, the list of militarily critical technologies: Provides background and support for international cooperative activities Supports the development of technology policy, technology release guidelines, and specific proposals or controls to be implemented by multinational organizations Provides coverage of the mission areas assigned to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
D . LEGAL BASIS FOR MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES DOCUMENTS The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 assigned responsibilities for export controls to protect technologies and weapons systems. It established the requirement for DoD to compile a list of militarily critical technologies. The EAA and its provisions, as amended, were extended by Executive Order 12924 (19 August 1994), which was extended on 15 August 1995, 14 August 1996, 13 August 1997, 13 August 1998, 10 August 1999, and 3 August 2000. The legislation and execution directive are amplified and implemented by DoD Directive 2040.2 and by the Deputy Secretary of Defense letter dated 23 January 1995.
III- -iv
APPENDIX C MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREA LOCATOR
III-C-1
III-C-2
APPENDIX C MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREA LOCATOR

This Technology Area Locator lists the Department of Defense (DoD) militarily critical technology areas for Parts I, II, and III. Not all technology areas are addressed in each part. A short description of the three parts is shown below. PART I PART II WEAPONS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES (WST) Contains a list of technologies critical to the development and production of superior weapons. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) TECHNOLOGIES Contains a list of technologies required for development, integration, or employment of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery. DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES (DCT) Contains a list of technologies which will produce increasingly superior performance of military systems or maintain a superior capability more affordably. PART II WMD
PART III
I WST AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY Aerodynamics.........................................................................................1.2 Aeronautical Propulsion ...........................................................................1.2 Aeronautical Structures.............................................................................1.1 Aeronautical Vehicle Control.....................................................................7.1 Aeronautical Subsystems and Components................................................... Aeronautical Design and Systems Integration................................................1.3 ARMAMENTS AND ENERGETIC MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY Small- and Medium-Caliber Weapons Systems .............................................2.1 Tactical Propulsion.................................................................................. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (SAFF) ................................................2.4 Guns, Artillery, and Other Launch Systems..................................................2.5 Guidance and Control............................................................................... Battlespace Environment........................................................................... Warhead Technologies..............................................................................2.2 Lethality and Vulnerability........................................................................ Energetic Materials..................................................................................2.3 Mines ...................................................................................................2.6 Missile Systems ..................................................................................... Survivability, Armor and Warhead Defeat Systems ........................................ Non-lethal Weapons................................................................................. Demilitarization and Decontamination.........................................................
III DCT
1.3 1.4 1.3,1.4 1.3,1.4
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
5.7 1.5
1.5,3.2,4.2 4.2 1.1,1.2,1.3
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14
III-C-3
I WST BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGY Human Performance Enhancement.............................................................. Biological Sensors...................................................................................3.2 Biomaterials and Nanofabrication................................................................ Individual and Group Protection .................................................................3.1 Biological Dispersion............................................................................... BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY Etiological Factors .................................................................................. Defeat or Management of Biological/Chemical Attacks................................... Management of Trauma, Stress, and Treatment ............................................. Tactical Medical Command/Control............................................................ CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY Chemical Defense Systems .......................................................................3.1 Chemical Dissemination and Dispersion...................................................... Chemical Material Production.................................................................... Chemical Detection, Warning, and Identification ...........................................3.2 Obscurants.............................................................................................15.9 DIRECTED AND KINETIC ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Charged Particle Beam.............................................................................. Neutral Particle Beam............................................................................... Anti-matter Particle Beam......................................................................... Gamma Ray Lasers.................................................................................. Kinetic Energy Weapons........................................................................... High Power Microwave/Radio Frequency Waves ........................................... Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy (DE) Systems............................4.2 ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY Electronic Components ............................................................................5.1 Electronic Materials.................................................................................5.2 Electronic Fabrication ..............................................................................5.3 General Purpose Electronics Equipment.......................................................5.4 Microelectronics......................................................................................5.5 Nanoelectronics....................................................................................... Opto-Electronics .....................................................................................5.6 ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Energy Conversion and Power Generation.................................................... Energy Storage ....................................................................................... Power Conditioning................................................................................. Biological Energy Systems ....................................................................... High Density Conventional Systems ..........................................................14.1 Mobile Electric Platform Power.................................................................14.2 Pulsed and High Power Systems ................................................................14.3
PART II WMD
III DCT
3.3 3.1 3.4 3.2
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
4.4 4.2 4.1 4.3
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 11.5
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
III-C-4
I WST GROUND SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Advanced Diesel Engines ..........................................................................6.1 Human Systems Interfaces for Ground Systems............................................. Hybrid-Electric Propulsion Systems............................................................ Sensors for Ground Systems...................................................................... Signature Control for Ground Systems........................................................ Structures for Ground Systems................................................................... Systems Integration for Ground Systems ..................................................... Vetronics...............................................................................................6.2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Information Communications.................................................................8.1,8.11 Information Exchange ..............................................................................8.8 Information Processing.......................................................................8.3,8.6,8.9,8.10 Information Security................................................................................8.5 Information Management and Control ......................................................... Information Systems Facilities .................................................................. Information Sensing ................................................................................ Information Visualization and Representation ...............................................8.4 Modeling and Simulation..........................................................................8.7 Electronic Attack.....................................................................................9.1 Electronic Protection................................................................................9.2 Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM).........8.2 LASERS, AND OPTICS TECHNOLOGY Lasers ................................................................................................4.1,15.7 Optics................................................................................................. 9.3,9.4 Optical Materials and Processes................................................................ Supporting Technologies and Applications...................................................4.2 Optoelectronics and Photonics Technology................................................... MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY Advanced Fabrication and Processing...........................................................10.1 Bearings ................................................................................................10.2 Metrology..............................................................................................10.3 Non-Destructive Inspection and Evaluation...................................................10.4 Production Equipment..............................................................................10.5 Robotics................................................................................................10.6 MARINE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Ocean Salvage ........................................................................................ Propulsors and Propulsion Systems............................................................12.1 Signature Control and Survivability............................................................12.2 Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles .................................................12.3 Advanced Hull Forms............................................................................... Human Systems Integration ......................................................................
PART II WMD
III DCT
1.1
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5
5.9 1.1,5.9 1.1 1.1,5.9 5.9
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6
III-C-5
I WST MATERIALS AND PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY Armor and Anti-Armor Materials................................................................11.1 Electrical Materials..................................................................................11.2 Structural Materials, High-Strength and High-Temperature..............................11.5 Special Function Materials........................................................................11.6 Smart Materials and Structures................................................................... Micromachined Materials and Structures (Including MEMS)............................ Magnetic Materials..................................................................................11.3 NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Enrichment Feedstocks Production.............................................................. Uranium Enrichment Processes..................................................................13.2 Nuclear Fission Reactors ..........................................................................13.1 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing)..........................................................13.2 Lithium Production ................................................................................. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development .................................................. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing............................................................13.3 Radiological Weapons.............................................................................. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components........................................................13.3 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing.......................................................13.3 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ........................................ Heavy Water Production ........................................................................... Tritium Production..................................................................................13.2 POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIME TECHNOLOGY Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components ....................................7.2 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers.....................................................15.6 Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems ....................................7.3 Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers ..................................................15.8 Precise Time and Frequency (PT&F)........................................................... Situational Awareness/Combat Identification................................................ SENSORS TECHNOLOGY Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platform..............................................15.1 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar......................................................15.2 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar.....................................................15.3 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform.............................................................15.4 Electro-Optical Sensors ............................................................................15.5 Radar ....................................................................................................15.10 Land Mine Countermeasures...................................................................... Sea and Littoral Region Mine Countermeasures ............................................
PART II WMD
III DCT
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13
15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 15.11 15.12 15.13
1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4
16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6
17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8
III-C-6
I WST SIGNATURE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Tailored Property Materials .......................................................................16.1 Multifunction Systems and Subsystems ...................................................... Systems Integration................................................................................. SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Space Avionics and Autonomy .................................................................. Electronics and Computers........................................................................17.1 Launch Vehicles for Space Systems............................................................ Space Optics ..........................................................................................17.2 Power and Thermal Management................................................................17.3 Propulsion for Space Systems ...................................................................17.4 Integration and Qualification...................................................................... Sensors for Space Systems........................................................................17.5 Survivability in Space.............................................................................. Structures for Space................................................................................. Integrated Systems................................................................................... Space Based Lasers .................................................................................. WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY Shock Waves.......................................................................................... Hard Target Penetration ............................................................................18.1 Thermal Radiation................................................................................... Ionizing Radiation................................................................................... Electromagnetic Effects ............................................................................ Underground Weapons Effects Simulation....................................................
PART II WMD
III DCT
1.3,1.4
18.1 18.2 18.3
19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10 19.11 19.12
6.2 6.3 6.4,6.5,6.6,6.7 6.1,6.8
20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 20.6
III-C-7
Updated May 23, 2001 INTRODUCTION

The current environment of dual use Low Observable/Counter Low Observable (LO/CLO) technologies has made it extremely difficult to distinguish between technologies which are appropriate for export through the commercial marketplace and militarily critical technologies requiring further controls. This section is intended to highlight for users of signature control technologies the export coordination and approval requirements and critical LO and CLO technologies. The MCTL must be used in conjunction with other relevant program and policy guidance, to include the following: DoD 5220.22M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) DoD Instruction S-5230.28, Low Observable (LO) and Counter Low Observable (CLO) Programs (S-NF), October 2, 2000 Security Classification Guide for Department of Defense (DoD) Low/Counter Low Observable (LO/CLO) Programs (U), October 2, 2000 Specific program classification guidance Government contractual guidance
PROCEDURES
The common theme found throughout DoD guidance is the need for early coordination of requirements with the expectation that industry will make contact with the Service LO/CLO Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) if licensing arrangements are required. The MCTL and DoD policies/instructions provide threshold values for various signature control technologies and applications. When these thresholds are exceeded, a DoD technical review of the signature control aspects of the proposed export is required prior to it being licensed for export. These threshold/tripwire values apply to a wide range of systems and their technologies. Some of these, such as helicopters, UAVs, assault ships, missiles, etc. will usually fall below the stated values. The mandated review process discussed below will accommodate these variations and in fact assure consistency and accuracy in case processing. Early
INFORMAL, PARALLEL REVIEW PROCESS
Industry
DoC
DoS
Service LO/CLO OPR

DTRA
LO Cases
OUSD(AT&L)/DSP
DoC
OSD LO Position
TRI-SERVICE
DoS
FORMAL, STATUTORY REVIEW PROCESS
LO/CLO EXCOM
Chart 1: Process for Review of Signature Control Technologies T h l i
coordination with the appropriate Service LO/CLO OPRs will facilitate more timely determination of DoD concerns or limitations for the proposed export. As shown in Chart 1, the normal statutory review process for conducting export license approvals is supplemented by an LO/CLO review process, defined by DoD Policy. Within the Department of Defense, each Service has a central office to provide basic guidance regarding LO/CLO classification and policy. The following offices are designated by DepSecDef as the Service LO/CLO Office of Primary Responsibility (OPRs): AF:
SAF/AQL Directorate of Special Programs Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1060 Director, LO/CLO Policy and Technology (N91) Crystal Square 2, Room 213 1725 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22215 Director of Special Programs (SAAL-SO) Room lD711 Pentagon Washington DC 20310-0103 (703)588-2083
Navy/Marines:
(703) 413-2263
Army:
(703) 614-0152
Under the direction of the DepSecDef, USD(AT&L) manages and chairs the LO/CLO Executive Committee (EXCOM). The LO/CLO EXCOM oversees technology development and progress of key LO/CLO programs to focus and direct efforts as necessary and resolve issues that arise as programs mature. The EXCOM also sets overall technical policy on international transfer of LO/CLO information and capabilities and coordinates exceptions to National Disclosure Policy when necessary. The EXCOM also establishes security guidelines to insure consistent application of security policy to protect critical LO/CLO technologies. USD(AT&L) has appointed the Director of Special Programs, who reports directly to USD(AT&L), as the DoD Director of LO Technology. The Director functions as the principal coordinator of all LO and CLO issues and is the executive secretary for the LO/CLO EXCOM. The Director ensures proper management oversight is applied to all LO/CLO special access programs (SAPs) and activities. The Director reviews and makes recommendations about the international transfer of LO/CLO information and capabilities consistent with EXCOM guidance and National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee Policy Statements. The Director of Special Programs also chairs the Tri-Service Committee. This group meets frequently to coordinate DoD Component and LO/CLO activities. The committee makes recommendations concerning LO/CLO programs, policies, plans, studies, and exports consistent with this policy and previous EXCOM decisions. To facilitate the timely DoD review of LO/CLO export cases, the following information (where appropriate to the specific export license request) is required: The specific foreign requirement for this technology (e.g., Request for Technology (RFT), Request for Information (RFI), Statement of Work (SOW)) U.S. initiative supporting the requirement (e.g., business plan, briefing material) Applicable current guidance (e.g., security guide, MCTL, National Disclosure Policy (NDP), specific contract) Legacy of the LO/CLO technology (e.g., foreign release history related export cases) Technology specification (e.g., material composition, performance, weight, cost) - this must be done for the specific item being requested for export, including comparable items available from other U.S. companies and from foreign sources
Identify critical technologies in the export request and assess performance vs. LO/CLO policy and guidelines Proposed program review (platform, subsystem, component, materials, technologies) Program Protection Plan (including anti-tamper plans) This section provides an outline of the signature control technologies license review and approval process. Critical LO/CLO technologies are considered sensitive to the Department of Defense. Current DoD Policy states that they will not be exported without review by the LO/CLO EXCOM process. The timeliness of this review process can be facilitated by using the informal, parallel process shown in the Chart 1.
CRITICAL LO TECHNOLOGIES
The following technologies, though not all inclusive, are critical to achieving LO capability at a system level. The Service component LO/CLO OPR will assess component performance requirements against thresholds defined by DoDI S-5230.28 to support proper level of classification.
CRITICAL CLO TECHNOLOGIES

The following technologies are critical to achieving robust CLO capability at a system level. The Service LO/CLO OPR will assess performance capabilities against thresholds defined by DoDl S-5230.28 to support proper level of classification.
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR 1996 DOD MCTL PART I
AERONAUTICS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 1.1 Aircraft, Fixed Wing .........................................1-3 1.2 Gas Turbine Engines ........................................1-5 1.3 Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces ...................1-7 ARMAMENTS AND ENERGETIC MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY 2.1 Ammunition, Small and Medium Caliber ....... 2-3 2.2 Bombs, Warheads, and Large Caliber Projectiles ......................................................... 2-5 2.3 Energetic Materials .......................................... 2-7 2.4 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ................. 2-10 2.5 Gun and Artillery Systems ............................... 2-12 2.6 Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems ........................................................... 2-13 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 3.1 Chemical and Biological Defense Systems...... 3-6 3.2 Detection, Warning, and Identification ............ 3-8 DIRECTED AND KINETIC ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 4.1 Lasers, High Energy Chemical......................... 4-3 4.2 Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons .............................................. 4-5 ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY 5.1 Electronic Components .................................... 5-3 5.2 Electronic Materials ......................................... 5-5 5.3 Fabrication Equipment ..................................... 5-7 5.4 General Purpose Electronic Equipment ........... 5-10 5.5 Microelectronics............................................... 5-12 5.6 Opto-Electronics .............................................. 5-15
ix
GROUND SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 6.1 Advanced Diesel Engines ................................ 6-3 6.2 Vetronics .......................................................... 6-5 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND VEHICLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY 7.1 Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems ............ 7-3 7.2 Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components ..................................................... 7-5 7.3 Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems ........................................................... 7-10 INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 8.1 Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems (C4I2)................................................. 8-3 8.2 Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM)............................ 8-5 8.3 High-Performance Computing ........................ 8-7 8.4 Human Systems Interface................................. 8-9 8.5 Information Security ........................................ 8-11 8.6 Intelligent Systems ........................................... 8-13 8.7 Modeling and Simulation ................................. 8-15 8.8 Networks and Switching .................................. 8-17 8.9 Signal Processing ............................................. 8-19 8.10 Software ........................................................... 8-21 8.11 Transmission Systems ...................................... 8-23 INFORMATION WARFARE TECHNOLOGY 9.1 Electronic Attack ............................................. 9-3 9.2 Electronic Protection ........................................ 9-5 9.3 Optical Countermeasures ................................. 9-6 9.4 Optical Counter-Countermeasures .................. 9-8
7 2
10 MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY 10.1 Advanced Fabrication and Processing ............10-3 10.2 Bearings...........................................................10-7 10.3 Metrology ........................................................10-9 10.4 Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment .........10-11 10.5 Production Equipment.....................................10-13 10.6 Robotics...........................................................10-16 11 MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY 11.1 Armor and Anti-Armor Materials ...................11-3 11.2 Electrical Materials .........................................11-5 11.3 Magnetic Materials..........................................11-7 11.4 Optical Materials .............................................11-9 11.5 Structural Materials (High-Strength and High-Temperature)..........................................11-11 11.6 Special Function Materials..............................11-16 12 MARINE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 12.1 Propulsors and Propulsion Systems ................12-3 12.2 Marine Signature Control and Survivability ..12-6 12.3 Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles ..........................................................12-9 13 NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 13.1 Fission Reactors ..............................................13-3 13.2 Nuclear Materials Processing..........................13-5 13.3 Nuclear Weapons ...........................................13-7 14 POWER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 14.1 High Density Conventional Systems .............14-3 14.2 Mobile Electric Platform Power......................14-5 14.3 Pulsed and High Power Systems ....................14-8
x
15 SENSORS AND LASERS TECHNOLOGY 15.1 Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms .........................................................15-3 15.2 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar.........15-5 15.3 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar ......15-8 15.4 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform.................15-11 15.5 Electro-Optical Sensors...................................15-13 15.6 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers......15-15 15.7 Lasers ..............................................................15-17 15.8 Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers ..15-19 15.9 Obscurants.......................................................15-21 15.10 Radar ..............................................................15-23 16 SIGNATURE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY ......................................................16-1 17 SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 17.1 Electronics and Computers..............................17-3 17.2 Optronics .........................................................17-5 17.3 Power and Thermal Management ...................17-7 17.4 Propulsion for Space Systems .........................17-8 17.5 Sensors for Space Systems..............................17-11 18 WEAPONS EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES TECHNOLOGY 18.1 Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons .........................................................18-3 Appendix A -- Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................... A-1 Appendix B -- Definitions............................................... B-1 Appendix C -- Index........................................................ C-1 Appendix D -- Explanation of Table Elements ............... D-1
FIGURES
1.0-1 1.0-2 1.1-1 1.2-1 1.3-1 2.0-1 2.0-2 2.1-1 2.2-1 2.3-1 2.3-2 2.4-1 2.5-1 2.6-1 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3 3.0-4 3.1-1 3.2-1 4.0-1 4.0-2 4.1-1 4.1-2 4.2-1 5.0-1 5.0-2 5.1-1 5.2-1 5.3-1 5.4-1 Aeronautics Systems Overview ...................................... 1-1 Aeronautics Systems FTA Summary .............................. 1-2 Aircraft, Fixed Wing Overview ...................................... 1-3 Gas Turbine Engines Overview ...................................... 1-5 Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces Overview................. 1-7 Armaments and Energetic Materials Overview .............. 2-1 Armaments and Energetic Materials FTA Summary ...... 2-2 Ammunition, Small & Medium Caliber Overview ......... 2-3 Bombs, Warheads, and Large Caliber Projectiles Overview ........................................................................ 2-5 Energetic Materials Overview ........................................ 2-7 Energetic Materials Definition........................................ 2-7 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Overview................ 2-10 Gun and Artillery Systems Overview ............................. 2-12 Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems Overview ........................................................................ 2-13 Chemical and Biological Systems Overview .................. 3-1 Chemical and Biological Systems FTA Summary.......... 3-2 Australia Group Biological/Toxin Warfare Agents......... 3-3 Selected Toxic Chemicals Requiring Detection, Warning, Identification and Defense .............................. 3-5 Chemical and Biological Defense Systems Overview .... 3-6 Detection, Warning, and Identification Overview .......... 3-8 Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Overview ............ 4-1 Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems FTA Summary.... 4-2 Lasers, High Energy Chemical Overview....................... 4-3 Supersonic Oxygen-Iodine Chemical Laser.................... 4-3 Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons Overview......................................................... 4-5 Electronics Overview...................................................... 5-1 Electronics FTA Summary ............................................. 5-2 Electronic Components Overview .................................. 5-3 Electronic Materials Overview ....................................... 5-5 Fabrication Equipment Overview ................................... 5-7 General Purpose Electronic Equipment Overview.......... 5-10 xi 5.5-1 5.6-1 6.0-1 6.0-2 6.1-1 6.2-1 7.0-1 7.0-2 7.1-1 7.2-1 7.2-2 7.2-3 7.3-1 8.0-1 8.0-2 8.1-1 Microelectronics Overview............................................. 5-12 Opto-Electronics Overview............................................. 5-15 Ground Systems Overview ............................................. 6-1 Ground Systems FTA Summary ..................................... 6-2 Advanced Diesel Engines Overview............................... 6-3 Vetronics Overview ........................................................ 6-5 Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control Overview .... 7-1 Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control FTA Summary......................................................................... 7-2 Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems Overview ............ 7-3 Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Overview......................................................................... 7-5 Gyro Technology Applications ....................................... 7-6 Accelerometer Technology Applications ........................ 7-6 Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems Overview......................................................................... 7-10 Information Systems Overview....................................... 8-1 Information Systems FTA Summary .............................. 8-2 Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems (C4I2) Overview......................................................................... 8-3 Primary Supporting Technologies for Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems................................................. 8-3 Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing Overview.. 8-5 High Performance Computing Overview........................ 8-7 Human Systems Interface Overview............................... 8-9 Information Security Overview....................................... 8-11 Intelligent Systems Overview ......................................... 8-13 Modeling and Simulation Overview ............................... 8-15 Primary Supporting Information Systems Technologies for Modeling and Simulation .................... 8-15 Networks and Switching Overview................................. 8-17 Signal Processing Overview............................................ 8-19 Software Overview ......................................................... 8-21 Transmission Systems Overview .................................... 8-23
8.1-2 8.2-1 8.3-1 8.4-1 8.5-1 8.6-1 8.7-1 8.7-2 8.8-1 8.9-1 8.10-1 8.11-1
9.0-1 9.0-2 9.1-1 9.2-1 9.3-1 9.4-1 10.0-1 10.0-2 10.1-1 10.2-1 10.3-1 10.4-1 10.5-1 10.6-1 11.0-1 11.0-2 11.1-1 11.2-1 11.3-1 11.4-1 11.5-1 11.6-1 12.0-1 12.0-2 12.1-1 12.2-1 12.3-1 13.0-1 13.0-2 13.1-1 13.2-1 13.3-1
Information Warfare Overview....................................... 9-1 Information Warfare FTA Summary .............................. 9-2 Electronic Attack Overview............................................ 9-3 Electronic Protection Overview ...................................... 9-5 Optical Countermeasures Overview ............................... 9-6 Optical Counter-Countermeasures Overview ................. 9-8 Manufacturing and Fabrication Overview .................... 10-1 Manufacturing and Fabrication FTA Summary ............ 10-2 Advanced Fabrication and Processing Overview.......... 10-3 Bearings Overview ....................................................... 10-7 Metrology Overview..................................................... 10-9 Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment Overview........ 10-11 Production Equipment Overview .................................. 10-13 Robotics Overview........................................................ 10-16 Materials Overview....................................................... 11-1 Materials FTA Summary .............................................. 11-2 Armor and Anti-Armor Materials Overview ................ 11-3 Electrical Materials Overview ...................................... 11-5 Magnetic Materials Overview....................................... 11-7 Optical Materials Overview.......................................... 11-9 Structural Materials Overview ...................................... 11-11 Special Function Materials Overview ........................... 11-16 Marine Systems Overview............................................ 12-1 Marine Systems FTA Summary.................................... 12-2 Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Overview.............. 12-3 Marine Signature Control and Survivability Overview ...................................................................... 12-6 Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles Overview ...................................................................... 12-9 Nuclear Systems Overview........................................... 13-1 Nuclear Systems FTA Summary................................... 13-2 Fission Reactors Overview ........................................... 13-3 Nuclear Materials Processing Overview ....................... 13-5 Nuclear Weapons Overview ......................................... 13-7
14.0-1 14.0-2 14.1-1 14.2-1 14.2-2 14.3-1 15.0-1 15.0-2 15.1-1 15.2-1 15.3-1 15.4-1 15.5-1 15.6-1 15.7-1 15.8-1 15.9-1 15.10-1 16.0-1 16.0-2 17.0-1 17.0-2 17.1-1 17.2-1 17.3-1 17.4-1 17.5-1 18.0-1 18.0-2 18.1-1
Power Systems Overview ............................................. 14-1 Power Systems FTA Summary ..................................... 14-2 High Density Conventional Systems Overview ............ 14-3 Mobile Electric Platform Power Overview ................... 14-5 Integrated Mobile Electric Platform Power System ...... 14-6 Pulsed and High Power Systems Overview .................. 14-8 Sensors and Lasers Overview ....................................... 15-1 Sensors and Lasers FTA Summary ............................... 15-2 Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms Overview....................................................................... 15-3 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Overview ...... 15-5 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Overview ..... 15-8 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Overview .............. 15-11 Electro-Optical Sensors Overview ................................ 15-13 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers Overview ... 15-15 Lasers Overview ........................................................... 15-17 Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers Overview....................................................................... 15-19 Obscurants Overview.................................................... 15-21 Radar Overview ............................................................ 15-23 Signature Control Overview.......................................... 16-1 Signature Control FTA Summary ................................. 16-2 Space Systems Overview .............................................. 17-1 Space Systems FTA Summary...................................... 17-2 Electronics and Computers Overview........................... 17-3 Optronics Overview ...................................................... 17-5 Power and Thermal Management Overview................. 17-7 Propulsion for Space Systems Overview ...................... 17-8 Sensors for Space Systems Overview ........................... 17-11 Weapons Effects and Countermeasures Overview........ 18-1 Weapons Effects and Countermeasures FTA Summary....................................................................... 18-2 Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons Overview....................................................................... 18-3
xii
TABLES
1.1-1 1.2-1 1.3-1 2.1-1 2.2-1 2.3-1 2.3-2 2.4-1 2.5-1 2.6-1 3.1-1 3.2-1 4.1-1 4.2-1 5.1-1 5.2-1 5.3-1 5.4-1
Aircraft, Fixed Wing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 1-4 Gas Turbine Engines Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 1-6 Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 1-7 Ammunition, Small & Medium Caliber Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................... 2-4 Bombs, Warheads, & Large Caliber Projectiles Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................... 2-6 Energetic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 2-8 Energetic Materials That Exceed Critical Parameters..... 2-8 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................... 2-11 Gun & Artillery Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 2-12 Mines, Countermines, & Demolition Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................... 2-14 Chemical and Biological Defense Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................... 3-7 Detection, Warning, and Identification Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................... 3-9 Lasers, High Energy Chemical Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 4-4 Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...... 4-5 Electronic Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 5-4 Electronic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 5-6 Fabrication Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 5-8 General Purpose Electronic Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................... 5-11
5.5-1 5.6-1 6.1-1 6.2-1 7.1-1 7.2-1 7.3-1 8.1-1 8.2-1 8.3-1 8.4-1 8.5-1 8.6-1 8.7-1 8.8-1 8.9-1 8.10-1 8.11-1
Microelectronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....................................................................... 5-13 Opto-Electronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....................................................................... 5-16 Advanced Diesel Engines Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................... 6-4 Vetronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..... 6-5 Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................... 7-4 Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................... 7-7 Radio and Data-Based Reference Navigation Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................... 7-11 Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems (C4I2) Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................... 8-4 Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-6 High-Performance Computing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-8 Human Systems Interface Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-10 Information Security Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....................................................................... 8-12 Intelligent Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....................................................................... 8-14 Modeling and Simulation Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-16 Networks and Switching Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-18 Signal Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....................................................................... 8-20 Software Militarily Critical Technology Parameters....... 8-22 Transmission Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 8-24
xiii
9.1-1 9.2-1 9.3-1 9.4-1 10.1-1 10.2-1 10.3-1 10.4-1 10.5-1 10.6-1 11.1-1 11.2-1 11.3-1 11.4-1 11.5-1a 11.5-1b 11.6-1 12.1-1 12.2-1 12.3-1
Electronic Attack Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ..................................................................... 9-4 Electronic Protection Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ...................................................................... 9-5 Optical Countermeasures Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 9-7 Optical Counter-Countermeasures Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................. 9-8 Advanced Fabrication and Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 10-4 Bearings Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..... 10-8 Metrology Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................................... 10-10 Non-Destructive Inspection Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 10-12 Production Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................. 10-14 Robotics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..... 10-16 Armor and Anti-Armor Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................. 11-4 Electrical Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................................... 11-6 Magnetic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................................... 11-8 Optical Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................................................... 11-10 High-Strength Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 11-12 High-Temperature Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 11-14 Special Function Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................. 11-17 Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 12-4 Marine Signature Control and Survivability Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................................... 12-7 Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................... 12-10
13.1-1 13.2-1 13.3-1 14.1-1 14.2-1 14.3-1 15.1-1 15.2-1 15.3-1 15.4-1 15.5-1 15.6-1 15.7-1 15.8-1 15.9-1 15.10-1 16.0-1 17.1-1 17.2-1 17.3-1
Fission Reactors Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..................................................................... 13-4 Nuclear Materials Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 13-6 Nuclear Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..................................................................... 13-8 High Density Conventional Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................... 14-4 Mobile Electric Platform Power Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 14-7 Pulsed and High Power Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 14-9 Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................... 15-4 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................... 15-6 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................... 15-9 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................... 15-12 Electro-Optical Sensors Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 15-14 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters .................................... 15-16 Lasers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ........ 15-18 Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters.................... 15-20 Obscurants Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..................................................................... 15-22 Radar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ......... 15-24 Signature Control Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..................................................................... 16-3 Electronics and Computers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters................................................. 17-4 Optronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters..................................................................... 17-6 Power and Thermal Management Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 17-7
xiv
17.4-1 17.5-1 18.1-1
Propulsion for Space Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 17-9 Sensors for Space Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................................................ 17-12 Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters ................... 18-4
xv
APPENDIX A DoD MCTL MASTER LOCATOR*

MCTL Parts This master locator lists the 18 MCTL technology sections for Part I and their included technology areas and indicates for Parts II and III where supporting data are located. The Locator also lists additional technology areas which are addressed only for Parts II and III. A short description of the three MCTL parts is shown below. Part I Weapons Systems Technologies (WST) Contains a list of technologies critical to the development and production of superior weapons. Part II Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Technologies Contains a list of technologies required for development, integration, or employment of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Part III Developing Critical Technologies (DCT) Contains a list of technologies which, when fully developed and incorporated into a military system, will produce increasingly superior performance or maintain a superior capability more affordably.
I WST AERONAUTICS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Advanced Concept Turbine Engines Aircraft, Fixed Wing 1.1 Aircraft, Rotary Wing Air Vehicles, Unmanned Full Authority Digital Electronic Controls (FADEC) Gas Turbines Engines 1.2 Guidance, Navigation, and Controls Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces 1.3 Ramjet and Scramjet Systems Integration Test Facility, Propulsion System
PART II WMD
III DCT
I WST
PART II WMD
III DCT
1.4 1.3
1.4 1.3 1.3,1.4
X X X X X X X X X X X
ARMAMENTS AND ENERGETIC MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY Air-Dispersed Explosives Systems Ammunition, Small and Medium Caliber 2.1 Ballistic Missiles 1.1, .2 Bombs, Warheads, and Large-Caliber Projectiles 2.2 1.5,3.2, 4.2 Cruise Missiles 1.3 Energetic Materials 2.3 4.2 Gun and Artillery Systems 2.5 1.5 Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems 2.6 Non-Lethal Weapons Penetrators Regenerative Liquid Propellant Gun Safing, Arming, Firing, and Fuzing 2.4 5.7 Survivability, Armor and Warhead Defeat
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
*These listings are subject to change as Part III is developed. Technology areas may be added or deleted.
II-A-1
I WST BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Biological Defense Systems Biological Dispersion Biological Detection, Warning, and Identification Biological Material Production CHEMICAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Chemical Defense Systems Chemical Dispersion Chemical Material Production Chemical Detection, Warning, and Identification
PART II WMD
III DCT ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY Electronic Components Electronic Materials Fabrication Equipment General Purpose Electronic Equipment Microelectronics Opto-Electronics ENVIRONMENT TECHNOLOGY Camouflage Control of Combat Environment Micrometerology Obscurants Particle Dispersion, Coagulation, Recyling, and Reverse Disposal GROUND SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Advanced Diesel Engines Human Systems Interfaces for Ground Systems Hybrid-Electric Propulsion Systems Sensors for Ground Systems Signature Control for Ground Systems Structures for Ground Systems Systems Integration for Ground Systems Vetronics GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND VEHICLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems
I WST
PART II WMD
III DCT
3.1 3.2
3.4 3.2 3.3 3.1
X X X
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
X X X X X X
3.1
3.2
4.4 4.2 4.1 4.3
X X X X X X
DIRECTED AND KINETIC ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Coil Gun and Railgun Electrothermal and Electrothermal Chemical Gun High-Power Microwaves Lasers, Gas Dynamic and Pulsed Electrical Atomic and Molecular Lasers, High Energy Chemical 4.1 Lasers, High Energy Excimer Lasers, High Energy Free Electron Lasers, High Energy Optically Pumped Gas and Solid State Lasers, High Energy Solid State Lasers, High Energy Transfer Lasers, Short Wavelength Particle Beam, Charged Particle Beam, Neutral Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy (DE) 4.2 Systems
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
6.1 X X X X X X X
1.1 6.2
7.1 7.2 7.3
1.3,1.4 1.1,1.2, 1.3 1.1,l.3
X X
II-A-2
I WST INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Command, Control, Communications, Computing Intelligence and Information Systems Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) High-Performance Computing Human Systems Interfaces Information Security Intelligent Systems Modeling and Simulation Networks and Switching Signal Processing Software Transmission Systems INFORMATION WARFARE TECHNOLOGY Combat Identification Electronic Attack Electronic Deception Electronic Protection Optical Countermeasures Optical Counter-Countermeasures Psychological Operations
PART II WMD
III DCT MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY Armor and Anti-Armor Materials Biomaterials Electrical Materials Magnetic Materials Optical Materials Signature Control Materials Special Function Materials Structural Materials, High Strength and High Temperature MARINE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Advanced Hull Forms Human Systems Interfaces Ocean Salvage and Deep-Sea Implant Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Signature Control and Survivability Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles Systems Integration MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY Advanced Field Expedient Treatment Artificial Skin Blood Substitute Human System Monitoring and Assessment Immunizations and Neutralization Performance Enhancement
I WST
PART II WMD
III DCT
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11
2.1, .5
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.5
2.4
X X X X X X X X
2.6 2.3 2.2
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4
X X X X X X X
12.1 12.2 12.3
X X X X X X X
MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY Advanced Fabrication and Processing 10.1 Bearings 10.2 Computer-Aided Design, Manufacturing, Engineering, Test, and Maintenance Metrology 10.3 Non-Destructive Inspection and Evaluation 10.4 Production Equipment 10.5 Robotics 10.6
5.9
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
1.1,5.9 1.1 1.1 5.9
II-A-3
I WST NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Enrichment Feedstocks Production Fissile Materials Enrichment Heavy Water Production Inertial Confinement Fusion Lithium Production Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Nuclear Fission Reactors Nuclear Materials Processing Nuclear-Related Materials Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Radiological Weapons Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Tritium Production Uranium Enrichment Processes POWER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Biological Power High-Density Conventional Systems Magnetohydrodynamics Mobile Electric Platform Power Pulsed- and High-Power Systems Superconductive Power Applications 13.3 13.3 13.2
PART II WMD
III DCT SENSORS AND LASERS TECHNOLOGY Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platform Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Electro-Optical Sensors Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers Lasers Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers Radar SIGNATURE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Manufacturing and Validation Readiness and Mission Support Special Materials System Concept Design and Integration Test and System Validation SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY Astronics Electronics and Computers Launch Vehicles for Space Systems Optronics Power and Thermal Management Propulsion for Space Systems Qualification and Testing Sensors for Space Systems Signature Control and Survivability Structures for Space Systems Integration
I WST
PART II WMD
III DCT
5.1 5.2 5.12 5.5 5.9 5.3 5.2,5.4, 5.13 5.1,5.5, 5.12 5.6, 5.7 5.11 5.10 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.13 5.2 X X X X X
13.1 13.2
15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.10 16.1 1.3,1.4
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
13.2 13.2
17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5
14.1 14.2 14.3
X X X X X X
II-A-4
I WST WEAPONS EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects High-Power Microwave Weapons Effects Induced Shock Waves From Penetrating Weapons Laser Weapons Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects
PART II WMD
III DCT WEAPONS EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES (contd) Particle Beam Weapons Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Effects Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse Effects (SGEMP) Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing
I WST
PART II WMD
III DCT
6.2 6.6
X X X X X
6.8 6.7 6.4
X X X X
18.1 6.5 6.3
6.1
II-A-5
INTRODUCTION
A.
OVERVIEW OF THE 1996 DoD MCTL
The 1996 DoD MCTL is a documented snapshot in time of the ongoing DoD MCTL process. It is designed to be more precise and more userfriendly than previous editions. This is accomplished through the use of graphic format and display of technical data in tabular form. The technologies included in the DoD MCTL support the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) objectives to: Maintain near perfect real-time knowledge of the enemy and communicate to all forces in near real-time; Engage regional forces promptly in decisive combaton a global basis, Employ a range of capabilities more suitable to actions at the lower end of the full range of military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage, Control the use of space, and Counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction and future ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to the CONUS and deployed forces.
Materials and Production Nuclear Systems Marine Systems Power and Propulsion Sensors and Navigation Signature Control Space Systems Weapons Effects and Countermeasures
During the MCTL Process the TWGs reviewed over 6000 technologies related to defense weapons systems and identified 2060 militarily significant technologies that provide measurable advantage to US military systems or enhance threats posed by potential adversaries. Information on these technologies was incorporated into an electronic data base. The TWGs analyzed these significant technologies and nominated 656 which met the "militarily critical criteria" for inclusion in the MCTL Part I.
MCTL 2060 Significant Technologies Entered into Data Base Part I 656 Technologies Selected as Militarily Critical
B.
MCTL DEVELOPMENT
Reviewed Over 6000 Defense Related Technologies
To support the MCTL Process the fifteen (15) Technology Working Groups (TWGs), shown below, were established. Aeronautics Systems Advanced Weapons Systems Chemical and Biological Systems Conventional Weapons Systems Electronics and Countermeasures Ground Systems Information Systems
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE MCTL, PART I, WEAPONS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY (WST)
A foreign technology assessment (FTA) providing a summary of other nations' capabilities in this technology area.
Part I contains eighteen (18) sections, each devoted to a specific technology area. Each section introduction contains: An overview of the technology area identifying: The technology areas that contain militarily critical technologies Selected technology areas for which militarily critical technologies have not been identified A graphic showing the relationships to other technology areas with respect to supporting technologies and technology trends A rationale statement expressing why the technologies are important to US military forces. A foreign technology assessment (FTA) with accompanying figure, providing summary estimates of foreign capabilities. These estimates are expert judgments by the TWGs and compare foreign nation capabilities to US militarily critical technology areas (see paragraph E below).
Part I contains four appendices: Appendix A provides a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations used in Part I Appendix B contains definitions of words and phrases contained in Part I Appendix C contains an index of key words and phrases referenced to the subsection of text in Part I where used Appendix D contains an explanation of the contents of the columns in the table together with an example.
D.
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Systems integration was carefully studied by each of the TWGs during their deliberations. Although the TWGs considered integration to be key to the superiority of US weapons systems, specific militarily critical technologies that capture the integration issue could not be identified. The paragraphs below discuss the significance of systems integration to US weapons systems. Systems integration enables the harmonious and productive working of disparate components and the interfaces that connect them. Integration is key to understanding the implications of technology and product release decisions. Each weapons system requires the use of specific hardware and software and the integration of new technologies or advances in existing technology subsets to increase overall system performance, improve manufacturing or reduce costs. Systems integration is an ongoing process. Good integration includes traceable assurances that the components and functions will fit together and operate in concert. In the past, weapons systems designers have successfully improved both the hardware and software in an interactive process, and then integrated both to effect simultaneous improvements. Excessive integration adds cost and time without yielding a significant improvement in the product or system. Too little integration results in products or systems that do not function as advertised. Technology integration can be treated as a subset of systems integration. High technology weapons systems are fundamentally driven by availability and integration of technologies. Successful technology integration 2
Each of the sections is divided into technology subsections. Each subsection contains information directly related to the technology being treated, including: An overview identifying: The technologies covered in the subsections, The militarily critical technologies, and In graphic form, the characteristics that make the technology militarily critical and a listing of the military systems the technology area benefits;
A rationale statement expressing why the technologies are important to US military forces, Tables that present data on militarily critical technologies (see Appendix D), and
produces superior systems. The tools and techniques for preparing, mixing and matching the various components are also critical technologies because they are key to achieving the desired capabilities.
F.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
E.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Recent military operations have defined and recognized related information fields as a new form of warfare. The 1996 MCTL is the first opportunity in which to include information warfare as a separate technology section. The decision as to which technology areas and technologies to be included under information warfare is continually being addressed by the various components of DoD. An official definition of Information Warfare (see Section 9) has been approved and will be included in Joint Publication 102, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. It is recognized that the four technology areas discussed in MCTL Part I, Section 9, address only those areas formerly known as electronic warfare or electronic combat (1992 MCTL Section 6.4). Other technology areas, to include deception and psychological warfare, were not included because militarily critical technologies were not identified. These two areas will be discussed in MCTL Part III "Critical Developing Technologies." Other areas suggested by some users as belonging under information warfare are currently covered in other technology sections; e.g. information (cryptographic) security; networks, switching and computers in Section 8; sensors in Section 15; and signature control in Section 16.
The MCTL process produces estimates of the general status of foreign capabilities in each of the MCTL technology areas. These estimates are called Foreign Technology Assessments (FTA). These FTA estimates are the scientific and technological consensus of the Technical Working Group (TWG) members from industry, government and academia. Collaboration with the Intelligence Community is an essential part of the FTA determination and selected members of the Intelligence Community are TWG members who participate regularly in the MCTL process. These MCTL FTAs are foreign capability assessments and do not constitute findings of foreign availability, which are the responsibility of the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act. Tables containing summaries of the general status of foreign capabilities appear at the beginning of each of the eighteen MCTL major technology area sections. In the MCTL FTA summary tables, the level of sophistication in foreign capabilities is represented by one, two, three or four blocks, four being the highest. Four blocks indicate that the country is believed to have capabilities in all critical elements of a technology area; three blocks, that the country is believed to have a capability in a majority of the technology area critical elements; two, a capability in some critical elements; and one, a capability in only a limited set of the critical elements, as the table legends indicate. No block indicates that the TWG knows of no capability within a country or was unable to reach a consensus regarding the capability.
SECTION 2 - ARMAMENTS AND ENERGETIC MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY

Rationale The militarily critical technologies identified provide the US superior capability at the stated parameter levels. Many of the listed systems and components have operational capabilities that would enhance military capabilities of potential adversaries of the US. For the most part, the identified technologies are a generation or more ahead of any equivalent proscribed country commodities, and are not available in adequate quantity or quality in proscribed countries to seriously threaten the security of the United States. Elements of the technology are applicable to the continued development of "smart" or "brilliant" munitions, including bombs, artillery, mines, or strategic and tactical missile subsystems, but also to the evolution of elementary or more sophisticated CW/BW and nuclear munitions. Some of the technology, particularly that relating to fuzing, arming, and focusing the output of warheads, represents applications of nuclear weapons technology to advanced conventional munitions.
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Ammunition, Small and Medium Caliber ................ Bombs, Warheads, and Large Caliber Projectiles ...... Energetic Materials .......................................... Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ...................... Gun and Artillery Systems ................................. Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems ........ SUMMARY
2-3 2-5 2-7 2-10 2-12 2-13
Overview (See Figure 2.0-1) This section lists the critical technologies shown in the box above required to develop and produce in quantity safe, affordable, storable, and effective conventional munitions and weapons systems of superior operational capability, such as: Infantry and crew-served weapons systems; ammunition; artillery weapons systems; torpedoes, depth charges; bombs; land and sea mines, demolition devices; high explosive, kinetic energy and pyrotechnic warheads; projectiles; submunitions; propulsion systems; and fuzes, safing and arming devices, and their component parts. Technology related to these products is listed elsewhere in the MCTL, particularly in Sections 4, 6, 8, 12, 14 and 15. Likewise, elements of precursor munitions technology are reflected in the Materials and Equipment Annex of the MTCR, and are embedded in nuclear, and CW/BW munitions of all types found in Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction. The additional technology areas of air dispersed explosives systems, missiles, non-lethal weapons, regenerative liquid propellant gun and armor and warhead defect survivability do not contain militarily critical technologies but may contain critical emerging technologies.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing Fabrication Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Information Systems Sensors & Lasers Materials
ARMAMENTS & ENERGETIC MATERIALS
TREND
Lethal Smart Integrated Technologies Multiple Weapons/Platforms
Figure 2.0-1.
Armaments and Energetic Materials Overview
2-1
C ountry
2.2 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.6 Ammunition, B ombs, Energetic Safing, Gun & Mines, Small & Warheads, Materials A rming, Artillery C ountermines Fuzing, Systems & Demolition Medium & Largeand Systems Caliber C aliber Firing Projectiles
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) Nearly 40 countries worldwide have significant capabilities to produce, market, and develop modern munitions and weapons systems. Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Former Yugoslavia have some capability to design and produce standard ammunition for small arms, artillery, and in most instances at least elementary rocket and missile systems. In addition, the Czech Republic, Russia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania have independent capabilities and are active in exporting products and occasionally manufacturing plants related to munitions production.
Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Germany India Indonesia Iran Iraq Israel Japan Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Thailand UK US Former Yugoslavia
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 2.0-2.
Armaments and Energetic Materials FTA Summary
2-2
SECTION 2.1 AMMUNITION, SMALL AND MEDIUM CALIBER (< 81 mm)

Overview (See Figure 2.1-1) This section covers the development, production, and use of cased, combustible- or consumable-case, and telescoped ammunition; and kinetic energy projectiles for infantry and crew-served weapons, including single shot, automatic, rapid fire, guided or unguided devices. Coverage includes small and medium caliber fixed ammunition up to 60 mm; mortar rounds up to 81 mm; cannon ammunition up to 45 mm; surfacelaunched projectiles up to 60 mm; grenades; military shotgun shells up to 70 mm; and ammunition or related technology for infantry assault weapons. The technologies cover advanced weapons systems of the appropriate calibers, including both rapid-fire defense, anti-armor, or antipersonnel weapons; shoulderfired recoilless rifles or missiles, including anti-armor, air defense and assault rifles. Rationale (See Table 2.1-1) The listed technologies are related to essential elements of US rapid-fire, air-defense and antiarmor capability. Of all the weapons systems, the man-portable items are those most likely to have a readily accessible and devastating potential in the hands of terrorist groups. Representative systems include: Bushmaster, 25-, 35-, and 40-mm automatic cannon; DIVADS 40-mm division air defense system; PIVADS 20-mm air defense system; Ammunition for the AC-130 gunship LALS 11 linkless ammunition loader; Integrated air-air, precision aircraft armament control systems, 30-mm GAU 8/A armor piercing incendiary ammunition; Rh 503 35/50-mm cannon; GEPOD 30/F16 CAS ammunition; and Mk15 20-mm CIWS Phalanx gun system. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) A large number of developed and developing countries are able to develop and produce basic, small and medium caliber systems, and more particularly the ammunition for such
Ammunition, Small & Medium Caliber

Materials Design Packaging New Guidance Technologies

Cannons ( 45 mm) Surface-launched Projectiles Small Arms Shoulder-Fired Weapons Weapons to Defeat Light Armor
Figure 2.1-1.
Ammunition, Small and Medium Caliber Overview
systems. These products are available in abundance in world markets. However, only the United States and, to a lesser degree, UK, France, Germany plus Sweden, Japan, Russia, China, and Switzerland, are able to develop and produce systems based on superior technologies.
2-3
Table 2.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY CASE - COMBUSTIBLE
Ammunition, Small & Medium Caliber Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Muzzle velocities > 1400 m/sec Residue < .1% Penetration > 2 calibers Specific impulse > 200 sec Continuous operation > 20 s CRITICAL MATERIALS Selected energetic materials Plastic Casing HydroxylAmmoniumNitrate (HAN) UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 3, 21, 22 USML III WA ML 3, 21, 22 USML III WA ML 3, 21, 22 USML III
AMMUNITION - TELESCOPED PROJECTILES - GUIDED- OR COURSECORRECTED WITH INTEGRATED THRUSTERS
None Identified None Identified
None
FIRING SYSTEMS - BULK-LOADED AND REGENERATIVE-LIQUID PROPELLANT
MULTIMODE PERSONAL WEAPONS
Muzzle velocity > 110% solid equivalent None Muzzle velocity same as that achievable with equivalent solid propellant whose volume is at least 10% greater Range > 500 m None Weight < 20 lb
None Identified
None Identified
Fire control systems that incorporate course correction codes for rapid fire gun systems. Aiming and firing codes for accurate fire control; and interior, exterior, and terminal ballistic codes Computer codes and WA ML 3, 21, 22 microchips for control of USML III rapid fire, charge/recharge of propellant None identified WA ML 3, 21, 22 USML III
2-4
SECTION 2.2 BOMBS, WARHEADS, AND LARGE CALIBER PROJECTILES (> 81 mm)
Overview (See Figure 2.2-1) The technology covers the critical elements of conventional, improved conventional, "precision-guided," "smart," "brilliant," or "sentient" ammunition and warhead subsystems for air-, sea-, and groundlaunched systems. More specifically, the technology covers bombs, submunitions, missile warheads, and large caliber projectiles, generally > 6081 mm. The technology is included in DoD Research and Technology Plans. None of the critical elements have application to commercial products, with the exception of shaped charge technology to oil-well penetrators. Rationale (See Table 2.2-1) The technology and components listed are incorporated in munitions and weapons systems to provide superior lethality in terms of fragmentation, armor or hull penetration, blast effectiveness, or lethal area. Munitions, submunitions, or weapons system warheads that incorporate related technology include: PATRIOT, STINGER, LOS-F-H (line of sight, forward, heavy); CHAPARRAL, HELLFIRE II, RAPIER, Standard missile, RAM, SEA SPARROW air defense missiles; TOW 2, TOW 2A, and TOW 2B antiarmor missiles; MLRS (multiple-launch rocket system); ATACMS (Army tactical missile system); JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile); COPPERHEAD, STAFF, SADARM, ASP artillery-launched projectiles; HOMS (Hellfire optimized missile system) LOSAT; BAT; and JAVELIN fireand-forget antitank missile systems; ADAM; Sidewinder, AIM-54 Phoenix, Sparrow, AMRAAM, AAAM and LRAAM air-air missiles; AGM-130 guided bomb; Powered GBU-15 glide bomb; and BLU 109B penetrators; BLU-108/B SFW cluster bomb; HARM, SIDEARM, and IIR and laser Maverick air-ground missiles; HARPOON antiship missile; TOMAHAWK cruise missile; HYDRA 70 2.75-in. rocket; Special forces penetration-augmented munition (PAM); and selectable lightweight attack munition SLAM mine; MK-50 torpedo; MK-48 ADCAP torpedo; Near Tip MK-46 torpedo; SLAM missile, standoff land attack missile; and WALLEYE free fall weapons.
Bombs, Warheads, & Large Caliber Projectiles

Lethality Penetration Countering Algorithms Shock Resistance Miniaturization Multifunctional Vector Control

Artillery Naval Guns Antitank Weapons Aircraft Tanks Submarines
Figure 2.2-1.
Bombs, Warheads and Large Caliber Projectiles Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) Many US/NATO bombs, warheads, and projectiles are superior in the integration of their fuzes, sensors, and other subsystems. US excels in smart, brilliant, or sentient categories, while France, the UK, Germany, Israel, and Norway possess the technical capability. Russia matches the US capability. Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, and Italy, and to lesser extent China, Taiwan, North and South Korea have a significant proportion and technology base.
2-5
Table 2.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY KINETIC ENERGY PENETRATORS
Bombs, Warheads, & Large Caliber Projectiles Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Penetration > 400 mm Equivalent RHA at 60 arc Penetration > 100 mm Equivalent RHA < 10 standoff Penetration > 100 mm Equivalent RHA > 200 m standoff Penetration > 8 CD CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 3, 16, 18, 21, 22 USML XXI WA ML 3, 18, 21, 22 USML XXI WA ML 3, 18, 21, 22 USML XXI WA ML 3, 18, 21, 22 USML XXI WA ML 3, 18, 21, 22 USML XXI
SELF-FORGING FRAGMENT (SFF)
None identified
Compaction and forming equipment, and None identified process regimes, for heavy-metal liners Compaction and forming equipment, and Algorithms for sensing, process regimes, for heavy-metal liners fuzing and deployment None identified None identified
EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PROJECTILE (EFP)
None identified
SHAPED CHARGES
None identified
TANDEM OR MULTIPLE WARHEAD MUNITIONS Penetration > 400 mm Equivalent RHA at 60 arc
None identified
None identified
None identified
2-6
SECTION 2.3 ENERGETIC MATERIALS

Overview (See Figure 2.3-1) These technologies cover high explosives and gun and missile propellants. They are concerned with the manufacture of ingredients and their formulation as compositions ready for incorporation into conventional munitions and weapons systems. Some energetic materials are used in WMD; they will be covered in WMD, Vol. II. Commercial explosives are used by the military during major hostilities or by military engineers for civil works. Rationale (See Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2) The listed critical energetic materials are the basis for the range, payload, and lethality that provides the US munitions and weapons systems their superior performance. Without the technology and the manufacturing plants of adequate capacity no country is able to match or exceed the US defense capability associated with conventional systems. The three tables of this section are different from other sections' due to large numbers of energetic materials and their multiple uses as gun propellants, missile propellants and high explosives. Table 2.3-1 defines when energetic materials are sufficient to be militarily critical. The other tables list chemicals and their uses. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) Over 20 countries have some capability to produce standard energetic materials, such as TNT, RDX, HMX, NC, AP, metal fuels, hydrazine and compounds, for use in missile, CW/BW, and "smart" munitions applications. The US, along with France, the UK, and Japan, maintains a lead in the formulation and production of the advanced energetic materials for use in the smart munitions listed in Sections 2.0 and 15.0. Russia and China have at least researched the synthesis of many of the substances; other countries, which include Italy, South Africa, Sweden, Brazil, and Egypt, have a selective capability to produce some of the materials. An increasing number of non-NATO countries have the technology to formulate energetic materials for munitions and weapons applications, their capabilities being limited primarily by the availability of the listed advanced materials and the lack of computational and experimental capability to design and synthesize new molecules and polymers. Due to the large number of energetic materials (as defined in Figure 2.3-2) and the need to determine which are militarily critical, a means is provided to show when a specific energetic material is militarily critical. Each is in the table depending on its use as a high explosive, missile propellant and/or gun
Energetic Materials

Stability Producibility Ignitability Specific Impulse Safety

Projectiles Fuzes Bombs Vector Controls Warheads Mines Propulsion
Figure 2.3-1.
Energetic Materials Overview
Energetic Materials
Any high explosive, propellant, or pyrotechnic that can sustain a steady state burning rate > 38 mm (1.5 in.) per second under standard temperature and pressure.
Figure 2.3-2. Energetic Materials Definition
propellant. Table 2.3-1 states the minimum level that provides US superiority for each use. Table 2.3-2 lists the energetic materials that exceed these levels depending on application.
2-7
Table 2.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY HIGH EXPLOSIVE FORMULATIONS
Energetic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Not applicable EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 8, 18, 21, 22 USML V
MISSILE PROPELLANT SOLID COMPOSITIONS (FOR ROCKET OR

MISSILE PROPULSION SYSTEMS OR SUBSYSTEMS)
GUN PROPELLANTS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS INSPECTION EQUIPMENT SUPERIORITY Any high explosive formulation with a See Table 2.3-2 Not applicable detonation velocity > 8700 m/s or a detonation pressure > 340 kilobars or Crystal Density > 1.8 gm/cm3 dv > 8000 m/s or dp > 250 kilobars > 250 C for > 5 min Any solid propellant with Ip (under standard See Table 2.3-2 Not applicable conditions) > 250 s for non-metallized, or > 270 s for aluminized compositions Or Ip > 230 s for non-haloenized, and 250 s for non-metallized and 266 s for non-haloenized for compositions. Any gun propellant having a force constant See Table 2.3-2 Not applicable greater than 1200 kJ/kg (400,000 ft/lb)
Not applicable
WA ML 8, 18, 21, 22 USML V
Not applicable
WA ML 8, 18, 21, 22 USML V
Note: Critical Materials superior to these parameters are in Table 2.3-2.
Table 2.3-2.
Energetic Materials That Exceed Critical Parameters

Applications
Chemicals That Exceed the Militarily Minimum Criteria When X in Application Box 1,1,3-trinitroazetidine (TNAZ) 2,2-bis(ethylferrocenyl) propane (Catocene) 2-ethyl aziridine amide with isocyanuric backbone structure (TEAT or HX-874) 2-ethyl aziridine amide with trimesic backbone structure (BITA, or HX-868; HX-876, when in a 40% benzene solution) 2-ethyl aziridine amide with trimethyladipic backbone structure ( HX-877; HX-873, when in a 40% benzene solution) 2-methyl aziridine amide with isophthalic backbone structure (HX-852; HX-875, when in a 40% benzene solution) 5-nitro-2,4-dihydro-3H-1,2,4-triazol-3-one (NTO, OTN, or ONTA) alcohol-functionalized polyepichlorohydrin amine-based antioxidants (Protech Series 3000) bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) acetal (BDNPA) bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) formal (BDNPF) bis(2-hydroxyethyl)glycolamide (BHEGA, or HX-880) bis(2-methyl aziridinyl) methylamino phosphine oxide (Methyl BAPO) Bulk (> 50 g) quantities Bulk (> 50 g) quantities Bulk (> 500 g) quantities Bulk (> 500 g) quantities Bulk (> 500 g) quantities Bulk (> 500 g) quantities
Minimum Critical Quantity
High Explosive X
Missile Propellant X X X X X X
Gun Propellant X
Bulk (> 5 kg) quantities Low molecular weight (> 10,000) precursor; bulk quantities > 50 lb Bulk quantities (> 1,000 kg) to any one destination Bulk quantities > 7.5 kg Bulk quantities > 7.5 kg Bulk (> 50 g) quantities Bulk (> 50 g) quantities
X X X X X X X (cont'd)
2-8
Table 2.3-2.
Energetic Materials That Exceed Critical Parameters (Cont'd)

Applications
Chemicals That Exceed the Militarily Minimum Criteria When X in Application Box butacene diaminofurazan (DAF) dicyclopentadienyl iron (Catocene) derivatives diferrocenylethane (DFE) ferrocene carboxylic acids glycidylazide polymer (GAP) and derivatives hexanitro hexaaza isowurtzitane (CL-20, or HNIW) and clathrates hydroxylamnmonium nitrate (HAN) iron oxide (Hematite, Pyrocat)
Minimum Critical Quantity
High Explosive
Missile Propellant X X X X X X X X X X X
Gun Propellant
Bulk (> 500 kg) quantities or formulations Bulk (> 50 g) quantities Bulk quantities or formulations > 5 kg Bulk (> 50 g) quantities Bulk quantities or formulations > 500 g Bulk quantities or formulations > 5 kg Bulk quantities or formulations > 5 kg > 500 cc Fine powder with a specific surface > 250 sq meters per gram and an average particle size of 0.003 micrometers or less lead 2-ethylhexoate Bulk quantities or formulations > 50 g N-butyl-ferrocene Bulk quantities > 50 g nickel-aluminum active metals Pyrophoric surfaces on metal or polymeric foils (> 1 kg) nitratomethylmethyloxetane (NMMO, NIMMO) Bulk quantities or formulations > 5 kg nitroguanidine (NQ) Bulk (> 1,000 lb) quantities or formulations; or high density, cubic or spherical crystals oxalohydroxamic acid (DHG) Bulk (> 50 g) quantities polyglycidyl nitrate (PGN, or poly-GLYN)) Bulk quantities or formulations > 50 kg polynitroorthocarbonate (TNEOC) Bulk quantities or formulations > 750 g tetraethylenepentamine acrylonitrile (TEPAN, or HX-879) Bulk (> 1 lb) quantities or formulations tetraethylenepentamine-acrylonitrile glycidol (TEPANOL, or HX-878), and Bulk (> 1 lb) quantities or formulations its salts titanium Particle size > 10 triaminoguanidine nitrate (TAGN) Bulk (> 100 lb) quantities or formulations triaminotrinitrobenzene TATB Bulk (> 100 lb) quantities or formulations triphenyl bismuth (TPB) Bulk (> 1 lb) quantities or formulations; produced to meet about twenty different MILSPECs, adapted to each missile system. tris-1-(2-methyl)aziridinyl phosphine oxide (MAPO) and derivatives Bulk (> 1 lb) quantities or formulations zirconium Powders in particle sizes < 60 whether spherical, atomized, spheroidal, flaked, [sponge], or ground, manufactured from material consisting of > 99% Zr
X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
2-9
SECTION 2.4 SAFING, ARMING, FUZING, AND FIRING

Overview (See Figure 2.4-1) This subsection addresses the development, production, and use of safing, arming, and fuzing devices for munitions/weapons systems, their subsystems, or their components. Fuze technology also draws on technologies listed in Sections 5 and 15, adapted to the various precision, weight, geometry, environment, cost, reliability, and shelf-life requirements of the munitions and weapons systems. The safing and arming requirements are derived from the need for a fuze never to set off a munition before it reaches a chosen burst point relative to a target, and then to function in the munition with better than 95 percent reliability at that point, even after decades of storage; or to remain passive under severe physical stress for substantial periods and then to function with split second timing, drawing on integrated power supplies that are themselves dependent on instant, synchronous activation. The cost requirements for high usage components are such that a few cents or even fractions of a cent per device can significantly affect the affordability or cost-effectiveness of designs. None of the systems, subsystems, materials or software are dual-use items, although some components related to navigation and control may have potential civil applications. Rationale (See Table 2.4-1) The trend toward "smart" munitions, and multioptions in the setting and remote setting of fuzes have resulted in fuze developments of high complexity incorporating state-of-the-art communications and electronics technology. Two particular areas of concern relate to sensors and signal processors, even if the hardware involved is not itself at the cutting edge of the respective technologies. In the case of sensors, details of the frequencies, bandwidths, and sensitivities that would identify weaknesses or means of defeat could be divulged and must be protected if the US defense posture is to be maintained. In the case of signal processing, details of algorithms identifying means of detection, discrimination, control, bias techniques, unique demodulation techniques, or revealing performance in electronic countermeasures and clutter environments must similarly be protected.
Safing, Arming Fuzing, and Firing Fuzing,

High Reliability Fast Setting Time High Target Discrimination Capability High Stability Wide Temperature Range In All Environments

Munitions Delivered By Aircraft Sea Systems Land Systems Nuclear Systems
Figure 2.4-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) The technical area as applied in US, UK and French munitions and weapons systems are unique and not available to most countries or countries with which the United States is not closely allied. While elements of the technology are available in developed, and even developing, countries, the affordability and the integration of the technologies into sophisticated "smart" systems, providing multi-options to the user, and precision, accuracy, and reliability in hostile environments can be matched only by a few outside of the United States. Countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel are beginning to acquire "smart" systems technologies.
2-10
Table 2.4-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
TECHNOLOGY MULTI OPTION FUZE FOR ARTILLERY (MOFA) MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS INSPECTION EQUIPMENT SUPERIORITY Manual set time 4199.9 sec, Ga AS for MMIC High g telemeters (PCM and other Precision < 0.1 sec; chip environments); soft recovery test vehicles Inductive setting capability compatible with autoloader rate of fire of 1012 rds/min, 48 simultaneous impacts; Withstand > 20,000 g and temp < 100 C, ECM hardened Reliability > 95% None identified None identified Timing accuracy < .001 sec error Detonation accuracy < 100 m CEP None identified None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Computer programs for design of conformal antennae for fuze sensors; automatic target recognition; clutter modeling; signal (ECM/ECCM) processor modeling None EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 3, 4. 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, B,. D, E USML III, IV CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E WA ML 3, 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV WA ML 3, 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV
ELECTRONIC-TIME FUZES
PROXIMITY FUZES MEDIUM ALTITUDE (100500 M ABOVE GROUND LEVEL)
None
SMART MINE FUZES
GUIDANCE-INTEGRATED FUZES
Remote arm and Safe Selectable target identification with a P > 80% identification accuracy Sensing Accuracy < 0.1 m CEP
None identified
None identified
GaAS chips
None identified
Algorithms that fuse sensing and reference to arm and detonate mine Algorithms that integrate sensing and fuzing validated data
WA ML 3, 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV WA ML 3, 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV
2-11
SECTION 2.5 GUN AND ARTILLERY SYSTEMS

Overview (See Figure 2.5-1) This subsection covers the development and production of artillery weapons systems, including the subsystems and components, the propelling charges, rocket motor assists, associated interior and exterior ballistics, and the warhead interfaces. The concern is also with chemical and electrothermal-chemical propulsion systems for tube-launched projectiles of calibers greater than 81 mm. The technology has no civil applications, but generates significant commercial competition among both developed and developing countries in the sale of older (1960's), standard products, and the provision of ammunition to replenish stocks for the obsolescent weapons of Russia and NATO countries. Emerging technology is concerned with the evolution of liquid propellant propulsion systems, and with the development of autonomous fire control systems. Rationale (See Table 2.5-1) Propelling charge technology is used for rocketassisted projectiles, including tube-launched, tubular, and ramjet projectiles fired from guns and howitzers. The emphasis of the technology is on improvements to the range, kinetic energy, mobility, and manpower requirements. Weapon systems that incorporate related technology include: M119 105-mm light weight howitzer M198 155-mm howitzer, the M109A6 Paladin howitzer; M110 203-mm howitzer; the Crusader system; Unicharge, Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS), and the regenerative liquid propellant gun and the Advanced, 155 mm Artillery Cannon System Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) The development of artillery systems has tended to be characterized by slow evolution. This applies even to Russia in spite of its traditional emphasis on the importance of artillery. Austria, Egypt, South Africa, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Greece all developed competent replicas of the US M109 howitzer and Russian equivalents, while the joint UK/GE/French agreement to develop a superior FH-70 system fell apart several years ago. In general, the technology for gun propulsion Table 2.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Gun & Artillery Systems

Data Processing Speed Systems Integration Accuracy Loaders

Ground & Sea Cannon Platforms
Figure 2.5-1.
Gun and Artillery Systems Overview
development and testing among non-NATO countries, other than Sweden, is probably on a par with that of China. In 1988 this was represented as being of a standard, or classical, level of competence, based on instrumentation that was 20 or more years old.
Gun and Artillery Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY DEMOLITION DEVICES - MULTISTAGE, Probability of detection > 90% at ranges > 2 ENCAPSULATED MULTISTAGE MUNITIONS, OR km; Data process time < 1 sec to fire ADVANCED TANDEM FORWARD CHARGES AUTOLOADERS - ADVANCED, MODULAR
ARTILLERY CHARGES
REFERENCE Ammunition guidance and WA Cat 3, 4, 21, 22 control algorithms; validated USML III, IV tech. data packages Fire control and charge selection algorithms WA ML 2, 21, 22 USML II
Capable of autoloading and firing 10 rounds/min None identified at muzzle velocities > 825 m/sec and ranges of 430 km
Propellant grain production equipment
2-12
SECTION 2.6
MINES, COUNTERMINES, AND DEMOLITION SYSTEMS

Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems
Overview (See Figure 2.6-1) This subsection covers technology for land and sea mines, and demolition systems (but not demolition charges, such as demolition "blocks," unless they are intended to be assembled components of an integrated system). The emphasis is on scatterable, precision, or "smart" devices. Included in this section are special forces and man-portable urban warfare demolition systems. Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) items are sometimes geometrically constrained versions of shoulder-fired, antitank missiles that permit safe functioning in confined spaces. Aspects of the warhead technology are covered under Subsection 2.1, and the rocket motor technology is covered by Subsection 2.5. Elements of the technology are covered by DoD S&T Plans, and the technology is not relevant to WMD. Developing technologies (see Part III) are concerned with sensor fuzed, multi-option systems that can be mass dispersed and remotely armed or disarmed. An example is the emerging airborne stand-off minefield detection system (ASTAMIDS) which will provide commanders with the ability to conduct reconnaissance, provide early obstacle and minefield detection, and communicate the locations of minefields to maneuver forces prior to their arrival. Rationale (See Table 2.6-1) Standoff remotely settable mine fuzing is to establish a mine field and yet necessary to ensure that friendly forces can safely break through to facilitate required maneuver and ground operations barriers that preclude effective battlefield operations. Within this context it is critical to control the access to selected devices by terrorist groups, in particular their access to special forces devices, which are capable of creating very serious national security problems in civil urban environments, in sensitive government buildings and structures, and to defense facilities nationwide. There are no dualuse or commercial applications of the technology. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 2.0-2) Countries with major fuzing capabilities include Russia, France, Germany, UK, and Sweden. Germany has significant capability with the development and production of MOUT weapons. Countries that over the last two decades have acquired sufficient competence to develop and produce mines, demolition systems, and

Sensors Control Software High Fault Tolerance Reliability Materials Energetic Structural

Ground & Sea Maneuver Blockades MOUT
Figure 2.6-1.
Mines, Countermines, and Demolition Systems Overview
shoulder-fired missile systems for internal, or international markets include Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Greece, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Norway, China, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. But few if any of these are known to have produced effective MOUT-type variants, or to have developed mines with the multi-option-microprocessor control fuzes. Most countries with ammunition production plants have the ability to produce at least primitive land mines, and countries outside NATO that produce sophisticated mines with multioption functioning and fuzing include Russia and Sweden.
2-13
Table 2.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY SENSOR-FUZED MINES
Mines, Countermines, & Demolition Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Remotely (air or ground) settable at 5 km standoff; Effective over 360 at < 50 m target standoff, detection probability > 75% distinguishes different target signatures Hard structure penetration of > 1 m at 50 m standoff CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Digital signal processing algorithms to identify friend or foe and track target vehicles Algorithms for sequential firing of ground-emplaced high-explosive charges and blasting agents EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV
DEMOLITION DEVICES - MULTISTAGE, ENCAPSULATED MULTISTAGE MUNITIONS, OR ADVANCED TANDEM

FORWARD CHARGES
None identified
None identified
WA ML 3, 4, 21, 22 USML III, IV
2-14
SECTION 5 - ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY

for making transistors smaller. The huge investment required for new fabrication plants will result in the realignment of today's chip manufacturers. There are many joint ventures being formed between US and Japanese to share the huge investment required for new fabrication plants. This trend is expected to continue and the end of some of today's chip manufacturers is expected because there won't be a business case for many new multi-billion dollar fabrication plants after 2005. Rationale Semiconductor and Electronic Equipment Technology is one of the critical areas that gives the United States its modern military capabilities. The electronic technologies are either contained or used in the production of virtually every weapons system in the US arsenal, and they enable a dramatically higher performance and reliability with smaller size and lower power. Electronic devices and components contribute greatly, perhaps more so than any other technology, to the current technological edge of most US military systems over those of any conceivable adversary. Widespread utility derives from the technological attributes of high component density, high speed, low power
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Instrumentation Manufacturing & Fabrication Materials Information Systems Power Systems Sensors & Lasers
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Electronic Components ..................................... Electronic Materials.......................................... Fabrication Equipment ...................................... General Purpose Electronic Equipment ................... Microelectronics ............................................. Opto-Electronics ............................................. SUMMARY
5-3 5-5 5-7 5-10 5-12 5-15
Overview (See Figure 5.0-1) The array of technologies covered in Section 5.0 is related to Microelectronics (General Purpose Integrated Circuits), OptoElectronics, Electronic Components, General Purpose Equipment, Fabrication Equipment, and Materials. Militarily critical technologies include materials and techniques that enable the extreme density and high performance, with low power, of Very Large Scale Integrated Circuits (VLSI), Ultra Large Scale Integrated Circuits (ULSI), and Very High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC). These technologies also include microwave/millimeter wave tubes, integrated circuits and devices, manufacturing equipment, and materials. Computer aided design, manufacturing and test (CAD/CAM/CAT) capabilities to turn out practical working systems in a timely and efficient manner are companion capabilities which must keep pace to allow the effective use of these critical technologies. The performance of processors and capacity of memory chips has doubled every 18 months since 1970. Other semiconductor chips have followed this pattern. This exponential growth is expected to continue until 2005. As the count of transistors on a chip continues to grow exponentially, the cost of building a top-of-the-line chip fabrication plant has also risen because of the higher costs associated with the increasingly exotic facilities and tools need to etch finer and finer lines on a chip. By that time, the price per transistor is expected to bottom out. Each new generation of chips will continue to produce a smaller return on investment and there will no longer be an economic incentive
ELECTRONICS
TREND
Situational Awareness Autonomous Operations Computational Capabilities
Figure 5.0-1.
Electronics Overview
5-1
dissipation, wide temperature range, radiation hardening, and reliability. Electronic devices and components are widely employed in nearly every type of military system and will be utilized to an even greater extent in the future as systems become more sophisticated. Radiation hardness is a characteristic much desired in electronic equipment particularly for military space and nuclear plant applications. There is a military specification for radiation hardening required by weapons effects environment which will not be considered here. Many modern electronic devices are inherently tolerant to radiation effects are vacuum tubes and devices using light as the processing medium, CMOS devices becoming more tolerant and devices using materials or compounds other than silicon (e.g. gallium arsenide). Radiation hardening is therefore included as a specific technology in subsection 5.5 rather than repeating in every applicable section or subsection. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 5.0-2) The United States is the clear leader in the broad category of Electronics over the entire range of technologies covered in this category. Japan possesses a majority of these technologies mainly due to their capability in memory (DRAM) integrated circuits and other semiconductor devices (telephone and satellite communications) and semiconductor production and materials. The European countries have notable capabilities, but concentrated in niche areas that complement those of the United States and Japan. The Russians generally lag by one or two generations in the degree of performance of critical elements (depending on the technology considered), but still have a broad Electronics capability. They have critical capability in some areas, such as microwave tube oscillators, gyrotrons, and sophisticated materials. None of the remaining countries approaches the capabilities of the aforementioned ones. China has been slowly developing capabilities during the past 5 to 10 years and will probably accelerate the rate of development during the next 5 to 10 years in an attempt to catch up militarily and commercially with others. Other Pacific Rim countries are also accelerating their development but primarily in commercial areas.
C ountry
5.2 5.3 5.1 Electronic Fabrication Electronic Components Materials Equipment
5.4 5.5 5.6 General MicroOptoPurpose Electronics Electronics Electronic Equipment
Canada China Denmark Czech Republic France Germany Hungary Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia S. Korea Switzerland Taiwan UK US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 5.0-2.
Electronics FTA Summary
5-2
SECTION 5.1 ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS

Overview (See Figure 5.1-1) Arrays of electronic components include technologies to design and build microwave tubes, solid state microwave/millimeter wave, superconducting electronics and acoustic wave devices. These technologies are being supported by a current Tri-Service Vacuum Electronics Initiative R&D program for microwave tubes and the DoD Electronics Technology Program for solid state devices. Electronic devices are vital components in most military systems. Their use includes computers, missiles, avionics, electronic attack (EA), early warning radars, guided munitions, and satellites. The microwave tube, acoustics, and superconducting technologies are unique enabling technologies in that no alternative technology can be substituted for some power and frequency regimes. At present this is limited dual-use technology and military use is 80 percent of the US consumption. Rationale (See Table 5.1-1) Electronic devices utilize some of the most critical and pervasive technologies and thereby contribute significantly to the US military edge over potential enemies. Widespread utility derives from the attributes of high component density, high speed, low power consumption, high degree of radiation hardness, wide temperature range, and reliability. The military sector is driving electronic device development in EA and Radar. Systems containing modular parts are easily installed on platforms and are more easily upgraded and modified to adapt to varying missions. The commercial sector is driving communications, space and industrial processing. The commercial technology in microwave tubes, acoustic wave and superconducting devices was obtained from development for military applications. The major commercial applications of these technologies are in communications, weather and air traffic control radar, navigation, TV, EA test equipment, and industrial heating. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 5.0-2) The US is the leading country in microwave and millimeter wave electronic components and devices. In microwave tubes, France (in traveling wave tubes) and the US are the strongest, with Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK having extensive capabilities. Others with capabilities in tube technology are Canada, China, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, and Taiwan. The US has a commanding lead in linear beam microwave tube technology due to substantial R&D investments
Electronic Components

Bandwidth Power Average/Peak Linearity Efficiency Size, Power, Weight Dynamic Range Frequency Radiation Hardness

Radar EW, EA, ES Communications Navigation Guided Munitions
Figure 5.1-1.
Electronic Components Overview
for electronic warfare applications and radar applications. Many of the specific technologies have been developed in the US for military systems, but some of the tubes are licensed for manufacture in the NATO countries. The leading countries in acoustic wave device capability are the US and Japan; however, a number of other countries possess a niche capability. These include the UK, France, Germany, Canada, and Israel. The US leads in analog and microwave devices and Japan is the clear leader in digital superconducting integrated circuits. Countries with lesser capabilities, or niche markets, include France, Germany, and Italy. The US is leading in solid state devices; Japan, Germany, and France are strong contenders.
5-3
Table 5.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY TRAVELING WAVE TUBES, PULSED OR CONTINUOUS WAVE
Electronic Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS CAD of gun, collector and circuit EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Operating frequency higher than 46 GHz Having a cathode heater element which has a turn-on time < 3 seconds to rated RF power
Tungsten wire tape, None identified Molybdenum wire tape, APBN Boron Nitride Rods, Cathode Nickel None identified
COUPLED CAVITY TUBES, OR DERIVATIVES THEREOF
An "instantaneous bandwidth" > 10% or a peak power > 70/30 Cupronickel 50 kW. Cathode nickel
None identified
HELIX TUBES, OR DERIVATIVES "bandwidth" > one octave, and average power times frequency THEREOF > 2 (kW-GHz); "bandwidth" one octave, and average power times frequency > 4 (kW-GHz) CROSS-FIELD AMPLIFIER A gain > 17 dB or noise figure < 35 dB TUBES
Tungsten wire tape, None identified Molybdenum wire tape APBN Boron Nitride Rods Cathode Nickel
CAD of gun, collector and circuit
Corning 77 Glass Rhenium tungsten wire
IMPREGNATED CATHODES FOR Having a turn on time to rated emission of less than 3 None identified seconds; or ELECTRONIC TUBES Producing a continuous emission current density at rated operating conditions exceeding 10 A/cm2 MICROWAVE POWER AMPLIFIERS CONTAINING TUBES Operate above 3 GHz or output power density exceeding 80 W/kg and volume < 400 cubic centimeters None identified
ACOUSTIC WAVE DEVICES BULK
Frequency 1 GHz
None identified
ACOUSTIC WAVE DEVICES SURFACE WAVE
Frequency > 1 GHz Sidelobe > 55 DB
None identified
MICROWAVE/MILLIMETER WAVE INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (MMIC)
Frequency > 3 GHz
None identified
MICROWAVE/MILLIMETER WAVE TRANSISTORS
Frequency > 40 GHz
GaAs or other III/V or II/VI materials
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E None identified CAD of electron gun WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E None identified CAD of gun, collector and WA ML 11, 21, 22 power supply circuit WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E None identified None identified WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E Sub-micron photolithographic Unique CAD tools needed for WA ML 11, 21, 22 equipment high performance WA CAT 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E Automatic on-chip testers; automated Unique CAD, CAM, CAE WA ML 11, 21, 22 fabrication equipment for high-volume software needed WA CAT 3A, D, E production, automatic network MCTR 11 analyzer USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E Automatic network analyzers, on-chip Unique software is needed to WA ML 11, 21, 22 testers, fabrication equipment, design devices WA CAT 3A, D, E especially for sub-micron geometries MCTR 11 and large volume production USML XII, 121.16 CCL CAT 3A, D, E
None identified
None identified
5-4
SECTION 5.2 ELECTRONIC MATERIALS

O v e r v i e w (See Figure 5.2-1) This technology area includes the preparation and processing of new and current electronic and Opto-Electronic (OE) materials from the purification of the basic elements to the final wafer or substrate material ready for device fabrication. Materials handling and their processes are currently undergoing rapid changes to meet the future demands of the electronic industry. These materials are made of very pure starting materials. Preparation methods are numerous, depending on the material under consideration, liquid state preparation (separation of liquid metals), and the making of gases used in the compounding of crystal-starting materials or in epitaxial growth (hydrides, halides, anometallic compounds, and use of pure elemental gases). Rationale (See Table 5.2-1) The basic building blocks of military electronic, OE, and optic devices and circuits are materials used in single crystal polycrystalline or amorphous form. These materials are used to perform a vast array of functions including logic, amplification, modulation, memory, display, delay, signal generation, sensing, switching, etc., which are the basic building blocks of the military electronic and OE device and system technology. Many of the materials that fall under the broad category of electronic materials are capable of performing many functions. Silicon ICs can be used to switch, amplify, detect, generate, store, and process electronic signals on a small chip of material. Dramatic increases in performance of military systems are made possible by advances in semiconductor materials. Militarily critical technologies relate to the specific preparation, purification, and compounding methods used and the equipment and materials employed. Electronic materials include semiconductors, conductors, dielectrics, piezoelectrics, superconductors, magnets, magnetoresistive, ferro- and pyroelectrics, lasers, OE and magneto-optic materials, as well as others. In the past, enhanced military system reliability and versatility resulted from the substitution of ICs for discrete transistors with the accompanying savings in cost, weight, and improved performance. In the future, military systems will depend on the evolution of these technologies for decreased lifecycle costs, size advantages, and increases in performance and ruggedness. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 5.0-2) The world leaders in semiconductor materials technology are Japan and the US. Japan has taken a lead position in some semiconductor materials, at the expense of the US, as they are the primary source for some critical materials used in US manufacture. Other
Electronic Materials

Uniformity Purity Process Control Substrate Size & Uniformity Optimized for High Performance

Electronic Devices Components Sensors Environment Tolerant Devices Radiation Tolerant Temperature Tolerant Compound Semi-Conductors Fabrication Equipment
Figure 5.2-1.
Electronic Materials Overview
Pacific Rim countries are making sizeable investment in future semiconductor capability. Other countries with extensive capabilities are Russia, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK. Former East Bloc countries have the ability to prepare high purity electronic and OE materials in small laboratory quantities of high purity. Their ability to prepare high-purity chemicals on a large scale (production level) is severely limited due to a lack of Western sophisticated equipment and technology. Japan and the United States are the world leaders in resist materials, while Germany, Russia, the Czech Republic, and the UK have limited capabilities. Quality control has been the major barrier for high-quality volume production in Russia. Japan is the world leader in hydride materials, with France, the UK, and the US slightly behind.
5-5
Table 5.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY HETERO-EPITAXIAL
Electronic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT MOCVD (Metal Organic Chemical Vapor Deposition) and MBE (Molecular Beam Epitaxy) epitaxial growth equipment. Bulk and surface lifetimes for ultra-thin film testing UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL
Hetero-epitaxial MATERIALS WITH materials with epitaxially EPITAXIALLY GROWN grown layers of Silicon, LAYERS OF SILICON, Germanium, III/V GERMANIUM, III/V compounds or II/VI COMPOUNDS OR II/VI compounds. MetalCOMPOUNDS. organic compounds and hydrides used as precursors. RESIST MATERIALS Positive resist optimized for use at wavelengths Light sensitive polymers < 400 nm for use at wavelengths < E-beam or Ion-beam resist with sensitivity of 400 mm, polymers sensitive to exposure by, > 0.01 microcoulomb/mm2 E-beam, X-ray and ion X-ray resist with sensitivity of 2.5 mJ/mm2 beam. Resist optimized for surface imaging technologies, and silyated resist. METAL ORGANIC Metal-organic compounds of aluminum, Metal-organic COMPOUNDS gallium, indium, arsenic or antimony or organic compounds of aluminum, compounds of phosphorus, having a purity better gallium, indium, arsenic than 99.999 %. or antimony or organic compounds of phosphorus, having a purity better than 99.999%. HYDRIDES Hydrides of phosphorus, arsenic or antimony, Hydrides of phosphorus, having a purity > 99.999%, even diluted in arsenic or antimony, neutral gases. having a purity > 99.999%, even diluted in neutral gases. SUBSTRATE MATERIALS OF Substrate thickness uniformity < 2.5 % across Diamond, Alumina, DIAMOND, ALUMINA, SILICON 75 mm Silicon and Polysilicon. AND POLYSILICON
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Capability to produce hetero-epitaxial materials consisting of a "substrate" with stacked low defect density epitaxially grown multiple layers of Silicon, Germanium, III/V or II/VI compounds to a flatness of 3 to 5% across 75 mm or less than 50 angstroms across 400 mm
REFERENCE Special algorithms are used WA IL Cat 3C to control the growth process CCL Cat 3C of the materials.
Spectroscopic ellipsometer, spectrophotometer. Equipment for: defect detection and classification, viscosymeters; interferometeric measurement equipment.
None identified
WA IL Cat 3C CCL Cat 3C
Optical spectroscopy
Special algorithms are used WA IL Cat 3C to control the synthesis of the CCL Cat 3C materials.
Optical spectroscopy
Special algorithms are used WA IL Cat 3C to control the growth process CCL Cat 3C of the materials.
Spectroscopic ellipsometer, spectrophotometer. Mechanical lapping and polishing equipment. Electrochemical polishing. Interferometric flatness measurement equipment. Resistance measurement equipment.
Special algorithms are used CCL EAR 99 to control the growth process of the materials.
5-6
SECTION 5.3 FABRICATION EQUIPMENT

Overview (See Figure 5.3-1) This subsection covers semiconductor processing equipment used to fabricate devices used in military systems (the same process is used in commercial fabrication). Semiconductor processing technology involves the formation of monocrystalline ingots of silicon, sapphire, or gallium compounds which are then sliced into wafers 400750 microns thick for further processing. This involves the growth of epitaxial layers, implantation of dopants, deposition of thin film layers, delineation of patterns using lithographic techniques, etching, testing, and packaging of integrated circuits (ICs), passive and active devices, and sensors used in military equipment and systems. Microcircuit technology, both hybrid and monolithic, requires sophisticated design and manufacturing equipment technologies to produce integrated, solidstate circuits in which complex electronic functions are obtained using silicon and III/V and II/VI compound semiconductors as the basic material. Rationale (See Table 5.3-1) Semiconductor and electronic component technology is one of the key areas that gives the United States modern military capabilities. These electronic technologies are either contained or used in the production of every weapon system in the US arsenal, and enable dramatically higher performance and reliability with smaller size. Potential adversary countries have problems at each step in the production process, especially in high quality, low defect wafer preparation and low particulate processing equipment. The oxidation process is important in radiation hardening and is a key process in silicon ICs. Lithography, which involves wafer imaging, resist processing, and maskmaking, is a prime determinant of feature size, and hence density of ICs. Therefore it is a critical element for the high speed and density required for todays military systems. Packaging is important to achieve the high speed and reliability of ICs when assembled into a system. Hybrid microcircuits are widely used and are common in missiles, avionics, torpedoes, smart munitions, proximity fuses, sonobuoys, and secure communication satellites. Monolithic microcircuit technology is one of the most crucial and pervasive technologies contributing to the superiority of US systems. Widespread utility derives from the technological attributes of high component density, high speed, low power consumption, high degree of radiation hardness, nonvolatility (for memory circuits), wide temperature range, and reliability.
Fabrication Equipment

Feature Size Processing Speed High Yield Fabrication Stability Quality Control Cleanliness/Low Defects Integrated/Automated

Electronics Devices Components Sensors Micro Electro-Mechanical Devices Nanostructures Integrated Circuits Environment Tolerant Devices Radiation Tolerant Temperature Tolerant
Figure 5.3-1.
Fabrication Equipment Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 5.0-2) The world leaders in semiconductor fabrication equipment are the US and Japan. Other countries with extensive capabilities are Germany, UK, Netherlands and France. Among the New Forum countries, only Japan manufactures a complete range of microelectronics production equipment. In all areas except ion implantation, Japanese equipment is state of the art. Japan's capability in lithography and mask-making leads the world while the US leads in deposition and etching. Among the other New Forum countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK produce some types of production equipment, with some items rated as state of the art. Among the non-New Forum countries, Switzerland produces the greatest variety of microelectronics production equipment.
5-7
Table 5.3-1.
Fabrication Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE Spectroscopic ellipsometer; spectroSpecially designed photometer. Equipment for: defect algorithms for process detection and classification; film thickness control and uniformity control WA Cat 3B, D, E CCL Cat 3B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY EPITAXIAL GROWTH EQUIPMENT Capable of producing a layer thickness uniform Surface finish, hardness to < 2.5% across 75 mm and chemical inertness of metal components; outgassing properties and dimensional stability of system parts MOLECULAR BEAM EPITAXY Capable of producing a layer thickness uniform Surface finish, hardness EQUIPMENT (MBE) to < 1.5% across 75 mm of III-V or II-VI and chemical inertness of compound structures; metal components; outgassing properties and Hall mobility of 200,000 cm2/V-se. for GaAs; dimensional stability of 2 Defect density < 100 oval defects/cm system parts; and solid (effusion cells) and gas sources METAL ORGANIC CHEMICAL VAPOR Capable of producing a layer thickness uniform Surface finish, hardness DEPOSITION EQUIPMENT (MOCVD) to < 2.5% across 75 mm of III-V or II-VI and chemical inertness of compound semiconductor structures metal components; outgassing properties and dimensional stability of system parts; and high purity (metal organic gas sources ION IMPLANTATION EQUIPMENT Accelerating voltage > 200 keV Surface finish, hardness Optimized to operate at an accelerating voltage and chemical inertness of of < 10 keV. metal components; Direct write capability; or High energy implant outgassing properties and into a heated substrate. dimensional stability of system parts PLASMA DRY ETCH BATCH With cassette-to-cassette operation and load Surface finish, hardness PROCESSING EQUIPMENT locks. and chemical inertness of Etch capability of feature sizes < 0.7 microns; metal components; Etch profile slope > 60 degrees; outgassing properties and Aspect ratio > 3:1; dimensional stability of Nitride/Oxide selectivity > 4:1. system parts PLASMA DRY ETCH MODULES Etch capability of feature sizes Surface finish, hardness CLUSTER TOOLS < 0.7 microns. and chemical inertness of Etch profile slope > 60 degrees. metal components; Aspect ratio > 3:1. outgassing properties and Nitride/Oxide selectivity > 4:1. dimensional stability of system parts PLASMA ENHANCED CVD EQUIPMENT/ Deposition of tungsten films. High purity source gases CLUSTER TOOLS. Deposition of Boron Phosphide Silicon Glass at > 475 C. Deposition uniformity better than 35% across 150 mm.
Real time closed-loop in situ automated process control; defect detection and classification; film thickness and uniformity control
Specially designed algorithms for process control
Real time closed-loop in situ automated process control; defect detection and classification; film thickness and uniformity control
SEM. (Scanning Electronic Microscope) Specially designed Equipment for: beam current and energy algorithms for process control; temperature control; defect control detection and classification.
SEM (Scanning Electronic Microscope) Equipment for: defect detection and classification; plasma induced damage control; wafer tracking and transport.
SEM (Scanning Electronic Microscope) Equipment for: defect detection and classification; plasma induced damage control; wafer tracking and transport.
Spectroscopic ellipsometer; spectrophotometer. Equipment for: defect detection and classification;
(cont'd)
5-8
Table 5.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Fabrication Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 3B, D, E CCL Cat 3B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY CLUSTER TOOLS Integrated automatic loading multi-chamber central wafer handling systems, having interfaces for wafer input/output. with more than two process modules. Single wafer and sequential multiwafer processing. LITHOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING Light source wavelength < 400 nm or capable of PHOTO-OPTICAL, X-RAY, AND E-BEAM. producing a pattern with a resolvable feature size of < 0.7 microns. E-BEAM MASK AND RETICLE MAKING EQUIPMENT. Masks capable of producing a pattern with a resolvable feature size of < 1.0 microns. Spot size < 0.2 microns. Overlay accuracy better than 0.20 microns (3 sigma). SEMICONDUCTOR TEST EQUIPMENT S-parameters of transistors above 31 GHz. Truth testing ICs at a pattern rate > 60 MHz. Testing microwave IC's at frequencies > 3 GHz. Contactless E-beam test systems for operation below 3 keV. PACKAGING AND BONDING EQUIPMENT Bond pitches < 6 mils. Bonding speed of > 10 wires/sec. Loop heights < 7.5 mils.
Equipment for: defect detection and Specially designed classification; wafer tracking and algorithms for process transport; communication standardization. control
Temperature stability, Equipment for: defect detection and surface finish, optical classification; feature size metrology. durability. E-beam/Ionbeam source emissivity. None identified SEM; (Scanning Electronic Microscope) Equipment for: defect detection and classification; feature size metrology.
Specially designed algorithms for process control Specially designed algorithms for process control
None identified
Equipment for: defect detection and classification; communication standardization.
Small diameter Equipment for: defect detection and metallurgically controlled classification; nondestructive testing. gold/alloy wire, ceramic substrates, sealing compounds, capillary materials, lead frames and ball grid area(BGA) materials.
5-9
SECTION 5.4 GENERAL PURPOSE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

Overview (See Figure 5.4-1) This subsection covers general purpose electronic equipment that supports operational military systems. The equipment includes precision time and frequency standards; frequency synthesizers which are derived from precise standards and serve as stable sources for encrypted communication, radar and navigation systems, and various signal analyzers and digitizers that permit collection and analyses of data from enemy weapon systems and information links. Magnetic recording equipment permits permanent records of the collected data. Rationale (See Table 5.4-1) Many of the instruments described in this subsection are civil, general purpose electronic test and recording equipment described in commercial catalogs. Frequency synthesized signal generators are primarily intended to be used as a signal source for testing a wide variety of civil and military equipment. They can also be used as transmitter master oscillators or as receiver local oscillators for frequency hopping Doppler radars (which require very low spurious output signal sources) and fast frequency switching and frequency hopping and spread-spectrum communications systems. Frequency synthesizer assemblies refer to modules or boards which can be incorporated directly into the equipment and which lack various features required by test equipment. Atomic frequency standards refer mainly to the cesium clocks which serve as primary standards. They are vital to the operation of systems employing any sort of coded transmission and satellite based navigation systems or submarine navigation systems where frequency updates from the national standards are not possible. Signal analyzers are either scanning analyzers, which can monitor large bandwidths for signals of interest and can provide basic characteristics of the signal, or dynamic analyzers, which scan a much smaller bandwidth but provide much greater detail on displayed signals. Recorders are basically digital format, helical scan, magnetic tape machines which use a standard civil/military D-1 or D-2 tape cassette. Reel-to-reel types are also used. Digital recorder applications include recording of underwater acoustic signals for identification, tracking, and targeting of underwater vehicles; recording of communications and radar signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum for intelligence collection or countermeasures; and recording of telemetry of friendly or enemy missiles or satellites.
General Purpose Electronic Equipment

Degree of Stability Transfer Rate Signal to Noise Resolution Digitizing Rate Switching Time

GS Clocks Secure Communications Navigation Recorders Video Telemetry Sonar
Figure 5.4-1.
General Purpose Electronic Equipment Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 5.0-2) High-performance equipment suitable for the described applications is known to be available in several countries. Scanning spectrum analyzers are manufactured in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. Dynamic signal analyzers are manufactured in the US, the UK, Denmark, Japan. Frequency synthesizers are manufactured in the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, France. Recorders are manufactured in Japan, the US, France, and the UK. Atomic frequency standards (cesium primary standards) are only known to be manufactured in the US and Switzerland.
5-10
Table 5.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY DIGITIZER, WAVEFORM
General Purpose Electronic Equipment Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E
STANDARD, FREQUENCY, ATOMIC RECORDERS, DIGITAL

INSTRUMENTATION MAGNETIC TAPE RECORDERS, DIGITAL CONVERSION EQUIPMENT FREQUENCY SYNTHESIZERSASSEMBLIES
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Digitizing rate of 200 million samples/sec. and a None identified resolution of 10 bits or more, and a continuous throughput of 2 Gbit/sec or more None identified Long term stability >1 x 1011/month Transfer rate > 175 Mbit/s. Transfer rate > 175 Mbit/s. None identified None identified
None identified. Commercially produced None identified equipment. None identified Equipment is produced commercially None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified
FREQUENCY SYNTHESIZERS-SIGNAL
GENERATOR
ANALYZER, SIGNAL, SCANNING ANALYZER, DYNAMIC
Switching time < 1 ms., or SSB phase noise None identified better than (126 + 20 log10F -20 log10f) in dBc/Hz (F is offset from operating frequency in Hz) (F is offset from operating frequency in Hz and F is the operating frequency in MHz) Operating frequency > 1 GHz and switching None identified time < 1 ms., or SSB phase noise better than (126 + 20 log10F - 20 log10f) in dBc/Hz (F is offset from operating frequency in Hz; f is the operating frequency in MHz) Operating frequency > 1 GHz None identified Real time bandwidth > 25.6 kHz None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A. D. E CCL Cat 3A, D, E
5-11
SECTION 5.5 MICROELECTRONICS

Overview (See Figure 5.5-1) This section covers microcircuits [including General Purpose Integrated Circuits (IC)], hybrid microcircuits, and MMIC (millimeter/microwave IC), which are a subset of microcircuits and includes hybrid MMIC and monolithic MMIC operating at frequencies greater than 30 GHz. Also covered are integrated circuit design and evaluation testing involving Computer Aided Design (CAD) of integrated circuit packages. Electronic packaging technologies are required to achieve the inherent high speed, high power, and severe environment of the basic building block microcircuits. Rationale (See Table 5.5-1) Microelectronics are one of the most crucial and pervasive technologies contributing to the current technological edge of US systems over those of potential adversaries. Widespread utility derives from the technological attributes of high component density, high speed, low power consumption, high degree of radiation hardness, nonvolatility (for memory circuits), wide temperature range, and high reliability. General purpose ICs are widely used in military systems today (e.g., manpack radios, computers, missiles, avionics, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), COMSEC, early warning radars and satellites). Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 5.0-2) The worldwide capability in microelectronics technology is rapidly expanding, particularly microprocessors and associated semiconductor memory. In the last decade the Pacific Rim countries, specifically Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea have become proficient in niche areas - except Japan which has broad capability. Most of this increased capability has been due to US companies building product capability off-shore, licensing products to foreign companies and the outright sale of modern technology to foreign competitors. Japan and the US are the leaders in general purpose integrated circuits. France, Germany, and the UK have strong integrated circuit industries, with Italy and the Netherlands slightly behind. Taiwan and South Korea make memory integrated circuits that are technologically within a year of those of the US and Japan. Russia is superior to the other Eastern European countries in the production of general-purpose integrated circuits. China trails Russia and is generally on a par with the East European countries. China is advanced in control and voice/audio processing and has a clear interest in aggressively expanding its semiconductor fabrication
Microelectronics

Feature Size Processing Performance Data Rate Computation Rate Component Density Low Power Consumption Temperature Tolerance

Computers Avionics Communication Guidance Controllers
For Land, Air, Sea & Space Systems
Figure 5.5-1.
Microelectronics Overview
facilities. France produces some advanced types of digital signal processors, communications, and control systems. The US and Japan are the world's largest producers of integrated circuits and no other country exceeds 10 percent of the production levels of the US or Japan, and no more than ten countries exceed 1 percent of the production levels of the US and Japan.
5-12
Table 5.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY RAD-HARD INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
Microelectronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Wafer flatness, min. defects and uniformity for advanced ICs UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Dielectric Isolation, deep implant on SOS and SOI , controlled doping, surface passivation and controlled radiation testing None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Computer modeling software. Pre and post radiation modeling. SEU (Single Event Upset) models. Thermal analysis models EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY 6 Rads(Si) Total dose or 1 10 5 108 Rads(Si)/sec dose rate
TEMPERATURE-RATED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
Capability of operation at either temperature Ceramic extreme or over the specified temperature range substrates of 55 C to + 125 C. ALU 32 Bits CTP 80 MTOPS Frequency 80 MHz 1024 point complex FFT 1 msec 100 mFLOPS Data bus 16 bits 400,000 pixels/chip for graphics, 100,000 connections per sec.
GENERAL PURPOSE
MICROPROCESSORS
Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs
HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE
DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSORS (DSP)
Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Training algorithms Simulation algorithms Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE
ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK (ANN) ICS
A/D CONVERTER
8 to 12 bits - 10 nanosec 12 bits - 2 microsec 12 bits - 5 microsec 12 bits - 100 ns
Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs GaAs Epitaxial Wafers Wafer flatness, min. defects and uniformity for advanced ICs Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks and resists for High Density chips High Speed Testing equipment Chip probing Modified for GaAs - including MBE
D/A CONVERTER
GALLIUM ARSENIDE ICS
5000 equivalent (2 input) gates 1 GHz toggle frequency
(cont'd)
5-13
Table 5.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY FIELD PROGRAMMABLE DEVICES
Microelectronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Standard Cell S.W. Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Standard Cell S.W. Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE Standard Cell S.W. Simulation and modeling HDL (High-Level Development Language) CAE and ATE CAE and ATE EXPORT CONTROL
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY 25,000 usable gates (realizable) 133 MHz
Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs Wafer flatness, min. defects and uniformity for advanced ICs Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks and resists for High Density chips High Speed Testing equipment Chip probing
ASICS (CUSTOM INTEGRATED CIRCUITS)
0.35 ns gate delay 180 pins
MEMORY ICS; - SRAMS; - COMPOUND SEMICONDUCTOR

MEMORIES
Memory capacity and maximum access time. SRAM 4 mbits 10 ns
Wafer flatness, Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks min. defects and and resists for High Density chips uniformity for High Speed Testing equipment advanced ICs Compound materials (semiconductor, e.g. III/V and II/VI) Matched substrate material thermoconductivity, heat transfer and strength Diamond films Diamond substrates Matched thermoconductivity, heat transfer and strength Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks and resists for High Density chips High Speed Testing equipment Chip probing Modified for compound materials None identified
COMPOUND SEMICONDUCTOR ICS
1300 equivalent (2 input) gates 1.2 GHz toggle frequency
MULTICHIP MODULES (MCMS)
270 watts/meter/ K heat dissipation Dielectric constant of K = 5.4 hermeticity, etc.
REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E MCM board station software WA ML 11, 21, 22 CAE and ATE WA Cat 3A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 3A, D, E
DIAMOND SUBSTRATES FOR IC PACKAGES DIGITAL GATE ARRAYS (SILICON)
Heat dissipation 7001500 watts/meter/ K 150,000 equivalent (2 input) gates 100 MHz toggle rate
CVD process
None identified
WA Cat 3C CCL Cat 3C WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 ITAR 11 USML XII, 121.16
Lithography, Epitaxy, Deposition masks and resists for High Density chips High Speed Testing equipment
HDL (High-Level Development Language) Standard Cell S.W. CAE and ATE
5-14
SECTION 5.6 OPTO-ELECTRONICS

Overview (See Figure 5.6-1) This section focuses on Opto-Electronics (OE) (which includes electro-optics and optronics) devices, components, and systems that are used in signal processing, image processing, or computing, and the switching, interconnection, and related devices associated with these functions. What distinguishes these from other signal and image processors is that they utilize photons as the information carrying form of energy. The OE devices covered in this section can be broadly broken into two categories: analog and digital. By and large, the only technologies that have developed sufficiently to be considered militarily critical are of the analog type. Real-time analog optical processing is employed in correlators, spectrum analyzers, and in some target recognition devices by the military. Digital optical processing is still in the emerging state and, although there are many instances of its use in military systems, it will be some time before it reaches its potential. While there are important military applications of OE technologies, most of the underlying technology and device development is being driven by high-volume commercial applications. In fact, many important military applications are depending upon commercial market forces to develop the underlying technology and devices sufficiently to meet future military needs. Rationale (See Table 5.6-1) OE technologies are playing an increasingly important role in military systems. Many advanced military systems employ these technologies in one form or another, and many military applications are enabled by the performance and speed advantages offered by electrooptics and optoelectronics. These technologies offer the potential for dramatic improvements (2, 3, or more orders of magnitude) in processing speed, bandwidth, and electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic pulse (EMI/EMP) immunity. Furthermore, the inherent parallelism of light offers unique opportunities in image processing and parallel computing. Revolutionary advances in a number of fields of military (and commercial) importance could result: telecommunications data rates of giga-bps or even tera-bps would be an enabling technology for advanced distributed interactive simulation; signal processing systems offering instantaneous spectrum analysis would enable real-time electronic warfare/electronic intelligence (EW/ELINT) processing against sophisticated spread spectrum or frequency hopping systems; parallel image processinghandling two-dimensional images instantaneouslywould be an enabling technology for real-time target recognition and some ELINT functions; massively parallel optical computers would offer processing speeds of teraops/sec and memory size of tera-bytes, enabling advanced symbolic computations that are currently impossible. These advances are not imminent, but the potential is there, and solid advances have already been made.
Opto-Electronics

High Speed Radiation Resistant Bandwidth Robustness

Sensors Signal Interconnections Image Processing Radar/LIDAR Electronic Warfare Electronic Intelligence
Figure 5.6-1.
Opto-Electronics Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 5.0-2) There are few areas of applied military OE technologies where the US does not hold, or at worst share, a lead. A number of countries, however, have significant capabilities, and in some areas foreign players are ahead. Japan is our closest competitor, having significant capabilities in almost all areas of this technology, and is especially strong in commercial applications of these technologies. This is important since military systems are becoming increasingly dependent upon commercial components and devices. Other countries having capabilities (usually in specialized areas) include France, Germany, the UK, Canada, Russia, Italy, Netherlands and Israel.
5-15
Table 5.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Opto-Electronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Gallium phosphide None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Growing gallium phosphide boules UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY SIGNAL PROCESSORS, ACOUSTO-OPTIC Bandwidth > 1 GHz BRAGG CELLS Dynamic range > 60 dB Time bandwidth > 1000 SIGNAL PROCESSORS, ACOUSTO-OPTIC Bandwidth > 1 GHz 1-D DETECTOR ARRAYS > 1024 elements Readout < 10 microseconds SIGNAL PROCESSORS, ACOUSTO-OPTIC 1024 1024 minimum array 2-D DETECTOR ARRAYS 300 frames/sec minimum 40 dB dynamic range minimum PHASED ARRAYS, OPTICAL CONTROL- Bandwidth > 10% for L band and X band BEAMFORMING TECHNIQUES operation.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
FIBEROPTIC LINES, HIGH-SPEED

ANALOG
Bandwidth > 15 GHz Dynamic Range > 120 dB/Hz Noise figure (< 5 dB)
FIBEROPTIC LINKS, HIGH-SPEED RIN (Relative Intensity Noise) (< 140 dB/Hz) ANALOG-DIRECTLY MODULATED LASER Modulation rate > 15 GHz
DIODES
FIBEROPTIC LINKS, HIGH-SPEED ANALOGMICROCHIP SOLID-STATE

LASERS
Power > 150 mW into single-mode fiber
FIBEROPTIC LINKS, HIGH-SPEED

ANALOGWAVEGUIDE MODULATORS
Power handling > 150 mW Modulation rate > 15 GHz Power handling > 150 mW Frequency response > 94 GHz
Indium phosphide and related III-V semiconductor alloys Indium phosphide and related III-V semiconductor alloys Indium phosphide and related III-V semiconductor alloys Indium phosphide and related III-V semiconductor alloys Lithium niobate, lithium tantalate
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 5A, D, E CCL Cat 5A, D, E
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 6A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA Cat 6A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E
FIBEROPTIC LINKS, HIGH-SPEED ANALOG HIGH-SPEED DETECTORS
Low-temperature None identified gallium arsenide, low temperature indium-galliumarsenide
None identified
5-16
SECTION 8 - INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems (C4I2)............ 8-3 Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM)................................ 8-5 High-Performance Computing............................. 8-7 Human Systems Interface .................................. 8-9 Information Security ........................................ 8-11 Intelligent Systems .......................................... 8-13 Modeling and Simulation ................................... 8-15 Networks and Switching .................................... 8-17 Signal Processing............................................ 8-19 Software ...................................................... 8-21 Transmission Systems ...................................... 8-23
technology areas listed in the box nearby contain militarily critical technologies. To avoid duplication, specific technology items are listed under the most appropriate heading in Figure 8.0-2, which highlights the key dependencies among the technology areas and Information Warfare. Rationale IS are pervasive in virtually all activities of the military establishment, the commercial and industrial section, and all levels of government. IS technologies are vital to US warfighting capabilities. Uses of IS encompass a range of applications from IS systems embedded in individual smart weapons and sensors, to local processing and communication systems, including transportable and personal hand-held devices, to international wide area networks (i.e., the Internet). Access to these technologies by potential adversaries could enhance the performance of their military systems and could also be used to counter US capabilities.
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 8.0-1) Information Systems (IS) are defined as the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate and act on information. IS include several functional areas: acquisition, organization, and management of data; processing and manipulation of data; information storage and retrieval; humansystem interfaces; and means for ensuring the reliability and security of information and system resources. Most technologies used in information systems are dual use. New technologies and products are emerging daily. Performance of processors and capacity of memory chips has doubled every 18 months since 1970. This exponential growth is expected to continue until the year 2005. In addition to technology for the hardware and software components of reliable and secure information systems, other technology, in the form of specialized know-how for system design and integration, is necessary to meet important military requirements for C 4 I2 , intelligent systems, modeling and simulation, and strategically essential industrial CAD/CAM uses. Also, IS are the primary "enabler" and a target for Information Warfare (see Section 9). The
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Electronics Sensors & Lasers Power Systems Materials
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
TREND
Increased Computational Capability - Accuracy Information Processing - Control Signal/Noise Screening Precision Systems Integrated Strike Accurate Interfaces Seamless Maneuver Control Hybridization
Figure 8.0-1. Information Systems Overview
8-1
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) The US leads in system engineering and integration of complex information systems specially designed for military use. The US is closely followed by the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan. The underlying technologies for IS and for wide area integration of such systems are being driven largely by commercial infrastructure needs and markets. A significant number of countries have developed capabilities equivalent to those of the US in network switching and transmission. The US has sustained its lead in computing hardware because of superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities (see Sections 5 and 10). While the US continues to be the only country with critical capabilities in all IS technology areas, equivalent capabilities are found in one or more other
8.1 C4I2 Systems 8.2 CAD/ CAM 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 High Human Information Intelligent Performance Systems Security Systems Computing Interfaces
countries in every area. The growing multi-nationalizaton of information systems developments has increased the worldwide availability and accessibility of critical technologies. A high rate of IS knowledge transfer from the US to foreign competitors occurs through open source US trade journals, technical literature, various international fora, the Internet, and intelligence. As a result, the US technology leadership in communications and computer systems has declined in recent years relative to Europe and Japan. However, the US is the only country with the ability to supply empirically validated system engineering and integration know-how to large, complex military systems. This capability sets the US apart as the world leader.
Country
8.7 Modeling and Simulation
8.8 Networks and Switching
8.9 Signal Processing
8.10 Software
8.11 Transmission Systems
Australia Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Russia S. Africa S. Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Turkey UK US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 8.0-2.
Information Systems FTA Summary
8-2
SECTION 8.1
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTING, INTELLIGENCE, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (C4 I 2 )
Overview (See Figure 8.1-1) C 4 I2 comprises a multi-disciplined set of techniques to provide seamless communications, information management, and distribution, and decision-making in the new JCS Vision 20/0, improving situational awareness and effectiveness of warfighting forces in high-intensity combat situations. C 4 I2 is dependent on underlying hardware and software technologies covered elsewhere in this section. In addition, elements of C 4 I2 are also essential for development and operational integration of dynamic training, modeling, and simulation (see Figure 8.1-2). Battlespace environment has been explicitly identified as one of DoD's key technology areas for C 4 I2 and encompasses the following as key elements: weather prediction; propagation sensor modeling and performance prediction; and the underlying information management and human interface technologies required for effective use. While primarily aimed at military situational awareness and dynamic training and combat simulation, the technologies in question will find widespread commercial use in entertainment, education, and science and engineering.
C 4I2

Speed and accuracy with which information is available for use Fidelity of computer generated information to real-world physics

Combat Mission Simulators and training Data Sensor processors and fusion systems Military Platform integration and control Tactical C4I2 systems at all echelons Strategic Global Military communications systems
8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 9.0
High-Performance Computing Human Systems Interface Information Security Intelligent Systems Modeling and Simulation Networks and Switching Signal Processing Software Transmission Systems Information Warfare Technology
Figure 8.1-1. C 4 I 2 Overview
Figure 8.1-2. Primary Supporting Technologies for Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems
Rationale (See Table 8.1-1) C4I2 systems are needed to sustain US forces superior ability to detect, localize, and effectively engage enemy forces in a high threat/target-rich environment. The ability to synthesize and predict the complex effects of weather on sensors, vehicle maneuver capabilities, and communications gives commanders information that enhances their tactical decision-making ability. Synthetic battlespace environments will enable commanders to review the progress and project the course of battles under existing and predicted conditions; optimize tactics in real time; rehearse missions; and execute mission plans in real time. This will provide a level of situational awareness and real-time decision-making that is essential to sustain
8-3
the JCS warfighting capabilities (see Introduction, part A) defined by the JCS in the face of an increasingly mobile and lethal threat. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) While the United States leads in C 4 I2 integration of complete battlespace environment capabilities, other nations have many of the key underlying elements essential to its development and operational use. France is a world leader in military
communications. The Army's mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) is, in fact, based on French technology. Weather prediction, which plays an essential role, is a global activity in which Canada and the European Union have strong capabilities. Most nations with active sensor programs also have active efforts to improve their modeling and simulation of atmospheric effects, including obscurants used on the battlefield.
Table 8.1-1.
Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information Systems (C 4 I 2 ) Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY 4-hr turnaround of 72-hr weather prediction of None identified dispersion patterns, rates of transport, and effective concentrations of aerosols, particles, or gases Validated performance of one or more operational or developmental military sensors under battlefield conditions None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 17, 21, 22 USML XXI
TECHNOLOGY SHORT TERM, NEAR REAL-TIME WEATHER PREDICTION,

OCEANOGRAPHIC MODELING TO SUPPORT LITTORAL WARFARE AND OTHER ACTIVITY SENSOR MODELING AND PERFORMANCE PREDICTION
VEHICLE MODELING TO PREDICTO PREDICT OFF-ROAD TRAFFICABILITY
Validated off-road trafficability of operational or None identified developmental military vehicles in one or more ACCURATELY environmental scenarios EM PROPAGATION CHARACTERIZATION Validated models of EM propagation in which None identified TO PREDICT PERFORMANCE OF military sensors or communication systems are SENSORS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND exposed to two or more measured ELECTRONIC AND LASER CM EFFECTS environmental effects
Software characterizing the dispersion characteristics of aerosols and gases in realistic weather and terrain conditions Anechoic chambers Software (operational and Other modeling support equipment design models) characterizing clutter and interference effects and sensor response to same Empirically validated vehicle test facilities Models and simulations of vehicle traction (for land vehicles) and dynamics None identified Software (operation and design models) characterizing propagation effects and sensor response to same
WA ML 17, 21, 22 USML XXI
WA ML 17, 21, 22 USML XXI WA ML 17, 21, 22 USML XXI
8-4
SECTION 8.2
COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN AND COMPUTER-AIDED MANUFACTURING (CAD/CAM)

Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing
Overview (See Figure 8.2-1) Computer-aided design (CAD) is a technology enabling the design of intricate and often complex devices, mechanisms, and/or systems. The finished designs have detailed design data that permit a quality release for parts modeling and manufacturing. Computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) is a companion technology that supports the fabrication of a wide variety of devices and mechanisms with favorable impact on scheduling, flexibility, quality, and costs. The principal users of CAD and CAM systems have integrated the essentials of both CAD and CAM into a single, central data base that contains complete repositories of pertinent design and manufacturing data from which their entire engineering and manufacturing operations are driven. The ability to build and test computer models of proposed designs without having to construct expensive and time-consuming hardware is extremely beneficial to industry. Currently evolving is a functional hierarchical extension, based on CAD/CAM, that progresses through Virtual Prototyping, Data Visualization, Visually Coupled Systems, and Virtual Reality Systems, elements that underpin sophisticated computer modeling and simulation. Rationale (See Table 8.2-1) As the complexity and capability of weapon systems mount, the operating characteristics of a given design and its producibility must be well-defined and understood before an expensive build-up program is fully launched. Extensive computer modeling and simulation has become essential for a wide variety of major military components, such as ships, submarines, aircraft, surface vehicles, and missiles, and the subsystems incorporated within them. Because of increased operating cost and decreasing availability of assets, computer-based simulators are now used to obtain data that would previously have been acquired through live operational tests and exercises. Computer-based simulators, employing elaborate 2D and 3D graphic techniques, enable designers to exercise an otherwise unattainable range and variety of tactical situations. Virtual Prototyping and Data Visualization are extensions of CAD/CAM and are being used in the modeling and simulation of a variety of designs requiring high-performance computers and supercomputers for execution. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) US industry maintains a dominant lead in the development and use of CAD/CAM tools. Several NATO nationsviz., France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Canadaas well as Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland are also active and effective in the field. Unique support hardware is normally not required because current systems depend upon widely available computers and computer ancillaries for operation. The critical know-how is imbedded in algorithms and software, much of which is available on the open market. In striving for market edge, major CAD/CAM users supplement their systems with in-house-developed proprietary CAD/CAM tools.

Precision Speed Fidelity of data presentation

Electronics Manufacturing and Fabrication Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control Information Systems Information Warfare
Figure 8.2-1.
Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing Overview
Military users have benefited from commercial advances. US defense contractors have been able to adapt CAD/CAM systems, often developed in-house for commercial use, to fit military design and manufacturing needs. The systems then become a base for further enhancement. NATO and the Japanese academic and commercial research efforts have initiated the functional hierarchical extensions herein mentioned. Military developers have been quick to use the concepts to produce the sophisticated weaponry modern military requires. The US maintains the lead in the integration of aeronautics technologies into reliable, functional and producible systems.
8-5
Table 8.2-1.
Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Capable of assisting in the design of microcircuits with feature sizes less than 1 micron. CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Specialized analysis software and test equipment for verifying that CAD designs conform exactly to the manufacturing requirement UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Fully integrated CAD system with predictability of software process and product capable of yielding first pass parts of dense microcircuits with feature size less than 1 micron or CAD system with data capability of laying out complex physical structures. Unique tool driving software with capability to control the manufacture of advanced hardware. Application specific software used in structuring computer based prototypes EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 21 WA Cat 3D, E USML XXI CCL Cat 3D, E
TECHNOLOGY COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN (CAD)
COMPUTER AIDED MANUFACTURING (CAM)
VIRTUAL PROTOTYPING
DATA VISUALIZATION
VISUALLY COUPLED SYSTEMS TO

ACHIEVE USER IMMERSION
VIRTUAL REALITY SYSTEMS
CAM tools, dimensional inspection or measuring systems with capability to control the manufacture of microcircuits with feature size less then 1 micron. Extension of CAD design to the structure of military part models in the "virtual" manner for modeling and simulation using computers with CTP's > 1500 MTOPs. Process of converting a set of numbers resulting from militarily related complex numerical simulations or experiments into a graphical image, using computers with CTP's > 1500 MTOPs. Field of vision 70 degrees vertical, > 120 degrees horizontal. Helmet sensing and tracking system; Miniature cathode ray tube with 25 micron line widths @ luminance levels above 2000 foot Lamberts Minimum of 10,000 polygons per frame at a frame rate of 30 Hz
None identified
None identified
Computer driven machine and robotic tools capable of fabricating and testing equipment manufactured to militarily critical parameters None identified
WA ML 21 WA Cat 3D, E USML XXI CCL Cat 3D, E WA ML 14 USML XXI
None identified
None identified
Large parallel processor WA ML 14 software utilized in analyzing USML XXI military based research data
None identified
Miniature transducer winding, alignment and Helmholtz fixturing. Precision, nonferrous, automated mapping fixture.
Dynamic scattering and WA ML 14 scene generation algorithms. USML XXI Other display related algorithms Application specific software WA ML 14 for the manipulation of data USML XXI bases representing over 1,000 designs each containing hundreds of parameters
None identified
Currently helmet mounted display and sensor equipment are key items but requirements are still unfolding as the technology matures
8-6
SECTION 8.3
HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING
Overview (See Figure 8.3-1) High-performance computing encompasses conventional general-purpose digital computer processing equipment, including microprocessor-based single and multi-processor systems (including vector processors, array processors and other computers) and massively parallel and scalable computing. Also addressed in this section are graphic accelerators and image generators and programmable interconnections specially designed for aggregating high-performance processors to increase effective system power. Computers and software are explicitly identified as key technology areas in the DoD Technology Area Plans. High-performance computing is also critical to meet long-range S&T goals for battlefield digitization, human systems interfaces, manufacturing science and technology, and battlespace environment. High performance computing is an evolving technology for design of advanced military systems. (See also Section 8.2, CAD/CAM Technology.) Rationale (See Table 8.3-1) High-performance computing is an enabling technology for modern tactical and strategic warfare. It is the principal technological force multiplier that gives US forces their superior ability to detect, localize, and effectively engage enemy forces in a high threat/target-rich environment. It is also an enabling technology for processing the massive amounts of imagery and sensor data for real-time data fusion and generating synthetic environments for dynamic training and simulation, mission planning and rehearsal, and operational battle management. Embedded computers are key enabling elements for improved sensors and smart weapons; for navigation, guidance, and control of military platforms; and for all aspects of operational C4I2. Advanced computing is also important in the development of WMD and represents an enabling technology for deployment and use of WMD, particularly for CBW delivery, where the problem of predicting precise patterns of dispersion is computationally demanding. Access to unique software revealing operational limitations or vulnerabilities of US systems or to threat information and intelligence sources and methods might be exploited to defeat or degrade US mission performance. The ability of recipients to cluster computers on low-cost (~ $3500 per dual port) switching hubs is a growing factor in setting practical effective lower limits for proliferation reasons. Such hubs, using a variety of technologies and protocols, are increasingly being used to network small enterprises to allow more effective aggregation of processing power. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) Japan and the US have traditionally shared a worldwide lead in supercomputers. However, the emphasis in high performance computing is moving rapidly from mainframes to
High-Performance Computing

Superior ability of individual processors to process and configure data at higher rates, to achieve Real-time performance More accurate target assignment and situational awareness Ability to interconnect and aggregate processor power for higher system performance Synthesize and present complex data sets/scenes in real-time Operate in radiation and high temperature environments
Figure 8.3-1.

C 4 I 2 Weapons Control Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Fleet Air Defense Systems Military Combat Mission Simulators Mission Rehearsal and Planning Systems
High-Performance Computing Overview
scalable or massively parallel processor architectures, in which the US enjoys a lead. The Free World's increasing availability of technology to support assembly and integration has resulted in the proliferation of sources for computers up to a CTP level of approximately 700 Mtops. Other countries capable of assembling military computing with higher CTPs from widely available, lower performance (less than 700 Mtops) components, assemblies, and computing hardware (predominantly of US origin) include Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Taiwan, South Korea, and India.
8-7
Table 8.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY GENERAL-PURPOSE DIGITAL PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING COMPUTERS, DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSORS, AND ARRAY/VECTOR
PROCESSORS HAVING A COMPOSITE THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE USAGE GENERATION ENHANCEMENT WRITING RATES GRAPHICS ACCELERATORS AND PROCESSORS
High-Performance Computing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Operational software for military systems with performance parameters and sensitive threat information EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 4A, D, E CCL Cat 4A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Exceeding 1500 million theoretical operations/second (Mtops)
10 Million 3D vectors/second
None identified
INTERCONNECTION EQUIPMENT FOR

AGGREGATING COMPUTATIONAL POWER
Having data transfer rates of > 80 Mbytes/second with aggregate throughput > 400 Mbytes
None identified
RADIATION HARDENING OF COMPUTER Radiation hardened to withstand either of the None identified PROCESSING HARDWARE following: - a total dose of 5 105 rads (si) or higher; or - a dose rate upset of 5 108 Rads (Si)/s or higher or - dose rate survivable 1012 Rad(Si)/s TEMPERATURE HARDENING OF Designed to operate within the temperature None identified COMPUTER PROCESSING HARDWARE range from 218 K ( 45 C) to 397 K (+ 85 C)
Image processing algorithms tailored for military C4I2 and data fusion, especially those incorporating ATR None identified Operating systems specially designed for dynamic reconfiguration of computing clusters for specific military operations Specially constructed facility to simulate SEU and dose rate effects the Electromagnetic Pulse characteristics including SGEMP, software, analysis and simulation tools
High-resolution lithography (below 0.6 micron).
None identified
None identified
8-8
SECTION 8.4
HUMAN SYSTEMS INTERFACE
Overview (See Figure 8.4-1) Human systems interface, as covered in this subsection, encompasses all ways in which human operators interact with information systems. While the primary interfaces at present are visual output and manual input, the broader technology area also includes other forms of sensory inputs including auditory (voice and other audible indicators and warning), tactile, and haptic devices for both input and output. Human interface technology is being driven by a variety of requirements, ranging from those of the entertainment industry to the need to grasp and manipulate extremely large data sets in scientific research. For two-way communication, the state of the art remains mechanical (keyboard, joystick, etc.), which provides an input that is inherently unambiguous. Hands-off input devices (including eye-tracking, voice input) are being pursued as a way of dealing with increased workload, without increasing operator stress. Ultimately, the goal is to achieve total immersion of the operator in a virtual reality with which he or she interacts in a manner that is perceived as normal. Rationale (See Table 8.4-1) Significant advances in human system interfaces are required for circuit and projected military operations in the high-threat, information-rich battlefield of the future. In combat operations, two-way human interfaces facilitate an operators ability to handle large quantities of information in real time to improve situational awareness and decision-making capability in periods of high stress. In weapons systems, they will also improve reaction time and control in tactical vehicles, particularly in attack helicopters and combat aircraft. While the notion of unmanned drones for reconnaissance and targeting has been largely accepted by operational forces, higher fidelity, robust human interfaces will be a key enabling technology for deployment and use of unmanned engagement systems. Human system interfaces are also key to the kind of virtual prototyping of systems and production processes essential to maintaining industrial-base preparedness and responsiveness. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 8.0-2) Because of its widespread potential for entertainment mass markets, several countries have been active in pursuing human system interface technology. Canada is one of the
Human Systems Interface

Enhanced operator interaction with large/complex data sets Realism(Integration of Sensory effects) Responsiveness Ability to support group interaction/integration in Analysis/Development Operations
Figure 8.4-1.

Sensor data fusion C4 I2 Pilot/driver vision system Dynamic training and simulation Interactive CAD/CAM (including system analysis) Mission analysis, planning, and rehearsal
Human Systems Interface Overview
world leaders in visually coupled, virtual reality helmet-head-mounted displays. Japan, the UK, and Israel are also active in this area. Japans primary emphasis has been on applying the technology to designing, manufacturing and controlling complex systems and enterprises (for example very large, distributed electrical power systems). In the last year, virtual reality has developed as an area of worldwide research, with strong capabilities also emerging in France and Germany. Israel is reported to have significant capabilities in military helmetmounted display and also has wartime operational experience with unmanned drones that might apply to human interfaces for teleoperation.
8-9
Table 8.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Human Systems Interface Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None Identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None Identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Dynamic scene generation algorithms; Feedback algorithms for scene orientation and presentation; Smoothing algorithms for variable resolution, stereo displays Characterization of dynamic scenes, texturing, etc.; information relating same to effectiveness of mission training Software characterizing control responses of military systems EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 15, 21, 22 USML XI
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY VISUALLY-COUPLED DISPLAYS WITH Better than: RESOLUTION AND FIELD OF VIEW (FOV) 2.5 Arc-minute resolution; DESIGNED TO MATCH HUMAN VISUAL Vertical FOV > 70, and PERFORMANCE Horizontal FOV > 120
DYNAMIC SCENE GENERATION WITH REAL-TIME CAPABILITY
To sense line of sight and subject movement and generate appropriate scene with < 10 millisecond delay (>100 Hz refresh rate)
None Identified
None Identified
WA ML 15, 21, 22 USML XI
HAPTIC SENSORS
Force feedback in three dimensions, having 3 or None identified more degrees of freedom
None identified
8-10
SECTION 8.5 INFORMATION SECURITY

Overview (See Figure 8.5-1) This subsection covers Information Security technologies whose principal elements are cryptographic algorithms and cryptanalytic algorithms. These technologies are used by the US military forces, certain US Government (USG) departments and agencies, and authorized industrial users. Some special cryptographic systems are shared with US treaty allies. Rationale (See Table 8.5-1) The cryptographic and cryptanalytic technologies are essential to provide information security for US military weapons systems and research and development activities and to support essential USG cryptographic and cryptanalytic functions. Information security systems, equipment, subassemblies, and components are essential elements of intelligence, global surveillance, computer and communications networks, and C 4I2 systems that provide reliable wide band communications links and information management nodes through the chain of command and channels of communications from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the warfighters. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) The US is the largest producer and exporter of telecommunication and networking equipment and computer hardware and software. Although its technology leadership in communications and computing systems declined during the year 19901994 period relative to Europe and Japan, the US enjoys increasing leadership in information management. The imagination and creativity of the US information system industry and the ability to provide system engineering and integration of the information security technologies into information systems are what sets the US apart as the world leader. Information security technologies and products, especially those that are cryptology based, are developed independently in both government and industrial sectors by most nation states. The militarily critical information security technologies in this subsection are often highly classified by nation states and closely held by both governments and industries. An accurate assessment of foreign information security technologies and products is
Algorithms -Hard-to-break code Sophisticated code-breaking
Information Security

Intelligence C4 I 2 Global Surveillance Communications Computer Networks Weapons Systems
Figure 8.5-1.
Information Security Overview
usually not feasible. It may be possible to infer the state of a country's information security technologies from the quantity of the commercial information security products that are offered in world markets. The ranking illustrated in Figure 8.0-2 assumes that a close relationship exists between the state of the art of the commercial information security products a country offers for sale and its closely held military technologies and products. The ranking also assumes that commercial cryptography products are a reliable indicator of a country's full information security suite of military technologies and products.
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Table 8.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY CRYPTANALYTIC TECHNOLOGIES (FOR BREAKING CIPHERTEXT)
Information Security Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Computers of 10,000 CTP, or greater, and software specially designed to test the ability of cryptanalytic systems to perform key searches, statistical, linear and differential cryptanalyses; and, factor 110 decimal digit, or larger, numbers. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Operating systems and applications for massively parallel cryptanalytic processors (> 16 processors) specially designed to perform statistical, linear and differential cryptanalyses, exhaustive key searches and quadratic and number field sieve factoring. The software providing the cryptographic functionality must be specially designed and integrated into each application. The system engineering and integration, user system interface, algorithms and key generators must have zero defects. EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 5A, D, E USML XI, XIII CCL Cat 5A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Due to the numerous variables required to None identified implement an information security scheme and the wide range of products and services in which information security can be deployed this technology does not lend itself to specifically enumerated parameters.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGIES (FOR KEEPING DATA SECURE)
Due to the numerous variables required to None identified implement an information security scheme and the wide range of products and services in which information security can be deployed this technology does not lend itself to specifically enumerated parameters.
Computers of 10,000 CTP, or greater, and software specially designed to perform Randomness, Correlation, Weak Key and Symmetry Under Complementation tests to evaluate the strength of new USG encryption algorithms during development.
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 5A, D, E USML XI, XIII CCL Cat 5A, D, E
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SECTION 8.6
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Intelligent Systems
Overview (See Figure 8.6-1) Intelligent systems encompass several hardware and software items whose ultimate objective is to build systems that autonomously adapt their functionalitywithout human operator intervention or preprogrammed logic constraintsin response to changing requirements and conditions. Intelligent systems can be implemented in software on generalpurpose digital computers or on specially designed analog or hybrid analog/ digital neural networks and fuzzy logic chips. Interest continues in high-volume applications (such as in consumer products and appliances), particularly in the use of fuzzy logic/neural combinations wherein the training functionality of the neural net is used to optimize the fuzzy logic. Expert views of what constitutes machine or artificial intelligence have changed substantially in recent years, with advancing computer technology. Expert systems, once the predominant type of AI, no longer meet the basic criteria accepted for machine intelligence and are not considered by many experts to belong to the field of AI as it is now generally accepted. Rationale (See Table 8.6-1) The range and lethality of weapons available to potential adversaries have increased dramatically. Intelligent systems, in the form of smart sensors and autonomous vehicles and weapons, have the potential of increasing mission effectiveness while reducing exposure of human operators. As pilot's assistants, this technology can also reduce manpower and training requirements, again while maintaining or improving effectiveness. These same features will also enhance our ability to analyze military operations in realistic scenarios and conditions for system development, development of tactics and doctrine, and mission planning and rehearsal. Finally, intelligent systems are needed as part of battle management and C 4 I2 systems to sustain US forces' superior ability to detect, localize, and effectively engage enemy forces in a highthreat/target-rich environment.

Faster decisions More accurate and complete situational awareness Elimination/reduction of operator stress and resulting errors Survivability (Due to Geographic Distribution of Decision Process)

C 4 I 2 Smart Weapons Computer Aided Logistics Management Systems Intelligence Analyses Mission Planning and Analysis
Figure 8.6-1.
Intelligent Systems Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) Machine intelligence or intelligent systems are a field of general worldwide research. Much of this research, however, is still theoretical and in the area of machine cognition, per se, and not in specific hardware and software implementations. As noted previously, the growing availability of increasingly powerful microprocessorbased systems has reduced the emphasis on the development of special-purpose neural network hardware. Much of what work is continuing is being done in Japan, specifically in the area of simple fuzzy-logic/neural net combinations for use in consumer products. Japan is also interested in dual-use applications, including use of the technology in helicopter flight controls, that have potentially important military applications.
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Table 8.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Intelligent Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None Identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Neural networks exceeding 100,000 logical inferences/second UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Military systems software revealing limitations vulnerabilities, tactics, etc., or threat characteristics. EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 5A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 5A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Ability to self modify and validate any two or more of the following, without expert/human intervention Acceptable inputs/problem set Rule logic, or statistical methods and clustering Criteria Outcomes
HIGH SPEED, LOW LATENCY Data transfer rate (DTR) > 156 Mbits/second SWITCHING DISTRIBUTED, INTELLIGENT
SYSTEM
None Identified
Encryption and digital signature techniques to ensure the validity and authorization of automated artificial intelligence functions (so-called "intelligent agents"). Production equipment for development of Network operating systems WA Cat 5A, D, E optical, optical-digital hybrid equipment capable of automatic CCL Cat 5A, D, E for communications redistribution of machine intelligence function within a system to adapt optimally to new (not preprogrammed) conditions and requirements
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SECTION 8.7 MODELING AND SIMULATION

Overview (See Figure 8.7-1) Advanced simulation and modeling encompasses a wide range of dual-use applications, ranging from engineering design and manufacturing process optimization to dynamic flight trainers and simulators to distributed, interactive simulations of entire engagements and battles. The key elements of this technology involve digital processing to manipulate the data, human system interfaces through which the users interact with the data, and the knowledge embedded in the software discussed in related subsections of this MCTL (see Figure 8.7-2 for cross-reference). The modeling and simulation technologies are particularly important in the context of engineering problems and manufacturing processes, where critical know-how is specific to applications not addressed here. 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.10 8.11 High-Performance Computing Human Systems Interface Information Security Intelligent Systems Networks and Switching Software Transmission Systems
Figure 8.7-1. Figure 8.7-2. Primary Supporting Information Systems Technologies for Modeling and Simulation
Modeling & Simulation

Computational Speed Fidelity of Presentation Operational Flexibility

Combat Mission Simulation for training and system development C 4I 2 Data Fusion Mission Planning and Rehearsal Systems Engineering design Industrial/Information System process development and visualization
Modeling and Simulation Overview
Rationale (See Table 8.8-1) Three considerations drive the criticality of this technology. The first is force training and readiness. Decreasing funding, increasing operating costs, and escalating sophistication of threats and the operational scenarios in which those threats will be encountered make it impossible to develop essential combat skills in the field. The second is in industrial base preparedness. One of the effects of downsizing has been the deferral of engineering and manufacturing development of advanced systems in favor of extended technology development and demonstration programs. The risk of delaying engineering and production is reduced directly in proportion to our ability to do the critical engineering in modeling and to simulate manufacturing processes accurately. Finally, this technology plays an essential role in
operations, where modeling and simulation will be critical to effective representation of battlespace environments. In C 3 I, modeling and simulation enable commanders to do realistic mission rehearsal and preparation, explore options, and optimize force disposition and tactics. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) France and the UK are among the world leaders in dynamic training and combat simulation, followed closely by Germany. Japan is a world leader in most of the underlying technology and is probably the world leader in distributed interactive simulation of complex enterprises. Canada is also strong in this technology, particularly in visually coupled systems and dynamic scene generation.
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Table 8.7-1.
TECHNOLOGY GRAPHICS ACCELERATORS AND PROCESSORS WITH REAL-TIME
VECTOR WRITING RATES
Modeling and Simulation Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT High-resolution lithography (below 0.6 micron). UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Image processing algorithms tailored for military C3I and data fusion, especially those incorporating ATR Real-time adaptive network operating systems. Applications data files incorporating doctrine, tactics, or force element/weapon characteristics. EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 4A, D, E CCL Cat 4A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY > 10 million 3D vectors/second
SPEED AND RESPONSIVENESS OF
Network speed > 623 Mbits/second
None identified
None Identified
DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION Latency < 30 milliseconds
8-16
SECTION 8.8
NETWORKS AND SWITCHING
Overview (See Figure 8.8-1) This subsection covers the militarily critical technology for telecommunication equipment used for the electronic transfer of information. It encompasses technologies for "stored-program-controlled" circuit and packet switching equipment and network routers used for establishing a communication channel between two or more points. Switches may be categorized as circuit, message, and packet or any combination thereof. The technologies found in information networking and network control are heavily dependent on the automation of the monitoring and controlling functions within the network. The monitoring and controlling functions are combined in separate systems, which are capable of working over a widely dispersed geographical area with equipment using various transmission media and switches using common channel signaling. These systems provide a centralized control capability to configure transmission equipment to optimize networks for loading and failures and to configure switches and routers to optimize the call distribution within a network. Technologies identified are optical switching, radiation hardened telecommunications equipment, and equipment capable of operating in extremely cold and hot temperatures. Related technologies are multi-level priority and preemption; dynamic adaptive routing; optical switching; and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). Rationale (See Table 8.8-1) Information systems serve as the vital link in providing current information exchange in the C 2 function. The technologies that have provided the classical telecommunication capabilities have been broadened and have become the vehicle for more encompassing and capable information systems technologies. While access to large quantities of information is important, technologies that provide for the timely receipt of alerting information on enemy status (transmitted even at low data rates) provide for reorganization of combat battle plans and response to changing battlefield situations. Effective C 2 of forces is dependent on maintaining continuity of communications at all times with all elements, fixed or mobile. Continuity can be achieved by switching and reconfiguring networks to provide alternate means in the event of damage or jamming in a hostile environment. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 8.0-2) The majority of the technologies associated with information in networks and switching are common to both military and civil systems and have become readily available
Networks & Switching

Stored Program Control Priority & Pre-emption Protocols Switching Speed Transfer & Access Speed

Networks Local Wide Area Command & Control
Figure 8.8-1.
Networks and Switching Overview
through joint developments or through foreign sales. In foreign sales involving technology transfer, secondary transfer of technology by the original purchaser results in additional proliferation of this technology. Consequently, many countries have acquired technological capabilities in this manner and have rapidly improved their own products. The ranking (which is shown in Figure 8.0-2) largely reflects international standardization activity. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the UK have overall capabilities equal to those of the US. US technology surpasses them in niche technologies such as laser transmission. All of the foregoing countries plus Australia, Finland and Italy sell switching equipment worldwide. In most cases this equipment is quite technologically advanced but usually contains technologies of lesser capability. For example, the multi-level switching and preemption capability will contain only two levels rather than three to five levels.
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Table 8.8-1.
TECHNOLOGY OPTICAL SWITCHING
Networks and Switching Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 5A, C, D, E CCL Cat 5A, C, D, E
NETWORKING AND SWITCHING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Switching speed of 1.0 msec < 0.8 dB loss at wavelength of 1300 nanometers. Operates with either single or multimode optical fibers. Provides up to 4 port switch positions. Robustness to operate under shock condition of 1500 gs at 01000 Hz. Accommodate simultaneous access and transfer of scaleable & seamless variable speed information in a network operating between 16 Kbits/s and 10 Gbits/s Specially radiation hardened to withstand: total dose of 5 105 rads(si) or dose rate upset of 5 108 rads(si)/s or higher Operating temperature from 218 K ( 55 C) to 397 K (124 C).
None identified
None identified
Real time software for ATM WA Cat 5A, D, E call control CCL Cat 5A, D, E
None identified
Specially constructed facility to simulate None identified the Electromagnetic Pulse characteristics with a field intensity of 50,000 volts/meter None identified None identified
None identified
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SECTION 8.9
SIGNAL PROCESSING
Overview (See Figure 8.9-1) A signal is any physical quantity that varies with time, space, or any other independent variable or variables. Signal processing encompasses all aspects of conditioning, formatting, and extraction of useful information from such signals. Functions performed by signal processing include filtering to separate desired signals from undesired signals (noise) and analysis of the spatial or temporal characteristics of signals to extract information regarding the content of messages or the location and identification of targets. Image processing analysis and characterization of the spatial distribution of signals occur in two or more dimensions. The patterns generated may correlate to visual images or be entirely synthetic representations of nonvisual data from multiple sensors. Such 2D signal processing may or may not also include analysis of the temporal characteristics, such as moving target imagery. Rationale (See Table 8.9-1) Signal processing is a basic enabling technology for all telecommunications and military sensors. The ability to control and exploit the electromagnetic spectrum has become an increasingly vital element of the electronic battlefield. Signal processing is, in effect, the first layer of quality assurance for information that will ultimately be used for decision-making in the battlefield. The accuracy and reliability of that data, particularly in environments with high levels of interference (both unintentional and countermeasures induced), is critical to mission success. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 8.0-2) The basic principles and, increasingly, the components necessary for implementing advanced digital processing techniques are increasingly available. Implementation of militarily critical signal processing functions rests largely on empirically validated target and engineering design databases and empirically optimized algorithms. The US, by virtue of many years of investment in development, test, and operational use of advanced military sensors, has a significant
Signal Processing

Processing Speed Empirical Validation of Target Features and Characteristics

Sensors Radar Sonar FLIR Intelligence Analysis Systems Image Exploitation
Figure 8.9-1.
Signal Processing Overview
worldwide lead, followed closely by the UK, France, and Germany. Japan also has all of the underlying technology elements and has developed a variety of military systems (IR sensors, mortar location radars, satellite communications, etc.) that require state-of-the-art signal processing. Italy, Sweden (airborne radar), and other members of the EU have capabilities in specific sensor areas, as do Russia, Israel, India, and South Africa.
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Table 8.9-1.
TECHNOLOGY DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING
EQUIPMENT AT HIGH COMPOSITE THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE
Signal Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Signal processing algorithms for detection in noise and clutter; Image processing algorithms tailored for military C4I2 and data fusion, especially those incorporating ATR Empirically validated criteria and algorithms for feature extraction, classification, and identification of military targets; Empirically validated techniques for processing degraded or partial images of military targets Validated techniques for discriminating undersea noise, and localization algorithms accounting for undersea propagation effects Validated algorithms incorporating military target data and battle noise EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 4A, D, E CCL Cat 4A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY 1500 million theoretical operations/second (Mtops)
IMAGE PROCESSING SYSTEMS

INTEGRATING ONE OR MORE SYSTEM SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
Integrate one or more of following system support functions: Automated electronic scanning and beam forming, Motion compensation and clutter/countermeasures rejection, Real-time feature extraction
None identified
Imagery displays, capable of 10 million 3D vectors per second or greater
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 4A, D, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 4A, D, E
AUTOMATIC, REAL-TIME ACOUSTIC SIGNAL PROCESSING, SONAR
CTP = 1500 Mtops
None identified
None identified
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL 6A, D, E
AUTOMATIC, REAL-TIME TERRESTRIAL CTP = 1500 Mtops

ACOUSTIC PROCESSING
Not applicable
None identified
AUTOMATIC REAL-TIME TARGET

RECOGNITION
Specially designed to incorporate one or more empirically validated features for real-time detection and identification of military targets Specially designed for capturing and analyzing complex dynamic (range > 100 dB) signals in real-time Able to withstand shock and accelerations to 300 g.
None identified
None identified
ON BOARD-PROCESSING AND
ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SIGNATURES
Special antenna Specially designed equipment for radome and assembly of G-hardened components optical/IR window materials
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL 6A, D, E Validated algorithms and WA ML 11, 21, 22 detection criteria for military WA Cat 6A, D, E targets USML XI CCL 6A, D, E Empirically-validated target WA ML 11, 21, 22 detection algorithms, and WA Cat 5A, D, E target acquisition, aimpoint USML XI selection and firing criteria CCL Cat 5A, D, E
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SECTION 8.10
Overview (See Figure 8.10-1) Software consists of two components: (1) the applications matters, which contains algorithms, functions or logic, and parameters and (2) the code, which enables electronic computers to implement the applications. Militarily critical software applications are included in other sections of the MCTL as separate technology items or as "Unique Software and Parameters" in data tables. These applications use validated software that is generally related to one or more operational or developmental military systems. This subsection identifies the know-how that makes the second component, software code, militarily critical. There are two aspects to code: product and process. As product, code is considered militarily critical when it meets criteria in Table 8.10-1 under Military Critical Parameters. Process technologies in the development and life cycle support of software codein such activities as configuration management, testing, metrics/measurement, integrated documentation, and architectureinvolve technologies that are not currently militarily critical. Rationale (See Table 8.10-1) Software code is the lifeblood of countless models, simulations, decision systems, and information systems in innumerable military and nonmilitary applications. Attributes by which code is judged include predictability, reliability, error immunity, and confidence level. Predictability refers to the degree to which code enables applications to function as expected (e.g., target damage is, in fact, measured by a vulnerability model). Reliability is the measure of the code's ability to enable an application to be executed without interruption. Immunity to errors covers internal causes (e.g., virus) and external causes (e.g., power outage). Confidence level is a quantified measure of trust warranted by the software code. Table 8.10-1 identifies the levels at which these attributes are militarily critical. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 8.0-2) Two main considerations in scoring a country's software capability are (1) the ability to apply software development processes consistently to large or complex systems integration programs and (2) the ability to develop code of the quality listed under Militarily Critical Parameters in Table 8.10-1. Besides the US, countries
SOFTWARE
Software

Predictability Confidence Level Reliability Usability Rapid Execution Resolution State Awareness Immunity Flexibility
Figure 8.10-1.

System Operations Data Computation & Fusion Data Display Data Capture Autonomous Operations Weapons Systems
Software Overview
with the best military software capability are France, Israel, and the UK. Next in capability are Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. A great deal of technology exchange takes place in conferences and publications on software development. The use of the Internet has also broadened the base of discussion on software development techniques throughout the world. Currently, the US leads the world, largely because of national attention and concentration on developing military software. Other countries have gained expertise in certain aspects of software development, often from personnel transfers and training by US companies and US universities or through international conference participation and internationally available publications. Certain individuals and groups have obtained expertise in hacking and insertion of "rogue code".
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Table 8.10-1.
TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE THAT ENABLES
ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS TO IMPLEMENT APPLICATIONS
Software Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, 6D, 7D, 8D, 9D WA ML 2, 17 USML 121.8 CCL Cat 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, 6D, 7D, 8D, 9D
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY 100% functional predictability High confidence > 99% High reliability ~ 100% Immunity < 1 error in 1012 External > cryptographic data integrity probability of error > 10-9 Internal-detect-fix < 1 operational cycle
Unique software tools for production, Validated input data and testing, and inspection needed to achieve military software provide the the Militarily Critical Parameters. capabilities that make militarily critical systems superior
8-22
SECTION 8.11
TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
Transmission Systems
Overview (See Figure 8.11-1) This subsection covers the militarily critical technology for information transmission equipment and components used for transfer of voice, data, record, and other information by electromagnetic means either through atmospheric, exoatmospheric, or subsurface (water) media or via metallic or fiber optic cable. Information being exchanged is predominantly in digital form for voice, text, graphics, video and databases. This facilitates the application of security as required. The majority of the technologies for telecommunication transmission equipment are common to both military and civil systems. The information may be analog or digital, ranging in bandwidth from a single voice channel to video or multiple channels occupying hundreds of megahertz. Technologies identified as militarily critical include those for laser communications through atmospheric, exoatmospheric, and subsurface media or over optical fiber; radio transmission equipment operating at frequencies > 30 GHz with spread spectrum for low probability of intercept communications; phased array antennas for beam forming or nulling of interfering signals; and high-capacity, digitally controlled radio receivers. Other technologies considered were cable transmission technology for cables used where reduced vulnerability to intercept is of concern and underwater communications for concentrated naval operations. The types of cables considered are single or multiconductor, twisted pair or coaxial metallic cable, and those using optical fiber conductors. Cables can be employed on the surface for rapid deployment or buried in the earth for protection or as means of providing a required degree of hardness. Other applications are underwater inter-island or intercontinental connections. Technologies identified are those for single mode fibers with low dispersion; halide-based fibers of extremely low loss; and components and accessories for fiber. Rationale (See Table 8.11-1) The technologies for developing and producing a variety of types of telecommunications equipment used for electromagnetic transmission of information over any media provide for information exchange to control forces without impeding their mobility. The technology used minimizes the probability of information intercept by any third party. It nullifies the effect of electronic warfare assets that may be employed by a third party to counter the accurate receipt by the intended recipient of the information transmitted.

Operating Wavelength Coherent Optical Transmission Spread Spectrum (Frequency Hopping) Extended Frequency Frequency Agility Electronic Steerable

Communications for Ground/Airborne/Space/ Underwater Intelligence Collection Jamming/Anti-Jamming
Figure 8.11-1.
Transmission Systems Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 8.0-2) The majority of the technologies associated with information transmission equipment operating in the electromagnetic media or over fiber or cable are common to both military and civil systems and have been made readily available in the foreign market or through joint development. Consequently, many countries have not developed their own unique products but have acquired technological capabilities incrementally as products have undergone improvement and standardization. The ranking shown in Figure 8.0-2 is based on the information systems produced by the individual countries and their activity in acquiring or producing products in the world markets. Six countriesCanada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UKhave capabilities that rival those possessed by the US. Eight countriesAustralia, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwanhave technological capabilities in the majority of the critical technology areas.
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Table 8.11-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Transmission Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Pulse degradation measurement None identified Semi conductor manufacturing technologies at higher frequencies None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Intrusion detection techniques None identified EXPORT CONTROL
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY OPTICAL INFORMATION TRANSMISSION Using single mode optical fiber with dispersion None identified < 0.12 ps/nm/km at 15201580 nm LASER TRANSMISSION - FINE LINE Linewidth < 300 MHz None identified RADIO EQUIPMENT RADIO EQUIPMENT - SPREAD SPECTRUM (FREQUENCY HOPPING) Frequency > 31 GHz User programmable spreading codes; total transmitted bandwidth > 100 times the bandwidth of any one information channel and > 50 kHz. Digitally controlled > 1000 channels: Automatic, search and scan Switching time < 1 ms. Steering angle > 60 deg at frequency > 31 GHz. None identified None identified
REFERENCE WA Cat 5A, D, E CCL Cat 5A, D, E WA Cat 5A, D, E CCL Cat 5A, D, E Frequency control and agility WA Cat 5A, D, E CCL Cat 5A, D, E Spread spectrum necessary WA Cat 5A, D, E to detect and track hop rates CCL Cat 5A, D, E and apply counter measures to deny use of the spectrum Software with processors to WA Cat 5A, D, E cover and analyze the CCL Cat 5A, D, E spectrum of interest None identified WA Cat 5A, D, E CCL Cat 5A, D, E
RADIO RECEIVERS
None identified
Signal display and analyses equipment
PHASED ARRAY ANTENNAE
None identified
None identified
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APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS
Accessories and attachments. Associated equipment for any component, end-item or system, and which are not necessary for their operation, but which enhance their usefulness or effectiveness. (Examples: Military riflescopes, special paints, etc.) (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Accuracy. (Usually measured in terms of inaccuracy) is maximum deviation, positive or negative, of an indicated value from an accepted standard of true value. Active. Guidance by which a missile, warhead, or projectile emits radiation (usually radio frequency) and homes in on the signal reflected from a selected target. Active cooling. Optical components use flowing fluids in the subsurface of the optical component to remove heat from the system. Active flight control systems. Function to prevent undesirable "aircraft" and missile motions or structural loads by autonomously processing outputs from multiple sensors and then providing necessary preventive commands to effect automatic control. Active pixel. A minimum (single) element of the solid-state array which has a photoelectric transfer function when exposed to light (electromagnetic) radiation. Active tooling unit. A device for applying motive power, process energy or sensing to the workpiece. Adaptive control. A control system that adjusts the response from conditions detected during the operation. (Reference: ISO 2806-1980.) Additives. Substances used in explosive formulations to improve their properties. Aircraft. A fixed-wing, swivel-wing, rotary-wing (helicopter), tilt-rotor or tilt-wing airborne vehicle. (See also "Civil aircraft.") Alloyed aluminide coatings. Coatings of nickel or titanium aluminides modified with other metals such as chromium. Aluminum alloys. Alloys having an ultimate tensile strength of 190 MPa or more measured at 293 K (20 C). Amphibious vehicle. An automotive vehicle or chassis which embodies all-wheel drive, is equipped to meet special military requirements, and which has sealed electrical systems or adaptation features for deep water fording. (ITAR Sec 121.4.) Angular position deviation. The maximum difference between angular position and the actual, very accurately measured angular position after the workpiece mount of the table has been turned out of its initial position. (Reference: VDI/VDE 2617, Draft: "Rotary tables on coordinate measuring machines.") Antibodies. See "Anti-idiotypic antibodies," "Monoclonal antibodies," and/or "Polyclonal antibodies." Anti-idiotypic antibodies. Antibodies which bind to the specific antigen binding sites of other antibodies. Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Preprogrammed VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated) or LSI (Large Scale Integrated) circuit used for a specific application. Assemblies. A number of electronic components (i.e., circuit elements, discrete components, integrated circuits, etc.) connected together to perform a specific function, replaceable as an entity and normally capable of being disassembled. Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). A transfer mode in which the information is organized into cells; it is asynchronous in the sense that the recurrence of cells depends on the required or instantaneous bit rate. (CCITT Recommendation L. 113.) Australia Group. An international organization, chaired by Australia, that seeks to discourage and impede the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by harmonizing national export controls on chemical materials, biological organisms, and dual use equipment that could be used in chemical and biological weapons production. Automatic target tracking. A processing technique that automatically determines and provides as output an extrapolated value of the most probable position of the target in real time. Autonomous. Missile warhead or projectile guidance to improve their properties. Bandwidth of one voice channel. In the case of data communication equipment designed to operate in one voice channel of 3,100 Hz, as defined in CCITT Recommendation G.151. Bar. A unit of pressure that is equal to 106 dynes/cm2, or 14.5 psi (i.e., approximately sea-level atmospheric pressure). Basic scientific research. Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena or observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective. Bias (accelerometer). An accelerometer output when no acceleration is applied. Biocatalysts. "Enzymes" or other biological compounds which bind to and accelerate the degradation of CW agents. Biopolymers. Biological macromolecules as follows: "Enzymes;" Antibodies, "monoclonal," "polyclonal," or "anti-idiotypic," specially designed or specially processed "receptors." Black body. A perfect emitter (radiator) of electromagnetic radiation having a characteristic temperature that is the sole determinant of its radiated energy spectrum.
B-1
Blast. The brief and rapid movement of air, vapor, or fluid away from a center of outward pressure. Brilliant munition. A many-on-many munition that operates autonomously to search for, detect, identify, acquire, and attack specific classes of targets. The sensor on each munition acquires and attacks one among the class of targets, so that in a battlefield situation two munitions may attack the same target leaving others inviolate. Bulk. A comparatively large quantity of a substance or commodity that is manufactured, shipped, and stored as such, but which is characteristically broken down into smaller lots before application or further processing. Burnout (electronics). A type of failure that implies the destruction of a component caused by a permanent change in one or more characteristics beyond an acceptable amount. CAD/CAM (computer-aided design/computer aided manufacturing). Two highly specialized technical applications of a computer to improve the productivity of the engineer. CAE (computer-aided engineering). Analysis of a design for basic error-checking, or to optimize manufacturability, performance, and economy (for example, by comparing various possible materials or designs). Information drawn from the CAD/CAM design database is used to analyze the functional characteristics of part, product, or system under design, and to simulate its performance under various conditions. CAE permits the execution of complex circuit loading analyses and simulation during the circuit definition stage. CAE can be used to determine section properties, moments of inertia, shear and bending moments, weight, volume, surface area, and center of gravity. CAE can precisely determine loads, vibration, noise, and service life early in the design cycle so that components can be optimized to meet those criteria. Perhaps the most powerful CAE technique is finite element modeling. Calorie. The amount of heat required to raise the temperature of 1 gram of water from 15 C to 16 C at 760 mm Hg pressure. CAM (computer-aided manufacturing). The use of computer and digital technology to generate manufacturing-oriented data. Data drawn from a CAD/CAM database can assist in or control a portion or all of a manufacturing process, including numerically controlled machines, computer-assisted parts programming, computer-assisted process planning, robotics, and programmable logic controllers. CAM can involve production programming, manufacturing engineering, industrial engineering, facilities engineering, and reliability engineering (quality control). CAM techniques can be used to produce process plans for fabricating a complete assembly, to program robots; and to coordinate plant operation. C3I System. See "Integrated C3I systems." Camming (axial displacement). Axial displacement in one revolution of the main spindle measured in a plane perpendicular to the spindle faceplate, at a point next to the circumference of the spindle faceplate. (Reference: ISO 230.1 1986, paragraph 5.63.) Cathodic Arc Deposition. See "Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TEPVD)."
CEP. Circular Error Probable or Circle of Equal Probability. A measure of accuracy at a specific range, expressed in terms of the radius of the circle, centered on the target, in which 50% of the payloads impact. Chemical vapor deposition (CVD). An overlay coating or surface modification coating process wherein a metal, alloy, "composite," dielectric or ceramic is deposited upon a heated substrate. Gaseous reactants are decomposed or combined in the vicinity of a substrate resulting in the deposition of the desired elemental, alloy or compound material on the substrate. Energy for this decomposition or chemical reaction process may be provided by the heat of the substrate, a glow discharge plasma, or "laser" irradiation. Chemical laser. A "laser" in which the excited species is produced by the output energy from a chemical reaction. Chip. Micromechanical/microelectronic devices on a single substrate. Circuit element. A single active or passive functional part of an electronic circuit, such as one diode, one transistor, one resistor, one capacitor, etc. Circumvention (electronics). A system protection technique in which detection of the onset of nuclear radiation or EMP puts a critical portion of the system inn a protected condition. A system-level technique using special hardware and software for recovering from a transient upset. Civil aircraft. Those "aircraft" listed by designation in published airworthiness certification lists by the civil aviation authorities to fly commercial civil internal and external routes or for legitimate civil, private or business use. (See also "Aircraft.") CLOS. A "command-to-line-of-sight" guided munition system in which an operator looks through a sight, searches, detects, and acquires a target, then aims and fires a missile. Guidance commands are automatically generated at the launcher by continually comparing the aimpoint to the current missile location. Corrective commands are transmitted to the missile through a wire link between the launcher and the missile, causing the missile to fly along the line of sight between the launcher and the target (see, for example, the TOW missile). Cluster tool. A set of process chambers or modules linked by a wafer transport, in a controlled environment and with a communication system that can control sequential processing in a semiconductor fab line. Commingled. Filament-to-filament blending of thermoplastic fibers and reinforcement fibers in order to produce a fiber reinforcement/"matrix" mix in total fiber form. Comminution. A process to reduce a material to particles by crushing or grinding. Common channel signaling. A signaling method in which a single channel between exchanges conveys, by means of labeled messages, signaling information relating to a multiplicity of circuits or calls and other information such as that used for network management. Communications channel controller. The physical interface which controls the flow of synchronous or asynchronous digital information. It is an assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access.
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Compensation (TREE). A general category of techniques employed to divert primary and secondary photocurrents or to nullify their effects as an aid to circuit hardening against ionizing radiation. Component. An item which is useful only when used in conjunction with an end-item. A major component includes any assembled element which forms a portion of an enditem without which the end-item is inoperable. (Example: Airframes tail, sections, transmissions, tank treads, hulls, etc.) A minor component includes any assembled element of a major component. (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Composite. A "matrix" and an additional phase or additional phases consisting of particles, whiskers, fibers, or any combination thereof, present for a specific purpose or purposes. Composite theoretical performance (CTP). A measure of computational performance given in millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS), calculated using the aggregation of "computing elements (CE)." Compound rotary table. A table allowing the workpiece to rotate and tilt about two nonparallel axes, which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control." Computer operating area. The immediate contiguous and accessible area around the electronic computer, where the normal operating, support, and service functions take place. Computer using facility. The end-users contiguous and accessible facilities: Housing the "computer operating area" and those end-user functions which are being supported by the stated application of the electronic computer and its related equipment; and not extending beyond 1,500 meters in any direction from the center of the "computer operating area." Computing element (CE). The smallest computational unit that produces an arithmetic or logic result. Control. The process of steering a missile, while stabilizing it against disturbances such as wind gusts or blast, by the operation of aerodynamic surfaces, air or jet vanes, gas jets, or attitude control of rocket motors. Control subsystems respond to guidance (q.v.) signals to correct the attitude and position of a missile, and to activate power sources, servomechanisms, and other components. Contouring control. Two or more "numerically controlled" motions operating in accordance with instructions that specify the next required position and the required feed rates to that position. These feed rates are varied in relation to each other so that a desired contour is generated. (Reference: ISO/DIS 2806-1980.) Conventional unguided projectiles. Those which do not incorporate: Directional warheads, including warheads employing multi-point initiation to achieve focused blast/fragmentation characteristics; submunitions or submunition capacity; fuel/air explosives; provisions for increasing the range or impact velocity; kinetic energy armor penetration capability; mid-flight guidance; terminal guidance. Correlated munition. See "Sentient" munition. Corrosion resistant steel. Steel which is AISI (American Iron and Steel Institute) 300 series or equivalent national standard steels.
Co-spray. Simultaneously but separately injecting both ceramic and metal powders/particulates into a high-temperature plasma stream to form a metal matrix composite upon solidification on a substrate. Critical developing technology. Technology which, when fully developed and incorporated in a U.S. system, will produce increasingly superior military performance or maintain a superior capability more affordably. Critical Temperature. (Sometimes referred to as the transition temperature) of a specific "superconductive" material is the temperature at which the material loses all resistance to the flow of direct electrical current. Cryptanalysis. The analysis of a cryptographic system or its inputs and outputs to derive confidential variables or sensitive data, including clear text. (ISO 7498-2-1988 (E), paragraph 3.3.18.) Cryptography. The discipline which embodies principles, means, and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its undetected modification, or prevent its unauthorized use. "Cryptography" is limited to the transformation of information using one or more secret parameters (e.g., crypto variables) or associated key management. Cryptomaterial. All material including documents, devices, equipment, and apparatus essential to the encryption, decryption, or authentication of telecommunications. When classified, it is designated CRYPTO and subject to special safeguards. Data device. Equipment capable of transmitting or receiving sequences of digital information. Defense service. (1) The furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad, in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing, or use of defense articles; or (2) the furnishing to foreign persons of any [controlled] technical data ... whether in the United States or abroad. (ITAR Sec 120.9.) Designed or modified. Equipment, parts, components, or software that, as a result of "development or modification," have specified properties that make them fit for a particular application. The designed or modified equipment, parts, components, or software can be used for other applications. For example, a titanium-coated pump designed for a missile can be used with corrosive fluids other than propellants. (MTCR) Detonation (high-explosive). A violent chemical reaction with a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressures. Detonation, nuclear. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as that from a nuclear weapon. Digital computer. Equipment which can, in the form of one or more discrete variables, accept data; store data or instructions in fixed or alterable writable storage devices; process data by means of a stored sequence of instructions which is modifiable; and provide output of data. Digitizing rate. The rate (in samples per second) at which the acquired signal can be converted to digital information.
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Discrete component. connection.
A separately packaged circuit element with its own external
Dose, absorbed. The amount of energy imparted by nuclear (or ionizing) radiation to unit mass of absorbing material. The unit is the rad. In current usage, the rad unit has been replaced by the SI unit, the gray (Gy) [1 Gy - 100 rads]. Doppler. The special radiation line broadening attributable to the motion of the source or of the target, and sensed by detection and tracking systems. Drift. Environmental or thermal effects on response of a machine or device to gradually move away from the desired response. Drift rate (gyro). The time rate of output deviation from the desired output. It consists of random and systematic components and is expressed as an equivalent input angular displacement per unit time with respect to inertial space. Dynamic adaptive routing. Automatic rerouting of traffic based on sensing and analysis of current actual network conditions. Dynamic signal analyzers. "Signal analyzers" which use digital sampling and transformation techniques to form a Fourier spectrum display of the given waveform including amplitude and phase information. (See also "Signal analyzers.") Electron Beam PVD. See "Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TEPVD)." Electronically steerable phased array antenna. An antenna which forms a beam by means of phase coupling, i.e., the beam direction is controlled by the complex excitation coefficients of the radiating elements, and the direction of that beam can be varied in azimuth or in elevation, or both, by application, both in transmission and reception of an electrical signal. End-effectors. "End-effectors" include grippers, "active tooling units" and any other tooling that is attached to the baseplate on the end of a "robot" manipulator arm. End-item. An assembled article ready for its intended use. Only ammunition, fuel or another energy source is required to place it in an operating state. (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Energetic materials. A collective term for military high explosives, propellants and pyrotechnics, which is synonymous with the term military explosives (the preferred NATO/COCOM usage). Although the term has been adopted by some also to cover commercial explosives, it is used in the MCTL only to refer to military technology. Ensembling. A process to improve clock performance by using multiple clocks and to improve reliability by redundancy, self-monitoring, or reduction of signal perturbations. Enzymes. "Biocatalysts" for specific chemical or biochemical reactions. Equivalent density. The mass of an optic per unit optical area projected onto the optical surface. Expression vectors. Carriers (e.g., plasmid or virus) used to introduce genetic material into host cells.
Family. Consists of microprocessor or microcomputer microcircuits with: the same architecture; the same basic instruction set; and the same basic technology (e.g., only NMOS or only CMOS). Fast select. A facility applicable to virtual calls which allows data terminal equipment to expand the possibility to transmit data in call set-up and clearing "packets" beyond the basic capabilities of a virtual call. Fault tolerance. The capability of a computer system, after any malfunction of any of its hardware or "software" components, to continue to operate without human intervention, at a given level of service that provides continuity of operation, data integrity and recovery of service within a given time. Fibrous and filamentary materials. Include: continuous monofilaments; continuous yarns and rovings; tapes, fabrics, random mats and braids; chopped fibers, staple fibers and coherent fiber blankets; whiskers, either monocrystalline or polycrystalline, of any length; aromatic polyamide pulp. Film type integrated circuit. An array of "circuit elements" and metallic interconnections formed by deposition of a thick or thin film on an insulating "substrate." Firmware. Includes, but is not limited to, circuits into which software has been programmed. (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Fixed. The coding or compression (e.g., cryptographic or key variables) that cannot be modified by the user. Fixed ammunition. Ammunition rounds in which the cartridge with propellant and the loaded shell or "bullet" are all in one unit. With semifixed rounds the cartridge case is not permanently fixed to the projectile, so that zone charges within cases can be adjusted to obtain desired ranges, but each round is inserted into a weapon as a unit. Fixed sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are not variable or changeable by mechanical, electronic or electrical means. Fluoride fibers. Fibers manufactured from bulk fluoride compounds. Frequency agility (frequency hopping). A form of "spread spectrum" in which the transmission frequency of a single communication channel is made to change by discrete steps. Frequency agility (radar). See "Radar frequency agility." Frequency switching time. The maximum time (i.e., delay) taken by a signal, when switched from one selected output frequency to another selected output frequency, to reach a frequency within 100 Hz of the final frequency; or an output level within 1 dB of the final output level. Frequency synthesizer. Any kind of frequency source or signal generator, regardless of the actual technique used, providing a multiplicity of simultaneous or alternative output frequencies, from one or more outputs, controlled by, derived from or disciplined by a lesser number of standard (or master) frequencies.
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Gas atomization. A process to reduce a molten stream of metal alloy to droplets of 500micrometer diameter or less by a high-pressure gas stream. Gateway. The function, realized by any combination of equipment and "software," to carry out the conversion of conventions or representing, processing, or communicating information used in one system into the corresponding but different conventions used in another system. Generic software. A set of instructions for a "stored program controlled" switching system that is the same for all switches using that type of switching system. Geographically dispersed. Sensors are considered "geographically dispersed" when each location is distant from any other more than 1,500 m in any direction. Mobile sensors are always considered "geographically dispersed." Global interrupt latency time. The item taken by the computer system to recognize an interrupt due to the event, service the interrupt, and perform a context switch to an alternative memory-resident task waiting on the interrupt. Guidance. The data collection and command process whereby a missile or space vehicle is directed to a specified destination. Guidance subsystems may be internal or external to a missile system; may be preset, active, passive or semi-active; and function independently over initial, midcourse, and terminal phases of a flight path. Guidance munition. A "one-on-one" munition: a specific munition engages a specific target, which is advantageous during close combat situations. An operator is required in the loop to select the target and often assist in the guidance. The munitions may be either CLOS or "terminal homing" devices. Guidance sets. A device that integrates the data collection and command process that directs a missile or space vehicle to its target. High Energy Laser HEL. A laser which has an average or CW power level of nominally tens of kilowatts of power and which operates for nominally a few seconds, providing energies of 104 Joules or larger. When the "HEL" is operated in a pulsed mode, the energy is averaged over 1 second or the duration or the laser train of pulses, whichever is longer. "Hit-to-kill" System. A munition system incorporating integrated seeker, guidance and control, and fuze subsystems, whose warhead is initiated upon target impact, or in close proximity thereto. Hot isostatic densification. A process of pressurizing a casting at temperatures exceeding 375 K (102 C) in a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid particles, etc.) to create equal force in all directions to reduce or eliminate internal voids in the casting. Hybrid computer. Equipment which can accept data, process data, in both analog and digital representations, and provide output of data. Hybrid integrated circuit. Any combination of integrated circuit(s), or integrated circuit with "circuit elements" or "discrete components" connected together to perform specific function(s), and having all of the following characteristics: containing at least one unencapsulated device; connected together using typical IC production methods; replaceable and an entity; and not normally capable of being disassembled.
Image enhancement. The processing of externally derived information-bearing images by algorithms such as time compression, filtering, extraction, selection, correlation, convolution or transformations between domains (e.g., fast Fourier transform or Walsh transform). This does not include algorithms using only linear or rotational transformation of a single image, such as translation, feature extraction, registration or false coloration. Impulse, specific. The thrust developed in burning unit weight of a propellant, corrected for standard operating and discharge pressures. Specific impulse may be measured, or estimated theoretically from the thermochemical properties of propellant formulations and their decomposition products. Impulse, total. The integral of the thrust of a rocket motor over the burning time. Other factors being equal the same total impulse can result from a small thrust over a long burn time as from a high thrust over a short burn time. In the public domain. Means technology or software which has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology or software from being in the public domain.) In-bulk. See "Bulk." Inertial environmental test conditions. 1. Input random vibration with an overall "g" level of 7.7 g rms in the first half hour and a total test duration of one and one half hour per axis in each of the three perpendicular axes, when the random vibration meets the following: (a) A constant power spectral density (PSD) value of 0.04 g2/Hz over a frequency interval of 15 to 1,000 Hz; and (b) The PSD attenuates with frequency from 0.04 g2/Hz to 0.001 g2/Hz over a frequency interval from 1,000 to 2,000 Hz; 2. A roll and yaw rate of equal to or more than + 2.62 radian/s (150 deg/s); or 3. According to national standards equivalent to 1. or 2. above. Information security. All the means and functions ensuring the accessibility, confidentiality or integrity of information or communications, excluding the means and functions intended to safeguard against malfunctions. This includes "cryptography," "cryptanalysis," protection against compromising emanations and computer security. Information systems. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel and components that collect, process, store, disseminate and act on information. Information warfare. Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information based processes, information systems and computer-based networks. Instantaneous bandwidth. The bandwidth over which output power remains constant within 3 dB without adjustment of other operating parameters. Instrumented range. The specified unambiguous display range of a radar.
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Integrated C3I systems. Fabricated combinations of platforms; sensors and weapons; "software" and data-processing equipment; related communications subsystems; and user-system interfaces specifically designed for the control of U.S. armed forces and weapons systems. Command, control, communications and intelligence systems are integrated combinations of military command information processing, communications network, and intelligence gathering subsystems (including, surveillance, warning and identification subsystems) that make up the US C3I systems. These combined technologies support U.S. authorities at all echelons with the "integrated C3I systems" that provide the timely and adequate data "required" to plan, direct, and control U.S. military forces and operations in the accomplishment of their missions. Integrated services digital network (ISDN). A unified end-to-end digital network, in which data originating from all types of communication (e.g., voice, text, data, still and moving pictures) are transmitted from one port (terminal) in the exchange (switch) over one access line to and from the subscriber. Interconnected radar sensors. Two or more radar sensors are interconnected when they mutually exchange data in real time. Interpolation. The means in NC by which curved sections are approximated by a series of straight lines or parabolic segments. Intrinsic magnetic gradiometer. A single magnetic field gradient sensing element and associated electronics the output of which is a measure of magnetic field gradient. (See also "Magnetic Gradiometers.") Ion implantation. A surface modification coating process in which the element to be alloyed is ionized, accelerated through a potential gradient and implanted into the surface region of the substrate. This includes processes in which ion implantation is performed simultaneously with electron beam physical vapor deposition or sputter deposition. Ion plating. A special modification of a general TE-PVD process in which a plasma or an ion source is used to ionize the species to be deposited, and a negative bias is applied to the substrate in order to facilitate the extraction of the species to be deposited from the plasma. The introduction of reactive species, evaporation of solids within the process chamber, and the use of monitors to provide in-process measurement of optical characteristics and thicknesses of coatings are ordinary modifications of the process. Isostatic presses. Equipment capable of pressurizing a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid particles, etc.) to create equal pressure in all directions within the cavity upon a workpiece or material. K-factor. A standard method for expressing the surface hardness and finish of a machined gear tooth. Key precursors. Chemical compounds which are one manufacturing step away from producing a chemical warfare agent listed in the IML or provide the toxic properties to the chemical warfare agent it is used to produce. Laser. An assembly of components which produce both spatially and temporarily coherent light that is amplified by stimulated emission or radiation.
Latch-Up Free. A device or an integrated circuit which does not have an intentional or non-intentional four-layer p-n-p-n structure. For example, integrated circuits properly fabricated on silicon on insulator (SOI) substrates would be latch-up free. Linearity. (Usually measured in terms of non-linearity) is the maximum deviation of the actual characteristics (average of upscale and downscale readings), positive or negative, from a straight line so positioned as to equalize and minimize the maximum deviations. Line of sight. Guidance by which the missile, warhead, or projectile is commanded to follow a trajectory that will cause it to intercept a target in a direction defined by a target tracker. The method requires two way communication with the missile, warhead or projectile either by means of an IR, RF, wire, or fiber-optic link. Local area network. A data communication system which: allows an arbitrary number of independent "data devices" to communicate directly with each other; and is confined to a geographic area of moderate size (e.g., office building, plant, campus, warehouse). Mach number. The ratio of the speed of an object to the speed of sound in the surrounding medium. Magnetic gradiometers. Instruments designed to detect the spatial variation of magnetic fields from sources external to the instrument. They consist of multiple "magnetometers" and associated electronics the output of which is a measure of magnetic field gradient. (See also "Intrinsic magnetic gradiometer.") Magnetometers. Instruments designed to detect magnetic fields from sources external to the instrument. They consist of a single magnetic field sensing element and associated electronics the output of which is a measure of the magnetic field. Main storage. The primary storage for data or instructions for rapid access by a central processing unit. It consists of the internal storage of a "digital computer" and any hierarchical extension thereto, such as cache storage or non-sequentially accessed extended storage. Maraging steels. A special class of high-strength, low-carbon, nickel-alloy steels, wherein the high strength (greater than 1,030 MPa) is derived from age hardening or precipitation of intermetallic compounds in the grain structure and does not involve carbon. These steels typically contain no less than 10% nickel, no more than 0.03% carbon, and Co, Mo, Ti, and Al, as alloying elements. Mass fraction. The ratio of the weight of the propellant to the weight of the loaded rocket. The larger the ratio the longer the range of the rocket. Matrix. A substantially continuous phase that fills the space between particles, whiskers, or fibers. Maximum bit transfer rate. Of a disk drive or solid state storage device: the number of data bits per second transferred between the drive or the device and its controller. Measurement uncertainty. The characteristic parameter that specifies in what range around the output value the correct value of the measurable variable lies with a confidence level of 95%. It includes the uncorrected systematic deviations, the uncorrected backlash and the random deviations. (Ref.: VDI/VDE 2617.)
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Mechanical alloying. An alloying process resulting from the bonding, fracturing and rebonding of elemental and master alloy powders by mechanical impact. Non-metallic particles may be incorporated in the alloy by the addition of the appropriate powders. Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed, but adjustable, stops such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program pattern. Variations or modifications of the program pattern (e.g., changes of pins or exchanges of cams) in one or more motion axes are accomplished only through mechanical operations. Media access unit. Equipment which contains one or more communication interfaces ("network access controller," "communications channel controller," modem or computer bus) to connect terminal equipment to a network. Melt extraction. A process to "solidify rapidly" and extract a ribbon-like alloy product by the insertion of a short segment of a rotating chilled block into a bath of a molten alloy. Melt spinning. A process to "solidify rapidly" a molten metal stream impinging upon a rotating chilled block, forming a flake, ribbon or rod-like product. Microcomputer microcircuit. A "monolithic integrated circuit" or "multichip integrated circuit" containing an arithmetic logic unit capable of executing general purpose instructions from an internal storage, on data contained in the internal storage. (The internal storage may be augmented by an external storage.) Microprogram. A sequence of elementary instructions, maintained in a special storage, the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruction into an instruction register. Militarily critical technologies. Technologies whose technical performance parameters are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems. Military high explosives. Solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or mixtures of substances which, in their application as primary, booster, or main charges in warheads, demolition and other military applications, are required to detonate. Military propellants. Solid, liquid or gaseous substances or mixtures of substances used for propelling projectiles and missiles, or to generate gases for powering auxiliary devices for embargoed military equipment which, when ignited, burn or deflagrate to produce quantities of gas capable of performing work, but in their application these quantities are required not to undergo a deflagration to detonation transition. Military pyrotechnics. Mixtures of solid or liquid fuels and oxidizers which, when ignited, undergo an energetic chemical reaction at a controlled rate intended to produce specific time delays, or quantities of heat, noise, smoke, visible light or infrared radiation. Pyrophorics are a subclass of pyrotechnics, which contain no oxidizers but ignite spontaneously on contact with air. Minimum smoke. A descriptive term used for propellants that produce the least amount of smoke under specified conditions. The term is difficult to quantify, but AGARD identifies these as class AA propellants.
Mirrors. Reflective optical elements. Monoclonal antibodies. Proteins which bind to one antigenic site and are produced by a single clone of cells. Monolithic integrated circuit. A combination of passive or active "circuit elements" or both which are formed by means of diffusion processes, implantation processes or deposition processes in or on a single semi-conducting piece of material, a so-called "chip;" can be considered as indivisibly associated; and perform the function(s) of a circuit. Most immediate storage. The portion of the "main storage" most directly accessible by the central processing unit: a. For single level "main storage," the inertial storage; or b. For hierarchical "main storage:" the cache storage; the instruction stack; or the data block Motion control board. An electronic assembly of a number of electronic components (i.e., "circuit element," "discrete components," integrated circuits, etc.) connected together, specially designed to provide a computer system with the capability to coordinate simultaneously the motion of axes of machine tools for "contouring control." Multichip integrated circuit. Two or more "monolithic integrated circuits" bonded to a common "substrate." Multi-data-stream processing. The "Microprogram" or equipment architecture technique which permits simultaneous processing of two or more data sequences under the control of one or more instruction sequences by means such as: Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) architectures such as vector or array processors; Multiple Single Instruction Multiple Data (MSIMD) architectures; Multiple Instruction Multiple Data architectures, including those which are tightly coupled, closely coupled or loosely coupled; or Structured arrays of processing elements, including systolic arrays. Multilevel security. A class of system containing information with different sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization. Multiple transverse mode. Any laser whose average divergence is larger than that allowed for a "single transverse mode" laser will be considered to be multimode. Multispectral imaging sensors. Sensors capable of simultaneous or serial acquisition of imaging data from two or more discrete spectral bands. Sensors having more than 20 discrete spectral bands are sometimes referred to as hyperspectral imaging sensors. Network access controller. A physical interface to a distributed switching network. It uses a common medium which operates throughout at the same "digital transfer rate" using arbitration (e.g., token or carrier sense) for transmission. Independently from any other, it selects data packets or data groups (e.g., IEEE 802) addressed to it. It is an
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assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access. Neural computer. A computational device designed or modified to mimic the behavior or a neuron or a collection of neurons, i.e., a computational device which is distinguished by its hardware capability to modulate the weights and numbers of the interconnections of a multiplicity of computational components based on previous data. Neural networks. Computational devices designed to emulate in a simplistic manner the computational processes of the brain by utilizing a multiplexity of simple computational devices (artificial nervons) arranged in large networks that can be trained. Noble metal modified aluminide. Nickel or titanium aluminide modified with noble metals such as platinum or rhodium. Noise level. An electrical signal given in terms of power spectral density. The relation between "noise level" expressed in peak-to-peak is given by S2pp = 8No(f2 f1), where Spp is the peak to peak value of the signal (e.g., nanoteslas), No is the power spectral density [e.g., (nanotesla)2/Hz] and (f2 f1) defines the bandwidth of interest. Non-servo-controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is variable but the sequence proceeds only by the binary signal from mechanically fixed electrical binary devices or adjustable stops. Nuclear reactor. Includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come into direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core. Numerical control. The automatic control of a process performed by a device that makes use of numeric data usually introduced as the operation is in progress. (Reference: ISO 2382.) Object code (or object language). An equipment executable form of a convenient expression of one or more processes ["source code" (or source language)] which has been converted by a programming system. (See also "Source code.") Observable. The parameters (such as distance, speed, or shape) of a vehicle that can be seen optically, electronically, magnetically, acoustically, or thermally. Obscurant. A substance or radiation absorber that blocks the radiation emitted from a target, thereby preventing the continuous tracking or detection of the target. Operate autonomously. With regard to unmanned submersibles, refers to the ability of a vehicle to move between two or more known locations without the need for human intervention. Operate-through. The ability of an electronic system to function without major degradation during transient nuclear events. Optical amplification. In optical communications, an amplification technique that introduces a gain of optical signals that have been generated by a separate optical source, without conversion to electrical signals (i.e., using semiconductor optical amplifiers, optical fiber luminescent amplifiers).
Optical computer. A computer designed or modified to use light to represent data and whose computational logic elements are based on directly coupled optical devices. Optical fiber preforms. Bars, ingots, or rods of glass, plastic, or other materials which have been specially processed for use in fabricating optical fibers. The characteristics of the preform determine the basic parameters of the resultant drawn optical fibers. Optical integrated circuit. A "monolithic integrated circuit" or a "hybrid integrated circuit" containing one or more parts designed to function as a photosensor or photoemitter or to perform (an) optical or (an) electro-optical function(s). Optical switching. The routing of or switching of signals in optical form without conversion to electrical signals. O-sprey. Inert gas atomization of molten metal alloys onto a rotating collector plate resulting in a continuous production of spray-deposited billets and/or slabs which are further consolidated. Overall current density. The total number of ampere-turns in the coil (i.e., the sum of the number of turns multiplied by the maximum current carried by each turn) divided by the total cross section of the coil (comprising the superconducting filaments, the metallic matrix in which the superconducting filaments are embedded, the encapsulating material, any cooling channels, etc.). Pack cementation. Any surface modification coating or overlay coating process wherein a substrate is immersed in a powder mixture (a pack), that consists of: (1) The metallic powders that are to be deposited (usually aluminum, chromium, silicon or combinations thereof); (2) An activator (normally a halide salt); and (3) An inert powder, most frequently alumina. The substrate and powder mixture are contained within a retort which is heated to between 1,030 K (757 C) to 1,375 K (l,102 C) for sufficient time to deposit the coating. Part. Any single unassembled element of a major or a minor component, accessory, or attachment which is not normally subject to disassembly without the destruction or the impairment of design use. (Examples: Rivets, wire, bolts, etc.) (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Passive. Missile or warhead guidance by which the device homes in on the natural radiation (RF, IR, or visible) from the target. The device is autonomous, incorporating a seeker that required no external illumination of the target Peak power. Energy per pulse in joules divided by the pulse duration in seconds. Plasma spraying. Any overlay coating process wherein a gun (spray torch), which produces and controls a plasma, accepts powder or wire coating materials, melts them and propels them towards a substrate, whereon an integrally bonded coating is formed. For the purpose of this Item, plasma spraying constitutes either low pressure (less than ambient atmospheric pressure) plasma spraying or high velocity (nozzle-exit gas velocity greater than 750 meters per second calculated at 293 K at 1 atmosphere) plasma spraying carried out at atmospheric, low pressure or underwater. Polyclonal antibodies. A mixture of proteins which bind to the specific antigen and are produced by more than one clone of cells.
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Positioning accuracy. Of "numerically controlled" machine tools is to be determined and presented in accordance with ISO/DIS 230/2, paragraph 2.13, in conjunction with the requirements below: 1. Test conditions (paragraph 3): a. For 12 hours before and during measurements, the machine tools and accuracy measuring equipment will be kept at the same ambient temperature. During the premeasurement time the slides of the machine will be continuously cycled in the same manner that the accuracy measurements will be taken; b. The machine shall be equipped with any mechanical, electronic, or software compensation to be exported with the machine; c. Accuracy of measuring equipment for the measurements shall be at least 4 times more accurate than the expected machine tool accuracy; d. Power supply for slide drives shall be as follows: (1) Line voltage variation shall not be greater than 10 percent of nominal rated voltage; (2) Frequency variation shall not be greater than 2 Hz of the normal frequency; (3) Lineouts or interrupted service is not permitted. 2. Test program (paragraph 4): a. Feed rate (velocity of slides) during measurement shall be the rapid traverse rate. In case of machine tools which generate optical quality surfaces the feed rate shall be equal to or less than 50 mm per minute; b. Measurements shall be made in an incremental manner from one limit of the axis travel to the other without returning to the starting position for each move to the target position; c. Axes not being measured shall be retained at mid travel during test of an axis. Presentation of test results (paragraph 2): the results of the measurements must include: a. "Positioning accuracy" (A); and b. The mean reversal error (B).
Primary smoke. The solid particulates from the combustion of a fuel, pyrotechnic, or propellant. Metal and elemental fuels and other additives in energetic materials, or by themselves contribute significantly to primary smoke. (See "Secondary smoke.") Producibility. The elements of a design by which a product or a commodity, while meeting all of its performance objectives within the design constraints, may be produced in the shortest total time, at the lowest cost, with the most readily available materials using the most advantageous processes and assembly methods. (U.S. Army, AMC definition.) Production. All production stages, such as: product engineering, manufacture, integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, quality assurance. Progressivity. The rate of increase of the burning rate, or of the surface area, of burning propellant. (See "Propellant grain.") Proof test. The on-line or off-line production screen testing that dynamically applies a prescribed tensile stress over a 0.5 to 3 m length of fiber at a running rate of 2 to 5 m/s while passing between capstans approximately 15 cm in diameter. The ambient temperature is a nominal 293 K and relative humidity 40%. Propellant grain. A single piece of propellant, whose dimensions may vary from a few millimeters to several meters, and are known as the configuration for single grains, or the granulation for charges consisting of more than one grain. Configurations are changed to vary the exposed surface of grains and thus vary the burning surface. A grain that maintains a constant burning surface has a neutral configuration; a grain whose surface area or burning rate increases has a progressive configuration; a grain whose burning surface decreases has a degressive configuration. Public domain. See also "In the public domain." Information which is published and which is generally accessible or available to the public: (1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; (2) Through subscriptions which are available without restriction to any individual who desires to obtain or purchase the published information; (3) Through second class mailing privileges granted by the U.S. Government; (4) At libraries open to the public or from which the public can obtain documents; (5) Through patents available at any patent office; (6) Through unlimited distribution at a conference, meeting, seminar, trade show or exhibition, generally accessible to the public, in the United States; (7) Through public release (i.e., unlimited distribution) in any form (e.g., not necessarily in published form) after approval by the cognizant U.S. Government department or agency; (8) Through fundamental research in sciences and engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community. Fundamental research is defined to mean basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from research, the results of which are restricted for proprietary reasons or specific U.S. Government access and dissemination controls. University research will not be considered fundamental research if:
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Power management. Changing the transmitted power of the altimeter signal so that received power at the "aircraft" altitude is always at the minimum necessary to determine the altitude. Precision-guided munition. A munition equipped with a sensor that interacts with its aerodynamic control surfaces falls into one of the following categories "guided," "smart," or "brilliant." Precursors. Specialty chemicals used in the manufacture of military explosives. Principal element. An element is a "principal element" when its replacement value is more than 34% of the total value of the system of which it is an element. Element value is the price paid for the element by the manufacturer of the system, or by the system integrator. Total value is the normal international selling price to unrelated parties at the point of manufacture or consolidation of shipment.
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(i) The University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of scientific and technical information resulting from the project or activity, or (ii) The research is funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and dissemination controls protecting information resulting from the research are applicable. (ITAR Sec 120.11.) Pulse compression. The coding and processing of a radar signal pulse of long time duration to one of short time duration, while maintaining the benefits of high pulse energy. Pulse duration. Duration of a "laser" pulse measured at Full Width Half Intensity (FWHI) levels. Pyrophorics. See "Military Pyrotechnics." Q-switched laser. A "laser" in which the energy is stored in the population inversion or in the optical resonator and subsequently emitted in a pulse. Radar frequency agility. Any technique which changes, in a pseudo-random sequence, the carrier frequency of a pulsed radar transmitter between pulses or between groups of pulses by an amount equal to or larger than the pulse bandwidth. Radar spread spectrum. Any modulation technique for spreading energy origination from a signal with a relatively narrow frequency band, over a much wider band of frequencies, by using random or pseudo-random coding. Real-Time. (a) In solving a problem, a speed sufficient to give an answer within the actual time the problem must be solved; (b) Pertaining to the actual time during which a physical process transpires; and (c) Pertaining to the performance of a computation during the actual time that the related physical process transpires in order that results of the computation can be used in guiding the physical process. Real-time bandwidth. For "dynamic signal analyzers," the widest frequency range the analyzer can output to display or mass storage without causing any discontinuity in the analysis of the input data. For analyzers with more than one channel, the channel configuration yielding the widest "real-time bandwidth" shall be used to make the calculation. Real-time processing. The processing of data by a computer system providing a required level of service, as a function of available resources, within a guaranteed response time, regardless of the load of the system, when stimulated by an external event. Real-time spectrum analyzers. See "Dynamic signal analyzers." Receptors. Biological macromolecular structures capable of binding ligands, the binding of which affects physiological functions. Reduced smoke. A descriptor for propellants that have been tailored to produce less smoke than standard formulations of aluminum and ammonium perchlorate (see "Smoky"). They may be classified by AGARD as either class AC or BC. Repeatability. Closeness of agreement of repeated position movements to the same indicated location and under the same conditions. Required. As applied to "technology," refers to only that portion of "technology" which is peculiarly responsible for achieving or exceeding the embargoed performance levels,
characteristics or functions. Such "required" "technology" may be shared by different products. Resolution. The least increment of a measuring device; on digital instruments, the least significant bit. (Reference: ANSI B-89.1.12.) Resistive heating PVD. See "Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TEPVD)." Riot control agents. Substances which produce temporarily irritating or disabling physical effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. There is no significant risk of permanent injury and medical treatment is rarely required. Robot. A manipulation mechanism, which may be of the continuous path or of the pointto-point variety, may use sensors, and has all the following characteristics: a. Is multifunctional; b. Is capable of positioning or orienting material, parts, tools or special devices through variable movements in three dimensional space; c. Incorporates three or more closed or open loop servo-devices which may include stepping motors; and d. Has "user-accessible programmability" by means of the teach/playback method or by means of an electronic computer which may be a programmable logic controller, i.e., without mechanical intervention. N.B. The above definition does not include the following devices: 1. Manipulation mechanisms which are only manually/teleoperator controllable. 2. Fixed sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are not variable or changeable by mechanical, electronic or electrical means. 3. Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed, but adjustable stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program pattern. Variations or modifications of the program pattern (e.g., changes of pins or exchanges of cams) in one or more motion axes are accomplished only through mechanical operations. 4. Non-servo-controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is variable but the sequence proceeds only by the binary signal from mechanically fixed electrical binary devices or adjustable stops. 5. Stacker cranes defined as Cartesian coordinate manipulator systems manufactured as an integral part of a vertical array of storage bins and designed to access the contents of those bins for storage or retrieval. Rocket motor. A non-airbreathing reaction propulsion device consisting of a thrust or combustion change in which formulations of solid fuels, oxidizers, and additives are burned and expanded through an exhaust nozzle.
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Rotary atomization. A process to reduce a stream or pool of molten metal droplets to a diameter of 500 micrometers or less by centrifugal force. Run out (out-of-true running). Radial displacement in one revolution of the main spindle measured in a plane perpendicular to the spindle axis at a point on the external or internal revolving surface to be tested. (Reference: ISO 230/1-1986, paragraph 5.61). Scale factor (gyro or accelerometer). The ratio of change in output to a change in the input intended to be measured. Scale factor is generally evaluated as the slope of the straight line that can be fitted by the method of least squares to input-output data obtained by varying the input cyclically over the input range. Scanning spectrum analyzer. See "Signal analyzer." Secondary smoke. Smoke that results from the interaction of propellant or pyrot water to form droplets that condense on submicron atmospheric particles. Low temperatures, high humidity, and acid vapors, such as the HCI combustion products of ammonium perchlorate, all contribute to secondary smoke formation. Secret parameter. A constant or key kept from the knowledge of others or shared only within a group. Seeker. A device that orients a munitions sensor to survey, acquire, lock-on, and track a target. Semi-active. Missile or warhead guidance by which the target is illuminated by an auxiliary emitter (e.g., a laser or radar beam) and the missile or warhead homes in on the signal (reflection) from the target. Sensor fuzed munition. A "shoot-to-kill," "smart" munition of relatively low complexity and cost, which is most effective "close-in" against targets whose location is narrowly defined and for which there are small delivery errors. Sentient (or correlated). A descriptor for a "brilliant" munition that is aware of itself and its surroundings; for example, a brilliant munition that responds to its environment, or communicates with others among the same payload or salvo to share out the targets and maximize interception. Settling time. The time required for the output to come within one-half bit of the final value when switching between any two levels of the converter. Shared aperture optical elements. Optics that reflect a portion of the impinging radiation similarly to conventional beam splitters, however, and are composed of buried lenses or buried "gratings." Shoot-to-kill system. A sensor-fuzed munition that does not incorporate expensive seeker and guidance and control subsystems. The warhead is initiated tens of meters from the target while the munition is aimed at the target. Signal analyzer. Apparatus capable of measuring and displaying basic properties of the signal-frequency components of multi-frequency signals. Signal analyzers (dynamic). See "Dynamic signal analyzers." Signal processing The processing of externally derived information-bearing signals by algorithms such as time compression, filtering, extraction, selection, correlation,
convolutions or transformations between domains (e.g., fast Fourier transform or Walsh transform). Signature. Any or all of the properties of a gun or a rocket motor that may be used for the detection, identification, or interception of the device or its launch site. Plume signature characteristics include smoke, radiation emissions, visibility, radar absorption, self absorption, etc. Significant military equipment. Articles for which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability. (ITAR Sec 120.7.) Single-transverse mode. Any laser whose average beam divergence measured on any two orthogonal axes is equal to or less than 3.45 times the wavelength, divided by the aperture diameter along that axis for the angle containing 84% of the beam energy will be considered a single transverse mode laser. Slurry deposition. A surface modification coating or overlay coating process wherein a metallic or ceramic powder with an organic binder is suspended in a liquid and is applied to a substrate by either spraying, dipping or painting, subsequent air or oven drying, and heat treatment to obtain the desired coating. Smart materials. Materials that have the capability to respond to external stimulus, by changing their energy dissipation properties and geometric configuration, or stiffness in a controlled manner according to prescribed functional relationships or control algorithms. Smart munition. A "many-on-many" munition with a minimal target selection capability that does not require an operator in the loop. There are two prime categories; terminally guided ("hit-to-kill"), and sensor fuzed ("shoot-to-kill"). Smoky. A particular term used to describe rocket and missile propellants with high aluminum and ammonium perchlorate contents. An AOARB class CC composition. Software. (1) A set of computer programs, procedures and associated documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing system, e.g., compilers, library routines, manuals and circuit diagrams. (Joint Pub 1.02.) (2) Includes, but is not limited to, the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems and support software for design, implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair. (ITAR Sec 121.8(f).) (The Wassenaar Arrangement.) Solidify rapidly. Solidification of molten material at cooling rates exceeding 1,000 K/sec. Solids loading. The percentage of particulate matter in the total weight/volume of a propellant composition or grain. The solids loading attainable for a given fuel-oxidizer particulate composition depends on the binder and additives used to form a grain. Missile propellants are commonly rated in terms of a weight percentage; gun propellants in terms of a volume percentage. Source Code. A convenient expression of one or more processes which may be turned by a programming system into equipment executable form ("object code" or object language). (The Wassenaar Arrangement.) Spacecraft. Active and passive satellites and space probes.
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Space qualified. Products designed, manufactured and tested to meet the social electrical, mechanical or environmental requirements for use in the launch and deployment of satellites or high altitude flight systems operating at altitudes of l00 km or higher, Spatial light modulators. Optical devices that dynamically modulate the spatial distribution of the amplitude or phase of an incident light waveform across an aperture in either a transmissive or reflective mode of operation under the control of an electronic or optical signal. "Spatial light modulators" are also known as non-linear adaptive optics. Specific impulse. The thrust developed in burning unit weight of a propellant, corrected for standard operating and discharge pressure. Specific impulse may be measured, or estimated theoretically from the thermochemical properties of propellant formulations and their decomposition products. Specific modulus. Youngs modulus in pascals, equivalent to N/m2; (lb force/sq in.) divided by specific weight in N/m3; (lb force/cu in.) measured at temperature of (296 2 K; (23 2) C) and a relative humidity of (50 5)%. Specific tensile strength. Ultimate tensile strength in pascals, equivalent to N/m2 (lb force/sq in.) divided by specific weight in N/m3 (lb force/cu in.) measured at a temperature of (296 2) K and a relative humidity of (50 5)%. Spectral efficiency. A figure of merit parameterized to characterize the efficiency of transmission system which uses complex modulation schemes such as QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation), Trellis coding, QSPK (Q-phased shift key), etc. It is defined as follows: Spectral efficiency = "Digital transfer rate" (bits/second) 6 dB spectrum bandwidth (Hz) Spherical Error Probable or Sphere of Equal Probability (SEP). A measure of accuracy at a specific range, expressed in terms of the radius of a sphere, centered on the target, in which 50% of the payloads impact. Splat quenching. A process to "solidify rapidly" a molten metal stream impinging upon a chilled block, forming a flake-like product. Spread spectrum. The technique whereby energy in a relatively narrow-band communication channel is spread over a much wider energy spectrum. Spread spectrum (radar). See "Radar spread spectrum." Sputter deposition. An overlay coating process based on a momentum transfer phenomenon, wherein positive ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting Ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on an appropriately positioned substrate. Sputtering. An overlay coating process wherein positively charged ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on the substrate. N.B. Triode, magnetron or radio frequency sputtering to increase adhesion of coating and rate of deposition are ordinary modifications of the process.
Stabilizers. Substances used in explosive formulations to improve their shelf life. Stability. Standard deviation (1 sigma) of the variation of a particular parameter from its calibrated value measured under stable temperature conditions. This can be expressed as a function of time. Stacker cranes. Cartesian coordinate manipulator systems manufactured as an integral part of a vertical array of storage bins and designed to access the contents of those bins for storage or retrieval. Stored program control. A control using instructions stored in an electronic storage which a processor can execute in order to direct the performance of predetermined functions. Strong mechanical bond. In solid rocket motors, the requirement to have a bond between the rocket propellant and the motor casing that is equal to or greater than the tensile strength of the propellant. Substrate. A sheet of base material with or without an interconnection pattern and on which or within which "discrete components" or integrated circuits or both can be located. Substrate blanks. Monolithic compounds with dimensions suitable for the production of optical elements such as mirrors or optical windows. Sufficient technology. Technology required for a proliferant to barely enable the production of the Selected Weapons of Mass Destruction or Means of Delivery. Superalloys. Nickel-, Cobalt- or Iron-Base alloys having strengths superior to any alloys in the AISI 300 series at temperatures of 922 K (649 C) under severe environmental and operating conditions. Superconductive. Materials (i.e., metals, alloys or compounds) which can lose all electrical resistance (i.e., which can attain infinite electrical conductivity) and carry very large electrical currents without Joule heating. Super high power laser (SHPL). A "laser" capable of delivering (the total or any portion of) the output energy exceeding 1 kJ within 50 ms or having an average or CW power exceeding 20 kW. Superplastic forming. A deformation process using heat for metals that are normally characterized by low values of elongation (less than 20%) at the breaking point as determined at room temperature by conventional tensile strength testing, in order to achieve elongations during processing which are at least 2 times those values. Swept frequency network analyzers. Involves the automatic measurement of equivalent circuit parameters over a range of frequencies, involving swept frequency measurement techniques but not continuous wave point-to-point measurements. Switch fabric. That hardware and associated "software" which provides the physical or virtual connection path for in-transit message traffic being switched.
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Synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH). A digital hierarchy providing a means to manage, multiplex and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on different types of media. The format is based on the Synchronous Transport Module (STM) which is defined by CCITT Recommendation G.703, G.708, G.709 and other yet to be published. The first level rate of "SDH" is 155.52 Mbit/s. Synchronous optical network (SONET). A network providing a means to manage, multiplex and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on fiber optics. The format is the North America version of "SDH" and also uses the Synchronous Transport Module (STM). However, it uses the Synchronous Transport Signal (STS) as the basic transport module with a first level rate of 51.81 Mbit/s. The SONET standards are being integrated into those of "SDH." System. A combination of end-items, components, parts, accessories, attachments, firmware or software, specifically designed, modified or adapted to operate together to perform a specialized military function. (ITAR Sec 121.8.) Systems, equipment, subassemblies and components. Critical element E in the MCTL which includes end items generically controlled because they contain critical technologies and either have intrinsic military use or contain extractable critical technology, and items controlled for purposes of proliferation. Systems tracks. Processed, correlated (fusion of radar target data to flight plan position) and updated aircraft flight position report available to the Air Traffic Control center controllers. Systolic array computer. A computer where the flow and modification of the data are dynamically controllable at the logic gate level by the user. Tear gases. Gases which produce temporarily irritating or disabling effects which disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. Technical assistance. May take forms such as instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. N.B. "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data." Technical data. May take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. (EAR Part 772). Technical data is defined as: (1) Information, other than software [described in (4) below], which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions and documentation. (2) Classified information relating to defense articles and defense services; (3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; (4) Software directly related to defense articles; (5) This definition does not include information concerning general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges and universities or information in the public domain. It also does not include basic
marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles. (ITAR Sec 120.10.) Technologies for weapons of mass destruction. Technologies required for development, integration or employment of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and their manned and unmanned means of delivery. Technology. Specific information and know-how necessary for the development, production or use of a product. This includes the hardware and software necessary to achieve that purpose. Terminal interface equipment. Equipment at which information enters or leaves the telecommunication system, e.g., telephone, data device, computer, facsimile device. Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TE-PVD). An overlay coating process conducted in a vacuum with a pressure less than 0.1 Pa wherein a source of thermal energy is used to vaporize the coating material. This process results in the condensation, or deposition, of the evaporated species onto appropriately positioned substrates. The addition of gases to the vacuum chamber during the coating process to synthesize compound coatings is an ordinary modification of the process. The use of ion or electron beams, or plasma, to activate or assist the coatings deposition is also a common modification in this technique. The use of monitors to provide in-process measurement of optical characteristics and thickness of coatings can be a feature of these processes. Specific TE-PVD processes are as follows: (1) Electron Beam PVD uses an electron beam to heat and evaporate the material which forms the coating; (2) Resistive Heating PVD employs electrically resistive heating sources capable of producing a controlled and uniform flux of evaporated coating species; (3) "Laser" Evaporation uses either pulsed or continuous wave "laser" beams to heat the material which forms the coating; (4) Cathodic Arc Deposition employs a consumable cathode of the material which forms the coating and has an arc discharge established on the surface by a momentary contact of a ground trigger. Controlled motion of arcing erodes the cathode surface creating a highly ionized plasma. The anode can be either a cone attached to the periphery of the cathode, through an insulator, or the chamber. Substrate biasing is used for non line-of-sight deposition. Three-dimensional vector rate. The number of vectors generated per second which have 10 pixel poly line vectors, clip tested, randomly oriented, with either integer or floating point X-Y-Z coordinate values (whichever produces the maximum rate). Thrust. The force that propels a body; or the rate of change of momentum of a burning propellant. Tilting spindle. A tool-holding spindle which alters, during the machining process, the angular position of its center line with respect to any other axis. Time constant. The time taken from the application of a line stimulus for the current increment to reach a value of 1-1/e times the final value (i.e., 63% of the final value).
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Total digital transfer rate. The number of bits, including line coding, overhead and so forth per unit time passing between corresponding equipment in a digital transmission system. (See also "Digital transfer rate.") Transfer laser. A "laser" to produce a continuous output at all wavelengths over a range of several "laser" transitions. A line selectable "laser" produces discrete wavelengths within one "laser" transition and is not considered "tunable." Tunable. The ability of a "laser" to produce a continuous output at all wavelengths over a range of several "laser" transitions. A line selectable "laser" produces discrete wavelengths within one "laser" transition and is not considered "tunable." Turnkey plant. As defined in this section, consists of all the hardware, software, technical data, and technical assistance necessary for the installation of a complete operating facility for the production of the commodity, a chemical substance, at defined production rates and to specified product qualities. Hardware consists of all the equipment, components, control valves, instruments, reaction vessels, feed lines, and exposition proof barriers necessary for the conduct of the unit operations of the overall production process, whether the items are assembled or disassembled for transportation. The plant may be designed for installation at a prepared site that includes locally constructed and installed explosion proof barricades. Two-dimensional vector rate. The number of vectors generated per second which have 10 pixel poly line vectors, clip tested, randomly oriented, with either integral floating point X-Y coordinate values (whichever produces the maximum rate). Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233. Uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233, or both, in the amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is more than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature (isotopic ratio: 0.72%). Use. Operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul and refurbishing. User-accessible programmability. The facility allowing a user to insert, modify or replace "programs" by means other than: a physical change in wiring or interconnections; or the setting of function controls including entry of parameters. Vacuum atomization. A process to reduce a molten stream of metal to droplets of a diameter of 500 micrometers or less by the rapid evolution of a dissolved gas upon exposure to a vacuum. Variable geometry airfoils. Use trailing edge flaps or tabs, or leading edge slats or pivoted nose droop, the position of which can be controlled in flight. Vector rate. See "Two dimensional vector rate" and/or "Three dimensional vector rate." Vehicle management system (VMS). A vehicle control system characterized by a high degree of physical and functional integration of manual and automatic flight controls, propulsion controls, and airframe utility subsystem controls. Weapons of mass destruction technologies. Technologies used in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Weapons Systems Technologies (WST). Technologies critical to the development and production of superior weapons.
B-14
INTRODUCTION
A.
OVERVIEW OF THE 1996 DoD MCTL
The 1996 DoD MCTL is a documented snapshot in time of the ongoing DoD MCTL process. It is designed to be more precise and more userfriendly than previous editions. This is accomplished through the use of graphic format and display of technical data in tabular form. The technologies included in the DoD MCTL support the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) objectives to: Maintain near perfect real-time knowledge of the enemy and communicate to all forces in near real-time; Engage regional forces promptly in decisive combaton a global basis, Employ a range of capabilities more suitable to actions at the lower end of the full range of military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage, Control the use of space, and Counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction and future ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to the CONUS and deployed forces.
Materials and Production Nuclear Systems Marine Systems Power and Propulsion Sensors and Navigation Signature Control Space Systems Weapons Effects and Countermeasures
During the MCTL Process the TWGs reviewed over 6000 technologies related to defense weapons systems and identified 2060 militarily significant technologies that provide measurable advantage to US military systems or enhance threats posed by potential adversaries. Information on these technologies was incorporated into an electronic data base. The TWGs analyzed these significant technologies and nominated 656 which met the "militarily critical criteria" for inclusion in the MCTL Part I.
MCTL 2060 Significant Technologies Technologies Entered into Data Base Data Base Part I 656 656 Technologies Selected as Militarily Critical
B.
MCTL DEVELOPMENT
To support the MCTL Process the fifteen (15) Technology Working Groups (TWGs), shown below, were established. Aeronautics Systems Advanced Weapons Systems Chemical and Biological Systems Conventional Weapons Systems Electronics and Countermeasures Ground Systems Information Systems
Reviewed Over 6000 Over 6000 Defense Defense Related Technologies
C.
ORGANIZATION OF THE MCTL, PART I, WEAPONS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY (WST)
Part I contains eighteen (18) sections, each devoted to a specific technology area. Each section introduction contains: An overview of the technology area identifying: The technology areas that contain militarily critical technologies Selected technology areas for which militarily critical technologies have not been identified A graphic showing the relationships to other technology areas with respect to supporting technologies and technology trends A rationale statement expressing why the technologies are important to US military forces. A foreign technology assessment (FTA) with accompanying figure, providing summary estimates of foreign capabilities. These estimates are expert judgments by the TWGs and compare foreign nation capabilities to US militarily critical technology areas (see paragraph E below).
Part I contains four appendices: Appendix A provides a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations used in Part I Appendix B contains definitions of words and phrases contained in Part I Appendix C contains an index of key words and phrases referenced to the subsection of text in Part I where used Appendix D contains an explanation of the contents of the columns in the table together with an example.
D.
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Systems integration was carefully studied by each of the TWGs during their deliberations. Although the TWGs considered integration to be key to the superiority of US weapons systems, specific militarily critical technologies that capture the integration issue could not be identified. The paragraphs below discuss the significance of systems integration to US weapons systems. Systems integration enables the harmonious and productive working of disparate components and the interfaces that connect them. Integration is key to understanding the implications of technology and product release decisions. Each weapons system requires the use of specific hardware and software and the integration of new technologies or advances in existing technology subsets to increase overall system performance, improve manufacturing or reduce costs. Systems integration is an ongoing process. Good integration includes traceable assurances that the components and functions will fit together and operate in concert. In the past, weapons systems designers have successfully improved both the hardware and software in an interactive process, and then integrated both to effect simultaneous improvements. Excessive integration adds cost and time without yielding a significant improvement in the product or system. Too little integration results in products or systems that do not function as advertised. Technology integration can be treated as a subset of systems integration. High technology weapons systems are fundamentally driven by availability and integration of technologies. Successful technology integration produces superior systems. The tools and techniques for preparing, mixing and matching the various components are also critical technologies because they are key to achieving the desired capabilities. 2
Each of the sections is divided into technology subsections. Each subsection contains information directly related to the technology being treated, including: An overview identifying: The technologies covered in the subsections, The militarily critical technologies, and In graphic form, the characteristics that make the technology militarily critical and a listing of the military systems the technology area benefits;
A rationale statement expressing why the technologies are important to US military forces, Tables that present data on militarily critical technologies (see Appendix D), and A foreign technology assessment (FTA) providing a summary of other nations' capabilities in this technology area.
E.
INFORMATION WARFARE
F.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Recent military operations have defined and recognized related information fields as a new form of warfare. The 1996 MCTL is the first opportunity in which to include information warfare as a separate technology section. The decision as to which technology areas and technologies to be included under information warfare is continually being addressed by the various components of DoD. An official definition of Information Warfare (see Section 9) has been approved and will be included in Joint Publication 102, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. It is recognized that the four technology areas discussed in MCTL Part I, Section 9, address only those areas formerly known as electronic warfare or electronic combat (1992 MCTL Section 6.4). Other technology areas, to include deception and psychological warfare, were not included because militarily critical technologies were not identified. These two areas will be discussed in MCTL Part III "Critical Developing Technologies." Other areas suggested by some users as belonging under information warfare are currently covered in other technology sections; e.g. information (cryptographic) security; networks, switching and computers in Section 8; sensors in Section 15; and signature control in Section 16.
The MCTL process produces estimates of the general status of foreign capabilities in each of the MCTL technology areas. These estimates are called Foreign Technology Assessments (FTA). These FTA estimates are the scientific and technological consensus of the Technical Working Group (TWG) members from industry, government and academia. Collaboration with the Intelligence Community is an essential part of the FTA determination and selected members of the Intelligence Community are TWG members who participate regularly in the MCTL process. These MCTL FTAs are foreign capability assessments and do not constitute findings of foreign availability, which are the responsibility of the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act. Tables containing summaries of the general status of foreign capabilities appear at the beginning of each of the eighteen MCTL major technology area sections. In the MCTL FTA summary tables, the level of sophistication in foreign capabilities is represented by one, two, three or four blocks, four being the highest. Four blocks indicate that the country is believed to have capabilities in all critical elements of a technology area; three blocks, that the country is believed to have a capability in a majority of the technology area critical elements; two, a capability in some critical elements; and one, a capability in only a limited set of the critical elements, as the table legends indicate. No block indicates that the TWG knows of no capability within a country or was unable to reach a consensus regarding the capability.
SECTION 1 - AERONAUTICS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
1.1 1.2 1.3
Aircraft, Fixed Wing .......................................... 1-3 Gas Turbine Engines.......................................... 1-5 Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces ......................... 1-7 SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 1.0-1) The technologies presented in this section are those associated with aircraft, aero gas turbine engines and the interface of humans with the aeronautics systems. These are deemed critical to maintaining the overall superiority of US air forces vis-a vis potential adversaries on land, sea and air. The technologies of concern relate to the design, integration and manufacture of systems, subsystems and components that provide for the production of operational weapons systems. Many technologies in military aviation systems are shared with and are used by commercial aviation. However, those addressed in this section have been selected in light of the unique operational performance envelopes of military systems. These include hostile environments, severe performance requirements, and the need for rapid analysis and response to hostile situations by the operators of the combat platform. Rationale The US traditionally provides military aviation systems of high value, performance and durability. In most situations short of total nuclear war, military aviation systems represent the key means to rapidly project firepower against an adversary in the air and on land and sea. Most aeronautical design, integration and manufacturing technologies can be used by both military and commercial aviation. In reality, many developed and funded by the military are in fact, first employed by civil aviation. However, the technologies selected in this section represent those that allow the US to achieve and maintain dominance over adversaries in combat environments. Electromagnetic radiation hardening technologies allow for operation in severe nuclear and electronic environments. Propulsion/flight control systems integration allows for maximum flight performance of an airborne weapons platform in a combat environment. The gas
turbine technologies provide the ability for the power plants to sustain the high duty cycle rates and higher thrust-to-weight ratios which result in improved performance. These parameters allow for higher combat loads, range, time on station or other benefits as required for a specific mission. The technologies listed are also necessary for the high levels of reliability, serviceability and survivability necessary in military systems. The military pilot and crew, in combat, are faced with the need for rapid situation analysis and response. Information displays and appropriate response mechanisms can be effected through helmet mounted functions in addition to hand and foot operated actuations.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Electronic Systems Information Systems Sensors & Lasers Power Systems Materials AERONAUTICS Missiles
SYSTEMS
TREND
Agile Stealthy Lighter Miniaturized Combat Survivable Value

Figure 1.0-1. Aeronautics Systems Overview
1-1
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 1.0-2) Most of the nations which have military combat aircraft follow the technological approaches and philosophies of either the US, Russia, or of a small number of other producers such as France and Sweden. In the area of electromagnetic radiation hardening technologies, much of the basic knowledge of shielding is known or available to all. It is resident in trade journals and also in technology transfer programs. The concept of engine/flight control system integration is also known but the US clearly leads in implementation. Gas turbine engine technology is also widely dispersed, with Russia leading for many years in compressor design. Today the US is slightly ahead due to analysis capability with UK, Russia, France, Germany and Japan close behind. German strength also applies to the accessories that are needed for high performance surface vehicle systems. The UK, Canada, France, and Germany are close behind the US in human (crew) systems interface. The US maintains the lead in the integration of aeronautics technologies into reliable, functional and producible systems.
Country
1.1 Aircraft Fixed Wing
1.2 Gas Turbine Engines
1.3 Human (Crew) Systems
Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Spain Sweden UK US
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities:
All
Majority
Some
Limited
Figure 1.0-2.
Aeronautics Systems FTA Summary
1-2
SECTION 1.1
AIRCRAFT, FIXED WING

Aircraft, Fixed Wing
Overview (See Figure 1.1-1) This subsection addresses two technologies that are key to mission success of military aircraft, be they fixed or rotary wing, manned or unmanned. The first technology is associated with operation in high energy release environments in both conventional and nuclear battlefield arenas. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation effects caused by conventional and nuclear blasts will destroy a military air vehicle's operational and mission related electronic equipment if they are not properly designed, integrated and protected. The technologies of interest, in electromagnetic radiation hardening, are those related to the design, integration, component selection and shielding of critical components. The second area relates to those technologies associated with the integration of the engine control system with the airframe flight control system in order to achieve optimal performance. Rationale (See Table 1.1-1) The two militarily critical areas listed are those that are distinctly unique to military operations and are required for successful mission accomplishment. All combat vehicles need the application of hardening technologies for protection against various forms of high energy electromagnetic waves, both pulsed and continuous wave. These can be generated by nuclear blasts or high powered transmitters. The key technology lies not only in the shielding of electronic components but also in the part selection, testing and placement within the subsystem or system. Much of this knowledge has been acquired in the space applications and is readily transferable to the harsh environment of combat aircraft. The ever increasing US reliance on electromagnetic and electrooptical technologies for combat systems requires the preservation of leading edge hardening integration technologies for survival and mission success. The integration of the engine control system with the airframe flight control system allows the vehicle to perform safely at the extremes of its structural and performance parameters without exceeding control and structural stress limits. This can only be accomplished by fully automating the engine and flight control systems responses to pilot or other directed input. The two technologies must be integrated so that they work together to enable the dominance of US combat aircraft in all combat environments. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 1.0-2) Hardening technology has been associated with protection from nuclear weapons effects for some time by many countries. For aircraft application these include Russia,

Performance Range Payload Endurance Manufacturing Technology Integration Technology

Manned Combat Aircraft Unmanned Combat Aircraft Non Combat Aircraft
Figure 1.1-1.
Aircraft, Fixed Wing Overview
UK, France, Germany, and other countries that have nuclear weapons or even nuclear power capability. Many applications are protected on a brute force basis using shielding. However, this can often result in adding undesirable weight and size additions and also heat transfer considerations. The US leads in this field by the strong integration background because of the space program and the superior computational capability which allows optimization of design. The US and its traditional allies (UK, Germany) lead in the development and application of integrated automated flight and engine control systems. While the US leads all in the integration of the two controls, the UK has the critical technology for parts thereof.
1-3
Table 1.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION
HARDENING TECHNOLOGIES
Aircraft, Fixed Wing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Anechoic chambers; High power, wide band RF Sources UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Algorithms, CAD/CAE tools, source code, automatic verification and validation tools containing actual design values for detection of multiple, correlated soft faults in FCS computers for military application. EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 3A, B, D, E WA Cat 4A, B, D, E WA Cat 5A, B, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E CCL Cat 4A, B, D, E CCL Cat 5A, B, D, E WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Hardened against peak free field intensities external to the vehicle of greater than 17,000 V/m or box-level intensities of 225 V/m (e.g., Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse, Radar, High Frequency Broadcast and High Power Microwave)
PROPULSION/AIRFRAME/FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM INTEGRATION
Equivalent time delay of < 50 milliseconds; Loop gain margin > 6.0, phase margin > 45 degrees; bandwidth > 2.5 Hz; Cooper-Harper rating < 3, minimize wetted area and minimize observables; Aircraft loss rate per flight from FCS failures < 1 x 105
None identified
Pilot-in-the-loop simulators; Ground and flight testing of prototype systems.
Dynamic 6 degrees of freedom computer simulation models; CAD/CAE development software; Verification and validation tools containing actual design, fault tolerant and diagnostic parameters
1-4
SECTION 1.2
GAS TURBINE ENGINES
Overview (See Figure 1.2-1) Gas turbine engine technologies in this subsection cover the hot section of the engine, which includes the combustor and the turbine (power takeoff) subsections; integration of full authority digital engine control (FADEC) to real time interface with the aircraft flight control computer; and certain accessories applied to marine and armored vehicle power. In the combustor section, thermally decoupled liners allow operation at higher temperatures which result in increased performance (thrust-to-weight ratio) and longer life. Multiple domed combustors provide the capability of optimizing fuel use during different power settings to improve efficiency, reduce emissions and allow shorter length. The metallurgical structure of the blades necessary for proper performance at high temperatures and stresses is achieved through the manufacture of single crystal castings with internal cooling sections for both the turbine blades and the stationary vanes. The technology associated with the intercoolers and recuperators provides the increased power densities in gas turbines used in non-flight applications. Rationale (See Table 1.2-1) Efficient, reliable, and flexible propulsion systems provide US combat vehicles with the performance edge to achieve superiority in military operations. Thermally decoupled combustor liners extend the combustor life through their increased ability to withstand thermal gradients, hot streaks and non-uniform temperature patterns and provide the higher operating temperatures needed for increased efficiency and power output. Multiple domed combustors allow higher cycle operating temperatures, lower emissions and shorter length thereby improving fuel efficiency and increasing combustor life. Attaching turbine blades by advanced bonding techniques eliminates the mechanical joint and permits a lighter weight component with improved life, improved thrust-to-weight performance as well as extending time between overhauls. The manufacturing technology to produce small, precise holes in superalloys at small oblique angles is critical to the film cooling in turbine airfoils and permits operation at temperatures in excess of 1643 Kelvin. Single crystal casting of turbine airfoils provides for increased load carrying capability, improved low cycle fatigue life, improved oxidation resistance, and stress rupture life and results in increased operating temperature with no change in cooling geometry. FADEC technology is critical in that the requirements to regulate engine power and efficiency by manipulating the attendant variables (sensed parameters, specified schedules, control logic) coupled with mission requirements are so complex that they can no longer be accomplished by hydromechanical systems in advanced fighter aircraft. The integration of this capability with the flight control computer(s) is necessary to achieve required mission success. Finally, the technologies for intercoolers and recuperators for non-flight gas turbines provide large benefits in fuel consumption in military operations for both marine and ground combat vehicles.
Gas Turbine Engines

High Temperature Turbines Cooled Blades and Vanes Single Crystal Castings Thermally Decoupled Combustors Integrated FADEC

Fighter/Attack Aircraft Combat Helicopters UAVs Transport/Utility Aircraft Marine Vessels Armored Vehicles
Figure 1.2-1.
Gas Turbine Engines Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 1.0-2) The technologies listed in this section are led by the US. However, some limited capabilities in these areas are resident in Russia, Europe and some Asian countries. The US is a world leader in the area of advanced combustor and turbine technologies, followed closely by the UK and then France. The UK and France have demonstrated good hole drilling techniques for turbine blades. Russia has attempted to gain a lead in drilling techniques, but generally these have lesser quality and geometrical precision. In addition, Russia has not demonstrated good capabilities for the manufacture of complex cooling passages on their turbine blades. The US holds a critical edge in the integration of FADEC and flight control systems; however, both the UK and France are producing FADECs and have some success with the integration of FADEC with flight controls. No other countries have been successful with the integration of flight and engine controls. Many different countries now use FADEC, but the actual FADEC is produced primarily in the US, UK and France. Germany is still a world leader in the area of recuperation and intercooling for non-flight gas turbine engines.
1-5
Table 1.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY COMBUSTOR: THERMALLY
DECOUPLED LINERS
Gas Turbine Engines Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Production equipment for producing porous wall material; high temperature combustor material UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E WA CAT 9D, E CCL CAT 9D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Combustors operating at average burner outlet temperatures exceeding 1,811 K (1538 C) (2800 F)
COMBUSTOR; MULTIPLE DOMED
Average burner outlet temperatures exceeding 1,811 K (1538 C) (2800 F)
None identified
None identified
None identified
BLADE ATTACHMENT BY DIFFUSION Bond strength at least 100% of either of the BONDING, PRESSURE BONDING, LINEAR bonded parts. FRICTION/INERTIAL WELDING.
None identified
Equipment to achieve and insure viable bonds.
None identified
TURBINE: BLADES AND VANES WITH
Hole depths greater than 4 times the diameter,
None identified
COOLING PASSAGES PRODUCED BY with diameters less than 0.76 mm and incidence LASER, WATER JET, OR ECM/EDM angles equal to or less than 25 ; or hole depths HOLE DRILLING PROCESSES TO ALLOW > 5 diameter, diameters < 0.4 mm FOR AIR FILM COOLING
Equipment to use the various technologies None identified to achieve hole initiation with the desired entrance and exit hole geometric and metallurgical characteristics.
TURBINE: SINGLE CRYSTAL CAST
Single crystal alloys having (in the < 001 > exceeding 400 hours at 1273 K (1,000 C) at a stress of 200 MPa, based on the average property values.
None identified
COOLED TURBINE BLADES AND VANES. Miller Index Direction) a stress rupture life
Casting cores and shells; None identified Ceramic core manufacturing equipment, leaching apparatus, ceramic core wax pattern preparation equipment, and ceramic shell burnout or firing equipment. None identified High speed computer models; CAD development software
FULL AUTHORITY DIGITAL ENGINE CONTROL (FADEC) SYSTEMS WITH REAL TIME INTERFACE WITH A/C FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER. VARIABLE GEOMETRY ENGINES
INCORPORATING INTERCOOLERS AND/OR RECUPERATORS IN MARINE APPLICATIONS.
Equivalent time delay of < 50 milliseconds; None identified Loop gain margin > 3.0, phase margin > 45 degrees, bandwidth > 1.5 Hz; Engine loss rate per flight from engine control failures < 1 10-5 Marine GTEs with ISO rating of 24,245 kW None identified (32,500 Hp) or more and SFC < 0.219 kg/kW-hr (0.360 lb/hp-hr) in range of 35100 percent ISO standard continuous power.
None identified
None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 WA CAT 9A, B, D, E USML VIII CCL CAT 9A, B, D, E
1-6
SECTION 1.3
HUMAN (CREW) SYSTEMS INTERFACES
Overview (See Figure 1.3-1) This subsection covers all the interactive mechanisms between a crew member and the vehicle he is operating or operates in. Many of the items in the broad category are truly dual use in commercial spacecraft, aircraft, watercraft and ground vehicles. The technology includes the utilization of human factor data bases to match the human physiological requirements to the sensing of information and the subsequent interactions taken with machinery, computers, etc. The militarily critical portion of this area resides in the technologies associated with helmet mounted displays and the ability to cause interactions with some of the mission equipment through the use of the helmet capabilities. An example would be the pointing of a weapon being coupled with the helmet position of a helicopter weapons operator. Such helmet mounted capabilities are unique to the successful military mission accomplishment. The technologies also include the integration of display capabilities in a high resolution yet lightweight, low power (low heat generating) mode that will not restrict or fatigue the user. Rationale (See Table 1.3-1) Technologies supporting helmet mounted displays for vehicle crews are having a significant impact on improving the effectiveness of capabilities of combat platforms and their weapons systems. Providing vital tactical situation information along with weapons system readiness data in a single location, which does not require the operator to lose valuable time to acquire same from multiple sources, increases mission effectiveness in those moments of extreme stress. Rapid access to Command, Control and Communications data significantly increases operator ability to quickly respond to changing combat situations. The fusion of this data with mission sensor data in an optimal manner improves the operator's moment-tomoment situational awareness. This is critical to the selection of defensive and/or offensive actions necessary for dominance over the adversary. Finally, the Table 1.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY PILOTS/ FLIGHT CREW HELMET MOUNTED DISPLAYS
Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces

High Resolution Display Integrated Display System

Helicopter Gun Ship Crew Station Armored Vehicles Combat Aircraft (Fixed Wing) Heads-Up Display System
Figure 1.3-1.
Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces Overview
ability to couple the visual displays with the weapons position and orientation tracking adds to the crewman's ability to actuate mechanisms without having to release hand or foot controls. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 1.0-2) Some critical element capability resides within the UK, Germany, France, and Japan for combat flight crew display systems.
Human (Crew) Systems Interfaces Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 15, 21, 22 USML XXI
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Light Weight,(1-2 pounds), High resolution HDTV ABV, Color 16 bit.
1-7
SECTION 3 - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

Rationale Although the development, production, acquisition, and retention of chemical and biological weapons is prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (when it enters into force) and the Biological Weapons Convention, respectively, some countries will defer signing these treaties and others will probably abrogate their commitments, thus adding to the threat of proliferation. US forces must be able to detect toxic agents and avoid the threat or defend themselves against use of chemical and biological agents when avoidance is impossible. While technologies that are used to produce threat agents are not essential to US offensive superiority, their manufacture is important to maintain US superiority in countermeasures.
3.1 3.2
Chemical and Biological Defense Systems ................. 3-6 Detection, Warning, and Identification...................... 3-8
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 3.0-1) This section addresses technologies for: Bioprocessing; Chemical Manufacturing; Chemical and Biological Defense Systems; Detection, Warning and Identification; Battlefield Environment; and Human Factors. The technology areas identified in the above box contain militarily critical technologies. The other technology areas do not currently include technologies that are militarily critical. The Chemical and Biological Defense Systems section includes technologies that are designed to protect forces when contamination cannot be avoided and provide prophylaxis and therapy from threat agents to any affected forces. These Chemical and Biological Defense Systems technologies also cover decontamination to ensure rapid force reconstitution. Detection, Warning and Identification technologies covered in this section can provide real-time capability to detect, identify, locate, and quantify chemical and biological threats. Sensors must be integrated with an information processing system to analyze the threat, identify potentially affected units, and pass on alarms and warnings to implement protective measures. Both detection and protection apply to personnel operating on the ground, at sea, in the air, and in shelters and large enclosures. Although many sensor and defense technologies have commercial applications, military requirements are much more stringent. Selected toxic chemicals and biological agents which are of concern for defense and detection are presented in tabular form (see Figures 3.0-3 and 3.0-4). Toxic chemicals are extracted from the Chemical Weapons Convention. Biological agents are extracted from the Australia Group list.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Biotechnology Manufacturing Information Systems Sensors
CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
TREND
Detection Equipment Protective Clothing Protective Measures
Figure 3.0-1.
Chemical and Biological Systems Overview
3-1
Country
3.1 Chemical and Biological Defe nse Systems
3.2 Detection, Warning a nd Identification
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 3.0-2) Many nations have the capability to use chemical agents in warfare. Approximately 25 are believed to have or recently have had some offensive chemical agent capability. As Third World countries develop their indigenous chemical industries, this number is likely to increase. Research in the detection and warning of the use of chemical agents and the means to protect against their use is extensive. Potential biological threat agents are available in many culture collections and research organizations worldwide. Biotechnical knowledge is primarily open source. Manufacturing facilities able to support a biological warfare program are as widespread as are the number of commercial facilities for the pharmaceutical, agriculture, and food industries. Nations that are most advanced in Chemical and Biological Defense Systems technologies include Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, Sweden and the UK. The Netherlands and Switzerland join the above list as countries with significant capabilities in technologies associated with Detection, Warning and Identification.
Bulgaria Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Korea, N. Korea, S. Netherlands Pakistan Polan d Russia Serbia Swed en Switzerland Syria Taiwan UK Ukraine US
LEGE ND: Critical Technologies Capabilitie s: A ll Majority Some Limited
Figure 3.0-2.
Chemical and Biological Systems FTA Summary
3-2
Figure 3.0-3. Viruses V1. V2. V3. V4. V5. V6. V7. V8. V9. V10. V11. V12. V13. V14. Chikungunya virus Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus Dengue fever virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus Ebola virus Hantaan virus Junin virus Lassa fever virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Machupo virus Marburg virus Monkey pox virus Rift Valley fever virus Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus) Variola virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Western equine encephalitis virus White pox Yellow fever virus Japanese encephalitis virus
Australia Group Biological/Toxin Warfare Agents Bacteria B1. B2. B3. B4. B5. B6. B7. B8. B9. B10. B11. B11. B13. Bacillus anthracis Brucella abortus Brucella melitensis Brucella suis Chlamydia psittaci Clostridium botulinum Francisella tularensis Burkholderia mallei (pseudomonas mallei) Burkholderia pseudomallei (pseudomonas pseudomallei) Salmonella typhi Shigella dysenteriae Vibrio cholerae Yersinia pestis T1. T2. T3. T4. T5. T6. T7. T8. T9. T10. Toxins Botulinum toxins Clostridium perfringens toxins Conotoxin Ricin Saxitoxin Shiga toxin Staphylococcus aureus toxins Tetrodotoxin Verotoxin Microcystin (Cyanginosin)
Viruses (Warning List) WV1. WV2. WV3. WV4. WV5. WV6. WV7. WV8. Kyasanur Forest virus Louping ill virus Murray Valley encephalitis virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus Oropouche virus Powassan virus Rocio virus St Louis encephalitis virus
V15. V16. V17. V18. V19. V20.
Genetically Modified Micro-organisms G1. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the core list. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the core list, or their subunits.
G2. Rickettsiae R1. R2. R3. R4. Coxiella burnetti Bartonella Quintana (Rochlimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana) Rickettsia prowasecki Rickettsia rickettsii
Bacteria (Warning List) WB1. WB2. WB3. Clostridium perfringens Clostridium tetani Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype 0157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes Legionella pneumophila Yersinia pseudotuberculosis
WB4. WB5.
3-3
Genetically Modified Micro-organisms WG1. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the warning list. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the warning list, or their subunits. Viruses ( cont'd): AV12. Rinderpest virus AV13. Sheep pox virus AV14. Teschen disease virus AV15. Vesicular stomatitis virus Bacteria: AB3. Mycoplasma mycoides Genetically Modified Micro-organisms: AG1. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the list. Plant Pathogens Bacteria: PB1. Xanthomonas albilineans PB2. Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri Fungi: PF1. PF2. PF3. PF4. PF5. PF6.
Plant Pathogens (cont'd) Genetically Modified Micro-organisms: PG1. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens on the list. Awareness Raising Guidelines Bacteria: PWB1. Xanthomonas campestris pv. oryzae PWB2. Xylella fastidiosa Fungi: PWF1. Deuterophoma tracheiphila (syn. Phoma tracheiphila) PWF2. Monilia rorei (syn. Moniliophthora rorei) Viruses: PWV1. Banana bunchy top virus Genetically Modified Micro-organisms: PWG1. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens identified on the awareness raising list.
WG2.
Toxins (Warning List) WT1. WT2. WT3. WT4. WT5. WT6. WT7. Abrin Cholera toxin Tetanus toxin Trichothecene mycotoxins Modecin Volkensin Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin) Animal Pathogens Viruses: AV1. AV2. AV3. AV4. AV5. AV6. AV7.
African swine fever virus Avian influenza virus Bluetongue virus Foot and mouth disease virus Goat pox virus Herpes virus (Aujeszkys disease) Hog cholera virus (synonym: Swine fever virus) AV8. Lyssa virus AV9. Newcastle disease virus AV10. Peste des petits ruminants virus AV11. Porcine enterovirus type 9 (synonym: swine vesicular disease virus) Animal Pathogens (cont'd)
Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans (Colletotrichum Kanawae) Cochliobolus miyabeanus (Helminthosporium oryzae) Microcyclus ulei (syn. Dothidella ulei) Puccinia graminis (syn. Puccinnia graminis f. sp. tritici) Puccinia striiformis (syn. Pucciniaglumarum) Pyricularia grisea/Pyricularia oryzae
3-4
Figure 3.0.4
Nerve Agents O-Alkyl (<C 10 , incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl
Selected Toxic Chemical Requiring Detection, Warning, Identification, and Defense*

(C.A.S. Number)** Vesicants (cont)
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate O-Alkyl (<C 10 , incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate O-Alkyl (H or <C 10 , incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate
(107-44-8) (96-64-0)
(77-81-6)
Lewisites: Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine Nitrogen mustards: HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine Toxins
(541-25-3) (40334-69-8) (40334-70-1) (538-07-8) (51-75-2) (555-77-1)
(50782-69-9)
Saxitoxin Ricin (9009-86-3) Choking Agent
(35523-89-8)
Vesicants Sulfur mustards: 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether
(2625-76-5) (505-60-2) (63869-13-6) (3563-36-8) (63905-10-2) (142868-93-7) (142868-94-8) (63918-90-1) (63918-89-8)
Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride Blood Agents
(75-44-5)
Cyanogen chloride Hydrogen cyanide
(506-77-4) (74-90-8)
* **
This list is representative and not all inclusive The C.A.S. number is the Chemical Abstract Service Registry Number, a unique number based on chemical structure
3-5
SECTION 3.1 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Overview (See Figure 3.1-1) The US chemical and biological defense program includes contamination avoidance, individual and collective protection, and decontamination, all of which are addressed in this section. Contamination avoidance is based on sensors providing real-time detection and identification of toxic agents (see Section 3.2). The goal of individual and collective protection is to insulate US ground, air, and sea forces from CB agents using clothing ensembles and respirators for individuals and collective filtration systems for groups. Additional precautions can be taken for biological agents such as immunization prior to exposure and antidote treatments after exposure provided the threat agents can be identified. Military requirements for individual protection are much more stringent than those used in commercial applications. Manufacturers deal with known processes, inputs, and outputs. The military must be prepared to respond to unknown threats including new agents in unknown quantities anywhere, and at any time. Since many types of protective gear limit human performance, sometimes up to a 50% reduction in capabilities, more advanced efforts are aimed at accounting for these limitations and increasing the comfort/wear time and freedom of action. Decontamination technologies that ensure rapid and effective force reconstitution are also included. Modeling and simulation are used for hazard assessment, weapons effects, and the results of decontamination. Rationale (See Table 3.1-1) Under a Global Reach concept, US forces must be prepared for conflict in a chemically or biologically toxic environment. Ground, air, and naval forces are possible subjects of attack as is the supporting civilian infrastructure. US forces must have the capability to survive an initial CB attack and to sustain mission operations with minimal casualties and degradation of equipment. Individual ensembles (suits and masks) are essential to provide protection against current and future threats. Properly designed masks are sufficient for B agent protection while full suits are required for protection against most C agents. Reducing the physical burden imposed by CB protective gear is imperative to maintain unit combat performance. Collective protection is critical in order to provide a protective environment for personnel operating in aircraft, armored vehicles, ships, shelters, command and control facilities, and other large-area enclosures. A contamination-free location for casualty care, prophylaxis and therapy, and rest and recuperation is also critical to sustain military operations. Environmentally acceptable decontamination technologies are important when toxic materials must be neutralized. A robust and effective defensive capability reduces the threat that offensive CB agents would be used.
Chemical & Biological Defense Systems

Contamination avoidance Prophylaxis and Therapeutics Decontamination

Personnel Ground Vehicles Aircraft Ships Collective Protection
Figure 3.1-1.
Chemical and Biological Defense Systems Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 3.0-2) Many countries produce protective gear, decontamination equipment, and medical countermeasures. Masks, including those for civilians, are the most common type of protective gear produced. There are at least 23 countries that produce protective masks either in government factories or at commercial locations. Many NATO, former Warsaw Pact countries, Middle East, and Asian countries also produce protective clothing. Presently, multiple countries are cooperating in the development of protective clothing, e.g., the Combat Suit 90 and the Saratoga System. Only a few countries manufacture aircraft respiratory equipment: Canada, Norway, Russia, and the UK. A number of countries have developed collective protective systems for shelters: Finland, France, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, Russia has fielded and maintains a substantial inventory of collective protection systems for a wide range of vehicles and shelters. European nations are developing wide area decontamination systems. Medical countermeasures are pursued worldwide.
3-6
Table 3.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Chemical and Biological Defense Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Software for generating facial contours Software for generating facial contours EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 7, 21, 22 WA Cat 1B, D, E USML X WA ML 7, 21, 22 WA Cat 1B, D, E USML X
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY PRODUCTION AND DESIGN Provide protection against aerosol particles in TECHNOLOGY FOR PROTECTIVE MASKS the 0.1 to 10 micrometer range - BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION AND DESIGN Provide protection for 24 hrs against 10,000 mgTECHNOLOGY FOR PROTECTIVE MASKS min/m3 challenge for toxic vapors, aerosols - CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION AND DESIGN

TECHNOLOGY FOR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING - CHEMICAL

TECHNOLOGY FOR COLLECTIVE PROTECTION - BIOLOGICAL

TECHNOLOGY FOR COLLECTIVE PROTECTION - CHEMICAL
DECONTAMINATION - BIOLOGICAL
DECONTAMINATION - CHEMICAL
Butyl rubber, silicon Simulated agents; leakage testers; rubber; plastics mannequin - face model for mask and suit design; particle-size analysis equipment Butyl rubber, Simulated agents; Leakage testers; Silicon rubber mannequin-face model for mask and suit plastics design; particle-size analysis equipment Impregnated activated carbon (charcoal) Charcoal activated Simulated agents; particle-size analysis Provide protection for 24 hrs against 10 g/m2 cloth; semiequipment challenge by all liquid agents and 10,000 mgpermeable memmin/m3 for toxic vapors, aerosols branes; polymers Provide protection against aerosol particles in Teflon/Kevlar Simulated agents the 0.1 to 10 micrometer range laminate for Particle size analysts equipment biological resistance, decontaminability and environmental durability Prevent > 99.9% of toxic agents from entering Impregnated carbon Simulated agents common areas filters; polyethylene; fluoropolymer/aramid laminate Sieve or remove 0.1 to 10 micrometer particles Filter system to Simulated agents remove 0.1 to 10 Particle size analysts equipment micrometer particles by sieve action Remove > 99.9% of toxic material or neutralize AMBERGARD XE- Simulated agents it 555 resin; SuperTropical Bleach (STB)
None identified
WA ML 7, 21, 22 WA Cat 1B, D, E USML X WA ML 7, 21, 22 WA Cat 1B, D, E USML X
None identified
None identified
WA ML 7, 21, 22 WA Cat 1B, D, E USML X
None identified
None identified
3-7
SECTION 3.2
DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION
Overview (See Figure 3.2-1) Technologies used for detection, warning, and identification of toxic chemical and biological agents are included in this section. Detectors used at designated locations are called point detectors. Standoff detectors provide early, wide area warning of an attack. Detection technologies must be capable of sensing and mapping large areas of non-volatile liquid chemical agent contamination and to be able to rapidly discriminate and identify biological agents. For biological agents, detection and warning systems are based on physical or chemical properties of these agents. Identification systems use immunochemical or gene probe techniques or mass spectral analysis. No single sensor detects all chemical or biological agents of interest. Detectors for toxic agents must have a short response time with a low rate of false returns and meet appropriate size, weight, and power requirements. Detection equipment must be integrated with a command and control system to ensure an alarm is disseminated. This is essential for contamination avoidance. Other unknown factors include location, duration, and intensity of the agent, which are crucial parameters for command decisions. Current DoD emphasis is on multiagent sensors for biological detection and standoff CB detection. The technology focus is on detection, warning and identification across the spectrum of CB agents as well as on the integration of CB detectors into various platforms, individual clothing and the C3I network. Identification is critical to medical response. Rationale (See Table 3.2-1) The cornerstone of US CB defense efforts is early detection and warning to provide situational awareness and allow US forces to avoid the threat. Detection and identification of agents and prediction of future conditions provide information to military commanders and individuals. This information allows military commanders to initiate steps to avoid contamination or to ascertain the minimum appropriate protection required to continue operations with minimal degradation of performance and casualties.
Detection, Warning, and Identification

Sensitivity to Agents Detection Time Reliability Low False Alarm Rate Detection Range Multi Agent Detection/ Identification Integration
Figure 3.2-1.

Point Detection - Hand Held Systems - Mobile Systems Stand-off - Mobile Systems - Fixed Installations Tactical Command & Control
Detection, Warning, and Identification Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 3.0-2) A number of Western countries (Canada, France, Germany, UK) have significant capability in sensor technology. Russia and Israel also are well advanced in this field. At least 22 countries have some type of detector in their armed forces. The majority of detection, warning, and identification systems are for chemical agents; however, extensive efforts are underway to develop improved biological agent detectors.
3-8
Table 3.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY IMMUNO BASED - BIOLOGICAL
Detection, Warning, and Identification Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Antibodies directed against Australia Group list agents UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Antibody development UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Capability of detecting 100 organisms of Australia Group agents.
GENE BASED PROBE - BIOLOGICAL
Polynucleolides complementary to Australia Group gene sequences; polymers MOLECULAR RECOGNITION (E.G. Capability of detecting 100 organisms of Antibodies directed ANTIGENS, ANTIBODIES, ENZYMES, Australia Group agents. Can recognize against Australia Group NUCLEIC ACIDS, OLIGOMERS, LECTINS, weapons grade agent, by-products of its list agents or WHOLE CELLS, RECEPTORS, preparation or manufacturing signatures; does polynucleotides ORGANELLES) - BIOLOGICAL not recognize normally occurring environmental complementary to materials. Australia Group gene sequence ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY (IMS) - Detecting several thousand organisms. None identified BIOLOGICAL
Capability of detecting 100 organisms of Australia Group agents.
Gene sequence data
None identified
Coatings, films or fibers of biopolymers or chemical polymers that bind BW agents (binding Kd less than 1 108)
Molecular modeling databases (e.g. protein and DNA sequencing)
Database development; Ion source Spectroscope capable of concentrating and analyzing 1000 organisms Database development; Ion source
Spectrum recognition algorithms
ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY (IMS) - Capable of scanning samples of 10,000 daltons CHEMICAL or less in 5 minutes or less.
None identified
MASS SPECTROMETRY - BIOLOGICAL
Capable of scanning samples of 10,000 daltons or less in 5 minutes or less.
None identified
Database development Spectrum recognition Portable, field rugged mass spectroscope algorithms
MASS SPECTROMETRY - CHEMICAL
Capable of scanning samples of 10,000 daltons or less in 5 minutes or less.
None identified
Database development Portable, field ruggedized
WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E (cont'd)
3-9
Table 3.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY PASSIVE IR - CHEMICAL
Detection, Warning, and Identification Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Database development UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Spectrum and background recognition algorithms EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Detects vapors at distances up to 5 km (Nerve: None identified 90 mg/m2, blister: 500 mg/m2 for L and 1500 mg/m2 for HD). Converts recognition of agents to an optical or electrical signal. Low hysteresis. Optical/electronic component processing must be <1 second. Antibodies and gene sequences for Australia Group list agents
TRANSDUCERS (E.G., OPTICAL, ELECTROCHEMICAL, ACOUSTIC, PIEZOELECTRIC, CALORIMETRIC, SURFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE (SAW); FIBER OPTIC WAVE GUIDE) BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL SAMPLE COLLECTION (E.G. AIR, LIQUID, DUST, SOIL SAMPLING) - BIOLOGICAL
Production equipment configured for the detection of biological agents
Collects and concentrates 110 micrometers particles into liquid medium.
None identified
Aerosol samplers able to collect less than None identified or equal to 10 micrometers diameter particles into a liquid Aerosol samplers able to collect less than None identified or equal to 10 micrometers diameter particles into a liquid. Neg. pressure orifice devices for rupturing cell membranes or wall/retention of nucleic acids; impact collectors; ion trap mass spectrometers capable of scanning samples below 10,000 daltons in 5 minutes or less; pyrolyzers. Ion trap mass spectrometers capable of scanning samples from 40 to 1024 daltons in millisecs; pyrolyzers; chemical & enzyme detection kits. Spectrum recognition algorithm
SAMPLE COLLECTION (E.G. AIR, LIQUID, Collects and concentrates 110 micrometers DUST, SOIL SAMPLING) - CHEMICAL particles into liquid medium.
None identified
SAMPLE PROCESSING (E.G. CELL DISRUPTION, CONCENTRATION, PURIFICATION OR STABILIZATION) BIOLOGICAL
Completion within 10 minutes.
None identified
WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E
SAMPLE PROCESSING (E.G. CONCENTRATION) - CHEMICAL
Completion within 10 minutes.
None identified
Spectrum recognition algorithm
WA ML 7, 21 WA Cat 1A, D, E USML XIV CCL Cat 1A, D, E
3-10
SECTION 4 - DIRECTED AND KINETIC ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

4.1 Lasers, High Energy Chemical ................................ 4-3 4.2 Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons.... 4-5 SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 4.0-1) This section addresses Directed Energy (DE) and Kinetic Energy (KE) systems whose advanced technologies may change the way military missions are organized and executed in the future. DE systems include: High Energy Lasers (HEL), Charged Particle Beams (CPB), Neutral Particle Beams (NPB), High Power Microwaves (HPM) and supporting technologies required for DE weapon application. HEL systems of interest are based on the use of six different types of lasers: gas dynamic, pulsed high energy electrical molecular and atomic, excimer, chemical, optically pumped gas and solid state and free electron. Improvements in DE systems are anticipated from the development of new approaches to energy transfer, efficient mixing of chemical reactants, scaling of present system to higher power design of waveforms and more efficient propagation of beams through the atmosphere. Improvements in HPM are expected from more efficient and compact microwave sources, and design of antennas that can operate above the traditional voltage breakdown limit. KE systems include Electromagnetic Launch (EML) systems such as Railguns and Coilguns, Electrothermal Chemical (ETC) guns, and Electrothermal (ET) guns. Compact pulsed power sources are a common requirement for weaponization of EML, ETC, and ET guns. Additional improvements in EML systems are to be found in the development of wear resistant materials and supporting structures, improvements in ETC guns and non-sensitive propellants, and more efficient plasma ignition of propellants. Enhancements in ET guns will require more efficient plasma generators. NPBs and CPBs deliver energy at a significant fraction of the speed of light. The energy from NPBs and CPBs is deposited beneath the surface of the target adding another dimension to the kill mechanism/countermeasure considerations. Expected results include warhead detonation and structural breakup at higher fluences and electronic upset at lower fluences. HPM travel at the speed of light and may damage electronic systems by exposing their components to unwanted and unanticipated large electric fields or current spikes. These fields can cause temporary system malfunction or may result in permanent damage to equipment. Of the 12 technology areas in this section on DE and KE systems, only threeviz., Chemical Lasers, and Supporting Technologies for DE Weaponsinclude militarily critical technologies. A substantial amount of research and development (R&D) work has gone into the other technologies. These other systems are included in MCTL Part III, Critical Developing Technologies. Rationale HEL systems deliver energy at the speed of light and, in the more advanced systems, provide rapid retargeting of multiple systems, e.g., satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles or planes. HEL systems have potential for revolutionary impact in both strategic defenses and tactical battlefield applications. In contrast to DE, KE system projectiles travel at high velocities, but much lower than the speed of light (greater than 1.8 km/s), yet have sufficient kinetic energy to catastrophically rupture and disrupt all types of targets or cause the mission to be aborted. ETC guns are capable of generating more energetic projectiles at the muzzle than conventional munitions, and hence are more effective in destroying hard targets. This increased projectile energy can be utilized in the form of higher velocity, larger mass, or a combination of both.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Manufacturing & Fabrication Power Information Systems Materials DIRECTED & Electronics
KINETIC ENERGY SYSTEMS
TREND
New Physics - Directed Energy New Chemistry - Non-sensitive Propellants
Figure 4.0-1.
Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Overview
4-1
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 4.0-2) Besides the US, Russia, England, France, and Germany have substantial programs in lasers in general, and well-developed technical capabilities in the majority of critical elements. Japan, Israel and China also have some technology but at a lower level of capability. The UK, France, Germany, and Russia are the world's leading centers for kinetic energy weapons research, which includes ETC guns. While each country may emphasize a different aspect of the technology, there is often considerable overlap. For example, the French and German effort in developing compact pulse forming networks for an ET gun may find application for ETC guns. An operationally critical common goal for these guns is the development of electrical energy efficient, compact and mobile pulsed power systems. Other areas of commonality between ET and ETC guns include the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) techniques used in the combustion and plasma ignition processes. CFD technology is shared throughout the NATO countries and Japan. The United States appears to be the world leader in ETC technology, where near-term goals are focused on naval applications. Israel, working in conjunction with the United States, has an active program in the ETC gun that is directed to supporting the requirements of Theater Missile Defense and Air Defense. England is developing a multi-module capacitor bank for ETC guns, and is working on techniques to determine the pressure pulse shape for the ETC gun. The French and Germans are working on programs that can optimize the energy conversion processes in these guns. China also has a modest program in ETC technology.
Country
4.1 Lasers, High Energy Chemical
4.2 Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons
China France Germany Israel Japan Russia UK US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All
Figure 4.0-2.
Majority
Some
Limited
Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems FTA Summary
4-2
SECTION 4.1 LASERS, HIGH ENERGY CHEMICAL

Overview (See Figure 4.1-1) This section covers technologies applicable to high energy lasers which operate in the infrared (IR) and visible regions of the electromagnetic spectrums (0.330 m) and are capable of achieving militarily significant levels of energy or power. Of particular interest to the military are the chemical HF/DF and oxygen iodine (COIL) lasers. To be militarily useful a HEL system has to negate a target of interest. An enhanced system would determine the effectiveness of the action, move to another target, and repeat the procedure. To do this effectively the system has to be able to track one or more targets, produce a laser beam, point it at the selected target and provide enough energy on target to complete the mission. This technology is covered in the section dealing with DE weapons-supporting technologies. Development of a successful HEL system presupposes knowledge of the beam-target interaction physics and information about viable countermeasures. In this section we deal with the Beam Generation and Control System which is composed of the fuel supply system, the energy generator, the gain generator, the pressure recovery system, the optical system, aerodynamic and material windows, diagnostic instrumentation, power supply/power conditioning, and thermal management system. The DE weapons-supporting technologies section deals with target acquisition trackings, kill assessment system, and equipment with rapid beam slew capability. Effective design and testing of the weapon system requires knowledge of laser target interaction, possible countermeasures, beam propagation and inspection, and production test equipment. This is covered in another section under weapons effects and countermeasures. Rationale (See Table 4.1-1 and Figure energy and power can serve as a long-range or mission abortion. The system can missiles, or airplanes. At lower powers discrimination or soft kill. 4.1-2) This laser system at high lethal weapon for target destruction destroy/disable satellites, ballistic it can also be used for tracking,
Lasers, High Energy Chemical

Power & Energy Level Duration Power Consumption Beam Generation & Control Systems

Threat Air Defense Target Destruction Target Degradation
Figure 4.1-1.
Lasers, High Energy Chemical Overview

Laser Gain Region (I)
I2 O2(1) Generator O2(1) H2 O
Condenser
O2(1)
Reactant Exhaust
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 4.0-3) Besides the US, Russia, England, France, and Germany have substantial programs in lasers and well-developed technical capabilities in the majority of critical elements. Japan, Israel and China also have some technologies but at a lower level of capability.
Gaseous Liquid BHP (KOH, H2O2) CI2
H2O
Supersonic Nozzle Laser Beam
Figure 4.1-2.
Supersonic Oxygen-Iodine Chemical Laser
4-3
Table 4.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY HIGH ENERGY CHEMICAL LASER
Lasers, High Energy Chemical Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Fuels, surface passivated, flourine compatible; High quality optical surfaces Si, SiC; very low absorption coatings UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Laser diagnostic equipment; <10 radians steering errors; Beam quality testing; Non-linear correction at HEL power levels Corrective polishing technology; optical diagnostic system; integrated irradiance analyzer; static alignment system UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Various codes that apply to individual technology components and systems; Beam propagation codes; Optical design codes; ray tracing codes; Aerodynamic and solid window design codes; Computer codes for new window design and testing EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 19, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E MCTR 11, USML XII, 121.16 CCL 6A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Power > 20 kW CW Laser; Energy > 1 kJ pulsed laser wavelength; Wavelength (0.330 m)
4-4
SECTION 4.2 SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES FOR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

Overview (See Figure 4.2-1) This section covers those technologies which are required to turn a high energy laser or a particle beam into a weapon. The supporting technologies for directed energy (DE) weapons consist of target acquisition, tracking and kill assessment systems, and equipment with rapid beam slew capability. These technologies provide the capability to track one or more targets, point the beam at a target for a sufficiently long period to produce the desired effect, evaluate the damage, and then move the beam to another target. The laser beam-pointing and control techniques require advanced servo systems, integrated optics programming, adaptive optics, active focusing, alignment, and tracking techniques. The target acquisition tracking, kill assessment, and rapid beam slewing technologies required for different lasers and particle beams have different characteristics because of the different locations; atmospheric conditions; and scenarios and ranges for which the systems are designed. In this section we specifically focus on the technology requirements for the airborne chemical lasers system. Rationale (See Table 4.2-1) Supporting technologies for the chemical laser weapon provide the capability to track a target or targets, aim the beam at a target for a specified time period, evaluate the damage, and then move rapidly to another target. In this way multiple targets can be encountered and neutralized. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 4.0-3) Besides the US, Russia, England, and Israel have pointing and tracking programs and low-level capabilities in other supporting technologies.
Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons

Accurate Pointing and Tracking Rapid Retargeting Aimpoint Selection Kill Assessment High Power Adaptive Optics

Directed Energy Weapons Space Tracking Systems
Figure 4.2-1.
Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons Overview
4-5
Table 4.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY TARGET ACQUISITION/TRACKING SYSTEM - CHEMICAL LASER
Supporting Technologies for Directed Energy Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Aimpoint control < 0.25 rad Spot size, diameter < 0.5 m at 250 km Jitter < 0.25 rad CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Laser diagnostic equipment for high power beams UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Computer codes for testing system design, systems level and wave optics; High energy laser cavity dynamics vulnerability codes None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 19, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E MCTR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL 6A, D, E
lCCL EAR 99
EQUIPMENT WITH RAPID BEAM SLEW CAPABILITY - CHEMICAL LASER
Slew capability, rate > 0.5 rad/s Slew acceleration > 0.5 rad/s2 Retarget time (> 1 degree) < 2 sec
None identified
None identified
4-6
SECTION 6 - GROUND SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

support vehicles. These technologies enable combat vehicles to delay detection and limit the damage effects of opposing weapons while maneuvering and engaging adversary targets. The ground system technologies provide a qualitative superiority in land warfare.
6.1 6.2
Advanced Diesel Engines .................................... 6-3 Vetronics........................................................ 6-5
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 6.0-1) This section addresses technologies, excluding weapons, associated with combat vehicle systems that enable those systems to be superior to opposing systems they need to defeat in combat. Military ground vehicles share many systems and technologies with commercial vehicles. Despite the high percentage of dual-use technologies, there are often unique physical and/or operational capabilities required for military vehicles. There are eight technology areas, of which the two identified in the box above contain technologies that are militarily critical. In the remaining six technology areas unique militarily critical technologies were not identified. These are: Human Systems Interfaces, Hybrid-Electric Propulsion Systems, Sensors, Structures, and Systems Integration. Some technologies related to ground vehicle systems are covered in other sections of this MCTL Part I: Gas turbine engines in Section 1; Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control in Section 7, Electric armor in Section 11; Power Systems in Section 14; Sensors in Section 15; and Signature Control in Section 16. Technologies for further improving the stealthy characteristics of armored vehicle using composite and other unique materials will be covered in Part III of the MCTL. Rationale Ground vehicles are essential elements of modern land warfare. Technologies in this section and in the sections indicated above support advances in vehicle performance (speed, range, payload, mobility), reliability, maintainability, and survivability in ground combat vehicles and ground combat
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Manufacturing & Fabrication Information Systems Propulsion Systems High Density GROUND Diesel Engine TREND Integrated SYSTEMS Tracked Vehicle Transmissions Compact Size for Hi Speed High Mobility Tracked Vehicles Reduced Signature Vetronics Increased Range Flat Panel Displays Increased Payload
Figure 6.0-1. Ground Systems Overview
6-1
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 6.0-2) Along with the US, other western industrialized countries are leaders in ground combat vehicles. In some vehicle technology areas the UK, France, Germany and Japan are ahead of the US. Of the Former Soviet Union republics, Russia produces high quality armor and the Ukraine produces some of the most compact high density diesel propulsion systems. Israel also produces unique technology driven by self need. The US still maintains an edge in the integration of the various technologies into reliable, functional and producable systems. In some cases, Diesel and electric propulsion technology depend upon related commercial developments in the automotive field, and both Japan and Germany push the leading edge on developments in the commercial marketplace. Their strong automotive industry research and development use of ceramics and its application to low heat rejection and high efficiency diesels give them unique experience in these areas.
Country
6.1 Advanced Diesel Engines
6.2 Vetronics
France Germany Israel Italy Japan Russia Taiwan UK Ukraine US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All
Figure 6.0-2.
Majority
Some
Limited
Ground Systems FTA Summary
6-2
SECTION 6.1
ADVANCED DIESEL ENGINES
Overview (See Figure 6.1-1) This subsection addresses technology for advanced Diesel engines for combat vehicle propulsion systems. The size of a vehicle's powerplant and transmission, systems that usually are at least partially under armor on an armored vehicle, are significant factors in determining the size and weight of a combat vehicle. Therefore, engine design goals that maximize an engine's power density contribute to minimizing vehicle size and weight reduction and are critical elements. Reducing the size and increasing the power output of a Diesel engine (power density) pushes the limit of many areas of design and technology, e.g., materials, high temperature lubricants, eliminating parasitic power loses, air movement, and so on. Requirements to increase fuel efficiency require increases in engine operating temperatures, which in turn impact the material selection, design and engine cooling systems. Decreasing the need for cooling (low heat rejection) leads to smaller engines and systems with more useable power. These technologies are critical to reach the desired goal of smaller, more efficient armored vehicles. The technologies under this heading include those for integrated tracked vehicle propulsion systems, automatic transmissions with integrated braking and regenerative steer systems for high speed tracked vehicles and for high density, compact Diesel engines. Technologies for low heat rejection diesel engines appear in the research and development volume. Rationale (See Table 6.1-1) Efficient, flexible and reliable propulsion systems provide the basis for superiority in ground combat and ground combat support. They are frequently the factor that determines superiority over the opposition. They involve technologies that provide smaller, lighterweight combat vehicles, which facilitate rapid force projection. The technologies provide the high power densities necessary for lightweight armored vehicle platforms with superior mobility, maneuverability and agility. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 6.0-2) The technologies that go into the combat vehicle powerplants described above are dual use in nature. Developments in both Germany and Japan in many cases exceed those in
Advanced Diesel Engines
Efficient packaging High power density Low parasitic power loss High hot hardness gear steels Wear coatings High temperature friction materials Compact hydrostatic pumps/motors High energy braking systems High temperature lubrication Emission suppression Heat and noise
Figure 6.1-1.
Tracked Combat Vehicles Main Battle Tank Armored Vehicle Common Chassis Auxiliary Armored Attack Vehicles High Speed Band Tracked SelfTransporting Tractors Armored Amphibious Assault Vehicles
Advanced Diesel Engines Overview
the US in the commercial arena. The UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine all produce high-density combat vehicle Diesel engines that are highly competitive. Germany, however, is generally considered the leader in producing commercial Diesel engines for the world marketplace.
6-3
Table 6.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY DIESEL ENGINE, GROUND VEHICLE
Advanced Diesel Engines Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 6, 22 WA Cat 9E USML VII CCL Cat 9E WA ML 6, 22 WA Cat 9E USML VII CCL Cat 9E WA ML 6, 22 WA Cat 9E USML VII CCL Cat 9E
INTEGRATED TRACKED-VEHICLE
PROPULSION SYSTEMS
None identified Box volume of 1.2 m3. Power output > 750 kW based on 80/1269/EEC, ISO 2534. Power density > 700 kW/m3. Power > 750 kW on Diesel fuels with power None identified densities exceeding: 160 kW/m3; 0.140 kW/kg Power > 750 kW with input power densities exceeding: 800 kW/m3; 0.600 kW/kg None identified
None identified
None identified
AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSIONS WITH

INTEGRATED BRAKING AND REGENERATIVE STEER SYSTEMS FOR HIGH SPEED TRACKED VEHICLES
High Hot-hardness gear steels; Wear coatings; High Temp friction materials.
None identified
6-4
SECTION 6.2
Overview (See Figure 6.2-1) This subsection addresses Vetronics (vehicle electronics) systems. Combat vehicles are becoming much more highly automated, have smaller crews, and will be more directly integrated into the battlefield command and control nets. In order to reduce the workload of combat vehicle crews to a level where the number of crew members can also be reduced, more extensive use of vehicle electronic systems is required. This equipment must have high reliability, ruggedness, and meet a requirement to operate and survive in an equipment-hostile environment. Flat panel weapons display technologies meet this need and are critical. These technologies are required in order to carry the heavy communications/display loads and meet rapid response requirements with large volumes of data in the combat environment. High resolution, compact, high density full gray scale and 24-bit color integrated into combat displays provide the ability to handle that volume of data and display it in a manner that meets the needs of the armored vehicle combat crew member to maximize available combat information. Rationale (See Table 6.2-1) High reliability, combat rugged electronic systems are an absolute necessity in the combat environment of the future. This places a heavy responsibility on vehicle electronic systems to function with low failure propensity in a combat environment. Reliable systems which can provide readily understandable combat data make the difference in superior combat performance. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 6.0-2) Japan is the leader in commercial flat-panel display systems; however, the application, integration and utilization of the technology to combat vehicle display systems is being accomplished to some degree in UK, France and Germany.
VETRONICS
Vetronics

High Resolution Compact High Density Display High MTBF Highly Survivable in Combat Conditions

Combat Armored Vehicles Naval Vessel Combat Information Centers Combat Aircraft Applications Land-Based Mobile Combat Support Centers
Figure 6.2-1.
Vetronics Overview
Table 6.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY FLAT PANEL DISPLAYS
Vetronics Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Source code for three dimensional displays EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 15 USML XII
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Resolution: 3072 2048 dpi.; Color: 24 bit; Full None identified grey scale.
6-5
SECTION 7 - GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND VEHICLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY

guided and unguided weapons systems. In addition, other mission requirements, such as reconnaissance, require accurate velocity, motion compensation, and positioning synchronization data to maintain real-time knowledge of the enemy. Accurate position and time sequencing and use of sensor information are key force multipliers to offset numerical superiority of an adversary and reduce casualties. In the past few years, because of the application of dynamically unstable aircraft and missile design, the vehicle flight control systems (FCS) became vital to meet the design requirements of the platform. Similar advancements are being made in ground, marine, and spacecraft vehicle control. The long-term costs for Third World countries to design, fabricate, and apply this technology have been a limiting proliferation factor. This section contains important, highly leverageable technologies.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Sensors & Lasers Information Systems Aeronautics Electronics Materials
7.1 Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems ....................... 7-3 7.2 Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components .... 7-5 7.3 Radio & Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems .... 7-10 SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 7.0-1) This section encompasses technologies for both autonomous and cooperative positioning, coordination, and control of military force elements, as noted in the military S&T Plans. Included are technologies for flight management, guidance, and vehicle control. Elements of the technology continue to be improved and adapted to mission needs. This is especially true for the US Global Positioning System (GPS). Navigation is defined as obtaining the present condition or state of the vehicle from sensed values of position and motion. Guidance systems integrate these conditions and produce vehicle control responses. In essence, these technologies are closely coupled and overlap depending on application, which includes WMD. Most of these technologies have dual-use requirements, and all of them are essential for various mission needs. Commercial aircraft accuracy requirements are generally less than those for military aircraft. The trend is for consolidation of various navigation technologies into hybrid systems. Rationale The militarily critical parameters key on values above which inertial, radio, and data-based referenced navigation equipment and vehicle control equipment could be used to deliver conventional weapons, a single item (for nuclear), individually targeted RVs, or a set of items to a level of accuracy appropriate to the destructive footprint of these munitions. Accurate positioning, attitude, pointing, and control of land, sea, air, and space vehicles are essential for effective coordination of highly mobile military forces. Accurate time and frequency form the basis for modern guidance, navigation, and vehicle control as well as telecommunication. These capabilities directly enhance the delivery accuracy and lethality of manned and unmanned,
GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION TREND & VEHICLE CONTROL

Increased Accuracy Control Precision Strike Accurate Maneuver Control Hybridization
Figure 7.0-1.
Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control Overview
7-1
Country
7.1 Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems
7.2 Inertial Navigation Sys tems
7.3 Radio and D ataBased Referenced Na vigation Systems
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 7.0-2) Depending on national desires and needs, nations have chosen to develop, produce, and use guidance, navigation, and vehicle control technologies for military and commercial purposes. Many countries do not have an indigenous aircraft manufacturing capability and the inherent flight control technology that are fundamental requirements. From a user viewpoint, inertial navigation systems are more expensive to produce and maintain than radio navigation systems. This fact and other military mission considerations have led many nations to rely more on radio navigation systems for many military and commercial needs. This fact is more evident now with the use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). The only worldwide radio navigation systems that exist are OMEGA, US GPS and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Other regional radio navigation systems, such as LORAN C, have been produced to meet local needs. Some of the countries, such as France, the UK, and Russia, have been leaders in Guidance, Navigation, and Vehicle Control because of their indigenous aircraft industry. Much of the technology capability for many countries has been obtained through US licensing agreement transfers and foreign students attending US universities. US industry has depended on and supported US export control to obtain a level playing field for itself and foreign nations. US industry has also depended on the control regulations to be able to negate the offset demands for manufacturing data that are most often sought by foreign countries. Foreign offset requirements are one of the main proliferation mechanisms of these technologies. Further details of the foreign technology assessment are provided in the respective subsections.
A ustralia B elgium B razil C anada C hina Finland France Germany India Israel Italy Japan N etherla nds N . Korea N orway Poland R omania R ussia South Africa S. Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland UK U kraine US LEGEND: C ritical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 7.0-2.
Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control FTA Summary
7-2
SECTION 7.1 AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLE CONTROL SYSTEMS

Overview (See Figure 7.1-1) Flight control systems (FCS) (including Flyby-Wire and Fly-by-Light) are composed of sensors, computers, actuators, and the other system components dictated by the architecture, methodologies, and algorithms required by the air vehicle (aircraft, RPV, or cruise missile) to perform their intended missions. Similar control systems are used in ground, sea, and space vehicle missions. They function to control the vehicle, including agility and steering, to achieve the desired flight path (e.g., weapon launch windows). The FCS also prevents undesirable aircraft and missile motions or structural loads by autonomously processing outputs from multiple sensors and then providing necessary preventive commands to effect automatic control. Flight path optimization is an FCS procedure that minimizes deviations from a four-dimensional (space and time) desired trajectory based on maximizing performance or effectiveness for mission tasks. Particularly important are evolving adaptive control techniques for integrated control and signature control. Control actuators transform control logic into vehicle responses. New technologies are required to further reduce power and logistic support. Electric actuators are used in small civil aircraft, RPVs, and missiles. They replace conventional hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical drive systems in larger, highperformance civil and military aircraft and helicopters. Rationale (See Table 7.1-1) National security considerations dictate a critical concern for FCS because of FCS use in weapon delivery platforms. The key characteristic of reliability in a wide variety of environmental conditions has caused FCS, in the past, to have had a high degree of autonomy relative to other components of the vehicle. With the advent of digital bus systems and redundant computers, the vehicle and FCS are being integrated with the other electronic and mechanical systems in the vehicle. Integration technology has, therefore, become a critical technology. Most, if not all, commercial practices evolve from military requirements with the g loadings and dynamics being considerably less for commercial use. Flight control laws and algorithms are the mathematical relationships defining input sensor processing, sensor selection, dynamic compensation, fault detection/isolation, and command generation to flight control force and moment generators and cockpit flight guidance displays. Control laws and algorithms are typically represented in the form of mathematical equations, block diagrams, flow charts, software source code,
Aircraft & Vehicle Control Systems

Accurate Positioning & Control Anti-Jam/Anti-Spoof Frequency Response Response Time Integration Technology Manage Redundancy Fault Tolerance Active Control Adaptive Technology
Figure 7.1-1.

Aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) UAVs/RPVs Helicopters Air Cushion Vehicles Ground Effect Vehicles Missiles Reentry Vehicles
Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems Overview
software design specification/program description language, logic diagrams, or circuit schematics. Description of flight control laws and algorithms in any of these forms are critical technologies if they contain any of the actual parameters (gains, time constraints, thresholds, limits) for military aircraft. FCS software in any embodiment (source, object, or machine code) associated with any military aircraft in operation or in development is critical. Reduction of aircraft signature by decreasing aircraft air data protrusions requires a knowledge of data processing and nonintrusive sensing. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 7.0-2) The US leads the world in vehicle FCS primarily because of software and CAD expertise. However, many countries, such as France, Russia, and the UK, now have autonomous capability in aircraft flight control, some of which has been adopted from a wide variety of US commercial and military aircraft.
7-3
Table 7.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY AIRFOILS, VARIABLE GEOMETRY
Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., response, shape, rates). EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE Smart materials Digital air vehicle and control system dynamic computer models; CAD development software; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for linking design parameters to vehicle dynamic models. None identified Digital air vehicle and control system dynamic computer models; CAD development software; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems. Digital air vehicle and control system dynamic computer models; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for developing power controllers. Air vehicle rigid, flexible and control system dynamic computer models; CAD development software; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for linking design parameters with flexible vehicle dynamics. Digital air vehicle and control system dynamic computer models; CAD development software; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems. Integrated air vehicle control system, structural and propulsion dynamic computer models; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for linking individual disciplinary models. Digital air vehicle and control system dynamic computer models; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for linking individual disciplinary models. Integrated air vehicle control system, structural and propulsion dynamic computer models; pilot in-the-loop simulators; ground and flight testing of prototype systems; CAD tools for linking propulsion and vehicle dynamic models. Unique computer models and laser velocimetry CAD Development Tools for linking algorithms and aircraft shapes WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E
CONTROLLER, MULTI-AXIS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Fixed wing - external robustness to maximize L/D configured airfoil from supersonic only to include high subsonic region. Helicopter Dynamically optimized airload distribution on rotors for 50% reduction in acoustic signature and 60% less vibration; Bandwidth of > 3 Hz Cooper-Harper rating of < 3; No pilot induced oscillation (PIO) due to rate limiting
Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits, thresholds). Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., power switching logic, gains, time constants). Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits) for military applications. Automatic verification and validation tools. Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits). Automatic verification and validation tools. Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits). Automatic verification and validation tools. Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits). Automatic verification and validation tools. Algorithms and verified data containing actual design parameters (e.g., gains, time constants, limits). Automatic verification and validation tools. Compensation algorithms and verified data.
WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E
ELECTRIC ACTUATORS
Output power > 4 hp; Rate > 50 deg/s; Acceleration > 100 inches/sec2; Bandwidth > 4 Hz 30% reduction in pilot fatigue in 12 Hz region caused by turbulence induced structural oscillations; minimize flutter for aeroelasticity induced airspeed limits; 50% increase in structural fatigue life.
Rare earth magnets; see Materials
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, ACTIVE
None identified
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, FULL Equivalent time delay of < 100 milliseconds; AUTHORITY DIGITAL bandwidth of > 3 Hz; Aircraft loss rate per flight of < 1 x 105 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, MULTI-DISCIPLINED INTEGRATED Equivalent time delay of < 100 milliseconds; Bandwidth of > 3 Hz; Time to identify structural modes < time to double amplitude
None identified
WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7E
None identified
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, RECONFIGURABLE
Detect and respond in less than the time to reach double amplitude
None identified
WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7D, E WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7D, E
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, THRUST VECTORING
Equivalent time delay of < 100 milliseconds; Bandwidth of > 3 Hz; Rate limit > 60 deg/sec
None identified
NONCONVENTIONAL (OPTICAL/MODELING) AIR DATA SENSORS
Operation > 30,000 ft Covert Air Data with accuracy equivalent to conventional sensors
None identified
WA ML 10, 21, 22 WA Cat 7E USML VIII CCL Cat 7D, E
7-4
SECTION 7.2 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS

Overview (See Figure 7.2-1) This technology area encompasses a wide range of systems and components that form the basis for autonomous, covert navigation and motion sensing. Included are Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), various types integrated systems, and each of many distinct types of gyroscopes and accelerometers that can be found in a navigation system. Multifunction inertial components are also noted. An INS is a self-contained system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. An INS contains accelerometers and gyroscopes to sense linear and angular rate. It can be mechanized either as a gimballed platform or a strapdown inertial sensing unit employing a computer to provide the "software" equivalent of gimbals or a hybrid unit with either gimbal or strapdown features. Gyros and accelerometers can also be used as separate instruments. Separate militarily critical technology areas and parametric controls apply to gyros, accelerometers, and systems. (See Figures 7.2-2 and 7.2.3, which provide examples of applications.) Rationale (See Table 7.2-1) This technology has been driven by military requirements. The reliability of ring laser gyros and fiber optic gyros has allowed for an expanding list of military and commercial applications. INS and their respective sensor components have wide applications in commercial transport and civil aircraft, surveying, research, and robotics. The GAO/NSIAD Report 93-67 of March 1993 noted, however, that "the technical data for nonmilitary INS is the same as for military INS and is particularly sensitive because it enables the licensee to manufacture all or part of the item." The INS and component parametric controls allow the export of INS for commercial aircraft while protecting the test equipment, software, and technology thereof. Export of INS and sensors is of extreme military concern and is specifically noted in the MTCR relative to its use for guidance and control. Military applications include strategic systems (missiles and RVs; strategic platforms); aircraft carriers, SSNs, and surface combatants; aircraft; tactical missiles; and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and command and control (C2) require high navigation accuracy. Low-speed vehicles employ INS navigation and attitude data for weapon direction and fire control. Commercial uses include launch vehicles, satellites, oil drilling platforms, directional drilling systems, dredging platforms, submersibles, hydrographic and natural resource survey vessels, ships, aircraft, automobiles, trucks, trains, and robotic production. Inertial navigation systems technology has been enhanced by advances in computer technology (memory capacity, throughput, and filters), sensor advancements, and electronics. However, levels of parametric controls that are traceable to critical and significant military capabilities have been developed.
Inertial Navigation Systems & Related Components

Autonomous/Covert Navigation Error Rate World Wide Data Accurate Positioning & Control Anti-Jam/Anti-Spoof Compensation

Aircraft, RPVs, UAVs Ground Vehicle Systems Satellites Marine Systems - Ships - Submarines/Submersibles Missiles
Figure 7.2-1.
Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 7.0-2) The technology gap between the US and other nations is rapidly closing. The US leads the world in most inertial technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, alignment, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. However, France, Israel, UK, PRC, and Russia are rapidly closing the gap. Russia and the PRC have produced conventional inertial products and have initial production capability in ring laser and fiber optic gyros. Russia has developed some flexure rotor and magnetically suspended gyroscopes, and the quality of these gyroscopes appears to be on a par with Western equipment. Since tuned rotor gyroscopes are inexpensive and very suitable for a space reentry guidance application, the acquisition of this type of technology has enhanced gyroscopic capability in maneuvering remote unmanned vehicles. Nations who are developing an inertial capability include Australia, Brazil, PRC, India, Israel, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. Italy, Brazil, and Sweden
7-5
have the capability to produce conventional spinning wheel inertial devices. Recent international conferences indicated a wide INS knowledge base in Russia and China. Russia produces both single-mode and multi-mode fibers, but the quality has not been ascertained. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has orchestrated the fiber optic industry as a critical industry of which fiber optic gyros are a small part of the market. The importance of fiber optic sensors to Japan is indicated by the fact that the Japan Research and Development Corporation has specific cognizance of this technology. Several
countries are now imbedding GPS receivers into their INS. The capabilities of the UK, France, and Japan are nearly equal to the US except for the most precise inertial systems and sensors. All these countries have pursued the evolution of inertial technology from spinning mass to floated gyro to dynamically tuned gyro to ring laser gyro and now to fiber optic gyros. Some have concentrated on only a few of these technologies. Germany, Japan, and Israel have developed fewer of these technologies than the US, UK, and France and have less total system integration experience.
1 nautical mile < 10 g 10 < g < 100
earth rate
FLIGHT CONTROL SMART MUNITIONS
1,000
MISSILE INTERCEPTOR
TACTICAL MISSILE MIDCOURSE GUIDANCE AHRS
SCALE FACTOR STABILITY (ppm)
1,000
SCALE-FACTOR STABILITY (ppm)
DTG
STELLARAIDED RV AHRS TORPEDOES
TACTICAL MISSILE MIDCOURSE GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION
ROBOTICS
100 50
STELLAR-AIDED REENTRY
100
FLOATED GYRO ESG

STRATEGIC MISSILE
RLG
MISSILE INTERCEPTOR
CRUISE MISSILE TANKS AIRCRAFT
10
STELLAR AIDED
RATE AND INTEGRATING GYROS
10
MECHANICAL FLOATED INSTRUMENTS MECHANICAL PENDULOUS REBALANCE ACCELEROMETERS
CRUISE MISSILE NAVIGATION SURVEYING
AUTONOMOUS SUBMARINE
SELF-ALIGNING STRATEGIC MISSILE
POINTING AND TRACKING
RLG
UNAIDED RV
STELLAR-AIDED STRATEGIC MISSILE
0.1 0.000015
0.00015
0.0015
0.015
0.15
1.5
15
150
1500
1 /sec
0.1 0.1 1
HIGH PERFORMANCE
10
50
MEDIUM PERFORMANCE
100
1,000
LOW PERFORMANCE
10,000
HIGH PERFORMANCE
MEDIUM PERFORMANCE BIAS STABILITY (deg/h)
LOW PERFORMANCE
BIAS STABILITY (g)
Figure 7.2-2. Gyro Technology Applications (shaded area is militarily critical region)
Figure 7.2-3. Accelerometer Technology Applications (shaded area is militarily critical region)
7-6
Table 7.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY For Aircraft, Vehicle or Spacecraft for attitude, guidance and control - Nav error < 0.8 nmi/hr 50% CEP For ships - Nav error of < 0.8 nmi in 3 hrs For missiles - Nav error of < 2 nmi/hr Or specified to function at linear acceleration > 10 g on any platform For A/C, Vehicle or Spacecraft - Nav error < 0.8 nm/hr 50% CEP For ships - Nav error of < 0.8 nmi in 3 hrs For missiles - Nav error of < 2 nmi/h Or specified to function at linear Acceleration > 10 g on any platform CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment Ships motion simulator CAD development tools for linking various design parameters UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. INS alignment time for moving platform and transfer alignment techniques EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E Algorithms and verified data WA ML 9, 11, 21, needed to exceed militarily 22 critical parameters. WA Cat 7A, B, D, Source code for combining E INS with Doppler, GNSS or MTCR 9 DBRN. USML VIII, 121.16 INS initial align time for CCL Cat 7A, B, D, moving platform. E Transfer align techniques and reference to geoid Algorithms and verified data WA ML 9, 11, 21, needed to exceed militarily 22 critical parameters. WA Cat 7A, B, D, Source code for combining E INS with GNSS. MTCR 9 INS initial align time for USML VIII, 121.16 moving platform. CCL Cat 7A, B, D, Transfer align techniques E and reference to geoid
HYBRID NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
None identified
Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. GNSS receivers require special simulator testing systems. CAD development tools for linking various design parameters
INERTIAL/GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)
GYRO ASTRO TRACKING DEVICES
For A/C, Vehicle or Spacecraft - Nav error < 0.8 nm/hr 50% CEP Pointing accuracy < 75 arc sec For ships - Nav error of < 0.8 nmi in 3 hrs For missiles - Nav error of < 2 nmi/hr Or specified to function at linear acceleration > 10 g on any platform Signal decryption (anti spoof) and/or nullsteerable antenna, jamming protection. Accuracy of < 20 meter 50% SEP in position and < 200 nanosecond in time. < 0.1 m/s velocity > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 kts Azimuth accuracy < 75 arc seconds Or specified to function at linear acceleration >10 g on any platform
None identified
Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. GNSS receivers require special simulator testing systems. CAD development tools for linking various design parameters
None identified
Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment including clock accuracy of 1 microsecond/24 hrs Star signal simulators CAD development tools for linking various design parameters Gyro tuning test and dynamic balance station Gyro run-in motor test station Evacuation and fill stations Centrifuge fixtures for gyro bearings Scatterometers-accuracy > 10 ppm Profilometers-accuracy < 5 angstrom Fiber winding machines CAD development tools for linking various design parameters
Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Source code for combining with INS. Transfer align techniques and reference to geoid
GYROSCOPES
Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for None identified < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform See Figure 7.2-2
WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E Algorithms and verified data WA ML 9, 11, 21, needed to exceed militarily 22 critical parameters. WA Cat 7A, B, D, Error compensation for E environmental effects and MTCR 9 technology characteristics USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E
(cont'd)
7-7
Table 7.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
ACCELEROMETERS
Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT
Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment Accelerometer axis align stations Programmable dividing head CAD development tools for linking various design parameters Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment Accelerometer axis align stations
UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS

Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics Algorithms and verified data needed for compensation
EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE

WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E
None identified Bias stability of < 130 micro g or Scale factor stability of < 130 ppm or Specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform See Figure 7.2-3 Combination of gyro and accelerometer parameters with limiting tolerance parameter being a drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform < 3 arc minutes Refer to parameters for gyroscopes None identified
MULTI-FUNCTION INERTIAL COMPONENTS
AZIMUTH DETERMINATION SYSTEM
None identified
Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment
FLOATED GYROSCOPES
None identified Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform None identified Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform None identified Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform
Gyro dynamic balance station Gyro run-in motor test station Gyro evacuation and fill stations Centrifuge fixtures for gyro bearings
DYNAMICALLY TUNED GYROSCOPES (DTG)
Gyro tuning test station Gyro dynamic balance station Gyro run-in motor test station Gyro evacuation and fill stations Centrifuge fixtures for gyro bearings Scatterometers-accuracy < 10 ppm to characterize mirrors Profilometers-accuracy < 5 angstrom to characterize mirrors Gyro evacuation and fill stations Ion beam coating facilities Electron beam evaporation machines CAD development tools for linking various design parameters
RING LASER GYROSCOPES (RLG)
Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics
(cont'd)
7-8
Table 7.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for None identified < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Gyro evacuation and fill stations CAD development tools for linking various design parameters UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 9 USML VIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E
ELECTROSTATICALLY SUPPORTED GYROSCOPES (ESG)
FIBER OPTIC GYROSCOPES (FOG)
Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for None identified < 10 g or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform
Fiber winding machines CAD development tools for linking various design parameters
Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics
HEMISPHERICAL RESONATOR GYROSCOPES (HRG)
Gyro dynamic balance station Gyro evacuation and fill stations Surface etching techniques
Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Unique compensation techniques
MICRO ELECTRO-MECHANICAL (SILICON) GYROS
Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment Accelerometer axis align stations Ion milling Plazma Arc Electronic Sputtering
MICRO ELECTRO-MECHANICAL (SILICON) ACCELEROMETERS
Bias stability of < 130 micro g or Scale factor stability of < 130 ppm or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform
None identified
Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment Accelerometer axis align stations Ion milling Plazma Arc Electronic Sputtering
7-9
SECTION 7.3 RADIO AND DATA-BASED REFERENCED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Overview (See Figure 7.3-1) This subsection covers a limited category of technology and equipment having a wide range of dual-use applications. GNSS receivers with certain characteristics have proliferation concerns, especially when used in the differential and hybrid modes using compensating systems for improving accuracy and redundancy. Accurate time and frequency form the baseline for telecommunications and navigation. DBRN provides highly accurate position, velocity, and track under dynamic and covert conditions. DBRN systems use prestored ground and undersea terrain contour, acoustic, electromagnetic spectrum, magnetic, gravity, and stellar sensor data. Radio navigation equipment using low probability of intercept techniques also provides covert capability. Rationale (See Table 7.3-1) Accurate positioning, control, and redundancy for platforms are essential for effective coordination of military activities. Individual system accuracies depend on mission requirements. Encrypted signals of the GPS deny nonauthorized users the full capability of the systems. Nullsteerable antenna are a military response to jamming. Hybrid and DBRN systems combine the best features of different navigation systems to provide autonomous, covert, unjammable information. All radio navigation and DBRN systems rely on precise time and frequency. DBRN technology is partially derived from sensor and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. DBRN technology, leveraged by computer speed and memory, resolves data ambiguities and optimizes navigational sensor and stored data. The use of power management and phase shift key modulation reduces the emitted signal resulting in a decreased detectability and covert (stealth) operation. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 7.0-2) The US and Russia have independently developed and deployed GPS and GLONASS, respectively. The US leads the world in radio navigation and DBRN technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. The gap, however, is closing quickly as the newer technologies require, in some cases, less capital investment in the technology. Increased computational effectiveness for a given equipment volume and weight could provide an adversary with distinct navigation payoffs: (1) enhancing navigation capabilities and (2) improving reliability and resistance to hostile actions. Signal detection and processing technology is used to acquire, synchronize, and track desired signals for measurement of navigation parameters. The substantial margin of capability added by this technology is vital to continued US superiority in precision navigation and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. Highly interference-resistant receivers for satellite navigation systems are also vital.
Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems

Accuracy 3D and Time Pointing Velocity/Acceleration World Wide Reliability Compensation Autonomous/Covert
Figure 7.3-1.

Individual Combatant Aircraft, RPVs, UAVs Ground Vehicle Systems Satellites Marine Systems - Ships - Submarines/Submersibles Missiles
Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems Overview
Militarily critical signal conversion technologies contribute directly to mission effectiveness by improved anti-jamming performance, increased reliability, higher precision navigation, real-time adaptive response to hostile environments, and decreased system size, weight, and cost. The know-how to achieve improvements most beneficial to military applications depends upon integrated circuit technology and the software to support it. In this area, Russia lags the US by 3 to 5 years. France, the UK, Germany, Israel, and Japan are the leading nations that have developed end-use products that use signals from both GPS and GLONASS and DBRN for military applications. The acquisition of dual-use end-products could allow the transfer of the necessary know-how for military applications. Russia has developed the use of magnetic arrays to improve compensation for DBRN systems.
7-10
Table 7.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT
Selective Availability, Anti-Spoofing (SA/AS) Signal Simulators with SA/A-S < 200 nanosecond measurement capability ECCM or Interference Resistance Receivers Selective Availability, Anti-Spoofing (SA/AS) Signal Simulators with SA/A-S < 200 nanosecond measurement capability

Algorithms including classified, encrypted algorithms and verified data. Vehicle attitude determination
None identified GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM Signal decryption (anti spoof) and/or nullsteerable antenna, jamming protection (GNSS) Accuracy of < 20 meter 50% SEP in position and < 200 nanosecond in time and < 0.1 m/s velocity for > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 kts None identified DIFFERENTIAL GNSS Signal decryption (anti spoof) and/or nullsteerable antenna, jamming protection Accuracy of < 1 meter 50% SEP in position and < 200 nanosecond in time and < 0.1 m/s velocity for > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 kts HYBRID NAVIGATION SYSTEMS Accuracy of < 20 meter 50% SEP in position. Jamming protection to maintain PPS or < 0.1 m/s velocity for > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 kts For spacecraft - Pointing accuracy of < 50 arc sec None identified
PRECISION TIME AND FREQUENCY SUBSYSTEMS
RADAR ALTIMETERS AND DOPPLER NAVIGATION SYSTEMS HAVING POWER MANAGEMENT OR PHASE SHIFT KEY MODULATION
Signal phase (time) communication synchronization < 100 microseconds, UTC (USNO). Intersystem synchronization < 100 nanoseconds relative to other system nodes. Navigation systems < 200 nanoseconds, UTC (USNO). Frequency for reference and calibration, f / f < 1 x 1010. Non detectable in radar frequency range
Synthetic quartz Magnetic shielding materials, see Materials
WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, Algorithms including classified, encrypted algorithms and verified 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E data. MTCR 11 Differential techniques that USML XII, 121.16 provide accuracy of < 1 meter. CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E Vehicle attitude determination WA ML 9, 11, 21, Algorithms and verified data Components require specially designed needed to exceed militarily critical 22 test, calibration, or alignment equipment. WA Cat 7A, B, D, E GNSS receivers require special simulator parameters. MTCR 11 testing systems. Specially designed test, Source code for combining INS USML XII, 121.16 with Doppler, GNSS or DBRN. calibration, or alignment equipment CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E INS initial align time code for moving platform, transfer align techniques and reference to geoid WA Cat 3A, B, D, E Frequency for reference and calibration, Algorithms and verified data needed to combine clock outputs MTCR 12 f / f < 1 x 1010 USML XII, 121.16 to improve stability/accuracy CCL Cat 3A, B, D, E performance (i.e., "Ensembling") Automatically detect phase jumps or frequency perturbations and/or improve reliability from redundancy. Self monitoring. None identified Cross correlation algorithms and verified data. WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E WA ML 9, 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 7A, B, D, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 7A, B, D, E
None identified
DATA BASED (FOR EXAMPLE TERRAIN, ACOUSTIC, ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM, MAGNETIC, GRAVITY, GRAVITY GRADIENT, BATHYMETRIC, STELLAR) REFERENCED NAVIGATION
Accuracy < 100 meters CEP
None identified
Unique computer test models for Algorithms for image correlation optimization of data base manipulation and and pattern recognition. extraction Integration and data analysis algorithms and verified data
7-11
SECTION 11 - MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY

addressed under Electrical Materials. Similarly, Magnetic Materials addresses a few specific materials with military applications in magnetic shielding, sonar, and high-speed power supplies. Materials critical to the reliable transmission of electromagnetic radiation to surveillance sensors, weapon guidance systems, or for countermeasures purposes while protecting the associated electronic componentry from the environment are addressed under the Optical Materials category. Structural Materials addresses a broad range of materials classes used for the fabrication of military systems. This category is subdivided into (1) highstrength materials, which encompass those materials used for fabrication of military vehicles of virtually every shape and description and (2) high-temperature materials, which are used primarily for propulsion purposes and hypersonic airframes. Those materials such as high-temperature lubricants, hydraulic fluids, anti-fouling coatings required for US military hardware to operate reliably at superior levels of performance are addressed under the heading of Special Function Materials. Materials, systems, and arrangements used for Signature Control are addressed in section 16.
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6
Armor and Anti-Armor Materials ........................ Electrical Materials......................................... Magnetic Materials......................................... Optical Materials ........................................... Structural Materials (High Strength and High Temperature) ........................................ Special Function Materials................................ SUMMARY
11-3 11-5 11-7 11-9 11-11 11-16
O v e r v i e w (See Figure 11.0-1) Many classes of materials inherently have both military and commercial applications. While commercial applications are generally at lower performance levels than those of the military, this is not always the case. This section identifies those materials that provide specific military advantage and covers the physical properties, mechanical properties, behavior, and/or processing required to achieve that advantage. The technologies include materials engineered to defeat an enemy threat and functional materials needed to preserve the capability of high-performance hardware in daily operations. This section addresses seven categories of materials technology: the six listed above plus Biomaterials. The Biomaterials category addresses materials that function in biological application (e.g., medical implants) or are derived through biological types of processes (e.g., spider silk). This category is the subject of much R&D interest, but no militarily critical applications have been identified to date. Consequently, this category will not be discussed further in this volume. Armor materials includes those materials and material systems specifically designed to protect equipment and personnel from enemy threats. Anti-Armor materials include those materials for projectiles used to defeat enemy armor. Materials for various types of penetrators, sabots, shaped charge liners, and their launchers are included. Because of the close interaction between the design of armor systems to protect against a threat and the design of systems to defeat armor, both the subcategories of materials technology are addressed under the combined Armor and Anti-Armor materials technology area. Superconducting electrical materials that provide the capability for lightweight, compact, high-power motors, magnets, and energy storage systems are
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Sensors & Lasers Chemical & Biological Systems Information Systems
MATERIALS
TREND
Lubrication Durability Special Effects Multi-Functional Coatings Lighter/Stronger Structures Higher Temperatures
Figure 11.0-1. Materials Overview
11-1
Rationale Materials Technology provides military system designers with materials that have properties beyond those of commodity materials or provides military specific materials not otherwise available. These higher performance and/or special-purpose materials allow designers to create systems that preserve the performance advantage of US military equipment. As a result, several areas of Materials Technology, the materials themselves, and their means of production are vital to preserve cutting edge capabilities. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) All industrialized and many developing nations have significant and very often excellent materials R&D capabilities. Thus, from a basic materials technology view, many countries have at least some materials technologies that challenge US capability. In the category of armor, France, Germany, Israel and Russia are considered overall world leaders along with the US. France, Germany, Israel, Sweden, the UK, and Russia have very significant dense alloy capability pertinent to antiarmor projectile manufacture. The US is a leader in the production of electrically superconducting wire for device manufacture. The UK, Japan, and Germany are able to produce superconducting materials of similar capability materials of similar capability. A host of nations have substantial R&D efforts directed at high transition temperature superconductivity. At the moment, the US has the lead in the development of high transition temperature superconducting wire. The US is a leader in all areas of magnetic materials. Japan, Germany, France, and the UK have nearly equivalent capabilities in one or more areas of magnetic materials technology. A host of other countries either have active R&D programs or moderate production capabilities for selected magnetic materials. The US is also a leader in the technology for optical materials and coatings. However, selected optical materials are being developed or produced in the UK, Russia, Japan, Israel, and China. Aerospace and automotive applications are large commercial sector users of high-strength and high-temperature materials. Thus, any country with well-developed industries in these areas tends to have corresponding structural materials technology and production capabilities. Thus, the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia have respectable structural materials capability. France, Germany, Japan, India, and Russia are exceptionally strong in powder metallurgy and can approach or duplicate US capabilities. The US still commands a lead in aluminide intermetallic alloys because of aircraft applications. Japan and Germany are recognized leaders in monolithic ceramics, whereas France and the US have a commanding lead in ceramic matrix composite capabilities. All countries that manufacture gas turbine aeropropulsion engines have some hightemperature coating capabilities with military application potential: the US, the UK, and Japan are in the lead. Special function materials are the lubricants, seals, corrosion protection coatings, and so forth that allow US equipment to
perform at its full potential. The US holds a lead in the overall area because of the need driven by higher performance equipment. Regardless, France, the UK, and Japan have capabilities in selected functional material technologies that rival those of the US.
Country
11.1 11.2 A rmor and Electrical Anti-armor Materials Materials
11.3 Magnetic Materials
11.4 Optical Materials
11.5 Structural Materials
11.6 Special Function Ma terials
Australia Austria Brazil Canada China Czech Republic Finland France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Poland Romania Russia Slovak Republic S. Africa S. K orea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK Ukraine US
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: Al l Majority Some Limi ted
Figure 11.0-2.
Materials FTA Summary
11-2
SECTION 11.1 ARMOR AND ANTI-ARMOR MATERIALS

Overview (See Figure 11.1-1) This subsection covers armor materials which includes metals and related composites, ceramics and related composites, and organic fibers and composites. Of special interest are ceramics that are near theoretical (> 98 percent) density, e.g., titanium diboride, boron carbide, and aluminum oxide; composite material; arrays of metal plates; ceramics; arrays of woven cloth; ceramics and metals; ceramics or single crystal whiskers in a bonded matrix; layers of metals; and high-explosive and very dense materials. Applications include body armor and vehicle armor protection of platforms/ vehicles, satellites, and tactical shelters. Anti-armor materials include steel, titanium, ceramics, and applique arrangements. Anti-armor materials of concern include forged or explosively formed or rolled molybdenum, tantalum, tungsten, and depleted uranium (DU). Rationale (See Table 11.1-1) Performance needs in armor and anti-armor materials depend on specific systems and threats. Deployment of appropriate armor with behavior more advanced than that of an adversary and use of antiarmor materials more advanced than those of the adversary provide the US a higher level of survivability and lethality, respectively. Much of weaponry's success depends on the performance of materials that are effective against hard targets, armored vehicles, aircraft, and space vehicles. Improved models of the dynamic behavior of materials are essential to understand and optimize the effects of projectiles on the target or to maximize the protection afforded by materials in their defeat. Control of microstructure and processing of armor and anti-armor materials are crucial for achieving performance and properties needed by the military. Computer codes for the performance of anti-armor components against specific targets and armor, including Arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian and Combined Arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian codes are of special use here. High-quality, antiarmor materials for such uses as penetrators and warheads increase the rate of attrition as adversaries adopt improved armor materials. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) Generally, the US is considered to be ahead of potential adversaries in armor/anti-armor materials; however, Russia ranks as a world leader and China is not far behind. US capabilities are a generation ahead of former Warsaw Bloc countries (e.g., Czech Republic and Poland) except Russia. These countries are involved in
Armor & Anti-Armor Materials

High Strength, Fracture Resistant Alloys High Density Alloys Near-Theoretical Density Ceramics (boron carbide, aluminum oxide) Composite and Applique Configurations

Endoatmospheric Projectiles Armor Piercing Projectiles Artillery and Mortar Rounds Body Armor, Aircraft Armor, Vehicle Armor Armor for Platforms and Shielding for Tactical Shelters Missiles, Ships, Submarines
Figure 11.1-1.
Armor and Anti-Armor Materials Overview
sales of armor and munitions. In general, only the US can easily produce the critical items in quantities and qualities of military significance. Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland could go into production of armor/anti-armor materials with ease. Israel and South Africa have well-developed capabilities in both areas. The reactive armor concept, first developed in the US and then adopted in Russia, Israel, and other countries, is now being developed by other countries. For this field overall, the most able nations are France, Russia, Israel and Germany, followed by China, Japan, and the UK. A number of countries, notably the Netherlands, South Korea, South Africa, France, Israel, Russia, Japan and the UK, are developing or producing personal armor.
11-3
Table 11.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Armor and Anti-Armor Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Manufacturing, inspection and test equipment for projectile components and subcomponents UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE CCL EAR 99
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY TUNGSTEN Elongation >3% yield strength > 1250 MPa Not applicable Ultimate tensile strength greater than 1270 MPa (185,900 psi) Density > 17.5 g/cm3. COPPER, MOLYBDENUM OR TANTULUM Density greater than 95% of theoretical Not applicable
SHAPED CHARGE LINERS
DEPLETED URANIUM
SILICON CARBIDE TITANIUM DIBORIDE BORON CARBIDE COMPOSITE MATERIALS SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR KE ABSORPTION TO
In bar stock and as fabricated penetrators Not applicable density greater than 18.0 gm/cm3, Yield strength greater than 850 MPa, Ultimate tensile strength greater than 1200 MPa; elongation > 20% Density equal or greater than 98% theoretical Not applicable Density equal or greater than 98% theoretical Not applicable Density equal or greater than 98% theoretical Not applicable
Shear/spin forming equipment capable of Programs to control forging WA ML 16, 18, 21, forming these materials to required and rolling of these materials 22 tolerances WA Cat 2B, D, E USML XXI, 121.10 CCL Cat 2B, D, E None identified None identified WA ML 3, 21, 22 USML III, XXI
Arrays of metal plate & low density foams or Not applicable arrays of metal plates, ceramics and adhesive, RESIST FRAGMENTATION OR TO IMPEDE or arrays of woven cloth, ceramics and metals; SHOCK WAVE TRANSMISSION or Ceramics or single crystal whiskers in a bonded matrix; or Layers of metals and high explosives & very dense material, all in configurations specially designed to absorb kinetic energy, to resist fragmentation, to impede transmission of shock waves or to change the orientation of a projectile prior to penetration. Thus, each configuration is application-design specific.
CCL EAR 99 WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E WA ML 13, 18, 22 USML X
11-4
SECTION 11.2 ELECTRICAL MATERIALS

Overview (See Figure 11.2-1) This subsection covers a limited group of superconducting materials in the form of wires, which permit very high field magnets and solenoids to perform at levels unattainable by other means. Superconducting wire is included in the 1995 DoD S&T plan. Rationale (See Table 11.2-1) Electrical materials are considered militarily significant because their use in military systems provides superior performance levels. Superconducting material that can be formed into very thin lower transition temperature wire is considered an essential component for both highenergy density inductive energy storage for airborne or space platforms and propulsion systems for quiet ships and submarines. High transition temperature superconducting ceramic oxide wire can also be used to make magnets and solenoids that have the same applications as low transition temperature superconducting wire, including high energy density inductive energy storage for airborne or space platforms; propulsion systems for quiet ships and submarines; and magnetic mine sweeping. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) The US is a leader in research and production of superconducting wire. Japan, Germany, and the UK have substantial R&D as well as commercialization of low transition temperature superconducting wire with levels competitive with those of the US. In high transition temperature superconducting wire, the US has the lead for the moment, with no material yet commercially available. Finland, France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Switzerland have excellent and substantial R&D efforts. To a lesser extent, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, South Korea, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and Taiwan are involved in R&D on superconducting wire.
Electrical Materials

Light Weight, High Conductivity Ultra-Low Power Loss Conductors

Energy Storage Systems Minesweeping Magnets High Efficiency Motors Energy Transmission
Figure 11.2-1.
Electrical Materials Overview
11-5
Table 11.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Electrical Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY MULTIFILAMENTARY With lengths exceeding 100 m or with mass Nb SUPERCONDUCTIVE COMPOSITE exceeding 100 g; and CONDUCTORS CONTAINING NIOBIUM(1) Embedded in a matrix other than a copper or TITANIUM copper-based mixed matrix; or (2) With a cross-sectional area less than 28 square micrometers. SUPERCONDUCTIVE COMPOSITE With lengths exceeding 100 m or with mass Nb CONDUCTORS CONSISTING OF ONE OR exceeding 100 g; and MORE SUPERCONDUCTIVE FILAMENTS (1) 9.85 K< Tc < 24 K at B = 0; EXCLUDING NIOBIUM-TITANIUM AND (2) With cross-sectional area < 28 square CERAMIC OXIDES micrometers; and (3) Which remain in superconducting state at T = 4.2 K when exposed to a magnetic field corresponding to B = 12 T or greater SUPERCONDUCTIVE COMPOSITE With lengths exceeding 100 m and Tc > 24 K at None identified CONDUCTORS CONSISTING OF ONE OR B = 0; and MORE SUPERCONDUCTIVE FILAMENTS which has "overall current density" of 10,000 CONTAINING CERAMIC OXIDES amps/square centimeter exposed to a magnetic field corresponding to B = 2 T or greater
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
11-6
SECTION 11.3 MAGNETIC MATERIALS

Overview (See Figure 11.3-1) This subsection covers types and applications of magnetic materials that are militarily significant. These include (1) high relative permeability nickel-rich iron-nickel alloy sheets with 4 percent to 6 percent molybdenum; (2) magnetostrictive alloys, primarily rare earth iron alloys; and (3) both amorphous alloy strips and nanocrystalline alloy strips consisting of iron, cobalt, and/or nickel with boron, silicon, or phosphorous. Magnetostrictive alloys are included in the 1995 DoD S&T plan. Magnetic materials is an area where significant R&D activity is taking place in both nongovernment and government laboratories as well as abroad. Rationale (See Table 11.3-1) Magnetic materials are militarily significant because their use in military systems provides performance levels that give US forces a military advantage. Very thin (less than 0.05 mm) high relative permeability metal sheet (relative permeability greater than 1.2 105) is used to achieve lightweight magnetic shielding of navigation satellite electronics. Without the shielding capabilities, the navigational accuracy of the GPS would be significantly reduced because of EMI. Other magnetic materials offer shielding but with a substantial weight penalty relative to the nickel-rich ironnickel alloys currently being used. Magnetostrictive alloys are needed for magneto-acoustic sonar systems to detect submarines and other objects under water. Amorphous/nanocrystalline magnetic alloy strips are required as a critical component of very high-speed power supplies, including those used in EMP simulators. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) The US is a leader in all areas of magnetic materials. Japan has comparable capabilities to the US in all areas, with a very aggressive magnetic materials R&D program. In the area of high permeability magnetic materials, Germany and France's capabilities are comparable to those of the US. In the area of high permeability magnetic alloys, the UK's capabilities are slightly below those of the US. Other countries that have moderate production capabilities for high permeability magnetic materials are Austria, Canada, China, Russia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, S. Korea,
Magnetic Materials

Light Weight, High Quality Magnetic Shielding High Efficiency Mechanical Coupling Ultra-Low Loss and High Speed Magnetic

GPS Satellites Sonar MAD Directed Energy Devices EMP Simulators
Figure 11.3-1.
Magnetic Materials Overview
Romania, S. Africa, and Taiwan. In the area of magnetostrictive alloys, both Sweden and the UK's capabilities are similar to the US. Countries with considerable capabilities in magnetostrictive alloys include China, France, Germany, Israel, and Russia. Australia, Canada, Italy, Poland, and Spain are also active in R&D of magnetostrictive alloys. In amorphous/nanocrystalline materials, although not comparable to the US and Japan, several countries are involved in R&D including India, Russia, the Slovak Republic, and Spain.
11-7
Table 11.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY HIGH PERMEABILITY ALLOYS
Magnetic Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Hydrogen Anneal Equipment UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
MAGNETOSTRICTIVE ALLOYS
AMORPHOUS ALLOYS
NANOCRYSTALLINE ALLOYS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Sheets with initial relative permeability (for fully annealed materials) of 120,000 or more;. Thickness of 0.05 mm or less; typically, but not limited to, Ni rich Fe-Ni with Mo concentrations of 4 to 6% With saturation magnetostriction > 500; ppm; or magnetomechanical coupling factor (k) > 0.8; primarily but not limited to rare earth alloys Strips with a composition having at least 75 weight percent Fe, Co, or Ni; and a saturation magnetic induction (Bs) of 16 kG or more; Strip thickness of 0.02 mm or less; or an electrical resistivity of 0.0002 ohm-cm or more Strips with a composition having at least 75 weight percent Fe, Co or Ni; and a grain size < 50 nm saturation magnetic induction (Bs) of 16 kG or more; and, a strip thickness of 0.02 mm or less; or an electrical resistivity of 0.0002 ohm-cm or more
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
11-8
SECTION 11.4 OPTICAL MATERIALS

Overview (See Figure 11.4-1) This subsection includes mature material technologies for linear and nonlinear optical transmission in the visible and/or IR spectral regimes, including bulk materials and thin films and coatings. Special emphasis is placed on materials and coatings that are affordable, maintainable, and durable in the harsh environments experienced in military operations, such as the high-speed exposure to rain and dust and/or high temperatures and the high structural loads associated with high-speed, maneuvering flight. This subsection includes (1) IR Optical Materials, (2) IR coating materials for protection against hazardous environments, (3) germanium optics, (4) specialty transparent materials for coatings and filters, (5) nonlinear optical (NLO) materials for wavelength conversion, and (6) substrates and optical thin film coatings for high energy laser optical components (mirrors, beamsplitters and windows). Rationale (See Table 11.4-1) Target detection by FLIR systems and guidance of IR guided missiles depends on the performance of optical materials. Both FLIRs and missile seekers often operate in hostile environmental conditions such as rain and dust and EO countermeasures and often at supersonic speeds. These capabilities are provided, in part, by optical materials and/or coatings and affect the delivery accuracy and lethality of guided weapons systems. Access to the materials and coatings technology could increase adversary capabilities by making a much superior material and/or optical coating/filter for windows, domes, and optical elements for optical (EO) sensor systems capabilities available to hostile forces. The current US technology lead translates into a significant combat advantage for US military forces. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) Some of the materials and coatings technologies covered in this technology area are being developed and/or produced in the UK, Russia, Japan, Israel, Germany, and China. In particular, China has an emphasis in NLO materials development. The focus in the other countries is on linear optical materials. In addition, Belgium has a dormant (mothballed) capability for ZnS and ZnSe.
Optical Materials

Transparency Manufacturing Accuracy Resistance to Harsh Mission Environments Purity/quality Production Size/Capability

Infrared Windows for Airborne Systems Surveillance Seekers LIDAR Systems
Figure 11.4-1.
Optical Materials Overview
11-9
Table 11.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Optical Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE EXPORT SOFTWARE CONTROL AND PARAMETERS REFERENCE None identified WA Cat 2B, D, E WA Cat 6C, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 6C, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY IR OPTICAL ELEMENTS (I.E. BULK Transparent over any portion of the 112 OPTICAL MATERIALS IN microns spectral band and strength > 48 MPa COMBINATION WITH APPROPRIATE (7 ksi), COATINGS) plus any of the following: plate size > 8 cm diameter, or domes of any size, or withstand 2 mm dia. raindrop impacts at 2.5 cm/hr rate at > Mach 1.0, or survive aerothermal heating rate > 100 w/cm2 IR COATING MATERIALS FOR Rain and dust erosion; oxidation resistant at PROTECTION AGAINST HAZARDOUS > 700 C; antireflection ENVIRONMENTS. GERMANIUM (Ge) OPTICS Resistivity < 15 ohm cm Absorption .03 cm1 @ 10.6 microns; Diameter > 15 cm; Withstand blowing sand at 8 m/s wind velocity with particle density > 1.0 gm/m3 and particle size distribution 74350 microns SPECIALTY TRANSPARENT Selectable or variable bandpass or narrow MATERIALS FOR COATINGS/FILTERS rejection in 0.220 micron spectral region
ZnS and ZnSe > 100 cm3 in Equipment for rapid polishing of IR window materials. volume or Single point diamond turning machines > 8 cm diameter with thickness > 2 cm.
Diamond-like carbon (DLC), Equipment for measuring absolute None identified diamond, MgO, ThF4, BP, reflectance to an accuracy of 0.1%. Ge Ge Equipment for rapid polishing of IR None identified windows and domes
WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E CCL EAR 99
Selected oxides and dielectrics (application dependent) ZnGeP2; KTA; GaSe; RTA CdGeAs2; RTA Si, SiC low water fused silica coating materials ThF4, ZnSe, SiOZ, TiO2, ZrO2, Nb2O5, Al2O3
NONLINEAR OPTICAL (NLO)

MATERIALS FOR WAVELENGTH CONVERSION HEL OPTICAL COMPONENTS, MIRRORS, BEAMSPLITTERS, WINDOWS
Spectral bandpass at 212 microns; average output power > 2 watts Substrates Diameter > 7.025 m for single crystal Si and SiC Low water fused silica < 199 ppm water Optical coating with total loss supply
For control of coating deposition, Controls for especially thickness & composition. deposition of coatings/in situ characterization of coatings. None identified None identified
WA Cat 6C, E CCL Cat 6C, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E
Single point diamond turning coating None identified vacuum chamberscharacteristic equipment to measure absorptance (laser calorimetry), TIS, BRDF, Scatter reflectance
11-10
SECTION 11.5
STRUCTURAL MATERIALS (HIGH-STRENGTH AND HIGH-TEMPERATURE)
Overview (See Figure 11.5-1) Structural materials technology includes development, synthesis, processing, and characterization of a wide class of monolithic alloy and composite materials, as well as specialized coatings. Because the structural materials category is so broad, it has been subdivided into (1) high-strength materials used for fabrication of platforms, vehicles, and weapons and (2) high-temperature materials used primarily for propulsion. High strength materials are very numerous, even for military systems, and include both ferrous and nonferrous metal alloys and both metal and polymer matrix composites. Included are maraging ultrahigh strength and high-strength low alloy steels; high-strength magnesium, aluminum and titanium alloys; aluminum-lithium alloys; and magnesium-, aluminum- and polymer-matrix composites, including both matrix and reinforcement constituents. Materials suitable for use at high temperature include iron-, nickel-, and cobalt-based superalloys and advanced intermetallics; tungsten and molybdenum alloys; oxide, carbide, nitride, and boride ceramics (in monolithic and composite forms); carbon-carbon composites, "high-temperature" aluminum alloys; and hightemperature protective coatings. This technology also serves as the base for emerging system technology advances. In general, structural materials have numerous dual-use applications. Rationale (See Tables 11.5-1a and b) Structural materials are the backbone of all military platforms, and they often provide secondary or additional capabilities, such as signature control or optical performance. High-temperature and highstrength materials technology is very important for military systems. Their most important uses are as mechanically and thermally stressed components in propulsion systems; thermal protection for re-entry bodies, leading edges, missile motor case insulation; and coatings in gas turbines. When used in military systems, these materials are driven closer to their inherent performance limits than when used in most civil sector applications. The superiority of materials properties and behavior can be directly translatable into systems performance for overcoming capabilities of potential adversaries. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) Leaders in the advanced ferrous metallurgy technology area include the UK, Japan, Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, Japan, China, Korea, India, Israel, Canada, South Africa, and Russia. All have capabilities of an advanced nature in ferrous alloys. In nonferrous alloys, and especially in aluminum and titanium, leaders include
Structural Materials

High Strength Reliable High Temperature Performance Light Weight Increased Durability Lower Life Cycle Costs Increased Range Better Survivability
Figure 11.5-1.

Spacecraft Missiles Aircraft Armor Ships Submersibles
Structural Materials Overview
Russia, Japan, the UK, Germany, and France. Metal matrix materials capabilities are strong in Japan, and to a lesser degree in the UK, France, and Germany. Polymer matrix composite capabilities are very widespread in the world. Advanced capabilities exist in Japan, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Israel and the Netherlands. Superalloy work is at a high level in the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and Russia. Capabilities for high-temperature protective coatings are linked to superalloy capabilities in these same countries. Advanced intermetallics capabilities exist in Japan, China, Sweden, and the UK. Both monolithic and composite ceramics technology is at very high levels in Japan, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Canada. Carbon-carbon composite efforts are very good in Japan, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, the UK and China.
11-11
Table 11.5-1a.
High-Strength Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Not included EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY THERMOPLASTIC POLYMERIC RESINS The capability of having polymer components, Aromatic liquid FOR ELEVATED TEMPERATURE seals, or composite structures or laminates that crystal APPLICATIONS can operate at temperatures 523 K (250 C) polymers, polyarylene ketones, polyarylene ether ketones, polyarylene sulfides, polyarylene sulfones, polyarylene ether sulfones and other polyarylene materials FLUORINATED AND NONFLUORINATED The ability to perform at temperatures 205 C Fluorinated and POLYMERIC MATERIALS FOR THE (400 F) in operation nonfluorinated MATRICES OF COMPOSITE polymers; STRUCTURES OR LAMINATES bismaleimides; aromatic polyamideimides; aromatic polyimides; aromatic polyetherimides RESIN IMPREGNATED FIBER Any fiber above Specific tensile strength 23.5 x 104 m and PREPREGS UTILIZING FIBROUS OR Specific modulus 13.87 x 106 m for fibers or AS4/T-500 and FILAMENTARY REINFORCEMENTS filaments Tg > 145 C after cure (As determined matrix Tg > 145 C after cure by ASTM D4065 or national equivalents) FIBROUS OR FILAMENTARY POLYMERIC Organic fibers or filaments with specific tensile None identified MATERIALS strength > 3.6 GPa and tensile modulus > 130 GPa and for use above 330 C (540 F) COMPOSITE MATERIALS OR LAMINATES Fibers with specific modulus of 13.87 x 106 m Any fiber with THAT CONTAIN CONTINUOUS CARBON properties and OR INORGANIC FIBROUS OR indicated under specific strength of > 23.05 x 104 m; FILAMENTARY MATERIALS WITH A militarily critical matrix Tg > 145 C after cure. POLYMER MATRIX parameters ALUMINUM ALLOYS (PM) Ultimate tensile strength of > 240 MPa (35 ksi) None identified at 200 C, 415 MPa (60 ksi) at 25 C, with specified powder parameters; of composition Al-Mg-X; Al-X-Mg; Al-Zm-X; Al-X-Zm; Al-Fe-X; Al-X-Fe made by powder metallurgy.
None identified
None identified
Prepregging equipment, fibers, fiber Not included treatment, resins and combination of all of these. None identified None identified
All equipment associated with the production of high performance organic matrix composite components and structures
Not included
WA Cat 1A, B, C, E CCL Cat 1A, B, C, E WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
Equipment to carry out process Not included specified in WAWG 2 Item 1.C.2.b.2. Equipment for producing and processing contamination free alloy powder.
cont'd)
11-12
Table 11.5-1a.
TECHNOLOGY ALUMINUM AND ALUMINUM ALLOY
MATRIX COMPOSITES
High-Strength Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Stiffness > 103 GPa (15 Msi) and Fracture toughness > 297 MPa root m (18 ksi) root in. A temperature that supports sustained combustion 220 C (400 F) higher than that of traditional structural titanium alloys Tensile strength 1100 MPa (160,000 psi) Elastic modulus 172 GPa (25 Msi) and Density 4.4 x 103 kg/m3 (0.16 lb/in.3). CRITICAL MATERIALS Reinforcement fibers and protective fiber coatings None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Process control software EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE CCL EAR 99
TITANIUM (BURN-RESISTANT) SUCH AS PRATT & WHITNEY "ALLOY C" (PROPRIETARY COMPOSITION), OR EQUIVALENT. TITANIUM-MATRIX COMPOSITES
HIGH THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY CARBON Thermal conductivity Ka 1000 watts/mC

FIBERS TWO DIMENSIONALLY (2D) REINFORCED CARBON FIBER CARBON MATRIX COMPOSITES
Procedures and equipment designed Not included for contamination free processing of alloys and powders or for superplastic forming and diffusion bonding. Reinforcement Hot isostatic pressing and canning Process control softfibers and equipment. ware, consolidation titanium alloy foil models, and fiber spacing procedures. None identified None identified None identified Densification, weaving, automated fabrication, process control, high temp. sensors, processing (CVD, CVI, pitch impregnation, copyrolysis). Fiber production, fiber treatments, carbon and metal infiltration equipment. Not included
CCL EAR 99
CCL EAR 99
CCL EAR 99 WA Cat 1A, B, C, E CCL Cat 1A, B, C, E
Specific modulus exceeding 10.15 x 106m; and Fibers, including Specific tensile strength exceeding 17.7 x 104m pitch, PAN, high thermal conductivity fibers, high modulus fibers COMPOSITE MATERIALS OR LAMINATES Carbon fibers with specific tensile strength Any fiber with THAT CONTAIN CONTINUOUS CARBON properties > 17.7 x 104 m and OR INORGANIC FIBROUS OR indicated under Specific modulus > 10.15 x 105 m; Inorganic FILAMENTARY MATERIALS WITHIN militarily critical fibers with specific tensile modulus METAL OR CARBON MATRICES parameters > 2.54 x 106m and Melting/ softening/decomposition point > 1650 C ULTRA HIGH STRENGTH/HIGH Yield strength > 1.965 GPa (285 ksi) toughness None identified TOUGHNESS STEEL > 111 MPa root in. (100 ksi root in) INORGANIC FIBERS AND FILAMENTARY Having specific modulus > 2.54 x 106 m None identified MATERIALS (1650 C) and A melting or decomposition point > 1,922 K in an inert environment
Not included
WA Cat 1A, B, C, E CCL Cat 1A, B, C, E
"AerMet 100," patented by Carpenter None identified Technology Co. Equipment for converting polymeric Not included fibers into carbon or silicon carbide fibers; equip for chemical vapor deposition; equipment for wet spinning of refractory ceramics and equip for converting aluminum to alumina fibers
CCL EAR 99 WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
11-13
Table 11.5-1b.
TECHNOLOGY
High-Temperature Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY TITANIUM ALLOYS (MADE FROM METAL Advanced propulsion titanium alloys; stress Titanium alloy ALLOY POWDER OR PARTICULATES OR rupture life of 10,000 hours or longer at 450 C at powder made in CAST OR WROUGHT) a stress of 200 MPa controlled environment from melt or mechanical alloying TITANIUM ALUMINIDES Either ductility of > 0.5% elongation at 25 C or Not applicable Tensile strength of > 250 MPa at 870 C and Containing >10 weight % of aluminum; in crude or semi-fabricated forms, containing at least one additional alloying element TITANIUM-ALUMINIDE MATRIX Tensile strength > 1172 MPa at 540 C, Reinforcement COMPOSITES Creep resistance > 300 h at 634 MPa at 540 C fibers, aluminide and foil and >10,000 cycle low cycle fatigue life at 650 C contaminationand 634 MPa free aluminide powder NICKEL-BASED ALLOYS MADE FROM Stress rupture life > 10,000 hours at 550 MPa Nickel alloy METAL ALLOY POWDER OR (80 ksi), 650 C, or powder made in PARTICULATE MATERIAL A low cycle fatigue life of 10,000 cycles or more a controlled at 550 C at a maximum stress of 700 MPa environment from the melt or by mechanical alloying BULK GRAPHITES Bulk density of at least 17.2 g/cc measured at Not applicable 15 C and having a particle size of 100 mm or less DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION OF Formed on mold or mandrel from precursor Not applicable PYROLYTICALLY DERIVED MATERIALS gases which decompose in 1,300 to 2,900 C temp and range at pressure of 1 mm to 150 mm CERAMIC-CERAMIC COMPOSITE Tensile strength > 105 MPa (15 ksi) at 1000 C Not applicable
MATERIALS WITH MATRICES OF SILICON, ZIRCONIUMOR BORON CARBIDE OR NITRIDE, REINFORCED WITH FIBERS FROM THE C, SI-N, SI-C, SI-C-O-N, SI-AL-O-N, OR SI-O-N SYSTEMS OR MATRICES OF ALUMINUM OXIDE OR ALUMINUM NITRIDE, REINFORCED WITH ALUMINA FIBERS CERAMIC-CERAMIC COMPOSITE Tensile strength > 105 MPa (15 ksi) at 1000 C MATERIALS WITH A GLASS OXIDEMATRIX REINFORCED WITH FIBERS FROM ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS: SI-N, SI-C, SI-AL-O-N; OR SI-O-N; C, OR "NICALON"
Vacuum, gas or rotary atomization, Not included splat quenching, melt spinning and comminution, mechanical alloying or plasma spray, cospray or osprey process
Vacuum, gas or rotary atomization, Not included splat quenching, melt spinning and comminution, mechanical alloying or plasma spray, cospray or osprey process Hot isostatic pressing and canning Process control equipment. software
CCL EAR 99
Vacuum, gas or rotary atomization, Not included splat quenching, melt spinning and comminution, mechanical alloying or plasma spray, cospray or osprey process
None identified
None identified
MTCR 8 USML 121.16
Specifically designed nozzles for processing NDE methods still in development
Software for MTCR 7 development, production USML 121.16 and use; know-how Not included WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
B-Mg-Al silicate None identified (Compglas) with C or silicon carbide fibers; "Blackglass" (SiO2+C)
None identified
(cont'd)
11-14
Table 11.5-1b.
TECHNOLOGY 3 DIMENSIONALLY REINFORCED (3D) CARBON FIBER-CARBON MATRIX
High-Temperature Structural Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Process controls (i.e., weaving, densification, time, temperature, pressure) and knowhow EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1A, B, C, E CCL Cat 1A, B, C, E
COMPOSITES AND HIGHER LEVELS OF REINFORCED ("N"D) COMPOSITES
Specific modulus exceeding 10.15 x 106 m; and Carbon fibers Specific tensile strength exceeding 17.7 x 104 m and graphite
FIBROUS OR FILAMENTARY MATERIALS Specific modulus exceeding 12.7 x 106 m; and FOR USE ABOVE 540 C (1000 F) A specific tensile strength exceeding 23.5 x 104 m; Carbon fibrous or filamentary materials with a specific modulus exceeding 12.7 x 106 m; and A specific tensile strength exceeding 23.5 x 104 m METAL ALLOY AND INTERMETALLIC Powder metals with contamination levels < 3 None identified ALLOY POWDER PRODUCTION, non-metallic particles larger than 100 microns HANDLING AND CONSOLIDATION per billion metal particles SINGLE CRYSTAL METALS AND Incipient melting points above 1090 C Not applicable
INTERMETALLICS THERMAL PROTECTION COATINGS
High pressure densification, weaving (less than 0.030"), automated fibers including fabrication, processing equipment, pitch, PAN, and computed tomography, inspection rayon. Pitch and capability; impregnation equipment resin matrix systems. Not applicable Ultrasonic inspection equipment
Not included
Temperature at metal-coating interface > 1150 C (2100 F)
None identified
Equipment for producing and processing contamination-free alloy powdering. Equipment for single crystal blade growth; NDE/NDI equipment Plasma spray, CVD, e-beam, deposition, laser ablation (see Section 10)
Process control software Not included Not included
WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E WA Cat 9E CCL Cat 9E WA Cat 2B, D, E CCL Cat 2B, D, E
11-15
SECTION 11.6
SPECIAL FUNCTION MATERIALS
Overview (See Figure 11.6-1) The special function materials technology area covers a broad range of materials (over 100) for equally numerous applications. Included are hydraulic fluids and seals; turbine engine lubrication fluids and seals; high-temperature solid lubricants; protective paints and coatings for corrosion resistance; antifouling coatings for ships; rain and sand erosion-resistant coatings for missile domes; electronic cooling fluids; fuel system seals and sealants; gyro floatation fluids; and fire retarding materials. This technology area is included in current DoD R&D programs and is an area of significant activity in government and nongovernment laboratories. Rationale (See Table 11.6-1) Special function materials are essential to allow military systems to perform at the upper limits of their capability. They are vital elements of several areas of warfare: precision strike, sea control/undersea superiority, advanced land combat, air superiority/defense, and global surveillance and communications. The materials classes listed previously (fluids, seals and sealants, lubricants, coatings, etc.) not only control performance of systems but also strongly influence sustainability, reliability, and maintainability in daily operations of all types of US platforms, vehicles, weapons systems, instrumentation, etc. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 11.0-2) All countries engaged in the operation of military weapons and systems use the technologies addressed in this subsection to some degree or another. To a great extent, civil sector products can be used successfully in military systems but not at the outer bounds of their operational envelopes. Much of the work involved in development and production of these materials depends upon a sophisticated chemical industry. Thus, all industrialized nations, and many developing ones as well, have capabilities in special functional materials. The capabilities of France in
Special Function Materials

Improved Battle Damage Resistance Decreased Maintenance Lubrication in Hot Environments Increased Service Life Flammability Resistance

Soldiers Land Vehicles Ships Aircraft Spacecraft
Figure 11.6-1.
Special Function Materials Overview
engine coolants, lubricants, and seals; Germany in seals and coatings; the UK in coatings, hydraulic fluids, and seals; and Japan in seals and coatings are particularly noteworthy. These countries can approach or duplicate US technology in these areas.
11-16
Table 11.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AGENT
RESISTANT COATINGS
Special Function Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1A, D, E USML X CCL Cat 1A, D, E WA Cat 2E CCL Cat 2E WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
EROSION PROTECTIVE COATINGS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Specific formulations for substrate material/agent pairs with at least 95% of the coating being saturated elastomeric polymers Resistance to rain and sand erosion coatings composed of elastomeric polymers
FLUORINATED POLYMERS
Polyurethanes and fluoropolymers Elastomeric polymers containing 10% or more None identified of combined fluorine (by weight)
None identified
None identified
COMPLETELY FLUORINATED
POLYMERS
Fluoroelastomers containing no hydrogen
None identified
COPOLYMERS OR TERPOLYMERS
MADE FROM VINYLIDENE FLUORIDE, HEXAFLUOROPROPYLENE, TETRAFLUOROETHYLENE OR PERFLUOROMETHYLVINYLETHER CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS
Elastomeric polymers containing 10% or more None identified of combined fluorine (by weight)
FLUORINATED PHOSPHAZINE
POLYMERS
No flash point; autogenous ignition temperature None identified > 977 K (704 C) or higher; contains only chlorine, hydrogen and carbon Elastomers containing 30% or more by weight None identified of combined fluorine
Very specialized polymerization facilities, reactor vessels, or reactors with or without agitators and suitable agitators with total internal volume > 100 liters and less than 20,000 liters Very specialized polymerization facilities and know-how required to manufacture these materials Very specialized polymerization facilities, reactor vessels, or reactors with or without agitators and suitable agitators with total internal volume > 100 liters and less than 20,000 liters None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
SYNTHETIC HYDROCARBONS
Flashpoint > 477 K (204 C); pour point 239 K ( 34 C) or lower; viscosity index 75 or greater; thermal stability to 616 K (343 C) or greater SILAHYDROCARBONS Contains only silicon, hydrogen and carbon, flash point > 477 K (204 C); pour point 239 K ( 34 C) or lower; viscosity index 75 or greater, thermal stability to 616 K (343 C) or greater PERFLUOROPOLYALKYL ETHER BASED Viscosity of 1.0 centistoke or more at 343 C LUBES AND GREASES (600 F) and 20,000 centistokes or more at 51 C; Oxidatively stable at 316 C (per ASTM D4636 or national equivalent) POLYOL ESTER BASED LUBES 4 centistokes minimum viscosity at 100 C and 20,000 centistokes maximum at 51 C; Oxidatively stable at 220 C (per ASTM 4634 or national equivalent).
None identified
Very specialized polymerization None identified facilities, reactor vessels, or reactors with or without agitators and suitable agitators, with total internal volume > l00 liters and < 20,000 liters None identified None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
(cont'd)
11-17
Table 11.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY PHENYLENE ETHER BASED LUBES AND GREASES [PURE OR MIXED WITH ALKYLPHENYLENE ETHER(S) OR THIOETHER(S)] FLUORINATED SILICONE FLUIDS THIO ETHERS [PURE OR MIXED WITH PHENYLENE AND/OR ALKYLPHENYLENE ETHER] POLYTHIOETHER BASED SEALANTS SOLID LUBRICANT MATERIALS
Special Function Materials Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E
Provide lubrication over 54 C to + 2600 C (65 F to + 500 F)
Kinematic viscosity less than 5000 centistokes at 25 C Provide lubrication over 54 C to + 2600 C (65 F to + 500 F)
WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E WA Cat 1C, E CCL Cat 1C, E CCL EAR 99 CCL EAR 99
FLUORINATED FLUIDS FOR COOLING DIBROMOTETRAFLUOROETHANE OR
Seal over broad temperature range 54 C to None identified 150 C ( 65 F to 300 F) Coefficient of friction 0.12 maximum; meet the None identified adhesion criteria of ASTM D2510; outgassing mass loss 1.0% maximum; volatile condensible material 0.1% maximum, as determined per ASTM E595; or coefficient of friction of 0.25 maximum from 4 C to 538 C (+ 40 F to 1,000 F) as per ASTM D2981; oxidatively stable at 538 C (1000 F) minimum; load capacity of 1.25 MPa (150,000 psi) maximum as per ASTM E595 Completely (100%) fluorinated None identified Contains at least 85% of the named compounds None identified
None identified Specialized synthesis and handling equipment to maintain purity of the materials
POLYCHLOROTRIFLUOROETHYLENE OR and having a purity exceeding 99.8% and POLYBROMOTRIFLUOROETHYLENE Containing less than 25 particles (200 BASED, FULLY BROMINATED OR FULLY micrometers or larger) per 100 ml CHLORINATED HIGH DENSITY FLUIDS
11-18
SECTION 12 - MARINE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

Rationale Navy missions of sea control and power projection involve surface vessels and undersea vehicles, whose capabilities are consequences of technologies identified in this section. For surface vessels, the oceans offer no concealment, which causes navies to stress signature reduction to avoid or delay detection and thereby reduce risk of attack. However, military threats in the ocean and on the ocean floor are virtually unobservable without substantial expenditure of resources and effort. The high cost of successful underwater search biases the hide-and-seek contest in favor of the side avoiding detection. Thus, the following objectives provide guidelines in controlling exports of marine technology to potential adversaries: (1) prevent them from operating submerged; (2) limit the time they can stay submerged; and (3) make it difficult for them to operate submerged. Adversarial undersea vehicles are a potential means of delivery for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Such vehicles and systems for deep sea implant and ocean salvage are potential means for disrupting or defeating US naval undersea activities. Other technology items
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Energetic Materials Materials Sensors & MARINE Lasers
12.1 12.2 12.3
Propulsors and Propulsion Systems .................... 12-3 Marine Signature Control and Survivability ........... 12-6 Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles .......... 12-9 SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 12.0-1) This section covers several technology areas. These technology areas include technology items that are militarily critical. Propulsors and Propulsion Systems include technologies that enhance the range, endurance, and survivability of surface and subsurface vessels by improving propulsive efficiency and quietness. Signature Control for marine applications involves technologies, materials, and equipment related to development, testing, and production of surface and subsurface vessels with reduced acoustic, infrared, radar, magnetic, and visual signatures (signature control for broader applications is covered in Section 16); Survivability involves technologies to reduce vulnerability to adversary weapons and to improve damage control. Subsurface and Deep Submergence V e s s e l s include technologies and hardware related to manned and unmanned, tethered and untethered submersible vehicles; underwater vision systems; and undersea robots and manipulators. Most critical technology items with marine applications in Guidance, Navigation, and Control and in Sensors are covered in Sections 7 and 15, respectively. Because of their importance in the operation of submersible vehicles, some technologies related to underwater vision systems and underwater navigation are covered here. No technology items in the following Marine Systems technology areas are currently militarily critical: Advanced Hull Forms, Human Systems Interfaces, Ocean Salvage and Deep Sea Implant, and Systems Integration. The principal countermeasure against the mine threat is the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), whose technologies are covered under Subsurface and Deep Sea Vessels. Technology, material, and equipment for developing, producing, and using undersea mines are covered in Section 2. No other technology items are included under Undersea Weapon Systems. Technology related to marine gas turbine engines (GTE), which are derivatives of aero GTE, is covered in Section 1.
SYSTEMS
TREND
Agile Stealth Expanded Operational Envelope
Figure 12.0-1.
Marine Systems Overview
12-1
pertain to threats posed by surface vessels engaged in various missions, i.e., minesweeping, antisubmarine warfare, amphibious assault, and, in particular, attack against surface vessels operating against states of concern in restricted waters (e.g., Persian Gulf). Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 12.0-2) In an overall assessment of foreign technology in marine systems, Japan, the UK, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Finland, Italy, and Sweden are seen as following the world-leading US. Besides the US, the world leaders in technologies related to marine propulsion are Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK. In recent visits to submersible vehicle sites in the UK and France, World Technology Evaluation Center (WTEC) teams saw a variety of propulsion sources being used, or designed for use, in underwater vehicles. The teams found fuel cells, semi-fuel cells, Rankine cycle engines, Stirling cycle engines, and hydrazine gas generators at sea onboard various vehicle platforms. The developmental trend in Europe is toward high-density energy sources such as Rankine, Stirling, and hydrazinepowered engines. Semi-fuel cells, such as an aluminum oxygen battery, offer long-duration power sources for autonomous underwater vehicles. In Russia, the WTEC teams found a spectrum of energy systems from small, simplified nuclear reactors to conventional lead-acid batteries, which are used in numerous manned submersibles. The nuclear reactors are derivatives of nuclear power systems first developed for military submarines. The WTEC teams also found submersible vehicle-related fuel cells, which were derivatives of those developed for the space program. The US, the UK, France, and Japan are the world leaders in technologies related to subsurface and deep submergence vehicles. The European Economic Community (EEC) supports major programs involving unmanned platforms for undersea and oceanographic research. The EEC is making substantial progress in cooperative and coordinated research in undersea technology. France is the leader in autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) technology. The UK leads the EEC effort in developing long-range underwater vehicles and advanced sensors and affordable AUVs and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). Russia emphasizes manned underwater vehicles in part, at least, because of the nonavailability of microelectronics. Fundamental Russian submersibles are impressive. The focus has been on empirical validation because of a lack of computational capability. The closest rivals to the US as overall leader in technologies related to signature reduction for surface and subsurface marine vehicles are France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the UK.
Country
12.1 Propulsors and Propulsion Systems
12.2 Signature Control & Survivability
12.3 Subsurface & Deep Submergence Vehicles
Argen tina Au stralia Au stria Brazil Can ada Ch ina Czech Republic F inland F ran ce Germany Hu ngary In dia Israel Italy Japan Netherland s No rway N. Ko rea Poland Ru ssia S. Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK US L EGEND: Critical Technolog ies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 12.0-2.
Marine Systems FTA Summary
12-2
SECTION 12.1
PROPULSORS AND PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Overview (See Figure 12.1-1) Marine propulsion systems include power plants, which provide power to propel vehicles, and propulsors, which convert power to thrust. Power plants include marine gas turbines, which are discussed in MCTL 1.2 with technologies for air and ground gas turbine engines, and air independent power (AIP) systems, which include thermal engines and electrochemical power sources. The AIP systems include closed-cycle or semiclosed-cycle thermal engines that produce electrical or mechanical power from stored energy sources independent of the atmosphere. Four types of AIP thermal engines are candidates to power submarines and other underwater vehicles: (1) the closed-cycle Brayton or GTE, (2) the closed-cycle Rankine or steam turbine; (3) the closed-cycle Stirling piston engine; and (4) the semi-closed-cycle diesel engine. AIP systems also include electrochemical power sources, i.e., fuel cells, nonrechargeable batteries, rechargeable batteries, and thermoelectric devices. Propulsors include propellers, pumpjets and waterjets. There are several screw-type propellers, which are distinguished by their abilities to accommodate the effects of cavitation, which generates noise and reduces propeller efficiency. The waterjet is a different type of propulsor. As an alternative for countering propeller cavitation problems for high-speed craft and special-purpose craft, the waterjet, which is driven by a gas turbine or high speed diesel, provide a jet-reactive thrust of high-velocity water expelled through a nozzle. With a speed range above 45 knots, waterjets, whose principal advantage is improvement of vehicle maneuverability, are typically applied to patrol boats, surface effect ships, hydrofoils, motor yachts, and fast ferries. Rationale (See Table 12.1-1) The propulsion system is a principal consideration in the design of commercial vessels and naval surface and underwater vehicles of all sizes. The propulsion plant has a direct effect on vehicle weight, size, speed, cruising range, endurance, and maneuverability. AIP increases the slow speed endurance of nonnuclear power submarines over that attainable with diesel-electric power. This applies not only to new submarines but also to retrofitting AIP auxiliary generators to existing diesel-electric submarines. The AIP systems provide submarines and long-range/longendurance UUVs much more power for fully submerged use than can be stored in electric batteries. The AIP systems can thus extend the submerged range, endurance, and working capability of commercial submersibles. They can
Propulsors & Propulsion Systems

Quiet Operations Propulsive Efficiency

Surface Vessels Submarines Other Submersible Vehicles
Figure 12.1-1.
Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Overview
improve the capabilities of submersibles used in a naval role to deliver weapons, to emplace sensors, and to perform surveillance and other covert tasks. The focus of propulsor development has been increasing speed and propulsive efficiency for both commercial and military applications. Another focus for military applications has been acoustic signature reduction through the reduction of radiated noise. One of the advantages of waterjets and pumpjets vis--vis propellers is an expected reduction in acoustic signature. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 12.0-2) As shown in Figure 12.0-2, the US, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden and the UK are the world leaders in technologies related to marine propulsion.
12-3
Table 12.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS; TOLERANCE OF BLADE RADIUS SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: PITCH TOLERANCE SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: TOLERANCE OF BLADE SECTION WIDTH SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: THICKNESS TOLERANCE SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: TRACK TOLERANCE AT 0.95R SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: CLEARANCE TOLERANCE SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: TOLERANCE FOR SPECIAL SURFACE
POROSITY LIMITS SOFTWARE FOR REPAIR, OVERHAUL, OR REFURBISHING (REMATCHING) OF SPECIALLY DESIGNED PROPELLERS: SURFACE FINISH TOLERANCE WATER-SCREW PROPELLER OR POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR ACV, SES HYDROFOIL AND SWAS VESSELS- SUPER-CAVITATING, SUPERVENTILATED, PARTIALLY-SUBMERGED, OR SURFACE PIERCING PROPELLERS WATER-SCREW PROPELLER OR POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR ACV, SES HYDROFOIL AND SWAS VESSELS-LIGHTWEIGHT, HIGH CAPACITY PROPULSION REDUCTION GEARING
Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT CAD/CAM controlled milling machines UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS To achieve required tolerance EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 8D, E CCL Cat 8D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Tolerance + 0 to 1% of design
Tolerance 2 % of design at any section 1 and None identified 1/2% average for each blade
CAD/CAM controlled milling machines
To achieve required tolerance
WA Cat 8D, E CCL Cat 8D, E
Tolerance + 1% to 5% of design at each blade None identified radius
Tolerance + 2% to 5% of maximum design None identified thickness or 1/16 inch, whichever is greater at each design radius Tolerance is 1/2% of propeller design radius None identified
Cylindrical: 1/32 inch Edge gage: 1/64 inch or surface being checked Fairing rod: 1/32 inch 1/64 inch maximum dimension in l-inch wide band, each face, along leading edge, and at break of knuckle along trailing edge
None identified
None identified
Blades: 63 rms micro-inch Hub: 125 rms micro-inch
None identified
Power rating > 7.5 MW and speeds > 50 knots
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E
K factor > 300
Maraging steel
None identified
None identified
(cont'd)
12-4
Table 12.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY WATER-SCREW PROPELLER, POWER
GENERATION OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR USE ON MARINE VESSELS- INTERNALLY LIQUID-COOLED ELECTRIC PROPULSION MOTORS WATER-SCREW PROPELLER, POWER GENERATION OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR USE ON MARINE VESSELS- SUPERCONDUCTIVE OR PERMANENT MAGNET ELECTRIC PROPULSION ENGINES WATER-SCREW PROPELLER, POWER GENERATION OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR USE ON MARINE VESSELS- COMPOSITE SHAFT SYSTEMS WATER-SCREW PROPELLER, POWER GENERATION OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR USE ON MARINE VESSELS-VENTILATED AND BASEVENTILATED PROPELLER SYSTEMS WATER-SCREW PROPELLER, POWER GENERATION OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR USE ON MARINE VESSELS- QUIET MARINE PROPULSORS PUMPJET PROPULSION SYSTEMS UTILIZING DIVERGENT NOZZLE AND FLOW CONDITIONING VANE TECHNIQUES MODELS AND CODES THAT DEFINE HYDRODYNAMIC FLOW - AROUND PROPULSORS MODELS AND CODES THAT DEFINE HYDRODYNAMIC FLOW - INVISCOUS FLOW AROUND VESSELS MODELS AND CODES THAT DEFINE HYDRODYNAMIC FLOW - VISCOUS FLOW AROUND VESSELS VARIABLE PRESSURE WATER TUNNEL FOR MEASURING CAVITATION AND ACOUSTIC FIELDS UNDERWATER
Propulsors and Propulsion Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Output power > 2.5 MW CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Water tunnels with background noise < 100 dB (ref 1 mPa, 1 Hz) in 0500 Hz frequency band UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E
Output power > 0.1 MW
None identified
Water tunnels with background noise < 100 dB (ref 1 mPa, 1 Hz) in 0500 Hz frequency band
None identified
Transmission capability > 1.0 MW
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E WA Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL Cat 8A, B, D, E CCL EAR 99
Power rating > 2.5 MW
None identified
None identified
None identified
Thrust loading coefficient < 0.5 and power rating None identified > 500 shaft HP
None identified
None identified
Output > 2.5 MW
None identified
Water tunnels with background noise < 100 dB (ref 1 mPa, 1 Hz) in 0500 Hz frequency band None identified
None identified
109 computer floating point operations 1011 computer floating point operations 1011 computer floating point operations
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
Background noise < 100 dB (reference 1 Pa, 1 None identified Hz); Frequency Range 0500 Hz; Tunnel speed up to 18 m/sec; Pressure range 0.2 to 60 psia
None identified
None identified
12-5
SECTION 12.2 MARINE SIGNATURE CONTROL AND SURVIVABILITY

Overview (See Figure 12.2-1) This subsection covers several categories of signature reduction. Acoustic: Surface ships and submarines emit high levels of underwater noise that can be detected and tracked by passive sonars. The noise can also interfere with a vessel's own sonar, thereby reducing its own effectiveness. Infrared: Controlling IR signatures involves controlling the temperature and emissivity of a ship's exposed surfaces. Hot spots (for example, an exhaust stack) are easier to detect than warm targets (for example, a ship's hull), so hot parts are cooled or screened from direct view of IR-homing missiles. Radar: Reducing radar detectability involves: (1) using structural material that is an absorber; (2) covering the target object with radar absorbing material (RAM); and (3) shaping the target so it scatters the incident energy rather than reflecting this energy back in the source direction (which a specular reflector does). Wake: As a ship moves along the sea surface, it generates surface and underwater wakes that can be detected by various sensor systems: visual, conventional, and IR photography; IR radiometry; and microwave radiometry. Magnetic: Vessels can be treated to reduce magnetic signatures by either or a combination of two countermeasure techniques: deperming and degaussing. Visual: The visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum is not susceptible to reduction of echoing area techniques. Camouflage, light, smoke screen, and cloud cover are about the only ways to impede detailed target recognition. Survivability technologies include means to reduce vulnerability and to improve damage control. Refer to Section 16 for additional treatment of signature control. Rationale (See Table 12.2-1) Reducing the likelihood of mission loss because of adversary weapon attack is dependent on several factors. Both passive and active signatures affect the probability of being detected and targeted by an adversary. If passive and active emissions are sufficiently controlled, susceptibility to adversary attack is reduced. If a hit is taken, the likelihood of mission loss is affected by the ability of the US vessel to control degradation of vital functions through separation, redundancy, and hardening. Once hit, the
Marine Signature Control & Survivability

Reduced Signature Acoustic Infra Red Radar Magnetic Visual

Reduce Susceptibility to Attack Surface Vessels Submarines Other Submersible Vehicles
Figure 12.2-1.
Marine Signature Control and Survivability Overview
probability of mission loss is also affected by the ability to control the extent of damage and to recover mission-essential functions. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 12.0-2) France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the UK are the closest rivals to the US as overall leader in technologies related to signature reduction for marine vessels.
12-6
Table 12.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE: PASSIVE MOUNTS
Marine Signature Control and Survivability Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Frequency 10 Hz100 kHz Isolation performance > 6 dB CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Vessel noise measurement systems UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 21, 22 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML VI CCL Cat 8A, D, E
FOR ACOUSTIC ISOLATION AND OTHER COMPONENTS FOR VIBRATION ISOLATION BY ACOUSTIC MOUNTS WITH INTERMEDIATE MASS < 30% OF EQUIPMENT MASS TO BE MOUNTED. ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE: ACTIVE NOISE Noise reduction > 6 dB for systems with > REDUCTION OR CANCELLATION SYSTEMS, one degree of freedom OR MAGNETIC BEARINGS AND ELECTRONIC CONTROLS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS NOISE REDUCTION TECHNIQUES FOR Attenuation > 6 dB PROPULSION AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY
None identified
Vessel noise measurement systems
Active control software
None identified
Vessel noise measurement systems. None identified Materials characterization measurement systems Vessel noise measurement systems. None identified Materials characterization measurement systems None identified Empirical validation causing any (> 0) change(s) to model algorithms based solely on theory Vessel IR measurement systems. None identified Materials characterization measurement systems Vessel IR measurement systems. None identified Materials characterization measurement systems Vessel IR measurement systems. None identified Materials characterization measurement systems
ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE: COATINGS AND

MATERIALS FOR ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE CONTROL ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE: MODELS TO PREDICT ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE OF A SURFACE OR SUBSURFACE VESSEL IN THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT IR SIGNATURE 0.720 M: ENGINE EXHAUST SIGNATURE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FOR DIESEL OR GAS TURBINE SYSTEMS IR SIGNATURE 0.720 M: ACTIVE OR PASSIVE SYSTEMS TO REDUCE OR CONTROL IR SIGNATURE OF SHIP STRUCTURE IR SIGNATURE 0.720 M: MATERIALS, COATINGS, APPLIQUES, AND PAINTS TO REDUCE OR CONTROL IR SIGNATURE IR SIGNATURE: MODELS TO PREDICT IR OR EO SIGNATURE OF A SURFACE SHIP OR SUBMARINE IN THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: PHYSICAL MODELS FOR MEASURING RADAR SIGNATURES AT MILLIMETER AND SUBMILLIMETER WAVELENGTHS RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: RADAR ABSORBING STRUCTURE WITH FREQUENCY SELECTIVE OR CIRCUIT ANALOG MATERIALS
Frequency < 10 Hz100 kHz Noise reduction > 6 dB
None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML VI CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9, 21, 22 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML VI CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9,.21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML VI
Empirical validation causing any (> 0) None identified change(s) to model algorithms based solely on theory > 50% reduction of IR signature None identified
WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI
> 50% reduction of IR signature
None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML VI
Reflectivity 0.8 or 0.2 and RF transparent
Empirical validation causing any (> 0) None identified Validated signature change(s) to model algorithms based solely algorithms on theory Non-metallic scale models whose Model materials with Materials characterization measurement None identified performance is < 3 dB different than fullscaled dielectric systems scale models characteristics Absorption 15 dB; bandwidth > 15% of center frequency; thickness 1/2 wavelength; area > 1 m2; density < 4 g/cm3 < 50 ohms/square with > 50% transparency Composites with conductive circuit composites Dielectrics, plastics, and glass Materials characterization measurement None identified systems
Shipboard-suitable material with critical parameter characteristics None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML VI
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML VI
RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: WINDOWS TREATED FOR RADAR

SIGNATURE REDUCTION
Materials characterization measurement None identified systems
WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI (cont'd)
12-7
Table 12.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Marine Signature Control and Survivability Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Absorption 15 dB; band width > vice 15% of center frequency; thickness 1/2 wavelength; area > 1 m2; density < 4 g/cm3 < 50 ohms/square CRITICAL MATERIALS Composites with magnetically and electrically loaded components UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Materials characterization measurement systems UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified

RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1000 GHZ: MAGNETIC AND ELECTRIC ABSORBING MATERIALS
RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: INTRINSICALLY CONDUCTIVE POLYMERIC MATERIALS RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: GRADED RESISTIVE FILMS RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ BLAST-RESISTANT OR HIGH-WEAR AREA RAM RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: INTEGRATED APERTURE OR CONFORMAL APERTURE ANTENNA RF SIGNATURE: 1 MHZ1,000 GHZ: LOADED FOAM, LOADED CORES AND FIBER-LOADED PLANAR OR VARIABLE GRADED ABSORBERS RF SIGNATURE: DATABASES, DESIGN RULES, PROCEDURES, COMPUTER CODES, OR HANDBOOKS CONCERNED WITH SHAPING OR MATERIALS FOR LOWOBSERVABLE (LO) USE MAGNETIC SIGNATURE: ACTIVE SYSTEMS TO REDUCE OR CONTROL MAGNETIC SIGNATURE MAGNETIC SIGNATURE: PASSIVE SYSTEMS TO REDUCE OR CONTROL MAGNETIC SIGNATURE VISUAL SIGNATURE: 0.4 M0.7 M: WINDOWS VISUAL SIGNATURE: 0.4 M0.7 M: ACTIVE OR PASSIVE SURFACE TREATMENT FOR VISUAL SPECTRUM VISUAL SIGNATURE: 0.4 M0.7 M: LOW EMISSIVITY MATERIALS LASER SIGNATURE: 0.3 M10.6 M: SURFACE TREATMENTS
Conductive polymers Materials characterization measurement systems < 25 ohms/square Dielectrics and Materials characterization plastics with variable measurement systems resistivity > 10 dB absorption and suitable for missile Composites and Materials characterization blast zone or high abrasion application ceramics measurement systems > 50 % reduction in RCS None identified RF and RCS measurement ranges Strength > 100 psi in tension and compression; > 60 psi shear strength Empirical validation is the basis for any (> 0) data in the software Structural composites None identified Materials characterization measurement systems None
WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI WA ML 9. 21, 22 USML VI
None identified
Empirical validation is the WA ML 9, 21, 22 basis for any (> 0) data in the USML VI software Use experimentally verified data Use experimentally verified data None identified None identified WA ML 9, USML VI WA ML 9, USML VI WA ML 9, USML VI WA ML 9, USML VI 21, 22 21, 22 21, 22 21, 22
> 50% reduction in magnetic signature > 50% reduction in magnetic signature Control glint and glare with transparency > 50% Visual signature reduction > 50%; RF and IR compatible Emissivity 0.1 Reflectivity < 5%
None identified None identified Glass and plastic None identified
Magnetic field strength measurement systems Magnetic field strength measurement systems Materials characterization measurement systems Materials characterization measurement systems Materials characterization measurement systems Materials characterization measurement systems
MULTISPECTRAL SIGNATURE: MATERIALS WITH MULTISPECTRAL LO QUALITIES MULTISPECTRAL SIGNATURE: MODELS TO PREDICT MULTISPECTRAL SIGNATURE
Useful for LO applications in 2 spectral ranges (RF, IR, EO, magnetic, acoustic) Multispectral model that covers 2 bands (UV, visible, NIR, MIR, FIR, RF, magnetic and acoustic) and whose theory-based algorithms have any change (> 0) incorporated as a result of empirical validation
Paints, coatings, appliques Paints, coatings, or appliques and materials whose inherent surface characteristics achieve critical parameter performance None identified None identified
Materials characterization measurement systems Materials characterization measurement systems
None identified Validated model algorithms
12-8
SECTION 12.3
SUBSURFACE AND DEEP SUBMERGENCE VEHICLES
Overview (See Figure 12.3-1) This subsection covers technologies associated with the development, production, and operation of submersible vehicles and two groups of equipment that the vehicles use to perform military and nonmilitary tasks. The equipment groups are (1) underwater vision systems and (2) undersea robots and manipulators. The vehicles of principal concern are tethered, unmanned vehicles, called ROVs and untethered, unmanned vehicles called AUVs. Unmanned vehicles, including the tethered ROVs and the untethered AUVs, are identified as UUVs by the Navy. A range of UUVs, whose basic sensor and video systems are a high-resolution sonar and a low-light-level television, respectively, has evolved from the early use of manned submersibles and divers for the offshore oil and gas industry. To work underwater, the submersible platform needs the ability to navigate, to detect and visualize, and, for many tasks, to manipulate tools and/or a target object. Without one ability, the others are not useful. A degradation in one technology area, however, may be partially compensated by an increased capability in another. Searching for small objects, particularly if they are nonmetallic, in a cluttered environment requires the use of vision systems. Detection at long range enables submersible vehicles to acquire a target quickly and, thus, reduces search time. Undersea robots can be used in place of divers and manned submersibles to accomplish underwater work, which might include visual inspection, nondestructive testing, surveying, measuring, welding, and trenching. Remotely controlled articulated manipulators are a type of robotic arm attached to manned or unmanned submersible devices. They are anthropomorphic devices that perform underwater physical work including manipulation and intervention. Rationale (See Table 12.3-1) Advances in technologies related to submersible vehicles have precipitated the use of UUVs for a greater variety of missions. Except for transport and insertion of personnel ashore, unmanned tethered vehicles (ROVs) can do most tasks done by manned vehicles, and they can do tasks that are too dangerous for manned vehicles (e.g., locating and disabling mines). The unmanned, untethered vehicles (AUVs) are the most sophisticated submersibles. They are equipped with their own power supply and their own navigation and control systems. They are small, quiet, and capable of
Subsurface & Deep Submergence Vehicles

Structural Strength Propulsion/Stored Energy Endurance Range Accurate Navigation Sensor Resolution Articulated Manipulators

Minehunting Surveillance Intelligence Gathering Oceanography Recovery & Implant
Figure 12.3-1.
Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles Overview
operating at long distances from their home facility. The principal Navy missions for UUVs are mine neutralization, surveillance, intelligence collection, and tactical oceanography. When robots and manipulators are added, the abilities of submersible vehicles are extended to the implant and recovery of seafloormounted measurement equipment; intervention of adversary measurement equipment; and retrieval of combat and noncombat objects from the ocean floor. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 12.0-2) France, Japan, Russia and the UK are the foreign leaders in overall technologies related to submersible vehicles.
12-9
Table 12.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Test cells UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 8A, D, E CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA Cat 8A, D, E CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA Cat 8A, D, E CCL Cat 8A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY UNMANNED, UNTETHERED Energy density > 150 Whr/kg SUBMERSIBLE VEHICLES: STORED Life cycle (recharges) > 20 ENERGY Power density > 15 hp/ft3 UNMANNED, UNTETHERED Launch and recovery speed (time) SUBMERSIBLE VEHICLES: 13 minutes SUBMERGED LAUNCH AND RECOVERY Low speed control: 1 to 3 knots UNMANNED, UNTETHERED Navigation error rate within 0.2% distance SUBMERSIBLE VEHICLES: NAVIGATION traveled or < 100 mCEP whichever is less
RELATIVE TO ANY GEOGRAPHICAL REFERENCE UNDERWATER DATA TRANSMISSION BY Data rate > = 1 Gbits/sec FIBER OPTIC CABLE Range > = 30 km
None identified
None identified
Control/navigation software
None identified
None identified
System integration/control
None identified
None identified
None identified
UNDERWATER DATA TRANSMISSION BY ACOUSTIC UNDERWATER VISION SYSTEMS: TV SYSTEMS (CAMERA, LIGHTS,
Date rate > 20 kbits/sec None identified Range > 4 nmi System resolution > 800 lines measured in air; None identified camera resolution > 1100 lines measured in air
WA Cat 5A, B, C, D, E CCL Cat 5A, B, C, D, E CCL EAR 99 WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E
MONITORING AND SIGNAL TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT) SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR OPERATION FROM A SUBMERSIBLE VEHICLE UNDERWATER VISION SYSTEMS: Standoff 5 L, where the attenuation length L is VISION SYSTEM LENS OPERATION the distance at which an optical signal is
None identified
None identified
None identified
attenuated by 1/e, where e is the base of the system of natural logarithms UNDERWATER VISION SYSTEMS: > 150,000 active pixels per solid state area LLLTV CAMERA FOCAL PLANE ARRAYS array
None identified
None identified
None identified
UNDERWATER VISION SYSTEMS: UNDERWATER STILL CAMERAS WITH FILM FORMAT > 35 MM STROBOSCOPIC LIGHT SYSTEMS
Operating depth > 1000 m
None identified
None identified
None identified
Output energy > 300 J per flash Flash rate > 5 per sec
None identified
None identified
None identified
ARGON ARC LIGHT SYSTEMS
Usable at depths > 1000 m
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E WA ML 9 WA Cat 8A, D, E USML XIII CCL Cat 8A, D, E
12-10
SECTION 13 - NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

Even where techniques may be generally known, it is critical to guard specific US refinements, which frequently allow materials to be processed with significantly greater economy or with reduced detectability. For most potential proliferants, technology access, ease of operation, and secrecy are paramount considerations; therefore, technologies that enhance these should be controlled.
13.1 13.2 13.3
Fission Reactors ............................................. 13-3 Nuclear Materials Processing .............................. 13-5 Nuclear Weapons ........................................... 13-7
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 13.0-2) This section explains technologies associated with producing and using nuclear fission or fusion energy for both peaceful and military applications. Included are technologies for processing man-made fissile materials, for processing and handling highly radioactive and corrosive materials, for producing plutonium and tritium in reactors, for producing and assembling nuclear weapon components. Technologies for fissile materials enrichment, inertial confinement fusion and nuclear related materials are not considered militarily critical. Rationale Nuclear-related technologies have the following militarily critical applications: developing and producing nuclear weapons; developing strategically vital nuclear energy resources; and developing, producing, and using nuclear propulsion systems and primary power sources for naval vessels, military platforms, and space vehicles. Also critical are dual-use applications of advanced technologies, many of which apply both to producing and fabricating nuclear fuel elements for civilian reactors and to preparing weapons-grade materials.
Manufacturing & Fabrication Information Systems Energetic Materials Sensors & Lasers Materials Electronics
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
TREND
Power Projection Deterrence Stockpiling
Figure 13.0-1.
Nuclear Systems Overview
13-1
Country
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 13.0-2) Nuclear related technology is essential to the energy programs of many nations, and nuclear explosives are key components in the national security programs of several nations. A number of countries of proliferation concern appear to have progressed far enough in their nuclear explosive development programs that they must be considered as having some capability. There are several countries with advanced capabilities in all or most aspects of nuclear technology that supply the requirements of most other nations. The costs associated with developing a nuclear capability from scratch are such that for civilian applications most nations choose, at least initially, to import most of the goods and technology from a technology holder.
1 3.1 Fis sion Rea ctor
13.2 Nuclear Materials Processing
13 .3 Nuclear Weapons
Algeria Argentina Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Ind ia Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Netherland s N. Korea Pakistan Russia S. Africa S. Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan UK US L EGEND: Critical Techn olog ies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 13.0-2.
Nuclear Systems FTA Summary
13-2
SECTION 13.1
Overview (See Figure 13.1-1) Key technologies for developing, building, and operating nuclear fission reactor systems include fuel fabrication techniques, critical instrumentation, and control technologies. Of particular interest are space-based and naval nuclear reactors for propulsion. Specifically included in this section are technologies for reactor systems, naval nuclear propulsion, mobile portable and space power and propulsion systems, and electronuclear breeders. Rationale (See Table 13.1-1) The nuclear weapon states rapidly discovered that the best material for nuclear explosives is 239 Pu. Plutonium must be prepared by neutron irradiation of 238 U. The technology for building and operating a plutonium production reactor is similar to but simpler than that required to build and operate a civilian power reactor. In general, the experience and technology for other civilian reactors apply to production reactors. Further, a nuclear power reactor produces significant amounts of plutonium during normal operation. Reactor-grade plutonium is not ideally suited for weapon use, but a successful test of a nuclear weapon using reactor-grade plutonium was conducted by the US in 1962. Fission reactors also provide unique operational capabilities for naval propulsion and space power because of their long lives and relative compactness. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 13.0-2) The US has the best naval nuclear propulsion capability in the world. The US is well ahead of Russia in maintenance and reliability of naval nuclear propulsion hardware. 238Pu-fueled sources have fulfilled requirements for component warming and electricity on many US space missions. The US has less experience with space reactors than Russia. Although the technology exists for building
FISSION REACTORS
Fission Reactors

Material Purity Enrichment Processing Thermal Dissipation Energy Conversion

Power Grids Production of Nuclear Weapons Materials
Figure 13.1-1.
Fission Reactors Overview
electronuclear breeders, no large-scale machines of this type are known to have been built. The weapons states all have had large production reactor complexes associated with producing plutonium for their weapons programs. The US is no longer the technology leader in many aspects of nuclear reactor technology.
13-3
Table 13.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Fission Reactors Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 17 NDUL 2 USML XI CCL 0A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION Light-water reactors with HEU cores; small SYSTEMS high-flux cores; light, small containment vessels; very quiet pumps. Power output not included.
HEU Zirconium metal and alloys Hafnium metals MOBILE PORTABLE AND SPACE Power level at output bus able to support 238Pu in POWER AND PROPULSION appropriate equipment - not included. quantities SYSTEMS > 1 gm 237Np HEU for reactor cores Pyrolytic graphic coated fuel particles Other shortlived heavy isotopes decaying principally via alpha emission ELECTRONUCLEAR BREEDER 500900 MeV proton accelerators with current Fuel element in the milliamp range. Spallation neutron fabrication production target which can be cooled to materials: withstand operating temperatures or which uses uranium, circulating liquid metal. Ability to manufacture thorium, tritium at a rate sufficient to accumulate isotope zirconium at a rate equal to or greater than the rate of alloys, production (or refilling) of weapons. hafnium-free zirconium Boron for neutron absorption Lithium for breeding tritium.
Radiation-resistant pressure vessels and Software benchmarked components against operating naval > 36-in i.e. high pressure valves (> 6.9 MPa nuclear reactors or 1000 psi) Quiet pumps, reduction gearing. High temperature (> 450 C) radiationresistant reactor control systems. Efficient Seebeck effect materials for converting isotope decay heat to electricity directly. None identified
WA ML 17 USML XI
High-current linear accelerator, probably using superconducting cavities Microwave power systems capable of supporting the high levels of beam power. Remote handling equipment (similar to that for other reactors) Equipment for fabricating targets to produce tritium, 233U, and transuranic targets. Refueling equipment and reprocessing facility. Handling and extraction facilities for tritium. Ideally, refueling equipment should be able to shift fuel/blanket elements and extract material without lengthy shutdowns.
Fine grid 3-dimensional NDUL 2, 8 simulations of a sub-critical CCL 1B, C, D, E reactor where fission chains are maintained by an external and non-isotope neutron source
13-4
SECTION 13.2
NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROCESSING
Overview (See Figure 13.2-1) Handling and processing nuclear materials involves experimentally producing radioactive isotopes, producing weapons-grade and reactor-grade materials, reprocessing spent fuel, and handling transuranic wastes. Technologies of concern include those required for processing and handling highly radioactive and corrosive materials and for producing, handling, and transporting tritium, uranium-233 (233U), and the transuranic elements. The critical technologies identified include tritium production and processing and spent fuel reprocessing. Rationale (See Table 13.2-1) Some reactor-produced materials may be used directly for military nuclear programs. Techniques developed for, or transferred from, reactor production of non-weapon materials may be used to produce tritium, plutonium, or other isotopes useful in nuclear weapons. Reprocessing technology developed for use with high burn-up nuclear power reactor spent fuel may also be used to recover weapons-grade plutonium from low burn-up spent fuel. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 13.0-2) The US currently does not reprocess civilian reactor fuel, but several Nuclear Suppliers Group countries are planning to reprocess their fuel for improved waste management and resource conservation. Fundamental know-how for the most commonly used solvent extraction process is readily available through the open literature, but the engineering detail and design necessary for success are difficult. Some necessary equipment, such as spent fuel chopping machines, is not readily available. Pyrochemical separation processes are under development and are of less concern because the product material is insufficiently decontaminated, therefore precluding human handling of the reprocessed material. The US is no longer the world leader in nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. France and England each have
Nuclear Materials Processing

Purity Safety Radiation Shielding

Tritium Production Weapons Grade Material Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Figure 13.2-1.
Nuclear Materials Processing Overview
operating or under construction large fuel reprocessing facilities whereas the US has only military fuel reprocessing. Several nations of proliferation concern appear to have mastered lithium isotope separation and nuclear fuel reprocessing. It is less apparent that many of these nations have developed tritium production and handling capability.
13-5
Table 13.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear Materials Processing Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY (PRODUCE MATERIAL OF THE QUALITY USED IN US NUCLEAR WEAPONS) Ability to enrich to > 90% 235U. Ability to manufacture ton quantities of UF6. Quantity not included.
URANIUM ENRICHMENT
High-purity fluorine. Maraging steel for centrifuges. Sintered nickel for gaseous diffusion
TRITIUM PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING
Ability to make tritium at rate corresponding to fill or refill of weapons
SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION) SOLVENT EXTRACTION OF

URANIUM OR TRANSURANICS FROM SPENT RADIOACTIVE FUEL.
Total weight not included.
Pure mercury for lithium enrichment Lithium isotopically enriched in 6Li Platinized catalysts specially designed or prepared for promoting hydrogen isotope exchange between hydrogen and water for recovering 3H from heavy water or for producing heavy water. Helium isotopically enriched in 3He. Large quantities of pure Remote, unattended or automated reagents for PUREX or equipment for processing irradiated other extraction fuel. processes Shielded casks to transport radioactive Chemicals for reducing of material (>1000 kg). actinide oxides to pure Personnel radioactive materials metals discrimination and diversion detection systems. High-density/lead glass radiation shielding windows > 0.09 m2 (1 ft2), with density > 3 g/cm3 and thickness of > 100 mm (4 in.) and specially designed frames. Radiation-hardened TV cameras rated to withstand 5 x 104 grays (silicon) Fuel chopping machines Reactor discharge equipment and interim cooling facilities for spent fuel. Gaseous diffusion, centrifuge and EMIS equipment for enriching uranium.
Special valves and seals for handling None identified UF6; lining material for piping. Pumps for uranium hexafluoride at high pressure Disposal equipment/site for depleted UF6. Laser isotope separation equipment None Identified None identified
NTL B5 NDUL 3 CCL0A, B, D, E NCR B, C, D, E, F, G. H, I
NDUL 8 CCL 1B, C, D, E NRC A, L
Software unique to the specific processes or equipment in use on an industrial scale.
NDUL 1, 8 CCL 0A, B, D, E CCL 2B, D, E
13-6
SECTION 13.3
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Overview (See Figure 13.3-1) If sufficient highly enriched uranium is available, it is probably impossible to preclude construction of a gun-assembled nuclear explosive; therefore, the technologies of concern are those that enable the development of an implosion-assembled device. An implosion-assembled device uses conventional high explosive to strongly compress fissile material into a supercritical assembly. Inertia slows the system disassembly long enough for substantial energy release from fissions. A more advanced weapon development may use the energy from the fission explosion (the primary) to ignite a thermonuclear explosion (the secondary). An even more advanced development may use a mixture of deuterium and tritium in the primary to improve some of its characteristics (a technique called boosting). Critical are technologies developed and applied in the production of nuclear weapons, such as thin-film hydriding; material processing and fabrication techniques; isostatic and hydrostatic pressing; and nondestructive evaluation and imaging. This section also covers safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) components and fabrication techniques for uncommon materials or structures, along with some chemical, mechanical, and explosives engineering used in the US nuclear weapons program. Also covered are technologies for developing, producing, and using techniques and devices that enhance nuclear weapon survivability, weapon safety, and other security-related items. Rationale (See Table 13.3-1) Advanced US capabilities in nuclear weaponry are critical to national security, and US advanced technology must be protected. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism threaten US national security and world security. Therefore, the minimum technology necessary to build nuclear explosives must also be protected as much as possible. Sometimes that protection must extend to technologies that are more than 50 years old. Foreign capabilities in such technologies may indicate nuclear weapons production capability. Technologies developed in peaceful applications can be used to develop nuclear weapons. A proliferant need not master the full spectrum of design, development, production, and testing capabilities cited to produce a serviceable nuclear device. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 13.0-2)
Nuclear Weapons

Specialized Test Equipment Simulation & Modeling Codes Melting & Casting Processes Energetic Materials

ICBMs Stand-off Weapons Tactical Weapons Bombs
Figure 13.3-1.
Nuclear Weapons Overview
13-7
Table 13.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE
AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING
MILITARILY CRITICAL CRITICAL PARAMETERS MATERIALS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Nuclear Test Ban See Nuclear Materials quantity and size (Table 13.2-1) Treaty Ultrashort None identified pulse/ultra high intensity X-ray source duration < 5 ps; intensity 5 1018 w/cm2
PARAMETERS Flash x-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators with Not included a peak energy of 500 keW or more. Single and multiple-axis radiographic test facilities with associated high explosive containment chambers capable of withstanding a conventional explosion with at least as much high explosive as is used in US weapons. Vertical drilling equipment capable of boring large diameter (> 1.33 m) to depths of 500 m or more. Mechanical framing cameras with rates > 225,000 frames/s or streak cameras with speeds > 0.5 mm/s; electronic streak or framing cameras with 50 ns or better resolution. Computers having a CTP of 71500 MTOPS Non modular analog oscilloscopes with bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater; Plug in modular oscilloscopes with bandwidths of 4 GHz or greater; Analog sampling oscilloscopes with bandwidths greater than 4 GHz; Digital oscilloscopes with greater than 1 gigasample/sec, 8 bits or better resolution and 256 or more samples per channel. None identified Not included WA Cat 6A, D, E NDUL 5, 6, 8 CCL Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
Not included
Beryllium, beryllium alloys (containing more than 50% beryllium by weight), beryllium compounds (especially oxide), and beryllium parts, waste, and scrap except Beryl (silicate of beryllium and aluminum) in the form of emeralds or aquamarines Tritium and its compounds, and mixtures containing tritium Deuterium Plutonium (fissile material) High-explosive substances or mixtures containing more than 2% of Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX); or Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), or Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB); Hexanitrostilbene (HNS); or any greater than 1.8 g/cm3 explosive with greater than 8000 m/sec detonation velocity Calcium (high purity) containing both < 0.001% by weight of impurities other than magnesium and < 10 parts per million of boron (contd)
WA ML 8 WA Cat 1C, D, E NTL A1, B2 NDUL 2, 6, 8 USML 121.12 CCL Cat 1C, D, E NRC M, 110.9
(cont'd)
13-8
Table 13.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE
NUCLEAR Magnesium (high purity) containing both < 0.0002% by WEAPONS weight of impurities other than calcium and < 10 parts TESTING (CONTD) per billion of boron High-purity (99.99% or greater) bismuth with very low silver content (< 10 parts per million) Boron and boron compounds, mixtures, and loaded materials in which the 10B isotope is more than 20% by weight of the total boron content. Uranium in any form NUCLEAR High-explosive and detonation systems in arrangements None identified WEAPONS using single or multiple precision electrical detonators PRODUCTION designed for nuclear weapons. Optical fibers developed and fabricated to transmit a high-energy pulse from a laser to a high explosive initiator. Capacitors with voltage rating > 1.4 kV, energy storage > 10 J, capacitance > 0.5 F, and series inductance < 50 nH, or voltage rating > 750 V, capacitance > 0.25 F, and series inductance < 10 nH. Cold cathode tube switching devices with anode peak voltage rating of > 2.5 kV; anode peak current rating of 0.1 kA; anode delay time of 10 s or less Fast switch assemblies with a fast function anode peak voltage rating > 2 kV; anode peak current rating of 0.5 kA or more; turn-on time of 1 s or less Modular electrical pulse generators capable of: Delivering their energy in < 15 s; Output > 0.1 kA; Risetime < 10 s into loads of < 40 ohms; No dimension > 25.4 cm (10 in.); Weight < 25 kg (55 lb) Triggered spark gaps having an anode delay time of 15 ms or less and a peak current of 0.5 kiloamp or more Neutron generator systems and accelerator tubes used to initiate nuclear weapons
None identified
None identified
NNDUL 6, 8 CCL Cat 3A, D, E
13-9
SECTION 14 - POWER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

platform power applies a suite of technologies so that electric power can function as a multipurpose and single source of energy that combines propulsion of the mobile platform with operation of the systems mounted on that platform. Rationale Power is a required energy source in most military subsystems and components and in all large systems. Some systems such as E-3 Sentry aircraft require major modifications to provide the electric power required for subsystem operations. At the device level batteries are required which provide exceptionally steady and continuous power until exhausted, and then are required to degrade gracefully. Other batteries or capacitors are required to maintain a state of charged readiness for years before providing the single pulse of precisely conditioned power needed to fuse a munition. Advances in materials and components have been enabling for devices which generate repeating pulses of power to drive and charge sensors and weapons. In all cases performance
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Information Systems Electronics Materials
14.1 14.2 14.3
High Density Conventional Systems ................... 14-3 Mobile Electric Platform Power.......................... 14-5 Pulsed and High Power Systems ....................... 14-8
SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 14.0-1) Electric power drives subsystems and systems in literally hundreds of kinds of US military equipment. These many ongoing applications dictate military requirements for power level, power reliability, ruggedness, packaging and ability to operate in a wide range of environments. At the same time, a dual-use revolution is in progress which makes electric power the source of choice for applications which have belonged to hydraulic, pneumatic or other kinds of energy sources in the past. Technically, improvements in electric power are characterized by the ability to get more work per unit of input, more precise control and application of power to each task assigned, and greater military capability through improvements in performance and reliability, increased compactness and lower costs of ownership. Power systems can be organized in many ways. This section first covers high density conventional systems. These systems are packaged for military operations, but encompass a power range which is populated by literally thousands of commercial items and technical approaches. Features distinguishing military criticality are taken from the traits required by the military, but only desired in commercial applications. The power range of these systems is from 0 to 500 kilowatts, which is the upper level of commonly used commercial systems. The third section covers Pulsed and high power systems, which are generally found infrequently in commercial applications because the military weight and size constraints simply do not apply to commercial needs. These systems have power levels in excess of 500 kilowatts. Mobile electric
POWER SYSTEMS
TREND
High Energy Efficiency Battle Damage Tolerance Ubiquitous Enabling Component
Figure 14.0-1. Power Systems Overview
14-1
improvements in the power delivered to the using devices have included packaging which improves reliability while reducing both size and weight. At the same time shape and volume can be tailored to fit into nonstandard locations which often become available in a weapon or other hardware. These traits, in combination, have been enabling, and encourage substitution of electric power for hydraulic, pneumatic and mechanical power. The military significance of these trends is far reaching. Hazards to operating personnel are reduced, systems are more reliable, battle damage can be successfully localized, the number of required maintenance specialties is significantly lower, types of items in supply pipelines are reduced. Further advances in the near term will reduce requirements for explosive initiation of systems sequences. There is limited awareness of the scope and impact of the ongoing quiet revolution in electric power systems. Trends which appear contradictory indicate the importance of these technologies. Total power required in major systems is increased because many more tasks are being accomplished with electrical power. Simultaneously, the preponderance of uses has shifted toward the low power and low voltage portion of the spectrum. The shift is characterized by computers which have moved rapidly from using 12 volts toward < 2 volts. In a parallel development, higher voltage applications have been enabling for rapid switching of power and conditioning processes which produce focused electric or electrically driven weapons. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 14.0-2) Although the majority of power device companies are US, the industry is quite fragmented and many companies are small. Simultaneously, foreign entities are strongly motivated to enter the competition for both technical advances and off-the-shelf products. Many foreign programs receive government or consortium funding, and multinational European Community ventures are common. In breaking out national level capabilities, Germany is prominent in state of the art and next generation switching devices and in fuel cells which take different approaches than US efforts. The UK has broad expertise in several areas including batteries, capacitors, gate turn-off thyristors and magnetic materials. Israel has several established programs, and power developments are linked to their ambitions to encourage military exports. Capabilities in South Korea, India, China and France are tightly linked to government-sponsored programs and take various alternative approaches to component development. Significant progress has been
made in Russia in pulsed and high power systems. Germany and Japan support programs to develop next-generation silicon carbide switching devices which will be operational within the next three years. Other niche capabilities in Sweden and Switzerland reflect specialized applications in the commercial world such as mass transportation systems.
Country
14 .1 High Density Conventional Systems
1 4.2 Mobile Electric Pla tform Power
1 4.3 Puls ed and High Power Sys tems
Australia Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Republic France Germany India Israe l Italy Japan Netherlands Russia S. Africa S. Korea Sweden Switzerland UK US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilitie s:
All Majority Some Limited
Figure 14.0-2.
Power Systems FTA Summary
14-2
SECTION 14.1
HIGH DENSITY CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS
Overview (See Figure 14.1-1) This section covers power systems comprising components/subsystems rated at less than 500 kilowatts. Such systems are found in almost every military operating system, including multiple components of major weapons. Critical technologies in this section cover both power sources and power conditioning activities. Power systems are fundamental components which are often specifically tailored for each of the other major technology areas within the MCTL. Rationale (See Table 14.1-1) Technologies for power components/systems rated at less than 500 kW are migrating toward revolutionary changes in power density and precision. They are militarily critical because of their basic enabling roles in systems' performance and because the changes now realized make them militarily less vulnerable and more effective. New capabilities are possible because of these changes. Power system miniaturization is a key element which has lead to micropackaging on a chip and distributed packaging in order to perform a function such as track motor or flight control. Within weapons systems, electric power will become more common and will perform tasks now done with mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic power. Major initiatives include the Air Force More Electric Aircraft program, and advancements in the Navy/Army/DNA ETC (electro thermal chemical) electric gun. The latter provides significantly more energy at gun fire initiation, thus extending the energy imparted to the projectile. The gun shoots farther. Military requirements for power systems are distinguished primarily by the need for ruggedized packaging, and high volumetric power densities. Thermal stress is the primary concern, with shock stress an important secondary concern. Thermal management is key to reduced failure rates and improved stealth qualities. Military demand for low failure (total life-cycle reliability) drives new design architectures. As a result, approximately 40 percent of total demand for military power systems results in custom design applications to fit military systems requirements. Such requirements create pervasive pressures to reduce both production and product costs. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 14.0-2) The US is the world leader in these power systems technologies. Within that context, critical
High Density Conventional Systems

Power Density Thermal Management High Temperature Long Life Graceful Degradation Lower Weight Smaller Volume

Man Portable Electric Systems Fuzing Timers/Clocks Guns Actuation of components of major weapons Weapons platforms
Figure 14.1-1.
High Density Conventional Systems Overview
technologies of benefit to the US are strong in Germany for fuel cells and MOS controlled thyristor switching devices in which their approaches are different from ones being followed in the US. The UK has broad expertise across batteries, high performance capacitors, gate turn-off thyristors and magnetic materials. Japan has advanced capability in batteries, fuel cells and switches. Capabilities in China are tightly linked to government sponsored laboratory programs, and will respond to emerging market initiatives. Canada shows strong promise for fuel cell technology development. Israel's capabilities are strongly linked to their drive for military exports. Switzerland has excellence in high power solid state switches. Russia has excellence in high power solid state switches and pulsors.
14-3
Table 14.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY ELECTRICAL MACHINES (INCLUDES GENERATORS, STARTER/GENERATOR AND ACTUATORS) INSULATION SYSTEM
High Density Conventional Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML: 11, 21, 22 USML VI, XII CCL EAR 99
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Power Density > 5 kW/kg High Temperature > 200 C environment At operating frequencies (systems dependent) Temperature > 300 C Long life > 25,000 hours; at 400 V/m (10 kV/mil)
RESERVE BATTERIES
Density > 350 W-hr/kg over range 350 C to 500 C
PRIMARY BATTERIES RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES
Density > 120 W-hr/kg over range - 30 C to + 70 C Bipolar designs > 270 volts, > 1000 cycles; Lithium polymer technology > 200 Whr/kg and > 1000 cycles; Lithium ion batteries > 180 Whr/kg and > 1000 cycles
None identified Polymers, ceramics, inorganics, liquids and mixtures used to achieve militarily critical parameters High temperature None identified materials for electrodes, separators, electrolytes, containers None identified None identified None identified
None identified
None identified
POWER SEMICONDUCTORS
CAPACITORS - FILTER - ENERGY STORAGE
CAPACITOR DIELECTRIC MATERIAL
Materials for seals or seal technology, high conductivity polymer electrolyte, high energy density anode/cathode 2 High temperature High current density > 500 A/cm materials: > 300 C junction temperature gallium nitride, High switching frequency : > 100 kHz below titanium, 10 kW, > 500 kHz above 10 kW inorganic Blocking voltage > 600 V insulators, aluminum nitride, silicon nitride, silicon carbide dielectrics: Filter: > 200 C; ESR < 0.5 milliohms Energy density. > 1.5 J/g electrostatic capacitor impregnants, polymer, Energy Storage: energy density > 40 J/g for ceramics, electrochemical energy storage capacitors; ESR < 5 milliohm over 55 C to 80 C Voltage > inorganics and mixtures 600 V polymer, Filter: Case 1: breakdown strength > 10 kV/mil, temp > 200 C, dielectric constant > ceramics, inorganics and 3, dissipation factor < 0.0002 mixtures Energy Storage: Case 2: breakdown strength > 140 V/m (3 kV/mil), temp > 300 C, dielectric constant > 10, dissipation factor < 0.0005
Surface mount technology Electro-deposition process Ultrasonic bonding
None identified
CCL EAR 99
Winding machines
None identified
None identified
None identified
CCL EAR 99
14-4
SECTION 14.2 MOBILE ELECTRIC PLATFORM POWER

Overview (See Figure 14.2-1) Mobile electric platform power systems combine the propulsion and electrical energy generation functions. One example is provided in graphic form in Figure 14.2-2. This illustrates thinking about how platform power is generated, stored, managed and used, using components as indicated. The net effect, through advances in technologies, is a power system which has operational advantages of: reduced signature, increased density, lower weight and volume, greater flexibility in configuration and greater economy/reliability. Power components are characterized by significant reduction in moving parts, elimination of rigid connections and improved ability to use small and irregular spaces within a vehicle. Rationale (See Table 14.2-1) Power systems within all types of combat vehicles are broadly characterized by the level of energy required and the time over which the energy is demanded, pulsed or continuous. Components of the platform power system include an engine-generator which is sized to meet the average power requirements of the vehicle. Coupled to this item are energy storage and energy management components which make it possible for the system to meet the peak energy demands required in mission execution. Other major power uses are in counter mine warfare and electronic countermeasures. Energy density, thermal management, cost and packaging are critical parameters for military power systems. Aggressive design in thermal and magnetic requirements management are enabling for high performance systems. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 14.0-2) The United States is the world leader in most facets of mobile electric platform power systems. In this arena they are unlikely to develop commercial counterparts because of performance, volume, and environmental demands, combined with low production volumes. Most foreign endeavors to develop total mobile electric platform power systems will be regarded as highly competitive military activities and would require monitoring without a strong outlook for cooperation. Within that context, critical technologies of interest to the United States exist. Germany is strong in Fuel Cells and next generation switching devices (e.g., MOS-controlled thyristors) in which their approaches complement those being followed in the United States. The UK has broad expertise across batteries, high performance capacitors, gate turn-off thyristors (GTO Thyristors)
Mobile Electric Platform Power

Simplicity Operating Temperature Power Density Thermal Management Energy Extraction Permanent Magnetic Materials

Active Suspension Dynamic Armor Motor Controllers & Electric Filters Actuators Weapons Sensors
Figure 14.2-1.
Mobile Electric Platform Power Overview
and magnetic materials. Israel has an established military program is this area including advanced capabilities in batteries, fuel cells and power distribution. Canada shows strong promise for fuel cell technology development. Israel's capabilities are strongly linked to their drive for military exports. Sweden and Switzerland have various military activities to try to complete indigenous military programs. Russia has used alternate materials to build power averaging and power conditioning systems. Japan has a broad initiative to integrate a suite of functional technologies. Swiss excellence is recognized in solid state switches. Russia has considerable expertise in high power solid state switches and pulsers.
14-5
Pulse Power Applications

Medium Power Laser Electric Guns High Power Microwave Active Armor Counter Mine Counter Measures
Future Main Battle Tank Future Scout Future Programs
ENGINE
Turbine Diesel Linear Free Piston Future Main Battle Tank Future Scout
POWER AVERAGING
Flywheel Ultracapacitor
POWER CONDITIONING
Silicon Carbide Power Electronics
Surface Combatant 21 More Electric Aircraft C-5 Upgrade Electric AAAV
STEALTH ENERGY POWER

Batteries Fuel Cells
Continuous Power Applications
Electric Propulsion
Active Suspension
Figure 14.2-2.
Life Support
Communications
Stealth
Auxiliaries
Integrated Mobile Electric Platform Power System
14-6
Table 14.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY POWER SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES (E.G., SIC TECHNOLOGY FOR CLOSING/OPENING ACTIVE SWITCHES)
Mobile Electric Platform Power Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS High temperature materials: gallium nitride, silicon carbide aluminum nitride, inorganic insulators Not included UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY > 300 C operating temp, > 1500 V 500 amp/cm2
Manufacturing equipment for e.g., crystal None identified growth, epitaxial deposition and ion implantation
CCL EAR 99
CHEMICAL DOUBLE LAYER CAPACITOR > 5 kWh, >1000 V, > 20 Wh/kg TECHNOLOGY FOR ENERGY STORAGE
AND FILTERING
PERMANENT MAGNET MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY
> 300 C operating temp, > 50 mega gaussoersted
HIGH POWER ROTATING MACHINES Power density > 200 W/kg tip speed > 300 m/s
ADVANCED SWITCHING TOPOLOGIES INCLUDING SOFT SWITCHING TECHNOLOGIES FLYWHEEL (HIGH ENERGY DENSITY) TECHNOLOGY BATTERY TECHNOLOGY
>30 mW/m3 > 70 kHz > 0.5 mW average power >150 kJ/kg, > 6 kW/kg: Energy extraction in seconds of > 500 MJ/m3 > 75 kJ/kg, > 3 kW/kg after 75 charge/discharge cycles to an 80% depth; recharge in 100300 seconds
Electrode production line which provides high volume continuous production. Cell fabrication equipment; high power discharge equipment; layer uniformity, planarity inspection equipment Magnetic metals Electrode production line which provides and materials high volume continuous production. Cell fabrication equipment; High power discharge equipment; layer uniformity, planarity inspection equipment Ferromagnetic Equipment for balancing rotating composites for machinery of mass > 1000 kg at speeds > rotors insulation 2500 RPM; test equipment to simulate coordination/ stress in structure, mechanical and materials electromechanical design None identified None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 1C, D, E CCL Cat 1C, D, E
None identified
WA ML 12, 19, 21, 22 USML MIL XXI
None identified
WA ML 19, 21, 22 USML MIL XXI WA ML 18, 22 WA Cat 3E CCL Cat 3E
Composites Multiple materials for electrodes, separators, electrolytes Composites, magnetics, insulators and other materials that enable high power density systems
MOTOR CONTROL INVERTERS
Power density > 30 MW/m3 at Pav > 200 kW
Integration and testing
None identified
CCL EAR 99
14-7
SECTION 14.3 PULSED AND HIGH POWER SYSTEMS

Overview (See Figure 14.3-1) High power electronics consists of a system for conversion of prime electrical power into the necessary short pulses of electrical energy needed to energize loads such as directed energy and kinetic energy weapons, and high power microwaves. These technologies are applied to both weapons and sensors of many kinds. Peak power, pulse shape, pulse duration, repetition rates, firing rates, silent watch, and system energy storage recharging times all represent militarily critical performance parameters that transcend known commercial, industrial, or consumer applications. In addition, high power electronics packaging currently requires parallel/series combinations of components in the power train to achieve reliability, fault tolerance, and graceful aging at performance levels far higher than todays commercial standards. Rationale (See Table 14.3-1) High average power electronics is needed not only as one part of mobile electric platform power but also as a matching section between repetitive very high peak power systems and intermediate energy storage. These traits characterize the electrical portions of system designs which have applications in many weapons systems. Such very high average power conditioning systems have little, if any, commercial application making development a military responsibility. All military platforms suffer under the constraint of volume and weight limits not necessarily relevant in the present commercial, industrial, and consumer sector. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 14.0-2) The US is presently one of the world leaders in high power electronics systems (i.e., systems having average/burst powers above 500 kilowatts). Technologies of potential benefit to the US can be found in Germany for megawatt class energy storage and next generation switching devices (e.g., MOS controlled thyristors, IGBTs, SiC). The UK has broad expertise in batteries, high performance capacitors, gate turn-off thyristors (GTO Thyristors) and magnetic materials to apply to multimegawatt average power systems. Japan is one of the world leaders in the areas of large thyristors and GTOs, currently producing 150-mm diameter sized devices. They have also developed MOS-gated thyristors having an order of magnitude increase in current change per unit time capability to replace thyratron switches in pulsors for high energy level applications. These
Pulsed & High Power Systems

High Peak Power & Pulse Repetition Rate Power Distribution & Architectures Fault Tolerance Solid State Switches Capacitors Batteries
Figure 14.3-1.

Electric Propulsion High Power Microwave Electric Gun Countermeasures Active Suspension
Pulsed and High Power Systems Overview
devices all have significant military applications. Systems capabilities in Korea, India, China, and France are tightly linked to government-sponsored programs, and will respond to emerging military requirements. Israel's and Frances capabilities are strongly linked to their drive for military exports and may well position them as major technology transfer agents. In very high power systems, there are significant technological opportunities in Russia such as SiC high power solid state switches and pulsers. Switzerland has high power solid state switches. Reductions in long range focused investment have yielded increased dependence on foreign sources for components which use alternative and superior technical approaches.
14-8
Table 14.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY HIGH POWER ELECTRONICS CONTINUOUS (CW) (TOP PARAMETERS DESCRIBED) HIGH POWER ELECTRONICS - PULSED (TOP PARAMETERS DESCRIBED) BATTERIES: PRIMARY AND RESERVE
Pulsed and High Power Systems Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Composites UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Power management and control systems
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Density > 25 mW/m3 at Pav > 0.5 mWavg > 5 x 109W peak >1 MJ/m3 > 1 MWavg at any operational repetition rate Temperature range: -30 C to 70 C; > 10 MJ per kg; >70 MJ per m3 150 Wh/kg after 75 charge/discharge cycles at a discharge current equal to C/5 hours (C being the nominal capacity in ampere hours) > 1.5 kJ/kg, > 5 kV prf > 0.2 Hz: graceful aging < ms discharge time > 80% charge/discharge efficiency > 500 A/cm2 > 5 kV, 15 ms pulses, > 1 mA, prf to 10 Hz > 100 kV, 1 s pulses, > 100 mW, > 10 kA/s > 1 kJ, prf > 1 kHz > 5 kV, CW, > 70 kHz, 1 kA Operating at > 500 kV at 110 kJ/pulse, at a repetition rate > 100 Hz
WA ML XI USML XXI
Composites
Test equipment for pulse diagnostics Phased triggering for series/ WA ML XI and component and material parallel switching USML XXI manufacturing components Material processing and for purity None identified and uniformity Test equipment for pulse diagnostics Environmental compatibility Equipment to make and validate None identified material free of defects having uniform thickness; metallized electrodes and connections at high current densities Purity of substrate materials/device None identified design/processing and packaging WA Cat 3A, D, E CCL Cat 3A, D, E
None identified
CAPACITORS
Selected ceramics, polymers
SOLID STATE SWITCHES FOR HIGH

POWER ELECTRONICS
Silicon carbide
WA ML 19 USML XIII
PULSE TRANSFORMERS
POWER DISTRIBUTION/MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE
PRIME POWER SYSTEMS: INCORPORATING CW AND PULSED ALTERNATORS
> 5 kV, 125 mW avg Power Quality: THD < 1%, Voltage regulation < 0.1% in mobile configurations Pav > 1 mW 1 GW/m3 1 ms pulse duration > 10 MJ/pulse Specially designed for repetitive burst operations (2 or more pulses) at energy levels > 10 MJ/pulse
Pulsed insulations and low dielectric constant and lower loss MHz class ferrites Conductors and insulators which take thermal stress
PRIME POWER SYSTEMS: ROTATING

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPULSATORS
High strength composites mechanical impulsetoughened, insulation, ceramic and magnetic bearings High strength composites Mechanical impulsetoughened, insulation Ceramic and magnetic bearings
Quality processing and validation for leakage inductance/capacitance/insulation and insulation strength Quality processing and validation for leakage inductance/capacitance/insulation and insulation strength Impregnation & winding equipment/NDI test equipment
None identified
WA ML 19 USML XIII
Power Management and Control Systems
CCL EAR 99
None identified
CCL EAR 99
Impregnation & winding equipment/NDI test equipment
None identified
CCL EAR 99
14-9
SECTION 15 - SENSORS AND LASERS TECHNOLOGY

15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms...... Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar .............. Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar ............ Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform .................... Electro-Optical Sensors .................................. Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers............. Lasers ...................................................... Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers........... Obscurants................................................. Radar ...................................................... SUMMARY
Overview (See Figure 15.0-1) This section covers most sensor types that are of military interest. Inertial, chemical, biological and nuclear sensors are covered in other sections. This section also covers the laser technologies that are not covered in other sections. The sensors included are acoustics for air, terrestrial and marine platforms; electro-optical; gravity meters and gradiometers; lasers; magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers; and radar. Obscurants are included as one method of countering some sensors. The acoustic sensors are used militarily for locating submarines, mines and lost objects; depth sounding; bottom mapping; and weapon activation and homing. They are used commercially for fish finding, seismic exploration at sea and for petroleum and mineral exploitation. Electro-optical sensors are typically used for night vision devices and for terminal guidance for smart weapons. Gravity meters measure gravity magnitude and gravity gradiometers measure gravity gradients. These sensors are used for missile siting, inflight guidance, and to aid in inertial navigation. They are used commercially in geophysical surveys. Military lasers having less than 15 kW output power are used primarily for limited visibility operations and to improve targeting accuracy with guided weapons. Magnetic sensors detect the presence of a magnetic field and measure its magnitude and/or direction and are used militarily for covert detection of submarines and mines and for proximity detection by ordnance fuses. They are used commercially in geophysical surveys. Radar is used militarily on all types of platforms and at fixed sites for detecting and locating targets, for weapon guidance and to obtain information about earth features and atmospheric conditions. Major commercial uses are air
15-3 15-5 15-8 15-11 15-13 15-15 15-17 15-19 15-21 15-23
traffic control, ship tracking for collision avoidance and weather tracking. Gravity gradiometers, lasers and radar are used in the delivery of WMD. No major emerging technology developments are underway. A large part of sensors and lasers technology is enabling for military applications as they are the eyes and ears of many military systems and provide a great proportion of the data required for prosecution of military activity. Rationale Sensors are required for most military actions. The side with superior sensors has a significant advantage over the adversary. Technologically superior sensors remain a national military goal. Though the sensors covered are of a great variety with widely dispersed functions, they are common in that the US state of the art is generally comparable to or better than the rest of the world and that most development and production was driven by US military objectives. In most warfare scenarios, sensors will be used singly or in combinations. Active sensors are used to obtain massive amounts of real-time, highly accurate data. Passive sensors are used for covert types of operations. Some sensors are primary and others are used to confirm or verify the results. Obscurants on the battlefield have the potential to degrade sensors across the electromagnetic spectrum.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Power Systems Information Systems Materials Electronics Improved sensitivity Improved information management Correct decisions criteria
SENSORS & LASERS
TREND
Improved discrimination criteria Interference reduction Data fusion Greater resolution Selective information processing
Figure 15.0-1.
Sensors and Lasers Overview
15-1
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 15.0-2) The US has clearly led in the development, production and use of sensors and lasers. The FSU was very active in all areas of sensors and laser development but rarely reached the technological level of the West. Current Russian sensors remain limited by the lack of production facilities and a motivated work force. Where there is a national priority, France, Germany, Japan and the UK have developed and produced excellent sensors. These and other countries noted are currently making good progress. The former substantial lead of the US in acoustic systems has eroded to a marginal lead over Russia, France and the UK. Germany and Japan come next followed by Australia and Canada. The US clearly leads in third generation image intensifiers and second generation staring array
technology, followed by the UK, France, Netherlands, Japan and Germany. The US clearly leads in gravity meters and gradiometers, followed by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the Ukraine. The US leads in low powered lasers, closely followed by Russia with France, Germany, Japan and the UK coming next. The US leads in magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers followed by the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Russia and the Ukraine. The US leads in radar systems development followed by France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the UK and Japan. The US appears to lag in obscurants development, with China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK and the Ukraine leading the way.
Country
15.1 Acoustic Sensors
15.2 Marine Active Sonar
15.3 Marine Passive Sonar
15.4 Marine Platform Acoustic Sensors
15.5 ElectroOptical Sensors
15.6 Gravity Meters
15.7 Lasers
15.8 Magnetometers
15.9 Obscurants
15.10 Radar
Australia Canada China Czech Republic Finland France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Poland Russia South Africa Sweden UK Ukraine US LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: All Majority Some Limited
Figure 15.0-2.
Sensors and Lasers FTA Summary
15-2
SECTION 15.1 ACOUSTIC SENSORS, AIR AND TERRESTRIAL PLATFORMS

Overview (See Figure 15.1-1) This item covers technologies for the development or production of acoustic systems for air platforms and for terrestrial (landbased) applications. Included are the seismic acoustic systems for the location and identification of petroleum producing features within the earths crust. The processing and computing capability of seismic terrestrial-based processing centers that are considered critical are discussed in the Information Systems section. Passive acoustic terrestrial systems are included for intruder detection and for the detection and location of target vehicles and direct fire weapons. Microphones or geophones are placed as best possible for reception and enhanced signal to noise ratio. Criteria for decision and the selection and weighting of discriminates (clues) is paramount. Aircraft sensors require isolation from acoustic noise caused by air flow, propulsion and other equipment vibration. The acoustic sensors for identifying, selecting and isolating the vibrations are required for noise reduction. Seismic processing and computing capability has been developed 100 percent by the seismic industry. Passive intruder-detection systems have been developed primarily by the military. Aircraft acoustic vibration reduction has been driven by military needs. Current intruder- and vibration-reduction systems were developed by the US but foreign built systems are now being evaluated. Rationale (See Table 15.1-1) The signal processing and digital computing capability of seismic land-based processing centers are similar to and can be used for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) passive sonar surveillance data analysis. Passive acoustic systems for use in the detection and location of intruders is a current military technique that has commercial application. The unique processing used to discriminate against false targets and to identify intruders is specially developed for this application and considered militarily critical. Development of passive acoustic systems to detect and locate target vehicles and direct fire weapon being fired from distances up to 5,000 meters, while the detection sensors operate in an acoustic environment of closer and louder explosions, is a highly specialized and critically military capability that has no commercial counterpart. Ground vehicles used for passive reception in intruder detection or direct fire detection system can generate an acoustic environment much louder than the signals to be detected. Self-noise reduction, including but not limited to isolation, is required. Aircraft sensors are adversely impacted by acoustic vibrations from air flow, propulsion and those created by other
Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms

Data processing Weighting and selection of clues Validated decision criteria Correct decisions Vibration sensitive sensors Performance in acoustic clutter

Intruder detection systems Aircraft Seismic processing centers Artillery target acquisition systems Land based vehicle target acquisition systems
Figure 15.1-1.
Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms Overview
equipment aboard. Cancellation or isolation from the noise source is required for proper operation. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 15.0-2) US industry has dominated seismic processing and computational development and use. The US military has pioneered the location of target vehicles and direct fire weapons by passive acoustic means as well as aircraft acoustic vibration-detection and reduction systems. Terrestrial acoustic intruder-detection systems are now developed commercially as well as by the military. Israel has an advanced intruder detection system. Foreign capability in the other areas is improving and some foreign involvement is being considered.
15-3
Table 15.1-1.
TECHNOLOGY PASSIVE ACOUSTIC DETECTION AND
LOCATION OF INTRUDERS ON LAND
Acoustic Sensors, Air and Terrestrial Platforms Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Capability to differentiate intruders from background with 98% accuracy Locate direct fire weapons within 10 m out to 5000 m range CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Validated set of algorithms for detection and discrimination of intruders Validated set of algorithms to isolate, detect, discriminate, and locate direct fire weapons from a selfgenerating ground clutter environment. Validated set of algorithms for detecting, discriminating and tracking of targets against noise clutter background Validated set of algorithms using active and passive noise reduction techniques None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 5, 21, 22 USML XII WA ML 5, 21, 22 USML XII
PASSIVE ACOUSTIC SYSTEMS FOR

LOCATING DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS ON LAND
None identified
None identified
PASSIVE ACOUSTIC DETECTION AND

LOCATION OF TARGET VEHICLES ON LAND
Target detection, identification and real time position tracking within 10 m out to 5000 m range.
None identified
None identified
WA ML 5, 21, 22 USML XII
GROUND VEHICLE PLATFORM-NOISE

REDUCTION
> 40 dB reduction
None identified
None identified
WA ML 5, 21, 22 USML XII, XXI WA ML 5, 21, 22 USML VII, VIII, XIII, XXI
AIRCRAFT SELF-NOISE REDUCTION
> 6 dB reduction
None identified
None identified
15-4
SECTION 15.2
ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, ACTIVE SONAR
Overview (See Figure 15.2-1) Most marine sensing systems use sonars which employ acoustic signals (sound waves) to locate underwater objects and to determine features. Sonars are termed active when sound is generated by the system for the purpose of echo ranging on a target and passive when listening to the sound radiated by the target. Active sonars are used militarily for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), weapon homing, torpedo defense, mine warfare, swimmer warfare, deep sea salvage, and underwater communications and navigation. Commercial uses include locating fish and other objects, seismic exploration at sea, petroleum and mineral exploitation, and academic studies. Dual use includes the detection, classification, and tracking of underwater objects and features for navigation, depth sounding, and bottom mapping. Active sonar performance is highly dependent on the acoustic environment and frequency of the system. ASW sonars are low frequency, 100 Hz to 10 kHz, to obtain long ranges out to 30 km. Mine detection and deep sea salvage active sonars are generally short range using high frequency, 30 to 750 kHz, to provide the resolution to discriminate and identify the desired targets from background clutter. Underwater weapon active sonars are medium range, on the order of 1000 m, to detect, locate, and track the target and provide steering commands. Marine seismic systems use a towed 8- to 200-Hz frequency source and a long towed hydrophone array (streamer) to receive the sound signals bounced off the ocean bottom and other features in the earth's crust to locate areas that have a potential for petroleum. There are no active sonar technologies known to be directly used for WMD. There is no revolutionary, emerging technology development underway. Approximately 10% of active sonar systems, by cost, are commercial and most have dual use potential for major military applications. Most all active sonar development has been driven by military application, including part of the seismic systems. Rationale (See Table 15.2-1) The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the greater emphasis worldwide on littoral vs. deep ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet, diesel-electric submarines. With quieter submarines or cluttered environment, active sonar is the primary sensor. Active sonars are also the most effective sensor for detecting, locating and tracking sea mines, torpedoes and swimmers and for the homing and activation of acoustic mines and torpedoes. High-powered, long-range, modern fish-finding sonars have potential for finding sea-based mines, which are a
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar
Performance in acoustic clutter Operational range Resolution Classification and Identification Area coverage Rapid target track Target position accuracy Acoustic power density Feature heightfinding Acoustic Imaging
Surface ships Submarine and other submersibles USW aircraft Torpedoes and mines Antisubmarine warfare Antisurface ship warfare Mine warfare Deep sea salvage Mine and object avoidance Underwater and under Ice navigation Underwater communication Seismic profiling
Figure 15.2-1.
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Overview
major factor in littoral warfare. Also, high-powered fish-finding sonars are a readily available source for jamming and for countering passive sonars for surveillance and for weapons sensors. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 15.0-2) The US major lead has eroded to a marginal lead in active sonar systems technology over Russia and the major western producing countries. The UK and France clearly pace the remainder of the western world and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia in many technology areas. Germany and Japan come next followed by Australia and Canada. Other countries noted have acoustic capability in niche areas.
15-5
Table 15.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY ACTIVE SONAR DATA PROCESSING
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Cues (discriminants), decision criteria and process for real-time automatic or computeraided detection, classification, discrimination, or identification of USW targets for data reduction and decision process Empirically validated real-time processing of active acoustic data for fixed or mobile arrays operating in the bistatic, or multistatic mode Real-time adaptive with interference rejection > 12 dB < 1 at frequencies < 100 kHz Track targets having speeds < 3 knots and reduce effect of countermeasures 500% increase in reliable data rate and the determination of reliable data rate CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Validated set of algorithms EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 21, 22 USML XI
ACTIVE SONAR SIGNAL & DATA

PROCESSING
None identified
None identified
Validated set of algorithms
WA ML 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 4, 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA Cat 6A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI
ACTIVE SONAR ADAPTIVE BEAMFORMING ACTIVE SONAR BEAMFORMING ACTIVE SONAR REVERBERATION
SUPPRESSION INCLUDING BROADBAND PROCESSING CHANNEL ADAPTIVE PROCESSING USING PROBE PULSE TO CHARACTERIZE THE MEDIUM AND UTILIZING THAT INFORMATION IN THE TRANSMIT OR RECEIVE SIGNAL PROCESSING ENVIRONMENTALLY ADAPTIVE ACTIVE SONAR
Validated set of algorithms None identified Validated set of algorithms
None identified
None identified
The process of matching signal to environmental conditions in order to minimize multiple arrival interference and signal attenuation by 3 dB or more ACOUSTIC PROJECTORS Instantaneous radiated acoustic power density > 0.01 mW/mm2/Hz; continuously radiated acoustic power density > 0.001 mW/mm2/Hz, both for frequencies < 10 kHz; designed to withstand pressure at depths >1000 m or sidelobe suppression > 22 dB ACOUSTIC PROJECTOR USING With diameter < 20 cm; submerged life PIEZOELECTRIC COMPOSITE OR > 10 years; operating < 500 Hz or element ELECTROSTRICTIVE MATERIALS sound pressure level > 180 dB (reference to 1 Pa at 1 m) ACOUSTIC PROJECTOR USING Uniformity better than 2 dB in transmitting PIEZOELECTRIC ELEMENTS voltage or current response or a uniformity of better than 2% in frequency of resonance; or uniformity batch to batch with 5% of specified design for dielectric or piezoelectric or electrostrictive constant ACOUSTIC PROJECTOR MODELING Design that predicts actual source level, transmitting voltage or current response within 2 dB or resonance at all power levels within 2% SUBMERSIBLE ACTIVE SONAR FOR OBJECT Feature height finding or beam interpolation LOCATION AND RECOVERY using computer aided detection or track, fine angle horizontal or vertical resolution
None identified
None identified
None identified
Underwater acoustic anechoic test tank with 2000 psi pressure capability.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E
None identified
Underwater acoustic test tank.
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA ML 4, 9, 21, 22 USML XI
None identified
None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI (cont'd)
15-6
Table 15.2-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)
UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Validated set of algorithms EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY SUBMARINE AHEAD LOOKING ACTIVE Ahead looking bathymetric sonar using None identified SONAR monopulse (interferometric) processing having displays with three dimensional qualities; with system data accuracies better than 0.5% of the average water depth across the swath SUBMARINE OR SUBMERSIBLE ACTIVE Multi-aspect data fusion processing None identified
SONAR DATA PROCESSING SUBMARINE ACTIVE SONAR TO DETERMINE OVERHEAD ICE THICKNESS WITH ICE HARDENED CONFORMAL TRANSDUCERS SIDESCAN SONAR WIDE-SWATH BATHYMETRIC ACTIVE SONAR
Validated set of algorithms Validated set of algorithms
Determine ice thickness with 75% accuracy
None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI
UNDERWATER WEAPONS ACTIVE

SONARS
ACTIVE SONAR FOR SWIMMER DETECTION, CLASSIFICATION AND

TRACK MINE COUNTERMEASURE PLATFORM ACTIVE SONARS SYSTEM FOR DETERMINING THE POSITION OF SURFACE OR UNDERWATER VEHICLES
Continuous coverage at > 20 knots speed Beams less than 1.9 or data accuracies better than 0.3% of the average water depth across the swath Multiple preformed beams, transmit frequency > 15 kHz, withstand depth > 500 m, sound pressure level > 220 dB (reference to 1 Pa at 1 m), resolve targets at ranges > 1000 m with angular accuracy better than 5, or doppler accuracy better than 2 knots. Narrow beams, computer aided detection, classification and track with low false alarm rate at range of 500 m Null steering > 12 dB to remove surface effect interference that blanks targets Accuracy < 10 m at ranges > 1000 m
None identified
None identified
WA ML 11, 21, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E Target recognition and track WA ML 4, 9, 21, 22 set of validated algorithms USML XI
Validated set of algorithms None identified
None identified
None identified
Target recognition and track WA ML 9, 21, 22 set of validated algorithms USML XI
ACOUSTIC DECOYS AND JAMMERS CORRELATION-VELOCITY SONAR LOG
Performance time vs size and 90% probability of blanking sensor or decoying sensor Horizontal speed measurement at distances between the carrier and sea bed > 500 m and accuracy of 0.4% of distance traveled
Validated set of algorithms to WA ML 9, 21, 22 track the sea surface USML XI Underwater acoustic range with operating None identified WA Cat 6A, D, E range of >1000 m and frequency band of > CCL Cat 6A, D, E 10 to 100 kHz None identified None identified WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XI None identified None identified WA Cat 6A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E
None identified
15-7
SECTION 15.3
ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, PASSIVE SONAR
Overview (See Figure 15.3-1) Passive sonars are used militarily for the covert location of underwater objects that radiate acoustic energy and are used primarily for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Functions performed are detection, classification, identification and location of acoustically radiating targets, including those being performed by mine actuators and acoustic-homing torpedoes. Passive sonar performance is dependent on the acoustic environment. The major interference is own-ship noise, radiated noise from nearby friendly ships, long range shipping, and ambient background noise. As submarines have become quieter, the ASW passive sonar band has been extended to the lower few hundred hertz. Propagation paths are the same as for active sonars except the path is one-way only. Thirty to sixty km ranges are possible with towed arrays and hundreds of km ranges are possible from fixed or deployed sites. In littoral areas, the ranges are shorter. Underwater weapon passive sonars are designed to detect targets at ranges out to 20 km, while discriminating the target radiated noise from weapon self-noise, ambient background noise or countermeasures. There are few commercial uses of passive sonar except for academic research. The major concern is with "active" seismic marine towed hydrophone arrays (streamers) and bottom or bay cable systems that can be used in the passive mode for ASW. No passive sonar technologies are known to be directly used for WMD. Most passive sonar development is by evolutionary processes and there is no revolutionary, emerging technology development underway. All basic passive sonar technologies are enabling as they are required for covert, small or large scale ocean sensing. All US Navy passive sonars are US developed and produced. Some advanced technologies are shared with close allies, but relatively few systems are exported. Rationale (See Table 15.3-1) Most successful ASW is performed using an alternation of active and passive sonar based on the scenario or, at times, a combination of both. Passive systems remain the most effective sensor for antisubmarine and anti-surface ship warfare in the surveillance or stand-off mode, for the initial contact in a melee engagement and for intercepting transients from the opponents platforms and weapons. In these roles, towed hydrophone arrays are the most effective ASW sensor used to date. Passive acoustic sensors also remain one of the primary sensors used in sea mines and torpedoes. This covert and relatively low power mode has large volumetric coverage and is
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar

Covertness Operational range Classification and Identification Transients processing Area coverage

Deployed or fixed sites Surface ships Submarine and other submersibles ASW aircraft Torpedoes and mines Antisubmarine warfare Antisurface ship warfare
Figure 15.3-1.
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Overview
effective for activating stationary mines and for activating and steering mobile weapons. All passive sonar development has been driven by military application. Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 15.0-2) The US has maintained a comfortable lead in passive sonar systems technology over Russia and the major western producing countries. The UK and France clearly pace the remainder of the western world and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia in many technology areas. Germany and Japan come next in size and quality of acoustic systems technology capability, followed by Australia and Canada. Other countries noted have acoustic capability in niche areas.
15-8
Table 15.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY INTERCEPT RECEIVERS DEPLOYED PASSIVE SONAR
SYSTEMS
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Validated set of algorithms EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI Processing for irregular array WA ML 11, 21, 22 shapes, data rate reduction, USML XI data fusion and decision criteria Processing for irregular array WA ML 11, 21, 22 shapes, and data rate USML XI reduction, data fusion and decision criteria Validated set of algorithms WA ML 11, 21, 22 USML XI Validated set of algorithms Validated set of algorithms WA ML 4, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI
Full spectrum with bearing determination < 45 error None identified None identified Range one convergence zone (CZ) (30 to 60 km) and track multiple targets None identified None identified
BOTTOM MOUNTED PASSIVE

SONAR SYSTEM
Range multiple CZ, track multiple targets or > 5-year life
SONOBUOYS INCLUDING ACTIVE

ADJUNCT RECEPTION
UNDERWATER MINES AND

TORPEDOES PASSIVE SENSORS PASSIVE TARGET TRACKING
Empirically validated real-time, in buoy processing; None identified None identified incorporating volumetric arrays or providing target bearing with < 45 error Detect, track target radiated noise of targets out to 20 None identified Nose assembly and body machining km Resolve and track multiple targets None identified None identified Processor for target bearing accuracy of < 0.5
PASSIVE TARGET BEARINGS
PASSIVE RECEPTION
PASSIVE RANGING FULL SPECTRUM PROCESSING PASSIVE SONAR

DATA FUSION PASSIVE SONAR ARRAY NOISE CANCELLATION BY ELECTRONIC PROCESSES PASSIVE SONAR ADAPTIVE BEAM FORMING, NULL STEERING OR SIDELOBE REDUCTION PASSIVE SONAR HULL MOUNTED RECEIVING ARRAYS
Computer aided, real-time processing for detection, classification, threat related identification or tracking with capability to detect submarines at speeds < 8 knots at 30 km range using flow and propulsor related noise or using multiple track or multiple line spectra Ranging < 10 minutes time None identified Array installation and alignment Full acoustic spectrum with 360 coverage In real-time for 2 or more receiving arrays > 2 dB for flow or acceleration noise None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified
None identified Array installation and alignment and Validated set of algorithms underwater acoustic test range with operating range of 10 km and accuracy of < 0.1 deg. None identified None identified Validated set of algorithms
Validated set of algorithms Validated set of algorithms Validated set of algorithms Validated set of algorithms
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 22 USML XI
> 6 dB interference reduction
ASW TOWED ARRAYS
Not self noise limited > 12 knots and None identified Array installation and alignment > 35 m depth using sensor matching or array shading equipment or pressure tolerant processing with > 3 dB self noise reduction Multiple lines, strength member in hose wall, None identified None identified electronic cancellation of flow or acceleration noise, vibration isolation operates > 8 knots tow speed, or low noise, dynamic leveling and depression force > 100 pounds at speed > 8 knots
None identified
None identified
WA ML 9, 22 USML XI
(cont'd)
15-9
Table 15.3-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters (Cont'd)
CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified Open ocean acoustic test range UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Array shape prediction Predict self-noise based on physical characteristics of array None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA Cat 6A, D, E CCL Cat 6A, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY TOWED ARRAY DISCRETE POINT Ability to predict within 1m discrete points on a LOCATION towed array TOWED ARRAY SELF-NOISE MODELING Ability to predict towed array self-noise levels within 10 dB based on tow speed, array diameter, construction and material properties SEISMIC TOWED HYDROPHONE 'Longitudinally reinforced hose wall, multiplexed ARRAYS hydrophone group signals designed to operate > 35 m depth, array diameter < 40 mm or hydrophones better than specified below SEISMIC BAY OR BOTTOM CABLE Multiplexed sensor group signals designed to SYSTEMS operate > 35 m depth or hydrophones better than specified below HYDROPHONES (TRANSDUCERS) Continuous flexible sensors or assemblies of discrete sensor elements with dimensions < 20 mm and separation of elements < 20 mm; or using optic fibers, piezoelectric polymers, or piezoelectric composite ceramic material as sensing elements HYDROPHONES (TRANSDUCERS) Sensitivity better than - 180 dB (reference to WITHOUT PREAMPLIFIERS AND WITH NO 1 V per Pa)
ACCELERATION COMPENSATION HYDROPHONES (TRANSDUCER) WITHOUT PREAMPS AND WITH ACCELERATION CANCELLATION
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Open ocean acoustic test range
None identified
None identified
Acoustic hydrophone calibration facility
None identified
HYDROPHONES INCORPORATING
PREAMPLIFIERS
TOWED ARRAY HYDROPHONES
Operates < 35 m depth with sensitivity better None identified than - 186 dB (reference to 1 V per Pa), operates at depths > 35 m and sensitivity better than - 192 dB, operates at depths > 100 m and sensitivity better than - 204 dB; designed for operation at depths > 1000 m. Detection threshold < sound pressure spectrum None identified defined by (9016 log (freq. in Hz)) expressed in dB reference to 1 Pa and operates > 35 m depth and having dimension < 3 cm Acceleration voltage response divided by None identified voltage sensitivity is < 135 dB reference to 1 Pa/g measured in air Acceleration voltage response divided by voltage sensitivity is < 150 dB reference to 1 Pa/g measured in water over band 1010,000 Hz > 12 dB velocity reduction and > 4 dB in echo reduction for frequency < 10 kHz and operating depths > 35 m Operate at depths > 35 m and within 25% of neutrally buoyant None identified
None identified
None identified
Vibration and acoustic hydrophone test fixtures
None identified
HULL MOUNTED HYDROPHONE
Vibration and acoustic hydrophone test fixtures
None identified
HULL MOUNTED HYDROPHONES

MOUNTINGS
None identified
Quality control and uniformity of manufacturing
None identified
HYDROPHONES FOR DETECTING

ACOUSTIC PARTICLE VELOCITY
None identified
None identified
None identified
WA ML 9, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 9, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 9, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 9, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 9, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML XI CCL Cat 6A, D, E
15-10
SECTION 15.4
ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE PLATFORM
Overview (See Figure 15.4-1) This item covers marine platform acoustics, which encompasses all measures taken to reduce the self-noise of ships, submarines, or other sonar platforms. Platform acoustic technologies have a major impact on the sonar system capability by the reduction of self-noise generated by own ship machinery or water flow around the platform. Specifically of interest are domes; baffles; machinery quieting including main propulsion, valves, gears, pumps, fans, balancing, and mounting of same, measurement techniques and instrumentation; hull coatings; and active and passive structural acoustic noise control. Some of these items are partially covered under signature reduction in MCTL Section 12 on Marine Systems. Radiated noise that is under marine systems and ship self-noise that impacts sonars often come from the same sources but the process for reduction of these noises can be quite different and separate. There are no known commercial uses for the large acoustic domes and windows that are considered militarily critical. No marine platforms are known to be directly used in WMD. No emerging technology development is underway. Most marine platform acoustic processes are enabling as the platform is required to operate both the multitude of active and passive sonar systems. All self-noise reduction for marine platforms has been driven by military application. Most acoustic processes covered in this section were developed by the US Navy. Rationale (See Table 15.4-1) Active and passive sonar systems are expected to remain for the foreseeable future as the dominant sensors on surface ships and submarines for anti-submarine, anti-surface ship and mine warfare. The sonar hydrophones and transducers (projectors) need to be effectively coupled to the ocean without being damaged by objects in the water or wave action on the platform. Also they need to be isolated from own ship generated noise, turbulent flow noise, and propulsor-generated noise. Therefore, each hydrophone or transducer array is acoustically isolated as much as possible from the ship and protected from the ocean by an acoustically transparent dome or window. Unfortunately, structural integrity, acoustic isolation and acoustic transparency are not generally compatible. A group of special materials and isolation techniques have been developed to resolve the problem.
Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform

Low self-noise at operational speeds Sensor accuracy Reliability Long life Robustness Depth of operation Low insertion loss

Surface ships Submarines Antisubmarine warfare Antisurface ship warfare Shipboard minehunting Underwater communications
Figure 15.4-1.
Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Overview
Foreign Technology A s s e s s m e n t (See Figure 15.0-2) The US has in the past maintained a comfortable lead in nuclear powered submarine self-noise reduction (and the companion radiated noise) over Russia, France, and the UK. The US 688I class submarines were the quietest in the world, but Russia then developed the AKULA Class, which appears quieter, and now has a new class attack submarine, the SEVERODVINSK under construction, which is to be even quieter. The new US SEAWOLF, SSN-21, is slated to be the new, low-noise leader. The US does not build diesel-electric submarines, but Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, and the UK build quiet diesel-electric submarines. Some of these submarines are quieter when operated electrically than nuclear-powered ones.
15-11
Table 15.4-1.
TECHNOLOGY ACOUSTIC DOMES AND WINDOWS
Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Underwater acoustic test range for frequency > 15 kHz UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI
BAFFLES, DECOUPLERS AND

ABSORBERS FOR SUBMARINES ACOUSTIC REFLECTORS AND LENS
ACOUSTIC BAFFLES, CONDITIONERS,

AND DECOUPLERS
ACTIVE OR PASSIVE NOISE

CANCELLATION SYSTEMS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY < 2 dB insertion loss at normal incidence > 15 kHz, submerged > 5 years, withstand wave slap, highly damped or nonpropagation of structural defect Pressure release or absorption 80% effective over depth excursion of submarines. Function 80% effective over depth excursion of submarines Noise reduction > 10 dB for frequencies < 2 kHz or > 20 dB for frequencies from 2 to 5 kHz; both for depths > 35 m. Noise cancellation > 6 dB.
Underwater anechoic acoustic test facility None identified with pressure of 1000 psi Underwater anechoic acoustic test facility None identified with pressure of 1000 psi Underwater anechoic acoustic test facility None identified with pressure of 1000 psi None identified None identified
WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9, 21, 22 USML XI WA ML 9
None identified
15-12
SECTION 15.5
ELECTRO-OPTICAL SENSORS
O v e r v i e w (See Figure 15.5-1) This section covers critical military applications of electro-optical "Sensors Systems" used in various tactical and strategic missions, other than in space. Sensors designed and radiation hardened for space applications are covered in the Space section. The sensor systems covered here are based on either thermal imaging or image intensification technology. Collectively, these systems are more commonly known as Night Vision Systems. Rationale (See Table 15.5-1) The principal military applications of critical electro-optical sensor systems are those which seek to facilitate the conduct of operations at night or under conditions of limited visibility. Image intensification permits operations under light level conditions as low as starlight. The equipment ranges from night vision goggles for individual personnel to large telescopes, vehicle driver systems and weapon sights. The critical systems depend on second and third generation technology; microchannel plate amplifiers and compound semiconductor photocathodes. Thermal imaging does not depend on ambient visible light. It creates images based on temperature differences within a scene. These systems operate in the low atmospheric absorption regions of the atmosphere usually 35 and 812 micrometers wavelength. They are also referred to as infrared imaging systems. In addition to the ability to operate without visible light, thermal imaging systems have an advantage over image intensification under conditions of limited visibility, e.g., fog, smoke, rain. Applications range from man-portable night sights to weapon sights, tank driving systems, airborne surveillance, ship defense and imaging guided missiles and missile applications when range is short or a dual mode seeker is employed. The critical systems depend on focal plane arrays, the most critical being cooled staring arrays. Cooled scanning arrays will continue to be a mainstream technology through the 1990's. The original modular Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) technology is being replaced by a hybrid technology which is based on arrays such as 480 4 elements. These are being phased into Commanche and the main battle tank now. Staring arrays will be the next generation FLIR technology for such applications and are currently used in some missiles. Uncooled arrays also exist and are useful for low cost, lightweight applications. However, their performance cannot equal that of a cooled array system. Their principal applications are in individual weapon sights or driver's viewers.
Electro-Optical Sensors

Image Intensification Target/background contrast Resolution

Night vision goggles Forward looking infrared Thermal weapons sights IR search and track (ship defense)
Figure 15.5-1.
Electro-Optical Sensors Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) The US is clearly the world leader in third generation image intensifier and second generation staring array technology. The UK, Italy, Germany and Israel have mature first generation scanning array technology. France has a mature second generation scanning array technology. The Netherlands has mature second generation image intensifier technology. Japan has some technical competence in all these areas but appears to be focusing mainly on civil applications. Russia has third generation image intensifier and first generation scanning array technology. Its serial production capability for high performance devices is questionable. India and the PRC both have some second generation image intensifier capability based on technology transfers from Western states.
15-13
Table 15.5-1.
TECHNOLOGY IMAGE INTENSIFIERS "SECOND GENERATION"
Electro-Optical Sensors Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Equipment for production of fiber optic face plates, fabrication of multialkali photocathodes and micronchannel plate amplifiers. Equipment for production of fiber optic face plates, fabrication of compound semiconductor photocathodes and microchannel plate amplifiers. None identified UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA ML 15 WA Cat 6A, E MTCR 11 USML XII, 121.16 CCL Cat 6A, D WA IL Cat 6 WA ML 15
IMAGE INTENSIFIERS "THIRD GENERATION"
INVERTERS, FIBER OPTIC, FOR IMAGE

INTENSIFIERS
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS CRITICAL MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US MATERIALS SUPERIORITY Electrostatically focused image intensifier tubes, None identified employing multialkali photocathodes, e.g., S-20 or S-25, microchannel plate electron amplifiers (multipliers) and fiber optic faceplates and a luminous sensitivity > 240 A/Lumen. Electrostatically focused image intensifier tubes, None identified employing III-V compound semiconductor photocathodes and microchannel plate electron amplifiers and a radiant sensitivity > 10 mA/watt. Diameter < 25 mm None identified
None identified
None identified
COOLED ARRAYS, SCANNING AND STARING - INDIUM ANTIMONIDE (IN SB)
Arrays having 256 elements or more.
InSb
Epitaxial growth equipment capable of producing a layer thickness uniform to < 2.5% across 75 mm.
None identified
COOLED, SCANNING ARRAYS MERCURY CADMIUM TELLURIDE (MCT)
HgCdTeg Low Arrays having more than 60 elements, or incorporating Time Delay and Integration (TDI) Defect CdTe within the element and having four (4) elements substrates or more. HgCdTeg Low Detect CdTe substrates Barium Strontium Titanate, Lead Zironate PtSi
None identified
COOLED, STARING ARRAYS - MERCURY Arrays having 256 elements or more. CADMIUM TELLURIDE (MCT)
None identified
UNCOOLED ARRAYS, STARING, BARIUM Arrays having more than 8,000 elements
STRONTIUM TITANATE OR MICROBOLOMETERS
None identified
None identified
COOLED OR UNCOOLED ARRAYS,

PLATINUM SILICILE
Arrays having more than 10,000 elements
None identified
None identified
INFRARED DETECTOR COOLERS CRYOGENIC
Cooling source temperature below 218 K and None identified MTTF or MTBF exceeding 2,500 hours. JouleThompson (JT) minicoolers, self regulating, with an outside bore less than 8 mm.
None identified
None identified
15-14
SECTION 15.6 GRAVITY METERS AND GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS

Overview (See Figure 15.6-1) This technology can be used to measure a bodys (such as the earths) gravity field, which in turn has applications for detection and localization of mass distributions, covert position determination and inertial navigation compensation. Gravity meters can be used in a static or dynamic base mode to measure gravity magnitude. The gravity gradiometer is used to measure the difference over some known distance. Gravity data are used to estimate vertical deflection and other gravity field components. The knowledge of this influence can be used for detection of man-made or natural mass differences. Since gravity and spatial accelerations are not separable, all inertial navigation and guidance systems require direct or indirect compensation based on knowledge of the gravity field. The indirect, and most common, method uses map data computed from gravity meter surveys. The direct method uses realtime compensation of the local gravity vector to remove the largest uncompensated error left in inertial navigation systems. Compensation can be in real time or post processing for a moving base/platform. Several operational problems arise when gravity meters and gravity gradiometers are deployed on a mobile platform in such applications as geophysical exploration. Since most gravity meters and gravity gradiometers are sensitive to orientation with respect to the earth's gravity field, motion of the sensor in the earth's field will generate spurious signals or "noise" that can degrade the detection capability. Compensator systems and associated software are required to facilitate real-time cancellation of motion-generated noise. The resulting stabilized hybrid system provides the military with a non-emanating, non-jammable, totally covert system that can be used worldwide for navigation. Sensor array compensation can reduce spatial and temporal noise. Rationale (See Table 15.6-1) Gravity meter accuracy is essential for autonomous siting, initializing and enroute compensation for in-flight gravity effects for WMD delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles and other longrange unaided inertial guided applications including aircraft and cruise missiles. While ICBM siting requires absolute accuracy of better than 50 microgals, instruments with accuracies of 1 to 3 microgals are required for commercially monitoring vertical crustal motion and global sea level change. These differences need to be assessed for relevance since commercial needs are driving the market. Gravity meters and gravity gradiometers are used commercially in a static mode or on a moving base/platform to assist in the exploration for natural resources such as oil, gas, or minerals. Other uses include tunnel detection, buried material detection, cargo identification, and weigh-in-motion. Emerging
Gravity Meters & Gravity Gradiometers

Accuracy Autonomous/covert Data base accuracy compensaton Array compensation

Satellites Strategic aircraft Submarines ICBMs
Figure 15.6-1.
Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers Overview
technology using gravity sensor arrays is now viable due to computer speed and memory advances. Another emerging technology to detect real time gravity data from a moving platform uses difference acceleration data from inertial navigation systems and the Global Navigation Satellite System. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) A few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity meter and gravity gradiometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. Gravity meters (static mode) better than 10 microgals are manufactured and used in the US. Canada, Germany, UK, Japan, China, Russia, and the Ukraine have developed gravity meters that have not achieved the 10 microgal level.
15-15
Table 15.6-1.
TECHNOLOGY GRAVITY METERS (GRAVIMETERS)
GROUND USE
Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS None identified UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Test, calibration, or alignment equipment to calibrate gravimeters with a static accuracy of < 50 microgal. Accelerometer axis align stations. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 9 WA Cat 6A, B, D, E USML XII, 121.16 CCL 6A, B, D, E WA ML 9 WA Cat 6A, B, D, E USML XII, 121.16 CCL 6A, B, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Ground use-Static accuracy of < 50 microgal
GRAVITY METERS (GRAVIMETERS)

MOBILE USE
Mobile use accuracy of < 700 microgals with a None identified time-to-steady-state registration of less than 2 minutes under any combination of attendant corrective compensation and motional influences.
GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS GROUND USE Static platform < 2.5 Eotvos/root Hz
None identified
GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS MOBILE USE Moving platform < 10 Eotvos/root Hz
None identified
Algorithms and verified data for real-time gravity compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation using arrays. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation Algorithms and verified data or alignment equipment to obtain mobile for real-time gravity accuracy of < 700 microgals. compensation and detection Accelerometer axis align stations. (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation Algorithms and verified data or alignment equipment to obtain static for real-time gravity accuracy of < 2.5 Eotvos/root Hz. compensation and detection Accelerometer axis align stations. (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation using arrays. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation Algorithms and verified data or alignment equipment to obtain mobile for real-time gravity accuracy of < 10 Eotvos/root Hz. compensation and detection Accelerometer axis align stations. (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays.
WA Cat 6A, B, D, E CCL 6A, B, D, E
WA Cat 6A, B, D, E CCL 6A, B, D, E
15-16
SECTION 15.7
Overview (See Figure 15.7-1) This section covers critical military applications of low power lasers (those having less than 15 kW output power) which are used in various tactical and strategic military systems, other than in directed energy systems. Directed energy lasers are covered in the Directed Energy Weapons section. Tunability and wavelength diversity are critical for optical counter and counter-countermeasures. Brightness and beam collimation contribute to greater range capability. Rationale (See Table 15.7-1) The principal applications of critical military systems that employ lasers are those which seek to facilitate the conduct of military operations at night or under conditions of limited visibility. The critical military applications include rangingfor artillery systems helicopters and armored vehicles; target designationday/night; semiactive guidance for laser guided weapons; imagingfor target acquisition. Lasers currently (1995) employed on the battlefield, as well as in air and naval military systems, mainly use Nd:YAG-based lasers. These operate in the near-visible region (approx. 1,000 nm). They can be easily detected by most night vision systems. In addition, they are capable of eye blinding. Consequently, a new family of "eye safe" lasers has been introduced for a number of applications, e.g., range finders, target illuminators. These operate between 1,000 and 2,000 nm wavelength. Target designators will remain at approximately 1,000 nm for the foreseeable future. Lasers are also used in many other military applications. However, most are not judged to be militarily critical and are widely available. If they are used in other military applications which are identified as critical, those applications have other parameters which justify the criticality of the system. One example is numerically controlled machine tools. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) Many industrialized nations have the technology to produce lasers for use in nonweapon military roles. Several smaller countries are making in-roads into the laser rangefinder market cutting the US and Russian share. The US and Russia
LASERS
Lasers

Tunability Brightness Beam collimation Wavelength diversity

Target designators Range finders Smart weapons Optical CM/CCM
Figure 15.7-1.
Lasers Overview
have the broadest capability. The UK, France, Germany and Japan have capability in selected types of military lasers. At least 75% of the militarized countries in the world today have deployed some non-weapon lasers. Most of these systems use Nd:YAG lasers at 1,064 nm. (This wavelength can damage the eye if unprotected.) The number of nations with a capability to produce the newer "eye safe" lasers (wavelengths greater than 1200 nm) is still limited and may remain so because of limited dual-use applications.
15-17
Table 15.7-1.
TECHNOLOGY
Lasers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS None identified EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA Cat 6A, C, D, E NDUL 3 CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E NDUL 3 CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E NDUL 3 CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E NDUL 3 CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E NDUL 3 CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E WA ML 15, 22 NDUL 3 WA Cat 6A, C, D, E WA ML 15, 22 NDUL 3 WA Cat 6A, C, D, E WA Cat 5A, B, D, E CCL Cat 5A, B, D, E WA Cat 6A, C, D, E CCL Cat 6A, C, D, E
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY SOLID STATE/TUNABLE LASERS, Output energy > 1 J/pulse and a pulsed peak WAVELENGTH BETWEEN 600 AND 1400 power > 20 W.
NM
Ti:Al2O3Tm:YS None identified GG, Cr:BeAl2O4 and alexandrite None identified
SOLID STATE/TUNABLE LASERS, WAVELENGTH EXCEEDING 1400 NM
ND:DOPED, PULSE-EXCITED, MODELOCKED, Q-SWITCHED
Output energy > 50 mJ/pulse and a pulsed peak Tm:YAG, power > 1 W or an average or CW output power Tm:YSGG, exceeding 1 W. optical parametric amplifiers (OPO) Pulse duration < 1 ns and a peak power None identified > 5 gW, an average output power > 10 W; or a pulsed energy > 0.1 J.
None identified
None identified
None identified
ND:DOPED; PULSE-EXCITED, Pulse duration 1 ns and a multiple transverse None identified Q-SWITCHED, MULTIPLE TRANSVERSE mode output with a peak power > 400 MW, an MODE average output power > 2 kW; or a pulsed energy > 2 J. ND:DOPED; PULSE-EXCITED, Q-SWITCHED, SINGLE TRANSVERSE
MODE
None identified
None identified
Pulse duration 1 ns and a single transverse mode output with a peak power > 100 MW, an average output power > 20 W; or a pulsed energy > 2 J. A single transverse mode output with a peak power > 500 kW, an average output power > 150 W. A multiple transverse mode output with a peak power >1 mW, or an average or CW output power > 2 kW.
None identified
None identified
None identified
ND:DOPED; PULSE-EXCITED, NON-Q-SWITCHED, SINGLE

TRANSVERSE MODE
None identified
None identified
None identified
ND:DOPED; PULSE-EXCITED, NON-Q-SWITCHED, MULTIPLE

TRANSVERSE MODE
None identified
None identified
None identified
SEMICONDUCTOR LASERS; SINGLE

TRANSVERSE MODE DIODES
Wavelength > 1050 nm or average output power None identified exceeding 100 mW.
None identified
None identified
SEMICONDUCTOR LASERS - MULTIPLE Output energy > 500 micro joules/pulse and a TRANSVERSE MODE peak pulsed power > 10 W, or an average or CW power > 10 W.
None identified
None identified
None identified
15-18
SECTION 15.8 MAGNETOMETERS AND MAGNETIC GRADIOMETERS

Overview (See Figure 15.8-1) Magnetic sensor systems detect and display the presence of a magnetic field and measure its magnitude and/or direction. This unique and enabling technology can be used to detect and locate an adversary, detect magnetic heading, or determine own position from a database reference. Magnetic sensors are used on many military platforms. Some magnetic sensors, using different technologies, are sensitive to their orientation with respect to the vector components of the local magnetic field; others are not. Some are capable of measuring the absolute level of an ambient magnetic field and its variations; others can only measure variations. Magnetic sensor systems can be configured to detect the spatial variation of the magnetic field intensity from sources external to the instrument, that is, the gradient of the magnetic field intensity, and in this mode are called magnetic gradiometers. Magnetic gradiometers can consist of two magnetic sensors or consist of a single intrinsic magnetic gradient sensor. Magnetometers or magnetic gradiometers use sensors that incorporate militarily critical technologies: Superconductive Quantum Interference Devices (SQUID), electron resonance/optically pumped, nuclear precession, fiber optic, fluxgate, torsion or induction coil. Computational techniques for real-time compensation and detection for operation on mobile platforms are militarily critical. Using other computational techniques, data bases with prior or real time magnetic field data from magnetometer arrays can be used to reduce the spatial and temporal background noise of the sensor for detection and classification of intruding vehicles in the sea and on land. Rationale (See Table 15.8-1) Magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are essential to the military because of their covert detection and signature classification capability. The sensors are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors for anti-submarine warfare, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection, underwater mine detection and active degaussing systems. Magnetic sensors in a tactical missile can be used to detect and localize a target, such as a tank, from the background magnetic field variations. Another application is to determine position for navigational purposes relative to a database. Dual-use applications include clinical diagnostics and geophysical applications. The use of magnetometer arrays may be adapted by commercial users, but the main initial application will be military. Ocean bottom arrays can be used to detect and classify vessels. Land-based arrays can measure time varying natural noise for airborne compensation. The main differences between military and commercial use are the real-time accuracy requirements for operation from a moving base and the detection and classification capability.
Magnetometers & Magnetic Gradiometers

Autonomous/covert Data base accuracy Detection/classification Anti-jam/anti-spoof Motion compensation Array compensation

ASW Mine countermeasures Mine fusing Area surveillance Threat fusion Artillery Aircraft/ships/tanks Satellites
Figure 15.8-1.
Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers Overview
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) Depending on military and commercial uses, many countries, such as France, Germany, Canada, Russia, and the Ukraine, have developed a capability in most of the differing magnetometer and magnetic gradiometer technologies. Canada leads the world in fluxgate sensors, while Russia has developed a unique potassium resonance magnetometry capability, and the US leads in SQUID development for military and civil applications. Military applications currently have logistic complications due to low self-noise requirements at superconducting temperatures. China and Japan have limited but expanding capabilities in several magnetometry technologies. While the US leads in platform motion compensation, Russia appears to have the lead in the use of compensation using magnetic sensor arrays.
15-19
Table 15.8-1.
TECHNOLOGY MAGNETOMETERSSQUID
Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND MATERIALS INSPECTION EQUIPMENT None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY Noise level < 0.05 nanotesla (nT) rms/root Hz
MAGNETOMETERS-
Noise level < 0.05 nT rms/root Hz
ELECTRON RESONANCE/ OPTICALLY PUMPED (4HE, RB, CESIUM, ETC.) MAGNETOMETERSNoise level < 0.05 nT rms/root Hz NUCLEAR PRECESSION(PROTON/O VERHAUSER) MAGNETOMETERSNoise level < 0.05 nT rms/root Hz at INDUCTION COIL frequencies < 1 Hz or 1 103 nT
REFERENCE Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic WA ML 4, 19, 22 compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) WA Cat 6A, D, E for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E None identified WA ML 4, 19, 22 WA Cat 6A, D, E USML VI, VIII CCL Cat 6A, D, E
None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter
rms/root Hz > 1 Hz and < 10 Hz or 1 104 nT rms/root Hz > 10 Hz MAGNETOMETERSFIBER OPTIC
MAGNETOMETERS-FLUX Noise level < 0.05 nT rms/root Hz at GATE (VALVE) frequencies < 1 Hz and 102 nT rms per square root Hz at > 1 Hz MAGNETOMETERTORSION
MAGNETIC
GRADIOMETERS USING MULTIPLE MAGNETOMETERS MAGNETIC GRADIOMETER-FIBER OPTIC
Noise level of individual magnetometers of < 0.05 nT rms/root Hz
Noise level of < 0.3 nT/meter rms/root Hz None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter Noise level of < 0.015 nT/meter rms/root None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter None identified Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter
INTRINSIC MAGNETIC
GRADIOMETER USING Hz OTHER THAN FIBER OPTICS NON-MAGNETIC CLOSED Operation < 103 deg K CYCLE REFRIGERATION EQUIPMENT
15-20
SECTION 15.9
Overview (See Figure 15.9-1) Obscurants are materials that limit or prevent reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and weapon guidance. They can be used on the battlefield to enhance friendly operations and/or degrade enemy operations. Obscurants can be identified by their impact on the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, e.g., ultraviolet (UV); visible; infrared (IR); millimeter wave (mmW); centimeter wave (cmW); above cmW; and multispectral. The major near-term US efforts consist of the following: production and fielding of a large area visual/IR obscurant generator (mechanized and motorized); production and fielding of a self-protection grenade for armored vehicles that defeats sensors in the visual, IR, and mmW; and demonstrating the feasibility of an mmW obscurant generating system to prevent threat radars from observing, acquiring, targeting, and tracking friendly targets. A long-term goal is to validate the capability of multispectral materials to obscure or defeat enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition assets in broad bands of the EM spectrum from visual through mmW. Rationale (See Table 15.9-1) Obscurants have the potential to negate the value of high-cost sensor and guidance systems. Live fire testing has proven that smart weapons can be defeated by timely employment of current and nearterm obscurant systems. Obscurants can hinder increasingly sophisticated enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. It is imperative that US forces protect their valuable assets from advanced tactical enemy weapons operating in a variety of wavelengths. Mobility is key for close combat maneuver units; highly mobile smoke generators are critical for mission accomplishment. Providing screening selectively in various wavelengths on demand, at variable flow rates, allows maximum flexibility. For armored units, the addition of smoke is a proven force multiplier. Self protection grenade systems provide protection from enemy smart and dumb weapon systems. In addition, they are the most cost effective countermeasure currently fielded. A smoke grenade costing $120 can defeat a smart weapon priced at a minimum of $20K while defending a tank valued in excess of $1 million. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) Most countries in the world with a standing army have the capability to create an obscuring cloud
OBSCURANTS
Obscurants

Scattering & absorption Packing density Dissemination efficiency

Combat aircraft Artillery Mortar Armor Infantry
Figure 15.9-1.
Obscurants Overview
through the use of simple dispensing devices such as grenades, white phosphorus (WP) mortar projectiles, and artillery projectiles, or by firing high explosive (HE) artillery rounds to make dust clouds. If the need arises, units can create smokescreens using wet straw, wet burlap, or other materials. The effectiveness of weapons used in Operation Desert Storm and the potential of obscurants to counter these weapons have spurred an interest in and proliferation of obscurants. Since then, most countries have evaluated the current and projected threat to them and are now attempting to obtain appropriate obscurant and dispensing systems to meet their needs. Recent information indicates that Russia has an "upper atmospheric" aerosol that is effective to 1 GHz.
15-21
Table 15.9-1.
TECHNOLOGY MID- AND FAR-INFRARED SCATTERING; ABSORBING
Obscurants Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS Conductive flakes (brass, aluminum, graphite); submicrondiameter conductive fiber Metal microwires; metal coated fibers Carbon fiber; conductive polymers UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS Obscurant modeling EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE WA ML 4 USML XXI
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO SECURE US SUPERIORITY ExtIR > 1.5; packing density > 50% of the material density; dissemination efficiency > 50% of the packaged material.
MILLIMETER WAVE SCATTERING
ExtMM > 2; packing density > 50% of the material density; dissemination efficiency > 50% of the packaged material. ExtMM > 2; packing density > 50% of the material density; dissemination efficiency > 50% of the packaged material.
Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers
Obscurant modeling
WA ML 4 USML XXI
MILLIMETER WAVE ABSORBING
Obscurant modeling
WA ML 4 USML XXI
15-22
SECTION 15.10
Overview (See Figure 15.10-1) Radar systems consist of power supplies, transmitter chains and final amplifiers, antennas, receivers and signal processors, and (usually) displays. Radar is indispensable for a wide variety of military uses, being installed on the ground, on ships, aircraft and missiles for search and localization of enemy and friendly vehicles and installations of all types. The important radar technologies involve bandwidth control, stability for coherent operation, and advanced software for signal processing. Development activity involves solid state modules integrated with antenna elements for active aperture radar. The goal of automatic target recognition (ATR) is being pursued experimentally in many defense communities. Millimeter radars are candidates for missile seeker heads, some for WMD. Another emerging technology employs low frequency (Low UHF) for foliage and ground penetration. As a class, all radar technologies are uniquely enabling since no other detection schemes are capable of ranging and direction finding in the atmosphere in the variety of obstructing conditions (darkness, rainfall, etc.) and at the requisite distances. Rationale (See Table 15.10-1) Radar equipment is indispensable for a wide variety of military uses. Radars have long range (hundreds of miles) uses for aircraft detection, medium-range (tens of miles) applications for ship detection and airborne interceptor control, and short-range abilities for battlefield vehicle and missile seeker detection. Radars are used from the long wavelength (HF) to the millimeter wavelengths (GHz). The military sector has been by far the driving force behind radar development. Commercial uses of radar include air traffic control, shipboard navigation, earth resources and oceanography, weather analysis, law enforcement. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 15.0-2) Foreign radar technology strength resides primarily among the nations that have invested heavily in military preparedness. These include France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Israel, Russia, Sweden, and Japan. Truly indigenous capabilities over a broad
RADAR
Radar

Resolution Bearing accuracy Power Wide bandwidth Beam agility Adaptive signal processing Pulse compression Sidelobe control Clutter reduction ECM resistant
Figure 15.10-1.

Ground based surveillance Space based surveillance Tanks Artillery Ships Submarines Aircraft Missiles Infantry Mapping
Radar Overview
range of radar expertise exist among these nations. Russia, with other FSU support, has produced a remarkable volume of military radars, but the state of the art in digital processing has lagged behind the leaders. Several other nations have developed skills in rather narrow specialties such as synthetic aperture (SAR) (e.g., Canada), air traffic control (e.g., Brazil, India), and battlefield equipment (e.g., Israel). Typically, however, these nations are dependent upon the leaders (including the US) for components such as power amplifiers, pulse compression units and signal processing subsystems.
15-23
Table 15.10-1.
TECHNOLOGY MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY
Radar Militarily Critical Technology Parameters

CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION,
AND
INSPECTION EQUIPMENT MILLIMETER RADAR Operating freq. between 40 and 230 GHz, None identified None identified average power > 100 milliwatts WIDE OPERATING BAND RADAR > 20% of center frequency; multiband None identified None identified operation and average power > 200 watts WIDE INSTANTANEOUS > 60 MHz bandwidth None identified None identified
BANDWIDTH RADAR SPACE-BASED SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (SAR)
Resolution 3 meters or better; displaced phase center Resolution 3 meters or better Resolution of ship target roll, pitch and yaw in sea state 2 and above and better than 0.5 meter Instantaneous beam agility; interleaved functions; - beam switch time of 20 ms or less; space-time adaptive processing Adaptive signal processing (50 dB antenna sidelobe nulls); switching rate of 100 ms or less Clutter cancellation of 40 dB or better Precision phase and amplitude channel tracking of 98% Pulse compression ratio > 500; compressed pulse width < 100 nanosecond Lower than 35 dB first sidelobe peak, lower than 45 dB average relative to the main beam peak in a 30 degree sector centered on the main beam axis Time difference on multiple echos > 0.3 ms separation Range > 500 km for target size of 1 m2 or greater Space-qualified with coherent detection or angular resolution of 8 microradians Antenna components that attenuate each band less than 5% Angular resolution better than 3 milliradians; range resolution better than 10 m rms; velocity resolution better than 3m/sec Hardening; thermal shock > 100 cal/sq cm, with peak overpressure > 50 kPa; nonspherical design; boresight error slope accuracy; frequency selective surfaces
AIRBORNE SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (SAR) INVERSE SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (ISAR) PHASED ARRAY RADAR (GENERAL) PHASED ARRAY RADAR (ADAPTIVE SIGNAL PROCESSING) AIRBORNE DOPPLER RADAR (CLUTTER CANCELLATION) AIRBORNE INTERFEROMETER
RADAR RADAR PULSE COMPRESSION
None identified Space environmental chambers None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified
WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E None identified WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E Pulse compression phase coding; anti- WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, multipath/clutter algorithms USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E None identified WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16,, CCL Cat 6A, D, E Fast algorithms for imaging; efficiency for intensive computations Resolution algorithms; fusion with radar signal modulation Threat and target priority identification None identified None identified None identified None identified WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E, MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E WA ML 5, 15, 22, WA Cat 6A, D, E MTCR 11, USML XI, 121.16, CCL Cat 6A, D, E
None identified
RADAR ANTENNA SIDELOBE

CONTROL
HEIGHTFINDING GROUND RADAR LASER RADAR COMBINED (MULTI-FUNCTION APERTURE) RADAR TEST RANGE RADAR
None identified Computer None identified numerical controlled (CNC) machine None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified None identified Threat and target priority identification Imaging algorithms None identified None identified
RADOMES
Taper software for linear boresight accuracy and sidelobe control
15-24
SECTION 16SIGNATURE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY

Scope RF Signature Control ........................................................................ 16-5 Acoustics Signature Control...............................................................16-10 Infrared Signature Control..................................................................16-12 Multispectral Signature Control..........................................................16-13 Optical Signature Control..................................................................16-14 Laser Signature Control.....................................................................16-15 Magnetic Signature Control ...............................................................16-15 SUMMARY This section covers signature control technologies and, to the extent possible, signature enhancement (or counter low observable) technologies. Topics include critical aspects of radar, infrared, visible, laser, magnetic and acoustic signatures. Selected segments of space and undersea technology applications for detection and concealment are not included. OVERVIEW Signature control technologies for system survivability are critical to certain U.S. weapons systems as they reduce an adversarys ability to detect, track, and engage during combat operations (low observable) and increase the ability of the United States to detect foreign weapons systems which have low observable features. This segment is known as counter low observable (CLO). Understanding of U.S. signature control technology is essential to: (1) minimize its understanding and use by adversaries, (2) to maximize the effectiveness of reduced U.S. system signatures for land, sea, and air forces, and (3) assure the U.S. ability to counter the steps made by adversaries to reduce signatures of their systems. Across the energy spectrum, the application of signature control begins with highly accurate signature measurements of: subsystems to include embedded elements, components, subcomponents and materials which, in sum, comprise the total weapon system signature. The desired final signature becomes a target that drives a total signature budget that is closely controlled during the research, acquisition and operations phases. Sophisticated test equipment, procedures and techniques are necessary to meet development and operational requirements. These have required years of U.S. research and investment. Signature control is therefore a unique summation for each weapon system. The technologies are treated individually; however, this section does not include detail indicating the extraordinary importance of the integration of the diverse technical factors required for each successful operating system. These technology techniques and derived compatible military tactics play immensely strong roles in all phases of effective signature control in the development processes. RATIONALE (See Table 16.0-1) Signature control technologies are essential and can be decisive in combat. They make detection by an adversary much more difficult through concealment from his sensor systems. Each weapons system contains a blend of many different signature parameters with technical approaches tailored to control these signature values as the threat analyses demand. Each case is a series of compromises and optimizations beginning with conceptualization of the system, and then sustained through operational mission execution and evaluation. A new level of expertise and success has matured over the recent years that has proven the value of signature control in combat effectiveness and in protecting human lives. Optimal integration has been achieved in spite of using a wide variety of disparate technologies. Tradeoffs have been aided through advances in both mathematics and in computational power. These changes have resulted in abilities to reduce or control signatures to levels which are, for example, more than two orders of magnitude lower than basic signature values. In general, RF (radar) energy signatures receive the largest share of military attention Highlights Fundamental military advantages are characteristic of signature control technologies. Advances in sensing capabilities require that multispectral approaches to signature control be used. Systems integration drives the overall effectiveness of signature control features in weapons systems. Operational effectiveness requires that signature control features do not demand extensive unique maintenance or logistics support.
16-1
because radar is the most prevalent of the existing non-human sensors, particularly for operation at long ranges and in a wide variety of environmental conditions. Infrared signature technologies also receive substantial attention due to the availability of sensors that can detect the emissions of turbine engine contrast signatures and other heat sources attendant to military systems. Recent thrusts in multispectral sensor systems within radar/infrared and ranges can be directed toward enhancing the probability of detection and deserve special attention by the low observable system designer. Visible, laser, acoustic and magnetic signatures are of interest in proportion to the system vulnerabilities in these areas, and each case may have some special attention required due to land, sea, and air environments. In each of these spectral segments the parameters indicated are sufficiently broad to encompass the variations in concerns and needs of each of the Services. Many of the technologies can be dual use, but commercial applications to date have serviced specialized and limited markets. However, in some areas, such as advanced material compounds, care must be taken to closely evaluate those which could be critical for low observables system materials, structures, or avionics (i.e., protective covers) design. Radar absorbing materials can be used to protect humans from electromagnetic radiation. Other limited applications occur in environmental sciences (crop management), meteorology, law enforcement surveillance, and aviation air traffic control. Broad commercial applications which would generate mass markets have yet to emerge, and may depend upon a material or item traits not yet recognized. Analyses of the markets show a strong demand by foreign interests for the acquisition of signature control technologies for military applications for both new equipment and for retrofit of existing systems. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figures 16.0-2, 3) The United States leads the world in signature control technologies, but that lead has narrowed as other nations have taken both theoretical and practical interests in the subject. There are many domestic and international symposiums which widely distribute information on the theoretical understanding of the physics, materials properties, design precepts and integration concepts which address both signature control and improved detection of military systems. Significant technologies have been developed abroad which rival U.S. alternatives. French and Russian computer analytical codes show advanced approaches to technical evaluations. Russia, Sweden, France, Germany and the UK have announced military systems designed and constructed with unique signature control technologies. China has a keen interest in the subject. These same nations have developed new materials and approaches to retrofit current systems in efforts to reduce their system signatures. Russians have aggressively marketed their significant capabilities to refit existing third party systems with signature control features. However, the integration of the most
advanced design approaches, materials selections, measurements, applications, and detailed attention to engineering details continues to be strongest in the United States, reflecting the large investment in recent years.
16-2
Country
RF Signature Control
Acoustic Signature Control
Infrared Signature Control
Multispectral Signature Control
Optical Signature Control
Laser Signature Control
Magnetic Signature Control
Argentina Australia Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Syria Taiwan Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: (All) (Majority) (Some) (Limited)
Figure 16.0-2. Signature Control FTA Summary by Scope Areas
16-3
Country
Materials and Structures
Test Measurement Production and Inspection
Design Technology
Software
Counter Low Observable
Argentina Australia Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Syria Taiwan Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States
LEGEND: Critical Technologies Capabilities: (All) (Majority) (Some) (Limited)
Figure 16.0-3. Signature Control FTA Summary by Process Area
16-4
Table 16.0-1. RF Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Radar Absorbing Materials and Structures (RAM/RAS) Militarily Critical Parameters Signature reduction: 5 dB for bandwidth > 15% of center frequency (1 MHz2 Ghz) 15 dB for bandwidth > 15% of center frequency (2 GHz18 GHz) 10 dB for bandwidth > 5% of center frequency or 1 Ghz, whichever is less (greater than18 Ghz) Absorption > 10 dB SpG > 4.4; To 525 F. performance Specially sized: particles, flakes, whiskers, or ceramics All performance levels Critical Materials Magnetic and electric absorber materials Loaded forms, loaded core (as honeycomb) absorbers Fiber loaded planar or variable graded absorbers. Impedence matched absorbers. RAM with enhanced durability/maintainability features. High temperature(>400 F): ceramic matrix composites, dielectric or magnetic loaded RAM Sintered Ferrites Special materials for loading magnetic absorbers. Phase perturbation materials or devices Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Production and Operational Phase: Test, Signature Measurement, Production, and Inspection Equipment Any low clutter RCS measurement range and/or equipments capable of measuring low system signatures under controlled static or operating conditions. Any tools or sensors capable of measuring signature for production or field operation quality control. Special equipment that characterizes military RF system signature in design, prototyping, manufacturing, or operational phases. None identified` None identified WA ML 17, 18, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E (contd) Unique Software and Parameters "Active control software" and source code. Dedicated source code. All objective code which enables you to arrive at militarily critical parameters. Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 18, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E
Radar Absorbing Materials and Structures (RAM/RAS) for special surface applications
Preserves low observables system radar signature, which has discontinuities
Flexible seals (conductive or absorptive) for hiding fixed or movable components
16-5
Table 16.0-1. RF Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies (contd) Technology Resistive and Magnetic Materials that Support Signature Control Militarily Critical Parameters Electric conductivity <10,000 mhos, or surface (sheet) resistivity less than 50 ohms/square All performance levels Resistivity < 50 ohms/square or > 300 ohms/square Transmissivity 50% or greater. Resistivity 50 ohms/square or less Critical Materials Intrinsically conductive polymeric materials Circuit analog films Frequency selective surfaces Graded resistive or magnetic films Transparent or opaque materials that support signature control Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Any special equipment for applying radar absorbing materials, dielectrics, or special particulates associated with signature control. Any system capable of high resolution, multi-band RCS imagery measurements. Specifically for particles, flakes, fibers, whiskers or other additives for RAM uniformity and electromagnetics enhancement. Radomes (for RF tuning) Frequency Selective Surfaces Circuit Analog Materials Shuttered Radomes Radomes which inherently do not scatter incident energy (radar, laser, etc.) None identified Unique Software for Low Observables Design Functions WA ML 21, 22 WA Cat 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1E, 2E (contd) Unique Software and Parameters None identified Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 18, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E
Design Techniques Supporting Low Observable Performance of Electronic Elements (RF)
Signature reduction Techniques for aperture design and integration that preserve system signature goals. Techniques that preserve overall signature goals. Coatings and dopants to prescribed conductivities.
16-6
Table 16.0-1. RF Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies (contd) Technology Design Techniques Supporting Low Observable Performance of Electronic Elements (RF) (contd) Militarily Critical Parameters Techniques that preserve overall RF system signature goals. Special techniques and resultant performance levels to achieve operationally significant LPI design on a signature controlled system Critical Materials Antennas Low signature design options configured as: Conformal Protruding Frequency selective antenna design Special low dielectric loss materials Sensor or System Operator Apertures or Windows Single or dual mode (i.e., RF/IR, laser/RF, etc.) sensor apertures and/or conformal arrays. Visual with coating, i.e., treated window or canopy. Solid or patterned coatings Dopants added (w/wo) layered patterns within the sensor or window substrate Aperture or canopy integration and joining to an adjacent conductive or absorbing structure Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified Unique Software and Parameters Electro-magnetic signature prediction codes that use shaping and specific material properties as inputs, and give accurate prediction of optimized design. Dedicated object or source code that enables one to derive military critical signature parameters and/or optimize RF signature design solution. High resolution radar imagery software useful as design tool for low observables component and system design. Software or networking. Large scale computer codes that can accurately predict system RCS performance (contd) Export Control Reference
16-7
Table 16.0-1. RF Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies (contd) Technology Design Techniques Supporting Low Observable Performance of Electronic Elements (RF) (contd) Militarily Critical Parameters Critical Materials Low Probability of Intercept Radar System (LPIR) Production techniques and processes for precise and rapid manufacturing of signature control materials (quick cure, precision dimension control, and precision coatings spray and feed systems which contain particulate matter). Rapid repair, renewal, or remanufacture techniques for low observables absorber materials, coatings or structures as field logistics support features for high operational readiness. System designed for large area precision spraying of radar absorbing or materials with similar constituents. RCS monostatic, bistatic, or imagery measurement systems. Methods for uniform mixing and distribution to ensure controlled spray for RAM. Any active emission features which augment survivability but retain signature goals. Any techniques to reduce RCS of conformal or protruding devices mounted in the system airstream Active electronic countermeasures (ECM) Low Signature Aero Data Sensors for aircraft direct measure of velocity, static and dynamic pressures None identified None identified WA ML 11 MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified Unique Software and Parameters None Identified Export Control Reference
Signature Control Electronics
(contd)
16-8
Table 16.0-1. RF Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies (contd) Technology Propulsion Systems Low Observables Design Militarily Critical Parameters System signature spoiling or augmentation techniques to include: Hot section and engine front face signature control Critical Materials None identified Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified Unique Software and Parameters None identified Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 22 MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16
16-9
Table 16.0-2. Acoustics Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Passive, devices, materials, features, or techniques used in or on components or systems of any aircraft, ground vehicle, surface or subsurface vessel to reduce or limit the generation or transmission of sound or vibrations. Militarily Critical Parameters 50% or more signature reduction. Frequency 10 Hz50 kHz. Source quieting, isolation, decoupling, absorbing, damping improvements in performance of > 3 dB and attenuation of < 50 kHz for vessels. Frequency < 500 Hz for aircraft and ground vehicles. Critical Materials Specially designed materials, coatings, absorbers, decouplers, or damping for acoustic signature reduction. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Any tools or sensors capable of measuring acoustic signatures. Any acoustic target strength measurement devices. Acoustic noise measurement, monitoring systems, and techniques for total vessels or components. Acoustic target strength sites, systems, or techniques for total vessels, materials, or components. Unique Software and Parameters Test data, techniques, and other information revealing effectiveness of acoustic quieting or target strength reduction. Specifically designed software for analyzing or predicting acoustic signatures. Dedicated signal processing software source code for: (1) acoustic design of vessels or components, or (2) for monitoring noise from components or systems, or (3) for acoustic target strength reduction. Models to predict acoustic signatures of surface or subsurface vessel in the ocean environment. Export Control Reference WA ML 17 WA Cat 2E, 8A, 8D, 8E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 2E, 8A, 8D, 8E
(contd)
16-10
Table 16.0-2. Acoustics Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies (contd) Technology Devices, materials, features, or techniques used in or on any surface or subsurface vessel to reduce or limit acoustic target strength (reflected sound) of the vessel. Acoustic Signature Devices or enclosures specially designed for underwater noise reduction Militarily Critical Parameters Frequency 10 Hz100 kHz. Target strength reduction > 3 dB and attenuation < 100 kHz. Critical Materials Specially designed materials, coatings, absorbers, decouplers, or damping for acoustic signature reduction Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified Unique Software and Parameters Specially designed software Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 2E USML XIII CCL Cat 1C, 1E, 2E WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 2A, 2D, 2E, 8A, 8D, 8E USML XIII CCL Cat 2A, 2D, 2E, 8A, 8D, 8E
Frequency 10 kHz100 kHz. Noise reduction > 6 dB. Noise reduction > 6 dB for systems with 1 degree of freedom.
AIP systems: Brayton, Stirling, or Rankine cycle engines; and fuel cells with output power > 2 kW. Active noise reduction or cancellation systems, or magnetic bearings and electric controls for such systems.
None identified
Specially designed software
16-11
Table 16.0-3. Infrared Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Infrared Signature Control Techniques Militarily Critical Parameters Wavelength 0.720.0 microns. RF transparent Reflectivity > 0.8 or < 0.2. If capable of operating at 400 F or higher (as ceramic dielectric stack materials), indices of refraction and emissivity of 0.15 or less. Critical Materials IR paints, coatings, applications. Films, wallpaper appliqus, etc., from paints developed for IR signature control. Pigments/additives, binders/resins, and dielectric stack materials designed for IR signature control. Mixer diffuser mechanism for diffusion of thermal energy. Thermally or electrically activated materials. Techniques for shielding infrared threat sensors from infrared signature sources directed toward a weapon system. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Test equipment to validate and explore IR signature characteristics of operating integrated systems or platforms. Any special IR signature precision measurement equipment Unique Software and Parameters Computer codes used to predict IR signatures and/or specific materials design performance that will result in an accurate prediction of an optimized system design perforformance and the code is validated by test data or contains test data as a means of prediction. Computer codes for dedicated signal processing software source code. Includes subsets taken from partial or incremental solvers specifically tailored for signature measurements. Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E, 2E
16-12
Table 16.0-4. Multispectral Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Multispectral Signature Control Techniques Militarily Critical Parameters Any combination of two or more signature control techniques that can reduce basic signatures 50% or more of the parameters in each category. Generally includes radar/IR or radar/acoustics but could also include visual and UV. Techniques for integrating or embedding dissimilar materials to achieve the required performance effect. Multi-spectral imagers (RF, IR, Acoustic, Visual, etc.) Software for networking. Data fusion techniques. Critical Materials Use 50% of values in this column (above), radar, IR, etc. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Same as parameters from basic technologies Unique Software and Parameters Same as parameters from basic technologies Computer codes used to predict IR signatures and/or specific materials design performance that will result in an accurate prediction of an optimized system design performance and the code is validated by test data or contains test data as a means of prediction. Computer codes for dedicated signal processing software source code Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E, 2E
16-13
Table 16.0-5. Optical Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology System (on-board) Signature Control Techniques Optical Signature Control Techniques Militarily Critical Parameters At 0.4 to 0.7 microns, visual contrast < 15%. Solar glint reduced > 90%. Optical cross section reduction exceeding 10%. Photochromic, thermochromic, electrochromic surface materials which are compatible with RF and IR materials. Critical Materials Glint controlling surface treatments (most often for transparent canopy uses). Surface treatments and special materials for surface area visual signature /contrast reduction. Lighting to reduce contrast with background. Techniques to reduce, hide, or mask emissions that could be signature enhancements such as wake, smoke, contrails, other exhaust products etc. Active and passive techniques to reduce optical cross section, and retroreflection (optical augmentation) of optical and infrared systems. Nonlinear optical materials and fast optical switches. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified Unique Software and Parameters Computer codes to predict low observables optical signatures and/or specific techniques that will result in an accurate prediction of an optimized system design performance and the code is validated by test data or contains test data as a means of prediction. Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E, 2E
16-14
Table 16.0-6. Laser Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Laser Signature Control Techniques Militarily Critical Parameters Reflectivity < 5% for wavelength 0.3 to 10.6 microns Critical Materials Paints, coatings, other surface treatments; special lens material selections. Compatible with RF and IR materials and design foals. Computer aided design of lens surfaces of optical guidance/control systems. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Any special laser signature precision measurement equipment Unique Software and Parameters Computer codes to predict low observables optical signatures and/or specific techniques that will result in an accurate prediction of an optimized system design performance and the code is validated by test data or contains test data as a means of prediction. Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 1E, 2E
Table 16.0-7. Magnetics Signature Control Militarily Critical Technologies Technology Magnetics Signature Control Techniques Militarily Critical Parameters 50% reduction in magnetic signature from common designs Critical Materials Specially designed materials, structures, coating, or paints to reduce magnetic signature. Nonferrous armors, magnetics spoofing devices, and deperming or degaussing techniques for large military items. Most applications for vessels or ground vehicles. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Any special magnetic signature precision measurement equipment Unique Software and Parameters Computer codes to predict low observables optical signatures and/or specific techniques that will result in an accurate prediction of an optimized system design performance and the code is validated by test data or contains test data as a means of prediction. Export Control Reference WA ML 17, 21, 22 WA Cat 1C, 1E, 2E MTCR 17 USML XIII, 121.16 CCL Cat 1C, 2E
16-15
Updated May 23, 2001 INTRODUCTION

The current environment of dual use Low Observable/Counter Low Observable (LO/CLO) technologies has made it extremely difficult to distinguish between technologies which are appropriate for export through the commercial marketplace and militarily critical technologies requiring further controls. This section is intended to highlight for users of signature control technologies the export coordination and approval requirements and critical LO and CLO technologies. The MCTL must be used in conjunction with other relevant program and policy guidance, to include the following: DoD 5220.22M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) DoD Instruction S-5230.28, Low Observable (LO) and Counter Low Observable (CLO) Programs (S-NF), October 2, 2000 Security Classification Guide for Department of Defense (DoD) Low/Counter Low Observable (LO/CLO) Programs (U), October 2, 2000 Specific program classification guidance Government contractual guidance
PROCEDURES
The common theme found throughout DoD guidance is the need for early coordination of requirements with the expectation that industry will make contact with the Service LO/CLO Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) if licensing arrangements are required. The MCTL and DoD policies/instructions provide threshold values for various signature control technologies and applications. When these thresholds are exceeded, a DoD technical review of the signature control aspects of the proposed export is required prior to it being licensed for export. These threshold/tripwire values apply to a wide range of systems and their technologies. Some of these, such as helicopters, UAVs, assault ships, missiles, etc. will usually fall below the stated values. The mandated review process discussed below will accommodate these variations and in fact assure consistency and accuracy in case processing. Early
INFORMAL, PARALLEL REVIEW PROCESS
Industry
DoC
DoS
Service LO/CLO OPR

DTRA
LO Cases
OUSD(AT&L)/DSP
DoC
OSD LO Position
TRI-SERVICE
DoS
FORMAL, STATUTORY REVIEW PROCESS
LO/CLO EXCOM
Chart 1: Process for Review of Signature Control Technologies T h l i
coordination with the appropriate Service LO/CLO OPRs will facilitate more timely determination of DoD concerns or limitations for the proposed export. As shown in Chart 1, the normal statutory review process for conducting export license approvals is supplemented by an LO/CLO review process, defined by DoD Policy. Within the Department of Defense, each Service has a central office to provide basic guidance regarding LO/CLO classification and policy. The following offices are designated by DepSecDef as the Service LO/CLO Office of Primary Responsibility (OPRs): AF:
SAF/AQL Directorate of Special Programs Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1060 Director, LO/CLO Policy and Technology (N91) Crystal Square 2, Room 213 1725 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22215 Director of Special Programs (SAAL-SO) Room lD711 Pentagon Washington DC 20310-0103 (703)588-2083
Navy/Marines:
(703) 413-2263
Army:
(703) 614-0152
Under the direction of the DepSecDef, USD(AT&L) manages and chairs the LO/CLO Executive Committee (EXCOM). The LO/CLO EXCOM oversees technology development and progress of key LO/CLO programs to focus and direct efforts as necessary and resolve issues that arise as programs mature. The EXCOM also sets overall technical policy on international transfer of LO/CLO information and capabilities and coordinates exceptions to National Disclosure Policy when necessary. The EXCOM also establishes security guidelines to insure consistent application of security policy to protect critical LO/CLO technologies. USD(AT&L) has appointed the Director of Special Programs, who reports directly to USD(AT&L), as the DoD Director of LO Technology. The Director functions as the principal coordinator of all LO and CLO issues and is the executive secretary for the LO/CLO EXCOM. The Director ensures proper management oversight is applied to all LO/CLO special access programs (SAPs) and activities. The Director reviews and makes recommendations about the international transfer of LO/CLO information and capabilities consistent with EXCOM guidance and National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee Policy Statements. The Director of Special Programs also chairs the Tri-Service Committee. This group meets frequently to coordinate DoD Component and LO/CLO activities. The committee makes recommendations concerning LO/CLO programs, policies, plans, studies, and exports consistent with this policy and previous EXCOM decisions. To facilitate the timely DoD review of LO/CLO export cases, the following information (where appropriate to the specific export license request) is required: The specific foreign requirement for this technology (e.g., Request for Technology (RFT), Request for Information (RFI), Statement of Work (SOW)) U.S. initiative supporting the requirement (e.g., business plan, briefing material) Applicable current guidance (e.g., security guide, MCTL, National Disclosure Policy (NDP), specific contract) Legacy of the LO/CLO technology (e.g., foreign release history related export cases) Technology specification (e.g., material composition, performance, weight, cost) - this must be done for the specific item being requested for export, including comparable items available from other U.S. companies and from foreign sources
Identify critical technologies in the export request and assess performance vs. LO/CLO policy and guidelines Proposed program review (platform, subsystem, component, materials, technologies) Program Protection Plan (including anti-tamper plans) This section provides an outline of the signature control technologies license review and approval process. Critical LO/CLO technologies are considered sensitive to the Department of Defense. Current DoD Policy states that they will not be exported without review by the LO/CLO EXCOM process. The timeliness of this review process can be facilitated by using the informal, parallel process shown in the Chart 1.
CRITICAL LO TECHNOLOGIES
The following technologies, though not all inclusive, are critical to achieving LO capability at a system level. The Service component LO/CLO OPR will assess component performance requirements against thresholds defined by DoDI S-5230.28 to support proper level of classification.
CRITICAL CLO TECHNOLOGIES

The following technologies are critical to achieving robust CLO capability at a system level. The Service LO/CLO OPR will assess performance capabilities against thresholds defined by DoDl S-5230.28 to support proper level of classification.
SECTION 18 - WEAPONS EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES TECHNOLOGY

18.1 Induced Shock Waves From Penetrating Weapons ..... 18-3 SUMMARY
O v e r v i e w (See Figure 18.0-1) This section addresses twelve technology areas that are used to evaluate the survivability and hardening of military systems against the effects of nuclear and other advanced weapons. Recognizing the trend towards consolidation of defensive technologies, "hardening" has been included within the broader category of countermeasures. The eight nuclear-related areas include Detonation-Induced Shock Waves, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse, Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse, Nuclear Radiation and System Electromagnetic Pulse, Thermal Radiation, Electromagnetic Propagation, Pulsed Power Weapons Effects Simulation, and Underground Testing. The four nonnuclear technology areas are Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons, Laser Weapons, Particle Beam Weapons, and High-Power Microwaves. Only one of the 12 technology areas in this section, Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons, contain technologies that are militarily critical. The eight nuclear technology areas, as well as the penetrating weapons technology, are directly related to WMD and will be addressed in Part II of the MCTL. All of the non-nuclear technologies are considered as emerging technologies, and these will be considered in detail in Part III of the MCTL. Since weapons effects technologies are specifically focused on military applications it is not surprising that a modest level of dual-use applications have been identified so far. Current dual-use applications account for about 15%, which could potentially be increased to more than 25%. Rationale The technologies of this section are essential to US military systems that must operate in hostile environments created by nuclear weapons, or by advanced weapons (whose impact on the future battlefield is yet to be established). Since the end of the cold war, the emphasis on the effect of nuclear weapons on systems has diminished as compared with the advanced technologies of: High Energy Laser (HEL) beams, Particle Beam (PB), High Power Microwaves (HPM), and new Penetrating Weapons (PW). The evaluation of the effects of HEL, PB, HPM and PW on military systems (subsystems) by simulation and analysis, and the incorporation of appropriate countermeasures, is a critical component in the design and weaponization of these advanced systems. HEL beams can place energy on target at the speed of light. These beams can destroy or incapacitate a target through rapid energy deposition; or they can provide target detection through backscatter of the incident energy. Particle beams travel at slightly less than the speed of light and can accomplish essentially the same objective as a laser beam, the differences being mostly in the on-target depth of energy deposition. High power microwaves provide the possibility of using radio frequency as a directed energy weapon, with target destruction being achieved by disrupting a system's electronics. Induced shock waves from advanced high-velocity PW can enhance the destruction of surface targets (as compared with conventional current munitions), attack buried targets more effectively, and intercept fast-moving targets such as reentry vehicles.
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES Manufacturing & Fabrication Information Systems Materials
WEAPONS EFFECTS & COUNTERMEASURES
TREND
Hardening from - Blast - Shock - Electro Magnetic Pulse
Figure 18.0-1.
Weapons Effects and Countermeasures Overview
18-1
Country
Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 18.0-2) The US is the overall world leader in the full spectrum of technologies dealing with penetrating weapons-induced shock, although strong capability exists in France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, and the UK. China is acquiring enhanced capability in this technology. Much of the technology, particularly dealing with the basic sciences of this subject, is universally shared through publications and presentations in international meetings such as the Hypervelocity Impact (HPVI) symposia and the Electromagnetic Launch (EML) conferences. There is considerable cooperation between France and Germany in this area, and between the US and the UK. In addition, Israel has been working with the US to develop a Hypervelocity Weapon System to support the requirements of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and Air Defense (AD). A key component of this program is intercept lethality and survivability. It is also interesting to note that France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US are also the leading countries in the nuclear weapons related technologies. This is not unexpected since there is much synergism among the basic sciences (e.g., materials research, pulsed power) that support both nuclear weapons effects and advanced weapons effects technologies.
18.1 Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons
China France Germany Israel Japan Russia UK US

LEGEND: C ritical Technologies Capabilities:
All
Majority
Some
Limited
Figure 18.0-2.
Weapons Effects and Countermeasures FTA Summary
18-2
SECTION 18.1 INDUCED SHOCK WAVES FROM PENETRATING WEAPONS

Overview (See Figure 18.1-1) Technologies in this section address methods for simulating and evaluating the effects of penetrating weapons (PW) on surface, space, and underground targets. These weapons destroy targets by rupturing the impacted material. The high incident kinetic energy per square meter of these penetrating weapons produces intense shock waves in the target. The extremely large pressures and shearing forces associated with the shock waves generated in the projectile-target interaction are intended to exceed the latter's elastic limit. Depending on the host material, this can result in permanent disfigurement due to plastic flow ablation, vaporization, cratering, and even ionization of the target. The simulation technologies of this section, consisting of testing, analysis, and software, provide a quantitative basis for establishing the survivability of targets. It is also important to note that PWs that can attack underground targets (such as bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons) are relevant to weapons of mass destruction. With few exceptions the technologies addressed in this section have not reached their ultimate capability. The technologies covered in this section may have 2030% dual-use applications. They include, for example: body armor for law enforcement, bomb containment systems, aircraft protection against bird strikes, and survivability of satellites against micrometeorites. Rationale (See Table 18.1-1) The technologies of this section are essential for developing US military systems that could face advanced penetrating weapons. Induced shock waves from advanced high velocity penetrating weapons can enhance the destruction of surface targets (as compared with conventional current munitions), attack buried targets more effectively, and intercept fast moving targets such as reentry vehicles. An adversary possessing the capability to defend land-based assets, underground bunkers, and airborne/space platforms against penetrating weapons can greatly improve its military capability. The evaluation of the effects of penetrating weapons on military systems by simulation and related analyses, and the resultant development and incorporation of appropriate countermeasures, are vital in the design and weaponization of these advanced systems. Foreign Technology Assessment (See Figure 18.0-2) The US is the overall world leader in the full spectrum of technologies dealing with Penetrating Weapons Induced Shock, although strong capability exists in France, Germany,
Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons

Penetration Suppression Shock Suppression Energy Absorption Fragmentation Resistant Materials High Strain Rate Response Material Response

Mobile Land Based Systems Fixed Land Based Facilities Underground Facilities Aerospace Platforms
Figure 18.1-1.
Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons Overview
Israel, Japan, Russia, and the UK. Russia and the US hold co-leader status in technologies dealing with penetrating weapons induced shock of space based targets. China is acquiring enhanced capability in this technology. Much of the technology, particularly dealing with the basic sciences of this subject, is universally shared through publications and presentations in international meetings such as the Hypervelocity Impact (HPVI) symposia and the Electromagnetic Launch (EML) conferences. There is considerable cooperation between France and Germany in this area and between the US and the UK. In addition, Israel has been working with the US to develop a Hypervelocity Weapon System to support the requirements of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Air Defense (AD). A key component of this program is intercept lethality and survivability.
18-3
Table 18.1-1.
Induced Shock Waves from Penetrating Weapons Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
CRITICAL MATERIALS UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT Projectile launchers capable of imparting velocities exceeding 1.8 km/s in laboratory-scale facilities; test targets and physical models, and instrumentation for HPVI assessments. UNIQUE SOFTWARE AND PARAMETERS EXPORT CONTROL REFERENCE Validated computer programs WA ML 17, 21, 22 and algorithms for evaluating and USML XXI optimizing reactive armor configurations, and assessing kinetic energy target effects on modules, including material models.
MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETER TECHNOLOGY MINIMUM LEVEL TO ASSURE US SUPERIORITY SIMULATION OF Simulation of the effects on land surface targets PENETRATING of: WEAPON EFFECTS - long rod penetrators of velocities > 1.8 km/s ON SURFACE - shaped charged jets capable of penetrating TARGETS RHA @ > 10 charge diameters - EFPs capable of producing projectile lengths > 1 charge diameter
Composite materials consisting of metals, foams, ceramics, adhesives, layers of metals and high explosives, and very dense materials, special constructions that can resist fragmentation and absorb shock waves, and Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA). SIMULATION OF Depth and payload capability for penetrating into Boulder fields on surface, PENETRATING or close to a target buried more than 2 m. reinforced concrete slabs WEAPON EFFECTS on bunker, soil, penetrationON BURIED resistant armor on bunker, TARGETS and high density case materials SOFTWARE Validated computer codes and algorithms that None identified include EOS models at high strain rates for predicting hypervelocity impact against armor, fragments against space targets, and penetration against buried objects with uncertainties 20%
Test facilities for simulating multi-layer ground/bunker penetrating configurations under battlefield conditions.
Validated software programs that WA ML 17, 21, 22 describe projectile penetration USML XXI through the ground.
Not applicable
Validated computer LagrangeWA ML 17 Eulerian codes and algorithms USML XXI that predict the performance of penetrating weapons against targets and include material models; input/output signals of sensors in single/multiple impact warheads, fractionation, vaporization, melt.
18-4
APPENDIXES
A. B. C. D.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................ A-1 DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................. .. B-1 INDEX ........................................................................................................................ ........ C-1 EXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS ....................................................................... D-1
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A mF m M sec 3D A ABEC A/sec AC A/C ACIPS ACVs AD AG AgGaSe2 AGMA AHRS AI AIP AIWS AL Al-Li AMMO AMP AN ANMO ANN ANSI Ap micron microampere microfared micrometer micron microsecond Three dimensional ampere Annular Bearing Engineers Committee Amperes per second Alternating current Aircraft Advanced Collective Integrated Protection System Air cushion vehicles Air Defense Australia Group Control List Silver Gallium Selenide American Gear Manufacturers Association Altitude and Heading Reference Systems Artificial Intelligence Air independent power Advanced interdiction weapon system Albania Aluminum-Lithium Azidomethylmethyloxetane Ampere Ammonium nitrate Azidonitratomethyloxetane Artificial Neural Network American National Standards Institute Ammonium perchlorate Ar AR AS4/T-500 ASTM ASTAMIDS ASW AT ATACS ATC ATE ATIRCM ATM ATR AU Au AUV AW B Ba BAMO bar BCMO BDNPA BDNPF BE Be/Be BER BG BHEGA BHP Argon Argentina carbon filter designations American Society for Testing Materials Airborne stand-off minefields detection system Anti-submarine warfare Austria Advanced tank cannon system Air Traffic Control Automatic Test Equipment Advanced Tactical Infrared Countermeasures Asynchronous Transfer Mode Automatic Target Recognition Australia Gold Autonomous underwater vehicle Advanced Weapons Systems Magnetic induction Barium Bisazidomethyloxetane 0.987 atmospheres Bischloromethyloxetane Bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) formal and acetal Bis(2,2-dinitropropyl) formal Belgium Beryllium/beryllium Bit error rate Bulgaria bis-2-Hydroxyethylglycolamide Brake horsepower BITA (butylene imine trimesamide) Polyfunctional aziridine amides with isophthalic, trimesic Ballistic Missile Defense cis-bis(5-nitrotetrazolato) pentaamminecobalt (III) perchlorate Bis(nitratomethyl)oxetane Butadienitrileoxide bis(2-methyl aziridinyl)-2-(2hydroxypropanoxy)propylamino phosphine oxide Beginning of life bits per second Brazil Biological response modifiers saturation magnetic induction Butanetrioltrinitrate British thermal units British thermal units per square foot Biological warfare Biological Weapons Convention Byelorussian SSR Degree Celsius Command, control and communications Command, control, communications and intelligence Command, Control and Communications Counter Measures Command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, and information systems Canada Computer-aided design Computer-aided design/manufacturing
BMD BNCP BNMO BNO BOBBA 8
BOL bps BR BRM BS BTTN BTU BTU/ft2 BW BWC BY C C3 C3I C3CM C4I2
CA CAD CAD/CAM
A-1
CAD/CAM/ CAT CAE CAE/CAD CAI cal cal/cm2 cal/cm2-sec CAM CAS CAS/M CAT CATOX CB CBPS CBW cc CCD CCL CCM CCM CCRDs Cd/HgTe CD CDs CDT CdTe CDU Cd/Zn/Te CE CEP CFD CH CIF3 CIP CL CL-14
Computer aided design/ manufacturing/testing Computer-aided engineering Computer-aided engineering/design Computer Aided Inspection Calorie Calories per square centimeter Calories per square centimeter per second Computer-aided manufacturing Computer-aided servicing Computer-aided servicing/maintenance Computer-aided testing Catalytic oxidation Chemical and Biological Chemical and Biological Protection Shelter Chemical & Biological Warfare Cubic centimeters Charge coupled device Commerce Control List Capability Maturity Model Counter-countermeasures Co-axial X-ray diodes Cadmium mercury telluride Critical Diameter Compton diodes Critical Developing Technology Cadmium telluride Control and Display Unit Cadmium zinc telluride Computing element Circular error probable Computational Fluid Dynamics Switzerland Chlorine Trifluoride
cm2 cm3 CMC CMM CMM cmW CN CNC CNTD CO CO CO2 COCOM
Square centimeters Cubic centimeters Ceramic matrix composite Capability Maturity Model Coordinate Measuring Machine centimeter wave China Computerized numerically controlled Controlled nucleation thermal decomposition Colombia Carbon Monoxide Carbon Dioxide
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Control of Exports COIL Chemical Oxygen Iodine Lasers COMINT Communication intelligence CP 2-(5-cyanotetrazolato) pentaamminecobalt (III) perchlorate CPB Charged Particle Beams CR Czech Republic CRT Cathode ray tube CS Czechoslovakia CTP Composite Theoretical Performance CTPB Carboxyl-terminated polybutadiene CU Cuba Cu Copper CVD Chemical vapor deposition CW Chemical Warfare CWC Chemical Warfare Convention CYBERSPACE Internet Domain CYBERWAR Use of computers and telecommunications as weapons of destruction CZ convergence zone D* DAF DATB dB dBm DBRN Detectivity Diaminofarazan Diaminotrinitrobenzene Decibel Decibel referred to 1 milliwatt Data-Based Referenced Navigation
DC DCTP DE DE DECADE deg deg/hr DEWS DF DFE DGPS DHG DINGU DIPAM DIRCM DK DLC DME DN DNA DNA DNGU DoC DoD DoE DoS DRAM DS DSP DTG DTR DU D2O DZ E EA EAA EB
Direct current Defense Critical Technologies Plan Directed-energy Germany DNA X-ray simulator program Degree degrees/hour Directed Energy Weapons Systems Deuterium fluoride Diferrocenylethane Differential Global Positioning System Oxalohydroxamic acid Dinitroglycoluril Diaminohexanitrobiphenyl Defensive Infrared Countermeasures Denmark Diamond-like carbon Distance Measuring Equipment Product (bearing bore in mm times speed in RPM) Defense Nuclear Agency deoxyribonucleic acid Dinitroglycoluril Department of Commerce Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of State Dynamic random access memory Directionally Solidified Digital signal processors Dry Tuned Gyroscope Data Transfer Rate Depleted uranium Heavy Water Algeria Energy Electronic Attack Export Administration Act Electron beam
Cold isostatic pressing Chile 5,7-Diamino-4,6-dinitrobenzofurazane-1oxide CL-20/HNIW Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane cm Centimeter
A-2
EBPVD EC ECCM ECCN ECM ECR ECS EDM EEC EELV EEPROM EFP EG EIA ELINT EM EMC EMCDB EMI EMIS EMP Eo EO EOCCM EOCM EOS EP EPS ES ESG ESM ESR ETC EU eV EW f/max f/min
Electron Beam Physical Vapor Deposition Electronics and Countermeasures Electronic counter-countermeasures Export Control Classification Number Electronic countermeasures Electron cyclotron resonance Electrostatic Chucks Electrical discharge machines European Economic Community Enhanced expendable launch vehicle Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Explosively-formed penetrator Egypt Electronic Industries Association Electronic Intelligence Electromagnetic Electromagnetic Compatibility Elastomer Modified Cost Double Based Propellants Electromagnetic interference Electromagnetic Isotope Separation Electromagnetic pulse Sublimation energy Electro-optic Electro-optical counter countermeasures Electro-optical countermeasures Equation of State Electronic Protection Environmental protection system Electronic Suppression Electrostatically supported gyroscope Electronic support measures Equivalent Series Resistance Electrothermal-chemical European Union Electron volt Electronic warfare maximum frequency minimum frequency
FAE FADEC FALCON FCS FDDI FEA FEFO FELs FFT FI FIFV FLIR FOG FOV FPA FR fps FSU ft FTA g g GaAs GAP GB Gbits/s GBq Ge GE GFLOPS GHz GIS GLONASS gm GNSS GPa GPA
Fuel-air explosives Full authority digital electronic engine controls Fuel-Air Line Charge Ordnance Neutralizer Flight control systems Fast Digital Data Interconnect Finite Element Analysis Bis-2-fluoro-2,2-dinitroethylformal Free electron lasers Fast Fourier transform Finland Future infantry fighting vehicle Forward-Looking Infrared Fiber-optic gyroscope Field of Vision Focal plane array France feet per second Former Soviet Union foot Foreign Technology Assessment acceleration of gravity (32 feet per second2/9.8 m2) gram gamma Gallium arsenide Glycidylazide polymer United Kingdom Gigabits per second Gigabecquerel Germanium Germany Giga floating point operations per second Gigahertz Geographic Information systems Global Navigation Satellite System Gram Global Navigation Satellite Systems Gigapascals One megabar
GPS GR GRMS GS GTE GTO GTN GW Gy H HAN HAP HBIW HBT HDL HE HEL HEMP HEMT HF HF HfF4 Hg HgCdTe HIP HK HMX HNIW HNS hp HPM HPVI HRG HTPB HTS HU Hz IAEL IC ICAO
Global Positioning System Greece Gravity root mean square Ground Systems Gas Turbine Engines Gate turn-off General Technology Note Gigawatt Gray Hour Hydroxylammonium nitrate Hydroxylammonium perchlorate Hexabenzylhexaazaisowurtzitane Hetero-bipolar transistors High-Level Development Language High Explosive High energy laser High altitude electromagnetic pulse High electron mobility transistors High Frequency Hydrogen fluoride Hafnium fluoride Mercury Mercury Cadmium Telluride Hot isostatic pressing Hong Kong Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane Hexanitrostilbene Horsepower High power microwave Hyper velocity impact Hemispherical resonator gyroscope Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene High temperature superconducting Hungary Hertz International Atomic Energy List Integrated circuits International Civil Aviation Organization
A-3
ICBM ID IE IEEE IFOV IIL IL ILS IMS IN InSb INFOWAR INS INTERNET IP IQ IR IR IRCM IRIG IRST IS IS ISAR ISDN ISO IT ITAR ITU J J/gm J/pulse JDAM JP JSLIST JSOW JT
Intercontinental ballistic missile Indonesia Ireland Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers Instantaneous Field of View International Industrial List Industrial List Instrument Landing System Ion mobility spectrometry India Indium Antimonide Information Warfare Inertial navigation systems International Computer Network Isostatic pressing Iraq Iran Infrared Infrared countermeasures Interrange Instrumentation Group Infrared search and track. Iceland Information Systems Inverse synthetic aperture radar Integrated Services Digital Network International Standards Organization Italy International Traffic in Arms Regulations International Telecommunications Union joules joules/gram joules per pulse Joint direct attack munition Japan Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology Joint standoff weapon Joule-Thomson
K k K-6 kA kA/cm2 kA/ns kbar kbit KDN KE Ketobicyclic Keto-RDX keV KEW kg kg/dm3 kG kHz kJ km km/sec kN KOH KP kPa KR Kr krad(Si) ksi kt kT KTA KW kV kV/cm kV/mil kV/mm kW
Kelvin Magnetomechanical coupling+ factor 2,4,6-Trinitro-2,4,6-triazacyclohexanone kiloamperes kiloamperes per cm2 kiloampere per nanosecond kilobar kilobit Potassium dinitramide Kinetic energy 2,4,6,8-Tetranitro-2,4,6,8-tetraazaHMX bicyclo(3,3,0)-octanone-3 2,4,6-Trinitro-2,4,6-triazacyclohexanone kiloelectron volt Kinetic energy weapons kilogram kilograms per cubic decimeter kiloGauss kilohertz kilojoule kilometer kilometers per second kilonewtons Potassium hydroxide North Korea kilopascal (0.00987 atmospheres) South Korea Krypton kilorads (in Silicon) thousand pounds per square inch kiloton (yield) kilotesla Potassium titanyl arsenate Kuwait kilovolt kilovolt per centimeter kilovolt per mil kilovolts per millimeter kilowatt lambda
l LANS LDCs LEO LICA 12 LIDAR LIS LLLTV LO LOS LPI LRU LU LY m m2 mA mA/cm2 MABS MAC MAPO MBBAY MBE MBG Mbit Mbytes MCM MCT MCTL megarad(Si) MEO Methyl BAPO MeV mg Mg mg/cc mg/cm2
liter Local Area Network System Lesser Developed Countries Low Earth Orbit Neopentyl(dially)oxy-tri(dioctyl) phosphato titanate Light Detection and Ranging Laser isotope separation Low-Light-Level TV Low Observables Line of sight Low probability of intercept Line Replaceable Unit Luxembourg Libya meters square meters milliamperes milliamps per square centimeter Military application of blast simulation Message Authentication Code Tris-1-(2-methyl)aziridinyl phosphine oxide A specific X-ray blowoff code Molecular Beam Epitaxy Multi-band gap Megabit Megabytes Mine Countermeasure Mercury Cadmium Telluride Militarily Critical Technologies List Million rads (in Silicon) Middle Earth Orbit Bis(2-methylaziridinyl)methylamino phosphine oxide Million electron volts milligram Magnesium milligrams per cubic centimeter milligrams per square centimeter
A-4
MHD MHz mil MILSPEC min mJ MJ ML ml MLRS MLS mm mm2 mmIC MMC mmW MN MOCVD MOPS MOS MOUT MPa Mrad(Si) MRI MS MSE msec (ms) m/sec MTBF MTCR Mtops MTTF MV MV/ns MW mW MX N
Magnetohydrodynamic megahertz milli-inch Military specifications minutes millijoule megajoule Munitions List milliliters Multiple Launch Rocket System Microwave landing system millimeter square millimeter millimeter/microwave IC Metal matrix composite millimeter Wave mega-newton Metal organic chemical vapor depositions Million Operations Per Second metal oxide semiconductor Military operations in urban terrain megapascals million rads (in Silicon) Magnetic Resonance Imaging Marine Systems Mobile subscriber equipment millisecond meters per second Mean-time-between-failures Missile Technology Control Regime Million composite theoretical (MTOPS) operations per second Mean-time-to-failure megavolt megavolt per nanosecond megawatt milliwatt Mexico Newton
Na N.B. N.I. N/m2 NASA NATO NA NAVSAT NC NCA Nd NDE NDT NDUL NEPE NF NFIL NFML NG nH NL NLO nm nmi NMMO NO NONA NP NPB NQ NRC NS NSA NSAN nsec (ns) NSG nT NTO NZ "N" D
Sodium Nota Bene None identified Newtons per square meter National Aeronautic and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization Not Applicable Navigation Satellite Numerically controlled National Command Authorities Neodypnium Nondestructive evaluation Nondestructive test Nuclear Dual Use List Nitrate ester plasticized polyether New Forum New Forum Industrial List New Forum Munitions List Nitroglycerin Nanohertz Netherlands Nonlinear optical nanometer nautical miles 3-nitratomethyl-3-methyloxetane Norway Nonanitroterphenyl Non-Proliferation Neutral Particle Beam Nitroguanidine Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Systems National Security Agency Non-stabilized ammonium nitrate nanoseconds Nuclear Supplier Group nanotesla 3-nitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one New Zealand N-dimensional
OCM OCCM Octal Octal OE OFHC OMV ONTA OPC OPO OPSEC OTH OTN O2-I Pa PAM PAR PB PBAA PBAN PBXs PC PCDE PEK PETN PEX PFPAE PGN PH Picrite PIN PIO PK PL PM poly-GLYN ppm
ohm Optical countermeasures Optical counter-countermeasures Aluminum octadecanoate HMX/TNT mixtures Opto-Electronics Oxygen-free high conductivity Orbit maneuvering vehicles 3-nitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one Optical Proximity Correction Optical Parametric Oscillator Operations security over the horizon See NTO Oxygen Iodine Pascal Penetration-augmented munition Precision Approach Radar Particle beam Polybutadiene-acrylic acid Polybutadiene-acrylic acid-acrylonitrile Plastic bonded explosives Personal Computer Polycyanodifluoroaminoethyleneoxide Polyether ketone Pentaerythritol tetranitrate Paste extrudable explosive Perfluorinated Polyalkyl ether Polyglycidylnitrate Philippines NGU or NQ (q.v.) Personal Identification Number Pilot Induced Oscillation Pakistan Poland Power Metallurgy poly(nitatromethyloxirane) Parts per million
A-5
PRC PRF PSA PSAM PSD ps psf psi PT PVDF or PVF2 PV/W PYX Q QAM R&D R/W RADX rad(Si) rad(Si)/sec RAM RCS RDX RF RHA RLG rms RO ROIC ROV RPM RPV RU RV S/cm S/m S/N SA
Peoples Republic of China Pulse Repetition Frequency Pressure-Swine Absorption Phase stabilized ammonium nitrate Power Spectral Density pico second pounds per square foot pounds per square inch Portugal Polyvinylidine fluoride Pressure-volume/weight Picrylaminodinitropyridine A figure of merit for a resonant circuit Quadrature amplitude modulation Research and development Read/write Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine Radiation absorbed dose (in Silicon) Rads (Si) per second Radar absorbing materials Radar cross section Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine Radio frequency Rolled homogeneous armor Ring laser gyroscope Root mean square Romania Readout integrated circuit Remotely operated vehicles Revolutions per minute Remotely piloted vehicle Russia Reentry vehicle Siemens per centimeter Siemens/meter Signal to noise Saudi Arabia
SACMA SAFF SAFOR SAM SAR SAW SC SCDE SDH SDI SE sec (s) SEM SEP SES SEU SEV SG Si SiN SiGe SIGINT SINCGARS SINS SIT SKIPPER SLAM SLAR SLV SMP SN SONET SPDT SPF/DB SpG SQUID
Suppliers of Advanced Composite Materials Safing, arming, fuzing and firing Semiautomated forces Surface-to-air missiles Synthetic Aperture Radar Surface acoustic wave Single Crystal Simplified Collective Detection Equipment Synchronous Digital Hierarchy Strategic Defense Initiative Sweden second Scanning Electronic Microscope Spherical Error Probable Surface effect ships Single Event Upset Surface effect vehicles Singapore Silicon Silicon Nitride Silicon geranium Signal intelligence Single Channel Ground Air Radio System Ships inertial navigation systems Silicon intensified target A specific Lagrangian ground motion code Selectable lightweight attack munition Side Looking Airborne Radar Space launch vehicles Symmetrical Multiprocessor Sensors and Navigation Synchronous Optical Network Single point diamond turning Superplastic Forming/Diffusion Bonding Specific Gravity Superconductive quantum interference device
SR SRA SRAM SRBM SR-12 SS SSB SSBN SSN SSR STOL SU SWAS SY S&T T TAGN TAIW TAS TAT TATB Tc TCSEC TDI Te TEGDN TEM TEPAN TEPANOL Tg Tetryl TH ThAD Ti TIR TIS
Slovak Republic Shop Replaceable Assembly Short range attack missile Short range ballistic missile Ammonium dinitraminide Space Systems Single Side Band Submarine Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine, nuclear attack Secondary Surveillance Radar Short takeoff and landing USSR Small water plane area ship Syria Science and Technology tesla Triaminoguanidinenitrate Tetraacetyldibenzylhexaazaisowurtzitane Thallium arsenic selenide 1,3,5,7-Tetraacetyl-1,3,5,7-tetraazacyclooctane Triaminotrinitrobenzene Critical Temperature Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria Time Delay and Integration Telluride Triethyleneglycoldinitrate Transverse electromagnetic Tetraethylenepentamine-acrylonitrile Tetraethylenepentamineacrylonitrileglycidol Glass transition temperature Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine Thailand Tetranitrotetraaradecalin Titanium Total Indicated Reading Total Internal Scattering
A-6
TMD TMP Tn TN TN TNAD TNAZ TNEOC TNGU TNT Torr TOW TPB TR TSA TV TVC TVOPA
TW TW T/W TWG U UA UAV UDMH UF6 UHF UK ULSI UNDEX uPa/g US USG USMG USN
Theater Missile Defense Trimethylol propane Tunisia Tunisia Thermonuclear 1,4,5,8-Tetranitro-1,4,5,8-tetraazadecalin 1,1,3-Trinitroazetidine Polynitroorthocarbonate Tetranitroglycoluril Trinitrotoluene Pressure equivalent of 1 millimeter of mercury Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireguided antitank missile Triphenyl bismuth Turkey Temperature swing adsorption Television Thrust Vector Control (Tris vinoxypropane adduct) 1,2,3Tris(1,2-bis(difluoroamonio) ethoxy)propane terawatt Taiwan Thrust-to-Weight Ratio Technology Working Group Uranium Ukrainia Unmanned aerial vehicles Unsymmetrical dimethyl lydrazine Uranium Hexafluoride Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom Ultra-large-scale integration Underwater explosion Micropascal per gram United States United States Government U.S. Munition List U.S. Navy
USNO UTC UTS UUV UV V VE V&V V/m VHF VHSIC VLSI VN VOR VTOL W W/cm2 W/in W/kg WA WAM WANS Whr/kg WMD WORM WP WRA WSMR WST WTEC YAG YSGG Z ZA ZnS ZnSe ZrF4
United States Naval Observatory Universal Time Coordinated Ultimate tensile strength Unmanned underwater vehicle Ultraviolet volt Venezuela Verification and validation volts per meter Very high frequency Very-high-speed-integrated-circuits Very-large-scale integration Viet Nam Very High Frquency Omni Directional Range Vertical takeoff and landing watt watts per square centimeter watts per inch watts per kilogram Wassenaar Arrangement Wide area mine Wide Area Network System watt hours per kilogram Weapons of Mass Destruction Write once/read many White phosphorus Weapon replacement assembly White Sands Missile Range Weapons Systems Technology World Technology Evaluation Center Yttrium/aluminum garnet Yttrium scandium gallium garnet Atomic number South Africa Zinc Sulfide Zinc selenide Zirconium fluoride
A-7
APPENDIX C INDEX
2-D Graphic Techniques ................................................................................ 8.2 3-D Flows....................................................................................................... 1.6 3-D Graphic Techniques ................................................................................ 8.2 3-D Vectors/Second ..................................................................................... 8.10 Absorbing Materials, IR ............................................................................... 1.10 Absorbing Materials, RF .............................................................................. 1.10 Accelerators, Pulsed Electron....................................................................... 13.3 Accelerometers............................................................................................... 7.3 Accept/Reject Decision ................................................................................ 10.4 Accurate Position .............................................................................................. 7 Acoustic Systems, Seismic........................................................................... 15.1 Acoustic Wave Devices.................................................................................. 5.1 Acoustic Waves.............................................................................................. 5.1 Acoustics ......................................................................................................... 15 Acoustics, Platform ...................................................................................... 15.4 Active Emissions.......................................................................................... 12.3 Active Suspension Systems ............................................................................ 6.9 Adaptive Motion Control ............................................................................. 10.4 Aerodynamic Flow Control Design................................................................ 1.1 Aeronautics Systems Technology...................................................................... 1 Air Dispensed Explosives.................................................................................. 2 Air Independent Power (AIP)....................................................................... 12.2 Air Platform ................................................................................................. 15.1 Air Vehicles, Unmanned ................................................................................ 1.3 Air-Turbojet ................................................................................................... 1.6 Air-Turborocket ............................................................................................. 1.6 Aircraft, Combat ............................................................................................ 1.1 Aircraft, Fixed Wing ...................................................................................... 1.1 Aircraft Flight Control Systems (FCS)........................................................... 7.1 Aircraft, Military V/STOL ............................................................................. 1.2 Aircraft Respiratory Equipment ..................................................................... 3.2 Aircraft, Rotary Wing .................................................................................... 1.2 Aircraft, Stealth .............................................................................................. 1.1 Airfoils .................................................................................................... 1.2, 7.1 Alexandrite................................................................................................... 15.7 Algal............................................................................................................... 3.4 Algorithms, Cryptanalytic .............................................................................. 8.4 Algorithms, Cryptographic............................................................................. 8.4 Algorithms, Digital Signal Processing ........................................................... 9.3 Algorithms, Dynamic Scene Generation ........................................................ 8.6 Alloy Power, Intermetallic ........................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Advanced ......................................................................................... 10.1 Alloys, Aluminum ........................................................................................ 11.5 Alloys, Aluminum-Lithium .......................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Cobalt-Based Super.......................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Earth Iron ........................................................................................... 1.3 Alloys, Ferrous Metal................................................................................... 11.5 Alloys for Anti-Armor..................................................................................... 11 Alloys, Hafnium-Free................................................................................... 13.1 Alloys, Iron-Based Super ............................................................................. 11.5 Alloys, Magnetostrictive .............................................................................. 11.3 Alloys, Nickel-Based.................................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Nickel-Based Super ......................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Nickel-Rich Ion-Nickel.................................................................... 11.3 Alloys, Non-Ferrous Metal........................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Titanium........................................................................................... 11.5 Alloys, Zirconium ........................................................................................ 13.1 Aluminia......................................................................................................... 5.5 Aluminides, Nickel....................................................................................... 11.5 Aluminides, Titanium................................................................................... 11.5 Aluminum......................................................................................5.5, 10.1, 11.5 Aluminum Nitride ........................................................................................ 14.1 Aluminum Oxide.......................................................................................... 11.1 Aluminum Oxygen Battery ............................................................................. 12 Ammunition ................................................................................................... 2.2 Ammunition, "Brilliant" ................................................................................. 2.3 Ammunition, "Precision-Guided"................................................................... 2.3 Ammunition, "Sentient" ................................................................................. 2.3 Ammunition, "Smart"..................................................................................... 2.3 Ammunition, Cannon ..................................................................................... 2.2 Ammunition, Telescoped................................................................................ 2.2 Amphibious Assault ........................................................................................ 12 Amplifiers .................................................................................................... 15.9 Analyzers, Dynamic Signal ............................................................................ 5.4 Analyzers, Scanning ....................................................................................... 5.4 Analyzers, Scanning Spectrum....................................................................... 5.4 Anechoic Chambers........................................................................................ 1.1 Angular Measurement Machines.................................................................. 10.3 Antennae, Phased Array ............................................................................... 8.11 Antennas....................................................................................................... 15.9 Antennas, Beamforming................................................................................. 9.2
C-1
Antennas, Phased Array ................................................................................. 9.2 Antennas, Refractive ...................................................................................... 9.2 Anthropomorphic Devices............................................................................ 12.4 Architecture.................................................................................................... 8.3 Armaments ........................................................................................................ 2 Arming Devices ......................................................................................... 2, 2.5 Armor, Active ................................................................................................... 2 Armor, Electromagnetic .................................................................................. 18 Armor Protection............................................................................................. 11 Armor Systems, Active .................................................................................. 6.8 Armor, Vehicle............................................................................................. 11.1 Array, Second Generation Staring................................................................ 15.5 Arrays, Cooled ............................................................................................ 15.5 Arrays, Digital Gate ....................................................................................... 5.6 Arrays, Focal Plane ..............................................................................15.5, 17.3 Arrays, IR Detector ...................................................................................... 17.3 Arrays, LLLTV Camera Focal Plane ........................................................... 12.4 Arrays, Scanning .......................................................................................... 15.5 Arrays, Solar ................................................................................................ 17.1 Arrays, Towed Hydrophone .................................................................15.2, 15.3 Arsenic ........................................................................................................... 5.5 Artificial Neural Network (ANN) .................................................................. 5.6 Artillery Weapons Systems ............................................................................... 2 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)............................................................ 8.8 Atomic Frequency Standards ......................................................................... 5.4 Auditory ......................................................................................................... 8.6 Automatic Target Recognition (ATR)....................................................8.9, 15.9 Azimuth Determination System ..................................................................... 7.3 Bacterial ......................................................................................................... 3.4 Barium.......................................................................................................... 15.5 Batteries .........................................................................................14, 14.2, 14.4 Batteries, Primary......................................................................................... 14.1 Batteries, Reserve......................................................................................... 14.1 Battle Management ........................................................................................ 8.6 Beam Forming.............................................................................................. 8.11 Beam Forming, Active Sonar ....................................................................... 15.2 Beam Generation............................................................................................ 4.2 Beryllium ..................................................................................................... 13.3 Biological Defense Systems ........................................................................... 3.2 Biological Systems ............................................................................................ 3 Biological Warfare ............................................................................................ 3 Biological Weapons Convention ....................................................................... 3 Biopolymers ................................................................................................... 3.4 Biotechnology ................................................................................................... 3 Bismuth ........................................................................................................ 13.3
Blast Effectiveness ......................................................................................... 2.3 Bombs ........................................................................................................ 2, 2.3 Bombs, Parachute-Deployed .......................................................................... 2.1 Bonded Matrix.............................................................................................. 11.1 Boride Ceramics ........................................................................................... 11.5 Boron................................................................................................... 11.3, 13.1 Boron Carbide .............................................................................................. 11.1 Boron Compounds........................................................................................ 13.3 BPS................................................................................................................. 5.2 C I Modeling ................................................................................................ 8.10 3 C I Simulation .............................................................................................. 8.10 4 2 C I .......................................................................................................... 8.1, 8.4 Cable Systems, Bay ...................................................................................... 15.3 Cable Systems, Bottom ................................................................................ 15.3 Cable Transmission ...................................................................................... 8.11 Cable, Coaxial Metallic ................................................................................ 8.11 Cable, Twisted Pair ...................................................................................... 8.11 Calcium ........................................................................................................ 13.3 Camouflage .................................................................................................. 12.3 Capability Maturity Model (CMM)................................................................ 8.3 Capacitor, Chemical Double Layer .............................................................. 14.4 Capacitors..............................................................................13.3, 14, 14.1, 14.4 Capacitors, High Performance...................................................................... 14.1 Carbide ........................................................................................................... 1.5 Carbon .......................................................................................................... 10.1 Carbon/Carbon Composites.......................................................................... 10.1 Catamarans ...................................................................................................... 12 Cavitation ..................................................................................................... 12.2 Cells, Amorphous ......................................................................................... 17.1 Cells, Fuel.......................................................................................12, 14.1, 14.2 Cells, Multi-Band Gap (MBG) ..................................................................... 17.1 Cells, Poly-Crystalline Silicon...................................................................... 17.1 Cells, Semi-Fuel .............................................................................................. 12 Cells, Solar .................................................................................................. 17.1 Cells, Thin-Film ........................................................................................... 17.1 Ceramic Oxide Wire..................................................................................... 11.2 Ceramics.........................................................................................11, 11.1, 14.1 Cesium Clocks................................................................................................ 5.4 Chaff Decoys ................................................................................................. 9.1 Chemical Defense Systems ............................................................................ 3.2 Chemical Systems ............................................................................................ 3 Chemical Weapons Convention......................................................................... 3 Chemicals, Organic ........................................................................................ 3.4 Chemicals, Toxic............................................................................................ 3.3 Chloroflurocarbons....................................................................................... 11.6
3
C-2
Circuit, Integrated ........................................................................................... 17 Circuits, Gallium Arsenide Integrated............................................................ 5.6 Circuits, General Purpose Integrated (IC) .................................................. 5, 5.6 Circuits, High-Voltage Analog........................................................................ 17 Circuits, Microprocessor Integrated ............................................................... 8.7 Circuits, Millimeter/Microwave Integrated (MMIC) ..................................... 5.6 Circuits, Readout Integrated (ROICs) ............................................................ 9.3 Circuits, Solid State........................................................................................ 5.3 Circuits, Very High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) .................................. 5 Cluster Tools .................................................................................................. 5.3 Coatings, Antifouling ................................................................................... 11.6 Coatings, Biological Agent Resistant ........................................................... 11.6 Coatings, Chemical Agent Resistant ............................................................ 11.6 Coatings, CoCrAlY ..................................................................................... 11.5 Coatings, Cubic Boron Nitride ..................................................................... 11.5 Coatings, Erosion Protective ........................................................................ 11.6 Coatings, Optical............................................................................................. 17 Coatings, Sand-Erosion Resistant................................................................. 11.6 Cobalt ........................................................................................................... 11.3 Codes, Arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian ............................................................ 11.1 Codes, Combined Arbitrary Lagrange-Eulerian ........................................... 11.1 Coilguns ............................................................................................................ 4 Collective Filtration Systems ......................................................................... 3.2 Collective Protective Systems ........................................................................ 3.2 Common Channel Signaling........................................................................... 8.8 Communications Intrusion ............................................................................... 9 Components, Advanced Transmissive............................................................. 17 Components, Electronic ............................................................................. 5, 5.1 Components, Erosion-Resistant.................................................................... 11.1 Components, Safing, Arming, Fuzing and Firing (SAFF)............................ 13.3 Composite Theoretical Performance .............................................................. 8.5 Composites...................................................................................................... 11 Composites, Aluminum Alloy Matrix .......................................................... 11.5 Composites, Carbon-Carbon ........................................................................ 11.5 Composites, Carbon Fiber Matrix ................................................................ 11.5 Composites, Ceramic-Ceramic .................................................................... 11.5 Composites, Ferromagnetic ......................................................................... 14.4 Composites, Piezoelectric ............................................................................ 15.2 Composites, Polymer Matrix........................................................................ 11.5 Composites, Titanium-Aluminide Matrix .................................................... 11.5 Compound Rotary Tables............................................................................. 10.5 Compounds, Anometallic ............................................................................... 5.5 Compounds, Metal Organic............................................................................ 5.5 Compressor Blades....................................................................................... 10.5 Computational Power ..................................................................................... 8.5 Computer Aided Design (CAD) ..................................................5, 5.6, 8.2, 10.2
Computer-Aided Engineering (CAE) ........................................................... 10.2 Computer Aided Manufacture (CAM) .................................................. 8.2, 10.2 Computer Intrusion............................................................................................ 9 Computer Modeling........................................................................................ 8.2 Computer-Controlled Coordinate-Measuring Machine (CMM) ................... 10.3 Computers ....................................................................................................... 17 Computing, Parallel........................................................................................ 8.5 Computing, Scaleable..................................................................................... 8.5 Conducting Polymers ................................................................................... 11.2 Configuration Management ............................................................................ 8.3 Contamination Avoidance .............................................................................. 3.2 Contrail Reduction.......................................................................................... 6.8 Controllers.................................................................................................... 10.6 Converter, A/D ............................................................................................... 5.6 Converter, D/A ............................................................................................... 5.6 Copolymers .................................................................................................. 11.6 Counter-Countermeasures, Electronic ..................................................... 5.6, 9.2 Counter-Countermeasures, Optical ................................................................ 9.4 Counter Low Observable................................................................................. 20 Counter-Radar Shaping .................................................................................. 6.8 Countermeasures ............................................................................................. 18 Countermeasures, Electronic (ECM)................................................ 5.1, 5.6, 9.1 Countermeasures, Optical........................................................................... 9, 9.3 Countermines.................................................................................................. 2.7 Cr:BeAl2O4 ................................................................................................... 15.7 Crew Stations ................................................................................................. 6.5 Cryo-Cooling................................................................................................ 17.2 Cryogenic Dewars ........................................................................................ 17.1 Cryogenic Refrigerators ............................................................................... 17.1 Cryogenic Temperatures .............................................................................. 17.1 Cyberwar ........................................................................................................... 9 Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX).................................................. 13.3 Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX).......................................................... 13.3 Cyrocoolers .................................................................................................. 17.1 Cyrogenic ..................................................................................................... 15.5 Data Based Referenced Navigation ................................................................ 7.2 Data Fusion .................................................................................................... 8.9 Data Visualization .......................................................................................... 8.2 Deception, Electronic ........................................................................................ 9 Deception Measures .......................................................................................... 9 Deception, Physical ........................................................................................... 9 Decontamination Technologies ...................................................................... 3.2 Deep Sea Implant ............................................................................................ 12 Degaussing ................................................................................................... 12.3 Demolition Devices ........................................................................................... 2
C-3
Demolition Systems ....................................................................................... 2.7 Demolition Systems, Man-Portable Urban Warfare....................................... 2.7 Deperming.................................................................................................... 12.3 Deposition Masks ........................................................................................... 5.6 Deposition, Chemical Vapor (CVD) ............................................................ 10.1 Deposition, Ion Assisted Resistive Heating Vapor ....................................... 10.1 Deposition, Pyrolytic.................................................................................... 10.1 Deposition, Sputter....................................................................................... 10.1 Depth Charges ................................................................................................... 2 Detection ................................................................................................. 3.3, 9.3 Detection Equipment...................................................................................... 3.3 Detectors, Biological Agents.......................................................................... 3.3 Detectors, CB ................................................................................................. 3.3 Deuterium..................................................................................................... 13.3 Devices, Countermeasure............................................................................... 6.7 Devices, Field Programmable ........................................................................ 5.6 Devices, Implosion-Assembled .................................................................... 13.3 Devices, Power Semiconductor.................................................................... 14.4 Diamond......................................................................................................... 5.5 Diamond Turning ......................................................................................... 10.3 Dibromotetrafluoroethane ............................................................................ 11.6 Dielectrical ................................................................................................... 14.1 Diesel-Electric Power................................................................................... 12.2 Digital Cellular Radio .................................................................................. 8.11 Digital Processing .......................................................................................... 8.5 Digital RF Memories...................................................................................... 9.2 Digital Signal Processing Microprocessor Chips............................................ 8.9 Digital Signal Processors................................................................................ 9.3 Digitizers........................................................................................................ 5.4 Dimensional Inspection ................................................................................ 10.3 Dimensional Measuring Systems ................................................................. 10.3 Directed Energy Systems .................................................................................. 4 Disinfectants................................................................................................... 3.4 Displacement, Angular................................................................................. 10.3 Displacement, Linear ................................................................................... 10.3 Display Systems, Helmet Mounted ................................................................ 6.5 Display Systems, Panel .................................................................................. 6.5 Dopants .......................................................................................................... 5.3 Dose-Rate........................................................................................................ 17 Dynamic Adative Routing.............................................................................. 8.8 Dynamic Flight Trainers .............................................................................. 8.10 Dynamic Scene Generation ............................................................................ 8.6 Dynamic Training .......................................................................................... 8.5 E-Beam Mask................................................................................................. 5.3 Earth Orbit, Low (LEO) .................................................................................. 17
Earth Orbit, Middle (MEO)............................................................................. 17 ECM Microwave Power Module.................................................................... 9.1 ECM Solid State Amp .................................................................................... 9.1 ECM Synthesizer............................................................................................ 9.1 Efficient MW Power Sources ......................................................................... 9.2 Electric Actuators ........................................................................................... 7.1 Electric Discharge Machines (EDM) ........................................................... 10.5 Electric Drive ............................................................................................... 14.4 Electric Power ................................................................................................. 14 Electrical Materials ...................................................................................... 11.2 Electro-Optical ................................................................................................ 15 Electro-Optics............................................................................................. 5, 5.2 Electrochemical Power................................................................................. 12.2 Electrodes ..................................................................................................... 14.1 Electrolytes.......................................................................................... 14.1, 14.4 Electromagnetic............................................................................................ 8.11 Electromagnetic Launch (EML)........................................................................ 4 Electromagnetic Pulse ..................................................................................... 17 Electromagnetic Radiation ............................................................................ 1.1 Electromagnetic Radiation Hardening............................................................ 1.1 Electromagnetic Spectrum.............................................................. 4.2, 8.9, 12.3 Electron Beam .............................................................................................. 10.5 Electronic Equipment, General Purpose..................................................... 5, 5.4 Electronic Fabrication Equipment ..................................................................... 5 Electronics....................................................................................................... 17 Electronics, High Power ............................................................................... 14.2 Electronuclear Breeders................................................................................ 13.1 Emission Suppression..................................................................................... 6.1 Emissivity......................................................................................... 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 Empirically Validated Design ........................................................................ 8.5 Encrypted Communication ............................................................................. 5.4 End Wall Flows .............................................................................................. 1.6 End-Effectors ............................................................................................... 10.6 Energetic Materials..................................................................................... 2, 2.4 Engine, Closed-Cycle Stirling Piston ........................................................... 12.2 Engine Controls, Computerized...................................................................... 1.6 Engine, Semi-Closed-Cycle Diesel .............................................................. 12.2 Engines, Combined Cycle .............................................................................. 1.6 Engines, Dal-Mode Ramjet/Scramjet ............................................................. 1.6 Engines, Diesel............................................................................................... 6.1 Engines, Gas Turbine ..................................................................................... 1.6 Engines, Hydrazine-Powered .......................................................................... 12 Engines, Liquid Air Cycle .............................................................................. 1.6 Engines, Marine Gas Turbine......................................................................... 1.6 Engines, Military Aircraft .............................................................................. 1.6 Engines, Rankine Cycle................................................................................... 12
C-4
Engines, Semi-Closed-Cycle Thermal ......................................................... 12.2 Engines, Stirling Cycle.................................................................................... 12 Engines, Turborocket Ramjet......................................................................... 1.6 Environment, Battlespace............................................................................... 8.1 Environment, Synthetic .................................................................................. 8.1 Environmental ................................................................................................ 3.4 Enzymes ......................................................................................................... 3.4 Epistemological................................................................................................. 9 Epitaxial Growth ............................................................................................ 5.3 Epitaxial Layers ............................................................................................. 5.3 Epitaxy ........................................................................................................... 5.6 Etching ........................................................................................................... 5.3 Exoatmospheric............................................................................................ 8.11 Exoskeletal Assists ......................................................................................... 3.5 Expert Systems............................................................................................... 8.7 Explosion, Fission ........................................................................................ 13.3 Explosion, Thermonuclear ........................................................................... 13.3 Explosives, Air Dispersed .............................................................................. 2.1 Explosives, Nuclear...................................................................................... 13.3 Fabrication, Advanced.................................................................................. 10.1 Fabrication Technology................................................................................... 10 Feedback Units, Linear Position................................................................... 10.5 Feedback Units, Rotary Position .................................................................. 10.5 Ferromagnetic .............................................................................................. 14.1 Fiber Optic Links ........................................................................................... 5.2 Fibers, Carbon .............................................................................................. 11.5 Fibers, Halide Based .................................................................................... 8.11 Fibers, Inorganic........................................................................................... 11.5 Filament Winding......................................................................................... 10.1 Filled HTPB ................................................................................................. 11.5 Fire Control Systems ...................................................................................... 2.6 Flame Photometry .......................................................................................... 3.3 Flawed.......................................................................................................... 10.4 Flight Control Laws........................................................................................ 7.1 Flight Control Systems ................................................................................... 7.1 Flight Crew Helmet Mounted Displays.......................................................... 1.8 Flight Path Optimization ................................................................................ 7.1 Flight Speeds, Low Subsonic ......................................................................... 1.3 Flight Speeds, Subsonic.................................................................................. 1.3 Flight Speeds, Transonic ................................................................................ 1.3 Fluids, Fluorinated Silicone.......................................................................... 11.6 Fluids, Gyro Flotation .................................................................................. 11.6 Fluids, Hydraulic.......................................................................................... 11.6 Fly-by-Light ................................................................................................... 7.1 Fly-by-Wire.................................................................................................... 7.1
Fly-Cutting Machine .................................................................................... 10.5 Flywheel ....................................................................................................... 14.4 Focal Plane Arrays (FPA) .............................................................................. 9.3 Force Multiplier.............................................................................................. 8.5 Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) .................................................................. 9.3 Fragmentation................................................................................................. 2.3 Frequency Hopping Systems .......................................................................... 5.2 Frequency Synthesizers .................................................................................. 5.4 Fuel, Liquid Gel ............................................................................................. 2.1 Fuel, Reprocessing Spent ............................................................................. 13.2 Fuel-Air Explosions........................................................................................ 2.1 Functional Hierarchical Extension.................................................................. 8.2 Fungal............................................................................................................. 3.4 Furnaces, Arc Remelt ................................................................................... 13.3 Furnaces, Casting ......................................................................................... 13.3 Furnaces, Controlled Environment Induction ............................................... 13.3 Furnaces, High Temperature ........................................................................ 10.1 Furnaces, Vacuum ........................................................................................ 13.3 Fusion Energy.................................................................................................. 13 Fusion, Inertial Confinement ........................................................................... 13 Fusion, Magnetic Confinement ....................................................................... 13 Fuzes ................................................................................................................. 2 Fuzing............................................................................................................. 2.5 Fuzzy Logic Chips.......................................................................................... 8.7 Gallium.................................................................................................... 5.3, 5.5 Gallium Arsenide .................................................................................. 5.2, 17.1 Gallium Nitride ................................................................................... 14.1, 14.4 Gallium Phosphide ......................................................................................... 5.2 Gate Turn-Off Thyristors ................................................................................ 14 General Purpose Digital Signal Processing Equipment .................................. 8.9 Generators, Energy......................................................................................... 4.2 Generators, Flash X-Ray .............................................................................. 13.3 Generators, Gain............................................................................................. 4.2 Generators, Hydrazine Gas.............................................................................. 12 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) ......................................................... 7.2 Geophones .................................................................................................... 15.1 Geophysical Surveys ....................................................................................... 15 Germanium..................................................................................................... 5.5 Giga-BPS........................................................................................................ 5.2 Gimballed Platform ........................................................................................ 7.3 Glass Oxide-Matrix ...................................................................................... 11.5 Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).................................................... 7 Global Positioning System (GPS)...................................................................... 7 Gradiometers ................................................................................................... 15 Gradiometers, Gravity ..................................................................................... 15
C-5
Gradiometers, Magnetic ..........................................................................15, 15.8 Gradiometery, Gravity ................................................................................. 15.6 Graphic Accelerators..............................................................................8.5, 8.10 Graphics Processors ..................................................................................... 8.10 Graphites, Bulk............................................................................................. 11.5 Gravity Field ................................................................................................ 15.6 Gravity Gradients ............................................................................................ 15 Gravity Gradiometry ...................................................................................... 7.2 Gravity Magnitude .......................................................................................... 15 Gravity Meters ................................................................................................ 15 Grenades......................................................................................................... 2.2 Grinding ....................................................................................................... 10.5 Grinding Machines ....................................................................................... 10.5 Ground Systems ................................................................................................ 7 Guidance ........................................................................................................... 7 Guidance and Control........................................................................................ 6 Guidance Systems ............................................................................................. 7 Guns, Electrothermal (ET) ......................................................................... 4, 4.1 Guns, Electrothermal Chemical (ETC) ................................................4, 4.1, 4.2 Gyro Astro Tracking Devices......................................................................... 7.3 Gyros.............................................................................................................. 7.3 Gyros, Fiber Optic.......................................................................................... 7.3 Gyros, Micro Electro-Mechanical .................................................................. 7.3 Gyros, Ring Laser .......................................................................................... 7.3 Gyroscopes..................................................................................................... 7.3 Gyroscopes, Dynamically Tuned (DTG)........................................................ 7.3 Gyroscopes, Electrostatically Supported ........................................................ 7.3 Gyroscopes, Fiber Optic................................................................................. 7.3 Gyroscopes, Flexure Rotor ............................................................................. 7.3 Gyroscopes, Floated ....................................................................................... 7.3 Gyroscopes, Hemispherical Resonator ........................................................... 7.3 Gyroscopes, Ring Laser (RLG) ...................................................................... 7.3 Halides ........................................................................................................... 5.5 Haptic ............................................................................................................. 8.6 Hard Targets.................................................................................................... 18 Hard-to-Find and See ................................................................................... 17.4 Hard-to-Hit................................................................................................... 17.4 Hard-to-Kill.................................................................................................. 17.4 Hazard Assessment ........................................................................................ 3.2 Hazardous Operations .................................................................................. 10.6 Helicopter....................................................................................................... 1.2 Helicopters, Military ...................................................................................... 1.2 Hemishells.................................................................................................... 10.3 Hexanitrostibene (HNS) ............................................................................... 13.3 High Density Conventional Systems ............................................................ 14.1
High Energy Laser, Space Based..................................................................... 17 High Performance Computing........................................................................ 8.5 High Power Density ..................................................................................... 14.2 Honing Machines.......................................................................................... 10.5 Hot Isostatic Presses ..................................................................................... 10.5 Howitzers ....................................................................................................... 2.6 Hull Penetration.............................................................................................. 2.3 Human Factors ............................................................................................... 3.5 Human Interface............................................................................... 1.8, 8.1, 8.6 Human Interface Systems............................................................................... 6.1 Hybrid Electric Drive Systems ..................................................................... 14.4 Hydrides ......................................................................................................... 5.5 Hydrocarbons, Synthetic .............................................................................. 11.6 Hydrofoils............................................................................................... 12, 12.2 Hydrophones ................................................................................................ 15.3 Identification .................................................................................................. 3.3 Image Intensification .................................................................................... 15.5 Image Generators ........................................................................................... 8.5 Image Intensifier, Third Generation ............................................................. 15.5 Image Intensifiers "X" Generation ............................................................... 15.5 Image Processing............................................................................................ 8.5 Image Processing Systems.............................................................................. 8.9 Immunity ........................................................................................................ 3.5 Immunization ................................................................................................. 3.2 Immunochemistry........................................................................................... 3.3 Impregnants.................................................................................................. 14.1 Indium ............................................................................................................ 5.5 Indium Phosphide........................................................................................... 5.2 Induction Coil............................................................................................... 15.8 Inductors....................................................................................................... 14.2 Inertial Navigation Systems (INS).................................................................. 7.3 Information Infrastructure ................................................................................. 9 Information Security....................................................................................... 8.4 Information Systems ......................................................................................... 8 Information Warfare (Inforwar) ........................................................................ 9 Infrared Detector Coolers ............................................................................. 15.5 Infrared, Far................................................................................................ 15.10 Infrared, Mid .............................................................................................. 15.10 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) .................................................................. 9.3 Infrared Systems........................................................................................... 15.5 Inorganic Insulators ............................................................................. 14.1, 14.4 Inorganics ....................................................................................................... 1.1 Inspection, Post-Manufacture ....................................................................... 10.3 Integrated Display Systems ............................................................................ 1.8 Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN).................................................. 8.8
C-6
Integration Documentation............................................................................. 8.3 Integration, Vehicle Systems............................................................................. 6 Intelligence, Artificial .................................................................................... 8.7 Intelligence, Machine ..................................................................................... 8.7 Intelligent System, Distributed ....................................................................... 8.7 Intelligent Systems ......................................................................................... 8.7 Interfaces, Human Systems ............................................................................... 6 INTERNET ....................................................................................................... 8 Inverters ....................................................................................................... 15.5 Ion Beam Polishing ...................................................................................... 10.3 Ion Implantation .....................................................................................5.3, 10.1 IR Focal Plane Array Seekers ........................................................................ 9.3 Iron............................................................................................................... 11.3 Isotope Separation ........................................................................................... 13 Isotopes ........................................................................................................ 13.2 Jet-Reactive Thrust....................................................................................... 12.2 Jets................................................................................................................... 18 Kill ................................................................................................................. 9.3 Kinetic Energy Penetrators........................................................................... 11.1 Kinetic Energy Systems .................................................................................... 4 Ladar ............................................................................................................ 17.3 Laminates ..................................................................................................... 11.5 Lapping Machines ........................................................................................ 10.5 Laser Cutting Machines................................................................................ 10.5 Laser Diagnostic Equipment .......................................................................... 4.2 Laser Reflectivity ........................................................................................... 6.8 Laser Transmission ...................................................................................... 8.11 Lasers ................................................................................................15, 15.7, 18 Lasers, Chemical ............................................................................................ 4.2 Lasers, Chemical Oxygen Iodine (COIL)....................................................... 4.2 Lasers, "Eye Safe"........................................................................................ 15.7 Lasers, High Energy (HEL)............................................................................... 4 Lasers, High Energy Chemical....................................................................... 4.2 Lasers, Nd:YAG-Based................................................................................ 15.7 Lasers, Semiconductor ...........................................................................9.1, 15.7 Lasers, Solid State .......................................................................................... 9.1 Lasers, Solid State/Tunable .......................................................................... 15.7 Lasers Technology .......................................................................................... 15 Lead Zironate ............................................................................................... 15.5 Lethality ....................................................................................................... 11.1 Light Systems, Argon Arc............................................................................ 12.4 Light Systems, Stroboscopic ........................................................................ 12.4 Liquid Jet Machines ..................................................................................... 10.5 Lithium......................................................................................................... 13.1
Lithium Niobate ............................................................................................. 5.2 Lithium Tantalate ........................................................................................... 5.2 Lithographic ..................................................................................... 5.3, 5.3, 5.6 Lithography, High Resolution ............................................................... 8.7, 8.10 Low Observable \"Stealth" ...................................................................... 1.1, 1.2 Low UHF ..................................................................................................... 15.9 Lubricants, Solid ......................................................................................... 11.6 Lubrication, Turbine Engine......................................................................... 11.6 Mach 6............................................................................................................ 1.6 Machine Tools.............................................................................................. 10.5 Machine Tools, Grinding.............................................................................. 10.5 Machine Tools, Milling ................................................................................ 10.5 Machines, Flow ............................................................................................ 10.1 Machines, High Power Rotating................................................................... 14.4 Machines, Shear Forming............................................................................. 10.1 Machines, Spin ............................................................................................. 10.1 Machines, Stretch Forming........................................................................... 10.1 Machining Equipment .................................................................................. 10.5 Magnesium .......................................................................................... 11.5, 13.3 Magnetic Materials....................................................................................... 11.3 Magnetometers ....................................................................................... 15, 15.8 Magnetometers-Electron Resonance/Optically Pumped............................... 15.8 Magnetometers-Flux Gate ............................................................................ 15.8 Magnetometers-Nuclear Precession ............................................................. 15.8 Magnets ........................................................................................................ 11.2 Man-Machine Interfaces................................................................................. 3.5 Manipulators.................................................................................................... 12 Manipulators, Remotely Controlled Articulated........................................... 12.4 Manufacturing Level Integration.................................................................. 10.2 Manufacturing Technology ............................................................................. 10 Maraging Ultrahigh Strength........................................................................ 11.5 Marine Sensing Systems............................................................................... 15.2 Marine Systems ............................................................................................... 12 Maskmaking ................................................................................................... 5.3 Material, Capacitor Dielectric ...................................................................... 14.1 Material, Fissile............................................................................................ 13.3 Material, Radar Absorbent ........................................................................... 12.3 Materials, Anti-Armor.................................................................................. 11.1 Materials, Armor .......................................................................................... 11.1 Materials, Dielectric ....................................................................................... 4.1 Materials, Electro-Optical (EO) ..................................................................... 5.5 Materials, Electronic ...................................................................................... 5.5 Materials, Exotic ............................................................................................. 17 Materials, Ferrite .......................................................................................... 11.3 Materials, Fibrous......................................................................................... 11.5
C-7
Materials, Filamentary ................................................................................. 11.5 Materials, Filamentary Polymeric ................................................................ 11.5 Materials, Fire Retarding.............................................................................. 11.6 Materials, Fissile ............................................................................................. 13 Materials, Fluorinated .................................................................................. 11.5 Materials, Glass Fibrous............................................................................... 11.5 Materials, Hetero-Epitaxial ............................................................................ 5.5 Materials, High Strength ................................................................................. 11 Materials, High Temperature .......................................................................... 11 Materials, Inorganic Fibrous ........................................................................ 11.5 Materials, IR Coating ................................................................................... 11.4 Materials, IR Optical .................................................................................... 11.4 Materials, Magnetic......................................................................................... 14 Materials, Magneto-Optic .............................................................................. 5.5 Materials, Non-Fluorinated Polymeric ......................................................... 11.5 Materials, Non-Linear Optical ........................................................................ 11 Materials, Non-Linear Optical (NLO).......................................................... 11.4 Materials, Nuclear ........................................................................................ 13.2 Materials, Optical....................................................................................11.4, 17 Materials, Penetrator .................................................................................... 11.1 Materials, Radar Absorbing...................................................................... 6.8, 18 Materials, Reactor-Grade ............................................................................. 13.2 Materials, Resist............................................................................................. 5.5 Materials, Sabot............................................................................................ 11.1 Materials, Semiconductor.................................................................................. 5 Materials, Shell ............................................................................................ 11.1 Materials, Special Function .......................................................................... 11.6 Materials, Structural ..................................................................................... 11.5 Materials, Superconducting....................................................................4.1, 11.2 Materials Technology...................................................................................... 11 Measurement, In-Process ............................................................................. 10.3 Measurement, Laser-Based .......................................................................... 10.3 Measurement, Non-Destructive.................................................................... 10.4 Media, Subsurface........................................................................................ 8.11 Megawatts .................................................................................................... 14.1 Mercury Cadmium Telluride (MCT)............................................................ 15.5 Metallurgy ...................................................................................................... 6.8 Meters, Gravity .......................................................................................15, 15.6 Metrics/Measurement..................................................................................... 8.3 Metrology..................................................................................................... 10.3 Micro Electro-Mechanical Accelerometer ..................................................... 7.3 Microchannel Heat Exchangers.................................................................... 17.1 Microcircuit, Monolithic ................................................................................ 5.3 Microcircuits .................................................................................................. 5.6 Microcircuits, Hybrid ..................................................................................... 5.6 Microelectronics............................................................................................. 5.6
Microphones................................................................................................. 15.1 Microprocessor Integrated Circuit.................................................................. 8.5 Microprocessor-Based Single......................................................................... 9.5 Microprocessors ............................................................................................. 9.3 Microprocessors, Digital ................................................................................ 8.7 Microwave/Millimeter Wave Transistors....................................................... 5.1 Microwaves, High Power ................................................................... 4, 14.2, 18 Milling.......................................................................................................... 10.5 Millions of Theoretical Operations/Second .................................................... 8.5 Minefield Detection........................................................................................ 2.7 Mines.............................................................................................................. 2.7 Mines, Land....................................................................................................... 2 Mines, Sea ................................................................................................ 2, 15.2 Minesweeping ................................................................................................. 12 Mirrors............................................................................................................. 17 Missile Systems, Ballistic................................................................................ 17 Missile Systems, "Brilliant" .................................................................... 2.2, 2.3 Missile Systems, "Sentient"..................................................................... 2.2, 2.3 Missile Systems, "Smart" ........................................................................ 2.2, 2.3 Missiles ................................................................................................... 2.2, 2.3 Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic ............................................................... 17.2 Mobile Electric Platform Power ................................................................... 14.4 Modeling ...................................................................................................... 8.10 Molybdenum ...............................................................................11.1, 11.3, 11.5 Mortar Rounds................................................................................................ 2.2 Motion Compensation ....................................................................................... 7 MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime .................1.1, 7.2, 7.3, 14.3 MTCR 1 - Missile & Rocket Systems with Range > 300 km .............................................................1.1, 7.2, 7.3, 14.3 MTCR 2 - Missile & Rocket Subsystems................................................. 17.4 MTCR 3 - Propulsion Components ................................................... 1.2, 17.4 MTCR 4 - Propellants and Constituent Chemicals ............................ 2.3, 17.4 MTCR 5 - Production Equipment for Propellants ..........................................MTCR 6 - Structural Composites Technology ......................................... 10.1 MTCR 7 - Pyrolytic Deposition & Densification Equipment ........10.1, 11.5 MTCR 8 - Structural Materials ...............................................................11.5 MTCR 9 - Compasses, Gyros, Accelerometers & Inertial Equipment ......................................................................................10.3, 11.6 MTCR 10 - Flight Control Systems ..........................................................11.6 MTCR 11 - Avionics Equipment ....................... 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 7.3, 11.6, 15.10 MTCR 12 - Launch Support Facilities...........................................15.6, 15.10 MTCR 13 - Analogue and Digital Computers ............................................8.3 MTCR 14 - Analogue-to-Digital Converters .......................................5.2, 5.3 MTCR 15 - Rocket System Test Facilities & Equipment .........................17.4 MTCR 16 - Software for Rocket System Modelling........................16.0, 17.4 MTCR 17 - Reduced Observables - Materials & Coatings ..............11.6, 16.0
C-8
MTCR 18 - EMP & EMI Protection Design Technology....................5.2, 5.3 MTCR 19 - Rocket Systems with Range < 300 km ....................................2.0 MTCR 20 - Subsystems for Rocket Systems with Range < 300 km...........2.0 Multi-Axis Adaptive Control........................................................................ 10.4 Multi-Band Devices ....................................................................................... 9.4 Multi-Processor .............................................................................................. 8.5 Multi-Spectral Devices................................................................................... 9.4 Multi-Threat Recognition Systems................................................................. 9.3 Multichip Modules (MCMs) .......................................................................... 5.6 Multiconductor ............................................................................................. 8.11 Munitions, "Brilliant" ........................................................................................ 2 Munitions, "Smart"..................................................................................... 2, 2.5 Munitions, Fuel-Air........................................................................................ 2.1 NDUL 1.1 NDUL 1.2 NDUL 1.3 NDUL 1.4 Spin-forming and flow-forming machines....................... 10.1 Numerically controlled machines .................................... 10.5 Dimensional inspection machines.................................... 10.3 Vacuum or controlled environment induction furnaces .................................................................................10.1, 13.3 NDUL 1.5 - Hot isostatic presses......................................................... 10.5 NDUL 1.6(a) - Robots or end-effectors for handling high explosives...... 10.6 NDUL 1.6(b) - Robots or end-effectors radiation hardened ..................... 10.6 NDUL 1.8 - Vacuum or controlled atmosphere metallurgical furnaces .................................................................................10.1, 13.3 NDUL 2.1 - Aluminum alloys - High strength..................................... 13.3 NDUL 2.2 - Beryllium ......................................................................... 13.3 NDUL 2.3 - Bismuth............................................................................ 13.3 NDUL 2.4 - Boron ..............................................................13.1, 13.2, 13.3 NDUL 2.5 - Calcium (high purity)....................................................... 13.3 NDUL 2.9 - Hafnium...................................................................13.1, 13.2 NDUL 2.10 - Lithium ....................................................................13.1, 13.2 NDUL 2.11 - Magnesium ...................................................................... 13.3 NDUL 2.16 - Zirconium ................................................................13.1, 13.2 NDUL 2.17 - Nickel powder and porous nickel metal........................... 13.3 NDUL 5.1 - Flash x-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators .... 13.3 NDUL 6.2.1 - Electronic switching devices............................................ 13.3 NDUL 6.2.2 - Electronic capacitors........................................................ 13.3 NDUL 6.3 - Firing sets and high-current pulse generators................... 13.3 NDUL 6.4 - High explosive substances or mixtures ............................ 13.3 NDUL 8.2 - Nuclear material handling equipment ......................13.1, 13.2 NDUL 8.3 - Tritium............................................................................. 13.3 NDUL 8.4 - Tritium production facilities and equipment.................... 13.1 NDUL 8.5 - Platinized catalysis........................................................... 13.2 NDUL 8.6 - Helium ............................................................................. 13.2 NDUL 8.7 - Alpha-emitting radionuclides........................................... 13.1 Navigation ......................................................................................................... 7 -
Navigation, Bathymetric................................................................................. 7.2 Navigation, Gravity Gradiometry................................................................... 7.2 Navigation, Inertial....................................................................................... 15.6 Navigation Systems, Doppler ......................................................................... 7.4 Network Routers............................................................................................. 8.8 Networks ........................................................................................................ 8.8 Neural Networks............................................................................................. 8.7 Nickel .................................................................................................. 10.1, 11.3 Night Vision Systems ................................................................................... 15.5 Nitride .......................................................................................................... 11.5 Noise Control ............................................................................................... 12.2 Non-Destructive Detection ........................................................................... 10.4 Non-Destructive Evaluation ......................................................................... 10.4 Non-Destructive Inspection .......................................................................... 10.4 Non-NC Machines........................................................................................ 10.5 Nuclear Effects................................................................................................ 18 Nuclear Fission................................................................................................ 13 Nuclear Fuel Elements .................................................................................... 13 Nuclear Materials Processing ....................................................................... 13.2 Nuclear Systems .............................................................................................. 13 Nuclear Thermal Propulsion......................................................................... 17.2 Null Steerable Antenna................................................................................... 7.4 Nulling.......................................................................................................... 8.11 Numerically Controlled (NC) ....................................................................... 10.5 Obscurants............................................................................................ 15, 15.10 Obscurants, Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum ............................................ 15.10 Obscurants, Infrared (IR)............................................................................ 15.10 Obscurants, Ultraviolet............................................................................... 15.10 Obscurants, Visible..................................................................................... 15.10 Ocean Salvage ................................................................................................. 12 Off-Orbit Spares........................................................................................... 17.4 Oil-Well Perforation....................................................................................... 2.4 Operating Systems.......................................................................................... 8.3 Optic Devices ................................................................................................. 5.5 Optical Coatings ........................................................................................... 10.1 Optical Devices .............................................................................................. 9.3 Optical Elements, Large .................................................................................. 17 Optical Fiber................................................................................................. 8.11 Optical Scatter .............................................................................................. 10.3 Optical Spectroscopy...................................................................................... 5.5 Optics, Adaptive.............................................................................................. 17 Optics, Cooled ................................................................................................. 17 Optics, Directed Energy .................................................................................. 17 Optics, Fibers ............................................................................................... 15.5 Optics, Hi-Temperature.................................................................................. 9.3
C-9
Optics, Lightweight Space Qualified............................................................... 17 Optics, Magnetometer-Fiber ........................................................................ 15.8 Optics, Segmented........................................................................................... 17 Optics, Silicon ................................................................................................. 17 Optics, Single-Crystal Silicon ......................................................................... 17 Optics, Space................................................................................................... 17 Optics, Uncooled............................................................................................. 17 Optoelectronics............................................................................................... 5.2 Optronics ...............................................................................................5, 5.2, 17 Organic Composites ..................................................................................... 11.1 Organisms ...................................................................................................... 3.4 Oxidation Process........................................................................................... 5.3 Packet Switching Equipment.......................................................................... 8.8 Paints, Protective.......................................................................................... 11.6 Parallel Computing......................................................................................... 5.2 Parallel Image Processing .............................................................................. 5.2 Particle Beams................................................................................................. 18 Particle Beams, Charged (CPB) ........................................................................ 4 Particle Beams, Neutral (NPB) ......................................................................... 4 Passive Sonar Surveillance........................................................................... 15.1 Penetrators....................................................................................................... 18 Performance Enhancers.................................................................................. 3.5 Pharmacological Agents................................................................................. 3.5 Phased Array Antennas ................................................................................ 8.11 Phased Arrays................................................................................................. 5.2 Phenylene Ether............................................................................................ 11.6 Phosphorous ...........................................................................................5.5, 11.3 Photo-Acoustic Spectrography ....................................................................... 3.3 Photochemistry............................................................................................... 3.3 Photogrammetry ........................................................................................... 10.3 Photography ................................................................................................. 12.3 Photovoltaic.................................................................................................. 17.1 Piezoelectrics.................................................................................................. 5.5 Plasma Dry Etch............................................................................................. 5.3 Plasma Enhanced............................................................................................ 5.3 Plasma Spray................................................................................................ 10.1 Platforms, Marine......................................................................................... 15.4 Platforms, Sonar........................................................................................... 15.4 Platforms, Space.............................................................................................. 18 Platinum Silicile ........................................................................................... 15.5 Plutonium ..................................................................... 10.1, 13, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3 Poly (Phenylene-Vinylene) .......................................................................... 11.2 Poly (Thienylene-Vinylene) ......................................................................... 11.2 Polyaniline.................................................................................................... 11.2 Polybromotrifluoroethylene.......................................................................... 11.6
Polychlorotrifluoroethylene.......................................................................... 11.6 Polymers....................................................................................................... 14.1 Polymers, Fluorinated................................................................................... 11.6 Polymers, Fluorinated Phosphazine.............................................................. 11.6 Polypyrrole ................................................................................................... 11.2 Polysilicon ...................................................................................................... 5.5 Polythioether ................................................................................................ 11.6 Polythiophene ............................................................................................... 11.2 Porous Nickel Metal ..................................................................................... 13.3 Positioning Synchronization .............................................................................. 7 Power Conversion Systems .......................................................................... 14.2 Power Density .............................................................................................. 14.1 Power Management...................................................................................... 17.1 Power, Peak.................................................................................................. 14.2 Power Semiconductor................................................................................... 14.1 Power Systems ....................................................................................... 14, 14.4 Power Systems, Electric (EPS)..................................................................... 17.1 Power Systems, High.................................................................................... 14.2 Power Systems, Pulsed................................................................................. 14.2 Prediction, E-M Propagation .......................................................................... 8.1 Prediction, Performance ................................................................................. 8.1 Prediction, Weather ........................................................................................ 8.1 Prepregs, Resin Impregnated Fiber............................................................... 11.5 Pressing, Hydrostatic.................................................................................... 13.3 Pressing, Isostatic ......................................................................................... 13.3 Preuse Time and Frequency ........................................................................... 7.4 Processing, Acoustic Signal............................................................................ 8.9 Processing, Advanced................................................................................... 10.1 Processing, Image........................................................................................... 8.9 Processing, On Board ..................................................................................... 8.9 Processing, Signal........................................................................................... 8.9 Processing, Terrestial Acoustic ...................................................................... 8.9 Processors, Digital Signal ........................................................................ 5.6, 17 Processors, Signal......................................................................................... 15.9 Production Equipment .................................................................................. 10.5 Projectiles ................................................................................................. 2, 11.1 Projectiles, Kinetic Energy ............................................................................. 2.2 Projectiles, Rocket-Assisted ........................................................................... 2.6 Projectiles, Surface Launched ........................................................................ 2.2 Projectors, Acoustic...................................................................................... 15.2 Propagation Sensor Modeling......................................................................... 8.1 Propellant Bonding Systems......................................................................... 17.2 Propellant Systems, Liquid........................................................................... 17.2 Propellants, Missile ........................................................................................ 2.4 Propellants, Solid............................................................................................ 2.4 Propellers............................................................................................. 10.5, 12.2
C-10
Propulsion ................................................................................................ 6, 17.2 Propulsion, Electronic .................................................................................. 17.2 Propulsion, Gun.............................................................................................. 2.6 Propulsion, Launch Vehicle ......................................................................... 17.2 Propulsion, Magnetohydrodynamic.............................................................. 11.2 Propulsion Systems .....................................................................1.6, 2, 6.1, 13.1 Propulsion Systems, Air Breathing................................................................. 1.6 Propulsion Systems, Combat Vehicles ........................................................... 6.1 Propulsion Systems, Marine....................................................................12, 12.2 Propulsion Systems, Nuclear........................................................................... 13 Protective Clothing......................................................................................... 3.2 Protective Gear............................................................................................... 3.2 Protective Masks ............................................................................................ 3.2 Psychological Operations .................................................................................. 9 Pulse Shape .................................................................................................. 14.2 Pyroelectrics................................................................................................... 5.5 Pyrotechnics ................................................................................................... 2.4 Radar ..............................................................................................15, 15.9, 17.3 Radar, Airborne Doppler .............................................................................. 15.9 Radar Altimeters ............................................................................................ 7.4 Radar Antenna Sidelobe Control .................................................................. 15.9 Radar Cross Section ....................................................................................... 1.1 Radar Delectability....................................................................................... 12.3 Radar, Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR)................................................... 15.9 Radar, Phased Array..................................................................................... 15.9 Radar Pulse Compression............................................................................. 15.9 Radar, Space Based Synthetic Aperture (SAR)............................................ 15.9 Radar, Wide Instantaneous Bandwidth......................................................... 15.9 Radar, Wide Operating Band ....................................................................... 15.9 Radars, Doppler.............................................................................................. 5.4 Radars, Millimeter........................................................................................ 15.9 Radiation Hardening........................................................................5.5, 8.3, 17.1 Radio Navigation Systems ............................................................................. 7.4 Radioactive...................................................................................................... 13 Radiometry, IR............................................................................................. 12.3 Radiometry, Microwave............................................................................... 12.3 Radomes....................................................................................................... 15.9 Railguns............................................................................................................. 4 Ramjet ............................................................................................................ 1.6 Random RF Energy ......................................................................................... 20 Rapid Beam Slew Capability.......................................................................... 4.2 Reactants ........................................................................................................ 3.4 Reactor Systems, Fission.............................................................................. 13.1 Reactors, Fission .......................................................................................... 13.1 Reactors, Naval Nuclear............................................................................... 13.1
Real-Time Data Fusion................................................................................... 8.5 Receivers ...................................................................................................... 15.9 Receivers, Radio........................................................................................... 8.11 Reduced Signature............................................................................ 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 Reflectivity ....................................................................................... 1.1, 2.2, 1.3 Reflectivity Emissivity ................................................................................... 6.8 Remediation Methods..................................................................................... 3.4 Resins, Thermoplastic Polymeric ................................................................. 11.5 Respirators...................................................................................................... 3.2 Reverse Osmosis ............................................................................................ 3.4 RF Reduction.................................................................................................. 6.8 Rifles, Shoulder-Fired Recoils........................................................................ 2.2 Robotic Arm ................................................................................................. 12.4 Robotics........................................................................................................ 10.6 Robots........................................................................................................... 10.6 Robots, Undersea.................................................................................... 12, 12.4 Rocket ............................................................................................................ 1.6 Rocket Motor Nozzles.................................................................................. 10.1 RPVs, Military ............................................................................................... 1.2 Run-Out........................................................................................................ 10.5 S&T Plan................................................................................................. 1.3, 4.1 Safing Devices............................................................................................ 2, 2.5 Sapphire.......................................................................................................... 5.3 Satellites, Communication............................................................................... 17 Satellites, Reconnaissance ............................................................................... 17 Satellites, Surveillance .................................................................................... 17 Scramjet.......................................................................................................... 1.6 Sealants, Fuel System................................................................................... 11.6 Seals, Fuel System........................................................................................ 11.6 Seals, Hydraulic............................................................................................ 11.6 Seismic ......................................................................................................... 15.1 Seismic Systems, Marine.............................................................................. 15.2 Semiconductor Processing Equipment ........................................................... 5.3 Semiconductors .............................................................................................. 5.3 Sensors .........................................................................................6, 9.3, 15, 17.3 Sensors, Acoustic .........................................................15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 Sensors, Active............................................................................................. 17.3 Sensors, Air Data............................................................................................ 7.1 Sensors, Biological ......................................................................................... 3.3 Sensors, Chemical .......................................................................................... 3.3 Sensors, Electro-Optical ......................................................................... 15, 15.5 Sensors, Infrared .......................................................................................... 17.3 Sensors, Integrated ......................................................................................... 6.7 Sensors, IR ................................................................................................... 17.3 Sensors, Magnetic .................................................................................. 15, 15.8
C-11
Sensors, Multi-Wavelength ............................................................................ 9.3 Sensors, Smart................................................................................................ 8.7 Sensors, Space.............................................................................................. 17.3 Sensors Technology ........................................................................................ 15 Sensors, Threat............................................................................................... 6.7 Sensory Inputs ................................................................................................ 8.6 Separators..................................................................................................... 14.4 Shaped Charges .......................................................................................11.1, 18 Ships, Small Waterplane Area......................................................................... 12 Ships, Surface Effect ....................................................................................... 12 Shotgun Shells, Military................................................................................. 2.2 Signal Analyzers ............................................................................................ 5.4 Signal Decryption........................................................................................... 7.4 Signal Phase (Time) Communication Synchronization .................................. 7.4 Signal Processors............................................................................................ 5.2 Signals, Encrypted.......................................................................................... 7.4 Signature Control ...........................................................1.10, 6.8, 12, 12.3, 17.4 Signature Control Technologies ...................................................................... 18 Signature Detection ......................................................................................... 18 Signature Reduction .........................................................1.3, 6.8, 12.3, 15.4, 16 Signature, RF................................................................................................... 20 Signatures, Acoustic........................................................................................ 20 Signatures, Infrared ......................................................................................... 20 Signatures, IR............................................................................................... 12.3 Signatures, Laser ............................................................................................. 20 Signatures, Magnetic ...............................................................................12.3, 16 Signatures, Multispectural............................................................................... 16 Signatures, Passive ....................................................................................... 12.3 Signatures, Radar ............................................................................................ 16 Signatures, Visible .......................................................................................... 16 Silahydrocarbons .......................................................................................... 11.6 Silicon ....................................................................................5.3, 5.5, 11.3, 17.1 Silicon Nitride .............................................................................................. 14.1 Simulation ..............................................................................................8.5, 8.10 Simulation, Combat........................................................................................ 8.1 Simulation, Computer .................................................................................... 8.2 Simulation, HEMP .......................................................................................... 18 Simulators, Pilot-in-the-Loop......................................................................... 1.1 Single Crystal Casting .................................................................................. 11.5 Single Crystal Polycrystalline ........................................................................ 5.5 Single Crystal Whiskers ............................................................................... 11.1 Single-Event-Effects ....................................................................................... 17 Situational Awareness .................................................................................... 8.1 Slide Way Assemblies.................................................................................. 10.5 Smart Towed Decoys ..................................................................................... 9.2 Smartsuits....................................................................................................... 3.5
Software ......................................................................................................... 8.3 Software, CAD/CAE ...................................................................................... 5.5 Software, CAM .............................................................................................. 5.5 Software, Virtual Reality.............................................................................. 10.2 Solenoids ...................................................................................................... 11.2 Sonar, Sidescan ............................................................................................ 15.2 Sonar Systems, Magneto-Acoustic ............................................................... 11.3 Sonar, Wide-Swath Bathymetric Active....................................................... 15.2 Sonars........................................................................................................... 15.2 Sonars, Active .............................................................................................. 15.2 Sonars, Passive ............................................................................12.3, 15.2, 15.3 Sonobuoys .................................................................................................... 15.3 Space Power .................................................................................................... 17 Space Power Systems ................................................................................... 13.1 Space Qualified ............................................................................................... 17 Space-Qualified Charged Coupled Device (CCD) ....................................... 17.3 Space Systems ................................................................................17, 17.2, 17.4 Spacecraft..................................................................................................... 17.1 Spectrometry .................................................................................................. 3.3 Spectrophotometer................................................................................... 5.3, 5.5 Spectroscopic Ellipsometer ..................................................................... 5.3, 5.5 Spectrum Analysis.......................................................................................... 5.2 Spindle Assemblies ...................................................................................... 10.5 Spread Spectrum........................................................................................... 8.11 SQUID.......................................................................................................... 15.8 Stealth.......................................................................................1.3, 7.4, 9.3, 14.1 Steels, Low Alloy ......................................................................................... 11.5 Steels, Maraging.................................................................................. 11.5, 12.2 Stored Program Controlled............................................................................. 8.8 Strapdown Inertial Sensing............................................................................. 7.3 Strontium...................................................................................................... 15.5 Structural Monitoring Systems ....................................................................... 1.1 Structures, Combat Vehicle............................................................................ 6.9 Submarines ................................................................................................... 12.2 Submarines, Diesel-Electric ......................................................................... 15.2 Submunitions..................................................................................................... 2 Substrates, Diamond....................................................................................... 5.6 Superconducting Devices ............................................................................... 5.1 Superconductors ............................................................................................. 5.5 Superconduting Electronics ............................................................................ 5.1 Superplastic Forming/Diffusion Bonding..................................................... 10.1 Survivability ................................................................................11.1, 12.3, 17.4 Suspension Deflection (Jounce)...................................................................... 6.9 Switching........................................................................................................ 8.8 Switching, Optical .......................................................................................... 8.8 Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)......................................................... 8.11
C-12
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) ..................................................... 8.11 Synthetic Environments.................................................................................. 8.5 Tactile ............................................................................................................ 8.6 Tantalum ...................................................................................................... 11.1 Tape Laying ................................................................................................. 10.1 Target Acquisition/Tracking System.............................................................. 4.2 Telecommunications Equipment .................................................................... 8.8 Telecommunication Transmission................................................................ 8.11 Television, Low Light Level ........................................................................ 12.4 Temperature-Swing Adsorption (TSA) .......................................................... 3.2 Tera-BPS........................................................................................................ 5.2 Terpolymers ................................................................................................. 11.6 Terrestrial Platform ...................................................................................... 15.1 Terrestrial Systems, Passive Acoustic .......................................................... 15.1 Theater Missile Defense................................................................................. 4.1 Thermal Imaging.......................................................................................... 15.5 Thin-Film Hydriding .................................................................................... 13.3 Thio Ethers ................................................................................................... 11.6 Third World Countries ...................................................................................... 3 Thorium........................................................................................................ 13.1 Thrust Vector Control Systems .................................................................... 17.2 Thrust Vectoring ............................................................................................ 7.1 Thyratron Switches ...................................................................................... 14.2 Thyristors .............................................................................................14.1, 14.2 Thyristors, Gate Turn-Off (GTO) ........................................................14.2, 14.4 Time Sequencing............................................................................................... 7 Ti:Tm:YSSG ................................................................................................ 15.7 Titanate......................................................................................................... 15.5 Titanium .............................................................................10.1, 11.5, 14.1, 14.4 Titanium Diboride ........................................................................................ 11.1 Tm:YAG ...................................................................................................... 15.7 Torpedoes.......................................................................................................... 2 Torpedoes, Homing ...................................................................................... 15.2 Total-Dose....................................................................................................... 17 Trajectory ....................................................................................................... 7.1 Transformers, Pulse...................................................................................... 14.2 Transmission, Linear Optical ....................................................................... 11.4 Transmission, Non-Linear Optical ............................................................... 11.4 Transmission Systems .................................................................................. 8.11 Transmitter Chains ....................................................................................... 15.9 Transuranic Wastes ...................................................................................... 13.2 Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) ................................................................. 13.3 Tritium ...........................................................................................13, 13.2, 13.3 Tritium Production ....................................................................................... 13.2 Tubes, Coupled Cavity ................................................................................... 5.1
Tubes, Cross-Field Amplifier ......................................................................... 5.1 Tubes, Helix ................................................................................................... 5.1 Tubes, Microwave/Millimeter Wave.......................................................... 5, 5.1 Tubes, Traveling Wave .................................................................................. 5.1 Tungsten .............................................................................................. 11.1, 11.5 Turbine Blade ................................................................................................. 1.6 Turbine, Closed-Cycle Rankine.................................................................... 12.2 Turbine, Steam ............................................................................................. 12.2 Turbines, Marine Gas ................................................................................... 12.2 Turning ......................................................................................................... 10.5 Turning Machines......................................................................................... 10.5 Underwater Communications ....................................................................... 8.11 Underwater Noise......................................................................................... 12.3 Uranium.................................................................................10.1, 11.1, 13, 13.1 Uranium, Depleted ....................................................................................... 11.1 Uranium, Enriched ....................................................................................... 13.2 Uranium-233 ................................................................................................ 13.2 Vehicle Control ................................................................................................. 7 Vehicle Electronic Systems .......................................................................... 6.11 Vehicle Structures ............................................................................................. 6 Vehicle Systems, Combat.................................................................................. 6 Vehicle Systems, Control Configured ............................................................ 1.1 Vehicles, Adversarial Undersea ...................................................................... 12 Vehicles, Air Cushion ..................................................................................... 12 Vehicles, Armored................................................................................... 6.1, 6.8 Vehicles, Armored Combat ............................................................................ 6.7 Vehicles, Autonomous Underwater........................................................ 12, 12.4 Vehicles, Combat .................................................................................... 6.5, 6.8 Vehicles, Deep Submergence ....................................................................... 12.4 Vehicles, Heavy-Duty Ground Combat............................................................. 6 Vehicles, Low Observable.............................................................................. 6.8 Vehicles, Remotely Operated ....................................................................... 12.4 Vehicles, Stealthy........................................................................................... 6.8 Vehicles, Submersible .................................................................................. 12.4 Vehicles, Subsurface .................................................................................... 12.4 Vehicles, Survivable....................................................................................... 6.8 Vehicles, Tethered Submersible ...................................................................... 12 Vehicles, Tethered Unmanned ..................................................................... 12.4 Vehicles, Tracked Combat ............................................................................. 6.1 Vehicles, Unmanned Underwater................................................................. 12.4 Vehicles, Untethered Submersible................................................................... 12 Vessels, Advanced Naval ................................................................................ 12 Vessels, Deep Submergence............................................................................ 12 Vessels, Subsurface ......................................................................................... 12
C-13
Vessels, Subsurface Marine ............................................................................ 12 Vessels, Surface Marine.................................................................................. 12 Vetronics .................................................................................................. 6, 6.11 Vibration Reduction ..................................................................................... 15.1 Virtual Prototyping......................................................................................... 8.2 Virtual Reality................................................................................................ 8.6 Virtual Reality Systems.................................................................................. 8.2 Vision Systems............................................................................................. 12.4 Vision Systems, Underwater ...................................................................12, 12.4 VisuallyCoupled Systems............................................................................. 8.2 VisuallyCoupled Displays ............................................................................ 8.6 Voice Recognition Systems............................................................................ 6.5 Vulnerability ................................................................................................ 12.3 WA IL Category 1 - Advanced Materials ......................................8.10, 10.1, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.5, 11.6, 13.3, 15.9, 16.0 WA IL Category 2 - Materials Processing ........................................................... 2.1, 8.2, 8.10, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.5, 10.6 WA IL Category 3 - Electronics ...............................2.1, 2.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 8.2, 8.10, 9.1, 9.3, 10.1, .......................................................................................... 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 17.1 WA IL Category 4 - Computers ................. 8.2, 8.3, 8.6, 8.7, 8.9, 8.10, 9.1, 11.1 WA IL Category 5 - Telecommunications ........................................................................ 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.10, 8.11, 12.7 WA IL Category 6 - Sensors and Lasers ......................8.9, 8.10, 9.3, 11.4, 11.5, .............................................15.2, 15.3, 15.5, 15.6, 15.7, 15.8, 15.10, 17.2, 17.5 WA IL Category 7 - Navigation and Avionics ..................6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.10 WA IL Category 8 - Marine ............................... 2.1, 8.10, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 16.0 WA IL Category 9 - Propulsion ....................................1.2, 2.1, 8.10, 10.1, 17.4 WA ML-1 - Small Arms ...................................................................... 2.1 WA ML-2 - Large Calibre Armament.....................................2.1, 2.5, 4.1 WA ML-3 - Ammunition ............................. 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 15.10, 17.4 WA ML-4 - Bombs, Rockets, Missiles & Mines ..........2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 15.2, ...............................................15.3, 15.8, 15.9, 18.8-10, 17.4 WA ML-5 - Fire Control & Related Alerting & Warning Equipment .....................................................2.5, 15.1, 15.10 WA ML-6 - Military Vehicles.............................................................. 6.1 WA ML-7 - Toxicological Agents ................................................ 3.1, 3.2 WA ML-8 - Military Explosives .........................2.3, 4.1, 11.6, 13.3, 17.4 WA ML-9 - Vessels of War & Naval Equipment .........1.1, 7.2, 7.3, 12.1, ..................................... 12.2, 15.2, 15.4, 15.6, 15.8, 16, 17.4 WA ML-10 - Aircraft and Related Equipment..................1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 7.1, ...............................................................................11.5, 11.6 WA ML-11 - Electronic Equipment..... 5.1-5.4, 8.3, 8.5, 8.9, 15.1-3, 15.10
ML-12 WA ML-13 WA ML-14 WA ML-15 WA ML-16 WA ML-17
Kinetic Energy Weapons Systems (KEW) ......4.1, 11.1, 14.2 Armored or Protective Equipment.................................. 11.1 Military Training Equipment............................................ 8.2 Imaging/Countermeasure Equipment ..........11.6, 15.5, 15.10 Forgings, Castings & Semifinished Products ................... 2.2 Miscellaneous Articles ................8.1, 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.7, 8.10, .........................................................................12.2, 13.1, 16 WA ML-18 - Production Equipment and Technology............ 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 11.1, 14.2, 14.3, 17.4, 18.1 *WA ML-19 - Directed Energy Weapons Systems (DEW) ....................................................... 4.2, 4.3, 14.1, 14.2, 17.2 WA ML-20 - Cryogenic & Superconductive Equipment .......................4.1 *WA ML-21 - Software .............................4.1, 8.1-8.7, 8.9, 8.10, 11.1, 15.1 *WA ML-22 - Development Production and Use Technology .............................. 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 11.1, 14.2, 14.3, 17.4, 18.1 Wakes........................................................................................................... 12.3 Warfare, Antisubmarine .................................................................................. 12 Warhead Defeat Devices ................................................................................... 2 Warheads........................................................................................................ 2.3 Warheads, Canister......................................................................................... 2.1 Warheads, High Explosives............................................................................... 2 Warheads, Kinetic Energy................................................................................. 2 Warheads, Projectile..................................................................................... 11.1 Warheads, Pyrotechnic ...................................................................................... 2 Warheads, Torpedo....................................................................................... 11.1 Water Jet Machines ...................................................................................... 10.5 Waterjets ...................................................................................................... 12.2 Wave, Solid State Microwave/Millimeter ...................................................... 5.1 Waves, Induced Shock .................................................................................... 18 Waves, Surface Acoustic................................................................................ 9.3 Weapon Effects, Advanced ............................................................................. 18 Weapon Effects, Penetrating ........................................................................... 18 Weapons, Anti-armor ..................................................................................... 2.2 Weapons, Antipersonal................................................................................... 2.2 Weapons Carriage Systems Design ................................................................ 1.1 Weapons, Directed Energy ........................................................................... 14.2 Weapons Effects.............................................................................................. 18
*
*WA
Certain MLs were recently renumbered by the Wassenaar Arrangement as follows: Former New Number ML 23 Directed Energy Weapons Systems ML 19 ML 24 Software ML 21 ML 25 Development Production and Use Technology ML 22 ML 26 Kinetic Energy Weapons Systems ML 12
C-14
Weapons, Kinetic Energy............................................................................. 14.2 Weapons, Laser-Guided ............................................................................... 15.7 Weapons, MOUT ........................................................................................... 2.2 Weapons, Nuclear ..................................................................................... 13, 18 Weapons, Penetrating...................................................................................... 18 Weapons, Penetrating, Effects of .................................................................... 18 Weapons Systems, Artillery ........................................................................... 2.6 Weapons, Undersea ......................................................................................... 12 Weaving ....................................................................................................... 10.1 Wideband Adaptive Polarizers ....................................................................... 9.2 Zero Failure (Total) Life-Cycle Reliability .................................................. 14.1
C-15
APPENDIX D EXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS
Table D-1.
Militarily Critical Technology Parameters
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY MILITARILY CRITICAL PARAMETERS MATERIALS
UNIQUE TEST, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION EQUIPMENT
UNIQUE SOFTWARE
AND PARAMETERS
TECHNOLOGY IS DEFINED -- SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND KNOW-HOW

NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR USE OF A PRODUCT.
By definition a militarily critical technology is: "Technology whose technical performance parameters are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems."
Critical Materials
These are unique Production, Testing & Inspection equipments which are critical
Unique software needed to
International
produce, operate or maintain this and National technology capability. export control references that address the technology.
associated with or unique. If these items were not this technology. available for some time it would be expected that the capability would degrade over time.
THIS INCLUDES THE HARDWARE AND

SOFTWARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT PURPOSE.
Example
MICROWAVE/MILLIMETER WAVE
TRANSISTORS
Frequency > 40 GHz
GaAs or other III/V or IWI materials
Automatic network analyzers, on-chip
Unique software needed to
WA IL Cat 3
testers, fabrication equipment, especially design the devices. for sub-micron geometries and large volume production. WA ML 11
MTCR 11
D-1
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Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies (WMD)
February 1998 ( Through Change 1: December 1999)

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Introduction Common Preface Common Master Locator Part II: Table of Contents Section 1 - Means of Delivery Technology Section 2 - Information Systems Technology Section 3 - Biological Weapons Technology Section 4 - Chemical Weapons Technology Section 5 - Nuclear Weapons Technology
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Section 6 - Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology Appendix B: Explanation of Table Elements Appendix C: Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix D: Definitions Appendix E: International Regimes Appendix F-1: Index Appendix F-2: Control List References
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INTRODUCTION TO MCTL PART II
INTRODUCTION TO MCTL PART II
A. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Before the demise of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons was considered in the context of superpower relations. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent events have had many consequences. Regional conflicts, once constrained, are now increasingly likely to result in the use of weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities to acquire key technologies and components have expanded through the dual stimuli of underutilized technical expertise and difficult economic circumstances. Simultaneously, development and availability of applicable technologies have expanded. Responsible states have endeavored to stem proliferation of WMD through international agreements and export controls. Such tools, while imperfect, remain the basis for increasingly comprehensive steps to address the broad WMD threat. United Nations inspectors in Iraq discovered that Saddam Hussein, in spite of international treaties, had efforts underway to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. North Korea developed the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons even though it was a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. South Africa produced six nuclear devices while under the constraints of an international trade embargo. The Aum Shinrikyo cult killed and injured people in Japan by placing containers of the nerve agent sarin in crowded Tokyo subway trains. The same group had a very capable laboratory including fermentors, dryers, and sizing equipment and had produced the biological pathogen anthrax. Concern about the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery has reached exceptional levels. On November 14, 1994, the President of the United States found that ...the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.... He declared a national emergency to deal with the threat. This executive order (12938) was extended on November 8, 1995; November 12, 1996; and again on November 12, 1997.
required for many employment options for WMD are also included. Emphasis is placed on a proliferant countrys ability to threaten the United States and its allies; however, subnational activities are also considered. Of greatest interest are technological capabilities sufficient to produce WMD of a given type and the ability to deliver them. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies can be used in many cases to obtain capability without extensive, development programs. Other technologies of concern are those that are built on the grid of existing technologies such as commercial networking of communications. The above criteria differ from those used in MCTL, Part I, Weapons Systems Technologies, where the performance levels of interest were those that ensure the superiority of U.S. military systems. In Part II WMD, operational technology capabilities are stressed without making any assumptions regarding an adversarys strategy or tactics, intentions, objectives, methods of employment, or target selection. Items of proliferation concern that are on export control lists as well as those that do not appear on export control lists are included to provide indicators of possible capabilities for WMD development and to inform U.S. export control decision makers. Foreign Technology Assessments are provided to assist in understanding the capabilities of selected foreign countries in WMD-related technologies. While every effort was made to prepare a comprehensive listing of technologies of proliferation concern, the absence of a technology should not be construed to mean that the technology could not make a contribution to proliferation.
C. OVERVIEW
This document identifies and discusses the technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Since the United States has forsworn the use of biological and chemical weapons, the underlying technologies include those usable by another country to develop an offensive capability and those needed to defend against their use. The parameters listed indicate those levels agreed to in the MCTL Technology Working Group process. They provide a description of technologies which are appropriate for possible actions by those assigned responsibility to constrain proliferation. The technologies treated in this volume differ greatly. The development of nuclear weapons generally requires significant infrastructure, including a large capital investment required for the production of special nuclear material. By contrast, pathogenic biological agents can be made in small commercial facilities which are difficult to
B. OBJECTIVE
This document identifies technologies and technology levels required for the development, integration, or employment of nuclear (including radiological), biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Technologies describing the effects of the employment of these weapons and technologies for information systems
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distinguish from legitimate pharmaceutical or related production activities. Technologies required to produce toxic chemicals are widely available, and much of the equipment is embedded in legitimate chemical industry. The infrastructure complexity and expense associated with different means of delivery vary widely. Proliferant states which have been prominent in world affairs have opted for extended investment in means of delivery, command and control, and their associated infrastructures. While not all proliferants follow such a path, there are very real reasons for doing so when the world is viewed through the eyes of the individual proliferants. Nuclear technologies receive wide publicity. Technical information is available in the public sector at an increasingly fine level of detail. Technologies for the production and operation of means of delivery are also well known. Examples of items include the widely distributed cruise missile systems and use of the U.S.-deployed Global Positioning System, which offers users precise time and location worldwide. Biotechnologies which can be applied to biological weaponry are predominantly dual use, growing rapidly and requiring relatively small amounts of capital investment. Heightened interest in the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery has been accompanied by a significant amount of misinformation. Factual and carefully considered technical information is needed to address constraints effectively through nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives. This report provides technical data on WMD. In addition, it distills, from a technological viewpoint, reality from the myths of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. It is helpful to retain an ongoing awareness that the problem is complex and the challenge is often driven by unique cultural considerations. WMD warfare involves a myriad of factors: types of weapons; delivery systems; conflict arena size and WMD launch-to-target distance; attack size, timing, tactics, frequency, and duration; military or political, counterforce or countervalue attack objectives; weapon stockpile sizes; and custody and release policies and procedures. In summary, development, integration, and employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery is grounded in a huge number of choices which will be driven overwhelmingly by the political aims, culture, and resources of the proliferator. Other drivers include economics, a trained workforce, and available technical knowledge. 1. Means of Delivery The Means of Delivery (MOD) treated here are exceptionally diverse. Included are manned and unmanned aerial vehicles of various levels of cost and sophistication. Artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems make up the ground-based elements of MOD. These last two are traditional weapons of war, widely available and relatively inexpensive. By contrast, intercontinental ballistic missiles are complex, difficult to develop, and very expensive to maintain in operational status. Of particular
interest in this section is the compatibility of the MOD with the actual payload. Physical parameters of speed, heat, shock, and delivery angle tend to drive the survivability, dispersion, and efficiency of chemical or biological payloads. In each MOD system, application of all of the technologies known to or used by the United States is not required. A proliferator has the latitude to select among often disparate, but equally satisfactory choices of means of delivery. MOD usually requires some information systems, however simple, to control assets and complete missions. 2. Information Systems Each proliferator will use information systems to some degree throughout processes appropriate to acquire and employ WMD. Technologies treated here are commonly found within the commercial information technologies available throughout the world. Selection of information systems suites is driven by the particular combination of weapons selected, cost of information systems, and culture of the individual proliferator. The impact in various kinds of employment is addressed in detail. 3. Biological Weapons Biological organisms are easier and less expensive to produce than special nuclear material or many chemical warfare agents. The required technology is widely available, with dual-use applications in the commercial fermentation and biotechnology industries. Because data on producing biological organisms is so widely available in open literature, it is difficult for industrialized nations to withhold relevant information from potential proliferants. Most equipment needed for large-scale production of biological warfare agents is also dual use and widely available in world markets. Biological agents must retain their potency during storage, delivery, and dissemination. When weaponized for missile, bomb, or cluster bomblet delivery, agents are weakened by the environmental stresses of heat, oxidation, and desiccation. While it is relatively difficult to develop munitions with predictable effects, it is less difficult to spread biological agents indiscriminately to cause large numbers of casualties. Standard biological agents for covert sabotage or attacks against broad-area targets are easy to produce and easy to disseminate using commercially available agricultural sprayers. Because biological agents reproduce, a small amount can multiply into a significant threat. When disseminated, they are slow acting; microbial pathogens require incubation periods of days to weeks between infection and the appearance of symptoms. Toxin agents are poisonous substances made from living systems or produced from synthetic analogs of naturally occurring poisons. They are covered under biological weapons technologies in this document even though they act as chemical agents.
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4.
Chemical Weapons
6.
Nuclear Weapons Effects
Technologies to produce chemical weapons are difficult to distinguish unambiguously from those used to manufacture commercial chemical compounds. Many technologies that benefit chemical weapon production are dual use and widely available. Legitimate commercial chemical facilities can produce chemical warfare agents. Multiple-purpose chemical plants which manufacture organo-phosphorous pesticides or flame retardants could be converted to produce nerve agents. Open literature and standard principles of chemical engineering enable proliferants to learn how to produce chemical weapons. Although some chemical agents, such as mustard gas, are simple to produce, others are produced by more complex processes involving corrosive or reactive material. More than 100 countries have the capability to produce simple chemical weapons such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and sulfur mustard. Somewhat fewer countries are able to produce nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun, and VX. Commercial equipment that could be used to produce chemical warfare agents is generally available. An operational capability to use chemical weapons involves design and development of effective munitions, filling them before use, and integrating them with a delivery system. Dispersion of chemical agents is hindered by atmospheric turbulence, which increases vertical dilution and thereby reduces casualties. Dispersion is also affected by air temperature and temperature gradient. 5. Nuclear Weapons The basic concepts of nuclear weapons are widely known. Nuclear bomb-related physics is available in unclassified publications, and experienced foreign nuclear designers could be hired to expedite a proliferant countrys nuclear weapon program, which requires a large, specialized, and costly scientific-industrial base. For most countries, the biggest obstacle to developing nuclear weapons is procuring plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Because production of these nuclear materials is the most difficult and costly part of a nuclear weapon program, leakage of weapon-grade material from nuclear-capable countries is a very serious concern. Despite wide availability of the basic design concepts, a proliferant country must have technical expertise to produce a single nuclear weapon. First-generation nuclear weapons developed by most proliferant countries would likely be designed for delivery by short-range ballistic missile (like a SCUD) or tactical aircraft. Highperformance computers would not be needed to design first-generation fission weapons. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that delivery accuracy would seldom be a problem. Nuclear weapon effects are blast, thermal, and radiation. Against human beings, blast and thermal effects are immediate; nuclear radiation effects can be immediate or delayed.
Nuclear weapons effects simulation and hardening technologies have been widely employed in the United States. Other nuclear states have employed these technologies to a lesser degree. Employment of simulation technology by a proliferator is an effective means of ensuring that the desired results will be achieved while avoiding the adverse public reaction to an actual nuclear test. Although these technologies are less widely understood than the technologies for WMD, they are included to provide key elements of insight into nuclear weapons phenomena. They are presented independently because they are a highly specialized set of technologies which have been the subject of significant research and development.
D. ORGANIZATION OF PART II
Weapons of Mass Destruction include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; means of delivery; information systems that enable a proliferant to command, control, and manage resources required for a WMD program; and certain nuclear weapons effects technologies that provide insight into nuclear weapons, their applications, and constructing defenses appropriate to these effects. Each of the six sections contains the following parts: Scope identifies the technology groups covered in the section; each group is covered by a separate subsection. Background provides historical perspective and/or complementary information about the sections technologies. Overview discusses the technology groups identified under Scope. Rationale indicates why the technology groups are important. Foreign Technology Assessment (FTA), with accompanying figure, provides summary estimates of foreign capabilities; these estimates are expert judgment by the TWGs and are discussed in Section E below. There is a subsection for each technology group identified under scope. Each subsection contains these parts: Overview identifies and discusses technologies listed in tables that follow. Rationale indicates why listed technologies are important to proliferators. Foreign Technology Assessment (FTA) provides comments on a more detailed technology level than in the section FTA above. Tables, which are the heart of the MCTL, present data elements related to the development, production, or employment of WMD. The principal data element is Sufficient Technology Level, which is the level of technology required for a proliferant to produce entry-level WMD, delivery systems, or other hardware, and software that are useful in WMD development,
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integration, or use. The Export Control Reference column provides general reference to assist in identifying potential national and international control guidelines. This column is provided for general reference and should not be construed as a definitive determination of U.S. export control policy for these technologies. Jurisdictional determination of a specific technology and/ or commodity must be made in accordance with the procedures in the ITAR and EAR. (Note: For a brief description, see Appendix F, International Regimes.) The following references are used: USML: United States Munitions List CCL*: Commerce Control List NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission WA: Wassenaar Arrangement Cat: category designationCCL and WA Dual Use list ML: Munitions List NTL: Nuclear Trigger List (Nuclear Suppliers Group) NDUL: Nuclear Dual Use List (Nuclear Suppliers Group) MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime AG List: Australia Group List BWC: Biological Weapons Convention CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention Other data are defined in Appendix B, Explanation of Table Elements.
E. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The MCTL includes estimates, called Foreign Technology Assessments (FTA), of foreign capabilities in each of the MCTL technology areas. These FTA estimates are
the scientific and technological consensus of the TWG members from industry, government, and academia. Collaboration with the Intelligence Community is an essential part of the FTA determination, and selected members of the Intelligence Community are TWG members who participate regularly in the MCTL process. These MCTL FTAs are foreign capability assessments and do not constitute findings of foreign availability, which are the responsibility of the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act. Tables containing summaries of general foreign capabilities appear in each of the six MCTL Part II sections. The technological capability level is represented by diamond icons. indicates capability in the technology area that exceeds the sufficient level. It does not mean that the country has capability in all of the technologies associated with that technology area. It implies a range of technologies, e.g., for ICBM indicates that the technological capability of a country exceeds the sufficient level of technology to develop an ICBM; it does not necessarily mean that the country has the technological sophistication of the United States in ICBMs. In a corresponding manner, indicates sufficient technology capability; shows some technological sophistication but less than a sufficient level; and means limited capability. (Note: This is NOT the same as MCTL Part I, where the number of blocks was related to technologies listed in the accompanying tables at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems.) If two or more countries have the same number of diamonds, it does not necessarily mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The diamonds indicate indigenous capability to produce or the ability to legally acquire and use those technologies. A country could obtain key items surreptitiously or through illegal acquisition, catapulting the possessed WMD capability past the lower levels of expected evolutionary development.
CCL EAR 99: Items that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that are not elsewhere specified in any CCL category are designated by EAR 99.
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CONTENTS
Figures ................................................................................................................. II-vii Tables .................................................................................................................... II-ix INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. II-1 SECTION 1MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY ............................... II-1-1 1.1Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) ............................................................ II-1-6 1.2Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ............................................ II-1-21 1.3Cruise Missiles ........................................................................................ II-1-34 1.4Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft ................................................................... II-1-46 1.5Artillery ................................................................................................... II-1-58 SECTION 2INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY ......................... II-2-1 2.1Information Communications .................................................................... II-2-5 2.2Information Exchange ............................................................................. II-2-10 2.3Information Processing ............................................................................ II-2-15 2.4Information Security ................................................................................ II-2-21 2.5Information System Management and Control ....................................... II-2-25 2.6Information Systems Facilities ................................................................ II-2-31 SECTION 3BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ........................... II-3-1 3.1Biological Material Production ................................................................. II-3-9 3.2Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion .......................................... II-3-15 3.3Detection, Warning, and Identification .................................................... II-3-19 3.4Biological Defense Systems .................................................................... II-3-23 SECTION 4CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ............................... II-4-1 4.1Chemical Material Production ................................................................... II-4-8 4.2Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ................................... II-4-22 4.3Detection, Warning, and Identification .................................................... II-4-27 4.4Chemical Defense Systems ..................................................................... II-4-34 SECTION 5NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ................................. II-5-1 5.1Enrichment Feedstocks Production ......................................................... II-5-10 5.2Uranium Enrichment Processes ............................................................... II-5-13 5.3Nuclear Fission Reactors ......................................................................... II-5-42 5.4Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) ...................................................... II-5-48 5.5Lithium Production .................................................................................. II-5-54 5.6Nuclear Weapons Design and Development ........................................... II-5-58 5.7Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ......................................................... II-5-67 5.8Radiological Weapons ............................................................................. II-5-75 5.9Manufacturing of Nuclear Components .................................................. II-5-79 5.10Nuclear Weapons Development Testing ................................................ II-5-91 5.11Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ............................. II-5-109 5.12Heavy Water Production ...................................................................... II-5-112 5.13Tritium Production .............................................................................. II-5-117 SECTION 6NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY ............... II-6-1 6.1Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing ........................................ II-6-5 6.2Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations ................................ II-6-11 6.3Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects ......................................................... II-6-16 6.4Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and SystemsGenerated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects .............................. II-6-22 6.5Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation ........................ II-6-26 6.6High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects ........................... II-6-28 6.7Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Effects ........................ II-6-31 6.8Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation ............................... II-6-33 APPENDIX ADoD MCTL MASTER LOCATOR ....................................... II-A-1 APPENDIX BEXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS .......................... II-B-1 APPENDIX CGLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ... II-C-1 APPENDIX DDEFINITIONS ....................................................................... II-D-1 APPENDIX EINTERNATIONAL REGIMES ............................................. II-E-1 APPENDIX F-1INDEX ............................................................................. II-F-1-1 APPENDIX F-2CONTROL LIST REFERENCES ................................... II-F-2-1
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FIGURES
1.0-1. Means of Delivery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ............ II-1-5 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .............................................................................................. II-1-10 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .............................................................................................. II-1-26 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ............... II-1-38 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .............................................................................................. II-1-50 1.5-1. Artillery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .......................... II-1-62 2.0-1. Information Systems .............................................................................. II-2-2 2.0-2. Information Systems Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ......... II-2-4 2.2-1. Routing and Switching Systems .......................................................... II-2-10 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control .................................. II-2-27 3.0-1. Progress in Applicable Biotechnologies ................................................ II-3-4 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents ........................................................ II-3-5 3.0-3. 4.0-1. 4.0-2. 4.1-1. 4.1-2. 4.2-1. 4.3-1. 4.3-2. 4.4-1. 5.0-1. 5.0-2. 6.0-1. Biological Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .......... II-3-8 Relative Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies ................. II-4-6 Chemical Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .......... II-4-7 Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals.................... II-4-12 Australia Group Chemicals .................................................................. II-4-14 MC-1 Gas Bomb .................................................................................. II-4-22 Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) ......................................................... II-4-27 RSCAAL .............................................................................................. II-4-28 Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) ........ II-4-35 Nuclear History ...................................................................................... II-5-5 Nuclear Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary .............. II-5-9 Nuclear Weapons Effects Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ................................................................................................ II-6-4 6.8-1. Simulation of Nuclear Effects Using Pulsed-Power Radiation Sources ................................................................................................. II-6-33
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II-viii
TABLES
1.1-1. 1.1-2 1.2-1. 1.2-2. 1.3.1. 1.3.2. 1.4.1. 1.4.2. 1.5.1. 1.5.2. 2.1-1. 2.1-2. 2.2-1. 2.2-2. 2.3-1. 2.3-2. 2.4-1. 2.4-2. 2.5-1. 2.5-2. 2.6-1. 2.6-2. 3.1-1. 3.1-2. 3.2-1. 3.2-2. 3.3-1. 3.3-2. 3.4-1. 3.4-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters .............................. II-1-11 Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data ........................................... II-1-17 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters ................. II-1-27 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data .............................. II-1-31 Cruise Missile Technology Parameters ................................................ II-1-39 Cruise Missiles Reference Data ........................................................... II-1-43 Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters ......................... II-1-51 Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data ..................................... II-1-55 Artillery Technology Parameters ......................................................... II-1-63 Artillery Reference Data ...................................................................... II-1-64 Information Communications Technology Parameters .......................... II-2-8 Information Communications Reference Data ...................................... II-2-9 Information Exchange Technology Parameters ................................... II-2-13 Information Exchange Reference Data ................................................ II-2-14 Information Processing Technology Parameters .................................. II-2-17 Information Processing Reference Data .............................................. II-2-20 Information Security Technology Parameters ...................................... II-2-23 Information Security Reference Data .................................................. II-2-24 Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-2-28 Information Systems Management and Control Reference Data ........ II-2-30 Information Systems Facilities Technology Parameters ...................... II-2-33 Information Systems Facilities Reference Data ................................... II-2-34 Biological Material Production Technology Parameters ..................... II-3-11 Biological Material Production Reference Data .................................. II-3-13 Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-3-17 Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Reference Data ............ II-3-18 Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters ......... II-3-20 Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data ...................... II-3-22 Biological Defense Systems Technology Parameters .......................... II-3-25 Biological Defense Systems Reference Data ....................................... II-3-26 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters....................... II-4-15 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data ................................... II-4-19 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-4-24 4.2-2. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Reference Data .... II-4-26 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters ......... II-4-29 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data ...................... II-4-32 4.4-1. Chemical Defense Systems Technology Parameters ........................... II-4-36 4.4-2. Chemical Defense Systems Reference Data ........................................ II-4-37 5.1-1. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Technology Parameters ............... II-5-11 5.1-2. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Reference Data ............................ II-5-12 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters..................... II-5-20 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data ................................. II-5-35 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters ............................... II-5-45 5.3-2. Nuclear Fission Reactors Reference Data ............................................ II-5-47 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters ........... II-5-51 5.4-2. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Reference Data ........................ II-5-53 5.5-1. Lithium Production Technology Parameters........................................ II-5-56 5.5-2. Lithium Production Reference Data .................................................... II-5-57 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-5-62 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data ............. II-5-65 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters ............... II-5-70 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data ........................... II-5-73 5.8-1. Radiological Weapons Technology Parameters ................................... II-5-77 5.8-2. Radiological Weapons Reference Data ................................................ II-5-78 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters ........ II-5-82 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data ..................... II-5-87 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters ........ II-5-95 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data .................. II-5-103 5.11-1. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Parameters .......................................................................................... II-5-110
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5.11-2. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Reference Data ................................................................................... II-5-111 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters .............................. II-5-114 5.12-2. Heavy Water Production Reference Data .......................................... II-5-116 5.13-1. Tritium Production Technology Parameters ...................................... II-5-118 5.13-2. Tritium Production Reference Data ................................................... II-5-118 6.1-1. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Technology Parameters .............................................................................................. II-6-7 6.1-2. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Reference Data .......... II-6-9 6.2-1. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-6-13 6.2-2. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Reference Data ... II-6-15 6.3-1. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Technology Parameters ............... II-6-18 6.3-2. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Reference Data ............................ II-6-20 6.4-1. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and SystemsGenerated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-6-24
6.4-2. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and SystemsGenerated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Reference Data ...................................................................................................... II-6-25 6.5-1. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Technology Parameters ........................................................................ II-6-27 6.5-2. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Reference Data ..................................................................................... II-6-27 6.6-1. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Technology Parameters ........................................................................ II-6-30 6.6-2. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Reference Data ..................................................................................... II-6-30 6.7-1. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-6-32 6.7-2. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Reference Data ...... II-6-32 6.8-1. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-6-35 6.8-2. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Reference Data ...................................................................................................... II-6-36
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SECTION II INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
SECTION 2INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Scope Information Communications ..................................................... II-2-5 Information Exchange ................................................................ II-2-10 Information Processing ............................................................... II-2-15 Information Security ................................................................... II-2-21 Information System Management and Control .......................... II-2-25 Information Systems Facilities ................................................... II-2-31
Highlights
Information Systems capabilities, built on the grid of existing military and commercial technologies, enable most WMD operations Large damage envelopes of WMD minimize precision weapon guidance, delivery, and information systems dependencies. Information Systems (in some form) can be anticipated to be used by most proliferators.
BACKGROUND There are many different definitions for Information Systems (IS). The following definition is used for Part II: People, technologies, and machines used to capture or generate, collect, record, store, retrieve, process, display and transfer or communicate information to multiple users at appropriate levels of an organization to accomplish a specified set of functions. This definition suggests the wide range of technologies incorporated in different Information Systems. Since Information Systems are likely to be used in most WMD weapons systems, this separate IS section promotes a more consistent, thorough, and effective assessment. These assessments emphasize countries, other than the United States, which might be adversaries. Consideration is also given to coalition arrangements for both adversaries and allies. Enabling IS capabilities relevant to subnational activities are treated insofar as those activities might target nations or nation-states. Subsets of Information Systems are commonly referred to as Functional Areas. A large information system may have as many as seven functional areas. IS requirements are normally allocated to functional areas (or system segments). For instance, functional area specifications allow system architects to select the best hardware or software implementation solutions available at the time of fabrication and production. Specifications written in terms of bandwidth, signal quality, reliability, availability, and other generic performance parameters leave designers free to make optimum selections. In the media area, for example, metallic or fiber-optic cable or satellite or terrestrial radio can be selected depending on the speeds and accuracies specified as requirements. Assessing technologies in terms of IS functional area capabilities, as opposed to specific hardware/software composition, minimizes the requirement for revised MCTL assessments as new products or devices are introduced or older ones withdrawn. For example, a new WMD weapon delivery or damage assessment requirement might be discovered for real-time video observation of battlefield or target areas at a remote command center. If no prior real-time video requirement existed in a proliferants information systems, then in all likelihood channel bandwidth or bit-rate revisions to the Information Communications functional area capability parameters would be necessary. A real-time observation capability would mean that there is possession of or access to guided or unguided (terrestrial or satellite, radio or optical transmission through the atmosphere or outer space) media technology, with the ability to support video traffic. Figure 2.0-1 illustrates the extensive scope of what qualifies as an information system and shows the seven traditional functional areas: (1) Information Processing, (2) Information Security, (3) Information Exchange, (4) Information Communications, (5) Information Management and Control, (6) Information Systems Facilities, and (7) Information Systems Sensors. The information system examples in Figure 2.0-1 include large, complex entities such as enterprise management information systems (MIS), telecommunications systems, and even the worldwide Internet. The list could be extended to include numerous smaller systems such as those based on personal computers.
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS
EXAMPLE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS INTERNET TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
FUNCTIONAL AREAS MARKET APPLICATIONS
MIS SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL AREAS

INFORMATION INFORMATION PROCESSING SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION EXCHANGE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES INFORMATION SYSTEMS SENSORS
MILITARY
NON-MILITARY GOVERNMENT
COMMERCIAL
BASIC TECHNOLOGIES, TECHNIQUES, DEVICES, AND MATERIALS
Figure 2.0-1. Information Systems
OVERVIEW This section identifies IS technologies that have potential utility in implementing and enabling critical WMD operations. Of special interest in this section are Information Systems built on the grid of existing technologies, including those of World War II vintage, as opposed to those depending on development that requires an extensive industrial base. In particular, this section focuses on the minimum set of technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of WMD and their means of delivery. This is in contrast with Part I of the MCTL, in which performance levels ensuring superiority of U.S. military systems were provided. In Part II, the innovative use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, perhaps in combination with advanced and older military IS technologies, dominates the assessments. In this COTS category are systems that are procured for civilian purposes, which are rapidly re-programmable for military operations. Modern, fiberoptic-based, software-defined telecommunications networks are a prime example. Properly designed, they provide multimedia voice and data service to the general population and can also constitute a highly survivable backbone for equipment that is optimized for military operations. IS functional areas for WMD capabilities often overlap those cited in MCTL Part I, Section 8. They differ principally in that performance levels ensuring superiority of U.S. systems are not imposed. However, MCTL Part I provides complementary technical assessment information.
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RATIONALE Recent experience demonstrates the value of both military and commercial IS techniques. Unlike the past when DoD, NASA, and other USG agencies dominated and sponsored frontier developments, the vast majority of technologies supporting todays information systems are driven by civil requirements. Increasingly, the government is specifying off-the-shelf mainstream commercial open-systems, standards-based technologies as the method of choice for avoiding obsolescence in a fastchanging technology environment. Overall, strategic and tactical military use of information systems encompasses a range of applications from wide-area switched networks serving an entire theater of operations (often countrywide with global interties), to local processing and communications systems including transportable and personal hand-held devices, to IS systems embedded in smart weapons and sensors. Proliferator possession of critical technologies supporting such a diversity of applications can have decisive significance. In areas of direct combat support, information systems sustain the performance advantages of management, command and control, surveillance, and guidance and control systems for weapons of mass destruction. It should be noted that most of the technology capabilities cited are those that could be of interest to proliferant countries with large numbers of weapons and relatively capable delivery systems. Countries with fewer resources may employ their weapons with minimal IS support. In fact, one reason why WMD are appealing to even subnational groups is that their large damage envelopes and lethal radii reduce the need for precision weapon delivery and other IS dependencies. In many cases, U.S. military countermeasure capabilities and techniques may be ineffective when used against commercial IS systems. For example, it may be extremely difficult or impractical to successfully electronically jam large metropolitan area cellular communications systems or all commercial satellite systems that an adversary may have at its disposal.
The tables in this section that identify technologies should be interpreted in the following manner. Proliferants with only a small number of WMD and no intention or capability of sustaining a long-term WMD attack may not be strongly dependent upon the availability of any supporting IS technology. When IS technology is required or helps facilitate WMD, under the column titled Sufficient Technology Level, the statement depicts technology items that meet most requirements identified during analysis of the wide range of WMD scenarios considered in this document. For COTS technology items, the statements generally indicate that commercial-application performance requirements for capacity, service, quality, availability, etc., generally exceed those encountered in WMD application scenarios. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 2.0-2) The United States currently leads in system engineering and integration of complex information systems, closely followed by the UK, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan. Underlying technologies for Information Systems and wide-area integration of such systems are driven largely by commercial requirements. A significant number of countries have developed capabilities equivalent to those of the United States in network switching and transmission. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities (see Sections 5 and 10 in MCTL Part I). While the United States continues to be the only country with critical capabilities in all IS technology Functional Areas (FAs), equivalent capabilities are found in one or more other countries in every FA. The growing multi-nationalization of information systems developments has increased the worldwide availability of advanced IS technologies. U.S. technology leadership in communications and computer systems has declined in recent years relative to Europe and Japan.
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Country
Sec 2.1 Information Communications
Sec 2.2 Information Exchange
Sec 2.3 Information Processing
Sec 2.4 Information Security
Australia Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan United Kingdom United States Vietnam Subnationals
Sec 2.5 Information Systems Management and Control
Sec 2.6 Information Systems Facilities

limited
sufficient level
some
Figure 2.0-2. Information Systems Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 2.1INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS

OVERVIEW The Information Communications Functional Area (FA) as generally defined includes transmission facilities, that is, the medium (free space, the atmosphere, copper or fiber-optic cable) and electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium. In this context, equipment amplifies (analog systems) or regenerates (digital systems) signals and provides termination functions at points where transmission facilities connect to switching or multiplexing systems. Multiplexers combine many separate sources of traffic into a single signal to enhance transmission efficiency. In modern designs, transmission termination, switching, multiplexing, and other functions may be integrated in a single piece of equipment and, in combination, play a major role in defining network capacity and latency, communication services, grade of service, maintenance, reliability, availability, and survivability. This section addresses a wide range of equipment used in local and long-distance communications. Included in the nonintegrated types are simple repeater/amplifiers, channel service units (CSUs), and data service units (DSUs). CSU/DSUs are termination equipment required to connect customer premises equipment (CPE) to telecommunications networks and typically provide transmit and control logic, synchronization, and timing recovery across data circuits. Other examples include satellite, terrestrial microwave, and cable transmit and receive terminals (transceivers), which, in most instances, include multichannel capabilities. Modern, fourth-generation and beyond switches and digital cross-connect systems (DCSs) incorporate switching, multiplexing and line-termination functions. In the case of public cellular or specialized mobile radio (SMR) equipment, Information Communications FA capabilities are combined with traditional applicationlevel functions such as call set-up and take-down dialing, signaling, etc.; advanced features like caller identification; and acoustic and other human interface capabilities. Thus, it is apparent that basic requirements for communicating information between two nodes can be accomplished through the use of a wide variety of COTS products, each with greater or lesser abilities to support WMD operations. Moreover, whether implemented in modern integrated or prior-generation products, Information Communications Functional Area capabilities are critical for WMD missions of any significant complexity or duration. RATIONALE Information Communications Functional Area capabilities, including beyond lineof-sight (BLOS) and secure communications, can be important to WMD operational missions and objectives.
Highlights
Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight communications are essential for: Remote reconnaissance and damage assessment, Aerial strikes launched from one country on targets in an adversary country, and Battlefield command and control within large tactical arenas. In mixed WMD and conventional conflicts survivable communications are critical to sustaining chemical or biological offensives.
Requirements for BLOS communications arise in both strategic and tactical battlefield WMD warfare. For missile and manned or unmanned aircraft attacks, where the distance between launch points and target designated ground zeros (DGZs) exceeds point-to-point line of sight, there is a need for some form of long-distance communications. Operational situations in which this occurs include aerial strikes launched from one country to targets in another country. Typical targets might be civilian shipping and transportation ports, industrial centers, military command centers, supply depots, and actual battlefield areas. For example, during an ongoing conflict, an aggressor might attempt to create a plague port to inhibit an adversarys ability to receive supplies or disembark allied or peacekeeping forces. BLOS communications are needed to relay information generated by sensors or individuals in the vicinity of the DGZ back to the strike-force headquarters. Such information may include force status reports; micro-meteorological, indications, and other intelligence data; situation reports; and, damage assessment reports. In the near term, voice or low-rate data communications capabilities from ground-based individuals or manned or unmanned airborne reconnaissance platforms may suffice. In the future, a sophisticated adversary may have a requirement for BLOS communications to relay data from disposable, possibly air-dropped, wide-area, array sensors systems.
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Long-distance communications are implemented using terrestrial or satellite relays, long-wave (below 3 MHz) radio transmission, or a combination of these media. Military long-distance systems can be based on either dedicated facilities or shared facilities obtained from public or other common-user networks. Increasingly, modern facilities of either dedicated or shared design, are able to provide integrated voice, data, facsimile, imagery, and video. At the low-cost end, single-channel long-distance connections can be made today with standard cellular telephones, interconnected to local and long-distance switched networks. In the near future, mobile service from one or more of the following satellite systemsIridium, Teledesic, Global Star, Odyssey, and Inmarsatwill become available. Tables 2.1-1 and 2.1-2 illustrate pertinent long-distance communications transmission capabilities. As an example, in the Gulf War, Iraq was unable to sustain its air defense capability after the United States destroyed its air defense communications network. This resulted from direct attacks on communications facilities with conventional, albeit smart weapons. WMD conflicts that escalate to nuclear levels impose the possibility of additional nuclear effects communications degradation and destruction. One advantage of chemical or biological warfare is that it does not necessarily threaten physical facilities and infrastructure plants. When employed in combination with conventional or nuclear warfare, many realistic scenarios arise in which the ability to sustain any offensive depends critically on survivable communications, which often come under physical attack in mixed conflicts. Under these conditions, homecountry communications among various command centers and depots are required to direct long-term WMD assembly and transport to battlefield and/or launch points. In-country telecommunications systems with extraordinary availability and survivability can be implemented using emerging commercial fiber and Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)-based telecommunications technologies. In the United States and elsewhere, these systems are built to Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) standards, equal, though not identical, to International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standards. As noted above, these systems are expected to be procured for civil use. But, with appropriate Information Exchange switching, multiplexing and digital cross-connect facilities (see Section 2.2), and Information System Management and Control capabilities (see Section 2.5), they can (1) be easily used for military applications and (2) achieve acceptable survivability and robustness in the face of physical attack. The reason for the extraordinary programmability and survivability of modern commercial telecommunications is twofold. First, the flagship and most profitable telephone carrier offerings today are their Software Defined Network (SDN) offerings. SDN allows carriers to offer large customers, who in the past may have opted for private, dedicated facilities-based networks, the option of equivalent virtual private networks using shared public network facilities.
These networks not only offer large industry or military customers service indistinguishable from dedicated facilities-based private networks, but deliver those services at lower cost. Moreover, SDNs greatly augment capabilities to modify, optimize, and customize carrier services, in accordance with changing requirements. Modern commercial telecommunications networks exhibit unparalleled survivability because the market demands it. One of the major U.S. carriers supports the equivalent of 300,000 Washington-to-New York voice circuits. Loss of that connection translates into revenue losses of $30,000 or more per minute. The advent of highcapacity fiber transmission makes it possible to carry an enormous number of voice conversations over a single fiber. Yet that funnel factor means that to ensure profitability and network availability, one must not concentrate that much traffic without extensive back-up or redundant connections. Fortunately, SDH/SONET standards addressed this problem from the outset. With automated Management and Control and appropriate switching and multiplexing facilities, SDH/SONET networks can be designed to tolerate massive switch and cable-cut failures. In many instances, service restoration can be virtually automaticaccomplished in 15 millisecondsa time span short enough to prevent disconnect of existing calls. For example, dual homing and two or four fiber-based bi-directional line-switched ring (BLSR) diversity among switching/multiplexing hubs, along with designed-in capabilities (like embedded SDH/SONET protection routing and automated performance monitoring and diagnostic management functions), yield survivability features that older dedicated military systems with precedence, priority, preemption, and even dynamic non-hierarchical routing (DNHR) cannot approach. The explanation for this is that these older techniques basically preserved or restored service on a call-by-call basis. On the other hand, one company has announced its U.S. network plan for 38 interlocking rings, with 16 nodes per ring, that will enable hundreds of thousands of equivalent voice circuits to be restored, almost instantaneously. Since SDH/SONET systems can accommodate the worlds largest common-user network traffic loads, bandwidth or channel capacity requirements encountered in WMD or conventional warfare scenarios can be met without resorting to state-of-the-art switching speeds or ultra-broadband transmission systems. Satellite-based services offer commercial communications exhibiting significant availability and survivability. One class of service that provides virtually undeniable service is mobile communications via hundreds of satellites through Iridium, Teledesic, and the other systems mentioned earlier. Another class of satellite service supports very small aperture terminals (VSATs) which employ small suitcase-packaged antennas 1.5 to 6 feet in diameter. Finally, high-capacity, multichannel trunk satellite service can be supported with larger but still transportable earth terminals.
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Not only is it difficult to electronically jam or physically disable the large numbers of satellites providing such services, but to do so may interrupt service to thousands of worldwide users, whether or not they are involved in a conflict. For practical purposes, satellite-based communications exhibit dual, BLOS and equivalent highsurvivability capabilities. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The first column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the Information Communications Functional Area by country and for subnational groups. All of the developed Western nations in the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States, and the UK), except recently joined Russia, plus the Scandinavian countries, Israel, and Taiwan, have capabilities in all elements of the Information Communications Functional Area, including transmission facilities and required electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium, in their installed base. Of the G8, only Russia has considerable development ahead before she becomes comparable to the other members. However, like China, this comparatively late development may be an advantage to Russia because she is not burdened with a large installed base of outmoded analog equipment and bandwidth-
limited non-fiber-optic transmission. Therefore, Russia, China, and other lesser developed countries can more readily expand their capabilities with modern equipment, avoiding performance penalties involved with hybrid facilities. The China assessment may be low since one indicator of Chinas Information Communications Functional Area capabilities is that the United States alone takes up 40 percent of Chinas exports. Part of this 40 percent, in which Chinas trade surplus with the United States is greatest, is telecommunications equipment, and China manufactures its own fiber-optic cable. Most of the other countries with lesser developed telecommunications (Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Vietnam) have lower Information Communications Functional Area capabilities, which tend to be concentrated around the larger population centers; however, these deficiencies could be corrected in a comparatively short period of time with supplemental satellite systems. For example, Irans telecommunications installed base is limited to Tehran and its surrounding area. An exception to this generality is Iraq. Iraqs baseline telecommunications capabilities are much less concentrated on the population centers and are more country-wide. See subsection 8.11 in Part I of the 1996 MCTL.
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Table 2.1-1. Information Communications Technology Parameters

Technology
Very-small-aperture terminals (VSATs)
Transport service provided via commercial satellites or via proliferant-owned satellite. Bandwidth sufficient to transmit imagery to mobile stations. Long range, highly available. Interference resistant, but limited bandwidth may not support all required traffic types and volume for advanced employment Beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS), greater than 100 m wavelength (below 3 MHz)
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
Public cellular, local and long-distance exchange, or specialized mobile radio service. Long wavelength radio communications
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Capabilities beyond normal commercial practice.
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None identified
Empirically validated code for predicting propagation characteristics of BLOS radio and advanced data encryption for compression of algorithms for rapid transfer of data. Capabilities beyond normal commercial practice.
Public mobile service via multi-satellite systems, e.g., Iridium and Teledesic, Inmarsat, Odyssey, and Global Star. Fiber-optic cable installations (See Sections 2.2, 2.5)
Limited bandwidth may not support all required traffic types and volume for advanced employment
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Configured to support 2- or 4-wire-based Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)/ SONET enhanced survivability requirements
WA Cat. 5E, P1; None Identified CCL Cat. 5E, P1
Specially designed, commercially available fiber-optic cable test equipment.
None Identified
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Table 2.1-2. Information Communications Reference Data

Very small aperture terminals (VSATs)
Mobile, COTS, mass-produced, low Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight cost ( ~ $25K). Transport service (BLOS) communications between provided via commercial or proliferant- target vicinities and C2I headquarters. owned satellite. Satellites subject to jamming and physical attack, but commercial impact may deter attack except under extreme situations. Vulnerability of management and switching centers. Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications between target vicinities and C2I headquarters.
Transport service via proliferantowned satellite; public cellular, local exchange (LEC) and Interexchange (IXC) carriers; public mobile multi-satellite communications, BLOS radio. VSATs with transport service via commercial or proliferant-owned satellites; public mobile multisatellite communications; BLOS radio. Public cellular, LECs and IXCs; public mobile multisatellite communications; VSATs via commercial or proliferant-owned satellites. Public cellular; LECs and IXCs; VSATs via commercial or proliferant-owned satellites; BLOS radio. Metallic or other local and longdistance transmission media.
Public cellular, local and longdistance exchange, or specialized mobile radio service.
Long-wavelength radio communications
Susceptible to jamming and radiometric transmitter position location; limited bandwidth.
Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications between target vicinities and C2I headquarters.
Public mobile service via multisatellite systems, e.g., Iridium and Teledesic, Inmarsat, Odyssey and Global Star Fiber-optic cable installations (See Sections 2.2, 2.5)
Service not yet available; multiplicity of satellites decreases vulnerability. Limited mobile channel bandwidth may not support all required traffic and volume types. SDH/SONET enhanced survivability designs needed to achieve needed availability levels.
Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications between target vicinities and C2I headquarters.
Local and long-distance communications for in-country communications.
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SECTION 2.2INFORMATION EXCHANGE
OVERVIEW Information Exchange (IX) is an IS functional area to which switching and multiplexing are usually assigned. As illustrated in Figure 2.2-1, all forms of circuit, packet, and SDH/SONET transport network-based line and path routing and switching are implied. In circuit switching, the IX functional area encompasses call-by-call [e.g., central office (CO) telephone exchange] as well as channel switching. In the past, channel switching was implemented manually at technical control centers. In the United States, by the late 1980s, digital cross-connect systems (DCS) began to be installed in 24-channel (T1, or more properly, DS-1) group-based Asynchronous Digital Transmission Systems (ADTS). Some DCS equipment provides not only channel switching at DS-1 rates (1.544 MBps), but also (1) add and drop multiplexing without breaking out each 64 Kbps DS-0 channel, and (2) supergroup (DS-n) channel switching. Moreover, it achieves these functions in compact, programmable equipment. Much of this vintage equipment is still in operation.
SWITCHING
Highlights
Circuit switching, packet switching, and multiplexing are Information Exchange Functional Area capabilities generally available and installed worldwide, and require constituent elements in all but stand-alone, desktop information systems. Stored program control central office and digital cross connect switching are key to Software Defined Networks that can be used for survivable communications capabilities supporting WMD operations. Transportable and dual (Central Office and tandem) function switches further enhance network survivability. Fast packet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode-based switching and multiplexing support voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video requirements.
PACKET CONVENTIONAL e.g., X.25 Port Sharing Variable bandwidth FAST PACKET CELL RELAY Fixed-size cells CALLBYCALL
CIRCUIT Dedicated circuits Fixed bandwidth CHANNEL Networking T1 multiplexers Digital crossconnects (DCS)
CO switches Tandem switches Dual function switches PBXs Key/Hybrid
FRAME RELAY Variable length frames
SDH/SONET TRANSPORT Line Switching Path Switching
Figure 2.2-1. Routing and Switching Systems
Today, ADTS DCS equipment is being replaced by SDH, International Telecommunications Union (ITU) G-Series or SONET-compliant synchronous byte interleave multiplexer equipment. SDH/SONET-based DCS equipment exhibit all basic asynchronous DCS features. Beyond basic features, SDH/SONET DCSs capitalize on all of the considerable advantages of synchronous transmission and multiplexing. Among these advantages is the ability to support synchronous payload envelopes (SPEs) that extend add and drop capabilities across all SDH multiplexing hierarchy levels. In addition, to enhance survivability and availability, SDH/SONET-based bi-directional line-switched rings (BLSRs) provide reusable bandwidth for more efficient inter-node transport in evenly meshed networks. A meshed network means traffic is more or less evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations. Half the available bandwidth in a BLSR is allocated as a working rate evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations, and the other half is reserved for protection routing. Thus, in an optical
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carrier, OC-48,1 application, working traffic is placed in the first 24 STS2-1 time-slots, with time-slots 25 through 48 serving as the protection facility. In conjunction with ITU Telecommunications Management Network (TMN)-based management functions, this can result in unparalleled recovery from transmission failures, whether failures occur naturally or from intended or collateral enemy attack damage. Network designs using early versions of these techniques have dramatically improved restoration from man-made or natural outages. For example, in 1991 it typically took 120 minutes after a failure to restore 35 DS3 circuits (about 24,000 equivalent DSO (or voice circuits). On July 30, 1996, more than 200,000 circuits were taken out of service when a water department crew bored into a fiber-optic cable in North Carolina. In this case, 92.8 percent of the service was restored in three minutes, nearly 10 times the number of circuits in 3 percent of the time. See Section 2.5 for a discussion of automated Information Systems Management and Control Functional Area technologies that can lead to this kind of performance in networks used to support WMD missions. What makes performance improvements of this magnitude possible is not just programmable switching, multiplexing, and computer-based network control technologies, but the fact that with broadband fiber optic cable and capacity-extending wavelength division multiplexing, for availability and survivability purposes, designers can virtually assume that spare or reserve capacity is free. That is, in large commercial or public networks, the 50-percent BLSR call fill-rate has no appreciable negative cost or revenue impact. Another technology category included in the Information Exchange Functional Area is the wide variety of equipment generally described under the rubric of packet switching. As Figure 2.2-1 shows, packet switching encompasses conventional and fast packet realizations in both frame and cell relay appearances. Although it is generally appreciated that modern telecommunications systems are increasingly able to integrate voice, data, video, and other services, as noted earlier an even more systemic form of integration is occurring: that is, the integration of switching and multiplexing within single equipment envelopes. This development trend is a logical one: early digital circuit switches employed time-division multiplexing techniques (augmented in larger switches with space division multiplexing) to accomplish switching functions. The most recent, and perhaps the most promising manifestation of the integration of switching and multiplexing functions in common equipment, is the Asynchronous
Transfer Mode3 (ATM) digital facility. However, more common so-called local area networks (LANs) and satellite access schemes also provide means for sharing common circuits among multiple traffic channels (multiplexing), and provide either connection-oriented or connection-less switching and call establishment functions. In addition to the switching and integrated switching-multiplexing equipment described above, equipment assigned to the Information Exchange Functional Area also includes older non-switching channel bank and flexible digital time division multiplexers, as well as all forms of analog electronic and photonic multiplexers (e.g., modern, wavelength-division multiplexers). RATIONALE The reason that IX Functional Area capabilities are so important to WMD operations is the same reason that they have commercial significance. Quite simply, IX capabilities are required constituent interconnection elements for any information system that extends beyond a stand-alone desktop installation. Stored program control central office and digital cross-connect switching is key to Software Defined Networks (SDNs). One of the principal advantages of SDNs is that they permit near-real-time network reconfiguration to optimize performance for a wide variety of traffic types and loading or in response to network damage or outages. These same programmability features allow peacetime civilian networks to be rapidly converted to highly survivable communications assets supporting crucial WMD operations. Equally valuable for WMD operations is the increased accessibility that end-user organizations have to telephone-company-based SDN management and control facilities that allow them to create and optimize individual subnetworks in accordance with unique customer (in this case, WMD force elements) service and configuration profiles. In fact, with the exception of long-wave radio, all BLOS and wide-area communications network survivability capabilities described in the Section 2.1, depend critically upon IX capabilities. You dont build terrestrial or satellite, fixed, cellular, or specialized mobile telecommunications systems without switching and multiplexing. A recent urban warfare study revealed that the Russians in Chechnya, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the British in Northern Ireland all resorted to commercial cellular services for mobile troop communications when military-issue portable radio performance proved unsatisfactory within cities.
1
2
OC n, the nth level in an optical carrier multiplexing hierarchy. Synchronous Transport Signal Level 1, basic SONET building block, electrical equivalent of OC-1.
ATM, a cell relay-based form of fast packet switching, uses fixed, 53-byte packets, suitable for voice, data, and other services, in either fixed or variable bit-rate formats.
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When operational, Iridium, Teledesic, or other satellite-based capabilities will be even more relevant in satisfying military urban mobile communications requirements since the service will involve reduced reliance, or none at all, on indigenous telecommunications facilities. Clearly, all these systems depend critically on highly sophisticated Information Communications, Information Exchange, and Information Systems Management and Control functional area technologies. Satellite-based mobile telecommunications of the type just described is one example of commercial technology for which there appears to be no practical military alternative. This statement is true unless one wants to defend the position that there exists in the world a country willing and able to deploy an Iridium or Teledesic-like satellite constellation for dedicated military use only. COTS dual-function switches that combine central office and tandem switching capabilities are also available. This means that in combination with SDH/SONET transmission systems discussed above, the physical location of switching within a network no longer needs to be fixed or pre-assigned. This results in enormous survivability and service restoration benefits. In the same vein, dual-function switches also enable cost-effective means of time-phased upgrading of obsolete telephone systems in urban areas such as Moscow or in many third world metropolitan areas. Transportable central offices used for disaster recovery by telephone companies represent another commercial technology with significant WMD operations survivability potential. Tables 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 list specific Information Exchange technology capabilities.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The second column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the IX functional area by country and for subnational groups. The IX functional area capability profiles of most countries are similar to their Information Communications capabilities. There are, however, some exceptions in the cases of smaller or less-developed countries. Iraqs IX functional area is assessed as greater than its Information Communications capabilities, as is Germanys, Japans, North Koreas, Russias, and South Africas, whereas Israel, Poland, and Taiwan are assessed as having fewer IX functional area capabilities than their Information Communications Functional Area capabilities. These lesser IX functional area capabilities can significantly affect the overall performance of their information systems. The switching and multiplexing capabilities associated with the IX functional area are common to both military and civil systems and have become readily available through joint developments or through foreign sales. The ranking of IX functional area capabilities largely reflects the effects of international standardization. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK have overall IX functional area capabilities equal to those of the United States, although U.S. capabilities may surpass them in some niche technologies such as optical systems. All of these countries, plus Italy, sell switching equipment worldwide. In most cases, their export equipment is technologically advanced; however, their equipment may incorporate somewhat limited capabilities. For example, their multi-level switching and preemption equipment may contain only two levels rather than three to five levels.
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Table 2.2-1. Information Exchange Technology Parameters

Technology
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Synchronous Digital Hierarchy-based/ Synchronous Optical Network (SDH/SONET) switching and multiplexing
Programmable digital byte interleave multiplexers implementing bidirectional line switched rings (BLSRs) providing reusable bandwidth in meshed networks and protection routing and switching for efficient and self-healing, survivable transmission. Programmable digital crossconnect system (DCS) multiplexers and automated diagnostic management and control.
WA Cat. 5E, P1; CCL Cat. 5E, P1
None Identified
Specially designed, commercially available SDH/SONET test equipment
None Identified
Asynchronous digital transmission hierarchy (DS-"n")
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
Specially designed, commercially available digital transmission test equipment Voice traffic generators
None Identified
Conventional and dualfunction central office and PBX switching.
Flexible, programmable, WA Cat. 5A, P1; tandem, central office, and CCL Cat. 5A, P1 PBX switching; dynamic nonhierarchical routing, priority and pre-emption. Multiplexing and switching for WA Cat. 5A, P1; local area network (LAN), CCL Cat. 5A, P1 metropolitan area and widearea networks (MAN/WANs).
None Identified
None Identified
Flexible, programmable, variable bit ratecapability, multimedia asynchronous transfer mode (ATM)
None Identified
Specially designed, commercially available ATM test equipment
None Identified
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Table 2.2-2. Information Exchange Reference Data

International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Synchronous Digital Hierarchy-based/Synchronous Optical Network (SDH/SONET) multiplexing and switching Asynchronous digital transmission hierarchy (DS-"n")
Public capabilities exceed most military requirements. Bandwidth required for WMD is less than commercial networks provide.
Survivable communications among command centers, depots, transportation facilities, industrial centers necessary for WMD operations. Survivable communications among command centers, depots, transportation facilities, industrial centers necessary for WMD operations. Survivable communications among command centers, depots, transportation facilities, industrial centers necessary for WMD operations. Support for multi-phenomena, widearea array sensors as they become available; survivability adjuncts to transmission items above.
Asynchronous digital transmission hierarchy (DS-"n"). See item below; Public mobile service via multisatellite systems (see item in Table 2.2-1 above) An ITU SDH-based broadband transmission system described above; (2) Public mobile service via multisatellite systems (see item in Table 2.2-1 above) SDH and DS-n transmission for service restoration
Public capabilities exceed most military requirements. Bandwidth required for WMD is less than commercial networks provide.
Conventional, dual-function central office and PBX switching
Requires combined use with synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) or DS-n transmission items to realize benefits. Public capabilities exceed most military requirements. Bandwidth required for WMD is less than commercial networks provide.
Flexible, programmable, variable bit rate, multimedia for local area network (LAN), metropolitan area and wide-area networks (MAN/WANs)
Less efficient and flexible conventional switching and multiplexing.
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SECTION 2.3INFORMATION PROCESSING
OVERVIEW Information Processing (IP) is an IS functional area to which computers, peripherals, servers, end-user or terminal equipment such as displays, keyboards, and other devices are normally assigned. Operating system, application and utility software are also considered elements of the IP functional area. This section discusses many of these technologies, consisting mainly of computer software and hardware. The following are among an extensive list of IP-based commercial capabilities with WMD application: Computer-aided design (CAD) software, hardware suite, and complex system engineering and integration tools; A rich variety of IS design, performance and environmental modeling, simulation, test, and evaluation products; On-line Analytical Processing (OLAP); Streamlined object-oriented programming (reusable programs, classes and objects), fourth-generation languages, and intelligent database management system development/modification products; Conventional and advanced multimedia (acoustic, voice, graphics imagery, video, tactile and haptic), user-friendly, human interfaces; High-performance virtual reality and other home entertainment products; Mature hardware and software products supporting client/server, distributed processing, and database system architectures; and Data Warehousing. In examining the role of commercial technology in WMD applications, it is necessary to understand DoDs overall acquisition policy. Section 2501 of Title 42 of the Defense Appropriations Act for 1993 declares: It is the policy of the Congress that the United States attain its national technology and industrial base objectives through acquisition policy reforms that have the following objectives: Relying, to the maximum extent practical, upon commercial national technology and industrial base that is required to meet the national security needs of the United States;
Highlights
In view of the rapid pace of commercial technology development, the performance of COTS information processing technology is generally far superior to military standard counterparts. COTS information-processing design, development, test, and evaluation tools facilitate adaptation and upgrade of older military and commercial information systems, delivery systems, and other WMD elements. Extraordinary performance growth in ever smaller, lighter, lower power packaging makes the introduction of powerful IP products possible, and greatly augments survivable transportable command centers.
Reducing the reliance of the Department of Defense on technology and industrial base sectors that are economically dependent on Department of Defense business; and Reducing Federal Government barriers to the use of commercial products, processes, and standards.
The implication is that through such policy initiatives, the proliferator seeking to acquire IS can become aware of a wider array of choices. Just as there is a need to plan for failure or destruction of switching centers in the Information Exchange IS functional area, availability of WMD IP functions ideally must not depend on the survivability of a small number of high-value informationprocessing centers. Insurance, airline reservation, and other industry segments have developed a wide variety of fail-safe redundancy and back-up technologies, including disaster recovery techniques and plans, that can easily be adopted with great advantage for WMD missions.
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RATIONALE Although COTS capabilities are intrinsically capable of supporting WMD missions, constructing automated strike planing, damage assessment, battle management, sensor and intelligence data fusion, modeling and simulation, weapon inventory and control, and numerous other IP functional capabilities requires significant customization. However, there is no question that COTS design, development, test, and evaluation technologies outlined above, which are available on the open market, facilitate the adaptation and technology infusion or upgrade of older military and commercial IS, delivery system, and other WMD elements. Inasmuch as COTS technology transfer to the WMD Information System baseline capabilities does not involve composite material, fuel processing, propulsion system, weapon payload integration, and similar structural and mechanical dependencies, much can be accomplished at reasonable levels of effort and within aggressive schedules by rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others. COTS products such as Internet and Intranet capabilities, distributed computing environments (DCE), client-server structures, on-line analytical processing (OLAP), on-line transaction processing (OLTP), an ever-growing family of enterprise software developments, and other commercial developments offer tremendous potential in streamlining and enhancing WMD and conventional warfare operations. Multimedia personal power-computers are of particular significance for conflict situations in which transportability and information-supported weapons (e.g., remotely piloted vehicles) are crucial to mission success. High-performance laptop PCs can be conveniently taken to temporary maintenance and repair depots, flight decks, launch vehicles, and battlefields. Slightly larger suitcase-size packaging, augmented with survivable communications and GPS capabilities, extends information-based, war-fighting potential even further. At desktop/workstation capability levels, it is possible today to achieve in singlevan, transportable command centers what 10 years ago demanded a convoy of vans and support vehicles. This advancement reflects increased IP performance and reliability, all accomplished with greatly reduced computer processor and peripheral size, weight, volume, power consumption and, consequently, scaled-down prime power and environmental control support facilities. Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2 list specific IP capabilities with WMD relevance. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The third column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the IP Functional Area by country and for subnational groups. The IP capability profiles of most countries are similar to their Information
Communications and Information Exchange capabilities. There are, however, some significant exceptions. India and Iran are assessed as having IP capabilities greater than those in both their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas. Iraqs IP capabilities exceed their Information Systems Management and Control and Information Systems Facilities. Japan, North Korea, and Pakistan have IP capabilities that exceed their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas. Only Australia, South Africa, and Switzerland are assessed as having IP capabilities that are less than their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas. Some of the country capability assessments that appear in Figure 2.0-2 may be conservative because the IP capabilities in almost all countries are growing so rapidly due, in large part, to the rapid expansion of the Internet. IP technology status statistics by country are difficult to locate; however, some indication of various countrys capabilities were revealed by a recent world survey of the Internet host and PC populations. This survey reported that Finland, with a population of 4 million, has the worlds largest Internet host density, with ~535 per 1,000 population. The United States still leads the world in PC density with ~ 390 PCs per 1,000 population; however, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland are close behind the United States in PC densities, with more PCs per 1,000 than Japan, Germany, the UK, and Canada. Software is changing the economic and military balances in the world. There is an accelerating intellectual capital transfer of software development know-how now in progress through the Internet, Intellectual capital transfer takes place through aggressive computer hardware and software marketing, conferences, trade journals, and technical literature on software development, and through the graduates of colleges and universities, which teach IP skills and abilities, in the United States and other countries. IP know-how transfer also takes place in personnel transfers overseas and training conducted by U.S. multinational companies. However, the United States still currently leads, and is forecast to continue to lead, the world in software innovation, the development of large complex systems, and in system engineering and integration through at least the year 2005 or 2010. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities. See Sections 5 and 10 in Part I of the 1996 MCTL. The United States is having a great deal of software developed by foreign nationals, either within their own country or as part of a team in the United States. For example, communications software is being developed in India by a subsidiary of a U.S. communications company. In another case, a critical DoD system being developed under contract in the United States has Russian nationals on the development team. Software developed today is so complex that any programmer(s) could put in viruses, Trojan horses, back doors, and time bombs that could go undetected all the way through installation, particularly if there is a cooperative group effort.
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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters

Technology
Distributed computing environment (DCE), and client-server architectures and structures
Enterprise-wide, compatible information processing functions, preferably with platform independent, WEB/Internet, multimedia plug-in and human interface compatibility.
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military DCE environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market. Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military OLAP environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market.
On-line analytical processing (OLAP) and supporting data bases
Using hierarchically orgaCCL EAR 99 nized, n-dimensional databases designed for live ad hoc data access and analysis, including consolidation, drill down, vector arithmetic, definable complex variables, time-series data handling, and other capabilities that reduce database size, yield orders-of-magnitude improvement in query response time, and make possible real-time data analyses not possible with conventional designs. Incorporating class, subclass, inheritance, encapsulation, abstraction and other capabilities such as higher quality software and database products, lower cost and faster development, easier maintenance and upgrade, and reduced lifecycle cost. CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Object oriented technologies (OOTs)
None Identified
None identified
Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military OOTS environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market. (contd)
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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters (contd)

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test Production and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
On-line transaction processing (OLTP) with supporting databases
Supports object-oriented, CCL EAR 99 relational databases and intelligent database management systems to facilitate high volume creation, updating and retrieval of individual records.
None Identified
None Identified
Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military OLTP environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market. Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military data warehousing environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market. Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military data compression and signal processing environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market. Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications.
Data Warehousing
Transforming data into useful CCL EAR 99 and reliable information that supports enterprise decisionmaking through analytical processing capabilities and applications such as point-intime data analysis, trend analysis, and data mining.
None Identified
None Identified
Data compression and signal processing technologies
Minimizing bandwidth and CCL EAR 99 storage requirements for voice, data, facsimile and other imagery, and video information; implementing optimum matched filter communications components; and enhancing imagery and facilitating pattern recognition and target detection.
None Identified
None Identified
Modeling, prediction, and Supporting: product design simulation technologies and development; training and evaluation; and enterprise and battlefield planning and decision-making.
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
(contd)
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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters (contd)

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test Production and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Computer-based training, distance learning, and group decision support system (GDSS)
Terminal/server/network/ teleconferencing technologies incorporating explicit and implicit hypermedia navigation, natural language processing, voice recognition, a variety of search engines, an array of personmachine interfaces, and other technologies.
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Proliferators have the ability to use COTS products in industrystandard applications. Engineering and integration capabilities to adapt COTS products to WMD/ military GDSS environments, if not indigenous, are readily available on the open market.
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Table 2.3-2. Information Processing Reference Data

Distributed computing environment (DCE), and client-server architectures and structures
Highly efficient enterprise-wide information-processing functions, preferably with platform independent, WEB/Internet, multimedia plug-in and human interface compatibility; COTS technology exceeds C2I requirements but modification, adaptation, and extension may be required to support specific military applications.
Enhanced, distributed, survivable intelligence and sensor data fusion, decision support, strike and re-strike planning, strike and damage assessment, micro-meteorological and other modeling and simulation.
Less efficient hardware and software.
On-line analytical processing Substantial development may be (OLAP) and supporting databases required to adapt military databases and procedures to secure the benefits of this technology.
Military logistic and other warfare Less efficient hardware and planning and decision support. software. Particularly applicable for strike and re-strike planning, strike and damage assessment, in time-constrained, hotconflict scenarios. Enhanced, distributed, survivable C2I information systems. Less efficient hardware and software.
Object-oriented technologies (OOTs)
Substantial development may be required to adapt military databases and procedures to secure the benefits of this technology. Substantial development may be required to adapt military databases and procedures to secure the benefits of this technology.
On-line transaction processing (OLTP), with supporting databases
Military logistic and other warfare Less efficient hardware and planning and decision support. software. Particularly applicable for strike and re-strike planning, strike and damage assessment, in time-constrained, hotconflict scenarios. Military logistic and other warfare Less efficient hardware and planning and decision support. software. Particularly applicable for strike and re-strike planning, strike and damage assessment, in time-constrained, hotconflict scenarios. Less efficient hardware and software.
Data Warehousing
Substantial development may be required to adapt military databases and procedures to secure the benefits of this technology.
Data compression and signal processing technologies
Some development may be required to Enhanced, distributed, survivable C2I adapt military databases and IS systems procedures to secure the benefits of this technology. Some development may be required to Enhanced, distributed, survivable C2I adapt military databases and IS systems and decision-making. procedures to secure the benefits of this technology. Some development may be required to Enhanced, distributed, survivable C2I adapt military databases and IS systems and decision-making. procedures to secure the benefits of this technology.
Modeling, prediction, and simulation techniques
Computer-based training, distance learning, and group decision support system (GDSS)
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SECTION 2.4INFORMATION SECURITY
OVERVIEW Technologies in the Information Security (INFOSEC) Functional Area are those designed to safeguard information privacy or secrecy and to ensure information integrity. Encryption, scrambling, protected wire, and steganographic techniques are used to protect the privacy and secrecy of data at or en route among information processing or storage nodes. Hash functions protect information integrity by alerting owners to data manipulation or tampering. This section deals principally with information in electromagnetic format contained within electronic or photonic devices or en route over suitable media. Physical access control capabilities are included to the extent that they provide protection against attacks intended to illegally acquire information and not merely to physically destroy the facilities in which it resides. Protecting information while it resides in processing, storage, server, and interface terminal nodesyet making it readily available to authorized usersis accomplished with access control, authentication, non-repudiation, and electronic signature techniques. All of what has come to be known as trusted system INFOSEC capabilities can be used by proliferators. The cost of trusted systems and other associated COTS INFOSEC products is comparatively small and within the reach of most proliferators. Associated COTS INFOSEC systems that might be used by proliferators for their trusted systems are standard physical and electronic access limiting techniques. Unique badges or cards, which include name, picture, individual personal identification numbers (PINs), other identification numbers, and passwords are in this category. Of Operations Security (OPSEC) interest are advanced local and remote identification and authentication mechanisms. In this latter category are thermogram, hand or eye scanning, voice printing, keyboard rhythm, fingerprint, signature dynamics, and other biometric technologies. Today there are quality COTS INFOSEC products of such strength that effective communications and signal intelligence countermeasure operations against them are practicable only for government agencies or other large, well-funded organizations. Readily available COTS secure communication products include line and trunk encryption devices, secure voice and data end-instruments, encrypted common channel and per-channel signaling systems, and a rich variety of encryption software. The availability of powerful and effective INFOSEC products and techniques does not guarantee that any countrys computer-dependent enterprise infrastructures are invulnerable. In fact, many of todays computer-dependent utilities such as
Highlights
Commercial INFOSEC products are available on world markets with capabilities deemed adequate for WMD operations. Significant progress is being made toward open, market-based INFOSEC development of public-private key architectures, related standards, and the functional specification of certification authority structures.
telecommunications systems and electrical power systems, as well as financial services systems and other civilian and military systems, are known to have been penetrated by competent hackers. Well-funded adversarial government or industrial espionage activities pose an even greater threat to these systems. Many infrastructure systems are vulnerable, not because they cannot be protected using available COTS products and techniques, but because risk-benefit analyses are not persuasive. Due to their perception of the threat, decision-makers accept the risk rather than bear the attendant investment costs, operating efficiency losses, and timeconsuming access restrictions associated with protecting their systems. A knowledgeable proliferator intent on achieving surprise or concealing its identity may be expected to be willing to pay the price of strong INFOSEC. New and more capable INFOSEC capabilities and techniques continue to appear in both commercial and military environments. And certainly, potential proliferants have ready access to commercial technologies to implement whatever level of security they deem necessary to protect their WMD warfare operations. Commercial technology developments that promise to augment todays capabilities and allow WMD proliferators to implement even higher levels of information security are outlined below. The use of fiber-optic cable, even in the absence of encryption, greatly complicates the old-fashioned wire-tapping procedure. Intrusion-resistant fiber cable makes undetected eavesdropping almost impossible. Similarly, common-channel signaling
II-2-21
defeats automated, in-channel, search-on-number intercept techniques, since signaling and subscriber traffic take different signal paths. Proliferants able to use commercial fiber-optic systems would realize these benefits. Perhaps the most significant open, market-based INFOSEC development is the progress made towards the adoption of public key cryptography and protocols, related standards, and the establishment of certification authority structures. As improved standards and overall architectures emerge, there appears to be more than an adequate supply of scientific and professional competence available for assistance in the development and integration of systems of whatever strength proliferators require, from algorithm and protocol development to encryption and key management. The financial services industrys interest and the intense interest of business in electronic commerce on the Internet have accelerated development of commercial tools and technologies with broad WMD application. Among them are means to protect (while selling) intellectual property rights, safeguard databases, restrict access, prevent false repudiation, safely transfer funds, and execute binding contracts electronically, as well as numerous other secure capabilities. RATIONALE Because all businessmen and government decision-makers have not implemented measures to correct vulnerabilities in many of todays nonmilitary systems, the opinion is often advanced that commercial capabilities are unsuited for military applications and their importance to WMD warfighting is minimized. It is unlikely that these arguments will persuade astute WMD proliferators who are free to convert commercial INFOSEC products normally used to protect civilian dual-use information systems to WMD use. Virtually all commercial INFOSEC capabilities have direct WMD application for weapon storage, custody and release as well as other military command and control operations. In conducting successful nonattributable WMD attacks, covertness is mandatory. In such situations, even the appearance of encrypted traffic may compromise missions by tagging information. A proliferator may avoid encryption altogether using one-time codes and steganographically concealed messages buried in innocuous text or bitmapped images to prevent adversaries from intercepting intelligible data. This ancient coding method is ideal in high-volume traffic voice and Internet-type data networks. Steganography
is within the reach of all proliferators. Even prisoners with no equipment but their minds have developed essentially undetectable means of transmitting embedded decoding templates with the concealed messages. A complementary approach for maintaining secrecy and covertness involves the use of secure, intrusion-resistant, low probability of detection and interception communications technologies. Of course, if a WMD or conventional attack strategy critically depends on the element of surprise, overt encryption using any of the commercial technologies remains an option. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Complete INFOSEC and OPSEC technical data appears in open source U.S. and foreign trade journals and technical literature and also can be obtained from vendors. Cryptographic systems are widely available. A Russian vendor will deliver a complete package with a 2-year service provision to anyone, and Sun is fielding a whole suite of strong cryptographic products supplied by a Russian manufacturer for their customers anywhere in the world. National and international export regulations can be circumvented in those countries that prohibit the export of robust information security systems, including strong cryptography. In addition, there are now many countries that have at least a limited capability to produce, or at least use, robust information security products. The Information Security Functional Area column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a foreign technology assessment by country and for subnational groups. One-third of the countries assessed have capabilities in all INFOSEC Functional Area technologies. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States are the world INFOSEC technology leaders. Denmark, Finland, India, Israel, Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan are close behind the leaders. Iran and North Korea are believed to have all essential INFOSEC functional area capabilities. Most countries and subnational groups, have at least a limited INFOSEC technology capability. A limited capability includes the ability to use INFOSEC products obtained on the world market with little or no direct technical support from the manufacturers. Note that Libya, Vietnam, and the subnationals are among those credited with a limited INFOSEC technology capability and all of them should be able to purchase robust INFOSEC systems, which are comparatively inexpensive. See Section 2.3 (page II-2-16) for a description of COTS software vulnerability.
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Table 2.4-1. Information Security Technology Parameters

Technology
Commercial trunk and line encryption system hardware and software
Technologies and products that provide strong link encryption for networks, enduser-to-end-user encryption, and encryption for voice, imagery, video, text, files, and data, all of which could be adapted for C2I. Proven COTS products are available for concealing messages in innocuous text or bit-mapped images to transmit covert, low probability of detection and interception politico-military messages. May be used in conjunction with other security measures by any but lowest level proliferant. Proven COTS products are available which include encryption and hash algorithms, certification authorities, and key management and distribution. Multi-level access control mechanisms including resource segmentation and combined use of unique badges or cards, and local and remote personal identification numbers, passwords, thermogram, hand or eye scanning, voice printing, keyboard rhythm, fingerprint, signature dynamics and other biometric technologies.
WA Cat. 5A, P2; None Identified CCL Cat. 5A, P2; WA ML 11; USML XI WA Cat. 5A, P2; None Identified CCL Cat. 5A, P2; WA ML 11; USML XI
None Identified
None Identified
One-time operational codes or commercial software steganographic encoding techniques
None Identified
None Identified
Trusted systems to protect data, processing, and other information systems resources.
WA Cat. 5A, P2; None Identified CCL Cat. 5A, P2; WA ML 11; USML XI
None Identified
Pattern recognition algorithms and programs for analysis of biometric features.
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Table 2.4-2. Information Security Reference Data

Commercial trunk and line encryption system hardware and software
Traffic is susceptible to decryption and spoofing by defending countries with intelligence and information warfare infrastructures. The time scales of WMD operations are typically very short relative to the protection provided by commercial encryption. Traffic is susceptible to decryption and spoofing by defending countries with intelligence and information warfare infrastructures.
Secure C2I communications for concealing intent during the preparation phase of WMD operations and achieving surprise, controlling force application and obtaining rapid damage assessment in the execution phase of WMD operations. Secure C2I communications for concealing intent during the planning and preparation phase of WMD operations and achieving surprise, controlling force application and obtaining rapid damage assessment in the execution phase of WMD operations. Secure C2I communications for concealing intent during the planning and preparation phase of WMD operations and achieving surprise, controlling force application and obtaining rapid damage assessment in the execution phase of WMD operations.
Wealthy adversaries may choose from a variety of strong COTS technologies and products; poorer adversaries and terrorists may find inexpensive COTS that will provide adequate security. None, except for low probability of interception and detection radio transmission techniques.
One-time operational codes or commercial software
Trusted systems to protect data, processing and other information systems resources.
COTS equipment exceeds requirements for the WMD planning and preparation phase, but substantial customized modification may be required to provide a secure, end-toend military system.
Less efficient (and less expensive) 3rd generation COTS hardware and software applications are widely available. An alternate to "trusted" systems and products for a minimum WMD capability might be personal recognition and trusted couriers.
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SECTION 2.5INFORMATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
OVERVIEW Information System Management and Control (IM&C) is the IS Functional Area capability for planning, organizing, designing, optimizing, engineering, implementing, provisioning, monitoring, directing, controlling, and accounting for IS activities and resources. Here, controlling is understood to subsume operations, maintenance, configuration and change management, and security. Within the military, IS IM&C is but one element of mission-level Command, Control, and Intelligence functional capabilities. With inadequate IM&C capabilities, a WMD proliferator would have difficulty in rapidly converting civilian telecommunications complex Information Systems to military use or in taking advantage of the survivability Information Systems are able to furnish. This section addresses IS technologies necessary to control normal operations and service provision while achieving reliability, availability, fault isolation, service restoration, and survivability objectives. As an example of an advanced IM&C capability, consider todays software defined or virtual private telecommunications networks (SDN/VPNs), in which traffic is routed through networks under the control of computers residing in network control points or operations centers (NCP/NOCs). These computers are connected to remote stored program-controlled switching and multiplexing equipment using common-channel signaling (CCS) networks. The computers, and associated databases containing a subscribers unique VPN information, screen every call and apply call-processing control in accordance with customer-defined requirements. The IM&C capabilities implemented in an NCP/NOC not only control normal call-processing and routing, but they monitor and manage virtually every aspect of a network. Of particular interest to WMD operations, NOCs are the management and control means by which the extraordinary survivability features of SDH/SONET bidirectional line-switched rings (BLSRs) are realized. Highly survivable operations, if needed for some WMD missions, can be realized through the combination of fiber-optic and other media Information Communications functional area capabilities; flexible and programmable switching and multiplexing Information Exchange functional area capabilities; and importantly, computer, database, and software IM&C functional area capabilities. Thus, commercial hardware and software product technologies implementing IM&C capabilities can be central to any proliferants successful adaptation of commercial public telephone networks for WMD military purposes.
Highlights
With inadequate Information System Management and Control capabilities, no WMD proliferator can rapidly convert civil telecommunications or other complex IS systems to military use. Information Systems Management and Control functional area capabilities are of seminal importance to both normal day-to-day and stressed-mode, complex system operations. As information systems grow, add more components, more functions, and more users, IS Management and Control itself becomes more difficult and complex, yet increasingly crucial.
The increasing importance of IM&C to telecommunications and other complex Information Systems is due to many worldwide trends. In the past, data processing was usually accomplished within mainframes in a relatively small number of large, centralized processing sites. In the telecommunications arena, networks supported limited sets of services derived from a relatively small set of basic technologies, using equipment from only a few vendors. Today, divestiture, deregulation, privatization (overseas), and rapid technological expansion and competition has resulted in significant growth in the number of private and public telecommunications networks. These networks support numerous services and are derived from a wide variety of network elements (NEs) with equipment supplied by hundreds of manufacturers. To cope with added functional complexity and reduce manpower requirements, network operators are placing more processors in voice communications networks (VCNs). Analogously, advances in microprocessors technology and the corresponding trend away from centralized-mainframe designs has spawned a large number of data communications networks (DCNs) now connecting distributed processors in client/server configurations. In both cases, the result is that networks are more complex and more software driven than ever.
II-2-25
Not surprisingly, as information systems proliferate, add more components, more functions and more users, IS management itself becomes more difficult and complex, yet increasingly crucial. The fast growing cellular telephone industry adds new dimensions to telecommunications management, particularly for roaming applications where one carriers subscribers must be recognized and served by other carriers networks. In the United States, divestiture has meant that many end-to-end connections require services and/or facilities from two different local exchange carriers (LECs), one or more interexchange carriers (IXCs) or backbone networks, and often two local area networks comprising customer premises equipment (CPE) from a variety of manufacturers. Overseas, similar situations exist among interconnected pan-European national networks and within countries where privatization has given rise to a variety of alternative service providers. Effective, integrated IM&C in this environment is difficult to achieve, but may be far simpler in third-world countries, where rebuilding homogeneous nationwide networks from the ground up may be feasible. Since the IS product environment worldwide is heterogeneous, practical, longterm, and end-to-end (e.g., systems including customer-owned and carrier or other service provider-based, common-user information systems), effective IM&C approaches must be based on standards and a common, evolving agent process/manager process paradigm. Relevant standards include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Telecommunications System Sector (TSS) M30X0 Telecommunications Management Network series; the International Standards Organization (ISO) Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP) and several subsidiary standards; the Internet Activities Board, Simple Management Network Protocol (SMNP); and the Institute of Electronics Engineers (IEEE) local and metropolitan area network standard entitled LAN/MAN Management. To achieve the rapid fault isolation and service restoration leading to ultra-high availability and militarily acceptable levels of survivability, standards must be implemented in appropriate network elements and arranged in architectures with designedin performance monitoring; fault isolation; and excess traffic, processing, storage capacity, and disaster recovery back-up resources that can be quickly reallocated to compensate for intentional, man-made, or naturally occurring damage or failure. In public networks, this means stored program central office, tandem and digital cross-connect switching, multiplexing, router and server equipment; telecommunication management networks (TMNs, i.e., data communication networks designed to exchange management information but logically separate from managed networks); broadband fiber-optic Synchronous Digital Hierarchy/SONET (SDH/SONET)-based backbone transmission; and alternate multimedia communications (e.g., broadband
satellite and satellite or terrestrial based mobile communications). An advanced signaling system such as the ITU-TSS Signaling System # 7 (SS # 7AT&T and Bellcore versions are commonly referred to as CCS 7 and SS 7, respectively) plays an important role in normal and degraded-mode military operations of advanced telecommunications system. For example, during the Cold War era, COCOM permitted the export of SS # 7-capable switching hardware, but restricted export of SS # 7 itself. Figure 2.5-1 summarizes IM&C dimensions, i.e., the functions, managed entities, and domains implied in the above discussion. In the figure, IM&C functions are divided into technical and business/government/military categories, with only key subfunctions illustrated. Managed entities are grouped under IS Services, IS Networks, and IS Elements categories, again with only partial subcategory illustrations. Finally, the dedicated-facilities and common user management domains are shown. RATIONALE Figure 2.5-1 graphically demonstrates the challenges involved in creating either end-to-end integrated management and control systems or achieving the goal of open IM&C systems. However, as noted, in third-world countries where upgrading essentially allows designers to start with a clean slate, military information systems can be built upon homogeneous or even single-vendor common-user commercial systems. These systems can easily be more survivable than dedicated, special purpose alternatives built from equipment made to military specifications. The reason is twofold. First, civil information systems generate revenue only when operational. As a consequence, the profit motivation for high availability, minimum downtime, and immunity to failures and accidental cable cuts is paramount. Second, although it is possible to design excess capacity into military systems to account for losses in warfare, capacity requirements sufficient to handle peacetime civilian requirements are generally orders of magnitude larger than any justifiable military overbuild design requirements. To illustrate these advantages, consider the Autovon military network. It was once regarded as the preeminent, survivable voice network with 55 U.S. switch centers. Today civil requirements have resulted in switch numbers and capacities dwarfing old Autovon military requirements. As a consequence, the most survivable military IS designs are those based on the ability to make optimal use of civil systems by placing them at the disposal of military users. This is especially true of commercial technologies embodying the most effective IM&C mechanisms to circumvent outages caused by natural disasters and irreducible component failures. Tables 2.5-1 and 2.5-2 illustrate specific technology capabilities with WMD significance.
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FUNCTIONS
BUSINESS/ GOVERNMENT/ MILITARY Financial Service-Level Arrangements CMIP Functions Fault Management Performance Management Configuration Management Security Management Accounting Management
TECHNICAL
Reliability/Availability/Survivability Capacity/Traffic Management Engineering and Integration
D S ed L yst ica o em ted W Me cal s t id rop e- o Ar lita ea n
C Sy om st m M Loc em on W e al s Us er t id rop e- o Ar lita ea n
MANAGEMENT DOMAIN
IS SERVICES
Voice, Data, Video, Distributed Processing, Directory, Security, ...
IS NETWORKS
Circuit-Switched Packet-Switched Transmission
ATM-SONET-SDH Based
IS ELEMENTS
Switches, Multiplexers, Modems, Mainframes, Servers, PCs, Workstations, Computer Program Components, Databases, Communications Protocols, Human Interfaces, etc.
MANAGED ENTITIES (OBJECTS) Figure 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The Information Systems Management and Control (IM&C) column in Figure 2.0-2 shows the comparative IM&C capabilities of 32 countries and a representative assessment for subnational groups. Only one-third of those listed have all IM&C Functional Area capabilities because this is a large, complex, functional area consisting of 11 elements that include the capability for planning, organizing, designing, optimizing, engineering, implementing, provisioning, monitoring, directing, controlling (operations, maintenance, configuration and change management), and accounting for IM&C activities and resources. Countries with strong capabilities in all IM&C technologies are the world Information Systems leaders (or host divisions of multinational
companies), which have installed much of the worlds information systems telecommunications base. The worlds IM&C leaders are Canada, France, the UK, and the United States. In contrast, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the subnationals are among those countries that have only limited, if any, IM&C capabilities. An ambitious WMD proliferator would need strong capabilities in all IM&C technologies to rapidly convert civilian telecommunications and the other complex information systems functional area technologies to military use and take advantage of the extraordinary survivability modern systems could provide for WMD operations. A minimal proliferator that does not intend to conduct sustained or sophisticated WMD operations might not benefit from the possession of IM&C technologies.
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Table 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters

Technology
Logically and/or physically separate signaling and Telecommunications Management Network (TMN)
Encrypted networks that WA Cat. 5A, P2; None Identified support normal network oper- CCL Cat. 5A, P2 ations and service offerings; specially designed to implement real-time management via ATM; dynamic autonomous reconfigurability at all levels of service (intelligent fault recovery); seamless support to broadcast and multilevel, multi-user point-topoint data communications services; hybrid real-time/ non-real-time distributed computing environments incorporating mobile assets; automated data distribution and control from multiple sources. Can monitor and manage virtually every aspect of the network during normal and degraded conditions. Programmable, computerbased facilities for managing and controlling switching, multiplexing, communications, and other network operations. Monitors performance, detecting, isolating, and diagnosing failures, rapidly accomplishing restoration and reprovisioning. WA Cat. 5A, P1; None Identified CCL Cat. 5A, P1
Specially designed, commercially available management systems that allow for self test.
Operating systems and network management software incorporating hierarchical, multilevel security; intelligent agents for distributed computing environment monitoring, work load allocation, and dynamic configuration management.
Combined network control point/operations center (NCP/NOC)
None Identified
Vendor-specific NCP/NOC software
Automated system management system (SMS) hardware and software
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
Vendor-specific SMS software
(contd)
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Table 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
SMS and network element hardware and software
Implementing evolving TMN CCL EAR 99 and CMIP/SNMP manager process/agent process paradigm-based protocols and object-oriented, management information base (MIB) architectures, models, standards and interfaces.
None Identified
None Identified
Operating system and network management software incorporating hierarchical, multi-level security; intelligent agents for distributed computing environment monitoring, work load allocation, and dynamic configuration management. Evolving network management software incorporating html/ browser technology SMS proprietary software to implement SS # 7.
Customer or integrated network management systems (CNM/INMS) Signaling System (SS) 7
Providing end-to-end, global, unified network management of an entire enterprise network. Implementing SS # 7-based encrypted common channel signaling.
CCL EAR 99
None Identified
None Identified
WA Cat. 5A, P2; None Identified CCL Cat. 5A, P2
None Identified
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Table 2.5-2. Information Systems Management and Control Reference Data

Logically and/or physically separate signaling and Telecommunications Management Network (TMN)
Proprietary products are available within so-called Intelligent Networks but not implemented to the same extent by all commercial telephone companies or PTTs. While the TMN model enjoys nearly universal endorsement, telco carriers and equipment are only making slow progress towards adopting and implementing national or world-wide standards. Proprietary products are implemented in modern telephone companies and used to render their flagship software defined/virtual private network (SDN/ VPN) service offerings. Proprietary products for failure detection and recovery.
Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations.
Earlier generation hardware and software.
Combined network control point/ operations center (NCP/NOC)
Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations. Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations. Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations. Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations.
Automated system management system (SMS) hardware and software SMS and network element hardware and software
Proprietary products are available and used separately in local and longdistance exchange carrier and customer-owned network domains. Proprietary products are available and used separately in local and longdistance exchange carrier and customer-owned network domains. An SMNP open systems based industry consensus is emerging. None
Customer or integrated network management systems (CNM/INMS)
Signaling System 7
Highly efficient, highly survivable, rapidly reconfigurable and reconstitutable C2I information systems operations.
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SECTION 2.6INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES
OVERVIEW Information Systems Facilities is the Functional Area encompassing any or all of the following capabilities: exterior physical shelter and interior room; equipment and other IS support structures; prime power generation and/or co-generation; power conditioning; environmental heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC); chemical and biological filtration and protection; electromagnetic pulse protection; tempest shielding; radiation protection; and human habitation and life-support accommodations. Clearly, not all of these capabilities are required for every instance of military operations. Physical shelters may be fixed, or transportable in ground mobile, airborne or shipborne configurations. They may support manned command, control and intelligence centers, manned information processing or communications centers, or unattended IS resources. Civil IS shelters typically may not involve sleeping quarters or other overnight accommodations, but instead merely provide facilities housing IS equipment and personnel in common office work environments. Where nuclear weapons are involved, the Cold War era taught that under determined attack, there is no such thing as a survivable, fixed command center or IS operations building. Not even so-called deep underground command centers, regardless of cost, could be certified as survivable. As a consequence, in military WMD scenarios in which long-term survivability is mandatory, mobile facilities are the only viable option. From a U.S. perspective, preparation for global nuclear warfare, beginning with the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) program in the 1970s, led to the investment of billions of dollars in military, mobile command, surveillance, and IS center technology. The airborne command center, the Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACs), and the Ground Mobile Command Center (GMCC) are illustrative developments. For tactical scenarios, the Tri-Tac program developed a wide variety of mobile/transportable voice and data switching, communications satellite and terrestrial terminals, and various IS processing center products to support moving battlefield theater locations. In Europe, the Deutsche-Bundespost placed cable hocks within civilian telecommunications networks, permitting mobile switching and multiplexing gear to be connected with surviving transmission media to restore service interrupted by intentional or collateral wartime damage. By the late 1980s, enormous advances in microprocessor-based computer power, coupled with dramatic reductions in space, weight, and prime power consumption, made possible installation in a single rack those IS capabilities which previously required an 18-wheel tractor-trailer.
Highlights
Older military or commercial high technology, highly survivable transportable/mobile information systems facility capabilities are readily available to proliferants. Advances in processing power, coupled with dramatic reductions in space, weight, and power consumption, allow information systems capabilities to be packaged in much smaller volumes. In many cases, the total cost per transportable information systems facility may be an order of magnitude less than the cost of a single precision-guided conventional weapon.
Due to these advances, the trend towards transportable IS facilities accelerated in the 1990s. Today, satellite terminals able to operate in military or civilian bands are encased in suitcases. COTS office in suitcase products incorporate multimedia telecommunications, position location, and rich varieties of distributed computing environment data processing functions. Worldwide, many commercial telecommunications carriers inventory central office, tandem, and dual-function switches; cellular/PCS base-station; digital loop carrier (DLC); and other capabilities in transportable/mobile configurations. Alternatively, with broadband, fiber-optic transmission, traffic can be affordability back-hauled great distances to remotely restore damaged or otherwise failed switching, multiplexing, DLC, or other functions. Because so many commercial enterprises now literally depend upon continuous telecommunications and data processing operations, and because downtimes of even 15 minutes can have catastrophic revenue and profit consequences, many businesses have elaborate internal or third-party, contract-based, disaster recovery IS capabilities. All of the above IS technology capabilities are known to potential WMD proliferants and available on world markets. Thus, the possibility that WMD proliferants will be able to use transportable or mobile IS facilities to mount highly survivable offensives must be fully accounted for in planning by U.S. or allied forces.
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RATIONALE The relevance of older military or commercial, high-technology, highly survivable IS facility capabilities in WMD warfare is evident from the above discussion. Should a WMD proliferator possess only fixed IS and support facilities, U.S. and allied precision-guided and other conventional weapons can be effective. In future WMD and other conflicts, we may find that adversaries have deployed, or can deploy, transportable or mobile IS facilities. Ominously, in many cases the total cost per transportable IS facility may be an order of magnitude less than the costs of a single precision-guided conventional weapon needed to target and destroy such a facility. Clearly, the wartime utility of high-technology, high-survivability IS Facility capabilities by WMD users must be fully understood by U.S. strategists and planners if effective countermeasures and counter-strike alternatives are to be available. See Tables 2.6-1 and 2.6-2 for specific examples of pertinent IS Facility capabilities. Sections 3 (Biological Weapons Technology), 4 (Chemical Weapons Technology), and 5 (Nuclear Weapons Technology) present specific technologies that provide personal and shelter-based protection from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons effects, respectively. Note that survivable IS facilities are not required by proliferators with minimal WMD weapon inventories and capabilities, or those that perhaps would launch isolated WMD attacks.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The last column in Figure 2.0-2 contains a foreign technology assessment by country and for subnational groups in the IS Facilities Functional Area. Countries with advanced Information Systems, and especially those defending against or planning large-scale, sustained WMD operations, need all of the IS Facilities Functional Area capabilities. Only nine of the 32 countries listed have capabilities in all of the technologies in this functional area. Like the IM&C technologies, the IS Facilities Functional Area technologies are found among the world leaders in Information Systems: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the United States. Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Sweden also have all IS Facilities Functional Area technologies. Several countries have limited IS Facilities Functional Area technologies: Iran, North Korea, and Poland. Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, and the subnationals also have limited capabilities in these technologies. Proliferants committed to conducting large-scale and sustained WMD warfare need substantial IS Facilities Functional Area capabilities, particularly for operations requiring highly survivable transportable and mobile IS capabilities.
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Table 2.6-1. Information Systems Facilities Technology Parameters

Technology
Transportable command and force shelters
High mobility and WMD WA ML 13; weapon effects protection USML XXI incorporating closed-cycle or specialized air-decontamination capabilities and radiation-hardened to protect/limit exposure of internal components to a total dose* of 5 103 Gy(SI) or a transient dose of 5 106 Gy(SI)/sec. Equipped with central office WA ML 13; and dual function switches, USML VII multiplexing and media termination equipment, incorporating closed-cycle or specialized air-decontamination capabilities and radiation-hardened to protect/limit exposure of internal components to a total dose of 5 103 (Gy)(SI) or a transient dose of 5 106 Gy(SI)/sec, able to restore transmission and call center service and rapidly deployable via road, rail, or air shipment. Provides and with the ability WA ML 13; to rapidly deploy or restore USML XXI terrestrial cellular, PCS, or SMR service. Incorporating closed-cycle or specialized air-decontamination capabilities and radiationhardened to protect/limit exposure of internal components to a total dose of 5 103 Gy(SI) or a transient dose of 5 106 Gy(SI)/sec.
None Identified
EMI/EMP testing
None Identified
Specially designed tractor-trailer rigs for telecommunications restoration
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
Transportable base stations
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
* The dose rates are expressed in Systme Internationale dUnits (SI) metric units of radiation. The gray (Gy) is a unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation; one Gy is an absorbed dose of ionizing radiation equal to one joule per kilogram of absorber. The gray replaces the rad. One rad = 0.01 Gy.
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Table 2.6-2. Information Systems Facilities Reference Data

Transportable command and force Degree of ability to withstand bombs, shelters missiles, or WMD weapons effects Specially designed tractor-trailer rigs for telecommunications restoration Transportable base stations
Highly survivable C2I and trans-attack conflict execution operations
Use other fixed and mobile assets as available Use other fixed and mobile assets as available Use other fixed and mobile assets as available
Deployment and activation rates under Highly survivable switching, multimilitary conflict situations plexing and multimedia communications capabilities Requires combined use with survivable wireline telco service items to reap maximum benefits Survivable home-country and theater of operations communications (see additional citations above)
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SECTION III BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
SECTION 3BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Scope Biological Material Production .............................................. II-3-9 Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion......................... II-3-15 Detection, Warning, and Identification ................................... II-3-19 Biological Defense Systems ................................................... II-3-23
Highlights
Biological weapons are unique because they are made up of pathogenic organisms that can reproduce and cause infection (and death) in a large number of hosts. It takes hours to days for symptoms of exposure to appear. Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce. All of the equipment used to produce biological agents is dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. Dissemination and dispersion are key to the effective employment of biological weapons. Many toxic organisms are subject to destruction by external forces (e.g., sunlight, explosives).
BACKGROUND Biological agents are naturally occurring microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi) or toxins that can cause disease and death in a target population. They can also attack the food supply and/or materiel of a nation. Biological weapons (BW) which project, disperse, or disseminate biological agents have two characteristics that enhance their effectiveness as weapons: (1) biological agents, other than toxins, reproduce and, therefore, a small amount of infectious agent can cause disease; (2) biological agents, other than toxins, usually require an incubation period of hours to days to manifest signs of exposure so the affected soldier is not certain whether a biological agent attack has occurred until illness sets in. The uncertainty can compromise unit cohesion and weaken U.S. force superiority. The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons and has developed a strategy of offensive strike power by other means, coupled with biological defense capability, as a suitable deterrent to potential adversaries. A nation, subnational group, or organization, or even an individual, determined to construct a biological weapon and release the agent can, with minimal financial resources and infrastructure, produce an effective weapon. Small amounts of biological material are sufficient because of the reproductive nature of microorganisms. The availability of small amounts of biological organisms, including those listed by the Australia Group (AG), in culture collections provides a major resource for such determined entities. All of these stocks are also available from natural sources, such as soil samples and infected rodents. In addition to naturally occurring organisms, genetically modified organisms may be used as biological agents. Some organisms exist primarily in repositories and may be used as biological agents (Variola Virus). It is estimated that between 10 and 10,000 virulent organisms of the AG agents are sufficient to cause illness in one individual. The number of organisms required is a function of the specific agent and the means of delivery. The delivery of a limited amount of a biological agent might be militarily significant if the agent is released in a contained environment (e.g., a closed building, submarine, or surface vessel).
There are aspects that make biological weapons agents unique and different from all other weapon systems. Whereas a subnational group would be required to have a significant infrastructure to develop nuclear devices, it would be less complicated to make biological agents. Moreover, the biological agent could be a strategic and disorganizing threat because of its ability to reproduce and the delayed manifestation of symptoms. Those delivering BW could be protected by active or passive immunization or by well-designed protective masks to protect the respiratory system from aerosols, the primary delivery mechanism. An additional concern is the relative low cost required for the production and the ease of deployment of biological agents by subnational groups and organizations for biomedical, pharmaceutical, and food production. All of the equipment used to produce biological agents is dual use. Because biological agents reproduce, only small amounts of a starter organism are needed. The use of appropriate growth media or nutrients in a cell culture system of 100 liters, or of four passes through a 25-liter system, can generate sufficient agent to infect numerous targets in a contained area (e.g., subway, contained office building). Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) require the purchase of large amounts of precursor or of fissile material to achieve threat capability. The self-generation of the biological agent is a unique element of this WMD.
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Biologically derived toxins also present a threat. The recent apprehension in the United States of an individual citizen who produced large quantities of the toxin ricin is an example of the danger related to the production of toxin WMDs by small groups. As with other chemical agents, the toxins do not reproduce and, therefore, represent a threat that differs quantitatively from biological agents. 1. History of Biological Weapons Crude forms of biological warfare have been employed since 300 B.C., when the decaying corpses of animals and humans were placed near water and food supplies of adversaries. Over the years, different diseases, including plague and smallpox, were used as the agent. Catapults were one vehicle for introduction of the infected tissue. Other vehicles, including blankets, have been employed to transmit smallpox to a target population. World War I saw the development of biological warfare strategies. Cholera and plague were thought to be used in Italy and Russia while anthrax was presumably used to infect animals in Romania. A consequence of such events was the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfareknown as the Geneva Protocol. This protocol banned the use of biological agents in warfare but not research, development, production, or stockpiling of such agents. With the advent of World War II, rapid developments occurred in biological warfare capability in the United States and other nations. In February 1942, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences established a Biological Warfare Committee, chaired by Edwin B. Fred of the University of Wisconsin. The administration of the biological warfare effort was placed under civilian supervision: Dr. George Merck directed the advisory group, and Ira Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin became the scientific director. In 1943, Fort Detrick, Maryland, became the site of these activities, as Camp Detrick. In Canada, Sir Fredrick Banting, Dr. J.R. Collys, and Dr. Charles Best led the biological warfare capability effort. The technologies examined at Fort Detrick included pathogen identification, modes of transmission, infection, detection, public health measures, containment, rapid drying of organisms, and packing for delivery. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the U.S. unilaterally renounced biological warfare. Biological weapon stockpiles and their associated munitions were destroyed following the preparation of an environmental impact statement and review by both federal and state authorities and the public. Low targeting capability, the potential for catastrophic outcome on civilian populations, and public antipathy to biological weaponry were factors in the renunciation of biological warfare. In 1972, there was international agreement to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction [Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)]. Concern over USSR compliance with the Convention arose with the sudden outbreak of anthrax cases in Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinenberg) in 1979.
The early 1980s saw renewed discussion of the utility of biological weapons as strategic weapons. For example, information became publicly available concerning studies of biological agents in Japan and the studies on the effects of infectious agents on human subjects in Harbin, Manchuria, during World War II. The number of infectious agents used on human populations was about 25 (e.g., plague, typhus, smallpox, tularemia, gas gangrene, tetanus, cholera, anthrax, tick encephalitis). In 1941, the Japanese deployed plague-infected fleas in Hunan Province, resulting in the death of several hundred persons. The difficulty encountered by the Japanese was the development of an effective delivery system. In recent years, newly emerging infectious diseases have complicated the picture. They include AIDS, prion disorders, and several hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola. These diseases and the possible reduction in immunocompetence have fostered an increased role of the United States and international agencies in monitoring disease outbreaks. Several federal agencies in the United States are responsible for the health and protection of the population, including military personnel, from infectious diseases. The civilian agencies include the National Institutes entities that address health care issues of primary importance to the defense community: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), and the Naval Medical Research Units. 2. Recent Developments Affecting Biological Warfare Capability The introduction of modern biotechnology during the past 25 years has markedly changed the qualitative and quantitative impact that biological warfare, or the threat of such warfare, can have on military forces and urban communities. This new technology provides the potential capability of (1) developing biological agents that have increased virulence and stability after deployment; (2) targeting the delivery of organisms to populations; (3) protecting personnel against biological agents; (4) producing, by genetic modification, pathogenic organisms from non-pathogenic strains to complicate detection of a biological agent; (5) modifying the immune response system of the target population to increase or decrease susceptibility to pathogens; and (6) producing sensors based on the detection of unique signature molecules on the surface of biological agents or on the interaction of the genetic materials in such organisms with gene probes. The specific technologies used in realizing these capabilities include (1) cell culture or fermentation; (2) organism selection; (3) encapsulation and coating with straight or crosslinked biopolymers; (4) genetic engineering; (5) active or passive immunization or treatment with biological response modifiers; (6) monoclonal antibody production; (7) genome data bases, polymerase chain reaction equipment, DNA sequencers, and the rapid production of gene probes; and (8) the capability of linking gene probes and monoclonal antibodies on addressable sites in a reproducible manner. New technologies related to biological warfare are emerging rapidly. The technology of monoclonal antibody production has existed only since 1975, while the technology of genetic engineering has existed since the 1980s. Technology for
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sequencing the genomes of organisms has changed so dramatically that the rate of sequencing has increased by several orders of magnitude since 1994. All of these reflect the enormous change in information databases and in technology including biotechnology, computer equipment, processes, and networking of research teams. Information that will emerge from the human genome effort is likely to increase our understanding of the susceptibilities of different populations to disease and stresses of various sources. Such information may increase the proliferation of BW agents, particularly in areas with active ethnic rivalries, and lead to a new variant of ethnic cleansing. The rapid rate of development reflects to some degree the national and international investment in this technology. The level of federal spending in the United States in the entire biotechnology area during 1994 approximated 4 billion dollars. The private sector invested approximately 7 billion dollars during the same year. This investment and the rate of information accrual indicates that biological technology that can be used for peaceful and military purposes is increasing in capability at a rate exceeding most other technologies. The pharmaceutical industry is relying on biotechnology for new therapeutic products to improve prophylaxis and therapy for many different diseases and is concerned that these new technologies not fall into the hands of potential adversaries. Figure 3.0-1 portrays graphically the explosive growth of applicable biotechnologies. The illustration was prepared from a broad field of knowledge and applications, which, in aggregate, are doubling every 18 months. Examples of sustained geometric growth include monoclonal antibodies, combinatorial chemistry, and gene probes, which are explained below. - Monoclonal Antibodies - In the early 1970s, Kohler and Milstein developed a procedure to produce antibodies for a single antigenic epitope. An epitope is the region of a molecule that initiates the production of a single antibody species. The dimensions of an epitope approximate a surface area 50 50 Angstroms. These antibodies are called monoclonal antibodies. With quality control, these antibodies can be produced in gram quantities in a highly reproducible manner, and therefore, they are suited for industrial uses. The industries currently using monoclonal antibodies include medical diagnostics, food, environmental protection, and cosmetics. - Combinatorial Chemistry - This is a technique for rapidly synthesizing large numbers of peptides, polynucleotides, or other low molecular weight materials. These materials are synthesized on a solid-state matrix and in an addressable form so that materials of known sequence can be accessed readily. The materials can function as receptors, pharmaceuticals, or sensor elements. The technique, developed by Merrifield in the 1970s, has been essential for the growth of combinatorial chemistry.
- Gene Probes - These are polynucleotides that are 2030 units bend, under stringent conditions, complementory nucleic acid fragments characteristic of biological agents. These units provide the basis of rapid detection and identification. OVERVIEW This section of the MCTL is concerned with technologies related to the development, integration and deployment of biological weapons . The infectious organisms discussed are those identified by the AG (see Figure 3.0-2). The AG list does not include every known organism that could be used in a biological weapon. Toxins will be considered in the biological weapons section consistent with the AG and the BWC of 1972. Several aspects of biological warfare will be covered: (1) the identity of the biological organism or toxins; (2) equipment and materials necessary for the production, containment, purification, quality control, and stabilization of these agents; (3) the technologies for the dissemination and dispersion of biological agents; (4) equipment for detection, warning, and identification of biological agents; and (5) individual and collective biological defense systems. RATIONALE Biological weapons are unique because the effects from pathogenic organisms, except toxins, are not seen for hours to days after dissemination. If adequate detection devices are not available, the first indication of a biological weapon attack could be symptoms in target personnel. At this point, treatment propylaxis and therapy is often ineffective. In addition, incapacitated troops require tremendous logistical support (four or five medical corpsmen and associated personnel for each ill person); thus, incapacitants may be preferable to lethal agents. Also, besides deaths caused by infectious agents, the psychophysical damage suffered by troops who believe they have been exposed to a biological attack could markedly impair combat functions. The perception is almost as significant as the reality. The affected soldier is not certain whether a biological attack has occurred and could be psychologically, if not physically, impaired. The biological technology industry is information intensive rather than capital intensive. Data on technologies involved in biological production are widely available in the published literature. These technologies are dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. New technologies, such as genetic engineering, are more likely to affect fabrication, weaponization, or difficulty of detection than to produce a supergerm of significantly increased pathogenicity.
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(Height of line indicates rate of developmenttime to double) 5 yr (Arrows show enabling technologies) 1940 1950 1960
Solid State Peptide and Nucleic Acid Synthesis Vaccines Monoclonal Antibodies
1 yr
6 Months
1970 1970
1980
1990
2000
Uses
Pathogen Masking Detection
Nucleic Acid Probes Chimeric Monoclonal Antibodies
Sensors Personal Protection Vaccines Pathogen Masking
1972
Sensors DNA Engineering
1984
Multiarray Biopathogen Detector Sensors, Human Genome, Pathogen, Soldier Selection, Active Protection
1982
Pathogen Efficacy
1992
Robust Toxicant or Pathogen Disease suscepitibiliity Stress Susceptibility Toxicant Resistance Personal Protection Therapeutics Treatment Enhance Human Performance and Protection Pathogen Masking Detection
Human Genome Project Encapsulation and Stabilization Antibiotics Bioactive Peptides Cell Growth Chambers/Fermenters
1989
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Figure 3.0-1. Progress in Applicable Biotechnologies
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Viruses
V1. V2. V3. V4. V5. V6. V7. V8. V9. V10. V11. V12. V13. V14. V15. V16. V17. V18. V19. V20. Chikungunya virus Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus Dengue fever virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus Ebola virus Hantaan virus Junin virus Lassa fever virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Machupo virus Marburg virus Monkey pox virus Rift Valley fever virus Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus) Variola virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Western equine encephalitis virus White pox Yellow fever virus Japanese encephalitis virus B1. B2. B3. B4. B5. B6. B7. B8. B9. B10. B11. B11. B13.
Bacteria
Bacillus anthracis Brucella abortus Brucella melitensis Brucella suis Chlamydia psittaci Clostridium botulinum Francisella tularensis Burkholderia mallei (pseudomonas mallei) Burkholderia pseudomallei (pseudomonas pseudomallei) Salmonella typhi Shigella dysenteriae Vibrio cholerae Yersinia pestis
Toxins T1. Botulinum toxins T2. Clostridium perfringens toxins T3. Conotoxin T4. Ricin T5. Saxitoxin T6. Shiga toxin T7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins T8. Tetrodotoxin T9. Verotoxin T10. Microcystin (Cyanginosin) T11. Aflatoxins Viruses (Warning List) WV1. WV2. WV3. WV4. WV5. WV6. WV7. WV8. Kyasanur Forest virus Louping ill virus Murray Valley encephalitis virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus Oropouche virus Powassan virus Rocio virus St Louis encephalitis virus Bacteria (Warning List) WB1. WB2. WB3. Clostridium perfringens Clostridium tetani Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype 0157 and other verotoxinproducing serotypes Legionella pneumophila Yersinia pseudotuberculosis
Genetically Modified Microorganisms G1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the core list. G2. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the core list or their subunits.
Rickettsiae R1. R2. R3. R4. Coxiella burnetti Bartonella quintana (Rochlimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana) Rickettsia prowasecki Rickettsia rickettsii
WB4. WB5.
(contd) Figure 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents
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Genetically Modified Microorganisms WG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the warning list. WG2. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the warning list or their subunits. Toxins (Warning List) WT1. WT2. WT3. WT4. WT5. WT6. WT7. Abrin Cholera toxin Tetanus toxin Trichothecene mycotoxins Modecin Volkensin Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin) Animal Pathogens Viruses: AV1. African swine fever virus AV2. Avian influenza virus AV3. Bluetongue virus AV4. Foot and mouth disease virus AV5. Goat pox virus AV6. Herpes virus (Aujeszkys disease) AV7. Hog cholera virus (synonym: Swine fever virus) AV8. Lyssa virus AV9. Newcastle disease virus AV10. Peste des petits ruminants virus
Animal Pathogens (contd) Viruses (contd): AV11. Porcine enterovirus type 9 (synonym: Swine vesicular disease virus) AV12. Rinderpest virus AV13. Sheep pox virus AV14. Teschen disease virus AV15. Vesicular stomatitis virus Bacteria: AB3. Mycoplasma mycoides Genetically Modified Microorganisms: AG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from animal pathogens on the list.
Plant Pathogens (contd) Fungi (contd): PF5. Puccinia striiformis (syn. Pucciniaglumarum) PF6. Pyricularia grisea/Pyricularia oryzae Genetically Modified Microorganisms: PG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens on the list.
Awareness Raising Guidelines Bacteria: PWB1. Xanthomonas campestris pv. oryzae PWB2. Xylella fastidiosa Fungi: PWF1. Deuterophoma tracheiphila (syn. Phoma tracheiphila) PWF2. Monilia rorei (syn. Moniliophthora rorei) Viruses: PWV1. Banana bunchy top virus Genetically Modified Microorganisms: PWG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens identified on the awareness raising list.
Plant Pathogens Bacteria: PB1. Xanthomonas albilineans PB2. Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri Fungi: PF1. Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans (Colletotrichum kanawae) PF2. Cochliobolus miyabeanus (Helminthosporium oryzae) PF3. Microcyclus ulei (syn. Dothidella ulei) PF4. Puccinia graminis (syn. Puccinnia graminis f. sp. tritici)
Figure 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents (contd)
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While laboratory-scale capability for production of biological agents is sufficient for achieving most terrorist purposes, large-scale production for military purposes can be achieved easily in dual-use facilities. All of the equipment needed for large-scale production of offensive biological agents is dual use and available on the international market. Although a typical vaccine plant costs in excess of $50 million, a less elaborate fermentation plant that could produce biological agents could be built for less than $10 million. If disseminated properly, only a small amount of biological agent is needed to infect numerous people. Proper dissemination, however, is a non-trivial problem because the agent must be dispersed in 1 to 10 micron particles and be inhaled by the target population. Symptoms normally take hours to days to appear. Detection is key to implementation of protective measures. Since biological organisms are living, they have the potential to reproduce. They can continue to affect people for extended periods of time. However, they are subject to being negated by sunlight and the environment, but most can be effectively stabilized against adverse environmental effects. Stress from explosive dissemination and/or missile firing can reduce efficiency to about the 5-percent level, which is why aerosol dissemination by pressurized gases was adopted by munition designers in the old U.S. program. Dissemination efficiencies of up to 70 percent were achieved, with 30 to 50 percent being produced routinely. Vaccines can be produced to defend against biological agent use; however, to produce the vaccine, the organism being employed by an adversary must be known. Although some of the proliferation concerns for biological weapons are similar to those for other WMD, some concerns are unique. The unique features include containment of the agent during production, stabilization and dispersion of the agents, detection, identification, and warning. All these aspects are important because biological agents are relatively easy to hide. The diffusion of information, technologies, and raw materials associated with biological and pharmaceutical processing are almost always dual use and, therefore, raise non-proliferation issues.
Because of the low financial costs of acquiring equipment for biological agent production, the implications for the proliferation of production and dispersion are clear: developing nations can attack targets effectively with biological agents. Defensive technologies are of interest because changes in vaccine production or other self-protection measures could presage an offensive attack. Stabilization and dispersion are proliferation concerns because these technologies increase the efficacy of biological agents. Detection, identification, and warning technologies can be used to support efforts to mask the presence of biological agents even though these technologies do not pose a direct threat. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3) Most industrialized nations manufacture equipment and materials that can be used for the production, containment, purification, quality control, and stabilization of biological agents and for their dissemination and dispersion. Most developed nations manufacture the equipment for identifying these agents, but the means for detection and warning are less readily available. All these technologies are dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. The AG group of biological agents are readily available in the natural environment and from culture collections in the industrialized and in some developing nations. The recent outbreaks of Ebola in Africa and Hanta (Hantaan) virus infections in Asia and North and South America are evidence of occurrence in the natural environment. In addition, these organisms can be obtained from national collections [e.g., American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and European collection]. The ATCC and European collections do not necessarily share information. Many collections of organisms recognized as potential biological agents and included in the AG list exist throughout the world and are made available with minimal monitoring of use or transport. This is particularly the case in the open societies of the United States, Europe, and Japan, as was documented in 1995 by a case occurring in Ohio. The nutrients, growth media, and small-size fermenters are readily available.
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Country
Sec 3.1 Biological Material Production
Sec 3.2 Stabilization, Dispersion and Weapons Testing
Sec 3.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification
Sec 3.4 Biological Defense Systems
Australia1 Austria1 Belgium 1 Brazil Bulgaria Canada1 China Cuba Czech Republic1 Denmark1 Egypt Finland1 France1 Germany1 Greece1 Hungary1 India Iran Iraq Israel Italy1 Japan1 Korea (North) Korea (South) 1 Libya Netherlands1 Norway1 Pakistan Poland1 Romania1 Russia Slovak Republic1 South Africa Spain1 Sweden1 Switzerland1 Syria Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom 1 United States1
1
Indicates that the nation is a member of the Australia Group (AG). exceeds sufficient level sufficient level some limited
Figure 3.0-3. Biological Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 3.1BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW The previous section addressed the various organisms that might be selected for production (The AG Biological Agents). This section addresses the production of the organisms, including procedures such as culture, fermentation, viral reproduction, etc.; the stabilization of the organisms; and specific equipment used in the manufacturing process. The stages involved in the production of biological agents include selection of the organisms, large-scale production of organisms from small starter cultures, and stabilization of the organisms. The list of biological organisms and toxin products that are of concern as biological agents is derived from the AG consensus. The design of a production facility provides important information regarding whether the facility is intended to produce pharmaceutical grade products or biological weapon grade materials. Relevant design elements include containment, purification equipment, sterilization equipment, and ventilation and filtration systems. The design of a biochemical processing plant is an important signal of covert biological agent production. Containment of the biological material during processing is of special interest. There is a clear distinction between processing materials for biological or toxin agent weaponization and processing protective agents to be used for countermeasures or personnel performance enhancement. For the production of biological agents for offensive military activities, the processing containment requirement is to protect the environment from the agent because of its infectious nature. For the production of biomaterials, such as vaccines, biological response modifiers, antibiotics, and anti viral agents, for defensive military activities, the containment requirement is to protect the processed biomaterial from contaminating materials in the environment. Effectiveness of countermeasures is enhanced by achieving high levels of purity and cleanliness in the product before it is administered to friendly personnel. By contrast, an unpurified biological agent that will be used in BW is generally more stable than the purified agent that is needed to produce vaccines and biological response modifiers (BRMs). Consequently, a proliferant does not require a high level of purity if production is for BW use only. Generation of biological agents requires fermenters or single cell production capabilities with operational conditions identified in the MCTL, including smooth, highly polished stainless steel surfaces, self-containment capability, and negative pressure conditions. The primary difference between the production requirements for biological weapons and non-military commercial purposes lies in containment and contamination. During biological agent production, efforts are generally made to avoid contaminating the environment with the organism. Less concern arises about the
Highlights
Biological weapon production is similar to commercial production of biological materials. With the exception of toxins, biological organisms can multiply. Containment of the organisms is critical. Design of the plant can indicate covert biological agent production.
contamination of the product. Conversely, the pharmaceutical, brewing, and biotechnology industries are most concerned about protecting the purity and quality of the product. This concern is reflected in the nature of the sealing joints, positive or negative pressure chambers, and containment of venting systems. Utilities involving clean steam, sterile air, and inert gas supply are most critical for containment in the processing of biologically based materials for human use, which must meet good manufacturing practices (GMP). Clean steam, generated from a purified water supply, must be supplied to all processing equipment having direct contact with the product to ensure sterility and prevent the influx of environmental contaminants. Steam sterilization is accomplished before product processing by direct supply to the equipment. Steam is supplied to the equipment seals (e.g., sample ports, agitator shafts, raw material addition ports) during processing as a primary barrier. Equally important is the removal of collapsed steam or condensate formed on the equipment. This prevents the formation of pockets of standing water, which promote bacterial growth, and maintains the high temperature necessary for sterilization. The collected contaminated condensate can be channeled to an area for final sterilization or inactivation before it is released into the environment. Efficient steam supply and condensate removal requires pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, venting, and the capability for free draining of all lines. Supplying sterile, inert gases to processing equipment is a method of containment. This can protect oxygen-sensitive biomaterials and prevent aerosol generation of toxic products. Inert gases, such as nitrogen, helium, and argon, are usually supplied directly to processing equipment through sterile, in-line filters, maintaining a pressurized system or providing an inert blanket over the product in processing vessels. To attain a higher level of containment, many bioprocessing industries have employed greater degrees of automation. Potential contamination of purified product, human exposure to toxic products or constituents, and the risk of human error are
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minimized. Processing facilities make use of state-of-the-art computerized distributed control systems (ABB, Modicon, Allen Bradley Corp.), which allow automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging and trending. Another component in bioprocessing is the design of ventilation within the primary and secondary barriers of a process area. Ventilation at primary barriers (i.e., barriers separating product from equipment operators and the rest of the processing area) is accomplished with dedicated, in-line air/gas membrane filters. Ventilation across secondary barriers requires more complicated air handling system design to allow for the maintenance of clean areas (rated by the number of particles per volume of air) and maintenance of positive or negative pressure between the processing area and the outside environment or between different processing areas in the same facility. Equipment used in these designs includes high efficiency fans and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The procedure used for the actual replication of an organism is a function of the organism itself. Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2 include several techniques, including cell culture, fermentation, viral replication, recombinant DNA, and powdering and milling. Cell culture is necessary for the reproduction of pathogenic viruses and Rickettsiae since they will not reproduce outside a living cell (e.g., chick embryo or tissue cultures). Single cell growth chambers, including fermentation, are used for the production of bacteria and bacterial toxins, although some bacteria (e.g., plague bacteria) can also be cultivated in living animals. Recombinant DNA techniques are a preferred method to produce rare animal toxins. Because of the complexity of this technique, the capability is not as widespread as the others. Powdering and milling is the technique generally used to produce BW and toxin weapons (TW) agent particles having diameters less than or equal to 10 m, the size most effective for respiratory delivery. RATIONALE Figure 3.0-2 lists the naturally occurring pathogens and toxins potentially used as BW agents. Whereas the majority of these agents have no current dual-use applications, a small number do have biomedical roles other than those in vaccine production. The highly toxic botulinal toxin A, produced by Clostridium botulinum, shows medicinal promise in blocking involuntary muscle spasms or weakening a muscle for therapeutic purposes. Five medical uses of toxins that might be used in BW have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Immune protection against these agents is important because they occur naturally in some regions of the world. Toxins and pathogens that affect animals, such as anthrax, brucella, plague, and tularemia, are widespread. Vaccines are widely produced and administered. The issue of the need for the same toxic agent for either BW/TW production or countermeasure vaccine production emphasizes the dual-use nature of the technologies. Indeed, initial processing of agents and processing of their associated vaccines only differ by a few steps (e.g., the degree of purification and the type of containment used).
The qualitative and quantitative impact of biological warfare, or the threat of such warfare, on military forces and urban communities has changed markedly in the past 20 years. The production techniques described in this section have resulted in more virulent strains of organisms and the genetic modification of non-pathogenic organisms to pathogenic strains with virulent characteristics. The implications of genetic engineering for chemical and biological warfare are far-reaching. Genetic engineering provides the potential for improved virulence by the incorporation of genes (i.e., specific strands of DNA) permitting increased production of a pathogen or toxin. Thus, as much as 100 times more pathogen or toxin could be produced per cell than that which could be produced by naturally occurring strains. Cells that normally do not produce toxins may be altered to produce toxins for biological weapon development. Conversely, known pathogens or toxins may be genetically inactivated for vaccine countermeasure development. Cells can also be modified to produce antibodies directly for passive immunization against specific infectious agents. As with the human immune system, many current biowarfare detection kits depend on antibodies reacting with the antigenic surface coatings of pathogenic bacteria or viruses. Thus, modified non-pathogens can be used to mask the agent from the immune-based detector and, potentially, from the human immune system itself to increase the agents effectiveness. General robustness or survivability of a pathogen under the environmental stresses of temperature, ultraviolet (UV) radiation, and desiccation (drying) can also be genetically improved to promote stability during dissemination; nutrient additives are used to enhance survival of selected biological agents in aerosols. Controlled persistence of a pathogen to permit survivability under specified environmental conditions may eventually be possible. The potential also exists for the development of so-called conditional suicide genes, which could program an organism to die off following a predetermined number of replications in the environment. Thus, an affected area may be safely reoccupied after a predetermined period of time. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-2) Seed stocks of the AG group of biological agents are readily available in the natural environment and from culture collections in the industrialized and in some developing nations. The recent outbreaks of Ebola in Africa and Hanta virus infections in Asia and North and South America are evidence of this. In addition, these organisms may be obtained from national collections (e.g., American Type Culture Collection [ATCC] and European collections). Most industrialized nations manufacture equipment and materials necessary for the production, containment, purification, and quality control of these materials. Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the UK, and the United States are the most advanced countries in the techniques of manufacturing large quantities of biological agents and protective vaccines and materials required for prophylaxis and therapy.
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Table 3.1-1. Biological Material Production Technology Parameters

Technology
HUMAN PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2
Viruses
Any quantity is a concern. Less than 20 pounds can incapacitate humans in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 220 pounds can incapacitate humans in a 100-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 600 pounds can incapacitate humans in a 100-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 100 pounds can incapacitate humans in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern.
AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV
Not applicable
Cell culture apparatus; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Fermenters; cell cultures; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Fermenters; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Cell culture apparatus; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Infectivity of cultured organisms plus items in four entries above.
Not applicable
Bacteria
Not applicable
Not applicable
Toxins
Not applicable
Not applicable
Rickettsiae
Not applicable
Not applicable
Genetically Modified Microorganisms
Not applicable
Not applicable
ANIMAL PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2
Viruses
Any quantity is a concern. Less than 20 pounds can incapacitate animals in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 220 pounds can incapacitate animals in a 100-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern.
AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV
Not applicable
Cell culture apparatus; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Fermenters; cell cultures; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Infectivity of cultured organisms plus items in two entries above
Not applicable
Bacteria
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
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(contd)
Table 3.1-1. Biological Material Production Technology Parameters (contd)

PLANT PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2
Viruses
Any quantity is a concern. Less than 30 pounds can affect plants in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 30 pounds can affect plants in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern. Less than 50 pounds can affect plants in a 10-km2 area. Any quantity is a concern.
AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1C; USML XIV AG List; CCL Cat 2B
Not applicable
Cell culture apparatus; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Fermenters; cell cultures; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Fermenters; cell cultures; laminar flow facilities; containment equipment; biological agent detectors Infectivity of cultured organisms plus items in three entries above.
Not applicable
Bacteria
Not applicable
Not applicable
Fungi
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
EQUIPMENT
Containment Facilities
Equipment having three or more physical barriers between the agent and the employee.
HEPA filters
Toxic agent detectors
Not applicable
Fermenters
Having: AG List; a capacity > 100 liters; CCL Cat 2B multiple sealing joints; capable of in situ sterilization in a closed state. Capable of processing 5-liter batches Capable of processing 20-liter batches AG List; CCL Cat 2B AG List; CCL Cat 2B
Stainless steel; titanium; glass
Not applicable
Centrifugal Separators Cross-flow Filtration Equipment
Smooth surface; Toxic agent detectors Aerosol containment Smooth surface; Toxic agent detectors Aerosol containment
Not applicable Not applicable
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Table 3.1-2. Biological Material Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications HUMAN PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2 Alternative Technologies
Viruses Bacteria Toxins Rickettsiae Genetically Modified Microorganisms
Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination
Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons
ANIMAL PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Viruses Bacteria Genetically Modified Microorganisms
Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination
Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons
PLANT PATHOGENS See Figure 3.0-2
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Bacteria Fungi Genetically Modified Microorganisms
Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination Containment and dissemination
Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons Biological agents in biological weapons
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Note: The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons; however, to perfect defensive procedures, it is necessary to understand the organisms. (contd)
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Table 3.1-2. Biological Material Production Reference Data (contd)

EQUIPMENT
Containment Facilities
Protection of the environment and the employee.
Containment, isolation, and production of biological agents
Programs to automate process, allowing automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging Programs to automate process, allowing automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging Programs to automate process, allowing automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging None identified
Fermenters
Cleanliness of facilities and contamination of the agent
Centrifugal Separators
Cleanliness of facilities and contamination of the agent
Cross-flow Filtration Equipment
Quality of the filters and amount of air-flow
Note: The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons; however, to perfect defensive procedures and intelligence-gathering procedures, it is necessary to understand the manufacturing procedures for these organisms.
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SECTION 3.2STABILIZATION, DISSEMINATION, AND DISPERSION

OVERVIEW Biological weapons production can be divided into three distinct phases: biological agent production (see Section 3.1), stabilization, and dissemination/dispersion. This section discusses the latter two parts. Stabilization and dissemination/dispersion are important issues because of the susceptibility of the biological agents to environmental degradation, not only in storage but also in application. This is a problem whether the end use is for biological weapons, pharmaceutics, cosmetics, pesticides, or foodrelated purposes and is related to the susceptibility of the organisms to inactivation of the biochemical compound by the environment. This loss of bioactivity can result from exposure to high physical and chemical stress environments, such as high surface area at air-water interfaces (frothing), extreme temperatures or pressures, high salt concentrations, dilution, or exposure to specific inactivating agents. This section discusses various techniques of stabilization, such as freeze drying and ultra freezing, and various techniques of dissemination/dispersion, such as spray devices, cluster bombs, etc. Section 1 of this document discusses modes of delivery, such as cruise missiles, airplanes, and artillery shells . The primary means of stabilization for storage or packaging are initial concentration; direct freeze drying (lyophilization); direct spray drying; formulation into a special stabilizing solid, liquid, or sometimes gaseous solution; and deep freezing. Methods of concentration include vacuum filtration, ultrafiltration, precipitation, and centrifugation. Freeze drying is the preferred method for long-term storage of bacterial cultures because freeze-dried cultures can be easily rehydrated and cultured via conventional means. Many freeze-dried cultures have remained viable for 30 years or more. Deep or ultra freezing of biological products is another long-term storage technique for species and materials not amenable to freeze drying. The method involves storage of the contained products in liquid nitrogen refrigerators (196 Celsius) or ultra-low temperature mechanical freezers (70 Celsius). Mechanical freezing systems should include precautionary back-up freezers and electrical generators. Cryoprotective agents, such as dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), glycerol, sucrose, lactose, glucose, mannitol, sorbitol, dextran, polyvinylpyrollidone, and polyglycol, are required to ensure cell viability during storage. A toxin agent is most effective when prepared as a freeze-dried powder and encapsulated. Such encapsulation, however, is not necessary for weaponization. Infectious biological agents are generally stabilized and then spray dried. Effective delivery of these agents must also consider the environmental effects on the agent (inactivation). Dissemination (delivery) of biological agents in biological

Highlights
Stabilization is critical to effective dissemination. The environment can affect the survival of the organism. Explosive delivery means can result in inactivation of the organism.
warfare has been traditionally accomplished by aerosol dispersal using either spray devices or through incorporation of the agents with explosive devices (cluster bombs, missile warheads with submunitions designed for extended biological agent dispersal). The latter, however, must be approached with caution since explosive, heat-generating entities can inactivate the organisms/toxins. The preferred approach is dispersion via the use of a pressurized gas in a submunition. Other preferred platforms from an efficiency standpoint include small rotary-wing vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft fitted with spray tanks, drones, bomblets, cruise missiles, and high-speed missiles with bomblet warheads. Fixed-wing aircraft and ground vehicles with aerosol generators also make excellent delivery systems. Aerosolization of biological agents using spray devices is the method of choice since the extreme physical conditions associated with explosive dissemination can completely inactivate the biological agent. (Aerosol dispersal allows for control of particle size and density to maximize protection from environmental degradation and uptake of the enclosed biological agents in the lungs of targeted populations.) Aerosol particles with a diameter of 115 m mass median diameter (MMD) are readily absorbed by lung cells following inhalation, the primary mode of infection by most biological agents. Some agents can also act following ingestion of contaminated food or water. However, infectious agents generally do not penetrate intact skin. Equipment used with aerosol dispersal of biological agents includes spray nozzles or aerosol delivery systems capable of dispersing particles or droplets and compressors for initial weaponization by agent integration with compressed gas (air). For subnational or terrorist groups, the biological agents can be dispersed by manual aerosol generators. The availability of vaccines against selected biological agents may render the user immune to the effects of the agent although a suffcient dose of agent may overwhelm the vaccines protective effect. Dissemination efficiency rates of aerosol delivery systems are in the range of 4060 percent. Cruise missiles, aircraft carrying gravity bombs or spray attachments,
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and fixed-wing or rotor craft with attached sprayers are all vehicles for delivery of biological agents. The delivery of biological agents by explosive devices is much less efficient (~15 percent). In a theater environment, the effective use of BW agents requires analysis of meteorological conditions and the mapping of the target. RATIONALE Biological agents have some unique characteristics that make weaponizing them attractive. Most biological weapons consist of living organisms (toxins are the exception) and, thus, can replicate once disseminated. A relatively small group of persons, using single individuals deployed in a military staging area, could bring about the infection of a large percentage of targeted persons. The clinical illness could develop within a day of dispersal and last for as long as 23 weeks. The mission and political impact of such a strike on a combat or constabulary force of 10,000 soldiers may compromise operations. In a civil situation, major subway systems in a densely populated urban area could be targeted for biological agent strike, resulting in massive political and social disorganization. Approximately 10 grams of anthrax spores can kill as many persons as a ton of sarin. Under appropriate meteorological conditions and with an aerosol generator delivering 110 micron particle-size droplets, a single aircraft can disperse 100 kg of anthrax over a 300 km2 area and theoretically cause
3 million deaths in a population density of 10,000 people per km2. The mean lethal inhalator dosage is 10 nanograms. On the other hand, some biological agent characteristics can severely limit the effectiveness of BW, which consist of living organisms. A technique to stabilize (protect) the organisms from adverse environments is essential if the weapons are to maintain their effectiveness over some period of time. This requirement of stabilization also extends to the methods of delivery since the organisms are very susceptible to degradation in the environments associated with delivery systems. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3) Any country having pharmaceutical, cosmetic, or advanced food storage industries will have stabilization facilities similar to those that could be used for biological weapons. The ability to disseminate the biological agent over a wide area would be limited to those countries having cruise missiles or advanced aircraft. Even the smallest country or a terrorist group, however, has the capability to deliver small quantities of BW agent to a specific target. Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, the UK, and the United States have the most advanced techniques of manufacturing large quantities of biological agent and are also the most apt to have the capability to disseminate the biological agent over large areas.
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Table 3.2-1. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Technology Parameters

Technology
Freeze-drying Equipment
Having: steam sterilizable; a condensor capacity > 25 kg in 24 hours and < 400 kg in 24 hours Designed for aerosol challenge testing having a capacity > 0.5 cubic meter
AGList; CCL Cat 2B
Stainless steel; titanium; glass
None identified
Aerosol Inhalation Chambers
AGList; CCL Cat 2B
High efficiency filter that passes particles 0.1 to 10 m in diameter None identified
None identified
Delivery systems and Any capability is a concern spray tanks to allow bomblet dissemination Warheads for missiles Any capability is a concern
WA ML 4, 7; USML IV, XIV WA ML 4; USML IV, XIV CCL EAR 99
Spin flow and flow-forming None identified machines
Spin flow and flow-forming None identified machines None identified Validated software to predict short-term weather patterns
Development and use Any capability is a concern of accurate, shortterm weather prediction
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Table 3.2-2. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Reference Data

Freeze-drying Equipment Aerosol Inhalation Chambers
Maintaining low temperature Filters that pass 0.110 m particles and remove large quantities of debris (>20 m diameter) Delivery range, accuracy, and effect on contained organisms Delivery range, accuracy, and effect on contained organisms Dissemination of biological weapon
Stabilize biological agents for use in BW or for storage Testing aerosols for BW use
None identified Detonation-induced release of particles having uncontrolled sizes
Delivery systems and spray tanks to allow bomblet dissemination Warheads for missiles Development and use of accurate, short-term weather prediction
Delivery of both conventional weapons and Detonation-induced release of WMD particles having uncontrolled sizes Delivery of both conventional weapons and Balloon-floated devices; nonWMD fixed-wing vehicles Predict dispersion patterns of disseminated biological weapons to maximize the effect on hostile troops and, at the same time, minimize the effect on friendly troops On-site determination of wind pattern and wind flow
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SECTION 3.3DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION
OVERVIEW Detection, warning, and identification involve sensors and transduction of a detected signal to a transponder. Standoff detectors provide early, wide-area spectroscope and warning of biological agent attack. Stand-off detectors are spectroscopebased monitors of materials containing nucleic acid/protein with absorbance in the 230285 nanometer range. They can be confounded by biological material or pollen of size similar to that of the biological agent. Point detectors are used at designated locations. Most detection and warning systems are based on physical or chemical properties of biological agents. The point detectors include dipstick kits selective for some but not all AG agents (see Table 3.0-2) or multiarray sensors using antibodies generated against AG agents or gene sequences complementary to AG agents. Identification systems, which are critical to medical response, use immunochemical or gene probe techniques or mass spectral analysis. No single sensor detects all agents of interest. Detectors for biological agents must have a short response time (less than 30 minutes for biological agents) with a low false alarm rate. Detection equipment must be integrated with a command and control system to ensure an alarm is raised. Early warning is essential to avoid contamination. Agent location, intensity, and duration are crucial parameters for command decisions. Sensor systems based on physical or chemical properties of biological agents include high-performance liquid and gas chromotography, mass spectrometry, scattering Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), and ion mobility spectrometry (IMS). The basic recognition component of the sensor designed for a specific agent is generally a large molecule that binds selectively to the target agent. The recognition molecules are physically bound to a supporting surface that generates a signal (transduction) when the recognition molecule binds the biological agent. The methods for transduction include (1) changes in absorption of light at specific wavelengths; (2) changes in resonating frequency of a piezoelectrically active surface caused by mass effects; (3) changes in pathways of light movement at an interface of target agent and recognition molecules; and (4) switching of a light-conducting pathway resulting from interaction of recognition molecule with the biological agent. Recognition molecules are antibodies (association constants of 106 to 108), receptors (dissociation constant, KD, KD = <1014), or DNA sequences complementary to genetic material encoded by the biological agent.
Highlights
Reliable, quick-response sensor systems are essential for detection and warning. Identification is critical to medical response. Various physical phenomena are used to convert sensor signals to useful detection and identification information. Underlying sensor technology exists in many countries.
Biodetection systems providing limited warning and identification functions currently exist. Systems in the inventory or in the advanced stages of development warn that a biological attack has occurred and collect samples for subsequent laboratory analysis. However, no real-time, on-site detection systems are available today. The rapid growth in biotechnology is assisting in the area of improved biological defense technologies, although many of the same advances can also be used to improve biological agents. RATIONALE Early detection and warning is the first line of defense against biological agents. Detection and identification of biological agents allow commanders to take steps to avoid contamination, to determine the appropriate protection for continued operations, and to initiate proper prophylaxis and therapy to minimize casualties and performance degradation. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3) Besides the United States, several countries have a significant capability in the sensor technology that underlies detection and identification of biological agents: Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and the UK. Several other countries are just a step behind: Austria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Switzerland, and the Ukraine. The worldwide efforts to develop improved biological agent detectors are extensive.
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Table 3.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters

Technology
Immuno-based detectors Capability of detecting organisms of AG agents
WA ML 7; WA IL Cat 1A; USML XIV WA ML 7; WA IL Cat 1A; USML XIV WA ML 7; WA IL Cat 1A; USML XIV
Antibodies directed against AG list agents Polynucleotides complementary to AG gene sequences; polymers Antibodies directed against AG List agents or polynucleotides complementary to AG gene sequence
Antibody development
None identified
Gene-based probe
Capability of detecting organisms of AG agents
Gene sequence data
None identified
Molecular recognition (e.g., antigens, antibodies, enzymes, nucleic acids, oligomers, lectins, whole cells, receptors, organelles)
Capability of detecting organisms of AG agents. Can recognize weapons grade agent, by-products of its preparation or manufacturing signatures; does not recognize normally occurring environmental materials.
Coatings, films, or fibers of biopolymers or chemical polymers that bind BW agents (binding Kd less than 1 x 108)
Molecular modeling (e.g., protein and DNA sequencing)
Mass Spectrometry
Capable of scanning samples WA ML 7; of 10,000 daltons or less in WA IL Cat 1A; 30 minutes or less USML XIV Detecting hundreds of organisms WA ML 7; WA IL Cat 1A; USML XIV; CCL Cat 6 WA ML 7; WA IL Cat 1A; USML XIV WA ML 7; WA Cat 3A; USML XIV; CCL Cat 3A
None identified
Database development; portable, field-rugged mass spectroscope Database development; ion source; spectroscope capable of concentrating and analyzing 1,000 organisms None identified
IMS
None identified
Scattering LIDAR
Detect agent (liquids and aerosols) at any distance
None identified
Spectrum and background recognition algorithms Spectrum recognition algorithms
Transducers [e.g., optical, electrochemical, acoustic, piezoelectric, calorimetric, Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW); fiber-optic wave guide]
Converts recognition of agents to an optical or electrical signal; low hysteresis; optical/ electronic component processing within 30 minutes
None identified
Production equipment configured for the detection of biological agents
(contd)
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Table 3.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
Sample Collection (e.g., air, liquid, dust, soil sampling) Sample Processing (e.g., cell disruption, concentration, purification, or stabilization)
Collects and concentrates <10 m particles into liquid medium Completion within 30 minutes
WA ML 7; USML XIV WA ML 7; USML XIV
None identified
Aerosol samplers able to None identified collect 10 m diameter particles into a liquid Neg. pressure orifice Spectrum recognition devices for rupturing cell algorithm membranes or wall/ retention of nucleic acids; impact collectors; ion trap mass spectrometers capable of scanning samples below 10,000 daltons in 5 minutes or less; pyrolyzers None identified None identified
None identified
Development and use of sensor models
Specific performance of military sensors
USML XIII
Software/technical data for military systems on control lists
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Table 3.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data

Immuno-based detectors
Low cross-reaction of antibodies with non-pathogenic organisms
Confirmation and All Clear device; screening device
Light scattering (e.g., LIDAR) not specific for agent; culture and morphological characterization of the agent Light scattering (e.g., LIDAR) not specific for agent; culture and morphological characterization of the agent Light scattering (e.g., LIDAR) not specific for agent; culture and morphological characterization of the agent
Gene-based probe
Obtaining the sufficient length of nucleic acid sequence (approx. 30 to 40 polynucleotides) to define the pathogen Identifying specific epitopes or genetic sequences characteristic of threat agents; designing probes that are specific for the epitopes or sequences that are stable under the conditions of use and can be incorporated into the sensor
Characterization and identification of AG agents; enables the conversion of pathogenic to non-pathogenic organisms and vice-versa Contamination avoidance; biological agent detection; process and quality control in biological agent manufacturing
Molecular recognition (e.g., antigens, antibodies, enzymes, nucleic acids, oligomers, lectins, whole cells, receptors, organelles)
Mass Spectrometry
Requires sophisticated software; must Identification of agents know what you are looking for; extremely powerful analytical tool; training/maintenance requirements higher; requires significant power; size and weight problems Detect broad range of biological materials, including agents; short response time; semi-quantitative Alarm with potential for individual application, monitoring; early warning
Stand-off technologies including light scattering (e.g., LIDAR) not specific for agent; culture and morphological characterization of the agent Immuno-based detectors, genebased probes, and molecular recognition; culture and morphological characterization of the agent Immuno-based detectors, genebased probes, and molecular recognition; culture and morphological characterization of the agent Culture and morphological characterization of the agent
IMS
Scattering LIDAR
Background varies widely; size, power Early interrogation of suspect aerosol and weight requirements; need clouds frequency agile laser Miniaturization, stability to environment and exposure to samples; reproducibility, calibration; simplicity of use Contamination avoidance; biological, chemical agent detection
Transducers (e.g., optical, electrochemical, acoustic, piezoelectric, calorimetric, SAW; fiber optical wave guide)
Sample Collection (e.g., air, liquid, 1001,000 liters of air per minute; dust, soil sampling) sample preparation; separation and concentration of biological agent Sample Processing (e.g., cell disruption, concentration, purification, or stablization) Development and use of sensor models Sample processing while maintaining integrity of agent; automation and miniaturization; amplification techniques Clutter characteristics; specific sensor techniques for clutter rejection/ sub-clutter target detection/identification
Contamination avoidance; biological agent detection; process and quality control. Contamination avoidance; biological agent detection; process and quality control in biological/toxin agent manufacturing. C3I; mission rehearsal
Appearance of illness in exposed personnel Appearance of illness in exposed personnel
Appearance of illness in exposed personnel
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SECTION 3.4BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS
OVERVIEW This section covers measures that can be taken to protect forces in a biological weapons environment. The protection and countermeasures issues related to biological warfare and defense concern the individual soldier and the unit. The individual soldier can be protected by providing prophylactic treatment before deployment into a risk area, by providing full respiratory protection during time periods of potential exposure [Mission-Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) gear] to the biological agent, or by using pharmacological, physical, or biomedical antidotes to threat agents shortly after exposure. Prophylaxis of the individual is generally accomplished by immunization, using the attenuated or dead biological agent, which serves as an immunogen. More recently, it has become possible to provide protection by immunizing personnel against a fragment of the toxin/biological agent. Initiating the immunization process to achieving protection usually involves a period of weeks. Multivalent vaccines and DNA vaccines are in development to enhance countermeasures against biological agents. Protection measures for a unit or group primarily rely on weather monitoring, remote probe monitoring for biological agents, and central command data acquisition, transfer, and analysis. Large-scale decontamination measures for barracks, vehicles, and other equipment are also considered unit protection. Individuals can be protected from exposure to biological weapons agents by active or passive immunization against the agents. Figure 3.0-2 has identified many of the agents of concern. A nations capability to use a biological agent should be limited by its ability to provide protection against the agent for its forces and civilian population. A proliferant may not recognize such a limit. In addition, administering biological response modifiers (BRMs) to personnel at the appropriate time can mobilize the immune system in a normal individual. This will reduce the likelihood that exposure to a biological or toxin agent will degrade the individuals function or result in disease or death. These performance enhancers (BRMs) are discussed in detail below. BRMs or immunomodulators are biomolecules with the ability to enhance or diminish the immune response of the body. During the last decade, several BRMs (e.g., interferons, interleukins) have been identified. When injected, they enhance the immune response of the human subject to a given antigen (virus or bacterium). Derivatives of these immune enhancing agents can be administered to personnel to improve performance efficiency. Several naturally occurring proteins, including interferons and interleukins, function as immunostimulating BRMs. In addition to naturally occurring BRMs such as
Highlights
A proliferant would require some type of BW defensive capability for protection during employment and defense against a counterattack. Vaccines are possible but the agent must be known (requires lead time for full protection). Detection and identification are key to determine appropriate defensive measures to take after an attack. A mask is sufficient to prevent a majority of biological agents from infecting personnel. Biotechnology offers potential for enhanced protection in the future.
interferons and interleukins, immuno-enhancing drugs, such as arsphenamine and cefodizime, act to stimulate natural immune response. These drugs are used widely in medicine following chemotherapy and for treatment of various autoimmune diseases. Growth factors for cells of the hematopoetic immune system have been found useful for ameliorating immunosuppression conditions. BRMs can be administered via conventional methods, using encapsulation technology for mass treatment through aerosols or using controlled release systems for long-term internal treatment. Although the immune system enhancers are of potential benefit, they may have undesired side effects, such as fever and malaise, that can degrade combat performance. Anti-idiotype antibodies can be used to initiate immunization in forces against toxic biological agents. Immunization with the anti-idiotype can induce production of antibodies that recognize and bind the biological agent specifically and selectively. In the most favorable scenario, the human subject would be completely protected immunologically and yet never be exposed to attenuated biological or toxin agent. Immunosuppressants are one class of BRMs that show promise in offensive biological warfare. These are substances that cause subjects to become immunocompromised or more susceptible to infection and, therefore, can be used directly or in concert with other encapsulated chemical or biochemical weapons for diminishing an adversarys capabilities. These substances include pharmaceuticals, such as
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cyclosporin, rapamycin, and FK506, which are useful in chemotherapy treatments for various cancers and in the prevention of organ, bone marrow, or skin graft rejection. Biological agent protection requires only respiratory and eye protection rather than the complete MOPP gear required for chemical protection. The protective garment requirements include resistance to the penetration of biological weapon or toxin materials, filtration of inflow air to remove particles containing the agents, and cooling of the interior compartment. Current clothing and mask systems used for protection against biological agents act as a barrier between the agent and the respiratory system or mucosal tissues of the target. They do not inactivate the agent. For biological protection, such clothing is sufficient but is not comfortable. Visual field of view is decreased and the head mask results in discomfort because of temperature increase and fogging. RATIONALE Biological defense systems technologies have been included for two reasons. First, an aggressor can be expected to have some standard of protection for the force employing BW. Standards of protection could vary from minimal to sophisticated, but all should be considered, especially those that allow a proliferant to feel secure in
offensive operations. Secondly, an attacker would have to be prepared for a counterattack in kind (depending on the opponent). Self-protection defensive measures would be easiest to take in an offensive attack mode. The attacker would know in advance what biological weapon(s) would be employed and could immunize those that might come in contact with the organism(s). Protective masks could be worn to provide additional protection. When being attacked, a country would encounter problems similar to those faced by the United States: unknown agents being used at an unspecified place for an undetermined duration. Immunization requirements would have to be determined by intelligence reports of enemy capabilities. Some type of detection (see Section 3.3) would be needed to alert forces to take protective measures. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3) Vaccines can be produced by any country with a pharmaceutical industry. Equipment can be purchased on the open market since it is all dual use. Protective masks are made in many countries. A simple dust mask could provide significant protection as long as it was worn when being exposed to the biological agent.
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Table 3.4-1. Biological Defense Systems Technology Parameters

Technology
Production and design Any capability technology for protective masks
WA ML 7; WA Cat 1A; USML X WA ML 7; USML X
Butyl rubber; silicone rubber
Simulated agents; leak- Software for generating age testers; mannequin- facial contours face model for mask and suit design; particle-size analysis equipment Simulated agents None identified
Production and design Any capability technology for collective protection
Teflon/Kevlar laminate for biological resistance, decontaminability and environmental durability
Decontamination
Any capability
WA ML 7; USML XIV CCL EAR 99 CCL EAR 99 WA ML 7; USML XIV WA ML 7; USML XIV CCL EAR 99
Hypochlorite or simi- None identified lar bleach compound or autoclaving for sterility Target strains None identified Filter system to remove 0.1- to 15-micron particles by sieve action Portable plasma generator None identified None identified None identified Simulated agents; particle-size analysis equipment Simulated agents; recovery of infectious agent None identified
None identified
Vaccines BRMs Regenerative collective protection - Membrane filtration Regenerative collective protection - Plasma destruction Encapsulation: liposomes; polymer entrapment; micelles; emulsions; immobilization of biopolymers Antibiotics
Any capability Any capability Any capability
Any capability
None identified
Any capability
None identified
Any capability
CCL EAR 99
None identified
None identified
None identified
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Table 3.4-2. Biological Defense Systems Reference Data

Production and design technology for protective masks
Communications (microphone passthrough); respiration (air management); eye protection; composite eye lens retention system; anthropometrics; performance degradation; ability to consume fluids Affordable; deployable; adaptable to structure Volume of agent; time required; adaptability to unknown agents; environmentally sound; identification of what needs to be decontaminated; identification of decrease of toxicity to allowable level Efficacy of vaccine; efficacy of prophylaxis; pre- vs. post-exposure treatment Efficacy of prophylaxis; pre- vs. postexposure treatment Remove particles having average diameter of 0.115 m, and allow rapid flow of air Production of lightweight plasma generators (e.g., ozone that is bactericidal or inactivates viruses) Ensure release of prophylaxis and therapeutics shortly after contact with plant/animal/human tissues Inhibit cysteine proteases or cellular transport
Protective masks that are suitable in removing aerosol dispersed biological agents
Avoid contamination
Production and design technology for collective protection Decontamination
Continue to operate without degradation
Individual protection
Reduce contamination to allow military operations
Oxidizing or chlorinating chemical treatment; heat at 120 C with pressure
Vaccines
Minimize BW casualties; reconstitute forces; maintain performance standards Minimize casualties after BW attack; reconstitute forces; maintain performance standards Reduction of logistics burden; preclude inhalation of aerosolized biological agent Reduction of logistics burden; inactivate aerosolized biological agent Individual protection; decontamination; performance retention
Preclude viral or bacterial entry or maturation in target tissue Enhance immune response
BRMS
Regenerative collective protection - Membrane filtration Regenerative collective protection - Plasma destruction Encapsulation; liposomes; polymer entrapment; micelles; emulsions; immobilization of biopolymers Antibiotics
Standard filters
Standard filters
None identified
Minimize casualties after BW attack; reconstitute forces; maintain performance standards
Preclude viral or bacterial entry or maturation in target tissue
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SECTION IV CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
SECTION 4CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Scope Chemical Material Production ........................................................II-4-8 Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ..........................II-4-22 Detection, Warning, and Identification ...........................................II-4-27 Chemical Defense Systems ............................................................II-4-34
Highlights
Chemical weapons (CW) are relatively inexpensive to produce. CW can affect opposing forces without damaging infrastructure. CW can be psychologically devastating. Blister agents create casualties requiring attention and inhibiting force efficiency. Defensive measures can be taken to negate the effect of CW. Donning of protective gear reduces combat efficiency of troops. Key to employment is dissemination and dispersion of agents. CW are highly susceptible to environmental effects (temperature, winds). Offensive use of CW complicates command and control and logistics problems.
BACKGROUND Chemical weapons are defined as weapons using the toxic properties of chemical substances rather than their explosive properties to produce physical or physiological effects on an enemy. Although instances of what might be styled as chemical weapons date to antiquity, much of the lore of chemical weapons as viewed today has its origins in World War I. During that conflict gas (actually an aerosol or vapor) was used effectively on numerous occasions by both sides to alter the outcome of battles. A significant number of battlefield casualties were sustained. The Geneva Protocol, prohibiting use of chemical weapons in warfare, was signed in 1925. Several nations, the United States included, signed with a reservation forswearing only the first use of the weapons and reserved the right to retaliate in kind if chemical weapons were used against them. (Note: the United States did not ratify the Protocol until 1975). Chemical weapons were employed in the intervening period by Italy (in Ethiopia) and Japan (in Manchuria and China). Both nations were signatories to the Geneva Convention. Chemical weapons were never deliberately employed by the Allies or the Axis during World War II, despite the accumulation of enormous stockpiles by both sides. Instances of employment of chemical weapons in the local wars since then are arguable, although they were definitely used in the Iran-Iraq conflict of 198287. In January of 1993, a lengthy and detailed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in Paris by many countries. Unlike the Geneva Conventions single paragraph prohibition, the CWC attempts to define the prohibited substances, including their effects, and to establish enforcement mechanisms. In addition to banning CW use, the CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. The CWC obliges a state party to destroy chemical weapons under its possession, jurisdiction, and control; to destroy all CW it abandoned in the territory of another state party; and to destroy CW production facilities under its jurisdiction or control. On April 29, 1997, the CWC entered into force, thereby putting in place a detailed and intrusive declaration and verification regime. Russia possesses the largest acknowledged stockpile of chemical weapons and may have difficulty adhering to the CWCs destruction reuirements because of economic difficulties.
Development of chemical weapons in World War I was predominantly the adaptation of a chemical fill to a standard munition. The chemicals were commercial chemicals or variants. Their properties were, for the most part, well known. The Germans simply opened canisters of chlorine and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Shortly thereafter the French put phosgene in a projectile and this method became the principal means of delivery. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard shells for the first time and simultaneously attempted to use a solid particulate emetic, diphenyl chloroarsine, as a mask breaker. Mustard, an insidious material, penetrates leather and fabrics and inflicts painful burns on the skin. These two themes, along with significant increases in toxicity, represent a large segment of the research and development of chemical weapons that nations have pursued over the years. There is first the concept of agents that attack the body through the skin, preferably also through clothing, and more preferably through protective clothing. Along with that concept is the idea of penetrating or breaking the protective mask so that it no longer offers protection for the respiratory system. Increasing the toxicity of the chemical agent used would theoretically lower the amounts required to produce a battlefield effect. Unless this increase is significant, however, it can be masked by the inefficiencies of disseminating the agent. Consequently, later development has focused on the methods for delivering the agent efficiently to the target.
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The chemicals employed before World War II can be styled as the classic chemical weapons. They are relatively simple substances, most of which were either common industrial chemicals or their derivatives. An example is phosgene, a choking agent (irritates the eyes and respiratory tract). Phosgene is important in industry as a chlorinating material. A second example is hydrogen cyanide, a so-called blood agent (prevents transfer of oxygen to the tissues), now used worldwide in the manufacture of acrylic polymers. The industrial application of many of the classic chemical agents is recognized by the CWC and they are included on a schedule wherein few restrictions apply. They would be only marginally useful in modern warfare and generally only against an unsophisticated opponent. Moreover, large quantities would be required to produce militarily significant effects, thus complicating logistics. Blister agents or vesicants are an exception to the limited utility of classic agents. Although these materials have a relatively low lethality, they are effective casualty agents that inflict painful burns and blisters requiring medical attention even at low doses. The classic mustard is the most popular among proliferant nations since it is relatively easy to make. Mustard is generally referred to as the king of agents because of its ease of production, low cost, predictable properties, persistence, and ability to cause resource-devouring casualties rather than fatalities. Its insidious nature is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Mustard on the skin causes no immediate sensation and symptoms normally do not appear until several hours after exposure. At incapacitating levels this may be as long as 12 hours. (Contrary to the normal expectation, horrible fatalities occurred in the Iran-Iraq War because Iranian soldiers, feeling no effects, continued to wear mustard soaked clothing and inhale its fumes.) To produce immediate effects, an arsenical vesicant known as lewisite was developed in the United States. Much of the former Soviet Union vesicant stocks were mixtures of lewisite and sulfur mustard. Between the world wars the development of chemical weapons included adaptation to aircraft delivery (bombs) and exploitation of lewisite, since the more potent mustard was, from a battlefield perspective, slow in producing casualties. Independent experiments in several countries led them to consider/adopt mixtures of mustard and lewisite as fills for chemical munitions. Nerve gases, or anticholinesterase agents, were discovered by the Germans in the 1930s and developed during World War II. In 1936 during studies of possible pesticides, the German chemist Gerhard Schrader discovered what he called tabun or GA. Two years later Schrader discovered the even more toxic sarin or GB. These compounds are orders of magnitude more toxic than those used in World War I and thus represent the significant toxicity increase that changed the concept of employment. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans never exploited their technological advantage, although they did produce a large number of tabun-filled munitions. Nerve gases are liquids, not gases, which block an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) that is necessary for functions of the central nervous system. Similar in action to many
pesticides, they are lethal in much lower quantities than classic agents. The nerve gases are effective when inhaled or when absorbed by the skin (percutaneous), or both, although there are differences in effectiveness. In general, the lower the materials volatility (and hence its inhalation threat) the greater its percutaneous toxicity. Nerve agents are generally divided rather arbitrarily into G- and V-agents, although there are numerous structural variants that are potent cholinesterase inhibitors. Nerve agents known to date to have been produced for chemical warfare purposes are all organophosphorus compounds and are liquids at room temperature. The Italians, Hungarians, Japanese, French, English, Russians, and Americans, as well as the Germans, all perfected mustard, phosgene, and similar agents during World War II. Although never used in the conflict, these nations amassed such huge quantities of chemical munitions that their disposal presented a practical problem, one that would be virtually insurmountable in todays more environmentally conscious world. In those more naive times, however, the munitions simply found their way to the bottoms of almost all the worlds oceans in the holds of expendable ships. After World War II the victors took an interest in exploiting the potential of the remarkably potent nerve agents. The British, in particular, had captured small stocks of sarin (GB) and set about investigating its potential. The Soviets removed the Germans GB production plant to the Soviet Union. GB turned out to be perhaps the best of the respiratory agents, being volatile as well as exceedingly toxic. The United States designed a cluster bomb to exploit the characteristics of GB and followed this with a litany of adaptations of munitions. Artillery rockets were produced as were bombs, projectiles, and spray tanks. Many of these used the basic design of high-explosive weapons and simply changed the fill to GB. In the instance of the spray tank, it was necessary to use a polymeric thickening material so that the liquid would form large droplets and not evaporate before it reached the ground. The French, British, and Canadians all built small-scale facilities to produce the GB for testing. The United States, however, entered into full-scale production of GB, as did the Russians just a little later. The Russians also produced soman (GD), an agent the U.S. developers had decided to forswear because of its properties of being refractory to treatment above a single lethal dose. In the late 1950s, UK scientists discovered another category of nerve agents, the V-agents. These were particularly interesting in that most of them were very effective percutaneously and represented an effective way to circumvent the ubiquitous gas mask. The United States and the UK pursued a form of V-agent called VX, although they produced it by entirely different processes. The Russians exploited another structural analog that proved more adaptable to their industrial processes. The 1960s saw continued development in nonlethal agents, or riot control agents, first used in World War I. These materials, most notably CS, are strong irritants of the mucous membranes with very high safety ratios. The letters CS are code letters for a solid powder classified as a riot-control agent (O-chlorobenzylmalonitrile). This
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compound is a highly effective irritant of the mucous membranes with an exceedingly high safety ratio (~63,000). The purpose of CS and similar materials is temporary incapacitation without permanent harm. CS was developed and first used by the UK. It was quickly adopted and used extensively by the United States and since has been produced and employed by many nations. CS is a solid at room temperature and presents a problem for effective dissemination in useful particle sizes. Particulate CS, like most solids, tends to develop an electrostatic charge which causes the particles to agglomerate into larger particles. Much development effort during the 1960s was spent on finding effective dissemination techniques. The work on particulate CS could be extrapolated to another type of chemical agent that was of extreme interest in the 1960s: incapacitating agents. These were initially seen by some as a panacea to make warfare safe and humane. Thousands of potential compounds were screened, obtained from government sources in the United States and from commercial pharmaceutical companies around the world. Although there were several promising materials, primarily mental incapacitants, only BZ was ever standardized. The problem of incapacitants, or incapacitating agents, is complex. The use of incapacitants in warfare is considered to be prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention even though only a single agent, BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate), and its immediate precursors are included as listed compounds (Schedule 2) in that Treaty. In retrospect, while BZ was the only incapacitating agent formally accepted (i.e., type classified) by the United States, it was a poor choice and is now obsolete. It remained in U.S. stocks for only a short period of time. The substance is a mental rather than a physical incapacitant with long-onset time and unpredictable symptoms. The victim becomes confused and is likely to be incapable of acting decisively. The confusion, however, may not be readily apparent. The duration of action is long, about 48 hours, making prisoner management difficult. There are, moreover, hundreds of compounds more potent, faster acting, and with shorter duration of effect. Mental incapacitants are predominantly glycolates, whereas some of the more potent candidates for physical incapacitants have come from research on improved anesthetics. Indeed, almost all potential incapacitants are byproducts of the pharmaceutical industry and have legitimate pharmaceutical uses. The defining technologies for such incapacitating weapons, then, are the production of a physiologically effective compound in greater than practical pharmaceutical quantities and incorporation of the material in weapons. It is probable that the physical state of an incapacitant will be a particulate solid and that the practical route for effective use is by inhalation. Binary chemical weapons use toxic chemicals produced by mixing two compounds immediately before or during use. Binary weapons do not necessarily employ new toxic chemicals. In U.S. parlance, relatively innocuous precursors were stored separately and reacted to form the toxic chemical agent en route to the target. In principle, the binary concept could also be used to produce highly lethal but unstable com-
pounds or mixtures of compounds unsuitable for long-term storage. The U.S. type classified and produced a GB (sarin) binary nerve agent weapon, the M687 projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell), and was in the late stages of development of two other binary weapons when its offensive CW program was terminated. The Russians have been publicly accused by dissidents within their own agencies of developing new binary agents, and the Iraqis are known to have constructed binary bombs and missile warheads, albeit with crude manual mixing of the reactants. Other possibilities for chemical agents include toxins and allergens which also have been, at times, considered biological agents. Although not living organisms themselves, these materials are usually products of living organisms with complex molecular structures. A wide variety of toxins with an equally broad spectrum of chemical, physical, and physiological properties exists. The CWC attempts to avoid the complexity by listing only two toxins in its list of substances for verification. They are ricin, a byproduct of castor bean extraction, and saxitoxin, a shellfish poison. Given the large number of potential toxins, these would appear to be place holders to permit the inclusion of any toxin if deemed necessary at a future date. Until the recent attempts at terrorism by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, virtually all uses of chemical weapons have been as tactical weapons by nations. These have ranged from attempts to break the stalemate in World War I to the recent use by Iraq to blunt Iranian human wave attacks in the Iran-Iraq War (198287). Chemical weapons were not employed by the major protagonists in World War II. Between World Wars I and II, two signatories of the Geneva Protocol (Italy and Japan) employed chemical weapons. Typically, nations have employed them against unprotected targets and not against an equally well-armed nation; chemical weapons are therefore arguably an example of mutual deterrence. Although there have been charges of chemical weapon use in virtually every conflict in recent decades, most have not been substantiated by clinical or physical evidence. The growth of chemical agent technology development that spurred production is illustrated in Figure 4.0-1. Chemical agents used initially in World War I were industrial compounds adapted for weapons use. As the war continued, more compounds were screened and specialized agents, particularly sulfur mustard, came to the fore. After the war, research continued at a slow but steady pace, with the major breakthrough being the German discovery of the nerve gases in the mid 1930s. Agent technology accelerated again in the 1950s with the British discovery of the V-agents. The 1960s featured extensive work and discovery in incapacitants and riot control agents as well as the early work on binary agents. If the dissidents of the Russian chemical program are to be believed, major advances are continuing. In the lethal chemical arena a development effort that spread out over three decades was the concept of binary agent employment. This concept entailed the creation of highly efficient yet simple reaction schemes that could be used to create toxic agents from non-toxic ingredients in the weapon en route to the target. The United States
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developed three different binary munitions, a GB projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell), an aerial bomb producing VX, and a medium-range missile warhead (for the MLRS) containing an intermediate volatility agent. Iraq made a crude attempt to exploit binary systems in the Gulf War, but none were actually deployed. The Russian Army apparently quashed early attempts to develop binary agents by its technicians, although public revelations in 1995 by scientist Vil Mirzayanov and in 1996 by a former head of the Russian demilitarization program indicate recent Russian development of binary systems for new and novel classes of nerve agents. An historical perspective of the growth of dissemination technology in comparison to agent technology also can be seen in Figure 4.0-1. Dissemination technology into the 1950s consisted mainly of the use of an explosive burster in adapted shells and iron bombs. During that time the concept of submunitions for better agent dispersal (e.g., missile warheads such as the Sergeant) and spray tanks (e.g., the Aero 14B) evolved and led to more uniform dissemination. These were followed in the mid-1960s and 1970s by concepts of thermal dissemination and aerodynamic breakup, as well as rheological techniques of particle size control in the 1990s. Despite the importance of detection, the major technological advances for detection, identification, and warning are relatively recent. Initially, detectors were papers impregnated with a dye that underwent a color change when exposed to a chemical agent. By World War II, air-sampling tubes filled with liquids that changed color on exposure were available, as well as rather crude wet chemical point detectors. The advent of the nerve gases after World War II led to the development of sensitive enzyme detection techniques and point detection alarms. The latter were based on wet chemistry and required extensive servicing. The recent advances in microprocessing and fieldable instrumentation techniques have made remote and area sensing of chemical agents feasible. A major advance in individual physical protection occurred very early with the development of the activated charcoal filtered gas mask. Many incremental improvements to aid in effectiveness against particular agents and to add to communication and creature comforts followed. Impregnated clothing for protection against percutaneous poisoning was another rather early development which continues to be improved incrementally by increasing protection factors and wearability. OVERVIEW This section addresses technologies that would enable a country to develop both offensive and defensive chemical weapons capability. The United States has forsworn the offensive use of chemical weapons and is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, technologies for offensive military operations are not of interest except to maintain an appreciation for others potential and to continue to develop a robust defense against them. References to offensive operations and technologies are
included to ensure that there is an understanding of what is required to develop, integrate, and employ chemical weapons. There are a number of reasons for a country to pursue the development of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce. Many standard munitions can be modified and filled with toxic chemicals. A chemical attack (or even a credible threat of a chemical offensive) can reduce the efficiency of an opposing force by making it take precautionary steps (donning protective suits, entering shelters, etc.) or diverting its attention to defensive measures. Casualties incurred can burden a countrys medical resources. Unlike conventional weapons, chemical munitions, for the most part, injure or kill people while leaving the surrounding infrastructure intact. Moreover, because of their unconventional nature, chemical weapons can be psychologically devastating for a force being attacked. Military forces that contemplate CW employment have many things to consider. The use of chemical weapons runs counter to the global norm and is apt to engender strong denunciation by third parties and retaliation by the nation attacked. There are significant operational hurdles. Logistics, training, and command and control are complicated by the possible employment of chemical munitions. Care must be taken to prevent ones own force from bearing the brunt of an attack. A properly defended force might be slowed but will not be stopped. Although the cost of CW employment could be high in terms of the above factors, the benefit of degrading an adversarys performance and the psychological affect might be deemed sufficient to offset the cost. This section on Chemical Weapons Technologies contains four subsections. Chemical Material Production addresses technologies for producing toxic chemical agents that could be used in chemical weapons. Those that require special expertise are covered in more detail than those available through standard industrial processes. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing addresses those technologies that a proliferant could use to disperse toxic chemicals and ensure the viability of its dissemination systems. Also addressed are Detection, Warning, and Identification technologies that enable forces to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to minimize the threat. The last subsection, Chemical Defense Systems, discusses those systems that provide protection from the effects of chemical weapons. RATIONALE A number of technologies are required to develop, integrate, and employ chemical weapons. Although many of these technologies are old and available in the open literature, successful employment entails more than simply producing toxic chemicals. Technologies used for dissemination and dispersion are perhaps the most important. The myriad technologies for offensive use are included in this section to provide the reader an appreciation of the requirements to develop chemical weapons and an understanding of where offensive breakthroughs might occur, even though the United States
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has renounced the capability. Technologies needed to detect the use of toxic chemicals and provide protection are essential to all countries. Even proliferants that employ chemical weapons require some type of detection and protection capability. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) Starting in World War I, a number of countries have employed chemical weapons. After false starts by others, the Germans finally employed chlorine successfully at Ypres, Belgium, in 1915. Other WWI use included phosgene and chloropicrin in 1916 by the British, and mustard in 1917 by Germany. Lewisite was developed in 1918, too late to be used in WWI. Between the world wars, Japan began research on chemical weapons and began production in the late 1920s. The Italians used mustard in Ethiopia in 193536. Although Allied and Axis nations produced and stockpiled chemical weapons, they were not used during World War II. Egypt employed mustard and probably G-agent in Yemen in the 1960s. Both sides relied on CW during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Iraqis
used mustard, tabun, and sarin from 198287 and were prepared to do so in the Gulf War. Libya dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian Troops in 1987. Many nations have become States Parties to the CWC and can be expected to adhere to their commitments not to develop chemical weapons. Others will not sign or may abrogate their commitments. Any nation with a sophisticated chemical industry has the potential to produce chemical weapons, although nerve agents require a greater amount of expertise than classical agents and vesicants. Having the potential, however, does not indicate intent. Subnational groups, both independent and state-sponsored, could produce or purchase toxic chemicals or possibly chemical warfare agents to threaten a civilian populace. Since civilians are poorly prepared for attacks by toxic materials, consequences of a successful attack could be severe. Governments are increasingly concerned about the use of toxic chemicals in light of the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo but thus far have been unable to come to grips with the complexity of the problem. The armed forces of many nations have some type of detection equipment and protection gear, although there are wide variations in their quantity and capability.
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Improved gas mask (protection; fit; comfort) Gas mask w/voicemitter & drinking capability Novichok Series
9
CC-2 impregnated clothing
Protective ointment (Mustard); collective protection; gas mask w/Whetlerite Miniaturization Laser detection
VX Gas mask; rosin oil impregnated clothing
Relative Development
5
Protection
Nerve gas alarm Tabun Sarin
Detection
Binary munition
Agent
Lewisite
Blister agent detectors; kit; color change paper Aerodynamic Chlorine, Smell Chloropicrin, Phosgene, Mustard
Dissemination
Missile warheads; spray tanks Projectiles: central bursters Aircraft bombs
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
1995
CW Use
Arms Control The Hague
1899
WWI
Chlorine: 1915 Phosgene: 1916 Chloropicrin: 1916 Mustard: 1917
It/Fr/Sp/Japan
Mustard
Egypt
Mustard
Iran/Iraq/Libya
Mustard; Tabun Sarin
Geneva Protocol
1925
CWC
1993
Figure 4.0-1. Relative Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies
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Country*
Sec 4.1 Chemical Material Production
Australia Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria United Kingdom United States Viet Nam Subnationals
Sec 4.2 Dissemination, Dispersion and Weapons Testing
Sec 4.3 Detection, Warning and Identification
Sec 4.4 Chemical Defense Systems

some limited
sufficient level
Figure 4.0-2. Chemical Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 4.1CHEMICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW This subsection contains information on a number of the toxic chemicals and their most important precursors. Included are nerve agents (e.g., sarin, soman, tabun, VX), vesicants (e.g., sulfur mustards, lewisites, nitrogen mustards), and classic chemical agents (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide). Important precursors are also listed. These include DF, DC, and QL, all used in producing nerve agents. There are thousands of toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons. Those listed have been stockpiled and/or used by a number of countries. The CWC Schedules of Chemicals (Figure 4.1-1) and the Australia Group (AG) list of precursors (Figure 4.1-2) are also provided to ensure recognition of those being considered either for verification provisions of the CWC or for export control. It should be remembered that the CWC schedules and the AG list do not include all of the known chemicals that have been or could be used to produce toxic agents. Depending on the type of agent to be produced, there can be technical hurdles that must be overcome. Classic agents can be manufactured using existing chemical infrastructure, and most have legitimate commercial uses. Likewise, vesicants are not technologically complicated. The production of the nerve agents, however, requires significantly more sophisticated chemical processing. Some production processes require strict temperature control. Containment of toxic substances and gases can pose problems. Depending on the immediacy of use, purity of product can add a difficult dimension to production. In some cases, special equipment or handling is required to prevent corrosion of equipment and/or rapid deterioration of the product. These hurdles can be overcome. If sufficient purity cannot be attained, an agent can be manufactured and used immediately. This presupposes the capability to manufacture a sufficient quantity in the time allotted. If special, corrosive-resistant equipment cannot be obtained, corroded equipment can be replaced when necessary or only a limited amount can be produced. If nerve agent production is technologically infeasible for a proliferant, a simpler agent (vesicant or classic agent) can be produced. Alternatives can entail increased costs, increased munition requirements, or reduced CW capability. Some of the simpler classic chemical agents can be manufactured using existing chemical infrastructure. For example, phosgene is manufactured internally within chemical plants throughout the world for use as a chlorinating agent. Chlorination is the most common of chemical intermediate reactions in the chemical process industry. A reasonable size phosgene facility could be purchased with an investment of $10$14 million. Similarly, hydrogen cyanide is currently manufactured worldwide as an intermediate in the manufacture of acrylic polymers and could be diverted for
Highlights
There are many routes to produce most toxic chemicals. Thousands of chemicals exist that could be considered for chemical weapons. If corrosive-resistant equipment cannot be procured (for corrosive reactants and products), standard equipment can be used and replaced or discarded. Many CW precursors are common industrial chemicals. Some have been used in the past as agents in CW. Most technologies associated with CW production are old and available in the open literature.
other uses or separately manufactured with about the same investment. In either instance the technologies are simple, well known, and require no specialized equipment. These CW agents require high munitions expenditures and are easily defeated by a gas mask, so that use would most likely be against unprotected populations and/or poorly equipped combatants. Almost all proliferant states since World War I have manufactured vesicants, principally sulfur mustard, bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide. There are several routes to this compound, none of which require sophisticated technology and/or special materials. The earlier producers favored the Levinstein Process, which consists of bubbling dry ethylene through sulfur monochloride, allowing the mixture to settle and (usually) distilling the remaining material. More recent production has involved chlorination of thiodiglycol, a relatively common material with a dual use as an ingredient in some inks. This method does not result in the solid byproducts of the Levinstein Process and can be more easily distilled. Drums of thiodiglycol, produced in the United States and illegally diverted from their intended recipients, were found by international inspectors after the Gulf War at Iraqi CW production sites. The principal problem experienced by initial manufacturers of sulfur mustard has been the insidious nature of this material. Virtually all those producing mustard have experienced a large number of industrial accidents resulting in casualties from mustard burns. Nitrogen mustards have been synthesized only in pilot plant quantities, but did not require any unusual processes or materials. Lewisite was produced by both the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. The plants were quite small and unsophisticated by
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todays standards. Lewisite is an arsenical and as such would require unusually large amounts of arsenates in its production. Production of the nerve agents requires significantly more sophisticated chemical processing. In a majority of these materials, there are corrosive chemicals in the process that require specialized corrosion-resistant construction materials . With the exception of GA (tabun), manufactured by the Germans in World War II and the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war, G-agent production involves both chlorination and fluorination steps. Both of these steps require special and expensive construction materials. Reactors, degassers, distillation columns, and ancillary equipment made of high nickel alloys or precious metals are needed to contain the corrosive products and by products. Only the last step of the process involves the highly toxic material, so that special air handling equipment would be needed for only a small portion of the facility. There are many process routes for producing the G- and V-agents; the majority involve the synthesis of methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) at some stage. The United States designed and built plants for four different processes for producing DC. Two were used in the stockpile production of GB (sarin), a third represented an upgrade of the stockpile production process to minimize waste, and the fourth represented a newer method used in producing material for binary weapons. The Soviet Union used a still different process to make DC and Iraq one similar to the last U.S. process. DC is a relatively easy material to store and to ship and need not be produced at the same site as the final product. It is very stable and has been stored for over 30 years with little deterioration. The size of the facility required to produce DC in militarily significant quantities ranges from very large down to room sized. A facility to produce DC with ancillary support would cost approximately $25 million not including pollution and environmental controls and waste treatment. Modern waste treatment and pollution abatement to U.S. standards would more than double the cost, although it is doubtful that a proliferant would build to these standards. The various DC production processes require some special corrosion-resistant equipment, generally glass-lined reactors and storage tanks, although not the ultra-expensive equipment required for later stages. DC has limited commercial use. In the actual production of G-agents, the partially fluorinated DC (now a transient mixture called Di-Di) is reacted with an alcohol or alcohols and the product degassed and usually distilled. As noted previously, this is the toxic step of the reaction which requires air handling and filtering and also part of the highly corrosive portion that requires high nickel alloy (such as Hastelloy C) equipment and piping or precious metals (such as silver). The U.S. stockpile of GB was produced in this fashion and the former Soviet Union stockpiles of GB and GD (soman) by a variation of that process. The Iraqis used a somewhat over-fluorinated DC and mixed alcohols to produce a GB/ GF mixture which was inherently unstable. Most of the alcohols involved in producing G-agents have large-scale commercial use. An exception is the alcohol for producing GD, pinacolyl alcohol, which has very limited pharmaceutical use.
Two principal general methods have been employed for V-agent production. The process used in the United States was called the Transester Process. It entails a rather difficult step in which phosphorus trichloride is methylated to produce methyl phosphonous dichloride. The material is reacted in turn with ethanol to form a diester and this material then transesterified to produce the immediate precursor of VX. The product is reacted with sulfur to form V-agent. This process has the advantage of being straightforward and producing high quality product. Conversely, it has the disadvantage of some difficult chemical engineering steps. The V-agent formed exclusively in the United States was VX. The former Soviet Union, the only other known producer of significant quantities of V-agent, did not produce VX per se, but rather a structurally different variant with the same molecular weight. The Soviets designed their process to make maximum use of production capability already available. The DC of the G-agent process was used in an Amiton process conducted in solution. The technique has the advantage of producing a single intermediate (DC). Disadvantages include the need to recover a highly toxic material from solution and to handle large quantities of contaminated solvent. In general, the V-agents are not easily distilled, and it is unlikely that a final purification process can be developed. Incapacitating agent production is similar in many ways to the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, since these compounds are normally variations or derivatives of compounds used or postulated for use as pharmaceuticals. Since most pharmaceuticals are produced in relatively small quantities, production would entail a scale-up to an unusual process size for the type of reactions entailed. Moreover, virtually all candidate incapacitating agents are solids at room temperature and would require drying and grinding to an inhalable particulate. Given the tendency of many compounds to acquire a static charge and agglomerate, the grinding is a nontrivial manufacturing problem. The problems associated with manufacture (and use) of solid lethal agents (such as carbamates) are analogous to those experienced with incapacitants. As a consequence of the diversity and complexity involved, it is difficult to provide any generic insights to toxin production. The only toxin to exist naturally in large quantities is ricin. It is a byproduct of castor oil production. Production of ricin is a physical separation. There are weak parallels with plutonium extraction or uranium isotope enrichment in nuclear processing. Toxin separation is much easier, less expensive, and requires smaller equipment. These advantages might make a toxin attractive to a poor, proliferating country. Most other toxins must be laboriously extracted in small quantities from the organism that secretes them. While synthetic toxins are possible, they are complex molecules, the synthesis of which in any significant amount would be difficult. Biotechnology may enhance the ability to produce toxins that were previously difficult to obtain in significant quantity. Production of chemical agents in the past has anticipated their long-term storage since (in the instance of United States at least) they were viewed as deterrent weapons and by policy would not have been employed except in response to aggressor use.
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This also meant that the agents and/or their weapons of employment might be stored for extensive periods of time. The life span of chemical weapons was first expected to be a decade. The requirement was later increased to 20 years when it became clear that munitions were likely to be stored at least that long. Chemical agents can either be stored in bulk quantities or loaded into munitions. With the nerve agents in particular, the quality of the initial material must be excellent and they must be stored under inert conditions with the absolute exclusion of oxygen and moisture. Generally an overlay of dry helium was employed to leak check munitions. A small amount of stabilizer (24 percent) was also used to extend agent life span. The United States stored agent in both bulk containers and in munitions. In the latter instance, the munitions were normally stored in revetted bunkers. This was particularly true when explosives and propellants were uploaded in the munitions. Storage of agents in explosive, uploaded munitions has both advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is speed of use when the munition is needed. There is no labor-intensive or time-consuming uploading process, and most munitions can be handled and shipped as if they were conventional munitions. The principal disadvantage is that explosives and propellants become part of the system, and their storage and deterioration may complicate the handling of the chemical weapons. An illustrative case is seen in the 115-mm M55 rockets where burster, fuse, and rocket propellant cannot be easily and/or safely separated from the agent warhead before demilitarization. As a consequence, demilitarization is far more complicated and costly than it would be otherwise. Agents stored in bulk in the United States are now stored entirely in large cylindrical ton containers similar to those used to store and ship many commercial chemicals. The procedure for the former Soviet Unions stockpile appears to have been to upload their stocks of nerve agent into munitions when produced, but to store them without the bursters or fuses. These munitions were then themselves stored in more conventional warehouse-like structures. Conversely, the older stocks of vesicants (i.e., mustard, lewisite and mustard-lewisite mixtures) are stored in bulk, apparently intended to be filled in munitions a short time before use. Bulk storage of the vesicants by the Russians is in large railroad-car-size tanks again located in warehouse-like structures. When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a make and use regimen. Judging by the information Iraq gave the United Nations, later verified by on-site inspections, Iraq had poor product quality for their nerve agents. This low quality was likely due to a lack of purification. They had to get the agent to the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition. This problem would have been less severe in their mustard rounds because of less aggressive impurities. The problem of degradation inhibited their ability to deploy and employ nerve weapons but probably did not have a great effect on their use of mustard. Using their weapons soon after production probably worked well in the Iran-Iraq War, where the skies over Iraq were controlled by the Iraqis. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, loss of air control in the Gulf meant the weapons could never reach the front. The chemical munitions found in Iraq
after the Gulf War contained badly deteriorated agents and a significant proportion were visibly leaking. Binary munitions were once intended by the United States as a means of retaining a retaliatory capability without the necessity of an agent stockpile. The relatively nontoxic intermediates could be stored separately and not placed in proximity to one another until just before use. This requires some human engineering to ensure the munitions designs permit simple, rapid mating of the ingredient containers and production of the lethal agent en route to the target. The binary system was envisioned almost exclusively for application to the standard nerve agents. Although at least three types of binary munitions were planned, only one (155-mm artillery shell) was in production when the United States ended CW production. The Russians claim to have considered binary munitions but not produced any. The Iraqis had a small number of bastardized binary munitions in which some unfortunate individual was to pour one ingredient into the other from a Jerry can prior to use. Release of agent by enemy action during shipment is a disadvantage of unitary chemical munitions. The sinking of the U.S. cargo ship John Harvey in the harbor at Bari, Italy, during World War II and the subsequent unwitting release of a large quantity of mustard gas is a case in point. Mustard escaped from damaged munitions contaminating those escaping the sinking ship and civilians on shore. RATIONALE (See Table 4.1-1) Since there are so many toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons, only those agents of major significance and their precursors have been included. These toxic chemicals have been designated of most concern by the world community. The majority of nerve agents, sulfur mustards, lewisites, and some of the nitrogen mustards are listed in the CWC schedules of chemicals (Figure 4.1-1). Each nerve agent is representative of a family (hundreds to thousands) of chemicals. Those specifically included have been produced and stockpiled by a number of countries. The precursor DC is the fundamental building block for a significant portion of G- and V-agents. The classic chemicals (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide) have been included since they are so readily available that a proliferant could obtain them easily. Although these chemical agents would require high munitions expenditures and are easily defeated by a gas mask, they could be used effectively against unprotected populations and/or poorly equipped combatants. Toxins have not been included in this subsection but can be found in Section 3, Biological Weapons Technologies. Although toxins are not living organisms, they are made by living organisms. They are listed in Schedule 1A of the CWC and the biological agent part of the Australia Group list.
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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) Any country with a chemical industry has the capability, if not the intent, to produce toxic chemicals. Most of the technologies are old and described in the open literature. The countries listed in Figure 4.0-2 have the capability or have used chemical weapons in the past and therefore are technically capable of producing chemical weapons. The assessment is not an indication of current intent. Many of these countries have signed/ratified the CWC. There have been numerous press reports of toxic chemicals produced in Russia that are not covered in the CWC schedules. Vil Mirzayanov, a chemist and former high-ranking scientist in the former Soviet Unions chemical weapons program, published an article in Kuranty in 1991 (and co-authored another article in 1992 in the Moscow News) in which he claimed that Russia had developed new kinds of chemical weapons. Substances like Novichok (A-230, A-232, and A-234) are chemical agents that the Russians are said to have developed in spite of agreement to halt production of chemical weapons. These statements were repeated by a former head of the Russian demilitarization program. There has been press coverage of a large, underground facility being built at Tarhunah in Libya that the United States claims is designed as a chemical production facility. Libya dropped chemical agents obtained from Iran from a transport aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Late in 1988, Libya completed a chemical agent facility at Rabta as part of its drive to develop an indigenous CW capability. When the United States brought international attention to the plant, Libya responded by fabricating a fire to make it appear that the facility had been seriously damaged. This plant was closed in 1990, but the Libyans announced its reopening in September 1995 as a pharmaceutical facility. The Rabta facility is still capable of producing chemical agents.
Since the late 1980s, North Korea has expanded its chemical warfare program. Today it can produce large quantities of blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents. It also maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing precursors for toxic chemicals, the agents themselves, and weapons. As mentioned previously, Iran delivered limited quantities of blister and blood agents against Iraqi soldiers late in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has increased its rate of production since 1984 and has produced at least several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents. Some of these agents have been weaponized to support ground combat operations. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had become nearly self-sufficient in producing many precursors and had developed a variety of chemical weapons on its own. The chief inspector of the UN Special Commission chemical destruction group said that all known chemical munitions, agents, and precursors in Iraq had been eliminated by May 1994. Many think that Iraq can revive its CW capability in a matter of months in the absence of UN monitoring or import controls. On the Asian subcontinent, India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons. India has a large chemical industry that produces numerous dual-use chemicals that are potential precursors. In June 1997, India submitted CW declarations to the CWC governing body in The Hague. This was the first time the Indians publicly acknowledged a CW program. Pakistan has procured dual-use precursors from foreign sources and is moving slowly toward the capability of producing precursors. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan proved that subnational groups can obtain the expertise and ingredients to threaten society with chemical agents. A Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations study indicated that the cult had produced the nerve agents sarin, soman, tabun, and VX, as well as phosgene and sodium cyanide. Toxic chemicals were used at least twice, including the Tokyo subway attack that left 12 dead and more than 5,000 injured.
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The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purposes of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1(a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons. (Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical marked * on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.) Schedule 1 (CAS registry number) A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates, e.g., sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8) soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0) (2) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates, e.g., tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate (77-81-6) (3) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts, e.g., VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate (50782-69-9) (4) Sulfur mustards: 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide (2625-76-5) Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide (505-60-2) Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane (63869-13-6) Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane (3563-36-8) 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane (63905-10-2) 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane (142868-93-7) 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane (142868-94-8) Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether (63918-90-1) O-Mustard: bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether (63918-89-8) (5) Lewisites: Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (541-25-3) Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (40334-69-8) Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (40334-70-1) (6) Nitrogen mustards: HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (538-07-8) HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (51-75-2) HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (555-77-1) (7) Saxitoxin (35523-89-8) (8) Ricin (9009-86-3) B. Precursors: (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride (676-99-3) (10) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite (57856-11-8) (11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate (1445-76-7) (12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate (7040-57-5)
(contd)
Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals
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Schedule 2 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate (78-53-5) and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts (2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)1-propene (382-21-8) (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*) (6581-06-2) B. Precursors: (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl, or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms, e.g., Methylphosphonyl dichloride (676-97-1) Dimethyl methylphosphonate (756-79-6) Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonothiolothionate (944-22-9) (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates (7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1) (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (76-93-7) (9) Quinuclidine-3-ol (1619-34-7) (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-chlorides and corresponding protonated salts (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding protonated salts Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol (108-01-0) and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol (100-37-8) and corresponding protonated salts (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts (13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide (111-48-8) (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol (464-07-3)
Schedule 3 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride (75-44-5) (2) Cyanogen chloride (506-77-4) (3) Hydrogen cyanide (74-90-8) (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane (76-06-2) B. Precursors: (5) Phosphorus oxychloride (10025-87-3) (6) Phosphorus trichloride (7719-12-2) (7) Phosphorus pentachloride (10026-13-8) (8) Trimethyl phosphite (121-45-9) (9) Triethyl phosphite (122-52-1) (10) Dimethyl phosphite (868-85-9) (11) Diethyl phosphite (762-04-9) (12) Sulfur monochloride(10025-67-9) (13) Sulfur dichloride (10545-99-0) (14) Thionyl chloride (7719-09-7) (15) Ethyldiethanolamine (139-87-7) (16) Methyldiethanolamine (105-59-9) (17) Triethanolamine (102-71-6) Source: The Chemical Weapons Convention, Annex on Chemicals, Part B.
Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals (contd)
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Chemical 1. Thiodiglycol 2. Phosphorus Oxychloride 3. Dimethyl Methylphosphonate 4. Methyl Phosphonyl Difluoride 5. Methyl Phosphonyl Dichloride 6. Dimethyl Phosphite 7. Phosphorus Trichloride 8. Trimethyl Phosphite 9. Thionyl Chloride 10. 3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine 11. N,N-Diisopropyl--Aminoethyl Chloride 12. N,N-Diisopropyl--Aminoethane Thiol 13. 3-Quinuclidinol 14. Potassium Fluoride 15. 2-Chloroethanol 16. Dimethylamine 17. Diethyl Ethylphosphonate 18. Diethyl N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidate 19. Diethyl Phosphite 20. Dimethylamine Hydrochloride 21. Ethyl Phosphinyl Dichloride 22. Ethyl Phosphonyl Dichloride 23. Ethyl Phosphonyl Difluoride 24. Hydrogen Fluoride 25. Methyl Benzilate 26. Methyl Phosphinyl Dichloride 27. N,N-Diisopropyl--Amino-Ethanol 28. Pinacolyl Alcohol 29. O-Ethyl 2-Diisopropylaminoethyl Methylphosphonite
C.A.S. # 111-48-8 10025-87-3 756-79-6 676-99-3 676-97-1 868-85-9 7719-12-2 121-45-9 7719-09-7 3554-74-3 96-79-7 5842-07-9 1619-34-7 7789-23-3 107-07-3 124-40-3 78-38-6 2404-03-7 762-04-9 506-59-2 1498-40-4 1066-50-8 753-98-0 7664-39-3 76-89-1 676-83-5 96-80-0 464-07-3 57856-11-8
Chemical 30. Triethyl Phosphite 31. Arsenic Trichloride 32. Benzilic Acid 33. Diethyl Methylphosphonite 34. Dimethyl Ethylphosphonate 35. Ethyl Phosphinyl Difluoride 36. Methyl Phosphinyl Difluoride 37. 3-Quinuclidone 38. Phosphorus Pentachloride 39. Pinacolone 40. Potassium Cyanide 41. Potassium Bifluoride 42. Ammonium Bifluoride 43. Sodium Bifluoride 44. Sodium Fluoride 45. Sodium Cyanide 46. Tri-ethanolamine 47. Phosphorus Pentasulphide 48. Di-isopropylamine 49. Diethylaminoethanol 50. Sodium Sulphide 51. Sulphur Monochloride 52. Sulphur Dichloride 53. Triethanolamine Hydrochloride 54. N,N-Diisopropyl-2-Aminoethyl Chloride Hydrochloride
C.A.S. # 122-52-1 7784-34-1 76-93-7 15715-41-0 6163-75-3 430-78-4 753-59-3 3731-38-2 10026-13-8 75-97-8 151-50-8 7789-29-9 1341-49-7 1333-83-1 7681-49-4 143-33-9 102-71-6 1314-80-3 108-18-9 100-37-8 1313-82-2 10025-67-9 10545-99-0 637-39-8 4261-68-1
Source: ACDA Fact Sheet on Australia Group Export Controls, November 7, 1995 (current as of September 6, 1997).
Figure 4.1-2. Australia Group Chemicals
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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters

Technology Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl ( C10, incl. Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates, e.g., sarin (GB) : O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (CAS: 107-44-8)
Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl ( C10, incl.
Sovereign States: capable of CWC; annual production of approx. WA ML 7; 100 tons USML XIV Subnational: capable of producing any amount
Phosphorus trichloride; DF; DC; hydrogen fluoride; isopropanol
Needs expensive corrosive-resistant equipment such as hastelloy or silver
None identified
cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates, e.g., soman (GD) : O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (CAS: 96-64-0)
Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl ( C10, incl.
Phosphorus trichloride; DC; hydrogen fluoride; pinacolyl alcohol
Needs expensive corrosive-resistant equipment such as hastelloy or silver
None identified
cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates, e.g., tabun (GA) : O-Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (CAS: 77-81-6)
Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (H or C10,
Phosphorus None identified oxychloride or phosphorus trichloride; sodium cyanide; dimethlyamine; ethyl alcohol
None identified
Sovereign States: capable of CWC; annual production of approx. WA ML 7; 200 tons incl. cycloalkyl) Me, Et, USML XIV n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl Subnational: capable of alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) producing any amount phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts, e.g., VX (CAS: 50782-69-9)
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; for Phosphonochloridates, annual production of approx. WA ML 7; 300 tons e.g., chlorosarin:
QL; sulfur or DC if Amiton-like process is used
Inert atmosphere High-temperature methylation equipment (QL process)
None identified
DC
Glass-lined reactors
None identified
O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate (CAS: 1445-76-7)
Subnational: capable of producing any amount
USML XIV
(contd)
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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (contd)

Technology
Manufacturing processes Sovereign States: capable of CWC; for Sulfur mustards: (see annual production of approx. WA ML 7;
Figure 4.1-1 for names) - CAS: 2625-76-5 - CAS: 505-60-2 - CAS: 63869-13-6 - CAS: 3563-36-8 - CAS: 63905-10-2 - CAS: 142868-93-7 - CAS: 142868-94-8 - CAS: 63918-90-1 - CAS: 63918-89-8
500 tons Subnational: capable of producing any amount
USML XIV
Sulfur monochloride or sulfur dichloride or Thiodiglycol
None identified
None identified
Manufacturing processes for lewisites:
- Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (CAS: 541-25-3) - Lewisite 2: Bis(2chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (CAS: 40334-69-8) - Lewisite 3: Tris(2chlorovinyl)arsine (CAS: 40334-70-1)
Manufacturing processes for Nitrogen mustards:
Arsenic trichloride
None identified
None identified
- HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (CAS: 538-07-8) - HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (CAS: 51-75-2) - HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (CAS: 555-77-1)
HN 1: ethyl diethanolamine HN 2: methyl diethanolamine HN 3: triethanolamine
Glass- or enamel-lined equipment
None identified
(contd)
II-4-16

Technology Manufacturing processes for Amiton: O,O-Diethyl
Sovereign States: capable of CWC; annual production of approx. WA ML 7; S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] 500 tons USML XIV phosphorothiolate and Subnational: capable of corresponding alkylated producing any amount or protonated salts (CAS: 78-53-5) Sovereign States: capable of CWC; annual production of approx. WA ML 7; Pentafluoro-22,000 tons USML XIV (trifluoromethyl)-1Subnational: capable of propene (CAS: 382-21-8) producing any amount
Manufacturing processes for PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3Manufacturing processes for Phosgene: carbonyl
None
Normally made in solution, extraction equipment
None identified
None
Needs expensive corrosion resistant equipment such as Hastelloy or silver Corrosion resistant equipment
None identified
Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None annual production of approx. from WA ML); dichloride (CAS: 75-44-5) 2,000 tons USML XIV Subnational: capable of producing any amount
Manufacturing processes for Cyanogen chloride
None identified
(CAS: 506-77-4)
Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None annual production of approx. from WA ML); 2,000 tons USML XIV Subnational: capable of producing any amount Sovereign States: capable of CWC (exempted None annual production of approx. from WA ML); 5,000 tons USML XIV Subnational: capable of producing any amount Sovereign States: capable of annual production of approx. 200 tons Subnational: capable of producing any amount CWC; AG List; WA ML-7; CCL Cat 1E DC; hydrogen fluoride
None identified
None identified
Manufacturing processes for Hydrogen cyanide
None identified
None identified
(CAS: 74-90-8)
Manufacturing processes for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or iPr) phosphonyldifluorides, e.g., DF: Methyl-
Production equipment made of Hastelloy or other high nickel alloys; silver
None identified
phosphonyldifluoride (CAS: 676-99-3 )
(contd)
II-4-17

Technology Manufacturing processes for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or iPr) phosphonylchlorides, e.g., DC: Methyl-
phosphonyl dichloride (CAS: 676-97-1) Note: This material, rather than DF, is the fundamental building block of a significant portion of G and V agents.
Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (H or C10,
Sovereign States: capable of annual production of approx. 400 tons Subnational: capable of producing any amount
CWC; AG List; WA ML-7; CCL Cat IE
Thionyl chloride or Glass-lined vessels phosgene or Glass-lined distillation phosphorous columns pentachloride. Dimethylmethylphosphonate (DMMP) (many production processes available).
None identified
Sovereign States: capable of annual production of approx. 200 tons incl. cycloalkyl) O-2dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i- Subnational: capable of Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, producing any amount Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts, e.g., QL (CAS: 57856-11-8)
CWC; AG List; WA ML 7; CCL Cat 1E
TR (diethyl methylphosphonite) KB (2-(N-Ndiethylamino) ethanol). Similar esters and amino alcohols.
Waste treatment incinerators Distillation columns High-temperature methylation equipment
None identified
II-4-18
Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data

Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)phosphonofluoridates, e.g., sarin (GB) : O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (CAS: 107-44-8) Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)phosphonofluoridates, e.g., soman (GD) : O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (CAS: 96-64-0) Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates, e.g., tabun (GA) : O-Ethyl N,Ndimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate (CAS: 77-81-6) Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. cycloalkyl) Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or iPr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts, e.g., VX (CAS: 50782-69-9) Manufacturing processes for Phosphonochloridates, e.g., chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate (CAS: 1445-76-7)
Oxidation; alkylation; fluorination; esterification. Large power needs. Must be distilled and stabilized unless manufactured for immediate use.
Troop concentrations, sabotage.
A number of production processes have been documented
Oxidation; alkylation; fluorination; esterification. Large power needs. Must be distilled and stabilized unless manufactured for immediate use.
Cyanation reaction
Alkylation reaction or use of Amitonlike process. Product should be stabilized.
Troop concentrations, sabotage, terrain denial
No fluorinated reactor involved; therefore, do not need Hastelloy although glass-lined vessel required. Easier to produce, but far less toxic.
Sabotage (more applicable to subnational)
(contd)
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Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (contd)

Manufacturing processes for Ventilation; filtration Sulfur mustards: (see Figure 4.1-1 for names) - CAS: 2625-76-5 - CAS: 505-60-2 - CAS: 63869-13-6 - CAS: 3563-36-8 - CAS: 63905-10-2 - CAS: 142868-93-7 - CAS: 142868-94-8 - CAS: 63918-90-1 - CAS: 63918-89-8 Manufacturing processes for Corrosion; potential for explosive lewisites: reactions - Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (CAS: 541-25-3) - Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (CAS: 40334-69-8) - Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (CAS: 40334-70-1) Manufacturing processes for Nitrogen mustards: - HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (CAS: 538-07-8) - HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (CAS: 51-75-2) - HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (CAS: 555-77-1) Manufacturing processes for PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene (CAS: 382-21-8) Manufacturing processes for Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride (CAS: 75-44-5) Chlorination; neutralization
Troop concentrations, sabotage, terrain denial
Troop concentrations, sabotage
Troop concentrations, sabotage
A number of production processes have been documented including those to make other nitrogen mustards not listed on CWC schedules
Byproduct of Teflon manufacture
Gas-mask penetrant
A number of production processes have been documented A number of production processes have been documented
Used heavily in commercial processes Nonpersistent gas
(contd)
II-4-20
Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (contd)

Manufacturing processes for

Cyanogen chloride
None identified
(CAS: 506-77-4) Manufacturing processes for

Hydrogen cyanide
Quick-acting casualty agent Degradation of mask filters Bombs, grenades
A number of production processes have been documented A number of production processes have been documented A number of production processes have been documented
Used heavily in acrylic industries
(CAS: 74-90-8) Manufacturing processes for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides, e.g., DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride (CAS: 676-99-3 ) . Manufacturing processes for Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonylchlorides, e.g., DC: Methylphosphonyl dichloride (CAS: 676-97-1 ) Note: This material rather than DF is the fundamental building block of a significant portion of G and V agents. Manufacturing processes for O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, nPr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts, e.g., QL (CAS: 57856-11-8)
Fluorination reaction; corrosion
Key component in binary G agents
Chlorination reaction
Used to make DF and Di-Di mix Also can be used in some V agent processes
Transesterification reaction High-temperature methylation
Component of VX binary weapon; may A number of production be intermediate in VX process processes have been documented
II-4-21
SECTION 4.2DISSEMINATION, DISPERSION, AND WEAPONS TESTING
OVERVIEW Perhaps the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of dissemination. This section lists a variety of technologies that can be used to weaponize toxic chemical agents. Munitions include bombs, submunitions, projectiles, warheads, and spray tanks. Techniques of filling and storage of munitions are important. The principal method of disseminating chemical agents has been the use of explosives. (Figure 4.2-1 shows an example of a U.S. chemical bomb, the MC-1.) These usually have taken the form of central bursters expelling the agent laterally. Efficiency is not particularly high in that a good deal of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Particle size will vary, since explosive dissemination produces a bimodal distribution of liquid droplets of an uncontrollable size but usually having fine and coarse modes. For flammable aerosols, sometimes the cloud is totally or partially ignited (flashing) in the dissemination process. For example, explosively disseminated VX ignited roughly one third of the time it was employed. The phenomenon was never fully understood or controlled despite extensive study. A solution would represent a major technological advance.
Highlights
Efficiency of dissemination is the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons. Much of the agent is lost in an explosive dissemination by incineration and by being forced onto the ground. Flammable aerosols frequently flash (ignite) when explosively disseminated. The environment (winds and temperature) are important factors in CW dissemination.
Figure 4.2-1. MC-1 Gas Bomb
Aerodynamic dissemination technology allows nonexplosive delivery from a line source. Although this method provides a theoretical capability of controlling the size of the particle, the altitude of dissemination must be controlled and the wind direction and velocity known. Accurate weather observations can enable the attacker to predict wind direction and velocity in the target area. An important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of dissemination as it is tailored to the types of agent. The majority of the most potent of chemical agents are not very volatile. Indeed, the most volatile of the G-agents is GB (sarin), which has a volatility near that of water. All are nonvolatile liquids or solids at room temperature. VX is an oily liquid. An advanced proliferant might attempt to develop on-board sensor systems for initiation and control of agent dissemination/dispersal for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and artillery. In these cases, the sensor (target-detection device) may employ technologies common to other electronic fuzing applications. The efficacy of explosives and pyrotechnics for dissemination is limited by the flammable nature of some agents. In some respects, long-range strategic weapons pose a lesser problem than shortrange tactical weapons that are fired over, or in the vicinity of, ones own forces. The agent must be dispersed within the boundary layer (<200300 ft above the ground) and yet high enough to allow effective dispersal of the agent. This poses design problems because the ground/target detection device must be substantially more sensitive than for conventional munitions. The increased sensitivity also results in increased susceptibility to false firing due to noise, mutual interference, and electronic countermeasures (ECM).
II-4-22
Casualties due to premature initiation of the warhead are unacceptable in tactical weapons. Accordingly, an additional function such as a simple electrical or mechanical timer may be used to arm the height-of-burst sensor. A more recent attempt to control aerosol particle size on target has been the use of aerodynamic dissemination and sprays as line sources. By modification of the rheological properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can theoretically be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved. In practice, the task is more difficult, but it represents an area where a technological advance could result in major munition performance improvements. The altitude of dissemination must be controllable and the wind direction and velocity known for a disseminated liquid of a predetermined particle size to predictably reach the ground and reliably hit a target. Thermal dissemination, wherein pyrotechnics are used to aerosolize the agent has been used particularly to generate fine, inhalable clouds of incapacitants. Most of the more complex agent molecules, however, are sensitive to high temperatures and can deteriorate if exposure is too lengthy. Solids are a notoriously difficult problem for dissemination, since they tend to agglomerate even when pre-ground to desired sizes. Dispersion considers the relative placement of the chemical agent munition upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination so that the material is most efficiently used. For example, the artillery rockets of the 1950s and early 1960s employed a multitude of submunitions so that a large number of small agent clouds would form directly on the target with minimal dependence on meteorology. Another variation of this is multiple free aerial sprays such as those achieved by the BLU 80/ B Bigeye weapon and the multiple launch rocket system. While somewhat wind dependent, this technique is considerably more efficient in terms of agent quantities. Testing requirements for munitions seek to measure the efficacy of dissemination. This has been done historically on instrumented grids with samples of the disseminated material taken at known positions. The positions are assigned area values and these are integrated to determine total dosage and dose isopleths. While the technique was constantly improved, it still was crude by most standards and required
numerous tests to provide useful information. Instrumental methods such as versions of light detection and ranging (LIDAR) may well be better suited to more accurate measures but without the signature of the chemical grids. Modeling dissemination patterns for agent laydown can be an effective way to predict dispersal without physical testing. Little testing would be required given good, verified models. The problem, however, is model verification. RATIONALE (See Table 4.2-1) Many dissemination technologies have been included because many are available to a proliferant. In World War I, canisters of chlorine were simply opened to allow the gas to drift across enemy lines. Although this produced limited results, it is indicative of the simplicity of potential means of dispersion. Although central bursters have limitations, countries usually use this method in the early stages of CW development, although it does not have to be the first one. There is sufficient open literature describing the pros and cons of various types of dissemination to dictate the consideration of all of them by a proliferant. Most countries could develop the toxic agents and adapt their standard munitions to carry the agents. It is much more difficult, however, to achieve success in effective dispersion and dissemination. Weather observation and forecasting are essential to increase the probability of effective CW dissemination and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) As stated previously, most countries have the capability to develop chemical weapons. Those with a well-developed military infrastructure could readily adapt existing munitions for chemical warfare. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq delivered mustard and tabun with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, and rockets. Virtually any country or subnational group with significant resources has sufficient capability to attain the minimum capability that would be needed to meet terrorist aims. Any nation with substantial foreign military sales or indigenous capability in conventional weapons will have (or have ready access to) both the design know-how and components required to implement at least a moderate capability.
II-4-23
Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters

Technology
Projectile cases for CW agents
Ability to produce fillable, fireable, and leakproof munition casings
USML II, IV; WA ML 2, 4
High fragmentation steels and corrosion/leak resistant casings
Projectile forging, casing production, high-integrity weld or ball seals, inert gas insertion, helium leak check equipment, acoustic metal flaw detection. High-integrity weld or ball seals, inert gas insertion, helium leak check equipment. Ability to dynamically balance loaded warhead. Ability to test fuze accuracy and reliability.
Liquid fill ballistic programs Dissemination prediction models
Warheads for CW missile Ability to produce casings for USML IV; systems either bulk liquid or subWA ML 4; munitions capable of MTCR 4 appropriate opening for dissemination Electronic time fuzes High-explosive formulations Accuracy/setability to within 0.1 second Precisely tailored energetic properties to prevent ignition USML III; WA ML 3 USML V; WA ML 8
Corrosion/leakresistant casings
Ballistic programs able to account for effects of liquid fills Dissemination and dispersion prediction capabilities None identified
Accurate electronic clock technology
Although standard Measures of explosive Explosive dissemination formulations are stability, oxygen balance pattern prediction usable, formulations desirable. to reduce potential aerosol ignition are desirable. Energetics with sufficiently low and controllable burning temperatures that do not destroy the material being disseminated. Measurement of energetic mix burning temperatures. Dissemination effectiveness predictive models
Energetic materials
Low-temperature burning energetic materials capable of vaporization/condensation or ablative dissemination of solid agents
USML V; WA ML 8; WA Cat 1C; CCL Cat 1C
(contd)
II-4-24
Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters (contd)
Technology
On-board sensors for Radar or radio proximity USML XI, XII; sequencing and initiation sensors for reliable measure- WA ML 11, 15 of CW warheads ment of altitudes from 50 to 100 meters. Guidance integrated fuzing. Nonenergetic electromechanical mechanisms for warhead control and initiation. Aerodynamic dissemination Nonexplosive dispersion of CW agents in a line source in the atmosphere Capability to produce and disperse agent filled submunitions USML XIV; WA ML 7 USML IV; WA ML 4
None identified
Specially designed ground approach or terrain return simulators
HOB measurement and detection algorithms and logic algorithms for ECCM or terrain feature analysis
Compatible thixotropic additives for control of particle size None identified
Rheogoniometer for Dissemination measurement of dynamic effectiveness predictive rheological properties of models batches Corrosion/leak-resistant Dissemination casings for subeffectiveness predictive munitions. Sub-munition models fill capability for missile warheads. Deployable micrometeorological sensors Reliable particle size measurement Linkage of sensor data to weapons system to control employment None identified
Submunition dispersion
Prediction/sensing of micro-meteorology De-agglomeration of particles Dosage/Area measurement
Ability to predict wind velocity CCL EAR 99; and direction in a target area USML XIV, XXI Ability to have majority of pre- USML XIV; ground solid particles in the WA ML 7 inhalable range Ability for reasonable measurement of dissemination effectiveness USML XIV; WA ML 7
None identified
Effective (probably item-specific) deagglomerant None identified
Techniques for measure- Software to translate ment of aerosol concen- data to concentration trations versus time isopleths and/or ground depositions over a broad area None identified Fuzzy programs to rapidly adjust delivery to prevailing meteorological conditions
Fuzzy logic for unmanned aircraft
Use of fuzzy logic in conjunction with on-site micrometeorological data to optimize dissemination performance
WA ML 21; USML XXI
None identified
II-4-25
Table 4.2-2. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Reference Data

Projectile cases for CW agents
Acquiring/producing fillable/fireable and leakproof munition casings
Bombs, projectiles, submunitions, warheads
Warheads for CW missile systems Producing casings for either bulk liquid Missiles or submunitions capable of appropriate opening for dissemination. Electronic time fuzes High explosive formulations Energetic materials Producibility Ability to cast stable explosives for weapon environments. Low-temperature burning energetic materials capable of vaporization/ condensation or ablative dissemination of solid agents. Conventional, biological and chemical warheads All munitions systems All munitions systems
Radar fuzes, proximity fuzes None identified None identified; many energetics available
On-board sensors for sequencing Effects of initiation mechanism on and initiation of CW warheads agent Aerodynamic dissemination Submunition dispersion Prediction/sensing of micrometeorology De-agglomeration of particles Dosage/Area measurement Fuzzy logic for unmanned aircraft Nonexplosive dissemination of CW agents Fuzing, filling Data collection Keeping particles in inhalable size Detection, collection Computational ability
Technology common to conventional cannister weapons and strategic/ tactical nuclear weapons Line source delivery of CW agents CW agent delivery Prediction of CW effects Dissemination of CW agent Contamination avoidance, command and control Delivery of CW agent
Delivery from manned aircraft Surface burst/contact sensor Different delivery system Bombs, warheads On-site observers None identified Use animals Normal logic
II-4-26
SECTION 4.3DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION
OVERVIEW Because many toxic chemicals act quickly, rapid detection is needed to prevent lethal or incapacitating results from unwanted exposure. This subsection covers a variety of technologies that can be used to detect CW agents. Sample collection, sample processing, and information processing are vital to enable identification and warning of chemical exposure. Detection can be accomplished at a designated location (point detection) or at a distance (standoff detection). No single fielded sensor detects all chemical agents of interest. Standoff detection is particularly difficult for low volatility agents (e.g., either U.S. or Russian forms of VX). Sensitivity of a detector is crucial to detecting lethal concentrations. Equipment must be reliable, provide identification quickly with a low false alarm rate and high accuracy, and be integrated into an alarm system so that warning can be distributed and proper action taken. Unknown factors can include location, persistence, and intensity of the agent. These are critical parameters for command decisions. Figure 4.3-1 shows a U.S. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). Detection, warning, and identification have an offensive CW component and are also necessary in a defensive context.
Highlights
Detection requirements for a purely offensive posture are minimal. A prudent attacker must be prepared to defend against a counterattack in kind if the CW threshold is crossed. Detection, warning, and identification of the employment of CW are key to implementing defensive measures. Detection of CW is a key aspect of CWC compliance.
Figure 4.3-1. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)
Some amount of detection and warning capability is needed if a country is to develop and employ chemical weapons. When toxic chemicals are produced,
detection and warning are necessary to the extent that the safety of workers is important. If storage sites are established, detection is needed to verify the integrity of the . weapons and to ensure that the surrounding area does not become contaminated. These concerns can be mitigated if production occurs just before use. Even though soldiers and airmen employing chemical weapons might wear some type of protective clothing, detection is necessary to prevent inadvertent exposure and to minimize contamination. It should be noted that other countries have not considered safety to be as important as the U.S. did when it was involved in offensive CW preparation. Consequently, they may dispense with procedures that the U.S. deemed essential. Proliferators of chemical weapons would not need much detection equipment. The agent(s) being produced and used would be known. Point detectors would be sufficient to determine inadvertent leakage. Detection capability is required to know when the environment is safe for normal operations after CW has been employed. Detection, warning, and identification are critical in a defensive role. Protection against chemical agents is available, but since wearing protective gear degrades military performance, units must not assume a protective posture until it is mandatory. Many prophylactic measures are most effective if implemented before exposure, and many therapeutics must be initiated soon after exposure. The sophistication needed depends on the technological capability of the enemy. The detection and identification requirements in a defensive posture are much more difficult to meet than those required for offensive operations. Detection, warning, and identification systems are further stressed because the time, place, amount, and type of agent used are determined by the attacker. The defender must be ready for anything at any time and in any amount.
II-4-27
Historically, detection of ground and surface contamination has depended on a color change on special paper that was exposed to an agent. Another method was a color change that occurred when air was drawn through tubes with special dye chemicals on a substrate. Special analytical kits were used to determine the presence of chemical agents in water. Various technologies are used in automatic detectors. All of them indicate the presence of an agent in one location. A number of detectors are being developed to provide standoff capability. Figure 4.3-2 shows the U.S. Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), which is designed to detect nerve and vesicant agent clouds at up to 5 km. If an agent can be detected at a sufficient distance, measures can be taken to avoid the contamination and the need to wear protective clothing.
RATIONALE (See Table 4.3-1) To prevent unnecessary casualties during production, transport, storage, and employment, a proliferant might need only be able to detect those agents that are being developed. A number of technologies could be used for this purpose, although only point detectors would suffice, since the location and identity would already be known. Warning would be quite simple. A prudent attacker, however, must be prepared for a retaliatory attack by an adversary. In this case, the agent to be expected might not be known. Identification and warning would be critical to taking proper defensive measures. The ability to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to forces is essential for operating in a chemical environment. Early detection and warning provide situational awareness to allow military forces to avoid or reduce the threat. If exposure cannot be avoided, troops must don protective clothing. Military forces also must know when contamination has been reduced to a level that permits normal operations. Knowledge of areas of residual contamination is important as well. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) A number of Western countries (Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States) have significant capability in sensor technology. Russia and Israel also are well advanced in this field. At least 18 countries have some type of chemical detector in their armed forces. Countries among the 18 include China, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, the Czech Republic, and South Africa.
Figure 4.3-2. RSCAAL
II-4-28
Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters

Technology
WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B WA ML 7; Mass SpectrometryDetect level 0.1 mass spectrometry (MS- 100 picograms of CW agent WA Cat IA; MS) AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 3A WA ML 7; Passive Infrared (IR) Detect level @1,000 m ~100 mg/m3 of CW agent WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 6A WA ML 7; Wet chemistry Detect >1.0 mg of CW agent WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B WA ML 7; Enzymatic reactions Detect level <0.1 mg of CW agent WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B Gas phase ion chemistry Detect levels <1.0 mg of CW WA ML 7; agent WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B 3 Gas Chromatography Detect level 0.11.0 mg/m of WA ML 7; (GC)-IMS CW agent WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 3A Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) Detect level 0.05 1.0 mg/m3 of CW agent
Radioactive materials in some systems
None identified
Spectral data base
None identified
Miniaturization and ruggedizing of current technology required
Spectral data base
None identified
Database development
Requires data base of emission patterns
None identified
None identified
None identified
Enzyme (acetocholinesterase) substrate
None identified
None identified
None identified
Ion source
None identified
Carrier gas
None identified
Spectral data base. Retention time indices.
(contd)
II-4-29

Technology
GC-Mass Spectrometry (MS)
Detect level 1 100 picograms of CW agent
WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 3A
Carrier gas
None identified
Spectral data base Retention time indices
GC-Flame Photometric Detect level 10 WA ML 7; Detector (FPD)-Flame 1,000 picograms of CW agent WA Cat IA; Ionization Detector (FID) AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B Transverse Field Detect level 0.001 Compensation (TFC)-IMS 0.01 mg/m3 of CW agent WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B WA ML 7; WA Cat IA, 3A; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 3A WA ML 7; WA Cat IA, 6A; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 6A WA ML 7; WA Cat IA, 6A; AG List; USML XIV; CCL Cat 2B, 6A
Carrier gas
None identified
Retention time indices
Radioactive materials
None identified
Spectral data base
Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Crystal Arrays
Detect level 0.011.0 mg of CW agent
Polymer coatings
None identified
Signal patterns of arrays
Absorption LIDAR
Detect levels of 1 mg/m3 of CW agent
None identified
None identified
Spectral data base
Scattering LIDAR
Detect levels above 1 mg/m3 of CW agent
None identified
None identified
Spectral data base
(contd)
II-4-30

Technology
Information Processing (e.g., data reduction, information transfer, sensor multiplexing, decision making Sample Processing (e.g., concentration)
Any capability is a concern
CCL EAR 99
None identified
Multiplexed system for detection of CW agents
Adaptations of existing systems.
Any capability is a concern
WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL 2B WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL 2B WA ML 7; WA Cat IA; AG List; USML XIV; CCL 2B
None identified
Analytical chemistry equipment
Spectral recognition algorithms
Remote liquid particulate Detect levels above 1 mg/m3 sensing
None identified
None identified
Emission data base
Remote solid particulate sensing
Detect levels above 1 mg/m3
None identified
Database development
Requires database of emissions
II-4-31
Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data

Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) Mass Spectrometry-mass spectrometry (MS-MS) Passive Infrared (IR)
Replacement of radioactive elements Power requirement Potential interference of atmospheric pollutants; identification of specific substances; limited to relatively volatile material; atmospheric transmission window; signal processor intensive Requires significant servicing; environmental limitations on reactants Requires individual processing and interpretation; sensitivity of living substrates to environment Source of ionization; analysis of products Electric requirement Electric requirement Long (120 min) response time Electric requirement Long (210 min) response time Electric requirement Long (0.55 min) response time Substance dependent sensitivity; atmospheric transmission window Substance dependent sensitivity
Point alarm Verification Remote detection of chemical agents
Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Use another detection technology
Wet chemistry Enzymatic reactions
Point alarm Point alarm
Use a live animal Use another detection technology
Gas phase ion chemistry Gas Chromatography (GC)-IMS GC-Mass Spectrometry (MS) GC-Flame Photometric Detector (FPD)-Flame Ionization Detector (FID) Transverse Field Compensation (TFC)-IMS Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Crystal Arrays Absorption LIDAR Scattering LIDAR Information Processing (e.g., data reduction, information transfer, sensor multiplexing, decision making
Point alarm Point alarm Point alarm Point alarm
Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Use another detection technology
Point alarm Point alarm Remote sensing Remote sensing
Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Use another detection technology Manual data analysis
Availability/preparation of comprehen- Areas where comparison of spectral sive data base on known and potential and/or other data is required for toxic material detection/identification
(contd)
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Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data (contd)

Sample Processing (e.g., concentration) Remote liquid particulate sensing
Differentiation of samples from background Several agents (e.g., VX) are of very low volatility and provide little material for sensing Highly toxic particulates cannot be detected by current remote methods
All areas of agent sensing Remote sensing
Remote solid particulate sensing
Remote sensing
None identified
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SECTION 4.4CHEMICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS
OVERVIEW Chemical defense includes individual and collective protection and decontamination. The goal of individual and collective protection is to use clothing ensembles and respirators as well as collective filtration systems and shelters to insulate forces from chemical agents. Decontamination is essential to return personnel and equipment to normal operating conditions. Technologies for these types of equipment are included in this subsection. Masks protect the respiratory system by preventing the inhalation of toxic chemical vapors and aerosols. They protect eyes and face from direct contact with chemical agents as well. Important considerations in mask design are the ability to don the mask and hood quickly, communications, respiration, performance degradation, and the ability to consume fluids while the mask is in place. Masks must be compatible with operational missions and equipment (e.g., night vision goggles). Ideally, protective clothing (garments, gloves, and boots) should provide protection from contact with chemical agents as well as flame protection, with a minimum amount of heat stress. Ensembles must be durable and able to be laundered and decontaminated. Protective equipment reduces the efficiency of the person wearing it. Collective protection enables groups to work in a toxic-free environment in tents, vehicles, or special shelters. Efforts are aimed at making systems mobile and easy to erect. Air supplied to shelters is purified in much the same way as it is for individual masks. Shelf life of protective equipment is a concern to all users. Periodic inspections are necessary to ensure readiness. Decontamination removes toxic substances or renders them harmless. Individuals and equipment must be decontaminated. Depending on the particular agent, CW agents can be washed and rinsed away, evaporated, absorbed, or removed by heat treatment. There is medical treatment available to offset the effects of chemical weapons. Atropine and 2-PAM chloride can be administered upon suspicion of exposure to a nerve agent. Atropine is an anticholinergic agent. It blocks the action of acetylcholine (a nerve transmitter substance), preventing it from stimulating nerves. 2-PAM chloride is anoxime, which increases the effectiveness of drug therapy in poisoning by somebut not allcholinesterase inhibitors. Atropine and 2-PAM chloride only work to a limited degree with refractive nerve agents such as GD. Their administration when an exposure has not occurred can be harmful. Diazepam (more commonly known as Valium) is used as an anticonvulsant once an individual exhibits incapacitating
Highlights
Masks and protective clothing are needed to defend against many toxic chemicals. Reduction in combat efficiency from wearing protective gear is estimated to be up to 50 percent. Proliferators may not provide the same measure of protection that is afforded U.S. troops. Training and protection reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons.
symptoms of nerve agent exposure. The carbamate pyridostigmine, given in a dose of 30 mg every 8 hours, can be used as a pretreatment for nerve agent exposure. Without appropriate chemical defenses, operations may have to be limited. Forces could be required to remain covered until the threat of further exposure is reduced. This could be mission threatening if persistent agents are encountered. An alternative is to avoid contamination. To do this, detection equipment must be integrated with a command and control system to ensure an alarm is disseminated. In chemical warfare, effective chemical defense measures can greatly limit the damage inflicted by a chemical attack. In World War I the gas mask had a dramatic effect in limiting the significance of chemical weapons. Developments since then (improved masks, protective clothing, detectors, and training) have further widened the margin of protection. Collective protection takes defensive measures one step further by providing a toxic-free environment for group functions such as command centers and medical facilities. Since World War I, chemical warfare has only been used against those entirely lacking or highly deficient in protective equipment. Some suggest that chemical defense acts as a deterrent to the initiation of chemical warfare because there is less incentive to attack a well-protected force. World War II is cited as an example of this theory, since both sides were well equipped for chemical defense and neither side used chemical weapons. Others suggest that equivalent offensive capability is the real deterrent. While protective clothing can reduce the effects of CW, its use poses other problems.
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techniques, and proficiency of both military and civilian populations obtained through training. RATIONALE (See Table 4.4-1) Even proliferants must provide some amount of protection for their people if they are to prevent casualties during production, storage, transport, and employment of chemical weapons. Often rogue states include defensive training for their ground forces. That is not to say that protection must or will be supplied according to U.S. standards. In World War II, the Soviets were reported to have filled chemical shells in the open with no protection. When workers died, they were replaced. If a defensive posture is developed, individual protection, decontamination, and collective protection could be part of the program. Military requirements are much more stringent than commercial applications which deal with known substances. Ground, air, and naval forces are all subject to attack with unknown agents and must be protected. A robust defensive capability not only protects troops but could act as a deterrent against a chemical-capable adversary. Technologies in this section can enhance chemical protection for troops. If contamination is unavoidable, protective clothing enables an individual to continue operations in a chemical environment. Collective protection is important for providing a safe and contamination-free work area and rest/relief facilities. A key use of collective protection is in medical facilities. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) Numerous countries produce chemical protective gear. Production of masks is the most common, including masks for civilians (as seen in Israel during Operation Desert Storm), although limited shelf life remains a problem. Many NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries as well as Middle East and Asian states produce protective clothing. Only a few manufacture aircraft respiratory equipment: Canada, Norway, Russia, and the UK. A number of countries have developed collective protection for shelters: Finland, France, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, Russia has fielded and maintains a substantial inventory of collective protection systems for a wide variety of vehicles and shelters. Since 1990 North Korea has placed a high priority on military and civilian chemical defense readiness. Training in a chemical environment is mandatory and an integral part of armed forces training. Pyongyang is attempting to equip all forces, including its reserves, with full protective gear. In addition, it has directed that the entire population be issued gas masks. Iran has increased defensive chemical warfare training in the last few years and is making efforts to buy foreign equipment.
Figure 4.4-1. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)
The wearing of individual protective equipment can hinder performance by interfering with vision, communication, and dexterity. High ambient temperatures are particularly devastating to those required to don protective clothing. With training, many of the negative effects can be minimized. Overheating, however, is difficult to overcome. In hot weather, full protective gear is very burdensome. Even the threat of agents can dictate the donning of gear. Commanders must then consider limiting the duration of operations or elect to compromise the protection afforded by individual gear. Figure 4.4-1 shows the newest U.S. protective clothing. Although the CWC prohibits the development, production, possession, and transfer of chemical weapons, it places no restraint on chemical defensive measures. The Convention ensures the rights of parties to maintain chemical defense programs and grants parties the right to ...participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. Chemical defense systems are needed by both an attacker and a defender. An offensive unit needs to limit the number of casualties caused by inadvertent exposure. In addition, troops must be prepared for a retaliatory strike once chemical agents have been used. Since the attacker chooses the time, place, extent, and duration of an attack, defensive measures by the attacker can be planned accordingly. The extent of defensive equipment needed by a proliferant is dictated primarily by the value the nation places on human life and well-being of its forces. Other factors include potential adversaries, extent of CW use expected, quality of munitions and sealing
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Table 4.4-1. Chemical Defense Systems Technology Parameters

Technology
Production and design Any type of vapor and technology for protective aerosol protection masks
WA ML 7; WA Cat 1E; USML X
Butyl rubber; silicone rubber; plastics
Simulated agents; Software for generating leakage testers; facial contours mannequin-face model for mask and suit design; particle-size analysis equipment. Simulated agents; particle-size analysis equipment; testing methodology Simulated agents; particle-size analysis equipment None identified
Production and design Any type of vapor and technology for protective aerosol protection clothing
WA ML 7; WA Cat 1E; USML X WA ML 7; USML XIV;
Charcoal activated cloth; semipermeable membranes; polymers Impregnated charcoal filters; polyethylene; fluoropolymer/ aramid laminate None identified Sufficient water supply None identified Chloromide S-330; atropine/obidoxime chloride (CAS 114-90-9)
Absorption technology for collective protection
Any type of vapor and aerosol protection
None identified
Nonaqueous decontamination technology Aqueous decontamination technology Medical prophylaxis technologies Therapeutic technologies
Ability to decontaminate to mission essential levels Ability to decontaminate to mission essential levels Ability to protect mission essential personnel Ability to protect mission essential personnel
USML XIV; WA ML 7 USML XIV; WA ML 7 USML XIV; WA ML 7 USML XIV; WA ML 7
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Table 4.4-2. Chemical Defense Systems Reference Data

Production and design technology Communications (microphone passfor protective masks through); respiration (air management); eye protection; composite eye lens retention system; anthropometrics; performance degradation; ability to consume fluids; protect from unknowns; shelf life
Aircrew masks; protective masks
Technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Production and design technology Integration with hood/mask; closure Individual protection for protective clothing technology; performance degradation; ability to consume fluids; limited life span; protect from unknown; environmental considerations; shelf life Absorption technology for collective protection Affordable; deployable; adaptable to structure; modification to deal with filter penetrants; protection from unknown; charcoal for most organic materials Collective protection
Technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Individual protection technologies; technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Nonaqueous decontamination technology
Volume of toxic agent; time required; Reduce contamination to allow military adaptability to unknown agents; operations disposal of agent; identification of what needs to be decontaminated; identification of decrease of toxicity to allowable level; solubility of agent; corrosiveness on material; sensitivity of electrical components Volume of toxic agent; time required; Reduce contamination to allow military adaptability to unknown agents; operations disposal of agent; identification of what needs to be decontaminated; identification of decrease of toxicity to allowable level; solubility of agent; corrosiveness on material; sensitivity of electrical components Efficacy of prophylaxis; pre- vs. postexposure treatment; side effects; storage; application synergism. Side effects; response time Reduce casualties; reconstitute forces
Weather (time); aqueous decontamination; technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Aqueous decontamination technology
Weather (time); nonaqueous decontamination; technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Medical prophylaxis technologies
Therapeutics; individual and collective protection technologies; technologies that enable contamination avoidance Technologies that enable contamination avoidance
Therapeutic technologies
Reduce casualties; reconstitute forces
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SECTION VI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY
SECTION 6NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
Scope Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects (NWE) Testing ................II-6-5 Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations .......................II-6-11 Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects ................................................II-6-16 Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects .......II-6-22 Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation ...............II-6-26 High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects ..................II-6-28 Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Effects ..............II-6-31 Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation ......................II-6-33
Highlights
NWE technologies enable a country to harden more effectively its offensive and defensive systems against a nuclear weapon. Physical simulators that mimic the environments generated by a nuclear explosion and validated computer codes that can predict the NWE on systems are both used to evaluate the vulnerabilities of potential targets or delivery systems. Each type of nuclear weapons effectblast and shock, thermal radiation, transient nuclear radiation, and EMPrequires its own set of physical simulators and validated codes. Few simulators are able to replicate more than one NWE. Both physical simulators and validated codes require large financial investments.
BACKGROUND A nuclear detonation creates a severe environment including blast, thermal pulse, neutrons, x- and gamma-rays, radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and ionization of the upper atmosphere. Depending upon the environment in which the nuclear device is detonated, blast effects are manifested as ground shock, water shock, blueout, cratering, and large amounts of dust and radioactive fallout. All pose problems for the survival of friendly systems and can lead to the destruction or neutralization of hostile assets. Although some nuclear weapons effects (NWE) such as blast and cratering have analogs in the effects of conventional weapons, many NWE are unique to nuclear use. In addition, blast and other common weapons effects are likely to be much more powerful in the nuclear case than in the realm of conventional weapons. NWE are so severe that combinations of two or more simultaneously (as in a real event) may not add linearly, complicating the design and construction of physical simulators or the writing and validation of computer simulation codes. OVERVIEW Some NWE can be modeled mathematically using powerful computers; others, and in particular the combination of several effects, are beyond valid analytic or numerical assessment. The only way to know if friendly systems or target assets will endure a given nuclear attack may be to expose representative equipment to real nuclear
explosions or to construct complex simulators which reproduce a part of the spectrum of NWE. Until the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, the United States conducted atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons, and it was relatively simple to include effects testing in the experiment. By signing the 1963 accord, the United States, the UK, and the Former Soviet Union agreed to discontinue atmospheric testing, testing in outer space, and testing under water. The only environment in which nuclear devices could be detonated was underground in circumstances where radioactive debris did not drift beyond national boundaries. In the years between 1963 and 1992 the States Parties to the LTBT conducted underground tests to study NWE. As a result of congressional action the United States unilaterally entered a testing moratorium, which was made permanent with the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Because it is no longer considered acceptable for the United States to conduct any nuclear explosions for any reason, future U.S. assessments of the vulnerability of its systems or of potentially hostile systems will have to rely upon the use of simulation and analysis validated by comparison with the results from almost 50 years of testing. Combinations of nuclear weapons effects pose particularly difficult simulation problems. The thermal pulse can weaken or ignite a target, permitting the blast wave
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to be more effective than against a cold object. X-ray radiation can damage electronics and protective systems, making the target more vulnerable to neutrons. EMP and transient radiation effects in electronics (TREE) can operate synergistically. Thermal effects could conceivably damage some components designed to harden a system against EMP. Low-energy x-rays absorbed by a target in space can heat surface material to the vaporization point, causing it to explode away from the system, producing shock effects within the target. The effects produced and the ranges at which they are effective depend upon the yield of the nuclear weapon and the height of burst (HOB) and may depend upon the design of the device itself. Potential proliferators will not have their own data from atmospheric and underground testing of nuclear weapons to use in validating simulation and analysis. If a proliferator decides that detailed knowledge of weapons effects is necessary for developing either a targeting or a survival strategy, it will need to gain a useful increment of information beyond that in the open literature (e.g., in Glasstone and Dolans The Effects of Nuclear Weapons and in more technical publications) to justify the expense of simulation. It will also have to acquire a detailed knowledge of the mechanisms by which nuclear weapons produce their physical effects. Should a proliferator actually carry out an NWE test despite international norms against such testing, one can infer that the testing state can produce significantly more special nuclear material (SNM) than it requires for its war stocks. Theoretical predictions of NWE based on computer codes and algorithms that have not been compared with experiments may not be accurate, and the details of such experiments are not generally available. Those codes and algorithms which have been validated by experiment usually contain adjustable parameters and are much more reliable predictors of NWE. Such codes are termed substantiated. Physical simulation provides more confidence in predicting NWE because it does not rely upon the mathematical approximations of codes and algorithms but uses physical phenomena closely related to those produced by a nuclear detonation to test the behavior of real systems. But physical simulation remains second best compared to testing against a real nuclear detonation. The technologies to be discussed at length in this section are briefly described in the following paragraphs. 1. Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing Underground testing (UGT) can provide much insight into weapon design, radiation effects (gammas, neutrons, x-rays) on military systems, selected aspects of shock and blast, thermal effects, and source region EMP (SREMP). Countries with limited defense budgets are less likely than the major nuclear powers to have had exhaustive underground testing programs.
2.
Blast and Shock Effects From Nuclear Detonations
Although thermal radiation, EMP, and ionizing radiation from a nuclear blast are all damage producing, at yields below about a megaton the blast and shock produced by a nuclear weapon are the predominant means of damaging a target. For some targets, such as underground bunkers and missile silos, blast and shock are virtually the only effective destructive mechanisms. 3. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects The intensity of thermal radiation decreases only as the inverse square of the distance from a nuclear detonation, while blast, shock, and prompt ionizing radiation effects decrease more rapidly. Thus, high-yield weapons are primarily incendiary weapons, able to start fires and do other thermal damage at distances well beyond the radius at which they can topple buildings or overturn armored vehicles. 4. TREE and System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects An understanding of TREE and SGEMP is of critical importance in designing and building equipment that can survive a nuclear attack. It is not clear, however, that a nation having limited financial and technical resources could develop unique radiation-hardened devices and/or systems. These countries could, however, test a few critical subsystems or systems in an established foreign simulation facility. Although there are certain aspects of TREE and SGEMP technology that are of general scientific interest, for nations which have interests in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the desire to evaluate and test systems at SGEMP and TREE dose rate levels typical of nuclear weapons is a useful indicator that they plan on nuclear combat, whether as a user or as a victim of the weapon. While TREE and SGEMP may indeed be effective, a nuclear planner without the benefit of extensive simulation and substantiated codes will probably rely on the gross NWE such as blast, shock, and thermal radiation. 5. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Nuclear effects on electromagnetic signal propagation, which affects command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4 I), are of concern to countries expected to use nuclear weapons, particularly those which intend to explode a weapon at great altitudes or those which expect to have to defend against such a nuclear attack. C3I technology is primarily affected by high-altitude nuclear effects that could interrupt satellite-to-satellite communications, satellite-to-aircraft links, or satelliteto-ground links. Most nations will hope that signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and ground-based differential GPS transmitters will be usable shortly after a nuclear explosion, as well as traditional communications channels which must be protected.
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6.
High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects
The electromagnetic pulse generated by the detonation of a single nuclear weapon at high altitudes can be a threat to military systems located as much as a thousand miles away. HEMP can disable communications systems and even power grids at enormous distances from the burst. This type of threat could be used by a third world country that has the capability to launch a rocket carrying a high-yield device (about 1 megaton or more) a few hundred kilometers into the upper atmosphere and a few thousand kilometers from its own territory (to avoid damaging its own systems). Nuclear weapons effects simulators, particularly for HEMP, require high-energy, terawatt-class power conditioning. Parts of these systems have significantly advanced energy storage, switching, and power-control technologies in the submicrosecond, multimegajoule regime. These technologies directly map into support for the power technologies needed for advanced weapons such as high-power microwaves. 7. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Effects This technology is specifically concerned with nuclear detonations that occur at very low altitudes down to ground level and that are usually targeted at military installations. Interest in this technology is uniquely associated with interest in using or defending against the use of nuclear weapons. SREMP produces an environment characterized by a combination of electromagnetic and ionizing radiation caused by a lowaltitude nuclear detonation. 8. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Although this technology is focused on developing simulators which produce pulsed electromagnetic and particle radiation resembling that arising from a nuclear weapon, it is shared by many nations. Certain aspects of this technology have relevance for non-nuclear directed-energy weapons devices and thermonuclear power technology. Countries that have an interest in acquiring in-house capability in this technology could possibly have a long range interest in nuclear weapons. The financial investment required for admission is, however, very large. RATIONALE Nuclear detonations are the most devastating of the weapons of mass destruction. To make this point one need only recall the pictures from Hiroshima or the
international furor over the accidental but enormous radiation release from the Chernobyl power plant. The contamination from Chernobyl was significantly larger than would have been expected from a nuclear detonation of about 20 kT at ground level, but was comparable in extent to what might result from a small nuclear war in which a dozen or so weapons of nominal yield were exploded at altitudes intended to maximize blast damage. Hence, for those nations which are concerned about being the victims of a nuclear attack, the requirement for understanding and implementing ways of mitigating NWE is important. It is just as important for the user of a nuclear weapon to understand (and be able to mitigate) NWE on his own forces, not merely on the delivery vehicle, unless he can be certain that there will be no nuclear retaliatory strike. Some important nuclear weapons effects are subtle in their action, producing no obvious visible damage to targeted systems. If these effects are to be employed deliberately, the using state must understand them well. To do so requires simulation and substantiated computation codes. In the absence of nuclear testing, simulation equipment, numerical simulation, and theoretical analysis of NWE are the only means states can verify how NWE will affect their own forces and those of their opponents in a nuclear environment. NWE simulation, as well as survivability and hardening programs, have both offensive and defensive aspects, and may be desired by both nuclear possessor states and those with neither nuclear weapons nor plans to build them. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) Most of the relevant equipment and specialized software has been developed in parallel by many countries including Russia, China, the UK, and France, as well as Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. Although the simulation, survivability, and hardening equipment available from non-Western countries is inferior to that produced in the West (years behind in the case of HEMP simulation), it may be good enough to permit a nuclear aspirant to understand how to make its own equipment more survivable than otherwise. The most advanced capabilities usually only are necessary when one is trying to design equipment to be the lightest, most effective, and most efficient; when one backs away from the edge of the envelope, less-detailed analysis and testing may suffice. After all, the NATO allies operated acceptably survivable equipment decades ago.
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Country
Sec 6.1 Underground Testing
Sec 6.2 Blast and Shock
Australia Canada China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan Russia South Africa UK United States
Sec 6.3 Thermal Radiation
Sec 6.4 TREE and SGEMP
Sec 6.5 Signal Propagation
Sec 6.6 HEMP
Sec 6.7 SREMP
Sec 6.8 Pulsed Power

sufficient level

some

limited
Figure 6.0-1. Nuclear Weapons Effects Foreign Technology Assessment Summary
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SECTION 6.1UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TESTING
OVERVIEW This section concentrates on those additional and specific technologies needed for nuclear weapons effects testing. The technologies for underground nuclear testing in general are covered in Section 5.10. Underground nuclear weapons effects tests (UGWETs) provide nuclear environments for demonstrating the hardness and survivability of military equipment and materials as well as for studying basic nuclear effects phenomenology. The UGWET-specific technologies include horizontal emplacement of the device, the provision of evacuated horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS) tubes for viewing the detonation, and mechanical closures to prevent debris from traveling through the HLOS tube to the experiment station that measures the radiation and shock environment and the response of systems. Also included are scattering station design and the computer codes necessary to understand the results of the experiments. Technologies to contain the release of radiation are only covered to the extent that they differ from those used in nuclear weapon development tests. For effects testing, horizontal emplacement tests (HET) are preferred over vertical emplacement tests because the emplacement of device and test equipment is simplified. Horizontal tunnels provide greater experiment flexibility and access. Vertical shaft tests are less expensive but only provide limited exposure area because of the risk associated with containment when the crater is formed. The need to excavate large cavities for the placing of test samples and the construction of appropriate environments for those samples (for example, a vacuum for reentry bodies) drives the conductor of HLOS tests to seek suitable terrain such as a mesa or mountainside. Effects tests could also be conducted inside a deep mine. HETs can incorporate large cavities so that shock and SREMP from a low-yield device actually have space to develop to the point where they are representative of similar effects in the open air from a large-yield weapon. The minimum burial depth is: D = 400 Y1/3 feet, and the radius of the cavity formed by the detonation is: R = 55 Y1/3 feet, where linear dimensions are measured in feet and yield in kilotons. The object of an HET is often to allow nuclear radiation to reach the test object while preventing it from being destroyed by the other effects. Indeed, scientists expect to be able to recover the test instrumentation. Such a test requires redundant contain
Highlights
Full-yield nuclear tests are the only way to produce all relevant nuclear weapon effects simultaneously. Underground nuclear weapons effects tests can provide insight into weapon performance, nuclear radiation effects, shock and blast, thermal effects, and source region EMP (SREMP). Signatories of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including all five declared nuclear weapon states and Israel, are no longer permitted to conduct nuclear test explosions. For those states physical simulation combined with validated computer codes provides the most reliable way to evaluate NWE. Even when it was allowed, underground testing was a very expensive way to garner the needed information. It was used by countries with significant economic bases and which were also committed to the development of nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities. Complete containment of radioactive debris is probably essential if a nation wishes to conduct a clandestine nuclear test. In any underground nuclear weapons effects test (UGWET), fast-acting mechanical closures to prevent debris from reaching the test objects are unique and critical equipment.
ment vessels: the first around the device, a second around all of the experiment to protect the tunnel system if the inner vessel fails and the experimental equipment is lost, and a third to ensure that no radiation escapes into the atmosphere even if the experimental equipment is lost and the tunnel system contaminated. The HET-HLOS configuration is most often used for radiation effects tests, but the HLOS configuration must withstand the blast and shock waves produced by the device. The HLOS pipe is tapered from about 6 inches in diameter at the zero room (the device emplacement cavity) to about 30 feet in diameter at the experimental area 1,500 to 1,800 feet away and provides a clear line of sight to the device for those test subjects which need to see direct radiation.
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Not all experiments require direct nuclear radiation; many are suitable for use with a scattered (lower intensity) beam produced in a scatter stationtypically made with appropriate nuclear and atomic properties to deflect the correct wavelength and intensity of radiation. The design of these scatter stations requires both technical skill and experience so that the scattered radiation is properly tailored for its intended use. An incorrectly designed station could mean that the test object is exposed to incorrect radiation types or intensities, which could significantly reduce the value of the test. A number of techniques are used in parallel to ensure that the HLOS pipe is closed before nuclear debris reaches the experiment. X- and gamma-rays travel at the speed of light, and electrons (beta particles) and neutrons are not much slower. The debris, however, moves much more slowly, at hydrodynamic velocities. [A modified auxiliary closure (MAC) or, when lower-yield weapons are used, a fast acting closure (FAC), positioned close to the device locationthe working pointis able to shut the pipe in about 1 ms and to withstand pressures of about 30,000 psi.] A gas seal auxiliary closure (GSAC) farther along the HLOS pipe can close in less than 30 ms, and the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) will shut the pipe off in 300700 ms. The TAPS is considerably farther from the working point than the FAC and therefore (a) has more time to function and (b) must close a larger aperture due to the taper of the HLOS pipe. These closure technologies are likely to require significant experience to develop to the point of reliable operation. Other instrumentation to measure device performance, delivered shock, thermal pulse, electromagnetic pulse, and radiation is essentially similar to that used in a device development test (see Section 5.10).
RATIONALE Emplacement canisters, fast-acting closures for HLOS tunnels, and containment technology are the keys to preventing the release of radioactive debris into the atmosphere, allowing UGWET tests to be conducted without their being detected off-site. Mechanical closure designs and materials unique to underground tests in general and UGWET in particular include mechanical and cable gas-flow blocking designs and techniques that operate up to a pressure difference of 1,000 psi for up to an hour and specialized explosive and/or mechanically driven devices capable of isolating portions of the HLOS pipe during or within the first 100 ms after exposure to radiation. Because the experimental area is often quite large and is at a considerable distance from the working point, the vacuum systems needed to evacuate air from them to simulate a space environment are unusual. Required are specially designed diffusion or cryogenic pumps capable of maintaining a pressure much less than 103 Torr over a pipe system as long as 1,800 feet and varying in diameter from as small as 1 inch to as large as 30 feet. The crystals used to determine the energy spectrum of the radiation are unusual as well, and must be specially designed and fabricated to measure x-ray fluences at levels >0.1 cal/cm2 in a time <50 ns and to operate in the UGT environment. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) Some foreign vendors can manufacture digitizers, measurement systems, and fiber-optic equipment comparable to those used in U.S. UGWET. France manufactures digitizing oscilloscopes; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan manufacture the electronic components for measurement and recording systems; and Germany manufactures cryogenic vacuum pumps of the large size required for HLOS events. For an FTA covering equipment generally usable in a nuclear test, see Section 5.10.
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Table 6.1-1. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Technology Parameters

Technology
UGWET Testbed that Contains the Nuclear Radiation Generated in the Explosion
Contain radioactive release USML XVI that concurrently complies with environmental constraints and detection using mechanical and cable-gasflow blocking designs that withstand up to 1,000 psi for up to 1 hour, or mechanical devices that isolate portions of the line-of-site pipe within 100 ms after exposure to radiation; techniques for recording analog signals with frequency content >250 MHz; timing and firing systems that provide a probability of failure less than 0.01%. Systems that permit measurement and recording of x-ray fluence >0.1 cal/cm2 and timeresolved spectra in the photon energy range 50 eV to 500 keV measure and record neutron spectrum at flux levels >1019 n/cm2-5 of 14 MeV neutrons; measure the complete time-dependent flux of gamma rays. Design parameters and USML XVI design rules for scatter station design that facilitate the acquisition of information on system response to the nuclear and electromagnetic radiation generated in UGWETs.
Stemming materials
Specially designed: mechanical closures that prevent the uncontrolled release of gas or debris, diffusion or cryogenic pumps that maintain less than 1 Torr over a total pipe system more than 500 feet in length, manufacturing equipment that can maintain 2-dimensional uniformity <1%, detectors that measure X-ray fluence >0.1 cal/ cm2, stress and particle motion gauges capable of measuring stress greater than 1 kilobar and velocities >10 m/s, airblast gauges with <2 ms risetime.
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms for computing: coupled radiation hydrodynamics flow (especially in 2- or 3-dimensional geometry), high-temperature opacity, x-ray deposition and material response, shock propagation and equation-of-state, stress waves in and around nuclear explosive cavities, Maxwell's equations in ionized air; and evaluate x-ray blowoff.
Scattering Station Design
Lithium hydride
None identified
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that facilitate the design of scatter stations and collectively incorporate the effects of electromagnetic and x-ray environments.
(contd)
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Table 6.1-1. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Technology Parameters (cont'd)
Technology
Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing Coupled RadiationHydrodynamics Flow
Radiation/hydrodynamic flow USML XVI parameters that have been derived from UGT environments that improve the ability to design UGWETs.
None identified
None identified
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that compute radiationhydrodynamics flow for the range of parameters relevant to an underground nuclear test environment. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that compute hightemperature opacity (including ionized gas contributions), and multigroup opacity libraries created by such codes. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can predict x-ray deposition and material response of thin-film optical systems.
Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing HighTemperature Opacity
Opacities of materials of atomic number greater than 71 and for photon energies from 50 to 20,000 electron volts.
USML XVI
None identified
None identified
Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing x-ray Deposition and Material Response
Thermal conduction and electron transport parameters theoretically derived and/or empirically deduced from UGWETs that can accurately predict the response of thin-film optical systems to nuclear weapon generated x-rays.
USML XVI
None identified
None identified
Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing Shock Propagation and Equation of State
Substantiated parameters for USML XVI shock propagation and equation of state at high pressures and temperatures that can be used in the prediction of these entities.
None identified
None identified
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms for computing shock propagation that contain equation of state information at high pressures and temperatures.
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Table 6.1-2. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Reference Data

UGWET Testbed that Contains the Nuclear Radiation Generated in the Explosion
Containing the large overpressures generated by nuclear detonation while allowing the transport of nuclear radiation through the various test chambers, and preventing the residual gases from reaching the atmosphere. Developing instrumentation and integrated electronic systems that can operate acceptably in the presence of the high level ionizing radiation and strong shock waves that are generated by the nuclear detonation. Methods of obtaining sufficient energy from the main nuclear radiation beam using suitable scattering materials in conjunction with placement of measurement instrumentation to obtain a large amount of information on the radiation response of subsystems. Typical radiation levels at the experiment are 1 cal/cm2 of x-rays, 1012 neutrons/cm2. Incorporating experimental data into theoretical models that give accurate results for coupled radiationhydrodynamics flow. Incorporating experimental data into theoretical models that give accurate results for x-ray and gamma ray energy absorption and transmission through materials
All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, thermal radiation, or shock waves.
Above-ground radiation testing techniques, computer codes, and related algorithms for determining system response to nuclear weapons.
Scattering Station Design
All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, or neutrons.
Above-ground radiation testing techniques, computer codes, and related algorithms for determining system response to nuclear weapons.
Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing Coupled RadiationHydrodynamics Flow Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing HighTemperature Opacity
All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, or neutrons. All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, or neutrons. All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, or shock waves. All military systems that must operate in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, or shock waves.
None identified
None identified
Computer Codes and Related Incorporating experimental data into Algorithms for Computing x-ray theoretical models that give accurate Deposition and Material Response results for the energy deposition and response of thin films to x-rays. Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing Shock Propagation and Equation of State Incorporating experimental data into theoretical models that provide insight into the equation of state at extremely high pressure and temperature.
None identified
Gas guns and flyer-plate tests.
(contd)
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Table 6.1-2. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Reference Data (cont'd)
Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing Stress Waves from Nuclear Explosive Cavities Computer Codes and Related Algorithms for Computing x-Ray Induced Blow-Off
Incorporating experimental data into theoretical models that give predictable and repeatable results for the stress waves produced by underground nuclear detonations. Incorporating experimental data into theoretical models that give predictable and repeatable results for the blow-off of materials produced by incident x-rays.
All military systems that must operate None identified in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, thermal radiation, or shock waves. All military systems that must operate None identified in a nuclear detonation environment involving gamma rays, x-rays, thermal radiation, or shock waves.
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SECTION 6.2BLAST AND SHOCK EFFECTS FROM NUCLEAR DETONATIONS
OVERVIEW As pictures of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and of the test structures erected at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s amply demonstrate, the blast and shock waves produced by nuclear explosions are the principal means for destroying soft targets. Ground shock from a low-altitude, surface, or underground burst may be the only way to destroy hardened underground structures such as command facilities or missile silos. In the absence of atmospheric and underground nuclear testing to determine the survivability of structures, means must be found to simulate the phenomena associated with a nuclear explosion. For blast and shock this can be done either in a large-scale, open-air test employing chemical explosives or in a specially designed test facility which can also produce thermal fluxes comparable to those from a nuclear weapon. The air blast from a nuclear explosion is, however, different from that produced by conventional explosives. Because of the intense thermal pulse, the surface and near-surface air mass surrounding ground zero is heated rapidly. Within this heated region the blast wave travels more rapidly than it does in the cooler air above. As a result, blast waves reflected from the ground travel outwards and merge with the direct blast wave from the explosion. This produces a nearly vertical shock front called the Mach stem, which is more intense than that from the direct blast. To simulate the Mach stem with tests using high explosives, scientists employed helium-filled bags at ground level surrounding the high explosives used in the test. Because such tests can only be scaled and do not replicate the actual effects of a nuclear explosion, only scale models of test objects could normally be used. More recently, U.S. attention has focused on a higher pressure regime than can be attained in open-air testing and on the construction of large simulators capable of reproducing simultaneously the blast and the thermal pulse from a nuclear detonation. These simulators typically employ a fuel-oxygen mixture, for example, liquid oxygen and finely powdered aluminum, and consist of long semicircular tubes. These simulators can even approximate the effects of soil type on blast wave propagation as well as the entraining of dust in the blast wave. RATIONALE Proliferators could conduct nuclear simulations to obtain quantitative data about the behavior of blast and shock waves interacting with real structures. The actual combination of overpressure, dynamic pressure, lift, and diffraction effects on a target is exceedingly difficult to model analytically or to simulate numerically, particularly without actual data. Military interest in the effects of dynamic loading on systems is in
Highlights
Blast and shock effects are the primary damage-producing mechanisms for soft targets such as cities and are often the only effective mechanism for destroying underground structures such as missile silos. Nuclear weapons with yields below about one megaton are particularly identifiable as blast/shock weapons. Nuclear blast and shock phenomena differ from those produced by conventional chemical explosives because of their long duration and large overpressures. There is considerable overlap between the pressure regime of nuclear-produced blast and shock and that of air drag produced in strong hurricanes.
the survivability of tracked and wheeled vehicles, towed vehicles, C3 shelters, etc., in the pressure regime characteristic of nuclear weapons. Civilian interest is in the survivability of similar systems and structures subjected to storm winds. The two are not completely distinct interests because the dynamic pressure from strong hurricanes may be comparable to that from nuclear blasts. Military interest also focuses on shock loading, a dynamic process which differs from the nearly steady-state effects of storm winds. As a rule of thumb, a 30 kPa pressure threshold corresponding to a 60 m/s particle velocity in the shock, or a drag force equivalent to that produced by about 210 km/hr (130 mph) steady winds, distinguishes the military and civilian applications. A frequently used design objective for civil structures is survivability in 190 km/hr (120 mph) winds. Technologies for simulation include not only the ability to produce strong shocks and air blasts but also those used to measure shock wave values, dynamic pressure in a dusty environment, and deflections or other motions of the test structure. Dust-loaded shock tubes are unique to NWE testing. Similarly, combining both blast and thermal pulse would be unique to the nuclear situation. Explosives which are diluted or mixed with inert materials such as dilute explosive tiles produce more uniform detonations that more closely resemble a nuclear detonation; such explosives would also be critical to NWE testing.
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Simple software for computing nuclear blast, shock, and thermal effects is already uncontrolled, but codes which have been compared with nuclear detonations and which have been improved as a result are critical. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) U.S. capability in numerical simulations of nuclear blast effects is probably unsurpassed, but France, Canada, the UK, and Germany are making rapid progress in the field. Note that neither Canada nor Germany possesses nuclear weapons and that neither is believed to have any program to acquire such arms. Israel has some capability in numerical simulation. Most likely, Russia does as well. The French had the most advanced Western blast simulator, a compressed-airdriven facility with a 70 m2 cross section that is large enough to test full-sized military vehicles. The United States now has the Large Blast/Thermal Simulator with a larger cross section (about 300 m2), a greater operating envelope than the French installation, and the capability to perform combined synergistic blast and thermal simulations (thermal pulse up to 8 cal/cm2).
Germany has a blast simulator with a cross-section of 76 m2 and is acquiring thermal radiation simulators. The Germans are good at shock wave photography in small laboratory-scale shock tubes. The UK has a smaller explosively driven blast simulator with a smaller cross-section and smaller operating envelope than any of the above-listed facilities. The UK also operates lamp-type thermal radiation simulators. Canada, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Israel, and the Netherlands have had active blast simulation programs in the past. Italy, Japan, India, and Pakistan have capabilities in some critical elements of survivability and hardening to nuclear blast and thermal radiation. Japan has been conducting high-quality, laboratory-scale shocktube research. Russia and some Eastern European states have above-ground blast simulators comparable to those of the United States and other NATO nations. Most of the countries with blast simulation capabilities do not possess nuclear weapons and likely acquired the technologies to study the survivability of their own assets.
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Table 6.2-1. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Technology Parameters
Technology
Nuclear Airblast Simulator
Overpressure and/or USML XVI dynamic pressure levels exceeding 3 kPa, dust generated by nuclear burst with scaled HOB below 250m/(KT)1/3, and all highyield bursts at higher HOB for high humidity layers below 3,000 m above sea level. 3,000 K e.b.b. source, pulse- USML XVI length 0-10 s, surface emittance >8 cal/cm2-s, that can test subsystems and systems against combined thermal and blast effects of a low-altitude nuclear detonation.
Explosives or explosives mixed with inert materials (dilute explosives) specially designed for nuclear weapons simulation.
Miniaturized gauges that can measure pressure and structural response; shock tubes or other devices that can simulate the non-ideal nuclear airblast environment. Instrumentation for measuring response of systems and materials for flux levels >8 cal/cm2-s, cameras with spectral resolution <0.25 nm, sampling rate >120/s, and with 10-bit resolution.
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that predict the pressure waveform generated by a nuclear airblast that can be used for designing the simulator and for calibration. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can interpret and extrapolate the results from simulation to real systems; and include: the response of materials at elevated temperature and temperature gradients in the presence of shock waves. None identified
System Level Thermal/ Blast Simulators for LowAltitude Nuclear Detonations
Liquid oxygen, powdered aluminum
Nuclear Ground Shock Simulator
Peak overpressures from 0.1 MPa surface flush and shallow-buried structures that extend from the surface to several meters below the surface.
USML XVI
Explosives or explosives mixed with inert materials (dilute explosives) specially designed for nuclear weapons simulation. Allweather materials that can protect RVs, launch vehicles, and aircraft against dust. None identified
Instruments for measuring effects resulting from stresses 10 MPa, gauges that measure stresses and strains in underground detonations.
Underwater Nuclear Detonation Simulator
Overpressures greater than 100 psi and having impulse sufficient to degrade the operational capability of seabased assets resulting from an underwater nuclear detonation.
USML XVI
None identified
None identified
(contd)
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Table 6.2-1. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Technology Parameters (cont'd)
Technology
Thermostructural Shock Simulator
Generate time history (1 to USML XVI 100 ns pulse duration) of soft x-ray induced shock wave on space platforms.
None identified
Optical measuring None identified systems that exhibit less than 10 mm per meter change in lateral or longitudinal dimensions when exposed to levels of x-ray generated pressures and impulses necessary to degrade the operational effectiveness of space assets.
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Table 6.2-2. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Reference Data
Nuclear Airblast Simulator
Ability to maintain sufficiently high pressure for sustained period of time using high explosives so as to adequately simulate the effect of a nuclear blast.
Above-ground communication nodes, jeeps, trucks, tanks, artillery; RVs, boost vehicles, and aircraft.
Substantiated computer codes and related algorithms that predict: overpressure and impulse on surface platforms, and dust lofting and atmospheric transport; laboraory scaled experiments of airblast over nonideal grounds using laser beam facilities. Substantiated computer codes and related algorithms that predict combined effects of blast and thermal radiation. Substantiated computer codes and related algorithms that predict any of the following: airblast, ground shock, loads on flushmounted, shallow-buried, or deeply buried structures that may include the effect of non-ideal terrain. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that predict overpressure and impulse on surfce ships and submarines due to nuclear-produced underwater detonations out to ranges where the pressures fall to 100 psi. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can predict the mechanical and structural response of missile/spacecraft structures due to nuclear weapon generated x-rays.
System Level Thermal/Blast Achieving synchronization of blast Simulator for Low-Altitude Nuclear and thermal radiation waveforms. Detonations Nuclear Ground Shock Simulator
Above-ground communication nodes, jeeps, trucks, tanks, artillery; RVs, boost vehicles, and aircraft.
Disposable simulation techniques that Buried communication nodes, produce ground-shock shocks >5 MPa bunkers, underground missile silos and coupled energy >10 KT of TNT. that may either be simply covered or structurally reinforced.
Underwater Nuclear Detonation Simulator
Engineering of conventional highexplosive shaped charges to simulate nuclear detoanation pressure-time history of underwater detonation.
Combat and combat-related surface ships, submarines.
Thermostructural Shock Simulator Tailoring of shock overpressure and impulse (pulse width 1 to 100 ns) on irregular surface of space structures and RVs.
Satellites, ICBMs
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SECTION 6.3NUCLEAR THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS
OVERVIEW Thermal radiation decays only as the inverse square of the distance from the detonation. Thus, weapons in the megaton class and above are primarily incendiary weapons, able to start fires and do other thermal damage at distances well beyond the radius at which they can topple buildings or overturn armored vehicles. The effect of thermal radiation on unprotected human beings is likely to be very serious, producing flash burns over large areas of the body. However, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings demonstrated that once the victim is beyond the radius at which light-colored fabrics are directly ignited, even simple precautions can greatly reduce the extent and seriousness of thermal injuries. Many examples exist of people severely burned on their faces and arms, but unburned beneath even a thin shirt or blouse. Thermal effects on structures are equally complex. The response of a structure to the thermal pulse from a nuclear weapon depends upon its composition (wood, masonry, concrete); the type and albedo of any exterior paint; the transparency of any windows facing the burst; the type, texture, and composition of roofing; and even the presence or absence of awnings and shades. For weapons in the 1 to 200-kiloton region used against structures commonly found in the West, blast effects are likely to predominate; larger weapons will have the ability to start fires at distances far greater than they can inflict significant blast damage. Films of tests conducted in Nevada in the 1950s confirm that at the extreme distance at which wood-frame houses can be ignited by lower yield weapons, the buildings are blown apart seconds later by the blast wave, while structures which survive the blast do not ignite after the blast. Tests conducted in the Pacific using megaton-class weapons show the opposite effect. Secondary fires started by broken gas mains, electrical short circuits, etc., are not considered here. To fight on the modern electronic battlefield, one must understand the effects of nuclear weapons on sensors which function in the ultraviolet, optical, and infrared wavelength regions. Much less information about the response of such instruments is available openly, simply because no modern sensors were operating in Japan in 1945, and few were tested above ground before the LTBT went into effect. Thus, a state seeking to harden its sensors against the light flash from a nuclear weapon must determine the spectrum of the radiation from the weapon, simulate that spectrum at appropriate intensity levels and for representative durations, and then expose sensors to the flash. This probably could be done for small systems and sensors in a facility of modest size using commercially available non-nuclear technology; it is much more
Highlights
The thermal flash from nuclear weapons in the megaton class is able to ignite structures at distances greater than the blast wave from the same weapons can destroy them. Ignition of wood, etc., takes place at fluences of about 5 cal/cm2, while many modern structures can withstand overpressures of at least a few psi. Thermal radiation can produce flash burns on unprotected human beings, but at distances beyond that at which clothing is ignited by the flash even simple precautions can greatly reduce injuries. Thermal radiation from a nuclear weapon can adversely affect sensors in the infrared through the ultraviolet regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. A country seeking to harden its sensors against the light flash from a nuclear weapon must determine the spectrum from the weapon as affected by atmospheric absorption and then simulate that spectrum at appropriate intensity levels for representative duration. High-temperature blackbody radiation sources are used for simulation of the nuclear thermal radiation.
difficult to test large systems. Note that the spectrum of interest is a function of the yield of the attacking weapon, the time after detonation, and the distance the sensor is from the burst (because the atmosphere is not uniformly transparent at all wavelengths of interest). RATIONALE The fireball from a nuclear explosion reaches blackbody temperatures greater than 107 K, so that the energy at which most photons are emitted corresponds to the x-ray region of the electromagnetic spectrum. For detonations occurring below 30,000 m (100,000 ft) these X-rays are quickly absorbed in the atmosphere, and the energy is reradiated at blackbody temperatures below 10,000 K. Both of these temperatures are well above that reached in conventional chemical explosions, about 5,000 K. For
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detonations below 100,000 feet, 35 percent to 45 percent of the nuclear yield is effectively radiated as thermal energy. In addition to the high temperature of the nuclear fireball, the blackbody radiation is emitted in a characteristic two-peaked pulse with the first peak being due to the radiating surface of the outrunning shock. As the shock front temperature drops below 6,000 K, thermal radiation decreases when the shock front becomes transparent to radiation from the interior. This occurs between 105 and 102 seconds after detonation. At about 0.1 second after detonation, the shock front becomes sufficiently transparent that radiation from the innermost, hottest regions becomes visible, producing a second thermal peak. Before the second peak begins the fireball has radiated only about one quarter of its total energy. About 99 percent of the total thermal energy is contained in the second pulse. The duration of this pulse depends on the yield of the weapon and the height of burst (HOB); it ranges from only about 0.4 s for a 1 kT airburst to more than 20 s for a 10 MT explosion. Both theory and experiment indicate that the dominant thermal pulse can be adequately represented by a blackbody at a temperature between 6,000 and 7,000 K, which places the peak of the spectrum near the boundary between the ultraviolet and the visible regions of the spectrum. The shape of the Planck spectrum is such that most of the radiation is contained in the visible and infrared regions. The response of any given system to the thermal pulse depends on the absorption properties of the test subject but also to the distance from the burst and the atmospheric conditions between fireball and target such as clouds, snow, aerosols, and dust. The atmosphere is not equally transparent at all wavelengths, so the spectrum of the radiation incident on a target must be correctly calculated and then simulated. By the same token, known atmospheric absorption effects can be used by a system incorporating sensors at different distances from a nuclear explosion to establish the characteristics of the explosion itself and, therefore, the weapon type. Such information would be very useful in selecting appropriate responses. Sensors used to deliver
information on which decision makers can rely, however, must be calibrated against simulated nuclear fireballs under a wide range of atmospheric conditions. Mixing and ignition facilities with surface emittance rates on the order of 150 cal/cm2-s at blackbody temperatures of 3,000 K are critical to some simulators. Such mixer facilities should mix fuel and oxidizer before ignition to avoid the production of smokes and particulate clouds. Instrumentation designed to function at flux levels above about 150 cal/cm2 -s is specialized to the nuclear simulation role; this intense radiation environment can easily melt all known materials over the duration of a full thermal pulse. These conditions are not found in any commercial applications. Other processes and technologies such as plasma discharges with arc diameters >1.0 cm and arc lengths >10 cm for current greater than 1,000 and more than 300 kW input power are unique to nuclear simulation and have no commercial applications. Software is to be validated against nuclear detonations or simulations and intended to model the characteristics of the fireball as functions of the characteristics of the nuclear source, burst environment, and atmospheric conditions. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) The new U.S. Large Blast/Thermal Simulator (LBTS) is the most advanced facility of its type in the West, having a larger operating envelope (blast) than the comparable French instrument plus the capability to perform simultaneous blast and thermal testing, also a capability lacked by the French. The United States and France lead in full-scale, thermal pulse simulation technology. Large-area, chemically driven, thermal-radiation simulators were developed in the United States but have been sold to France, the UK, and Germany. The United States operates flash and continuous-lamp facilities and uses solar furnaces on small targets. France and Germany have made incremental improvements to the simulators purchased from the United States. Russia and some Eastern European countries have thermal simulators comparable to those of the United States and other NATO nations.
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Table 6.3-1. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Technology Parameters

Technology
High Intensity Thermal Radiation Chemical Energy Sources
3,000 K e.b.b. sources, pulse USML XVI length >1 sec, that can provide a flux >7 cal/cm2-s to test objects with volumes >100 cubic feet.
Liquid oxygen, powdered aluminum
Movable asymptotic calorimeters for measuring thermal flux, cameras with spectral resolution <0.25 nm, digital sampling rate >120/s, and with 10-bit resolution. Instrumentation including photometers and flux gauges that can accurately measure incident flux densities in the 10's of W/cm2 range (temperature and flux are inferred from power density measurement) Instrumentation including photometers and flux gauges that can accurately measure incident flux densities in the 10's of W/cm2 range (temperature and flux are inferred from power density measurement) Instrumentation including photometers and flux gauges that can accurately measure incident flux densities in the 10's of W/cm2 range (temperature and flux are inferred from power density measurement)
No special commercial software is required for power control.
Solar Power Tower Heliostats and receiver that (Central Receiving Tower produce 3,000 K e.b.b., with Mirror Field) provide 5 MW total thermal power, peak fluxes 260 W/cm2, illuminate targets as large as 27 m2, and simulate thermal nuclear transient in second range. Solar Parabolic Dish/ Parabolic Trough Systems
USML XVI
None identified
No special commercial software is required for power control. Programming effort is challenging but straightforward.
Parabolic dish that generates USML XVI solar thermal power by tracking the sun and provides 75 kW total thermal power, peak flux 1500 W/cm2 over a 15-in. diameter circular area, and can control pulse duration in millisecond range. Heliostat that tracks and USML XVI directs sunlight into parabolic dish and can provide total thermal power, and peak flux 400 W/cm2, and can control power to simulate nuclear thermal transients.
None identified
Solar Furnace Systems
None identified
(contd)
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Table 6.3-1. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Technology
Thermal Effects Simulators for IR Detectors
Peak energy density from 1 to 103 J/cm2; peak power density from 103 to 106 W/cm2; laser irradiation pulses from 107 to 1 sec; uncertainty in damage threshold <35%. Pulse length between 109 to 104 sec, power density from 105 to 108 W/cm2.
USML XVI
Photovoltaic Detectors (PV): HgCdTe, PbSnTe; Pyroelectric Detectors: TGS, SBN; Thin-film Photoconductors (PC): PbS, PbSe; bulk HgCdTe Ge, Si, InSb, GaAs, SiGa, SiAs, InAs, InGaSb, PbSnSe, LiTaO3
Laboratory lasers having None identified following capabilities: peak energy density from 1 to 103 J/cm2; peak power density from 103 to 106 W/cm2; pulse width from 107 to 1 sec. Laboratory lasers having None identified following range of capability: pulse length between 109 to 104 sec, power density from 105 to 108 W/cm2. Plasma Radiation Source None identified
Thermal Effects Simulators for Optical Semiconductors
USML XVI
Thermal Radiation Effects Soft x-Ray Simulators Using Plasma Radiation Source
Soft x-ray (photon energies USML XVI between 1 to 10 keV) radiation spectrum for ontarget fluences 4.5 cal/cm2 over an area > fraction of a centimeter in under 100 ns; capability of generating peak pressures in 10 s of kbar (few GPa) range. Magnetic driven flyer plates that simulate thermally generated pressures at the surface of space platforms as high as 10 kbar, and impulses as low as ~ 5 ktap (500 Pa-s). USML XVI
None identified
Magnetic Driven Flyer Plates Simulator for Soft x-ray Thermal Radiation Effects
None identified
Pulsed power system for None identified magnetic field
Explosive Loading Simulators for Soft x-ray Thermal Radiation Effects
Explosively driven flyer USML XVI plates that simulate thermally generated pressures and impulses at the surface of generic shaped space platforms of moderate size (e.g., RVs) with pressures <1 kbar to 70 kbar (7 GPa) for fiberreinforced organic ablators and up to 13 GPa for metal targets; and impulses ranging from several hundred taps to >7,000 taps (700 Pa-s).
High Explosives
None identified
None identified
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Table 6.3-2. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Reference Data

High Intensity Thermal Radiation Chemical Energy Sources
Generate nuclear thermal radiation for testing and evaluation of materials, components, subsystems, and systems for military application.
Systems that must survive the thermal Substantiated computer codes effects from a low altitude nuclear and algorithms that can predict detonation the response of systems to the thermal radiation generated by a nuclear detonation; solar simulation methods. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can predict the response of systems to the thermal radiation generated by a nuclear detonation; chemical energy sources Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can predict the response of systems to the thermal radiation generated by a nuclear detonation; chemical energy sources Substantiated computer codes and algorithms that can predict the response of systems to the thermal radiation generated by a nuclear detonation; chemical energy sources
Solar Power Tower (Central Receiving Tower with Mirror Field)
Precise computer control of reflector Systems that must survive the thermal field to simulate thermal nuclear pulse; effects from a low altitude nuclear design and focus of mirrors; techdetonation niques for determining incident flux. These must work in combination with high speed shutter to produce the leading edge of the thermal pulse. Design and fabrication of facets; tailor Systems that must survive the thermal power level by facet alignment; control effects from a low altitude nuclear of transients, in conjunction with high detonation speed shutter, to replicate nuclear thermal pulse (especially leading edge); techniques for determining incident flux. Design and fabrication of facets; tailor Systems that must survive the thermal power level by facet alignment; control effects from a low altitude nuclear of transients, in conjunction with high detonation speed shutter, to replicate nuclear thermal pulse (especially leading edge); techniques for determining incident flux. Determination of damage thresholds for detectors including vaporization and melting in photoconductors, cracking caused by thermal stress in pyroelectric detectors, and junction degradation in photodiodes. Theoretical models for: optical and carrier transport, depth of heated material, coupled diffusion equations for temperature and excess carrier density, non-linear processes including two-photon absorption, freecarrier absorption, dynamic Burstein shift.
Solar Parabolic Dish/Parabolic Trough Systems
Solar Furnace Systems
Thermal Effects Simulators for IR Detectors
Sensor systems that must survive the Substantiated computer programs thermal effects from either a low or and algorithms that can predict high altitude nuclear detonation. melting and vaporization, cracking caused by thermal stress, and junction degradation, taking into account laser beam parameters and geometry. Sensor systems that must survive the Substantiated computer programs thermal effects from either a low- or that can predict optical and carrier high-altitude nuclear detonation. transport; depth of heated region; coupled diffusion equations for temperature and excess carrier density; two-photon absorption, free-carrier absorption, and dynamic Burstein shift.
Thermal Effects Simulators for Optical Semiconductors
(contd)
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Table 6.3-2. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Reference Data (cont'd)

Thermal Radiation Effects Soft xRay Simulators for High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations Using Plasma Radiation Source
Simulation: of impulse, material blowoff, spallation and surface damage caused by vaporization and/or ablation, buckling of thin-walled structures, brittle fracture, delamination, nucleation and growth of flaws. Increasing the size of the energy source >500 kJ for applying magnetic pressures >10 kbar (1 GPa) to large targets.
RVs and space platforms that must survive a high-altitude NUDET.
Substantiated multidimensional shock wave computer programs that incorporate constitutive models of composite materials, blow-off, fracture, nucleation, growth of flaws; buckling, brittle fracture, and delamination. Substantiated multidimensional shock wave computer programs that incorporate constitutive models of composite materials, blow-off, fracture, nucleation, growth of flaws; buckling, brittle fracture, and delamination. Substantiated multidimensional shock wave computer programs that incorporate constitutive models of composite materials, blow-off, fracture, nucleation, growth of flaws; buckling, brittle fracture, and delamination.
Simulation of Soft x-ray Thermal Radiation Effects Produced by High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations Using Magnetic Driven Flyer Plates
RVs and space platforms that must survive a high-altitude NUDET.
Explosive Loading Simulator for Soft x-ray Thermal Radiation Effects
Methods for concurrent simulation of RVs and space platforms that must peak pressure, impulse, and angular survive a high-altitude NUDET. distribution of shock waves produced by soft x-rays on moderate to large space platforms or segments of space platforms using a combination of the: Sheet-Explosive Loading Technique (SELT), Light-Initiated High Explosive (LIHE) technique, and methods for spraying explosive on complex targets such as the Spray Lead at Target (SPLAT) technique. Specific issues are: SELTaccounting for finite velocity and oblique shock wave instead of uniform detonation time over surface and nonperpendicular shock, especially at low stress, reducing the minimum explosive thickness to permit reduction of impulse to threat levels, and adjusting the peak pressure and impulse using attenuators; LIHEproduce impulses <1,000 taps (100 Pa-s) using shortduration blast waves, reduce sensitivity of explosives and improve handling capabilities, and apply to complex target shapes; SPLAT generate low-impulse simulation for large test objects.
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SECTION 6.4TRANSIENT RADIATION EFFECTS IN ELECTRONICS (TREE) AND SYSTEMS-GENERATED ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (SGEMP) EFFECTS
OVERVIEW Many military systems (and, increasingly, civilian systems such as communications and weather satellites) must be capable of operating in environments containing sources of both natural and man-made radiation. In this context radiation refers to particle-like effects caused by neutrons, photons, and charged particles. When energetic radiation passes through matter, many complex processes occur including Compton scattering, photoelectric excitation, Auger electron emission, and pair production caused by photons; ionization caused by charged particles; and various nuclear processes caused by neutrons. Neutron-induced reactions can stimulate the release of charged particles and photons. As the level of integration of modern electronics increases, and as the size of individual devices on chips shrinks, electronic systems become increasingly vulnerable to any unwanted charge deposition or atomic displacement within the silicon base of the semiconductors. Effects which are generally short-lived are classed as transient radiation effects in electronics (TREE). EMP generated within the system by the passage of radiation through cases, circuit boards, components, and devices is called systems-generated EMP or SGEMP. The quantification of both phenomena is critical to the design of optical and electronic packages which can survive these effects. Ideally, such subsystems should be produced without significant increases in either cost or weight. Because the radiation which causes TREE and SGEMP is relatively strongly absorbed in the atmosphere, both phenomena are of primary importance to space systems exposed to high-altitude, high-yield nuclear detonations. RATIONALE Survivability analysis of semiconductor electronics requires quantitative understanding of at least the following: Ionization effects (both total dose and dose rate) which produce enhanced photocurrents in the transient state and can also cause permanent trapping of free charge in metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) devices. Displacement effects (displacement of lattice atoms leading to changes in the bandgap energy levels) and thermomechanical shock induced by the rapid deposition of energy from the nuclear detonation. These effects depend not merely on total dose but also on dose rate. Naturally occurring effects include total dose from electrons and protons trapped in the
Highlights
Radiation can damage or destroy microelectronic integrated circuits by a number of mechanisms. Although high doses and dose rates are more predictably effective at damaging microcircuits, single-event upsets are becoming increasingly more common and devastating as individual device size decreases. TREE and SGEMP are primarily problems for space-based systems. Natural radiation can do similar damage over a period of years. It is difficult to predict the details of system survivability using computation, and it is also very expensive to build adequate simulators. Many foreign powers have the ability to produce radiationhardened or radiation-resistant microcircuits.
Van Allen belts and single-event upset (SEU) or even single-event burnout. SEU results when enough ionization charge is deposited by a high-energy particle (natural or man-produced) in a device to change the state of the circuitfor example, flipping a bit from zero to one. The effect on a power transistor can be so severe that the device burns out permanently. Large x- and gamma-ray dose rates can cause transient upset and permanent failure. These dose rates are delivered over a 10100 ns time period. Delayed gammas in a 110 microsecond period at the same dose rate can cause latchup and burnout of devices. Latchup is the initiation of a high-current, low-voltage path within the integrated circuit and causes the circuit to malfunction or burnout by joule heating. Neutron fluences of greater than 1010 n/cm2 can cause permanent damage. A nuclear weapon will typically deliver this dose in a period from 0.1 to 10 ms. Total ionization greater than 5,000 rads in silicon delivered over seconds to minutes will degrade semiconductors for long periods. As device sizes decrease, the threshold for damage may go down.
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It is inherently difficult to predict the effects of TREE and SGEMP from first principles. Because components, circuit boards, cases, connectors, and everything else within a system can be arranged in many ways, and because radiation can come from any direction, only a detailed simulation (perhaps involving Monte Carlo calculations) can do the job. The task of prediction is made more complex because the effects of the radiation pulse can depend on the operating state of the system at the moment the radiation passes through it. A series of tests with conditions chosen to reach design dose and dose rate limits during many different phases of system operation is probably preferable. Such testing, however, requires simulators which can reproduce the extreme conditions produced by nuclear weapon detonation, typically >1011 rads (Si)/s. Simulators of this environment typically include high-current, short-pulse electron linear accelerators irradiating a primary target to produce an appropriate flux of secondary radiation.
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) Many nations have the capability to produce radiation-hardened microelectronic and electro-optical devices and to use these devices in military systems. These states include the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and South Korea. Many of these nations do not possess nuclear weapons. The UK, France, Sweden, and Russia have demonstrated their ability to produce radiation-hardened systems. All nations which can produce radiation-hardened components and systems may be presumed to have the ability to verify by experiment that such systems function correctly. Those countries which did not conduct nuclear effects tests must have some simulation capability. Nuclear weapon states must also have the capability to simulate TREE and SGEMP since all have signed the CTBT.
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Table 6.4-1. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Technology Parameters
TREE/SGEMP Effects Simulators
Pulsed gamma ray, x-ray, USML XVI electron beam, and ion beam sources that simulate a nuclear weapons radiation environment with dose rates >1011 rads(Si)/s over a volume that is large enough to test military subsystems/systems; diagnostic and test equipment that can operate in dose rates >1011 rads(Si)/s.
Optical fibers and semiconductor materials that can operate in dose rates >1011 rads(Si)/s.
Substantiated multidimensional shock wave computer programs that incorporate constitutive models of composite materials, blow-off, fracture, nucleation, growth of flaws; buckling, brittle fracture, and delamination. that can operate and evaluate the performance of components, subsystems and systems in a nuclear weapon generated environments >1011 rads(Si)/s. Specially designed test systems that can evaluate the performance of components, subsystems, and systems that are required to operate in a radiation environment >1011 rads(Si)/s.
None identified
TREE/SGEMP Hardening Systems, subsystems, and components that are hardened against nuclear weapon generated environments that exceed 1011 rad(Si)/s
USML XVI
None identified
Substantiated radiation computer codes and algorithms that: perform TREE/SGEMP hardening assessments and tradeoff studies at either the component, subsystem and system level; can evaluate operatethrough capability.
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Table 6.4-2. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Reference Data
TREE/SGEMP Effects Simulators
Computer implemented analytical models of gamma ray, x-ray, electron and ion transport in multilayered and multidimensional structures. Development of testing procedures and related measurement systems that can operate at dose rates exceeding 1011 rad (Si)/s. Methods for circumventing and mitigating the effects of prompt nuclear radiation induced electrical signals. Minimizing sensor degradation from debris gammas. Developing radiation-hardened components and circuits.
Mission critical military systems that must operate in the TREE and SGEMP threat environment such as satellites, C3 nodes, RVs, etc.
Substantiated radiation (gamma ray, x-ray, electron beam, and ion beam transport) computer codes and algorithms that predict TREE/SGEMP effects in subsystems or systems.
TREE/SGEMP Hardening
Mission critical military systems that None identified must operate in the TREE and SGEMP threat environment such as satellites, C3 nodes, RVs, etc.
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SECTION 6.5NUCLEAR EFFECTS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNAL PROPAGATION
OVERVIEW The large quantities of ionizing radiation produced by a high-altitude, high-yield nuclear detonation can severely change the environment of the upper atmosphere, producing heavily ionized regions which can disrupt electromagnetic waves passing through those zones. These disturbed regions can easily be the size of North America and can persist for tens of hours. The trapping mechanism for these high-energy electrons may be similar to that which produces the Van Allen radiation belts. The actual degree of communications interruption is dependent upon the scenario and includes weapon yield and HOB, time of day, cloud cover, latitude and longitude of the burst, the specific communications path, and the time after the detonation. Other systems which may be affected by nuclear weapons effects on electromagnetic wave propagation include sensors in the IR, visible, and UV regions, and laser communications which may be affected by the background IR. A very hot (but transparent) region of the atmosphere can act as a lens to refract a laser communications beam off of its intended receiver. Radar beams are both attenuated and refracted when passing through a nuclear fireball at altitudes below 25 km. At these altitudes the mean free path is small, and it is reasonable to speak of the fireball as being in local thermal equilibrium. Under these circumstances it is difficult to track incoming reentry vehicles (RV). Optical systems will suffer increased noise levels both because of ionized regions and from blackbody radiation from the fireball, and long-wave infrared (LWIR) systems may be unable to see through the fireball to an RV in the distance and may not be able to see an RV nearer to the sensor than the fireball because of the background. No high-altitude nuclear tests have been carried out by the United States since the ratification of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Apparently, few IR data were obtained from the CHECKMATE, KINGFISH, ORANGE, and STARFISH highaltitude tests, so the visual information from those tests has been extrapolated to the IR regime. The main sources of high-altitude IR which would produce clutter include plasma emission, molecular and atomic emission from excited states, and emission from uranium oxide. All of these are functions of electron density. At frequencies above about 300 MHz (UHF, SHF, and EHF), signals may be disrupted by scintillation, primarily characterized by intermittent fading and multipath transmission. These effects may persist for long periods and can degrade and distort a
Highlights
Trans-satellite and satellite-to-ground communications are frequently interrupted. Operational effects include lower signal-to-noise ratio, fading, and reduced information rate for communication channels. Simulation of these effects uses hardware-in-loop.
signal almost beyond recognition (for example, the plasma clouds are dispersive so that the speed of all frequencies of electromagnetic radiation are not equal in the cloud). Temporal and frequency coherence can both be destroyed. RATIONALE The vast majority of information relating to the propagation of electromagnetic radiation in a nuclear environment is pure science, primarily ionospheric and auroral physics including such phenomena as whistlers between northern and southern hemisphere locations. It requires no protection, but information on the mitigation of the effects may be classified because of considerations applicable to specific systems. Two areas require special mention as critical technology: The process of calculating the evolution of the nuclear-produced plasma in the Earths atmosphere and magnetic field. Certain aspects of propagation simulators that reproduce the nuclear environment. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) All five of the declared nuclear weapon states, the United States, Russia, the UK, France, and China may have some capability to determine the effects of nuclear environments on electromagnetic signal propagation. All have access to and/or have contributed to the unclassified literature on RF propagation through structured media. The United States and the UK have provided models for calculating line-of-sight communications effects; the status of similar models in the other three nations is unknown.
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Table 6.5-1. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Technology Parameters

Technology
Fading Dispersive Communication Channel Simulators
Simulate RF propagation USML XVI through disturbed ionosphere generated by high altitude nuclear detonations, compute: frequency-selective bandwidth, coherence time, signal-to-noise ratio, bit error rate; frequency-selective band >100 kHz
None identified
None identified
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms integrated with hardware in the loop that predict the space-time ionospheric plasma concentration, frequencyselective bandwidth, and coherence time in nuclear disturbed ionosphere. Substantiated computer codes and algorithms integrated with hardwarein-the-loop that calculate high-altitude nuclear environments and predict propagation for IR/VIS/UV signals.
Optical and Infrared Simulators
Simulate propagation of IR (0.830 microns), VIS (0.40.8 microns), UV (0.010.4 microns) waves in backgrounds generated by nuclear detonations.
USML XVI
None identified
None identified
Table 6.5-2. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Reference Data

Fading Dispersive Communication Predict generation of ionic species, Channel Simulators plasma concentration, coherence bandwidth, coherence time, propagation delay, and probability of correct message resulting from a high altitude nuclear detonation. Optical and Infrared Simulators Predict generation of ionic species, plasma concentration, and propagation characteristics such as attenuation, refraction, etc., in IR/VIS/UV region resulting from a high altitude nuclear detonation.
Military communication systems and radars that must operate in nuclear disturbed propagation paths.
None identified
IR/VIS/UV systems that must operate in nuclear disturbed propagation paths.
None identified
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SECTION 6.6HIGH-ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGETIC PULSE (HEMP) EFFECTS
OVERVIEW A high-altitude nuclear detonation produces an immediate flux of gamma rays from the nuclear reactions within the device. These photons in turn produce high energy free electrons by Compton scattering at altitudes between (roughly) 20 and 40 km. These electrons are then trapped in the Earths magnetic field, giving rise to an oscillating electric current. This current is asymmetric in general and gives rise to a rapidly rising radiated electromagnetic field called an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Because the electrons are trapped essentially simultaneously, a very large electromagnetic source radiates coherently. The pulse can easily span continent-sized areas, and this radiation can affect systems on land, sea, and air. The first recorded EMP incident accompanied a highaltitude nuclear test over the South Pacific and resulted in power system failures as far away as Hawaii. A large device detonated at 400500 km over Kansas would affect all of CONUS. The signal from such an event extends to the visual horizon as seen from the burst point. The EMP produced by the Compton electrons typically lasts for about 1 microsecond, and this signal is called HEMP. In addition to the prompt EMP, scattered gammas and inelastic gammas produced by weapon neutrons produce an intermediate time signal from about 1 microsecond to 1 second. The energetic debris entering the ionosphere produces ionization and heating of the E-region. In turn, this causes the geomagnetic field to heave, producing a late-time magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) EMP generally called a heave signal. Initially, the plasma from the weapon is slightly conducting; the geomagnetic field cannot penetrate this volume and is displaced as a result. This impulsive distortion of the geomagnetic field was observed worldwide in the case of the STARFISH test. To be sure, the size of the signal from this process is not large, but systems connected to long lines (e.g., power lines, telephone wires, and tracking wire antennas) are at risk because of the large size of the induced current. The additive effects of the MHD-EMP can cause damage to unprotected civilian and military systems that depend on or use long-line cables. Small, isolated, systems tend to be unaffected. Military systems must survive all aspects of the EMP, from the rapid spike of the early time events to the longer duration heave signal. One of the principal problems in assuring such survival is the lack of test data from actual high-altitude nuclear explosions. Only a few such experiments were carried out before the LTBT took effect, and at that time the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of
Highlights
HEMP is generated by electric currents in the atmosphere produced by Compton scattering of the gamma radiation from a high-altitude nuclear detonation. The electromagnetic waves from EMP can degrade the performance of ground and airborne systems more than 1,500 km from the burst. The technologies used to harden against HEMP are essentially those used in the area of electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic interference; they are internationally available.
HEMP was relatively poor. No high-altitude tests have been conducted by the United States since 1963.1 The acid test of the response of modern military systems to EMP is their performance in simulators, particularly where a large number of components are involved. So many cables, pins, connectors, and devices are to be found in real hardware that computation of the progress of the EMP signal cannot be predicted, even conceptually, after the field enters a real system. System failures or upsets will depend upon the most intricate details of current paths and interior electrical connections, and one cannot analyze these beforehand. Threat-level field illumination from simulators combined with pulsed-current injection are used to evaluate the survivability of a real system against an HEMP threat. The technology to build simulators with risetimes on the order of 10 ns is well known. This risetime is, however, longer than that of a real HEMP signal. Since 1986 the United States has used a new EMP standard which requires waveforms at threat levels having risetimes under a few nanoseconds. Threat-level simulators provide the best technique for establishing the hardness of systems against early-time HEMP. They are, however, limited to finite volumes (air1
In addition to the more familiar high-yield tests mentioned above, three small devices were exploded in the Van Allen belts as part of Project Argus. That experiment was intended to explore the methods by which electrons were trapped and traveled along magnetic field lines.
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craft, tanks, communications nodes) and cannot encompass an extended system. For these systems current injection must be used. RATIONALE HEMP can pose a serious threat to U.S. military systems when even a single highaltitude nuclear explosion occurs. In principle, even a new nuclear proliferator could execute such a strike. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that such a state would use one of its scarce warheads to inflict damage which must be considered secondary to the primary effects of blast, shock, and thermal pulse. Furthermore, a HEMP attack must use a relatively large warhead to be effective (perhaps on the order of one megaton), and new proliferators are unlikely to be able to construct such a device, much less make it small enough to be lofted to high altitude by a ballistic missile or space launcher. Finally, in a tactical situation such as was encountered in the Gulf War, an attack by Iraq against Coalition forces would have also been an attack by Iraq against its own communications, radar, missile, and power systems. EMP cannot be confined to only one side of the burst. Because actual nuclear tests can no longer be performed, and because above-ground explosions have been prohibited since 1963, the only ways to determine the results of attacks utilize simulators, theoretical models, and the data from earlier U.S. nuclear tests. The integrated use of this information in computer models which can predict the HEMP environment as a function of weapon parameters and explosion geometry is a critical technology requiring protection. In contrast, basic theoretical models lacking actual test results should not be controlled. Theoretical models of HEMP coupling to generic systems such as cables and antennas are of general scientific interest. Codes associated with the generic coupling of
HEMP to systems and which do not reveal specific features of military systems and their responses, performance, and vulnerabilities to HEMP need not be controlled. These codes are similar to those used in electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic interference and the study of lightning. Interest in the synergism between lightning and HEMP will continue. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) The United States has been the world leader in HEMP technology since the first articles on the subject appeared in the early 1960s. These scientific papers appeared in the open literature, which allowed the Soviet Union to become active in the field. The general consensus is that Soviet (now Russian) capabilities lag years behind those of the United States. Nonetheless, Soviet interest in pulsed-power, which began under A.D. Sakharov, should call attention to the possibility that some of the Soviet HEMP program was very closely held. HEMP capabilities have been acquired by the European nations, including Sweden and Switzerland. Many of these countries have developed active programs that include the use of simulators operating nearly at the threat level. Papers presented at recent unclassified conferences by participants from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact indicate that they lag significantly behind the West in both simulation and theoretical understanding. Several foreign vendors produce equipment comparable to that available from U.S. sources. France manufactures pulse generators, field sensors, fiber-optic links, transient digitizers, and measurement systems; England manufactures 1-GHz bandwidth fiber-optic links used mainly in HEMP and conducts high-power microwave research. Switzerland and Israel have also developed test/simulation equipment of high quality.
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Table 6.6-1. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Technology Parameters

Technology
System Threat Level HEMP Simulators
Generate peak electric fields USML XVI exceeding 5 kV/m, risetime <10 ns, and pulse duration <1 s over volumes that are large enough to test complete military systems.
None identified
Pulsers capable of delivering rates of voltage rise greater than 100 kV/ns into less than 100 ohms, or rates of current rise greater than 1 kA/ns into impedances greater than 100 ohms into a port on a system.
Substantiated computer programs and related algorithms for computing the on-test-target electric field generated by the pulser.
Table 6.6-2. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Reference Data

System Threat Level HEMP Simulators
Developing plane wave EM fields for Subsystems and systems that must Current injection techniques, horizontal and vertical polarization complete their mission in the presence theoretical computations with peak electric field >5 kV/m, of the HEMP threat. risetime <10 ns, and pulse duration <1 s over volumes that can test complete military systems. The development of plane wave EM fields is extremely difficult. In all tests, configuration effects due to the simulation must be removed to develop the system response in a plane wave EM environment. These codes are critical for an adequate test. The use of current injection techniques adds risk because nonlinear effects due to arcing and sparking cannot be taken into acount, so results can be misleading.
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SECTION 6.7SOURCE REGION ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (SREMP) EFFECTS
OVERVIEW SREMP is produced by low-altitude nuclear bursts. An effective net vertical electron current is formed by the asymmetric deposition of electrons in the atmosphere and the ground, and the formation and decay of this current emits a pulse of electromagnetic radiation in directions perpendicular to the current. The asymmetry from a lowaltitude explosion occurs because some electrons emitted downward are trapped in the upper millimeter of the Earths surface while others, moving upward and outward, can travel long distances in the atmosphere, producing ionization and charge separation. A weaker asymmetry can exist for higher altitude explosions due to the density gradient of the atmosphere. Within the source region, peak electric fields greater than 105 V/m and peak magnetic fields greater than 4,000 A/m can exist. These are much larger than those from HEMP and pose a considerable threat to military or civilian systems in the affected region. The ground is also a conductor of electricity and provides a return path for electrons at the outer part of the deposition region toward the burst point. Positive ions, which travel shorter distances than electrons and at lower velocities, remain behind and recombine with the electrons returning through the ground. Thus, strong magnetic fields are produced in the region of ground zero. When the nuclear detonation occurs near to the ground, the SREMP target may not be located in the electromagnetic far field but may instead lie within the electromagnetic induction region. In this regime the electric and magnetic fields of the radiation are no longer perpendicular to one another, and many of the analytic tools with which we understand EM coupling in the simple plane-wave case no longer apply. The radiated EM field falls off rapidly with increasing distance from the deposition region (near to the currents the EMP does not appear to come from a point source). As a result, the region where the greatest damage can be produced is from about 3 to 8 km from ground zero. In this same region structures housing electrical equipment are also likely to be severely damaged by blast and shock. According to the third edition of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, by S. Glasstone and P. Dolan, the threat to electrical and electronic systems from a surface-burst EMP may extend as far as the distance at which the peak overpressure from a 1-megaton burst is 2 pounds per square inch. One of the unique features of SREMP is the high late-time voltage which can be produced on long lines in the first 0.1 second. This stress can produce large late-time currents on the exterior shields of systems, and shielding against the stress is very difficult. Components sensitive to magnetic fields may have to be specially hardened.
Highlights
SREMP is generated by electric currents produced by ionizing radiation from nuclear bursts below 20 km in altitude and can be effective within a radius of 3 to 8 km from the burst point, depending on weapon yield. SREMP adversely affects communications facilities and power grids and may be effective against electronic systems in blasthardened targets such as missile launchers. It is difficult to simulate SREMP because the electromagnetic and radiation environments must be produced simultaneously.
SREMP effects are uniquely nuclear weapons effects. RATIONALE During the Cold War, SREMP was conceived primarily as a threat to the electronic and electrical systems within hardened targets such as missile launch facilities. Clearly, SREMP effects are only important if the targeted systems are expected to survive the primary damage-causing mechanisms of blast, shock, and thermal pulse. Because SREMP is uniquely associated with nuclear strikes, technology associated with SREMP generation has no commercial applications. However, technologies associated with SREMP measurement and mitigation are commercially interesting for lightning protection and electromagnetic compatibility applications. Only those aspects of SREMP involving intense ionizing radiation or extremely large current pulses are militarily critical. Basic physics models of SREMP generation and coupling to generic systems, as well as numerical calculation, use unclassified and generic weapon and target parameters. However, codes and coupling models which reveal the response and vulnerability of current or future military systems are militarily critical. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) Several NATO countries including the UK, France, and Germany can perform the calculations of the SREMP environment and coupling to systems. More extensive capabilities for SREMP testing exist in Russia, France, and the UK.
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Table 6.7-1. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Technology Parameters

Technology
Source Region ElectroSystems that can generate magnetic Pulse(SREMP) simultaneously a radiation Simulators environment that exceeds 109 rad(Si)/s, and an electromagnetic environment for a nuclear weapon detonation 5 km in altitude.
USML XVI
None identified
Current generators that None identified produce an action 7 2 >2 x 10 A -s, or currents that exceed 20 kA, or rates of current change >2 x 1010 A/s; current generators that simulate SREMP induced long line currents at high voltages with the following combined characteristics: load current >2 x 104 A, load voltage >100 kV, FWHM greater than or equal to 30 microseconds.
Table 6.7-2. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Reference Data

Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Simulators
Substantiated computer codes and related algorithms that can predict the SREMP waveform and coupling to military systems.
Military systems and subsystems that must operate in the SREMP threat environment.
Substantiated computer codes and algorithms for predicting SREMP that include: neutron inelastic scattering and capture, radiation induced electric properties of fireballs; models of electrical discharges in soil
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SECTION 6.8PULSED-POWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS SIMULATION
OVERVIEW The large amount of commonality among the various pulsed-power schemes used to simulate TREE, HEMP, and SREMP makes it reasonable to discuss those technologies in a single subsection. However, the enormous amount of detail required to discuss even one technology thoroughly means that this section can only sketch the machines used to produce, tailor, and control the physical processes which produce the effects. Radiation, as commonly used in the nuclear weapons arena, applies to neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays alike. It can also include high-energy beta particles (electrons). All of these types of radiation show corpuscular behavior when interacting with matterthe high-energy photons because of their extremely short wavelength. Describing these interactions quantitatively requires the full machinery of relativistic quantum mechanics including the computation of the relevant Feynman diagrams. The particle energies involved range from the upper energy limit of the ultraviolet band, 0.124 keV, to the MeV and tens of MeV associated with the gamma rays and neutrons emitted from a fissioning or fusioning nucleus. Figure 6.8-1 shows the nuclear effects and the radiation sources for simulation.
Figure 6.8-1. Simulation of Nuclear Effects Using Pulsed-Power Radiation Sources Nuclear Effect TREE SGEMP SREMP IEMP (internal EMP) Thermomechanical shock (TMS) Thermostructural shock (TSR) Radiation Sources for Simulation gamma rays, hard x-rays, neutrons gamma rays, hard x-rays gamma rays gamma rays, hard x-rays soft x-rays, electrons, ions soft x-rays, ions
Highlights
Pulsed-power technologies are critical to the simulation of NWE caused by gamma rays, x-rays, neutrons, SREMP, and HEMP. Many of the identified energy storage, pulse formation, and switching techniques are relevant for particle accelerators, possible thermonuclear power production, particle-beam weapons, and laser weapons. Some of the identified pulsed-power techniques are also used in the design and testing of civilian power distribution systems. Pulsed-power generators for NWE simulation are very expensive.
The distinction between x-rays and gamma rays is not fundamentally based on photon energy. Normally, one speaks of gamma rays as having energies between 10 keV and 10 MeV and thinks of even hard x-rays as having lower energies. In fact, the difference between the two phenomena lies in their origin: gamma rays are produced in nuclear reactions while x-rays are an atomic phenomenon produced by electron transitions between discrete atomic levels or by blackbody (thermal) radiation from a heated object. A reasonable upper bound for x-ray energy in discussing
nuclear phenomenology would be a few hundred keV, associated with the initial stages of fireball formation. The upper limit to the frequency of the electromagnetic radiation attributed to HEMP is in the range of a few GHz. Thus, the interactions of the HEMP pulse with systems can be computed using classical electromagnetic theory without the need to include quantum effects. Off-the-shelf equipment suffices for the simulation of HEMP in small volumes. The peak electric field is about 50 kV/m, with a pulse width of several nanoseconds. However, producing equivalent fields over an entire military system such as a tank requires a very large radiating system with feed-point driving voltages in the megavolt range. The combination of antenna feed-point voltage and nanosecond rise time is what gives rise to the connection between HEMP pulsed-power technology and the technology needed to produce appropriate gamma- and x-rays. The production of pulses of neutrons corresponding to those generated by a nuclear weapon is primarily of interest for simulating TREE. Flash x-ray (FXR) techniques are used to produce hard and soft x-rays. Typically, a high-energy electron beam is dumped onto a target to produce bremsstrahlung (breaking radiation) photons over a broad range of energies up to the kinetic energy of the incident particles. Calculating the actual spectrum produced in a given target is difficult because thick targets, in which the electrons may interact several times, are
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required to obtain the desired intensities. This, in turn, raises the importance of nonlinear terms. Ideally, an FXR device should produce the same photon spectrum distributed identically over time as the spectrum from a nuclear device. This is not possible at the present time, but existing simulators provide useful approximations. Specific technologies used to provide the power pulse include the Z-pinch; Blumlein or coaxial cable pulse-forming and transmission lines; large banks of very high-quality, low-loss capacitors; fast opening and closing gas and liquid switches with very low resistance in the closed state; Marx generators to produce the actual high-voltage pulse, and even Van de Graaff electrostatic generators with high current (for the class of accelerator) output. The switches used are unusual and have few other uses. One, for example, must conduct with a low resistance over a period of 0.4 to 1.0 microsecond, but must open to a high resistance state in times of the order of 10 ns. RATIONALE Pulsed-power generating and conditioning systems and their associated loads (e.g., vacuum diodes) which convert the pulsed systems electrical output pulse to a photon or particle beam are valuable tools to study the hardness and survivability of critical military systems. The required fidelity of the simulation increases as the size of tested hardware increases because it is important to maintain the correct conditions over the aggregate of components which must function together. Some aspects of systems used in simulators are unclassified, and some border on the classified world. Some devices which may be used to simulate nuclear effects (e.g., the National Ignition Facility to be built at Livermore, or the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator operating at Sandia National Lab) are also important research tools for the broader scientific community.
Of particular importance are NWE simulators that can produce pulses with peak power greater than 25 TW from sources with impedance <0.1 ohm and having vacuum power flow and conditioning that can couple to a radiating load having a circular area less than 500 cm2. These performance levels exceed the publicly available figures for the SATURN and HERMES III accelerators at Sandia National Laboratory. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 6.0-1) Russia has demonstrated strong NWE simulation capabilities, comparable to those of the United States. The UK and France have extensive programs, but less ambitious than Russias. China has an NWE simulation program, but little is known about its capabilities. Germany has always been a leader in pulsed-power conditioning for basic research applications. Pulsed-power conditioning has been developed in Sweden, primarily to support kinetic energy and particle beam weapons research; in Switzerland, to investigate protection against EMP; and in Israel, primarily for basic research at the Weizmann Institute of Science and for kinetic-energy weapons research at Israel's SOREQ Nuclear Research Center. Germany and Japan use similar technology primarily in support of light ion beams for inertial confinement fusion. For HEMP simulation, the principal advanced technologies developed in the United States for risetimes less than 2 ns are multiple channel gas switches and multistage circuits in which the last stage charges very rapidly to increase the breakdown field of the output switch and decrease its inductance. The existence of triggered multichannel switches and the use of multistage circuits has been reported widely, but not in the context of EMP simulations. Countries with substantial pulsed-power capabilities (e.g., the UK, France, Russia, and Japan) could easily develop EMP simulators using such technologies.
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Table 6.8-1. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Technology Parameters

Technology
Plasma Radiation Sources for Soft x-Ray Effects Simulation
X-rays under 15 keV produced by Z-pinches or other devices that can be used to approximate the soft x-ray spectrum produced by a high altitude nuclear detonation.
USML XVI
None identified
None identified
None identified
Bremsstrahlung Sources X-rays produced by electrons USML XVI for Hard x-Ray and with energies >100 keV Gamma Ray Simulation hitting a high-Z target, and can approximate either the gamma rays or hard x-rays generated by a nuclear detonation. Neutron Beam Sources for Simulation Neutron beam sources capable of generating >1013 neutrons/ sq-cm that approximate the spectrum generated by either a fission or fusion device. USML XVI
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
None identified
Ion Beam Sources for Soft x-Ray Simulation
Ion beam sources that can be USML XVI used to approximate the soft x-ray deposition in materials generated by a nuclear detonation. Transport electrical power to a vacuum load at levels >2.5 TW. USML XVI
None identified
None identified
None identified
Vacuum Power Flow
None identified
None identified
None identified
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Table 6.8-2. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Reference Data

Plasma Radiation Sources for Soft x-Ray Effects Simulation
Development of: sources >40 kJ using 110 keV x-rays and >.5 kJ using 520 keV x-rays in under 100 ns over an area >1 sq. cm; debris mitigation techniques; x-ray optic components with reflectivity >20%; methods for collecting and focusing x-rays.
All military systems that must survive the soft x-ray threat
Substantiated computer programs and related algorithms that can predict the effects of soft x-ray penetration in materials; magnetic flyer plate or high explosive simulators.
Bremsstrahlung Sources for Hard Development of: electron beam All military systems that must survive x-Ray and Gamma Ray Simulation currents >2.5 MA in rise or fall time the gamma ray or hard x-ray threat <100 ns, an assembly of multipleseries diodes and components capable of operation at power levels >0.6 TW; debris shields that maintain a vacuum seal over areas >10 sq. cm. Neutron Beam Sources for Simulation Neutron sources that can generate the All military systems that must survive required fluence and energy spectrum the neutron irradiation threat over a large area in under 10 ms. Match ion beam energy deposition profile in various materials. All military systems that must survive the soft x-ray threat
Substantiated computer programs and related algorithms that can predict the effects of hard x-ray penetration in materials.
Substantiated computer programs and related algorithms that can predict the effects of neutron penetration in materials. Substantiated computer programs and related algorithms that can predict the effects of ion beam penetration in materials. None identified
Ion Beam Sources for Soft x-Ray Simulation
Vacuum Power Flow
Transporting and conditioning the electrical power through the vacuum interface and vacuum region to a vacuum load at power levels >2.5 TW.
None identified
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APPENDIX B EXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS
APPENDIX B EXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS
Table B-1. Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Level Export Control Reference Critical Materials Unique Test, Prlduction, and Inspection Equipment Unique Software and Parameters
Technology
Technology is defined, giving specific information necessary for the development, production, or use of a product. This includes the hardware and software necessary to achieve that purpose.
The level of technology required for a proliferant to produce entry-level WMD, delivery systems, or other hardware or software useful in WMD development, integration or use.
International and National export control references that address the technology
Critical materials associated with this technology.
Critical/unique Unique software needed production, testing and to produce, operate or inspection equipment. If maintain this technology. these items were not available for some time, it would be expected that the capability would degrade.
Table B-2. Reference Data

Technology is defined, giving Technical issues that drive/ Military uses of this technology. specific information necessary for significantly influence this technology. the development, production, or use of a product. This includes the hardware and software necessary to achieve that purpose.
Other technologies that could accomplish this step in WMD processes.
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APPENDIX C GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
APPENDIX C GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ITEM A A/s ACIPS ACM ADTS AG AGL AGR Am AS-l5s ASTM ATCC ATACMS ATM AVLIS B B/T BGO BLOS BLSRs BLU 80/B BRM BTU BW BWC BWR DESCRIPTION ampere ampere/second Advanced Collective Integrated Protection System Attitude Control Module Asynchronous Digital Transmission Systems Australia Group above ground level Advanced Gas Reactor Americium FSU Cruise Missile American Society for Testing Materials American Type Culture Collection Army Tactical Missile System Asynchronous transfer mode Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation System Biological Biological/Toxin Berium Germanate Beyond Line-of-Sight Bi-directional Line-switched Rings Bigeye Weapon Biological response modifier British Thermal Units Biological Weapon(s) Biological Weapons Convention Boiling Water Reactor 6.3 6.7 3.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 2.2 All 1.1, 1.4 5.3 6.7 1.3 5.12 3.0, 3.1 1.5 2.2, 2.5 5.2 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 3.1, 3.3 5.10 2.1 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 4.2 3.1, 3.4 1.1, 1.4 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 3.0 5.3 SECTION ITEM C2I C3 C3I C4I CAD CAD/CAE CAM CANDU CAS CBPS CC CCD CCL CCM CCS CEP CFD CHEMEX CID CMIP CMM CNC CNM CO DESCRIPTION Command, Control, and Intelligence Command, Control, and Communications Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence Computer-Aided Design Computer-Aided Design/ Computer-Aided Engineering Chemical Agent Monitor, Computer-Aided Manufacturing Canadian Deuterium Uranium (Reactor) Chemical Abstract Service Chemically and Biologically Protected Shelter Combinatorial Chemistry Charge Coupled Device Commerce Control List Computer-Controlled Machines Common Channeling Signaling circular error probable Computational Fluid Dynamics Chemical Exchange Process Charged Injection Device Common Management Information Protocol Coordinate Measuring Machines Computerized Numerically Controlled Customer Network Management Central Office SECTION 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 6.0, 6.2, 6.4 2.0, 3.3 5.11 2.3 1.1, 1.3 4.3 5.12, 5.13 4.1, 4.4 3.4 3.0 5.10 All 5.9 2.5 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 1.3, 1.4, 5.2 5.2, 5.5, 5.12 5.10 2.5 5.9 5.0, 5.9 2.5 2.2
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ITEM COCOM COLEX CONUS COTS CPE CPU CSUs CT CTBT CVD CW CWC D D.C. dB DCE DCN DCS DD/DT DEMP DES DF DGZs DLC DMSO DNA DNHR DoD DOE DS DS-0 DS-I
DESCRIPTION Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls Column Exchange Continental United States Commercial-off-the-shelf Customer Premises Equipment Central processing unit Channel Service Units Computed Tomography Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chemical Vapor Deposition Chemical Weapon(s) Chemical Weapons Convention Deuterium Direct Current decibel Distributed Computing Environment Data Communication Networks Digital Cross-Connect Systems Deuterium Deuterium/Deuterium Tritium Dispersed Electromagnetic Pulse Data Encryption Standard Difluor: methyl phosphonyl difluoride Designated Ground Zeros Digital Loop Carrier Dimethyl sulfoxide Desoxyribonucleic acid Dynamic Non-Hierarchical Routing Department of Defense Department of Energy Digital Signals Digital Signal level 0 Digital Signal level 1 = 544 mbytes
SECTION 2.5 5.0, 5.5 6.6 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 2.1, 2.5 1.3 2.1 1.1, 1.2 2.5, 5.10, 6.1 1.4 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 4.0, 4.1, 4.4 5.5, 5.6, 5.13 4.1, 5.5, 5.7 1.3 2.3 2.5 2.1, 2.2 5.6 6.6 1.1 4.1 2.1 2.6 3.2 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 2.1 2.3, 5.10, 5.11 5.1, 5.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
ITEM DS-N DSUs DT e.b.b EAA EAR EBR-II ECCM ECM EDM EHF ELEX EM EMIS EMP EO EOD EOS ESA FA FAC FID FPD FRG FSU FTA FWHM FXR G-7 G-8
DESCRIPTION Digital Signal Hierarchy Data Service Units Deuterium Tritium Equivalent blackbody Export Administration Act Export Administration Regulations Experimental Breeder Reactor II Electronic Counter-countermeasures Electronic Countermeasures Electrical Discharge Machines Extremely High Frequency Electroexchange Electromagnetic Electromagnetic Isotope Separation Electromagnetic Pulse Electro-Optical Explosive Ordinance Disposal Equation of State Electronic Safe and Arm Functional Areas Fast-Acting Closure Flame Ionization Detector Flame Photometric Detector Federal Republic of Germany Former Soviet Union Foreign Technology Assessment full width at half maximun Flash x-ray Group of Seven Industrial Nations G-7 Nations plus Russia
SECTION 2.2 2.1 5.6 6.2, 6.3 Preface 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 4.2, 4.4 5.4 4.2, 5.7 4.2, 5.7, 5.9 5.9 6.5 5.5 5.0, 5.2, 6.6, 6.7 5.0, 5.1, 5.2 5.9, 6.0, 6.1, 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 5.7 5.11 5.10 4.2 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 6.1 4.3 4.3 5.6 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 6.0 All 6.7 6.8 1.4 2.1
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ITEM G agents GA GB GC GD GDP GDSS GHz GMP GPa GPS GS gs GSAC Gy HDO HE HEMP HEPA HEU HF HLOS HNO3 HOB HSD HTO HTT HVAC HWR
DESCRIPTION Nerve Agents Tabun (nerve agent) Sarin (nerve agent) Gas Chromatography Soman (nerve agent) Gross Domestic Product Group Decision Support System Gigahertz (10+9 hertz) Good Manufacturing Practices Gigapascals Global Positioning System Girdler Sulfide Measure of Acceleration Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure Gray (Gy) is a unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation equal to 1 joule per kilogram of absorber Singly Deuterated Water High Explosives High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse High-Efficiency Particulate Air Highly Enriched Uranium Hydrofluoric Acid Horizontal Line-of-Sight Nitric Acid Height of Burst High Strength-to-Density Singly Tritiated Water Horizontal Tunnel Tests Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Heavy Water Reactor
SECTION 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 4.3 4.0, 4.1 5.10 2.3 1.4, 5.2, 5.10, 6.6, 6.8 3.1 6.3 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 6.0 5.12 1.1, 1.2, 1.5 6.1 2.6 5.12 1.5, 5.0, 5.6, 5.10 6.0, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 3.1 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.10 5.1, 5.4 6.1 5.1, 5.4 4.2, 5.7, 6.0, 6.2, 6.3 5.0, 5.2 5.13 6.1 2.6 5.3
ITEM Hz IAEA IC ICBM IEEE IM&C IMS IMUs IND INFOSEC INMS IP IR IS ISO ITU IX IXCs JSLIST JSTARs K kA kbar kbps keV hertz
DESCRIPTION
SECTION 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.0, 5.2, 5.7 5.0, 5.4 5.0 Introduction, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 5.0, 6.2 2.5 2.1, 2.5 3.3, 4.3 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 5.11 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.3, 1.4, 4.3, 5.7, 6.3, 6.5 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 2.5, 5.10 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 2.2 2.1, 2.5 4.4 1.4 5.9, 5.10, 6.2, 6.3 6.7 6.3 2.2 5.9, 5.9, 5.10, 5.13, 6.1, 6.3, 6.8
International Atomic Energy Agency Intelligence Community Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Institute of Electrical Engineers Information System Management and Control Ion Mobility Spectrometry Inertial Measurement Units Improvised Nuclear Device Information Security Integrated Network Management Systems Information Processing Infrared Information System International Standards Organization International Telecommunications Union Information Exchange Inter-exchange Carrriers Joint Service Lightweight Suit Technology Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Kelvin temperature kiloamperes kilobar kilobits per second kilo (thousand) electron volt
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ITEM kHz kJ km kPa kT ktap kV kV/m kV/ns kW L LANS LBTS LECs LEU LIDAR LIHE LIS LMFBR LTBT LWIR m/s MA mA MAC MAN/WANS Mbps MC-1 MCTL MeV
DESCRIPTION kilohertz kilojoule kilometer kilopascal (0.00987 atmospheres) kilotons one thousand dyne centimeters per second kilovolt thousand volts per meter thousand volts per nanosecond kilowatts Lithium Local Area Networks Large Blast/Thermal Simulator Local Exchange Carriers Low Enriched Uranium Light detection and ranging Light-Initiated High Explosive Laser Isotope Separation Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Limited Test Ban Treaty long-wave infrared meters per second mega-ampere milliamperes Modified Auxiliary Closure Metropolitan Area and Wide-area Networks Megabytes per second Chemical Bomb Militarily Critical Technologies List million electron volts
SECTION 1.1, 6.5 6.3, 6.8 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 3.2, 4.3, 5.10, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 1.1, 1.2, 6.2 5.6, 6.0, 6.2, 6.3 6.3 6.6, 6.7 6.6, 6.8 6.6 1.4, 5.2, 5.9, 6.3 5.0, 5.5 2.2 6.3 2.1, 2.5 5.0, 5.1, 5.3 3.2, 3.3, 4.3 6.3 5.0, 5.2 5.3 5.10, 6.0, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6 6.5 6.1 6.8 1.5 6.1 2.2 2.2 4.2 All 5.6, 5.9, 5.13, 6.1, 6.8
ITEM MHD-EMP MHz MIB MIRV MIS ML MLIS MLRS mm MMD MOD MOPP MOS MPa mph ms MS-MS MT MTBF MTCR MW NATO NC NCP NDUL NE nm NNWS
DESCRIPTION Magnetohydrodynamic Electromagnetic Pulse megahertz Management Information Base Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles Management Information System Munitions List (Wassenaar Arrangement) Molecular Laser Isotope Separation Multiple Launch Rocket System millimeter Mass Medium Diameter Means of Delivery (of WMD) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Metal-Oxide Semiconductor megapascal mile per hour millisecond Mass Spectrometrymass spectrometry metric ton Mean Time Between Failures Missile Technology Control Regime megawatt North Atlantic Treaty Organization numerically controlled Network Control Points Nuclear Dual-Use List (NSG) Network Element nanometer Non-Nuclear Weapons States
SECTION 6.6 2.1, 5.10, 6.1 2.5 5.0 2.0 All 5.0, 5.2 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 4.0 1.4, 1.5, 4.1, 6.2 3.2 Introduction 3.4 6.4 5.2, 5.12, 6.2 6.2 6.1, 6.8 4.3 5.4, 6.0, 6.3 5.2 All 5.2, 5.3, 6.3 4.4, 6.0, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7 1.1, 1.3, 5.9 2.5 Introduction, 1.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13 2.5 6.2, 6.3 Appendix E
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ITEM NOC NPT NRC ns NSG NTL NUDET NWE NWES NWSs OC OLAP OLTP OOT OPSEC OTS Pa/s PALs PBV PBX PC PD PINs PM psi PSP PTT Pu PUREX PWR
DESCRIPTION Network Operations Center Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Regulatory Commission nanosecond Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear Trigger List (Supplement of NSG) Nuclear Denotation Nuclear Weapons Effects Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Nuclear Weapons States Optical Carrier On-Line Analytical Processing On-Line Transaction Processing Object-Oriented Technologies Operations Security off-the-shelf pascals per second Permissive Action Links Post-Boost Vehicle Plastic-Bonded Explosives Personal Computer Photo Detectors Personal Identification Numbers Photo Multipler pounds per square inch Plasma Separation Process Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Plutonium Plutonium Uranium Recovery by Extraction Pressurized Water Reactor
SECTION 2.5 Appendix E Introduction, 5.0 5.10, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.6, 6.8 Introduction, 5.0, 5.13 Introduction, 5.3 6.3 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.8 6.8 5.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4, 5.11 5.10 6.3 5.0, 5.7 1.2 5.9 1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 5.0 5.10 2.4 5.10 1.2, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 5.2 2.5 5.0, 5.6 5.4 5.3
ITEM QL R&D rad(si) rads RaLa RBMK rcs rf RMS rpm RSCAAL RV SAFF SAW SCPE SCUD SDH SDN SELT SEU SGEMP SHF SI SLAM SMNP SMR SMS SNM SONET
DESCRIPTION CW Precursor Research and Development Radiation Absorbed Dose (in Silicon) Radiation Absorbed Dose Radio Lanthanum (Russian) High-power Pressure-tube Reactor radar cross section radio frequency root-mean-square Revolutions per minute Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm Reentry Vehicles Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Surface acoustic wave Simplified Collective Protection Equipment Short-Range Missile Synchronous Digital Hierarchy Software-Defined Network Sheet-Explosive Loading Technique Single-Event Upset System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse Super High Frequency Systme Internationale dUnits (the International System of Units) Standoff Land Attack Missile Simple Management Network Protocol Specialized Mobile Radio System Management System Special Nuclear Material Synchronous Optical Network
SECTION 4.1 1.4 6.4, 6.7 6.4 5.10 5.3 1.3, 1.4 6.5 1.4, 5.9 1.1, 1.2 4.3 1.1, 1.2, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 5.0, 5.7 3.3, 4.3 3.4 1.0, 1.2 2.1, 2.2 2.1, 2.2 6.3 6.4 6.0, 6.4, 6.8 6.5 2.6, 5.9 1.3 2.5 2.1, 2.6 2.5 5.0, 5.6, 6.0 2.1, 2.2, 2.5
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ITEM SPES SPLAT SREMP SS STS T TAPS TBM TBP TDD TEL TERCOM TFC TMNs TMS TN TNT TREE TSR TSS TV TVC TW TWG U UAV UGT UGWET
DESCRIPTION Synchronous Payload Envelopes Spray Lead at Target Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse Signaling System Stockpile to Target Sequence Tritium Tunnel and Pipe Seals Theater Ballistic Missiles Tri-n-butyl-phosphate Target Detection Device Transporter/Erector Launcher Terrain Contour Matching Transverse Field Compensation Telecommunication Management Networks Thermomechanical Shock Thermonuclear Trinitrotoluene Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics Thermostructural Shock Telecommunications System Sector Television Thrust Vector Control Toxin weapon; throw weight Technology Working Group Uranium Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Underground Testing Underground Weapons Evaluation and Testing
SECTION 2.2 6.3 6.0, 6.1, 6.7, 6.8 2.5 5.7 5.5, 5.6, 5.13 6.1 1.1, 1.2 5.1, 5.4 5.7 1.1, 1.3 1.3 4.3 2.2, 2.5 6.8 5.6, 5.13 5.0, 5.7, 5.10, 6.2 6.0, 6.4, 6.8 6.8 2.5 3.1, 5.10 1.2 3.1, 6.8 Introduction, 5.0 5.0, 5.1 1.3, 1.5, 5.8 6.0, 6.1 6.1
ITEM UHF UK UN USAMRIID USML USSR UV V/m V-A V Agents VCNs VIS VPNs VSATs VX WA WA Cat WA ML WEB WMD
DESCRIPTION Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom United Nations United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases United States Munitions List Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Ultraviolet volts/meter volt-ampere Nerve Agents Voice Communications Network Visible Virtual Private Networks Very-Small-Aperture Terminals Nerve Agent Wassenaar Arrangement Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-use List Category Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List Weapons Effects Test Weapons of Mass Destruction
SECTION 6.5 All 1.1, 4.1 3.0 All 3.0 3.1, 6.5 6.7 5.2 4.0, 4.1 2.5 6.5 2.5 2.1 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 All All All 2.3 Introduction, 1.0, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 5.7 6.2 Introduction 4.0 2.6
WSMR WST WWI WWMCCS
White Sands Missile Range Weapons Systems Technologies World War I World-Wide Military Command and Control Systems
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APPENDIX D DEFINITIONS
APPENDIX D DEFINITIONS
Accuracy. (Usually measured in terms of inaccuracy) is maximum deviation, positive or negative, of an indicated value from an accepted standard of true value. Active. Guidance by which a missile, warhead, or projectile emits radiation (usually radio frequency) and homes in on the signal reflected from a selected target. Active cooling. Optical components use flowing fluids in the subsurface of the optical component to remove heat from the system. Active flight control systems. Function to prevent undesirable aircraft and missile motions or structural loads by autonomously processing outputs from multiple sensors and then providing necessary preventive commands to effect automatic control. Active pixel. A minimum (single) element of the solid-state array which has a photoelectric transfer function when exposed to light (electromagnetic) radiation. Active tooling unit. A device for applying motive power, process energy, or sensing to the workpiece. Adaptive control. A control system that adjusts the response from conditions detected during the operation. (Reference: ISO 2806-1980.) Additives. Substances used in explosive formulations to improve their properties. Aircraft. A fixed-wing, swivel-wing, rotary-wing (helicopter), tilt-rotor, or tilt-wing airborne vehicle. (See also Civil aircraft.) Alkylation. A reaction that introduces an alkyl group. For CWC purposes, a phosphorus-carbon bond is produced. Alloyed aluminide coatings. Coatings of nickel or titanium aluminides modified with other metals such as chromium. Aluminum alloys. Alloys having an ultimate tensile strength of 190 MPa or more measured at 293 K (20 C). Angular position deviation. The maximum difference between angular position and the actual, very accurately measured angular position after the workpiece mount of the table has been turned out of its initial position. (Reference: VDI/VDE 2617, Draft: Rotary tables on coordinate measuring machines.) Antibodies. See Anti-idiotypic antibodies, Monoclonal antibodies, and/or Polyclonal antibodies. Anti-idiotypic antibodies. Antibodies which bind to the specific antigen binding sites of other antibodies. Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Preprogrammed VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated) or LSI (Large Scale Integrated) circuit used for a specific application. Assemblies. A number of electronic components (i.e., circuit elements, discrete components, integrated circuits, etc.) connected together to perform a specific function, replaceable as an entity and normally capable of being disassembled. Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). A transfer mode in which the information is organized into cells; it is asynchronous in the sense that the recurrence of cells depends on the required or instantaneous bit rate. (CCITT Recommendation L. 113.) Australia Group. An informal international forum, chaired by Australia, that seeks to discourage and impede the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by harmonizing national export controls on chemical materials, biological organisms, and dual-use equipment that could be used in chemical and biological weapons production. Automatic target tracking. A processing technique that automatically determines and provides as output an extrapolated value of the most probable position of the target in real time. Bandwidth of one voice channel. In the case of data communication equipment designed to operate in one voice channel of 3,100 Hz, as defined in CCITT Recommendation G.151. Bar. A unit of pressure that is equal to 106 dynes/cm2, or 14.5 psi (i.e., approximately sea-level atmospheric pressure). Basic scientific research. Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena or observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective. Bias (accelerometer). An accelerometer output when no acceleration is applied. Biocatalysts. Enzymes or other biological compounds which bind to and accelerate the degradation of CW agents. Biological Agent. A microorganism, or toxin derived from it, which causes disease in humans, animals or plants, or which causes the deterioration of material. Biopolymers. Biological macromolecules as follows: enzymes, antibodies, monoclonal, polyclonal, or anti-idiotypic, specially designed or specially processed receptors. Black body. A perfect emitter (radiator) of electromagnetic radiation having a characteristic temperature that is the sole determinant of its radiated energy spectrum. Blast. The brief and rapid movement of air, vapor, or fluid away from a center of outward pressure.
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Blister agent (vesicant). An agent that burns and blisters the skin, eyes, respiratory tract, and lungs. Blood agent. An agent that prevents the normal transfer of oxygen from the blood to body tissues. Brilliant munition. A many-on-many munition that operates autonomously to search for, detect, identify, acquire, and attack specific classes of targets. The sensor on each munition acquires and attacks one among the class of targets, so that in a battlefield situation two munitions may attack the same target leaving others inviolate. Bulk. A comparatively large quantity of a substance or commodity that is manufactured, shipped, and stored as such, but which is characteristically broken down into smaller lots before application or further processing. Burnout (electronics). A type of failure that implies the destruction of a component caused by a permanent change in one or more characteristics beyond an acceptable amount. CAD (computer-aided design). The use of a computer and computer graphics in the design of parts, products, and others. CAE (computer-aided engineering). Analysis of a design for basic error-checking, or to optimize manufacturability, performance, and economy (for example, by comparing various possible materials or designs). Calorie. The amount of heat required to raise the temperature of 1 gram of water from 15 C to 16 C at 760 mm Hg pressure. CAM (computer-aided manufacturing). The effective utilization of computer technology in the management, control, and operations of the manufacturing facility through either direct or indirect computer interface with the physical and human resources of the company. C3I System. See Integrated C3I systems. Camming (axial displacement). Axial displacement in one revolution of the main spindle measured in a plane perpendicular to the spindle faceplate, at a point next to the circumference of the spindle faceplate. (Reference: ISO 230.1 1986, paragraph 5.63.) Cathodic Arc Deposition. See Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TE-PVD). CEP. Circular Error Probable or Circle of Equal Probability. A measure of accuracy at a specific range, expressed in terms of the radius of the circle, centered on the target, in which 50 percent of the payloads impact. Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry number. A unique number which links the molecular structure of a chemical with its Chemical Abstracts index name and other data. Each number designates a single substance so far as its structure has been elucidated and can be defined in terms of atoms (composition), valence bonds (structure), and stereochemistry.
Chemical laser. A laser in which the excited species is produced by the output energy from a chemical reaction. Chemical vapor deposition (CVD). An overlay coating or surface modification coating process wherein a metal, alloy, composite, dielectric or ceramic is deposited upon a heated substrate. Gaseous reactants are decomposed or combined in the vicinity of a substrate resulting in the deposition of the desired elemental, alloy or compound material on the substrate. Energy for this decomposition or chemical reaction process may be provided by the heat of the substrate, a glow discharge plasma, or laser irradiation. Chemical weapons (CW). (From the CWC) (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b). (CWC, Article II) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A multilateral treaty that bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect transfer and use of chemical weapons. It also prohibits the use or preparation for use of CW and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of anyone else to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty. It further requires participating states to destroy existing chemical weapons and any CW production facilities. Chip. Micromechanical/microelectronic devices on a single substrate. Choking agent. An agent that attacks the eyes and respiratory tract from the nose to the lungs, primarily causing pulmonary edema (dry drowning). Circuit element. A single active or passive functional part of an electronic circuit, such as one diode, one transistor, one resistor, one capacitor, etc. Circumvention (electronics). A system protection technique in which detection of the onset of nuclear radiation or EMP puts a critical portion of the system in a protected condition. A system-level technique using special hardware and software for recovering from a transient upset. Civil aircraft. Those aircraft listed by designation in published airworthiness certification lists by the civil aviation authorities to fly commercial civil internal and external routes or for legitimate civil, private, or business use. (See also Aircraft.)
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CLOS. A command-to-line-of-sight guided-munition system in which an operator looks through a sight, searches, detects, and acquires a target, then aims and fires a missile. Guidance commands are automatically generated at the launcher by continually comparing the aimpoint to the current missile location. Corrective commands are transmitted to the missile through a wire link between the launcher and the missile, causing the missile to fly along the line of sight between the launcher and the target (for example, the TOW missile). Cluster tool. A set of process chambers or modules linked by a wafer transport, in a controlled environment, and with a communication system that can control sequential processing in a semiconductor fab line. Commingled. Filament-to-filament blending of thermoplastic fibers and reinforcement fibers in order to produce a fiber reinforcement/matrix mix in total fiber form. Comminution. A process to reduce a material to particles by crushing or grinding. Common channel signaling. A signaling method in which a single channel between exchanges conveys, by means of labeled messages, signaling information relating to a multiplicity of circuits or calls and other information such as that used for network management. Communications. The process of representing, transferring, interpreting or processing information (data) among persons, places, or machines. Communications implies a sender, a receiver, and a transmission medium over which the information travels. The meaning assigned to the data must be recoverable without degradation. (See also Telecommunications) Communications channel controller. The physical interface which controls the flow of synchronous or asynchronous digital information. It is an assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access. Compensation (TREE). A general category of techniques employed to divert primary and secondary photocurrents or to nullify their effects as an aid to circuit hardening against ionizing radiation. Composite. A matrix and an additional phase or additional phases consisting of particles, whiskers, fibers, or any combination thereof present for a specific purpose or purposes. Composite theoretical performance (CTP). A measure of computational performance given in millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS), calculated using the aggregation of computing elements (CE). Compound rotary table. A table allowing the workpiece to rotate and tilt about two nonparallel axes, which can be coordinated simultaneously for contouring control. Computer operating area. The immediate contiguous and accessible area around the electronic computer, where the normal operating, support, and service functions take place.
Computer using facility. The end-users contiguous and accessible facilities housing the computer operating area and those end-user functions which are being supported by the stated application of the electronic computer and its related equipment; and not extending beyond 1,500 meters in any direction from the center of the computer operating area. Computing element (CE). The smallest computational unit that produces an arithmetic or logic result. Contouring control. Two or more numerically controlled motions operating in accordance with instructions that specify the next required position and the required feed rates to that position. These feed rates are varied in relation to each other so that a desired contour is generated. (Reference: ISO/DIS 2806-1980.) Control. The process of steering a missile, while stabilizing it against disturbances such as wind gusts or blast, by the operation of aerodynamic surfaces, air or jet vanes, gas jets, or attitude control of rocket motors. Control subsystems respond to guidance (q.v.) signals to correct the attitude and position of a missile, and to activate power sources, servomechanisms, and other components. Conventional unguided projectiles. Those which do not incorporate directional warheads, including warheads employing multi-point initiation to achieve focused blast/ fragmentation characteristics; submunitions or submunition capacity; fuel/air explosives; provisions for increasing the range or impact velocity; kinetic energy armor penetration capability; mid-flight guidance; terminal guidance. Correlated munition. See Sentient munition. Corrosion-resistant steel. Steel which is AISI (American Iron and Steel Institute) 300 series or equivalent national standard steels. Co-spray. Simultaneously but separately injecting both ceramic and metal powders/ particulates into a high-temperature plasma stream to form a metal matrix composite upon solidification on a substrate. Critical Temperature. (Sometimes referred to as the transition temperature) of a specific superconductive material is the temperature at which the material loses all resistance to the flow of direct electrical current. Cruise Missile. An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target. Cryptanalysis. The analysis of a cryptographic system or its inputs and outputs to derive confidential variables or sensitive data, including clear text. [ISO 7498-21988 (E), paragraph 3.3.18.] Cryptography. The discipline which embodies principles, means, and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its undetected modification, or prevent its unauthorized use. Cryptography is limited to the transformation of information using one or more secret parameters (e.g., crypto variables) or associated key management.
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Cryptomaterial. All material including documents, devices, equipment, and apparatus essential to the encryption, decryption, or authentication of telecommunications. When classified, it is designated CRYPTO and subject to special safeguards. CWC Schedules. In the CWC, the three categories into which toxic chemicals and their precursors are divided based on the threat the chemicals/precursors pose to the purpose and objectives of the Treaty and the extent of their commercial use. Cyanation. A reaction in which a cyanide group is added. For CWC purposes, a cyanide group is bonded to a phosphorus atom. Data device. Equipment capable of transmitting or receiving sequences of digital information. Designed or modified. Equipment, parts, components, or software that, as a result of development or modification, have specified properties that make them fit for a particular application. The designed or modified equipment, parts, components, or software can be used for other applications. For example, a titanium-coated pump designed for a missile can be used with corrosive fluids other than propellants. (MTCR.) Detonation (high-explosive). A violent chemical reaction with a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressures. Detonation, nuclear. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as that from a nuclear weapon. Developing Critical Technologies. Technologies which when fully developed and incorporated into a military system will produce increasingly superior performance or maintain a superior capability more affordably. Digital computer. Equipment which can, in the form of one or more discrete variables, accept data, store data or instructions in fixed or alterable writable storage devices, process data by means of a stored sequence of instructions which is modifiable, and provide output of data. Digitizing rate. The rate (in samples per second) at which the acquired signal can be converted to digital information. Discrete component. A separately packaged circuit element with its own external connection. Dose, absorbed. The amount of energy imparted by nuclear (or ionizing) radiation to unit mass of absorbing material. The unit is the rad. In current usage, the rad unit has been replaced by the SI unit, the gray (Gy) [1 Gy = 100 rads]. Doppler. The special radiation line broadening attributable to the motion of the source or of the target, and sensed by detection and tracking systems. Drift. Environmental or thermal effects on response of a machine or device to gradually move away from the desired response. Drift rate (gyro). The time rate of output deviation from the desired output. It consists of random and systematic components and is expressed as an equivalent input angular displacement per unit time with respect to inertial space.
Dynamic adaptive routing. Automatic rerouting of traffic based on sensing and analysis of current actual network conditions. Dynamic signal analyzers. Signal analyzers which use digital sampling and transformation techniques to form a Fourier spectrum display of the given waveform including amplitude and phase information. (See also Signal analyzers.) Electron Beam PVD. See Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TEPVD). Electronically steerable phased array antenna. An antenna which forms a beam by means of phase coupling; i.e., the beam direction is controlled by the complex excitation coefficients of the radiating elements, and the direction of that beam can be varied in azimuth or in elevation, or both, by application, both in transmission and reception of an electrical signal. End-effectors. End-effectors include grippers, active tooling units and any other tooling that is attached to the baseplate on the end of a robot manipulator arm. Energetic materials. A collective term for military high explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics, which is synonymous with the term military explosives (the preferred NATO/COCOM usage). Although the term has been adopted by some also to cover commercial explosives, it is used in the MCTL only to refer to military technology. Ensembling. A process to improve clock performance by using multiple clocks and to improve reliability by redundancy, self-monitoring, or reduction of signal perturbations. Enzymes. Biocatalysts for specific chemical or biochemical reactions. Equivalent density. The mass of an optic per unit optical area projected onto the optical surface. Expression vectors. Carriers (e.g., plasmid or virus) used to introduce genetic material into host cells. Fast select. A facility applicable to virtual calls which allows data terminal equipment to expand the possibility to transmit data in call set-up and clearing packets beyond the basic capabilities of a virtual call. Fault tolerance. The capability of a computer system, after any malfunction of any of its hardware or software components, to continue to operate without human intervention, at a given level of service that provides continuity of operation, data integrity and recovery of service within a given time. Fibrous and filamentary materials. These materials include continuous monofilaments; continuous yarns and rovings; tapes, fabrics, random mats and braids; chopped fibers, staple fibers and coherent fiber blankets; whiskers, either monocrystalline or polycrystalline, of any length; aromatic polyamide pulp.
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Film type integrated circuit. An array of circuit elements and metallic interconnections formed by deposition of a thick or thin film on an insulating substrate. Firmware. Implementation of software in hardware circuitry or read-only memory. Fixed. The coding or compression (e.g., cryptographic or key variables) that cannot be modified by the user. Fixed ammunition. Ammunition rounds in which the cartridge with propellant and the loaded shell or bullet are all in one unit. With semifixed rounds the cartridge case is not permanently fixed to the projectile, so that zone charges within cases can be adjusted to obtain desired ranges, but each round is inserted into a weapon as a unit. Fixed-sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are not variable or changeable by mechanical, electronic, or electrical means. Fluoride fibers. Fibers manufactured from bulk fluoride compounds. Frequency agility (frequency hopping). A form of spread spectrum in which the transmission frequency of a single communication channel is made to change by discrete steps. Frequency agility (radar). See Radar frequency agility. Frequency switching time. The maximum time (i.e., delay) taken by a signal, when switched from one selected output frequency to another selected output frequency, to reach a frequency within 100 Hz of the final frequency or an output level within 1 dB of the final output level. Frequency synthesizer. Any kind of frequency source or signal generator, regardless of the actual technique used, providing a multiplicity of simultaneous or alternative output frequencies, from one or more outputs, controlled by, derived from, or disciplined by a lesser number of standard (or master) frequencies. Gas atomization. A process to reduce a molten stream of metal alloy to droplets of 500-micrometer diameter or less by a high-pressure gas stream. Gateway. The function, realized by any combination of equipment and software, to carry out the conversion of conventions or representing, processing, or communicating information used in one system into the corresponding but different conventions used in another system. Generic software. A set of instructions for a stored program controlled switching system that is the same for all switches using that type of switching system. Geneva Protocol of 1925. A multilateral agreement that prohibits the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons in war. It was opened for signature in 1925 and was ratified by the United States in 1975.
Geographically dispersed. Sensors are considered geographically dispersed when each location is distant from any other more than 1,500 m in any direction. Mobile sensors are always considered geographically dispersed. Global interrupt latency time. The item taken by the computer system to recognize an interrupt due to the event, service the interrupt, and perform a context switch to an alternative memory-resident task waiting on the interrupt. Gray. The gray (Gy) is a unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation; one Gy is an absorbed dose of ionizing radiation equal to one joule per kilogram of absorber. The gray replaces the rad. One rad = 0.01 Gy. Guidance. The data collection and command process whereby a missile or space vehicle is directed to a specified destination. Guidance subsystems may be internal or external to a missile system; may be preset, active, passive or semi-active; and function independently over initial, midcourse, and terminal phases of a flight path. Guidance munition. A one-on-one munition: a specific munition engages a specific target, which is advantageous during close combat situations. An operator is required in the loop to select the target and often assist in the guidance. The munitions may be either CLOS or terminal homing devices. Guidance sets. A device that integrates the data collection and command process that directs a missile or space vehicle to its target. High Energy Laser (HEL). A laser which has an average or CW power level of nominally tens of kilowatts of power and which operates for nominally a few seconds, providing energies of 104 Joules or larger. When the HEL is operated in a pulsed mode, the energy is averaged over 1 second or the duration of the laser train of pulses, whichever is longer. Hit-to-kill. A munition system incorporating integrated seeker, guidance and control, and fuze subsystems, the warhead of which is initiated upon target impact or in close proximity thereto. Hot isostatic densification. A process of pressurizing a casting at temperatures exceeding 375 K (102 C) in a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid particles, etc.) to create equal force in all directions to reduce or eliminate internal voids in the casting. Hybrid computer. Equipment which can accept and process data in both analog and digital representations and provide output of data. Hybrid integrated circuit. Any combination of integrated circuit(s), or integrated circuit with circuit elements or discrete components connected to perform specific function(s), and having all of the following characteristics: containing at least one unencapsulated device; connected using typical IC production methods; replaceable as an entity; and not normally capable of being disassembled.
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Image enhancement. The processing of externally derived information-bearing images by algorithms such as time compression, filtering, extraction, selection, correlation, convolution, or transformations between domains (e.g., fast Fourier transform or Walsh transform). This does not include algorithms using only linear or rotational transformation of a single image, such as translation, feature extraction, registration, or false coloration. Impulse, specific. The thrust developed in burning unit weight of a propellant, corrected for standard operating and discharge pressures. Specific impulse may be measured, or they may be estimated theoretically from the thermochemical properties of propellant formulations and their decomposition products. Impulse, total. The integral of the thrust of a rocket motor over the burning time. Other factors being equal the same total impulse can result from a small thrust over a long burn time as from a high thrust over a short burn time. In the public domain. Means technology or software which has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology or software from being in the public domain.) In-bulk. See Bulk. Inertial environmental test conditions. (1) Input random vibration with an overall g level of 7.7 g rms in the first half hour and a total test duration of 1-1/2 hour per axis in each of the three perpendicular axes, when the random vibration meets the following: (a) A constant power spectral density (PSD) value of 0.04 g2/Hz over a frequency interval of 15 to 1,000 Hz; and (b) The PSD attenuates with frequency from 0.04 g2/Hz to 0.001 g2/Hz over a frequency interval from 1,000 to 2,000 Hz; (2) A roll and yaw rate of equal to or more than + 2.62 radian/s (150 deg/s); or (3) According to national standards equivalent to (1) or (2) above. Information security. All the means and functions ensuring the accessibility, confidentiality or integrity of information or communications, excluding the means and functions intended to safeguard against malfunctions. This includes cryptography, cryptanalysis, protection against compromising emanations, and computer security. Information system. People, technologies, and machines used to capture or generate, collect, record, store, retrieve, process, display and transfer or communicate information to multiple users at appropriate levels of an organization to accomplish a specified set of functions. Information systems. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, disseminate, and act on information. Information warfare. Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending ones own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks.
Instantaneous bandwidth. The bandwidth over which output power remains constant within 3 dB without adjustment of other operating parameters. Instrumented range. The specified unambiguous display range of a radar. Integrated C3I systems. Fabricated combinations of platforms; sensors and weapons; software and data-processing equipment; related communications subsystems; and user-system interfaces specifically designed for the control of U.S. armed forces and weapons systems. Command, control, communications, and intelligence systems are integrated combinations of military command information processing, communications network, and intelligence gathering subsystems (including surveillance, warning, and identification subsystems) that make up the U.S. C2I systems. These combined technologies support U.S. authorities at all echelons with the integrated C2I systems that provide the timely and adequate data required to plan, direct, and control U.S. military forces and operations in the accomplishment of their missions. Integrated services digital network (ISDN). A unified end-to-end digital network, in which data originating from all types of communication (e.g., voice, text, data, still and moving pictures) are transmitted from one port (terminal) in the exchange (switch) over one access line to and from the subscriber. Interconnected radar sensors. Two or more radar sensors are interconnected when they mutually exchange data in real time. Interpolation. The means in NC by which curved sections are approximated by a series of straight lines or parabolic segments. Intrinsic magnetic gradiometer. A single magnetic field gradient sensing element and associated electronics, the output of which is a measure of magnetic field gradient. (See also Magnetic Gradiometers.) Ion implantation. A surface modification coating process in which the element to be alloyed is ionized, accelerated through a potential gradient, and implanted into the surface region of the substrate. This includes processes in which ion implantation is performed simultaneously with electron beam physical vapor deposition or sputter deposition. Ion plating. A special modification of a general TE-PVD process in which a plasma or an ion source is used to ionize the species to be deposited, and a negative bias is applied to the substrate to facilitate the extraction of the species to be deposited from the plasma. The introduction of reactive species, evaporation of solids within the process chamber, and the use of monitors to provide in-process measurement of optical characteristics and thicknesses of coatings are ordinary modifications of the process. Isostatic presses. Equipment capable of pressurizing a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid particles, etc.) to create equal pressure in all directions within the cavity. K-factor. A standard method for expressing the surface hardness and finish of a machined gear tooth.
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Laser. An assembly of components which produce both spatially and temporally coherent light that is amplified by stimulated emission or radiation. Latch-Up Free. A device or an integrated circuit which does not have an intentional or non-intentional four-layer p-n-p-n structure. For example, integrated circuits properly fabricated on silicon on insulator (SOI) substrates would be latch-up free. Linearity. (Usually measured in terms of non-linearity) is the maximum deviation of the actual characteristics (average of upscale and downscale readings), positive or negative, from a straight line so positioned as to equalize and minimize the maximum deviations. Line of sight. Guidance by which the missile, warhead, or projectile is commanded to follow a trajectory that will cause it to intercept a target in a direction defined by a target tracker. The method requires two-way communication with the missile, warhead, or projectile either by means of an IR, RF, wire, or fiber-optic link. Local area network. A data communication system which allows an arbitrary number of independent data devices to communicate directly with each other and is confined to a geographic area of moderate size (e.g., office building, plant, campus, warehouse). Mach number. The ratio of the speed of an object to the speed of sound in the surrounding medium. Magnetic gradiometers. Instruments designed to detect the spatial variation of magnetic fields from sources external to the instrument. They consist of multiple magnetometers and associated electronics, the output of which is a measure of magnetic field gradient. (See also Intrinsic magnetic gradiometer.) Magnetometers. Instruments designed to detect magnetic fields from sources external to the instrument. They consist of a single magnetic field sensing element and associated electronics, the output of which is a measure of the magnetic field. Main storage. The primary storage for data or instructions for rapid access by a central processing unit. It consists of the internal storage of a digital computer and any hierarchical extension thereto, such as cache storage or non-sequentially accessed extended storage. Maraging steels. A special class of high-strength, low-carbon, nickel-alloy steels, wherein the high strength (greater than 1,030 MPa) is derived from age hardening or precipitation of intermetallic compounds in the grain structure and does not involve carbon. These steels typically contain no less than 10 percent nickel; no more than 0.03 percent carbon; and Co, Mo, Ti, and Al, as alloying elements. Mass fraction. The ratio of the weight of the propellant to the weight of the loaded rocket. The larger the ratio the longer the range of the rocket. Matrix. A substantially continuous phase that fills the space between particles, whiskers, or fibers. Maximum bit transfer rate. Of a disk drive or solid-state storage device: the number of data bits per second transferred between the drive or the device and its controller.
Measurement uncertainty. The characteristic parameter that specifies in what range around the output value the correct value of the measurable variable lies with a confidence level of 95 percent. It includes the uncorrected systematic deviations, the uncorrected backlash, and the random deviations. (Ref.: VDI/VDE 2617.) Mechanical alloying. An alloying process resulting from the bonding, fracturing and rebonding of elemental and master alloy powders by mechanical impact. Non-metallic particles may be incorporated in the alloy by the addition of the appropriate powders. Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed, but adjustable, stops such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program pattern. Variations or modifications of the program pattern (e.g., changes of pins or exchanges of cams) in one or more motion axes are accomplished only through mechanical operations. Media access unit. Equipment which contains one or more communication interfaces (network access controller, communications channel controller, modem, or computer bus) to connect terminal equipment to a network. Median Lethal Dosage (vapor/aerosol, LCt50). The amount of agent (vapor, aerosol) expected to kill 50 percent of exposed, unprotected people. Median Lethal Dose (liquid, LD50). The single dose of a substance that causes death of 50 percent of a population from exposure to the substance by any route other than inhalation. Melt extraction. A process to solidify rapidly and extract a ribbon-like alloy product by the insertion of a short segment of a rotating chilled block into a bath of a molten alloy. Melt spinning. A process to solidify rapidly a molten metal stream impinging upon a rotating chilled block, forming a flake, ribbon or rod-like product. Microcomputer microcircuit. A monolithic integrated circuit or multichip integrated circuit containing an arithmetic logic unit capable of executing generalpurpose instructions from an internal storage on data contained in the internal storage. (The internal storage may be augmented by an external storage.) Microprogram. A sequence of elementary instructions, maintained in a special storage, the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruction into an instruction register. Militarily critical technologies. Technologies, the technical performance parameters of which are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems. Military high explosives. Solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or mixtures of substances which are required to detonate in their application as primary, booster, or main charge in warhead, demolition, and other military applications.
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Military propellants. Solid, liquid, or gaseous substances or mixtures of substances used for propelling projectiles and missiles or to generate gases for powering auxiliary devices for embargoed military equipment and which, when ignited, burn or deflagrate to produce quantities of gas capable of performing work; but in their application these quantities are required not to undergo a deflagration- to-detonation transition. Military pyrotechnics. Mixtures of solid or liquid fuels and oxidizers which, when ignited, undergo an energetic chemical reaction at a controlled rate intended to produce specific time delays, or quantities of heat, noise, smoke, visible light, or infrared radiation. Pyrophorics are a subclass of pyrotechnics which contain no oxidizers but ignite spontaneously on contact with air. Minimum smoke. A descriptive term used for propellants that produce the least amount of smoke under specified conditions. The term is difficult to quantify, but AGARD identifies these as class AA propellants. Mirrors. Reflective optical elements. Monoclonal antibodies. Proteins which bind to one antigenic site and are produced by a single clone of cells. Monolithic integrated circuit. A combination of passive or active circuit elements or both which are formed by means of diffusion processes, implantation processes or deposition processes in or on a single semiconducting piece of material, a socalled chip; can be considered as indivisibly associated and perform the function(s) of a circuit. Most immediate storage. The portion of the main storage most directly accessible by the central processing unit: a. For single level main storage, the inertial storage; or b. For hierarchical main storage, the cache storage; the instruction stack; or the data block. Motion control board. An electronic assembly of a number of connected electronic components (i.e., circuit element, discrete components, integrated circuits, etc.), specially designed to provide a computer system with the capability to coordinate simultaneously the motion of axes of machine tools for contouring control. Multichip integrated circuit. Two or more monolithic integrated circuits bonded to a common substrate. Multi-data-stream processing. The Microprogram or equipment architecture technique which permits simultaneous processing of two or more data sequences under the control of one or more instruction sequences by means such as: Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) architectures such as vector or array processors; Multiple Single Instruction Multiple Data (MSIMD) architectures; Multiple Instruction Multiple Data architectures, including those which are tightly coupled, closely coupled or loosely coupled; or
Structured arrays of processing elements, including systolic arrays. Multilevel security. A class of system containing information with different sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization. Multiple transverse mode. Any laser, the average divergence of which is larger than that allowed for a single transverse mode laser will be considered to be multimode. Multispectral imaging sensors. Sensors capable of simultaneous or serial acquisition of imaging data from two or more discrete spectral bands. Sensors having more than 20 discrete spectral bands are sometimes referred to as hyperspectral imaging sensors. Nerve agent. Extremely toxic compounds that produce convulsions and rapid death by inactivating an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) essential for the normal transmission of nerve impulses. Network access controller. A physical interface to a distributed switching network. It uses a common medium which operates throughout at the same digital transfer rate using arbitration (e.g., token or carrier sense) for transmission. Independently from any other, it selects data packets or data groups (e.g., IEEE 802) addressed to it. It is an assembly that can be integrated into computer or telecommunications equipment to provide communications access. Neural computer. A computational device designed or modified to mimic the behavior of a neuron or a collection of neurons; i.e., a computational device which is distinguished by its hardware capability to modulate the weights and numbers of the interconnections of a multiplicity of computational components based on previous data. Neural networks. Computational devices designed to emulate in a simplistic manner the computational processes of the brain by utilizing a variety of simple computational devices (artificial neurons) arranged in large networks that can be trained. Noble metal modified aluminide. Nickel or titanium aluminide modified with noble metals such as platinum or rhodium. Noise level. An electrical signal given in terms of power spectral density. Th relation between noise level expressed in peak-to-peak is given by S2pp = 8No(f2 f1), where Spp is the peak to peak value of the signal (e.g., nanoteslas), No is the power spectral density [e.g., (nanotesla)2/Hz] and (f2 f1 ) defines the bandwidth of interest. Non-servo-controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms. Automated moving devices operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is variable but the sequence proceeds only by the binary signal from mechanically fixed electrical binary devices or adjustable stops.
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Nuclear reactor. Includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come into direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core. Numerical control. The automatic control of a process performed by a device that makes use of numeric data usually introduced as the operation is in progress. (Reference: ISO 2382.) Object code (or object language). The machine-readable code. (See also Source code.) Obscurant. A substance or radiation absorber that blocks the radiation emitted from a target, thereby preventing the continuous tracking or detection of the target. Observable. The parameters (such as distance, speed, or shape) of a vehicle that can be seen optically, electronically, magnetically, acoustically, or thermally. One-point safe. A nuclear weapon is one-point safe if there is a probability of less than one part in a million of a nuclear energy release greater than or equal to 4 pounds TNT equivalent when the high explosives are detonated at the single point most likely to produce nuclear yield. Operate autonomously. Refers to the ability of a vehicle to move between two or more known locations without the need for human intervention. Operate-through. The ability of an electronic system to function without major degradation during transient nuclear events. Optical amplification. In optical communications, an amplification technique that introduces a gain of optical signals that have been generated by a separate optical source without conversion to electrical signals (i.e., using semiconductor optical amplifiers, optical fiber luminescent amplifiers). Optical computer. A computer designed or modified to use light to represent data and with computational logic elements based on directly coupled optical devices. Optical fiber preforms. Bars, ingots, or rods of glass, plastic, or other materials which have been specially processed for use in fabricating optical fibers. The characteristics of the preform determine the basic parameters of the resultant drawn optical fibers. Optical integrated circuit. A monolithic integrated circuit or a hybrid integrated circuit containing one or more parts designed to function as a photosensor or photoemitter or to perform (an) optical or (an) electro-optical function(s). Optical switching. The routing of or switching of signals in optical form without conversion to electrical signals. Overall current density. The total number of ampere-turns in the coil (i.e., the sum of the number of turns multiplied by the maximum current carried by each turn) divided by the total cross section of the coil (comprising the superconducting filaments, the metallic matrix in which the superconducting filaments are embedded, the encapsulating material, any cooling channels, etc.).
Pack cementation. Any surface modification coating or overlay coating process wherein a substrate is immersed in a powder mixture (a pack) that consists of: (1) The metallic powders that are to be deposited (usually aluminum, chromium, silicon, or combinations thereof); (2) An activator (normally a halide salt); and (3) An inert powder, most frequently alumina. The substrate and powder mixture are contained within a retort which is heated to between 1,030 K (757 C) to 1,375 K (l,102 C) for sufficient time to deposit the coating. Passive. Missile or warhead guidance by which the device homes in on the natural radiation (RF, IR, or visible) from the target. The device is autonomous, incorporating a seeker that requires no external illumination of the target Peak power. Energy per pulse in joules divided by the pulse duration in seconds. Plasma spraying. Any overlay coating process wherein a gun (spray torch), which produces and controls a plasma, accepts powder or wire coating materials, melts them, and propels them towards a substrate, whereon an integrally bonded coating is formed. Polyclonal antibodies. A mixture of proteins which bind to the specific antigen and are produced by more than one clone of cells. Positioning accuracy. Of numerically controlled machine tools is to be determined and presented in accordance with ISO/DIS 230/2, paragraph 2.13, in conjunction with the requirements below: 1. Test conditions (paragraph 3): a. For 12 hours before and during measurements, the machine tools and accuracy measuring equipment will be kept at the same ambient temperature. During the premeasurement time the slides of the machine will be continuously cycled in the same manner that the accuracy measurements will be taken; b. The machine shall be equipped with any mechanical, electronic, or software compensation to be exported with the machine; c. Accuracy of measuring equipment for the measurements shall be at least four times more accurate than the expected machine tool accuracy; d. Power supply for slide drives shall be as follows: (1) Line voltage variation shall not be greater than 10 percent of nominal rated voltage; (2) Frequency variation shall not be greater than 2 Hz of the normal frequency; (3) Lineouts or interrupted service is not permitted.
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Test program (paragraph 4): a. Feed rate (velocity of slides) during measurement shall be the rapid traverse rate. In case of machine tools which generate optical quality surfaces, the feed rate shall be equal to or less than 50 mm per minute; b. Measurements shall be made in an incremental manner from one limit of the axis travel to the other without returning to the starting position for each move to the target position; c. Axes not being measured shall be retained at mid travel during test of an axis. 3. Presentation of test results (paragraph 2): the results of the measurements must include: a. Positioning accuracy (A); and b. The mean reversal error (B). Power management. Changing the transmitted power of the altimeter signal so that received power at the aircraft altitude is always at the minimum necessary to determine the altitude. Precision-guided munition. A munition equipped with a sensor that interacts with its aerodynamic control surfaces that falls into one of the following categories: guided, smart, or brilliant. Precursors. Specialty chemicals used in the manufacture of military explosives. Primary smoke. The solid particulates from the combustion of a fuel, pyrotechnic, or propellant. Metal and elemental fuels and other additives in energetic materials or by themselves contribute significantly to primary smoke. (See Secondary smoke.) Principal element. An element is a principal element when its replacement value is more than 34 percent of the total value of the system of which it is an element. Element value is the price paid for the element by the manufacturer of the system, or by the system integrator. Total value is the normal international selling price to unrelated parties at the point of manufacture or consolidation of shipment. Producibility. The elements of a design by which a product or a commodity, while meeting all of its performance objectives within the design constraints, may be produced in the shortest total time, at the lowest cost, with the most readily available materials using the most advantageous processes and assembly methods. (U.S. Army, AMC definition.) Production. All production stages, such as product engineering, manufacture, integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, and quality assurance. Progressivity. The rate of increase of the burning rate or of the surface area of burning propellant. (See Propellant grain.) Proof test. The on-line or off-line production screen testing that dynamically applies a prescribed tensile stress over a 0.5 to 3 m length of fiber at a running rate of 2 to 5 m/s while passing between capstans approximately 15 cm in diameter. The ambient temperature is a nominal 293 K and relative humidity 40 percent.
2.
Propellant grain. A single piece of propellant, the dimensions of which may vary from a few millimeters to several meters and are known as the configuration for single grains or the granulation for charges consisting of more than one grain. Configurations are changed to vary the exposed surface of grains and thus vary the burning surface. A grain that maintains a constant burning surface has a neutral configuration; a grain with a surface area or burning rate that increases has a progressive configuration; a grain with a burning surface that decreases has a degressive configuration. Public domain. See In the public domain. Pulse compression. The coding and processing of a radar signal pulse of long time duration to one of short time duration, while maintaining the benefits of high pulse energy. Pulse duration. Duration of a laser pulse measured at Full-Width Half-Intensity (FWHI) levels. Pyrophorics. See Military Pyrotechnics. Q-switched laser. A laser in which the energy is stored in the population inversion or in the optical resonator and subsequently emitted in a pulse. Radar frequency agility. Any technique which changes, in a pseudo-random sequence, the carrier frequency of a pulsed-radar transmitter between pulses or between groups of pulses by an amount equal to or larger than the pulse bandwidth. Radar spread spectrum. Any modulation technique for spreading energy origination from a signal with a relatively narrow frequency band over a much wider band of frequencies, by using random or pseudo-random coding. Real-Time. (a) In solving a problem, a speed sufficient to give an answer within the actual time the problem must be solved; (b) Pertaining to the actual time during which a physical process occurs; and (c) Pertaining to the performance of a computation during the actual time that the related physical process occurs so that results of the computation can be used in guiding the physical process. Real-time bandwidth. For dynamic signal analyzers, the widest frequency range the analyzer can output to display or mass storage without causing any discontinuity in the analysis of the input data. For analyzers with more than one channel, the channel configuration yielding the widest real-time bandwidth shall be used to make the calculation. Real-time processing. The processing of data by a computer system providing a required level of service, as a function of available resources, within a guaranteed response time, regardless of the load of the system, when stimulated by an external event. Real-time spectrum analyzers. See Dynamic signal analyzers. Receptors. Biological macromolecular structures capable of binding ligands, the binding of which affects physiological functions.
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Reduced smoke. A descriptor for propellants that have been tailored to produce less smoke than standard formulations of aluminum and ammonium perchlorate (see Smoky). They may be classified by AGARD as either class AC or BC. Repeatability. Closeness of agreement of repeated position movements to the same indicated location and under the same conditions. Required. As applied to technology, refers to only that portion of technology which is peculiarly responsible for achieving or exceeding the embargoed performance levels, characteristics, or functions. Such required technology may be shared by different products. Resistive heating PVD. See Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TEPVD). Resolution. The least increment of a measuring device; on digital instruments, the least significant bit. (Reference: ANSI B-89.1.12.) Riot control agents. Substances which in low concentrations produce temporarily irritating or disabling physical effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. There is minimal risk of permanent injury, and medical treatment is rarely required. Robot. A manipulation mechanism, which may be of the continuous path or of the point-to-point variety, may use sensors, and has all the following characteristics: a. Is multifunctional; b. Is capable of positioning or orienting material, parts, tools, or special devices through variable movements in three-dimensional space; c. Incorporates three or more closed- or open-loop servo-devices which may include stepping motors; and d. Has user-accessible programmability by means of the teach/playback method or by means of an electronic computer which may be a programmable logic controller, i.e., without mechanical intervention. N.B. The above definition does not include the following devices: 1. Manipulation mechanisms which are only manually/teleoperator controllable. 2. Fixed sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are not variable or changeable by mechanical, electronic, or electrical means. 3. Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is mechanically limited by fixed but adjustable stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program pattern. Variations or modifications of the program pattern (e.g., changes of pins or exchanges of cams) in one or more motion axes are accomplished only through mechanical operations.
4. Non-servo-controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The program is variable but the sequence proceeds only by the binary signal from mechanically fixed electrical binary devices or adjustable stops. 5. Stacker cranes defined as Cartesian coordinate manipulator systems manufactured as an integral part of a vertical array of storage bins and designed to access the contents of those bins for storage or retrieval. Rocket motor. A non-airbreathing reaction propulsion device consisting of a thrust or combustion change in which formulations of solid fuels, oxidizers, and additives are burned and expanded through an exhaust nozzle. Rotary atomization. A process to reduce a stream or pool of molten metal droplets to a diameter of 500 micrometers or less by centrifugal force. Run out (out-of-true running). Radial displacement in one revolution of the main spindle measured in a plane perpendicular to the spindle axis at a point on the external or internal revolving surface to be tested. (Reference: ISO 230/1-1986, paragraph 5.61). Scale factor (gyro or accelerometer). The ratio of change in output to a change in the input intended to be measured. Scale factor is generally evaluated as the slope of the straight line that can be fitted by the method of least squares to input-output data obtained by varying the input cyclically over the input range. Scanning spectrum analyzer. See Signal analyzer. Secondary smoke. Smoke that results from the interaction of propellant or pyrotechnics and water to form droplets that condense on submicron atmospheric particles. Low temperatures, high humidity, and acid vapors, such as the HCI combustion products of ammonium perchlorate, all contribute to secondary smoke formation. Secret parameter. A constant or key kept from the knowledge of others or shared only within a group. Seeker. A device that orients a munitions sensor to survey, acquire, lock-on, and track a target. Semi-active. Missile or warhead guidance by which the target is illuminated by an auxiliary emitter (e.g., a laser or radar beam) and the missile or warhead homes in on the signal (reflection) from the target. Sensor fuzed munition. A shoot-to-kill, smart munition of relatively low complexity and cost, which is most effective close-in against targets with a narrowly defined location and for which there are small delivery errors. Sentient (or correlated). A descriptor for a brilliant munition that is aware of itself and its surroundings; for example, a brilliant munition that responds to its environment, or communicates with others among the same payload or salvo to share out the targets and maximize interception.
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Settling time. The time required for the output to come within 1/2 bit of the final value when switching between any two levels of the converter. Shared aperture optical elements. Optics that reflect a portion of the impinging radiation similarly to conventional beam splitters and composed of buried lenses or buried gratings. Shoot-to-kill system. A sensor-fuzed munition that does not incorporate expensive seeker and guidance and control subsystems. The warhead is initiated tens of meters from the target while the munition is aimed at the target. Signal analyzer. Apparatus capable of measuring and displaying basic properties of the signal-frequency components of multi-frequency signals. Signal analyzers (dynamic). See Dynamic signal analyzers. Signal processing. The processing of externally derived information-bearing signals by algorithms such as time compression, filtering, extraction, selection, correlation, convolutions or transformations between domains (e.g., fast Fourier transform or Walsh transform). Signature. Any or all of the properties of a gun or a rocket motor that may be used for the detection, identification, or interception of the device or its launch site. Plume signature characteristics include smoke, radiation emissions, visibility, radar absorption, self absorption, etc. Single-transverse mode. Any laser with an average beam divergence measured on any two orthogonal axes equal to or less than 3.45 times the wavelength, divided by the aperture diameter along that axis for the angle containing 84 percent of the beam energy will be considered a single transverse mode laser. Slurry deposition. A surface modification coating or overlay coating process wherein a metallic or ceramic powder with an organic binder is suspended in a liquid and is applied to a substrate by either spraying, dipping, or painting followed by air or oven drying and heat treatment to obtain the desired coating. Smart materials. Materials that have the capability to respond to an external stimulus by changing, in a controlled manner according to prescribed functional relationships or control algorithms, their energy dissipation properties and geometric configuration, or by changing their stiffness. Smart munition. A many-on-many munition with a minimal target selection capability that does not require an operator in the loop. There are two prime categories: terminally guided (hit-to-kill) and sensor-fuzed (shoot-to-kill). Smoky. A particular term used to describe rocket and missile propellants with high aluminum and ammonium perchlorate contents. An AGARD class CC composition. Software. Programs, data bases, and associated documentation available on humanand/or machine-readable media such as paper, magnetic tapes, disks, or embedded firmware that operate computers.
Software Documentation. Information in human-readable form, including computer source code listings and printouts, which documents the design or details of the computer software, explains the capabilities of the software, or provides operating instructions for using the software to obtain the desired results from a computer. Software Support. Resources such as people, facilities, documentation, information, and instrumentation to operate, maintain, or produce software products. Solidify rapidly. Solidification of molten material at cooling rates exceeding 1,000 K/sec. Solids loading. The percentage of particulate matter in the total weight/volume of a propellant composition or grain. The solids loading attainable for a given fueloxidizer particulate composition depends on the binder and additives used to form a grain. Missile propellants are commonly rated in terms of a weight percentage; gun propellants, in terms of a volume percentage. Source code (or source language). Source code, a subset of computer software documentation, is a set of symbolic computer instructions that is written in a high-level/ human-readable language that cannot be directly executed by the computer without first being translated into object code. Spacecraft. Active and passive satellites and space probes. Space qualified. Products designed, manufactured and tested to meet the special electrical, mechanical, or environmental requirements for use in the launch and deployment of satellites or high-altitude flight systems operating at altitudes of l00 km or higher. Spatial light modulators. Optical devices that dynamically modulate the spatial distribution of the amplitude or phase of an incident light waveform across an aperture in either a transmissive or reflective mode of operation under the control of an electronic or optical signal. Spatial light modulators are also known as non-linear adaptive optics. Specific impulse (Is). The total impulse per unit weight of propellant. Specific modulus. Youngs modulus in pascals, equivalent to N/m2 (lb force/sq in.) divided by specific weight in N/m3 (lb force/cu in.) measured at temperature of (296 2 K; (23 2) C) and a relative humidity of (50 5) percent. Specific tensile strength. Ultimate tensile strength in pascals, equivalent to N/m2 (lb force/sq in.) divided by specific weight in N/m3 (lb force/cu in.) measured at a temperature of (296 2) K and a relative humidity of (50 5) percent. Spectral efficiency. A figure of merit parameterized to characterize the efficiency of transmission system which uses complex modulation schemes such as QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation), Trellis coding, QPSK (Q-phased shift key), etc. It is defined as follows:
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Spectral efficiency = Digital transfer rate (bits/second) 6 dB spectrum bandwidth (Hz) Spherical Error Probable or Sphere of Equal Probability (SEP). A measure of accuracy at a specific range, expressed in terms of the radius of a sphere, centered on the target, in which 50 percent of the payloads impact. Splat quenching. A process to solidify rapidly a molten metal stream impinging upon a chilled block, forming a flake-like product. Spread spectrum. The technique whereby energy in a relatively narrow-band communication channel is spread over a much wider energy spectrum. Spread spectrum (radar). See Radar spread spectrum. Sputter deposition. An overlay coating process based on a momentum transfer phenomenon, wherein positive ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on an appropriately positioned substrate. Sputtering. An overlay coating process wherein positively charged ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on the substrate. N.B. Triode, magnetron, or radio frequency sputtering to increase adhesion of coating and rate of deposition are ordinary modifications of the process. Stability. Standard deviation (1 sigma) of the variation of a particular parameter from its calibrated value measured under stable temperature conditions. This can be expressed as a function of time. Stabilizers. Substances used in explosive formulations to improve their shelf life. Stacker cranes. Cartesian coordinate manipulator systems manufactured as an integral part of a vertical array of storage bins and designed to access the contents of those bins for storage or retrieval. Stored program control. A control using instructions stored in an electronic storage which a processor can execute to direct the performance of predetermined functions. Strong mechanical bond. In solid rocket motors, the requirement to have a bond between the rocket propellant and the motor casing that is equal to or greater than the tensile strength of the propellant. Substrate. A sheet of base material with or without an interconnection pattern and on which or within which discrete components or integrated circuits or both can be located. Substrate blanks. Monolithic compounds with dimensions suitable for the production of optical elements such as mirrors or optical windows.
Sufficient Technology. The level of technology required for a proliferant to produce entry level WMD, delivery systems, or other hardware or software useful in WMD development integration or use. Superalloys. Nickel-, Cobalt-, or Iron-Base alloys having strengths superior to any alloys in the AISI 300 series at temperatures of 922 K (649 C) under severe environmental and operating conditions. Superconductive. Materials (i.e., metals, alloys, or compounds) which can lose all electrical resistance (i.e., which can attain infinite electrical conductivity) and carry very large electrical currents without Joule heating. Super high power laser (SHPL). A laser capable of delivering (the total or any portion of) the output energy exceeding 1 kJ within 50 ms or having an average or CW power exceeding 20 kW. Superplastic forming. A deformation process using heat for metals that are normally characterized by low values of elongation (less than 20 percent) at the breaking point as determined at room temperature by conventional tensile strength testing, in order to achieve elongations during processing which are at least two times those values. Swept frequency network analyzers. Involves the automatic measurement of equivalent circuit parameters over a range of frequencies, involving swept frequency measurement techniques but not continuous-wave point-to-point measurements. Switch fabric. That hardware and associated software which provides the physical or virtual connection path for in-transit message traffic being switched. Synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH). A digital hierarchy providing a means to manage, multiplex, and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on different types of media. The format is based on the Synchronous Transport Module (STM) which is defined by CCITT Recommendation G.703, G.708, G.709, and others yet to be published. The first level rate of SDH is 155.52 Mbit/s. Synchronous optical network (SONET). A network providing a means to manage, multiplex and access various forms of digital traffic using a synchronous transmission format on fiber optics. The format is the North America version of SDH and also uses the Synchronous Transport Module (STM). However, it uses the Synchronous Transport Signal (STS) as the basic transport module with a first level rate of 51.81 Mbit/s. The SONET standards are being integrated into those of SDH. Systems tracks. Processed, correlated (fusion of radar target data to flight plan position), and updated aircraft flight position report available to the Air Traffic Control center controllers. Systolic array computer. A computer where the flow and modification of the data are dynamically controllable at the logic gate level by the user. Tear gases. Gases which produce temporarily irritating or disabling effects which disappear within minutes of removal from exposure.
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Technical assistance. May take forms such as instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. N.B. Technical assistance may involve transfer of technical data. Technical data. May take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, and read-only memories. Technologies for weapons of mass destruction. Technologies required for development, integration, or employment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Technology. Specific information and know-how necessary for the development, production, or use of a product. This includes the hardware and software necessary to achieve that purpose. Telecommunications. Any process that enables one or more users to pass to one or more other users information of any nature delivered in any usable form by wire, radio, visual, or other electrical, electromagnetic, or optical means. The word is derived from the Greek tele, far off, and the Latin communicare, to share. (See also Communications.) Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM). A guidance and navigation system which measures the topography below a flight vehicle with radar or other electromagnetic energy and compares the results to onboard maps, in order to determine location. Terminal interface equipment. Equipment at which information enters or leaves the telecommunication system, e.g., telephone, data device, computer, and facsimile device. Thermal evaporation-physical vapor deposition (TE-PVD). An overlay coating process conducted in a vacuum with a pressure less than 0.1 Pa wherein a source of thermal energy is used to vaporize the coating material. This process results in the condensation, or deposition, of the evaporated species onto appropriately positioned substrates. The addition of gases to the vacuum chamber during the coating process to synthesize compound coatings is an ordinary modification of the process. The use of ion or electron beams, or plasma, to activate or assist the coatings deposition is also a common modification in this technique. The use of monitors to provide in-process measurement of optical characteristics and thickness of coatings can be a feature of these processes. Specific TE-PVD processes are as follows: (1) Electron Beam PVD uses an electron beam to heat and evaporate the material which forms the coating; (2) Resistive Heating PVD employs electrically resistive heating sources capable of producing a controlled and uniform flux of evaporated coating species;
(3) Laser Evaporation uses either pulsed- or continuous-wave laser beams to heat the material which forms the coating; and (4) Cathodic Arc Deposition employs a consumable cathode of the material which forms the coating and has an arc discharge established on the surface by a momentary contact of a ground trigger. Controlled motion of arcing erodes the cathode surface, creating a highly ionized plasma. The anode can be either a cone attached to the periphery of the cathode through an insulator or the chamber. Substrate biasing is used for non-line-of-sight deposition. Three-dimensional vector rate. The number of vectors generated per second which have 10 pixel poly line vectors, clip tested, randomly oriented, with either integer or floating point X-Y-Z coordinate values (whichever produces the maximum rate). Thrust. The force that propels a body or the rate of change of momentum of a burning propellant. Tilting spindle. A tool-holding spindle which alters, during the machining process, the angular position of its center line with respect to any other axis. Time constant. The time taken from the application of a line stimulus for the current increment to reach a value of 1-1/e times the final value (i.e., 63 percent of the final value). Total digital transfer rate. The number of bits, including line coding, overhead, and so forth per unit time passing between corresponding equipment in a digital transmission system. (See also Digital transfer rate.) Total impulse (I t). The thrust force F (which can vary with time) integrated over the burning time, t. Toxic chemical. Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals in military feasible quantities. Transfer laser. A laser to produce a continuous output at all wavelengths over a range of several laser transitions. A line-selectable laser produces discrete wavelengths within one laser transition and is not considered tunable. Tunable. The ability of a laser to produce a continuous output at all wavelengths over a range of several laser transitions. A line-selectable laser produces discrete wavelengths within one laser transition and is not considered tunable. Turnkey plant. Consists of all the hardware, software, technical data, and technical assistance necessary for the installation of a complete operating facility for the production of the commodity, a chemical substance, at defined production rates and to specified product qualities. Hardware consists of all the equipment, components, control valves, instruments, reaction vessels, feed lines, and exposition proof barriers necessary for the conduct of the unit operations of the overall production process, whether the items are assembled or disassembled for transportation. The plant may be designed for installation at a prepared site that includes locally constructed and installed explosion-proof barricades.
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Two-dimensional vector rate. The number of vectors generated per second which have 10-pixel polyline vectors, clip tested, randomly oriented, with either integral or floating point X-Y coordinate values (whichever produces the maximum rate). Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233. Uranium containing the isotopes 235, 233, or both in the amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is more than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature (isotopic ratio: 0.72 percent). Use. Operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul, and refurbishing. User-accessible programmability. The facility allowing a user to insert, modify, or replace programs by means other than (1) a physical change in wiring or interconnections or (2) the setting of function controls including entry of parameters. Vaccines. Materials that when injected into immune-competent responsive persons and animals will enable the human and animal recipient to become resistant to infection. Vacuum atomization. A process to reduce a molten stream of metal to droplets of a diameter of 500 micrometers or less by the rapid evolution of a dissolved gas upon exposure to a vacuum.
Variable geometry airfoils. Trailing edge flaps or tabs or leading edge slats or pivoted nose droop, the position of which can be controlled in flight. Vector rate. See Two-dimensional vector rate and/or Three-dimensional vector rate. Vehicle management system (VMS). A vehicle control system characterized by a high degree of physical and functional integration of manual and automatic flight controls, propulsion controls, and airframe utility subsystem controls. Vesicant. Toxic chemicals that have a blistering effect on the skin. Weapons of mass destruction technologies. Technologies used in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Weapons Systems Technologies (WST). Technologies critical to the development and production of superior weapons. Yield. In chemical reactions, the quantity of pure product divided by the starting material.
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APPENDIX E INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
APPENDIX E INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

There are a number of international treaties, agreements, regimes, and informal arrangements that seek to constrain the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles as well as conventional weapons. Some address material/agents and equipment in general terms while others are more specific. Some have led to explicit export control arrangements limiting the transfer of technologies, materials and equipment while others contain broad prohibitions of activities. All have varying degrees of participation and adherence. The agreements, in many cases, establish an international norm of behavior that can be used to highlight aberrant actions. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970 and is adhered to by over 170 nations. A fundamental objective of the NPT is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, the nuclear weapons states (five had tested and manufactured nuclear weapons by the time the treaty was negotiated and available for signature) agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist, encourage, or induce non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Each NNWS pledged not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire them, and not to seek or receive assistance in their manufacture. The treaty also obliged each NNWS party to the NPT to accept international safeguards through agreements negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The intent of these safeguards is to prevent by deterring, via IAEA inspections, the diversion of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes. Nuclear material and specified equipment would be exported to NNWS only under IAEA safeguards. An offshoot of the NPT, the Zangger Committee, which first met in 1971, maintains a list of nuclear exports that require IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. The Committee is made up of 30 NPT members who export nuclear material and equipment. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reinforces the work of the Zangger Committee through an expanded set of controls and by potentially including non-NPT states that are nuclear suppliers. In April 1992, the NSG approved a comprehensive arrangement to prohibit exports of some 65 dual-use items of equipment and materials to unsafeguarded nuclear activities and nuclear explosive programs. It also agreed to a common policy not to engage in significant, new nuclear cooperation with any NNWS that has not committed itself to full-scope safeguards on all present and future nuclear activities. The NSG conditions for transfer apply to all NNWS whether or not they are NSG members. Nuclear transfers require acceptance of IAEA safeguards; dual-use transfers are prohibited for use in unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activities and nuclear explosives activities. Legal authority in the United States for controlling the export of specialized nuclear items is the Atomic Energy Act and the NPT. The licensing agencies are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) #110 and #810 address federal regulations regarding nuclear equipment and material and assistance to foreign atomic energy activities. On an international basis, CFR #110 controls items on the International Atomic Energy List. GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 (GP) At the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms of 1925, the United States took the initiative of seeking to prohibit the export of gases for use in war. At French suggestion, it was decided to draw up a protocol on non-use of poisonous gases. Poland recommended that bacteriological weapons be covered in the prohibition. The Geneva Protocol was signed on June 17, 1925, and restated the prohibition previously laid down by the Versailles and Washington treaties and added a ban on bacteriological warfare. The Protocol contained a one-paragraph prohibition against the use of chemical (and bacteriological) weapons. However, agents could be legally developed, produced, stockpiled, and transferred. Several countries, as conditions of their ratification or accession, reserved the right to respond in kind to aggressors using these weapons. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) entered into force in 1975 and has been signed and ratified by over 135 parties. The BWC prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of toxins or of microbial or other biological agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; also prohibited are development, production, and stockpiling of weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. It does not provide a mechanism for controlling export of these items.
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During the two decades since the BWC entered into force, there have been increasing concerns about biological weapons proliferation and the ability of the Convention to deter it. Efforts at periodic review conferences have centered on strengthening the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention. The treaty as written has no verification measures. Although confidence-building measures have been approved, there is still concern whether verification could be effective. There is no existing BWC committee comparable to the Zangger Committee in the NPT. The Convention does not prohibit exchange of equipment, materials, or scientific and technical information for peaceful purposes. The Second Review Conference, held in 1986 in an effort to reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biological activities, adopted voluntary measures to strengthen confidence in treaty compliance and to help deter violations. Because of continuing concerns about proliferation, possible noncompliance of some parties, and the rapid and significant advances in biotechnology, the Third Review Conference, held in 1991, reaffirmed and extended the voluntary confidencebuilding measures. As a result of a mandate of the Third Review Conference, an Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts convened to identify, examine, and evaluate potential measures for verifying the provisions of the BWC from a scientific and technical viewpoint. The Ad Hoc Group (also known as Verification Experts) assessed 21 potential off-site and on-site measures using six mandated evaluation criteria. They also considered some combination of measures. The groups final report concluded that because of the dual-use nature of nearly all biological-weapons-related facilities, equipment, and materials, and the huge overlap between prohibited and permitted purposes, no single approach could fulfill the mandated criteria for a stand-alone verification measure. Nevertheless, the group found that some measures, either singly or in combination, have the potential to strengthen the BWC by helping to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities and thus to reduce ambiguities about compliance. CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction [referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)] was opened for signature in January 1993. Over 160 countries have signed the Treaty. It entered into force on April 29, 1997. The CWC bans the production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It charges each party not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons; transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical agents to anyone; use chemical weapons; engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a party to the Convention. Each Party undertakes in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention to destroy the chemical weapons it possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another Party, and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. Finally, each Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. The CWC provides for routine and challenge inspections to assist in the verification of compliance with the Convention. Routine inspections of declared facilities are mandated by the Convention. In accordance with CWC provisions, challenge inspections may be conducted at a facility where a Party suspects illegal activities. The CWC does not include a specific list of controlled chemicals or equipment. It does contain an Annex on Chemicals in which are listed three Schedules of toxic chemicals and their precursors based on the threat they pose to the purpose and objectives of the CWC and the extent of their commercial use. The Verification Annex describes restrictions on transfers of scheduled chemicals in detail. Transfers of some chemicals to countries who have not ratified the Convention will be prohibited by the CWC. AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG) In 1984, several countries, reacting to the use of chemical weapons in the IranIraq War, began informal consultations, the goal of which was to discourage and impede proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on chemical weapon (CW) materials. This informal, international forum was chaired by Australia and became known as the Australia Group. At their December 1992 meeting the AG members, recognizing the need to take steps to address the increasing problem of the spread of biological weapons, agreed on measures to control the export of biological agents and dual-use equipment which could be used in the production of biological weapons. They also agreed on a framework paper for effective licensing arrangements for export controls, thereby further strengthening measures to address the problem of chemical and biological weapon (CBW ) proliferation and use. Today, the AG controls extend to 54 dual-use chemical precursors for CW, microorganisms and toxins that could be used in BW, and dual-use equipment and technology that could be used in chemical or biological weapons production. Controls agreed to during meetings of the AG are applied on a national basis, although all participants are agreed that controls will be more effective if similar measures are introduced by all potential exporters of relevant chemicals and equipment and by countries of possible transshipment. In the United States, the Commerce Control List (CCL) is the vehicle that implements AG agreements. There are currently 30 members of the AG. It has no charter or constitution and operates on consensus. The AGs actions are viewed as complementary measures in
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support of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. In tandem with export controls, the AG has periodically used warning mechanisms to sensitize the public to CBW proliferation. The AG has issued an informal warning list of dual-use CW precursors and bulk chemicals and of CW-related equipment. Members develop and share the warning lists with their chemical industry and ask it to report on any suspicious transactions. The AG has also used an approach to warn industry, the scientific community, and other relevant groups of the risks of inadvertently aiding BW proliferation. Meetings of the AG focus on sharing information about national export controls, considering proposals for harmonizationthe adoption of common export controls by all membersand considering other measures to address CBW proliferation and use. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) The Missile Technology Control Regime currently provides the central institutional arrangement as well as the base international norm for dealing with missile proliferation. The aim of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction . The MTCR is neither an international agreement nor a treaty but a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in limiting the spread of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR considers missiles to include ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles (SLV), and sounding rockets. Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) include cruise missiles, drones, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). The MTCRs members cooperate by applying on a national level common export control guidelines to an agreed list of items (the Equipment and Technology Annex). When the MTCR was instituted in 1987 by the United States and six other concerned countries, it was intended to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling technology transfers relevant to nuclear weapon delivery other than by manned aircraft (i.e., by restricting the proliferation of missiles and related technology). In 1993, MTCR member states tightened export controls further, agreeing to also control transfers of rocket systems or UAVs (including cruise missiles) capable of a 300-km range regardless of range or payload. Also, if the seller has any reason to believe these systems would be used to deliver WMD, there is a strong presumption to deny the transfer regardless of the inherent range and/or payload of the system. There are now 29 MTCR members; other countries have agreed to abide by the basic tenets of the MTCR. The annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into Category I and Category II items. It includes equipment and technology, both military and
dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production, and operation. Category I consists of complete missile systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets); unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, and target and reconnaissance drones; specially designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems such as rocket engines or stages, reentry vehicles, guidance sets, thrust-vector controls, and warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms. According to the MTCR Guidelines, export of Category I items is subject to a presumption of denial. Category II covers a wide range of parts, components, subsystems, propellants, structural materials, test and production equipment, and flight instruments usable for the Category I systems and subsystems. These items are less sensitive components and technologies, most of which have dual-use applications. Category II also covers those systems that have a range of 300 km (but cannot carry a 500-kg payload to that range) and some associated subsystems. Category II items may be exported by MTCR members on a case-by-case basis, provided that the importing state furnishes sufficient end-use guarantees for the item. The MTCR Guidelines specifically state that the Regime is not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The United States maintains a strict interpretation of this statement. Despite some differences of opinion with regard to commercial space applications, all members agree that the technology used in an SLV is virtually identical to that used in a ballistic missile. WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT (WA) In December 1995, 28 governments agreed to establish a new international regime to increase transparency and responsibility for the global market in conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The official name of the regime is The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Wassenaar being the town outside The Hague where five rounds of negotiations took place over a 2-year period. The arrangement will respond to the new security threats of the post Cold War by providing greater openness through information sharing about arms and technology transfers worldwide. The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international framework that will need to be elaborated and defined more fully. It will focus on the threats to international and regional peace and security. A central part of the regime is the commitment by its members to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-users to states whose behavior today is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. The regime will also undertake to prevent destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms worldwide. The Iraq war taught that indiscriminate exports of conven-
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tional weapons and sensitive dual-use technologies can pose serious threats to U.S. interests, to foreign policy goals, and to international security. This regime will seek to apply the lessons of Iraq to prevent similar destabilizing buildups. It will also fill an important gap in the global non-proliferation regimes by covering conventional arms and associated dual-use technologies. The WA, by requiring its members to adhere to current non-proliferation regimes, will encourage non-members to also adhere to these regimes. The WA seeks to prevent destabilizing buildups of weapons by establishing a formal process of transparency and consultation. Participants have agreed to control through their national policies those items and technologies contained in a list of DualUse Goods and Technologies and in a separate Munitions List. OTHER NUCLEAR-RELATED AGREEMENTS There are a number of other agreements that restrict nuclear weapons in some way. Many of them ban nuclear weapons from a location or geographic area (i.e., nuclear-weapon-free zones). The following lists the treaty/agreement, the year it entered into force, the number of signatories, and a brief description of its provisions. Antarctic Treaty: 1961; 37 countries; internationalized and demilitarized the Antarctic Continent and provided for its cooperative exploration and future use. The treaty prohibits any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of military weapons. Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT): 1963; 117 countries; prohibits nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Outer Space Treaty: 1967; 98 countries; parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction .
Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco): 1968; 29 countries (24 in force); obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Seabed Treaty: 1972; 94 countries; prohibits emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor beyond the 12mile coastal zone. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT): 1974; United States, USSR; prohibits underground nuclear tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga): 1985; 15 countries; prohibits testing, deployment, or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty: 1987; United States, USSR; eliminated ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. All of these missiles, their launchers, and associated support structures and support equipment were destroyed. START I: 1994; United States, USSR; reduces arsenals by about 30 percent. The original signatory, the USSR, has since dissolved and the states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have endorsed the treaty by signing the START I Protocol. African Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba): 1996; 53 signatories, three ratifications; prohibits building, testing, burying, or stockpiling nuclear materials. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): 1996; 148 signatories, 7 ratifications (as of 1 October 1997): bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
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SELECTED REGIME PARTICIPANTS

NSG Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada China* Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel* Italy
q q q q q q q
GP
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
BWC
q q q q q q q q q q
CWC**
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
AG
q q q q
MTCR
q q q q q q q q q q q q q
WA
NSG Japan Korea, North Korea, South Libya Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Poland Portugal Romania* Russian Fed. Slovak Republic South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States
q
GP
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
BWC
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
CWC** AG
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
MTCR
q
WA
q q
N
q
N
q q q q q q q q q
N
q q
q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q
N
q q q q q
S
q q q q q q q q q q q
N N N
q q
N N
q q q
S
q q q q
q q
q q
q q
S
q q q q q q
S
q
Regime Total number of participants (as of date) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 34 (N = NPT: 185) (1/97) Geneva Protocol (GP) 145 (7/96) Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 140 (S = signed: 158) (5/97) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)** 106 (S = signed: 168) (11/97) Australia Group (AG) 30 (10/96) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 29 (11/97) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 33 (12/96)
* China, Israel, and Romania have pledged to abide by the basic tenets of the Missile Technology Control Regime. ** For the latest list of CWC signatories/parties, see http://www.opcw.nl/
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APPENDIX F-1 INDEX
APPENDIX F-1 INDEX

TERM 5-axis machines Ablative heat shields Absorbance Accelerator-type neutron henerators Access control Acid etch metal Active immunization Actuators Add and drop multiplexing Advanced alloys Advanced Collective Integrated Protection System (ACIPS) Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Advanced manufacturing plants Advanced signaling system Advanced state vector Advanced state vector calculation routines Aerial bombs Aerodynamic braking Aerodynamic break-up Aerodynamic design concepts which reduce IR signature Aerodynamic dissemination Aerodynamic fins Aerodynamic loads Aerodynamic separation processes Aerodynamic separation technique Aerodynamic shape Aerolization Aerosol dispersal Aerosol generators SECTION REFERENCE 5.9 1.1 3.3 5.0 2.4 1.1 3.0, 3.4 1.1 2.2 5.9 3.4 5.3 5.9 2.5 1.3 1.3 4.2 1.1, 1.2 4.0 1.3 4.2 1.1 1.1 5.2 5.0 1.1, 1.5 3.2 3.2 3.2 TERM Aerosol particle size Aerosols Aerothermal tunnels Aerothermal wind tunnels Afghanistan Africa AIDS Airborne reconnaissance platforms Air blast Airborne agents Aircraft Aircraft delivery (bombs) Airframe Algeria Alpha-based plutonium Alpha-emitter Alpha-emitting isotopes Alpha-n reactions Alpha-induced neutron emission Alpha radiation Altitude Control Module (ACM) Amalgam American Society for Testing Materials (ATSM) American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) Americium (Am) Amiton process Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers Anesthetics Angola Angular measurement machines SECTION REFERENCE 4.2 3., 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.4 1.1 1.4 1.1, 1.5 3.0, 3.1 3.0 2.1 6.2 1.0 1.0, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 4.0, 5.7 4.0 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 1.3 5.9 5.6, 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.8 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 5.0, 5.5 5.12 3.0, 3.1 6.7 4.1 5.12 4.0 1.3 5.9
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TERM Animal pathogens Anthrax Anti-cholinesterase agents Anti-idiotype antibodies Anti-viral agents Antibodies Antigenic surface coatings Arcjets Argentina Arming and fuzing mechanisms Array sensors systems Arsenical vesicant Artillery Artillery rockets Artillery shells Asynchronous Digital Transmission Systems (ADTS) Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) Atmospheric absorption effects Atmospheric tests Atomic Atomic displacement Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation System (AVLIS) Attitude control modules Auger electron emission Auroral physics Australia Australia Group (AG) Australia Group Chemicals Austria Authentication
SECTION REFERENCE 3.1 1.5 4.0 3.4 3.1 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 3.1 1.1 1.0, 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, 5.0, 5.2, 5.6, 5.12 5.7 2.1 4.0 1.0, 1.5 4.0 1.5, 4.2 2.2 2.2, 2.5 6.3 5.10 5.0, 6.1, 6.4 6.4 5.2 1.1 6.4 6.5 1.2, 2.0, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 6.0, 6.2 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.3, Appendix E 4.1 1.2, 3.0, 3.3, 5.0 2.4
TERM Authorative control documents Automated engineering computer routines Automated welding equipment Autonomous control systems Autonomous map guidance systems Avionics systems Backbone networks Bacteria Bacterial toxins Bacterium Baffle Plates Ballast Ballistic missile Baltic Republic Bare-bones testing Barrier steel Becker Nozzle Process Belarus Belgium Bellows Bellows-forming mandrels Bellows-sealed valves Bellows seal Berium Germanate (BGO) Beryllium Beta particles Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) Bidirectional Line-Switched Rings (BLSRs) Bigeye Weapon (BLU 80/B) Binary bombs Binary chemical agents Binary chemical weapons Binary munitions
SECTION REFERENCE 5.0 1.1 1.1 1.1, 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.5 3.0, 3.1 3.1 3.4 5.2 1.5 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1 1.4, 1.5 5.10 5.2 5.0 1.5 1.2, 1.5, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0 5.2, 5.9 5.9 5.2 5.2 5.10 5.6 6.1 2.1, 2.2 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 4.2 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0, 4.1
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TERM Binary weapons Bioactivity Biological (B) Biological agent Biological agent attack Biological agent weapon Biological attack Biological Defense Systems Biological material Biological material production Biological organisms Biological Response Modifier (BRM) Biological sprayers Biological warfare Biological Warfare Committee Biological weapon stockpiles Biological Weapons (BW) Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Biological weapons technologies Biological/Toxin (B/T) Biologically derived toxins Biomaterials Biomedical Biomedical antidotes Biometric Biomolecules Biopolymers Bioprocessing industries Biotechnology Blackbody temperatures Blackbody radiation Blast
SECTION REFERENCE 4.1 3.2 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 3.3 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 3.0 3.1 1.0 3.0, 3.4 3.0, 3.1 3.1 3.0, 3.1 3.4 1.3 3.0, 3.4 3.0 3.0 1.3, 1.4, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 3.0, Appendix E 3.0 3.1, 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.4 2.4 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.0, 3.1,3.3, 3.4 6.3 6.3, 6.5, 6.8 6.0, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6
TERM Blast and heave waves Blast and shock effects Blast and thermal pulse Blast simulation Blast wave Blister agent (vesicant) Blister and blood agents Blow down tunnels Blueout Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Boost cutoff command signals Boosted weapon Boreholes Brazil Breaking out Breeder reactors Bridge wires Britain British Thermal Units (BTU) Broadband Broadband fiber-optic transmissions Broadband satellite Bruce Heavy Water Plant Bulgaria Bulk storage Burst point Bursters Cable-cut failures Calibration equipment Call fill rate Calorimetric Calutron Cameras
SECTION REFERENCE 6.6 6.0, 6.2 6.2, 6.7 6.2 6.0, 6.2, 6.3 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1 1.1 6.0 5.3 1.1 5.0 5.10 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 5.0, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10 2.2 5.3 5.7 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 5.4 1.1, 1.4 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 2.2 2.5 5.12 1.4, 3.0, 4.0 4.1 6.6 1.5, 4.1 2.1 1.1 2.2 3.3 5.0, 5.2 5.0
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TERM Canada
SECTION REFERENCE 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.0, 4.3, 4.4, 5.0, 5.12, 5.13, 6.0, 6.2 5.3, 5.12, 5.13 2.2 4.1 1.1, 1.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 1.1, 1.2 5.1 5.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 5.12 3.0, 3.1 3.1 2.0, 2.2 2.1., 2.5 2.2 1.3, 1.4 3.1 5.2 3.2 5.0, 5.9 5.0 1.3 1.3 5.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 4.0 5.10
TERM Charged-Injection Device (CID) Charged particles and photons Chechnya Chemical Abstract Service Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) Chemical agents Chemical bomb (MC-1) Chemical defense Chemical exchange processes (CHEMEX) Chemical fill Chemical material production Chemical munitions Chemical protection Chemical shells Chemical sprayers Chemical substances Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) Chemical vapors Chemical warfare Chemical Weapons (CW) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Chemical weapons production Chemical weapons technologies Chemically and Biologically Protected Shelter (CBPS) Chemotherapy Chernobyl nuclear plant Chile China
SECTION REFERENCE 5.10 6.4 2.2 4.1, 4.4 4.3 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 4.2. 4.4 4.2 4.0, 4.4 5.2, 5.5, 5.12 4.0 4.1 4.0, 4.1 4.4 4.4 1.3 4.0 1.4 4.4 4.3, 4.4 1.4, 2.6, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 4.0, 4.1, 4.4, Appendix E 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 5.9 1.0, 1.3, 1.4 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 4.0, 4.3, 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 6.0, 6.5, 6.8 4.1 4.0, 4.1 3.0
Canadian Deuterium Uranium (Reactor) Capacity-extending wavelength division multiplexing Carbamates Carbon Carbon carbon Carbon tetrachloride Carrier gas handling equipment Cartridge loading Case bonding Casing material Catalytic burners Cell culture Cells Cellular communications systems Cellular telephone Central Office (CO) Central Processing Unit (CPU) Centrifugal separators Centrifugal subsonic compressors Centrifugation Centrifuge Centrifuge enrichment CFD design optimization routines CFD inverse design routines Chain fission reaction Channel bank Channel Service Units (CSUs) Channel switching Charcoal-filtered gas masks Charge-Coupled Device (CCD)
Chlorinating agent Choking agent Cholera
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TERM Circular Error Probable (CEP) Classic agents Classic chemical agents Classic chemical weapons Clean steam Client-server architectures Client-server structures Cluster bombs CNC Machine Tool Coalition Forces Coaxial cables Collective protection Collectors Color change Column Exchange (COLEX) Combat Aircraft Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Combinatorial Chemistry (CC) Combined network control point/operations center Command and control Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Command, Control, and Intelligence (C2I) Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Commerce Control List (CCL) Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Commercial cellular services Commercial chemicals Commercial environments Commercial satellite systems Commercial telecommunications networks Common-channel signaling (CCS)
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.1 2.3 2.3 3.2, 4.0 5.9 6.6 5.10 4.4 5.2 4.3 5.0, 5.5 1.0 1.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 6.0, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 2.0, 3.3, 4.0, 6.0 5.11 All 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.6 2.2 4.0 2.4 2.0 2.1, 2.6 2.5, 2.6
TERM Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP) Communications Communications facilities Complex molecules Composite filament-winding equipment Composite filament-winding machines Composite tape-laying equipment Composite weaving Composite weaving or interlacing equipment Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Compressed gas Compton electrons Compton scattering Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Computer-assisted fabrication Computer-based network control Computer-Aided Design (CAD) Computer-Aided Design/Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD/CAE) Computer codes Computer-Controlled Machines (CCM) Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) Machine Tools Computer security Computerized distributed control systems Computerized Tomography (CT) Conditional suicide genes Containment Contamination Continental United States (CONUS) Control systems Controllers and end-effectors
SECTION REFERENCE 2.5 2.0, 2.1, 2.4, 4.4, 6.0, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 2.1 4.1 1.1, 1.3 1.1 1.1, 1.3 1.1, 1.3 1.1, 1.3 5.0, 5.8, 5.10, 6.0, 6.1, Appendix E 3.2 6.6 6.4, 6.6 1.3, 1.4, 5.2 5.9 2.2 2.3, 5.0, 5.2 1.1, 1.3 6.0, 6.1, 6.3 5.9 5.0, 5.9 2.3 3.1 1.1, 1.2 3.1 3.0, 3.1, 4.1, 5.3 3.0, 3.3, 4.3, 5.4 6.6 5.3 5.9
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TERM Conventional artillery shells Conventional wind tunnels Cooling systems Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM) Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) Corrosive-resistant equipment Cosmic radiation Countermeasures Countermeasures/counter-countermeasures Coupled radiation Coupled radiation-hydrodynamics flow Cratering Croatia Cross-flow filtration Cruise missile Cryogenic Cryogenic distillation towers Cryogenic temperatures Cryogenic vacuum pumps Cryogenically cooled Cryptographic Cryptography Crystal Arrays Cuba Customer Network Management (CNM) Customer or integrated network management systems Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) CWC schedules Cyanogen chloride Cylindrical ton containers Czech Republic
SECTION REFERENCE 1.5 1.4 5.2 5.9 2.4, 2.5 4.1 5.13 3.1 2.0 6.1 6.1 6.0 1.4 3.1 1.0, 1.3 5.12, 6.1 5.12 5.5 6.1 1.2 2.4 2.4 4.3 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.4, 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.1, 2.5 4.1 4.1 4.1 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 3.3, 4.0, 4.3, 5.0
TERM D-electromagnetic pulse Data Communication Networks (DCN) Data Encryption Standard (DES) Data end-instruments Data Service Units (DSU) Data warehousing Database Decoding templates Decomposition of amalgam Decontamination Dedicated facilities Dedicated facilities-based networks Deep freezing Delivery systems Demilitarization program Denmark Dense plasma focus instrument Department of Defense (DoD) Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted or Natural Uranium Desiccation Designated Ground Zeros (DGZ) Desktop/workstation Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Detection Detection, warning, and identification Detector Detonation (high explosive) Detonation (nuclear) Detonators Deuterium Deutrons
SECTION REFERENCE 6.6 2.5 1.1 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.3, 2.5 2.4 5.5 3.4, 4.4, 5.4, 5.8 2.1, 2.5 2.1 3.2 1.0, 1.5 4.1 1.5, 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0 5.6 2.0, 2.3, 5.10, 5.11 5.2, 5.10 1.5, 5.3 3.1 2.1 2.3 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 3.0, 3.3, 3.4, 4.0, 4.3 3.0, 3.3, 4.0, 4.3 4.0, 4.3 5.6, 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 5.0, 5.6, 5.7, 6.0, 6.3, 6.5 5.0, 5.7, 5.10 5.0, 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 5.13
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TERM Diffuser housings Difluor: methyl phosphonyl difluoride (DF) Digital computer Digital controllers Digital cross-connect facilities Digital cross-connect switching Digital Cross-Connect Systems (DCS) Digital Loop Carrier (DLC) Digital radar maps Digital Signal Hierarchy (DS-N) Digital Signal level 0 (DS-0) Digital Signal level 1 = 544 mbytes (DS-I) Digital Signals (DS) Digital topographical maps Digitizing oscilloscopes Dimensional inspection Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) Dipstick kits Direct combat support Disaster recovery techniques Dispersal Dispersed electromagnetic pulse Dispersion Displacement effects Dissemination Dissemination, dispersion, and weapons testing Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) DNA sequences Dose isopleths Dry helium Dry thermonuclear devices Dual-function switches Dual-canister burster charge Dynamic loading
SECTION REFERENCE 5.2 4.1 1.2 5.9 2.1 2.1, 2.2 2.1, 2.2 2.6 1.3, 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1, 2.2 1.3 6.1 5.9 3.2 3.3 2.0 2.3 3.0, 3.2 6.6 4.2 6.4 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 4.2 4.0, 4.2 2.3 3.0 4.2 4.1 5.5 2.2 1.5 6.2
TERM Dynamic Non-Hierarchical Routing (DNHR) E-folding time E-region Earth-penetrating bomb Ebola Ecuador Egypt Eisenhower-Krushchev Moratorium Electrical Discharge Machines (EDM) Electrochemical Electrodynamic vibration test system Electrolysis Electromagnetic compatibility Electromagnetic interference Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Electromagnetic radiation Electromagnetic signal propagation Electromagnetic spectrum Electromagnetic waves Electron density Electronic-time fuzes Electronic Counter-countermeasures (ECCM) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Electronic fuze Electronic fuzing Electronic or photonic devices Electronic Safe and Arm (ESA) Electronic signature Electronic timers Electronuclear breeder Electrostatic discharge Element routines
SECTION REFERENCE 2.1 5.6 6.6 5.0 3.0, 3.1 1.3 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0 5.0 5.9 3.3, 5.5 5.9 5.5 6.6, 6.7 6.6 5.0, 5.1, 5.2 5.9, 6.0, 6.1, 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 6.0, 6.5, 6.7, 6.8 6.0, 6.5 6.3 6.5, 6.6 6.5 4.2 4.2, 5.7 1.4, 4.2, 5.7, 5.9 1.5 4.2 2.4 4.2 2.4 1.5 5.13 6.6 1.3
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TERM Emplacement canisters Encrypted telemetry data Encryption devices Encryption software End-effectors End caps Energetic materials England Enola Gay Enriched uranium Enriched uranium fuel Enrichment Enrichment feedstocks production Environmental controls Environmental degradation Environmental heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning Enzymatic reactions Equation of State (EOS) Equivalent blackbody (e.b.b.) Erosion protection coatings Ethiopia Europe European Union Expelling charges Exploding bridge-wires Explosive devices Explosive firing trains Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Explosives Export Administration Act (EAA) Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Extendible nozzle exit cones Extremely High Frequency (EHF)
SECTION REFERENCE 6.1 1.1, 1.2 2.4 2.4 5.9 5.2 1.1, 4.2 6.6 5.0 5.0, 5.6. 5.10 5.3, 5.10 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, 5.5 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.6 4.3 5.10 6.2, 6.3 1.4 1.3 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.0, 2.6, 3.0, 5.7 1.1, 1.2 1.5 1.1, 1.2 3.2 5.7 5.11 4.2 Preface 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 4.4, 5.10 1.2 6.5
TERM Eye protection Failsafe redundancy and backup Fast Acting Closure (FAC) Fast neutrons Fast packet Fat Man Fault isolation Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Feed preparation systems Feed systems Fermentation Fiber-based bidirectional line switched ring Fiber-optic cable Fiber-optic transmission Filament-winding machines Filtration systems Finite element codes Finite element structural computer routines Finland Fire sets Fireball Firing sets Fissile element separation Fissile isotope Fissile material Fissile nuclei Fission Fission chain reaction Fission explosives Fission primary Fission weapons Fixed-wing aircraft Fixed launch sites
SECTION REFERENCE 3.4 2.3 6.1 5.6 2.2 5.0, 5.6 2.5 5.6 5.2 5.2 3.0, 3.1 2.1 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 5.10 2.1, 2.6 1.1, 1.2, 5.9 4.4 1.1 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.0, 4.0, 4.3, 4.4 4.2 6.3, 6.5, 6.8 5.6 5.4 5.0, 5.4 5.0, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6 5.0 5.0, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 5.10, 5.13 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.0, 5.4, 5.5, 5.13 3.2 1.2
II-F-1-8
TERM Flame Ionization Detector (FID) Flame Photometric Detector (FPD) Flammable aerosols Flash x-ray (FXR) Flash x-ray Cameras Flash x-ray Generators Flight azimuth Flight computers Flow instrumentation Fluid energy mills Fluid mechanics finite element routines Fluorides Flux Food and Drug Administration Foreign Technology Assessment (FTA) Former Soviet Union (FSU) France Freeze-dried powder Freeze drying Frequency changers Frothing Fuel disassembly Fuel dissolution Fuel rod cladding Fuel storage Full width at half maximum (FWHM) Functional Areas (FA) Fungi Fusing and firing circuits Fusion Fusion secondary Fuzes Fuzing
SECTION REFERENCE 4.3 4.3 4.2 6.8 5.10 5.10 1.0, 1.2 1.1, 1.4 1.3 1.1, 1.2 1.3, 1.4 5.3 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.6 3.1 All 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 6.0 All 3.2 3.2 5.2 3.2 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.4 6.7 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 3.0, 3.1 1.5 5.0 5.0 4.1 5.0, 5.7
TERM G-7 nations plus Russia (G-8) G-agents G-molecular laser isotope separation systems G-series Gamma-ray Gamma detectors Gamma Pinex photography Gas blowers Gas bomb Gas centrifuge Gas Chromatography (GC) Gas compressors Gas masks Gas phase ion chemistry Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure (GSAC) Gaseous diffusion Gaseous solution GC-flame photometric detection Gene probes Gene sequences Generic performance parameters Genetic engineering Genetic material Genetic modification Genetically modified microorganisms Geneva convention Geneva Protocol Genome data base Geomagnetic field Germany Girdler Sulfide (GS) Glass phenolic Glide bombs Global Communications Network
SECTION REFERENCE 2.1 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 5.2 2.2 5.8, 5.10, 6.1, 6.4, 6.6, 6.8 5.10 5.10 5.2 4.2 5.0, 5.2 3.3, 4.3 5.2 4.0, 4.1 4.3 6.1 5.0, 5.2 3.2 4.3 3.0, 3.3 3.3 2.0 3.0, 3.1 3.0, 3.3 3.0, 3.1 3.0, 3.1 4.0 3.0, 4.0 3.0 6.6 All 5.12 1.2 1.4 2.0
II-F-1-9
TERM Global Navigation Systems Global Positioning System (GPS) Glonass Glycolates GPS receivers Gray (Gy) Great Britain Greece Grinding machines Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Ground-based GPS systems Ground Mobile Command Center (GMCC) Ground shock Group Decision Support System (GDSS) Group of Seven Industrial Nations (G-7) Guidance and navigation systems Guidance computers Guidance system feedback instrumentation Guidance systems Guided bombs Gulf War
SECTION REFERENCE
TERM Height of Burst (HOB) Helikon Techniques Helium Hematopoetic immune system Hemi-shells Hemorrhagic fevers High-altitude IR High-altitude nuclear detonation High-capacity fiber transmission High-power microwave High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects High-altitude nuclear explosion High-altitude tests High-atomic-weight injection fluid High ballistic coefficient High-capacitance batteries High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) High-energy electrons High-energy neutrons High explosive High-explosive detonator High-explosive initiation High Explosives (HE) High Nickel Alloy (Hastelloy C) High-speed ultracentrifuge High spin rates High Strength-to-Density (HSD) High-temperature furnace High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Hiroshima Hit-to-kill interceptors
SECTION REFERENCE 4.2, 5.7, 6.0, 6.2, 6.3 5.2 5.0, 5.2, 5.3 3.4 5.9 3.0 6.5 6.4 2.1 6.6 6.0, 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 1.1 1.2 1.5 3.1 6.5, 6.8 5.6 1.5, 4.2, 5.6 1.5 5.6 5.6, 5.10 4.1 5.2 1.5 5.2 5.4, 5.9 5.3 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5 5.0, 5.7 1.4
1.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 6.0 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 4.0 1.3, 1.4 2.6 1.2, 1.3 1.5, 3.0 5.9 5.10 1.1 2.6 6.0 2.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2, 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.0, 1.1, 1.4, 2.1, 4.0, 4.1, 5.2, 6.6 Gun-assembled weapon 5.0, 5.3, 5.6, 5.7 Gun assembly 5.0, 5.6 Hand or eye scanning 2.4 Hard x-ray 6.8 Hardware/software composition 2.0 Head mask 3.4 Header piping systems 5.2 Heat exchangers 5.2 Heat sink 1.1 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 2.6 Heavy water moderated reactors 5.0, 5.3, 5.13 Heavy water production 5.12
II-F-1-10
TERM Holland Homogeneous nationwide networks Horizontal Line-of-Sight (HLOS) Horizontal Tunnel Tests (HTT) Hot cells Hot isostatic presses Human genome Human immune system Human pathogens Hungary Hydrodynamic Hydrodynamic computer routines Hydrodynamic implosion Hydrodynamic tests Hydrodynamics flow Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) Hydrofluorination Hydrogen bomb Hydrogen cyanide Hydronuclear testing Hysteresis loop measurement equipment IAEA Trigger List Immune-based detector Immune system Immunization Immuno-based detectors Immuno chemical Immuno logically Immuno modulators Immuno suppressants Implosion assembly Implosion device Implosion systems Implosion weapon
SECTION REFERENCE 1.2 2.5 6.1 6.1 5.4 5.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 1.2, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 3.3, 4.0, 4.3 1.3, 5.0, 5.6, 5.10, 6.1 1.3 5.10 5.10 6.1 5.1, 5.4 5.1 5.0 4.0, 4.1 5.10 1.1 5.0 3.1, 3.3 3.1, 3.4 3.0, 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 5.6, 5.7, 5.9 5.0, 5.6, 5.10 5.0, 5.6, 5.7 5.0, 5.6
TERM Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) In-flight refueling Inactivating agents Incapacitants Incapacitating agents Incapacitating levels Incubation period India
SECTION REFERENCE 5.6, 5.11 1.4 3.2 4.0 4.0, 4.1 4.0 3.0 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10, 5.12, 6.0, 6.2 1.2, 1.4 3.0, 3.1 3.1 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 3.0, 3.1 3.0 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5 2.0, 2.1, 2.2 2.5 2.0, 2.3, 4.3 2.0, 2.3, 2.4 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 2.0, 2.1, 2.3, 2.5 2.0, 2.6 2.0 5.12 3.2 3.2, 4.4 1.4 1.3 2.5 6.4
Indonesia Industrialized nations Inert gas Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) Infectious agent Infectious diseases Information communications Information Exchange (IX) Information management and control Information Processing (IP) Information Security (INFOSEC) Information System (IS) Information System Management and Control (IM&C) Information systems facilities Information systems technologies Infrared absorption analyzers Ingestion Inhalation Innovative control effectors Innovative flow effectors Institute of Electrical Engineers (IEEE) Integrated circuit
II-F-1-11
TERM Integrated Network Management System Integrated switching-multiplexing equipment Inter-Exchange Carriers (IXC) Inter-node transport Interception Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Interface terminal nodes Interferons Interleukins Internal Electromagnetic Pulse (IEMP) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Standards Organization (ISO) International Telecommunications Union (ITU) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Internet Ion exchange columns Ion exchange reflux systems Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) Ion source Ionization Ionizing radiation Ionosphere Iran
SECTION REFERENCE 2.5 2.2 2.1, 2.5 2.2 2.4 Introduction, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 5.0, 6.2 2.4 3.4 3.4 6.8 5.0, 5.4 2.5, 5.10 2.1, 2.2 1.4 2.0, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 5.2 5.2 3.3, 4.3 5.2 6.0, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 6.0, 6.1, 6.5, 6.7 6.5, 6.6 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.0, 5,2, 5.6, 5.10, 6.0 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.10, 6.6 5.4 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.8 All
TERM Italy
SECTION REFERENCE 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 5.9, 6.0, 6.2 All 4.4 1.4 1.3 1.1, 1.2 2.4 6.2 6.3 2.0 5.5 5.0, 5.2, 5.11, 6.3, 6.5, 6.8 6.5 6.5 5.11 5.0, 5.2 5.2 1.1 2.2 3.3 2.0 4.1 4.0, 4.1 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.0, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0 , 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.10, 6.0 6.3 3.2, 3.3, 4.3 5.0 5.0, 5.10, 6.0, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, Appendix E
Iran-Iraq War Iraq
Japan Joint Service Lightweight Suit Technology (JSLIST) Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Kenya Kevlar Keyboard rhythm Lamp-type thermal radiation simulators Large Blast/Thermal Simulator (LBTS) Large damage envelopes Large nuclear stockpiles Laser Laser communications Laser communications beam Laser detection systems Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) Laser systems Launch strategy Lebanon Lectins Lethal radii Levinstein Process Lewisite Libya
Irradiated fuel Isotopes Israel
Light-Initiated High Explosive (LIHE) Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Light-water power reactors Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
II-F-1-12
TERM Line-of-sight (LOS) Liquefied gases Liquid-liquid centrifugal contractors Liquid-liquid exchange columns Liquid deuterium Liquid droplets Liquid fueled missile Liquid hydrogen Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Liquid migration Liquid propellant engines Liquid thermal diffusion Liquid uranium metal handling systems Lithium-mercury amalgam Lithium (L) Lithium hydroxide Little Boy Local Area Networks (LANs) Local Exchange Carriers (LEC) Long-distance communications Long-range cruise missiles Long-wave infrared (LWIR) Long wavelength radio communications Los Alamos Low ballistic coefficient Low enriched uranium Low observables Machine tools Magnetic suspension bearings Magnetohydrodynamic Electromagnetic Pulse (MHD-EMP) Management Information Base (MIB) Management Information System (MIS)
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.5 4.2 1.1 5.12 5.3 1.5 1.1, 1.2 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.0, 5.4, 5.5 5.0 5.0 2.2, 2.5 2.1, 2.5 2.1 1.0, 1.3 6.5 2.1 5.0, 5.2, 5.3 1.2 5.0, 5.1 1.4 5.9 5.2 6.6 2.5 2.0
TERM Manhattan Project Manned aircraft Manned tactical aircraft Manufacturing of nuclear components Manufacturing processes Map guidance technology Maraging Steel Mask breaker Masks Mass Medium Diameter (MMD) Mass spectral analysis Mass spectrometry Mass spectrometry-mass spectrometry (MS-MS) Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) Means of Delivery (MOD) Mechanical framing cameras Mechanical streak cameras Mercury Meshed network Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) Metal preparation Metal stamping equipment Meteorological information systems Methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) Metropolitan Area and Wide-Area Networks (MAN/WANS) Mexico Microencapsulation Microorganisms Microwave power Middle East Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) Military environments Milling
SECTION REFERENCE 5.0, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.10 1.4 1.0 5.8, 5.9 4.1 1.4 5.2 4.0 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.3, 4.3 4.3 5.2 Introduction, 1.0 5.10 5.10 5.0, 5.5 2.2 6.4 5.4 1.3, 1.4 3.2 4.1 2.2 1.4 1.5 3.0 5.2 4.4 All 2.4 5.9
II-F-1-13
TERM Milliradium range angular accuracy Mine shafts Mirrors Missile systems Missile technology Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Missile warheads Missiles Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Mixer-settler Mobile launchers Mobile telecommunications Modified Auxiliary Closure (MAC) Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) Molecular pumps Molecular recognition Monoclonal antibodies Monte Carlo Calculations Motion detection sensors/alarms Motor stators Multichannel trunk satellite service Multimedia communications Multimedia voice Multiplane balancing machines Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Multiplexer equipment Multiplexing Multistage light gas guns Munitions ListWassenaar Arrangement (ML) Mustard gas (blister agent) Mustard rounds Mustard shells
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1 5.10 1.2, 1.5, 6.3 1.1 1.2 All 4.0 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 4.2 3.4 5.4 1.2 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 6.1, 6.2 5.0, 5.2 5.2 3.3 3.0 6.4 5.11 5.2 2.1 2.5, 2.6 2.0 5.9 5.0 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.5 2.2, 2.5 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 5.10 All 4.0, 4.1 4.1 4.0
TERM Nagasaki Natural lithium Natural uranium Navigation Neptunium Nerve agentSarin (GB) Nerve agentSoman (GD) Nerve agentTabum (GA) Nerve agent (VX) Nerve agents (G agents) Nerve agents (V agents) Nerve gases Netherlands Network Control Points (NCP) Network Element (NE) Network Operation Centers (NOCs) Neutron-emitting isotopes Neutron detectors Neutron economy Neutron fluences Neutron generator tubes Neutron initiators Neutron Pinex photography Nevada Test Site New Zealand Nigeria Nitric Acid (HNO3) Nitrogen mustards No-lone zones Nobel Laureates Nobel Prize Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) Non-Proliferation Treaty
SECTION REFERENCE 5.3, 5.7 5.5 5.3, 5.4 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 5.3, 5.4 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 4.0, 4.1 4.0, 4.1 4.0 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.0, 4.3, 5.0, 5.2, 5.9, 6.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 5.8 5.10 5.0 6.4 5.6 5.6 5.10 5.10 1.2 1.3 5.1, 5.3, 5.4 4.1 5.11 5.0, 5.0 Appendix E 5.0, Appendix E
II-F-1-14
TERM North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Korea
SECTION REFERENCE 4.4, 6.0, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 5.0, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 6.0 2.2 1.2, 1.3, 2.0, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 4.4, 5.12, 6.2 5.2 6.2 1.1 1.5 6.0 5.7, 5.9 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8 5.2, 5.10 Introduction, 1.1, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13 2.1, 6.1, 6.8 6.5 6.1 6.1 5.0, 5.7, 5.10, 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6 5.0, 5.3, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10 5.10, 6.3, 6.5 5.0, 5.3, 5.5 5.5 Appendix E 5.13 5.0, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 5.12 5.6 Introduction, 5.0 1.5
TERM Nuclear simulations Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Nuclear testing Nuclear thermal radiation effects Nuclear Trigger List (NTL) Nuclear warhead Nuclear weapon
SECTION REFERENCE 6.2 Introduction, 5.0, 5.3, 5.13, Appendix E 5.10 6.0, 6.3 Introduction, 5.3 5.0, 5.7 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 5.0, 5.1, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 6.0, 6.1, 6.8, 5.5, 5.6 5.3 5.10, 5.11 5.0, 5.6 5.10 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.8 6.8 6.0 6.0 5.0, 5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13 5.0 5.0 5.10 3.0, 3.3 1.1, 1.3 6.0 1.1, 1.3, 5.9 3.1 5.2, 5.3 2.3 2.3 5.10 3.0
Northern Ireland Norway Nozzle enrichment process Nuclear airblast simulator Nuclear arsenal Nuclear artillery shells Nuclear combat Nuclear components Nuclear Denotation (NUDET) Nuclear devices Nuclear Dual-Use List (NDUL) Nuclear effects Nuclear effects on electromagnetic signal propagation Nuclear effects phenomenology Nuclear environments Nuclear explosion Nuclear explosives Nuclear fireball Nuclear fission Nuclear Fusion Reaction Column Exchange Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear physics Nuclear reactor Nuclear reactor physics Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Nuclear shells
Nuclear weapon physics Nuclear Weapon Program Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Nuclear weapons design Nuclear weapons development testing Nuclear Weapons Effects (NWE) Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation (NWES) Nuclear weapons effects simulators Nuclear weapons effects technologies Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) Nuclear weapons technologies Nuclear weapons training Nuclear yield testing Nucleic acid/protein Numerical control Numerical simulation Numerically Controlled (NC) machines Nutrient additives Oak Ridge Object-oriented programming Object-Oriented Technologies (OOT) Off-the-shelf (OTS) Offensive biological agents
II-F-1-15
TERM Offensive strike power Office in suitcase Oligomers On-board sensor On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) One-time operational codes Operation Desert Storm Operations Security (OPSEC) Optical Carrier (OC) Optical semiconductors Oralloy Oralloy-fueled gun-assembled device Organisms/toxins Organophosphorus compounds Oscillating electric current Oscilloscope Overt encryption Oxidizer Packet switching Pakistan Pan Am 103 Parallel-staged missile Parallel staging Particle-like effects Passive immunization Pathogenic bacteria Pathogenic organisms Pathogenic viruses Pathogens Peptides Per-channel signaling
SECTION REFERENCE 3.0 2.6 3.3 4.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 4.4 2.4, 5.7, 5.11 2.2 6.3 5.6, 5.10 5.10 3.2 4.0 6.6 5.10 2.4 1.1 2.2 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.3, 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 5.10, 6.0, 6.2 5.6, 5.7 1.2 1.1, 1.2 6.4 3.0, 3.4 3.1 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 3.1 1.5, 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 3.0 2.4
TERM Permissive Action Links (PAL) Persian Gulf Personal Computer (PC) Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) Personnel Communications System (PCS) Peru Pharmaceutical companies Pharmaceutical industry Phosgene Phosphor bronze mesh packing Photo Detectors (PD) Photo Multipler (PM) Photoelectric excitation Photomultiplier tubes Photons Physical phenomena Physical simulation Physics package Physiological effects Piezoelectric, calorimetic transducers Piezoelectric instrumentation Piezoelectrically Pin dome tests Pinhole photography Plant pathogens Plaque infected fleas Plasma emission Plasma generation systems Plasma Separation Process (PSP) Plutonium Plutonium-fueled weapons Plutonium extraction Plutonium nitrates
SECTION REFERENCE 5.0, 5.7 1.3, 2.6 1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 5.0 2.4 2.6 1.3 4.0 3.0, 3.4 4.0, 4.1 5.12 5.10 5.10 6.4 5.10 6.4, 6.6, 6.8 6.0 6.0, 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.3 1.1 3.3 5.10 5.10 3.1 3.0 6.5 5.2 5.2 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 5.4 5.4 5.4
II-F-1-16
TERM Plutonium Uranium Recovery by Extraction (PUREX) Point-to-point line-of-sight Poland Polonium Polynucleotides Porous barrier Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV) Potassium amide/liquid ammonia Powdering and milling Power reactors (fast) Power reactors (intermediate) Power reactors (thermal) Power transistor Pre-initiation Precipitation Prepreg material Pressure gauges Pressure regulators Pressure relief devices Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Production reactors Programmable switching Projectile cases Proliferator
SECTION REFERENCE 5.4 2.1 1.4, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0 5.6 3.0, 3.3 5.2 1.2 5.12 3.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 6.4 5.10 3.2 1.1 1.1 3.1 3.1 5.3 5.0, 5.3, 5.13 2.2, 2.5 4.2 1.1, 2.0, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, 4.3, 5.0, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10, 6.2, 6.6 4.3 3.4 3.0, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 1.1, 1.2 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 2.4
TERM Protective clothing Protective masks Pseudolites or differential GPS Public key cryptography Public mobile service Pulse generators Pulsed-power nuclear weapons Pulsed-power nuclear weapons effects simulation Purification process Purified water supply Pyongyang Pyrotechnics Radar-absorbing material Radar altimeter Radar altimeter fusing Radar beams Radar Cross Section (RCS) Radar fuzes or timers Radar jamming and spoofing Radiation Radiation Absorbed Dose (in Silicon) [rad(si)] Radiation shielding Radio-chemistry Radio command guidance Radio inertial guidance Radio Lanthanum (RaLa) Radio timing fuze Radioactive debris Radioactive isotopes Radioactive material Radioactivity Radiological weapons Ramjets
SECTION REFERENCE 4.0, 4.3, 4.4 3.4, 4.0 1.1 2.4 2.1 5.10 6.0, 6.8 6.0, 6.8 4.1 3.1 4.4 4.2 1.3 1.5, 5.7 1.2 6.5 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 1.5 1.3 5.4, 5.8, 6.0, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 6.4, 6.7 5.4 5.10 1.1 1.3 5.10 1.5 5.10, 6.0 5.0, 5.8, 5.10 5.0, 5.6, 5.8 5.4 5.0, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 1.3
Prophylactic measures Prophylactic treatment Prophylaxis Propulsion system Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration Protect wire
II-F-1-17
TERM Reactor-grade graphite Real-time network reconfiguration Real-time transmission Real-time video observation Receive terminals Receptors Recognition molecules Recombinant DNA Reentry Vehicles (RV) Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) Remote stored program-controlled switching Repeater/amplifiers Reprocessed uranium Reprocessing facilities Reprocessing plants Reproducibly timed squibs Republic of South Africa Research reactors Resource-devouring casualties Respiratory protection Respiratory system Ricin Rickettsiae Robot Rocket-assist launch sites Rocket motor test stands Rockets Romania Rotary-wing vehicles Rotary shaft seals Rotor assemblies Rotor assembly equipment Rotor tubes
SECTION REFERENCE 5.12 2.2 1.3 2.0 2.1 3.0, 3.3 3.3 3.1 1.1, 1.2, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 4.3 2.5 2.1 5.4 5.0, 5.3, 5.4 5.0, 5.4 1.2 5.0 5.3 4.0 3.4 4.0, 4.4 4.0 3.0, 3.1 5.9 1.2 1.1, 1.2 4.2 3.0 3.2 5.2 5.2 5.9 5.2
TERM Rudimentary computers Russia (Russia) High-power Pressure-tube Reactor (RBMK) Safely transfer funds Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (SAFF) Sample collection Sarin (nerve agent) Satellite Satellite-based mobile telecommunications Satellite-to-aircraft links Satellite-to-ground links Satellite-to-satellite communications Satellite relays Saudi Arabia Scatter station design Scattered gammas Scattering LIDAR Scene generation Scope cameras Search-on-number Secure voice Security operations Security personnel Seed stocks Self-protection defensive measures Self-sustaining chain reaction Semiconductor electronics Sensor networks Sensors Separator module housings Serial staging Servo valves Shared public network facilities
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1 All 5.3 2.4 5.0, 5.6, 5.7 3.3 3.2, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 2.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 2.1 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 6.1 6.6 3.3, 4.3 1.4 5.10 2.4 2.4 5.11 5.11 3.1 3.4 5.0 6.4 1.4 3.0, 3.3 5.2 1.1, 1.2 1.1 2.1
II-F-1-18
TERM Shear forming machines Sheet-Explosive Loading Technique (SELT) Shelf life Shelters Shock propagation Shock wave Shock-wave photography Short-Range Missile (SCUD) Signaling System (SS) Signature dynamics Signature reduction Simple Management Network Protocol (SMNP) Simplified Collective Protection Equipment (SCPE) Simulators Singapore Single-channel long-distance connections Single-event burnout Single-Event Upset (SEU) Single-cell growth chambers Single-cell production Single-stage missiles Singly Deuteriated Water (HDO) Singly Tritiated Water (HTO) Slovak Republic Slovenia Small solid strap-on boosters Small, solid rocket engine for takeoff assistance Smallpox Smart weapons Soft x-ray Software Defined Network (SDN) Solar furnace Solar parabolic dish
SECTION REFERENCE 5.9 6.3 4.4 4.4 6.1 5.6, 5.10 6.2 1.0, 1.2, 2.3 2.5 2.4 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 2.5 3.4 6.0, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8 1.3, 5.7 2.1 6.4 6.4 3.1 3.1 1.2 5.12 5.13 3.0, 3.3, 4.0 1.4 1.2 1.3 3.0 2.0, 2.1 6.3, 6.8 2.0, 2.1, 2.2 6.3 6.3
TERM Solar power tower Solid lethal agents Solid propellant oxidizers Solid propellants Solid rocket motors Solvent extraction/fluorination (wet process) Soman (nerve agent) Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) South Africa
SECTION REFERENCE 6.3 4.1 1.1, 1.2 1.1, 1.2 1.2 5.4 4.0, 4.1 6.0, 6.1, 6.7, 6.8 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.0, 4.0, 4.2, 4.3, 5.0, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 5.7, 5.10, 6.0 1.4, 1.5, 3.0, 3.1 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.4, 2.6, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.6, 5.7, 6.4 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 5.3, 6.6 1.5, 3.0, 4.0, 5.6 5.0, 5.6 2.1, 2.6 5.0, 5.3, 5.4, 5.8 5.0 1.1, 1.3 3.2 6.3 4.0, 4.2 3.0, 3.1, 3.2 3.3 1.3 2.4 1.3 3.1 4.0, 4.1 1.4 5.0, 5.3, 5.7
South America South Korea Soviet Union Spain Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) Spent fuel rods Spent reactor fuel Spin, flow, and shear forming machines Spray devices Spray Lead at Target (SPLAT) Spray tanks Stabilization Standoff detectors Standoff Land-Attack Missile (SLAM) Steganographic encoding Stellar optics Sterilization Stockpile Stockpile-to-target delivery cycle Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS)
II-F-1-19
TERM Stored program control Strap-on boosters Streak cameras Structurally efficient radar absorbing structure Submunitions Subsonic cruise missile Subterranean sites Suitcase-size packaging Sulfur mustard Super germ Super High Frequency (SHF) Superconducting magnets Supercritical mass Supercriticality Supergun project Superplastic forming/diffusion bonding equipment Supersonic expansion nozzles Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Surveillance Survivability Sweden Switching Switzerland
SECTION REFERENCE 2.2 1.2 5.10 1.3 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1,5, 3.2, 4.0, 4.2 1.3 5.10 2.3 4.0, 4.1 3.0 6.5 5.2 5.0, 5.6, 5.10 5.0, 5.6 1.5 5.9 5.2 3.3, 4.3 2.0 2.1, 2.4, 6.0, 6.2, 6.4 All 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.6 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 4.0, 4.4, 5.0, 5.4, 5.6, 5.9, 6.0, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8 2.1 2.2 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 2.2 2.2 4.1
TERM Syria System Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) System Management System (SMS) Tabun (nerve agent) Tactical aircraft Tails withdrawal systems Taiwan
SECTION REFERENCE 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 6.0, 6.4, 6.8 2.5 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 1.4 5.2 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 5.0, 5.6, 5.7, 6.1, 6.4 2.5 2.2, 2.5 3.3 4.2 2.1 5.7 Introduction 2.2, 2.5 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 2.0, 2.1, 2.5 2.5 2.0, 2.2, 2.5 1.1, 1.2 3.1, 5.10 1.3 2.1 5.0, 5.6 1.3 4.0 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 6.6 4.3, 4.4
Synchronization Synchronous byte interleave Synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH). Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) Synchronous Payload Envelopes (SPES) Synchronous transmission and multiplexing Synthetic toxins
Tandem and digital cross-connect switching Tandem switching Target agent Target area Target-designated ground zeros Target Detection Device (TDD) Technology Working Group (TWG) Telecommunication Management Networks (TMN) Telecommunications Telecommunications networks Telecommunications System Sector (TSS) Telecommunications systems Telemetry Television (TV) Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) Terrestrial microwave Terrorism Thailand The Hague Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) Theoretical models Therapeutics
II-F-1-20
TERM Therapy Thermal diffusion Thermal dissemination Thermal effects simulators Thermal neutrons Thermal pulse Thermal radiation Thermal spray forming equipment Thermal/blast simulators Thermogram Thermomechanical Shock (TMS) Thermonuclear (TN) Thermonuclear device Thermonuclear fusion Thermonuclear weapons Thermostructural Shock (TSR) Thermostructural-shock simulator Thorium fuel Threat-level simulators Threat agents Thrust Thrust-to-weight ratio Thrust bearings Thrust chamber Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Time delay generators Titanium Total-dose Toxic agents Toxic chemical Toxic chemical precursors Toxic-free environment Toxic products
SECTION REFERENCE 3.0, 3.1, 3.3 5.2 4.0, 4.2 6.3 5.6 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6 5.0, 5.7, 6.0, 6.3 1.4 6.2 2.4 6.4, 6.8 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.13 5.5 5.5, 5.13 5.0, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 6.8 6.2 5.4 6.6 3.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1, 1.2 1.1, 1.2 5.10 5.2 6.4 4.2, 4.3 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 4.1 4.4 3.1
TERM Toxic substances Toxicity Toxin agent weaponization Toxin weapon; throw weight (TW) Toxin(s) Toxin/biological agent Trajectory Transducers Transduction Transester process Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) Transient recorders Transmission termination Transponder Transport of nuclear weapons Transport/Erector Launcher (TEL) Transverse Field Compensation (TFC) Tri-n-butyl phosphate Trinitrotoluene (TNT) Tritium Trusted system Tungsten Tunnel and Pipe Seals (TAPS) Turbofan engines Turbopumps Turkey Ukraine Ultra-broadband transmission systems Ultra freezing Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Ultrafiltration Ultraviolet (UV)
SECTION REFERENCE 4.2 4.0 3.1 3.1, 6.8 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 3.4 1.1, 1.2 3.3 3.3 4.1 6.0, 6.4, 6.8 5.10 2.1 3.3 5.11 1.1, 1.3 4.3 5.1, 5.4 5.0, 5.7, 5.10, 6.2 5.0, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 2.4 5.6, 5.7 6.1 1.3, 1.4 1.1, 1.2 1.5, 3.0 1.0, 1.5, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.0, 5.7, 5.9 2.1 3.2 6.5 3.2 3.1, 5.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.8
II-F-1-21
TERM UN Special Commission Underground Nuclear Weapons Effect Testing Underground Testing (UGT) Underground Weapons Evaluation and Testing (UGWET) Underwater Nuclear Detonation Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) United Kingdom (UK) United Nations (UN) United States (U.S.) United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) United States Munitions List (USML) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Upper atmosphere Uranium (U) Uranium dioxide Uranium enrichment Uranium gun-assembled devices Uranium gun-bomb Uranium hexafluoride Uranium hexafluoride gas Uranium isotopes Uranium metal Uranium ore Uranium ore concentrates Uranium oxidation systems Uranium oxide Uranium recovery Uranium reprocessing Uranium tetrachloride Uranium vaporization systems U.S. National Academy of Sciences
SECTION REFERENCE 4.1, 4.3 6.1 5.0, 6.0, 6.1 6.1 6.2 3.0, 3.1, 5.0, 5.10 All 1.0, 1.1, 4.1, 5.0 All 3.0 All 1.0, 1.3, 5.8 6.0, 6.5 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.13, 6.5 5.1 5.0, 5.2, 5.12 5.2, 5.6 5.2 5.1, 5.2 5.0 5.2, 5.4 5.3 5.1, 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.3, 6.5 5.2 5.4 5.1, 5.2 5.2 3.0
TERM V-blocks V-agents Vaccines Vacuum chamber Vacuum filtration Vacuum pumps Vacuum systems Van Allen belts Velocity attitude angle Venezuela Ventilation Venting systems Vernier motor control Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) Vesicant Vibration shakers Vibration test equipment Vibration thrusters Vietnam Viral replication Viral reproduction Virtual Private Networks (VPN) Virtual private telecommunications networks Virulent organisms Virus Virus software Voice Communications Network (VCN) Voice printing Vortex tube Warhead systems Warheads Warsaw Pact
SECTION REFERENCE 5.9 4.0 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 5.2 3.2 5.2 5.2 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 1.1 1.3 3.1 3.1 1.2 2.1 4.0, 4.1 1.4 1.3, 1.4 5.9 1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 4.0 3.1 3.1 2.1, 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.0, 2.3, 3.0, 3.1, 3.4 2.3 2.5 2.4 5.0, 5.2 1.4 1.0, 1.1, 1.5, 4.2 4.4, 5.9
II-F-1-22
TERM Wassenaar ArrangementDual-use List Category (WA-Cat) Wassenaar ArrangementMunitions List (WA ML) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Waste treatment/recycle Water-hydrogen sulfide Water shock Wave-length division multiplexers Weapon guidance Weaponization Weapons-grade plutonium Weapons-grade uranium Weapons Integration Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
SECTION REFERENCE All All All 5.4 5.12 6.0 2.2 2.0 3.2 5.0, 5.3, 5.4 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 Introduction, 1.0, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.0, 5.0, 5.7, 5.9, 6.0 1.3, 1.4 Introduction 4.0, 4.2 4.2 6.2 2.2
TERM Wide-area spectroscope Wide-area switched networks Wind tunnels Wire tapping WMD delivery WMD operations World-wide internet World Trade Center World War I (WWI) World War II (WWII) World-Wide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS) x-ray
SECTION REFERENCE 3.3 2.0 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 2.4 1.4, 1.5 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 2.0 5.6 3.0, 4.0, 4.2, 4.4 3.0, 4.0, 4.1, 4.4, 5.0, 5.2, 5.12 2.6 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.0, 5.5, 5.6, 5.9, 5.10, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8 5.0, 5.10 5.0 5.10 5.1, 5.3 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 4.0 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 6.8
Weapons separation design Weapons Systems Technologies (WST) Weapons testing Weather observation White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) Wide-area communications
x-ray detectors x-ray laser x-ray recording systems Yellowcake Yemen Yugoslavia Z-pinches
II-F-1-23
APPENDIX F-2 CONTROL LIST REFERENCES
APPENDIX F-2 CONTROL LIST REFERENCES

CL-ITEM AG LIST CCL Cat 0B CCL Cat 1A CCL Cat 1B DESCRIPTION Australia Group List Nuclear MaterialsTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and ToxinsSystems, Equipment, and Components Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and ToxinsTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and ToxinsMaterials Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and ToxinsTechnology Materials ProcessingSystems, Equipment, and Components Materials ProcessingTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Materials ProcessingSoftware Materials ProcessingTechnology Electronics Design, Development, and ProductionSystems, Equipment, and Production TelecommunicationsSystems, Equipment, and Components TelecommunicationsTechnology Information SecuritySystems, Equipment, and Components Sensors and SensorsSystems, Equipment, and Components Navigation and AvionicsSystems, Equipment, and Components SECTION REFERENCE 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 5.2 3.3, 3.4, 5.8, 5.12 CCL Cat 9B 1.1, 1.3, 5.9, 5.12 CCL Cat 9D 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 5.4 4.1 5.2 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 5.2, 5.4, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 1.3 1.4 1.5, 3.3, 4.3, 5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.10 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 5.7, 5.10 2.1, 2.2 1.1, 1.2, 2.4, 2.5 4.3, 5.2, 5.10 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.7 CCL Cat 9E CCL EAR 99 CL-ITEM CCL Cat 7E CCL Cat 9A DESCRIPTION SECTION REFERENCE 1.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 5.9 1.4 1.4
CCL Cat 1C CCL Cat 1E CCL Cat 2A CCL Cat 2B CCL Cat 2D CCL Cat 2E CCL Cat 3A CCL Cat 5.A-P1 CCL Cat 5.E-P1 CCL Cat 5A-P2 CCL Cat 6A CCL Cat 7A
CWC MTCR MTCR MTCR MTCR MTCR
1 2 3 4 5
MTCR 7 MTCR 8 MTCR 9 MTCR 10 MTCR 11
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.2, 5.7, 5.10, 5.11, 5.13 Chemical Weapons Convention 4.1 Complete Rocket Systems 1.1 Complete Subsystems 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 5.7 Propulsion Components 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 5.9 Propellants and Constituent Chemicals 1.1, 1.2 Production Technology, or Production 1.1, 1.2 Equipment Structural Composites Production 1.3 Equipment Structural Materials 1.1, 1.2 Instrumentation, Navigation, and 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 Direction-Finding Equipment Flight Control Systems and 1.1, 1.3 Technology Avionics Equipment 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.7
Navigation and Avionics Technologies Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles, and Related EquipmentSystems, Equipment, and Components Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles, and Related EquipmentTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles, and Related EquipmentSoftware Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles, and Related EquipmentTechnology Items subject to the EAR that are not elsewhere specified in any CCL Category are designated by EAR 99
II-F-2-1
CL-ITEM MTCR 14 MTCR 15 MTCR 16 MTCR 17 NDUL 1 NDUL 3 NDUL 4 NDUL 5 NDUL 6 NDUL 7 NDUL 8
DESCRIPTION Analogue-to-Digital Converters Test Facilities and Test Equipment Specially Designed Software Materials, Devices, and Specially Designed Software for Reduced Observables Industrial Equipment Uranium Isotope Separation Equipment and Components Heavy-Water Production Plant Related Equipment Implosion Systems Development Equipment Explosives and Related Equipment Nuclear Testing Equipment and Components Other Dual-Use Nuclear Items (Lithium) NRC Appendix AIllustrative List of Nuclear Reactor Equipment NRC Appendix BIllustrative List of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Components NRC Appendix CIllustrative List of Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components NRC Appendix DIllustrative List of Aerodynamic Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components NRC Appendix EIllustrative List of Chemical Exchange or Ion Exchange Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components NRC Appendix FIllustrative List of Laser-Based Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components
SECTION REFERENCE 5.10 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 5.9 1.4 1.3, 1.4 1.1, 5.9 5.2, 5.9 5.12
CL-ITEM NRC-G NRC-H NRC-I NRC-J NRC-K
DESCRIPTION
SECTION REFERENCE 5.2 5.1, 5.2 5.2, 5.4 5.1 5.12
5.9, 5.10 5.6, 5.7 5.10 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.13 5.3, 5.4, 5.8, 5.13 5.2 5.2 NTL-B6 5.2 NTL-B7 5.2 USML 121.10 USML 121.16 5.2 USML III NRC-L NRC 110. 8 NTL-A1 NTL-B1 NTL-B3 NTL-B5
NRC-A NRC-B NRC-C NRC-D NRC-E
NRC-F
NRC Appendix GIllustrative List of Plasma Separation Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components NRC Appendix HIllustrative List of Electromagnetic Enrichment Plant Assemblies and Components NRC Appendix IIllustrative List of Reprocessing Plant Components NRC Appendix JIllustrative List of Uranium Conversion Plant Equipment NRC Appendix KIllustrative List of Equipment and Components for Use in Production of Heavy Water, Deuterium, and Deuterium Compounds NRC Appendix LIllustrative List of Byproduct Materials List of Nuclear Facilities Under NRC Export Licensing Authority (Para. c, Lithium) Source Nuclear Material Reactors and Equipment therefor Plants for the Reprocessing of Irradiated Fuel Elements Plants for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium... Plants for the Production of Heavy Water, Deuterium, and Deuterium Compounds Plants for the Conversion of Uranium... Forgings, Castings, and Machined Bodies Missile Technology Control Regime Annex Ammunition
5.8, 5.13 5.5 5.8 5.3, 5.8, 5.13 5.2, 5.4 5.2 5.12 5.1 4.2 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.7 4.2
II-F-2-2
CL-ITEM USML IV USML V USML VII USML VIII USML X USML XI USML XII USML XIII USML XIV USML XVI USML XVIII
DESCRIPTION Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and Mines Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents, and their Constituents Tanks and Military Vehicles Aircraft and Associated Equipment Protective Personnel Equipment Military Electronics Fire Control, Range Finder, Optical, and Guidance Control Equipment Auxillary Military Equipment Toxicological Agents and Equipment and Radiological Equipment Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment Devices For Use In Protecting Rocket Systems And Unmanned Air Vehicles Against Nuclear Effects Software Advanced MaterialsSystems, Equipment, and Components Advanced MaterialsTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Advanced MaterialsMaterials Advanced MaterialsTechnology Materials ProcessingTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment Materials ProcessingSoftware Materials ProcessingTechnology ElectronicsSystems, Equipment, and Components TelecommunicationsSystems, Equipment, and Components TelecommunicationsTechnology
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.2, 5.6, 5.8 4.2
CL-ITEM WA Cat 5A-P2 WA Cat 6A WA Cat 7A
DESCRIPTION Information SecuritySystems, Equipment, and Components Sensors and LasersSystems, Equipment, and Components Navigation and AvionicsSystems, Equipment, and Components Navigation and Avionics Technologies PropulsionSystems, Equipment, and Components PropulsionTest, Inspection, and Production Equipment PropulsionSoftware PropulsionTechnology Ammunition Bombs, Torpedoes, Rockets, Missiles, etc. Fire Control Toxicological Agents
SECTION REFERENCE 1.1, 1.2, 2.4, 2.5 4.3, 5.10 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 1.4 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.9
2.6 1.2, 1.4 1.1, 1.2, 4.4 1.5, 2.4, 4.2 1.4, 4.2 1.3, 1.4 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 4.2
WA Cat 7E WA Cat 9A WA Cat 9B WA Cat 9D WA Cat 9E WA ML 3 WA ML 4 WA ML 5 WA ML 7
USML XXI WA Cat 1A WA Cat 1B WA Cat 1C WA Cat 1E WA Cat 2B WA Cat 2D WA Cat 2E WA Cat 3A WA Cat 5.A-P1 WA Cat 5.E-P1
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.6, 4.2 3.3, 4.2, 4.3 1.1, 1.3, 5.9
WA ML 8 WA ML 10 WA ML 11
1.1, 1.3, 3.3, 4.2 4.4 1.1, 5.9 1.3 1.4 1.5, 4.3, 5.7, 5.10 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 5.7, 5.10
WA ML 13 WA ML 15 WA ML 16 WA ML 17 WA ML 18 WA ML 21
1.4 1.4 4.2, 5.7 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.2, 5.6, 5.8 1.4, 4.2 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 Military Explosives and Fuels 1.1, 1.2, 4.2 Aircraft, Unmanned Airborne Vehicles, 1.1, 1.4 Aero Engines Electronic Equipment 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2.4, 4.2 Armoured or Protective Equipment 2.6 Imaging or Countermeasure 4.2 Equipment Forgings, Castings and Other 4.2 Unfinished Products Miscellaneous Equipment 1.3, 1.4 Equipment and Technology for the 1.1, 1.2, 4.2 Production of ML Products Software 1.3, 1.4, 4.2
2.1, 2.2, 5.7
II-F-2-3
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IDA Documents
Space Systems Technology Working Group (D1519) [Executive Report][Summary
only]
The object of this assessment was to identify those technologies that are space unique, militarily critical, and dual-use to provide the basis for policy and priority decisions regarding technology support, cooperative agreements, and expert controls. U.S. Government Technology Information Locator (D2154) [Executive Report][Summary only][Appendix of U.S. Government Links]
DoD & Military Services Technology Planning Sources

Defense Science & Technology planning (DSTP) (requires registration) JCS - Vision 2010 Defense Technology Area Plans (DTAP) Army Science & Technology Master Plan (ASTMP)
Navy Science & Technology Requirements Guidance (STRG) Major DoD Acquisition Policy Directives Defense Acquisition Deskbook
USG-Export Control Documents

Export Administration Regulations International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) [Parts 120-121 reformatted as of April 12, 1999] (ITAR) CFR Parts 120-130
International Export Control Regimes and Agreements

Australia Group Export Controls, Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) http://www.jya.com/mtcr-geta.htm http://www.acda.gov/treaties/mtcr.htm Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Nuclear Trigger List Wassenaar Arrangement Export Controls - Dual-use Technologies & Munitions List Foreign Comparative Testing Program
Arms Control Implementation & Compliance
Other
National Archives and Records Administration: Code of Federal Regulations OSD International Cooperation Handbook Defense Systems Management College
IDA DOCUMENT D-1519

(Revised)
EXECUTIVE REPORT SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP
TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP CO-CHAIRPERSONS Dr. Raymond V. Wick USAF, Phillips Laboratory Major General USAF (Ret.) Gerald K. Hendricks Institute for Defense Analyses TECHNICAL ADVISOR L. Kirk Lewis Institute for Defense Analyses Norman D. Jorstad Director, Technology Identification and Analyses Center Institute for Defense Analyses
September 1994
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Contract DASW01 94 C 0054 Task T-C2-1236.1
PREFACE
This publication documents work done for the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Dual-Use Technology Policy and International Programs. In addition to providing a basis for policy and priority decisions regarding technology support, cooperative agreements and export controls, the results of this analysis will be incorporated into the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and Foreign Technology Assessments (FTAs).
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FOREWORD
In October 1992, the Director of Multinational Programs, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to assess space technologies. The objective of this assessment was to identify those technologies that are space unique, militarily critical, and dual-use to provide the basis for policy and priority decisions regarding technology support, cooperative agreements, and export controls. To accomplish these tasks, IDA organized a Space Systems Technology Working Group (SSTWG) with Dr. Raymond V. Wick, Chief Scientist for the Space and Missiles Technology Directorate of the Air Force Phillips Laboratory, and Major General Gerry Hendricks (USAF, Retired) from IDA as cochairpersons. Twelve subgroups of government, industry, and academia representatives were formed to address the major space system technology areas. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Dual-Use Technology Policy and International Programs) was the DoD sponsor for this SSTWG effort. Each of the space technology subgroups was asked to identify and describe the militarily critical space technologies (using Service mission deficiencies as a major input), explain their military significance, identify the key quantitative parameters involved, estimate their dual-use potential, assess their foreign availability, and recommend appropriate actions. For critical military parameters, the objective was to define more completely the threshold specifications in order to free from control those technologies that were not militarily critical. Also, because of the importance of the economic and the military and scientific aspects of space technology, the SSTWG subgroups were asked to discuss the economic security implications of the critical military and dual-use technologies. The results of these individual subgroup efforts and the subpanel membership lists are published in the "Technical Report," IDA Document D-1521. In addition, the "Scripted Briefing," IDA Document D-1520, can be used as a supplement to this document. This Executive Report summarizes the findings and conclusions of the subgroups. It contains a Summary with conclusions and recommendations of the SSTWG, an Introduction (Section I), and a discussion of each space technology area (Section II). iii
Section III has three sets of tables. The first set (Table III-1) summarizes all identified critical and unique space technologies. The second set (Tables III-2 through III-13) lists the critical technologies and their critical parameters in each of the 12 functional areas. The third set (Tables III-14 through III-23) lists 10 of the 12 technologies and includes the values of parameters that have been achieved in laboratory and the corresponding production capabilities to date for each technology. The conclusions and recommendations of this SSTWG study verify several of the recommendations by the Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board, particularly those recommending strong support of space research and development (R&D), the improvement of the U.S. launch capability, and the removal of impediments to the economic growth of U.S. space activity. This report supports Secretary Widnall's assertion that: "Space systems signal America's stature as a world power and aerospace nation. Control of space and access to it are fundamental to economic and military security. Ask the 20 foreign countries who will have space capabilities by the year 2000: a presence in space implies influence, power and security" (Sheila E Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, September 1993).
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY ....................................................................................... S-1 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................I-1 II. CRITICAL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES...............................................II-1 A. Space Systems Integration..........................................................II-1 B. Launch Vehicles .....................................................................II-2 C. Structures ............................................................................II-3 D. Propulsion ...........................................................................II-5 E. Power and Thermal Management .................................................II-6 F. Communications ....................................................................II-8 G. Electronics and Computers ........................................................II-10 H. Astronautics (Guidance, Navigation, and Control).............................II-12 I. Sensors and Surveillance ..........................................................II-13 J. Optics ................................................................................II-15 K. Vulnerability and Survivability....................................................II-17 L. Qualification and Testing ..........................................................II-19 III. TECHNOLOGY SUMMARIES ......................................................III-1 A. Technology Matrix Summary .....................................................III-1 B. Military Critical Space Technologies .............................................III-4 C. Technology Capabilities...........................................................III-21 IV. SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP (SSTWG) .........IV-1 Glossary..........................................................................................GL-1
TABLES
III-1. III-2. III-3. III-4. III-5. III-6. III-7. III-8. III-9. III-10. III-11. III-12. III-13. III-14. III-15. III-16. III-17. III-18. III-19. III-20. III-21. III-22. III-23. SSTWG Critical Space Technology Summary .................................. III-1 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Space Systems Integration............ III-5 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Launch Vehicles ....................... III-6 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Structures............................... III-7 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Propulsion.............................. III-9 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Power and Thermal Management............................................................... III-11 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Communications...................... III-13 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Electronics and Computers ......... III-14 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Astronautics .......................... III-16 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Sensors and Surveillance ........... III-17 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Optics .................................. III-18 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Vulnerability and Survivability...... III-19 Militarily Critical Space Technologies: Qualification and Testing ............ III-20 Technology Capabilities: Launch Vehicles ..................................... III-22 Technology Capabilities: Structures.............................................. III-23 Technology Capabilities: Propulsion............................................. III-25 Technology Capabilities: Power and Thermal Management............................................................... III-27 Technology Capabilities: Communications...................................... III-29 Technology Capabilities: Electronics and Computers.......................... III-30 Technology Capabilities: Astronautics........................................... III-32 Technology Capabilities: Optics ................................................. III-33 Technology Capabilities: Vulnerability and Survivability ..................... III-34 Technology Capabilities: Qualification and Testing ........................... III-35
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SUMMARY
A . BACKGROUND The Space Systems Technology Working Group (SSTWG) study was formed as a result of two major concerns. The first was an industry concern about the export restrictions on militarily critical technologies, with the resulting negative effect on global space commercial business opportunities. The second was a recognition within the Department of Defense (DoD) and industry that the primary planning documents used to prioritize spending and to restrict foreign trade treated space technology in a cursory fashion rather than as a focused priority technology area. This study complements recent Joint Directors of Laboratory technology studies, directed towards fostering attention on critical military and military space technologies. Examples of this casual treatment of space technology include the Militarily Critical Technology List (MCTL) space technology coverage, which gives fractional and varying levels of technical detail to space technology items scattered throughout the 15 established technology sections, and the DoD Key Technology Plan, in which space-unique technologies are scattered throughout the 11 recognized categories but space technology is not recognized as a distinct entity or category. This format makes it difficult to locate specific space technology items and to identify the unique performance parameters that determine if they are truly critical space technologies that should be given priority support. As a result, numerous space-related technologies are not addressed in the key DoD plans. The United States has recognized the importance of space and space technology to its national and economic security since the beginning of the space era. Consequently, we have played a dominant world role in developing and using space technology. The importance of our military and commercial space assets and their capabilities, in peacetime and in combat, was demonstrated vividly during the buildup and conduct of the Gulf War. With the decline in available defense resources, the United States has an added impetus to identify critical military space technologies. Fully supporting all aspects of national planning for the development of these technologies will
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contribute significantly to our continued military and commercial leadership in space. U.S. space leadership in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s enhanced our economic strength and strengthened our technological and military capabilities. Recent global changes, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new economic centers and alliances, place greater pressure on U.S. space leadership. More countries are competing for space leadership, and they are acquiring the needed technologies. If the United States does not aggressively pursue the goal of remaining the dominant space power, other countries will seize the opportunity. France is becoming the leader in low-cost, highly reliable commercial launchers, and Russia and China are working diligently to establish a commercial space industry. An awareness of these challenges within the Congress and recognition by other national leaders is crucial to build the foundation for the resource support necessary for continued U.S. leadership in space. If the United States is to maintain its military space leadership role, the DoD must ensure that military space science and technology requirements are adequately identified and specifically defined and documented so that critical space development programs receive the required resource support. B . ECONOMIC IMPACT Although the military threat to national survivala characteristic of the bipolar Cold War yearsis greatly reduced, the military threat of regional conflict i s , and will remain, high. A more important and immediate menace to the United States is the economic threat posed to the present U.S. aerospace industry. The U . S . share of the global aerospace market has dwindled significantly in recent years. This market shrinkage has had a direct impact on the U.S. space industry as a whole, a fact emphasized in the recently completed Space Industry Study chaired by the Vice President of the United States. In addition, the European and Pacific Rim countries are mounting statesponsored efforts to become leaders in the global aerospace market, particularly where there appears to be a commercial payoff (i.e., space communications and launch services). Substantial investments have been made to support research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities and to educate scientists and engineers. Business leverage alliances and partnerships are growing between governments, industry, and their educational institutions. If this trend continues, the S-2
United States could be relegated to second place (or worse) in many categories of the world aerospace market early in the 21st century. The space contriCONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC bution to our national SECURITY economy is considerable. Every state in the union EVERY STATE IN THE UNION IS INVOLVED WITH SOME ASPECT OF SPACE has research, develop 2.5% OF TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ment, or manufacturing DoD INVESTMENT activities related to 20 13.0 15.7 current and projected % DoD INVESTMENT 10 5.3 space efforts. Space 6.5 % DoD TOA 0 expenditures currently S1 92 93 94 95 96 97 amount to more than 2.5 percent of the Federal Budget (about $35 billion) and represent 15 percent of the DoD investment account through 1997. The $5 billion commercial space export business in 1991 was the equivalent of exporting about 500,000 automobiles. This export business could increase significantly if the United States maintains its competitive edge in the development of new cost reducing technologies with advanced systems capabilities.
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The question is as follows: How can the United States best exploit its space technologies and maximize the contribution of these technologies to military and economic security? The United States' long-term investment in the military capability necessary to defend the itself must be protected. Pressures from U.S. industry for expansion into commercial space markets around the world will continue, and limiting the access of space technologies to these foreign markets must be weighed carefully. Today, U.S. space industry access to the global market is often being restrained through limitations on the foreign sale of dual-use technologies. For the space-critical technologies at risk, the challenge for the U.S. government is to achieve a reasonable and prudent balance between national security requirements, military interests, and economic interests. To be successful, government and industry must communicate and coordinate. One approach to managing dual-use technologies is to emphasize selling products or allowing the use of the technology products rather than selling S-3
the development and production technologies themselves. A good example of this approach is land satellite (LANDSAT) imaging. Images, not the optical systems that produce these images, are sold commercially. Another approach is to develop more cooperative research agreements between government and industry to pursue reduced-cost launcher and payload technologies and more international cooperative agreements with other friendly countries. C . DISCUSSION The ability to manage space technologies and capabilities is critical to overall U.S. space leadership, especially in the management of dual-use space technologies. Greater use, both commercially and militarily, will lower the unit cost to all users. For the militarily critical space technologies, their security value versus commercial access to them and the resultant effect on our global competitive position will require continual evaluation. A continuing dialog about U.S. long-term objectives is required to provide the basis for identifying and restricting those few militarily critical space technologies that should not be exported because of national security reasons. With the emphasis on broadening the global commercial opportunities for all technologies, including space, DoD will need sound and very specific rationales for the technologies judged to be militarily critical. As the United States transitions from policies that governed past export controls, it must recognize the need for changes and make the needed adjustments. Today, some noncritical technologies, such as all "space-qualified" cryocoolers, are controlled. Under the new export control regime, noncritical technologies must be reevaluated to determine whether controls are necessary. The past definitions were too general and covered categories of technologies rather than specific technology elements, items, or systems. However, we have identified three technologies that are not controlled but are critical and should be controlled. When such technologies are identified, the United States must effect prompt changes in export controls. In the first case, the penalty for not acting is the loss of commercial sales and their attending economic impacts. In the second case, the potential loss of a militarily critical technology that adversely affects U.S. national security is a real possibility. The ability to properly define critical technologies, to adequately assess their priority in relation to U.S. security requirements, and to effectively communicate this information to DoD and Congressional leadership provides the best assurance that funding for these critical space technologies will be forthcoming. Without adequate visibility S-4
and understanding of space technologies' military and economic contributions, the needed support to bring these technologies to full maturity will erode. D . TRENDS A relatively flat trend in U. S. defense space budgets is forecast over the next few years. In total, the U.S. commercial space market is expected to continue to grow, albeit slowly. The greatest growth areas are expected to be communications and ground surveillance systems. Forty new communication satellites are scheduled for launch in the next 5 years. These launches are projected to result in a nominal 4 percent growth per year in new space-based C/Ku-band transponders. On the negative side, U.S. commercial TRENDS -- LAUNCHES launch capability is not as cost effective as that COMMERCIAL SATELLITE LAUNCHES of our foreign competi15 tion. As a result, w e 10 FRANCE LAUNCHES are now launching 5 0 fewer commercial sat80 UNITED 82 84 ellites than the French. STATES 86 88 YEAR 90 In the 19911992 period, 92 France launched 12 satellites, and the United States launched 4 satellites. This situation, if unchanged, will have serious long-term implications for the U.S. space program.
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The public space euphoria of the early 1980s, with talk of long duration space missions and future colonization, has subsided. Recent congressional actions suggest that space, as a priority, has taken a back seat to the demands for budget balancing and increased funding for social concerns. Highlighting and emphasizing to the public and Congress the value and importance of today's space technologies should have a positive direct effect and provide the best opportunity to maintain U.S. space dominance.
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E . TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Technology investment has the potential payoff of maintaining U.S. technological performance leadership and a leveraged position in the world economic arena. Countries and companies that have large research and development (R&D) investments appear to do well. With new technologies, the challenge is obtaining the needed investment up-front to realize the desired long-term benefits. The French Ariane is an example of a technology investment strategy that has paid dividends. By investing in launch operations with modernized and automated checkout and launch, Ariane can launch a comparable Atlas Centaur or heavy-lift Titan IV with a 100-person ground crew in about 10 days. In comparison, the United States needs 300 people and 55 days to launch an Atlas Centaur and 1,000 people and 90 days to launch a heavy-lift Titan IV. Through this quick, low-cost launch service, the French are capturing most of the world's commercial satellite launch business. The United States has the enabling technologies to lead in low-cost launch systems. However, we lack national priority, investment strategy, and resource support to systematically develop these technologies for the nextgeneration propulsion systems and launch vehicles. Given this, the crucial questions are as follows: How can the United States best exploit space technologies and maximize the contributions of these technologies toward our military and economic security goals and objectives? How can the United States provide cost-effective technological advances to overcome other countries' leads in specific areas of space capabilities? During this study, the technology subgroups made judgments about the adequacy of current critical technology support. These judgments, though outside the charter and objective of the SSTWG, were included because of their potential utility for the offices and agencies responsible for developing these technologies. F . RESULTS This study identified and described the key quantitative parameters of militarily critical space technologies and categorized the dual-use potential and military significance of these technologies to provide a basis for policy and support priority decisions. Of primary concern to DoD is the overall category of technologies that are "militarily critical." These technologies are defined as those that are essential to S-6
accomplishing a military mission or objectiveespecially in overcoming a military mission area deficiencyor are new enabling technologies that have potential for significant increase in a military capability. They represent the key to maintaining military space capability leadership. "Space-unique" technologies are those that support only the space mission. This important category of military critical technologies is identified in this study but, at this time, is not specifically recognized in key DoD documents. These technologies are not automatically being nurtured by other nonspace mission thrusts. Visibility to senior DoD and Congressional officials is key to future development of these technologies. Also identified are "dual-use" militarily critical technologies that have the potential for military and commercial applications, with payoff for both. By being more precise and improving the definitization of parameters that describe these dual-use technologies, the United States can release formerly controlled technology for commercial export to strengthen its space industry and, at the same time, protect those technologies that support security requirements. Having categorized these technologies, part of the study charter was to examine the implications of export control and "dual-use." Some commercial dual-use technologies do not contribute to militarily significant technology since their operating parameters or functions are significantly different. A case in point is the electronic components of some military communication satellites that must operate in a more hazardous radiation environment than the equivalent commercial satellites. Since visibility and support are fundamental to furthering the R&D of these spaceunique militarily critical technologies, the SSTWG investigated the prospect of entering into partnerships through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRDAs) with industry and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with specific allied nations to more effectively develop the technologies. Section III lists specific recommendations for each technology.
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G . CONCLUSIONS The concluded: 1. SSTWG study
RESULTS
SPACE-UNIQUE, SPACE-UNIQUE, MILITARILY MILITARILY CRITICAL 40 ALL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES ALL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES
All Services need an integrated space mission area "road map" to provide a firm basis for space technology planning and prioritization. Space technologies are not adequately recognized as an individual category in the MCTL and in key DoD planning and funding documents.
SPACESPACEUNIQUE UNIQUE
SPACE MILITARILY CRITICAL 116 MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES TECHNOLOGIES

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RECOMMENDED EXPORT CONTROL CHANGES
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PRIOR TO STUDY RESULTS OF STUDY Modifications to the development process 3 3 techniques of systems engineering and inte31 31 gration (SE&I) as applied to space sys27 27 tems (defining, developing, manufacturing, integrating, testing, launching, and on-orbit operations) have significant potential for greater efficiencies, cost saving, assured access to space, and continued U.S. space leadership.
ADDED ADDED CONTROLLED CONTROLLED LIBERALIZED LIBERALIZED NOT CONTROLLED DECONTROLLED
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Forty technologies of the 116 militarily critical space technologies, have been identified and categorized as critical space unique and should be recognized as such in the appropriate DoD documentation. Of these, 37 are dual-use. These dual-use technologies require more precise and explicit parameters to ensure that only critical items are controlled and those outside the explicit parameters are made available to the open commercial market. Thirty-six technology areas that have high payoff potential and are candidates for additional investment have been identified. S-8
Sixty-one technologies were recommended for a change in their export control status: 27 of these were recommended for decontrol; 31 were recommended for less stringent control; and 3 not currently controlled were recommended for control. Sixty-three technologies have been identified as candidates for partnerships through CRDAs and specific international agreements (MOUs). 4. Payload modules, buses, and interfaces must be standardized to improve technology insertion and provide improved interoperability and savings within the military and commercial space community. Selling the products of space technology or on-orbit capabilities rather than selling the specific technology has the significant potential of protecting the U.S. job and production base and the associated development and production technologies. This practice has already begun with the Global Positioning System (GPS) services and high-resolution space imagery products ($400 million in 1993 and a potential $2 billion in 2000).
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These space technology areas are treated in more detail in the "Technical Report," IDA Document D-1521. Summary tables of each technology area are included in Section III of this document. H . RECOMMENDATIONS Based on these conclusions, the SSTWG makes the following mendations: 1. 2. recom-
Space systems technologies should be included as a separate, unique section in all future versions of the MCTL. Key DoD planning and resource documents (such as the Defense Science and Technology Strategy and the DoD Key Technology Plan) should treat space technology as a separate, unique area. Specifically, DoD should create an integrated space mission area road map to provide a firm basis for space technology prioritization and development.
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An existing advisory board, such as the Defense Science Board (DSB), should identify SE&I practices that have been successful in other key industries and that can be applied to space programs. The United States should include unique critical space systems technologies in the new international export control regime and incorporate recommended changes.
4.
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Where beneficial, the United States should pursue both domestic and international partnerships through CRDAs and MOUs for identified space system technologies to bring these technologies into production sooner and at lower unit cost. DoD should take the initiative for the government and industry in defining interface standards and should encourage standardization for launch vehicle payloads, payload interfaces, and modular space components. The United States should emphasize selling complete space systems or using the products of space technology rather than selling the development and production technologies themselves. This practice would improve the U.S. job outlook and protect the critical technologies involved.
6.
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Implementing these recommendations will provide impetus and rationale for ensuring that unique space-critical technologies are adequately recognized and that the necessary investment is made now to ensure that the United States continues its leadership in military space capabilities into the 21st century. I. REVIEW PANEL The following page lists the members of the SSTWG Review Panel.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Space is a unique environment that provides unparalleled military operational advantages and economic opportunities. The importance of space and space technology to provide global reach and global power is captured in the statement by Air Force Secretary Widnall: "Control o f space and access to it are fundamental to economic and military security." To the military commander, space provides the advantages of viewing areas of interest, knowing the weather, being able to navigate and accurately locate areas of concern, and the ability to execute command and control of operational forces anywhere to support national security goals and objectives. To withstand the space environment, components must operate in conditions of extreme thermal cycling and are exposed to radiation. Reliability requirements are measured not in days but in years. This environment requires unique space technology parameters. The bottom line is that the unfriendly environment of space and its impact on space systems, be it out-gassing, high-energy particle bombardment, radiation damage, atomic oxygen reactions, or the long-life requirements of space components, is a significant technological challenge. Many of the space-unique technologies have both military and commercial uses. The few that are judged militarily critical will provide the United States with the capability to maintain its military leadership role in space for years to come. These technologies should be recognized and given special attention. Section II discusses the specific technologies that are identified as "space critical." Section III gives additional information about each of these technologies.
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II. CRITICAL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES
A . SPACE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION SE&I technology involves the process of defining, developing, manufacturing, integrating, and testing a cohesive system of ground, launch, and space segments from design concept and on-orbit operation through disposal. For space systems, this process is very lengthy, costly, and, for many of the processes, inefficient. Improvement in the SE&I "process" has the potential for large payoffs in developing and using critical space technologies. Significant improvements in SE&I will play an important role in maintaining the ability of the United States to be competitive in the world market. One of the recommendations is that an existing advisory board, such as the DSB, review and study of the latest worldwide SE&I concepts and processes available, particularly in the automotive and electronics industries. The results of this review should recommend a way to develop optimum SE&I processes, techniques, tools, simulations, and models to support space technology development and production. Improvements in the efficiency o f space systems' SE&I processes are essential if the United States is to retain world space system leadership and reduce costly, extended development as, for example, has been the case in the MILSTAR program.
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In the future, it is enSPACE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION visioned that technology development and funding will follow one TECHNIQUES, PROCESSES, AND TOOLS or more of five broad concepts: THAT BREED GREATER EFFICIENCIES ON-SCHEDULE LAUNCH PROCESSING (1) cost-shared research and GREATER SIMULATION CAPABILITIES GREATER EASE OF TESTING development; (2) partnerships SYSTEMS WITH INCREASED RELIABILITY COST-EFFECTIVE AND INTEGRATED SYSTEMS between government and RECOMMENDATION industry; (3) support of REVIEW SE&I IN OTHER INDUSTRIES AND ADAPT THESE PROCESSES TO SPACE SYSTEMS commercial research and development by the DoD laboratories; (4) focus on dual-use technologies development; and (5) an expanded Science and Technology Reliance program.
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Examples of process and technology items that have dual-use application are improved radiation hardness compliance capability; fault tolerance; autonomous operations via artificial intelligence (AI); space debris identification for cataloguing; launch vehicle processing; electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and lightning protection; standardized interfaces; a system design and synthesis process integrated with a system requirements analysis process; systems engineering processes, including automated tools and metrics; and integrated weapons systems management. One of the most important emerging space technologies is self-testability, with a built-in-self-test (BIST) capability designed for all components and at system levels, including an autonomous and robotic system design, to permit easy ground operational monitoring. Advanced autonomous systems designs include BIST and self maintenance and high-reliability features. Section III of this document identifies critical processes and technologies that should be improved, those that could be used in joint program ventures, and some that should be funded by the government to improve U.S. competitiveness and market position in the international arena
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B . LAUNCH VEHICLES The Delta, Atlas, and Titan expendable boosters have LAUNCH VEHICLES been the backbone of our space OUTDATED TECHNOLOGY NOT SUITABLE CHINA 8% RUSSIA FOR CURRENT MISSIONS lift capability and will continue 8% SPACE SHUTTLE WILL NOT PROVIDE LOWFRANCE in this role into the 21st century. 50% COST SPACE TRANSPORT U.S. U.S. 33% 33% U.S. MARKET SHARE DECLINING However, these launch vehicles (U.S. WON ONLY 3 OF LAST 19 CONTRACTS) were designed more than HIGH COST -- LOWER MISSION SUCCESS COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES RUSSIAN PROTON $20 TO 50 MILLION 1991-1992 30 years ago and their techU.S. ATLAS $90 TO 100 MILLION nology is now outdated and UNITED STATES HAS THE TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN MARKET LEAD expensive to operate. Although the space shuttle was envisioned the workhorse that would provide low-cost space transportation, this goal has not been and will not be realized.
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With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has joined the competition for providing a low-cost, highly reliable launch capability along with France, Japan, China, and Brazil. Overall, the U.S. market share of space launches has decreased significantly since the 1980s. The impact of this trend is highlighted by the fact that the United States has won only 3 of the last 19 space launch contract opportunities. France provided 50 percent of all worldwide commercial launches in the 19911992 time frame. This situation has occurred because of a French investment strategy that has made their space launching more cost effective and efficient. To compare competitive costs for U.S. launch services, launching a satellite with the Atlas system costs $90 to $100 million. Launching a comparable load with an Russian Proton missile costs only $20 to $50 million. The flight reliability of these systems is difficult to verify. The United States has the intrinsic capability to advance technology and regain the world space market lead. Space-critical technologies should be nurtured, and, in some cases, protected as space-critical technology items to ensure U.S. military and economic leadership (see Section III). Continued work in critical technologies, such as fault-tolerant avionics, automated launch control systems, and electromechanical and hydraulic systems, has the potential to reduce costs and increase launch system reliability.
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To reduce the time and cost of vehicle payload integration and launch and to remain competitive in the world market, the U.S. government and industry must standardize interfaces for the launch vehicle to the payload bus and employ new advanced technology-based launch vehicles in order to reduce the infrastructure and personnel requirements which are the most significant factors. These technologies have significant payoff in modernized, near-term expendable systems and in the more challenging reusable and single-stage-to-orbit systems of the future. C . STRUCTURES The United States continues to lead the world in the development and production of aluminum-lithium (Al-Li) alloys and composite structures such as graphite-reinforced thermosets and thermoplastics and metal matrix materials. However, Europe and Asia are now challenging this U.S. lead. Applying this technology STRUCTURES to satellites and launch vehicles can provide weight savings of up CURRENT SYSTEMS to 60 percent, with significant HEAVIER, SINGLE-FUNCTION MATERIALS LOWER TEMPERATURE-CAPABLE MATERIALS (greater than a factor of two) EMPIRICAL & DETERMINISTIC METHODOLOGIES LOW REUSABILITY & DAMAGE TOLERANCE reductions in cost and fabrication time. Using lightweight, TECHNOLOGY GOALS LIGHTWEIGHT, SMART STRUCTURES high strength-to-weight ratio SUSTAINED HIGH-TEMPERATURE OPERATIONS ADAPTIVE & PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGIES materials that are dimensionally REUSABILITY & RELIABILITY FOR 100 MISSIONS stable and have minimal outgassing properties will be required to meet future space structure needs where weight reduction is a driving issue.
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Continued work in structural control and system monitoring technologies will provide critical data for new models and simulations, resulting in improvements to all launch vehicle technologies. Structural control technology is being developed to achieve higher pointing precision and finer control. This will allow the United States to more accurately track targets and provide better stable vibration-free platforms for space sensors and laser crosslink communications. II-4
Space systems health monitoring technology is being developed for use in separating space packages and for maintaining space systems once they are in orbit. This technology includes advanced methodologies for determining and sensing the actual structural parameters that define the response of the system, analytical models that accurately use the parameters to predict response, sensing systems to measure structural response, and control systems that could include neural networks to respond to system changes. Most space structures technologies are considered dual-use, for which export controls are not recommended. Instead, space structures technologies lend themselves more to cooperative programs where the costs and benefits of new developments can be shared and where both military and commercial benefits will accrue. The main area of concern for militarily critical space structures technology is the manufacturing and process techniques for advanced materials with embedded sensors that can detect and control vibration to less than 10 nanoradians angular pointing accuracy. These manufacturing and process techniques should be controlled. The critical space structures technologies requiring additional funding include smart structure controls, advanced low-weight-to-stiffness alloy and composite development, and structured system health monitoring. D . PROPULSION The space systems described in Launch Vehicles are based on old, expensive intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. These propulsion systems have moderate-to-high reliability but also have high operating costs. They are 35 to 50 percent of the total missile system costs and contribute greatly to pricing the United States out of the world launch market.
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The United States has PROPULSION the enabling technologies to lead in low-cost propul CURRENT SYSTEMS sion systems. However, we MATURE/OUTDATED TECHNOLOGY PROPULSION REPRESENTS 35 - 50% LAUNCH SYSTEM lack national priority and COST THE UNITED STATES HAS THE ENABLING resource support to deTECHNOLOGIES velop these technologies GOAL: SYSTEMS THAT ARE for the next-generation -- ROBUST -- EFFICIENT propulsion systems and -- SIMPLE -- RELIABLE launch vehicles. In addition, -- LOW-COST the availability of modified ICBM boosters and the existing infrastructure have contributed to this situation. The goal of these enabling technologies is to provide robust, efficient, simple, highly reliable, low-cost propulsion systems that meet critical military launch requirements and also allow the United States to compete in the commercial launch market.
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Emerging critical propulsion technologies are grouped in three basic categories: chemical (which includes liquid, solid and hybrid systems), low-thrust electrical, and nuclear thermal. Electric propulsion can provide efficient station-keeping and maneuvering capabilities. Each of these technologies has considerable potential, and R&D must be continued. Future rocket and missile systems will use all of these propulsion technologies in one form or another. Low-cost solids and low-pressure, high-tolerance liquid propellant systems or hybrids are the leading candidates to meet our currently projected first stage propulsion needs. Nuclear thermal propulsion appears to be very attractive for high-energy upper stage propulsion and for co-generated electrical output systems; however, it must overcome additional environmental challenges to reach its full space potential. Most propulsion technologies are dual-use and have direct commercial applications. Propulsion technologies needing export control are those that apply to ballistic missile proliferation. To offset these controls, the United States should be prepared to sell the launch or on-orbit service provided by this new technology. The sale of these services will not only improve the U.S. position in the world launch
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market but will reduce the desire of other nations to develop their own capability or seek services elsewhere. Dual-use propulsion technologies that need additional resource support to reach maturity include high-energy density propulsion materials, improved propellant bonding, and advanced cryo-cooling and storage. E . POWER AND THERMAL MANAGEMENT Power and thermal management are key technologies for effective use of the space environment. Taken together, the Environmental Protection System (EPS) constitutes 10 to 30 percent of spacecraft weight. New power and thermal management technologies must be supported if the United States is to maintain its competitive position in the world market. Future space applications, both commercial and POWER & THERMAL MANAGEMENT military, will require high power SYSTEM GOALS (greater than a kilowatt), long NOW 1997 2005 duration operation (greater than 30%* 3 years), and controlled operating 21% NiCd 18% Rigid Si NiH temperatures for spacecraft 28V PMAD Rigid GaAs SSB or NaS Flexible MBG Improved PMAD hardware. These demanding Advanced PMAD 3-5 W/kg 5-7 W/kg requirements lead to a preference 8-10 W/kg for passive systems that operate * Environmental Protection System (EPS) as a percent of spacecraft mass maintenance free, provide heat rejection by radiation, require low mass and volume, and are capable of reliable autonomous operation. Power generation, other than photovoltaic, requires thermal management at high temperatures while sensors, electronics, and crew support require thermal management at moderate-to-cryogenic temperatures.
2
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Solar cells mounted on the surface of the spacecraft or deployed on solar arrays are highly reliable and account for the majority of power generation systems flying today. Today's state-of-the-art cells include lower cost silicon (Si), which is 13 percent efficient, and more radiation-resistant gallium arsenide (GaAs) with efficiencies of up to 19 percent. Advanced cells, including thin-film, poly-crystalline (or amorphous) silicon, and multi-band-gap (MBG) cells, are being developed to lower cost, increase II-7
efficiency, and provide higher radiation resistance. The United States currently leads in most solar cell developments. Dynamic conversion of solar energy offers the potential for high efficiency and reduced drag in orbit. Solar energy, focused into a heat receiver, heats a working fluid. The working fluid drives a heat engine, using either a Brayton, Rankine, or Stirling thermodynamic cycle. This engine, in turn, drives an alternator that converts the heat into electrical energy. The system-specific power (W/kg) of solar dynamic conversion is currently not competitive with photovoltaic systems, as i s shown later in Section III. Continued work is needed in these technologies to achieve high efficiency and reduced-weight power conversion systems. Nuclear power systems have high power densities, operate independently from orbit position (eclipse, distance to the Sun), and have potentially long operating life and growth potential. Two nuclear candidates are nuclear fission reactors and radioisotope systems. Nuclear fission reactor technology has high theoretical promise for space applications but requires significant continued development. Long, unattended operations with high reliability and autonomous control are required, and operating temperatures are high. Compact designs will require effective shielding and radiation-hardened sensors. Radioisotope systems, up to a few hundred watts, have operated reliably in space for decades on a total of 23 U.S. space missions. Batteries for power storage typically comprise 10 percent of the total spacecraft dry weight. Nickel-cadmium (NiCd) and nickel-hydrogen (NiH2 or NiMH2) batteries are state of the art. New developments include sodium-sulfur (NaS) and solid-state polymer (SSP) batteries. The Japanese have taken the lead in SSP batteries because of anticipated commercial applications. The graphic on the previous page describes the future power and thermal management system technology goals. Thermal management is critical to spacecraft design and includes the development of microchannel heat exchangers, cryogenic refrigerators (cryocoolers) and heat pipes that have an effective thermal conductivity several hundred times that of the best metals and have no moving parts. In space, because of the rejection of heat only by radiation, the development of carbon-carbon (C-C) radiators and lightweight heat transfer technologies is very important and requires further R&D. II-8
Most space power and thermal management technologies are dual-use. Technologies that make the power system (and the spacecraft) more survivable against man-made hazards are likely to be unique for military systems. Some long duration commercial spacecraft may require hardening against pellets, ultraviolet (UV) radiation, and natural space radiation. Most power and thermal control system technologies are produced and marketed internationally for both commercial and military applications. To be economically viable, technologies being developed in military programs may require an unrestricted market or government-subsidized production to provide the stimulus for advanced commercial development of these new technologies. This was the case in the early development of communication satellites. Dual-use technologies that need additional support to reach maturity include high-specific-power photo-voltaic cells, high-energy density batteries (recyclable over 1000 times), and high-efficiency cryocoolers. F . COMMUNICATIONS Space communication is a powerful force multiplier and is critical to modern military operations. With the boom in telecommunication products and services, telecommunication applications continue to be on the forefront of military advances and are mandatory to maintaining a superior force. Correspondingly, the dependence on space communications has steadily increased.
COMMUNICATIONS

POWERFUL FORCE MULTIPLIER CONSIDERABLE DUAL-USE LARGE COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL

APPROXIMATELY 35 COUNTRIES COMPETING OTHER COUNTRIES AHEAD IN SOME AREAS
60 50 40 30 20 11 10 0
U.S. FRANCE
58
COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION SATELLITES TO BE LAUNCHED (1992-1997)
5
ITALY
7 3
U.K. OTHERS
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Some military needs are unique; however, most space communications technologies are dual-use. Approximately 35 countries have space programs, and the predominant emphasis is in communications. A significant number of these countries are trying to become a leading developer in the space communications industry. The United States is the dominant country in space communications although several II-9
countries and multinational alliances are competing technologically with U.S. industry in many areas of space communications. Unique space-critical technologies need additional support in the following subsystems: adaptive nulling, integrated phased array and large multibeam antenna systems, solid-state amplifiers, and gigabit (Gb) rate receivers. System flexibility and accessibility are very important. Even with the increased capacity of fiber optic communications, space communications will still be needed to fill the communication gaps of land-based systems. Satellites have this flexibility in all regions of the world. Space communications is still overwhelmingly a COMMUNICATIONS government sector activity. The vast majority of the SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY A PRIMARY REQUIREMENT world's investment in space SYMMETRY BETWEEN MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL communications (more than TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SIGNIFICANT 60 percent) comes from LEVERAGE AVAILABLE government funding. As the MILITARY LEADS FUTURE VISION FOR MILINDUSTRY ARCHITECTURE space communications industry matures, this percentage could change, but space investments currently seem to lie outside the financial planning horizons of most companies. The U.S. commercial sector has depended to a great extent on the government and military work to support their R&D. With the reduction in government support for military satellites, companies have experienced a corresponding reduction in R&D investments for potential commercial satellite technologies.
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The U.S. military will continue to be a dominant user and developer of communication satellites. In this position, the U.S. Government can use this leverage to assist the U.S. commercial sector in technology advancement and significant manufacturing improvements. For example, standardized modular designs provide flexibility while achieving considerable development improvements. If the U.S. Government took the lead in standardizing a future modular architecture for all communication satellites, this action would allow the potential for cost II-10
sharing and a U.S. competitive advantage. A modular architecture derived from the military to assist industry in technology advancement and provide commonalty could reduce engineering and development costs in many sectors of the space industry. Accomplishing this goal will require a partnership to further the capabilities of the military and industry. This partnership has the potential to provide the improvements in the civilian economic competitiveness in communications that are needed to maintain our global position in space communications developments. It also could be an important element in capturing the expanding third world market and is of great interest in Iridium-type direct satellite communications systems, where literally hundreds of satellites are involved. G . ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTERS Most space electronic and computer components perform the same function as that of their nonspace counterparts. However, space electronics and computer components must be highly reliable and radiation hardened. The graphic depicts the critical elements of space electronic and computer technologies.
ELECTRONICS & COMPUTERS
RADIATION HARDENING
TOTAL DOSE SINGLE EVENT UPSETS (SEUs)
SURVIVABILITY
NATURAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT RADIATION STRESS THERMAL STRESS ENHANCED ENVIRONMENT ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) RF LASER
RELIABILITY
ARCHITECTURE PACKAGING TESTING
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Radiation hardening of electronic components and their design for survival against electromagnetic pulse (EMP), strong radio frequency or (RF) waves, lasers, and the natural space environmentwhen combined with high reliability and low power, volume, weight, and costpresent a severe challenge for space electronics and computer technology. Reliability is a very critical requirement for space electronics and involves a number of important technologies, including the overall architecture of adaptive and redundant system design, packaging technologies, and testing technologies. Important ongoing technology developments that must be supported are hardened digital processors, packaging of monolithic wafers and hybrid wafer scale integration (multichip modules), and three-dimensional (3D) packaging. Fault-tolerant computing, optical processing, and opto-electronic integrated II-11
circuits are also important space technologies. Radiation hardened micro-electronicmechanical systems (MEMSs), which are a class of sensors that respond to physical stimulus and transmit electrical impulses for interpretation, measurement, or operation by a control system, are vital to advanced space systems. Virtually all electronics and computer technologies used in space have a groundbased or a civilian space-based counterpart and are, therefore, dual-use. However, two military areas, strategic radiation hardening (nuclear weapons environment) and extraordinary survival technologies (space weapons environment), have no ground-based or civilian space-based counterparts. These technologies should be protected from unrestricted export. Dual-use technologies that need additional support to reach maturity include improved radiation hardening; lightweight, high-efficiency electronics; (3D) packaging; fault-tolerant, high-speed computer hardware; and very high reliability electronics and computers for flights of 10 years or longer in duration. H . ASTRONAUTICS (GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL) Ballistic missile accuracy ASTRONAUTIC TECHNOLOGIES depends on inertial space platform (GUIDANCE NAVIGATION & CONTROL) (GUIDANCE NAVIGATION & CONTROL) navigation and guidance system technology. Military satellite PLATFORM POSITIONING & STABILIZATION sensors and laser communication GPS INTEGRATION ENHANCED GPS PERFORMANCE crosslinks (which must have high SOFTWARE RING LASER/FIBER OPTICS GYROS data rates with a low probability of ENHANCED GYRO PERFORMANCE SOFTWARE intercept) require precision astro ORBITAL MECHANICS LOW ATMOSPHERIC DRAG MODELING nautics. Third World countries DUAL-USE want this technology and a s CRITICAL FOR BOTH SPACE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES many as 15 countries already have operational ballistic missiles.
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Recent technology developments (GPS, fiber optic gyros, and software algorithms) make simpler, less expensive, and highly accurate guidance components available to many countries. The gyroscopes, accelerometers, and accompanying technologies required for the stabilization and navigation of the satellite while on orbit are approximately the same technologies used to launch the satellite (or a ballistic missile) into orbit. Also, II-12
this same basic astronautic technology is used for civilian applications such as commercial aircraft and ship stabilization and navigation and for peaceful space applications such as weather and communication satellites. The dual-use capability characteristic of astronautic technology elements, items, and systems presents a serious problem for participants in today's global space market. Many times, countries purchase technology for legitimate purposes, but some countries (as demonstrated by pre-Gulf War Iraq) retroengineer, copy, or directly divert technologies that are considered to be tightly controlled. A critical example of dual-use technology is the readily available GPS. The GPS was developed to provide military land, sea, and air forces with their precise location on the earth and in low aerospace. The use of GPS in civilian applications is increasing. The GPS can be used to enhance satellite guidance and attitude performance. Unfortunately, the GPS has potentially dangerous applications such as an inexpensive ballistic missile guidance system. Although DoD has incorporated a "war mode" into the GPS that decreases the accuracy of the system, several techniques (through software and hardware) allow a large portion of this inaccuracy to be removed. More than 300 versions of GPS receivers are sold throughout the world. A similar system is Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Although GPS is now fully operational, the Russians have not completed the necessary orbital portion of their system. However, receivers are being built to receive signals from both systems to resolve ambiguity and loss of signal that may occur with either system. Dual-use technologies such as advanced gyroscopes, accelerometers, and accompanying technologies need cooperative agreements with industry to achieve the required improvements. Control of the militarily critical elements of astronautic technology is difficult. The current MCTL includes but does not adequately define many of these technologies. One approach to controlling this predominately dual-use technology is to emphasize the sale or use of our technology products in complete vehicles or on-orbit capabilities where value added by the United States has been maximized and reverse engineering is difficult.
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I.
SENSORS AND SURVEILLANCE
Existing controls have SENSORS & SURVEILLANCE allowed the United States to maintain a lead in space sen CROWN JEWELS--VISIBLE AND INFRARED (IR) sors. Emerging technologies SENSORS REAL-TIME DIGITAL DATA COLLECTION provide the potential to INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE -- RAPID DATA TRANSFER maintain this lead. How MANY DUAL-USE SENSORS -- HARD TO PROTECT ever, new technologies such as VISIBLE & NEAR IR: ELECTRONIC PHOTOGRAPHY, HIGHDEFINITION TELEVISION (HDTV) optical memory devices, proIR: FIRE, RESCUE, POLICE, MANUFACTURING grammable chips, high FOREIGN COMPETITION resolution vidicon tubes (where competition is strong, particularly from the Japanese), and focal plane arrays (from Japan and France) are challenging our ability to maintain this space sensor technology lead. An expected large market exists for highresolution vidicons for high-definition television (HDTV).
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These new technology challenges, combined with reverse engineering and cannibalization of existing systems, compel the United States to support the emerging technologies and to control existing critical technologies. Long wave infrared (LWIR) sensors that provide high signal-to-noise (S/N) ratios with very low noise background at cryogenic temperatures must be developed to image cold objects against a very cold background. These LWIR sensors are required to detect and identify debris and space objects. Current electro-optic and infrared (IR) sensors allow the United States to examine activity at any point on or near the earth. The electronic readout capability of the newer sensors gives the satellite an essentially indefinite life on station as compared to earlier systems that used film and were limited by the magazine size. In cases where scattered sunlight or thermal radiation is not adequate to form images of sufficient detail and clarity, laser illumination can be used. These capabilities are central to the U.S. early warning capability for missile launches and locating nuclear detonations and are also a major component of tactical and strategic data collection. Some critical astronautic technologies are as follows: High-resolution, space-qualified charged coupled device (CCD) arrays and large (8192 element or greater) linear detector arrays that allow II-14
electronic readout of image data from the ultraviolet to near infrared (1.2 microns) spectral region. A detector with a resolution element spacing of 3 m would allow a resolution equivalent to a g o o d , fast high-resolution film such as Kodak Tri-X. This is the technology of choice for imaging space cameras in satellites and for ground- or aircraft-based devices for space object identification. Space-qualified, IR sensors, which are the key element in sensor systems, such as the Deep Space Probe (DSP), that monitor missile launches. A major concern is whether the sensing element and the cryogenics to support it will function reliably in space with unattended operation for 5 to 10 years. IR detector arrays, often called focal plane arrays (FPAs), including one dimensional (1D), two dimensional (2D), or three dimensional (3D) arrays enable imaging analogous to the vidicons in the visible spectrum. While a vidicon responds to light wavelengths generated as scattered sunlight or man-made radiation, the IR array responds to the heat radiation emitted by the sunlight or by other hot or warm objects. The reduced spatial resolution (because of the long wavelength) is offset by the improved contrast to the background for heat engines, the ability to "see" at night, and an improved ability to penetrate cloud cover. Active sensors, including radar and ladar, which provide decisive improvements in support to theater forces. Day/night adverse weather theater surveillance by radar will improve command, control, communications, and identification (C3I) on the battlefield. Ladar can improve weather information and imagery. Dual-use potentials are more limited for active sensors.
Space-qualified, high S/N arrays (greater than 50,000 elements) for long IR wavelengths may need to be controlled because of their strategic importance. However, since most military space sensor and surveillance technology is dual-use, the same IR detectors may have many terrestrial applications. Currently, both "space-" and "nonspace-qualified" IR detectors are embargoed because of Army terrestrial requirements. A dual-use example of astronautic technology is the Hubble Space Telescope, which is a reconnaissance camera looking up rather than down. Now that spherical aberration is corrected, Hubble could function as an "embargoed sensor" for some militarily critical applications and as a classic universe exploring telescope. The United States should continue the present sensor and surveillance export control limits, with constant upgrade and review, to attempt to allow the maximum latitude for II-15
the development of scientific and earth resource space-based sensors (as well as groundand space-based astronomy) consistent with protection of critical defense technologies. One approach, mentioned earlier, to controlling this predominantly dual-use technology is to emphasize selling the products of our technology in complete vehicles or on-orbit capabilities where value added by the United States has been maximized and reverse engineering is difficult. J. OPTICS
Optical components and their related technologies are very important to the U.S. military and commercial space capabilities and the space industry. Optics are critical elements of surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. They set the limits of possible target detection, identification, and resolution. Optical components are also critical elements in projected space-based High-Energy Laser (HEL) systems. If these optics do not have the proper figure (shape) and finish (polish) and cannot survive operational power levels, the laser system cannot perform as required. Low-power, relatively large optical elements are required for space power, relay, and communication systems. Another critical optics area is the projected manufacture of optical elements or materials in space. This includes manufacturing membrane or lightweight optics (that are either too large or fragile to be launched from earth) and processing optical materials in space. Four areas comprise the critical space optics technologies process: 1. 2. 3. 4. Design of the optical systems and components Production methods for highly accurate, lightweight optical components Specialized exotic materials used for the optics Precision meteorology associated with the fabricating and certifying space optics.
Space optics also can be classified as cooled or uncooled. Cooled optics are most commonly used in exclusively military HEL applications. Uncooled optics fall into two basic categories. The first category is low-absorption coatings for mirrors used for surveillance, reconnaissance, acquisition, pointing, and tracking and those II-16
used for communication applications. Most of these optics require high-reflectivity coatings or partially transmissive or selective wavelength coatings. Many of the optics in this category are dual-use. The second category is the advanced transmissive component typified by single-crystal silicon optics. The combination of a OPTICS substrate that is transmissive at the application wavelength LIGHTWEIGHT SPACE OPTICS and a very low absorption ADAPTIVE OPTICS coating allows the use of COOLED, HEL OPTICS uncooled optics for HEL UNCOOLED, HEL OPTICS LOW ABSORPTION COATINGS application. This relatively new SINGLE-CRYSTAL SILICON technology represents a breakthrough in optical component development for HEL systems (specifically, space-based HEL applications) because it substitutes very expensive, complex, heavy components with lightweight, inexpensive components.
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Optics in the second category of uncooled optics are currently used exclusively in military applications and must be protected for both space and terrestrial applications. In addition, the development and production technology for large phased array deployment and control are space unique and critical for HEL military application. Most optics have dual-use. Nearly all optical systems in space can be used for both military and commercial applications. For example, surveillance satellites are used for military observation and for mapping natural resources, evaluating environmental effects, and conducting astronomical studies. Space communications and the manufacture of optics and optical materials are also areas of potential dual-use. Reconnaissance and directed energy weapon (e.g., space-based laser) applications are uniquely military. Optical technology has seen more progress in the past 30 years than during any other comparable time period. Laser technology and modern computers have radically expanded the number of applications for optical components and have II-17
revolutionized the measurement and fabrication of optics. This revolution in optics has occurred for defense-related components and systems and for commercial products and applications. The United States, Japan, and most Western European countries have welldeveloped capabilities in optics per se but less capability in dedicated advanced space optical systems and components. The United States must balance the need for allowing industry to compete in the expanding optical components and technologies world market and for protecting military interests. The primary technology requiring additional support and development is the radiation and atomic oxygen hardening of optics and their coatings. K . VULNERABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY Survivability of space systems covers the technologies associated with protecting or hardening these systems as they perform designated missions in natural or manmade hostile environments. The vulnerability of space systems is reduced by making the systems hard to find, hard to hit, and hard to kill.
VULNERABILITY & SURVIVABILITY
REDUCE VULNERABILITY BY BEING HARD TO

FIND HIT KILL
PROTECT AGAINST MAN-MADE HAZARDS

MICROWAVE LASER NUCLEAR RADIATION ELECTROMAGNETIC (EMP & RF) DEBRIS
SUPPORTING EFFORTS
SPACE OBJECT IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL & EFFECTS SIMULATION
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Technologies that suppress and control signatures; techniques for deception, proliferation, and reconstitution; and use of off-orbit spares are important to enhanced system protection for the "hard-to-find" cases. Technologies such as autonomy, maneuverability, attack warning, and use of decoys are important for the "hard-to-hit" cases. Technologies such as hardening to nuclear, laser, R F , kinetic energy weapon, and debris environments are important for the "hard-tokill" cases. The mission-critical space system components that are important to II-18
radiation harden include sensors, processors, communications components, attitude control systems, power systems, structures, and propulsion systems. The importance of protecting space systems against natural and man-made hostile environments must not be minimized. Developing and placing a space system in orbit and repairing or maintaining this system in orbitif this is possibleare very costly. In the past, equipment designs have included protection features that resulted in a military-unique system. Dual-use technologies are being encouraged, if not demanded, because of the need for economic leverage. Consequently, the United States must evaluate the controlled technologies and processes very carefully to meet military system needs without limiting the ability to take advantage of the lower cost commercial technology being developed. Many of the military and government hardening protection technologies appropriate for the natural environments must be considered for commercial applications. Commercial and military systems must survive in many of the same natural environments, and many times the military depends on commercial systems (e.g., space communications). Therefore, these dual-use technologies should be shared, where practical, to enhance the survivability and reduce the costs of military and commercial systems. Identifying the critical vulnerability and survivability technologies is the result of an orderly process (see the "Technical Report," IDA Document D-1521) that relates specific space system characteristics, missions, and capabilities to the known threat environments, damage mechanisms, and protecting designs and technologies. Technologies that are militarily unique relate to the hostile man-made space environment, which includes nuclear radiation, electromagnetic susceptibility, EMP, high-power RF, microwave effects, laser effects, space debris, signature and signature control, and space object identification. Some of these survivability technologies are common to both military and commercial space systems. Two identified military critical technologies that must be protected are filters that limit high power RF energy while passing the wavelengths of the sensor signal and processes and algorithms that identify foreign spacecraft by using their signatures.
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L . QUALIFICATION AND TESTING Space qualification and QUALIFICATION & TESTING testing is the bridge between designing and manufacturing a system to meet a specific COMPLETE TESTING mission profile and the LOW PRODUCTION RATES INCREASED COMPLEXITY verification and assurance HIGH RELIABILITY before launch that the system ENVIRONMENTAL SIMULATION BEHAVIORAL/ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING will function properly. Qualification and testing techBRIDGE BETWEEN DESIGN & ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE nologies include advanced measurement or metrology techniques, environmental test facilities and simulation, system design response and environmental prediction models, data collection and analysis systems, and test engineering tools and practices.
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The United States leads in sophisticated space qualification and testing capabilities, but not in cost-effective, automated testing and launch processing, which the French currently are using with the Ariane V. The basis of a space system test program is the natural and induced environment to which the system will be subjected during manufacturing, assembly, shipping, pre-launch, launch, ascent, and on-orbit operation. Test levels are based on worst case predicted levels with minimum stress levels adequate to detect and screen infant mortality failures. Hardware testing is conducted throughout the entire manufacturing process starting with the raw materials and piece parts through the total system level. A typical DoD satellite system may require 1 to 2 years of system level testing. The natural space environment includes system exposure to vacuums, magnetic fields, trapped radiation, solar particles, cosmic rays, atomic oxygen, upper atmospheric drag, micrometeoroids, thermal radiation, and zero gravity. Induced space system environments include effects caused by ground processing, transportation, handling, storage, launch injection, debris, and weapons system radiation. Space system test programs, regardless of the customer (military, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), or commercial), are designed to ensure II-20
low-risk, high reliability end items. Low-quantity production rates and unique designs minimize opportunities to take advantage of volume production and test practices. Technology development that facilitates the reliable testing of systems, reduces system life cycle costs, and expedites the turn-around time and delivery schedules of space systems will provide a competitive advantage in what is clearly a growing and global market. The increasing complexity of microelectronics devices and the trend toward smaller, more complex satellites presents technology challenges in the test area related to time, cost, test capacity/capability, and metrology. Needed improvements include more effective means of measuring, controlling, and verifying manufacturing operations; improved nondestructive test methods and sensor techniques; sophisticated, high-quality software engineering tools; and the development of new or improved metrology and dosimetry capabilities. Application of photonics and fiber optics is rapidly increasing, and this raises numerous reliability and radiation hardness issues related to testing and space application. Realistically and/or cost effectively testing under on-orbit environmental conditions and system applications is difficult or impossible with large space structures. This reality is forcing increased use and reliance on dynamic modeling and prediction techniques. Finally, test engineering and application of design and test philosophies targeted at automated test and checkout, built-in test (BIT), and increased application of knowledge-based, expert systems for data acquisition and analysis will be key in achieving cost objectives while maintaining or improving reliability. Except for the military weapons threat, technologies related to space qualification and testing will have dual-use application for most space systems. As indicated earlier, the entire space community is driven by economic factors to build more reliable systems in less time and at reduced costs. Development and application of critical qualification and testing technologies will play a major role in accomplishing DoD, NASA, and commercial program cost, performance, and schedule objectives. A related problem is that methodologies must be developed to produce and identify parts and materials in large quantities, with assured high reliability. The current specification system does not allow quality criteria to be used; therefore, parts and materials II-21
that meet existing specification requirements may not have the required reliability for space missions. The current practice for space equipment is to identify and control the parts and materials at least to the manufacturing lot numbers. If assured-reliability parts and materials were developed and made available as standard items, considerable in-process space vehicle testing costs could be eliminated without reducing mission success probability.
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EXECUTIVE REPORT
III. TECHNOLOGY SUMMARIES

The following section contains graphical presentations of the space-critical technologies with detailed physical parameters, recommended changes in export controls, and potential for CRDAs and International MOUs along with a series of comparative tables. The purpose of these tables is to give the reader an appreciation of the status of the identified space-critical technologies. A . TECHNOLOGY MATRIX SUMMARY In this section, Table III-1 summarizes the number of space technologies recommended for decontrol, control, or liberalization.
Table III-1.
Subgroups Tasks Militarily --Space-Critical --Space-Critical Unique Dual-Use --Space-Critical --Space-Critical Unique Export Control --Space-Critical - Decontrolled - Liberalized - Added --Space-Critical Unique - Decontrolled - Liberalized - Added Needing Investment Proposed --CRDA --MOU Totals 116 40
SSTWG Critical Space Technology Summary

ElecPower tronics and Commu- and Propul- Thermal nicaComsion Mgt tions puters 22 6 12 7 7 0 13 9 Sensors and Astro- Surveilnautics lance 4 1 6 1 QualifiVulner. cation and and Optics Surviv. Testing 7 1 6 2 2 2
Space Systems Launch StrucInteg. Vehicles tures 9 4 3 3 25 4
111 37
9 4
3 2
25 4
22 6
12 7
7 0
12 8
4 1
4 0
5 1
6 2
2 2
27 31 3 12 10 1 36
2 0 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 13 1 0 3 0 5
7 1 0 6 0 0 6
0 2 2 0 1 1 7
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 3 0 5 3 0 9
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 1 0 1
0 6 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 2
30 33
4 3
2 1
3 2
4 6
7 6
0 7
6 5
1 1
0 1
1 1
0 0
2 0
III-1
EXECUTIVE REPORT
III-2
EXECUTIVE REPORT
III-3
EXECUTIVE REPORT
B . MILITARILY CRITICAL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES In this section, Tables III-2 through III-13 provide detailed information regarding all 116 militarily critical space technologies, including their critical physical parameters. The charts also indicate dual-use applicability and export control recommendations and suggest international partners for cooperative research.
III-4
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-2.
Militarily Critical Space Technologies:

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y DualUse (Y or N) Y
Space Systems Integration

Export Control (Y or N) N Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Russia, France, Japan, UK, China R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) ADQ
Technology Space Debris Cataloguing
Military Parameters Detect a 1-cm object at an altitude of 540 nm See Table III-3 Standard graphical user interfaces for all common operations < 1 hr retraining Unattended operations for 30 days 100:1 reduction in data stream > Class 2 anomalies
Payload Integration Mission Operations --Standardization of Ground Control --Satellite Autonomy --On-Board Data Processing --Expert Systems Standard --Interfaces and Interconnections (Mechanical and Electrical) --Buses --Interfaces for Buses High-Fidelity, Zero-Gravity Simulation --Large Chamber Size (D)
France, Russia, Japan France, Russia, Japan France, Russia, Japan France, Russia, Japan Russia, France, China Russia, France Russia, France N
Y N N
Y Y Y
N N N (D) N (D) N N N
Y Y Y
I I I
3 standards or less 3 standards or less Standard interface modular box with common connectors 6 degrees of freedom < 0.1 percent simulation error for > 30 sec > 6 m 4 m 20 m *
N N N Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
I I I I
Dropped from control
I = Inadequate Funding; W/O = Without Funding; ADQ = Adequate Funding
III-5
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-3.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y DualUse (Y or N) Y
Launch Vehicles
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Y R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I
Technology Launch Operations --Automated Launch Processing: Model-based expert system for reactive control, fault detection, and processing Aerothermodynamics --Boundary Layer Transition --Air Breathing Propulsion Design Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Software Development
Military Parameters Launch-on-need within < 30 days
Export Control (Y or N) N
Prediction model of Mach, altitude and thrust for > Mach 8 50 percent reduction software personnel 1750 MIL-STD processor compatible
Y Y
N Y
Y N
Y N
N N
I ADQ
Propulsionsee Launch section in Propulsion Table Structuressee Structures section in Structures Table (D) Dropped from control * I = Inadequate Funding; W/O = Without Funding; ADQ = Adequate Funding
III-6
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-4. Militarily Critical Space Technologies:
SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y Y DualUse (Y or N) Y Y Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) Y (+)
Structures
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Russia Russia R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I
Technology Long-term, Zero-g Cryogenic Storage and Acquisition Systems Space Environmental-Resistant Coatings
Military Parameters High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul Resistance to degradation by atomic oxygen, UV, and cosmic radiation for 30 years space station lifetime; Operate > 7 yrs (see specific data in Vulnerability table) Weight reduction of > 30 percent over equivalent metallic systems Machinability/weldability w/15 percent higher specific strength over Al 2219 Lightweight panels, smooth surfaces, and nonintrusive, reusable fasteners Retained strength at 1500 F continuous operating temperature Retained strength at 2300 F continuous operating temperature 800 F sustained operating temperature Curing at 100 F with specific strength of autoclaved Gr-Ep/Gr-Pi Ability to change shape within 10 ms Distributed control systems: fuzzy logic self-organized controllers Significant reduction in current aerospace manufacturing with up to 50 percent less scrap Noncatastrophic failure after impacts--no major delaminations
Multi-Use Panels for Satellites Al-Li Materials
Y N
Y Y
N Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) N (D) N
N N
N N
I I
Advanced C-C Composites
Titanium Matrix Composite Materials, Organic Composites Ceramic Matrix Composite Materials High-Temperature Organic Composites Room-Temperature Curing Organic Composites "Smart" Materials With Memory Adaptive Control Systems for Precision Lightweight and Flexible Structures Near Net-Shape Forming of Metallic Structures Damage-Tolerant Organic Composite Primary Structures
N N N N N N
Y Y Y Y Y Y
N N Y N N N
N N N N N Russia
I I I I I I
Y (+) Y (N)
Germany
III-7
EXECUTIVE REPORT
(D) (N) Dropped from control Needs to be added to controls * I = Inadequate Funding; W/O = Without Funding; ADQ = Adequate Funding (+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter
Table III-4.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) N DualUse (Y or N) Y
Structures (Continued)
Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Russia R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I
Technology Complex Geometry Organic Composites
Military Parameters 33 percent weight reduction over equivalent metallic structures with less complex manufacturing processes Complex vibrational models: nonlinear dynamics models Reliability prediction and control to reduce weight and cost Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1.6 lb/ft2 3000 F max. continuous operating temp. High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul Oxidation-resistant >100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, 3501000 C Oxidation-resistant >100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, < 600 C High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul 3000 F continuous operating temp. 15 percent < weight of Al 2219 with similar properties with 100 percent strength and stiffness of Al 2219 Strength and stiffness retained at 1500 F Strength and stiffness retained at 2400 F
Algorithms to Model ControlStructure Interactions for Flexible Structures Algorithms for Probabilistic Structural Analysis and Design Launch Structures --Thermal Protection System (TPS) Carbon-Carbon (C-C) --Reusable, Cryogenic Main Propellant Tank and Composite Feed Lines --TPS Radiant Shield --TPS Refractory Blanks --High-Temperature Seals
N (D) N (D) Y (+)
Russia
I I
Germany, France
Y (+) Y (+) Y Y
N N N
Y Y Y
Y Y Y
Russia Y Russia
I I I
--Lightweight Metallic Structure
Russia
--Titanium Metal Matrix Composite Structures --Ceramic Matrix Composite
N N
Y Y
N N
N N
N N
I I
III-8
EXECUTIVE REPORT
--Room-Temperature Curing Organic Composites (D) (N) Curing < 100 F with specific strength of autoclaved Gr-Ep/Gr-Pi * N Y N N N I
Dropped from control Needs to be added to controls
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter
Table III-5.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y N N N N N N N N DualUse (Y or N) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Export Control (Y or N) N (D) Y (+) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Propulsion
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N N N N N N N N N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Italy, Russia, Germany Russia N N N N France N N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I I I I I I I I
Technology Elecric Propulsion Systems Liquid Rocket Propulsion Systems Cryogenic Propellant Storage and Refrigeration High-Pressure Turbopumps High-Pressure Thrust Chambers Micro-Orifice Injectors for Small Engines One-Piece C-C Thrust Chambers Pulsed Liquid Rocket Engines Solid Rocket Propulsion Systems
Military Parameters Low power 1.5 to10 kWe High power > 10 kWe I(t) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN Loss rate < 30 percent/yr Temperature < 100 K Exit pressure > 17.5 MPa P(c) > 10.6 MPa Orifice < 0.30 mm F(vac) < 18 kN Density > 1.4 gm/cc Tensile strength > 28.4 MPa F/W > 100:1 Response Time < 0.030 sec I(t) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN I[sp (vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg Stage mass fraction > 88 percent Prop solids loading > 86 percent Bond strength > Propellant strength Diameter > 0.61 m PV/W > 2.54 E+6 cm Total angular velocity > 5 degrees Angular velocity > 20 deg/sec Angular accel. > 40 deg/sec2 Thrust > 45 kN Max. erosion rate < 0.075 km/sec
Propellant Bonding Systems Composite Motor Cases Thrust Vector Control Systems
N N N
Y Y Y
Y Y Y
N N N
Germany N N
I I I
Nozzles
France
III-9
EXECUTIVE REPORT
High-Energy Propellant Ingredients Hybrid Rocket Propulsion Systems (D) (N) I[sp(vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg I(total) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN * N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Japan I I
Dropped from control Needs to be added to controls
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter
Table III-5.

Propulsion (Continued)
Export Control (Y or N) Y Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) W/O
Technology Nuclear Propulsion Systems
Military Parameters F/W >20:1 Mean outlet temp. > 2800 K Start-up time to 1800 K < 60 sec 50 reuses without refurbishment 0.9995 reliability I(sp) > 450 250 klb thrust 50 reuses without refurbishment 0.9995 reliability I(sp) > 450 250 klb thrust < 2 times current system cost 550 klb s.I. thrust 450 sec I[sp(vac)] < 2 times current system cost 550 klb s.I. thrust 380 sec I[sp(vac)] < 2 times current system cost 300 klb s.I. thrust 275 sec I[sp(vac)] Price equal to monolithic solids > 400 klb thrust 275 sec I[sp(vac)]
Launch Vehicle Propulsion --Reusable LO2/LH2 Propulsion Y Y N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D) Y Russia I
--Tripropellants
Russia
--Expendable - LO2/LH2 Upper Stages - LO2/LH2 Booster
Russia
Russia
- LO2/RP-1 Booster
Russia, China N
- Hybrids
(D)
Dropped from control
III-10
EXECUTIVE REPORT
(N) Needs to be added to controls (+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter
III-11
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-6.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y
Power and Thermal Management

Export Control (Y or N) Y (N) Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I
Technology SolarPhotovoltaic
Military Parameters Production technology: Specific power > 300 W/m2 Beginning of life (BOL) at 28 C at cell level Production technology: System-specific power > 25 W/kg All refractory heat engine components at temperatures > 1250 K All analysis of all transient heat engine cycle performance Plutonium 238 > 1 gram Neptunium 237 > 1 gram High-purity refractory metals at > 1250 K High-temp. thermoelectric materials > 1000 K Highly enriched uranium > 20 percent U-235 Radiation-resistant electrical insulators > 1.0 E+18 nvt
DualUse (Y or N) Y**
SolarDynamic --Materials
Y Y
Y** Y**
Y Y
Y Y
Russia Russia
I I
--Software Nuclear Radioisotope --Materials Nuclear Fission --Materials
Y**
Russia
Y**
Russia
Y (+)
Russia
--Components (D) Dropped from control parameter
(N)
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this **
(N) Needs to be added to controls * I = Inadequate Funding; W/O = Without Funding; ADQ = Adequate Funding
With relaxed specifications nvt = neutron velocity time
III-12
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-6.

Power and Thermal Management (Continued)

DualUse (Y or N) Y** Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) UK R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I
Technology Long-life Cryogenic Coolers Temp:
Military Parameters Efficiency (W/W) < 10 < 75 < 200 < 750 (1) 120180 K (2) 6080 K (3) 3040 K (4) 911 K Vibration: < 0.02 N rms Unattended life: 7 years Cooling loads: (1) 120180 K (2) 6080 K (3) 3040 K (4) 911 K < 10 W <5W <1 W < 0.5 W
Spacecraft Thermal Control --Liquid Metal Heat-Pipes > 600 K N Y N Y Y** Y** Y** Y N N N N N Y Y Y Russia France N Canada I I I I --Advanced Radiators (Composite) < 30 kg/kW < 7 m2/kW --High-Power Density Electronics Cooling Energy StorageBatteries > 1000 W/cm2 Components with an energy density of: 100 W-hr/kg > 1000 cycles 75 W-hr/kg > 25,000 cycles > 250 W-hr/kg (primary battery) *
(D) (N)
Dropped from control Needs to be added to controls Watts input power per Watt of cooling
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter ** With relaxed specifications
III-13
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-7.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) N N N DualUse (Y or N) Y Y Y
Communications
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N N N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Y** Y** Y** R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) ADQ ADQ ADQ
Technology Antennas --Adaptive --Integrated Phased Array --Multi-Beam Antennas --Side Lobe Control - Reflectors - Phased Arrays Space Solid-State Amplifiers
Military Parameters Null depth > 25 db, adaptation time < 10 msec Number of radiating elements > 1000 Spatial resolution single beam < 0.5 degrees Side lobe > 35 db at aspect angles > 5 degrees Side lobe > 50 db below the mean peak 250 MHz > 25 W 8 GHz > 2 W 20 GHz > 3 W 60 GHz > 1/4 W 10 yr, 30-percent efficiency > 1 Gb per second
Export Control (Y or N) N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D) N (D)
N N N
Y Y Y
N N N
Y** Y** Y**
ADQ ADQ ADQ
Receiver --High Data Rate --Spread Spectrum (D) Dropped from export control * N Y N (D) N Y** ADQ
* * MILSATCOM program currently has international study looking at joint development of MOUs for communications satellites with Canada, UK, and France.
III-14
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-8.

Electronics and Computers

Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) N Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I
Technology Architecture --Digital Signal Processors
Military Parameters Rad hard > 1 Mrad Throughput > 1 MOPs Reprogrammable Rad hard > 1 Mrad and Throughput > 1 MOPs Rad hard > 1 Mrad Capacity > 10 GB Continuous operation > 10 years Rad hard > 1 Mrad Low-cost product line Rad hard > 500 krad Rad hard > 500 krad Density > 5 k gates Rad hard > 1 Mrad Retention > 10 years Endurance > 1.0 E+12 cycles Rad hard > 10 Mrad Hermetic seal Density Improvement > 10 X Rad hard > 1 Mrad 23000 connections Film thickness < 0.3 m Uniformity > 95 percent Cost < $20/wafer Defects < 10/cm2 *
DualUse (Y or N) Y**
--High-Speed Data Buses Rad Hard Electronics Technology --Archival Data Storage Systems
Y**
Y**
N (D) N (D) Y (+) Y (+) N (D) N (D) Y N
France, Japan France N France, Japan France
--Electronics/Computers --Cryogenic Electronics --Field Programmable Devices --Nonvolatile Memory
Y Y Y Y
Y N Y** Y
Y Y Y Y
I I W/O I
--Packaging
Y**
France, Japan, Germany, Ukraine Finland France
--Neural Networks --Dielectrically Isolated Materials (SOI)
N N
Y Y**
Y Y
I I
(D)
Dropped from export control
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter for export
III-15
EXECUTIVE REPORT
** The dual-use requirements are less than the military requirements.
III-16
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-8.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) N Y Y *
Electronics and Computers (Continued)

DualUse (Y or N) Y** Y** Y Export Control (Y or N) N N (D) N (D) Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Y N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N N France R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I I
Technology Computer Technology --Software --Optical Domain Data Processing --Opto-Electronic Integrated Circuits (D)
Military Parameters Fault-tolerant On-orbit reprogrammability Rad hard > 500 krad Rad hard > 500 krad
(+) Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter for export ** The dual-use requirements are less than the military requirements.
III-17
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-9.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) N DualUse (Y or N) Y Export Control (Y or N) N (D)
Astronautics
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) ADQ
Technology Ring Laser
Military Parameters Bias < 0.003 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.0015 degree/hr Scale factor < 5 ppm Colored noise < 0.003 degree/hr Misalignment 1.5 arc sec Bias < 0.1 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.08 degree/hr Scale factor < 100 ppm Colored noise < 0.035 degree/hr Misalignment 20 arc sec Bias < 25 g White noise < 10 g/hz Scale factor < 120 ppm Colored noise < 15 g Misalignment 0.2 arc sec Subsystem Rel > 0.9999 Vib > 50 gs SEU Resilient Latch-up free Position error: X = 0.3, Y = 0.3, Z = 0.3 m at 3 gs for 3 axis *
Fiber Optic Gyro
N (D)
ADQ
Accelerometers
N (D)
ADQ
GPS-Aided Navigation
ADQ
(D)
III-18
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-10.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y N N N N N DualUse (Y or N) N Y Y Y Y N
Sensors and Surveillance

Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y (+) Y Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N N N N N N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) France France France France Canada, France, Russia UK R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I ADQ I (for far IR) I I
Technology Diode Laser Beacons Diode Laser Optical Communications High-Resolution Charged Coupled Arrays IR Detector Array Sensor SAR Space-Based Pattern Recognition Radar Algorithms (D) (+) > 10 W
Military Parameters
Data rate > 1 Gb/sec Spatial resolution: Pitch of < 25 m, > 1.0 E+3 pixel elements 1 or more space-qualified elements < 3 m resolution at > 200 km All ultra wideband single expansion mode pulse (SEMP ) measurement algorithms *
Increased critical threshold thus freeing up technologies below this parameter for export
III-19
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-11.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) N Y DualUse (Y or N) N Y Export Control (Y or N) Y (+) Y (+)
Optics
Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) Y Y R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I
Technology Directed Energy Optics Lightweight Space Qualified Optics
Military Parameters < 1.0 E3 absorption > 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 incident radiation < 20 percent bulk weight 30 kg/m2 areal density Total weight > 10 kg > 1 m aperture > 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 Incident radiation for 30 sec > 10 cm aperture > 100 Hz bandwidth < 1/2 flatness for > 100 Hz bandwidth = 0.5 m Single crystal substrate w/optical coating < 200 ppm absorption total (substrate and coating) > 25 cm aperture < 200 ppm optical scatter Scatter < 3.0 E3 and absorption < 1.0 E3 (for surface > 30-cm diameter) > 1 m aperture equivalent
Passively and Actively Cooled Optics Adaptive Optics
N N
Y Y
Y (+) Y (+)
Y Y
Y Y
I I
Silicon Optics
Y (+)
Optical Coatings
Y (+) Y
Segmented Optics (D) (+)
N *
III-20
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-12.

Vulnerability and Survivability

Export Control (Y or N) Y Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) N Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) ADQ
Technology Nuclear/Natural Radiation Hardening
Military Parameters Total dose > 5.0 E+5 rads(Si) Dose rate > 5.0 E+8 rads(Si)/sec SEU < 1.0 E7 errors/bit/day Newton fluence > 1.0 E+10 n/cm2 Field strength > 30 kV/m > 40 db attenuation of RF energy and > 96 percent transmission of sensor frequency Codes and algorithms with range of frequency from vacuum UV (0.11 ) through LWIR (25 ) Energy density > 1.0 E3 joule/cm2 with dwell times > 1 sec
Electromagnetic Pulse High-Power RF Filters for Sensor Optics Signature Identification for Space Objects Laser Effects (D) (+)
N Y
Y Y
Y Y (+) Y
N N
N N
ADQ ADQ
ADQ
ADQ
III-21
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-13.

SpaceUnique (Y or N) Y Y DualUse (Y or N) Y Y
Qualification and Testing

Export Control (Y or N) N (D) N Proposed CRDAs (Y or N) Y Y Proposed Int'l MOUs (Y or N) N N R&D Funding (I, W/O, or ADQ*) I I
Technology Thermal Vacuum Simulation Space Environmental Simulator --Atomic Oxygen --Electrons --Protons --UV Radiation --Temperature --Hypervelocity Debris
Military Parameters 1.0 E8 Torr 320 to + 250 C 1.0 E5 Torr Energy 5 eV Flux 1.0 E+14/cm2 Energy 500 eV Flux 1.0 E+12/cm2/MeV Energy 1 MeV Flux 1.0 E+7/cm2/MeV 100 nm to 400 nm (1 sun equivalent) 130 to 100 C Size 0.1 mm1.0 mm Flux 1.0 E2 to 1.0 E+21 hits/hr/m2 Velocity ~ 10 km/sec *
(D)
III-22
EXECUTIVE REPORT
C . TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES In this section, Tables III-14 through III-23 provide a summary of the status of critical space technologies. Columns show the current capabilities of the technology when produced in the laboratory and when produced by industryboth for commercial and military applications.
III-23
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-14.
Technology Launch Operations --Automated Launch Processing: Model-based expert system for reactive control, fault detection, and processing Aerothermodynamics --Boundary Layer Transition --Air Breathing Propulsion Design Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Software Development
Technology Capabilities:
Launch Vehicles
Current Industry Production Capabilities Launch-on-need 2460 days
Military Parameters Launch-on-need within < 30 days
Current Laboratory Capabilities Launch-on-need 7 days (laboratory demo portions)
Prediction model of Mach Altitude and thrust for > Mach 8 50 percent reduction software personnel 1750 MIL-STD processor compatible
Experimental nonvalidated CFD codes NoneEmpirical data only
50 percent reduction software personnel 1750 MIL-STD processor compatible
Working toward 50 percent reduction software personnel 1750 MIL-STD processor compatible
Propulsionsee Launch section in Propulsion table Structuressee Structures section in Structures table
III-24
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-15.
Technology Long-term, Zero-g Cryogenic Storage and Acquisition Systems Space Environmental-Resistant Coatings
Structures
Current Industry Production Capabilities None Long-Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) satellite with 5-yr 9-month lifetime
Military Parameters High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul Resistance to degradation by atomic oxygen, UV and cosmic radiation for 30 years space station lifetime; Operate > 7 yrs (see specific data on Vulnerability table) Weight reduction of > 30 percent over equivalent metallic systems
Current Laboratory Capabilities Proof-of-concept test article built but never tested 30-yr accelerated exposure to singular flux with no synergistic effects
Multi-Use Panels for Satellites Al-Li Materials Advanced C-C Composites Titanium Matrix Composite Materials, Organic Composites Ceramic Matrix Composite Materials High-Temperature Organic Composites Room-Temperature Curing Organic Composites "Smart" Materials With Memory Adaptive Control Systems for Precision Lightweight and Flexible Structures Near Net-Shape Forming of Metallic Structures
Small parts built and tested
None None None None
Machinability/weldability w/15 percent 10 percent higher specific strength higher specific strength over Al 2219 over Al 2219 with fatigue problems Lightweight panels, smooth surfaces and nonintrusive, reusable fasteners Retained strength at 1500 F continuous operating temperature Retained strength at 2300 F continuous operating temperature 800 F sustained operating temperature Curing at 100 F with specific strength of autoclaved Gr-Ep/Gr-Pi Ability to change shape within 10 ms Distributed control systems: fuzzy logic self-organized controllers Significant reduction in current aerospace manufacturing with up to 50 percent less scrap Subscale panels built and tested Retained strength at 1200 F continuous operating temperature without oxidizing Retained strength at 20002300 F continuous operating temperature 700 F sustained operating temperature Curing at 100 F with 1020 percent less strength than that of autoclaved Gr-Ep/Gr-Pi Release mechanisms tested in lab Fuzzy controller on small beam
Retained strength at 2000 F continuous operating temperature 650 F sustained operating temperature None
None None
Order-of-magnitude reductions in NC-CAD/CAM part layups
Reductions in scrap of up to 50 percent demonstrated for sheet metal parts
III-25
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Damage-Tolerant Organic Composite Primary Structures Noncatastrophic failure after impacts No major delaminations Damage-tolerant woven composite under development, only small test coupons None
III-26
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-15.
Technology Complex Geometry Organic Composites
Structures (Continued)
Current Industry Production Capabilities Reduction of 15 percent weight with same complexity of manufacturing
Military Parameters 33 percent weight reduction over equivalent metallic structures with less complex manufacturing processes Complex vibrational models: nonlinear dynamics models Reliability prediction and control in order to reduce weight and cost Oxidation Resistant > 100 flights < 1.6 lb/ft2 3000 F max. continuous operating temp. High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, 3501000 C Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, < 600 C High durability to meet criteria for 100 flights before major overhaul. 3000 F continuous operating temp. 15 percent < weight of Al 2219 with similar properties with 100 percent strength and stiffness of Al 2219
Current Laboratory Capabilities Reduction of < 30 percent weight with same complexity of manufacturing
Algorithms to Model Control-Structure Interactions for Flexible Structures Algorithms for Probabilistic Structural Analysis and Design Launch Structures --Thermal Protection System (TPS) Carbon-Carbon (C-C)
Same as militarily critical Demonstrated in lab Same as militarily critical Available with some development 100-flight reuse not tested; = 2.5 lb/ft2 areal density) with coatings and fasteners; 3000 F max. temperature Subscale, nonflight weight test articles built with limited tests accomplished Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, 3501000C Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, < 600 C 100-flight reuse not tested Tested to 3000 F max. temperature 15 percent < weight of Al 2219 with 100 percent strength and stiffness of Al 2219 10 percent < weight of Al 2219 but with fatigue problems Strength and stiffness retained at 1500 F continuous operating temperature without oxidizing Strength and stiffness retained at < 2300 F, continuous operating temperature
Limited applications in industry Limited applications in industry
Limited applications in industry
--Reusable, Cryogenic Main Propellant Tank and Composite Feed Lines --TPS Radiant Shield --TPS Refractory Blanks --High-Temperature Seals
Tank not flight tested. Shuttle orbiter has reusable, noncomposite cryogenic feed lines Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, 3501000C Oxidation-resistant > 100 flights < 1 lb/ft2, < 600 C Replacement/refurbishment after each flight (Shuttle) Flown to 2300 F max. temperature None
--Lightweight Metallic Structure
--Titanium Metal Matrix Composite Structures --Ceramic Matrix Composite
Strength and stiffness retained at 1500 F Strength and stiffness retained at 2400 F
None
Strength and stiffness retained at 2000 F continuous operating temperature
III-27
EXECUTIVE REPORT
--Room-Temperature Curing Organic Composites Curing < 100 F with specific strength of autoclaved Gr-Ep/Gr-Pi Curing < 100 F with 10 to 20 percent less specific strength than autoclaved Gr-Ed/Gr-iPi None
Table III-16.
Technology Elecric Propulsion Systems Liquid Rocket Propulsion Systems Cryogenic Propellant Storage and Refrigeration High-Pressure Turbopumps High-Pressure Thrust Chambers Micro-Orifice Injectors for Small Engines One-Piece C-C Thrust Chambers Pulsed Liquid Rocket Engines Solid Rocket Propulsion Systems
Propulsion
Current Industry Production Capabilities Low power 1.5 to10 kWe High power > 10 kWe I(total) up to 3200 MN F(vac) up to 6.9 MN Loss rate = 210 percent/yr Temperature < 100 K Exit pressure up to 21.2 MPa P(c) up to 20.0 MPa Orifice sizes down to 0.15 mm F(vac) = 5 N to 18 kN Density = 1.41.9 gm/cc Tensile strength 50 MPa+ F/W = 1000:1 Response time = 0.005 sec I(total) = 2636 MN I[s(vac)] = 3.2 kN/kg F(vac) = 23 MN Mass fraction = 8893 percent Solid loading = 8692 percent Bond strength > Propellant strength Diameter < 4 m PV/W 4.0 E+6 cm Total angular velocity = 215 degrees Angular velocity < 40 deg/sec Angular accel. = 50 deg/sec2 Thrust = up to 23 E+6 N Erosion rates = 0.0 to 0.15 mm/sec I[sp(vac)] = 2.53.2 kN/kg
Military Parameters Low power 1.5 to10 kWe High power > 10 kWe I(t) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN Loss rate < 30 percent/yr Temperature < 100 K Exit pressure > 17.5 MPa P(c) > 10.6 MPa Orifice < 0.30 mm F(vac) < 18 kN Density > 1.4 gm/cc Tensile strength > 28.4 MPa F/W > 100:1 Response time < 0.030 sec I(t) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN I[sp (vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg Stage mass fraction > 88 percent Prop solids loading > 86 percent Bond strength > Propellant strength Diameter > 0.61 m PV/W > 2.54 E+6 cm Total angular velocity > 5 degrees Angular velocity > 20 deg/sec Angular accel. > 40 deg/sec2 Thrust > 45 kN Max. erosion rate < 0.075 km/sec I[sp(vac)] > 2.4 kN/kg
Current Laboratory Capabilities Low power 1.5 to10 kWe High power > 10 kWe I(t) > 3200 MN F(vac) up to 6.9 MN Loss rate = 210 percent/yr Temperature < 100 K Exit pressure up to 21.2 MPa P(c) up to 220 MPa Orifice sizes down to 0.15 mm F(vac) = 5 N to 18 kN Density = 1.41.9 gm/cc Tensile Strength 50 MPa+ F/W = 1000:1 Response time = 0.005 sec I(total) = 2636 MN I[s(vac)] = 3.2 kN/kg F(vac) = 23 MN Mass fraction = 8893 percent Solid loading = 8692 percent Bond strength > Propellant strength Diameter < 4 m PV/W 5.0 E+6 cm Total angular velocity = 215 degrees Angular velocity = < 40 deg/sec Angular accel. = < 50 deg/sec2 Thrust = up to 23 E+6 N Erosion rates = 0.0 to 0.15 mm/sec I[sp(vac)] = 2.53.2 kN/kg
Propellant Bonding Systems Composite Motor Cases Thrust Vector Control Systems
Nozzles High-Energy Propellant Ingredients
III-28
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Hybrid Rocket Propulsion Systems I(total) > 1.1 MN F(vac) > 220 kN Up to 18.4 MN Up to 1.1 MN Up to 18.4 MN Up to 1.1 MN
III-29
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-16.
Technology Nuclear Propulsion Systems
Propulsion (Continued)
Current Industry Production Capabilities F/W goal of 4.0:1* Temp goal of 2000 K* 510 minutes* I(sp) > 470 vac, 4 reuse SSME w/refurbishment 375 klb thrust (s.I.); 470 klb thrust (vac) 455 sec I[sp(vac)] RD-701 (FSU) capability 400 klb thrust (S.I.) 410 sec I(sp) (s.I.) RL-10C P&W 35 klb thrust 463 sec I[sp(vac)] D57 (Russia) 90 klb thrust 450 secI[sp(vac)] TRW Pintle Engine 733 klb thrust 393 sec I[sp(vac)]
Military Parameters F/W >20:1 Mean outlet temp. > 2800 K Start-up time to 1800 K < 60 sec 50 reuses without refurbishment 0.9995 reliability I(sp) > 450 250 klb thrust
Current Laboratory Capabilities F/W goal of 40:1 Temp goal of 3000 K Time goal of 110 sec RL10A-5, multiple restart 16.5 klb thrust 360 sec I(sp) (s.I.) 445 sec I[sp(vac)] RD-701 (Russia) Capability 400 klb thrust (s.I.) 410 sec I(sp) (s.I.) Advanced Technology Low-Cost Engine 400 klb thrust vac D57 (Russia) 90 klb thrust 450 sec I [sp(Vac)] 410 sec I[sp(vac)] 0.307 sec I(sp)(s.I.) STE(NLS) 650 klb thrust 428.5 sec I[sp(vac)] STE 130 640 klb thrust 456 sec I[sp(vac)] Approximately $60 million 350 klb s.I. thrust 450 sec I[sp(vac)] RD 170 (Russia) 1.8 Mlb thrust 337 sec I[sp(vac)] 2540 klb thrust (s.I.) < 270 sec I[sp(vac)]
Launch Vehicle Propulsion --Reusable LO2/LH2 Propulsion
--Tripropellants
50 reuses without refurbishment 0.9995 reliability I(sp) > 450 250 klb thrust < 2 times current system cost 50 klb s.I. thrust I[sp) 450 (vac)
--Expendable - LO2/LH2 Upper Stages
I(sp) 380 (vac)
- LO2/LH2 Booster
< 2 times current system cost 550 klb s.I. thrust 380 sec I[sp(vac)] < 2 times current system cost 300 klb s.I. thrust 275 sec I[sp(vac)] Price equal to monolithic solids > 400 klb thrust 275 sec I[sp(vac)]
Approximately $60 million 350 klb s.I. thrust 450 sec I[sp(vac)] MA-5B 337 klb thrust 334 sec I[sp(vac)] 2540 klb thrust (s.I.) < 270 sec I[sp(vac)]
- LO2/RP-1 Booster
- Hybrids
Typical of nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application (NERVA) Technology
III-30
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-17.
Technology SolarPhotovoltaic
Power and Thermal Management

Current Laboratory Capabilities Current Industry Production Capabilities Production technology: Specific power > 240 W/m2 BOL at 28 C at cell level Production technology: None
Military Parameters Production technology: Specific power > 300 W/m2 BOL at 28 C at cell level Production technology: System-specific power > 25 W/kg
Production technology: Specific power > 325 W/m2 BOL at 28 C at cell level Production technology: System-specific power @ 15 W/kg
SolarDynamic --Materials --Software Nuclear Radioisotope --Materials Nuclear Fission --Materials
All refractory heat engine components All refractory heat engine components All refractory heat engine components at temperatures > 1250 K at temperatures > 1250 K at temperatures > 1250 K Capable of analysis of all transient heat engine cycle performance Plutonium 238 > 1 gram Neptunium 237 > 1 gram High-purity refractory metals at > 1250 K High-temp thermoelectric materials > 1000 K Highly enriched uranium > 20 percent U-235 Radiation-resistant electrical insulators > 1.0 E+18 nvt* Capable of analysis of all transient heat engine cycle performance Plutonium 238 > 1 gram Neptunium 237 > 1 gram High-purity refractory metals at > 1250 K High-temp thermoelectric materials > 1000 K Highly enriched uranium > 20 percent U-235 Radiation-resistant electrical insulators > 1.0 E+18 nvt Capable of analysis of all transient heat engine cycle performance Plutonium 238 > 1 gram Neptunium 237 > 1 gram High-purity refractory metals at > 1250 K High-temp thermoelectric materials > 1000 K Highly enriched uranium > 20 percent U-235 Radiation-resistant electrical insulators > 1.0 E+18 nvt
--Components
nvt = neutron velocity time
III-31
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-17.
Technology Long-life Cryogenic Coolers
Military Parameters Temp: Efficiency (W/W)* < 10 < 75 < 200 < 750
Power and Thermal Management (Continued)

Current Laboratory Capabilities (1) 1W @ 150 K 12 W/W, < 1 N rms life TBD (2) 2W @ 60 K 50 W/W, < 1 N rms life TBD (3) 1 W @ 35 K 200 W/W, < 1 N rms (4) No lab results Current Industry Production Capabilities (1) None (2) 800 mW @ 80 K 75 W/W, > 1 N rms (3) None (4) None
(1) 120180 K (2) 6080 K (3) 3040 K (4) 911 K Vibration: < 0.02 N rms Unattended life: 7 years Cooling loads: (1) 120180 K (2) 6080 K (3) 3040 K (4) 911 K Spacecraft Thermal Control --Liquid Metal Heat-Pipes --Advanced Radiators (Composite) --High-Power Density Electronics Cooling Energy StorageBatteries > 600 K < 30 kg/kW < 7 m2/kW > 1000 W/cm2
< 10 W <5W <1 W < 0.5 W > 600 K < 30 kg/kW < 7 m2/kW < 500 W/cm2 Components with an energy density of: 60 W-hr/kg > 1000 cycles 40 W-hr/kg > 25,000 cycles > 200 W-hr/kg (primary battery) > 600 K < 30 kg/kW < 7 m2/kW < 100 W/cm2 Components with an energy density of: 60 W-hr/kg > 1000 cycles 40 W-hr/kg > 25,000 cycles > 150 W-hr/kg (primary battery)
Components with an energy density of: 100 W-hr/kg > 1000 cycles 75 W-hr/kg > 25,000 cycles > 250 W-hr/kg (primary battery)
Watts input power per watt of cooling
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EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-18.
Technology Antennas --Adaptive --Integrated Phased Array --Multi-Beam Antennas --Side Lobe Control - Reflectors - Phased Arrays Space Solid-State Amplifiers
Communications
Current Industry Production Capabilities Same as militarily critical
Military Parameters Null depth > 25 db, adaptation time < 10 msec Number of radiating elements > 1000 Spatial resolution single beam < 0.5 degrees Side lobe > 35 db at aspect angles > 5 degrees Side lobe > 50 db below the mean peak 250 MHz > 25 W 8 GHz > 2 W 20 GHz > 3 W 60 GHz > 1/4 W 10 yr, 30 percent efficiency > 1 Gb per second
Current Laboratory Capabilities Same as militarily critical
Same as militarily critical
Receiver --High Data Rate --Spread Spectrum Same as militarily critical Same as militarily critical
III-33
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-19.
Technology Architecture --Digital Signal Processors
Electronics and Computers

Current Industry Production Capabilities Rad hard > 1 Mrad Not programmable Hard-wired Rad hard > 1 Mrad Not programmable Tape drives (not random access) > 1 Mrad Rad hard > 1 Mrad No rad hard capability No rad hard capability Rad hard > 1 Mrad Retention > 5 years Endurance > 1.0 E+5 cycles Rad hard > 10 Mrad Hermetic seal Density improvement > 3 X None Film thickness < 0.3 m Uniformity > 96 percent Defects < 1.0 E+5/cm2
Military Parameters Rad hard > 1 Mrad Throughput > 1 MOPs Reprogrammable Rad hard > 1 Mrad Throughput > 1 MOPs Rad hard > 1 Mrad Capacity > 10 GB Continuous operation > 10 years Rad hard > 1 Mrad Low-cost product line Rad hard > 500 krad Rad hard > 500 krad Density > 5 k gates Rad hard > 1 Mrad Retention > 10 years Endurance > 1.0 E+12 cycles Rad hard > 10 Mrad Hermetic seal Density improvement > 10 X Rad hard > 1 Mrad 23000 connections Film thickness < 0.3 m Uniformity > 95 percent Defects < 10/cm2
Current Laboratory Capabilities Rad hard < 1 krad Throughput > 1 GFLOPs Hard-wired Rad hard < 1 krad Throughput > 1 GFLOPs Rad hard > 250 krad Capacity = 1 GB Continuous operation > 5 years Rad hard > 1 Mrad Rad hard > 100 krad No rad hard capability Rad hard > 1 Mrad Retention > 5 years Endurance > 1.0 E+10 cycles Rad hard > 10 Mrad Hermetic seal Density improvement > 10 X None Film thickness < 0.3 m Uniformity > 99 percent Defects < 1.0 E+3/cm2
--High Speed Data Buses Rad Hard Electronics Technology --Archival Data Storage Systems
--Electronics/Computers --Cryogenic Electronics --Field Programmable Devices --Nonvolatile Memory
--Packaging
--Neural Networks --Dielectrically Isolated Materials (SOI)
III-34
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-19.
Technology Computer Technology --Software --Optical Domain Data Processing --Opto-Electronic Integrated Circuits
Military Parameters
Electronics and Computers (Continued)

Current Laboratory Capabilities Fault-tolerant Ground reprogrammability Rad hard > 100 krad Rad hard > 100 krad Current Industry Production Capabilities Fault-tolerant Ground reprogrammability None produced None produced
Fault-tolerant On-orbit reprogrammability Rad hard > 500 krad Rad hard > 500 krad
III-35
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-20.
Technology Ring Laser
Astronautics
Current Industry Production Capabilities Bias < 0.003 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.0015 degree/hr Scale factor < 5 ppm Colored noise < 0.003 degree/hr Misalignment 1.5 arc sec Bias < 0.1 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.08 degree/hr Scale factor < 100 ppm Colored noise < 0.035 degree/hr Misalignment 20 arc sec Bias < 25 g White noise < 10 g/hz Scale factor < 120 ppm Colored noise < 15 g Misalignment 0.2 arc sec Position error better than X = 0.3, Y = 0.3, Z = 0.3 m at 3 gs for 3 axis
Military Parameters Bias < 0.003 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.0015 degree/hr Scale factor < 5 ppm Colored noise < 0.003 degree/hr Misalignment 1.5 arc sec Bias < 0.1 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.08 degree/hr Scale factor < 100 ppm Colored noise < 0.035 degree/hr Misalignment 20 arc sec Bias < 25 g White noise < 10 g/hz Scale factor < 120 ppm Colored noise < 15 g Misalignment 0.2 arc sec Subsystem rel > 0.9999 Vib > 50 gs SEU resilient Latch-up free Position error: X = 0.3, Y = 0.3, Z = 0.3 m at 3 gs for 3 axis
Current Laboratory Capabilities Bias < 0.01 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.08 degree/hr Scale factor < 100 ppm Colored noise < 0.035 degree/hr Misalignment 20arc sec Bias < 0.1 degree drift rate/hr Random walk 0.08 degree/hr Scale factor < 100 ppm Colored noise < 0.035 degree/hr Misalignment 20 arc sec Bias < 5 g White noise < 2 g/hz Scale factor < 25 ppm Colored noise < 3 g Misalignment 0.5 arc sec Demonstrated to position error of X = 0.3, Y = 0.3, Z = 0.3 m at 3 gs for 3 axis
Fiber Optic Gyro
Accelerometers
GPS-Aided Navigation
III-36
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-21.
Technology Directed Energy Optics Military Parameters < 1.0 E-3 absorption
Optics
Current Industry Production Capabilities < 200 ppm (2.0 E-4) absorptance Alpha Laser /Large Aperture Mirror Program (ALI/LAMP) at 2.7 m
Current Laboratory Capabilities < 200 ppm (2.0 E-4) absorptance at 2.7 m Incident radiation power density achievable is beyond that of military parameters and is classified < 20 percent bulk weight
> 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 incident radiation
Lightweight Space Qualified Optics
< 20 percent bulk weight 30 kg/m2 areal density Total weight > 10 kg > 1 m aperture > 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 Incident radiation for 30 sec > 10 cm aperture > 100 Hz bandwidth < 1/2 flatness for > 100 Hz bandwidth = 0.5 m Single crystal substrate w/optical coating < 200 ppm absorption total (substrate and coating) > 25 cm aperture < 200 ppm optical scatter Scatter < 3.0 E3 and absorption < 1.0 E3 (for surface > 30-cm diameter) > 1 m aperture equivalent
Hubble 2.3 m aperture Approx. 30 percent bulk weight
Passively and Actively Cooled Optics Adaptive Optics
> 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 Incident radiation for 30 sec > 20 cm aperture achievable > 500 Hz bandwidth achievable < 1/2 flatness for > 100 Hz band width = 0.5 m
> 1.0 E+4 W/cm2 Incident radiation for 30 sec > 20 cm aperture achievable > 500 Hz bandwidth achievable < 1/2 flatness for > 100 Hz band width = 0.5 m
Silicon Optics
(Absorption measurement not complete but typically > 200 ppm) > 45 cm aperture Si optics < 100 ppm scatter and < 100 ppm absorptance at 2.7 m (dependent upon wavelength, substrate, and size of optic)
Absorption not measured (only on witness samples) > 45 cm aperture Si optics < 100 ppm scatter and < 100 ppm absorptance at 2.7 m (dependent upon wavelength, substrate, and size of optic)
Optical Coatings
Segmented Optics
Large Aperture Mirror Program (LAMP) Large Aperture Mirror Program (LAMP) 4 m aperture 4 m aperture
III-37
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-22.
Technology Nuclear/Natural Radiation Hardening
Vulnerability and Survivability

Current Laboratory Capabilities Current Industry Production Capabilities Total dose > 1.0 E+6 rads(Si) Dose rate > 1.0 E+9 rads(Si)/sec SEU < 1.0 E8 errors/bit/day Newton fluence > 1.0 E+12 n/cm2 Field strength > 50 kV/m > 40 db attenuation of RF energy and > 96 percent transmission of sensor frequency None
Military Parameters Total dose > 5.0 E+5 rads(Si) Dose rate > 5.0 E+8 rads(Si)/sec SEU < 1.0 E7 errors/bit/day Newton fluence > 1.0 E+10 n/cm2 Field strength > 30 kV/m > 40 db attenuation of RF energy and > 96 percent transmission of sensor frequency Codes and algorithms with range of frequency from vacuum UV (0.11 ) through LWIR (25 ) Energy density > 1.0 E3 joule/cm2 with dwell times > 1 sec
Total dose > 1.0 E+8 rads(Si) Dose rate > 1.0 E+10 rads(Si)/sec SEU < 1.0 E9 errors/bit/day Newton fluence > 1.0 E+13 n/cm2 Field strength > 60 kV/m > 40 db attenuation of RF energy and > 96 percent transmission of sensor frequency Codes and algorithms with range of frequency from vacuum UV (0.11 ) through LWIR (25 ) Energy density > 1.0 E3 joule/cm2 with dwell times > 1 sec
Electromagnetic Pulse High-Power RF Filters for Sensor Optics Signature Identification for Space Objects Laser Effects
Energy density > 1.0 E3 joule/cm2 with dwell times > 1 sec
III-38
EXECUTIVE REPORT
Table III-23.
Technology Thermal Vacuum Simulation
Qualification and Testing

Current Industry Production Capabilities
Military Parameters 1.0 E8 Torr 320 to + 250 C 1.0 E-5 Torr Energy 5 eV Flux 1.0 E+14/cm2 Energy 500 eV Flux 1.0 E+12/cm2/MeV Energy 1 MeV Flux 1.0 E+7/cm2/MeV 100 nm to 400 nm (1 sun equivalent) 130 to 100 C Size 0.1 mm1.0 mm Flux 1.0 E2 to 1.0 E+21 hits/hr/m2 Velocity ~ 10 km/sec
Current Laboratory Capabilities
Parameters are achievable in volumes Parameters are achievable in volumes up to 250 ft3 (down to 150 C) up to 1000 ft3 (down to 150 C and 1.0 E7 Torr) Parameters currently achievable one to four at a time only (not all six parameters simultaneously) Parameters currently achievable one to four at a time only (not all six parameters simultaneously)
Space Environmental Simulation --Atomic Oxygen --Electrons --Protons --UV Radiation --Temperature --Hypervelocity Debris
III-39
IV. SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP (SSTWG)

This section lists the people involved with the SSTWG.
IV-1
SSTWG
Dr. Raymond Wick (Co-Chairperson) Chief Scientist for Space and Missile Technology Phillips Laboratory Dr. Archibald MacMillan Aerospace Technical Advisor The Aerospace Corporation Gerald K. Hendricks (Co-Chairperson) (MajGen, USAF Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses L Kirk Lewis - Technical Advisor (COL, USA, Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Norman Jorstad Director, Technology Identification and Analysis Center (TIAC) Institute for Defense Analyses SSTWG SUBGROUP CHAIRPERSONS Space Systems Engineering and Integration Col. Warren Riles Director of Systems Integration HQ, SMC/SDE Space Structures Technologies Dr. Rodney Galloway Group Chief for Structural Research Phillips Laboratory Mark G. Benton (Co-Chairperson) Project Manager Rockwell International Space Systems Division Space Power and Thermal Management W. Ralph James Acting Dept. Division Chief Space Power and Thermal Mgmt. Phillips Laboratory Robert Vacek (Co-Chairperson) Chief, Space Thermal Mgmt. Branch Phillips Laboratory Launch Vehicle Technologies Kenneth Hampsten Director, Vehicle Launch Technology Office Phillips Laboratory
IV-2
Space Propulsion Technologies Wilbur (Buss) Wells Manager, Ballistic Missiles and Space Systems Support OLAC PL/KSS (AF Rocket Lab.) Space Communications Technologies Gregory Edlund Director, Communications Systems The Aerospace Corporation Space Electronics and Computer Technologies Jerry Heffner Proliferation Staff Officer National Aerospace Intelligence Center Capt. Robert D. Pugh (Co-Chairperson) Chief, Microelectronics and Photonics Research Branch Space Sensors and Surveillance Technologies John McMahon Chief Scientist, Optical Sciences Division Naval Research Laboratory
Space Vulnerability and Survivability Technologies Alfred Sharp Division Chief for Advanced Weapons Survivability Phillips Laboratory Astronautic (Guidance, Navigation, and Control) Technologies Christopher Simi Electro-Optics Engineering Army Night Vision Laboratory CECOM Space Optics Technologies Theresa McCarth-Brow Group Chief for Large Optics Research Phillips Laboratory Space Qualification and Testing Technologies David Davis Chief, Component Engineering Division USAF/SMC/SDFP
IV-3
GLOSSARY
1D 2D 3D AI Al-Li BIST BIT BOL C-C CAD CAM cc CCD CRDA CFD db DoD DSB DSP EMC EMP EPS FPA GaAS Gb GB GHz GLONASS gm GPS one dimensional two dimensional three dimensional artificial intelligence aluminum-lithium built-in self test built-in test beginning of life carbon-carbon computer-aided design computer-aided manufacturing cubic centimeter charged coupled device Cooperative Research and Development Agreement Computational Fluid Dynamics decibel Department of Defense Defense Science Board Deep Space Probe electromagnetic capability electromagnetic pulse Environmental Protection System focal plane array gallium arsenide gigabit gigabyte gigahertz Global Navigation Satellite System gram Global Positioning System GL-1
HDTV HEL Hz ICBM IR kg kN kW ladar LAMP LANDSAT LDEF LWIR MCTL MEMS MGB MHz MILSATCOM mm MN MOU MPa N NaS NASA NERVA NiCd NiH2 or NiMH2 nvt ppm PV/W R&D radar RDT&E
high-definition television high-energy laser hertz intercontinental ballistic missile infrared kilogram kilo-newton kilowatt laser detecting and ranging Large Aperture Mirror Program land satellite Long-Duration Exposure Facility long wave infrared Militarily Critical Technologies List Micro-Electronic-Mechanical System multi-band gap megahertz military satellite communications millimeter mega-newton Memorandum of Understanding megapascals newton sodium-sulfur National Aeronautics and Space Administration nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application nickel-cadium nickel-hydrogen neutron velocity time parts per million pressure-volume/weight research and development radio detecting and ranging research, development, test, and evaluation
GL-2
RF rms S/N SE&I sec SEMP Si SSP SSTWG TBD TIAC UV W W/W
radio frequency root mean square signal-to-noise Systems Engineering and Integration second single expansion mode pulse silicon solid-state polymer Space Systems Technology Working Group to be determined Technology and Identification Analyses Center ultraviolet watt watts input power per watt of cooling
GL-3
SUMMARY
A . BACKGROUND The Space Systems Technology Working Group (SSTWG) study was formed as a result of two major concerns. The first was an industry concern about the export restrictions on militarily critical technologies, with the resulting negative effect on global space commercial business opportunities. The second was a recognition within the Department of Defense (DoD) and industry that the primary planning documents used to prioritize spending and to restrict foreign trade treated space technology in a cursory fashion rather than as a focused priority technology area. This study complements recent Joint Directors of Laboratory technology studies, directed towards fostering attention on critical military and military space technologies. Examples of this casual treatment of space technology include the Militarily Critical Technology List (MCTL) space technology coverage, which gives fractional and varying levels of technical detail to space technology items scattered throughout the 15 established technology sections, and the DoD Key Technology Plan, in which space-unique technologies are scattered throughout the 11 recognized categories but space technology is not recognized as a distinct entity or category. This format makes it difficult to locate specific space technology items and to identify the unique performance parameters that determine if they are truly critical space technologies that should be given priority support. As a result, numerous space-related technologies are not addressed in the key DoD plans. The United States has recognized the importance of space and space technology to its national and economic security since the beginning of the space era. Consequently, we have played a dominant world role in developing and using space technology. The importance of our military and commercial space assets and their capabilities, in peacetime and in combat, was demonstrated vividly during the buildup and conduct of the Gulf War. With the decline in available defense resources, the United States has an added impetus to identify critical military space technologies. Fully supporting all aspects of national planning for the development of these technologies will
S-1
contribute significantly to our continued military and commercial leadership in space. U.S. space leadership in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s enhanced our economic strength and strengthened our technological and military capabilities. Recent global changes, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new economic centers and alliances, place greater pressure on U.S. space leadership. More countries are competing for space leadership, and they are acquiring the needed technologies. If the United States does not aggressively pursue the goal of remaining the dominant space power, other countries will seize the opportunity. France is becoming the leader in low-cost, highly reliable commercial launchers, and Russia and China are working diligently to establish a commercial space industry. An awareness of these challenges within the Congress and recognition by other national leaders is crucial to build the foundation for the resource support necessary for continued U.S. leadership in space. If the United States is to maintain its military space leadership role, the DoD must ensure that military space science and technology requirements are adequately identified and specifically defined and documented so that critical space development programs receive the required resource support. B . ECONOMIC IMPACT Although the military threat to national survivala characteristic of the bipolar Cold War yearsis greatly reduced, the military threat of regional conflict i s , and will remain, high. A more important and immediate menace to the United States is the economic threat posed to the present U.S. aerospace industry. The U . S . share of the global aerospace market has dwindled significantly in recent years. This market shrinkage has had a direct impact on the U.S. space industry as a whole, a fact emphasized in the recently completed Space Industry Study chaired by the Vice President of the United States. In addition, the European and Pacific Rim countries are mounting statesponsored efforts to become leaders in the global aerospace market, particularly where there appears to be a commercial payoff (i.e., space communications and launch services). Substantial investments have been made to support research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities and to educate scientists and engineers. Business leverage alliances and partnerships are growing between governments, industry, and their educational institutions. If this trend continues, the S-2
United States could be relegated to second place (or worse) in many categories of the world aerospace market early in the 21st century. The space contriCONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC bution to our national SECURITY economy is considerable. Every state in the union EVERY STATE IN THE UNION IS INVOLVED WITH SOME ASPECT OF SPACE has research, develop 2.5% OF TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ment, or manufacturing DoD INVESTMENT activities related to 20 13.0 15.7 current and projected % DoD INVESTMENT 10 5.3 space efforts. Space 6.5 % DoD TOA 0 expenditures currently S1 92 93 94 95 96 97 amount to more than 2.5 percent of the Federal Budget (about $35 billion) and represent 15 percent of the DoD investment account through 1997. The $5 billion commercial space export business in 1991 was the equivalent of exporting about 500,000 automobiles. This export business could increase significantly if the United States maintains its competitive edge in the development of new cost reducing technologies with advanced systems capabilities.
LKL 5/2394 lkl6spc
The question is as follows: How can the United States best exploit its space technologies and maximize the contribution of these technologies to military and economic security? The United States' long-term investment in the military capability necessary to defend the itself must be protected. Pressures from U.S. industry for expansion into commercial space markets around the world will continue, and limiting the access of space technologies to these foreign markets must be weighed carefully. Today, U.S. space industry access to the global market is often being restrained through limitations on the foreign sale of dual-use technologies. For the space-critical technologies at risk, the challenge for the U.S. government is to achieve a reasonable and prudent balance between national security requirements, military interests, and economic interests. To be successful, government and industry must communicate and coordinate. One approach to managing dual-use technologies is to emphasize selling products or allowing the use of the technology products rather than selling S-3
the development and production technologies themselves. A good example of this approach is land satellite (LANDSAT) imaging. Images, not the optical systems that produce these images, are sold commercially. Another approach is to develop more cooperative research agreements between government and industry to pursue reduced-cost launcher and payload technologies and more international cooperative agreements with other friendly countries. C . DISCUSSION The ability to manage space technologies and capabilities is critical to overall U.S. space leadership, especially in the management of dual-use space technologies. Greater use, both commercially and militarily, will lower the unit cost to all users. For the militarily critical space technologies, their security value versus commercial access to them and the resultant effect on our global competitive position will require continual evaluation. A continuing dialog about U.S. long-term objectives is required to provide the basis for identifying and restricting those few militarily critical space technologies that should not be exported because of national security reasons. With the emphasis on broadening the global commercial opportunities for all technologies, including space, DoD will need sound and very specific rationales for the technologies judged to be militarily critical. As the United States transitions from policies that governed past export controls, it must recognize the need for changes and make the needed adjustments. Today, some noncritical technologies, such as all "space-qualified" cryocoolers, are controlled. Under the new export control regime, noncritical technologies must be reevaluated to determine whether controls are necessary. The past definitions were too general and covered categories of technologies rather than specific technology elements, items, or systems. However, we have identified three technologies that are not controlled but are critical and should be controlled. When such technologies are identified, the United States must effect prompt changes in export controls. In the first case, the penalty for not acting is the loss of commercial sales and their attending economic impacts. In the second case, the potential loss of a militarily critical technology that adversely affects U.S. national security is a real possibility. The ability to properly define critical technologies, to adequately assess their priority in relation to U.S. security requirements, and to effectively communicate this information to DoD and Congressional leadership provides the best assurance that funding for these critical space technologies will be forthcoming. Without adequate visibility S-4
and understanding of space technologies' military and economic contributions, the needed support to bring these technologies to full maturity will erode. D . TRENDS A relatively flat trend in U. S. defense space budgets is forecast over the next few years. In total, the U.S. commercial space market is expected to continue to grow, albeit slowly. The greatest growth areas are expected to be communications and ground surveillance systems. Forty new communication satellites are scheduled for launch in the next 5 years. These launches are projected to result in a nominal 4 percent growth per year in new space-based C/Ku-band transponders. On the negative side, U.S. commercial TRENDS -- LAUNCHES launch capability is not as cost effective as that COMMERCIAL SATELLITE LAUNCHES of our foreign competi15 tion. As a result, w e 10 FRANCE LAUNCHES are now launching 5 0 fewer commercial sat80 UNITED 82 84 ellites than the French. STATES 86 88 YEAR 90 In the 19911992 period, 92 France launched 12 satellites, and the United States launched 4 satellites. This situation, if unchanged, will have serious long-term implications for the U.S. space program.
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The public space euphoria of the early 1980s, with talk of long duration space missions and future colonization, has subsided. Recent congressional actions suggest that space, as a priority, has taken a back seat to the demands for budget balancing and increased funding for social concerns. Highlighting and emphasizing to the public and Congress the value and importance of today's space technologies should have a positive direct effect and provide the best opportunity to maintain U.S. space dominance.
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E . TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Technology investment has the potential payoff of maintaining U.S. technological performance leadership and a leveraged position in the world economic arena. Countries and companies that have large research and development (R&D) investments appear to do well. With new technologies, the challenge is obtaining the needed investment up-front to realize the desired long-term benefits. The French Ariane is an example of a technology investment strategy that has paid dividends. By investing in launch operations with modernized and automated checkout and launch, Ariane can launch a comparable Atlas Centaur or heavy-lift Titan IV with a 100-person ground crew in about 10 days. In comparison, the United States needs 300 people and 55 days to launch an Atlas Centaur and 1,000 people and 90 days to launch a heavy-lift Titan IV. Through this quick, low-cost launch service, the French are capturing most of the world's commercial satellite launch business. The United States has the enabling technologies to lead in low-cost launch systems. However, we lack national priority, investment strategy, and resource support to systematically develop these technologies for the nextgeneration propulsion systems and launch vehicles. Given this, the crucial questions are as follows: How can the United States best exploit space technologies and maximize the contributions of these technologies toward our military and economic security goals and objectives? How can the United States provide cost-effective technological advances to overcome other countries' leads in specific areas of space capabilities? During this study, the technology subgroups made judgments about the adequacy of current critical technology support. These judgments, though outside the charter and objective of the SSTWG, were included because of their potential utility for the offices and agencies responsible for developing these technologies. F . RESULTS This study identified and described the key quantitative parameters of militarily critical space technologies and categorized the dual-use potential and military significance of these technologies to provide a basis for policy and support priority decisions. Of primary concern to DoD is the overall category of technologies that are "militarily critical." These technologies are defined as those that are essential to S-6
accomplishing a military mission or objectiveespecially in overcoming a military mission area deficiencyor are new enabling technologies that have potential for significant increase in a military capability. They represent the key to maintaining military space capability leadership. "Space-unique" technologies are those that support only the space mission. This important category of military critical technologies is identified in this study but, at this time, is not specifically recognized in key DoD documents. These technologies are not automatically being nurtured by other nonspace mission thrusts. Visibility to senior DoD and Congressional officials is key to future development of these technologies. Also identified are "dual-use" militarily critical technologies that have the potential for military and commercial applications, with payoff for both. By being more precise and improving the definitization of parameters that describe these dual-use technologies, the United States can release formerly controlled technology for commercial export to strengthen its space industry and, at the same time, protect those technologies that support security requirements. Having categorized these technologies, part of the study charter was to examine the implications of export control and "dual-use." Some commercial dual-use technologies do not contribute to militarily significant technology since their operating parameters or functions are significantly different. A case in point is the electronic components of some military communication satellites that must operate in a more hazardous radiation environment than the equivalent commercial satellites. Since visibility and support are fundamental to furthering the R&D of these spaceunique militarily critical technologies, the SSTWG investigated the prospect of entering into partnerships through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRDAs) with industry and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with specific allied nations to more effectively develop the technologies. Section III lists specific recommendations for each technology.
S-7
G . CONCLUSIONS The concluded: 1. SSTWG study
RESULTS
SPACE-UNIQUE, SPACE-UNIQUE, MILITARILY MILITARILY CRITICAL 40 ALL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES ALL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES
All Services need an integrated space mission area "road map" to provide a firm basis for space technology planning and prioritization. Space technologies are not adequately recognized as an individual category in the MCTL and in key DoD planning and funding documents.
SPACESPACEUNIQUE UNIQUE
SPACE MILITARILY CRITICAL 116 MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES TECHNOLOGIES

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RECOMMENDED EXPORT CONTROL CHANGES
2.
PRIOR TO STUDY RESULTS OF STUDY Modifications to the development process 3 3 techniques of systems engineering and inte31 31 gration (SE&I) as applied to space sys27 27 tems (defining, developing, manufacturing, integrating, testing, launching, and on-orbit operations) have significant potential for greater efficiencies, cost saving, assured access to space, and continued U.S. space leadership.
ADDED ADDED CONTROLLED CONTROLLED LIBERALIZED LIBERALIZED NOT CONTROLLED DECONTROLLED
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3.
Forty technologies of the 116 militarily critical space technologies, have been identified and categorized as critical space unique and should be recognized as such in the appropriate DoD documentation. Of these, 37 are dual-use. These dual-use technologies require more precise and explicit parameters to ensure that only critical items are controlled and those outside the explicit parameters are made available to the open commercial market. Thirty-six technology areas that have high payoff potential and are candidates for additional investment have been identified. S-8
Sixty-one technologies were recommended for a change in their export control status: 27 of these were recommended for decontrol; 31 were recommended for less stringent control; and 3 not currently controlled were recommended for control. Sixty-three technologies have been identified as candidates for partnerships through CRDAs and specific international agreements (MOUs). 4. Payload modules, buses, and interfaces must be standardized to improve technology insertion and provide improved interoperability and savings within the military and commercial space community. Selling the products of space technology or on-orbit capabilities rather than selling the specific technology has the significant potential of protecting the U.S. job and production base and the associated development and production technologies. This practice has already begun with the Global Positioning System (GPS) services and high-resolution space imagery products ($400 million in 1993 and a potential $2 billion in 2000).
5.
These space technology areas are treated in more detail in the "Technical Report," IDA Document D-1521. Summary tables of each technology area are included in Section III of this document. H . RECOMMENDATIONS Based on these conclusions, the SSTWG makes the following mendations: 1. 2. recom-
Space systems technologies should be included as a separate, unique section in all future versions of the MCTL. Key DoD planning and resource documents (such as the Defense Science and Technology Strategy and the DoD Key Technology Plan) should treat space technology as a separate, unique area. Specifically, DoD should create an integrated space mission area road map to provide a firm basis for space technology prioritization and development.
3.
An existing advisory board, such as the Defense Science Board (DSB), should identify SE&I practices that have been successful in other key industries and that can be applied to space programs. The United States should include unique critical space systems technologies in the new international export control regime and incorporate recommended changes.
4.
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5.
Where beneficial, the United States should pursue both domestic and international partnerships through CRDAs and MOUs for identified space system technologies to bring these technologies into production sooner and at lower unit cost. DoD should take the initiative for the government and industry in defining interface standards and should encourage standardization for launch vehicle payloads, payload interfaces, and modular space components. The United States should emphasize selling complete space systems or using the products of space technology rather than selling the development and production technologies themselves. This practice would improve the U.S. job outlook and protect the critical technologies involved.
6.
7.
Implementing these recommendations will provide impetus and rationale for ensuring that unique space-critical technologies are adequately recognized and that the necessary investment is made now to ensure that the United States continues its leadership in military space capabilities into the 21st century. I. REVIEW PANEL The following page lists the members of the SSTWG Review Panel.
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PREFACE
This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) under the task order entitled Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and International Technology Assessments. The work was supported by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International and Commercial programs (DUSD(I&CP)).
FOREWORD
This document is a starter set to help users locate U.S. government technology information. For convenience, it uses Internet addresses, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers.1 It is not exhaustive, definitive, or a certified complete reference. Other federal data resources do exist or are being created. The purpose of this document is to save readers time and to introduce them to a variety of existing federal data sources that they may find helpful. We invite readers to browse through it and then use it when need arises. One caution: Expect changes in these federal listings and their content. Readers should not let the rate of change disturb them or lead them to conclude that this document is dead on arrival for lack of currency. We have all become somewhat accommodating to institutional change over the years. Departments merge, disappear, are invisibly absorbed, or have their names and office symbols changed for reasons that are not apparent. We just learn those new names and abbreviations and move forward. When compared with the rate at which governmental institutions change their symbols and identities, similar changes in Internet identities tend toward the fickle and unstable end of the spectrum. Some webmasters change their Uniform Resource Locator (URL)the resource locator address string that begins with http://a couple times per week. Sometimes they leave digital tracks that users can follow to the new location; sometimes they do not. Your comments on the utility of this document are invited. Come by, call, or send them to: Gordon Boezer The Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311-1772 703-578-2776 gboezer@ida.org
The Internet addressesfor example, [http://www.doc.gov]and the e-mail addressesfor example, [radius@rand.org]have been enclosed in brackets to avoid confusion with sentence marks of punctuation. The appendix (see page A-1) contains a list of Internet addresses for departments/ agencies/programs called out in this document.
Contents
Summary ...............................................................................................................S-1 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. Department of Commerce (DOC)............................................................................ 1 Department of Defense (DoD) ................................................................................ 5 Department of Energy (DOE) ............................................................................... 17 Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) .................................................... 25 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) .............................................. 39 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ................................... 47 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ....................................... 55
VIII. National Science Board (NSB) ............................................................................. 61 IX. X. XI. XII. National Science Foundation (NSF) ..................................................................... 63 National Science Foundation (NSF): Science Indicators Report.......................... 73 National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) ............................................. 75 National Technical Information Service (NTIS) .................................................. 77
XIII. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) ............................................... 83 XIV. Presidents Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) ......... 87 XV. Research and Development in the United States .................................................. 89 XVI. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) ............................................... 93 Glossary ....................................................................................................................... GL-1 AppendixList of Internet Addresses .......................................................................... A-1 3
TABLE
1. DTIC Database Accessibility and Availability ......................................................... 36
I. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)

The DOC is the smallest cabinet agency; however, it is the seventh largest in terms of federal spending for research and development (R&D). It accounts for approximately $1.021 billion or 1.4 percent of the federal total spending for FY 1998. The DOCs mission is to promote job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards for all Americans by working in partnership with business, universities, and communities. The DOC works toward that mission by: Building for the future and promoting U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace Strengthening and safeguarding Americas economic infrastructure Keeping America competitive with cutting-edge science and technology (S&T) and an unrivaled information base Providing effective management and stewardship of Americas resources and assets to ensure sustainable economic opportunities.
The DOC was established in 1903 to promote American business and trade, and today the DOC has a broad range of responsibilities. These include: Expanding U.S. exports Developing innovative technologies Gathering and disseminating statistical data and research reports for the federal government Measuring economic growth Granting patents 4
Predicting the weather and managing the nations coastal and marine resources Advancing the nations telecommunications and information infrastructure.
The DOC is comprised of a diverse group of organizations (14 separate bureaus). The key functional organizations that would be useful for S&T researchers can be divided into three major focus areas: 1. 2. 3. Business and trade Economy and statistics Science and technology (S&T).
All DOC organizations are accessible through the DOC Internet Homepage at [http://www.doc.gov]. BUSINESS AND TRADE Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) The BXA administers the Export Administration Act by developing export control policies, issuing export licenses, and prosecuting violators. It also controls exports for national security, foreign policy, and short-supply reasons and administers the Defense Production Act for industry-related issues. BXAs Internet address is [http://www.bxa. doc.gov]. Economic Development Administration (EDA) The EDA was established under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to generate new jobs, help retrain workers, and stimulate industrial and commercial growth in economically distressed areas. EDAs Internet address is [http://www.doc. gov/eda]. International Trade Administration (ITA) The ITAs mission is to encourage, assist, and advocate U.S. exports. It maintains 134 overseas offices and commercial centers in 69 countries and ensures that U.S. business has equal access to overseas markets. ITAs Internet address is [http://www.ita. doc.gov]. 5
ECONOMY AND STATISTICS Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) The BEA is the nations accountant for economic growth. It integrates and interprets raw economic data to draw a complete and consistent picture of the U.S. economy at the regional level and to compare our economy to the world economy. The BEA provides a quantitative view of production, distribution, and use of the nations output. BEA data are on-line. BEAs Internet address is [http://www.bea.doc.gov]. U.S. Census Bureau The Census Bureau is responsible for collecting data on population and demographics, on federal expenditures (i.e., R&D spending and industry census), and on production and capacity. The Census Bureaus Internet address is [http://www.census.gov]. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) NOAAs mission is to describe and predict changes in the Earths environment and to conserve and manage the nations coastal and marine resources. NOAAs Internet address is [http://www.noaa.gov]. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) The PTO is responsible for administering patent and trademark laws. The PTO maintains a U.S. patent database, which is accessible on the Internet. PTOs Internet address is [http://www.uspto.gov]. Technology Administration (TA) All the key TA organizations listed below are accessible from the TA Internet Homepage at [http://www.ta.doc.gov]. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST promotes economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and standards. NISTs Internet address is [http://www.nist.gov]. 6
National Technical Information Service (NTIS). NTIS collects and disseminates scientific, technical, engineering, and related business information produced by the U.S. government and foreign sources. NTIS Internet address is [http://www.ntia.doc.gov]. The Office of Technology Policy (OTP). Within the federal government, this office has the mission of developing and advocating national policies that use technology to build Americas economic strength. OPTs Internet address is [http://www.ta.doc.gov/OTPolicy/default.htm].
Although some of these organizations are not directly related to S&T, they provide information on economic and industry statistics, export policies, and industry demographics. The DOC maintains an on-line database called STAT-USA, which provides useful information on trade, the economy, and economic/production statistics. It also provides access to a global procurement market place.
II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)

DoDs research and development (R&D) budget authority for FY 1998 is $36,659.2 million. This total accounts for half of the total federal R&D budget authority. However, DoDs total S&T budget authority of $4.01 billion accounts for only 13 percent of the total FY 1998 federal budget for basic and applied research. The development portion of the DoD R&D accounts for 89 percent of the total DoD R&D budget and over 78 percent of all federal R&D funding for development R&D activities. Most of the funds are directed toward industry. This funding profile makes DoD unique to the other federal agencies R&D programs. For FY 1998, DoD ranks fifth behind DOE, HHS, NASA and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in total basic research, with $1.042 billion authorized, and second in applied research funding behind HHS, with $2.996 billion authorized. DoDs R&D activities fall into two broad areas: 1. 2. The DoD Science and Technology (S&T) program. This program includes basic research, applied research, and advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs). The DoD Development programs. These programs include the application of research for the production of defense materiel: weapons systems and other support items to be fielded by the Services and Defense agencies.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) is responsible for managing DoDs Science and Technology (S&T) and Development programs. USD (A&T)s Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil].
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) PROGRAM Overview The DoD Science and Technology (S&T) program is the cornerstone of national military strategy. A fundamental assumption of the U.S. national military strategy is that the armed forces should be technologically superior to any potential opponent. In peace, technological superiority is a key element in deterrence. In crisis, it provides a wide spectrum of options to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and Commanders in Chief (CINCs). In war, it enhances combat effectiveness, reduces casualties, and minimizes losses of critical defense materiel. Maintaining a technological edge has become even more important as the size of U.S. force structure decreases and high-technology weapons become available on the world market. The objective of DoDs S&T strategy is to develop options for future decisive military capabilities based on superior technology. A critical goal of DoDs S&T program is ensuring affordability through the use of commercial technologywhere appropriateand developing technologies that reduce the acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs of a weapons system. The Joint Vision 2010 report has developed a conceptual template to guide DoDs S&T programs and the development of critical military capabilities through new operational concepts: Dominant maneuver. Dominant maneuver is the multidimensional application of information and maneuver capabilities to provide coherent operations of air, land, sea, and space forces. Precision engagement. Precision engagement is the capability to locate the enemy accurately, to command and control (C2) friendly forces, to attack key enemy forces or capabilities precisely, and to assess the level of success accurately. Full dimensional protection. Full dimensional protection is the ability to protect our forces at all levels and obtain freedom of action while they deploy, maneuver, and engage an adversary. Focused logistics. Focused logistics is the capability to respond rapidly to crisis, shift warfighting assets between geographic regions, monitor critical resources en route, and deliver tailored logistics at the required level of operations.
Funding Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for defense S&T in three categories:
1.
Basic research (6.1 account). Basic research produces knowledge and a better understanding in a science or engineering area. It is a long-term investment. Universities perform over half of DoDs basic research. Scientists and engineers at DoD laboratories also perform basic research. DoD has also placed a portion of the program in industry, non-profit research institutes, and other federal laboratories. Basic research does not guarantee that a particular scientific result will lead to any military application. Applied research (6.2 account). Applied research is aimed at gaining the knowledge and understanding needed to determine how new technology can meet a specific, recognized need. The applied research program matures technologies for military use. Applied research provides proof of concept and evaluations built around models and laboratory experiments. Advanced technology development (6.3 account). Advanced technology development also matures technologies through demonstrations of fielded prototypes, including evaluations by operational units in a field environment.
2.
3.
Structure and Management The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is responsiblewith the exception of advanced technology developmentfor the development, direction, priorities, quality, and content of the S&T program. DDR&E ensures that the program responds to the needs of the warfighters and to the national military goals embraced by the departments S&T strategy. DDR&Es Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/ddre]. The Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology (under USD (A&T)) is responsible for advanced technology development programs, which includes creating and overseeing advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs). USD (A&T)s Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil]. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Science and Technology (S&T) Program The DDR&E organizations that play key roles in DoDs S&T program include the: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA is DoDs central R&D organization. It manages and directs selected basic and applied R&D projects and pursues research and technology (R&T) where risks and payoff are high. DARPAs Internet site provides a description of each of DARPAs technical and support offices and contains links to their individual web sites. Each technical office site provides specific information about its mission, personnel, programs and solicitations. DARPAs Internet address is [http://www.darpa.mil]. 10
Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO). DMSO was established to provide a full-time focal point for information concerning DoD modeling and simulation (M&S) activities. DMSO provides M&S services include a Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository (MSRR), a Defense Modeling, Simulation, and Tactical Technology Information Analysis Center (DMSTTIAC), and a Modeling and Simulation Operational Support Activity (MSOSA). The DMSO Internet site provides information about and links to DMSO projects, the DMSO library, and other M&S organizations and groups. DMSOs Internet address is [http://www.dmso.mil]. High-Performance Computing and Modernization Office. The High-Performance Computing and Modernization Office manages DoDs High-Performance Computing Modernization Program (HPCMP). HPCMPs mission is to modernize the total high-performance computational capability of the DoD S&T program, the Development, Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to a level comparable to that available in the foremost civilian and other government R&D organizations. The High-Performance Computing and Modernization Office operates major shared resource centers and manages the development of common high-performance computing (HPC) software available to support the entire DoD HPC user community. Distributed centers also provide HPC support to specific local and remote sites. The High-Performance Computing and Modernization Office also operates the Defense Research and Engineering Network (DREN), a robust high-speed network geared to support the Departments computational communications needs. The High-Performance Computing and Modernization Offices Internet address is [http://www. hpcmo.hpc.mil]. Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP). SERDP is DoDs corporate environmental R&D program. SERDP works in partnership with DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and focuses on cleanup, compliance, conservation, and pollution-prevention technologies. SERDPs Internet site provides information on organizational structure, personnel, and program thrust areas. SERDPs Internet address is [http://www.hgl.com/SERDP]. Laboratory Management and Technology Transition (LM&TT) Office. The Director for LM&TT is responsible for the stewardship and oversight of DoD and component laboratories, the DoD Manufacturing Technology Program (ManTech), Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), the Independent Research and Development (IR&D) program, and the Defense Information program. In addition, LM&TT cooperates within DoD to promote technology transfer (TechTRANSIT). The LM&TT Internet site offers links to each of its program offices, LABLINK, DoD laboratories, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), Service S&T organizations and laboratories, federal government R&D organizations, and international government and commercial S&T-related web sites. LM&TTs Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/labman].
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The Dual-Use Applications Program (DUAP). DUAP is a joint program of the Services, DARPA, DDR&E, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International and Commercial programs (DUSD (I&CP)) to prototype and leverage commercial research, technology, products and processes into military systems. DUAP will enable the Services to leverage commercial R&D for more effective, affordable, and sustainable military systems. DUAPs Internet address is [http://www.darpa.mil/jdupo/ duap.html]. DUAP consists of two programs/initiatives to encourage the dual-use technologies: The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiatives (COSSI) will prototype methods for reducing DoD operations and support (O&S) costs by inserting commercial products into fielded military systems. COSSIs Internet address is [http://www.darpa.mil/jdupo/cossi.html]. The Congressionally mandated DUAP Science and Technology (S&T) Initiative funds the development (6.2 account: Applied Research) of militarily useful, commercially viable technologies to reduce costs and increase performance and sustainment of defense systems. Congress will require each Service to fundat a minimum5 percent of their authorized applied research funding to the DUAP S&T initiative. Information about this initiative can be found at [http://www.darpa. mil/jdupo/st.html].
All these organizations and other useful information regarding the conduct of DDR&Es S&T programs are accessible through the DDR&E Internet Homepage (http://www.dtic.mil/ddre]. Other useful information that can be accessed from the DDR&E web site is: DDR&E offices, mission statements, program information, and directories S&T budget and program information Briefings, speeches, articles, and papers relevant DoDs S&T program All DoD/Service activities and laboratories involved in S&T R&D descriptive summaries from the Services and defense agencies Key DoD S&T planning and strategy documents, including: S&T strategy FY Joint Warfighter S&T Plan (JWSTP) FY Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) 12
FY Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) FY Basic Research Plan (BRP) Advanced Battlespace Information System (ABIS) Task Force Report Joint Vision 2010 Air Force Technology Area Plans Army Science and Technology Master Plan Navy Science and Technology Requirements Guide.
The military departments and the defense agencies are responsible for planning, programming, and conducting the S&T programs within their purview. The Services use their S&T programs to provide warfighting and system options for their components. The Defense agencies are responsible for certain multi-Service aspects of S&T and for designated programs that support national security objectives. The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), which is under DDR&E, is responsible for acquiring, archiving, and disseminating DoD science and engineering information. This document presents DTIC information in a separate section. The Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology and the Department of Defense (DoD) Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program The ACTD S&T program is managed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology, whose Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/at]. Each ACTD is managed by a lead Service or Defense Agency developer and is driven by the principal user-sponsor, typically a unified commander. ACTDs exploit mature advanced technologies to solve important military problems and incorporate new technologies into prototypes that can be fielded and placed into the hands of warfighters for evaluation. The objectives of the ACTDs are to conduct meaningful demonstrations, develop and test concepts of operations to optimize military effectiveness, and prepare to transition the capability into acquisition without a loss of momentum. ACTDs are structured to address the needs of the warfighter, provide needed capabilities, address deficiencies, and reduce costs and/or manpower requirements. Each ACTD is aimed at one or
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more warfighting objectives and is reviewed by the Services, defense agencies, and the Joint Staff. Several key criteria against which ACTDs are evaluated include response to user needs, maturity of the technologies, and potential effectiveness. Information about the ACTD program can be found at the Internet Homepage for the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology [http://www.acq. osd.mil/at]. Information that can be accessed from this web site includes: ACTD program introduction, milestones, history, and focus ACTD guidance, management, responsibilities, and description of the ACTD classes Guidelines for ACTD management plans and transition considerations ACTD program initiation, including a programmatic and organizational approach ACTD descriptions for the current fiscal year and last two fiscal years, including a point of contact (POC), program description, milestones, concept of operations (CONOPS), and technical approach.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-11 defines development R&D as the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from research directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including the design and development of prototypes and processes. The DoD Development program is directed primarily at weapons systems acquisition and supporting defense materiel. No single source for information on DoD-wide development programs exists, other than DTIC (see Section IV). DTICs mission is to provide a source of Scientific and Technical Information Program (STIP) services to assist in carrying out the departments STIP policy and management responsibilities, to operate DoD-wide scientific and technical information (STI) systems, and to act as a central coordinating point for DoD STI databases and systems. DTICs governing regulation is DoD Directive 3200.12, DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program. DTIC maintains a bibliographic database of technical reports and the Work Unit Information Summaries covering ongoing DoD R&D activities. The completeness of the files and the ability to update information once the project information is submitted to DTIC have raised concerns. Although R&D programs have a regulatory requirement to submit information to DTIC and DTIC has the mission to act as a central coordinating point for DoD databases, this is not always the case. Another concern of program personnel is timeliness 14
and currency of the data in DTIC files. For example, once information is submitted on a specific project, no requirement exists to update this information even though it may be active for several years. If these are valid concerns, they would present significant problems in trying to develop a coherent picture of DoD S&T efforts. A specific challenge would be how to maintain a current picture of critical ongoing programs, S&T applications and needs, and collaborative efforts underway within the DoD and federal R&D activities to support current R&D programs. Each Service and Defense Agency manages individual development programs without much current awareness of what the other Services/agencies are doing. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) [http://www.defenselink.mil/osd] sponsors many programs. Some organizations that may help direct the researcher toward specific Service and agency programs include: USD (A&T). USD (A&T) is responsible for all matters concerning DoDs S&T programs and acquisition management of weapons systems and other defense materiel throughout the acquisition cycle, including development programs. In addition to DDR&E and the Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology, USD (A&T) has several other offices responsible for the DoDs R&D programs. Although personnel in these offices may not have knowledge of specific S&T activities in each of the program offices and laboratories, they can provide important information on the acquisition program, activities involved, and key personnel to be contacted for more detailed information. USD (A&T)s Internet address is [http://www.acq. osd.mil]. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (PUSD (A&T)) Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Systems. The Strategic and Tactical Systems Directorate is responsible for the oversight, technical review, and evaluation of DoD development and acquisition programs in assigned mission areas. It is composed of seven offices with specific responsibilities for the following programs: Strategic and Tactical Systems; Theater Ballistic Defense Missile (TBMD) systems; National Missile Defense (NMD); Cruise Missiles; Tactical and Strategic Airlift; Tactical Land Systems; Tactical Naval Systems; Munitions; Electronic Warfare Programs; and Deep Strike Systems. The Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Systems Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts]. AcquisitionProgram Integration. For the Secretary of Defense and USD (A&T), Acquisition Program Integration develops, evaluates, and recommends policies and procedures governing the operations of the entire DoD acquisition system. It identifies major weapons system programs for the USD (A&T) and recommends these programs to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The Acquisition Program Integrations Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/api]. 15
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The BMDO Director is responsible for managing, directing, and executing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programs including Theater Missile Defense (TMD), NMD, and advanced BMD programs. BMDOs web site provides information on the BMDO organization, personnel, budget, document and report libraries, and fact sheets on specific ballistic missile programs. The web site also offers the BMDOLINK to related organizations and a search database for BMDO news. BMDOs Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo]. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD (NCB)). The ATSD (NCB) is responsible for managing, directing, developing, and acquiring Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NCB) defense programs. The Office of Counterproliferation and Chemical and Biological Defense (CP/CBD) within ATSD (NCB) is responsible for the advocating and accelerating the defense against chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) within CP/CBD is chartered to initiate and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of NCB WMD and their delivery. The office also publishes the Congressionally mandated CPRC report to Congress. This report provides detailed information about ongoing and needed R&D efforts by the DoD and other related federal agencies. The report also includes R&D efforts for the consequence management solutions to the use of NCB WMD. Several other reports involving S&T and related research efforts are also available on this web site. Information about CP/CBD can be found at the CP/CBD web site [http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/main.htm]. The CP/CBD Web is the Internet point-of-contact for United States Department of Defense Counterproliferation and Chemical Biological Defense Information.
The ASTD (NCB) Internet site (accesed from the OSD Homepage: [http://www.defenselink.mil/osd]) provides links to information on counterproliferation. These links provide access to the White House, Congress, and U.S. government agencies, including DOE laboratories and DoD component laboratories involved in related S&T and development efforts. This site also provides information from the news media, with search capability. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space (DUSD (Space)). DUSD (Space) is the principal OSD staff assistant advisor to the USD (A&T) on space matters. DUSD (Space) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of space policy. It also has oversight responsibility for space architectures and for space R&D and acquisition programs, including the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM), and the Global Positioning System (GPS). Specific information on the DUSD Space website includes information on mission, personnel, documents, reports, and space programs. The site also links into other DoD spacerelated organizations. DUSD (Space)s Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/space].
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Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) (DUSD (I&CP)). DUSD (I&CP) serves as DoDs focal point for defense-related international R&D, production, and acquisition involving cooperation between the United States and governments or industries of allied and friendly nations. DUSD (I&CP) coordinates DoD bilateral armaments cooperation relationships with these nations. DUSD (I&CP)s Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/icp].
The Directorate of Armaments Cooperation is a DUSD (I&CP) office that manages the International Cooperative Research and Development Program that incorporates defense cooperation across a full spectrum of acquisition activities, including requirements definition, concept development, R&D, production, procurement and follow-on support. The Directorate of Armaments Cooperation website provides information on cooperative R&D projects as defined in Section 2350 of Title 10 Chapter 138, a handbook for international armaments cooperation and the Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL). The Directorate of Armaments Cooperations Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/icp/armscoop.html]. DUSD (I&CP) also supports DoDs Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU) office and the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) program. SADBU manages the SBIR program and the Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) and other initiatives to promote DoD-sponsored research with small businesses. Both the SBIR and STTR fund approximately $500 million each year for early-stage R&D projects at small technology companies with a focus on projects that have commercial applications. The SADBU website provides information on the various programs and contains links and information to other DoD components and federal and state government agency SBIR and STTR programs. SADBUs Internet address is [http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu]. The purpose of the DoD DELG program is to meet national security objectives by encouraging standardization and interoperability of defense systems with our allies, lowering purchase costs of defense items to DoD, preserving critical defense skills, and maintaining the stability of the industrial base by facilitating the export of American-made products. Information about the DELG program can be found at Internet address [http://www.acq.osd.mil/icp/delg/defexploan.htm].
Many sites involved in defense systems and materiel acquisition and development programs and other R&D activities including Service Program offices, DoD and other federal laboratories, and other organizationscan be accessed from DefenseLINK. Although current Service and OSD sites are incomplete, under construction, or do not exist, this situation will improve with time and with more standardized formats and content on the DoD and federal S&T programs. Some useful and informative sites for several Services acquisition and development organizations do provide detailed and in-depth information on their respective R&D programs, 17
including collaborative efforts with universities, other federal agencies and laboratories, non-profit research organizations, and industry. DefenseLINK can be accessed through the DTIC Internet Homepage at [http://www.dtic.mil].
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III. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for providing the science and technology (S&T) leadership needed to achieve efficiency in energy use and the diversification of energy sources needed for a more productive and competitive economy, improved environmental quality, and secure national defense. The foundation for these efforts is a strong S&T program. DOEs annual research budgetover $5.5 billionis the fourth largest budget behind the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Almost all the DOE research and development (R&D) funding is for basic and applied research. DOE manages a $30-billion federally funded national laboratory system, with over 40,000 scientists and engineers. These laboratories perform world-class basic and applied research in the energy, high-speed computing, and national security areas. The laboratories are also active in collaborative efforts with energy-related private institutes, universities, and industry. Although the roots of DOEs laboratory system were based on the Manhattan Project and the development of nuclear weapons during and following World War II, DOE now supports a broad national S&T portfolio: supercomputing, oil and gas exploration applications, electronics, textile manufacturing, advanced materials, robotics, sensors and monitors, transportation, and basic research in physics and chemistry. The DOE laboratories serve a distinctive role in conducting long-term, often high-risk R&D through the use of capitalintensive facilities that are normally beyond the reach of industry and academia. The mission areas of DOEs national laboratories are: Energy. The primary energy mission for the laboratories is to pursue a research and technology (R&T) development agenda that enhances the long-term prospects for adequate energy supplies and efficient end-use technologies that minimize adverse environmental impacts. The key role of the laboratories is long-term research that holds the promise of significant payoffs. The two separate research activities are Fossil Energy and Fusion Energy. Environmental S&T. The primary environmental S&T mission is the acceleration of the scientific and technology base and the development of affordable technologies for the clean-up of radioactive and hazardous waste at weapons production laboratories and national laboratories. Environmental S&T also seeks to make significant contributions in 20
R&D for more efficient use of energy and materials, pollution prevention, waste minimization techniques in industrial processes, and the environmental impacts of energy use, including global climate modeling. National security. The national security mission is to develop technologies that enhance the ability of the nation to deter and defend against nuclear threats, reduce nuclear danger, and provide for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile. This mission also supports work in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control verification, and intelligence.
The decade of the 1990s has effected substantial change for the departments nine multi-program national laboratories, particularly the departments three nuclear weapons laboratories. Sweeping geopolitical changes, limitations on nuclear testing, increased attention to economic competitiveness, and the continuing demands of energy development and environmental qualityin the context of tighter federal R&D budgetsconfront the departments use of its laboratories for meeting national missions. DOE has restructured the laboratories and related field and headquarters organization to respond to these changes while maintaining core competencies and critical capabilities. DOE also has a major mission to contribute to the scientific foundation that underpins the departments mission areasenergy, the environment, and national security, including discrete areas of science (i.e., high-energy, nuclear, and condensed matter physics) by maintaining large-scale user facilities that the laboratories have designed and built. DOEs mission, goals, and objectives and the descriptions of its program offices, organizational structure, national labs, and facilities can be found at DOEs Internet address [http://www.doe.gov]. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) RESEARCH DOEs research missions and responsibilities are accomplished by several distinctbut separateorganizations. Each organization has responsibilities for conducting, managing, and reporting DOEs S&T efforts. DOE also has a Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB), whose mission is to provide the Secretary of Energy advice, information, and recommendations on the departments basic and applied research activities. The organizations involved in the DOE S&T program are: The Office of Energy Research (OER). OER programs fund basic research to advance the fundamental science knowledge base and train future scientists. Research includes the natural and physical sciences, materials and chemical science, engineering and geosciences, energy biosciences, magnetic fusion energy, high-energy and nuclear physics, 21
health and environment, and computational and technology research in mathematical, informational, and computational sciences. Although several S&T information sources are available from the DOE Internet Homepage, OER is responsible for the dissemination of S&T information through its Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), a division under the Office of Computational and Technology Research. OERs Internet address is [http://www.er. doe.gov]. The key (S&T) Program Management offices/programs under the OERall of which can be accessed from OERs Internet Homepageare: Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics. The Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics operates large worldclass scientific facilities for the nation. It manages an annual $1-billion basic research program that provides new insights into the nature of energy and matter. The Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics Internet address is [http://www. er.doe.gov/production/henp/henp.html]. Office of Basic Energy Sciences. The Office of Basic Energy Sciences supports research to advance the scientific knowledge, technical knowledge, and skills needed to develop and use new and existing energy resources in an economically viable and environmentally sound manner. Areas of interest are materials science, chemical science, energy biosciences, geosciences, and engineering. The Office of Basic Energy Sciences Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/production/bes/ bes.html]. Office of Biological and Environmental Research. The Office of Biological and Environmental Research is responsible for developing the knowledge needed to identify, understand, and anticipate the long-term health and environmental consequences of energy production, development, and use. The Office of Biological and Environmental Researchs Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/production/ober/ ober_top.html]. Fusion Energy Program. The Fusion Energy Program is responsible for advancing plasma science, fusion science, and fusion technology to build the knowledge base for an economically and environmentally attractive fusion energy source. The Fusion Energy Programs Internet address is [http://wwwofe.er.doe.gov]. Office of Planning and Analysis. The Office of Planning and Analysis provides the strategic plans and strategies of OER research efforts. It also performs cost/benefit analysis to ensure the quality of selected R&T programs and maximize payoffs to the U.S. S&T program. The Office of Planning and Analysis Internet address is [http://webster.er.doe.gov/er-5/home.html]. Office of Laboratory Policy and Science Education. The Office of Laboratory Policy and Science Education is responsible for maintaining and operating the DOE laboratories. The office also manages DOEs institutional planning, policy and processes, university and science education programs, and infrastructure management. The 22
DOE laboratory complex, which lists each laboratories capabilities and core competencies, can be accessed from OERs Internet Homepage. The Office of Laboratory Policy and Science Educations Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/production/er-07/index.html]. Office of Computational and Technology Research (OCTR). OCTR is responsible for the long-term computational and technology research for applied mathematical sciences, high-performance computing, communications, and infrastructure. The office manages DOEs Technical Information Management Program, which provides direction and coordination for the management and dissemination of scientific and technical information resulting from the DOEs R&D and environmental programs. OCTR also manages DOEs Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. OCTRs Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/production/octr/octr.html]. OCTR has three separate divisions: Advanced Energy Products and Technology Research Division (AEPTR). The Laboratory Advanced Energy and Technology Research Division explores the scientific feasibility of novel energy-related concepts. These concepts are at an early stage of scientific development and are considered premature for consideration by applied research or technology development programs. It also manages the DOEs SBIR and STTR programs. The AEPTR Divisions Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/production/ octr/aeptr/aeptr_pr.html]. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI). OSTI, located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the central point for collection, processing, and dissemination the scientific and technical information (STI) generated and acquired by the DOE programs. OSTI serves as DOEs central point for collecting and sharing scientific and technical information. OSTIs Internet address is [http://www. osti.gov]. Mathematical, Information, and Computational Division. The Mathematical, Information, and Computational Division manages DOEs High-Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) program and DOEs performance computing resource centers. It conducts research in the areas of advanced software technology and algorithms and information infrastructure technology and applications. The Mathematical, Information, and Computational Divisions Internet address is [http://www.er.doe.gov/ production/octr/mics/index.html].
Office of Defense Programs (DP). The mission of the Office of Defense Programs is to ensurewithout nuclear testingthe safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear weapon stockpile. It is responsible for providing the infrastructure and intellectual capability to maintain a nuclear weapon stockpileincluding the replacement of limited-life components and ensuring an adequate supply of tritiumand for providing the capability to reconstruct underground 23
testing and weapons production capability as required to meet national security needs. Access to DP Internet information requires registration; however, some fact sheets on lab facilities and the national ignition/tritium projects can be accessed on-line through the Internet DOE-DP access. The Office of Defense Programs Internet address is [http://www. dp.doe.gov]. The Office of Defense Programs has four departments at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and a project office headed by a Military General Officer: Research and Development Department Strategic Computing and Simulation Department Military Applications and Stockpile Management Department Program Support Department Tritium Project Office.
Chief Financial Officer (CFO). The DOE CFO is responsible for the R&D tracking database used to report to the White House Office of Science and Technology and for the Research and Development in the United States (RaDiUS) database (see Section XV). RaDiUS provides access to over 12,000 ongoing R&D projects within DOE. It provides a complete abstract of project sponsor, point of contact (POC), description, deliverables, and so forth. Users must register and be approved by the CFO. The CFO also provides names and e-mail addresses for all DOE program officers who are R&D tracking stakeholders within the headquarters and field program offices. The R&D tracking system is currently the only source of new and ongoing R&D within DOE. OSTI is currently working to have an enhanced R&D tracking system available. The CFOs Internet address is [http://www. cfo.doe.gov]. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE) Office. The mission of the EE Office is to lead the nation to a stronger economy, a cleaner environment, and a more secure future through the development and deployment of sustainable energy technologies. EE strives to achieve these goals through a balanced R&D program and deployment through private sector enterprises. The EE Office has four Deputy Assistant Secretary Offices and a Program office: Utility Technologies Office Industrial Technologies Office Building Technologies, State, and Community Programs Office 24
Transportation Technologies Office Federal Energy Management Program Office.
The EE Internet address is [http://www.eren.doe.gov]. This site provides information on program efforts, names, and email addresses. The EE Office also maintains an on-line database, Alternative Fuels Data Center. The Alternative Fuels Data Centers Internet address is [http://www.afdc.nrel.gov]. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB). The SEAB is chartered to provide the Secretary of Energy with independent and expert advice on a broad range of energy, environmental, and public policy issues. The SEAB replaced the Energy Research Advisory Board in 1990 as the principal scientific advisory committee to the DOE. The SEABs mission is to provide advice, information, and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy on DOEs basic and applied research activities, economic and national security policy, educational issues, or any other activities/operations that the Secretary may direct. Most work is done through a task force. Copies of recent reports are available through the DOE Internet Homepage at [http://www.doe.gov].
INFORMATION RESOURCES DOE has a number of on-line databases, some of which are specialized networks for specific fields of study, program offices, or laboratory communication links. Many have information, reports, and other documentation on-line and/or the ability to order the documents. OSTI is responsible for disseminating official DOE S&T reports. The CFO is also responsible for tracking ongoing R&D and currently manages the departments only R&D database of ongoing S&T projects. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is an independent statistical and analytical agency within DOE. EIA maintains a comprehensive data and information program relevant to energy sources and reserves, energy production, energy demand, energy technologies, and other related statistical information. Some of the products offered by DOE information organizations are as follows. OSTI provides information on the international S&T efforts through the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDE), and the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) International Nuclear Information System (INIS). For more information, visit the ETDE Internet Homepage at [http://www.etde.org] and the IAEA Internet Homepage at [http://www.iaea.org]. Other international products can be accessed through the OSTI Internet Homepage at [http://www.osti.gov]. 25
OSTI products and services include but are not limited to: Technical reports. The DOE Reports Bibliographic Database contains citations for the department-sponsored scientific and technical reports covering the period of January 1, 1994. These can be purchased through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) (703-487-4650). Energy information on-line. The departments two major databases, Energy Science and Technology and Nuclear Science Abstracts, can be accessed through commercial on-line systems [i.e., DIALOG (800-334-2564) and STN International (800-848-6533]. These databases provide complete bibliographic information and abstracts for technical reports, journal articles, conference papers and proceedings, patents, books, and so forth. Compact discs (CDs). The Energy Science and Technology (from 1974 to the present and is updated quarterly) and Nuclear Science Abstracts (from 19481976, historical only) databases are also available on compact disc from DIALOG (800-334-2564). The IEA Technology Data Exchange, which covers information from 1987 to the present, is also available from a commercial source, SilverPlatter (800-343-0064). Software. Energy Science and Technology software is available at the OSTI Internet address [http://www.osti.gov]. Virtual library. The Energy Science and Technology Virtual Library is prototype that provides desk-top access to information collections, electronic journals and preprints, applied and engineering standards, database and document delivery services, regulatory, funding and reference material. The virtual library can be accessed at the DOE Internet address [http://www.doe.gov]. Publications. Recent reports on DOE R&D reports are available through NTIS (703-487-4650).
EIA maintains a comprehensive data and information program on energy demand, production, technologies, resources, energy markets and reserves and on specific fuel groups. A complete listing of products, services, and types of information is available at the EIA Internet Homepage at [http://www.eia.doe.gov]. Some of the types of products and services offered are: STAT-USA. STAT-USA provides selected publications and electronic files through the EIA Internet Homepage. Listserve. Listserve makes press releases, many weekly and monthly data files, and notifications on the release of selected documents available through e-mail. EIA Electronic Publishing System (EPUB). information, call 202-586-2557. 26 EPUB is a free bulletin board accessible via modem. For more
National Energy Information Center (NEIC). EIAs NEIC provides energy information and referral services. For more information, call 202-586-8800 or e-mail at [infoctr@eia.doe.gov].
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IV. DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC)

The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) is a major component of the Department of Defense (DoD) Scientific and Technical Information (STI) program. DTIC is the one single source for DoD-wide unlimited- and limited-access/classified science and technology (S&T) activity reports and bibliographic research and development (R&D) report citations. MISSION DTICs mission is to provide a source of Scientific Technical Information Program (STIP) services to assist in carrying out DoD STIP policy and administration, to perform technical information support services for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (OSD (A&T)), to operate DoD-wide Scientific STI systems, and to act as a central coordinating point for DoD STI databases and systems. DTICs governing regulation is DoD Directive 3200.12, DoD Scientific and Technical Information (STI) Program (STIP), 11 Feb 98 AD-A336281) HOLDINGS DTIC holdings include technical reports, management summaries at the work-unit level, independent R&D summaries, and special collections (i.e., captured German and Japanese documents that date back to World War II). The scope of the collection includes areas normally associated with defense research (i.e., military science, aeronautics, missile and space technology, and nuclear science). However, since DoD interests are widespread, the collection also contains information on subjects covering broad scientific areas (i.e., biology, chemistry, energy, environmental sciences, oceanography, computer sciences, sociology, logistics, and human factors engineering). DTIC also maintains special collections. Valuable information can be found in the Air Technical Index and Technical Information Pilot collections, which contain technical reportsforeign and domesticdating back to the 1940s. These documents, many of which are the single remaining copy, are technically and historically significant. For information on the DTIC collection, phone 703-767-8040. 28
ACQUISITION EFFORTS DTIC acquires scientific, technical, engineering, and management studies and other types of informationin any type media or formatto meet DoDs needs. DoD directives require that defense activities, their contractors, subcontractors, and grantees provide DTIC with copies of each technical report that records the results of defense R&D efforts. Ongoing and planned projects are also reported. DTIC makes special arrangements for acquiring reports that are not controlled by regulations or contractual agreements but represent technically significant additions to its collection. SERVICES DTIC contributes to the management and conduct of defense research, development, and acquisition efforts by providing access to and transfer of scientific and technical information, current awareness database products, and on-line and Internet services. Access to Science and Technical Information DTIC has DoD-wide responsibility for acquiring, storing, and disseminating scientific and technical information to aid in defense R&D. The DTIC collection is contained in the following scientific and technical information databases: Technical Reports (TR) Bibliographic. This collection contains nearly 2 million print and non-print (software, data files, databases, and video recordings) documents conveying the results of completed defense-sponsored research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts, including patent applications, studies, reports, and open source literature from foreign countries. The TR databases Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ dtic-o/oc/ocp]. Work Unit Information System (WUIS). The WUIS database contains over 250,000 technically oriented management summaries that describe ongoing DoD R&T efforts at the work-unit level. This information concerns the what, where, when, how, at what costs, by whom, and under what sponsorship the research is being performed. It also includes summaries of completed and terminated efforts. The WUIS databases Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/dtico/wuis.html]. Independent Research and Development (IR&D). The IR&D collection contains nearly 140,000 descriptions of projects initiated by DoD contractors but not required under contract. These IR&D projects are usually performed to improve existing DoD products, meet dual-use needs, or meet what industry perceives to be potential DoD requirements. Proprietary information is accessible only to DoD and DoD-approved U.S. government organizations. The 29
information is used to identify contractors with expertise in areas of interest to DoD. The IR&D databases Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/dtic-o/ird.html]. Manpower and Training Research Information System (MATRIS). MATRIS is an automated decision support system designed to achieve joint service coordination of manpower, personnel, training, and human factors (MPT/HF) research. The MATRIS database includes references to program element and project descriptions, work unit and project and/or study summaries, DoD budget category breakdowns, descriptions of human systems integration, and Livewire tools and techniques. MATRIS also includes Merit Systems Protection Board report summaries and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) national plan for aviation human factors. The MATRIS service provides access to DoDs Technology Transfer database, the DoD Biomedical Research database, the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) system, and the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Interactive Topic Information System (SITIS). MATRIS also provides a gateway service to organizations with related interest and a extensive POC listing of all researchers who perform/manage people-related research. MATRIS Internet address is [http://www.dticam.dtic.mil]. The MATRIS POC can be reached at 619-553-7000 or at e-mail address [email@ dticam.dtic.mil]. Access to Current Awareness Database Products DTICs current awareness database includes: Current Awareness Bibliography (CAB)/Electronic Current Awareness Bibliography (ECAB). The CAB and ECAB provide a listing (in paper copy or by e-mail) of citations to newly acquired accessions in the TR database that match a users subject profile. The Automatic Document Distribution (ADD) or Automatic Hardcopy Document Distribution (AHDD) programs provide services to get entire documents in microfiche and/or hard copy. The CAB and ECAD are updated twice a month. The CAB/ECABs Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/cab.html]. Current Research Summaries. Current research summaries provide WUIS and IR&D records that match a users subject interest profile(s) on a recurring basis. These summaries can be produced on a monthly, quarterly, semiannual, or annual schedule.
Access to Compact Disc/Read-Only Memory (CD/ROM) Products DTICs compact disc/read-only memory (CD/ROM) products include: 30
Technical Reports (TR) Database Bibliographies on Compact Disc (CD). This CD-ROM is a subscription product that contains citations to over 1.3 million documents in DTICs TR database, including information on technical reports, DoD Directives and Instructions, regulatory publications, patent applications, conference papers, data files, databases, software, and videos. These CD-ROMs are updated quarterly. The Internet address for information on this product is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/trcdrom.html]. Internal Research and Development (IR&D) on Compact Disc (CD). This CD-ROM is a subscription product that contains over 4,000 IR&D projects initiated by industry but not under DoD contract. Information, which includes objectives, approaches, progress, diagrams, and photos, is considered proprietary and is available only to DoD and DoDapproved organizations. This CD-ROM is updated twice a year. The Internet address for information on this product is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/irdcdrom.html].
Access to On-Line Services The DTIC on-line services access includes: The Defense RDT&E On-line System (DROLS). DROLS is an on-line interactive system that provides direct access to classified/limited-access information and unclassified information in DTICs three major databases: TR Bibliographic, the WUIS, and the IR&D. It is currently the only database that satisfies the DoD regulatory requirements to ensure no duplication of R&D or other S&T efforts. Note: DROLS requires formal training in the native DROLS language. Searches are generally performed with the help of personnel who use this system on a regular basis. DROLS Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/drols.html]. Technical Reports Graphical User Interface (TRGUI). The TRGUI provides an easy-to-use tool to access, search, and order information from the DROLS TR Bibliographic database using a windows point and click interface. No training is required. DTIC expects to have the R&T WUIS database included by the end of calendar year (CY) 1997. The TRUGI is compatible with the Secure Telephone Unit (STU III) Asynchronous only. TGRUIs Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/trgui.html]. GoldenGate. GoldenGate is a graphical user interface (GUI) for searching the DTIC TR Bibliographic and WUIS databases and over 200 government and commercial STI databases, including DROLS. GoldenGate provides a single point-of-access to these databases and helps users formulate effective queries for searching. GoldenGate also provides access to commercial vendors (i.e., DIALOG, OVID, and Legi-Slate) and their S&T information; however, separate arrangements must be made with these commercial vendors to use their services. 31
Access to Internet Services The DTIC Internet services access includes: The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) Homepage. The DTIC Internet Homepage provides an in-depth look at the DTIC organization, processes, products, and services. The DTIC Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil]. The Defense Technical Information Web (DTIW). DTIC operates the DTIW, a World Wide Web site for finding information on, and of interest to, DoD. The DTIW Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtiw]. DTIW allows access to the following DTIC-managed STI information and databases. The Scientific and Technical Information Network (STINET). Two versions of the STINET Service reside on the Internet: Public STINET and Secure STINET (S-STINET). STINETs Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/stinet]. Public STINET. Public STINET (703-767-8272) includes access to over 11 years of the unclassified, unlimited portion of DTICs TR Bibliographic database; the R&D descriptive summaries, the DoD index to specifications and standards, reference information (i.e., directories), SBIR solicitations, and a limited selection of full-text electronic technical reports. Public STINET provides the DoD community with a window to mission-critical STI information, including DoD R&D, gray literature (restricted to .mil and .gov sites), and research by others. It also provides information on policy and budget documents and up-to-date information news feeds. Secure STINET (S-STINET). S-STINET is a subscription product that contains the information in the Public version but is password controlled. In addition, .mil Internet sites will be able to view sites limited to DoD access only. Access to S-STINET is limited to government agencies and their contractors. S-STINET provides access to, and has document ordering capability for citations (excluding abstracts) to unclassified/limited documents for the last 11 years; the last 5 years of unclassified active full-text Work Unit Summaries; simultaneous searching of DoD, Department of Energy (DOE) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) databases using the same query; and First News Service, which provides information from a worldwide network of databases, news wires, newspapers, trade publications, and magazines on many diverse topics. DefenseLINK. DefenseLINK provides a starting point to access information on DoDits organizations, and its functions. It also provides direct access to the information services that have been established by each military
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department and organization. For DoD information, DefenseLINKs Internet address is [http://www.defenselink. mil/pubs/ofg.html]. DTIC does not provide services to the general public and requires registration from those eligible to receive it services. It maintains a central registry file of users authorized to access defense-related information. All requests are validated against the central register for status, site classification, and/or subject matter need-to-know. Eligible users include DoD components; military Services; other U.S. government agencies and their contractors; DoD military and civilian students; universities involved in federally funded research throughout the United States; small business participants involved in Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR); and potential contractors. DTIC provides access to unclassified/ unlimited-access technical reports and bibliographic information through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) (703-487-4660). The Product Management Branch (703-767-8267) is DTICs point of contact (POC). To register to use the DTIC system, phone 703-767-8273 or 1-800-225-3842. The e-mail address is [reghelp@dtic.mil]. DTICs Internet address is [http://www. dtic.mil]. Access to Joint Internet Resources Several sites provide an extensive listing of information resources that DTIC has produced for other organizations and DTIC research, development, and acquisition resources. The Internet address for DTICs Joint-Produced Internet Resources is [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/joint-inet.html] Some sites of interest for S&T-related information are the following: Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC). AGMC is a key facility within the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). It plays a vital role in maintaining the operational readiness of the Air Forces first-line aircraft and missiles. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/ozone/fulltext. html]. Aerospace in the 21st Century Electronic Bibliography. This site explores the field of Aerospace and the advanced developments, research, and technologies that are expected 20 to 50 years in the future. This information has been compiled for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). The Internet address is [http://www/dtic.mil.aerospace].
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AirForceLINK. AirForceLINK is the official Department of the Air Force Homepage and the starting point for locating information about the Department of the Air Force, its organization, and its functions. The Internet address is [http://www.af.mil]. ArmyLINK. This site for Army Public Affairs carries out that organizations mission to inform and help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in Americas Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict, and war. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/ armylink]. Army Materiel Command (AMC). AMC supports the strategic forces with the technology, equipment, and logistics essential for success on any battlefield. It also handles diverse tasks (i.e., acquiring ammunitions for all the U.S. military services, managing the sale of Army equipment and services, and negotiating and implementing agreements for coproduction of U.S. weapons systems by foreign nations). The Internet address is [http://www. amc.army.mil]. CENDI. CENDI is an inter-agency2 cooperative organization composed of STI managers to improve federal STI support systems. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/cendi]. Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). DDR&E is the chief technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) on defense S&T development, priorities, programs and strategies. This site includes articles and papers, briefings and speeches, plans and documents, testimonies, a calendar of events, S&T programs, and much more. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/ddre]. DDDR&E Laboratory Management and Technology Transition (LM&TT). This site introduces the Office of the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Laboratory Management and Technology Transition. It provides a variety of management-related information and describes ongoing projects of interest to DoD laboratories. It also provides easy access to reports and projects generated by this office. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/labman]. DefenseLINK. DefenseLINK provides the highest level entry into the official information resources made available on the Web by various components of the DoD. In addition, the DefenseLINK Locator provides search access to the
CENDI = Department of Commerce/National Technical Information Service; Department of Education/National Library of Education; Department of Energy/Office of Scientific and Technical Information; National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Science and Technical Information Program; National Library of Medicine; the Department of Defense/Defense Technical Information Center and National Air Intelligence Center; and the Department of the Interior/USGS/Biological Resources Division
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database of DoD Government Information Locator Service (GILS) records. [http://www.defenselink.mil].
The Internet address is
DefenseLINK Locator (DoD-GILS). DoD-GILS is a searchable component to help the public locate and access DoD information resources. It describes the information available in those resources and provides assistance in obtaining the information. The Internet address is [http://www. defenselink.mil/locator]. Defense S&T Planning. This site provides a single location for the basic S&T planning and selected related DoD documents. It includes the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology Objective, the Defense Technology Area Plan, the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, and selected Service and Defense Agency planning documents. The Internet address is [http://www. dtic.mil/dstp]. DoD Directives and Instructions. The Director of Administration and Management Homepage contains a large number of the directives and instructions issued by the DoD. The Internet address is [http://www. web7.whs.osd.mil/corres.htm]. DoD Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). The MCTL is a detailed and structured compendium of the technologies that DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior United States military capabilities. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/mctl]. International Aerospace Information Network (IAIN). The IAIN Homepage is a prototype developed by the NATO AGARD. It is designed to guide the user to aerospace and aerospace-related sources of information. This site identifies and provides access to major collections of data relevant to aerospace R&D and serves as a vehicle to stimulate the integration and access of multidisciplinary data related to aerospace R&D. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/iain]. International Council for Scientific and Technical Information (ICSTI). ICSTI offers a unique forum for interaction between organizations that create, disseminate, and use S&T information. The Internet address is [http://www.cisti.nrc.ca/icsti]. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This site consists of information about the Joint Staff organization. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/jcs]. LabLINK. LabLINK provides a single access point to the DoD laboratory activities and presents a spectrum of government, academic, non-profit and private industry information sources on S&T research and policy. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/lablink].
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MarineLINK. MarineLink is the official web site of the U.S. Marine Corps. It provides recruitment information, press releases, fact sheets on weapons and equipment systems, and other pertinent U.S. Marine Corps information. The Internet address is [http://www.usmc.mil]. North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO). NATIBOs primary purpose is to identify and analyze key industrial sectors that are critical to defense, assess the viability of these sectors, identify issues and barriers related to sector viability, and develop strategies to enhance and sustain the health of the marketplace. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/natibo]. Technology Navigator. The Technology Navigator is a DTIC-sponsored effort using the Internet and governments intranets. This site allows users to explore emerging technologies and share information with experts from government, industry, and academia. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/technav]. TechTRANSIT. DDR&Es TechTRANSIT connects technology transfer resources and activities to meet the requirements of the DoD Office of Technology Transition. This office promotes technology transfer activities (i.e., spinon technology opportunities, spin-off transfer to the private sector, and defense conversion with dual-use applications). This site provides links to the technology transfer activities of federal, state, and international organizations. The Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/techtransit].
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS CENTERS (IACs) IACs are formal organizations sponsored by DoD to facilitate the use of highly specialized STI of concern to DoD. They establish and maintain comprehensive knowledge bases and databases, which include historical, technical, scientific and other data and information collected on a worldwide basis. Information collections include a wide range of unclassified, limited distribution, and classified information appropriate to the sponsoring technical communities. The collections are continually updated to incorporate the latest research information. Scientists, engineers, and information specialists staff the IACs. Most IAC services are free or have a minimal service charge that sponsoring agencies impose to cover the costs of preparing materials or responses. The DTIC IAC POC can be reached at 703-767-9120. The IAC e-mail address is [iac@dtic.mil]. The IACs Internet address is [http://www.dtic.mil/iac/#home]. The IAC centers and their Internet addresses are: Advanced Materials and Process Technology Information Analysis Center (AMPTIAC). AMPTIACs Internet address is [http://www.rome.iitri.com/amptiac]. 36
Chemical Warfare/Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC). CBIACs Internet address is [http://www. cbiac.apgea.army.mil]. Chemical Propulsion Information Agency (CPIA). CPIAs Internet address is [http://www.jhu.edu/~cpia]. Cold Regions Science and Technology Information Analysis Center (CRSTIAC). CRSTIACs Internet address is [http://www.crrel. usace.army.mil/crstiac/crstiac.html]. Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center (CSERIAC). [http://cseriac.flight.wpafb. af.mil]. CSERIACs Internet address is
Data and Analysis Center for Software (DACS). DACSs Internet address is [http://www.dacs.dtic.mil]. Defense Modeling, Simulation, and Tactical Technology Information Analysis Center (DMSTTIAC). DMSTTIACs Internet address is [http://dmsttiac.hq.iitri.com]. Guidance and Control [http://gaciac.iitri.com]. Information Analysis Analysis Center Center (GACIAC). (IATAC). GACIACs IATACs Internet Internet address address is is
Information Assurance Technology [http://www.iatac.dtic.mil/iatac.htm].
Infrared Information Analysis Center (IRIA). IRIAs Internet address is [http://www.erim.org/IRIA/ iria.html]. Manufacturing Technology [http://www.mtiac.iitri.com]. Information Analysis Center (MTIAC). MTIACs Internet address is
Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis Center (NTIAC). NTIACs Internet address is [http://www.ntiac.com]. Reliability Analysis Center (RAC). RACs Internet address is [http://www.rome.iitri.com/rac]. Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC). [http://surviac.flight.wpafb. af.mil]. SURVIACs Internet address is
Table 1 gives the reader a quick-look view of the DTIC database accessibility and availability.
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V. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS)

HHS is the federal governments principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services. HHS directs more than 300 programs that cover a wide spectrum of activities, including: Medical and social science research Preventing the outbreak of infectious disease Ensuring food and drug safety Providing information on health issues, medical research and advances, treatment of diseases Compiling registries on toxic and hazardous substances Medicare and Medicaid Social service programs for the less fortunate.
The medical and social science research, preventing infectious disease, and ensuring food and drug safety are critical programs during peacetime and during times of crisis, especially during combat operations when deployed troops must be provided adequate supplies of safe and reliable rations, drugs and medical supplies, vaccines, and biological and chemical defense items. Military program offices, the Services Surgeon General and Services/Defense Agency procurement offices work closely with HHS representatives in developing new drugs, vaccines, and antidotes; maintaining reliable sources of supplies for medical items and food/operational rations; and finding suitable alternatives in emergency or short supply situations. HHS is the largest grant-making agency in the federal government. It provides over 60,000 grants per year. The HHS budget for research and development (R&D) is $13 billion per year (FY 1998) and is the second largest behind the Department of Defense (DoD). HHS spends more than DoD in basic and applied research, including some science and technology (S&T) efforts that are 41
critical to the military Services. HHS programs are administered by the HHS Operating Divisions. All the Operating Divisions can be accessed from the HHS Internet Homepage [http://www.hhs.gov]. KEY SOURCES FOR RESEARCH AND DATA HHS is making an increasing amount of its S&T information available on-line and accessible on the Internet. Some of the HHS research, data, and policy information can be accessed only through specialized databases, and many HHS Internet sites have their own search engines. HHS has simplified access to these specialized information sources by collecting them in a single web page. The HHS Internet address is [http://www.hhs.gov]. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) DATA COUNCIL The HHS Data Council coordinates HHS collection and analysis activities through an integrated health data collection strategy. It meets monthly to coordinate all department health and non-health data collection and analysis activities. Issue-specific, inter-agency standing, and ad hoc staff committees perform the bulk of the councils work. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH The National Institutes of Health (NIH) NIHs mission is to uncover new knowledge that will lead to better health for everyone. NIH accounts for over 90 percent of the research spending within HHS. It works toward that mission by: Conducting research in its own laboratories Supporting research of non-federal scientists in universities, medical schools, hospitals, and research institutions throughout the country and abroad Helping to train research investigators Fostering communications of biomedical research.
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NIH is one of eight health agencies within HHS and comprises 24 separate institutes, centers and divisions. More than 81 percent of NIHs S&T investments are made through grants and contracts supporting research and training in more than 1,700 research institutions. These grants and contracts comprise the NIH Extramural Research Program. Approximately 11 percent of the budget goes to NIH-conducted research programs (Intramural Research Programs). Specific information on each activity can be accessed through the NIH Internet Homepage. NIHs Internet address is [http://www.nih.gov]. KEY SOURCES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) INFORMATION Key sources of S&T Information at HHS are the NLM and the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR). The National Library of Medicine (NLM) The NLM is the worlds largest medical library. It collects materials in all major areas of the health sciences and, to a lesser degree, other areas (i.e., chemistry, physics, botany, and zoology). The collection stands at 5 million items and includes books, journals, technical reports, manuscripts, microfilms, photographs, and images. The NLM also functions as a national resource for all U.S. health science libraries through a National Network of Libraries of Medicine (NN/LM). The NN/LM consists of 4,500 primary access libraries (mainly hospitals) and 140 resource libraries (mostly medical schools). These libraries cover all geographic regions of the United States. Several computer-based analysis and retrieval and on-line access systems provide access to the NLM databases. The NLM Internet Homepage affords access to a complete list of NLM on-line databases. NLMs Internet address is [http://www.nlm.nih.gov]. Key resources at the NLM are: Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS). MEDLARS is a computer-based system for storing and retrieving bibliographic and factual information and published/printed products [i.e., Index Medicus (a monthly listing of references, published in 36 languages) to current articles from over 3,200 of the worlds biomedical journals]. It currently contains over 8.6 million references that date back to 1966. MEDLARS now represents a family of over 40 databases, of which MEDlars onLine (MEDLINE) is the most well known. The Internet address for MEDLARS is [http://www.nlm.nih.gov/databases/medlars.html].
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MEDLINE. MEDLINE is the NLMs premier bibliographic database. It covers the fields of medicine, nursing, dentistry, veterinary medicine, the health care system, and the preclinical sciences. MEDLINE enables individuals and organizations to query the NLM computers store of journal articles and other references on specific subjects. MEDLINE is updated weekly, and approximately 33,000 new citations are added each month. MEDLINE can be accessed using command direct language searching, commercial networks, and through the Internet using user friendly software interface program called Grateful Med. The Internet address for MEDLINE is [http://www.nlm.nih.gov/databases/medline.html].
Internet Grateful Med (IGM). The NLM developed the software interface called Grateful Med in 1986 to make searching user friendly and to improve the efficiency of searching for specific topics. IGM allows access to MEDLINE (1966 to the present). In addition to MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, PREMEDLINE, and AIDSLINE, IGM offers free access to AIDSDRUGS, AIDSTRIALS, DIRLINE, HISTLINE, HSRPROJ, OLDMEDLINE, and SDILINE. IGMs Internet address is [http://igm. nlm.nih.gov].
The NIH Bibliographic Services Division. This division provides access to biomedical bibliographic information by maintaining the MEDLARS system and the MEDLINE database and by creating computer-produced bibliographic publications and Index Medicus. The division has two sections: The Index Section. The Index Section creates Index Medicus and maintains the MEDLINE database. The MEDLARS Management Section (MMS). MMS is responsible for computer-produced bibliographic publications, data licensing and distribution, and training on-line users. MMS can be contacted at 1-888-346-3656. It also responds to questions via e-mail: Grateful Med questions at [gmhelp@nlm.nih.gov] and MEDLARS at [mms@nlm. nih.gov].
The Division of Specialized Information Services (SIS). The SIS Division provides on-line services, responds to queries, sponsors publications, supports information requirements of other federal agencies, and supports interactive retrieval services in toxicology, environmental health, and other health-related areas. The SIS Division is responsible for creating and maintaining TOXNET, an integrated system for building, reviewing, and searching toxicology and environmental health-related databases. The SIS Division can be reached at 301-496-1131. The SIS Divisions Internet address is [http://www.sis.nlm.nih.gov]. The Lister National Center for Biomedical Communications (LHNCBC). LHNCBC conducts active R&D for the broad purpose of improving health-care information dissemination and use. This involves a wide range of research activities and disciplines. Research staff are engaged in developing intelligent information storage and retrieval systems, conducting their research by drawing on a diverse set of scientific fields and methods. Current staff have backgrounds in 44
medicine, computer science, library and information science, linguistics, cognitive science, education, and engineering. Research projects include digital library research, automated indexing techniques, vocabulary and thesaurus research, natural language processing, medical knowledge representation, image processing, database design, machine learning, expert systems, and computer-based learning. The Unified Medical Language System knowledge sources, the Visible Human data set, and MEDLINE data are important sources of knowledge for many of LHNCBCs experiments LHNBCs Internet address is [http://www.lhncbc. nlm.nih.gov]. The National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) The NCRR serves as a catalyst for discovery by creating and providing critical research technologies and by providing costeffective, multidisciplinary, and shared resources across the full spectrum of NIH-supported research activities. The NCRR plays a key role in addressing NIH research issues (i.e., gaining access to the state-of-the-art instrumentation and biomedical technologies). The NCRR Internet Homepage provides access to the NCRR strategic plan and research resources. The NCCRs Internet address is [http://www.ncrr.nih.gov]. SOURCES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) INFORMATION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) The FDA is a consumer protection agency. It is responsible for ensuring that food is safe to eat and that medicines and medical devices are safe and effective to use. It monitors the manufacture, import, transport, storage, and sale of foods, medicines, medical devices, cosmetics, radiation emitting devices, and animal food and drugs. It plays a critical role for DoD in developing and manufacturing new drugs, vaccines, biological and chemical defense items, operational rations, and other medical devices. The FDA also assists DoD in obtaining suitable off-shore medical items during emergency situations. The FDA operates the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), which investigates the biological effects of widely used chemicals. It also operates the Engineering and Analytical Center (EAC), which tests medical devices, radiation emitting products, and radioactive drugs.
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The FDA does not conduct research; rather, it examines the results of new studies by manufacturers and assesses their production, vendors, storage, testing, and distribution to ensure safe, quality, and consistent performance products. The FDA Internet Homepage provides access to complete information on the FDA. The FDAs Internet address is [http://www.fda.gov]. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) The CDC promote health and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability. The CDC comprise 11 centers, institutes, and offices whose mission is to monitor the nations health, detect and investigate health problems, conduct research to enhance disease prevention, guard against international disease transmission, provide immunization services, and implement prevention strategies. The CDC play an important medical role for DoD in ensuring the availability of vaccines, maintaining health/death statistics, detecting and monitoring diseases, and administrating research and operational programs for the prevention and control of vaccine-preventable diseases worldwide. The CDCs Internet address is [http://www.cdc.gov]. Several key CDC organizations of interest to DoD are: National Center for Infectious Disease (NCID). The NCID is responsible for conducting surveillance, epidemic investigations, epidemiological and laboratory research, and training and education programs to control infectious disease. The NCID administers the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases (DVBID) and serves as a national and international reference center for vector-borne and bacterial disease (i.e., Lyme disease, the plague, yellow fever, encephalitis) and other diseases that are a health threat to deployed troops. The NCIDs Internet address is [http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod]. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). NCHSs mission is to provide statistical information that will guide actions and policies to improve the health of the American people. The NCHS maintains an on-line public information system that can provide statistics on many public health issues, diseases, and causes of deaths. The NCHSs Internet address is [http://www. cdc.gov/nchswww/products/products.htm]. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Hazardous Substances Release/Health Effects Database. The ATSDR database is the scientific and administrative database developed to provide access to information on the release of hazardous substances from Superfund sites or emergency events and on the effects of hazardous substances on the health of human populations. The database can be accessed at the Internet site [http://atsdr1.atsdr.cdc.gov:8080/atsdrhome.html].
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OTHER USEFUL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) SITES Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) The OEPs mission is to manage and coordinate federal health, medical, and health-related social service response and recovery to federally declared disasters under the Federal Response Plan. This would include acts of terrorism, plans for continuity of operations, and health and medical consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attack. The OEPs Internet address is [http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/ophs/oep.htm]. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) AHCPR is the lead agency charged with supporting research designed to improve the quality of health care, reduce its cost, and broaden access to essential services. The AHCPRs Internet address is [http://www.ahcpr.gov].
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VI. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established by the Space Act of 1958. It is the federal civilian agency responsible for exercising controls over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States. NASA origins date back to 1915 when Congress created National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which would supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view to their practical solutions. That organization evolved into NASA in 1958 when Congress formed a civilian agency to lead the expansion of human knowledge in the atmosphere and space. NASAs science and technology (S&T) mission is to research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics, space, and related technologies; advance and communicate scientific knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe; and use the environment of space for human enterprise. Many of these efforts support or are conducted jointly with other federal agencies. Most of NASAs S&T efforts have some bearing on Department of Defense (DoD) technology needs. For example, virtually every aircraft in use today uses technology pioneered by NASA. Space exploration has contributed significantly to advanced medical equipment, communications satellites, weather forecasting, and natural resource mapping. NASAs research and development (R&D) budget authority for FY 1998 is $9.277 billion and ranks third in all federal agencies, accounting for over 12 percent of all federal S&T spending. NASAs Internet address is [http://www.nasa.gov]. THE STRATEGIC ENTERPRISES NASA executes its mission through four strategic enterprises. Each enterprise is analogous to a strategic business unit that commercial companies use to focus on and respond to their customer needs. Each enterprise has a set of strategic goals, objectives,
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and strategies that address the requirements of their core mission areas. In each enterprise area, the efforts in basic and applied science, R&D, and the equipment fielded have a direct bearing on the DoD S&T programs. Aeronautics Enterprise The goal of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology (OASTT), also known as the Aeronautics Enterprise, goal is to conduct long-range, high-risk, high-payoff research and technology (R&T) development to afford the U.S. superior civilian and military aircraft and space launch systems. NASA works closely with industry, academia, DoD, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to ensure that the national investments in aeronautics and space transportation R&D are clearly defined and coordinated. The program addresses critical aeronautical needs for improvements in safety, environment, aerospace productivity and aircraft performance, develops and demonstrates precompetitive next-generation space launch technology, and transfers NASA-developed technology to U.S. industry to ensure the U.S. leadership in aviation technology. OASTTs Internet address is [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/aero]. Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise (HEDS) A critical goal of this enterprise is to develop new products and manufacturing processes in a gravity free environment. HEDS Internet address is [http://www.osf.hq. nasa.gov/heds]. Earth Science Enterprise (ESE) This enterprise is dedicated to understanding the total Earth system and the effects of natural and human-induced changes on the global environment. ESEs Internet address is [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/mtpe]. Space Science Enterprise (SSE) This enterprise is dedicated to the exploration of space. The goals of the SSE S&T programs are to develop increasingly capable telescopes, scanning the entire electromagnetic spectrum from gamma rays to radio waves, and probing interstellar space beyond our solar system. SSEs Internet address is [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oss/ osshome.htm].
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FIELD CENTERS NASA accomplishes its mission and goals through its nine field centers and the contractor-operated Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), each with established areas of excellence and specific missions. Ames Research Center (ARC). The ARC, located at Moffet Field, California, is the Center of Excellence for Information Technology. Its mission is airspace operations systems and astrobiology. It conducts computer science and information system development and space, Earth, and life sciences research. Activities include flight simulation, wind tunnel development and operation, supercomputing and advanced computer-based modeling, and origins of life in the universe studies. ARCs Internet address is [http://www.arc.nasa.gov]. Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). The DRFC, collocated at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is the Center of Excellence for Atmospheric Flight Operations. Its mission is flight research, and it provides a facility for space shuttle landings and tests on a variety of aerospace vehicles. It also supports high-performance aircraft and spacecraft, general aviation, and flight research through and above the atmosphere. DFRCs Internet address is [http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/dryden.html]. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). GSFC, located in Greenbelt, Maryland, is the Center of Excellence for Scientific Research. Its mission is Earth science/physics and astronomy. It conducts research in Earth science and astrophysics and satellite tracking and control. It directs the development of the Earth Observing System (EOS); manages and operates the Hubbell Space Telescope; and operates the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), NASAs primary satellite communications network; and operates most Earth-orbiting robotics spacecraft. GFCSs Internet address is [http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov]. Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC). JSC, located in Houston, Texas, is the Center of Excellence for Human Operations in Space. Its mission is human exploration and astromaterials. It manages the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. Major activities include Shuttle mission control and operations planning, selection and training of astronauts, applied medical and life sciences research, and studies of lunar samples from the Apollo program. JCSs Internet address is [http://www.jsc.nasa.gov]. John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC). KSC, located in Cape Canaveral, Florida, is the Center of Excellence for Space Launch. It launches the Space Shuttle and expendable rockets; prepares shuttles for launch and services them upon return; develops and maintains launch pads; provides the primary landing site for the shuttle; and will operate the Space Station Processing Facility. KSCs Internet address is [http://www.ksc.nasa. gov/ksc.html].
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Langley Research Center (LaRC). LaRC, adjacent to the Langley AFB near Hampton, Virginia, is the Center of Excellence for Structures and Materials. Its mission is airframe systems, aerodynamics, and atmospheric science. It performs R&D in aeronautics and space technology related to aircraft safety, aerodynamics, general aviation, hypersonic flight, space systems and documentation, advanced composite materials and their non-destructive testing, and vertical/short-takeoff and landing flight research. LaRCs Internet address is [http://www.larc.nasa.gov]. Lewis Research Center (LeRC). LeRC occupies two sites: the main site in Cleveland, Ohio, adjacent to ClevelandHopkins Airport and the second site at Plum Brook Station near Sandusky, Ohio. It is the Center of Excellence for Turbomachinery. Its mission is aeropropulsion. It is the international leader in jet engine research. It conducts research in advanced space propulsion and space power systems, including electrical power solar arrays, combustion research, aircraft engine noise and emissions reduction, chemical and electrical rocket propulsion, and advanced turbojet aircraft engines. LeRCs Internet address is [http://www.lerc.nasa.gov]. George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC, located within the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama, is the Center of Excellence for Space Propulsion. Its mission is transportation systems development and microgravity. It provides expertise for rocket engine development and has R&D responsibilities in the Space Station program, astrophysics, microgravity science, and technology transfer. It also manages the main rocket engines, external fuel tank, and solid fuel boosters for the Space Shuttle program and its space lab microgravity science modules; develops the pressurized living and working modules; manages the development of the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility astronomy satellite; and develops new generations of reusable launch vehicles. MSFCs Internet address is [http://www.msfc. nasa.gov]. John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC). SSC, located at Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, is the Center of Excellence for Propulsion Test. It is the premier center for testing large rocket propulsion systems, and it maintains and operates a range of jet engine testing stands/facilities. It fosters the development of the commercialization of Earth observation data and provides expertise in land-use planning and other applications of Earth remote sensing data. SSCs Internet address is [http://www.ssc.nasa.gov]. Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). JPL, a government-owned, contractor-operated facility located in Pasadena, California, is the Center of Excellence for Deep Space Systems. Its mission is planetary science and exploration. It also has expertise in planetary science and manages/operates the worldwide Deep Space Network (DSN) of large ground-based satellite communications dishes. It designs and operates spacecraft to explore the solar systems, supports research in automated spacecraft operations and related computer science, and develops advanced technology in spacecraft and science instrument miniaturization. JPLs Internet address is [http://www.jpl. nasa.gov]. 52
ON-LINE RESOURCES NASA provides a variety of on-line services via the Internet, including photographs, scientific and technical information, news releases, and organizational data. NASA offers a ever expanding suite of on-line information resources that provide important information on its strategic plan, budget, accountability, cost benefit and metrics, enterprises, major programs, news releases and notices, and new and historical bibliographic data. This information can be accessed at NASAs Internet Homepage [http://www. nasa.gov]. NASA has designated the LaRC as the lead center for access to their on-line information resources. A complete listing and Internet access can be found at the LaRC Homepage [http://www.larc.nasa.gov]. A keyword access to the guide to NASA on-line resources can be accessed on the NASA Search Internet Homepage at [http://www. nasa.gov/search/index.html]. The on-line information allows access to: NASA information by subject area Each NASA research center, its databases, and other related information NASA gophers, servers, and anonymous file transfer protocol (FTP) sites Other NASA-related sites (i.e., the National Space Science Data Center, Space Link, JPL Extragalatic Database, and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory).
NASA also provides copies of all non-limited technical reports to the Department of Commerces (DOC) National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and most of the restricted or limited access and all of the non-limited reports to DoDs Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). NASA can also be accessed through the DTIC Secure Scientific and Technical Information Network (SSTINET), an on-line database. NASA does hold some information back because of international partnership agreements, proprietary data rights, or Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs. The on-line databases do not include classified information that NASA does for DoD. For specific information on NASA projects, NASA research centers have to be contacted on an individual basis. Most bibliographic information on classified projects should be available from the DTICs Technical Reports (TR) database. These can be
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accessed through S-STINET (on-line and Internet accessible) databases or the Defense RDT&E Online System (DROLS) on-line database. SCIENCE AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (STI) PROGRAM NASAs STI program is an essential product of research and facilitates technology transfer to enhance the competitive edge of U.S. aerospace companies and educational institutions. The STI program is based on customer needs and partnership arrangements within the agency and other federal agencies, industry, and international cooperative partners. STI is the result of scientific and technical research and mission-related activities at NASA. STI includes facts, theory, observations, and any other type of results from research or technical operations in any scientific or technical area. STI is a collection of data (in any media format) that represents a body of scientific, technical, or management knowledge identified as having value to accomplish NASAs mission. The STI database consists of 3 million recordsunclassified information only dating back to 1915and increases at a rate of 90,000 records annually. The records represent summaries of ongoing and completed research projects, journal articles, patents, reports, dissertations, and software on a variety of topics, with an emphasis on aeronautical and aerospace technology. The literature comes from many sources including NASA and its contractors, other government agencies, institutions, universities, and domestic and foreign private firms. Examples of STI products are research reports, journal articles, numerical data sets, wind tunnel and scientific data, technical videos, scientific and technical photographs, on-line scientific bibliographic databases, and technical resource locators. These products can include laboratory notes, preliminary technical information, lessons learned, scientific and technical operational information, and management information related to the operation of NASA technical programs and projects. The NASA STI program provides direct Internet access to nearly all this information and offers a powerful search capability to over 3 million historical aerospace, aeronautic, and related citations; a photo gallery; and report releases. It also offers access to unclassified/unlimited and limited distribution technical reports. Access to limited-distribution information requires registration, and release is contingent on the specific user profile developed by NASA. NASAs STI Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov]. NASAs STI program is managed by the LaRC and provides access to research efforts at all NASA research centers. For more information on the STI program and products, contact the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) at 301-621-0390 or e-mail
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[help@sti.nasa.gov]. The STI products and on-line information services most useful for DoD S&T inquiries include, but are not limited to: NASA Technical Report Server (NTRS). NTRS provides access to a bibliographic database that provides open access information on all unlimited/ unclassified NASA reports back to 1952. NTRS Internet address is [http://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/NTRS]. Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) Technical Report Server (TRS) (RECONselect). The CASI TRS (RECONselect) is a field searchable WAIS database that contains NASA-produced technical reports and aerospace-related open literature from 1970 through current. These documents were selected from the NASA RECON databases. CASI TRS RECONselects Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/RECONselect.html]. NASA RECONplus. NASA RECONplus is the primary on-line data retrieval system for the NASA STI databases, which include all unclassified/ unlimited and limited distribution STI information. Five databases contain bibliographic citations to worldwide aerospace-related information on aeronautics, astronautics, chemistry and materials, engineering, geosciences, and space sciences published from 1915 to the present. RECONplus users must be registered, and access is dependent on a specific user profile. RECONplus Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/reconplus/RECONplus.html]. Electronic Selected Current Aerospace Notices (E-SCAN). E-SCAN is an electronic awareness journal, published twice monthly, that provides information on recently released reports and journal literature pertaining to aeronautical and aerospace research. E-SCAN covers the full spectrum of literature but segments into subject groupings or topics and announces documents simultaneously in all relevant topics. E-SCANs Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/scan/scan.html]. STI Program Bibliographic Announcements. NASA has several electronic announcements of new STI information, including the STI bulletin, Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports (STAR), aerospace medicine and biology, aeronautical engineering, patent abstracts, and Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) reports. NASA also has a video catalog. The STI Program Bibliographic Announcements Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/sti-pubs.html]. NASA Image eXchange (NIX). This site allows users to search distributed photo databases at NASA Centers. NIXs Internet address is [http://nix.nasa.gov].
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER For more than 30 years, the secondary use of NASA technology and its impact on the economy and global competition has been facilitated through NASAs Commercial Development and Technology Transfer Program. This mechanism is employed to transfer to the public and private sector the new technologies developed during NASA activities. Such wide distribution and outreach activities have resulted in private industrys application of NASA-generated technology. Frequently, this leads to the development of commercially available products and services (spinoffs). NASAs Publication Spinoff captures between 40 and 50 of these success stories annually. The Spinoff Center for AeroSpace Information Technology Transfer Offices Internet address is [http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/ spinoff.html].
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VII. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)

NIST, formerly the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), was established by Congress in 1901 to support industry, commerce, scientific institutions, and all branches of government. In creating the NBS, Congress sought to redress a long-standing need to provide standards of measurement for commerce and industry and to support the technology infrastructure of the 20th Century. In World Wars I and II, the NBS was deeply involved in mobilizing science to solve pressing weapons and war materials problems. After World War II, basic programs were established in nuclear and atomic physics, electronics, mathematics, computer research, and polymers and in instrumentation, standards, and measurement research. Several key legislative mandates that have shaped NISTs role in science and technology (S&T): Stevenson-Wydler Act. This act was implemented throughout the federal laboratories to promote cooperative research and technology (R&T) transfer activities. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This act changed the name from NBS to NIST and augmented the mission by creating new programs to help industry speed the commercialization of new technology. NIST Authorization Act of 1989. This act created the Department of Commerces (DOC) Technology Administration to perform periodic critical examinations of NISTs role in economic growth.
NIST assists industry in developing the technology needed to improve product quality, modernize manufacturing processes, ensure product reliability, and facilitate rapid commercialization of products based on new technology. NISTs primary mission is to promote U.S. economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and standards. It carries out its mission through four major programs: 1. 2. Advanced Technology Program (ATP) Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) 57
3. 4.
Measurement and Standards Laboratories National Quality Program.
Information about these programs can be found on NISTs Internet Homepage. NISTs Internet address is [http://www.nist.gov]. PROGRAMS Advanced Technology Program (ATP) The ATP is a unique partnership between the government and private industry to accelerate the development of high-risk technologies that promise significant commercial payoffs and widespread benefits for the economy. The ATP focuses on the technology needed by U.S. industry and works by encouraging changes in how industry approaches R&D and by providing mechanisms for industry to extend its technological reach. It does not fund product development but does support enabling technologies essential for developing new products, processes, and services across diverse application areas. Some programs may have military applications (i.e., manufacturing composite structures and computer-integrated manufacturing for electronics). For more information about the ATP projects, call 301-975-5187. Additional information about ATP programs can be found on the Internet. ATPs Internet address is [http://www.atp.nist.gov]. Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) The NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership is a nationwide network of locally managed centers offering technical assistance and the newest business practices to help the nations 381,000 small- and medium-sized manufacturers improve their competitiveness. All centers rely on experienced field agents who work directly with smaller manufacturers to address their most critical needs. Typical MEP services include helping small manufacturers access information on new equipment (i.e., automation systems), find high-quality consultant advice for optimizing manufacturing systems, reduce costs by lowering waste, improve quality, expand markets for products, and find financing for modernization efforts. MEP extension centers are designed to help link sources of improved manufacturing technology and the small and mid-sized companies that need it. Center staff work with individual companies or with groups of companies organized around common needs, 58
industries, or technologies. While each center tailors its services to meet the needs dictated by its location and manufacturing client base, some common services are offered by most extension centers. These services include helping manufacturers assess their current technology and business needs, define avenues for change, and implement improvements. Many centers also assist companies with quality management, work force training, workplace organization, business systems, marketing, or financial issues. For more information about MEP, the toll-free number 1-800-MEP4MFG or 1-800-637-4634. This call will be automatically routed to the MEP center that serves your region. Additional information about MEP programs can be found on the Internet. MEPs Internet address is [http://www.mep.nist.gov]. Measurement and Standards Laboratories Measurement and Standards Laboratories develop and deliver measurement techniques, test methods and standards, and other infrastructural technologies and services that provide a common language needed by industry in all stages of commerce, R&D, production, and marketing. The NIST Laboratory program covers critical areas (i.e., physics, electronics and electrical engineering, chemical science and technology, materials science, and information technology). This program comprises seven laboratories: 1. Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL). BFRL is the national laboratory dedicated to enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. industry and public safety performance prediction methods, measurement technologies, and technical advances needed to ensure the life cycle quality and economy of constructed facilities. Its products are used by those who own, design, construct, supply, and provide for the safety or environmental quality of constructed facilities. BFRLs Internet address is [http://www.bfrl. nist.gov]. Chemical Science and Technology Laboratory (CSTL). As the nations reference Llaboratory, CSTLs provides the chemical measurement infrastructure to enhance U.S. industrys productivity and competitiveness; ensure equity in trade; and improve public health, safety, and environmental quality. CSTLs Internet address is [http://www.cstl.nist.gov]. Electronics and Electrical Engineering Laboratory (EEEL). EEEL promotes U.S. economic growth by providing measurement capability that is focused primarily on the critical needs of the U.S. electronics and electrical industries and their customers and suppliers. EEELs Internet address is [http://www.eeel. nist.gov]. Information Technology Laboratory (ITL). ITL responds to industry and user needs for objective, neutral tests for information technology. These are the enabling tools that help companies produce the next generation of products and 59
2.
3.
4.
services and that help industries and individuals use these complex products and services. ITL works with industry, research, and government organizations to develop and demonstrate tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and other infrastructural technologies. ITLs Internet address is [http://www.itl.nist.gov/aboutitl.htm]. 5. Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory (MEL). MEL serves as a central research laboratory for manufacturing infrastructure technology, measurements, and standards. It provides industry-needed manufacturing engineering tools, interface standards, manufacturing systems architectures, and traceability. MELs Internet address is [http://www.mel.nist.gov/ melhome.html]. Materials Science and Engineering Laboratory (MSEL). MSEL works with industry, standards bodies, universities, and other government laboratories to improve the nations measurements and standards infrastructure for materials. MSELs Internet address is [http://www.msel.nist.gov]. Physics Laboratory. The Physics Laboratory supports United States industry by providing measurement services and research for electronic, optical, and radiation technologies. It pursues directed research in the physical sciences; develops new physical standards, measurement methods, and data; conducts an aggressive dissemination program; and collaborates with industry to commercialize inventions and discoveries. The Physics Laboratorys Internet address is [http://www.physics.nist.gov].
6.
7.
Work is being done in critical technologies and components relevant to military R&D and applications. NIST laboratories have or are preparing on-line access to their individual databases. Additional information about the NISTs laboratory program can be found on the Internet. The Measurement and Standards Laboratories Internet address is [http://www. nist.gov/labs2.htm]. National Quality Program To assist U.S. businesses and non-profit organizations in delivering ever-improving value to customers, to enhance marketplace success, and to improve overall company performance and capabilities, NISTs National Quality Program uses the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award. Congress established the award program in 1987 to recognize U.S. companies for their achievements in quality and business performance and to raise awareness about the importance of quality and performance excellence as a competitive edge.
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Malcolm Baldrige was Secretary of Commerce from 1981 until his death in a rodeo accident in July 1987. Baldrige was a proponent of quality management as a key to this countrys prosperity and long-term strength. He took a personal interest in the quality improvement act that was eventually named after him and helped draft one of the early versions. In recognition of his contributions, Congress named the award in his honor. NISTs National Quality Programs Internet address is [http://www.quality. nist.gov]. THE VIRTUAL LIBRARY The NIST Virtual Library can be accessed on the Internet. This library provides an on-line library catalog, including citations, to all materials in the NIST research library: books, journals, software, videos, and all NIST publications. For more information, call 301-975-4465. The NIST Virtual Librarys Internet address is [http://nvl.nist.gov]. OTHER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST) SERVICES NIST provides many services and programs to help U.S. industry and trade, other government agencies, academia, and the general public to improve quality, reduce cost, and strengthen the competitiveness of domestically manufactured products. Services include calibration and laboratory accreditation services, coordination of metric usage, and the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR). For information on NIST programs and publications, call 301-975-3058. NISTs products and services are also listed on the NIST Products and Services Homepage. The Internet address is [http://www.nist.gov/servb.htm]. Technology Services Program NIST also provides access to international, uniform practices (i.e., standards in trade, standard reference material, standard reference data, and standards for weights and measurements) through its Technology Services program. Under the direction of Technology Services, NIST provides a wide variety of services and programs to help U.S. industry and trade, other government agencies, academia, and the general public improve the quality, reduce the cost, and strengthen the competitiveness of their products to
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sustain economic growth. The TEchnology Services Information System (TESIS) provides access to international, uniform practices (i.e., standard reference materials, standard reference data, and standards for weights and measures). Additional information about the Technology Services program can be found on the Internet. The Technology Services Internet address is [http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/ servprog.htm].
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VIII. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD (NSB)

The NSB was established by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950. The NSF was established to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and to secure national defense. The NSF would consist of the National Science Board (NSB) and a Director. As amended, the NSF Act also requires the NSB to render to the president and Congressevery even-numbered yeara report that indicates the state of science and engineering in the United States. The principal purpose for the NSB and the NSF was to provide the president and Congress with objective, quantitative information on the status of the nations science and engineering resources. This information is used to formulate science and technology (S&T) policy. Other activities that have been incorporated into the NSF Act of 1950 include: A comprehensive review detailing the significant areas of basic research in the United States and showing these areas separately by university, industry, and governmenta review that should also indicate work being done by friendly foreign countries A comparable survey detailing the existing support for graduate and undergraduate education in the sciences by public and private agencies A quantitative study of the scientific manpower resources of the United States, including scientific and technical specialties and degrees of proficiency, years of experience, and so forth.
The NSB consists of the NSF Director and 24 part-time members, each appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the Senate. They are selectedon the basis of their eminence in basic, medical, or social sciences; engineering; agriculture; education; research management; or public affairsto represent the views of the scientific and engineering leaders in all areas. The term of service is 6 years, with no more than two consecutive terms. Much of the NSBs work is done by standing and ad-hoc committees or the NSF staff. The board meets eight times a year. The NSB has dual responsibilities: national science policy advisor to the president and Congress and governing body for the NSF. 63
The NSBs mandated role in directing national science and engineering policy, other than its report to the president and Congress, does not appear to have any formal process. The Director of NSF, who is also the Director of the NSB, serves on the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and is a committee chair. Discussions with NSF staff confirmed that the NSB has not played a major role in science and technology policy during the last 10 years. However, the new director has begun to take measures to strengthen the NSBs role in formulating S&T policy and in deciding on the disbursement of funding resources in support of basic research. NSB can be reached at its Internet address [http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/start.htm] or by calling 703-306-2000.
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IX. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF)

The NSF is an independent U.S. government agency responsible for promoting science and engineering through programs that invest over $3.3 billion per year in almost 20,000 research and education projects. The NSF was established by the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and to secure the national defense. The NSF Act also established the National Science Board (NSB), with the principal purpose of providing the president and the Congress with objective, quantitative, information on the nations science and engineering resources as a basis for the formulation of science policy. The NSF was given additional mandates to submit a bi-annual report to Congress on the state of science and engineering in the United States. It also requires the NSF to provide a central clearinghouse for the collection, interpretation, and analysis of data on scientific and engineering resources and to provide a source of information for policy formulation by other agencies of the federal government. Although the NSF budget of nearly $3.4 billion is used to fund non-defense research and education projects in science and engineering, many of the research areas have a direct role in supporting the knowledge base, intellectual capital, and research infrastructure that is critical to existing and future defense needs. The NSF spends approximately 56 percent of its authorized budget to support research projects. The research projects provide support for individuals and small groups devoted to disciplinary research in traditional fields and to cross-disciplinary fields. Investments also include some support for research centers (approximately $208 million for FY 1998). The NSF also provides funding for the support of large, multi-user research facilities that are characteristically complicated and expensive and require long-term commitments of support. Approximately 20 percent (approximately $684 million for FY 1998) of its budget is used to support research facilities. The NSF also spends an additional 20 percent (approximately $669 million for FY 1998) of its budget funding on education and training programs at all educational levels. Approximately 4 percent of the NSF budget is for administrative and management expenses. The NSF does not perform any research or engineering projects but uses grants or cooperative programs to achieve most of its overall research and educational program objectives. The NSFs investment objectives are to: 65
Enable the United States to uphold a position of world leadership in science, mathematics, and engineering Promote the discovery, integration, dissemination, and employment of new knowledge in service to society Achieve excellence in U.S. science, mathematics, engineering, and technology education at all levels.
The NSF pursues these goals through four core strategies: 1. 2. 3. 4. Developing intellectual capital Strengthening the physical infrastructure Integrating research and education Promoting partnerships, including those between the academic community, industry, state and local governments, and other federal agencies. The NSFs Internet address is
The NSF can be reached at 703-306-1234 or accessed through the Internet. [http://www.nsf.gov].
THE KEY FUNCTIONAL OFFICES FOR NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) MISSION REQUIREMENTS The National Science Board (NSB) The NSB consists of 24 part-time members and a Director, who is also the NSF Director, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. They are selectedon the basis of their eminence in basic, medical, or social sciences; engineering; agriculture; education; research management; or public affairsto represent the views of the scientific and engineering leaders in all areas. The term of service 6 years and is limited to two consecutive terms. The NSB has dual responsibilities: as the national science advisor to the president and Congress and as the governing body for the NSF. Much of the work is done by committees. Meetings open to the public are held eight times a year. The NSB staff offices can be reached at 703-306-2000 or accessed at the NSF Internet Homepage [http://www.nsf.gov].
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The Division of Science Resources Studies (SRS) The SRS Division fulfills the legislative mandate of the NSF Act to provide a central clearinghouse for the collection, interpretation, and analysis of data on the availability of, and current and projected need for, scientific and technical resources in the United States and to provide a source of information for policy information by other agencies in the federal government. To carry out this mandate, the SRS Division designs, supports, and directs approximately 14 periodic surveys and several other data collections and research projects. These surveys yield the materials for SRS staff to compile, analyze, and disseminate quantitative information on domestic and international resources devoted to science and engineering and technology. Each year, the SRS Division produces approximately 30 publications, which can be roughly divided into four categories: 1. 2. 3. 4. Detailed statistical tables reports and selected data tables reports from the surveys Periodic overview reports (i.e., Science and Engineering Indicators or National Patterns of R&D Resources) Periodic reports of focused topics (i.e., International Science and Technology Data Update) Special reports.
Publications are grouped according to the NSF program office that produces them. The four groups are: 1. 2. 3. 4. R&D statistics Education statistics Science and engineering indicators and international comparisons Science and engineering work force statistics.
The SRS Division works closely with other federal agencies [i.e., the National Institutes for Health (NIH), the National Center for Education Statistics, Census Bureau (conducts many of the surveys), Bureau of Labor Statistics, Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the International Trade Administration (ITA)]. All federal agencies that perform research and development (R&D) participate in providing data for the SRS federal funds reports. The SRS Division also maintains several on-line databases that can be accessed through the Internet Homepage [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs] and computer tapes containing microdata (limited access) on respondent surveys. Also, statistics from over 70 other federal government agencies can be accessed from this Internet site. The databases include SESTAT, which is an 67
integrated system of information on employment, education, and demographics of U.S. scientists and engineers, and data briefs and reports, which summarize the findings of each survey or analytic study. MISSION AREAS The NSF has three specific mission areas in support of science and technology (S&T) in the United States: 1. 2. To serve as the national science advisor to the president and Congress, which is accomplished through the NSB To function as the nations clearinghouse for the collection, interpretation, and analysis of data on science and engineering resources, which is accomplished by the SRS Division within the NSF Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences To promote progress of science and engineering, which is accomplished through the NSF program areas.
3.
PROGRAM AREAS The NSF program areas are as follows: Biology. This program is managed by the Directorate of Biological Sciences [http://www.nsf.gov/home/bio]. Computer and Information Sciences. This program is managed by the Directorate of Computer Information and Sciences and Engineering [http://www.nsf.gov/home/cise]. Crosscutting Programs. This program [http://www.nsf.gov/home/crssprgm]. Education. This program [http://www.nsf.gov/home/ehr]. is managed is by managed the by the Directorate for for Crosscutting and Human Programs Resources
Directorate
Education
Engineering. This program is managed by the Directorate for Engineering [http://www.nsf.gov/home/eng]. Geosciences. This program is managed by the Directorate for Geosciences [http://www.nsf.gov/home/geo]. International. This program is managed by the Division of International Research and [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/int], which is part of the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences. Education
Math/Physical Sciences. This program is managed by the Directorate for Mathematics and Physical Sciences [http://www.nsf.gov/home/mps]. 68
Polar Research. This program [http://www.nsf.gov/home/polar] is managed by the Office of Polar Programs (OPP) [http://www.nsf.gov/ od/opp]. Science Statistics. This program is managed by the Division of Science Resource Studies [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs], which is part of the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences. Social/Behavioral Sciences. This program is managed by the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences [http://www.nsf.gov/ home/sbe].
PROGRAM DIRECTORATES The Directorates of the science and engineering programs do not perform actual R&D work. The NSF program staffs administer and manage programs being conducted by individuals, research centers, and other related institutions. All the Program Directorates, their operating divisions, points of contact (POCs), and activity summaries can be accessed through the NSF Internet Homepage [http://www.nsf.gov]. Some specifics on the Directorates individual activities are: Biological Sciences. This directorate fosters the understanding of the underlying principals and mechanisms governing life. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.nsf.gov/bio]. Computer Information Sciences and Engineering. This directorate supports research on the theory and foundations of computing, system software, and computer system design, as well as prototyping, testing, and development of cuttingedge computing and communications systems to address complex research problems. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.cise.nsf.gov]. Crosscutting Programs. This directorate supports work requiring the perspectives and contributions of various disciplines: programs that integrate research and education and programs that support collaborative efforts between NSF and other federal, academic, and public/private sector partners. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.nsf.gov/home/crssprgm]. Education and Human Resources. This directorate makes grants and awards in all areas of science, mathematics, and engineering education. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.ehr.nsf.gov]. Engineering. This directorate invests in engineering research in all engineering disciplines and state-of-the art manufacturing and engineering education. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.eng.nsf.gov]. 69
Geosciences. This directorate supports research in the atmospheric, earth, and ocean sciences, including resources (i.e., water, energy, minerals and biological diversity). It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.geo. nsf.gov]. Mathematics and Physical Sciences. This directorate supports research in mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and materials sciences. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.nsf.gov/mps]. Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences. This directorate supports research in social, behavioral, and economic research. It also provides tools for tracking human and institutional resources that are vital to building the nations science and engineering infrastructure. It can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe].
OTHER NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) OFFICES AND INTERNET SITES Several offices involved in NSF science and engineering activities are also assigned to the Director of NSF: the Office of Polar Programs and the Office of Science and Technology Infrastructure. Office of Polar Programs (OPP) The OPP science program recognizes the uniqueness of the polar regions as a premier natural laboratory for conducting research that can only or best be undertaken in the polar regions. These science programs approach polar research from the following three major perspectives. 1. Fundamental research to understand Earth and its systems. This includes research, programs, and activities that contribute to an understanding of the scientific questions associated specifically with the polar regions. Examples include the importance of the poles in Earths climatic heat balance and the thermohaline circulation of the polar oceans; the special adaptations of polar organisms (i.e., ice algae and ice fish); and the unique contributions of the two regions to understanding global systems (i.e., the more than 400,000-year climate record contained in ice cores). Exploration of the geographical frontier. Research programs and activities across many fields of science explore this little-known geographic frontier to advance science and education. For example, the central Arctic Ocean and the southern oceans are the least studied regions of the world oceans, especially during the winter. Science enabled by the polar setting. The Arctic and Antarctic provide opportunities or conditions that enable research that is not possible elsewhere or that can be most effectively conducted in the polar regions. For example, in both polar regions, unique conditions provide a window for astrophysical study of the origins of the universe. 70
2.
3.
Research supported by OPP ranges from individual investigator projects, through multi-disciplinary teams of researchers, to large multinational cooperative programs. Because the polar regions have a prominent role in global systems and processes and, consequently, global change research, many of the priorities focus on programs that involve investigators from many disciplines and institutions over several years. International cooperation is a hallmark of polar research. Additional information is available on the OPP Internet Homepage. OPPs Internet address is [http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp]. Office of Science and Technology Infrastructure (OSTI) OSTI, Internet address [http://www.nsf.gov/od/osti], administers the NSF Science and Technology Center (STC) program. The NSF established the STC program in 1987, as part of the Presidents State of the Union Address, to fund important basic research and education activities and to encourage technology transfer and innovative approaches to interdisciplinary program. The centers have the opportunity to explore new areas and build bridges among disciplines, institutions, and other sectors. They offer the basic research community a significant mechanism to take a longer term view of science and explore better and more effective ways to educate students. The STCs Internet address is [http://www.nsf.gov/od/osti/centers/start.htm]. Specifically, STC support enables academic research teams to: Exploit opportunities in science and engineering where the complexity of the research problems or the resources needed to solve them require the advantages of scale, duration, facilities, or collaborative relationships that can be best provided by campus-based research centers Involve students, research scientists, and engineers from academia, industry, non-profit organizations, and federal laboratories in partnerships to enhance the training and employability of professionals with an awareness of potential applications for scientific discoveries Receive long-term, stable funding at a level that encourages risk-taking and ensures a solid foundation for attracting quality undergraduate and graduate students into science and technology careers Facilitate the transfer of knowledge among academia, industry, and national laboratories.
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Presently, the 24 STCs are under the direction of 5 NSF directorates. Each of these STCs can be accessed from the Internet address [http://www.nsf.gov/od/osti/centers/ stcaward.htm]. Directorate of Biological Sciences Biological Timing Engineering Plants for Resistance Against Pathogens Molecular Biotechnology Light Microscope Imaging and Biotechnology Microbial Ecology
Directorate of Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences Research in Cognitive Science
Directorate of Computer Information Sciences and Engineering Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science Computer Graphics and Scientific Visualization Research on Parallel Computation
Directorate of Geosciences Southern California Earthquake Center Clouds, Chemistry, and Climate Astrophysical Research in Antartica Analysis and Prediction of Storms High-Pressure Research
Directorate of Mathematics and Physical Sciences Advanced Liquid Crystalline Optical Materials Superconductivity 72
Computation and Visualization of Geometric Structures High-Performance Polymeric Adhesives and Composites Quantized Electronic Structures Ultrafast Optical Science Particle Astrophysics Advanced Cement-Based Materials Synthesis, Growth, and Analysis of Electronic Materials Photoinduced Charge Transfer.
LINKS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) Links to all the NSF-funded research centers, federal laboratories, all Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), federal agencies, other U.S. science organizations, and international science organizations can be accessed through the Internet at [http://www.nsf.gov/home/external].
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X. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF): SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS REPORT

The Science and Engineering Indicators Report is mandated by the NSF Act of 1950, as amended, which required the National Science Board (NSB) to render to the president and Congressevery even-numbered yeara report that indicates the state of science and engineering in the United States. In September 1950, concern that the Korean War could turn into a protracted conflict prompted the Bureau of the Budget to commission a study by the NSF to conduct several surveys and assessments including: A comprehensive review of basic research areas being investigated in the United States, indicating the research support for these areas separately by universities, industry, and government A comparable study detailing the support for graduate and undergraduate education in the sciences and engineering at private and public agencies A quantitative study of the scientific manpower resources of the United States (e.g., scientific and technical specialties, degrees of proficiency, level of education, and so forth) A review of basic research activities in government agencies.
Many of these objectives were included in the early versions of the Science and Engineering Indicators Report. The initial goal of the report was to describe major scientific advances and technology achievements and to gauge the contributions of science and technology (S&T) to national goals and to the national welfare. Additional requirements for the report have been effected by the changing national and international commitments, changing national priorities, and the need for better accountability in the public sector. The changes have increased the need to better understand and measure past trends and current levels of effort and capabilities in science and engineering and to monitor international trends in S&T. The report now provides a useful benchmark to measure the performance of the nations science and engineering enterprise and has continually expanded its coverage of international S&T activities.
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The Science and Engineering Indicators Report has detailed statistics and analysis of trends covering: Elementary and secondary education in science and mathematics and higher education in science and engineering The science and engineering work force Research and development (R&D): financial resources and institutional linkages Academic R&D: infrastructure and performance Technology development and diffusion Economic and social significance of scientific and engineering research.
The NSF Science and Engineering Indicators Report is a reference document and a policy document that serves a much broader audience, including decision-makers in government, industry, academia, non-profit organizations, and professional societies. One of the continuing objectives of this report is to identify and follow changes in the science and engineering fields over time to reveal strengths and potential problems. A second objective of the report is to enhance the worldwide dissemination of S&T data and analysis. The Science and Engineering Indicators Report can be accessed on the Internet at the NSF Internet Homepage [http://www.nsf.gov] or directly using the address [http://www.nsf. gov/sbe/srs/seind].
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XI. NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL (NSTC)

The NSTC, a cabinet-level council, is the principal means for the president to coordinate science, space, and technology policies across the federal government. It acts as a virtual agency for science and technology (S&T) to coordinate the diverse parts of the federal research and development (R&D) enterprise. It is chaired by the president. Membership consists of the vice president, cabinet secretaries, agency heads with significant science and technology (S&T) responsibilities, the assistant to the president for S&T, and other White House officials. The NSTC was established by Executive Order 12882 in November 1993. It consolidates the responsibilities of several interagency councils [e.g., the Federal Coordinating Council of Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET), the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the National Critical Materials Council]. It is charged with looking forward to next century and projecting a vision and a strategy for federal R&D enterprises. The NSTCs main objective is to establish clear national goals for federal S&T investments in areas ranging from information technologies and health research to improving transportation systems and strengthening fundamental research. It prepares R&D strategies that are coordinated across federal agencies to form an investment package aimed at accomplishing multiple national goals. To orient S&T toward achieving national goals, nine goal-orientated committees were established to prepare coordinated R&D strategies and budget recommendations: 1. 2. 3. 4. Committee on Health, Safety, and Food Committee on Fundamental Science Committee on Computing, Information, and Communications Committee on Environment and Natural Sciences
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5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Committee on Technological Innovation Committee on Education and Training Committee on Transportation Committee on National Security Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology.
Each committee is chaired by a senior official or officials from a federal agency/department and is co-chaired by a White House/Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Senate-confirmed Associate Director. In addition to the nine standing committees, the NSTC establishes ad hoc working groups as needed to review and coordinate specific policies and programs. NSTCs Internet address is [http://www1.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/NSTC/ html/NSTC_Home.html]. publications can be viewed at this address. A key document is the Executive Summary of (year) Strategic Plans. NSTC
For more information or to obtain copies of NSTC documents, contact the OSTP Executive Secretariat Office at 202-4566100. To request a copy of a specific report, send a blank e-mail message to (Report-Abbreviation) [exsum@nstc.eop.gov].
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XII. NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE (NTIS)

The NTIS is a non-appropriated bureau within the Technology Administration of the Department of Commerce (DOC). It serves as the nations clearinghouse for unrestricted research and development (R&D) results and other information produced by and for the U.S. government. It collects scientific, technical, engineering, and business-related information and then organizes, maintains, and disseminates this information in several formats. It is the nations largest central resource and primary disseminator of information produced by the government and worldwide, mainly from government sources. All costs associated with collecting, abstracting, indexing, archiving, reproducing, and disseminating the information NTIS collects are paid from sales of its products and services. Products include information on audio cassettes, videotapes, printed technical reports, periodicals, on-line via Internet, computer tapes and diskettes, and compact discs (CDs). In 1945, the Publications Board was established to review all government-generated scientific and technical research documents produced in World War II and to determine what documents could be released to U.S. industry and the general public. In 1950, the DOC was directed to operate a clearinghouse to collect and distribute scientific and technical information. In 1970, the clearinghouse was re-established as NTIS. Since 1970, NTIS has published a regular index of government-sponsored research reports. NTISs mission is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. R&D enterprise, increase productivity and innovation in the United States, and increase U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. The NTIS information collection covers more than 375 scientific, technical, engineering, and business-related subjects collected from more than 200 U.S. government agencies and organizations including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Institutes for Health (NIH), and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DOC), Defense (DoD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Interior (DOI), Labor (DOL), and Transportation (DOT). 79
NTIS does not manage or disseminate classified or limited access information. It is the leading U.S. government agency in international technical and business information exchange. The American Technology Preeminence Act (Public Law 102-245), passed in 1991, requires all U.S. government agencies and their contractors to submit to NTIS their federally funded scientific, technical and engineering information within 15 days of the date the product is made publicly available. For more information on NTIS products/orders, call 703-487-4650. For on-line help, call 703-487-4640. The NTIS products catalog is on-line and can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.ntis.gov/search.htm]. INFORMATION TOOLS National Technical Information Service (NTIS) Web Page Information on NTIS and its products and services can be accessed on the Internet. NTISs Internet address is [http://www.ntis.gov]. NTIS also has a science and technology (S&T) Homepage at [http://www.ntis.gov/scitech/scitech.htm]. Subscriptions NTIS offers numerous printed and on-line subscriptions [http://www.ntis. gov/online.htm] to provide up-to-date listings on the most recent published findings for many subject matter areas. Some of the NTIS information most useful for S&T research efforts are: NTIS OrderNow. NTIS OrderNow is a web-based service for users to identify and purchase key research products sponsored by the U.S. government. The NTIS OrderNow Online Internet address is [http://chaos.fedworld. gov/ordernow]. This service is also offered on a CD, with information covering the last 2 years. The CD version is updated quarterly. For information about the NTIS OrderNow CD, go to Internet address [http://www.ntis. gov/ordnowcd.htm]. World News Connection (WNC). WNC provides information on-line from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) that monitors news items from around the world. WNC can cover a specific region or country and includes opensource and gray literature on scientific, technical, and environmental issues. For information about WNC, go to Internet address [http://wnc.fedworld.gov].
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NTIS Alerts. NTIS Alerts provides a twice monthly update (a paper product) covering a wide range of technology topics of the latest R&D reports and studies not readily available from other sources. It includes U.S. government sources from over 100 countries worldwide. NTIS Alerts Internet address is [http://www.ntis.gov/yellowbk/1nty169.htm]. NTIS database. NTIS provides information through conventional and emerging dissemination methods. The bibliographic database can be searched either on-line or from a CD. The bibliographic database contains summaries of scientific, technical, engineering, and business information acquired from 1964 to the present. This information available as printed reports, videos, software, and data filesrepresents hundreds of billions of dollars of research sponsored by the United States and foreign governments and is permanently available. Numerous printed and electronic awareness services are available to provide researchers, educators, and managers the most current government information. Most libraries have access to the database, which is also available through commercial services. The NTIS databases Internet address is [http://www.ntis.gov/ntisdb.htm]. Some of the databases of interest are: Energy Science and Technology Database (EDB). EDB is a multidisciplinary file containing worldwide references to basic and applied scientific and technical research literature. The information is collected for government managers, researchers at national laboratories, and other research efforts sponsored by the U.S. DOE. EDBs Internet address is [http://grc.ntis.gov/energy.htm]. AgroBase database. The AgroBase database combines two of the worlds most comprehensive databases on agriculture: the Agriculture On-line Access (AGRICOLA) database and the Agricultural Science and Technology (AGRIS) database. AgroBase benefits from a composite record technology that combines duplicate records (citations) from different databases into one record while maintaining all the unique information of the original records. The AgroBase database Internet address is [http://grc.ntis.gov/agrobase.htm]. Agriculture On-line Access (AGRICOLA) database. The AGRICOLA database provides a comprehensive source of agriculture and life science information. It also contains bibliographic records for documents acquired by the USDAs National Agricultural Library (NAL). Agricultural Science and Technology (AGRIS) database. AGRIS is a cooperative system for collecting and disseminating information on the worlds agricultural literature in which over 100 national and multinational centers take part.
Federal Research in Progress (FEDRIP) database. The FEDRIP database provides advance information for more than 150,000 ongoing federally funded research projects in the fields of physical sciences, engineering, and life 81
sciences from 12 non-defense-related government sources, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), NIST, NASA, U.S. Geological Survey, Transportation Research Board, EPA, Department of Veteran Affairs, DOE, and NIH. Each FEDRIP entry summarizes a research project: its objectives, funding interim findings, principal investigator, and sponsoring organization. Currently, this database can only be accessed through commercial databases (i.e., DIALOG, Knowledge Express Data Systems, and NERAC). FEDRIPs Internet address is [http://grc.ntis.gov/fedrip.htm]. NTIS Published Services. NTIS Published Services are bibliographies that contain 50 to 250 of the latest abstracts for research reports and studies available from the U.S. government and worldwide database sources. Experienced information specialists prepare search strategies to produce the most-up-to-date and relevant data available. With each new request (order), a new search is run, and a completely updated bibliography is produced. A catalog of published research titles will be available on-line through FedWorld and accessible through the Internet. FedWorld information network. FedWorld serves as a platform that affords agencies the opportunity to host data and communications [i.e., electronic commerce, electronic data interchange (EDI), and virtual conferences]. It also offers an on-line, dial-up, or Internet government information locator service that offers access to government information resources, including gateways that connect users with more than 300 government files, documents, and databases. FedWorlds goal is to provide a one-stop location that will enable the public to locate, order, and have delivered U.S. government information. Currently, FedWorldwhich offers special on-line subscription servicesprovides access to over 100 government dial-up bulletin boards, most of which are not available via the Internet. FedWorlds Internet address is [http://www.fedworld.gov]. Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI) and Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support (CALS) resource locator. EC/EDI and CALS resource locator provides help to identify, locate, and link to no-cost Internet world wide web, file transfer protocol (FTP), Gopher, Telnet, and mailing list sites relating EC/EDI and CALS. CALS covers a wide range of DoD and other federal agencies and civil and foreign governments. This resource locator can be accessed through the NTIS FedWorld Internet site at [http://www.fedworld.gov].
Sites Some specific sites of interest for S&T and R&D information are: WorldtecTM. WorldtecTM and WorldtecTM Briefs are international S&T alert services offered by the U.S. government. WorldtecTM offers time-sensitive and retrospective information gathered from several dozen U.S. and non-U.S. sources. 82
WorldtecTM enables users to browse hundreds of business-related communications from U.S. embassies and international program offices. International S&T content is gleaned from speeches, seminars and workshops, internships, meetings and visits, articles, abstracts from newspapers, periodicals, and books. All material is presented in English. The WorldtecTM Internet address is [http://worldtec.fedworld.gov]. Government Information Locator Service (GILS). GILS identifies public information sources throughout the U.S. government, describes the information available, and provides assistance in obtaining the information. GILS was established under direction of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No 95-01 and is a goal of the national information infrastructure agenda. The NTIS GILS Internet address is [http://www. fedworld.gov/gils].
Information Services Some information services offered by NTIS are (see NTIS Homepage at [http://www.ntis.gov]): NTIS on-line searching help desk. This service assists users in their on-line searches of NTIS databases. NTIS Fax Direct. NTIS Fax Direct distributes targeted lists of scientific, technical, engineering, and business information directly to a customers fax machine. Prepackaged NTIS Alerts. Prepackaged NTIS Alerts provides the same service as NTIS Fax Direct for 26 subject areas, many of which are defense related, to monitor a broad subject area (i.e., combustion; engines and propellants; space technology; ordnance; navigation, guidance, and control; and detection and countermeasures). Selected Research in Microfiche (SRIM). SRIM automatically sends subscribers microfiche copies of the full text of reports for a minimal charge. Subscribers can select from 350 subject areas. As new reports enter the collection in a field selected by the subscriber, microfiche copies are sent immediately, often before their availability is announced. NTIS offers a custom SRIM service to create a profile of special interest in any of the fields selected. OrderNow. OrderNOW is an on-line ordering system that provides access to approximately 20,000 of the newest items NTIS has to offer. It covers a 90-day period.
JOINT VENTURE PROGRAM NTIS has entered into several business relationships with commercial companies to provide on-line S&T information that is normally available through library reference services (i.e., DIALOG and Knowledge Express). 83
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XIII. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP)

OSTP was created in 1976 to provide the president with timely policy advice and to coordinate the science and technology (S&T) investment. Through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), OSTP helps the president coordinate science, space, and technology policy and programs across the federal government. The Presidents Committee on Science and Technology (PCAST) ensures public sector involvement in the work of OSTP and NSTC. OSTP plays a key role in advancing the presidents agenda in fundamental science, education, and scientific literacy. The OSTP is led by a Director and four Associate Directors, all of whom are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. OSTPs responsibilities are to: Advise the president and Executive Branch in policy and budget development on all questions related to S&T Lead inter-agency efforts to develop and implement S&T policies and budgets across all federal agencies Coordinate the federal governments research and development (R&D) efforts to maximize the return on the publics S&T investment Foster strong partnerships among federal, state, and local governments and the scientific community in industry and academia Communicate the presidents S&T policies and programs to Congress Address the need for appropriate resources Advance international cooperation in S&T.
OSTPs Internet address is [http://www.whitehouse.gov/OSTP.html].
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The White House S&T documents and subscription information is available on the Internet. Documents can be viewed on the Internet or received via e-mail. The e-mail address is [Publications@pub.whitehouse.gov]. The Internet Homepage is [http://www. pub.whitehouse]. ORGANIZATION OSTP is organized into four divisions. Environment Division This divisions policy areas include global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, deforestation, pesticides and toxic substances, urban and regional air quality, environmental technologies, water quality, hazardous and solid waste, natural hazards, and marine pollution. The divisions goal is to ensure a sound and technical underpinning for environmental policies and an interagency R&D strategy for environment and natural resource issues. The Environment Divisions Internet address is [http://www. whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/Environment/html/Environment.html]. National Security and International Affairs Division This division leads the White House effort to use S&T for our national security and to shape and coordinate international cooperation in S&T. The national policy areas include defense technology investments, technical aspects of arms control and nonproliferation policy, technology transfer and related export control policies, and intelligence technology. The international agenda includes strengthening American S&T, using international cooperation to support economic goals, and advancing international cooperation in large-scale S&T programs. The National Security and International Affairs Divisions Internet address is [http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/Security/html/Security.html]. Science Division This division focuses on maintaining a broad federal research program that advances the frontiers of knowledge, is based on excellence, is strongly coupled to education, and is supportive of critical national goals. The objectives are to ensure that the United States maintains global leadership in science, mathematics, and engineering and that science continues to provide support for the 86
successful resolution of pressing national problems in health, agriculture, the economy, energy, social well-being, education, and national security. The Science Divisions Internet address is [http://www.whitehouse.gov/ WH/EOP/OSTP/Science/html/Science.html]. Technology Division This divisions goals are to help develop and implement federal policies for harnessing technology to serve national goals (i.e., global competitiveness, environmental quality, and national security). The divisions areas of responsibility are to redirect the U.S. space and aeronautics program, including the Space Station; sustain U.S. leadership in defense technology while increasing the focus on dual-use and civil technologies; advance technologies for education; and facilitate the development and adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies and advanced computing and communication technologies. The Technology Divisions Internet address is [http://www.whitehouse.gov/ WH/EOP/OSTP/Technology/html/Technology.html].
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XIV. PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (PCAST)

PCAST serves as the highest level private-sector advisory group for the president and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), a cabinet-level council chaired by the president. The committee membersdistinguished individuals appointed by the presidentare drawn from industry, education, research institutions, and other non-governmental organizations. The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (S&T) [Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)] and a private sector member selected by the president co-chair the committee. President Clinton established PCAST in 1993 by Executive Order 12882, at the same time he established the NSTC. The formal link between NSTC and PCAST is to ensure that national needs remain an overarching guide for the NSTC. PCASTSs role is to advise the presidentdirectly or through the Director of OSTPon issues of S&T and their roles in achieving national goals. PCAST provides feedback on federal programs to ensure that the private sector perspective is included in the policy-making process and actively advises NSTC on S&T issues of national importance. PCAST also assists the NSTC in securing private sector participation in its activities. PCAST has drawn up the following set of principles as a framework for difficult choices in the allocation of scarce budgetary resources. S&T has been a major factor in the American economy and our quality of life and will be of greater importance in the years ahead. Public support for S&T should be considered an investment in the future. Education and training in science, mathematics, and engineering are crucial to Americas future. The federal government should continue to support S&T research by investing in universities, research institutions, and national laboratories. 89
The federal investment portfolio in S&T must support basic and applied research, including the development of precompetitive technologies in cooperation with private sector and for national needs. Stable funding, based on long-range planning, is essential for the effective and efficient use of the federal investment in research and its associated educational function and for enhancing international collaboration.
The PCAST Executive Secretariat Office at 202-456-6100 is the point of contact (POC) for more information on PCAST and for ordering unclassified PCAST reports. Information about PCAST can also be found on the Internet. PCASTs Internet address is [http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/NSTC/PCAST/pcast.html].
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XV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (RaDiUS)

RaDiUS is the only comprehensive database of federally funded research and development (R&D) in the United States. It permits authorized users to track federal R&D activities on the Internet. These activities range from cabinet- and agency-level budgets and the dollars invested annually to R&D at the program, project, and award/task levels. RaDiUS was developed by the Critical Technologies Institute (CTI), a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) operated by RAND. It provides analytic support to the White House Office of Science and Technology (OSTP) and the presidents National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to ensure that the federal S&T investment meets critical national goals. RaDiUS includes only those activities that involve the expenditure of officially designated R&D dollars, as defined by agencies in applying the definitions contained in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11. Procurement funds spent to support a contractors independent research and development (IR&D) efforts, for example, would not be included. RaDiUS contains aggregate and detailed information on the nature and amount of federal resources devoted to conducting R&D. It does not include information on spending for capital improvements or construction of R&D facilities, since these constitute one-time expenditures rather than continuing programs. RaDiUS has been designed to reflect the process by which federal goals and dollars are translated into actual R&D work. The R&D goals articulated by the federal government are transformed into the R&D objectives of individual federal organizations and eventually become the day-to-day work of scientist and engineers. RaDiUS systematically details the flow of federal R&D dollars through several stages: from Congressional appropriation accounts, to central points in ever-smaller units in the federal organizational hierarchy, to the hands of those actually performing the R&Dinside and outside the federal government. RaDiUS allows users to explore the overall scope of the R&D activities and investments made by the federal government across all federal agencies; compare
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and contrast the R&D activities and resources invested in specific science and technology (S&T) areas of various federal agencies; and examine in detail the R&D investment decisions and activities of specific federal agencies. Although the federal government spends over $70 billion every fiscal year on R&D, OSTP and other federal policy-makers have not always had the means to investigate how much the federal government is spending each S&T area. Historically, the only information available to address this question was incomplete and outdated. The information was compiled retrospectively, using traditional survey techniques yielding information that was often 2 or 3 years old at the time of its release. This lack of visibility was compounded by the fact that agencies did not follow a standard format in reporting R&D information. RaDiUS has been designed by identifying various existing federal information sources containing R&D data; by designing an organizational framework to merge data into a common, relational database; and by creating an on-line database that can be searched easily. In five levels of detail, RaDiUS describes the nature of the R&D activity and provides information on the funds devoted to each activity. Levels 1 through 4 are ever finer slices of the Budget Authority of the bureaucratic structure responsible for federal R&D. Level 5 records the actual awards or taskings made to contractors, grant recipients, or government laboratories. Although the dollars carried on these records are mostly obligations, some are actual costs. Each cabinet level or agency has a separate organizational hierarchy within RaDiUS. For example, the five levels tracked for DoD are as follows: Level 1 is the Department of Defense (DoD) Level 2 is the military Service/Defense Agency Level 3 is the program element (PE) Level 4 is the projects under the PEs Level 5 is the awards or tasks to whomever is performing the work.
For another agency [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)], the five levels tracked are as follows: Level 1 is NASA Level 2 is major systems/programs Level 3 is the sub-program 92
Level 4 is individual divisions Level 5 is the performing contractor by NASA center.
Access to RaDiUS has been limited to OSTP but is now being offered to other parts of the federal government under OSTPs guidance. All restrictions carried on the RaDiUS data were placed on these data by the federal agencies from whom the data were obtained. It does not contain classified information; however, it does contain information that is considered sensitive and thereby exempt from the Freedom in Information Act (FOIA). Users permitted to access the restricted data are screened in consultation with the appropriate federal agencies during an authentication process and are allowed only to access those records that the federal agencies will permit them to see. CTI-RAND expects that RaDiUS will be available for use by federal contractors (i.e., FFRDCs) in the near future. RaDiUS Information can be obtained from CTI-RAND at 202-842-5922 or by e-mail at [radius@rand.org]. Information is also available on the Internet. RaDiUSs Internet address is [http://www.rand.org/radius].
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XVI. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)

The USDA is charged with a broad mandate that covers a regulatory mission; food safety and inspections; animal and plant health inspections; programs that promote and support consumer services; farm subsidies and social programs; stewardship of natural resources; rural economic development; and agricultural research and market forecasting. The USDA is one of the top federal agencies in total research and development (R&D) funding authority, with a total of $1,378 billion authorized for FY 1998. Nearly all the USDA R&D programs support basic and applied research programs. The USDA has seven major services or program organizations with R&D concentrated in agricultural research, food safety, nutrition, pest management, and land conservation. Although most of USDAs R&D activities are not directly related to Department of Defense (DoD) science and technology (S&T) programs or acquisition interests, the USDA is an abundant information resource for critical topic areas of interest to the military Servicesincluding planners, management offices, and program offices. USDA organizations, subordinate agencies/organizations, mission statements, mandates, organizational hierarchy, program information, and so forth are accessible on the Internet. USDAs Internet address is [http://www.usda.gov]. For specific Information of USDA major program areas, the following list of Internet addresses is provided. The USDA Homepage [http://www.usda.gov] provides more information. Research, Education, and Environment Agricultural Research Service (ARS). The ARS provides access to agricultural information and develops new knowledge and technology needed to solve technical agricultural problems of broad scope and high national priority. The agency maintains a network of geographically dispersed national and overseas laboratories. The ARS also maintains the National Agricultural Library (NAL). The ARSs Internet address is [http://www.ars.usda.gov].
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National Agricultural Library (NAL). The NAL is one of four national libraries and has a mission to increase the availability and use of agricultural information for researchers, educators, policy-makers, consumers of agricultural products, and the public. The NAL is the nations primary source for agricultural information and serves as the U.S. center for international agricultural information. The NALs Internet address is [http://www.nalusda.gov]. Some key resources within the NAL are: Technical Service Division (TSD). TSDs mission is to identify, select, acquire, and provide bibliographic and subject access to agricultural publications and other related disciplines. It is charged with building a collection of the worlds agricultural information, serving as the official repository for USDA publications, and disseminating information through Agriculture On-line Access (AGRICOLA) and other databases. The TSDs Internet address is [http://www.nalusda.gov/tsd]. Agriculture On-line Access (AGRICOLA). AGRICOLA is a bibliographic database consisting of literature citations for journal articles, monographs, proceedings, theses, patents, translations, audiovisual material, and related subjects from 1970 to the present. On-line access is available through commercial vendors and compact disc-read only memory (CD-ROM)/magnetic tapes that can be purchased from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) (see Section XII). AGRICOLAs Internet address is [http://www. nalusda.gov/general_info/agricola/agricola.html]. NAL information centers. The NAL has nine subject-specific information centers that provide customized services. Through the Internet, the centers provide access to digital information, including images, databases, software, patents, bibliographies, and resource guides. They also provide subject matter expertise and standardized information and perform extensive outreach and collaborative activities. 1. 2. 3. 4. Agricultural Trade and Marketing Information Center (ATMIC). [http://www. nalusda.gov/atmic/index.html]. Alternative Farming Systems Information Center (AFSIC). [http://www.nalusda. gov/afsic/index.html]. Animal Welfare Information Center [http://www.nalusda.gov/awic/ index.html]. Biotechnology Information Center [http://www.nalusda.gov/bic/index.html]. 96 (AWIC). (BIC). ATMICs Internet address is AFSICs Internet address is Internet Internet address address is is
AWICs BICs
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Food and Nutrition Information [http://www.nalusda.gov/fnic/ index.html].
Center
(FNIC).
FNICs
Internet
address
is
Plant Genome Data and Information Center (PGDIC). [http://www.nalusda.gov/pgdic/index.html]. Rural Information Center (RIC) and RIC Health Services (RICHS). RIC and RICHSs Internet address is [http://www.nalusda.gov/ric/richs/index.html]. Technology Transfer Information [http://www.nalusda.gov/ttic/ index.html]. Center (TTIC). TTICs WQICs Internet Internet address address is is
Water Quality Information Center [http://www.nalusda.gov/wqic/index.html].
(WQIC).
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES). CSREES provides the focus to advance a global system of research extension and higher education in the food and agricultural sciences and related environmental and human sciences to benefit people, communities, and the nation. CSREES emphasizes partnerships with the public and private sectors to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources. CSREES programs increase and provide access to scientific knowledge; strengthen the capabilities of land-grant and other institutions in research, extension, and higher education; increase access to and use of improved communication and network systems; and promote informed decision-making by producers, families, communities, and other customers. CSREESs Internet address is [http://www.reeusda.gov]. Economic Research Service (ERS). ERS provides economic analysis on efficiency, efficacy, and equity issues related to agriculture, food, the environment, and rural development to improve public and private decision-making. ERS is one of four agencies in the USDAs Research, Education, and Economics (REE) Mission Area. ERSs Internet address is [http://www.econ.ag.gov]. National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). NASS serves the nation, its agriculture, and its rural communities by providing meaningful, timely, accurate, and objective statistical information and services. Through its Washington, DC, headquarters and 45 field offices serving all 50 states, NASS publishes hundreds of reports. Some reports include production and prospects for crops, livestock, dairy, and poultry, and other reports focus on stocks, prices, labor, weather, chemical use, and similar items that concern farmers, ranchers and others involved in, or affected by, agriculture. NASSs Internet address is [http://www.usda.gov/nass].
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Farm and Agricultural Service Farm Service Agency (FSA). The FAS ensures the well-being of American agriculture, the environment, and the American public through efficient and equitable administration of farm commodity programs; farm ownership, operating, and emergency loans; conservation and environmental programs; emergency and disaster assistance; domestic and international food assistance; and international export credit programs. These programs provide a safety net to help farmers produce an adequate food supply, maintain viable operations, compete for export sales of commodities in the world marketplace, and contribute to the year-round availability of low-cost, safe, and nutritious foods. The FSAs Internet address is [http://www.fsa.usda.gov]. Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). FAS serves U.S. agricultures international interests by expanding export opportunities for U.S. agricultural, fish, and forest products and promoting world food security. FASs Internet address is [http://www.fas.usda.gov]. Risk Management Agency. Through its Research and Evaluation Division, the Risk Management Agency researches, develops, and pilots new crop programs, plans of insurance, and risk management strategies; evaluates and makes recommendations for improvement of existing crop programs, plans of insurance, and risk management strategies; and coordinates the development and support for specialty crop programs. The Risk Management Agencys Internet address is [http://www.act. fcic.usda.gov]. The Research and Evaluation Divisions Internet address is [http://www.act.fcic.usda.gov/research/index.html].
Natural Resources and Environment Forest Service. The Forest Servicethe largest forestry research organization in the worldmanages public lands in national forests and grasslands. It provides technical and financial assistance to state and private forestry agencies. Congress established the Forest Service in 1905 to provide quality water and timber for the nations benefit. Over the years, the public has expanded the list of what they want from national forests and grasslands. Congress has responded by directing the Forest Service to manage national forests for additional multiple uses and benefits and for the sustained yield of renewable resources (i.e., water, forage, wildlife, wood, and recreation). Multiple use means managing resources under the best combination of uses to benefit the American people while ensuring the productivity of the land and protecting the quality of the environment. The Forest Services Internet address is [http://www.fs.fed.us]. Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). The NRCS works in partnership with the American people to conserve and sustain our natural resources. The NRCSs Internet address is [http://www.nrcs.usda.gov]. 98
Documentation and Reporting Systems Current Research Information System (CRIS). CRIS is the USDAs computer-based documentation and reporting system for ongoing and recently completed research projects in agriculture, food and nutrition, and forestry. CRIS is designed to provide ready access to information on research conducted primarily within USDA and the state agricultural research system. It contains approximately 30,000 descriptions of current, publicly supported research projects, with approximately 4,000 new projects and 20,000 progress and publication reports added annually. CRIS is updated weekly. Projects are conducted by or sponsored by the USDAs research agencies, state agricultural experimentation stations, the land-grant university system, other cooperating state institutions, and participants in the USDA National Research Initiative Competitive Grants program. CRISs Internet address is [http://cristel.nal.usda.gov:8080].
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Table 1. DTIC Database Accessibility and Availability

DROLS 1 (On-Line Access) TR Bibliographic WUIS IR&D TR GUI (DROLS Asynchronous Users Only) TR Bibliographic WUIS DGIS 2 (On-Line Access) TR Bibliographic (accessible through Public STINET) Public STINET (Internet Access) TR Bibliographic Secure STINET (Internet Access) TR Bibliographic. No abstracts WUIS [active records (5 years)] GoldenGate (Internet Access) TR Bibliographic WUIS IR&D Database on CD-ROM (DoD Only) IR&D
Features Coverage of DTICs Databases
TR Database on CD-ROM TR Bibliographic (no IAC citations)
Classification Level
Unclassified and classified citations to documents up to the Secret level (dependent upon user authorization)
Unclassified and classified citations to documents up to the Secret level (dependent upon user authorization)
Citations to unclassified/ unlimited documents
Citations to unclassified/ unlimited documents
Citations to unclassified/l imited technical reports and WUIS active records (dependent upon user authorization)
Unclassified citations up to Secret level (dependent upon user authorization)
Unclassified citations to documents up to Secret level (authorization required for access to export-controlled data)
Unclassified; company proprietary data (access limited to DoD and NASA only)
Number of Records
Over 2.1 million
Over 2 million
Nearly 350,000
Nearly 350,000
Over 450,000
Over 2 million
Over 1.3 million
Over 3800+ records 3
Years Covered
All years (as far back as World War I)
Last 11 years
Last 11 years
Last 11 years (TR); last 5 years (WUIS)
1993present (one year per CD-ROM)
Training Courses (Free)
In-house or onsite (3 days)
Not required; DROLS training can be helpful for effective use
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
Not required
100
Table 1. DTIC Database Accessibility and Availability (Continued)

DROLS (On-Line Access) Boolean logic Native DROLS language TR GUI (DROLS Asynchronous Users Only) Boolean logic Windows environment DGIS (On-Line Access) Boolean logic WAIS Public STINET (Internet Access) Boolean logic WAIS Secure STINET (Internet Access) Boolean logic WAIS GoldenGate (Internet Access) Boolean logic Windows environment Native DROLS language or Common Command Language IR&D Database on CD-ROM (DoD Only) Boolean logic Windows environment Natural language
Features Searching Capabilities
TR Database on CD-ROM Boolean logic Mnemonics
Minimum Experience Required
Intermediate (requires training)
Novice
Novice
Novice
Novice
Novice
Novice
Novice
Ordering Capabilities
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Costs
$125/year $40/per connect hour
GUI software free with DROLS registration $125/year, plus $40/per connect hour charges
$100 per year/ per subscription Includes Public STINET No connect hour charge
Free
$50 per year/per subscriber
$50 per subscriber 4 Group rate: $50 for first, $20 each additional subscriber $20 per subscriber each additional year
$600 for four quarterly issues
$50 for requesters outside the military Services and NASA
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Table 1. DTIC Database Accessibility and Availability (Continued)

DROLS (On-Line Access) Satisfies regulatory requirements for searching DTICs databases 05302130 M, T, Th, F (Wed.: 0730 2130) TR GUI (DROLS Asynchronous Users Only) 05302130 M, T, Th, F (Wed.: 0730 2130) WUIS GUI under development DGIS (On-Line Access) Available 24 hrs/day Internet access includes email Internet access is character based Public STINET (Internet Access) Available 24 hrs/day Directories to DoD sources Limited selection of full-text electronic reports Secure STINET (Internet Access) Available 24 hrs/day Directories to DoD sources Limited selection of full-text electronic reports News services GoldenGate (Internet Access) Gateway to government and commercial databases TR and WUIS databases available 05302130 M, T, Th, F (Wed.: 0730 2130) IR&D Database on CD-ROM (DoD Only) Updated semiannually
Features Other Attributes
TR Database on CD-ROM Updated quarterly
Note 1 for Table 1: Must be used before start of a new RDT&E program Note 2 for Table 1: Using Lynx (character based) Note 3 for Table 1: Projects, overviews, and financial summaries Note 4 for Table 1: Separate DROLS registration required
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103
GLOSSARY
GL-1
GL-2
GLOSSARY
A
ABIS ACTD ADD AEPTR AFMC AFSIC AGARD AGRICOLA AGRIS AHCPR AHDD AIC AMC AMPTIAC ARC ARS ATP ATSD NCB Advanced Battlespace Information System advanced concept technology demonstration Automatic Document Distribution Advanced Energy Products and Technology Research Division Air Force Materiel Command Alternative Farming Systems Information Center Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (NATO) Agriculture On-line Access Agricultural Science and Technology Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Automatic Hardcopy Document Distribution Aquaculture Information Center Army Materiel Command Advanced Materials and Process Technology Information Analysis Center Ames Research Center Agricultural Research Service Advanced Technology Program Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
GL-3
ATD ATMIC ATP ATSDR AWIC
advanced technology demonstration Agricultural Trade and Marketing Information Center Advanced Technology Program Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Animal Welfare Information Center
B
BEA BIC BFRL BMD BMDO BRP BXA Bureau of Economic Analysis Biotechnology Information Center Building and Fire Research Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Basic Research Plan Bureau of Export Administration (DOC)
C
C2 CAB CALS CASI CBIAC CD-ROM CDC CFO CIA command and control Current Awareness Bibliography Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support Center for Aerospace Information Chemical Warfare/Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center compact disc-read only memory Center for Disease Control Chief Financial Officer Central Intelligence Agency
GL-4
CINC COSSI CP/CBD CPIA CPRC CRIS CRSTIAC CSERIAC CSREES CSTL CTI CY
Commander in Chief Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiatives The Office of Counterproliferation/ Chemical and Biological Defense Chemical Propulsion Information Agency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Current Research Information System Cold Regions Science and Technology Information Analysis Center Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service Chemical Science and Technology Laboratory Critical Technologies Institute calendar year
D
DAB DACS DARPA DDR&E DELG DFRC DMSO DMSTTIAC DOA DOC Defense Acquisition Board Data and Analysis Center for Software Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Director, Defense Research and Engineering Defense Export Loan Guarantee Dryden Flight Research Center Defense Modeling & Simulation Office Defense Modeling, Simulation, and Tactical Technology Information Analysis Center Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce
GL-5
DoD DOE DOI DOL DOS DOT DP DREN DROLS DSN DTAP DTIC DT&E DTIW DTO DUAP DUSD I&CP DUSD (Space) DVBID
Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of Interior Department of Labor Department of State Department of Transportation Defense Programs Defense Research and Engineering Network Defense RDT&E Online System Deep Space Network Defense Technology Area Plan Defense Technical Information Center Development, Test and Evaluation Defense Technical Information Web Defense Technology Objective Dual-Use Applications Program Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases
E
E-SCAN EAC EC/EDI ECAB Electronic Selected Current Aerospace Notices Engineering and Analytical Center Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange Electronic Current Awareness Bibliography
GL-6
EDA EDB EE EEEL EIA EOS EPA EPUB ERS ESE ETDE
Economic Development Administration Energy Science and Technology Database Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Electronics and Electrical Engineering Laboratory Energy Information Administration Earth Observing System Environmental Protection Agency Electronic Publishing System Economic Research Service Earth Science Enterprise Energy Technology Data Exchange
F
FAA FAS FBIS FCCSET FDA FEDRIP FFRDC FNIC FOIA FSA FTP FY Federal Aviation Administration Foreign Agricultural Service Foreign Broadcast Information Service Federal Coordinating Council of Science, Engineering, and Technology Food and Drug Administration Federal Research in Progress Federally Funded Research and Development Center Food and Nutrition Information Center Freedom in Information Act Farm Service Agency file transfer protocol fiscal year
GL-7
FYDP
Fiscal Year Development Program
G
GACIAC GILS GPS GSFC GUI Guidance and Control Information Analysis Center Government Information Locator Service Global Positioning System Goddard Space Flight Center graphical user interface
H
HEDSE HHS HPC HPCC HPCMP Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise Health and Human Services high-performance computing High-Performance Computing and Communications High-Performance Computing Modernization Program
I
IAC IAEA IAIN IATAC ICSTI IEA IGM INIS IR&D Information and Analysis Center International Atomic Energy Agency International Aerospace Information Network Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center International Council for Scientific and Technical Information International Energy Agency Internet Grateful Med International Nuclear Information System independent research and development
GL-8
IRIA ISO ITA
Infrared Information Analysis Center International Standards Organization International Trade Administration
J
JCS JPL JSC JWSTP Joint Chiefs of Staff Jet Propulsion Laboratory Johnson Space Center Joint Warfighter S&T Plan
K
KSC Kennedy Space Center
L
LaRC LeRC LHNCBC LM&TT Langley Research Center Lewis Research Center Lister National Center for Biomedical Communications Laboratory Management and Technology Transition
M
M&S ManTech MATRIS MCTL MEDLARS MEDLINE modeling and simulation Manufacturing Technology Program Manpower and Training Research Information System Militarily Critical Technologies List Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System MEDlars onLine
GL-9
MEL MEP MILSATCOM MMS MPT/HF MSEL MSFC MSOSA MSRR MTIAC
Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory Manufacturing Extension Partnership Military Satellite Communications MEDLARS Management Section manpower, personnel, training, and human factors Materials Science and Engineering Laboratory Marshall Space Flight Center Modeling and Simulation Operational Support Activity Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository Manufacturing Technology Information Analysis Center
N
NAL NASA NASS NATIBO NATO NBS NCA NCB NCHS NCID NCRR NCTR NEIC National Agricultural Library National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Agricultural Statistics Service North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Bureau of Standards National Command Authorities Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological National Center for Health Statistics National Center for Infectious Disease National Center for Research Resources National Center for Toxicological Research National Energy Information Center
GL-10
NIH NIST NIX NLM NMD NN/LM NOAA NRCS NSB NSF NSTC NTIA NTIAC NTIS NTRS NTTC
National Institutes of Health National Institute of Standards and Technology NASA Image eXchange National Library of Medicine National Missile Defense National Network of Libraries of Medicine National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Natural Resources Conservation Service National Science Board National Science Foundation National Science and Technology Council National Telecommunications and Information Administration Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis Center National Technical Information Service NASA Technical Report Server National Technology Transfer Center
O
O&S OASTT OCTR OEP OER OMB ONR operations and support Office of Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology Office of Computational and Technology Research Office of Emergency Preparedness Office of Energy Research Office of Management and Budget Office of Naval Research
GL-11
OPP OSD OSD (A&T) OSD (C3I) OSTI OSTP OTP
Office of Polar Programs Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control Communications, and Intelligence) Office of Scientific and Technical Information Office of Science and Technology Policy Office of Technology Policy
P
PCAST PE PGDIC PHS POC PTO PUSD (A&T) Presidents Committee on Science and Technology program element Plant Genome Data and Information Center Public Health Service point of contact Patent and Trademark Office Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
R
R&D R&T RAC RaDiUS RDT&E RECON research and development research and technology Reliability Analysis Center Research and Development in the United States research, development, test, and evaluation REsearch CONnection
GL-12
REE RIC RICHS
Research, Education, and Economics Rural Information Center RIC Health Services
S
S&T S-STINET SADBU SBIR SBIRS SEAB SERDP SIS SITIS SRIM SRS SSC SSE STAR STC STI STINE STINET STIP STTR science and technology Secure STINET Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Small Business Innovation Research Space-Based Infrared System Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Specialized Information Services SBIR Interactive Topic Information System Selected Research in Microfiche Science Resource Studies Stennis Space Center Space Science Enterprise Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports Science and Technology Center scientific and technical information Science and Technology Internet Service Scientific and Technical Information Network Scientific and Technical Information Program Small Business Technology Transfer
GL-13
STU SURVIAC
Secure Telephone Unit Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center
T
TA TBMD TDRSS TESIS TMD TR TRGUI TSD TTIC Technology Administration Theater Ballistic Defense Missile Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System TEchnology Services Information System Theater Missile Defense Technical Reports Technical Reports Graphical User Interface Technical Service Division Technology Transfer Information Center
U
U.S. U.S.C. URL USD (A&T) USDA United States United States Code Uniform Resource Locator Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology United States Department of Agriculture
W
WNC WQIC WUIS WWW or www World News Connection Water Quality Information Center Work Unit Information System world wide web
GL-14
GL-15
SUMMARY
The federal government obligates approximately $70 billion every year for research and development (R&D). There are 25 federal departments and agencies funding science and technology (S&T) programs; however, only 7 account for the vast majorityabout 95 percentof annual federal R&D authorizations for federally supported R&D activities. The seven agencies in descending order of S&T expenditures are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The Department of Defense (DoD) The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) The Department of Energy (DOE) The National Science Foundation (NSF) The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) The Department of Commerce (DOC).
This document provides information on the seven top federal R&D performers. Each of these agencies, with the exception of DOC, had R&D budgets that exceeded $1 billion dollars in the last 5 years. The S&T efforts by NASA and DOE defense and basic science programs provide significant support to the DoD research, development, and acquisition programs. The HHS also has S&T programs in its National Institutes for Health (NIH) that are relevant to DoD programs in peacetime and wartime (medical treatment and the chemical and biological defense areas). The DOC is a recent addition to the list of top R&D performers. Nearly all of the DOC gain is attributed to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which was designed to form partnerships between industry and the government to develop and exploit high-risk, enabling technologies. Although the ATP focus is on improving U.S. competitiveness and is for commercial applications, many of the ATP programs have the potential to support DoD programs. Government R&D spending is a small portionapproximately 5 percentof the federal budget; however, it accounts for nearly 14 percent of annual discretionary spending.
S-1
All R&D efforts within the federal government are described as three stages of activity: 1. Basic research. Basic research produces knowledge and a better understanding in a science or engineering area. It is a long-term investment. Universities perform over half of DoDs basic research. Scientists and engineers at DoD laboratories also perform basic research. DoD has also placed a portion of the program in industry, non-profit research institutes, and other federal laboratories. Basic research does not guarantee that a particular scientific result will lead to any military application. Applied research. Applied research is aimed at gaining the knowledge and understanding needed to determine how new technology can meet a specific, recognized need. The applied research program matures technologies for military use. Applied research provides proof of concept and evaluations built around models and laboratory experiments. Advanced technology development. Advanced technology development also matures technologies through demonstrations of fielded prototypes, including evaluations by operational units in a field environment.
2.
3.
These stages of activity, which are defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, correspond to the traditional concept that innovation occurs in sequential stepsfrom scientific breakthroughs in basic research, which lead to taking this new knowledge to determine the means by which a specific need can be met or applied to research. This, in turn, leads to a specific application of technology or development with the intent to produce useful materials, devices, or systems, including the prototypes, methods, and process needed for production. The conduct of R&D does not include routine product testing; quality control; mapping; collecting general-purpose statistics; experimental production, routine monitoring; evaluating an operational program; or training personnel. Also, independent research and development (IR&D) that is allowed as a matter of course for private firms performing work for the DoD is not included. Most of the federal S&T efforts are open or unclassified and can be accessed through DOCs National Technical Information Service (NTIS) [http://www.ntis.gov]. Those with limited access or that are proprietary in nature require clearance from the sponsoring agency. DoD, NASA and DOE limited access/classified S&T bibliographic information can be accessed through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). DTIC has the responsibility acquire and disseminate information on all DoD S&T efforts,
S-2
including ongoing programs; however, DTIC is dependent on the R&D performing activity to report this information. DTIC has expressed two concerns regarding the S&T data gathering and information system: 1. 2. Although all DoD research organizations are required to report R&D actuivities, some S&T activities are not doing so. Once reported, there is no requirement to continually update these activities even though many are multi-year research efforts and, in some cases, changing baselines.
To get information on a specific project or technology area or its application, it is important to understand who performs the R&D and the type or nature of R&D activity. Who performs a specific R&D program is often dependent on the nature of R&D activity; whether this activity is basic research, applied research, or advanced technology development; and the specific technology area in which this R&D takes place. The management of R&D within DoD is also driven by the type of research activity. The management of all DoD R&D activity is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)). Basic and applied research programs are the responsibility of the Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology (under USD (A&T)) is responsible for advanced technology development programs, which includes creating and overseeing advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs). DoD-sponsored basic and applied research programs are defined and available on the DDR&E Internet Homepage [http://www.dtic.mil/ddre]. Management of these programs is generally controlled at OSD within the USD (A&T), with the Services and Defense Agencies responsible for the conduct of the programs. Unfortunately, DoD development activities, although managed at the OSD level, do not have a central location to get in-depth S&T information on the conduct of ongoing research efforts within the Services and Defense Agencies responsible for the programs. A good approach for getting specific information on a military department or Defense Agency S&T program is by examining the Departments research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget submission to OMB and the Presidents Budget to Congress. The DoD budget provides summary information of each Service and Defense Agency RDT&E budget by type activity. The DoD budget also provides detailed information on each R&D program identified by the program element (PE) for each
S-3
Service and Defense Agency. As an example, for the Army under its basic research program, there is a separate program element for major research areas. PE 0602105A is for Material Technology. The budget exhibit provides information for the last two fiscal years plus what is requested for next years budget. The Fiscal Year Budget of the U.S. government and its appendix contain the budget message of the President, including the administrations R&D priorities and detailed information for individual Department and Agency programs. The budget appendix includes for each Department and Agency the proposed text of appropriations language, budget schedule, new legislative proposals, and an explanation of the work to be done. The Presidents Budget includes a separate chapter on research, including budget authority by Department, by R&D type, and share for defense and civilian purposes. The budget is available on CD-ROM and in several electronic formats on the Internet at [http://www.access.gpo. gov/su_docs/budget/index.html]. For more information on access to the budget documents, call 888-293-6498. The DoD budget documentation is also available in electronic format and can be accessed on the Internet at [http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller].
S-4
USG Budget Information U.S. Budget Documentation
I. Department of Commerce (DOC)

Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) Economic Development Administration (EDA) International Trade Administration (ITA) Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) U.S. Census Bureau National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Technology Administration (TA) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Technical Information Service (NTIS) The Office of Technology Policy (OTP)
II. Department of Defense (DoD)

OSD Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Systems Acquisition Program Integration Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology) Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) High-Performance Computing and Modernization Office Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) Laboratory Management and Technology Transition (LM&TT) Office Dual-Use Applications Program (DUAP) Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiatives (COSSI)
DUAP S&T Initiative Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD (NCB)) Counterproliferation/Chemical and Biological Defense (CP/CBD) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space (DUSD (Space)) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) (DUSD (I&CP)) Directorate of Armaments Cooperation Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU) Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) Program
III. Department of Energy (DOE)

Office of Energy Research (OER) The Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics The Office of Basic Energy Sciences The Office of Biological and Environmental Research Fusion Energy Program The Office of Planning and Analysis Office of Computational and Technology Research (OCTR) Advanced Energy Products and Technology Research Division Office of Science and Technical Information Mathematical, Information, and Compu-tational Division Office of Defense Programs (DP) Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE) Office Alternative Fuels Data Center Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDE) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Energy Information Administration (EIA)
IV. Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
Technical Reports (TR) Database Work Unit Information System (WUIS) Independent Research and Development (IR&D) Database Manpower and Training Research Information System (MATRIS) Database Current Awareness Bibliography (CAB)/Electronic Current Aware-ness Bibliography (ECAB) Technical Reports (TR) Database Bibliographies on CD/ROM Internal Research and Development (IR&D) Database on CD/ROM The Defense RDT&E On-line System (DROLS) Technical Reports Graphical User Interface (TRGUI) DTIC Web Links Defense Technical Information Web (DTIW) The Scientific and Technical Information Network (STINET) DefenseLINK DoD Information Joint-Produced Internet Resources Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) Aerospace in the 21st Century Electronic Bibliography AirForceLINK Army Materiel Command (AMC) CENDI Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) DefenseLINK DefenseLINK Locator (DoD-GILS) Defense S&T Planning DoD Directives and Instructions DoD Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) International Aerospace Information Network (IAIN) International Council for Scientific and Technical Information (ICSTI) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) LabLINK MarineLINK North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO) Technology Navigator TechTRANSIT Information and Analysis Centers (IACs) Advanced Materials and Process Technology Information Analysis Center (AMPTIAC) Chemical Warfare/Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC) Chemical Propulsion Information Agency (CPIA) Cold Regions Science and Technology Information Analysis Center (CRSTIAC) Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center (CSERIAC) Data and Analysis Center for Software (DACS) Defense Modeling, Simulation, and Tactical Technology Information Analysis Center (DMSTTIAC)
Guidance and Control Information Analysis Center (GACIAC) Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) Infrared Information Analysis Center (IRIA) Manufacturing Technology Information Analysis Center (MTIAC) Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis Center (NTIAC) Reliability Analysis Center (RAC) Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC)
V. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

National Institutes of Health (NIH) National Library of Medicine Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS) MEDlars onLine (MEDLINE) Internet Grateful Med (IGM) The Division of Specialized Information Services (SIS) The Lister National Center for Biomedical Communications (LHNCBC) The National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Centers for Disease Control National Center for Infectious Disease (NCID) National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Office of Emergency Preparedness Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR)
VI. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA Enterprises Aeronautics Enterprise [Office of Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology (OASTT)] Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise (HEDS) Earth Science Enterprise (ESE) Space Science Enterprise NASA Field Centers Ames Research Center (ARC) Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC)
Goddard Space Flight Center Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JCS) John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Langley Research Center (LaRC) Lewis Research Center (LeRC) George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC) Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) NASA Search Internet Homepage NASA Science and Technical Information (STI) Program NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) Technical Report Server (TRS) (RECONselect) NASA REsearch CONnection (RECONplus) Electronic Selected Current Aerospace Notices (E-SCAN) STI Program Bibliographic Announcements NASA Image eXchange (NIX) Technology Transfer: Spinoff Center for AeroSpace Information Technology Transfer Office
VII. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Advanced Technology Program (ATP) Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) Measurement and Standards Laboratories Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) Chemical Science and Technology Laboratory (CSTL) Electronics and Electrical Engineering Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory (MEL) Materials Science and Engineering Laboratory (MSEL) Physics Laboratory National Quality Program NIST Virtual Library NIST Products and Services Technology Services
VIII. National Science Board (NSB)
IX. National Science Foundation (NSF)

Directorate of Biological Sciences Directorate of Computer Information and Sciences and Engineering Directorate for Crosscutting Programs Directorate for Education and Human Resources Directorate for Engineering Directorate for Geosciences Directorate for Mathematics and Physical Sciences Office of Polar Programs Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences Division of International Research and Education Division of Science Resource Studies Office of Science and Technology Infrastructure Science and Technology Center's Homepage Listing of Science and Technology Centers (STCs) NSF External Links
X. National Science Foundation (NSF): Science and Engineering Indicators Report
XI. National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
XII. National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

NTIS Science and Technology (S&T) Homepage NTIS Products Catalog NTIS On-line Subscriptions NTIS OrderNow Online NTIS OrderNow CD World News Connection (WNC) NTIS Alerts NTIS Database Energy and Science Technology Database (EDB) AgroBase Database Federal Research in Progress (FEDRIP) database FedWorld Information Network
WorldtecTM Government Information Locator Service (GILS)
XIII. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

Environment Division National Security and International Affairs Division Science Division Technology Division
XIV. President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
XV. Research and Development in the United States (RaDiUS) Database
XVI. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Agricultural Research Service (ARS) National Agricultural Library (NAL) Technical Services Division (TSD) NAL Centers Agricultural Trade and Marketing Information Center (ATMIC) Alternative Farming Systems Information Center (AFSIC) Animal Welfare Information Center (AWIC) Biotechnology Information Center (BIC) Food and Nutrition Information Center (FNIC) Plant Genome Data and information Center (PGDIC) Rural Information Center (RIC) and RIC Health Services (RICHS) Technology Transfer Information Center (TTIC) Water Quality Information Center (WQIC) Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) Economic Research Service (ERS)
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) Farm Service Agency (FSA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) Risk Management Agency Research and Evaluation Division Forest Service Natural Resources Conservation Service Current Research Information System (CRIS)

Part III: Developing Critical Technologies (DCT)
To be released by Section
Sections not linked are not yet available
Size (kb) MCT Section (pdf)

85 9 16 669 Introduction Common Preface Common Master Locator Section 1 - Aeronautics Section 2 - Armaments and Energetic Materials
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Section 3 - Biological Technology Section 4 - Biomedical Technology Section 5 - Chemical Technology Section 6 - Directed and Kinetic Energy Technology Section 7 - Energy Systems Technology Section 8 - Electronics Technology Section 9 - Ground Systems Technology Section 10 - Information Systems Technology Section 11 - Lasers and Optics Technology Section 12 - Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology Section 13 - Marine Systems Technology Section 14 - Materials and Processing Technology Section 15 - Nuclear Technology Section 16 - Positioning, Navigation, and Time Technology Section 17 - Sensors Technology Section 18 - Signature Control Technology Section 19 - Space Systems Technology Section 20 - Weapons Effects Technology Common Glossary Common Acronyms and Abbreviations
07 / 99 10 / 99 02 / 2000 . 01 / 2000 09 / 2001 . 05 / 2000 09 / 2000 09 / 99 . . . 05 / 2000 06 / 2000 . . . 01 / 2000 01 / 2000
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INTRODUCTION
A.
MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PART III OVERVIEW
Developing Critical Technologies identifies those technologies that will produce increasingly superior performance of military systems or maintain a superior capability more affordably. The object of the document is to look beyond the Department of Defense (DoD) planning period (5+ years) and as far into the future as is reasonable. Although it may not be possible to identify all technologies that will be used in future military systems, the focus will be on those technologies that have the greatest potential of fulfilling the requirements outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the respective Services in their visions and Science and Technology (S&T) plans. Today, many centers of technical expertise are developing and bringing new technologies to the commercial and military markets on a global basis. Key for U.S. military success will be the ability to learn of these advancing technologies and gain access to them when needed for use by U.S. forces. Many technologies, especially those used in the commercial marketplace, will continue to be developed at amazing speed (6 to 18 months from one generation of capability to the next). This has been true in recent years for various technologies, including the fields of microchips, biotechnology, electro-optics, microminaturization, and new materials and compounds. Military acquisition cycles of 12 to 20 years will require that some technology choices be delayed until the last minute so that the latest state-of-the-art items will be included in the fielded system. Even after fielding, most systems will have a life cycle sufficiently long to require ongoing updates with new technology as it becomes available. This requires that interfaces in the original item achieve an open system configuration that will allow for low-cost and simple-to-execute updates that can be accommodated with minimal design changes and minimal impact to the major structural system. Some military systems will be unable to take advantage of the economies of scale in production because of the limited numbers finally produced. Adaptation of commercial technologies for military application may have the greatest potential advantage in the economy of scale. Common subcomponents and interfaces will provide savings across the board. These dynamics establish the need to identify developing critical technologies. Part III presents information on what is important, why it is important, where the technology will be developed, and how DoD can gain access to this technology to integrate it into a major military system. Because of these factors, Part III, Developing Critical Technologies, is being produced to provide DoD with an understandable compendium that has the potential for future military use in achieving the using communitys longterm goals.
B.
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how the U.S. Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of its people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. This vision of future warfighting embodies the improved intelligence and command and control (C2) available in the information age and goes on to develop four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to U.S. military strengths. Within the next 15 to 20, years the United States expects to face the development and improvement of several weapons capabilities. Of particular concern are weapons of mass destruction (WMD); long-range precision weapons; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities; counters to precision strike capabilities; and information warfare. The future will be an era of accelerating technological change that will impact all military forces. Long-range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. Advances in low observable technologies and the ability to mask friendly forces will continue. The detectability of targets will be enhanced across the battlespace by multispectral sensing, automated target recognition, and other advances. Improvements in information and system integration will significantly affect military operations. The combination of these technology trends may provide multiple orders-of-magnitude improvement in lethality. Commanders will be able to attack targets successfully with fewer platforms and less ordnance while achieving objectives more rapidly. Individual warfighters will be empoweredas never beforewith an array of detection, targeting, and communications equipment that will greatly magnify the power of small units. Strategically, this improvement will enable more rapid power projection. Technologies that address the logistics burden of responding to threats through deployment of troops and associated resources will become increasingly important in the future. The inability to meet mandatory deployment objectives results in significant and costly delays. Some of the technologies that address this area are logistics management (information technologies), supply chain management, and rapid production. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable the United States to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Improved C2, based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence, will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations days and hours in advance of attacks. Providing improved targeting information directly to the most effective weapon system will potentially reduce the traditional force requirements at the point of main effort. In sum, by 2010, the United States should be able to enhance greatly the capabilities of its forces through more rapid adaptation of state-of-the-art technology. C. ORGANIZATION OF PART III Part III contains 20 sections, each devoted to a specific technology area. Each section contains the following:
Scope identifies the technology groups covered in the section. Each group is covered in a separate subsection. Highlights identifies the key facts found in the section. Overview discusses the technology groups identified under Scope. Rationale indicates why the technology groups are important for future military use. Background provides additional information. Technology Assessment covers significant technology trends that will influence the capability or availability of the technologies as well as affordability factors. Worldwide Technology Assessment (WTA), with accompanying figure, provides summary estimates of worldwide capabilities. These estimates are expert judgments by the Technology Working Groups (TWGs). For each technology group identified under Scope, there is a subsection that contains the following:
Highlights identifies the key facts found in the subsection. Overview identifies and discusses technologies listed in data sheets that follow. Rationale indicates why listed technologies are important for future military use. Worldwide Technology Assessment (WTA), with accompanying figure, provides a more detailed technology description than in the WTA section in the specific technology area. Data Sheets, which are the heart of Part III, present data on developing critical technologies. The principal data element is the Developing Critical Technology Parameter, which is the technology parameter expected to be attained. Each data sheet has its own WTA, with accompanying figure. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
D.
The list of militarily critical technologies includes estimates of worldwide capabilities in each of the designated technology areas and in each individual technology. These estimates are called Worldwide Technology Assessments, or WTAs. WTA estimates are the scientific and technological consensus of the TWG members from industry, government, and academia. Collaboration with the Intelligence Community is an essential part of the WTA determination, and selected members of the Intelligence Community are TWG members who participate regularly in the militarily critical technology process. These WTAs are worldwide capability assessments and do not constitute findings of foreign availability, which are the responsibility of the Department of Commerce (DOC) under the Export Administration Act (EAA). Developing Critical Technologies expands the use of the WTAs found in Parts I and II. Summary charts have been developed for each technology area, for each subsection grouping, and on individual technology data sheets. One to four circles (four being the highest) are assigned for status of research and development (R&D) efforts. Four circles indicate that the country is involved in extensive R&D; three circles indicate that the country has significant R&D; two circles indicate that the country has moderate R&D; and one circle indicates that the country has limited R&D. An absence of circles (or a country) may indicate a lack of informationnot of R&D efforts. This is an assessment of R&D efforts/capability and not an assessment of expected success.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

PART III: DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
SECTION 1: AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY
JULY 2000
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Dulles, VA
SECTION 1AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Aerodynamics ........................................................... III-1-5 Aeronautical Propulsion ......................................... III-1-27 Aeronautical Structures .......................................... III-1-51 Aeronautical Vehicle Control ................................. III-1-65 Aeronautical Subsystems and Components ........... III-1-75 Aeronautical Design and Systems Integration ....... III-1-85 Highlights The advanced technologies listed have been chosen because they will reduce weight, vulnerability, accident rates, and operating and support (O&S) costs while providing increased reliability, maneuverability, and overall performance. Emphasis on uninhabited systems is increasing. OVERVIEW This section covers technologies associated with aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, vehicle control, subsystems and components, and design and integration that might be used in various aeronautics systems. Future aeronautics systems include fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, hybrid vehicles, uninhabited air vehicles, and any other airborne vehicle that could be used for a military mission. This section does not address specific vehicles; rather it addresses the technologies used in multiple vehicles or revolutionary new concepts, such as blended wing/body (BWB) and micro air vehicle (MAV). It also does not address space vehicles (see Section 19), but it does cover vehicles that would operate with aircraft-like efficiency, put payloads into orbit, return to earth, and launch again with minimal support. Several current air-vehicle missionsstrategic bombing, air mobility, attack, air superiority, reconnaissance (intelligence gathering), and special operationswill endure for the foreseeable future. In addition, air vehicles may be required to access space on-demand in support of space operations. Air vehicles will need speed, range, lethality, flexibility, and survivability to accomplish these missions. Advanced aeronautics technologies are expected to provide a decrease in vehicle weight, with an attendant increase in range or payload; an increase in reliability; an increase in maneuverability; a decrease in vulnerability; a decrease in accident rates; a decrease in O&S costs; and a decrease in acquisition costs. In the future, the military will place more emphasis on using unmanned military systems to augment manned military systems. This will include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for the suppression of enemy air defense and strike missions and MAVs for reconnaissance. Affordability is a key issue for future aeronautics technologies. On the commercial side, few customers are willing to pay the price for new technology unless it provides a dramatic improvement in the cost of operations. Most developmental work is limited to incremental improvementsmuch of it focused on reliability, maintainability, and operability. Much work is being done to package existing technologies in new ways and increase capabilities with advances in computational capability. Military systems are increasingly relying on adapting commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies for mission uses. This is a trend that has occurred recently and is expected to continue in the future as military budgets are pressured.
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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer the potential of unique capabilities (size, maneuverability, and agility not constrained by human performance and life-support needs) while also providing cost savings. For the most part, technologies are the same except when they fly beyond manned vehicle operational envelopes. MAVs present technological challenges in miniaturizing components (e.g., actuators, motors, and sensors). Modularity in vehicle design could be used to provide mission flexibility and extend vehicle life via upgrades and modifications. The benefits would be found at several levels of the production and operational areas. These could include design, manufacturing, flight line, intermediate, and depot maintenance. Improvements in vehicle and manufacturing process design methods offer the potential for decreased manufacturing cost and design optimization. Advanced composite materials could contribute to a decrease in weight while still providing adequate structural integrity and performance. Reliability can be enhanced with an increased application of electric power while decreasing the use of hydraulics. Speed of military response can be realized by extending the range and payload of large aircraft. Large (million pound) transonic aircraft with an unrefueled range of 12,000 miles will be possible in the next quarter century. The military might leverage the commercial transport market for its airlift needs. A hybrid airship is being developed to carry extremely large payloads. The half-blimp, half-airplane could fit the lift niche between large transports (Boeing 747 and Lockheed C-5) and ships. Dubbed Aerocraft, it is expected to get from the United States to Europe in less than a day. It would haul 1 to 1.5 million lbs at 125 knots and be about 780 ft long. Although many future developments will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, work is underway on projects that go beyond current vehicles, applications, or principles. The charter of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) emphasizes the exploration of high-risk technology areas that can revolutionize air travel and create new markets for U.S. industry. The technology challenges for NASA include eliminating the barriers to affordable supersonic travel, expanding general aviation, and accelerating the application of technology advances. NASA and its industry partners developed a concept for a high-speed civil transport (HSCT) that would fly 300 passengers at more than 1,500 miles per hour (more than twice the speed of sound) at a ticket price less than 20 percent above comparable, slower flights. The HSCT was being developed as part of NASAs High-Speed Research (HSR) program begun in 1990. Although the international economic stakes were envisioned as being high (markets were projected for more than 500 HSCTs between 2000 and 2015), the HSR program was cancelled in 1999 because of changes in the aircraft market and industry interests. The lack of financial participation by the major aircraft manufacturers was the driving factor for cancellation. This industry action was the result of market analyses and technology requirements assessments that indicated an HSCT cannot reasonably be introduced before the year 2020. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is working on a new design for a hypersonic aircraft. The HyperSoar (see Figure 1.0-1) would fly at Mach 10 and would skip along the edge of Earths atmosphere. After ascending to approximately 130,000 ft just outside Earths atmosphere, it would turn off its air-breathing engine and coast back to the edge of the atmosphere. There, it would quickly start its engines and skip back into space. This maneuver would sharply cut heat build-up on the frame, a problem that has inhibited previous hypersonic designs. Potential military benefits would be cargo delivery or strikes from altitudes and airspeeds that could not be defeated by current defensive measures.
Figure 1.0-1. HyperSoar
RATIONALE Air vehicles will play a significant role in dominant maneuver, one of the four operational pillars of Joint Vision 2010. U.S. forces will have to engage in numerous actions around the globe. Power projection will be achieved through rapid strategic mobility. Air mobility will be required to respond to developments quickly and with sufficient force to stabilize crisis situations. Long-range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. Enhanced standoff capabilities will provide a wider range of delivery options.
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On risky missions, the UCAV would fly 40 or more miles in front of manned fighter jets to knock out air defenses. Loaded with low-cost precision bombs, a fleet of UCAVs commanded by controllers from a home base could wipe out anti-aircraft guns and missiles on the ground. This would protect manned assets and leave them for missions for which the UCAV cannot be used. The UCAVs must remain in contact with their remote commanders through complex communications links that must be safe from enemy signal jamming. Production of battlefield versionsat $10 million per UCAVcould begin in 2004. Dozens of the jets could be available by 2010, much sooner than military projections of just a few years ago. UCAVs offer an attractive mix of operational need and economic necessity. Reusable unmanned vehicles could deliver precision ordnance that is less expensive than cruise missiles. Since most concepts entail a system that remains in storage until needed, savings would be realized through reduced operations and training (needed for manned systems). Operator training would be conducted in simulators. A potential reduction in search and rescue forces would provide additional savings. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Aeronautics systems will benefit from advances in aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, vehicle control, subsystems and components, and design and integration technologies. UCAVs will be aggressively pursued because of budgetary constraints, manpower limitations, and technical maturity. They represent a challenge in systems integration and systems development. Advances in computer technology, communications, flight controls, and global positioning make UCAVs possible and will add to the capabilities of manned aircraft. The reader will not find a technology called UCAV herein, but many of the technologies listed apply to such vehicle systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 1.0-2) The United Kingdom is investigating several new technologies for its Future Offensive Air System, which is expected to enter service around 2017 as a replacement for the GR4, ground-attack Tornado. A manned aircraft is one of three options being considered to provide the required capabilities. Unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles will also be evaluated. Technology and affordability considerations will be the main drivers of cooperation with other countries. In France, Dassault is evaluating a light combat aircraft concept called the Futur Avion de Combat Europeen (FACE). This future (perhaps tailless) European combat aircraft is envisioned to complement the Rafale and the Typhoon in a high-low mix like the F-22/JSF. Russia is continuing to develop technology demonstrators with several thrust vectoring aircraft (SU-37, MiG-1-42/1-44) and one with forward-swept wings (S-37). The MiG-1-44 was the prototype for a competitor aircraft for the U.S. F-22. The MiG-1-44 made its long-delayed maiden flight on February 29, 2000. It is designed to be super maneuverable (maintain steering at angles of attack of 6070 deg). Preliminary work on this aircraft was begun in 1983, and indications are that it could be replaced by a fifth-generation aircraft that will replace the MiG-29. The aircraft is expected to compete with the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Funding constraints have caused severe slippages in Russian aircraft programs. Meager funding, a small procurement budget, and the reported inability of the Russian manufacturing base to produce aircraft in any quantity dictate a time period of 1020 years to accomplish an aircraft program. China is developing the J-10, which is the weight and class of the Eurofighter 2000. It is similar to the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Lavi multirole fighter and is expected to be operational by 2005. The XXJ will follow around 2015. Australia is developing a fixed-wing aircraft with vertical/short takeoff and landing capabilities. The aircraft has a fan in the wing and one in the rear. Sadleir Technology & Innovation Co. PTY, Ltd., envision a 450600 seat airliner. EUROFAR, a consortium of Aerospatiale, Eurocopter France, Eurocopter Germany, and GKN Westland (United Kingdom), is developing a European tilt-rotor aircraft for regional airlines. The first flight is expected in 2004, with entry into service scheduled for 2010. Another international efforta BWB, ultrahigh-capacity airliner/ very large commercial transport (UHCA/VLCT)involves Aerospatiale (France) and Daimler-Benz (Germany).
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Japans endeavor is the F1-X, a follow-on to the F-15J. This aircraft has thrust vectoring nozzles, digital flyby-light (FBL) controls, co-cured composites, and radar absorbing materials (RAMs). Airbus is planning to develop the A3XX, a long-range, double-decker, jumbo jet that could seat between 500 and 600 passengers. IAI has expanded its UAV activity, which is one of its main fields, and has made the company one of the worlds leaders in this technology. Because of cost considerations, the move is for future fighter aircraft to be multi-role. The U.S. JSF will enter service with the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines and the British Royal Navy. Russia, for the first time, will develop multifunctional aircraft and is retrofitting older aircraft (e.g., MiG-29 to MiG-29SMT) for multiple roles. Asia remains a market, not a maker, of truly advanced military aircraft. Those countries with their own aviation-manufacturing industries are mainly producing American or Russian versions under license. China, which has the largest research and development (R&D) program, is building several new fighters, but many are derived from Western designs. These are modern aircraft, though not on the cutting edge. When the planes enter service after 2000, China will have mainly replaced its huge numbers of 1950s-era aircraft with 1980s models.
Aeronautical Subsystems and Components
Country Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland UK United States Legend:
Aerodynamics
Aeronautical Propulsion

Extensive R&D
Aeronautical Structures
Aeronautical Vehicle Control
Aeronautical Design and Integration

Significant R&D

Limited R&D

Moderate R&D
Figure 1.0-2. Aeronautics Technology WTA Summary
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SECTION 1.1AERODYNAMICS
Highlights Tailless fighters can reduce weight, drag, and radar signature and increase range, maneuverability, and survivability. The Canard Rotor Wing (CRW) concept combines the low-speed flight characteristics of a helicopter with high-speed, fixed-wing capabilities. Concepts being evaluated for mid-size jet transport aircraft include conventional, high-wing aircraft, BWB aircraft, and box-wing aircraft with multiple refueling booms. Improved design methodologies and analysis tools are essential in reducing costs and enhancing vehicle capability in the future.
OVERVIEW This section includes those technologies that relate to designs or innovations that improve the aerodynamic characteristics of surfaces or bodies, with the goal of obtaining better flow patterns (subsonic and supersonic) and achieving improved lift and drag parameters. The technologies may apply to air vehicle external surfaces and to internal flow streams, such as those contained within propulsion units or other devices. The technologies also include flow control and the application of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to achieve accurate flow prediction for design optimization. Tailless fighters are being pursued as a means to improve agility and stealth characteristics. NASA and Boeing Co. produced the X-36 (see Figure 1.1-1), a 28percent scale prototype that lacks horizontal and vertical tails and uses split-aileron and engine thrust vectoring for flight control. The design promises a decrease in weight, drag, and radar signature and an increase in range, maneuverability, and survivability for future fighter aircraft. In response to a Navy requirement for an unmanned, high-speed, ship-based, vertical take off and landing (VTOL) vehicle, McDonnell Douglas Helicopter (now
Figure 1.1-1. X-36 Over the Mojave Desert
Boeing Company) developed a concept called CRW (see Figure 1.1-2). The CRW would spin a center wing to take off like a helicopter. The vehicle would accelerate to about 120 kn, when flaps would deploy from the front and rear wings. Flap deployment would offload the spinning center wing, which would stop rotation and be locked into a position across the fuselage to perform as a third wing. The flaps on the other two wings would then be retracted, and all three wings would provide the lift loads for fixed-wing flight. A reverse of these events would transition the CRW back to its rotary wing/VTOL mode for landing on small landing areas.
Figure 1.1-2. CRW Aircraft
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A configuration where the wing and fuselage are blended together (see Figure 1.1-3) into one structural component is attractive for future tanker/transport aircraft. The BWB configuration provides generous internal volume for fuel and cargo and reduced structural weight. The concept can employ multipoint refueling and, by the nature of its basic shape, has low observable (LO) characteristics. Joined wing (or box wing) aircraft (see Figure 1.1-4) are being considered for several types of aircraft. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems has studied a joinedwing aircraft as a tanker with two refueling booms to increase the number of stations available Figure 1.1-3. BWB Aircraft for refueling aircraft. Smaller joined wing aircraft could embed advanced sensors in the wing to support aircraft operation and mission needs. Advanced CFD analysis capabilities are critical to the design of advanced aircraft. For example, improved CFD-based (NavierStokes) design methodologies and analysis tools enable cost reduction and operational enhancements. RATIONALE Aerodynamics is the underlying science of all aeronautic systems. Advances in the science, as applied to transportation, have taken mankind from a sail on a ship to the supersonic transports and fighter aircraft of the 21st century. While the large, rapid leaps in air-vehicle performance of the 20th century may not be available in the near future, affordable, relevant improvements are ongoing. The ability to control airflow through any means while in flight results in increased maneuvering capability and survivability enhancement. Global-range aircraft will enable worldwide response to crises in a minimum amount of time. Joined-wing or BWB tankers can provide the same number of refueling booms on half as many aircraft. This is especially important because budget economics dictates that current aircraft will not be replaced on a one-for-one basis. Preliminary analyses indicate that the BWB would outperform all conventional large aircraft. An initial evaluation of this configuration indicated significant cost and performance benefits over conventional configurations: a 56-percent increase in lift/drag (L/D) ratio, a 20-percent decrease in fuel burn, and a 10-percent decrease in the operating-empty weight. The cargo aircraft, with a 280-ft wingspan, could carry 231,000 lb of payload more than 7,000 nmi at a cruise speed of approximately 560 mph. This is almost twice the capacity of the Boeing 747-400. It would reduce fuel burn and harmful emissions per passenger mile by almost a third in comparison to todays aircraft. Other potential benefits of the BWB include lower operating cost and reduced community noise levels. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 1.1-5) Aerospatiale, British Aerospace (who built the Concorde), and Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace have already pooled their preliminary projects in the European Supersonic Research Programme (ESRP). Their objective is to deliver by the year 2010 a new-generation supersonic aircraft (see Figure 1.1-6) that will carry up to 300 passengers, at an altitude of over 10,000 km and at a cruising speed of Mach 2.2. This aircraft would have half the Concordes fuel consumption per passenger. Market projections estimate a need for at least 500 of these aircraft between 2007 and 2025. Airbus is planning to develop the A3XX (see Figure 1.1-7), a long-range, double-decker jumbo jet that could seat between 500 and 600 passengers.
Figure 1.1-4. Joined-Wing Aircraft
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Country Brazil Canada China France Germany India Israel Japan Netherlands Russia Spain Sweden Switzerland UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Advanced Wing Planforms

Significant R&D
Airflow Control
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 1.1-5. Aerodynamics Technology WTA Summary
Figure 1.1-6. Second-Generation Supersonic Transport
Figure 1.1-7. Airbus A3XX
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.1. AERODYNAMICS

Advanced Wing Planforms Blended Wing/Body (BWB) ............................................................................................................................... III-1-11 Box Wing ............................................................................................................................................................ III-1-13 High Aspect Ratio, Strut-Braced Wing .............................................................................................................. III-1-14 Tailless ................................................................................................................................................................. III-1-16 Airflow Control Flow Control Employing Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) ............................................................. III-1-18 Forebody Vortex Flow Control .......................................................................................................................... III-1-20 Laminar Flow Control (LFC) ............................................................................................................................. III-1-21 Viscous Drag Reduction ..................................................................................................................................... III-1-23 Viscous Flow Control ......................................................................................................................................... III-1-25
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. BLENDED WING/BODY (BWB)

Developing Critical Technology Parameter
Compared with current aircraft of similar size: Greater than 50-percent increase in L/D ratio 25-percent decrease in fuel consumption 10-percent decrease in operating weight 15-percent decrease in direct operating costs
Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues
Low-cost composites. None identified. Advanced control algorithms, such as neural nets, to support flight controls. Systems integration (airframe/engine); safety; logistics. Commercial: landing length and logistics at airports; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) time limits to deplane passengers in an emergency; advanced flight controls. Military: advanced flight controls; short takeoff and landing.
Major Commercial Applications Affordability
BWB is being developed for commercial use. Would reduce direct operating costs compared with conventional wide-body aircraft using equivalent technology.
RATIONALE Although efforts have been aimed at developing a commercial BWB aircraft, there is significant military potential in such a planform. A BWB offers potential fuel, noise, and cost benefits. A flying-wing design offers more potential for wing laminar flow applications. The major hindrance to developing very large transports with BWB may be safety considerations in the event of a crash or the number of passengers that could be lost in a crash. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China UK

Significant R&D
France United States
Germany
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Experience gained from the development of the B-2 gives the United States a distinct advantage in the design and development of BWB aircraft. It would be too risky for a country to develop without investing in a large-scale prototype. A wide-ranging BWB design study is underway at the College of Aeronautics at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom. An international efforta BWB, UHCA/VLCTinvolves Aerospatiale (France) and DaimlerBenz (Germany). BACKGROUND Efforts are underway to study large BWB aircraft that would carry 800 passengers. Initial team members studying the BWB concept were Boeing (McDonnell Douglas), Stanford University, the University of Southern California, Clark Atlanta University, the University of Florida, and NASAs Langley and Lewis Research Centers.
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behind this design approach is to maximize overall efficiency by integrating the engines, wings, and the body into a single lifting surface. The BWB concept houses a wide double-deck passenger compartment that actually blends into the wing. Adjacent to the passenger section is ample room for baggage and cargo. Preliminary analyses indicate that the BWB would outperform all conventional large aircraft. It is conceived to carry 800 passengers (almost twice the passenger capacity of the Boeing 747-400) over 7,000 miles at a cruise speed of approximately 560 mph. It would reduce fuel burn and harmful emissions per passenger mile by almost a third in comparison to todays aircraft. Other potential benefits of the BWB include lower operating costs and reduced community noise levels. In August 1999, NASA announced that the BWB would be one of three advanced aeronautical concepts as quick starts in its Revolutionary Concepts (REVCON) project, which encourages the development of ideas that could lead to revolutionary new aircraft.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. BOX WING

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues
A 20-percent reduction in ramp space. Acquisition and operating cost improvements exceeding 20 percent over current transport aircraft. Low-cost metallic structures. None identified. Equivalent laminated plate solution (ELAPS) (based on Ritz function principle). Wing-section design to minimize interference between forward and aft wings; wing endplate structure (requires high stiffness and high fatigue strength); aeroelastic interaction of connected wing system. Commercial airliners. Saves on ramp space.
RATIONALE NASA is the lead agency for the development of this planform for large transport aircraft. Major military use would be in a tanker configuration. Dual-boom capability can occur while retaining the roll-on, roll-off capability of vehicles, cargo, and International Standards Organization (ISO) containers. These aircraft are intended to fill the vacuum that will be created by the retirement of the C-141s and serve as the projected replacements for the KC-135. They would have the flexibility to meet most of the needs of the military as cargo and personnel carriers and tankers in regional conflicts, peacekeeping endeavors, and humanitarian projects. The box-wing planform can be applied to both large and small aircraft. Figure 1.1-8 represents a 325-passenger version. Large box-wing aircraft (600+ passengers) could operate within existing international airports, and no infrastructure changes would be necessary. Five box-wing aircraft could be parked in the gate space of four conventional aircraft designed for the same payload, allowing airlines to avoid a billion-dollar investment in a new terminal to add gates. This would also benefit the military as it deploys worldwide. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China UK
Legend:
Figure 1.1-8. Lockheed-Martin/ NASA Box Wing Airliner

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
No box-wing aircraft is currently in production anywhere. However, the technology is well understood, and most countries with some aircraft capability could produce a subsonic version of such a planform.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. HIGH ASPECT RATIO, STRUT-BRACED WING

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials
Structurally sound wings for large aircraft with an aspect ratio greater than 12. Low-cost metallic structure; low-cost composite structure; integrally stiffened fuselage panels. None identified. Flight control algorithms. Wing/strut system optimizationwing and strut aerodynamic design to minimize interference between the wing and strut while minimizing the overall wing/strut structural weight; aeroelastic interaction of wing/strut system. Large passenger transports. The high aspect ratio, strut-braced wing configuration is applicable to a wide range of civil aircraft. The increased aerodynamic efficiency will greatly reduce fuel consumption and the aircraft size for a given payload/range requirement. NASA-sponsored studies of high aspect ratio, strut-braced wing transport aircraft indicate an acquisition and operating cost improvement of 810 percent over current transport aircraft. Lockheed-Martin studies showed a 2326 percent reduction in direct operating costs and 2123 percent reduction in acquisition costs.
Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues
Major Commercial Applications
Affordability
RATIONALE A high aspect ratio, strut-braced wing could be built with no new technology breakthroughs, but advanced materials technology would make the concept more affordable. The strut-braced wing transport concept (see Figure 1.1-9) greatly reduces subsonic transport weight while improving aerodynamic performance. The result is a transport aircraft that has greatly reduced size, acquisition cost, and operating costs. For military use, the high wing configuration is very similar to existing military cargo aircraft (C-141, C-5, C-117) and can incorporate the loading and airdrop features of those aircraft, including roll-on/roll-off loading of vehicles, equipment, and ISO containers.
Figure 1.1-9. Lockheed-Martin/ NASA High Aspect Ratio, Strut-Braced Wing Airliner
The strut-based configuration also supports a multipoint aerial refueling system by locating the booms and/or drogues at the wing/strut interface on each wing. It would provide the operational advantage of multipoint/ multiboom refueling with advanced aerodynamics and reduced operating costs. The strut-braced wing tanker can be configured to refuel one receptacle and one probe-equipped aircraft nearly simultaneously (multi-Service, multinational capability). Joint Vision 2010 states that power projection . . . will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force. Rapid strategic mobility enhanced by strut-braced transport aircraft could be an important part of that concept WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Netherlands
Legend:

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China Russia

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France UK

Moderate R&D
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NASA conducted studies of high aspect ratio, strut-braced winged aircraft in the early 1980s. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University began studies of the strut-braced wing concept in 1996. U.S. Governmentsponsored contractor work began in 1998. No high aspect ratio, strut-braced wing, jet-powered transport aircraft is currently in production anywhere in the world.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. TAILLESS

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications Affordability
Aircraft overall and side sector radar cross section (RCS) signature reduction of 15 percent. Subsonic and supersonic cruise drag reductions of 15 percent. Low-cost, high-temperature materials for vectoring nozzle applications. None identified. Vehicle control algorithm. Integration of other technologies (i.e., vehicle control, thrust vectoring). None identified. Tailless aircraft reduce nonrecurring costs in several ways. Eliminating the tail is a direct cost, weight, and drag savings. These savings enable further decreases since the aircraft can be made smaller and less expensive. The drag and weight reductions provide further operational savings in the form of reduced fuel usage.
RATIONALE Tailless military aircraft have the potential to reduce greatly overall RCS values, particularly in the side sector. The prime technologies associated with tailless designs (excluding specific signature-reduction features) include control effectors and flight control/vehicle management system design. To provide levels of maneuverability and agility comparable to conventional designs typically requires that a tailless aircraft has a more complex suite of control effectors. The application of tailless planform to other aircraft (e.g., B-2) is well proven. The key technical issue for tailless aircraft is proving the feasibility for a flight control system (FCS) capable of controlling a highly directionally unstable aircraft. A measure of instability is the time to double amplitude (TDA). Tailless fighter designs have TDAs of 0.2 sec. This means that the flight control will have to detect and correct for any disturbance in less than that amount of time. A tailless planform could provide an advanced fighter with good maneuverability and agility. Tailless aircraft have less drag and weight and fewer actuators and flight control surfaces. This would increase range. One of the motivations for tailless aircraft is associated with reducing RCS. Another use is in UCAVs. Boeings entry in the UCAV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is a tailless, 27-ft long aircraft that has a 34-ft wing and weighs 8,000 pounds. This technology is ready for application to advanced military vehicles. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Sweden
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Russia
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The Boeing Company and NASA teamed to develop a prototype fighter aircraft designed for stealth and agility. The result was a subscale tailless aircraft called the X-36 (see Figure 1.1-10). Germany has had a long history of work with tailless aircraft dating to the mid 1930s. In France, a flying wing was patented in 1929. In the United Kingdom, a Tailless Aircraft Advisory Committee was established in 1943 to research what was perceived to be the most promising layout for fast aircraft/tailless aircraft. Although the capability exists, no tailless aircraft fighters have been developed. BACKGROUND
Figure 1.1-10. X-36 Aircraft
Tailless aircraft are not a new concept. It has been pursued throughout the 1900s by a variety of designers. Flying wings (e.g., the XB-49) have been tailless. Sport planes have been flown tailless. The concept is now being evaluated for future, high-performance aircraft. The NASA/Boeing partnership project, the X-36, is a tailless 28-percent scale, experimental aircraft that will dramatically change the design of future stealth fighters. The remotely piloted X-36 has no vertical or horizontal tails, yet it is expected to be more maneuverable and agile than todays fighters. Its revolutionary design was built at a fraction of the cost and schedule typical of other X-aircraft. The tailless design reduces the weight, drag, and RCS typically associated with traditional fighter aircraft. It incorporates new flight control technologies in place of vertical and horizontal tails to improve the maneuverability and survivability of future fighter aircraft. During flight, the X-36 uses new split ailerons and a thrust vectoring nozzle for directional control. The ailerons not only split to provide yaw (left and right) control but also raise and lower asymmetrically to provide roll control. The X-36 vehicle also incorporates an advanced, single-channel digital fly-by-wire control system developed with commercially available components. The X-36 first flew in the summer of 1997 and completed its flight test schedule in November of that same year. For links to web sites with information on tailless aircraft, go to Internet address http://www.halcyon.com/bsquared/winglinks.html.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. FLOW CONTROL EMPLOYING MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS)

Reducing drag by up to 50 percent. Silicon wafers and other materials used in the micro-electronics fabrication industry. Particle-Imaging Velocimetry (PIV) flow measurement; MEMS fabrication techniques. Production facilities to fabricate and package large arrays of MEMS devices. Laminar flow control validation. Use of MEMS for flow control requires significant research into fundamental flow physics, control algorithm development, communication, and MEMS fabrication. Small-scale demonstration is 5+ years in the future. Micro actuation strategies used to achieve desired aerodynamic functionality (e.g., maximum L/D, minimum inlet flow distortion) in fixed-geometry flowpaths. Ability to integrate MEMS devices successfully into aircraft structure, survivability of MEMS devices in harsh military environments, ability of MEMS devices to provide adequate control at high speeds.
Potential in all commercial aircraft for increasing range, payload, and reducing life-cycle cost; specifically, ice-buildup warning sensors, wing laminar flow control and flow separation control, high lift, inlet flow control. Fabrication and packaging of MEMS arrays could significantly affect affordability.
Affordability
RATIONALE Active flow control can reduce aircraft friction drag and control separation on wings and inlets. Increased range resulting from decreased drag will contribute to the power projection envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. Reduced takeoff and landing distances will enable aircraft to operate out of smaller fields. Existing flow control systems using conventional air injection or mechanical actuation typically have significant impacts on weight, signature, and cost. MEMS technology has the potential to minimize these adverse impacts while maintaining a significant level of control effectiveness. Agility of aircraft with reduced RCS signature can be greatly enhanced. The most significant issue is the development of reliable, maintainable, and survivable MEMS effector and sensor arrays for military environments. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada India South Korea United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan Sweden

Significant R&D
France Netherlands Switzerland
Germany Norway UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) and industry are developing this technology. France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are also active in this technology area. Programs of lesser impact are in place in Canada, China, India, Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland. More information on
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defense applications can be found at http://www.ida.org/mems and in Militarily Critical Technologies, Part III: Developing Critical Technologies, Section 12: Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. FOREBODY VORTEX FLOW CONTROL

Increase maneuverability by 15 percent and increase nose pointing ability by 25 percent. None identified. None identified. None identified. Air supply and control valves. None identified. Cost of air supply and control valves for pneumatic systems may have a negative impact on affordability.
RATIONALE Forebody vortex flow control provides a means to generate yaw and roll moments for high-performance aircraft at moderate-to-high angles of attack. This allows increased agility to be achieved. The increased nose-pointing ability will give fighters an advantage during aerial engagements. Both mechanical and pneumatic methods have been investigated. Applications to date have focused almost exclusively on low-speed flight conditions. With the advent of reliable and effective thrust vectoring systems, the emphasis on forebody vortex control technology has diminished. Future efforts in this area may prove fruitful if designers can develop simple flow control systems that will modify not only the forebody vortex pattern but will also provide aerodynamic benefits in other parts of the flight envelope. The key reason this technology has not been applied so far is that it is too unconventional for designers to embrace. Forebody vortex flow control has been successfully demonstrated on the X-29. The only remaining hurdle is development of a fully integrated system, especially one that integrates the forebody vortex control system with the radar in the aircraft nose. Another area of interest is for high fineness ratio missiles, with the goal of eliminating fins and strakes. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Switzerland

Significant R&D
France UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Currently, active application of this technology seems to generate little interest. Passive means to control forebody vortices (mainly for stabilization of the vortex pattern) have been seen on aircraft from several European nations including Switzerland (modified Mirage) and Russia (MiG-29). The principles are understood well enough so that an active forebody vortex control system could be developed by most nations with the capability to design high-performance fighter aircraft.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. LAMINAR FLOW CONTROL (LFC)

Reducing drag by up to 50 percent. Smart materials, such as shape memory alloys; flexible materials technologies. Unique wind-tunnel test and measurement facilities, such as the Unsteady Low-Speed Wind Tunnel at Arizona State University. Advanced CFD methodologies; boundary layer stability analysis codes. Fundamental understanding of the physics of turbulent transition; manufacture of LOcompatible MEMS and smart structures. Can be used for both military and commercial applications. Military application is more difficult because of observables requirements. Minimize flow separation to maximize lift and L/D ratio. Cost of air supply and control valves for pneumatic systems may have a negative impact on affordability.
Affordability
RATIONALE As air moves over an airfoil, it travels in two distinct modes. From the leading edge of the airfoil the molecules travel in an orderly, nearly parallel stream in layers. The flow in this area is called laminar and hugs the airfoil. The flow continues to separate at some point that is defined by numerous parameters, such as shape, surface roughness, angle of attack, and so forth. It then transitions to a turbulent area characterized by random movement, vortices, and high drag. The lift is created in this laminar flow area. Thus, control of the flow and separation point greatly contribute to the lift and L/D ratio. LFC offers revolutionary capability to increase range and loiter of both military and commercial aircraft. Hybrid LFC can reduce minimum drag by as much as 50 percent and increase range by as much as 30 percent on flying wing-type aircraft designs. LFC can also significantly reduce the skin temperature of supersonic and hypersonic aircraft, allowing larger portions to be manufactured using aluminum instead of titanium. LFC can improve maximum lift and maneuver L/D. LFC can also minimize flow separation and control vortical structures to improve maneuverability and survivability. Supersonic laminar flow offers revolutionary capability to decrease the weight and cost of supersonic cruise aircraft. Control of vortices and flow separation can reduce cruise drag and increase maneuver L/D. This enhances the survivability and maneuverability that would support the operational concept of dominant maneuver found in Joint Vision 2010. The development of active flow control technologies using conventional actuators has the potential to provide significant aerodynamic performance gains. Successful demonstration of technology is primarily dependent on understanding the flow physics of the application and proper implementation of control algorithms rather than development of the flow control effectors. System-level integration of conventional actuation methods may adversely affect weight and cost. The effectiveness of such a system must be demonstrated over a useful range of varying operating conditions. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Brazil Germany Spain
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel Sweden

Significant R&D
China Japan UK

Moderate R&D
France Russia United States
Limited R&D
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Most foreign nations with the capability to design and produce modern combat aircraft have shown interest in flow control technology. Many integration issues remain in producing a practical military aircraft with laminar flow. Standard wing suction and blowing techniques are possible in the near term, but application of MEMS to reduce laminar flow is still only in the basic research phase.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. VISCOUS DRAG REDUCTION

Reduce turbulent skin friction drag by 12 percent using passive means; by 20 percent using active means. Passive approaches include riblets, films, and other surface features. Active approaches include MEMS-based actuators and sensors with distributed processing for control. Smart materials, such as shape memory alloys; flexible materials; adhesive films. High resolution, rapid frame optical diagnostic techniques, such as PIV; unique wind tunnel test and measurement facilities such as the Unsteady Low-Speed Wind Tunnel at Arizona State University. Advanced CFD; control software for active approaches. Manufacturing LO-compatible MEMS and smart structures; developing active systems at acceptable cost, weight, durability, and maintainability. All large aircraft; ground transportation (e.g., buses, trains). Passive coatings cost must be compared with the cost of painting and periodic paint removal. Increased range and reduced fuel consumption could justify the expense of manufacturing riblets.
Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment
Unique Software Technical Issues
RATIONALE Viscous drag reduction offers revolutionary capability to increase range and loiter of both military and commercial aircraft. Viscous drag reduction technologies have the potential to extend air vehicle range and reduce fuel consumption. Passive approaches have been demonstrated to reduce skin friction drag by 612 percent, giving total vehicle drag reduction of 36 percent. Active approaches demonstrated numerically and in the laboratory appear to reduce skin friction drag 1025 percent, giving a vehicle drag reduction of 512 percent. Drag reduction translates directly into increased vehicle range. Further development of active approaches is needed. Advanced diagnostic and simulation tools are required for this development, including PIV and direct numerical simulation. Adhesive film technology is critical for cost-effective implementation and retrofit of existing aircraft with this technology. Active approaches may be too costly, heavy, and/or difficult to maintain to be practical. Passive techniques could replace paint with adhesive film, reducing cost and environmental problems. Strategic mobility is key to providing the United States with future power projection capability and is enabling the concepts espoused in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Brazil Germany Russia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada India Spain

Significant R&D
China Israel Sweden

Moderate R&D
France Japan UK
Limited R&D
Passive devices have been studied for close to 20 years. Much of the passive technology has been published in the open literature, and patents have been granted for much of the passive and active technology. Airbus and
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European researchers are familiar with the technology. Airbus is probably closest to applying viscous drag reduction to a commercial aircraft. They have shown more interest than military and other commercial users. In India, the National Aerospace Laboratories initiated an active program to assess viscous drag reduction and understand aspects of flow structure on typical aircraft components for low and transonic speeds. India is using riblets and are applying lessons learned to commercial ground transportation (e.g., buses, trains). Riblets with symmetric v-grooves manufactured by 3-M company (United States) have been widely used in their research. Drag reduction was as high as 15 percent at an incidence of 6 deg on a National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) 0012 airfoil at low airspeed. BACKGROUND Viscous drag can amount to 4050 percent of the total drag, so any decrease can lead to substantially reduced fuel expenditures. This fuel saving can translate directly into millions of dollars of reduced operating costs for the industry.
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DATA SHEET III-1.1. VISCOUS FLOW CONTROL

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment
A 15-percent improvement of L/D at high angles of attack. Smart materials, such as shape memory alloys; flexible materials. Wind tunnel test and measurement facilities, such as the Unsteady Low-Speed Wind Tunnel at Arizona State University; high resolution, rapid-frame, optical diagnostic techniques, such as PIV. Boundary layer stability codes and active flow control models embedded in advanced CFD analysis and design codes. Actuators including pulsed microjets, on-demand vortex generators, and microbubbles; compatibility with LO technologies. Improvement of landing margins for commercial aircraft. Improvement in the efficiency of control surfaces would allow reduction in control surface size.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Affordability
Cost could be lower because it would be less complex than bleed systems. Cost benefit could be achieved by reducing aircraft weight and eliminating or reducing control surface size.
RATIONALE System-level performance is greatly diminished in the presence f separated flow. Flow separation occurs at some operating condition for most internal (e.g., inlets) and external (e.g., airfoils) flow environments. Micro-vortex generators are a low-cost technology that provides significant flow separation control by re-energizing the flow before separation. The reattached flow reduces overall drag and wake spread to increase overall system performance. The primary objective is to control flow separation caused by curvature, adverse pressure gradients, or shockwave boundary-layer interactions. Viscous flow control would reduce stall, improve control surface effectiveness, improve L/D for high-angle-of-attack flight, improve inlet performance for highly curved inlet ducts or supersonic conditions, and improve maneuverability. A wide variety of approaches are available to achieve viscous flow control, including steady and pulsed microjets, synthetic jets, on-demand vortex generators and elastic microbubbles for vortex generation, and boundary-layer bleed and wall jets for boundary layer profile manipulation. Viscous flow control could be used to control separation (improving propulsion system performance, particularly at maneuver speeds), improve performance of high-speed inlets, delay stall, and improve control surface effectiveness. Current research to control separation with small-scale, non-intrusive actuators shows promise. Actuators could be used on demand, possibly in off-design conditions, and their effects would be eliminated at cruise, giving drag reduction that compares with passive separation control devices. Active approaches would allow tailoring of flow field by adjusting actuator output to local flow conditions based on MEMS or other sensors. This would provide an optimal control scheme over a wide range of flow conditions. Viscous flow control methods are in a range of maturities. Vortex generators and boundary-layer bleed are in use. Steady microjet vortex gererators are ready for application. Synthetic jets, pulsed microbubbles, and on-demand vortex generators require additional development. Advanced flow diagnostic methods will help to accelerate the development of this technology.
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WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Brazil Germany Spain
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
China Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
All aircraft manufacturers are likely to be studying this technology. The advanced actuation approaches are not as widely studied, and developer tend to maintain proprietary and/or patent rights over their developments. The open literature provides access to many of the recent developments, although many of these publications probably provide outdated information.
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SECTION 1.2AERONAUTICAL PROPULSION

Highlights Enhanced technologies in turbine engines will result in increased range and payload at lower cost. Low cost will be realized by having common core (engine) architecture, ease-of-assembly design, and health monitoring systems. Thrust vectoring nozzles will reduce the weight, maintenance, and cost of aircraft and will improve maneuverability. Developments in ramjet/scramjet technology may enable hypersonic aircraft to be realized in an economical manner.
OVERVIEW This section covers the propulsion systems and fuels that power all types of air vehicles. Air vehicles include, but are not limited to, fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, hybrids such as tilt-wing aircraft, and UAVs. The category of UAVs also includes missiles that have their operational envelope within that portion of the atmosphere that can support air-breathing propulsion systems. The type of propulsion system most prevalent in military air vehicles today is the gas turbine. This section covers gas turbines, along with other engines such as the ramjet, scramjet, and pulse-detonation engine (PDE). The engines may be at any scalefrom that of the large transport aircraft down to the MAV. Also included, where appropriate, are components of power trains associated with the transmission of power from the power plant to the point of application to the air. This includes power conversion devices, such as gearboxes and transmissions. The United States has a national program to double the U.S. militarys 1988 propulsion capacity: the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) program. IHPTET set very aggressive goals for the year 2003: to provide durable performance with low production and maintenance costs for new fighters and upgrade potential for currently fielded systems. Specific performance and cost goals are being considered to the year 2015 and beyond. Development of advanced materials is a critical part of this effort. Increased temperature and strength organic matrix composites, ceramic matrix composites, super alloys, and intermetallic composites are key to increasing engine thrust-to-weight ratio. Reducing fuel consumption through higher component efficiencies and compression system pressure ratios is an important aspect of future turbine engines. Future turbine engines will have very low fuel consumption, high thrust-to-weight ratio, and low cost in all phases of their life cycles. Compared with 1988 technologies, turbine engines in the period 20092015 will have 2.53.0 better thrust-to-weight ratio, 20- to 30-percent better specific fuel consumption, and 50-percent reduction in total development, production, and maintenance costs. Other forms of propulsion are also being investigated. The scramjet engine is the key enabling technology for NASAs multi-year hypersonic flight research program, Hyper-X, which seeks to overcome one of the greatest aeronautical research challenges: sustained air-breathing hypersonic flight. The Air Force Wright Patterson Laboratories, in collaboration with Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), are developing storable fuel scramjet engine technology under the Hydrocarbon Scramjet Engine Technology (HySET) program. Ramjets operate by subsonic combustion of fuel in a stream of air compressed by the forward speed of the aircraft inlet as opposed to conventional turbojet engines, in which the compressor section (the fan blades) compresses the air. In comparison to turbojets, ramjets have no moving parts exposed to the engine airflow. Scramjets (supersonic-combustion ramjets) are ramjet engines in which the airflow through the whole engine remains supersonic. Testing scramjet engine technology is challenging because only limited duration (i.e., 13 min) testing can be performed in ground facilities because of the extremely high-energy requirements. Long duration,
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full-scale testing requires flight tests above Mach 5. Hyper-X (X-43) (see Figure 1.2-1) will build knowledge, confidence, and a technology bridge to Mach 10. The fuel for the X-43 will be gaseous hydrogen. Rockets carry their own oxygen (liquid) for combustion. An air-breathing scramjet engine burns oxygen scooped from the atmosphere in the same manner as normal jet engines. Using conventional turbojet technology, air-breathing hypersonic vehicles should carry more cargo/payload than equivalent rocket-powered systems since they have more weight and payload space available because of not having to carry oxidizer onboard.
Figure 1.2-1. X-43, Hyper-X (With Scramjet Firing)
Military applications of scramjet technology include long-range reconnaissance and rapid strike missions (see Figure 1.2-2). Operation at hypersonic velocities allows Continental United States (CONUS)-based surveillance missions within hours of request and multiple passes without the predictability of satellite orbits. High speed and altitude supplant expensive stealth technology to achieve survivability for hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles.
Figure 1.2-2. Storable Fuel Scramjet Strike Missile
One of the propulsion advances that will be put in future aircraft are thrust vectoring engines. These engines have flown in aircraft since the 1970s and are currently used in the F-15 Advanced Control Technologies for Integrated Vehicles (ACTIVE) and the X-36. They are expected to be used in fighters, UCAVs, BWB aircraft, and commercial aircraft. RATIONALE Propulsion sources for military vehiclesas opposed to civilian use enginesmust provide superior performance because of the rigorous demands placed upon them. Increases in power-to-weight ratios, maximum power output, fuel efficiencies, and durability are characteristics sought after in civilian and military applications. However, the military propulsion unit must have additional characteristics that are superior to those of adversaries. Rapid and violent cycle changes, operation in severe climatic conditions, and the hardening to withstand nuclear and electromagnetic shocks are some of the distinguishing differences between the two applications. Advanced technologies will be critical in providing military capability within budget limitations. Improved propulsion will allow global reach transports that have 50 percent greater range than the C-5 transport and 40 percent greater payload, will double the range of the B-1 bomber in half the time at 30 percent lower cost, will provide aircraft carrier support aircraft that have twice the time on station, and will enable supersonic VTOL fighters with twice the range and payload of the F-15 and UAVs that have twice the loiter capability and 3.5 times the range of the E-2. Low cost will be realized by reducing or eliminating the need for lubrication, hydraulics, and other subsystems while employing common core (engine) architecture, ease-of-assembly design, and health monitoring systems. Improvements in the control of fuel components and mix ratios will result in better efficiencies and reduced emissions to reduce vulnerability to signature-seeking weapons. Current after-burning exhaust systems are heavy and costly because of system complexity. Thrust vectoring nozzles will reduce the weight, maintenance, and cost of the aircraft and will improve maneuverability.
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For helicopters, propulsion, drive-train, and power-transfer research is required to reduce specific fuel consumption, increase horsepower-to-weight ratio, and lower the cost, volume, and noise of future and current systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 1.2-3) Japans National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) has completed a series of studies on the overall performance of aircraft propulsion systems, internal fluid dynamics, advanced fans and compressors, advanced combustor design, high-efficiency turbines, control system and instrumentation for advanced engines, materials and structures for engine components, measurement methods for gas turbine aircraft propulsion systems, ultrahigh bypass engine, turbo-air breathing engines for space plane, ceramic gas turbine, super/hypersonic transport propulsion systems, and contra-rotating turbomachines. The United Kingdom has strong capabilities in high-performance power-transmission technologies. The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) has the experimental capability required to validate the theoretical methods and to explore the application of advanced technology rotor systems. This capability is provided by a Mach-scaled model rotor rig, which, combined with a purpose built hover facility used with the DERA 24-ft and 5-m wind tunnels, forms an integrated test capability covering the flight envelope of the helicopter. France and Germany have expertise in bearingless rotor hubs. Germany also has noteworthy capabilities in composite materials and high-strength alloy shafting. The Sadlier VTOL Aircraft Co. PTY, Ltd., of Australia is considering a vertical take-off aircraft that would combine the properties of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. It has a fan in the wing and a rear fan. It employs a diamond-shaped lift system with a single lift rotor at the center of the fan.
Gas Turbine Engines Other Aeronautical Power Sources Fuels Technology
Country Australia Canada China France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Russia Sweden Switzerland UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D
Figure 1.2-3. Aeronautical Propulsion Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.2. AERONAUTICAL PROPULSION

Gas Turbine Engines Ceramic Matrix Composites (CMCs) ................................................................................................................ III-1-33 Cooled Cooling Air ............................................................................................................................................. III-1-35 Fluidic Nozzle ..................................................................................................................................................... III-1-36 Higher Blade-Cooling Effectiveness .................................................................................................................. III-1-37 Intermetallic Turbine Blade ................................................................................................................................ III-1-39 Magnetic Bearings .............................................................................................................................................. III-1-40 Other Aeronautical Power Sources Pulse-Detonation Engines (PDEs) ...................................................................................................................... III-1-41 Ramjets/Scramjets ............................................................................................................................................... III-1-43 Fuels Technology Cryogenic Fuels .................................................................................................................................................. III-1-46 New-Capability Fuels ......................................................................................................................................... III-1-48 Endothermic Fuel-Cooled Technology .............................................................................................................. III-1-49
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. CERAMIC MATRIX COMPOSITES (CMCs)

Develop CMCs to withstand increases in combustor temperatures and turbine blades to 2,500 F without the requirement for cooling. SiC/SiC; Silicon nitride. Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) methods for new and fielded CMC components. None identified. Ductility, durability, crack growth requirements, and affordability. An accurate failure mechanism prediction and crack growth rate. Turbine blade attachment contact stresses are high because of the high heat transfer from the blade to the disk rim. Contact stresses need to be reduced for increased service life. High Weibel modulus (run with a crack).
Civil aviation and industrial gas turbine engines. Advanced fabrication and joining methods, fiber costs. Performance/cost trade will become favorable with further development.
RATIONALE CMCs have been identified as potential candidates for high-temperature structural applications because of their high-temperature strength, light weight, and excellent corrosion and wear resistance. CMCs are used in gas turbine hot section components and exhaust nozzles. Their high-temperature capability improves engine performance, thrust-to-weight ratio and specific fuel consumption (SFC) by reducing the need for cooling air. Uncooled ceramic turbine blades will allow the turbine inlet temperature to be increased without the associated cooling penalty of increased weight. This provides a significant increase in turbine efficiency and power. Uncooled combustor liners will allow improvements in allowable cycle temperature, combustion efficiency and reduced unwanted exhaust emissions. CMCs that withstand high combustor operating temperatures reduce aircraft weight and subsequently increases range/payload. Civil aviation and industrial gas turbine engines can use this technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Russia

Significant R&D
France South Korea
Germany UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
France [Societe Europeenne de Propulsion (SEP)] leads composite design and fabrication technology. Japan leads in ceramic fiber technology. Canada Concordia Centre for Composites is doing fundamental and applied work in ceramic matrix composites.
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Russia Russian Academy of Sciences, Laboratory of Reinforced Systems of Solid State Physics Institute is engaged in a study of elastic-plastic and creep behavior of composite materials with metal and ceramic matrix.
South Korea Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) is doing work with metal matrix composites for aerospace applications.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. COOLED COOLING AIR

Lightweight, low-volume heat exchangers with a temperature differential between inlet and outlet of approximately 400 F. Heat exchanger compactness: 0.5 W/cm3-K. None identified. Diffusion bonding technology. None identified. Safety; cost; fuel thermal stability (oxidation); weight of a high-efficiency heat exchanger. Next generation turbofans (high operating ratio); nuclear reactors; environmental control systems. Extends capability of current materials used in compressor disks, turbine blades, and vanes if heat exchanger technology does not impose weight and volume penalty.
RATIONALE Using fuel/air or air/air heat exchangers to provide lower temperature cooling air for the turbine and the compressor disks allows current cooled materials to operate at higher engine-cycle temperatures without an increase in metal temperature. High-performance combat aircraft can operate at higher compressor exit (high operating ratio, high Mach number) and turbine inlet temperatures to improve specific power and fuel consumption. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France UK

Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Two Russian military engines use air/air cooling (fan duct heat exchangers). Pratt & Whitney is developing an engine with fan duct heat exchangers for the JSF.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. FLUIDIC NOZZLE

Thrust vector angle and rate changes to provide maneuvering with minimum airfoil control effectors. Nozzle weight reduced 50 percent; a 70-percent reduction in overall parts count. None identified. None identified. None identified. Maximum thrust vector angle and rate of change capability; thrust coefficient; secondary airflow quantity; air vehicle integration and installed performance; integrated flight/propulsion controls; design methodologies for fully-fixed exhaust system for afterburning jet engine application. Low potential; possible technology application to civil transport aircraft (lower noise). Lack of moving parts and the simplified structural integration combine to improve nozzle maintainability and reduce life-cycle cost.
RATIONALE Fluidic thrust vectoring is the deflection of the exhaust thrust vector of a jet engine through the influence of a secondary fluid stream. This technology allows for a fixed nozzle that will reduce weight and complexity of current variable area convergent/divergent nozzles. Currently used mechanical vectoring and area-control systems add weight and complexity to aircraft exhaust systems. Fluidic nozzles are expected to provide increased maneuverability along with the reduction/elimination of conventional control effectors. The reduction of these effectors will also provide for decreased radar signature. The potential for jet plume mixing will also support the reduced signature objectives to include (potentially) infrared (IR) signatures. Fluidic nozzles are applicable to tactical aircraft that have aggressive survivability requirements. Conformal fluidic nozzles provide after-burning and pitch/yaw thrust vectoring capabilities, with significant reductions in nozzle weight when compared with the pitch-only vectored F-22 nozzle. To maximize benefits, the nozzle must be paired with a variable-cycle engine (as opposed to a fixed-cycle engine). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Sweden

Moderate R&D
Israel Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
In the United States, DoD, academia, and industry are advancing this technology. Any nation with the technology to develop advanced engines for fighter aircraft is capable of incorporating fluidic nozzle technology.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. HIGHER BLADE-COOLING EFFECTIVENESS

Blade-cooling effectiveness () greater than 0.75 and cooling parameter less than 2 ( ) (see Figure 1.2-4); turbine inlet temperature greater than 2,500 F. Advanced single-crystal materials. Core fabrication; casting process; core removal; inspection process. None identified. Fragile, complex core geometry; reactions between cores and alloy; thin wall casting yields; test and production equipment. Next-generation turbofans. Extended hot section life.
RATIONALE Increasing turbine inlet temperature allows engines to produce more thrust, but the key is having in the hot section the materials that can to withstand the very high temperatures. Achieving this requires new technology in materials and better cooling methods. A methodology has been derived by which the many parameters involved can be lumped into a relationship between cooling effectiveness () and a cooling parameter ( ) (see Figure 1.2-4).
1
0.9
Ideal Porous Wall

(approaches infinity)
0.8
Blade Cooling Effectiveness (theta)
0.7
Maximum Limit of Internal Convection Only

(approaches infinity)
0.6
0.5
Internal Convection Only

LEGEND: Advanced Military Engines Commercial & Mature Military Engines
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cooing Parameter (omega bar)
Figure 1.2-4. High-Power Turbine Blade-Cooling
The most efficient designs, from an overall performance standpoint, are those that achieve the highest cooling effectiveness at the lowest possible cooling parameter. High-performance engines would operate at higher cycle temperatures without additional penalty caused by increased cooling flows.
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France UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
A 2,500-F temperature represents the level of turbine inlet temperature in new model Russian front-line fighter engines at rated power. The United States holds the edge in turbines designed to operate at turbine inlet temperatures above 2,500 F.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. INTERMETALLIC TURBINE BLADE

Turbine blades that can achieve increased performance through reduced blade weight and material capable of higher temperatures (to 2,500 F). TiAl, NbAl, molybdenum disilicide, and niobium disilicide. Being developed. Not identified. Manufacturing technologies. Fixed- and rotary-wing commercial aircraft that use gas turbine engines. Increased turbine life.
RATIONALE Turbine blades have historically been manufactured from castings. Use of intermetallics for weight savings imposes additional structural requirements and design complexities (double-walled spar design), which change the turbine-blade fabrication technology. Intermetallic turbine blades can result in an increase in component efficiencies and high operating-temperature capabilities through reduced turbine weight. They can be used in fixed- and rotary-wing military aircraft that have gas turbine engines. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia India Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan Switzerland

Significant R&D
France Russia UK

Moderate R&D
Germany South Korea United States
Limited R&D
Australia The Melbourne Research and Innovation Office at the University of Melbourne is working on the development of inter-metallic alloys for high-temperature applications.
India The National Aerospace Laboratories have down work on an electrochemically assisted arc machine (ECAAM) for turbine-blade machining and machining of intermetallics.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. MAGNETIC BEARINGS

Magnetic (non-lubricated) bearings that can maintain or improve on the loads and environmental conditions (available in current bearing technology). Superconducting materials at high temperatures or magnetic materials that maintain high flux density at temperatures up to 1,000 F. Robust, high-temperature insulation material that can be easily thin-coated onto magnetic coil windings. None identified. 5-axis control feedback. Robust insulation coatings for magnetic coil windings; elimination of mechanical backup for electrical power failure; system weight and bulk; redundant controls and power supplies; graceful failure mechanism; temperature and load-carrying ability; weight; transient load capability; affordability. First applications for marine and industrial; turbine, generator, and automotive industry. Until this technology is mature and many units are produced, magnetic bearings will be less affordable than conventional bearings. Elimination of lubrication circuits will reduce leaks and servicing requirements.
RATIONALE Active magnetic bearings are used to support a rotating shaft (e.g., that in a gas turbine engine) in a magnetic field. This provides many advantages over ordinary bearings because there is no contact between the shaft and the housing. There is, therefore, no wear, and no lubrication is required. Magnetic bearings simplify the lubrication system and allow higher temperatures, active rotor (engine shaft) control, and higher performance engines. Logistics savings area also realized because of no lubrication requirements, less maintenance, and higher reliability. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel United States
Finland Japan

Moderate R&D
France Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Magnetic bearings are being closely evaluated for small aircraft, ground-vehicle, and sea-platform applications because of potential performance and control benefits. Advanced R&D is being done for use in large, man-rated aircraft engines, but fielded application is probably at least 1020 years away. In the United States, the University of Virginia has a Center for Magnetic Bearings. The University of Sheffield in the Untied Kingdom is conducting research on magnetic bearings. In Finland, the Laboratory of Electromechanics at the Helsinki University of Technology has conducted research on magnetic bearings.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. PULSE-DETONATION ENGINES (PDEs)

Air-breathing PDEs: practical design configurations without pre-detonator or required pre-detonator volume less than 2 percent of total detonation tube. Operating frequency above 40 Hz per detonation tube. High-temperature materials for uncooled propulsion structures. Supersonic/hypersonic testing of integrated inlet-combustor-nozzle over a wide range of simulated flight conditions (altitudes and Mach numbers). CFD; optical diagnostic techniques; ultra high-speed framing Schlieren photography. Ability to generate and control repeated, consistent detonations in practical design configurations; minimization of performance losses from inlet and nozzle integration that would offset the benefits of detonation combustion; accurate modeling of detonation phenomena; vehicle integration and high mass-flow rapid and robust valves. Space-launch vehicles. Air-breathing PDEs have the potential to be much simplerhence, less expensivethan gas turbine engines for similar performance levels.
RATIONALE NASAs long-term space transportation research is directed toward high risk, breakthrough technologies, such as PDEs, high-energy propellants, and advanced propulsion concepts and materials. PDEs present novel alternatives to current gas turbine and rocket engines, based on a continuous combustion process. PDE technology has the potential to achieve higher performance at lower cost than gas turbine engines. Advantages of PDEs include high efficiency, mechanical simplicity, compact size, and near instantaneous start, spool-up, and throttling. A detonation in a tube serves as the PDEs combustor. The detonation rapidly traverses the chamber, resulting in a nearly constant volume, heat-addition process that produces a high pressure in the combustor to provide thrust. By operating multi-tube configurations at high frequencies, near-constant thrust can be produced. PDEs are also easy to maintain, demonstrate high thrust-to-weight ratios, and have significantly lower SFC compared with other engine types producing similar thrust. Pulse detonation is an enabling technology for multi-mode propulsion systems for military aerospace vehicles. NASA has constructed two PDE test articles and has begun initial tests to demonstrate the engineering feasibility of rocket engines based on this promising technology. Small (5-cm) PDEs could be used in MAVs. They could also find possible use in precision-guided standoff munitions, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft. The concept of pulse detonation has existed since the 1940s. Advances in computational capability and experimental diagnostics appear to be ready to enable the development of practical PDEs burning liquid fuels in air. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan United States
Russia
Moderate R&D
Sweden
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Efforts are underway, or have been conducted recently, in Israel, Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Meridian International (United Kingdom) has studied the whole spectrum of research, development, and future
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advances in the field of aerospace propulsion, including PDEs. Efforts in Israel and Russia appear to be at a comparable state of the art. Otherwise, foreign technology development efforts are apparently less mature than U.S. activities. Individual science-level efforts on detonation-wave phenomena and modeling may be superior (especially in Russia). The California Institute of Technologys Explosion Dynamics Laboratory has conducted experiments on detonation initiation, which has application to PDEs. The University of Texas and Penn State University have also conducted PDE research. Adroit Systems, Inc., has seven patents supporting its PDE development work in the Seattle, Washington, area.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. RAMJETS/SCRAMJETS

Air-breathing engines to operate at speeds in excess of Mach 5. High-temperature materials. Hypersonic wind tunnel engine test capability. None identified. Scramjet: engine thermal protection, flow turbulence, shock wave/boundary layer interactions, and boundary layer transition; design of the fuel injection system. Supersonic transport (SST); high-speed civil transport (HSCT); space-launch vehicles. Ramjet/scramjet engine would be cheaper than gas turbine engines. Vehicle development/integration will dictate cost (expensive).
RATIONALE Ramjets/scramjets enable flight at velocities greater than that which gas turbine engines can achieve. Ramjets are limited to about Mach 6. The upper speed limit of scramjets has yet to be determined, but theoretically it is above the range required for orbital velocity (Mach 20 to 25). Practically, however, material structural considerations and combustion efficiency limit the maximum speed to about Mach 15. Combined-cycle turbine/ramjet/scramjet/rocket engines could allow a hypersonic, aeronautical vehicle to take off, go into orbit, and strike targets anywhere in the world within hours. Ramjets have demonstrated readiness for the next generation beyond-visual-range missiles. Military applications of scramjet technology include long-range reconnaissance and rapid-strike missions Operation at hypersonic velocities allows CONUS-based surveillance missions within hours of request and multiple passes without the predictability of satellite orbits. High speed and altitude supplant expensive stealth technology to achieve survivability for hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles. Through its Hyper-X research program at Langley and Dryden Research Centers, NASA is currently building the X-43A (see Figure 1.2-5), a 3.6-m-long aircraft that will demonstrate scramjet flight at Mach 7 and Mach 10 within the next 3 years. Scramjets could also improve missile range (see Figure 1.2-6) and could be used to power reusable space launch vehicles that would weigh less, carry more payloads than conventional rocket launch systems, and operate from existing runways anywhere. This increases U.S. forces access to space and their ability to place satellites into any orbit on demand, thus ensuring communications and surveillance.
Figure 1.2-5. X-43A (Hyper-X)
Figure 1.2-6. Scramjet Strike Missile
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Australia India Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel UK

Significant R&D
France Italy United States
Germany Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Japan has an independent Hypersonic Propulsion Technology Program (HYPR) program. The HYPR program is funded by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO). Technology such as this will be required for the next generation of super/hyper-sonic transport propulsion system. The Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) Propulsion System Laboratory, in Japan, has studied an expander cycle air-turbo ramjet engine, ATREX, as a candidate for the propulsion system of the fly-back booster of the two-stage-to-orbit space plane. The Noshiro Rocket Testing Center, one of the facilities of the ISAS of the Japanese Ministry of Education, has conducted ground-firing tests to check the performance of the air turbo ramjet (ATR) engine. In addition to Japan, France and Germany have well-funded programs for the development of next-generation hypersonic vehicles. Aerospatiale (France) produces ramjet equipment (electrovalves, injectors, air intakes, motor bay assemblies, and so forth). The first French ramjet was released over Blagnac and reached a speed of 700 km/h in April 1949. Today, the Office National dEtudes et de Recherches Aerospatiales (ONERA) (France) cooperates with the Russian Central Aero- and Hydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI)1 and Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM) for aerodynamics and ramjet propulsion. According to Scientific American, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom have performed ground tests of prototype scramjet engines, and other related research is underway in countries such as China, India, and Italy. Today, scientists routinely conduct ground tests of scramjet engines at simulated speeds up to Mach 15. In flight tests, the Russians have demonstrated ramjet operation of a dual-mode scramjet up to Mach 6.4. NASA is currently building the X-43A (see Figure 1.2-5) that will demonstrate scramjet flight at Mach 7 and Mach 10 within the next 3 years. China is developing ramjet engine technologies to confer supersonic speeds on its missiles, and this will complicate interception. In addition, ramjets offer the potential to increase the range of a smaller missile. Chinas existing ramjet-powered missiles are large and cannot travel great distances, but the purchase of the operational Russian Raduga SS-N-22 ramjet-powered antiship missile could provide China a new source of cruise missile ramjet technology. Aerospatiale has a contract from the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA) covering the predevelopment of a new generic supersonic missile powered by a liquid-fueled ramjet engine. The VESTA (Vecteur Statoracteur) will form the basis for the future antiship missile ANNG (Anti-Navire Nouvelle Gnration). BACKGROUND The ramjet engine, which was invented in France in 1913, is the simplest type of the all-jet engines because it has no moving parts. It achieves compression of intake air by the forward speed of the air vehicle. The aerodynamic diffusion created by the inlet and diffuser slows the air entering the intake of a supersonic aircraft to velocities comparable to those in a turbojet augmentor. The expansion of hot gases after fuel injection and combustion accelerates the exhaust air to a velocity higher than that at the inlet and creates positive push. The ramjet has to be traveling through the air at high speed before it can be started; therefore, it has to be boosted to the proper speed by some other type of propulsion. In theory, the ramjet engine has no maximum speed and can accelerate indefinitely as long as it stays within the atmosphere. In reality, ramjets are limited to about Mach 6, above which the combustion chamber becomes so hot that the combustion products (water) decompose. The biggest drawback of the ramjet engine is its high rate of fuel consumption.
TsAGI is the Russian equivalent of NASA.
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Scramjet is an acronym for supersonic combustion ramjet. The scramjet (see Figure 1.2-7) differs from the ramjet in that combustion takes place at supersonic air velocities through the engine. By not slowing down the engine airflow to subsonic speeds for combustion (as in a ramjet), scramjet engines can operate more efficiently at Mach numbers above 5. It is mechanically simple, but more complex aerodynamically than a jet engine. The biggest structural challenge of a scramjet engine is thermal protection of the internal engine walls and fuel injector components.
Diffuser
Supersonic Combuster
Nozzle
Vehicle Fuel injection Forebody oblique shock Engine cowl
Figure I.2-7. Scramjet Diagram
Scramjets or ramjets can use a variety of cryogenic or storable fuels. Hydrogen fuel offers the highest specific impulse but requires cryogenic tankage and fuel-handling capabilities (see Data Sheet on Cryogenic Fuels, page III-1-46). During the 1990s, substantial progress was made on the development of storable hydrocarbon fuels that use chemical bond breaking (endothermic reaction) in the presence of catalysts to double the heat sink capability of the fuel from its physical heat sink alone. This breakthrough allows the scramjet engine thermal balance to be sustained up to Mach 8 flight by using fuel cooling of the combustor components (see Data Sheet on Endothermic Fuel-Cooled Technology, page III-1-49).
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. CRYOGENIC FUELS

Achieving hypersonic (above Mach 6) or very long-range capability. Graphite epoxy composites. Cryogenic fuel measurement system. None identified. Temperature variation and hydrogen compatibility; handling cryogenic fuel including infrastructure investment; leak detection. SST, HSCT, space launch; heavy duty trucks, buses, and automobiles. Large cost for demonstration and development but enables the use of fully reusable space-launch vehicles and long-range strike missiles from tactical aircraft.
RATIONALE Cryogenic fuels enable hypersonic flight and will be used in the future for reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). These fuels are also being evaluated as alternative fuels for the trucking industry. Trucks transport cryogenic fuels, and investigations are underway to see if they can also burn them. Boeing Rocketdyne is developing and building the XRS-2200 for the X-33 and is planning a full-scale RS-2200 for the future VentureStar orbiter. Both engine variants use liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen for the highest possible performance, placing them in the group of modern cryogenic high-performance engines. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Japan

Moderate R&D
India Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
India is developing a cryogenic-fuel-driven geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV). The three-stage GSLV, equipped with an upper cryogenic fuel state, is designed to orbit 2.5-ton communications satellites into a geosynchronous orbit. Germany is testing a liquid hydrogen automotive service station at Munich International Airport and leads the world in developmental work on hydrogen technology for use as an automotive fuel. Russias A.N. Tupolev Scientific and Technological Aviation Complex (Tupolev ANTK) claims it has solved all technical problems in the field of cryogenic aircraft fuels. The company has a unique gas facility for the Tu-156 series experimental aircraft at the Gromovs Flight Test and Research Institute in Zhukovsky. BACKGROUND Cryogenics is the science of very low temperatures. An accepted temperature used to distinguish between refrigeration and cryogenics is 73.3 C (100 F). Low temperatures in the cryogenic range are generally obtained by the liquidification or solidification of gases. The boiling point of liquid hydrogen is 252.7 C. In Russia, Kriogenmash AO is involved in cyrogenic fuels. The company originated in 1949 when the Plant of Cryogenic Machine-building was built in Balashikha. The company was involved in all missiles and launchers,
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featuring cryogenic fuel components (i.e., missiles: V-2/R-1 to the R-9 and SLVs from R-7/8A91 to the EnergiaBuran system). Kriogenmash AOs principal directions of activity include research, development, production, and assembly of: Air-fractioning, gas-fractioning, and liquefying installations for the production of oxygen, nitrogen, argon, hydrogen, liquid natural gas, crypton, xenon, neon, and so forth Systems for storage, transportation and fueling of liquid cryogenic products (oxygen, nitrogen, argon, hydrogen, natural gases, and helium) Space simulators and cryogenic thermal vacuum chambers for the aviation, rocket and space technology, medicine, radioelectronics, optics, food, and pharmaceutical industries Helium systems, liquefiers, and refrigerators for cooling objects in the temperature range 0.354.5 K.
Currently, Kriogenmash AO participates in the experimental development projects under the Federal Space Program of Russia.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. NEW-CAPABILITY FUELS

Fuels that function at higher temperatures with increased performance and stability for turbine engines. Various additives; composition and synthesis techniques of additives, initiators, catalysts, and coagulation and soot suppressants. None identified. None identified. Development of various additives that increase fuel stability while decreasing fuel coking; performance of additives to reduce hydrocarbon fuels ignition delay, emissions, and/or signature or improve engine and/or aircraft operability as a function of military combustor conditions, including pressure, temperature, residence time, and equivalence ratio. Increased fuel heat sink for aircraft designed to take advantage of higher fuel-tank temperatures and reduced engine coking; all present and evolving military and civilian aircraft. Projected cost is pennies per gallon. Requires but a small amount of additive.
Affordability
RATIONALE High-temperature fuels increase the potential heat that can be put into the fuel and reduces the amount of coking experienced in the engine; however, hydrocarbon fuels have long ignition delays and form particulates in engine exhaust that increase visibility (signature) and have harmful health and environmental effects. Therefore, chemical additives that enhance ignition/mitigate emissions and particulates must be applied at cost-effective, parts per million (ppm) concentrations. The addition of a small amount of additive(s) in the fuel costs only pennies per gallon. The reduced coking in the engine significantly reduces aircraft life-cycle costs. Chemical additives that will enhance ignition and mitigate particulate formation in military and commercial engines are the subjects of ongoing investigations. Meeting this objective will enable the sustainment of military readiness and allow both the military and commercial sectors to meet the air-quality standards of the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990) and upcoming amendments to this act. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Sweden

Significant R&D
Germany Switzerland
Japan UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The JP-8+100 additive has been shown to mitigate particulates in limited operational engine tests. JP-8+100 is improved JP-8 fuel with a fuel injector cleaner (additive) that reduces fouling/coking in engine fuel controls, mainburner fuel nozzles, manifolds and augmentor sprayrings/spraybars and reduces smoke and soot in older engines. JP-8+100 will reduce engine and aircraft fuel system operation and maintenance costs for current and future aircraft.
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DATA SHEET III-1.2. ENDOTHERMIC FUEL-COOLED TECHNOLOGY

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Heat sink [e.g., British Thermal Units (BTUs/lb)] as a function of fuel conditionstemperature, residence time, pressure, and so forth; increased vehicle thermal management capacity. Catalysts, coke-inhibiting structural materials; coatings (initiators and inhibitors); anticoagulant additives. Production of structures and engines that incorporate fuel passages for cooling.
Flow-control software to ensure proper temperature of flow before it enters combustor. Deposition (coking) from high-temperature fuels; catalysts and catalyst attachment methods; coke-tolerant structures/designs; operability of engine when fuel properties vary from liquid to vapor over envelope, heat exchanger design; manufacturing technology; vehicle fuel and thermal management integration; reactor fuel-flow control/ regulation. Hydrocarbon-fueled hypersonic vehicles (none at present); launch vehicles and HSCT. Enables the use of fully reusable space-launch vehicles and long-range strike missiles from tactical aircraft.
RATIONALE Endothermic fuels undergo endothermic (heat-absorbing) chemical reactions while flowing through heat exchangers and fuel-cooled structures. They are an enabling technology for hypersonic, storable-fuel, scramjet engines (Mach 58). The heated and decomposed chemical byproducts of the endothermic process also aid in mixing and in a supersonic stream that result in combustion efficiencies greater than 90 percent. Coke deposits, or carbon build-up, occur when hydrocarbon fuels are locally heated to high temperatures (> 1,000 F). In endothermic fuel reactors/heat exchangers, this can reduce contact with catalytic surfaces and result in lower endothermic efficiency and increased pressure drop through the flow passages. Periodic maintenance to remove this buildup is feasible for reusable systems, but sustained operation at the maximum upper fuel temperature coking limit can result in local overheating of structural components. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Russia
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Thus far, only the military has used endothermic fuel technology. These fuels have been ground-tested only (United States, Russia). No flight tests have been conducted. Russia has conducted extensive testing of fuel additives and initiators to lower the temperature at which the endothermic cracking process begins. This technique can result in higher heat transfer rates and lower structural operating temperatures of cooled engine components.
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BACKGROUND Endothermic fuel technology using operational jet propulsion (JP) fuels has been under development primarily by NASA and the Air Force since the early 1970s. Fuels tested for endothermic cooling capabilities and scramjet engine combustion include JP-7, -8, -10, NORPAR-12, and methylcyclohexane (MCH). Various catalysts are used to enhance the endothermic process, and several catalytic heat exchanger/reactor (CHER) designs and material systems have been developed and tested. Recently, low-cost catalytic coating processes have been successfully demonstrated on complex scramjet engine heat-exchanger and fuel-injector components.
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SECTION 1.3AERONAUTICAL STRUCTURES

Highlights Smart structures and materials will enable a new generation of vehicles that have highly integrated structures and actuators. On-board health monitoring systems will reduce time between removal and replacement of structural components. Active load control will result in increased service life and reliability.
OVERVIEW This section covers production techniques and methodology, maintenance technologies, and in-flight technologies associated with the air-vehicle structures. It does not include the development and production of materials used in the structures but rather the application and the processes necessary to fabricate and assemble the end-use structures. These structures may be applicable to any and all parts of an air vehicle, including lifting surfaces and bodies and other subsystems and components. RATIONALE A continuing and enduring objective in developing and building aeronautical structures systems is attaining high-strength properties that have the ability to withstand environmental, stress, and other outside forces while minimizing weight. Often, these characteristics are achieved through special materials and alloys, yet the structures qualities can also be improved through design and manufacturing techniques. These processes must be optimized to achieve the full capability of the advanced materials being used. The technologies in this section aim to improve aircraft structural performance while reducing acquisition and operating costs. Virtual prototyping to optimize structural design for efficiency and performance is of particular interest. It will remove a large portion of the risk involved in exploring new concepts and moving rapidly from concept to production. Reducing dynamically loaded, structural stress prediction inaccuracy and the production labor hours per pound for composite structures are other areas of great interest. Breakthroughs in these and other areas will improve maintenance and production costs, reduce the empty weight fraction of the airframe, and increase durability, performance, and ride comfort. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 1.3-1) The United States has always been a leader in the production of high-strength, lightweight, durable structures. Other nationsRussia specificallyhave often approached the strength question with robustness of design to ensure adequacy where weight was a secondary objective. Advanced composite structures are becoming common in international aircraft. Technologies for rotary-wing military systems reside primarily in the few countries that produce military helicopters. Predominant among these are France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has strong capabilities in composites and smart structures. Crash survivability is an area of special interest. France has expertise and, in general, is on a par with the United States in this area. Survivability depends on several factors, including equipment performance, which can be improved by more efficient design and testing of aircraft structures. Of particular interest is the testing of advanced structural concepts and manufacturing processes for composite and thermoplastic materials for primary helicopter airframe structures. In addition to the aforementioned countries, Canada has strong capabilities in fracture/fatigue analysis, Russia has strong capabilities in titanium and steel alloy structures, and Japan has world-class expertise in ceramics and composite materials.
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Country Australia Canada China France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Sweden Switzerland UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Production Techniques and Methodology
Maintenance Technologies
In-Flight Technologies

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Figure 1.3-1. Aeronautical Structures Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.3. AERONAUTICAL STRUCTURES

Production Techniques and Methodology Conformal Load Bearing Antenna Structures ................................................................................................ III-1-55 Smart Structures/Materials .............................................................................................................................. III-1-57 Smart Composite Rotorcraft Structures .......................................................................................................... III-1-59 Maintenance Technologies Structural Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) ................................................................................ III-1-60 In-Flight Technologies Active Aeroelastic Wing ................................................................................................................................. III-1-62 Active Load/Buffet Alleviation for Flight Surfaces ....................................................................................... III-1-63
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. CONFORMAL LOAD BEARING ANTENNA STRUCTURES

Elimination of 100 percent of the drag associated with externally mounted antennas. Materials providing structural and dielectric properties; radome materials having strength and stiffness yet providing low dielectric and magnetic loss. Materials exhibiting high dielectric and/or magnetic loss, while matched to free-space impedances, would provide critical antenna-loading capabilities. Test: Equipment that tests the electrical performance of the antennas while subjecting the device to the environment (e.g., heat, stress, reduced air pressure, increased water pressure, vibration, structural loads, and so forth). Production: Similar test equipment with increased throughput. Inspection: Hand-held, portable, or increased speed test equipment that performs checks on the test functions.
Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment
Unique Software
Software linking multiple antennas, or antenna array elements, would aid the development of conformal, load-bearing antennas. Any software that could, in real time or nearreal time, provide control, analysis, or synthesis functions to reconstruct direction or identification of type of the energy incident upon the antennas would provide critical developmental technologies. Professional people trained in electromagnetic propagation; mechanical/structures analysts with an understanding of magnetic and dielectric material properties provide the essence of those people required for design; chemists, with an understanding of dielectric material properties. Software programs providing finite element analysis, both electrical and mechanical (including material properties), from a common computer-aided design (CAD) database would drastically improve the speed of creating realizable designs. Crossed-slot antennas are best suited for this application (efficient volumetric utilization and wide gain patterns) but have been poorly modeled. Systems with graded aperture width or loading are difficult to analyze with available tools, but these features may be required to obtain optimal bandwidth efficiency in electrically small devices.
Technical Issues
Could be applied to commercial vehicles currently constrained in performance by the current sensors field of view caused by vehicle structures or outer mold line constraints. Affordability can occur by reducing the number of sensors necessary (because of increased efficiencies in field of view) and by reducing life-cycle cost [sensors capable of structural integrity will have increased mean time between failures (MTBFs)].
Affordability
RATIONALE This technology provides capability in placing antennas (sensors) in places on vehicles previously denied because of structural and/or aerodynamic reasons. Integration of load-bearing, conformal surfaces that provide electromagnetic sensing functions reduces the number of new sensors and increases the new sensors field of view. In addition to providing LO conformal antennas, capability exists for integration of multiple apertures serving varied needs [e.g., ultrahigh frequency (UHF) communications (COM)/satellite communication (SATCOM), Global Positioning System (GPS), identification friend or foe (IFF), and so forth] within a common housing, which would provide significant space and weight savings. Potential beneficiaries of this technology are JSF, Comanche,
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FA-18E/F, and other aircraft with sensitive RCS requirements. By structuralizing the aperture, integration of the antenna into existing airframes is greatly simplified. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany Netherlands UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel Russia United States
China Italy Sweden

Moderate R&D
France Japan Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Slot-antenna characterization, because of its inherent benefits, has probably been studied by all nations with advanced aircraft. Electrically small apertures have been similarly studied, but efficient wideband performance with minimal cavity volume has probably not been realized yet except by extensive finite-element modeling and cut-andtry experimentation. In the Netherlands, the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) is conducting research to determine the electromagnetic interaction of conformal antennas with the aircraft structure.
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. SMART STRUCTURES/MATERIALS

Smart structures will reduce the air vehicle empty weight by 10 to 25 percent. SMAs and actuator forms; ferroelectric ceramics, particularly single crystal variants of piezoelectric ceramics. Test equipment and particularly standardized test methods to provide total life/performance data under realistic loading (mechanical, thermal, and electrical) conditions; production equipment for large-scale, low-cost production of high-quality piezoceramics, particularly single crystal and fiber forms. Modeling piezoceramics, including effects of aging and use at high field levels; threedimensional (3-D) modeling of SMAs, including shear. Development and demonstration of complete actuator systems, including displacement amplification, power, and control; flight test demonstrations to increase credibility; new actuation techniques, such as rectification and termination methods, for high force SMA actuators; highly robust and self-adaptive control techniques. Medical applications of SMAs; piezoceramics for speakers, ultrasonic transducers, and sensors. Active fibers are highly promising but not currently affordable. SMAs are generally affordable unless temperatures above about 90 C are required. Then, expensive doping materials (Pd, Pt, Hf) are required.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Smart structures and materials technology will enable a new generation of vehicles that have highly integrated structures and actuation systems. This will free up internal volume for payload or fuel. Metamorphic or shape change structures will enable vehicles to operate at near optimal performance over a very broad flight envelope, thus enabling new missions and multimission vehicles. Active vibration, acoustics, and load suppression will reduce the cost and extend the lives of conventional vehicles through reduced design and qualification requirements on avionics (enabling use of COTS avionics) and of vehicle structures. Smart structures will assist in flutter suppression. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Argentina France Japan Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
China Italy South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
There has been a large proliferation of international conferences in this technology. The United States is currently the overall leader in this technology, but significant research efforts are ongoing in Japan and Europe, often for nondefense applications. In some nondefense applications, Japan and Europe possess at least parityif not a technological lead over the United States. The Canadian National Research Council conducts and coordinates a wide range of programs in basic materials (including rheological studies and piezoelectrics), as well as related work in vibration analysis and control applicable to the characterization of smart structures.
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French government institutes, academic institutes, and private industry participate actively in European research initiatives relating to smart materials and structures. At this juncture, France does not appear as advanced in applying the technology as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Germany is one of the European Union (EU) leaders in smart materials and structures, and an active participant in EU-sponsored programs. The United Kingdom also has a strong program in smart materials and structures, with participation from both academia and private industry. Participation in the Brite/EuRAM-sponsored activities pertinent to smart structures provides an insight into the breadth and depth of United Kingdoms capability. Italy conducts substantial research in sensing and smart structures and activities involve several government, academic, and private industry participants. Japan is frequently cited as being on a par with the United States as a world leader in smart materials and structures. Research areas of interest include smart polymeric composites with applications to infrastructures, ground, and aerospace vehicles; SMA materials and their composites; smart materials based on the coupling behavior between physical and mechanical phenomena; piezoelectric, piezoresistive, magnetostrictive, and their composite materials and structures where the stress and strain are key driving or resulting parameters; and novel electronic and optical composite materials with unique sensing capabilities. In South Korea, both the Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH) in Pohang (http://www.postech.ac.kr/e/) and the Seoul National University (http://www.snu.ac.kr/) conduct research in smart structures. The stated objectives of the research are to design and develop structuresespecially for aerospace applicationsthat are adaptable and responsive to external disturbances. In Switzerland, the work at the University of Lausanne covers a wide range of topics, including work in the bismuth titanate (BIT) family of piezoceramic materials (which are of interest for high-temperature applications) and in lead zirconate titanate (PZT) for high-frequency use.
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. SMART COMPOSITE ROTORCRAFT STRUCTURES

Main rotor smart actuation of rotor controls yields reduced blade loading, vibration levels, and design complexity. Noise cancellation to reduce acoustic signature by 10 dB.
Critical Materials
Nitinol torsion actuators, active fiber composites (piezoelectric), piezoelectric stacks; high fatigue-strength embeddable electrical wire buses. Production of piezoceramic actuator forms, including stacks, fiber composites, and single-crystal stacks and fibers. Advanced rotor analysis software. Energy transfer to actuation system; use of lightweight actuators. Variety of helicopters. Reduced maintenance costs.
Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications Affordability
RATIONALE Smart material actuation has the potential of making on-blade control of rotor blades feasible and commercially viable. The structural properties of smart materials are not well known or documented, and their use in actuation devices has not yet been fully flight demonstrated. Preliminary tests and analyses have indicated the feasibility of using smart materials actuation on helicopter rotor blades. Higher harmonic control and individual blade control tests have demonstrated that it is possible to reduce (actively) helicopter rotor vibration and noise at critical flight conditions. The use of active rotor blades could lead to the removal of the need for swashplates. This would reduce weight and complexity at the rotor hub. The Smart Materials Actuated Rotor Technology (SMART) program supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) considers active control of a rotor-blade trailing-edge flap and trailing-edge trim tab. Expected performance improvements for the flap include a 10-dB reduction in blade vibration-induced noise while landing; an 80-percent reduction in airframe vibrations; a 10-percent gain in rotor performance (L/D); and improved maneuverability from stall elevation. For the trim tab, the goal is to eliminate manual tracking requirements, relax blade-manufacturing tolerance, and reduce vibrations. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Italy United States
Limited R&D
In the United Kingdom, DERA does a significant amount of research and experimentation in rotorcraft technology (http://www.dra.hmg.gb/dera.html). This research addresses the structural design of blades, model performance trials and evaluation, and validation of the theory and analysis of external noise research and structural acoustics, including noise path identification and advanced statistical energy analysis (SEA). Scale rotor experiments are undertaken at a major hover test facility, where DERA also assesses rotor blade icing and the overall operational performance of rotorcraft. In addition, NASTRAN and DYTRAN finite element analysis, various pre- and post-processors, and STARS structural design optimization packages are available.
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. STRUCTURAL PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT (PHM)

A 20- to 40-percent reduction in maintenance manpower; 50-percent reduction in logistics footprint; 25-percent increase in sortie generation rate (compared with current aircraft). No materials issues, except those relating to high reliability sensors. MEMS for integrated sensor and data processing. PHM is a software-intensive system. Information processing methods including failure models that enable prognostics. PHM systems will need near zero false-alarm rate (hence, high-reliability sensors). Information-processing methods including failure models that enable prognostics. Wireless sensor systems are highly desirable. Capability to diagnose and isolate automatically, accurately, and consistently all faults within the avionics, propulsion, and subsystems.
Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software
Technical Issues
Civil Infrastructure (bridges, dams, buildings, offshore oil rigs); helicopters; large, highvalue equipment (e.g., large earth-moving equipment). Commercial aircraft can benefit by increased safety and reduced operating cost but will require major change in approach to structural integrity assurance.
Affordability
Affordable PHM system recurring costs will vary greatly with application. In all cases, cost savings will involve reduction of structural inspections. If PHM systems are not near 100-percent reliable, they will be unused in favor of the current manual inspection methods of ensuring structural integrity.
RATIONALE PHM is a technology-maturation project focused on using advanced sensors integrated through algorithms and intelligent models, such as neural nets, to monitor, predict, and manage aircraft health. The JSF PHM system, in combination with the Joint Distributed Information System (JDIS), is designed to increase mission reliability and sortie generation rate, while decreasing maintenance effort and logistics footprint. The software-intensive systems are designed to use the newest technology to accomplish these goals. For example, JSF expects to use PHM technology to enable a 20- to 40-percent reduction in maintenance manpower, a 50-percent reduction in logistics footprint (in terms of numbers of C-141 cargo aircraft loads), and a 25-percent increase in sortie generation rate, along with an affordable 8,000 flight-hour service life. PHM is the only technology that can significantly reduce O&S costs associated with inspections while maintaining safety of flight and vehicle availability. The goal of PHM is to enable what the JSF program calls autonomic logistics: a maintenance and supply system where information on aircraft faults detected while the aircraft is airborne is automatically downlinked to trigger the logistics system to meet the returning aircraft with appropriate parts, maintenance personnel, and maintenance equipment. Because both the individual aircraft PHM systems and the fleet-wide logistics system will include intelligent models (software with built-in learning capabilities), the system will eventually predict impending failures accurately and provide information about replacing parts just before they might fail (condition-based maintenance). Sensors for detection of composite failure, widespread (multisite) fatigue damage, and corrosion appear to be the key to the effective application of this technology. Sensor improvements in the following order of priority are necessary: reliability, cost, size, weight, and power.
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Canada Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Denmark UK

Significant R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The lead application area for this technology has been for helicopters where the United Kingdom has made a significant commitment since the early 1990s. The United Kingdom is home to several of the worlds leading manufacturers. Japan has a strong interest but is more oriented to civil infrastructure (rapid assessment of earthquake damage). Canada also has extensive research in this area. The Danish Companies, TERMA Information Systems Division (ISD) and IFAD, have joined the Boeing JSF One Team for PHM and will provide system design, information processing, and communications software.
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. ACTIVE AEROELASTIC WING

Potential of up to 20-percent weight reduction. None identified. None identified. CFD tools. Include the integration of structural dynamics with multivariable reconfigurable control at levels that exceed current state of the art. The commercial industry could make use of the technology for future transport development. The reduction of flight control surfaces and actuators produces savings in manufacturing and maintenance costs.
RATIONALE The new technology that is developed will increase the ability of flight control systems to account for and use aeroelastic effects in a beneficial manner. Aeroelastic characteristics of the wing are used to enhance overall performance of the air vehicle. Unlike conventional approaches, control surfaces are employed to induce twist, causing the wing itself to produce control forces. Potential benefits include improved aerodynamic efficiency because of thinner wing design, increased control power with application of lower control forces, and decreased structural loads. Limited commercial endeavors have been successful, but the technology needs a significant amount of maturation and development for military application. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Sweden

Significant R&D
Germany Switzerland
Japan UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
In the United States, Boeing, NASA, and the Air Force are pursuing an active aeroelastic wing program. In a similar vein, researchers at the University of Michigan have developed a method to design single-piece, jointless mechanisms (compliant mechanisms) that may improve aircraft performance and simplify aircraft design by allowing aircraft wings without control surfaces (ailerons, slats, tabs, and so forth).
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DATA SHEET III-1.3. ACTIVE LOAD/BUFFET ALLEVIATION FOR FLIGHT SURFACES

Aircraft service life extension of 20 percent. None identified. None identified. Software to implement the developed algorithms. The problem involves the combination of traditional buffet-alleviation techniques with the optimal determination of control surface deflections that minimize or reduce the loads on control surfaces, thereby reducing the power required to drive the surfaces. Commercial and military aircraft could benefit from this technology for the same reasons. Has the potential for life-cycle cost reduction via increased structural life.
RATIONALE This technology uses advanced optimization algorithms to determine control surface deflections that provide the control power to accomplish the specified maneuver while simultaneously minimizing the structural loads placed on the aircraft. This technology is applicable to all future aircraft, including JSF and UAV developments, and has the potential of being retrofit into current aircraft. Optimal solution of the combined load/buffet-alleviation problem involves significant computational resources. This development explores methods for determining the proper balance between model fidelity and computational resources but has the potential for life-cycle cost reduction via increased structural life. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Italy Switzerland

Significant R&D
France Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Germany Russia United States
Limited R&D
Any country with an active aircraft design industry would be expected to pursue this technology.
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SECTION 1.4AERONAUTICAL VEHICLE CONTROL

Highlights Optical technologies will become more prevalent for flight control system actuation and sensing. Multivariate, reconfigurable control systems will enhance survivability.
OVERVIEW This section covers technologies associated with the control of air vehicles. Vehicle control systems are composed of sensors, computers, actuators, and other system components dictated by the architecture, methodologies, and algorithms required by an air vehicle in performing its intended mission. Technologies critical to the development of future air vehicles include automated closed loop coupling; fly-bylight/power-by-wire (FBL/PBW), helicopter active control, multivariable reconfigurable control, and performanceseeking aircraft control. The requirement for control systems varies between manned air vehicles and UAVs. Some UAVs are meant to fly beyond current vehicle operational envelopes. MAVs introduce regimes that are not paralleled in full-sized vehicles. In the future, the pilot will control an aircrafts situation via many real or virtual controls in a cockpit. In addition to the standard hand and foot controls, controls will be activated by head movement, eye movement, voice sensing, and brain activity (fly-by-thought). Aeroelastic wings (see Section 1.3) are being investigated for the future. In this concept, the entire wing is a control surface. The former high alpha research vehicle (HARV) will be modified to research wing-twisting techniques for flight controls vs. traditional ailerons and flaps. Researchers want to determine if the twisting motion can make future wings lighter and aircraft more fuel efficient. Flight-control technology defines the aircrafts flying qualities and the pilot interface. Helicopters are inherently unstable, nonlinear, and highly cross coupled. Advances in smaller, more powerful computers hold tremendous promise in this field to allow realization of the full potential of the rotorcrafts performance envelope and maintenance of performance, even in poor weather and at night. Integrating flight control with weapons control is of great interest to permit improved pointing accuracy and the use of lower-cost unguided rockets as precision munitions. Other goals include improved external load handling at night and increased exploitable agility and maneuverability. RATIONALE Future flight regimes for manned air vehicles and UAVs will require enhanced control systems. More functions will be controlled to achieve better system/subsystem performance. Adaptive/expert systems will enable maximum mission effectiveness and potentially reduce maintenance costs. Objectives for new technology in fixed-wing aircraft include flight-control technologies leading to aircraftcontrol systems that: Automatically adjust to and survive combat damage Have on-board systems to identify flight control component failures and reduce repair time Provide supersonic tailless fighter control to improve range and payload Have FBL/PBW control technology to improve reliability Have LO air data systems to improve survivability Operate in poor visibility with an autonomous landing system to increase operational readiness.
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For helicopters, the objective is to demonstrate, through simulation and flight test, later-generation rotorcraft digital FBW/light-control systems with fault-tolerant architectures (including carefree maneuvering), task-compliant control law, and integrated fire-, fuel-, and flight-control capabilities designed with robust control law design methods. This will allow improvements to all-weather/night mission performance, flight safety, and development time and cost. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Several countries are conducting R&D on aeronautical vehicle control. The United States, Russia, and the other European countries are most active. In the United Kingdom, DERA conducts high-fidelity experiments in flight and uses ground-based simulation, supplemented by in-depth theoretical studies, to improve simulation modeling and control law design. (See individual technology data sheets for worldwide technology assessments on specific technologies.)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.4. AERONAUTICAL VEHICLE CONTROL

Fly-By-Light/Power-By-Wire (FBL/PBW) ............................................................................................................. III-1-69 Helicopter Active Control ........................................................................................................................................ III-1-71 Multivariable Reconfigurable Control ..................................................................................................................... III-1-72 Performance-Seeking Aircraft Control (PSAC) ...................................................................................................... III-1-73
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DATA SHEET III-1.4. FLY-BY-LIGHT/POWER-BY-WIRE (FBL/PBW)

FBL: Reduce the weight of flight control system components by 50 percent by using optical wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) systems and sensors. PBW: A 5- to 25-percent reduction in subsystem weight over FBW aircraft.
Fiber-optic materials. Optical time domain reflectometers; optical spectrum analyzers; optical network analyzers; fiber-optic fault locators; splicing equipment. Power system modeling and analysis to compare and evaluate possible architectures and topologies before hardware is actually built; modeling of converters, motor drives, actuators, starter/generators, batteries, and associated controls, and simulations of small systems and large end-to-end systems; signal conditioning and interpretation routines for fiber-optic sensors. Optical connectors and components operating in a tactical aircraft environment. WDM network test techniques will need to be adopted from the telecommunications industry.
Technical Issues
Subsonic civil transports; high-speed digital data communicationstelecom and datacom. Lower initial acquisition and direct operating costs, reduced weight, and the resulting increased aircraft performance and reliability.
RATIONALE FBL technology is the replacement of electronic data transmission, mechanical control linkages, and electronic sensors with optical components and subsystems. PBW technology is the elimination of hydraulics, variable engine bleed air, and the constant speed drive for power generation through advances in aerospace power system technology. FBL/PBW technologies could provide lightweight, highly reliable, highly electromagnetically immune fiberoptic control systems, and all-electric secondary power systems for advanced subsonic civil transport aircraft. For an aircraft such as the F-16, the change to PBW could save up to 1,000 pounds of aircraft weight. FBL systems offer the opportunity to develop safer, high-performance, lighter, and lower life-cycle-cost aerospace vehicles that are easier to build and maintain. The technology also offers advantages such as high-speed computing, large-bandwidth data transfer, increased sensor multiplexing, and improved reliability, plus immunity to electromagnetic interference (EMI), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), lightning, and high-energy radio frequency (HERF). In addition, optical fiber is fireproof and corrosion resistant. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
France Netherlands UK

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Any air-vehicle-producing country that is also developing fiber-optic networks for telephone communications has the capability and is probably looking into the use of fiber optics on aircraft. Most aircraft companies are
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pursuing FBL/PBW (with the FBL component being digital communications) with remote optical sensors powered by light, when feasible. Some European countries are attempting to develop adaptive/flexible systems that use WDM. Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and other Asian countries that are aggressively pursuing the fiber-optics telecommunications market are also likely to investigate the military applications. Heriot-Watt University in the United Kingdom (with the Imperial College London, British Aerospace, and DERA) has investigated the use of fiber-ribbon-based optical data links, with the goal of delivering components and a complete system suitable for use in an FBL aircraft. Lucas Aerospace (United Kingdom) is developing FBL/PBW technology and is reported to have placed the first certified FBL-controlled system on an in-service aircraft (BAC111). The German Aerospace Center (DLR), Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD), and Liebherr Aerospace Lindenberg (LLI) have finalized the design of a 60-million deutsche mark helicopter, which will be used to validate key technologies for future military and civil helicopter programs. The active-control technology, flying helicopter simulator (ACT/FHS) will be based on an EC135, refitted with FBL technology. Teijin Seiki Co., Ltd. (Japan) is actively conducting R&D aimed at realizing FBL technologies. In the United States, an F-18 systems research aircraft has been used to compare fiber-optic airframe and engine sensors with electrical ones. The F-22 will use an FBL control system developed by Lear Astronics. Moog Aircraft Group is also developing FBL technology.
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DATA SHEET III-1.4. HELICOPTER ACTIVE CONTROL

A 60-percent improvement in weapons-pointing accuracy; a 50-percent increase in agility and maneuverability; a 30-percent reduction in flight control system flight test development time. None identified. None identified. Integration architecture; validation and verification software. Techniques for sensing the onset of envelope limits, cueing the pilot, and/or limiting pilot inputs; air vehicle math modeling for high-bandwidth flight control; flight control design, optimization, and validation techniques; optimum functional integration of flight control, weapon systems, and pilot interface. Commercial rotorcraft. Reduction in major accident rate.
RATIONALE Helicopter active-control technology (ACT) will integrate state-of-the-art rotorcraft flight control technologies while exploiting advanced fixed-wing hardware components and architectures. The intent is to produce secondgeneration rotorcraft digital FBL/light-control systems that have fault-tolerant architectures. Payoffs will include capability improvements in all-weather/night mission performance, flight safety, and development time/cost reductions. This technology will provide a 50-percent increase in agility and could be applied to all rotorcraft as system upgrades. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Italy United States

Extensive R&D
France Japan
Germany Russia
Israel UK
Legend:
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
DLR (Germany), the German Ministry of Defense, ECD, and LLI have designed a flying EC135 testbed that incorporates advanced rotor and FBL control technologies (along with state-of-the-art avionics concepts). They also have finalized the design of the combined ACT demonstrator/FHS. Ongoing research at DERA (United Kingdom) is defining the benefits of ACT in future military helicopters to achieve improvements in performance and reductions in attrition.
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DATA SHEET III-1.4. MULTIVARIABLE RECONFIGURABLE CONTROL

Multivariable reconfigurable control is a key element in autonomous vehicle control and is necessary for safe vehicle operation. It will significantly reduce aircraft loss rates. None identified. None identified. COTS model-based development tools for developing and maintaining this technology. Transition of academic/theoretical technology to vehicle implementation is required. Commercial aircraft would benefit through the increased safety benefit that the technology offers. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The next generation of systems (e.g., aircraft, spacecraft, autonomous vehicles, missiles, and submarines) will be required to achieve and maintain the desired levels of performance under different perturbations and to perform multiple tasks in multiple operating regimes and under different failures. Multivariable reconfigurable control (inner loop) optimizes the available control power regardless of control effector failure or damage. Reconfigurable control compensates for control effector failure and/or damage and offers the potential for mission completion and safe return to base. This capability is essential for autonomous vehicle operation. The technology is applicable to all future aircraft and will benefit JSF preferred weapon system concept (PWSC) development. It is also a key technology for the successful operation of UAVs and UCAVs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany Netherlands
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel Russia

Significant R&D
China Italy UK

Moderate R&D
France Japan United States
Limited R&D
A significant amount of work has been accomplished in this technology through the United States Air Force (USAF)/Boeing Reconfigurable Systems for Tailless Fighter Aircraft (RESTORE) program. Though much work is still to be done, flight testing has occurred for the tailless X-36 aircraft. RESTORE will also have application to large aircraft.
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DATA SHEET III-1.4. PERFORMANCE-SEEKING AIRCRAFT CONTROL (PSAC)

In the maximum thrust mode: improvement in thrust (15-percent subsonic; 10-percent supersonic). None identified. None identified. Performance-seeking algorithms are critical. Separation of feedback from noise. Commercial aircraft can benefit from this technology. No added hardware is required for Adaptive Aircraft Performance Technology (AdAPT), making it very affordable.
RATIONALE PSAC uses on-board models, real-time parameter identification, and advanced optimization and multivariable techniques to maximize vehicle performance. It is an adaptive, real-time, on-board optimization of engine, inlet, and horizontal tail position. PSAC was developed to optimize aircraft propulsion system performance during steadystate engine operation. The multimode algorithm minimizes fuel consumption at cruise conditions, maximizes excess thrust (thrust minus drag) during aircraft accelerations, extends engine life by decreasing fan turbine inlet temperature (FTIT) during cruise or accelerations, and reduces supersonic deceleration time by minimizing excess thrust. This task requires the transition of academic and theoretical developments into practical application with the potential to maximize vehicle performance even for off-design flight conditions. This technology also applies to maximizing engine performance by accounting for inlet flow characteristics. The greatest technical issue with the real-time PSAC system is the separation of feedback from noise. Feedback is a measure of the performance change caused by specific control input. For example, the flight control may droop the ailerons by 5 deg to determine if the resulting increase in wing camber reduces aircraft drag. Unfortunately, the resulting drag change is hard to measure because of signal noise, precluding the fight control from finding the optimal aileron control settings. AdAPT is a research system flown onboard the NASA F-15 ACTIVE aircraft. It was used to determine optimum aerodynamic and engine control positions for a specific task. AdAPT overcame the noise problem by using fast Fourier transforms, which naturally reject noise. The AdAPT algorithm demonstrated the ability to measure changes in aircraft performance accurately and repeatedly and thus optimize all control settings in real time. The algorithm is readily transportable to any aircraft, with effectively no change required. The high-stability engine-control (HISTEC) program, developed by Boeing and test flown on the NASA F-15 ACTIVE aircraft, is one example of PSAC. In that application, the engine management system used real-time parameter identification of engine distortion to prevent engine stall. This same technology can be applied to other flight systems in a similar manner to optimize vehicle performance. This technology is directly applicable to the JSF PWSC and to LO platforms, in particular those with compact inlet ducts.
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France Sweden

Extensive R&D
Germany UK

Significant R&D
Japan United States
Russia
Legend:
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Several PSACs have been flight demonstrated over the past 15 years in the United States. The latest example is the AdAPT flight demonstration, which was flown on the F-15 ACTIVE aircraft at NASA Dryden Research Center from 1996 through 1998. Several papers have documented the results of this program.
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SECTION 1.5AERONAUTICAL SUBSYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

Highlights New subsystems and components technology will provide reduced air vehicle weight fraction, development costs, unit production costs, and O&S costs. Subsystem-level technology payoffs include an increase in mission reliability and a decrease in major accident rates. OVERVIEW Aircraft subsystems typically amount to about 10 percent of a fighter aircrafts empty weight and acquisition cost but cause more than 40 percent of aircraft equipment failures and downtime for repairs. Improvement in the latter factor will have a positive impact on the logistics requirement for maintenance and repair. This section covers technologies used in air vehicle subsystems and components that include advanced air data, integrated vehicle management systems (VMSs), and MEMS. RATIONALE The goals for new subsystem technologies for fixed-wing aircraft are reduced air vehicle weight fraction, development costs, unit production costs, and O&S costs. Typical payoffs expected include a reduction in takeoff gross weight, an increase in payload, an increase in operational readiness, and a reduction in vulnerability. These payoffs lead to lower acquisition and O&S costs. Technology barriers include management of a growing aircraft heat load with a shrinking aircraft heat sink; application of electric actuation to utility subsystems that require more power and higher actuation rates than are currently available, and development of mathematical models of complex physical processes for realistic modeling and simulation (M&S). For rotary-wing aircraft, the objectives are to develop the subsystems technologies associated with advanced, digitized maintenance concepts and real-time, on-board integrated diagnostics. These technologies include piezoelectric, inductive, and optical sensors; statistical and neural network signal processing algorithms; high-speed databases and storage processes; and intelligent decision aids. A collective objective is to develop the hardware, software, and processes necessary to perform automatic detection of critical mechanical component failures and to reduce total maintenance labor. These efforts contribute to rotary-wing vehicle system-level payoffs of an increase in mission reliability, a decrease in major accident rates, and a reduction in system O&S costs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Several countries are conducting R&D on aeronautical subsystems. MEMS research is being funded around the world and holds great promise for subsystems application. Several countries have capabilities of interest in subsystems for rotorcraft. Germany, Israel, and Japan have strong capabilities in advanced cockpit systems, but the German work on cockpit integration is of special interest. Germany is a recognized world leader in cognitive decision-aiding, knowledge-based systems, and high-speed data fusion. In addition, Japan has strong capabilities in avionics, based upon its world-class electronics capability. (See individual technology data sheets for worldwide technology assessments on specific technologies.)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.5. AERONAUTICAL SUBSYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

Advanced Air Data Systems .................................................................................................................................... III-1-79 Energy-Management Systems (EMSs) .................................................................................................................... III-1-81 Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) ............................................................................................................. III-1-83
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DATA SHEET III-1.5. ADVANCED AIR DATA SYSTEMS

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software
Provide air data at angles of attack > 35 deg. None identified. None identified. Software that will implement the algorithms and interface with vehicle control and redundancy management systems. Development of real-time model parameter identification and on-board model development; not constrained by personnel; commercial technology not geared toward military needs and requires significant development. While advanced data systems are not currently used in commercial applications, the NASA Safety Initiative will explore this technology by using advanced air data estimation techniques to improve aircraft safety. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE This technology data sheet addresses air data systems beyond upgrades to current technologies (i.e., better computation, integration of current data, and so forth) Exact and reliable air data are essential to the flight control systems in high-performance aircraft. Maximum maneuverability requires the accurate knowledge of flow angles and inertial accelerations. Also, conventional flow sensors loose their effectiveness at angles of attack greater than 35 deg. Advanced air data systems are needed for controlled, post-stall flight. These new systems will enable the expansion of the flight envelope to extreme angles of attack and include an optical, laser-based flow-measurement system or a Flush Air Data System (FADS), where pressure ports are mounted flush in the aircraft nose. The real-time flush air data-sensing system concept is being evaluated for possible use on the X-33 and X-34 reusable space-launch vehicles. All LO vehicles will benefit from this technology, which eliminates the requirement for obtrusive air data probes. For platforms such as the JSF, this technology will reduce hardware requirements and life-cycle costs by providing an algorithmic level of redundancy necessary for safety of flight. The technology is also applicable to failure detection and isolation systems, operations at high angle of attack, and hypersonic flight conditions. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Sweden

Moderate R&D
Israel Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
NASA is developing an advanced air data system using the F-18 systems research aircraft. Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace AG (Germany) is also working on advanced air data systems for the X-31 and the Eurofighter.
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BACKGROUND In early Shuttle experiments, FADS was a concept that proved to be a valuable tool in hypersonic flight testing. FADS is one of the key technologies being demonstrated by the X-34. The LoFLYTE test bed aircraft2 was used to test new aerospace technologies, including Accurate Automations Neural Air Data Sensor subsystem.
The LoFLYTE vehicle was the first known powered flight of a hypersonic waverider configuration at low speed.
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DATA SHEET III-1.5. ENERGY-MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (EMSs)

Fully integrated subsystem integration. High-temperature insulation, advanced composites, and lightweight metallic materials; phase change materials; cryogens. None identified. On-board software for optimized performance; M&S software for validation and verification of multiple subsystems. Seamless integration of models from disparate sources (air-vehicle designers, subsystem designers, and customer-furnished equipment). The ability to use this technology successfully is constrained by the lack of qualified technical personnel who have a working understanding of multiple, dissimilar disciplines. Enhanced heat-transfer systems are in early stages of development. Successful integration and exploitation of multiple heat sinks requires extensive modeling, controls integration, and performance integration.
Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software
Technical Issues
Helicopters; any heat-transfer application requiring either a large quantity of heat dispersion or significant temperature reductions from high-power density applications. Reduced parts count.
RATIONALE An EMS seeks to optimize the supply of energy (electrical, thermal, fluid flow) to subsystems in the appropriate quantity and condition and at the appropriate time based on flight conditions and operator commands. EMS development must begin at the outset of the air-vehicle design. At this time, the energy needs of each system must be determined to design common and multiple-user energy conversion devices such as electrical power supplies. The intent is to reduce or eliminate the prior practice of having an energy conversion device built into each subsystem. The aim of EMS is to reduce the space, weight, and power needs for subsystems. Military applications provide the cornerstone for fully integrated subsystems. To deploy smaller systems with comparable performance levels successfully, a significant amount of effort will be required. Extensive coordination between engine companies and the platform integrators will be required. While an increase in system performance has always been a lofty goal, this objective has recently been coupled with a growing need to decrease the volume requirements. These objectives pull the candidate solutions in different directions. For example, as systems become smaller, the available volume for utility functions also decreases. Only through the integrated installation of multiple systems will an optimal solution be possible. This technology integration will provide for increased superiority for military platforms. Very-high-heat flux systems are not currently available for high-power-density applications. As emerging technologies continue to increase with respect to power densities, the resulting thermal management problems will continue to escalate. By dramatically enhancing the thermal management systems with improved heat transfer materials, more and more capabilities will be available for insertion within the combined military and high-technology commercial arenas. As such, phase-change materials that can be combined with existing systems present a singular opportunity for thermal management improvements and provide an enabling function for order-of-magnitude changes for future growth capabilities. The technology is new and is a key enabler for enhanced thermal management applications.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany Sweden

Moderate R&D
Israel UK
Limited R&D
The JSF program has the lead in the United States. Daimler-Chrylser Aerospace AG (Germany) is investigating integrated VMSs for future aeronautical systems (Eurofighter, X-31).
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DATA SHEET III-1.5. MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS)

No quantitative parameters are available. The concept is to use extremely small (micron size) devices to perform similar tasks, albeit at a smaller scale, of conventional machines. Semiconductor materials. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. None identified. Fabrication and packaging challenges because some aircraft applications require exposure to severe environments. Inlet duct flow control and structural health monitoring. Significantly reduces aircraft vulnerability and increases aircraft survivability. MEMS fabrication is less expensive than traditional devices.
RATIONALE Currently, MEMS are being applied to sensor technology and navigation equipment. However, many other applications for MEMS are emerging (e.g., inlet duct flow control and structural health monitoring). Other applications of MEMS have the potential to reduce aircraft vulnerability and increase aircraft survivability significantly, thereby requiring fewer aircraft. A microfabricated fuel atomizer is under development. This atomizer offers better performance and is less expensive than conventional metallic devices and may be used in future gas-turbine combustors. Low-temperature MEMS under development at NASA Lewis Research Center include pressure-, heat-flux-, and strain-sensor arrays on flexible substrates. A MEMS ice detector will provide icing data on surfaces that were impossible to monitor with conventional sensors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Netherlands UK

Significant R&D
France South Korea United States
Germany Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
MEMS are being developed throughout the world. Those countries/organizations listed below are only a sampling of MEMS researchers/developers. For a more complete list, see Section 12.5, Production Equipment. The MEMS research locations shown do not necessarily indicate that the research is destined for use in air vehicles. Canada LISA, a laboratory of the Engineering Physics Department of cole Polytechnique of Montral, which is an affiliated school of Universit de Montral, is researching MEMS and micro-machining. Germany Researchers at the Berlin Technical University Microsensor and Actuator Technology (MAT) Center, Berlin, are developing high-temperature (up to 500 C) pressure sensors that can be operated in combustion engines.
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Accurately monitoring and controlling the pressure and temperature in the combustion chamber, can raise engine efficiency and reduce fuel consumption and pollutant emission. Netherlands MESA+ Research Institute, University of Twente is conducting MEMS research as is the Delft Institute of Microelectronics and Submicron Technology (DIMES) at Delft University of Technology. Switzerland The Institute of Microtechnology, University of Neuchtel, Switzerland, has had work underway for 15 years on microsensors and microactuators, optical MEMS, microfluidics, and other MEMS technologies.
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SECTION 1.6AERONAUTICAL DESIGN AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Highlights Systems integration is a key in taking existing technologies and using them in new, improved ways. Improvements in design integration technology are essential in the development of complex systems. Nearly simultaneous design processes are enabled by analytical tools coupled with high-speed computer networks. Design and integration simulations will reduce development, maintenance, and repair costs. On-board health monitoring systems will improve time between removal and replacement of components.
OVERVIEW This section covers technologies that enable the integration of various aeronautical technologies covered in other sections into a mission-ready, affordable air vehicle. It includes vehicle and manufacturing process design methods and technologies for the pilot to interface with an aircraft. Integration technology is information based and has become more viable because of advanced analytical tool developments, such as structural finite element methods, CFD, and advanced database management. Computer graphics have also been used, and this avoids expensive physical mockups of new aircraft. Design teams are able to couple analytical tools with high-speed computer networks and data management to work nearly concurrently with each other and to exchange critical design information. RATIONALE Integration of the numerous technologies required in an aeronautical system is possibly more important than the individual technologies themselves. The maximum impact of the total system may not be realized if integration is not properly accomplished with other systems and the pilot/crew. The increased emphasis on affordability causes cost and interdisciplinary optimization to become essential. Computer applications allow the identification of tradeoffs between mission performance and system cost, the development of alternative designs, the elimination of unsuitable designs earlier in the process, the definition of cost/benefits of applying new technologies, and increased chances of initial production successes. A nearly simultaneous design information system can help to keep design efforts coordinated. One area does not proceed too quickly without feedback from others. The aims of design and integration technologies include reductions in production cost for the first aircraft, in O&S costs, in engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) costs, and in airframe weight and increases in aircraft performance. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Many countries are conducting R&D on aeronautical design and integration. The United States, Japan, Russia, and other European countries are most active. (See individual technology data sheets for worldwide technology assessments on specific technologies.)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-1.6. AERONAUTICAL DESIGN AND INTEGRATION

Advanced External Vision ........................................................................................................................................ III-1-89 Aircraft Design and Synthesis Tools ....................................................................................................................... III-1-91 Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) ....................................................................................................................................... III-1-92 Single-Stage-To-Orbit (SSTO) Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) ......................................................................... III-1-94 Health Monitoring and Diagnostics ..................................................................................................................... III-1-96
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III-1-88
DATA SHEET III-1.6. ADVANCED EXTERNAL VISION

No quantitative parameters are available. However, the intent of this technology is improved field of view and display of the external environment under conditions too degraded for the human eye. None identified. Equipment for improved image registration and system boresighting. Software for image blending and matching (required software currently exists in prototype and/or crude fashion). Worldwide database availability and updates. Computational power. Multisensor (or multicamera) tiling. Special sensor housings, alignment fixtures and procedures, and position monitoring require unique technical approaches. Image blending/fusion. Achieving desired perceptual veridicality and image realism.
Technical Issues
Ground operations for commercial aircraft; possibly image presentation for game applications. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The intent of this technology is to increase pilots ability to see outside the aircraft. In military applications, it increases ability to see and destroy targets and to detect and counter threats. In commercial aircraft, it improves ground maneuverability. For transatmospheric high-speed vehicles, such as HSCT, it would replace heat-intolerant window structures. The same technology, or parts of it, could serve as a direct view replacement and be the display of choice for remotely operated underwater vehicles or, in some applications, for unmanned aircraft operations. For full field-of-view coverage, or in cases where wide field is combined with high-resolution requirements, multiple sensors will be required. For aircraft applications, multiple sensors with overlapping fields are also required for system redundancy/reliability. Combining these inputs may include color adjustment on a sensor-by-sensor basis, image realignment, and image blending for fully or partially overlapping images. Further, images from onboard sensors may have to be processed with stored database information. This is a major software technology (i.e., image processing/computational) technical issue. An area of concern is in the display of the external imagery. There are numerous possible approaches, including helmet-mounted displays (HMDs) and fixed, large-area displays. Head and possibly eye tracking will be required if the helmet approach or if variable-resolution fixed displays are used. Regardless of the hardware approach for image presentation, challenging issues include the perceptual veridicality desired and the display techniques to produce the correct level of perceptual realism. Some COTS software from gaming applications could be applied.
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China Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Parts of this technology are being worked by the virtual reality (VR) and gaming communities. Sensor designers, aircraft manufacturers, and image processing firms are also working the technology. The level of funding, however, has decreased in recent years.
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DATA SHEET III-1.6. AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND SYNTHESIS TOOLS

Reduction in overall aircraft design cycle time can be achieved by applying higher order analysis methods in a multidisciplinary design environment for configuration synthesis. None identified. None identified. Optimization procedures. Optimizations of analysis codes for vehicle synthesis. Commercial aircraft can benefit from this technology. Not an issue.
RATIONALE This task requires the integration of advanced optimization software with higher order analysis codes to improve the vehicle synthesis. Commercial industry has not developed the technology to the extent necessary for military application. NASA proposed an initiative for a new intelligent synthesis environment to develop a future design environment for engineering and science mission synthesis. One part of this was rapid synthesis and simulation tools (RSSTs), which has as its objective the development of synthesis and simulation capabilities necessary to predict life-cycle product and system response and performance. Intelligent, ultrafast, and accurate physics-based computational methodsdeterministic and nondeterministicwill be developed using soft computing methods. These nontraditional design tools will incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) methodologies, such as neural networks, genetic algorithms, and fuzzy logic. These capabilities support the collaborative design environment for the synthesis of science, engineering, and technology development. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Optimization software is available commercially, and countries involved in indigenous aircraft development have the advanced analysis routines available. Development of the knowledge required to merge these technologies is a competitive advantage to be maintained. The Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at the Georgia Institute of Technology conducts a significant amount of research related to aeronautics.
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DATA SHEET III-1.6. MICRO AIR VEHICLE (MAV)

Size: less than 15 cm (6 in.) in length, width, or height; weight: 50 grams or less; capable of staying aloft for 20 to 60 minutes for a range of 10 km; low aspect ratio wings at Reynolds numbers as low as 10,000. Lightweight composites. None identified. Flight control algorithms. Flow physics and aerodynamics at very low Reynolds numbers; weight/volume of payload; power consumption; propulsion; affect on the environment. Air monitoring; rescue; inspection and maintenance of equipment at inaccessible locations; agriculture. Relatively inexpensive.
RATIONALE MAVs are fully functional, militarily capable, 6-degree-of-freedom aerial robots whose mobility can deploy a useful micro payload to a remote or otherwise hazardous location where it can perform a variety of missions. Reconnaissance and surveillance of sites of interest without being detected or observed are basic military needs. Electronic surveillance and detection equipment can now be miniaturized so that entire payloads are measured in grams. Other missions could include chemical-biological agent detection and characterization and urban battlefield communications enhancement. Now needed are miniature aircraft that will fly for up to 60 minutes, be able to transmit sensed information or record, and return to a base site. Speeds of the MAVs will be low (on the order of 25 to 35 mph). The MAV requires a highly integrated design of the air vehicle and the payload. This requires knowledge of the vehicle and the sensor suite. Various designs employing fixed wing, rotary wings, and flapping wings are being investigated. Propulsion involving electric motors and stored electrochemical energy is limited by battery energy density. The energy stored in chemical reactions, such as oxidation, has the potential for much greater energy output per unit mass than current electric storage cell technology. Nontraditional propulsion schemes, including reciprocating chemical muscle (RCM) (flapping wings) for actuation, hold promise for near-term success. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada UK

Significant R&D
Italy
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Many countries are pursuing this technology. Most prominent are Australia, Canada, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the United States, programs are run or sponsored by DARPA, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and various universities. U.S. companies/organizations leading the R&D efforts involving fixed and rotary wing MAVs and propulsion systems include AeroVironment, Inc., Simi Valley, California, whose Black Widow MAV stays aloft for half an hour using high-energy lithium batteries; Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company, Nashua, New Hampshire; Lutronnix Corporation, Del Mar, California; Micro Craft, Inc., San Diego, California; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts; D-STAR Engineering, Shelton, Connecticut; Technology in Blacksburg, Inc.,
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Blacksburg, Virginia; IGR Inc., Beechwood, Ohio; M-DOT Inc., Phoenix, Arizona; and Aerodyne Corporation, Billerica, Massachusetts. In addition, other U.S. companies/organizations that have been at the forefront of MAV R&D involving an entomopter, or flapping wing, technology include the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), Atlanta, Georgia; SRI International, Menlo Park, California; Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee; and the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, The International Society of Structural and Multidisciplinary Optimization (ISSMO) has held yearly MAV competitions since 1997. The objective of the competition is to design, build, and fly a very small Micro aerial vehicle capable of flying a distance of 600 m from the launch site to the target, capturing the image of the target, and delivering that image to the officials at the launch siteall in 45 minutes. The main emphasis is on the use of multidisciplinary design optimization (MDO) methodology in the design of this vehicle. Participants (either reports or entries in the competition) have included MLB Company (United States), Politecnico Di Milano (Italy), the University of Florida, Arizona State University, the University of California (Santa Barbara), and Mississippi State University.
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DATA SHEET III-1.6. SINGLE-STAGE-TO-ORBIT (SSTO) REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV)

Reduce cost to low earth orbit (LEO) from $10,000 per pound to $1,000 per pound. Carbon-carbon; aluminum-lithium composite liquid oxygen tank. X-33; X-34. Aerodynamic databases. Scaling up technologies; integration; unconventional engines; composites. Commercial space access. Expensive program ($410B) that will yield an order-of-magnitude reduction in cost to orbit.
RATIONALE RLVs would provide rapid access to space and supporting missions, such as space control (protecting friendly space vehicles and inspecting and/or destroying adversary vehicles) and on-demand reconnaissance and surveillance and perhaps attack. The X-33 (see Figure 1.6-1) is a fully automated, fully functional, half-scale version of an operational RLV called VentureStar. The propulsion, the propellants, aerodynamics, and the operations of these two RLV are the same. These similarities allow tracing the performance of the various technologies and design elements from X-33 to VentureStar. When the technology is successful in the X-33, the components will be scaled up to construct a VentureStar vehicle. In November 1999, one of the two composite X-33 liquid-hydrogen tanks failed a structural test, and this has led to an undefined delay in the flight test program.
Figure 1.6-1. X-33
The X-34 (see Figure 1.6-2) will be used to demonstrate key technologies that can be used in a reusable launch vehicle. These technologies include composite primary and secondary airframe structures; composite reusable propellant tanks; cryogenic insulation and propulsion system elements; advanced thermal protection systems and materials; low-cost avionics including differential GPS integrated GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS); integrated vehicle health monitoring system; and a flush air data system. They also provide a platform for demonstration of Added On or additional experiments.
Figure 1.6-2. X-34
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France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
In Japan, the NAL has conducted concept studies on an SSTO aerospace plane. In Europe, Daimler-Chrysler is working on an RLV known as Hopper, a sled-launched, runway-recovered two-stage-to-orbit system that uses an expendable upper stage. Hopper is based on the Vulcain II L2/LOX engine of Ariane 5.
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DATA SHEET III-1.6. HEALTH MONITORING AND DIAGNOSTICS

Reduction in Could Not Duplicates and False Alarms from levels of 3050 percent to the levels of 510 percent; prognostics for mechanical systems that avoids mission aborts and reduces unscheduled maintenance by as much as 25 percent. None identified. Advanced sensors to detect component operation and performance deterioration. Signal processing to detect anomalies and signatures of degraded systems; fusion/integration algorithms to combine multiple sensor outputs; open software architecture to integrate development tools and provide a run-time framework that can be easily updated with mature algorithms and new technology. This task needs to transition theoretical/academic developments into industry application and integrate together the health monitoring and diagnostics of air vehicles. Open hardware and software architecture and standards are needed to leverage a sizable commercial technology base. Wireless communications devices and inexpensive, reliable sensor technology are issues. There is no obvious shortage of personnel or skilled labor for development. Automation vs. skilled labor to interpret and act on system output is an issue.
Technical Issues
Commercial aircraft will benefit from this technology by supporting condition-based maintenance, notifying pilots about the cause of aircraft behavioral anomalies (diagnostics), and providing information needed by reconfigurable flight control systems. Nearly every industry with electromechanical devices uses and needs this technology, including processing plants, automobiles, aircraft, and construction/mining equipment. The processing plant, automotive, and heavy machinery manufacturers are technology drivers because of the large volume.
Affordability
Low-cost sensors and plug-and-play software are the central issues here because they would reduce the support costs of air vehicles.
RATIONALE This technology is used to monitor aging of the aircraft. Health monitoring and diagnostics provides information concerning current aircraft operating state, including the ability to forecast impending failures in the structural, propulsion, or flight systems. Upon occurrence of noncatastrophic failures/damage, the system will identify the nature of the failure for a pilot or ground-based operator. The same information will allow the vehicle reconfigurable control system to adjust to the failure, and the integrated system will assess the extent to which the failure affects overall aircraft performance. The technology is applicable to JSF and all future aircraft (manned and unmanned). The technology is also an integral part of the NASA Safety Initiative, which is being developed to reduce the commercial accident rate. This technology increases the mission reliability of vehicles and reduces support costs. Applications to flightcritical systems are of particular interest. These include turbine engine, flight controls, subsystems (e.g., fuel) and structures. Several DoD-sponsored programs involve commercial and military partners.
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Australia Germany Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Japan UK

Significant R&D
China Netherlands United States
France Russia
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Nearly all developed countries have some effort to develop this technology. Automobile, equipment, shipbuilding, factory automation/equipment manufacturers, and aircraft manufacturers are pursuing technologies related to this subject.
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SECTION 3: BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGY
July 1999
THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

The Department of Defense welcomes comments on this publication. Refer comments to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) FAX: (703) 931-7792 e-mail: mctl@ida.org MCTL Internet Home Page: http://www.dtic.mil/mctl TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT:
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SECTION 3: BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGY
July 1999
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. III-3-xi Section 3. Biological Technology ........................................................... III-3-1 3.1 Human Performance Enhancement ........................................... III-3-7 3.2 Biological Sensors .................................................................... III-3-17 3.3 Biomaterials and Nanofabrication ........................................... III-3-25 3.4 Individual and Group Protection ............................................. III-3-29 Appendix A. Military Needs Met By Biological Technologies ................................................................... III-A-1 Appendix B. Biosafety Levels ............................................................. III-B-1 Appendix C. Glossary .......................................................................... III-C-1 Appendix D. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................. III-D-1 Appendix E. Militarily Critical Technology Area Locator ................ III-E-1
III-3-iii
FIGURES
3.0-1. 3.1-1. 3.2-1. 3.3-1. 3.4-1 Biological Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment .............................................................. III-3-6 Human Performance Enhancement Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment ........................................ III-3-15 Biological Sensors Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment ............................................................ III-3-23 Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment ........................................ III-3-28 Individual and Group Protection Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment ........................................ III-3-34
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TABLES
3.0-1 3.0-2 List of Developing Technologies and Concepts by Technology Group ............................................................... III-3-2 Developing Technologies and Concepts Related to to Biological Systems ............................................................... III-3-4
3.1-1A Human Performance Enhancement Militarily Critical Technologies .......................................................................... III-3-11 3.1-1B Human Performance Militarily Enhancement Critical Technologies ........................................................................... III-3-13 3.2-1A Biological Sensors Militarily Critical Technologies ............. III-3-21 3.2-1B Biological Sensors Militarily Critical Technologies ............. III-3-22 3.3-1A Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Militarily Critical Technologies ........................................................................... III-3-27 3.3-1B Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Militarily Critical Technologies ........................................................................... III-3-27 3.4-1A Individual and Group Protection Militarily Critical Technologies ........................................................................... III-3-32 3.4-1B Individual and Group Protection Militarily Critical Technologies ........................................................................... III-3-33
III-3-ix
SECTION 3. BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGY

Scope 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Human Performance Enhancement .................................................... III-3-7 Biological Sensors ............................................................................. III-3-17 Biomaterials and Nanofabrication .................................................... III-3-25 Individual and Group Protection ...................................................... III-3-29 Highlights Biotechnology has sustained a growth rate of doubling the base of knowledge every 18 months to 2 years. This trend appears to be accelerating in the human genome, multi-array sensor, and biomaterials areas. The economic engine for biotechnology is the non-military commercial sector, including medicine/health, agriculture/food processing, cosmetics, and transportation. Military exploitation and harnessing of biotechnology is in the embryonic stage. The impact on the military is anticipated to be pervasive and fundamental in the areas of human performance, sensors, biomaterials/nanofabrication, and individual and group performance. Significant advances in biotechnology capabilities should be anticipated from developed and less-developed nations.
OVERVIEW The rapid growth of biotechnology since 1970 has provided many items and systems that are useful to the civilian and the military sectors. These products and processes relate to improvements in human health by production of new pharmaceuticals, including antibiotics, vaccines, and performance sustainers. Sensors capable of detecting infectious agents, toxins, and chemical agents have been developed and miniaturized using insights provided by biotechnology. During the past decade, innovations in monitoring human performance, vigilance, and fitness for duty have emerged from the use of imaging systems that permit viewing brain activity on-line and correlating the electrophysiological activity of the brain with human performance. Advances in genetic engineering, molecular biology, and polymer chemistry have created new opportunities in the fabrication of electronic circuits, molecular motors, and structures having high strength and low weight. The shelf life and palatability of foods has been markedly improved by discoveries in biotechnology. The rapid growth in all these areas has been accompanied by federal and private sector investment in the United States and other developed nations. Some of this advanced technology has been acquired by developing nations, including those hostile to U.S. interests, potentially enabling adversaries to diminish the superior military capability of U.S. forces. This section describes the developing biotechnologies anticipated to be realized in a 20-year time frame. The roles of biological systems in the production of electrical energy are included in the Energy Technology section of Part III of the Militarily Critical technologies List (MCTL). The rate of economic growth of the biotechnology industry is the most rapid of all industrial sectors, and this reflects the perceived importance of this industry on product development, processes, and systems. Between 1996 and 1997, the market capitalization of this industry increased 60 percentfrom $52 to $83 billion. The revenues increased 15 percent, and the sales increased 16 percent. The largest applications of medically related biotechnology were in the United States.
Each of the technology items identified in this section is being driven by broad requirements and applications. All are expected to develop a substantial set of nonmilitary commercial applications and attendant manufacturing and support infrastructures. The industrial sectors supporting the biotechnology thrusts include health/medicine, pharmaceuticals, agriculture/food processing, and transportation. The military utility of specific biotechnologies for applications in national security systems has not yet been fully explored and developed. RATIONALE In this section, the developing technologies have been categorized into four groups: 1. 2. 3. 4. Human Performance Enhancement Biological Sensors Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Individual and Group Protection.
These categories reflect the proposed and actual military application suggested in the Joint Vision 2010 documentation and the supporting Service planning guidance. Table 3.0-1 provides a matrix of the 22 developing technologies and identifies where they are covered within the four technology areas.
III-3-1
Table 3.0-1. List of Developing Technologies and Concepts by Technology Group Technology Groups Developing Technology A. B. C. D. E. F. Recognition/perception Memory Visual/auditory/olfactory Cognition Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity Brain imaging Human Performance Enhancement X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Biological Sensors Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Individual and Group Protection
G. Human performance maximization H. I. J. K. L. Nanofabrication Sensors/molecular recognition Biomedical imaging and automation Biomaterials Encapsulation
M. Human Genome Project N. Pathogen Genome Project
O. Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) and Near Field Scanning Optical Microscopy (NSOM) P. Increased disease resistance
Q. Thin films [charged-coupled device (CCD)] R. S. T. U. V. Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) Blood substitutes and biocompatible clotting matrices Locator of persons Water purification Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
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Table 3.0-2 identifies the military applications of these developing technologies. Appendix A supports these summary tables by showing the individual Service needs related to each of the identified biotechnologies. Because the technology developments are funded primarily for dual-use pharmaceuticals, materials, and equipment, nations that currently possess leadingedge capabilities in biotechnology and the biosciences are anticipated to be the most economically developed nations with particular strength in pharmaceuticals, food processing, medical technology, and cosmetics. High-value-added products requiring these technologies are in the pharmaceutical, food, and cosmetic arenas. The rapid progress currently seen in the Human Genome Project is likely to give rise to an explosion of new products affecting human health, performance, and disease resistance. New diagnostic procedures for disease susceptibility and anticipated life-span enhancement will emerge. Since the sequencing of the genome of bacteria, viruses, and fungi is progressing at a high rate and results are correlated with genomic data from the Human Genome Project, the genetics of disease susceptibility in various human populations will emerge. A current example is the finding in 1998 that resistance to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in persons of European ancestry is associated with resistance to plague developed in these populations during the epidemics of the 14th to 17th centuries. The genetic factors responsible for virulence of certain bacteria, viruses, and fungi are currently being identified, and the pathogenicity islands (PAIs) are being mapped. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-1) The Human Genome Project is an international effort with complete exchange of information and databases for humanitarian purposes. The development of multi-national industries in the area of biotechnology has increased markedly as a result of tax and tariff structures that favor such alliances. The international regulatory standards applied to pharmaceuticals, food, and biomedical materials further encourage international cooperation and technology transfer. The biological and biomedical sciences sections of graduate and postgraduate education in the United States have the highest numbers of foreign students. This reality alone enhances transfer of technology to all nations, particularly less-developed countries. The low economic cost required to establish biotechnology facilities should result in rapid transfer of production capabilities to countries that do not lead in technologies. Shipping costs and capital investment are minimal. Precursor material and end products are low in weight. Production is not capital intensive compared with silicon-based electronics and analogous processes. Figure 3.0-2 provides an estimate of the capability of the identified nations in the development of products using biotechnology as a means of production. Although the less-developed countries will be able to acquire these technologies, the time interval between
achieving production in the most advanced nation and least developed nation is anticipated to be on the order of 2 to 5 years. Because of the breadth of effort and level of funding, the United States leads the rest of the world in aggregate discoveries and progress in biotechnology. However, other industrialized nations carefully track biotechnology progress through multiple open and corporate sources. The rapid dissemination of information through the world wide web and the rapid access of summaries of newly published articles through MEDLINE, Chemical Abstracts, and Science Citation Indexes increase the transfer of information across national borders at rapid rates. The delay between publication and appearance in electronic distribution is less than a month. Thus, the transition of a technology into products can be accomplished with equal speed in any relatively industrialized nation. Countries that have demonstrated such capability include China (for internal consumption), France, Germany Japan, Israel, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Other nations, such as Switzerland, have moved extensive development and production facilities out of the country for economic reasons. Russia has a residual aggregate knowledge base from the days of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and this is moderately enhanced by international partnering with industries in the United States and other nations. However, in Russia, the transition of the knowledge base into products continues to decline.
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Table 3.0-2. Developing Technologies and Concepts Related to Biological Systems

A. RECOGNITION/PERCEPTION Grandmother cell Gamma phase 40 Hz Hebbian circuit B. MEMORY In vivo gene regulation (CREB) F. BRAIN IMAGING Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Functional MRI (fMRI) Positron Emission Tomography (PET) X-ray digital G. HUMAN PERFORMANCE MAXIMIZATION Biological Response Modifier (BRM) as performance sustainer Drugs, diet, and equipment that sustain performance Analgesia without depression Pain control chemicals Circadian rhythm synchronizers Neuroprosthetics and chemicals (growth factors that enhance nerve repair) Exoskeletal supports Immune response enhancers C. VISUAL/AUDITORY/OLFACTORY Visual perception HMD Visual display NVD Iconographic display 3-D display (audio, visual, tactile)simulation and virtual reality Odor detectors Miniature auditory implant D. COGNITION Artificial intelligence Information warfare Axonal guidance-model for data fusion DNA computing E. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR AND BRAIN ACTIVITY EEG Visual evoked potential Brain stem auditory evoked potential Eye movement I. SENSORS/MOLECULAR RECOGNITION Dynamic interactive arrays based on antibodies, nucleic acid sequences, or receptors Swarm systems Human vital systems card (physiological/metabolic indicator; triage; alertness; and ID) J. BIOMEDICAL IMAGING AND AUTOMATION Telemedicinepod for rapid transport/containment of wounded Information systemsworldwide current status of infectious diseases Medical history of personnel on card Train and assist Corpsmen by telecommunication Distributed decision-making Integrate medical into C2 architecture H. NANOFABRICATION Protein/Lipid/Nucleic acid self assembly Switching devices (MEMS) AFM and NSOM devices
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Table 3.0-2. Developing Technologies and Concepts Related to Biological Systems (Continued)
K. BIOMATERIALS bacterial Rhodopsin phthalocyanine Bioceramics Body armor and personal protective systems Neuronal assemblies on chip Molecular switches (see Technology Item H) Blood substitutes (see blood substitutes (see Technology Item S) Molecular motors (MEMSsee Technology Item R) L. ENCAPSULATION Vaccines Performance enhancers Food materials and nutrients M. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT Determine susceptibility of human populations to disease Determine genetic susceptibility of individuals in military to toxicants, resistance to infectious diseases and sleep deprivation, and stress. All these are components of allelic profiling. Drug design N. PATHOGEN GENOME PROJECT Pathogenicity islands (PAIs) T. LOCATOR OF PERSONS Transmitter Excreted biocompatible material in urine O. ATOMIC FORCE MICROSCOPY (AFM) AND NEAR FIELD SCANNING OPRICAL MICROSCOPY (NSOM) (see Technology Item I) Nanoscale manufacture quality control P. INCREASED DISEASE RESISTANCE Super vaccine Recombinant vaccines Inhibit virus entry, intracellular transport, and maturation necessary for viral infectivity Multi-component, multi-valent vaccination Novel antibiotic with restricted distribution Note for Table 3.0-2: The bolded categories identify the developing technologies. The concepts under these categories provide examples of specific elements/applications of the technology. V. BIOMARKERS FOR TOXICANT/STRESS EXPOSURE Glutathione S transferases P450 Acute phase proteins U. WATER PURIFICATION Fluid capture and retention S. R. MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS) Switching devices Sensors Q. THIN FILMS (CCD) Artificial retina Information storage
BLOOD SUBSTITUTES AND BIOCOMPATIBLE CLOTTING MATRICES (see Technology K) Topical Fibrin
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Country Australia Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Poland Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Legend:
Human Performance Enhancement
Biological Sensors
Biomaterials and Nanofabrication
Individual and Group Protection
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Capability in Technology Elements:
Figure 3.0-1. Biological Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment
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SECTION 3.1 HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
OVERVIEW In the future, one of the most significant applications of emerging biotechnologies will be to enhance operational warfighter performance by improving perception, information processing, decision-making, and task execution capabilities. For the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), biotechnology can be used to increase these facets of human performance in three areas: Physiological monitoring. Psychological monitoring technologies, using miniaturized electrodes and data fusion systems that require low energy, will detect and assess changes in warfighter cardiovascular and neurological processes in real-time to drive system adaptation. Information display and control. Information display and control technologies will present and organize information or control systems to optimize warfighter awareness, decision-making, workload, and reaction times. Pharmacological intervention. Pharmacological intervention technologies, such as drugs or environmental changes, will improve the physiological processes underlying warfighter performance. Highlights Selection of personnel for task suitability will become increasingly accurate and sensitive based on identification of specific biomarkers for toxicant susceptibility, stress, and sustained performance. Performance monitoring and warning will enhance the ability of the military cohort to sustain and maximize mission goals of individuals and teams. Pharmacological intervention will enable military units to extend and sustain effective operational capabilities.
maintenance of force structure and mission success. This awareness is even more essential as the number of people engaged in military actions is reduced and the active duty forces are requested to participate in an increasing number of police actions. New technologies have also increased our understanding of the way in which humans respond to information. Iconographic displays associated with auditory and haptic information markedly reduce the time required to detect a change in the environment that may be hazardous (e.g., the spatial location of an incoming air-to-air missile or the direction of fire). Distributed information systems have enabled modeling of combat or rescue scenarios before the actual mission and have improved the identification of potential threats in a given setting. Interfacing the human genome database with computer-assisted perception will prepare the soldier and the command for threats in a particular setting and, thereby, improve mission performance. TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS Physiological Monitoring (Technology Items A,B,C,D,E,F,G,M,V in Table 3.0-2) Technologies that can non-obtrusively measure core physiological processes in a military environment are evolving. Applied research is successfully producing models that use those measures to determine operator cognitive workload, vigilance, and fatigue reliably in order to drive task allocation between the operator and the system
These areas will provide for the prescreening of personnel to determine genetic and non-genetic prognosticators that may indicate a susceptibility to stress and toxicants and for the analyses of paradigms for complex behaviors involving swarms and hives. If successfully pursued, these areas will be critical in maintaining and increasing our military superiority. RATIONALE The soldier is the basic unit of the combat force. The intrinsic nature of the person and the training, equipment, and support components provided are decisive elements in determining success in military operations. In this decade, it will be possible to understand the genetic basis of human function. As a result, it may become possible to determine how the individual soldier is likely to respond to chemical and biological threats and other fear-inducing situations. The particular susceptibility of individuals to specific biological agents may be able to be determined. It is also likely that new vaccines and therapies will be developed to help cope with threats in the environment. Knowledge of the individual susceptibility to disease and the mechanisms by which such susceptibility can be managed are critical to the
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or change information presentation to capitalize on available resources. The physiological parameters that can be correlated with functional performance changes include auditory and visually evoked potentials, broadband brain activity (e.g., using complex electroencephalographic output with an extended numbers of channels), eye movements, heart interbeat intervals, respiration rates, and blood oxygen levels. Imaging technologies, especially functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Positron Emission Tomography (PET) using 15O or 18F labeled derivatives, and magnetoencephalography, can reveal brain areas that are active during specific tasks. These technologies promise real-time analyses of performance for automation decisions or rapid screening tools for measuring job fitness. Interpretation of EEGmonitored brain wave patterns to indicate intended operator actions will occur online with near instantaneous reaction times and will allow the elimination of motor response errors (termed brain activated control). Technologies requiring physiological inputs, such as brain activated control, will capitalize on the development of remote (i.e., non-contact) sensors and analytical tools like fMRI. In addition, physiological changes could be inferred from changes in task accomplishment or loading by using models of human performance. Monitoring operator state for impending unconsciousness will serve to ensure safety by permitting the automatic transfer of operator control to the system computer. The exposure of warfighters to common physiological stressors, such as toxic chemicals, sleep deprivation, jet lag, and anxiety, can result in both acute performance decrements (like reduced vigilance or fatigue) and chronic health problems (generally resulting from an immuno-suppression that increases susceptibility to diseases of the nervous system, liver, and lungs). Today, the military can identify an affected individual only after his performance has been critically impacted. By that time, simple interventions are usually too late to correct mission performance or prevent disease. Military readiness could be improved dramatically by tracking physiological measures that can provide an early warning of impending performance problems. The biochemical markers of acute exposure to stress include the enzymes glutathione S-transferases and cytochrome P450. Biomarkers that reveal longer term exposure to conditions that compromise function or lead to unacceptable risk for error in highly skilled individuals are also of critical importance. Recent advances in the behavioral sciences, neurophysiology, biochemistry, medical imaging, and ergonomics provide the opportunity for developing early physiological monitoring techniques to detect situations that will degrade human performance. The development of unobtrusive monitors for these early warning markers will increase the likelihood of effective performance and reduce the risk of failure. A substantial improvement in the effectiveness of weapon systems that depend upon human interactions for success can then be realized. These capabilities will have classic and multiple dual-use applications and linkages across large industries.
Information Display and Control (Technology Items C,D,G in Table 3.0-2) In the realm of biotechnology, the presentation of information or the employment of control modalities can be designed to capitalize on specific interactions with human perceptual, cognitive, or motor systems. It can be expected that the humanmachine interface will be incrementally transformed into an interactive fusion that is driven by changes in neurophysiological states. The modeling of human information processing will be precise enough to design truly intuitive interfaces and to delineate the differences between computer and human information processing in order to optimize human-machine interactions and the allocation of mission functions. This improved understanding of mental processes will lead to enhanced situational awareness and decision-making by fundamentally changing the structuring of information interactions. Real-time monitoring of operator cognitive and perceptual resource consumption (i.e., workload), coupled with performance measures, will tailor information formatting to sensory modality and the assignment of tasking between the human and machine. This will provide a set of new boundaries in human information processing tailored to the individual performer. Changes in information display and system control technologies will revolutionize the human-machine interface. Binocular, full color, wide field of view helmet mounted displays (HMDs) will integrate sensor and data fusion symbology into the visual scene and employ eye-tracking technology to allow extremely fast and accurate target designation, even at night. Thin films of biomaterial or biomimetics on the HMD may provide the visually detected data and symbology (see Biomaterials). Three-dimensional (3-D) audio and haptic interfaces will significantly decrease reaction times by providing redundant target localization cues. Robust speech recognition, developed at General Motors and Delco, will permit hands-off operation, even under the most stressful conditions. Significant decreases in material weights will decrease the fatigue and muscle strain associated with current systems. Together, these technologies will create a true virtual environment capability to allow windowless vehicles (e.g., Citadel Ships) or optimized remote control. The development of virtual audio, visual, and haptic realities and the emerging networking of multiple and diverse systems allow many individuals to interact at remote stations. These technologies provide new opportunities for training skilled personnel, planning and testing responses to crisis situations, developing new operational strategies, conducting mission rehearsals, and evaluating the proposed solutions in low risk environments. This multi-system approach, using virtual realities and remote interactive systems, is the basis of advanced distributed simulation (ADS). A support system infrastructure for developing standards to be used in ADS has been created and is called distributed interactive simulation (DIS). DIS exercises support a cluster of virtual entities (human-in-the-loop simulators), live entities
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(operational platforms and test/evaluation systems), and constructed entities (automated simulations). Pharmacological Intervention (Technology Items A,B,C,G,M,U in Table 3.0-2) In the future, pharmaceuticals or manipulations of the environment will be used routinely to increase the cognitive and physical prowess and endurance of U.S. warfighters. This section provides a sampling of the expectations for military medical interventions to maximize performance. The nature of the biological mechanism that allows a person to discriminate a subject cognitively from its background has been termed the binding problem. Currently, two fundamental theories address the binding problem: There exist nerve cells that store all the collective neural inputs for a solitary object through unique neurons (e.g., a cell that is used to recognize grandmother). Accordingly, different grandmother cells would be required for recognition of all items in long-term memory. There exist gamma phased 40-Hz circuits that are programmed to become activated when a target to be recognized appears. Sets of individual 40-Hz circuits may collectively comprise Hebbian circuits. If the memory is comprised of 40-Hz circuits, the introduction of selective 40-Hz signals from external sources may stimulate or suppress the memory system.
from characterization of the human genome is likely to provide an understanding of performance, vigilance, and susceptibility to disease. Classical gene therapy approaches allow new genes or functions to be introduced into cells or individuals to correct genetic disorders. While optimal vehicles for gene therapy still need to be developed, this limitation is likely to be solved in the foreseeable future, opening the way to many applications. In addition to correcting genetic defects, the same technology could be used to enhance performance or allow new capabilities. An extension of this notion is the use of similar technological approaches to control specific genesturning them on or off at particular times. As one example, many of the genes responsible for programmed cell death (apoptosis) have been identified. Selectively altering their expression could greatly extend the life of desired cells or help to prevent their premature death, and, in combination with use or expression of growth factors, make possible selective growth control and controlled tissue regeneration. Combinatorial genomics has also recently been developed. Similar in concept to combinatorial chemistry, this technology shuffles portions of genes to give a vast number of new combinations, which are then screened for a desired function. Enhanced function, or even new functions, can be generated by repeating the cycle many times to evolve optimized recombinants in vitro. Research characterizing the expression of specific genes has determined that several genes, most notably the cyclic AMP-response element binding protein (CREB) gene, have products that enhance memory function in humans. The binding protein may be regulated by phosphorylation. As the human genome is further characterized, it is likely that other gene products will be associated with memory. Knowledge of the gene sequence can facilitate the development of drugs that interact with critical regions of the gene to increase production of proteins that enhance memory. Conversely, anti-sense molecules that effectively block proteins that diminish memory may be developed. The analyses of the genome of people with senile dementia or Huntington disease may reveal the existence of gene products that compromise memory. As the number of military members shrinks but the number of deployments increase, the force that can be maintained will depend to a great extent on how well individuals can be protected from the effects of sustained operationsmost notably fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian desynchronosis. For example, replacement or additional personnel may not be available. Consequently, sleep will be sacrificed to extend duty times. When sleep time is available, it will often be fragmentary, and people will be expected to perform their missions immediately upon awakening. The detrimental impacts on mission performance are obvious. For example, 15 percent of mishaps in naval combat aircraft and 13 percent of the associated deaths can be attributed to sleep deprivation, fatigue, and/or circadian disruption. In a study of
Evidence exists to support each of these physiological processes in different scenarios. The next decade is likely to see novel approaches to the design of pharmaceuticals that can enhance recognition speed and accuracy. Compounds, such as AMPAkines, that increase both working and long-term memory functions will significantly improve warfighter situation awareness, decision-making, and task execution under stress. The response of the warfighter to the battlefield environment is determined by training, physiological factors (e.g., strength and age), and the genetic factors of the combatant. The advent of the 21st century will provide increased information on the genetic contribution to the effectiveness of the warfighter. The sequencing of the entire human genome is expected to be complete by 2005. The genome will be characterized by rapid gene sequencers. One system in development prepares 400,000 bases per hour and analyzes about 8,000 bases per 16 hours. This system can determine the sequence of about 2 million bases per several months. A second strategy uses variants of mass spectrometry to sequence DNA. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization (MALDI) mass spectrometry has proved to be an important tool in synthetic- and bio-polymer characterization. The molecular sizes that can be sequenced by this technique are limited in 1997, but the method currently has utility for determining mutation sites in DNA fragments. The information to be obtained
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friendly fire casualties, most of the causal errors could be attributed to the negative consequences of sleep deprivation on operator performance. Increasing knowledge about the hormonal and neurochemical basis of circadian rhythms and their role in memory, vigilance, decision-making, and other cognitive functions will lead to meaningful drug interventions. Under normal conditions, circadian rhythms are entrained to approximately 24 hours by the presence of a number of Zeitgebers (i.e., environmental events that provide the stimulus setting the biological clock), such as the occurrence of light and dark, that inhibit or permit the release of melatonin, a hormone produced by the pineal gland. Strategies that use melatonin to induce sleep or shift circadian rhythms to negate jet lag or block melatonin (e.g., bright light) or to sustain arousal will enhance performance during time zone transitions. Improvements (up to threefold increases) in the duration of effective duty times (up to 72 hours) and recovery from sustained operations will be made possible by fatigue management through pharmacological interventions (e.g., ergogenic compounds) that either induce sleep and circadian synchronization or produce controlled arousal through targeting neural center stimulation and inhibition (e.g., modafanil) without side effects. Administration of these pharmacological controls will be individually titrated to the needs of the warfighter through nextgeneration drug delivery systems. TIMELINE FOR TECHNOLOGY AVAILABILITY Predicting when specific human performance enhancement technologies will be routinely available to the warfighter is difficult because gradations of capability will be introduced progressively. This notwithstanding, projections for the near term, midterm, and far term can be made with some confidence. Near term implies 3 to 5 years, midterm implies greater than 5 years but less than 10 years, and far term implies greater than 10 years. The application of perception and cognition research to the design of intuitive interfaces, automation, and decision-making will begin in the near term; some real-time, rudimentary physiological monitoring that drives meaningful changes in task allocation will be available in the midterm; and true system fusion and, later, control of systems by thought will be available in the far term. Revolutionary changes in the human systems interface will appear at the end of the near term or in the midterm. Significant pharmacological interventions to manage fatigue will begin in the next few years; however drugs or gene products that will change memory, for example, will appear in the midterm. ADDITIONAL DATA Tables 3.1-1A and 3.1-1B present additional data on this developing critical technology.
WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.1-1) Those nations that have advanced human genomics and strong human behavior research efforts are leaders in this area. The Human Genome Project is a multinational effort, with leading contributions from France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and United States. Since the genomic information is the result of a multi-national effort and the data are placed on the world wide web, most nations have ready access to the results. The methods used to transition these data to useful information resides in the laboratories in which the data are acquired. The human behavior research programs of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States have been at the leading edge. Much of the equipment used to collect electrophysiological data related to human perception and response is used in the medical community. The information obtained from these studies has applicability for improvement of performance in the transportation, medical, manufacturing sectors and in the military. Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States have strong programs in information display and control. Pharmacological intervention expertise is reflected in development and production facilities in France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Table 3.1-1A. Human Performance Enhancement Militarily Critical Technologies

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Drowsiness indicator; vigilance and fitness monitor; physiological indicators that predict decreased combat performance. Miniaturized auditory evolved potential in the 300-ms wave and visual in the 300- to 600-ms wave. Application ready in near term to midterm for evoked potential and eye movement. Functional MRI Simulator training with fMRI correlates brain functional response to training to job criteria. Magnet level of 1.8 Tesla or higher. Interface-evoked potentials with humanmachine interfaces and virtual reality projectors. Response times in 10 to 100 ms. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified.
Technology Miniaturized, non-obtrusive measures of eye movements; auditory- and visual-evoked potentials; EEG; cardiac interbeat interval; oxygen saturation
Rationale Real-time assessment of operator workload, vigilance, and fatigue to drive adaptive automation and information formatting will maximize human system interface and safety. Provides human and automated intervention capability to assess and support vigilance and operational readiness. fMRI enables evaluation of training by examining anticipated movement (intent before action). Hands-free task execution and localization cues from multiple sensory modalities decrease reaction times and enhance control by operator.
Critical Materials Miniaturized sensors embedded in body cover or helmet; lightweight data fusion tools and energy-efficient signal transmissions.
Technical Issues Determination of reliable, useful correlations between physiological measures and measures of cognitive performance and combat readiness.
Joint Vision 2010 DoD S&T Plan Information and systems integration; dominant battlespace awareness; dominant maneuver; agile organization training. See Table A-7.
Non-magnetic simulator system required to use MRI.
Long-term fMRI (time longitudinal map) will resolve baseline variations.
See Table A-7.
None identified.
Information display and control; robust voice control of military systems; 3-D audio/visual displays; brain activated control of machine interfaces; haptic interfaces; HMDs
Integrated audio/visual/ haptic information presentation.
Development of multi-modal sensory presentation for all people. Development of interface to allow neural control of flight systems. Application ready in near term.
Information integration; dominant maneuver; agile organization training; focused logistics; precision engagement. See Table A-7.
None identified.
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Table 3.1-1A. Human Performance Enhancement Militarily Critical Technologies (Continued)

Potential Developing Critical Technology Parameter Permits selective intervention in timelimited and reversible manner. Intervention is effective within minutes, and duration is hours. A sustained high performance level, including sleep/work cycles synchronized to work demands. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified.
Technology Pharmacological interventions, including drugs that affect object recognition and improve memory functions and drugs that control arousal or sleep and produce circadian synchronization
Rationale Enhancement or degradation of memory will affect human performance of skilled tasks for C3 personnel, aircraft, or other complex systems.
Critical Materials Drugs that bind or otherwise affect CREB or offer AMPAkines functions.
Technical Issues Development of drugs that bind selectively to memory-related genes or to receptors that are involved in sleep control. Understanding the process underlying memory and maintenance and the differentiation of memory.
Joint Vision 2010 DoD S&T Plan Dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full dimensional protection; full spectrum dominance. See Table A-7.
Biomarkers for early detection of genetic susceptibility to toxicants and stress
Rapid identification (in hours) of human genes affecting susceptibility to toxicants, stress, and disease. Includes genes for cytochrome P450, GST, acute phase proteins. Application ready near term to midterm.
The human genome will reveal factors of susceptibility to toxicants and stress. Mutations affecting activity of toxicant metabolizing enzymes may result in increased susceptibility. Rapid increases in the levels of these biomarkers may provide early warning of performance degradation.
None identified.
Creation of a database relating human genome to toxicant and stress susceptibility.
Full dimensional protection. See Table A-7.
None identified.
Biomarkers for detection of environmental agents or conditions that adversely affect human performance
Detects body response to and insulate from toxicants that degrade human performance in either or both near term (minutes to hours) and long term (years). Glutathione transferases and cytochrome P450 are detector biomolecules. Application ready near term to midterm.
None identified.
Determination of specific environmental factors that adversely affect human performance. Determination of specific physiological indicators that predict decreased human performance.
Full dimensional protection. See Table A-7.
None identified.
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Table 3.1-1B. Human Performance Enhancement Militarily Critical Technologies

Center of Technology Development: Military or Commercial Multiple commercial development centers include assessing production line assessments in factories; determining effectiveness of the medical care delivery (e.g., surgery); assessing human monitor of chemical process production (petroleum industry); measuring fitness of pilots and railway engineers; monitoring patients. Training centers for airline pilots and railway engineers; medical monitors for patient status. Biomedical applications in operating rooms for anesthesiology; precision machining of production processes involving toxic/radioactive materials. Commercial Technology Requires Development for Military Use Commercial applications drive technology in biomedical arena. Leading-edge R&D is commercial.
Technology Miniaturized, non-obtrusive measures of eye movements; auditory- and visual-evoked potentials; EEG; cardiac interbeat interval; oxygen saturation
Military Applications Provides indicators of loss of vigilance and fitness and predicts decreased combat performance and readiness.
Unique Software Signal-averaging miniaturization and data-sorting algorithms and programs.
Commercial Applications Provides equivalent indicators of loss of vigilance and fitness and predicts decreased performance and readiness in industry and commerce.
Access To Technology Ready access for the military. Some proprietary issues apply.
Other Important Data None identified.
Functional MRI
Ensures performance in stress conditions, with correlation of brain and behavior functions. Decreases response time under stress of battle; SUSOPS; informs operator of direction of target or incoming missile by multiple modalities; optimizes man-in-theloop cognitive and motor workload and tasking.
None identified.
Diagnosis of disease in patients. Training for high-skilled jobs.
None identified. Still in development.
Ready access.
None identified.
Information display and control; robust voice control of military systems; 3-D audio/visual displays; brain activated control of machine interfaces; haptic interfaces; HMDs
Software for interfaces.
Decrease response time under stress; motor workload and tasking; enhance performance in variable shift work.
Commercial applications drive the technology.
Ready access.
None identified.
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Table 3.1-1B. Human Performance Enhancement Militarily Critical Technologies (Continued)

Center of Technology Development: Military or Commercial Military may drive selective use of drugs that enhance vigilance for 72 hours. Military will want to develop countermeasures for drugs that disrupt memory processes. The medical and pharmaceutical industry and NIH fund 90 percent of this activity. Industrial hygiene; OSHA and industrial liability concerns have interest. Commercial Technology Requires Development for Military Use The commercial and military world have complementary needs.
Technology Pharmacological interventions, including drugs that affect object recognition and improve memory functions and drugs that control arousal or sleep and produce circadian synchronization
Military Applications Reduces training time; enhances situation awareness; improves reaction time; improves decision-making under stress; enhances fatigue management; SUSOPS. Selection of soldiers for DECON and for TADMUS activities.
Unique Software None identified.
Commercial Applications Training people for complex tasks; treating learning disabilities (e.g., ADD).
Access To Technology Ready access to drugs for learning enhancement.
Biomarkers for early detection of genetic susceptibility to toxicants and stress
Database of human genome.
Assisting with liability assessment; enhancing biomedical diagnostics.
Commercial sector drives technology.
Ready access to human genome.
See Biomedical Section, Part III of MCTL. Ethic and privacy cultural issues involved. None identified.
Biomarkers for detection of environmental agents or conditions that adversely affect human performance
Enables proactive avoidance of hazards; creates opportunity to detoxify. Increases avoidance of threat situations; assists in implementation of strategies to improve mission outcome.
Database of correlative information.
Improving safety of workplace and reduce liability.
Private sector and NIH are major supporters of technology development.
Ready access.
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Country
Physiological Monitoring
Information Display and Control
Pharmacological Intervention
Australia Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Poland Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Legend:
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Figure 3.1-1. Human Performance Enhancement Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment
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SECTION 3.2 BIOLOGICAL SENSORS

OVERVIEW Highlights A sensor provides the interface through which a system can detect the state of a changing environment in real time. It can also provide information about the interaction between the environment and individuals. Appropriate sensors and data fusion systems serve to integrate operational systems in much the same way as the sensory nervous system in the body. This analogy has given impetus to the construction of multi-spectral [shark-electromagnetic detection; pigeons and ultraviolet (UV) detection; swine and canine odor detection] and non-traditional (abiotic sensored insects) sensors for scanning the battlefield and for force deployment. The integration of advances in optics, electronics, microfabrication technology, and molecular biochemistry has made biosensor technology an area of rapid technological progress. Concepts that will result in improved field sensors by the year 2010 include gene probes, monoclonal and genetically engineered antibodies and other receptors, highprecision polymer molding, polymer liquid crystals, chemiluminescence, neuronal and protein DNA patterning, combinatorial chemistry, monolithic UV/visible/ infrared (IR) laser light-emitting and light-detecting surfaces, Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS), charge-coupled devices (CCDs), and neural networks. At present and, in fact, in our entire history of chemical syntheses, it is estimated that less than 1 percent of all possible organic compounds have been synthesized. Combinatorial chemistry uses automated production and screening of thousands of compounds, typically for drug screening or for materials with novel electroconductive properties. The number of compounds that can be synthesized per day is now in the thousands, and the production size is growing. One method produces as many as 25,000 different substances on a 3-inch diameter substrate. The challenge of this technology is to develop methods that rapidly screen the newly synthesized materials for properties of interest. Technologies for large-scale screening remain to be developed. Advances in synthesis and screening will lead to very small, lightweight, energy-efficient biosensors capable of simultaneous analysis for multiple analytes. All sensors would be reduced to a card format and integrated into a single case. Individual sensors can be formatted with both the biodetection components and the optoelectronic sensing elements in micron-scale arrays. Microfluidics, data processing, data transmission/display elements, and electropower sources will be incorporated with the optical or electrochemical detector and the molecular or cellular biodetection components in a fully automated, hand-held unit. For automated Biological multi-array sensors will permit rapid and accurate acquisition, storage, and assessment of data for biological, chemical, and mechanical signals. Biological sensors are anticipated to be more compact, energy efficient, and sensitive than non-biological units.
environmental monitoring, these units will be adaptable to a variety of platforms. Materials that have applications in display technology can be rapidly screened. Corporations in the United States with technology in this area include Affymetrix and Symyx. In addition, biosensors will be incorporated into suites of sensors. An example of such a suite would be an environmental monitor including sensors that measure meteorological conditions, Global Positioning Systems (GPSs), determinants for viability, UV-laser detectors for organic particles, generic biosensors for detecting any toxin or pathogen, and biosensors for biological agent identification. Data fusion techniques could assess the threat and deliver an assessment based on multiple factors. Similarly, a sensor suite for medical diagnostics could integrate sensors for temperature, blood pressure, pH, CO2, infectious agents, toxins, key enzymes, and markers of septic shock. Information acquired through the use of these sensors will markedly increase command and control (C2) awareness of the battlefield and other military environments. In 10 to 30 years, these sensors and sensor suites will be smart devices that perform appropriate analyses, data fusion, and evaluation and then trigger an appropriate response, such as input to command. For instance, a sensor incorporated into a smart chemical and biological warfare (CBW) suit will close the suits pores in response to a chemical agent, activate the mask only in response to a biological agent, regulate internal temperature, and trigger the injection of antidotes after agent identification. For medical applications, the on-line monitoring of blood chemistries, endotoxins, and drug levels might automatically trigger the introduction of appropriate levels of therapeutic agents. At the close of the 20th century, the U.S. defense community is experiencing a reduction in people and is conscious of the cost of acquisitions. The following subareas are critical to increasing military superiority:
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Molecular recognition components Biological and biomimetic photon and electron transfer materials Self-assembly systems, data fusion arrays, and characterization of the sensor surface.
Array sensors for enzymes, analytes, antigens, antibodies, receptors, and nucleic acid targets are available on chips that contain the biocomponents and the integrated circuitry to record the results. These arrays are supplied in the form of small disposable cassettes into which a sample of whole blood or any other biological fluid can be added. The chip will process the sample as required and move the processed materialthrough either capillary action or a small micropumpto the sites of analysis . The results could be read by the corpsman or telemetered to an off-site location for analysis and decisions regarding treatment and combat response. Detection and measurement of infectious and toxic threats and of hazard substances can be done before and during deployment to any global location. Application of this sensor information is profound for the protection and functional wellbeing and mission accomplishment of deploying forces. See the Biomedical section in Part III of the MCTL. RATIONALE Sensors provide data regarding materials and conditions in the surrounding environment. Converting these data to information can enable the performance of many functions, including threat awareness, functional awareness of individual groups, awareness of selected field conditions, and readiness of equipment. Military implications include well-being of the soldier if taken ill or wounded and determination of CBW attack. A soldier may even be able to carry one of these devices as a dog tag that would notify a command center or central processor that this soldier has been exposed to an agent or other toxicant. The most recent approaches have focused on exploiting the high affinity binding of naturally occurring molecules to target materials of interest. The molecules include polynucleotides that recognize pathogenic genome sequences of biological agents or human genomic material of interest; monoclonal and polyclonal antibodies that recognize surface molecules of biological or chemical agents; and receptors that change conformation following exposure to biological or chemical agents and generate an electronic or photonic signal. The major element in the U.S. biological defense program is early detection, identification, and warning to provide situational awareness and allow military forces to avoid or manage the threat. Detection and identification of biological agents and the prediction of future threat situations provide useful information to military commanders and individuals. Such information permits the pre-treatment of people before deployment and the management of medical care following exposure
to infectious or toxic agents. The detection and identification of organisms in a deployed zone allow commanders to take steps to avoid contamination, determine the appropriate protection for continued operations, and initiate proper prophylaxis and therapy to minimize casualties and performance degradation. The appropriate care of the exposed people will increase the rate of their reinsertion into units and minimize long-term disability resulting from exposure to the agents. Biosensors based on genomics can rapidly distinguish pathogenic organisms and pathogenproducing organisms from non-pathogens. TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS Molecular Recognition Components (Technology Items I,L,N in Table 3.0-2) Arrays based on antibodies, nucleic acid sequences, or receptors are in production at the close of the 20th century. Genomic sequencing of all known biological threat agents and infectious disease organisms is in progress. Some regions of the bacterial genome appear to be common among organisms pathogenic to humans (e.g., pathogenicity islands). Such regions could be used in detecting pathogens on nucleic acid arrays or other type of DNA/RNA detection systems. In addition, using anti-sense gene technology, stopping the pathogenic activity of an organism by tying up this region of the pathogens genome may be possible. Nucleic acid oligomer arrays for the detection of specific gene sequences have been produced on patterned surfaces by Affymetrix, several other companies, and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Similar arrays, for the sequencing of genes at very rapid rates to determine viral load and mutations, are being generated. Antibody and antigen arrays for detecting and quantifying biological agent antigens and antibodies that will permit the assay of several analytes simultaneously are in development. Sensors employing these components will allow the detection, characterization, and measurement of the concentration of biological agent and will predict the dispersal efficiency of the agent. Remote or standoff devices can be configured using this new technology. This technology addresses real-world problems. Anthrax and other biological agents are normally present in particular environments. These agents vary in natural abundance as a function of geographical location, land use, season, and meteorological conditions. After a database has been established for natural abundance of each biological agent in a given setting, the multi-array sensor will inform the user when a threshold that requires action has been reached. This type of approach will be inexpensive, fast, and portable. The application of receptors in analyses, as opposed to antibodies, is of great interest. Receptor- and antibody-based sensors are complementary and, in certain situations, may be useful together on an array. Antibodies provide information on
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mass but not on biological activity. Ligand binding to receptors provides information on biological activity but not on mass. Military interests include an array that detects bacteria and bacterial toxins. Since putting genes for toxins in common organisms is possible, hiding the presence of a dangerous toxin from detection is possible. An array containing antibodies to the organisms, receptors to the active toxin, and gene probes for the toxins may recognize threat conditions earlier than any of the singlecomponent sensors. Using MEMS technology, placing these arrays on the soldier and sharing the information through telemetry will be possible. A Human Vital Systems Card is an example of an integrated biosensor and data fusion component. The devices use different technologies and perform different functions by measurement of parameters, such as pO2, pCO2, pH, glucose, creatinine, blood urea nitrogen, blood electrolytes, and other components that would indicate the state of an individual. These devices can use MEMS and/or nanofabrication technologies and be small enough to be used either by being implanted under the skin or attached to the skin surface. Advances in non-invasive technologies will be required for this type of sensor. Biological and Biomimetic Photon and Electron Transfer Materials (Technology Items K and Q in Table 3.0-2) Bacterial Rhodopsin is a transmembrane protein of approximately 27 kilodaltons and is light-sensitive. When exposed to yellow light, it pumps a proton from the interior of the cell-membrane to the exterior through a photocycle. During this photocycle, it passes through several intermediate states with unique characteristics and life times. This protein could be faster than a Josephson Junction for switching and could operate at room temperature. It has potential for holography, information storage and retrieval at the molecular level, and molecular computing. An artificial retina using a light-sensitive material, such as bacterial Rhodopsin or one of the porphyrin containing dyes on a chip, has been produced in prototype form. Such a device could be implanted in the eye and electrically connected to the optical nerve. Although the signals sent to the brain will not be the same as those in normal eyes, the brain can learn the meaning of the signals and, in effect, see. Using this material as an artificial eye for both human and robot application will be possible. Phthalocyanine is a biomimetic molecule that has properties similar in some respects to bacterial Rhodopsin. It is a photosensitive porphyrin-like dye. When placed in a lipid membrane together with other compounds, it shows photo effects. As with other photosensitive materials that are reversible, it could be useful for molecular electronic applications.
Self-Assembly Systems, Data Fusion Arrays, and Characterization of the Sensor Surface (Technology Items H,O,R in Table 3.0-2) Most recent approaches have focused on exploiting the interaction of binding molecules with the surface of the sensor to construct sensors and provide quality control in the production of sensors. Techniques with sensitivities that can be applied to this problem include, in part, Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM), optical tweezers, membrane micropipette manipulations, and manipulation of functionalized magnetic beads by magnetic force fields. All these approaches have evolved toward methods used in analyzing molecular interactions that are most suitable for interrogating the interactions of a single molecule. AFM has been used to measure individual molecular interactions by separately modifying the surfaces of the AFM probe and the target surface with complementary binding agents. Atomic force microscopes and Near Field Scanning Optical Microscopy (NSOM) will make it possible to provide quality control for microscale and nanoscale fabrication. As an example, avidin passively adsorbed to the surface of the AFM probe was used to scan the surface that was derivatized with biotin. The rapid association of avidin with biotin was observed as the two surfaces came into closer contact and eventually touched. On retracting the AFM probe from the biotin-coated surface, the force fluctuations between the avidin and the biotin could be measured. The AFM system allows structural defects in thin films to be recognized at Angstrom-level resolution. The speed at which the AFM probe pulls away from the substrate significantly affects the force that is needed to rupture the receptor-ligand complex. Direct measurements of the forces between complementary strands of DNA were measured by AFM, where sample DNA was bound to the AFM probe and substrate surfaces by complementary capture of oligonucleotides. For nucleic acid detection of DNA or RNA sequences in samples where these analytes are in the range of 100 to 1,000,000 copies, some form of amplification is required. ADDITIONAL DATA Tables 3.2-1A and 3.2-1B present additional data on this developing critical technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.2-1) Several nations, including Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have advanced capabilities in sensor technology. Russia and Israel are also advanced in
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these technologies. Much of foreign investment in biosensors is in the pharmaceutical and commercial areas. Most of the current, field-hardened detection, warning, and identification systems are for chemical agents. Several multi-array sensor systems are in development and should be available for use in mobile systems in the 5-year period. These multi-array systems will be able to detect and identify biological agents based on genomics, immunogenics, combinatorial chemistry, and proteomics. The leading edge technologies are present in Germany, France, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Table 3.2-1A. Biological Sensors Militarily Critical Technologies

Potential Developing Critical Technology Parameter The gene sequence codes of PAIs; determine epitopes specific for AG BW agents. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified.
Technology Multi-array sensors for detecting biological agents (bacterial, viral, fungal), genome sequences, or antigenic epitopes (see Biomedical Technologies, Part III MCTL)
Rationale Genomic elements of biological agents determine pathogenicity; epitope can identify biological agents; multi-array sensors allow rapid unambiguous detection and identification of biological agents. Specific chemical or sound patterns that provide unambiguous identification of target (midterm).
Critical Materials Complimentary DNA sequence or epitope/ Gke surface.
Technical Issues Placement of complimentary gene sequences or antibodies on micron-level pmod elements in addressable manner.
Joint Vision 2010 DoD S&T Plan Full dimensional protection. See Table A-7.
Biosensors for odors/light/sound/pressure
Chemical to electron/ phonon transduction; pressure to electron/ phonon transduction. Incorporate sensor in thin film; MEMS. Design sensor surface to accommodate attachment of molecular recognition elements (104 per pixel) in a functionally active state.
Host transducing materials.
Production of sensor surface containing biomolecules in an active form; data fusion correlating known patterns with real-time threat conditions.
Full dimensional protection; precision engagement; dominant maneuver. See Table A-7.
None identified.
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Table 3.2-1B. Biological Sensors Militarily Critical Technologies

Center of Technology Development: Military or Commercial Medical/ pharmaceutical food industries lead. Commercial Technology Requires Development for Military Use Biomedical and food industry lead military applications.
Technology Multi-array sensors for detecting biological agents (bacterial, viral, fungal), genome sequences, or antigenic epitopes (see Biomedical Technologies, Part III MCTL) Biosensors for odors/light/sound/pressure
Military Applications Multiple applications, including protecting soldiers against biological agent and disease in deployed areas. Identifies movement of personnel, armor, and target location; stores high-density information.
Unique Software Database of PAIs and cell surface markers.
Commercial Applications Clinical detection of infectious agents; food processing.
Access To Technology Ready access.
Algorithm of chemical light/ sound or pattern unique to targets.
Food industry; chemical processing; military.
Food spoilage; toxicant release.
Military and food industries can have similar impact on technology.
Ready access.
None identified.
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Country
Molecular Recognition Components
Biological and Biometric Photon and Electron Transfer Material
Self-Assembly Systems, Data Fusion Arrays, and Characterizations of the Sensor Surface
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Trend Indicators: Capability relative to the United States:
Figure 3.2-1. Biological Sensors Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment
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SECTION 3.3 BIOMATERIALS AND NANOFABRICATION

OVERVIEW Highlights The rapid progress in biochemistry and molecular biology has provided industry with many new classes of materials. These include structural materials (silks and bioceramics, such as chitins); electron/photon conductive polymers, such as cytochrome and polyporphyrins; and ion gating molecules, including bioreceptors (adhesives from barnacles that can function on wet surfaces); and biocompatible lubricants. The military uses of these materials include miniaturization of electron circuits; lightweight, energy-efficient piezoelectric sensors for detection of delamination; exoskeletal supports for personnel; and camouflage/stealth. Because many biomaterials can self-assemble, these materials have been used to pattern sensor surfaces having thicknesses in the nanometer range. The biomaterials are produced in living organisms. The cost of production is modest, requiring only fermentation-like facilities. Because the living cells replicate, small starter cultures can be used to produce large numbers of organisms. The living organisms require aqueous systems for growth and, therefore, are environmentally advantageous. Organic solvent requirements are minimized, thereby reducing remediation, treatment, and pollution costs. The technology of genetic engineering permits proteins synthesized in one order or species of animal to be synthesized in other organisms. By this method, proteins normally made only in mammals, including humans, can be produced on a large scale in bacteria, yeast, or plants. One form of such engineering involves the use of cassette mutation, most studied in yeast. Cassette mutation allows entire genes of interest to be inserted into a microorganism for large-scale manufacture of the gene product. The following subareas are critical to increased military superiority and advanced economic competitiveness: Biomaterials. Production of high-tensile-strength, low-weight materials. Nanofabrication. Fabrication of miniaturized electronic and photonic switches, circuits, and molecular motors Miniaturization at the nanometer-scale level will facilitate high-density information storage, retrieval, and processing. Biomaterial-based circuit and switching devices will be available on the nanometer scale to enable rapid and accurate responses to changing requirements for applications of military force. Biopolymer-based artificial retinas have the potential to advance night vision, missile guidance, and reconnaissance systems.
and electron/phonon switching devices. These technologies provide large numbers of chips and electron/phonon switching devices. These technologies provide large numbers of lightweight sensors that operate in ambient temperatures. Military applications include protective clothing, stealth coatings, missile guidance systems, and underwater acoustic sensors. Production and maintenance quality control at the molecular level have profound implications for reliable operation of military systems in high-stress environments. TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS Biomaterials (Technology Items K and Q in Table 3.0-2) Within a decade, scalable, artificial imagers with optical response functions that more closely resemble human retinal response will be developed. These artificial imagers will be scalable to large sizes, will be low cost, and will have on-chip image processing functions. The materials include amorphous Silicon (a-Si) thin-film transistor (TFT) imaging arrays in conjunction with photosensitive layers comprised of materials such as bacteriorhodopsin (bR). Bacteriorhodopsin has the unique attribute that the generated photo response of a bR film yields the integral characteristic of the incident optical image. This means that the bR layer generates a photovoltage whose magnitude is proportional to the time rate of change of the incident optical signal. Thus, an imaging system with bR as the photosensitive layer performs optical processing functions that lead to systems that respond as edge or motion detectors. Combined with more conventional imager response functions, these bR-based imagers can yield a better picture of remote battlefield conditions. In addition,
RATIONALE Biopolymer-based systems have specificity and selectivity with regard to the chemical processes they facilitate. A major advantage of biosystems is their selfassembly properties. Such self-assembly occurs at the nanometer scale. The materials provide opportunities in the manufacture of artificial retinas, microsensor chips,
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fabricating imagers with pixels that use the orientation properties of bR films is possible. By fabricating individual pixels with regions that exhibit opposite orientation, generating optical response functions that closely mimic the response of retinal ganglion cells is possible. Such cells have particular sensitivity to moving or stationary target tracking. These are required elements of smart targeting weapons. These imagers could replace traditional sensor elements for strike, night vision, or reconnaissance missions. Lightweight, chemical-resistant, shrapnel-resistant, self-cooling materials are under development, using biological systems as models. The ceramic coatings of insects and shellfish are metal-protein-carbohydrate complexes. Spider silk, plant tassle silk, and silkworm silk all have high strength-to-mass ratios. These materials may be readily modified because proteins and carbohydrates contain many functional groups for grafting other materials. This ease of grafting has advantages in attachment of sensors to the clothing fabric. Signature reduction of a soldier may be achieved using a uniform made from a polymer material with side chains of a chiral material that reduces his signature to radar. A material that will reduce the infrared (IR) signature of a soldier at night is also very likely within the next 5 to 10 yearsif it is not already available. Nanofabrication (Technology Items H,O,R in Table 3.0-2) Biomaterials, such as proteins, lipids, and nucleic acids, can self-assemble. Selfassembly is the formation of organized, patterned structures without external direction. The fidelity of the self-assembly is extraordinarily high. These selfassembled components can be complex and perform unique functions. An example of self-assembly is the formation of pores by the addition of hemolysin from Staph. aureus to a solution containing lipid membranes. Without any external manipulation, the proteins will join together and form a pore in the membrane. Other examples include the appropriate folding of proteins as they are synthesized from messenger RNA and the assembly of a biomolecular motor that consists entirely of proteins (dynein and kinesin) combined in such a fashion that the product is an engine. Many polymers can self-assemble into membrane-like structures. Examples are the formation of monolayer of alkylthiols on gold surfaces, silanes on glass and metal oxides, and organic molecules into polymers on conducting surfaces by electropolymerization. Within the next 5 to 15 years, using self-assembling techniques to produce nanosize gears, motors, and other mechanical and electronic components in the nanometer size range will be possible. Such devices will find application in monitoring human health, behavior, and the environment. They may even be capable of assembling within the body by simple addition in monomeric form. These devices will perform functions presently requiring complex, expensive, and proportionally large integrated circuitry. They can also perform tasks not related to humans.
Using Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) technology and possibly selfassembly and nanofabrication, it will be possible to produce small devices capable of switching. These devices may be used to change wavelength in optical systems, turn electronic devices or circuits on and off, or monitor specific phenomenon in military systems, the environment, or the human body. The ability to change wavelength can lead to low-weight iconographic presentation formats on helmet mounted displays (HMDs). Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) and Near Field Scanning Optical Microscopy (NSOM) use a technique that involves maintaining close contact between a cantilevered probe and a surface by maintaining either constant potential, resistance or other measurable quality. The device produces a picture of surfaces at the molecular level. This picture can be the physical surface, the electrical potential, the resistance, the magnetic differences, or several other qualities that this surface may possess. In all these cases, the device produces a diagram of that surface or that surface property at the molecular level. In the next decade, the devices will be available in a hardened and portable form. With portable devices, examining surfaces in our external environment for changes, contaminants, or other characteristics that may have commercial or military application will be possible. One possible example of a commercial application would be the production of silicon or diamond chips for integrated circuits. Using atomic force microscopes and NSOM, the quality control of microscale and nanoscale fabrication can be realized. Such a device on a production line would be useful in looking for defects if it could be designed to scan surfaces at a relatively rapid rate. ADDITIONAL DATA Tables 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B present additional data on this developing critical technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.3-1) Technologically advanced nations have recognized the civilian and the military opportunities provided in biomaterials. France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are overall world leaders in this area. Other nations, including Israel, also conduct leading-edge research and development (R&D). Russia had a leading edge in the development of artificial retinas, but this advantage has diminished in recent years. In Germany, Japan, and the United States, the chemical industry has been a dominant driver of advances in biomaterials and bioelectronics.
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Table 3.3-1A. Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Militarily Critical Technologies

Potential Developing Critical Technology Parameter Optimizes match or contrast color of cloth to environment (e.g., electroactive polymers, bioceramics, HMD); indicates condition of structure by changing color. Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified.
Technology Smart biomaterials
Rationale Biopolymers can change wavelength absorbed and emitted or change function as piezoelectrically active materials.
Critical Materials None identified.
Technical Issues Develop biopolymers that have tunable absorbing/emitting properties in the IR, visible and UV range (800- to 260-nm wavelength); embed piezoelectrically active biopolymers in matrix while retaining structural integrity (midterm). Insertion of contractile proteins into stable lipidfluid monotypes with vector movement control.
Joint Vision 2010 DoD S&T Plan Dominant maneuver; full dimensional protection; full spectral dominance. See Table A-7.
Self assembly biomaterials
Produces nanometerscale materials (midterm).
Biopolymers self assemble and can form contractile, vectorially oriented filaments, which allow for production of nanometer-scale motors, transducers, and guidance systems.
Contractile proteins that self assemble.
Dominant maneuver; full dimensional protection; full spectral dominance. See Table A-7.
None identified.
Table 3.3-1B. Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Militarily Critical Technologies

Center of Technology Development: Military or Commercial Primarily military. Commercial Technology Requires Development for Military Use None identified.
Technology Smart biomaterials
Military Applications Uses in camouflage; determines structural integrity of aircraft. Micromotors for guidance systems.
Unique Software Algorithm for matching tuned materials to environment. None identified.
Commercial Applications Structural integrity of materials that become deformed. Nanometer-scale motors; microfluidics.
Access To Technology Limited.
Self assembly biomaterials
Medicine; manufacturing.
None identified.
Ready access.
None identified.
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Country Australia Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Poland Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Ukraine United Kingdom United States Legend:
Biomaterials
Nanofabrication
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Figure 3.3-1. Biomaterials and Nanofabrication Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment
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SECTION 3.4 INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PROTECTION

OVERVIEW Technological developments in novel materials, containment capability, and telecommunications have improved survivability and effectiveness of military forces. New insights regarding the molecular mechanisms involved in pathogenicity have given rise to countermeasures that can be employed if people are exposed to infectious diseases or agents. During the next two decades, novel material developments will provide filters that bind and inactivate biological agents, with minimal reduction of air flow, thereby protecting soldiers in the field or in contained vehicles. Telecommunications and the development of haptic devices are key to the introduction of remote surgical procedures that medical corpsmen can perform under the guidance of surgeons located at a distance from the battle arena. These methods of telemedicine have applications in training physicians and in delivering medicine to people residing in less densely populated areas. This innovation is important because early effective treatment of trauma provides higher survival rates and because injury of forces requires extensive deployment of support forces. It is also important because the military forces are being downsized and because physicians are more frequently deployed in sites distant from battle. The Biomedical Science section of Part III of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) has an extensive consideration of telemedicine. Biotechnology advances have also provided insights into the molecular basis of immune protection, vascular fluid loss, and neural regeneration. Enhanced immune competency permits forces to function at maximal strength after deployment. Sick calls are normally a problem during the first few weeks after deployment. Enhancement of the immune response by vaccination with super-antigens, by treatment with biological response modifiers (BRMs), or by food additives may ameliorate the problem. Extensive fluid loss is a primary cause of loss of life from traumatic injury. Applications of newly developed compatible blood clotting biopolymers, administered intra-abdominally to stanch blood loss, will help to ensure the survivability of ground forces. Spinal cord injuries constitute a major cause of long-term disability because current techniques do not permit regeneration of severed Central Nervous System (CNS) connections. New techniques, using growth factors and biocompatible guidance materials, are being developed to facilitate regrowth and repair of the CNS. The following subareas are critical to increasing individual and group protection and survivability: Biomedical imaging and transporting pods Highlights Novel biomaterials will enable reinsertion of military persons into active service at a rate several times faster than current techniques. Performance indicators will enable timely and appropriate intervention and maintain readiness and fitness assessment. Pharmaceuticals and performance enhancers will protect the combat force from endemic disease and extend mission performance capability. Biological tests will decrease combat morbidity and mortality by a factor several times faster than existing techniques. Prompt protection of human systems through analysis and assessment of food, water, and environmental factors will reduce the occurrence of disabling human disease and increase capability in a fighting force with fewer combatants.
Encapsulation Pathogen Genome Project and pathogenicity islands (PAIs) Blood substitutes and biocompatible clotting matrices Remote locator of persons to permit rescue of captured personnel Water purification Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure.
Enhanced resistance of people to disease organisms (biological agents and endemic organisms) before and after deployment/exposure to impact trauma and to burn injury and the subsequent reduction in sick calls are goals to be achieved by the newly emerging biotechnologies and medical advances. The Biomedical Science section of Part III of the MCTL discusses the role of environmental toxicants on performance and the protection of people from such toxicants. Enhanced prophylaxis can be achieved by using active vaccination against biological agents or infectious agents endemic in deployed areas. Vaccination with super-antigens or advanced adjuvants (i.e., improved antigen presentation) can upregulate the immune system before deployment and provide protection in a 4-day period rather than the usual 10-day post-vaccination period. The enabling technologies include genomic sequencing of all known threat agents and infectious disease organisms; multi-component, multi-valent vaccination systems to upregulate the immune system; and the development of immune response modifiers, including
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interferons and interleukins, having the potential to enhance immune response under crisis situations. The sequencing of PAIs can reduce the total number of vaccines needed. New technologies that protect people before deployment include DNA vaccines. These vaccines have become available as an additional technology to the current vaccine systems that have eliminated small pox and controlled childhood diseases. Recent advances have been realized in technology and molecular biology to treat personnel in the 12- to 72-hour period after exposure to B agents. Some of these advances followed research on the treatment of AIDS. People can be protected from the clinical signs of viral infection after exposure to agents because the virus in the lung or intestinal system must attack cells at secondary sites, such as the kidney, nervous system, blood cell, or other organ system. For the virus to attack successfully, it must enter the cell and must often travel to the nucleus. Then, the newly synthesized nucleic acid must be coated by the protein capsid. Cysteine protease inhibitors can block entry of the virus to cells, inhibitors of cytoplasmic nuclear transport can inhibit the second step, and inhibitors of molecular chaperones can inhibit the nucleic acid-viral protein coat interaction. New sets of antibiotics that inactivate PAIs may have utility in individual and group protection. These antibiotics can be anti-sense materials or chemicals similar to traditional antibiotics. Developing antibiotics that have not been used to eliminate the development of drug resistance in the general population is important. RATIONALE A defensive capability against biological threat agents provides a nation with the technology to continue operations in a contaminated environment, thereby diminishing the likelihood that such agents will compromise a well-protected military force. New understandings of the human organism have led to the development of pharmaceuticals that sustain human performance. Information about the human genome also provides a new capability to determine peoples susceptibility to naturally occurring toxicants and infectious agents. Biotechnology has the capability to fashion materials that bind toxicants with a high affinity and, thereby, inactivate such material. An awareness of the peoples predisposition to environmental toxicants and of the nature of materials that bind such chemicals will allow military capability to be maintained in a symmetric manner and provide maximum deterrence. These technologies have broad applications in the civilian chemical industry, hazardous industrial operations, and the detection of contraband. The interface of medicine and space satellite communication has given rise to a new field: telemedicine. This new area will markedly improve the surgical care provided to those in the military who experience traumatic injury, blood loss, and shock. It will permit placement of support physicians at a distance from the front line of combat while providing continuous visual, auditory, and haptic input to medics in the field.
TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS Biological Imaging and Transporting Pods (Technology Item J in Table 3.0-2) Pod-like units that permit patients who have been exposed to biological agents to be transferred to remote sites have been built. This protects troop cohorts from infection. The pods have a controlled environment, can be incorporated into a battle dress uniform (BDU), are lightweight, and can be decontaminated and reused. The pod contains a dosimeter of chemical and biological agent exposure (similar to a film badge for radiation). The pod is a bi-directional system that reports the personal information and also receives information about the environment, allowing the individual to take the appropriate action. This does not necessarily require individual-level monitoring if the device can be electronically linked to a nearby area monitor or sensor. The pod can encapsulate a patient in a small, automated decontamination (DECON) pod that can be managed by a crew smaller than that needed to encapsulate a large DECON team. Encapsulation (Technology Item L in Table 3.0-2) Many biologically active materials lose activity when exposed to oxidizing environments or to dilution in aqueous environments. Encapsulation of the biologically active material in a variety of matrices (e.g., liposomes, lactides, hydrogels) stabilizes the biomaterials and can provide a delivery vehicle for slow release. The slow release can be activated by enzymes normally found in the body or by pulsed electromagnetic signals. The release is a function of the chemical nature of the encapsulating material. Encapsulation can also provide targeted delivery of the biologically active material to specific organs if the capsules are coated with antibodies, lectins, or polycations. Encapsulation technology has potential applications in delivering taggants for a variety of military applications. Pathogen Genome Project and Pathogenicity Islands (PAIs) (Technology Item N in Table 3.0-2) The entire genome of many pathogenic organisms and of identified biological agents has been determined. As a result, the genomic sequences responsible for increased virulence and PAIs of these organisms have been characterized. It is apparent that the number of PAIs is smaller than the number of biological agents because the same PAIs are shared by several organisms. This observation can lead to the development of new antibiotics and anti-sense technologies to reduce virulence.
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Blood Substitutes and Biocompatible Clotting Matrices (Technology Item S in Table 3.0-2) Polymers having oxygen-carrying capabilities are available. Many of these are fluorinated compounds but have a disadvantage of showing hepatotoxicity. Biopolymeric oxygen-carrying compounds and clot-inducing compounds are being developed with anticipated product availability in the 2005 time period. These new products should have universal acceptor compatibility and should not require human donors. Remote Locator of Persons To Permit Rescue of Captured Personnel (Technology Item T in Table 3.0-2) Compounds may be developed that, when metabolized, will result in the excretion of compounds that are strong chromophores. Operators must be able to turn on or off for covert missions. The signal generator can be placed internally so it cannot easily be removed by the enemy for counter use. The device will be low cost and contain a physiological honesty checker so if scared Johnny cuts his finger, he will not activate this device unnecessarily and draw needed assets. The system may be used to locate a sailor overboard. Water Purification (Technology Item U in Table 3.0-2) Current technology requires use of reverse osmosis (RO). Desalinization of sea water and purification of contaminated water can be achieved using a combination of filtration and RO. New technologies that are effective in defouling and regenerating the capillary tubes in the RO system are being developed. Transgenic flora and fauna are being developed to produce renewable resources (water, food, therapeutics). Microbes capable of bioremediation and terraforming terrain to shape the environment are being examined. Biomarkers for Toxicant/Stress Exposure (Technology Items M,P,V in Table 3.0-2) Humans and other animals synthesize a variety of biological compounds when challenged with fever, infection, or emotional stress. The synthesized compounds may be of low molecular weight (e.g., adrenalin) or high molecular weight (e.g., acute phase proteins, glutathione transferases, cytochrome P 450). Exposure of individuals to stress, exhaustion, or other adverse conditions also results in changes in electrophysiological and behavioral characteristics of the affected people. The changes in the profiles of body chemicals, electrophysiological patterns, and behavior may be used as signatures to evaluate fitness and readiness.
ADDITIONAL DATA Tables 3.4-1A and 3.4-1B present additional data on this developing critical technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (WTA) (See Figure 3.4-1) Nations with advanced capability in individual and group protection include France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other nations have advanced technologies in pharmaceuticals or biopolymer grafting onto fibers. This area also requires leading-edge communications and space satellite industries for the telemedicine component. France, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have strength in this area although the economic realities in Russia have diminished their strength. China is rapidly increasing capability in the space satellite area and, as a consequence, will have capability in telemedicine. Many leaders in these technologies are multi-national (e.g., Celanese, Hoechist, Dupont), and the rapid advances are not nation specific.
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Table 3.4-1A. Individual and Group Protection Militarily Critical Technologies

Potential Developing Critical Technology Parameter Releases chemical or biological response modifiers on demand (near term). Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment None identified.
Technology Encapsulation
Rationale Biologically active materials, such as vaccines, antitoxins and performance sustainers, can be encapsulated, inserted in soldier, and released on demand. Antivirals and novel antibiotics can protect person exposed to infectious agents from clinical signs of disease.
Critical Materials Encapsulation vehicles that stabilize biochemicals and release high percentage of active biological (greater than 80 percent).
Technical Issues Develop matrices that bind biological materials to delay release.
Joint Vision 2010 DoD S&T Plan Full dimensional protection.
Novel antivirals and antibiotics (see Biomedicine section, Part III MCTL)
Intervenes in infectious entry into target and infection of secondary organ systems; replicates in cells and releases infectious particles (near term to midterm).
Antivirals and novel antibiotics.
Inhibit viral uptake; intracellular transport and maturation; create new antibacterials and reduce development of antibiotic resistance. Grow organs that will not be subjected to tissue rejection; grow organs in large enough mass to assume function of destroyed abdominal organs. Maximize survivability of exposed/wounded soldier while eliminating exposure of cohort.
Full dimensional protection.
None identified.
Organ culture; tissue growth (see Biomedicine section, Part III MCTL
Replaces organs (midterm).
Traumatic injury results in long-term damage to internal organs and neural function. Replacing heart valves and bridging of transected spinal cord can lead to restored function. Protect troop cohort from B-agentcontaminated individuals.
Production of organ stem cells and organs that are accepted in immune-competent people.
None identified.
Temperature and biotic system controlled transport pods
Develops pod that can stanch bleedings, have sterile environment, and contain B agents (midterm).
Materials suitable for filtration, body covering, weight bearing, shock absorbing, and humidity control.
None identified.
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Table 3.4-1B. Individual and Group Protection Militarily Critical Technologies

Center of Technology Development: Military or Commercial Biomedical, pharmaceutical; cosmetics; drug delivery. Biomedical and pharmaceutical industry and food industry. Health care dominates. Commercial Technology Requires Development for Military Use Drug delivery; vaccination.
Technology Encapsulation
Military Applications Provides protection against B agent; SUSOPS; sustains performance. Protects soldier from infectious agents.
Unique Software None identified.
Commercial Applications Biomedical, pharmaceutical; cosmetics; drug delivery. Biomedical and pharmaceutical industry and food industry. Health care; pharmaceutical production. Biomedical.
Access To Technology Ready access.
Novel antivirals and antibiotics (see Biomedicine section, Part III MCTL) Organ culture; tissue growth (see Biomedicine section, Part III MCTL Temperature and biotic system controlled transport pods
None identified.
Health, food quality.
Ready access.
None identified.
Stanches abdominal bleeding; repairs injuries to spinal cord, brainstem, and brain. Allows reinsertion of soldier; protects group.
None identified.
Medical organ replacement.
Ready access.
None identified.
Vital sign monitor.
Primarily military; emergency preparedness teams in isolated locations.
Rural medical emergencies and preparedness tasks.
Ready access.
None identified.
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Country
Individual Protection (Encapsulation, PAIs, Blood Substitutes, Biomarkers)
Group Protection (Biological Imaging and Transporting Pods, Remote Locator, Water Purification)
ll lll ll ll lll l llll llll ll ll l l lll ll lll l llll l ll ll lll ll ll llll llll l ll ll llll llll llll Most lll Many
ll lll l l ll l lll lll l l l l llll ll lll l llll l ll l lll l l lll llll l l l llll llll ll Some l At Least One
Figure 3.4-1. Individual and Group Protection Technologies Area Worldwide Capability Assessment
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APPENDIX A. MILITARY NEEDS MET BY BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGIES

INTRODUCTION Appendix A tracks the applications of developing biotechnologies to known and documented military needs. This kind of cross reference is made more challenging because of changes in program funding and by differences in nomenclature and format among the Services. Accordingly, Table A-1 presents an aggregation keyed to the biotechnology areas defined in Table 3.0-1. Tables A-2 and A-3 address Army needs, Tables A-4 and A-5 address Navy needs, and Table A-6 addresses Air Force needs. Table A-7 is organized by functional biotechnology application and indicates Service interest by program for the three military components.
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APPENDIX A. MILITARY NEEDS MET BY BIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGIES

Table A-1. Military Needs Met by Developing Biotechnologies
Item Number Biotechnology Area 1 Item Number Biotechnology Area1 Item Number Biotechnology Area1
1.
Personal protective system
13. Info pre-processing/data fusion and information display 14. Metabolic sensors 15. Real-time disease and injury surveillance 16. Analgesia without CNS depression 17. Collective protective system 18. Detect/alert/ID systems (required to link into the Medical Planning System) 19. Real-time training 20. Locator 21. Rapid field diagnostics (dipstick for malaria) 22. Individual selfdecontamination 23. Personnel decontamination, isolation, and evacuation 24. Blood clotting material/ wound repair
25. Host responsive modulation
C,E,G
2. 3. 4.
Multi-component, multivalent vaccination system Substitute blood Real-time, integrated alert/ detection and identification system Integrate medical into C2 architecture Enhanced prophylaxis and therapeutic agents Distributed medicine Performance enhancing drugs/diet/equipment Laser defensive system
P S I,V
I F,I,V G
26. Psychological maintenance and augmentation 27. Small MRI system 28. Minimize physiological effects of injury 29. Advanced screening/profiling 30. Distributed decision-making
A,B,C,D,E,V F F,S,T
5. 6.
J P,V
I,K,M,P,T I,J,T
A,B,C,D,E,G,M C,D,E,G
7. 8. 9.
J,V A,B,C,G,V K F,I,J,N U G
A,B,C,D,E,F,G I,T I I,K,L I,K,L,P S
31. Readiness tracker 32. Add-on to PSM for status of forward-deployed personnel 33. Spatial re-orienter 34. Recyclable decontamination agent 35. Biodosimetry capability to assess/permit medical triage 36. Power/fuel cells
E,F,V I C,E I,J,K,L I,J,V H,K
10. Non-invasive diagnostics 11. Safe water supply 12. Enhanced physical/ psychological training
Note 1 for Table A-1: The information in this column is taken from Table 3.0-1.
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Table A-2. Developing Biotechnologies and U.S. Army Requirements

Military Needs 1 USA TRADOC Code 2 Military Needs 1 USA TRADOC Code 2 Military Needs 1 USA TRADOC Code 2
1.
MTD11
13. Info pre-processing/data fusion and information display 14. Metabolic sensors
2.
Multi-component, multivalent vaccination system Substitute blood
CSS06
CSS05, CSS13, CSS14 CSS07, CSS08, CSS09 CSS08
26. Psychological maintenance and augmentation 27. Small MRI system
CSS14
3.
CSS11
15. Real-time disease and injury surveillance 16. Analgesia without CNS depression 17. Collective protective system 18. Detect/alert/ID systems (required to link into the Medical Planning System) 19. Real-time training
CSS07
4.
Real-time, integrated alert/ detection and identification system Integrate medical into C2 architecture Enhanced prophylaxis and therapeutic agents Distributed medicine
MTD19
28. Minimize physiological effects of injury 29. Advanced screening/profiling 30. Distributed decision-making
CSS07
5. 6.
CSS05 CSS06, CSS13 CSS05
EEL08 CSS05
BC23, TRD02 CSS05
7.
CSS24, DBS26, MDT17 DSA07 CSS07,CSS13 MTD13 MTD13 CSS08
31. Readiness tracker
CSS05
8. 9.
Performance enhancing drugs/diet/equipment Laser defensive system
CSS14 CSS07 CSS24, DBS26, TRD02
20. Locator 21. Rapid field diagnostics (dipstick for malaria) 22. Individual selfdecontamination 23. Personnel decontamination, isolation, and evacuation 24. Blood clotting material/ wound repair
32. Add-on to PSM for status of forward-deployed personnel 33. Spatial re-orienter 34. Recyclable decontamination agent 35. Biodosimetry capability to assess/permit medical triage 36. Power/fuel cells
MTD13 MTD13 CSS05, CSS13 CSS19, MTD06
10. Non-invasive diagnostics 11. Safe water supply 12. Enhanced physical/ psychological training Note 1 for Table A-2: See Table A-1. Note 2 for Table A-2: See Table A-3
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Table A-3. Relation of U.S. Army TRADOC Code to Operational Requirements

USA TRADOC Code Operational Capability Requirements
BC23 CSS05 CSS06 CSS07 CSS08 CSS09 CSS11 CSS13 CSS14 CSS19 CSS24 DBS18 DBS26 DSA07 DSA16 EEL08 MTD06 MTD11 MTD13 MTD17 MTD19 TRD02
Commander and battlestaff training Medical C4I Preventive medicine Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease Far-forward surgical support Battlefield hospitalization Combat health logistics system and blood management Provision of combat support in CB environment Combat stress control Power source and accessories Training support Near-real-time data fusion Training and leader development Real-time, on-board, all-weather precision terrain locator Artificial intelligence and decision aids Soldier/equipment protection Power generation Individual protective equipment NBC DECON Battle planning and rehearsal Sensors for mounted forces Train leadership skills
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Table A-4. Navy S&T Requirements Guidance, Department of the Navy, CNO N091 Prepared by N911, July 1987
Military Needs 1 Naval Code 2 Military Needs 1 Naval Code 2 Military Needs 1 Naval Code 2
1.
13. Info pre-processing/data fusion and information display 14. Metabolic sensors
2.
Multi-component, multivalent vaccination system Substitute blood
26. Psychological maintenance and augmentation 27. Small MRI system
3.
15. Real-time disease and injury surveillance 16. Analgesia without CNS depression
3,4
4.
Real-time, integrated alert/ detection and identification system Integrate medical into C2 architecture Enhanced prophylaxis and therapeutic agents
28. Minimize physiological effects of injury
5.
17. Collective protective system
29. Advanced screening/profiling
6.
3,5
18. Detect/alert/ID systems (required to link into the Medical Planning System) 19. Real-time training 20. Locator
30. Distributed decision-making
7. 8.
Distributed medicine Performance enhancing drugs/diet/equipment Laser defensive system
31. Readiness tracker 32. Add-on to PSM for status of forward-deployed personnel 33. Spatial re-orienter
9.
21. Rapid field diagnostics (dipstick for malaria) 22. Individual selfdecontamination 23. Personnel decontamination, isolation, and evacuation 24. Blood clotting material/ wound repair
10. Non-invasive diagnostics
34. Recyclable decontamination agent 35. Biodosimetry capability to assess/permit medical triage 36. Power/fuel cells
11. Safe water supply
2,5
12. Enhanced physical/ psychological training Note 1 for Table A-4: See Table A-1. Note 2 for Table A-4: See Table A-5.
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Table A-5. Relation of Navy Code to Operational Requirements

Navy Code Operational Capability Requirements
1 2 3 4 5
Combat Casualty Care Casualty Management Operational Medicine Assessment and Detection Combat Casualty Care Delivery and Treatment Operational Medicine Prevention Operational Medicine Treatment
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Table A-6. Military Needs/USAF R&D Programs Correlation Matrix

Military Needs 1 Relevant USAF Program
1.
[H] 1.A.01 High Altitude Protection Concepts [H] 1.A.01 Altitude DCS Prediction Model [H] 1.A.01 Advanced Life-Support Equipment [H] 1.A.04 Task Performance at High G [H] 1.A.04 Cognitive Limitations High G [H] 1.A.04 Pitch & Yaw Axis Agile Flight [H] 1.A.07.b Scientific Visualization for Research and Design [H] 1.A.07.b Accommodation Technology [H] 1.B.02 Advanced Fighter Program Life Support [H] 1.B.03.a Personal Protection in Hazardous Environments [H] 1.B.03.a SHARP EDGE [H] 1.C.01 Active and Enhanced Noise Reduction 1.C.01 Biologically Based Speaker Identification [H] 1.B.02 Aeromedical Information Highway [H] 1.A.04 Drug Effects at High G [H] 1.C.03 Teleoperator Aids [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Distributed Team Performance Testbed [H] 1.A.04 High ADA Flight and Human Performance [H] 1.A.04 Helmet-Mounted Systems in High G Environment [H] 1.A.07.a Interoperable Human Model [H] 1.A.08 Comfort & Performance Under Vibration [H] 1.B.03.a Effects of Drugs on +Gz Tolerance [H] 1.C.04.b Alternative Control Development [H] 1.C.05.a Airborne Helmet-Mounted Display Oculometer [H] 1.C.05.b COMBAT EYE [H] 3.A.2 (4 of 4) Photorefractive Keratectomy [H] 3.A.3 Aerospace Neuropsychiatric Performance Enhancement [H] 3.B.1 (1 of 3) Aircrew Spectacle Frame/Lens Material Program [H] 4.b.02.A Optical Radiation, Personnel Susceptibility [H] 4.b.02.A Optical Radiation, Safety Standards and Risk Assessment [H] 4.b.02.B Laser Eye Protection [H] 3.B.1 (3 of 3) (Gamma Camera) [H] 3.B.1 (3 of 3) (Retinal Oximetry) [H] 5.a.01 Aerobic Bioremediation of a Contaminated Aquifer [H] 5.a.04 New Technologies for Oil/Water Emulsion Treatment
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Multi-component, multi-valent vaccination system Substitute blood Real-time, integrated alert/detection and identification system Integrate medical into C2 architecture Enhanced prophylaxis and therapeutic agents Distributed medicine Performance enhancing drugs/diet/equipment
9.
Laser defensive system
10. Non-invasive diagnostics 11. Safe water supply
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Table A-6. Military Needs/USAF R&D Programs Correlation Matrix (Continued)

12. Enhanced physical/psychological training
[H] 1.B.03.a Strength Conditioning and +Gz Training [H] 1.B.03.a Simulation/Flying Tradeoff Study [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Automated Cognitive Task Analysis [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Models of Cognition Under Stress [H] 2.A.02 (1 of 3) Integrated Performance Assessment System [H] 2.A.02 (2 of 3) Training Analysis and Integration technologies for Readiness and Contingency Support [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Virtual Interactive Software Technology Advancement [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Virtual Interactive Instruction Development Support [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Cognitive Hyperspace for Applied Engineering of Long Distance Learning [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Advanced Virtual Agents for Team Training and Aiding in Remote Settings [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Automated Task Analysis for Team Skill and Knowledge [H] 2.A.03 (2 of 2) Fundamental Skills Tutors [H] 2.A.03 (2 of 2) Knowledge-Based Objects for Tutoring Systems [H] 2.B.01 (1 of 3) Visual Displays Research [H] 2.B.01 (1 of 3) Eye Position Feedback for Aircrew Training [H] 2.B.03 (1 of 2) NVG Perceptual Effects Training [H] 3.A.4 Enhanced Vestibular Screening and Diagnostic System [H] 3.B.2 Health Assessment and Performance Enhancement [H] 3.B.2 Exercise Countermeasures for Fluid Homeostasis [H] 1.A.02.a Crew Systems for Information Warfare [H] 1.A.02.a Crew-Centered Aiding [H] 1.A.05 Aerospace Performance Models, Simulation & Research System [H] 1.C.01 3-D Audio for Command and Control [H] 1.C.01 Advanced Communication Enhancement Technology [H] 1.C.02 Helmet-Mounted Sensory Technologies [H] 1.C.03 Haptic Stick Aids [H] 1.C.04.a Visual Communication and Identification [H] 1.C.04.a Information Portrayal [H] 1.C.04.a Visually Coupled Interface Design [H] 1.C.04.b Alternative Control and Display Integration [H] 1.C.04.b Direct Sensory Stimulation Development [H] 1.C.05.a Virtual Reality Display for Windowless Cockpit/Synthetic Vision (H] 1.C.05.b Full Color Binocular Helmet-Mounted Display [H] 1.C.05.b Panoramic Night Vision Goggle [H] 1.C.05.b Helmet-Mounted Sight Plus [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Automation of Operator Tasks H] 3.B.1 (2 of 3) Laser Imaging Radar
13. Info pre-processing/data fusion and information display
14. Metabolic sensors 15. Real-time disease and injury surveillance 16. Analgesia without CNS depression
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Table A-6. Military Needs/USAF R&D Programs Correlation Matrix (Continued)

17. Collective protective system 18. Detect/alert/ID systems (required to link into the Medical Planning System) 19. Real-time training 20. Locator 21.Rapid field diagnostics (dipstick for malaria) 22. Individual self-decontamination 23. Personnel decontamination, isolation, and evacuation 24. Blood clotting material/wound repair 25. Host responsive modulation 26. Psychological maintenance and augmentation
[H] 4.c.01 Active Noise Reduction Field Measurement [H] 4.c.02 Noise Mitigation [H] 1.A.03 Real-time Workload Classifier Physiological [H] 1.A.03 Real-time Workload Evaluator Performance [H] 1.B.02 Evacuation Hyperbaric Stretcher [H] 3.A.2 (3 of 4) Hyberbaric Rx Study [H] 1.A.01 Circadian Disruption Countermeasures [H] 1.A.05 Pharmacological Ops Aids [H] 1.A.05 Fatigue Management System 1.B.01.a Escape System Restraint Studies [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Distributed Team Performance Testbed [H] 2.A.01 (1 of 2) Team Performance Metrics [H] 2.A.03 (1 of 2) Distributed Sim-based Training Environment [H] 2.B.01 (3 of 3) Command and Control Training Effectiveness [H] 1.A.06 Advanced Helmet-Mounted Display Symbology [H] 1.A.06 Virtual Interface of Orientational Information [H] 3.B.1 (3 of 3) Bioaerosol Particle Detection
27. Small MRI system 28. Minimize physiological effects of injury 29. Advanced screening/profiling 30. Distributed decision-making
31. Readiness tracker 32. Add-on PSM for status of forward-deployed personnel 33. Spatial re-orienter 34. Recyclable decontamination agent 35. Biodosimetry to assess/permit medical triage 36. Power/fuel cells Note 1 for Table A-6: See Table A-1.
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Table A-7. Comparison of the Military Service Needs and Bio-Tech Developing Technologies
Military Needs 1 Developing Biotechnology Items 2 USA TRADOC Item/Code 3 Navy S&T Item/Code 4 Air Force R&D Programs 5
1. Personal protective system
K. Biomaterials
Individual protective equipment (Code MTD11)
High-altitude protection; lifesupport equipment; physiological and cognitive limitations; human modeling for system design; crew oxygen systems; active and enhanced noise reduction
P. Increased disease resistance 2. Multi-component, multivalent vaccination system 3. Substitute blood S. Blood substitutes and biocompatible clotting matrices I.
Preventive medicine (Code CSS06)
Operational Medicine Prevention (Code 4)
Combat health logistics Operational Medicine Treatment (Code 5) system and blood management (Code CSS11)
4. Real-time, integrated alert/detection and identification system 5. Integrate medical into C2 architecture 6. Enhanced prophylaxis and therapeutic agents
Sensors/molecular recognition Sensors for mounted forces (Code MTD19) V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure J. Biomedical imaging and automation Medical C4I (Code CSS05)
Information warfare
Operational Medicine Assessment and Detection (Code 2) Combat Casualty Care Delivery and Treatment (Code 3) Operational Medicine Treatment (Code 5)
Aeromedical evacuation
P. Increased disease resistance V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
Preventive medicine (Code CSS06) Provision of combat support in CB environment (Code CSS13) Medical C4I (Code CSS05)
High workload on task aircrew
7. Distributed medicine
J.
Biomedical imaging and automation
V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
Human sensory feedback for telepresence; cognition and performance modeling; sensory systems (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR)
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Table A-7. Comparison of the Military Service Needs and Bio-Tech Developing Technologies (Continued)
8. Performance enhancing drugs/diet/equipment
A. Recognition/perception B. Memory C. Visual/auditory/olfactory G. Human performance maximization V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
Combat stress control (Code CSS14)
Accommodation of aircrew in the cockpit; maneuverability; human modeling for system designs; advanced life-support systems; virtual interface technologies; HMDs; aerospace opthalmologic standards; aerospace neurosychiatric standards; aerospace visual appliances; enhanced crew performance in sustained operations; chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR) Optical radiation; personnel protection Aerospace optical and visual appliances; perception and cognition (AFOSR)
9. Laser defensive system 10. Non-invasive diagnostics
K. Biomaterials F. Brain imaging I. J.
Combat Casualty Care Casualty Management (Code 1)
Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease (Code Sensors/molecular recognition CSS07) Biomedical imaging and automation
N. Pathogen Genome Project 11. Safe water supply U. Water purification Operational Medicine Assessment and Detection (Code 2) Operational Medicine Treatment (Code 5) Biological treatment technologies; chemical treatment technologies
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12. Enhanced physical/ psychological training
G. Human performance maximization
Training support (Code CSS24) Training and leader development (Code DBS26) Train leadership skills (Code TRD02)
Advanced life-support systems; cognition and performance modeling; force development technology; instructional design and intelligent training; technology for global applications; warfighter training effectiveness behavioral research; night vision device training technology development; aerospace audiologic and veitibular standards; genderspecific physiologic optimization chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR) Crew-centered design tools and processes; enhanced crew performance in sustained operations; 3-D audio displays; night vision technology; human sensory feedback for telepresences; virtual interface technologies; helmet-mounted interface cognition and performance modeling; aerospace optical and visual appliance chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR); sensors systems (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR)
13. Information pre-processing/data fusion and information display
C. Visual/auditory/olfactory
14. Metabolic sensors
I.
Sensors/molecular recognition Medical C4I (Code CSS05) Provision of combat support in CB environment (Code CSS13) Combat stress control (Code CSS14)
Operational Medicine Prevention (Code 4)
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15. Real-time disease and injury surveillance
F. Brain imaging I. Sensor/molecular recognition
Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease (Code CSS07) Far-forward surgical support (Code CSS08) Battlefield hospitalization (Code CSS09)
Combat Casualty Care Delivery and Treatment (Code 3) Operational Medicine Prevention (Code 4)
V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
16. Analgesia without CNS depression 17. Collective protective system
G. Human performance maximization I. Sensor/molecular recognition
Far-forward surgical support (Codes CSS08) Soldier/equipment protection (Code EEL08)
Combat Casualty Care Delivery and Treatment (Code 3)
K. Biomaterials M. Human Genome Project P. Increased disease resistance T. Locator of persons
Aircraft noise modeling and measurement; aircraft noise effects and mitigation
18. Detect/alert/ID systems I. (required to link into the J. Medical Planning System)
Sensors/molecular recognition Medical C4I (Code CSS05) Biomedical imaging and automation
Operational Medicine Assessment and Detection (Code 2)
T. Locator of persons 19. Real-time training A. Recognition/perception B. Memory C. Visual/auditory/olfactory D. Cognition E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity F. Brain imaging G. Human performance maximization Training support (Code CSS24) Training and leader development (Code DBS26) Battle planning and rehearsal (Code MDT17) Human performance assessment
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20. Locator
Sensors/molecular recognition Real-time, on-board, allweather precision terrain T. Locator of persons locator (Code DSA07) I. Sensors/molecular recognition Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease (Code CSS07) Provision of combat support in CB environment (Code CSS13)
I.
21. Rapid field diagnostics (dipstick for malaria)
22. Individual selfdecontamination
I.
Sensors/molecular recognition NBC DECON (Code MTD13) K. Biomaterials L. Encapsulation
23. Personnel decontamination, isolation, and evacuation
I.
Sensors/molecular recognition NBC DECON (Code MTD13) K. Biomaterials L. Encapsulation P. Increased disease resistance
24. Blood clotting material/wound repair 25. Host responsive modulation
S. Blood substitutes and biocompatible clotting matrices C. Visual/auditory/olfactory E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity G. Human performance maximization
Far-forward surgical support (Code CSS08)
Aeromedical evacuation; aerospace opthalmologic standards
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26. Psychological maintenance and augmentation
A. Recognition/perception B. Memory C. Visual/auditory/olfactory D. Cognition E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
Combat stress control (Code CSS14)
Life-support equipment; enhanced crew performance; sustained operations; chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR)
27. Small MRI system
F. Brain imaging
Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease (Code CSS07) Treatment of battlefield wounds and disease (Code CSS07)
28. Minimize physiological effects of injury
F. Brain imaging S. Blood substitutes and biocompatible clotting matrices T. Locator of persons
Escape system technology; chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR)
29. Advanced screening/profiling
A. Recognition/perception B. Memory C. Visual/auditory/olfactory D. Cognition E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity G. Human performance maximization M. Human Genome Project
Commander and battlestaff training (Code BC23) Train leadership skills (Code TRD02)
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30. Distributed decision making
C. Visual/auditory/olfactory D. Cognition E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity G. Human performance maximization
Medical C4I (Code CSS05)
Cognition and performance modeling; technologies for global applications; warfighter training effectiveness behavioral research; chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR); sensory systems (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR)
31. Readiness tracker
E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity F. Brain imaging V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure
Medical C4I (Code CSS05)
32. Add-on to PSM for status of forward-deployed personnel 33. Spatial re-orienter
I.
Sensors/molecular recognition NBC DECON (Code MTD13)
C. Visual/auditory/olfactory E. Electrophysiological monitor and brain activity
Spatial disorientation countermeasures; chronobiology and neural adaptation (AFOSR); sensory systems (AFOSR); perception and cognition (AFOSR)
34. Recyclable decontamination agent
I. J.
Sensors/molecular recognition NBC DECON (Code MTD13) Biomedical imaging and automation
K. Biomaterials L. Encapsulation
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35. Biodosimetry capability to assess/permit medical triage
I. J.
Sensors/molecular recognition Medical C4I (Code CSS05) Biomedical imaging and automation Provision of combat support in CB environment (Code CSS13)
Aerospace optical and visual appliances
V. Biomarkers for toxicant/stress exposure 36. Power/fuel cells H. Nanofabrication K. Biomaterials
Power source and accessories (Code CSS19) Power generation (Code MTD06)
Note 1 for Table A-7: See Table 3.0-1. Note 2 for Table A-7: See Table A-1. Note 3 for Table A-7: See Tables A-2 and A-3. Note 4 for Table A-7: See Tables A-4 and A-5. Note 5 for Table A-7: The Air Force R&D Programs listed in Column 6 are Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) programs. The 6.1 programs are noted AFSOR (Air Force Office of Scientific Research). These programs reference the Major Technology Thrust designation in the FY98 Human Systems Technology Area Plan.
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APPENDIX B. BIOSAFETY LEVELS
INTRODUCTION The formal definition for each of the four biosafety levels is sometimes elusive or incomplete; however, at times, this definition is important for clarity of contracts, standards, international agreements, and other matters. The definitions and criteria presented in this appendix are extracted from the National Institute of Health (NIH) as an authoritative reference. However, variations exist that may or may not affect specific applications.
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APPENDIX B. BIOSAFETY LEVELS

BIOSAFETY LEVEL 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. Agents with a close or identical antigenic relationship to Biosafety Level 4 agents are handled at this level until sufficient data are obtained to confirm continued work at this level or to work with these agents at a lower level. Members of the laboratory staff have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents, and they understand the primary and secondary containment functions of the standard and special practices, the containment equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. They are supervised by competent scientists who are trained and experienced in working with these agents. The laboratory director strictly controls access to the laboratory. The facility is either in a separate building or in a controlled area within a buildingan area that is completely isolated from all other areas of the building. A specific facility operations manual is prepared or adopted. Within work areas of the facility, all activities are confined to Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSCs) or Class II BSCs used with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life-support system. The Biosafety Level 4 laboratory has special engineering and design features to prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment. The following standard and special safety practices, equipment, and facilities apply to agents assigned to Biosafety Level 4. A. STANDARD MICROBIOLOGICAL PRACTICES 1. 2. Access to the laboratory is limited or restricted at the discretion of the laboratory director when experiments are in progress. Persons must wash their hands after handling infectious materials and animals, and they take a decontaminating shower when they leave the laboratory. Eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses, and applying cosmetics are not permitted in the laboratory. Persons who wear contact lenses in laboratories should also wear goggles or a face shield. Food is stored outside the work area in cabinets or refrigerators designated for this purpose only. III-B-3 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. Mouth pipetting is prohibited. Only mechanical pipetting devices are used. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any spill of viable material. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
B. SPECIAL PRACTICES 1. Only persons whose presence in the facility or individual laboratory rooms is required for program or support purposes are authorized to enter. Persons who are immunocompromised or immunosuppressed may be at risk of acquiring infections. Therefore, persons who may be at increased risk of acquiring infection or for whom infection may be unusually hazardous (e.g., children or pregnant women) are not allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms. The supervisor has the final responsibility for assessing each circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the laboratory. Access to the facility is limited by means of secure, locked doors. Accessibility is managed by the laboratory director, biohazards control officer, or other person responsible for the physical security of the facility. Before entering, persons are advised of the potential biohazards and instructed about appropriate safeguards for ensuring their safety. Authorized persons must comply with the instructions and all other applicable entry and exit procedures. A log book, signed by all personnel, indicates the date and time of each entry and exit. Practical and effective protocols for emergency situations are established. When infectious materials or infected animals are present in the laboratory or animal rooms, hazard warning signs, incorporating the universal biohazard symbol, are posted on all access doors. The sign identifies the agent, lists the name of the laboratory director or other responsible person(s), and indicates any special requirements for entering the area (e.g., the need for immunizations or respirators).
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The laboratory director is responsible for ensuring that all personnel demonstrate a high proficiency in standard microbiological practices and techniques and in the special practices and operations specific to the laboratory facility before working with organisms at Biosafety Level 4. This might include prior experience in handling human pathogens or cell cultures or specific training provided by the laboratory director or other competent scientists proficient in these unique safe microbiological practices and techniques. Laboratory personnel receive available immunizations for the agents handled or potentially present in the laboratory. Baseline serum samples for all laboratory and other at-risk personnel are collected and stored. Additional serum specimens may be collected periodically, depending on the agents handled or the function of the laboratory. The decision to establish a serologic surveillance program takes into account the availability of methods for the assessment of antibody to the agent(s) of concern. The program provides for the testing of serum samples at each collection interval and the communication of results to the participants. A biosafety manual is prepared or adopted. Personnel are advised of special hazards and are required to read and to follow instructions on practices and procedures. Laboratory personnel receive appropriate training on the potential hazards associated with the work involved, the necessary precautions to prevent exposures, and the exposure evaluation procedures. Personnel receive annual updates or additional training, as necessary, for procedural changes. Personnel enter and leave the facility only through the clothing change and shower rooms and shower each time they leave the facility. Personnel use the airlocks to enter or leave the laboratory only in an emergency. Personal clothing is removed in the outer clothing change room and kept there. Complete laboratory clothing, including undergarments, pants, shirts or jumpsuits, shoes, and gloves, is provided and used by all personnel entering the facility. When leaving the laboratory and before proceeding into the shower area, personnel remove their laboratory clothing in the inner change room. Soiled clothing is autoclaved before laundering.
interior doors of the autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock. These doors are secured after materials are brought into the facility. 11. A high degree of precaution must always be taken with any contaminated sharp items, including needles and syringes, slides, pipettes, capillary tubes, and scalpels. Needles and syringes or other sharp instruments are restricted in the laboratory for use only when there is no alternative, such as for parenteral injection, phlebotomy, or aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Plasticware should be substituted for glassware whenever possible. a. Only needle-locking syringes or disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) are used for injection or aspiration of infectious materials. Used disposable needles must not be bent, sheared, broken, recapped, removed from disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand before disposal; rather, they must be carefully placed in conveniently located puncture-resistant containers used for sharps disposal. Non-disposable sharps must be placed in a hard-walled container for transport to a processing area for decontamination, preferably by autoclaving. Syringes that re-sheath the needle, needle-less systems, and other safe devices should be used when appropriate. Broken glassware must not be handled directly by hand but must be removed by mechanical means (e.g., a brush and dustpan, tongs, or forceps). Containers of contaminated needles, sharp equipment, and broken glass should be decontaminated before disposal, according to any local, state, or federal regulations.
4. 5.
6.
b. c.
7.
8.
9.
12. Biological materials to be removed from the Class III BSC or from the Biosafety Level 4 laboratory in a viable or intact state are transferred to a non-breakable, sealed primary container and then enclosed in a nonbreakable, sealed secondary container. This container is removed from the facility through a disinfectant dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an airlock designed for this purpose. 13. No materials, except for biological materials that are to remain in a viable or intact state, are removed from the Biosafety Level 4 laboratory unless they have been autoclaved or decontaminated before they leave the facility. Equipment or material that might be damaged by high temperatures or steam may be decontaminated by gaseous or vapor methods in an airlock or chamber designed for this purpose. 14. Laboratory equipment is decontaminated routinely after work with infectious materials is finished and especially after overt spills, splashes, or
10. Supplies and materials needed in the facility are brought in by way of the double-doored autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock, which is appropriately decontaminated between each use. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the facility retrieve the materials by opening the
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other contamination with infectious materials. Contaminated equipment should also be decontaminated before it is sent for repair or maintenance. 15. Spills of infectious materials are contained and cleaned up by appropriate professional staff or others properly trained and equipped to work with concentrated infectious material. 16. A system is set up for reporting laboratory accidents/exposures and employee absenteeism and for the medical surveillance of potential laboratory-associated illnesses. Written records are prepared and maintained. An essential adjunct to such a reporting-surveillance system is the availability of a facility for the quarantine, isolation, and medical care of personnel with potential or known laboratory-associated illnesses. 17. Materials (e.g., plants, animals, and clothing) not related to the experiment being conducted are not permitted in the facility. C. SAFETY EQUIPMENT (PRIMARY BARRIERS) 1. All procedures within a facility with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 4 are conducted in the Class III BSCs or in Class II BSCs used in conjunction with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a lifesupport system. Activities with viral agents that require Biosafety Level 4 secondary containment capabilities can be conducted within Class II BSCs within the facility, without the one-piece positive pressure personnel suit being used if (a) the facility has been decontaminated, (b) no work is being conducted in the facility with other agents assigned to Biosafety Level 4, (c) all personnel are immunized against the specific agent being manipulated and demonstrate protective antibody levels, and (d) all other standard and special practices are followed. 2. All personnel entering the facility will don complete laboratory clothing, including undergarments, pants, shirts or jumpsuits, shoes, and gloves. All such personal protective equipment is removed in the change room before showering and leaving the laboratory. 3. 2.
or equipment that are not brought into the facility through the change room. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the facility are constructed to form a sealed internal shell that facilitates fumigation and is animal and insect proof. The internal surfaces of this shell are resistant to liquids and chemicals, thus facilitating cleaning and decontamination of the area. All penetrations in these structures and surfaces are sealed. Any drains in the floors contain traps filled with a chemical disinfectant of demonstrated efficacy against the target agent, and they are connected directly to the liquid waste decontamination system. Sewer vents and other ventilation lines contain high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Internal facility appurtenances (e.g., light fixtures, air ducts, and utility pipes) are arranged to minimize the horizontal surface area on which dust can settle. Bench tops have seamless surfaces that are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat. Laboratory furniture is of simple and sturdy construction, and spaces between benches, cabinets, and equipment are accessible for cleaning. A foot-, elbow-, or automatically operated handwashing sink is provided near the door of each laboratory room in the facility. If there is a central vacuum system, it does not serve areas outside the facility. In-line HEPA filters are placed as near as practicable to each use point or service cock. Filters are installed to permit in-place decontamination and replacement. Other liquid and gas services to the facility are protected by devices that prevent backflow. If water fountains are provided, they are foot operated and are located in the facility corridors outside the laboratory. The water service to the fountain is not connected to the backflow-protected distribution system supplying water to the laboratory areas. Access doors to the laboratory are self-closing and lockable.
4. 5. 6. 7.
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10. Any windows are breakage resistant. 11. A double-doored autoclave is provided for decontaminating materials passing out of the facility. The autoclave door that opens to the area external to the facility is sealed to the outer wall and automatically controlled so that the outside door can be opened only after the autoclave sterilization cycle has been completed. 12. A pass-through dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an equivalent decontamination method is provided so that materials and equipment that
D. LABORATORY FACILITY (SECONDARY BARRIERS) 1. The Biosafety Level 4 facility consists of either a separate building or a clearly demarcated and isolated zone within a building. Outer and inner change rooms, separated by a shower, are provided for personnel entering and leaving the facility. A double-doored autoclave, fumigation chamber, or ventilated airlock is provided for passage of those materials, supplies,
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cannot be decontaminated in the autoclave can be safely removed from the facility. 13. Liquid effluents from laboratory sinks, BSCs, floor drains (if used), and autoclave chambers are decontaminated by heat treatment before being discharged to the sanitary sewer. Effluents from showers and toilets can be discharged to the sanitary sewer without treatment. The process used for decontamination of liquid wastes must be validated physically and biologically by use of a constant recording temperature sensor in conjunction with an indicator microorganism that has a defined heat susceptibility profile. 14. A dedicated non-recirculating ventilation system is provided. The supply and exhaust components of the system are balanced to ensure directional airflow from the area of least hazard to the area(s) of greatest potential hazard. The differential pressure/directional airflow between adjacent areas is monitored and alarmed to indicate malfunction of the system. The airflow in the supply and exhaust components is monitored and the components interlocked to ensure that inward (or zero) airflow is maintained. 15. The general room exhaust air from a facility in which the work is conducted in a Class III BSC system is treated by a passage through a HEPA filter(s) before being discharge to the outside. The air is discharged away from occupied spaces and air intakes. The HEPA filter(s) is located as near as practicable to the source to minimize the length of potentially contaminated ductwork. The HEPA filter housings are designed to allow for in situ decontamination of the filter before removal or removal of the filter in a sealed gas-tight primary container for subsequent decontamination and/or destruction by incineration. The design of the HEPA filter housing should facilitate validation of the filter installation. The use of pre-certified HEPA filters can be an advantage. The service-life of the exhaust HEPA filters can be extended through adequate filtration of the supply air. 16. A specially designed suit area may be provided in the facility to provide personnel protection equivalent to that provided by Class III BSCs. Personnel who enter this area wear a one-piece positive pressure suit that is ventilated by a life-support system. The life-support system includes alarms and emergency backup breathing air tanks. Entry to this area is through an airlock that is fitted with airtight doors. A chemical shower is provided to decontaminate the surface of the suit before the worker leaves the area. The exhaust air from the suit area is filtered by two sets of HEPA filters installed in series. A duplicate filtration unit, exhaust fan, and an automatically starting emergency power source are provided. The III-B-6
air pressure within the suit area is lower than that of any adjacent area. Emergency lighting and communication systems are provided. All penetrations into the internal shell of the suit area are sealed. A double-doored autoclave is provided for decontaminating waste materials to be removed from the suit area. 17. The treated exhaust air from Class II BSCs, located in a facility in which workers wear a positive pressure suit, can be discharged into the animal room environment or to the outside through the facility air exhaust system. The BSCs are tested and certified at 12-month intervals. The air exhausted from Class III BSCs is passed through two HEPA filter systems (in series) before being discharged to the outside. If the treated exhaust is discharged to the outside through the facility exhaust system, it is connected to this system in a manner that avoids any interference with the air balance of the cabinets or the facility exhaust system.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production facilities in which work is done with indigenous or exotic agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by inhalation. Laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic and potentially lethal agents and are supervised by competent scientists who are experienced in working with these agents. All procedures involving the manipulation of infectious materials are conducted within BSCs or other physical containment devices or by personnel wearing appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment. The laboratory has special engineering and design features. Many existing facilities may not have all the facility safeguards recommended for Biosafety Level 3 (e.g., access zone, sealed penetrations, and directional airflow, and so forth). In these circumstances, acceptable safety may be achieved for routine or repetitive operations (e.g., diagnostic procedures involving the propagation of an agent for identification, typing, and susceptibility testing) in Biosafety Level 2 facilities. However, the recommended Standard Microbiological Practices, Special Practices, and Safety Equipment for Biosafety Level 3 must be rigorously followed. The decision to implement this modification of Biosafety Level 3 recommendations should be made only by the laboratory director. The following standard and special safety practices, equipment, and facilities apply to agents assigned to Biosafety Level 3. A. STANDARD MICROBIOLOGICAL PRACTICES 1. 2. 3. Access to the laboratory is limited or restricted at the discretion of the laboratory director when experiments are in progress. Persons must wash their hands after handling infectious materials and animals, after removing gloves, and when they leave the laboratory. Eating, drinking, smoking, handling contact lenses, and applying cosmetics are not permitted in the laboratory. Persons who wear contact lenses in laboratories should also wear goggles or a face shield. Food is stored outside the work area in cabinets or refrigerators designated for this purpose only. Mouth pipetting is prohibited. Mechanical pipetting devices are used. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any spill of viable material. All cultures, stocks, and other regulated wastes are decontaminated before disposal by an approved decontamination method (e.g., III-B-7
autoclaving). Materials to be decontaminated outside of the immediate laboratory are to be placed in a durable, leakproof container and closed for transport from the laboratory. Materials to be decontaminated at an off-site location are packaged in accordance with applicable local, state, and federal regulations before being removed from the facility. 8. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
B. SPECIAL PRACTICES 1. 2. Laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments are in progress. The laboratory director controls access to the laboratory and restricts access to persons whose presence is required for program or support purposes. For example, persons who are immunocompromised or immunosuppressed may be at risk of acquiring infections. Persons who are at increased risk of acquiring infection or for whom infection may be unusually hazardous are not allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms. The laboratory director establishes policies and procedures whereby only persons who have been advised of the potential biohazard, who meet any specific entry requirements (e.g., immunization), and who comply with all entry and exit procedures can enter the laboratory or animal rooms. When infectious materials or infected animals are present in the laboratory or containment module, a hazard warning sign, incorporating the universal biohazard symbol, is posted on all laboratory and animal room access doors. The hazard warning sign identifies the agent, lists the name and telephone number of the laboratory director or other responsible person(s), and indicates any special requirements for entering the laboratory (e.g., the need for immunizations, respirators, or other personal protective measures). Laboratory personnel receive the appropriate immunizations or tests for the agents handled or potentially present in the laboratory [e.g., hepatitis B vaccine or tuberculosis (TB) skin testing]. Baseline serum samples are collected and stored for all laboratory and other at-risk personnel. Additional serum specimens may be collected periodically, depending on the agents handled or the function of the laboratory. A biosafety manual is prepared or adopted. Personnel are advised of special hazards and are required to read and to follow instructions on practices and procedures. Laboratory personnel receive appropriate training on the potential hazards associated with the work involved, the necessary precautions to prevent
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exposures, and the exposure evaluation procedures. Personnel receive annual updates or additional training, as necessary, for procedural changes. 9. The laboratory director is responsible for ensuring that all personnel demonstrate proficiency in standard microbiological practices and techniques and in the practices and operations specific to the laboratory facility before working with organisms at Biosafety Level 3. This might include prior experience in handling human pathogens or cell cultures or specific training provided by the laboratory director or other competent scientists proficient in safe microbiological practices and techniques.
also be decontaminated before it is sent for repair or maintenance or packaged for transport in accordance with applicable local, state, or federal regulations. 13. Cultures, tissues, or specimens of body fluids are placed in a container that prevents leakage during collection, handling, processing, storage, transport, or shipping. 14. All potentially contaminated waste materials (e.g., gloves, lab coats, and so forth) from laboratories or animal rooms are decontaminated before disposal or reuse. 15. Spills of infectious materials are decontaminated, contained, and cleaned up by appropriate professional staff or others properly trained and equipped to work with concentrated infectious material. Plastic-backed paper toweling used fir clean-up on non-perforated work surfaces within BSCs facilitates. 16. Spills and accidents that result in overt or potential exposures to infectious materials are immediately reported to the laboratory director. Appropriate medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment are provided and written records are maintained. 17. Animals and plants not related to the work being conducted are not permitted in the laboratory. C. SAFETY EQUIPMENT (PRIMARY BARRIERS) 1. 2. Properly maintained BSCs (Class II or III) are used for all manipulation of infectious materials. Outside of a BSC, appropriate combinations of personal protective equipment are used (e.g., special protective clothing, masks, gloves, face protection, or respirators), in combination with physical containment devices (e.g., centrifuge safety cups, sealed centrifuge rotors, or containment caging for animals). This equipment must be used for manipulations of cultures and of those clinical or environmental materials that may be a source of infectious aerosols, the aerosol challenge of experimental animals, harvesting of tissues or fluids from infected animals and embryonated eggs, and necropsy of infected animals. Face protection (goggles and mask or a face shield) is worn for manipulations of infectious materials outside of a BSC. Respiratory protection is worn when aerosols cannot be safely contained (i.e., outside of a BSC) and in rooms containing infected animals.
10. A high degree of precaution must always be taken with any contaminated sharp items, including needles and syringes, slides, pipettes, capillary tubes, and scalpels. Needles and syringes or other sharp instruments should be restricted in the laboratory for use only when there is no alternative, such as for parenteral injection, phlebotomy, or aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Plasticware should be substituted for glassware whenever possible. a. Only needle-locking syringes or disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) are used for injection or aspiration of infectious materials. Used disposable needles must not be bent, sheared, broken, recapped, removed from disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand before disposal; rather, they must be carefully placed in conveniently located puncture-resistant containers used for sharps disposal. Non-disposable sharps must be placed in a hard-walled container for transport to a processing area for decontamination, preferably by autoclaving. Syringes that re-sheathe the needle, needle-less systems, and other safe devices should be used when appropriate. Broken glassware must not be handled directly by hand but must be removed by mechanical means (e.g., a brush and dustpan, tongs, or forceps). Containers of contaminated needles, sharp equipment, and broken glass should be decontaminated before disposal, according to any local, state, or federal regulations.
b. c.
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11. All manipulations involving infectious materials are conducted in BSCs or other physical containment devices within the containment module. No work in open vessels is conducted on the open bench. 12. Laboratory equipment and work surfaces should be decontaminated with an appropriate disinfectant on a routine basis, after work with infectious materials is finished, and especially after overt spills, splashes, or other contamination with infectious materials. Contaminated equipment should III-B-8
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Protective laboratory clothing (e.g., solid-front or wrap-around gowns, scrub suits, or coveralls) must be worn insidebut not outsidethe laboratory. Reusable laboratory clothing is to be decontaminated before being laundered. Gloves must be worn when handling infected animals and when hands may contact infectious materials and contaminated surfaces or equipment. Disposable gloves should be discarded when contaminatedand never washed for reuse.
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connected to this system in a manner (e.g., thimble unit connection) that avoids any interference with the air balance of the cabinets or building exhaust system. Exhaust air from Class II BSCs can be recirculated within the laboratory if the cabinet is tested and certified at least every 12 months. 10. Continuous flow centrifuges or other equipment that may produce aerosols are contained in devices that exhaust air through HEPA filters before discharge into the laboratory. 11. Vacuum lines are protected with liquid disinfectant traps and HEPA filters, or their equivalent, which are routinely maintained and replaced as needed. 12. An eyewash facility is readily available.
D. LABORATORY FACILITIES (SECONDARY BARRIERS) 1. The laboratory is separated from areas that are open to unrestricted traffic flow within the building. Passage through two sets of self-closing doors is the basic requirement for entry into the laboratory from access corridors or other contiguous areas. A clothes change room (shower optional) may be included in the passage way. Each laboratory contains a foot-, elbow-, or automatically operated sink for hand washing. This sink is located near the laboratory exit door. The interior surfaces of walls, floors, and ceilings are water resistant so that they can be easily cleaned. Penetrations in these surfaces are sealed or are capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination. Bench tops are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat. Laboratory furniture is sturdy, and spaces between benches, cabinets, and equipment are accessible for cleaning. Windows in the laboratory are closed and sealed. A method for decontaminating all laboratory wastes is available, preferably within the laboratory (i.e., autoclave, chemical disinfection, incineration, or other approved decontamination method). A ducted exhaust air ventilation system is provided. This system creates directional airflow that draws air from clean areas into the laboratory toward contaminated areas. The exhaust air is not recirculated to any other area of the building and is discharged to the outside with filtration or other optional treatment. The outside exhaust must be dispersed away from occupied areas and air intakes. Laboratory personnel must verify that the direction of the airflow (into the laboratory) is proper. The HEPA-filtered exhaust air from Class II or Class III BSCs is discharged directly to the outside or through the building exhaust system. If the HEPA-filtered exhaust air from Class II or III BSCs is to be discharged to the outside through the building exhaust air system, it is III-B-9
2. 3.
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BIOSAFETY LEVEL 2 is similar to Level 1 and is suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment. It differs in that (1) laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are directed by competent scientists, (2) access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted, (3) extreme precautions are taken with contaminated sharp items, and (4) certain procedures in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted in BSCs or other physical containment equipment.
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 1 is not suitable for working with toxic or hazardous substances.
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SECTION 4: BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
October 1999
SECTION 4BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

Scope 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Etiological Factors............................................III-4-7 Defeat or Management of Biological and Chemical Attack ............................................ III-4-19 Management of Trauma, Stress, and Treatment..... III-4-37 Tactical Medical Command and Control.............. III-4-55 Highlights Endemic organisms, the major cause of infectious disease in deployed forces, can be dealt with using new technologies. Human genome sequencing will reveal disease and stress susceptibility factors. Pathogen genomics permits rapid detection/identification of agents. Immune system enhancers and novel antibacterial and antiviral compounds promise protection from or defeat of biological hazards. Interfacing biomedical technology with communication and information systems is enabling for global surveillance of endemic disease. Telemedicine provides opportunity to stabilize and enhance survivability of traumatically injured persons. Growth factors enhance wound repair and neural tissue regeneration.
OVERVIEW The biomedical issues confronting the Defense community in the 21st century differ markedly from those of the past two decades because of rapid advances in biotechnology and medicine, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and increasing environmental health risks. At the same time, rapid progress in the technologies of computers, information storage and retrieval, and miniaturization affect access to medical histories of defense personnel; this information can be used to prevent disease and enhance operational capability. The reduction in numbers of combat personnel, the threat of urban warfare in police actions, and the changing nature of the threat from biological and chemical warfare by rogue nations all contribute to the major role of medical care in the military community of the future. These changes require the re-examination of existing systems for health-care maintenance, individual and group protection, and management of injured persons in a manner that conforms to contemporary command, control, communication, computer, intelligence (C4I) capability. The Tactical Medical Coordination System (TacMedCS) provides a basis for the anticipated applications for the technologies likely to develop in the next two decades. The resulting structure will provide real-time information to unit commanding officers (CO) and enhance the development of dynamic battlespace orientation, mission planning, asset allocation, and intelligence. Among the health threats to military personnel are infectious disease; chemical and radiological exposure; and environmental stresses, including sleep deprivation, exposure to temperature extremes, and loud noises. The most common sources of infectious diseases are endemic or epidemic diseases in the deployed area. Because of recent incidents involving biological agent capability by nation states (e.g., Iraq) and non-national terrorist groups (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo in Japan), the threat of contracting an infectious disease through biological agent exposure has increased markedly. Several task groups in the United States have examined the current response capability of U.S. military, civil defense, local police, and emergency medical personnel to such an incident and have identified several III-4-1
needs. Among these are the production of novel antitoxins, vaccines, immunization adjuvants, and antibiotics to perceived threat agents. The threat agents include those identified by the Australia Group (AG) and others identified by the U.S. defense community. Advanced technologies related to training in the management of infectious disease, trauma, stress, and treatment are additional requirements. RATIONALE This biomedical science section addresses those technologies in the biomedical arena that will affect the operational readiness and sustained force projection capability of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. Section 4.1 considers the etiological factors of infectious disease and susceptibility of persons to disease and stress. Biodiversity plays roles in the evolution of disease and in developing seed stocks that prevent total destruction of a food material. Biodiversity also provides protection to the human population from potentially catastrophic events. Nonlethal weapon effects are considered in this section. The effects of new technologies on treating, managing, and protecting individuals and groups from infectious disease are considered in Section 4.2. Innovative approaches to training first responders to biological or chemical attack are also included. The protection of the forces from conventional weaponry, and the treatment of traumatic injuries, including damage to the nervous system, are presented in Section 4.3. Telemedicine approaches, treatment of wounded forces at sites distant from medical facilities, and affordability issues are also discussed. Technologies enabling for medical command strategies are presented in Section 4.4. The time line between development of the technology and the capability of inserting that technology into a system (i.e., application readiness) and the issues of affordability are considered in each section. The report provides a WTA that compares the capability of developed and developing nations to use the leading-edge biomedical technologies for support of their military operations. All the technology items identified here are driven by broad requirements and applications and all have substantial non-military commercial applications and support infrastructures. The industrial sectors supporting the biomedical science thrusts include health/medicine, pharmaceuticals, food processing, cosmetics, computers, communications, and electronics. Identification of Developing Biomedical Technologies Related to Military Applications The Developing Biomedical Technologies have been categorized into three functional sets: infectious diseases and protection, trauma, and stress. The direct relevance of the developing critical biomedical technologies to military applications and needs is then indicated. Developing Biomedical Technologies as related to infectious disease, trauma, and stress: Infectious disease related Rapid genomic analyses of biological agents and of human susceptibility to disease, toxicants, and stress; Rapid diagnosis of infectious disease by genomic/antigenic analyses and sensors; Database for infectious diseases worldwide; Microchip encoding of medical history; Containment and transport of infected persons; Remote diagnosis and surgery; and Novel antivirals, antibiotics, vaccines, and drug development.
Trauma related Blood coagulation factors; Artificial organs, including blood, and growth factors for neural repair; and Novel prosthetic materials.
Stress related Performance enhancing or sustaining chemicals (vigilance/attentiveness); III-4-2
Analytical measures and metrics for human performance; Iconographic and audio-visual displays and ergonomic tools; Nonlethal weapons including physiological/psychological assault; and Ingested/injected materials to identify location of persons.
Relevance of these technologies to military applications and needs: Topics Section
Affordability and medical care .............................................................................................................. 4.3 Analytical tools to assess impact of information or disinformation (books, media, community civil defense training) on responses to biological/chemical (B/C) incidents or accidents. New article in The New England Journal of Medicine by Timothy Johnson (Shattuck LectureMedicine and the Media, 339:8792, 1998) addresses most issues. ............................................................................................... 4.2 Bioeffects of nonlethal weapons ........................................................................................................... 4.1 Bioequivalence methods to compare effect of toxicants on performance (e.g., the degree of function compromised by a person intoxicated with an industrial solvent or fuel in terms of compromise by alcohol intoxication or by hypoxia). Related to aging, stress, gender, etc. .................................................... 4.3 Biomarkers of toxicant exposure including sensors................................................................................... 4.3 Facilities and technologies to test efficacy of B/C agent protection (Phase II and Phase III, including physical protection, biological and chemical protection); includes side effects of protection on the performance of personnel .................................................................................................................... 4.2 Genomics of personnel and of agent...................................................................................................... 4.1 Organ replacement by use of organ culture and polymeric materials............................................................. 4.3 Personal medical history microchip (personnel medical history of persons pre- and post-deployment) [Institute of Medicine Report on Gulf War] ......................................................................................4.1, 4.2 Preparation of soldiers for deployment................................................................................................... 4.2 Reinsertion of the soldier following trauma or illness, including reducing permanent disability ..................4.2, 4.3 Remote detection of vital signs and locator of living forms ....................................................................... 4.3 Repair of the central nervous system..................................................................................................... 4.3 Sensors (see biomarkers)...............................................................................................................4.1, 4.2 Small deployed units.....................................................................................................................4.1-4.3 Stanch abdominal bleeding and treat extensive burns ................................................................................ 4.3 Surveillance, protection, and response to B/C agent, including differentiating between intentional release of B/C agents and disease in newly deployed areas....................................................................4.1, 4.2 Telemedicine for the care of wounded personnel in remote or combat locations.............................................. 4.3 Training of health-care personnel for incidents/accidents involving B/C agents, nuclear material, and directed-energy sources .................................................................................................................. 4.2 Vaccines, antivirals, antibiotics, and vaccine platforms (e.g., viral modification to deliver epitopes and/or DNA components of interest) ..................................................................................................... 4.2
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Country Australia Belgium Canada China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands North Korea Norway Poland Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Ukraine UK United States
Legend: Capability in technology elements
Etiological Factors
Defeat or Management of Biological/ Chemical Attack
Management of Trauma, Stress, and Treatment
Tactical Medical Command/ Control
most
many
some
at least one
Figure 4.0-1. Biomedical Technology Systems WTA Summary
WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The technology assessment shown in Figure 4.0-1 describes the capability of the identified nation to implement new or novel solutions to needs faced by the military sector in that nation. The military applications of biomedical sciences are related in large part to the civilian applications; therefore, the technologies are dual use. The industrialized nations are the world leaders in medical technology developments, and their ability to contribute innovative solutions to biological and chemical threat agents is therefore higher than that of less developed countries. Several databases related to biomedical sciences are available via the Internet. These databases include the Human Genome database (i.e., nucleic acid sequences of the human population), protein sequences, and anatomical reconstruction of the human from magnetic resonance and whole-body sections (e.g., Visible Man and Voxel Man). As a result, scientists and technical persons in all nations can access these databases. Nation states can purchase equipment to meet needs or can identify new strategies by accessing the worldwide web (WWW). These states, however, may not have the capability to innovate new solutions to the problems because of lack of a research base or an infrastructure with limited financial, technical, or human resources. On the other hand, those nations with leading technical assets (human, financial, material, and infrastructure components) are capable of adding to the knowledge base at a rapid rate. They have a marked advantage in developing vaccines, new drugs, and novel body coverings that can mitigate or eliminate the effects of biological threat agents. The capability is therefore a function of leading-edge III-4-4
technology, rather than of access to available data. The WTA tables reflect the technological capabilities of nations to advance understanding of and response to threat agents, rather than the capability to access the information on the Internet.
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SECTION 4.1ETIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Highlights Genomics of pathogens are being determined. Susceptibility factors of human genome are being characterized. Worldwide database of endemic diseases is being compiled. The interface between human susceptibility, virulence factors, and worldwide endemic disease will now make possible prediction of risk, required treatments, and a human factors element of readiness of deployed forces.
OVERVIEW The biomedical components of etiological factors in disease include genomics of biological agents, human genomics, global surveillance of infectious disease, and nonlethal weapons. The management of physical injury is considered in Section 4.3. The development of clinical infectious disease in the human subject is the result of the interaction between the human host and the pathogen. The genome of the pathogenic organism and the susceptibility of the subject to the organism are factors in disease manifestation. The pathogenicity of viruses and of bacteria is a function of the genomic composition of the microorganism. There are common genomic sequences shared by biological agents which increase the pathogenicity of these organisms. These sequences, identified as pathogenicity islands (PAIs), have been characterized for several agents on the Australia Group list. Knowledge of the sequences can be used both to construct deoxyribonucleic-acid (DNA)- or ribonucleic-acid (RNA)-based sensors or to develop antiviral or antibiotic pharmaceuticals that will delay or reduce the pathogenic effects of the organisms. Individual susceptibility to a pathogen is a function of the nutrition, neuropsychopharmacological characteristics, fitness, and the genome of the person. One example of the genomic component of resistance was the finding that those persons whose predecessors came from areas of the globe that experienced bubonic plague were more resistant to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infections than persons from other areas. One explanation for this observation was that there was a common genetic factor that protected individuals against both diseases and that the plague permitted survival of such protected populations. Progress made in biotechnology and the understanding of the genetic code of humans will enable the susceptibility of persons to disease and stress to be determined by the year 2003. Since the genetic material of the human is determined at conception, it is possible to identify and characterize genes responsible for the inherited predisposition to decreased human performance and clinical disease. By the year 2003 it will be possible to have gene-based screens and diagnostic tests for alterations in genes; to develop the informatics needed to collect, store, analyze, and integrate the resulting molecular patterns; and to obtain epidemiologic and clinical data of persons at birth. With this information it will be possible to identify every major human gene that predisposes people to disease; to use the knowledge to help persons at risk; and to deal with the psychosocial, ethical, and legal issues associated with inherited disease. A portion of the material in Section 4.3 (AffordabilityNational Clinical Information System) is relevant to this section. RATIONALE The deployment of forces is frequently associated with increased incidence of illness in persons who have not previously resided in the region. Viral or bacterial disease is present in a high proportion of persons who report for sick call. As the number of forces to be deployed diminishes and the requirement for sustained performance increases, sick call can be anticipated to reduce force projection capability. The global surveillance of infectious diseases provides a database that can be used for immunization or other protection of individuals before deployment.
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The identification of important enzymes/gene products in the human, relevant to protection from B or C induced injury, can be utilized in defense strategies. The rapid genotyping of individuals is possible through the use of kits or chips that allow for genotyping for biomarkers of disease or chemical susceptibility. This has to be done only once in an individuals lifetime unless new, relevant genes are identified. The genotyping of individuals, along with a catalog of the manifestations of the various GP alone, and in combination, could lead to more appropriate (and potentially reduced risk) job assignments. It will also allow intervention/protection strategies to be tailored to the individual, rather than the traditional one-size-fits-all approach. Nonlethal weapons offer the opportunity to manage crisis situations in a manner that can inflict minimal traumatic injury and enhance survivability of U.S. forces. As U.S. forces are called upon to perform an increasing number of police and peacekeeping actions and as the proportion of these actions occur in urban settings, the requirement for nonlethal means of control increases. This technology has direct relevance to the world scene as it appears in the early period of the 21st century. A. 1. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INFECTIOUS AGENTS Genomics of the Pathogenic Organisms
The genome of many pathogenic organisms on the AG list has been characterized. Within the genome there are sequences of nucleic acids that enhance the pathogenicity of the organisms. These sequences are virulence genes and PAIs. The PAIs and virulence genes may allow the bacteria to adhere more firmly to mammalian cells or to otherwise enhance the survival and multiplication potential of the bacteria in the host (human or animal). The sequence of the PAIs in pathogenic E. coli, for example, is similar to sequences of cell proteins (adhesins) on the external surface of cells and to those used in cell-cell binding. The knowledge of the PAIs, virulence genes, and sequences unique to each of the pathogenic organisms allow rapid detection of these agents in samples of tissue (including blood) from infected patients. The ability to amplify and sequence nucleic acid fragments from infected tissues has given rise to a new approach in the understanding of emerging pathogens. Until the past decade it has been necessary to culture tissue samples to recover and identify the infectious agent. This requirement meant that appropriate culture media and conditions for culture had to be known. With the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology and with a gene data bank of infectious organisms, it is now possible to obtain very small samples of tissue and biological agent. The nucleic acid component of the agent can be amplified and matched to other known agents. This technology has been used to identify a bacterium involved etiologically in Whipples disease. In a related technology, representational difference analyses (RDA), samples of healthy and diseased tissues from a single subject are taken and the genomic material from the healthy tissue subtracted from that of the diseased tissue. This method has been used to identify Kaposi Sarcoma HV (KSHV), a virus responsible for Kaposi sarcoma in patients infected with HIV. The known genes can also be used in the construction of multi-array sensors used to detect pathogenic agents in the military or medical environment. The knowledge of the genomics of bacteria, viruses, and fungi permits rapid identification of infectious materials, allows the development of new immunogens without injecting material that has a potential to cause infection, and allows the development of new antibiotic and antiviral compounds. It permits the identification, by PCR and RDA, of pathogenic organisms not previously recognized and is expected to provide evidence of new microbial genera. See Science, 282: 219221, 1998. 2. Genomics of Personnel as Related to Disease or Toxicant Susceptibility
Large, population-based studies are being conducted to evaluate disease risks associated with the combined effects of genetic status and environmental exposures, including those related to lifestyle and diet. Using minute quantities of DNA in cells obtained from a simple mouth rinse, blood, or tissue, it is possible to detect gene mutations, the functions or effects of which may point the way to environmental, nutritional, hormonal, and other factors that contribute to diseases in humans. As more information about human genes becomes available, there will be opportunities to test the importance of newly discovered genes not only for their relation to susceptibility, but also for clues to environmental agents that affect health and performance. The tools to examine these complex III-4-8
interactions between genetic susceptibility and environmental exposures are being developed for studies that could greatly advance our understanding of how inheritance, lifestyle, and environment combine to cause disease. This knowledge will lead to new strategies for disease prevention. The development, function, and behavior of humans have been shown to involve genetic and environmental elements. In recent research efforts, biomedical science has been giving attention to inherent differences among individuals and groups of persons. These differences, at the genetic level, are collectively called genetic polymorphisms (GPs), and can affect the way that individuals and groups respond to various physical, chemical, and biological stresses. GPs generally manifest themselves as differences among individuals with regard to their ability to metabolize drugs and other substances and to their susceptibility to disease and other stressors. As a general rule, each human population is estimated to possess 3 to 10 genes that affect its susceptibility to disease or toxicants. Some GPs can be identified only by phenotyping the individuals, i.e., by examining blood or other tissues for the presence or absence of specific enzymes or receptors. Other GPs may be identified by looking at specific DNA sequences in the cells or at RNA products. Polymorphisms can manifest themselves as: The presence or absence of a specific enzyme that metabolizes xenobiotics; Differing relative concentrations of a specific enzyme, with associated differences in levels or rates of metabolism; Modified enzyme/gene product with a different level, or spectrum of activity than the wild type; The presence or absence of a specific gene product that controls a vital body function; and Differences in the ability of a gene to be induced to produce a product.
The polymorphisms can manifest themselves as differences in enzyme activity, differences in cell receptors, and differences in response to stress or injury. Different polymorphisms confer increased or decreased sensitivity to various external insults. These polymorphisms do not confer absolute resistance or sensitivity to an insult, but affect the probability that the individual (or group) with that polymorphism would be more or less sensitive to the disease/ damage. For example, the presence or absence of various cytochrome P450 and GST isoforms will increase or decrease the susceptibility of that individual to different types of smoking or chemical-related cancers, whereas other isoforms would increase the susceptibility for contracting the disease. Genetic polymorphisms and environmental factors interact in the development of resistance or susceptibility to disease. The human genome project will inform the medical community about the specific genes related to the development of disease, the susceptibility to shock following traumatic injury, and the susceptibility of individuals to intense stress associated with exposure to temperature extremes, intense noise, sleep deprivation, and infection. In the next decade it is likely that polymorphisms that affect performance, sensitivity to biological and chemical agents and specific drugs, and sensitivity to environmental conditions and situations will be identified. The individual genotype will affect sensitivity to biological and chemical agents, susceptibility to infection by specific organisms, activation or detoxification of chemical agents, and modulation of chemical or biological agent exposure. Examples include P450 and glutathione S-transferase (GST) polymorphisms that are associated with resistance or susceptibility to smoking-induced cancers; cell surface major histo compatibility (HLA) molecules that confer resistance or sensitivity to infection by specific microorganisms; and acetylase variants that rapidly or slowly metabolize (to activate or inactivate) certain toxins. GPs also affect the response of individuals to drugs that are important in the prophylaxis of disease and treatment of injury or fatigue. For example, polymorphisms for rapid or slow metabolism of drugs can lead to a propensity for adverse reactions, decreased drug efficacy, or to the need to use lower doses to achieve the desired effect. A correlation between genetic background and human performance will provide a capability to determine where, on the spectrum of susceptibility or resistance, military personnel may be most suited for defense-related tasks.
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3.
Global Surveillance of Infectious Diseases
There are three components to the surveillance database: endemic and epidemic disease; emerging and reemerging diseases, particularly of viral etiology; and antimicrobial drug resistance. There are several agencies that gather data on worldwide endemic disease. These include the Center for Disease Control (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), and Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO). The military services, through organizations such as Naval Medical Research Units (NAMRU) and Walter Reed Army facility, have interests in collating data on endemic disease. A comprehensive database of such information can function as a clearinghouse for defense and public health requirements, as well as an early warning system for outbreak of infectious diseases, whether caused by organisms endemic to an area or disseminated by terrorist or nation/state entities. The information would serve to alert pharmaceutical firms and the defense community to increase production requirements of vaccines and antibiotics. The database includes Information gathered from agencies currently involved in monitoring disease; Genomic sequences of viral, bacterial, and fungal pathogens; Genomic sequences of pathogenicity islands of AG agents and other relevant organisms; and Antigenic epitopes characteristic of AG agents and other relevant organisms.
Multi-array sensors consisting of probes for the relevant genomic sequences or epitopes could then be constructed and used in the surveillance system. B. NONLETHAL WEAPONS EFFECTS
Military peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts, and missions other than war have become increasingly common. In such operations, many dangers exist to the troops, yet the use of lethal force is often not justified or acceptable. DoD recently issued a policy statement for nonlethal weapons (NLW), in which such weapons are defined as weapon systems explicitly designed to incapacitate personnel or materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury, and undesired damage to property and the environment (DoD Directive 3000.3). Bioeffects and Nonlethal Weapons Bioeffects include any effect an internal or external stimulus has on part or all of a biological organism. Examples of bioeffects include DNA mutation, loss of equilibrium, stimulation or inhibition of sensory input, emotional response, nausea, fear, increase in heart rate, behavior avoidance, cellular damage, altered metabolism, confusion, loss of consciousness, convulsions, and death. They can be as innocuous as a recognition of a pleasant odor or as harmful as stopping of the heart. Bioeffects specialists include medical doctors, physiologists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, veterinarians, anatomists, neuroscientists, biologists, epidemiologists, theoreticians and others, all concerned with the effects of any stimulus (biological, chemical, or physical) on part of all of a biological organism. In addition to achieving a nonlethal goal, i.e., incapacitation, operational commanders are also interested in the parameters of the incapacitation. Some relevant parameters include dose for main desired effect; can the effect be tuned; time until initial effect; duration of effect; synergy with other factors; reversibility versus irreversibility of effects; side effects to targets; undesired collateral effects; environmental effects; and susceptibility to countermeasures. Policy acceptability is a topic in which bioeffects have two major roles. The first role of bioeffects concerns the policy that antipersonnel NLWs should minimize permanent injury. The second role of bioeffects in setting NLW policy concerns the long-term medical consequences of exposure to the NLWs for everyone exposed, including the operator, the target, and bystanders. If occupational exposure standards exist for the particular agent being used, as they do for many types of noise, radiation, and chemicals, then these standards should be followed when possible. If the exposures are sufficiently novel that no health standards existfor example, certain types of directed energythen standards need to be developed. III-4-10
The Variability of Human Responses and the Probabilistic Nature of Bioeffects Because of biological variability there will always be uncertainty in predicting the biological responses to nonlethal weapons. This is true for target, operator, and bystander effects. Even among a consistent population of humans, such as a group of young adult males, there will be a variability in responses to the same stimulus. When the variance of the population increases, for example, by adding persons of differing sizes, ages, weights, frailty, health, and sex, so will the variability of the population response to most NLWs. Therefore, biological responses to nonlethal weapons are probabilistic. Although bioeffects are certainly variable, it should be noted that they are not the only source of variability in the use of a NLWs. The energy emitted from the weapon itself (e.g., a directed-energy weapon) is variable to some extent. The transmission of the energy from the weapon to the target is affected by variations in beamforming, aiming, or focusing of the energy, as well as by intervening conditions such as rain, wind, temperature, terrain, and structures. Coupling of the energy to the target can be passively affected by the targets size, orientation, and clothing, as well as by active countermeasures purposively employed by the target. All of these sources of variability precede the biological variability and probabilistic nature of response. Acoustic Energy as a Nonlethal Weapon In his work Life of Marcus Crassus, Plutarch described the use of bells and drums as a psychological NLW. More recently, rock music was used to annoy Manuel Noriega in Panama. Current ideas for NLWs use highintensity infrasound. A special pressure chamber, the infrasound test device (ITS), has been constructed to examine the effects of infrasound at different frequencies on both anesthetized and awake subjects. The utility of acoustic energy as an NLW is likely to be defined in 5 years. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The identification of genomic maps is the result of multinational efforts, with the United States, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan acting as the primary participants. The large majority of the genome database is available on the WWW. The database includes bacterial and viral organisms as well as livestock, agricultural plants, and humans. The databases are maintained at sites in the United States, France, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and UK. Some genomic sequences have been patented for protection of intellectual property that may have applications for pharmaceutical production. The 100,000 genes of the human genome are expected to be completely sequenced by the year 2002. The information obtained from combining susceptibility factors with virulence factors in biological agents makes possible the construction of a formidable biological weapon. The relative capabilities shown in the WTA table reflect the technical capability of the identified nation to contribute to the human genome and pathogen genome database. They do not reflect access to the web. Technical capability to add to the genome database provides a temporal advantage to identify and deploy countermeasures. Large national or federal laboratories with leading capabilities to address the issues of the genome include the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States, the National Cancer Center and the Chemical Research Center in Japan, and the National Health and Medical Research Institute (INSERM) in France. Large private sector groups in the developed world also are actively characterizing the human genome and the genome of pathogens. There is not a single information database that describes endemic disease worldwide at the present time. Information is compiled from CDC, WHO, PAHO, and NAMRU data sets. Efforts to create a single database are in progress. See Technology Data Sheet for WTA chart.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS 4.1. ETIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Genomics ....................................................................................................................................III-4-15
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DATA SHEET 4.1. GENOMICS

The technologies required for sequencing the human genome and the genome of pathogens are the same. Accurate knowledge of, and the ability to determine, modify, and use, the base sequence of the human genome will reveal sequences that increase or decrease susceptibility to specific pathogens. This will enable the design and selection of agents that may have a particularly disabling or lethal effect on a given population. Although the entire human genome is expected to be characterized by 2002, the identification of susceptibility/resistance genes in specific populations will require a longer period. A small portion (25 nucleotides) of the entire sequence of one susceptibility/resistance gene is likely to be useful in designing a detector element. Determination of the base sequence of PAIs/virulence factors in the genome of biological pathogens enables differentiating pathogens from non-pathogens and thereby allows rapid detection of biological agents and design of countermeasures. The majority of these sequences should be determined by 2005. A single biological agent may contain one to five such pathogenicity factors. The total set of pathogenicity factors for all biological agents may be as low as 100 since multiple organisms share similar sequences. A small portion (25 nucleotides) of the entire sequence of 1 PAI is likely to be useful in designing a detector element.
None identified. None identified. The database of the genomes of biological agents and generic human genome is available on several commercial software systems. These sequences can be accessed on the WWW at GCG (Genetics Computer Group, Madison, Wisc.) http://www.gcg.com and at http://bbrp.llnl.gov/bbrp/genome. The GCG address provides genomic sequences from GenBank and EMBL. Protein sequences reflective of genome products are accessed through SWISS-PROT, SP-TREMBL, PIR, and GenPept. Various display systems are accessible directly as a Seqstore product through GCG. Although the polymorphism of disease-resistant/susceptible genes in differing populations has yet to be determined, initial findings indicate that resistance to HIV may be correlated with prior exposures of populations to plague. The sequences of the 100,000 genes of the human will be characterized by 2002. The sequences of several thousand genes have been completed and are available through Medline and the software systems described above. The multiple genes responsible for disease resistance/susceptibility have not been determined at this time. The genetic polymorphism of genes related to disease susceptibility/resistance may be realized by 2005; the determination of a specific populations susceptibility/resistance to particular infections agents may be realized by 2010. There is a broad ability to access the information; this requires a computer modem, access to the Internet, and an account with the information providers. The technology required to add to the knowledge base by determining genomic sequences resides primarily in the developed world because skilled molecular biologists and equipment are required. Those nations involved in determining the genomic sequences of disease resistance/susceptibility have a major temporal advantage in developing countermeasures to such agents. To use the genomic information in the construction of sensors for military applications, it is necessary to identify those fragments of 25 nucleotides that will prove most efficacious. Since this is a dual-use technology, with applications in the military, medical, and pharmaceutical sectors, several industries have an interest in determining the critical genomic sequences.
Technical Issues
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Technical Issues (contd)
The sequences of more than 20 PAIs/virulence factors have been determined and are available through Medline and the software systems described above. The characterization of each of the specific genomic sequences on all the biological agents of the AG remain to be determined. There is a broad ability to access the information; this requires a computer, modem access to the Internet, and an account with the information providers. The technology required to add to the knowledge base by determining genomic sequences resides primarily in the developed world because skilled molecular biologists and equipment are required. Those nations involved in determining the genomic sequences of biological agents have a major temporal advantage in developing countermeasures to such agents. To use the genomic information in the construction of sensors for biological agents, it is necessary to identify those fragments of 25 nucleotides that will prove most efficacious; this is the same requirement needed for analyzing the human genome described above. Since this is a dual-use technology, with applications in the military, medical, pharmaceutical, and food-processing industries, several industrial sectors have an interest in determining the critical genomic sequences. The same genomic sequences that confer susceptibility/resistance to biological agents affect the health of the U.S. population. Immune-compromised populations are more susceptible to infection, and hospitalized individuals are subject to nonsocomial infections. The medical and pharmaceutical industries are driving this technology. The same pathogens that pose threats as biological agents also cause disease in the general population. Immune-compromised populations are more susceptible to these organisms, and patients in hospitals are subject to nosocomial infections with the same agent. Contamination of food during processing involves several of the identified biological agents. For these reasons the medical, pharmaceutical, and food industries are driving this technology.
Affordability
The large investment by commercial sectors identified above results in lower costs to the defense sector.
RATIONALE The genetic code of biological agents is the determinant of infectivity of the agent and identifies those gene products in the infectious organism responsible for pathogenicity. Knowledge of the code for agent allows development of therapeutics and prediction of the methods by which each agent can be weaponized and disseminated. The genetic code of the human, livestock, and agricultural grains determines the susceptibility of each target to infectious agents. Genomics can contribute to Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance. Military applications include rapid detection and identification (in minutes) of AG biological agents; design of antibacterial, antiviral, and antifungal compounds; rapid inactivation of disseminated biological agents. The human genome database permits identification of personnel with high susceptibility to infections and stress and aids selection of soldiers for DECON and high stress/small team operations. There are extensive commercial research and development agreements (CRADAs) between the federal, private, and university laboratories in this area, thereby permitting rapid access of the federal sector to information. The genome information is available on the WWW.
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Australia Cuba Germany Iraq Malaysia Poland Sweden Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Belgium Czech Republic Hungary Israel Netherlands Russia Switzerland UK
Canada Egypt India Italy North Korea Singapore Syria United States
China France Iran Japan Norway South Korea Taiwan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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SECTION 4.2DEFEAT OR MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACK

Highlights Enhanced protection achieved by super-antigens, synthetic immune or antibody systems, vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals. Preventing secondary organ target infection following viral exposure is now a realization. Multi-array sensors detect B/C agents by genomic and immunogenic probes. A process has been initiated to training first responders to B/C incidents and attacks.
OVERVIEW The etiological basis of infectious disease in otherwise physically fit persons is exposure to sufficient amounts of pathogen or toxin that will overcome natural or induced protection against such agents. Traumatic injury or environmental toxicants (chemical or physical) may increase susceptibility to pathogens. The protection of persons from illness and the management of illness involve the determination of the causative factors, then the administration of appropriate medications and nutrition, and isolation of those individuals likely to transmit illness and compromise group function. For infectious disease the identification of the infectious organism and appropriate antivirals and antibiotics for the organism is important. The majority of infectious diseases affecting military personnel is associated with organisms in the environment of the deployed soldier. From a historical perspective, disease resulting from the intentional release of biological agents is the exception. Emerging and re-emerging viruses and bacteria, increased drug resistance in the general population associated with the increased use of antibiotics, and increased deployment of forces to third world countries where nutritional standards and sanitary conditions are wanting increase the risk of exposure to infectious disease. RATIONALE Rapid and accurate detection and identification of biological and chemical agents are the key elements to survival from exposure to these agents. Two needs related to an appropriate response to a biological incident are (1) determination of where and when an incident occurred and (2) identification of appropriate technologies to protect exposed persons. Sensor systems provide the capability to detect and identify biological and chemical threat agents. Biomarker systems provide the capability to detect an individuals exposure or susceptibility to biological or chemical threats. Biomarkers also provide a capability to assess changes in an individuals fitness for duty or vigilance in a timely manner. This section considers pretreatment of personnel prior to exposure to infectious agents or toxins, the detection of biological and chemical agents in the environment, and the treatment and management of persons following exposure to infectious or chemical agents. There will be a window of approximately 1272 hours between the time persons are exposed to biological agents and the first appearance of clinical signs and symptoms. This window provides time to detect, identify, and initiate countermeasures that will interdict the appearance of clinical signs. Toxicant exposure may have acute, midterm, and long-term effects on an individuals fitness for duty and vigilance. The performance component of persons in high-performance aircraft and closed-environment combat units (tank, submarine) will be reduced acutely following exposure to critical levels of toxicants. Early identification of toxicant exposure with the use of biomarkers can assist in maintaining combat readiness. The advanced distributed systems (ADS), particularly those used in platforms with minimal numbers of combat personnel, depend upon retention of high-performance capabilities by all personnel. On a mid- to long-term basis the exposure to toxicants may compromise cognitive function and thereby endanger groups of persons. Biomarkers will assist in detection of acute, mid- and long-term sequellae of toxicant exposure. The susceptibility biomarkers may also serve in selection of persons having increased
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resistance to chemical agents and toxicants. The human genome project, described in Section 4.1, is expected to identify persons with low and/or high susceptibility. The ability of first responders to recognize victims of a biological attack is limited by good medical practices associated with differential diagnoses. In normal medical situations the medical care provider evaluates the most likely cause of symptoms and complaints (differential diagnosis). The differential diagnostic process does not place intentional release of agent as a likely factor in current systems because biological warfare has not been and is not currently a major cause of illness in the public health domain or in the military. In addition, the presenting signs at early periods following biological agent exposure appear similar to those associated with influenza and other less serious threats. The training of first responders is therefore a critical element in developing an appropriate management regimen. A. ENHANCED PROTECTION AND TREATMENT OF PERSONNEL PRIOR TO AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING EXPOSURE
These technologies include materials that may be provided to personnel before deployment (e.g., vaccines), physical equipment used at the time that a biological or chemical agent is encountered [face masks, mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, aeroprecipitation of the agents], treatment of exposed persons entering a contaminated area (antibiotics, antivirals). The physical protection of persons from biological agents requires the use only of respiratory and eye protection filter systems, while that for chemical agents requires MOPP gear. The physical protection from biological agents is embodied by the filters that remove particles having an average diameter between 0.1 and 15 microns from the air flow system to the person. This has been addressed in Section 3 of Part II of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). One potential new physical method of protection against biological and chemical agents is aeroprecipitation. Biologically Based Protection New technologies are in development that will afford biological protection against biological agents. These include novel unconventional vaccines, antibiotics, antitoxins, superantigens, immune modulating viruses, synthetic immune systems, synthetic antibody-like drugs, chemical agent neutralizing drugs, and antiviral drugs that interdict viral disease after a person is exposed to viral agents. Vaccines Vaccines that protect against a subset of the biological agents are currently available, but vary in efficacy and time required to achieve protection after exposure. Methods to increase the rate at which immunological protection can be achieved are described below. Antibiotics The development of sulfa drugs in the 1930s and of penicillin and others in the 19401970s was a major gain in the protection of persons (military and civilian) following exposure to infectious bacteria. The use of antibiotics remains the primary mode of treatment of infectious disease of bacterial etiology, even as new problems emerge as a result of the broad distribution of these drugs. Drug-resistant organisms have become a significant concern in the treatment of bacterial infection in immuno-compromised persons [e.g., with nutrition difficulties, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), and transplant recipients]. Associated with the rise of drug resistance is the increase of nosocomial infections in patients entering hospitals. The rise in drug resistance is observed as new pharmaceuticals are developed. The use of combinatorial chemistry, multivalent drug regimes, and rational drug design based on knowledge of the immunogenic and genomic properties of infectious agents are three approaches used to interdict disease from bacterial agents. Antitoxins Active or passive immunization or the administration of toxin binding agents are two methods of protection in the time period immediately following toxin exposure. III-4-20
The above strategies may not apply in certain circumstances because (1) antibiotic-resistant organisms are relatively easy to produce; (2) not all pathogens produce toxins; (3) while vaccines are available for many pathogens, they have limited effect against active disease; (4) conventional vaccines can take several weeks to produce using the hybridoma-based technologies; and (5) vaccine development for a novel, unknown pathogen requires isolation and culture or generation of a large library of genomic DNA of the putative pathogen. New approaches for the development of antiviral, antibacterial, and antifungal materials include the following: Development of super-antigens to achieve rapid immune responses; Synthesis of antibody-like drugs constructed through combinatorial approaches; Development of immune modulating constructs that increase production of immuno-modulators in affected persons; Development of compounds that block the entry of viruses into secondary target sites, the replication of viruses in the secondary sites, and the packaging of the viral materials into mature viruses.
These approaches are flexible in that they could be developed very rapidly with minimal laboratory requirements and in self-contained modular units. Super-antigens (Part III, Section 3, Biological Technology). Enhanced prophylaxis can be achieved by use of active vaccination against biological agents or infectious agents endemic in deployed areas. Vaccination with superantigens or advanced adjuvants (i.e., improved antigen presentation) can up-regulate the immune system before deployment and provide protection in a 4-day period rather than the usual 10 days after vaccination. The enabling technologies include genomic sequencing of all known threat agents and infectious disease organisms; multi component, multivalent vaccination systems to upregulate the immune system; and development of immune response modifiers, including interferons and interleukins, having the potential to enhance immune response under crisis situations. The sequencing of PAIs can reduce the total number of vaccines needed. Immune modulating viruses. Retrovirus coding for interleukin 12 (IL-12) or interferon gamma (IFN-g) could be administered directly to the lungs as an aerosol. This would enhance the immune response in the location of agent delivered by inhalation, i.e., the lungs. This method is currently under development and proof of principle may be achieved within a year. This strategy may be most useful during early infection. Synthetic immune systems. These systems involve the delivery of retroviruses containing a pseudo-gene coding for a oligonucleotide derived from a SELEX-based method (see below). Gene therapies for cancer and various disease states characterized by a mutation-associated dysfunction of a key enzyme or receptor (for example, cystic fibrosis) have been used experimentally for the last 5 years. Genes coding for immunomodulators could also be used. The main reason for this approach is that large-scale oligonucleotide synthesis is not readily achieved, and in any case repeated administration would have to be performed to ensure efficacy. Since the body would express the retroviral gene construct continuously, a single dose would provide protection for an extended period of time. An alternative approach could use a phage-based selection system (Gao et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 94, 1177782, 1997). The approach in principal is similar to SELEX; however, selection and enrichment occur directly through phage expression and selection without PCR enrichment steps. Both technologies are extremely robust, do not require extensive participation by the host immune system, and can be developed very rapidly with minimal laboratory equipment. Synthetic antibody-like drugs. One promising strategy utilizes a PCR-based technology called SELEX (Systematic Evolution of Ligands by Exponential Enrichment, Gold et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 94, 5964, 1997). Very specific DNA fragments can be made against a pathogen in a very short period of time. The pathogen does not have to be cultured or strictly isolated from surrounding infected tissue. The fragments bind to the pathogen very tightly and can be made to include other elements that either alert the immune system to the pathogen or inactivate the pathogen directly. This technology is very robust but is also quite new. Chemical agent neutralization. The SELEX- and phage-based synthetic immune systems can be used to prepare a combatant for exposure to a wide array of intoxicants. A major hurdle to be overcome would be the construction of appropriate transcription control elements based on the presence of an array of intoxicants because it would not be desirable to have the response systems turned on unless the intoxicants were present in sufficient concentration. III-4-21
Interdiction of Viral Entry, Replication, and Maturation in Secondary Target Cells For the virus to attack secondary target sites successfully it must enter the cell, the nucleic acid may travel to the nucleus for replication, and then the newly synthesized viral nucleic acid must be coated by the viral protein capsid. Cysteine protease inhibitors can block entry of the virus to cells, inhibitors of cytoplasmic nuclear transport can inhibit the second step, and inhibitors of molecular chaperones can inhibit the nucleic acid-viral protein coat interaction. Finally, mature viral particles may only be released following initiation of apoptotic event. Compounds that inhibit apoptosis may protect the patient from rapid development of clinical signs. Recent studies indicate that the development of compounds that inhibit specific hemagglutinins and neuraminidases may protect individuals from virulent influenza viruses, a major cause of illness in the military and civilian populations. There are virulent and avirulent influenza viruses. Hydrolytic enzymes play a major role in the infectivity of influenza viruses. The virulent type replicates in all organs, while the avirulent type only replicate in gut and respiratory tract. Hydrolytic cleavage of hemagglutinin is required for virulence. Hemagglutinin (HA) of virulent organisms cleaved in all organs, but HA of avirulent cleaved only in gut and respiratory tract. New sets of antibiotics that inactivate PAIs may have utility in individual and group protection. These antibiotics can be antisense materials or chemicals similar to traditional antibiotics. It is important to develop antibiotics that have not been used in the general population to preclude the further development of drug resistance in the population. Assessment of Drug Toxicity on Microchips All the above technologies involve the development of new drugs to be administered to affected persons. Two major expenses in drug development are (1) the determination of the efficacy of the drug in protecting persons from biological or chemical agents, and (2) determining whether the novel drugs have adverse side effects. A new technique is emerging that will allow initial screening of a drugs actions on a microarray of DNA or peptide fragments. In this method, living cells are exposed to the drug of interest and the altered expression of genes is analyzed on the microarray. Because many of the drugs that are developed have undesirable side effects and because these side effects involve increased expression of specific proteins, the treated cell can be monitored for overexpression of messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) for the undesirable proteins. This would provide a critical step in reducing costs of drug development. The method has been described in Friend et al., in Nature Medicine, 4: 1293, 1998. Aeroprecipitation Aeroprecipitation technologies can be used to defend against the dispersal of biological agents as aerosols. The net electrostatic charge on the particles can be used to cause aggregation of the infectious agents, thereby reducing the number of particles that may affect the target population. The other physical properties of dispersed aerosols facilitate developing countermeasures that result in aggregation or precipitation of the biological agents shortly after dispersal. B. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL AGENTS
Some chemical and biological agents may not result in an overt clinical presentation until days or weeks after an attack. It is possible to envision a scenario where a number of intoxicants and biological agents may be present because of endemic disease rather than because of an intentional release of weaponized agent. In either case a subset of the exposed population may suffer due to genetic predisposition. Biopolymer-based sensors are available to detect and identify infectious agents, chemical agents, and biomarkers. Until the mid 1980s the majority of sensors depended on macroscale systems that utilized changes in optical density or changes in enzyme reactivity when a biological agent or chemical agent entered the field of the sensor. The optical density and enzyme reactivity changes were relatively nonspecific for agents, and the sensors therefore had utility as detectors but not identifiers of specific agents. With the advent of monoclonal antibody (MAb) and PCR technology it became possible to recognize specific infectious biological agents by the proteins on their surface (MAb) or by their genomic material (PCR). It became possible to identify toxins or chemical agents by the use of MAbs or receptors that specifically interacted with the agent. A new technology has arisen that permits miniaturization of the sensor through the production of multi-array sensors. The multi-array sensor recognizes either III-4-22
surface antigens or genomic sequences on a single detector surface. Upon interaction between the immobilized antibody or complementary genomic sequence on the sensor surface with the biological or chemical agents an optical/electrical signal is generated. The multi-array sensor may contain 1,000 detector elements on a single 4-cm2 surface. This technology permits rapid detection of the AG biological agents when appropriate false negative/positive controls are embedded on the sensor surface. The genomic sensor could detect bioengineered organisms that have pathogenicity factors incorporated into otherwise innocuous organisms. The miniature size of these systems, low energy requirements, and specificity as agent or biomarker identifiers now permit development of a smart suit with multiple sensors; a data fusion system that can organize the input from the many sensors into coherent information remains to be developed. Another new technology permits the rapid synthesis of microscale amounts of chemicals. This technology is a fusion of microfluidics and chip technology (see Robert Service, Science, 282: 399401, 1998). The apparatus has dimensions of 5 8 cm and can synthesize or sequence small amounts of DNA for inclusion as genomic probes on a multi-array sensor. Companies producing these microlaboratories include Affymetrix, Perkin-Elmer, Caliper, Aclara Biosciences, and Orchid Biocomputer. This new technology will have a major impact on affordability because almost all of the processes are automated and therefore require many fewer technicians. See also Biological Technology, Section 3, Part III of the list of MCT. A second general technology for assessing whether a population has been exposed to a biological or chemical agent is a probe that would identify an endogenous biomarker (see Section 4.3) at concentrations below that at which any pharmacological effect becomes evident. The detection of low molecular weight chemical molecules will probably be more tractable than the identification of high molecular weight compounds or microorganisms. Probes/detectors for known chemical agents: May be implanted to measure blood levels or the appearance of the chemical or a secondary product; or Can be attached to clothing or respirators to measure ambient levels.
Probes/detectors for known biological agents comprise several types: High-affinity bio- or immuno-chemical probes for specific antigens or cell products can be used to monitor body fluids and lavages for the presence of specific biomarkers of infection. High-efficiency probes can be used to monitor ambient air for specific microorganisms. Sensors that identify specific toxins/soluble infectivity factors/cell-surface invasive elements can provide advance warning and enable appropriate protective responses. Sensors that identify the bodys early response markers to pathogens or toxins can be used to provide warning and initiate responses.
One system for early detection of an extreme physiological stress or infection is an artificial antibody/ antitioxin-producing cell: an implanted reservoir containing specific antibodies, antitoxins, or antibiotics that are connected to implanted sensors. This sensor will identify specific molecules entering the circulation (or lungs or other tissues) and trigger the reservoir to release its contents and also transmit an outside signal to inform others of the exposure. This could lead to remote triggering of reservoirs in individuals who have not yet encountered the insult, but are potentially at risk. Sensors for Biological and Chemical Agents Sensor systems are discussed below and in Biological Technology, Section 3, Part III of the list of MCT. a. Synthetic reporter systems. Recent approaches in combinatorial chemistry permit the placement of thousands of unique protein or DNA fragments onto a microchip (multi-array sensor). Such a device could be used to identify intoxicants in urine, saliva, lung lavage, etc., or to identify organic markers of oxidative stress (for example: nitrotyrosine) or the presence of transcription factors related to stress. Nucleic acid sequences about 20 nucleotides long and complementary to the nucleic acid of pathogenic agents may be immobilized on these sensors and serve as probes for biological agents. These systems are likely to be extremely robust and technologically feasible. Since thousands of targets can be evaluated simultaneously III-4-23
by placing a drop of liquid on the chip, the chances of not detecting an AG agent or a biomarker for stress are reduced relative to conventional analytical or molecular biological approaches. These systems may also be semi-quantitative, enabling biokinetic modeling and thereby allowing determination of when an exposure occurred. This information may be useful in determining the extent and course of the exposure within a population. Such information could be valuable in choice of treatment modalities and in predicting how severely units will be affected. The development of robust systems using combinatorial chemistry approaches is feasible at this time. b. Cell-based reporter systems. Biological or chemical agent exposure could be identified by observing the changes in gene expression occurring in cells. Genes involved in cellular death (apoptosis), DNA damage (p53, p21, RB), and response to oxidant stress (NF-kappa-B, c-jun, OX-1, HSP-70) are up-regulated early during stress. The transcription of these genes can be identified with a fluorescent or electrochemical reporter system. A packet of cells could be carried on individual soldiers and the cells contact with a chemical or biological agent read with either a hand-held spectrophotometer or a ultraviolet light source. People-based reporter systems. A similar approach as that suggested in (a) above could also be used to monitor people. In this scenario the increased synthesis of biomarkers of infectious disease, chemical, or stress exposure will be observed in peripheral blood cells. The cost of observing gene regulation is currently high in terms of number of personnel, time, and machine-maintenance cost.
c.
C.
TRAINING OF HEALTH PERSONNEL FOR INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
During the past decade the acquisition and management of chemical and biological warfare weapons have become a concern to the international community. The economic situation in the former Soviet Union (FSU) raises concerns about the spread of B/C weapon technology to developing nations. The low cost of obtaining and weaponizing chemical/biological agents raises concerns about the potential use of such agents by lesser developed countries (LDCs), by surrogate groups operating at the behest of nation states, and by terrorist groups. Several panels appointed by President Clinton examined the ability of the United States and other industrialized nations to respond to the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The reports of these panels resulted in a set of Presidential directives that included a. b. c. d. e. increased international cooperation in the area of WMD; new approaches to prevent weapon acquisition; new approaches to crisis management; development of a critical infrastructure to coordinate responses; and increased transportation security.
Items c, d, and e involve increasing public awareness (including medical professionals; hospital administrators; and law enforcement, fire department and emergency medical response teams) to the potential threat of a developing incident/accident and appropriate responses to this threat. A new infrastructure system for Emergency Preparedness is now accessible on the WWW at http://222.apgea.army.mil/ops/ dp/missions.html Emergency Preparedness in CONUSIntegrated Civilian and Defense Activities Processes will be identified for informing residents when a release of biological agents has occurred or is imminent. Appropriate responses to the threat and ways to limit the exposure of adjacent communities to the biological agent will be developed. The critical elements of the process include the training of first responders and the development of mechanisms to control the dissemination and spread of the agent with minimal social disruption and panic following release of information to the public. The agencies involved in this task include the National Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Defense (DOJ, DHHS, and DoD).
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At the present time (1998), the Chemical and Biological (CB) Hotline serves as an emergency resource for first responders to request technical assistance. The Nunn-Lugar II act specifically calls for establishment of a designated telephonic link to a designated source of relevant data and expert advice for the use of state or local officials responding to emergencies involving a weapon of mass destruction or related materials. The Hotlines intended users include trained emergency response personnel: emergency operators and first responders (the firefighters, police, and emergency medical technicians who arrive at the scene of a CB terrorist incident). Other users may include the state emergency operations centers and hospitals that may treat victims of CB agent exposure. The CB Hotline is staffed by trained operators servicing the phones 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. Operators use extensive databases and reference materials in addition to immediate access to the nations top subject-matter experts in the field of CB agents. Areas of specialty include CB agent identification, medical treatments, and information on military and civilian defense equipment. The CB Hotline is a joint effort of the Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DHHS, and DoD. The National Response Center (NRC) is the entry point for the CB Hotline. The NRC receives basic incident information and links the caller to the DoDs and FBIs chemical, biological, and terrorism experts. These and other federal agencies can be tapped within a few minutes to provide technical assistance during a potential CB incident. If the situation warrants, a federal response action may be initiated. Use the local established policies and procedures for requesting federal assistance before contacting the CB Hotline. State and local officials can access the CB Hotline in emergency circumstances by calling 1-800-424-8802. Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) Public Affairs Office * Phone (410) 671-4345 * Facsimile (410) 671-5297.
Emergency PreparednessMilitary Response Teams Following the experience of the Gulf War, the Pentagon designated a platoon-size Army force, the technical escort unit (TEU) to have specific training and equipment to permit detection and identification of biological agents in deployed and combat areas. This TEU of 182 persons from the 310th Chemical Company and the Marine Corps 375-member Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBRIF) respond to biological agent threats. A biological integrated detection system (BIDS) has been developed and fielded for the 310th Company. The M93A1 Fox nuclear, chemical, and biological reconnaissance system vehicle is a component of the detection system. The Army has a Domestic Preparedness Program intended to strengthen the ability of federal, state, and local emergency personnel to respond to BW threats. A new National Guard initiative, National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) organization is in the formative stages. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Traditional sensors for biological and chemical agents are available to many nations. The biological agents of greatest concern to the defense community are naturally occurring in many regions of the world. In addition, many benign organisms have genomic sequences that are similar to those of the potential agents. The design of useful sensors must therefore differentiate between threat and nonthreat organisms and must identify a threshold level of concern. The advanced technologies described in this section as having the capability to identify threshold levels and distinguish between threat agent and benign organisms currently have limited distribution. The primary nations developing these technologies include the United States, France, UK, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Israel. Many of these nations have large pharmaceutical capability. Multinational efforts relating to the development of sensors for biological threat agents have emerged: the ITF 24. The United States, Canada, Sweden, Germany, France, and UK are among the nations performing leading research in the area. Smaller nations have acquired niche capabilities in the sensor and protection arena; these include Israel, Poland, and Czech Republic. The immune, antibiotic, and antiviral protection technologies are most developed in the nations with leadingedge pharmaceutical industries: the United States, Switzerland, Germany, France, UK, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark. III-4-25
See Technology Data Sheets for WTA charts.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS 4.2. DEFEAT OR MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACK
Biological Protection Against Biological and Chemical Agents..............................................................III-4-29 Aeroprecipitation...........................................................................................................................III-4-31 Bio-based Sensors..........................................................................................................................III-4-33 Training of Health Personnel...........................................................................................................III-4-35
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DATA SHEET 4.2. BIOLOGICAL PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL AGENTS
Biological protection: vaccines, antibiotics, antivirals, superantigens, immunemodulating viruses, synthetic immune systems, synthetic antibody-like drugs (SELEX), aeroprecipitation. Biosystems that result in rapid production of antibodies in a 1- to 3-day period instead of usual 10 days. Production of effective multivalent antibacterial and antiviral compounds by combinatorial chemistry and rational drug design. Production of noninfectious retroviruses that code for IL-2, interferon gamma, and other protective immuno-modulatory compounds. SELEX-produced oligonucleotides that bind and inactivate infectious biological agents. Biosafety Level (BL)-4 or BL-3 laboratories. The database of the genomes accessed on the WWW at GCG (Genetics Computer Group, Madison, Wisconsin) http://www.gcg.com and at http://bbrp.llnl.gov/bbrp/ genome. The GCG address provides genomic sequences from GenBank and EMBL. Protein sequences reflective of genome products are accessed through SWISS-PROT, SP-TREMBL, PIR, and GenPept. Various display systems are accessible directly as a Seqstore product through GCG. This software is useful for the SELEX and immune vaccine and immunomodulatory protection systems. Databases of the threedimensional structure of biological agent proteins, nucleic acids, and of the receptors for these agents on cells in the host are important for the construction of antibacterial and antiviral compounds. Such a database exists at the web sites described above. Increasing the rate of protection achieved by active vaccination is difficult because of the nature of evolved immune system. Secondary immune responses are achievable in 4 days or less. Passive protection is readily achievable in less than 1 day. Technologies allowing active immunization in a 23 day period may be available by 2005. The three-dimensional structure of the biological agent proteins and of the major receptors for these organisms will be completed by 2005. Novel antibacterial and antiviral compounds will be available for clinical investigation by 2008. Because of the long time for testing, required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process (510 years), actual distribution of novel materials to the public may occur by 2015. Military access to the compounds may be much more rapid (2010). Novel antibacterial and antiviral compounds have broad utility in the medical and pharmaceutical industries. Nosocomial infections, outbreaks of diseases in impoverished areas and in the developed world, and evolution of drug-resistant diseases all increase the demand for such materials. These factors drive the research and transition to the marketplace. The cost of the drugs, including testing to FDA standards, is a major factor in the biological protection arena. Because the medical and pharmaceutical industries are driving the research, the cost to the defense community is mitigated.
Critical Materials
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Personnel may be protected from biological agents by vaccination before exposure or by treatment with antibiotics/antivirals post exposure. Development of drugs or vaccines will provide protection of military personnel from endemic disease in newly deployed areas and from B agent attack. Biological protection supports the Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance. Military applications include increasing combat capability to reduce sick call and infectious disease and decreasing time required for reinsertion into III-4-29
units. Current Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NIH programs provide rapid access of technology to federal laboratories. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET 4.2. AEROPRECIPITATION

Development of particles with standing electrostatic charge and other properties to aggregate airborne biological agents. Stable particles with an appropriate electrostatic charge. Most surfaces of biological agents are electronegative due to modified sugars on the surface. These sugars are critical to binding of the agent to the target cell. Encapsulation of the B agent may result in an electropositive coating. The dissemination of oppositely charged particles having diameters of 20100 microns over the released B agent may cause aggregation and precipitation of the organisms prior to inhalation by the target population. Current technology permits preparation of large amounts of such particles. BL-3 or BL-4 laboratories. Turbulent flow test chambers in BL-3 or BL-4 facilities. Software to monitor wind shear and airflow patterns following release of agent, aggregation of the agent with particles, or sonic coagulation of the agent. Preparation of electrostatically charged particles with appropriate sizes to aggregate biological agent particles; release of the charged particles in sufficient density to aggregate greater than 95 percent of the agent in the aerosol. This technology should be application ready by 2005. The environmental protection industry has interest in this area, but the necessary applications will be driven primarily by DoD. Removal of pollens and fuel particles from the air. Aeroprecipitation would provide a first line of defense against biological agent attack and diminish the threat situation to deployed forces. The dispersion of particulates of insecticides and antifungal materials, from air platforms, occurs regularly in the agricultural sector.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The effectiveness of biological agents released by aerosol is a function of the number of infectious or toxic particles inhaled or ingested by the target. The aggregation of biological agent particles shortly after dissemination and before inhalation by the target will protect forces from disease. The electrostatic charge on the surface of agents or encapsulating materials provides a basis for removal of the particles by aeroprecipitation. Aeroprecipitation contributes to Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance. It can be used to precipitate infectious or toxic agents from a contaminated area near site of dissemination. It also can be used in military health-care environments to lower the number of infectious particles in a closed environment. This is a developing area with primary interest to defense and environmental protection.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET 4.2. BIO-BASED SENSORS

Development of multi-array sensors based on genomics/immunogenics of all biological agents or of the target population. The use of combinatorial chemical approaches to identify signatures of all biological agents. The identification of biological agent nucleic acid fragments (2030 nucleotides in length) that will bind complementary sequences in an appropriately stringent manner. The production of highly specific antibodies to target antigens of the agents, or the identification of chemical materials produced by combinatorial chemistry, that bind agents and differentiate them from nonpathogens of the same bacterial/viral family. The attachment of these specific binding materials to a transducing surface that is lightweight and field hardened and has low energy requirements. Clean rooms for preparing the sensor surface and for attaching the biopolymer probes to the transducing surface using optical, chemical, or lithographic technologies. Characterizing the product for utility in detecting biological agents in BL-3/BL-4 facility. Multi-array sensors have been produced using optical and lithographic techniques. The current prototypes contain 100 to 400 sensor elements on a surface that is 4 cm2. The capability to produce large numbers of multi-array sensors with appropriate quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) will be achieved by 2003. The multi-array sensors useful for biological agent detection in a field environment must be miniaturized and lightweight and require low energy compared with medical diagnostic sensors in a hospital setting. The fielded version of the multi-array sensor can be realized by 2008 or sooner. Detection of infectious agents in fluid samples of patients and livestock. Detection of bacteria or toxins in food products as a measure of QC in the industry. Monitoring water quality. The medical, agricultural, and environmental industries are major industrial sectors in the economy of developed nations. The leading drivers in this technology are the medical, pharmaceutical, and food industries. The cost component for DoD applications will complement those of these three industries and increase affordability. Datafusion and iconographic display of the multiarray sensors.
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Sensors can detect and identify biological or chemical agents based on the genomic, immunogenic, or chemical binding properties of biological agents or the receptor, immunogenic, or chemical-binding properties of C agents. Multi-array sensors, built on a variety of platforms, can achieve identification in minutes. The Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance embody bio-based sensors. They can be used to protect military personnel against biological agent and disease in deployed areas and to identify movement of personnel and target location. Large sensor arrays produce very large data sets. There is a current requirement for data fusion and iconographic display to reduce the data to information. There is a need for new programs with interfaces to information science technology databases, greater bandwidth transmission of sensor data, and rapid analyses with biotechnology.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET 4.2. TRAINING OF HEALTH PERSONNEL

Fluid hierarchy in communication systems between medical triage groups and first responders. The development of a fluid hierarchy will permit thoughtful responses sufficient to cope with all dimensions of a biological incident or threat in a timely and adaptive manner. Create an interface of local and federal public health resources with local security, National Guard, and military support. Novel communication structures, data fusion, and educational tools for rapid insertion in a crisis area. N/A. Training and communications systems. Rapid visual and auditory communication between health-care providers. Infrastructure to support local responder contact with medical triage units and interface between all medical facilities in a community and with regional Departments of Health. Can be realized by 2005. Managing local outbreak of infectious disease or mass food-poisoning cases. As various interagency task teams are formed and the interdepartmental linkages are established, the incremental costs may be modest.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE The rapid developments of new biomedical technologies, of information science, and of bioterrorism have given rise to a need to train health-care professionals in new approaches. There is a need for continuing education, for insertion of affordability concepts into care delivery and for integrating information science knowledge into healthcare management. Training of health personnel is important for the Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection, full spectrum dominance, and precision engagement. Increase combat capability by reducing sick call and infectious disease. Reduce morbidity, mortality, and decrease time required for reinsertion into units. Reduce costs of health care to forces. Current medical education and continuing education programs are available to the federal sector. Telemedicine has been pioneered by large-scale HMOs such as Kaiser Permanente and by the defense community. The rapid change of technologies, however, requires new efforts to enable timely changes in culture of medical practice and information processing. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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SECTION 4.3MANAGEMENT OF TRAUMA, STRESS, AND TREATMENT

Highlights Biomarkers will permit early detection of high-level toxicant and stress exposure. Biological growth factors enhance rate of wound healing and neural regeneration. Telemedicine promises the rapid removal and treatment of persons with traumatic injuries to enhance survival and reinsertion into units.
OVERVIEW As a result of the advances associated with the human genome project (see above) a needle-stick in the finger of a person provides a drop of blood to test for (1) signs of emerging disease, (2) unusual sensitivity to chemicals in the environment, or (3) stress. Sensitive tests look for the presence of telltale proteins that may be secreted from cells. This may be evident hours to days before clinical disease or functional decompensation becomes evident. A computer is used to connect to a database of DNA samples that can be compared to the patients DNA. If the patients DNA matches DNA sequences in the database that are consistent with early-stage disease or chemical sensitivity, treatment protocols can be initiated immediately. Such strategies can also be applied to alerting a physician that a flight line operational person may be exposed to toxic levels of fuel or other chemicals. Biomarkers of cell responses to drug therapy are also now being used to rapidly screen new drugs in development for early signs of toxicity. Biomarkers of intense emotional stress have been identified. Evidence that a new drug is causing the synthesis of proteins in cells that signal cell death or dysfunction (biomarkers) can short-circuit expensive tests required to demonstrate toxicity. Because the new technologies of combinatorial chemistry and drug design produce thousands of compounds per week, it is necessary to devise tests that provide rapid indication of utility and of toxicity. Biomarkers may provide information related to both of these needs. Telemedicine technologies and novel methods to treat traumatic injury are included in this section. RATIONALE Infectious disease and traumatic injuries are the primary causes of disability in persons of military age. The detection of predisposition to agents, toxicants, and stress will be important to evaluations of combat readiness, fitness for duty, and training. This section considers the biomarkers which may be of assistance in determining profiles of human susceptibility to disease and toxicant exposure. Mechanisms that facilitate the removal of persons contaminated with biological or chemical agents from the contaminated area are considered in the Bioscience section of Part 3 of the MCTL. The present section discusses the interface between medicine and telecommunications (telemedicine) in the management of persons at a site distant from primary medical care facilities. This approach is of increasing importance in situations where U.S. forces are deployed in small peacekeeping units at a site distant from primary care. The removal of physicians from front-line combat areas has also increased the need for telemedicine approaches. The final portion of this section discusses control of internal bleeding, cell and organ transplants, and the increasing role of growth factors in wound healing and nervous system repair. A. BIOMARKERS OF TOXICANT EXPOSURE AND OF PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS
A biomarker is an indicator of exposure of persons to particular agents, toxicants, or physiological stress. There are three types of biomarkers: An exposure biomarkerthe presence of an exogenous compound or its metabolite signaling that the person has been exposed to the toxicant;
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An effect biomarkerthe detection of an endogenous component or of a change in functional capacity of a person or other indication that an individual has been exposed to a toxicant or a biological or chemical agent or to physiological stress; and A susceptibility biomarkera genetic indicator that an individual is particularly susceptible to specific toxicants or stresses.
The exposure biomarkers are typically metabolites of the toxicant and their presence in body fluids (serum, urine, saliva, and spinal fluid) usually follows an acute exposure. They may be detected minutes to hours after exposure in most cases. The effect biomarkers are usually biomolecules such as proteins or hormones produced in the body of the exposed person. Examples of such effect biomarkers are acute phase proteins, heat shock proteins (HSP), and epinephrine. The change in these compounds may be detected in minutes to days after exposure to the toxicant or agent. The susceptibility biomarkers are usually components of the genome of the individual. Examples include the enzymes such as glutathione S-transferase (GST) and cytochrome P450 (P450) that function to detoxify compounds in the environment. Persons deficient in one of the GST isoenzymes have a fourfold higher incidence of lung cancer, if they smoke, than persons who have that subunit. There are endogenous chemicals that are produced by the body under conditions of stress such as intense noise, temperature extremes, industrial chemical exposure, fear, and fatigue. These compounds include the high molecular weight heat shock proteins, interferons and other immunomodulating factors, acute phase proteins, and low molecular weight hormones such as adrenalin and corticosteroids. Sensors that detect changing levels of stress biomarkers can be used in distributed information systems to assign tasks and alert command about rapid changes in readiness and vigilance. Exposing personnel to elevated concentrations of organic chemicals or industrial solvents for extended periods of time may compromise the health of a subset of the population. Acute effects may degrade the operational capability of units in which these persons function. Historical examples include the Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome incidents with associated morale issues and liability claims. A potential future example is exposure to jet fuel. Jet Propulsion 8 (JP-8) is the standard military fuel for U.S. and NATO forces. JP-8 as a parent fuel will be used by our military forces well into the 21st century. In FY 97, the Air Force alone used 2.2 billion gallons of JP-8, 77 percent of which went for direct aviation use. Similar in chemical composition to the fuel used in U.S. civil aviation (Jet A-1), JP-8 was introduced in Europe in the late 1970s, and its reduced volatility contributed to fewer aircraft explosions and fires. This property, in addition to lower benzene content than its predecessor, JP-4, led to a general opinion that the fuel, in vapor form, was safe from an occupational exposure standpoint. The report of the Committee on Toxicology, National Research Council, entitled Permissible Exposure Levels for Selected Military Fuel Vapors, recommended that exposure levels to JP-8 not exceed 1,000 mg/m3 as a short-term exposure limit and 350 mg/m3 as an 8-hour time-weighted average). Irritant dermatological, neurobehavioral signs (headache, disorientation), and complaints of belching or tasting fuel have been reported by persons who have been exposed to aerosols of JP-8 for long periods in some occupational settings. The optimal strategy, from an occupational health standpoint, is to identify biomarkers that signal when a person is on the verge of developing clinical signs following exposure to a toxicant. Such a signal will permit the temporary removal of the affected individuals from exposure. Isotope-dilution gas chromatography (mass-spectrometry method), has been used analyze levels of exposure of Air Force veterans who worked in Operation Ranch Hand to Agent Orange (by its dioxin contaminant). The method now provides the opportunity to analyze occupational exposures to industrial chemicals in the workplace. Sensors and Probes to Detect Changes in Biomarkers (see also the sections on Disease Detection, Diagnosis, and Treatment) Sensors may be developed to identify these markers so that the psychological fitness of individuals can be monitored. The response of the body to a physiological stress, foreign chemical, or infectious agent involves the increased or decreased synthesis of specific molecules by cells/tissues in the affected person. The substance produced by the subject could be an antibody (which could take from several days to months to appear); a cellular protein or III-4-38
mRNA, the concentration of which is increased or decreased in response to the insult; or a hormone that is produced as an effect of, or in response to, the insult. The measurement of biomarkers of exposure allows for prophylactic measures to be taken. The ideal system would be one that identifies the insult and initiates prophylactic or preventive measures before, or simultaneous with, any toxic response by the body. B. TELEMEDICINE
Telemedicine is the use of electronic information and communications technologies to provide and support health care when distance separates the participants. The technologies included in this area are multimedia medical databases, virtual reality presentations (visual, auditory, haptic), telepresence surgery, life support for trauma and transport (LSTAT), microsensors and transmitters, and sensate liners in which both coverings contain sensors. These technologies offer to the military the potential of Sustaining life of wounded persons during transport to hospital facilities and subsequent reinsertion into force; Detection of exposure of persons to chemical/biological agents and subsequent protection of cohorts from contamination by exposed individuals; Permitting remotely located, experienced surgeons to assist medical evacuation teams in performing surgery and reducing abdominal bleeding and shock; Determining susceptibility of deployed forces to infections and toxicants in an area where deployment will occur; and Determining the etiology of changes in health status of persons during deployment.
The civilian biomedical community will utilize these technologies while providing service to remote areas and when transporting persons experiencing traumatic injury (e.g., automobile and sports accidents). The industrial sector will utilize these technologies to monitor employees working in hazardous areas. Telemedicine Applications
The Information Age has direct impact on the medical industry, replete with robotics, telemedicine, telepresence surgery, remote manipulation, and dexterity-enhanced surgical techniqueseven three-dimensional visualization technologies. As a result, a paradigm shift has occurred in medicine, empowering surgeons and patients. Creating the operating room of the future that is capable of integrating and facilitating this infrastructure of applications is a task on the drawing boards of technology developers, research institutions, and innovators worldwide. One goal is to create an operating theater capable of freeing the surgeon from peripheral distractions during surgery, delivering information to the surgeons fingertips, and supplying speech-recognition technologies and robotics applications to assist in the process. The primary drivers in this technology will be the medical, civil defense, and national defense communities. Telemedicine Systems
Telemedicine technology requires a sophisticated telecommunications system that includes video, audio, and haptic interfaces from medical evacuation platforms and forward field medical units to areas that may be several thousand miles away. In this process, satellite systems are involved as are continuous communications. The fielded units are anticipated to contain smart systems that can facilitate the remote information processing between experts at a distance and medics on site. Telemedicine trials in psychiatry, home care, dermatology, radiology, cardiology, and renal dialysis monitoring have been tested successfully in the civilian health-care delivery system. Radiology has been employed extensively in this mode, utilizing transfer of images between distant sites. Neurological diagnoses and pharmacological control of III-4-39
seizures have been accomplished through transmission of electroencephalographic (EEG) patterns by telecommunications. Dermatological images of nonpigmented lesions have been transmitted to distant sites for diagnostic purposes. This approach has relevance to the military community in the treatment of skin burns and potential diagnosis of chemical burns and blistering. The applications of telemedicine technologies to radiology have increased as a result of marked progress in computer-based imaging. During the past 20 years, the anatomical and functional imaging of human organs has taken a quantum leap forward. The methodology of X rays has now been complemented by computerized tomographic (CT) systems including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), positron emission tomography (PET), or single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT). Organs deep within the body can now be biopsied by long, thin needles guided safely to their targets by CT or ultrasound scanning; in many cases, this capability has eliminated the need for general anesthesia and an open surgical procedure. Adaptations of MRI permit the placement of catheters within 1 mm of any region in the brain. This can allow specific delivery of materials to organs if the vascular bed of the organ is permeable to the material. In the next decade it is likely that metabolic imaging techniques will provide information about the disruption of cellular signaling pathways or specific patterns of gene expression. Using data from the National Library of Medicines Visible Male from the Visible Human Project, researchers have developed and tested imaging software that enables technicians to combine X-ray, CT scan, and MRI data to create a three-dimensional rendering of any organ in a patient, as well as the surrounding organs. By manipulating the three-dimensional image, the surgeon can see the relationship of one organ to other anatomic structures prior to surgery. This information enables the surgeon to determine the best way to conduct the operation. The application of computer technologies to enhance and manipulate images has been illustrated most dramatically in the pictures beamed back to Earth from orbiting satellites or from interplanetary probes. Extensions of this technology have profound implications for analyzing and refining patterns detected in medical images. Neural networks are a component of some artificial intelligence technologies that can be trained to recognize patterns. The demonstrated potential of these new technologies to enhance diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment has compelling implications for medical evacuation missions or for reinsertion of the soldier into the unit. C. NOVEL APPROACHES TO TREAT TRAUMATIC INJURY, STANCH ABDOMINAL BLEEDING, TREAT EXTENSIVE BURNS, AND PROVIDE ORGAN REPLACEMENT
Projectile injuries to the abdomen frequently result in extensive loss of blood through hemorrhage. Consequences of hemorrhage are a marked reduction in oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood; rapid changes in blood fluid volume; and associated changes in brain, kidney, and liver function. Reperfusion of the patient with cells and/or blood substitutes is often accompanied by damage to the central nervous system and other organ systems. The generation of free radicals and associated oxidative stress are among the factors that are etiologically involved in tissue damage following traumatic injury and reperfusion. The following are among the developing technologies that can be used to treat traumatic injury, severe hemorrhage, and their sequellae: Rapid detection of changes in vital signs of personnel; Mass casualty respirator capability; Tissue viability enhancers including pharmacological intervention to reduce oxidative stress, development of synthetic reperfusion fluids that have low hepato-toxicity, pharmacologic strategies to lower tissue oxygen requirements of tissues in shock; Stem cell and organ culture systems to increase the rate of organ regeneration and repair; Development of cell growth factors to enhance regeneration of damaged tissue; and Development of nerve growth factors to enhance rate of neural regeneration.
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Specific Elements of Traumatic Care a . Vital Signs Rapid detection of vital signs can be greatly enhanced by future technologies to the point that tricorder technology should actually exist. In its current form, the tricorder is a radio-frequency radiation device that will detect pulse/respiration. It has a distant life-signs scanning capability originally built for detecting vital signs through chemical warfare protective clothing, and can detect life signs through brush, structures, or collapsed buildings. Although this could be critical in finding the wounded, particularly in terrorist blast scenarios or natural disasters, it also has offensive parameters, i.e., detecting enemy personnel, and could easily be used as a life form detector in a tactical situation. b . Mass Casualty Respirator Mass casualty respirator capability to sustain survivability has recently been explored. This technology consists of high-frequency ventilation capability from a central source, but with multiple stations such that overall ventilation will be sufficient for 8095 percent of casualties. c . Tissue Viability
Tissue viability is dependent on cellular respiration, which in turn depends on supplying oxygen and removing wastes, and is a function of blood flow and perfusion. The availability of oxygen for tissue use is also governed by the perfusion fluid and cellular metabolic level. Blood substitutes, stroma free hemoglobin, and blood banking capability offer near-term vehicles of delivering oxygen to tissues and thus promote tissue salvage. Tissue salvage includes manipulating oxygen dissociation to allow oxygen release to hypoxic tissues. A more radical means of tissue and body salvage is an overall reduction in metabolic activity, thus decreasing oxygen demand and preserving available oxygen for tissue use. Another mechanism likely to be available in the battlefield by 2003 is the use of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO). Oxygen breathed at increased pressure will follow gas solubility laws (3 vol% per atmosphere in plasma); hence, at standard treatment pressures, oxygen no longer depends on red blood cell concentration or hemoglobin. Tissue oxygen levels in compromised areas can approach or exceed levels found in normal tissue, provided there is minimal perfusion. It could also be used in conjunction with blood substitutes or volume fluids. In battlefield and terrorist scenarios, HBO may have multiple actions. Preliminary studies demonstrate that HBO has a protective effect in reperfusion injuries. It is indicated as adjunct treatment for crush injuries, burns, cyanide poisoning, and severe carbon monoxide poisoning. HBO has been recommended as an adjunct treatment when available for injuries due to phosgene and blister agents. Multiple studies show that HBO increases oxygen levels in compromised tissue enough to allow polymorphonucleocytes to phagocytize bacteria. This may be important in certain biological agent treatments and in preventing infection in burn cases. The use of antioxidants to counteract radical formation during reperfusion injury is a near-term methodology. Research into decreasing lymphocyte adhesion to vascular endothelium and consequent inflammatory reaction is key to reperfusion injury treatment. Pharmocologic means of modifying biochemical responses in reperfusion injuries are also being studied. d . Growth Factors The new horizon in treating wounds is related to the understanding and development of growth hormones, cytokines, and integrins that trigger wound healing and angiogenesis. There appears to be an independent critical mechanism that involves the oxygen molecule that as of yet is not understood. The process of wound healing from a biochemical standpoint should advance quickly over the next 10 years, yielding a palate of pharmaceutical enhancements to heal traumatic injuries sooner. In stabilizing patients, surgery and antibiotics will continue to play a major role. New technologies concerning telemedicine consultation and advice (discussed in other areas of this report) offer to the field a means of handling more complicated cases. However, in a mass triage situation, time may be limited for this capability. In the surgical arena, scanning or similar technology should also develop over this time period to allow tissue viability determination that is independent of blood flow. Such a technology would allow the surgeon to prevent overly aggressive debridement. III-4-41
e., f. Cell and Organ Culture and Organ Transplant New cellular technologies are emerging that may allow for growing stem cells, growing organs, or stimulating organ regeneration. The successful reports in November 1998 of stem cell culture from fetal tissues promises availability of cells to replace all tissues, including neural tissues. A second technology report appeared in November 1998, indicating that nuclei from mature human cells could be caused to dedifferentiate by inserting the nuclei into cytosol of cells from cattle. Such dedifferentiated cells can also behave as stem cells. Pluripotent cells have the potential to differentiate into any type of cell or organ system. This is particularly promising in spinal cord contusion or partial transection where immature neural cells act as a bridge between host nerve tissue. It also promises benefit to aging patients with neuro-degenerative diseases such as Alzheimers disease, Parkinsons disease. and dystrophies. Another concept is an organ bank with cryogenically preserved replacement organs for transplantation. Over the next 20 years, advances in standard organ transplantation and organ storage will also develop, as well as a means of reducing organ rejection. Artificial skins, grown from cell tissue cultures, and synthetic membranes are already entering the marketplace. Continued development is certain. The first successful cloning of an adult mammal was achieved in 1996 in Scotland using sheep. The feat was replicated in 1998 using adult mice (New York Times, July 22, 1998). The implication of these findings is that the nuclei of cells that have differentiated can be induced to serve as primary genetic material for future generations of animals. The nucleic acid sequence in the future generations will be identical to that of the nucleic acid in the cell nucleus used at the start, hence the future generations are clones of the primary donor. The cloning of cattle can result in a highly predictable milk yield and quality from subsequent generations and has significant economic impact. The capability to clone humans has social and ethical consequences that remain to be addressed, and the technique is therefore controversial. However, this technical demonstration also has implications for the large production of organ tissues from individuals. Although the technology is not available at this time to specifically program the generation of a liver, kidney, spleen, etc., from an adult nucleus, such directed programming is likely to appear by 2010. In this manner the donor of the nucleus may be a service person who suffered extensive damage to an organ; the regrown organ may be implanted with little to no risk of tissue rejection or of infections with latent or slow viruses. Sustain Function and Repair of the Nervous System Functional integrity of the nervous system is a sine qua non for military personnel. The nervous system is critical for sensory perception and motor function, information analysis, and decision making. This area encompasses neural and psychiatric aspects of brain, spinal cord, and peripheral nerve function. Traumatic injury to the spinal cord is a primary concern, both because at the present time there is little clinical treatment to be offered to the patient with spinal cord transection, and as a consequence the massive loss of function will remain for the duration of the patients life. The financial cost to relatives and to society in caring for the patient is extensive. The incidence of spinal cord injuries in the civilian sector is approximately 40 persons per million population, with the rate of spinal injuries for males 2.5 times greater than that seen in females. The costs of caring for persons in the first year following injury is approximately $200,000, and each subsequent year has a cost of approximately $30,000. Veterans constitute 22 percent of the spinal cord injury population. Although hemisection or transection of the spinal cord is a civilian and military problem, the military cost relates to the inability to reinsert the affected soldier into a combat setting. As the fighting force is reduced in size and the ability to deliver firepower increases, spinal cord injuries loom as major problems in the next decade. Other neural and psychiatric sequella related to combat injuries include infectious diseases of the nervous system, effects of toxicants on the nervous system, development of seizures following traumatic injury to the head, increased neuronal cell death due to hypoxia from blood loss, induction of necrotic or apoptotic events in cells leading to neural degeneration, and stress-induced changes in the central nervous system with associated loss of synaptic connections. Spinal Cord Repair The past 15 years have seen the emergence of new technologies that may facilitate repair of hemisected spinal cord. Three major contributions have been (1) the recognition that placement of bridging matrices across the transected section of cord will serve as a bridge across which the nerve axons may pass; (2) placement of biological growth factors in the vicinity of the regenerating nerves appears to enhance the growth of the cut axons across the III-4-42
transection; and (3) biochemicals or biomimetics may be able to limit the scar forming growth of the glial cells, thereby removing a barrier to axonal growth across the transection. The bridging materials that have shown efficacy in experimental animals include fibrous biopolymers, biomimetics, and synthetic polymers. The ends of the polymers are placed in each edge of the cut surface of the cord. Neuronal axons will grow along the surface of the polymer and become inserted into the spinal cord on the other side of the cut cord. Most frequently the axons penetrate only 13 mm, thereby limiting the regeneration of the cord. Several proteins have shown utility in enhancing survival of neurons in spinal cord following injury and in facilitating axonal outgrowth. Included in this category are brain-derived neurotropic factors. Other proteins have demonstrated utility in reducing edematous swelling of neural tissue following traumatic injury. Since edema is accompanied by increased cell damage and death, these compounds are considered neuroprotective. Insulin-like growth factor I is an example of a compound with protective action. Insulin-like growth factor also reduced the marked increase of neuronal nitric acid synthase, an etiological inducer of nerve damage. In neural regions other than the spinal cord it has been shown that in humans, hypoxic damage is associated with the phosphorylation of a mitogen-activated kinase activating death domain protein and migration of the protein to the nucleolus of neurons. The phosphorylation is catalyzed by stress-activated kinase Jun kinase 3. The correlation of hypoxic damage of the nervous system with an enzymic event suggests that low molecular weight inhibitors may be developed that can interdict the hypoxic damage. Finally, during early development it has been shown that proteinaceous materials (GAP 43) are required for growth of retinal ganglion cell axons in the visual system. It is likely that such signaling molecules are required during neural regeneration in certain brain regions. With the advent of combinatorial chemistry it is anticipated that new classes of compounds will have applications in neuroprotection and regrowth of nerves across the lesion. Civilian Sector Relevance Penetrating abdominal wounds often accompany automobile and motorcycle accidents and gunshots. The same technologies used to treat military personnel are applicable to the victims of vehicular and gunshot incidents. D. SYSTEMS TO DETECT VITAL SIGNS AND REMOTE DETECTION OF LIFE FORMS
Microneural bionics, microchips designed to translate sensory input and mimic nerve efferent signals, are used to treat patients with lost hearing or vision. Current use in otolaryngology allows hearing in children who are born with hearing deficits. Ophthalmologic uses have been demonstrated in recently blind individuals, allowing light perception. It is not inconceivable that similar technology may not only restore some sensory deficits from injured warfighters, but could be developed to allow one to recognize nonhuman sensory input (infrasound, ultraviolet, and infrared spectrum) or enhance normal sensory perception. E. EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AS RELATED TO AFFORDABILITY
Medicine as practiced in 1998 is based on the interpretation by a clinical care giver (e.g., physician) of clinical signs and symptoms through a process of differential diagnosis. The database of information available to the physician is derived from information provided by a patient, experimentation in clinical trials, personal experience, scholarly reading of the literature, continuing medical education, and informational briefings. In these situations, the data available is relatively large and the physician relies in large part on that which can be processed in a period of minutes. The processing of this information is a function of recall ability, access to current information, state of readiness, and vigilance. The degree to which the physician can monitor patient compliance with prescribed medication and therapy varies with the clinical setting, diagnosis, and cost of follow-up. The availability of new computer-based systems and interfaces with the physician and other care givers can facilitate establishment of a database warehouse and provide a coherent format for taking patients medical histories. It also offers the ability to track distribution of medication; ticklers regarding upcoming visits; and responses to medication, including allergic reactions. The new technologies offer the opportunity to obtain evidence-based information and provide evidence-based management if the number of subjects is sufficiently large. They also provide
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the basis for developing a data chip that will contain the medical history and deployment history of each individual in DoD. Kaiser Permanente (KP), a large health-maintenance organization, has developed National Clinical Information System (NCIS), an effort to achieve information acquisition, retrieval, presentation, and management. NCIS comprises Oceania (structured notes); Pegasystems (information flow system); Oacis (Pharmacy knowledge base); IBM (integrated user interface); Ontyx (Lexical technology and dictionary); and SAIC (clinical data repository in Oracle). One of the outcomes expected with NCIS is the determination of most useful treatment modalities and management of patients. KP is the largest private, not-for-profit, health-care organization in the world, with 9 million patients, 10,000 MDs, 350 medical offices, 30 hospitals, $15 billion in annual revenues, and $10 billion in assets. In many respects KP resembles U.S. military health-care system (patients, physicians, cost issues). To improve health-care delivery, a system must incorporate new technology and knowledge. Associated with the new information and technology is the need to change the culture and behavior of physicians and health-care providers as well as the behavior of patients. The approach requires a medical component to examine technology effectiveness. A management focus examines treatment tradeoffs and must invest in most effective outcomes. Care management (evidence-based management), focuses on: Component-based care delivery; Eliminating inappropriate physician variation (diagnostic testing, pharmaceuticals); and Developing and adopting breakthrough methods (e.g., outcome driven, technology enabled).
The new model for health-care delivery should identify the role of the physician, establish a system responsible for patient adherence, and determine outcomes accountability. All these points based on large N of patients, large number of physicians, geographical distribution, and interaction with Blue Cross/Blue Shield cooperative arrangement. These large N values allow one to look at statistical outcomes of each treatment paradigm. Issues Related to Affordability One critical point is the rapid change in technologies that will become available to physicians and health-care professionals in the next two decades. The utilization of these new technologies can improve health-care delivery. In those cases where new diagnostic modalities and pharmaceuticals improve treatment outcome, new standards for appropriate medical care in the 21st century will emerge. These technologies may also provide an ever-increasing capability to produce new compounds that affect human behavior and performance. The issue of affordability rises to the surface because the new pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tools are likely to be expensive. Past experiences suggest that what is not affordable at time a may be at time b. The factor of affordability in the military community relates to the actual cost of the new item, the benefit achieved by the patient in terms of time away from the task, the compromise in function if treatment is not initiated, and the number of persons affected. These considerations lead to three action items: Provide incentives for new technologies so they can be adapted; Measure affordability as related to outcome; and Real cost effectiveness will increase in biotechnology and informatics because of rapid growth of fields and affordability not necessarily correlated with best business practice.
Many of these items have parallels to the TacMedCS discussed in Section 4, Overview, above. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The identification of molecules that may serve as biomarkers of toxicant exposure is in a rapid growth phase. A limited number of such molecules, synthesized in the body of affected persons, have been characterized. The genes coding for the biomarkers discovered to date have been sequenced. As indicated above in the genomics section, such sequences are available on the WWW.
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The technology of telemedicine is contingent on electronic, communication, satellite, and computational technologies. The nations that have these technologies are primarily first world states. The emerging technologies identified above for management and treatment of traumatic injuries are most developed in nations with very advanced medical treatment capability. Because they are costly, the national culture and resources determine the extent to which these technologies will be implemented. The rate of acquisition of these technologies is likely to expand rapidly during the next decade in the United States, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. See Technology Data Sheets for WTA charts.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS 4.3. MANAGEMENT OF TRAUMA, STRESS AND TREATMENT

Biomarkers of Toxicant Exposure and Stress.......................................................................................III-4-49 Telemedicine ................................................................................................................................III-4-50 Treat Traumatic Injury, Abdominal Bleeding, Burns, and Provide Organ Replacement.................................III-4-52
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DATA SHEET 4.3. BIOMARKERS OF TOXICANT EXPOSURE AND STRESS

Identification of exposure biomarkers, effect biomarkers, susceptibility biomarkers that serve as indicators of toxicant or stress thresholds. The biomarkers should have sufficient capability to detect traits and exposure levels that would predispose affected individuals to clinical symptoms. A single biomarker change may indicate a doubling of the risk of that individual to a toxicant or environmental stress; a set of biomarker changes may indicate that an individuals performance is reduced to 20 percent of his or her normal state. Compounds that bind or materials that respond to such biomarkers and can be used to transduce such a binding event to an optical, electrical, or auditory output. Noninvasive monitors of physiological responses including heart rate, eye blink, and interbeat interval. N/A. Database of biomarkers for toxicants or stress. Determination of the profiles of endogenous compounds that indicate a threshold for stress or toxicant exposure has been reached in an individual. Compounds include glutathione transferases, cytochrome P 450s, corticosteroids, epinephrin, acute phase proteins, and immuno-modulating factors. Operational capability can be achieved by 2010. The physiological factors are known at this time; appropriate noninvasive detectors of such physiological factors will be available by 2010. Monitoring fitness for duty in critical work environments (transportation personnel including airline pilots, railroad engineers, and surgeons/anesthesiologists). The technology is anticipated to be of low cost.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Early detection of biological effects on individuals exposed to low-level toxicants can permit initiation of protective actions. This will increase vigilance, readiness, and fitness for duty of affected persons. Biomarkers of exposure and of susceptibility will permit early warning and management of persons. Biomarkers can contribute to the Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance. They can be used to enhance alertness and fitness for duty of highly trained personnel. The identification of biomarkers of low-level toxicant exposure is an emerging and rapidly developing field. The Army has established an effort in the Military Operational Medicine Program at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The federal sector has rapid access to the available data. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET 4.3. TELEMEDICINE

Multimedia medical databases, portable virtual reality presentations (visual/auditory/ haptic), telepresence surgery, life support for trauma and transport, microsensors and transmitters, sensate liners. The telemedicine visual, auditory, and haptic devices will enable medics to interact in real time with physicians located miles from a combat arena and perform critical surgical procedures under guidance. Telecommunication system with visual, auditory, and haptic interfaces on medical evacuation platforms, on-line satellite communications, and computer technologies that enhance and manipulate images. N/A. Visible Human Project of NLM and similar databases in Germany. Software packages that interface MRI, CT scan, PET SPECT, and X-ray data sets. Software that encodes auditory, visual, and haptic information; uploads to and downloads from satellites; and reconstructs such information on-line. One software system with applicability is the NCIS that was developed by Kaiser Permanente. Ready worldwide, on-line communication on a 24-hour schedule with physicians on ready response at all times. The number of physicians currently trained in this technology is smaller than needed in the event of simultaneous major health events or in active combat. The capability to transmit and receive, with high fidelity and coherence, a visual/auditory/haptic representation of reality is limited. This system can be operationally ready by 2010. Rural health-care delivery in the United States and abroad. Medical and nursing education. The databases are currently on line. The identification of trained medical personnel may be costly. The system of evidence-based management in health care, developed by Kaiser Permanente, may serve as one model.
Critical Materials
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The treatment of and recovery from traumatic body injury is dependent upon the time interval between injury and health care. Care delivered in the first 30 minutes following injury markedly improves recovery because the effects of blood loss and subsequent shock may be mitigated. This time factor and the insertion of medics, in place of physicians, into the front line positions in combat have increased the need for telemedicine. Technical developments in telemedicine provide the opportunity to meet these operational needs. The Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance can be realized with the help of telemedicine. Provide excellent medical care to wounded persons by medics, using distance communications by satellite. Forces can be protected from exposure to friendly persons infected with B agents or with disease endemic to a deployed arena. The primary drivers in this arena are health-care providers in remote areas and the defense community. The federal sector has ready access to advanced technology associated with telemedicine.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET 4.3. TREAT TRAUMATIC INJURY, ABDOMINAL BLEEDING, BURNS, AND PROVIDE ORGAN REPLACEMENT
Device for rapid detection of vital signs, tissue viability assessor, growth factors, organ replacement from culture, neural regeneration. Radio-frequency radiation system that detects pulse/respiration. High-frequency ventilation system. Hyperbaric oxygen supply system. Growth factors including nerve growth factor, fibroblast growth factor, interleukins, insulin-like growth factor, and pleuripotent stem cells. Equipment to validate purity of growth factors and differentiation of stem cells. N/A. Preparation of large-scale, therapeutically useful growth factors. Societal acceptance of medical use of pleuripotent stem cells. Routes of administration of growth factors and stem cells to achieve organ replacement or neural regeneration. The RF system for detection of life forms can be operational by 2010. The hyperbaric oxygen system and high-frequency ventilation system may be fielded by 2003. Although the growth factor technology for organ replacement, other than neural regeneration, will be feasible by 2005, the general use of such technology in the medical community is likely to occur by 2014 or later due to safety and other FDA requirements. The use of growth factors for neural regeneration may be realized by 2014 (result of the recent findings that primate neural cells continue to divide in adult life). Emergency medical trauma care. Current care for patients with neurological damage is very costly. The technologies described here are modest in comparison.
RATIONALE The treatment of and recovery from traumatic body injury is dependent upon the time interval between injury and health care. Care delivered in the first 30 minutes following injury markedly improves recovery because the effects of blood loss and subsequent shock may be mitigated. This time factor and the insertion of medics, in place of physicians, into the front-line positions in combat has increased the need for technologies to replace blood fluid volume, stanch abdominal bleeding, and repair damage to nerves and the central nervous system. Technical developments provide the opportunity to meet these operational needs. This technology contributes to the Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance. It provides excellent medical care to wounded persons by medics, using distance communications by satellite, and enhances the rate of recovery of personnel suffering severe abdominal, head, and limb injury. The primary drivers in this arena are health-care providers in remote areas and the defense community. The federal sector has ready access to advanced technology associated with acute trauma care.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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SECTION 4.4TACTICAL MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Highlights TacMedCS manages care from field through treatment. Medical care, medical informatics, and medical communication are integrated.
OVERVIEW Medical command and control is the integration of disparate technologies including electronics, communications, information systems, and trauma care. It is evolving into a system providing both specific medical information as well as procedures that have utility across all services. The consequences of the advances in this technology have profound dual-use applications. These include emergency services, occupational medicine, rural health-care delivery, and disaster response. These broad applications will make the technologies more affordable. These changes will continue to evolve during the next decade in response to: Maneuvers initiated from the sea and otherwise over the horizon; Fast strike and move out; Discontinuous fronts and nonlinear battle areas; Autonomous small unit operations; and Urban warfare.
Each of these mandates a medical status and care system which can operate with integral purpose while drawing resources and capabilities from a variety of sources not collocated. Associated with these shifts are changes in the medical response strategies to locate and treat wounded, provide accurate diagnosis/triage, and evacuate to an optimum treatment facility. The new technologies available to the corpsman will enable more accurate information about the wounded soldier, a more complete selection of options to treat the patient, rapid communication with forward medical units to prepare them for receiving the patient, evacuation options, and additional procedures to stabilize the patient. This paradigm requires three elements of information management: accurate information, real-time information, and data integration. The technologies available to the corpsman and other health-care providers in the combat arena are described in Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The consequences of these new technologies will be to (1) maintain the health of all individuals in the theater, (2) protect deployed individuals from chemical and biological attack, (3) afford treatment that will minimize future disabilities, and (4) return the individual to his or her parent unit in a rapid manner. The information technologies supporting the medical technologies and assets are discussed below. Tactical Medical Coordination A Tactical Medical Coordination System (TacMedCS) has been developed. TacMedCS is a multicomponent system for efficient management of patients and their associated clinical/identification information from the field through evacuation to definitive treatment. TacMedCS has three components: Patient ID/clinical data chip (component 1); Hand-carried data input/transmission device (component 2); and Operations area command and control suite (component 3).
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Component 1 (EPROM chip) contains identification and pertinent clinical history; data transmitted when interrogated by a Component 2 device; and stores limited treatment information. Component 1 automatically measures and records vital signs, past/present medical history including biomarkers and other clinically important information. Component 2 (handheld reader/transmitter/recorder) interrogates the EPROM chip using an RF signal; transmits GPS-derived location and clinical data to the command and control suite; stores data internally for later download; writes data back to the patient EPROM chip; and has the potential to utilize different formats for storing information (barcode). A future component 2 is likely to contain capability for transmitting real-time images, auditory displays, and matrixed information to component 3. Component 3 (clinical command and control center) provides command and control real-time data coordination and management, along with patient tracking and status monitoring (includes visual display). Component 3 is staffed with high-level medical experts and is remote from the combat situation. Its function is to advise the corpsman regarding the most appropriate short-term treatment, recommend procedures for transfer of the patient, prepare the receiving facility for the arrival of the patient, and initiate care. The TacMedCS is patterned after the Tactical C4I and overnight delivery services currently available nationwide. The system utilizes adaptable, off-the-shelf technology in a unique combination. The new system provides real-time data integration and coordination, patient identification, and immediate information concerning clinical status, evacuation, and treatment choices. It is adaptable and conforms to contemporary C4I requirements. The TacMedCS has advantages over current approaches. It provides a battlefield medical command and control system and an operational medical informatics system for the integration of diagnostic, treatment, and evacuation information; makes real-time information available to unit COs for developing dynamic battlespace orientation and asset allocation and intelligence; makes real-time information available to MEDEVAC assets for mission planning; and makes real-time information available to definitive care assets for utilization planning, patient tracking, and triage. This approach has applications to a wide range of civil sector needs, and therefore the cost and generation of new ideas will be shared with the broader medical community. This will increase affordability to the defense community. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Leading-edge tactical medical command and control is a newly developing area of expertise. It relies on innovations in information gathering and processing, structured medical hierarchy, and integrated communication systems. The early stage of development has provided many opportunities for innovation, but few if any current models are that of TacMedCS. See Technology Data Sheet for WTA chart.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS 4.4. TACTICAL MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Medical Informatics .......................................................................................................................III-4-59
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DATA SHEET 4.4. MEDICAL INFORMATICS

A tactical medical coordination system comprising a patient ID/clinical data chip, a hand-carried data input/transmission device, and an operations area command and control suite. EPROM chip with ID and pertinent medical history; a component that interrogates the EPROM chip with an RF signal, transmits GPS location and clinical data to command suite, and stores data as barcode; a component to coordinate/manage data in real time, track the patient, and monitor status. Validate EPROM chip and data storage system for reliability. N/A. Integration of the three components. An operational system exists in the NASA program. NASA control of astronaut data systems. Rural health-care delivery. Home care delivery to persons with chronic illness requiring daily or more frequent monitoring of status (i.e., renal dialysis). The system is relatively low cost in the current configuration.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Early detection of biological effects on individuals exposed to low-level toxicants can permit initiation of protective actions. This will increase vigilance, readiness, and fitness for duty of affected persons. Biomarkers of exposure and of susceptibility will permit early warning and management of persons. Joint Vision 2010 concepts of full dimensional protection and full spectrum dominance would benefit from improved tactical medical command and control. It would enhance alertness and fitness for duty of highly trained personnel. The identification of biomarkers of low-level toxicant exposure is an emerging and rapidly developing field. The Army has established an effort in the Military Operational Medicine Program at Fort Detrick, Maryland. There is rapid access of the federal sector to the available data. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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SECTION 5: CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY
December 1999
SECTION 5CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY

Scope 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Chemical Defense Systems.................................III-5-4 Chemical Dissemination and Dispersion ............. III-5-19 Chemical Material Production........................... III-5-29 Chemical Detection, Warning, and Identification... III-5-39 Obscurants .................................................... III-5-57 Highlights Chemical weapons in the hands of rogue states and terrorist groups will remain a threat to U.S. national security. The United States will need to keep abreast of potential new agents and dissemination technologies to defend against their use. Full dimensional protection calls for new sensors that will be deployed to detect chemical or biological attack at great ranges and provide warning to specific units that may be affected. Obscurants offer adversaries methods of defeating and/or degrading precision weapon technology.
OVERVIEW This section addresses technologies related to the use of toxic chemicals, including the production of chemical agents and their dissemination; defense against chemical agents; and methods to detect, identify, and provide warning of their use. Also included are obscurants, that is, materials that limit or prevent reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and weapon guidance. Energetic materials (explosives and propellants) are in addressed in Section 2, Armaments and Energetic Materials. RATIONALE The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is now in effect and supported by a majority of nations of the world. Since further development of chemical agents is banned by this treaty, the supposition must be that any advances in chemical agents will occur as the results of efforts by rogue states (e.g., Libya, North Korea, and Iraq) or extra-national groups such as the Aum Shinrikyo, which was responsible for the Japanese subway attack in 1995. Unfortunately, the Information Age has made available, and will continue to provide, the wherewithal for such entities to be dangerous in the context both of national defense and in the use of chemical warfare for terrorism. Although the United States has forsworn the use of chemical weapons (CW), it must be alert to new technological developments that will enable an adversary to employ them. Joint Vision 2010 describes the four operational concepts that will be developed for the future: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, fulldimensional protection, and focused logistics. It is clear that U.S. forces must be prepared to wage war in an environment that includes the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the U.S. military must be able to assist in the response to the use of toxic chemicals against domestic targets. Operation Desert Storm has shown that obscurants, both natural and man-made, can be a force multiplier if properly employed. Current obscurants can be effective in the visible through the far-infrared wavelengths. Newer obscurants will be effective from the nanometer through the 1-m wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum.
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TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT
As technology flows to less-developed countries, its use for military as well as peaceful purposes is inevitable. Information on the technology used to produce toxic chemicals for use in chemical weapons is available in the open literature. Some of the classic chemical agents date back over 150 years. Some of the nerve agents require production steps that are more difficult but still within the reach of determined proliferators. Because of the potential use of CW on the battlefield, many nations are seeking technology to detect, defend, and defeat CW. Another concern is the impact on national security of toxic chemical use by terrorist organizations. Efforts are aimed at positive identification of chemical agents in time to avoid contamination. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Any country with a chemical industry has the capability to produce toxic chemical agents. Figure 5.0-1 shows capability, not intent. Countries that have not become a party to the CWC bear close scrutiny. These include Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Nations that have signed could well abrogate their commitments under the CWC. Further, it is recognized that research and development of chemical weapons, while once essentially limited to nation-states, is now within the capabilities of extra-national groups that owe no allegiance to causes other than their own. Any country with a chemical industry has the capability to manufacture man-made obscurants.
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Country Australia Austria Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Serbia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend:
Sec. 5.1 Defense Systems
Sec. 5.2 Dissemination and Dispersion
Sec. 5.3 Material Production
Sec. 5.4 Detection, Warning, and Identification
Sec. 5.5 Obscurants
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.0-1. Chemical Technology WTA Summary
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SECTION 5.1CHEMICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Highlights Capability to operate in a chemically contaminated environment is an important component of fulldimensional protection. Efforts to make protective clothing more wearable will reduce the degradation of operational efficiency. Decontamination of people and equipment is necessary to prevent continued exposure to toxic chemicals. Medical advances may provide relief from the effects of chemical agents.
OVERVIEW Defense has been the classic counter to the development of new chemical agents and weapons. As the agents have evolved to greater potencies with various ways of entering the body, individual protection, collective protection (protection for groups of individuals), and decontamination technologies have kept pace. Growth in defensive technology, however, has usually been incremental with no major breakthroughs. For example, the mask used today, while greatly improved for protection and comfort, still uses activated charcoal technology first developed in World War I. Moreover, the limits imposed by time and comfort are still the main problems of individual protection. Individual protection of civilians has been complicated by an insistence upon total protection, which leads to decreased comfort and thus severely limits wear time. Decontamination has likewise been complicated by a perceived necessity for total decontamination, coupled with the introduction of important equipment (e.g., electronics) that could be destroyed by current decontaminants. Military operations considered here include combat operations where chemical agents have been introduced as part of the engagement or where the potential for the use of such agents against U.S. troops exists. Possible employment by extra-national terrorist organizations in urban environments and against domestic soft targets are included. In the latter situations, Regular Army, Reserve Units, National Guard Units, or some combination would be expected to assist or augment civil authority. The following are the principal development issues in this area: Improvements in wearability of protective clothing will continue to be a major issue. There is a conflict between the need for encapsulation and impermeability to agents (liquids and vapors) and the need for ventilation and heat stress relief. Current procedures involve either addition of significant weight for climate control or reduced impermeability. Permissible times for completely encapsulated personnel need to be increased significantly. Current doctrine in the civil environment when responding to a scene where there is a probable release of an unknown chemical agent (or a known nerve or mustard agent) calls for complete encapsulation of personnel together with a self-contained breathing apparatus. Using current equipment with normal donning and cleanup times, actual time on scene tends to be less than a half hour. In many situations this is not enough time for identification of the agents employed, let alone rescue and clean-up. Protective garments tend to impede coordination and restrict vision when moving and manipulating equipment. There is a similar conflict between complete protection in what may well be an oxygen-poor closed space and the ability to perform necessary tasks. The ability to provide medical prophylaxis against many types of chemical agents and to reduce protection requirements would be of value in many environments. A degree of prophylaxis for front-line troops was attempted during the Gulf War. The results are understood to be mixed. Improved prophylactic measures would permit more effective operations against rogue nations in situations where the use of chemical agents against U.S. or Allied troops is possible.
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The development of a nonaqueous decontamination procedure for water-sensitive devices to permit their continued use would greatly enhance continuity of military operations. As we become more dependent on such sophisticated equipment, we become more susceptible to events that limit or destroy its usefulness.
Chemical defense has experienced evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. New materials technology is a possible area where breakthroughs might occur. Since defensive technologies must be applied to large numbers of personnel and diverse situations, this technology must provide economic as well as technological advances. A number of advances are expected: Improved materials for suits and masks will resut in lighter protective gear that offers improved comfort and protection. Miniaturization of self-contained environmental systems with improved cooling will provide significant reduction in heat stress of protective clothing. At the same time, advanced materials will increase durability and protection against degradation from perspiration. Nanotechnologies hold great promise in this area. Medical advances will result in long-term prophylaxis against cholinesterase poisoning and other agent effects for exposures equivalent to several lethal doses. Small, efficient, and lightweight oxygen-regeneration devices will be developed to reduce the amount of air to be supplied from bottles and permit extended wear of self-contained breathing apparatus. Concurrent material developments will lead to improved ergonomics, as well as reduced cost, for fully encapsulated suits. Nonaqueous techniques will be developed for decontamination of electronic equipment and other materials sensitive to current procedures. Combined filter/oxygen supply capabilities with appropriate sensors will be developed for long-term performance in potentially contaminated areas. Soldier clothing will be embedded with microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors that warn of chemical hazards.
RATIONALE Even though the United States has forsworn chemical weapons, our military forces must be prepared to fight an adversary armed with them. Current protective gear dramatically reduces operating efficiency. Joint Vision 2010 calls for increased individual and collective protection. It also points out that this protection, along with joint restoration capability from the effects of weapons of mass destruction, is a key element for achieving full-dimensional protectionone of the four operational concepts for future warfighting. The Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan enumerates the key operational capabilities in chemical and biological (CB) warfare defense and protection: Contamination avoidance, including the ability to detect, identify, and warn of CB attacks. (That is, DIW: detection, identification, warning.) Protection, encompassing individual, collective, and medical protection. Decontamination.
Figure 5.1-1 illustrates the CB defense concept. The requirements for force protection on the battlefield, shipboard, and at aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and sea ports of debarkation (SPODs) are shown.
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Figure 5.1-1. CB Defense Concept
The key operational capability subelements of force protection are individual protection, collective protection, and medical protection. The goals of individual protection technology efforts are to (1) improve protection against current threats and add protection against future threats, (2) minimize mission degradation by reducing the impact of the use of individual protection on the warfighters performance, and (3) reduce logistics burden. The key components of individual protection are ocular/respiratory protection and percutaneous protection. Both components support general warfighter requirements such as the Armys Land Warrior Program, as well as specialized applications for the Navy and Air Force. Advanced filtration technologies to reduce breathing resistance and selectively agent-impermeable membranes to increase uniform comfort will reduce individual performance degradation. The collective protection technology base efforts seek to maintain protection against current threats and add protection against future threats. At the same time, collective protection technology efforts seek to reduce logistical burdens through the development of improved filter materials with longer usable lifetimes. Collective protection efforts focus on (1) improvements to current reactive-adsorptive materials; (2) advanced nonreactive filtration processes; (3) advanced reactive filtration; (4) regenerable filtration processes for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings; and (5) reduced logistics burden. Medical protection consists of three primary functions: (1) pre-exposure preventive measures, (2) diagnosis, and (3) post-exposure treatment. These functions are applied to defense against both chemical and biological threats. Technology efforts will provide a number of medical products for preventing illness or personnel degradation when percutaneous or aerosol CB agents are used on the battlefield. For personnel exposed to these agents, a number of initiatives will seek to ameliorate or preclude the effects of inhaled or percutaneous chemical agents or provide relief from the symptoms of biological agents. Current technologies provide only partial protection against a number of percutaneous or inhaled chemical agents, and only a limited number of vaccines are available against biological agents. Some specific treatments are available for exposure to a limited number of biological agents. Before effective treatment can be applied, the causative chemical or biological agent must be identified, at least by type. Decontamination is defined as the process of removing or neutralizing a surface hazard resulting from a chemical or biological agent attack. The objective of decontamination technology efforts is to develop methods that are effective, are environmentally safe, react to neutralize chemical agents or disinfect biological agents, and do not degrade the operational effectiveness of the surface or equipment being decontaminated. Current decontamination
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materials are caustic and rely heavily on water. Moreover, current methods for decontamination cannot be used to decontaminate critical areas at fixed-site facilities, such as seaports or airports, the interiors of sea or air transport vehicles, or sensitive equipment, such as electronics and avionics. Critical studies are needed to define the decontamination technology issues that must be addressed as part of the national global force projection and our ability to simultaneously deploy in two potentially contaminated major theaters of war. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT A number of countries are developing protective clothing and several produce collective protection systems. At the present time, most customers for such items are military forces. Civilian agencies are procuring commercially developed protection for first responders who might come in contact with toxic chemicals resulting from a chemical accident or a terrorist attack. Bulgaria manufactures a wide range of NBC protective equipment. China has a thriving NBC defense industry, which supplies the full range of equipment. The Czech Republic maintains a robust and capable NBC defense industry; its armed forces are well equipped and trained in NBC defense. France is one of the largest suppliers of NBC defense equipment, especially to Africa and the Middle East. A number of countries in the Middle EastKuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabiaare actively seeking better NBC defense equipment for their armed forces and civilian population. Germany is one of the best equipped and trained North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in NBC defense. India relies heavily on the import of NBC protection. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had begun to develop its own NBC defense industry, making protective suits and masks. Israel has a sophisticated NBC defense industry, which is particularly strong in the provision of protection for civilians of all ages as well as for its armed forces. The Netherlands has a considerable research effort underway in NBC defense measures, particularly by TNO Laboratories. Its armed forces are well equipped and trained. Pakistan has shown considerable interest in the acquisition of NBC defense technology. Polands industry provides masks and decontamination facilities. Romanias industry makes a range of NBC equipment as does Serbias (including protective clothing and masks). Russia produces a wide array of chemical defense equipment Switzerland has a well-developed NBC defense sector offering a wide range of protection and contamination control equipment. The United Kingdom has a comprehensive NBC defense posture, which is actively maintained and expected to continue. In 1994 the UK formed a battalion-size NBC Reconnaissance Regiment that provides detection and decontamination capabilities for the army. The UK is a key exporter of the full range of NBC defense equipment, expertise, and training.
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Country Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Russia Serbia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend:
Individual Protection
Collective Protection
Decontamination
Medical Protection
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.1-2. Chemical Defense Systems Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-5.1. CHEMICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Production and Design for Protective Clothing....................................................................................III-5-11 Production and Design for Collective Protection..................................................................................III-5-13 Medical Protective Technologies ......................................................................................................III-5-15 Regenerative Filtration...................................................................................................................III-5-17
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DATA SHEET III-5.1. PRODUCTION AND DESIGN FOR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Semi-permeable, lightweight material, 20 percent lighter than the battle dress overgarment material system. It will allow selective permeation of moisture while preventing the passage of common vesicant agents, provide protection against penetration by toxic agents in aerosolized form, and provide at least the current level of protection against toxic vapors and liquids. Semipermeable membranes; polymers. Simulated agents; particle-size analysis equipment. None identified. Integration with hood/mask; closure concepts; performance degradation; ability to consume fluids; the development of selectively permeable membranes suitable for all battlefield applications. First responders. It will reduce the logistics burden as a result of improved launderability, lighter weight, and reduced volume (less bulky).
RATIONALE As a result of significantly reduced thermal stress and bulk of uniform, new CB protective clothing will significantly improve performance while in a mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) . Ultimately, incorporation of CB protection into the standard-duty uniform will provide continuous protection. The key components of individual protection are ocular/respiratory protection and percutaneous protection. Joint Vision 2010 calls for increased individual protection. This protection is a key element for achieving fulldimensional protectionone of the four operational concepts of future warfighting. The United States has been developing advanced materials that can provide the protection needed and should remain aware of foreign activities in this area, especially in the UK. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Bulgaria Egypt Hungary Italy North Korea Serbia Sweden United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Finland Iran Japan Pakistan Slovak Republic Switzerland
China France Iraq Libya Poland South Africa Syria
Czech Republic Germany Israel Netherlands Russia South Korea UK
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Many NATO countries have the capability to develop protective clothing. Iraq is beginning to make protective suits and masks and can be expected to continue in the future. Israel is actively developing protection for civilians, as well as military personnel. The Netherlands has considerable research efforts underway, especially by TNO Laboratories. Switzerland has a well-developed NBC defense industry, and the UKs program is comprehensive and expected to continue.
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The following companies are actively producing masks: Germany Alfred Kaercher GmbH & Co. Israel SHALON-Chemical Industries Limited UK Avon Technical Products Russia ILC Dover Inc. State factories Mine Safety Appliances
Canada and France produce aircrew masks, as well as masks for ground personnel. Many companies make protective suits: Austria J. Blasche Wehrtechnik GmbH Bulgaria Kintec Canada Acton International, Inc. France Bachman SA Germany Blucker GmbH Helsa-Werke Hungary Innovatext Rt Israel SUPERGUM Limited Italy Irvin Aerospace SpA South Africa HAZMAT Protective Systems Limited Sweden New Pac Safety AB Switzerland Saratoga (Wattwil) AG (a joint venture of the Swiss Heberlein Textildrek AG and the German Blucker) UK James North & Sons J&S Franklin Limited Manufactures de Vetrement Paul Boye Alfred Kaercher GmbH & Co.
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DATA SHEET III-5.1. PRODUCTION AND DESIGN FOR COLLECTIVE PROTECTION

Protect against 100 percent of current and future threats. Impregnated charcoal filters; polyethylene; fluoropolymer/aramid laminate. Simulated agents. Airflow models. Affordable; deployable/transportable; adaptable to structures. First responders. Reduced logistics burden.
RATIONALE The collective protection technology base efforts seek to maintain protection against current threats and add protection against future threats. At the same time, these efforts seek to reduce logistical burdens through the development of improved filter materials with longer useable lifetimes. Collective protection efforts focus on (1) improvements to current reactive-adsorptive materials; (2) advanced nonreactive filtration processes; (3) advanced reactive filtration; (4) regenerable filtration processes for NBC protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings; and (5) reduced logistics burden. Joint Vision 2010 calls for increased collective protection. In the battlefield of the future, it will become increasingly important for groups of forces in vehicles, field medical units, command and control facilities, etc., to be safe from chemical contamination. Collective protection is one of the key elements for achieving full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Bulgaria France Netherlands Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Russia UK

Significant R&D
China Iraq South Africa United States
Finland Israel Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
A number of countries address the problem of collective protection but not as many as address individual protection. Some companies make parts for shelters (e.g., filtration), while others develop the entire structure. Giat Industries (France) and Hunting Engineering (UK) created a jointly owned subsidiary encompassing the shelters activity at Rennes, which has applications in both military and civil fields. Other companies developing collective protection systems/components include the following: Belgium Air Filtration Finland Temet Oy France SP Defense (in addition to Giat Industries)
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Germany Albert Kaercher GmbH & Co. Israel SHALON Chemical Industries Limited UK AEA Technology plc MDH Limited United States Lockheed Martin Librascope IDL Defense Howden Aircontrol Limited
Allied Signal Aerospace ILC Dover
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DATA SHEET III-5.1. MEDICAL PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Development of practical prophylaxis for entire classes of chemical agents. None identified. None identified. None identified. Efficacy of vaccine; efficacy of prophylaxis; pre- vs. post-exposure treatment; understanding agent effects on physiology. First responders; hospitals for diagnosis and treatment of civil casualties. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Personnel must be able to perform their missions effectively. Casualties must be reduced and forces reconstituted. Medical protection will serve three primary functions: (1) pre-exposure preventive measures, (2) diagnosis, and (3) post-exposure treatment. These functions are applied to defense against both chemical and biological threats. Technology efforts will provide a number of medical products for preventing illness or personnel degradation when percutaneous or aerosol CB agents are used on the battlefield. A number of initiatives will seek to ameliorate or preclude the effects of inhaled or percutaneous chemical agents on exposed personnel. Current technologies provide only partial protection against a number of percutaneous or inhaled chemical agents. Before effective treatment can be applied, the causative chemical agent must be identified, at least by type. Individual protection is one of the key elements of full-dimensional protection as addressed in Joint Vision 2010. Increasingly, medical protection is being developed in addition to the more traditional forms of protection masks and clothing. By preventing casualties, vaccines and salves will help to negate attacks with toxic chemicals. A strong defense has often been thought to act as deterrent to offensive chemical warfare. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Bulgaria Denmark Germany Israel Netherlands Slovak Republic Switzerland
Legend:
Canada Egypt Hungary Italy North Korea South Africa Syria
China Finland Iran Japan Norway South Korea UK
Czech Republic France Iraq Libya Russia Sweden United States

Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Medical protective technologies are developed by the major NBC-related companies throughout the world such as: France Giat Industries Germany Albert Kaercher GmbH & Co. Aerochem
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Israel SHALON Chemical Industries Limited
Current efforts are usually aimed at treating contaminated personnel. Efforts in the future will be directed at preventing the toxic effects of chemical agents through salves and vaccines.
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DATA SHEET III-5.1. REGENERATIVE FILTRATION

Need for protection with unlimited capacity to remove CB agents from air streams to generate breathable air. Pressure swing absorption (PSA): compressed air from vehicle or alternative source. Temperature swing absorption (TSA): source of heat/energy from vehicle.
None identified. Software to detect system malfunction must be developed. PSA: removal rate of strongly adsorbed vapors after chemical attack. High energy cost. TSA: Sizing of TSA adsorption beds to prevent penetration of weakly adsorbed threat vapors and allow short (10 min) regeneration cycles. Large energy requirement. First responders. Regenerative filters would reduce the logistics burden of filters that must be replaced.
RATIONALE There is a need for protection with unlimited capacity to remove CB agents from air streams to generate breathable air. As part of full-dimensional protection, collective protection (e.g., in shelters, vehicles, ships, aircraft) must be provided to enable forces to operate in groups in a contamination-free environment. Field hospitals must be protected from contamination. Joint Vision 2010 calls for increased collective protection, one of the key elements for achieving full-dimensional protection. Regenerative filtration will reduce the logistics burden by eliminating the need to transport filters. It will also ensure that continuous filtration is provided to troops, thus protecting them from toxic chemicals. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Switzerland
France UK

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The following companies expend a lot of effort in developing filtration products both for the military and commercial uses: Canada Racal Finland Kemira OY France Giat Industries Israel SHALON-Chemical Industries Limited Sweden Floding SP Defense
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Switzerland Micronel AG UK Avon Technical Products
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SECTION 5.2CHEMICAL DISSEMINATION AND DISPERSION

Highlights Although there are many technologies for dissemination and dispersion of chemical weapons, new and/or unexpected means may be devised. Computer simulations may enable countries to test CW clandestinely. Advances in meteorological sensors might permit dissemination of CW with maximum effect.
OVERVIEW The emergence of rogue states and extra-national groups as principal causes of concern over the use of chemical agents changes the nature of the problem. Although traditional weapons systems discussed in Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies, remain a factor, smaller numbers of less conventional weapons are expected to constitute the majority of the chemical weapons threat. Developing technologies could assist in the dissemination and dispersion of chemical agents by making current methods more practical and efficient, not necessarily through novel means. Improved spray patterns, the ability to sense meteorological conditions in the target area, and remote control of unmanned systems could enable CW to be used more effectively. Problems of degradation during storage and materials compatibility, which have been serious concerns in the maintenance of chemical stockpiles in the past, are a small concern if the objective is to make and use the agents in relatively short periods of time. Simple, easily obtained commercial containers (e.g., spray bottles) could be used by extra-national groups to conduct acts of terrorism in cities and attack multiple soft targets. Combining simple devices with advances in electronic timing and control makes their use both more dangerous and probable. Primary devices in a terrorist incident appear likely to be small, spray-type munitions, used so that the source remains at least partly covert. Secondary devices aimed at attacking first responders and reducing public confidence in the Governments ability to handle a situation are most likely to be explosive devices, which can release quantities of agent quickly over a broad area. Such devices could easily be disguised as objects normally found in the area. There also is a likelihood that extra-national groups might use a mix of agents to confound the response team. Improvements in sensing and determining effects of micrometeorology will enhance employment of chemical weapons. Knowledge of micrometeorology would theoretically allow the effective use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise and ballistic missile technology for delivery of chemical weapons. Urban modeling using computational fluid dynamics may be available to accurately predict effects of chemical use in specific urban environments, thus making such use more devastating. Although each model would apply to only a specific scenario, generic modules would allow a standard model to be easily adapted to the site in question. Solids dispersion technology advances would permit effective employment of both lethal and incapacitating agents. Dissemination and dispersion of chemical agents is seen as benefiting from the use of currently unconventional insertion techniques (such as UAVs) to achieve desired target effects. RATIONALE Rogue states in particular, as well as terrorist groups, will have access to the Global Positioning System (GPS), which would allow them, at low cost, to place a chemical delivery system (e.g., a small, unmanned aircraft) accurately on a predetermined target while avoiding conventional defenses. The microminiaturization of sensors to determine wind speed and direction would permit aligning such a device for maximum effect.
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Dissemination and dispersion in the future are more likely to be influenced by enhancements in information systems than advances in munitions. Techniques to disseminate chemical agents more effectively are contingent on sensing of local conditions and knowledge of dispersion patterns. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Foreign countries will need to develop or obtain advanced sensors and computer modeling to deliver CW more effectively in a battlefield situation. Integration of these technologies with dissemination and dispersion techniques will be a key factor. Since the United States has renounced chemical weapons and is a party to the CWC, this assessment is based on theoretical capability. So, too, is the capability of other countries that have ratified the CWC and are expected to adhere to their commitments.
Country Australia Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Serbia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Dissemination
Dispersion
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.2-1. Chemical Dissemination and Dispersion Technology WTA Summary
III-5-20
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-5.2. CHEMICAL DISSEMINATION, DISPERSION, AND WEAPONS TESTING
Urban Modeling............................................................................................................................III-5-23 Micrometeorology.........................................................................................................................III-5-24 Computational Fluid Dynamics .......................................................................................................III-5-25 Enhanced Dermal Penetration...........................................................................................................III-5-26 Nontraditional Insertions.................................................................................................................III-5-27 Solids Dispersion..........................................................................................................................III-5-28
III-5-21
III-5-22
DATA SHEET III-5.2. URBAN MODELING

Detailed urban architecture, with generic, interactive, three-dimensional modules capable of being adjusted to a specific scenario. None identified. None identified. Image conversion to digital map; interactive virtual reality models; transport prediction codes. Computational complexity; unique areas; currency of the model; speed of development. Integration of real-world (e.g., meteorology) conditions. Verification of models. Disaster preparedness. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The potential to wage war in urban areas is increasing. The dispersion of chemical agents on the battlefield is well understood; however, urban architecture changes the pattern that would be expected in the open. Models of urban areas are needed to understand chemical agent distribution and effects in built-up areas. They would not be used by the United States in the context of offensive chemical warfare, which the United States has forsworn, but are extremely helpful in providing full-dimensional protection for our forces. This technology is being developed as part of other applications. The same models, however, could be used by an attacker. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Denmark Germany Iraq Libya Pakistan South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Egypt Hungary Israel Netherlands Poland Sweden United States
China Finland India Italy North Korea Russia Switzerland
Czech Republic France Iran Japan Norway South Africa Syria
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
There is a great demand for urban models in commercial as well as military circles. Those countries that have advanced efforts in information technology can be expected to make the most progress in modeling the urban landscape.
III-5-23
DATA SHEET III-5.2. MICROMETEOROLOGY

Ability to predict local effects of wind and temperature gradients within 10 m of the surface as they continually change. Ability to make critical measurements that permit continuous predictions. None identified. None identified. Interactive virtual reality models; transport prediction codes. Development of interactive micrometeorological predictive models and measurement devices that can be used to supply data for forecasting and analysis. Model verification and instrument correlation. Disaster preparedness. Not an issue.
RATIONALE To properly map contamination from chemical attack, it is necessary to know the meteorology of the battlefield where the agent was employed. Micrometeorology will help to defend and control complex areas and define the limits of agent contamination. For the United States, this would not be used in the context of offensive chemical warfare, which the United States has forsworn. It would fall under the categories of force protection and domestic preparedness in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
This technology is also being developed by commercial and nonmilitary governmental entities. Those countries with the most developed computational capability and information technology will lead the way.
III-5-24
DATA SHEET III-5.2. COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS

Ability to predict airflow patterns within and immediately adjacent to structures and to model the interchange between interior and exterior fluid mass transport phenomena. None identified. None identified. Interactive virtual reality models; transport prediction codes. Development of complex transport phenomena models in modules that can be assembled interactively to model interchange when agent is released indoors or immediate to a buildings exterior. Measurement and verification of models and combined model modules. Disaster preparedness; pollution abatement. Not an issue.
RATIONALE This technology is needed to defend against the consequences of indoor agent release or the interior effects of external agent release. It would not be used in the context of offensive chemical warfare, which the United States has forsworn. It would be applied in a number of areas, including urban warfare and domestic preparedness. This technology would assist in force protection as described in Joint Vision 2010. The technology is being developed as part of other applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Pollution control modeling and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) spill modeling are the drivers of this technology. Lessons learned in this application could be applied to military operations, particularly in urban areas.
III-5-25
DATA SHEET III-5.2. ENHANCED DERMAL PENETRATION

Techniques for (1) enhancing skin penetration of percutaneously toxic materials so that penetration occurs rapidly (within minutes), (2) penetrating protective masks in physiologically significant amounts and in logistically deliverable quantities, or (3) circumvention of the protective mask. Penetrating agents, mask-breaking agents. Effective heavy gas models (i.e., models describing the behavior of gases several times the vapor density of air). None identified. Developing a compound that penetrates and is toxic. (Most materials surveyed that have good penetrant or mask-breaking capability are of only moderate toxicity, most being less toxic than the WWI agent phosgene and thus virtually impossible to employ logistically.) None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Chemical agents would be selected and/or disseminated in such a manner as to circumvent the protective mask and protective clothing. The desire for a means of circumventing the protective mask has existed since the introduction in WW I of charcoal filters that greatly reduced the efficacy of the choking gases. In an effort to bypass the mask and re-establish efficient chemical warfare, the German Army introduced both arsenicals (e.g., vomiting agents) and sulfur mustards. The threat of mustard and its counterparts, as well as the later advent of percutaneously acting nerve agents, resulted in the development of protective clothing. In the 1960s and 1970s programs were conducted to use agents of intermediate volatility or of high airborne percutaneous toxicity to penetrate protective clothing. In the 1980s, mask breakers that would not be retained on charcoal filters were examined by both western and communist powers. In none of these instances were there reports of notable success. Rogue nations and extranational groups, which are not bound by the treaties and conventions of the worlds states (or have chosen to ignore them), might employ clothing penetrants such as toxic fragmentation devices or tailored filter penetrants (including emetics and lethal/emetic combinations). These could be used as means of penetrating or defeating protective clothing. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China North Korea
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Iran Syria

Significant R&D
Iraq
Moderate R&D
Libya
Limited R&D
Although specific work being done is difficult to assess, rogue nations or extra-national groups could be expected to put effort into R&D.
III-5-26
DATA SHEET III-5.2. NONTRADITIONAL INSERTIONS

Use of nonconventional delivery means such as UAVs to overtly or covertly disseminate chemicals that attack other than the traditional neurotransmitter sites. Materials that block alternative neurotransmitters and/or cause disruption in vital body functions. None identified. Map of human genome; neurotransmitter models for newly discovered/defined substances. Identifying other than the known neurotransmitters that have functions whose disruption will have serious consequences for the human body. None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Development by rogue nations or by extra-national terrorist groups whose only rules are there are no rules is likely. Although the United States has forsworn the use of chemical munitions, rogue nations and extra-national groups may take advantage of legitimate advances in science and technology to introduce unique applications of chemical warfare. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Iran Syria
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Iraq
Significant R&D
Libya
Moderate R&D
North Korea
Limited R&D
Although specific work being done is difficult to assess, rogue nations or extra-national groups could be expected to put effort into R&D.
III-5-27
DATA SHEET III-5.2. SOLIDS DISPERSION

Techniques for effective dissemination and dispersion of solid particulates efficiently in the inhalable size range (0.55 m). Possibly deagglomerants. Effective and reproducible measurement technology for aerodynamic particle size of dispersed solid particulates. Particulate dispersion models for nonspherical solid aerosols. Universal techniques for deagglomeration and dispersion of solid aerosols may not be achievable. Dispersion of agricultural and pesticide products. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The majority of incapacitants and probably those materials affecting neurotransmitters will exist normally as particulate solids. Solids naturally tend to agglomerate and are difficult to effectively disseminate as inhalable aerosols. The United States has forsworn chemical agents; however, rogue nations and extra-national groups may attempt to improve dissemination and dispersion of newly developed materials. Solids dispersion is an industrial (and a pharmaceutical) problem as well as a potential chemical warfare problem. There will continue to be considerable research and development for legitimate purposes. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Iran Syria
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Iraq
Significant R&D
Libya
Moderate R&D
North Korea
Limited R&D
Although specific work being done is difficult to assess, rogue nations or extra-national groups could be expected to put effort into R&D. A significant amount of work has been accomplished commercially in solid pesticides.
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SECTION 5.3CHEMICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Highlights Although production technologies for chemical agents are widely known, the use of combinatorial chemistry in conjunction with new screening methods could lead to the discovery of toxic chemicals unknown at present. Chemical agents can be tailored to affect target populations (lethal and nonlethal).
OVERVIEW This subsection addresses the production of toxic chemicals for use in war. Although a majority of the nations in the world is expected to abide by the ban of chemical weapons embodied in the CWC, some may not, and others will not become parties to the convention. Non-state groups also may develop CW in an attempt to further their goals. The following are advances that might occur, even with the more limited resources of the rogue states or extranational groups. The most potent lethal chemical agents discovered to date are those which directly influence neurotransmitters in one way or another. Neurotransmitters are chemical substances that transmit nerve impulses across the synapses (junctions) between certain types of nerve cells. Although a large number of them have been identified, their precise role and the mechanisms of their actions have been determined for only a few. The principal chemical warfare agents postulated and/or produced since World War II have affected the actions of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine by inactivating the enzyme acetylcholinesterase and thereby interfering with the regular sequence of nerve impulses. Tabun (GA), produced by the Germans in WW II, and sarin (GB) and soman (GD), synthesized and readied for production (but fortunately never produced by the Germans), are in this category. Similarly, the GB and chemical nerve agent (VX) produced and stockpiled by the United States and GB, GD, and a variant of VX produced and stockpiled by the former Soviet Union were anticholinesterase agents. In the Iran-Iraq War, GA and GB/GF nerve agents were used; GB/GF was prepared (although not used) by the Iraqis in the Gulf War. The Aum Shinrikyo employed GB in their terrorist attacks. Both rogue states and extra-national groups are thought to have experimented with VX. VX and its analogues are among the most toxic organophosphorus poisons, and there is thought in some areas that these compounds represent close to the practical limits of toxicity for the anticholinesterase agents. Another neurotransmitter, gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), used for channel blocking has probably reached its maximum efficacy. New agents are less likely to be the organophosphorus agents of today, but rather combinations which block multiple sites or which block neurotransmitter functions not understood at present. Neuroscientists are currently unraveling the functions of the other neurotransmitters. It is virtually certain that this information will be in the public domain and thus be available to the undesirable nations or groups to tailor different, more effective agents. It is anticipated that knowledge of the biochemical actions of the neurotransmitters may enable tailoring of agents that are potentially more dangerous as well as more difficult to counter. Several types of toxins are among the most toxic nonliving substances known. Toxins have high molecular weights and the full structural conformation of many of them has not been fully determined. Botulinus toxin, a mixture of eight 135 to 170 kD (kilodaltons) proteins, acts by inhibiting the release of acetylcholine in a cell. Which of the proteins responsible for the inhibition is not known for certain. During the coming decade the ability to map the proteins molecular structures may provide the ability to create relatively simple molecular fragments that could be readily incorporated in larger molecules and would exhibit the essential toxic properties of the toxin. The mapping of the human genome (and the subsequent public release of this information in the next few years) could provide the unscrupulous with useful information needed for designing genetically tailored chemical
III-5-29
agents that would attack specific sites in the body or selectively attack specific individuals or groups of individuals of a common genetic type. Despite the prohibitions under the CWC, the wording and definitions regarding incapacitating agents remain necessarily vague because they encompass specific biological effects, as well as a multitude of commercial pharmaceuticals. History seems to show a recurring impetus to revert to more humane forms of warfare. Toward this end, it is believed possible that forms of nonlethal but physically incapacitating agents may be developed and used. Particularly interesting would be materials created for police efforts internal to advanced nations that become known and/or available to extra-national groups or rogue states. Among the conceivable incapacitating agents are those that could result in overt or covert mood altering, the modification of hormonal systems, or the interference with bio-molecular kinetics. Given the probable world situation in the next 510 years, it is anticipated that chemical agent production even in the rogue states may be covert and may represent essentially bench-scale processes that can be easily concealed. Contrary to popular belief, neither the United States nor the Soviet Russian production facilities for their respective stockpiles were ever what could be construed as large scale. As a result of ongoing improvements in process control and automated processes, a high degree of automation would be expected for these future production facilities. They would likely be tailored to a fill just before use concept and generally difficult to locate. For agents that attack two or more neurotransmitters or for those intended for attacking genetically defined sites, a pharmaceutical-like manufacture would be expected. In the realm of terrorism, in addition to the above, it is envisioned that potential chemical agents could also result from the use of industrial chemicals against an unprotected civilian population. RATIONALE A description of chemical production techniques sufficient for a country/group to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons exists in the open literature. New techniques in combinatorial chemistry might enable a proliferator to synthesize and screen hundreds or even thousands of compounds and discover toxic chemicals previously unknown. It is imperative that the United States stay aware of new technological developments and understand their implications for chemical warfare. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Responsible countries will not engage in the development of new chemical agents; however, to detect their use and protect their people, they must be aware of developments in the field. Rogue states/groups can be expected to turn to any avenue of development, especially one not widely known. Methods of production should not be assumed to be necessarily like those used previously in more conventional chemical production (see Biological Technology, Section 4, for capability in related biological technologies). Figure 5.3-1 indicates the capability of countries, not the intent. It is expected that parties to the CWC will honor their commitments and refrain from producing toxic chemicals for weapons.
III-5-30
Country Australia Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Serbia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Material Production
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.3-1. Chemical Material Production WTA Summary
III-5-31
III-5-32
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-5.3. CHEMICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Biochemical Modeling....................................................................................................................III-5-35 Designer Chemistry.......................................................................................................................III-5-36 Relational Toxicology....................................................................................................................III-5-37 Bioregulation................................................................................................................................III-5-38
III-5-33
III-5-34
DATA SHEET III-5.3. BIOCHEMICAL MODELING

Identify key physiological sites based on knowledge of neurotransmitters and sites in the human genome. None identified. None identified. Biomolecular kinetic modeling algorithms. Three-dimensional interactive modeling. Medical and pharmaceutical. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Knowledge of the functions and structure of neurotransmitters and the human genome would allow for the modeling and subsequent creation of chemical molecules that would react at selected sites for a wide variety of effects. The information on the human genome and much derivative data is expected to be in the public domain and thus readily accessible to those who would use it for other than beneficial purposes. Knowledge of the human genome could theoretically permit a rogue state or extra-national group to tailor physiological effects to their desired ends. The United States must understand new technologies so that it can develop defensive measures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt India Italy Norway Sweden United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada France Iran Japan Poland Switzerland

Significant R&D
China Germany Iraq Netherlands Russia Syria
Czech Republic Hungary Israel North Korea South Korea UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Sequencing of the human genome is a multilateral, civilian effort. The United States, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan are the primary participants. Most of the genome database is available on the World Wide Web, giving any country or group access to the information.
III-5-35
DATA SHEET III-5.3. DESIGNER CHEMISTRY

Molecular structures that bind on two or more specific sites and/or molecular structure based upon fragments of toxin structure to take advantage of high potency of the toxin. None identified. None identified. Interactive chemical and biochemical modeling. Three-dimensional interactive modeling. Possible medical and pharmaceutical. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Toxicity based upon cholinesterase inhibition and/or GABA sites is thought to be close to the maximum possible. For more effective agents, the proliferant would most logically pursue other neurotransmitter sites. Although the United States has forsworn chemical agents, rogue nations and extra-national groups may seek to use developing knowledge of the human genome to design specialized agents that attack other or multiple neurotransmitter sites. The United States must understand new technologies so that it can develop defensive measures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Denmark Germany Israel Netherlands Poland South Korea Syria
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Egypt India Italy North Korea Russia Spain UK
China Finland Iran Japan Norway Slovak Republic Sweden United States
Czech Republic France Iraq Libya Pakistan South Africa Switzerland
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Rogue nations and extra-national organizations could be expected to devote effort to creating new types of toxic chemical agents. Combinatorial chemistry allows the screening of thousands of chemical compounds in a short period of time. The same efforts that are used by responsible countries and groups for developing new drugs and medicines could be diverted to nefarious objectives. The assessment above indicates capability to develop new chemical compounds and does not show intent to use these procedures for ill.
III-5-36
DATA SHEET III-5.3. RELATIONAL TOXICOLOGY

Using data from the human genome, the physiological effects are tied to a genetic trait so that the agent only affects specific individuals. None identified. None identified. Interactive chemical and biochemical modeling. Three-dimensional interactive modeling. Medical and pharmaceutical. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Once the human genome is mapped, it will be theoretically possible to attack a specific group of genes that control various functions or are unique to individuals/ethnic groups. This would be the ultimate specific agent, which could be tied to as narrow or broad a genetic definition as desired. The United States and numerous other countries have forsworn the use of CW and would not devote resources to this type of effort. An opposing force could theoretically be attacked, with only limited protection required by the troops dispensing the agent. Information in this area is partially proprietary, although basic information may be in the public domain. The United States must understand new technologies so that it can develop defensive measures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Rogue nations and extra-national organizations could be expected to pursue this type of capability. It has been reported that Iraq had developed such an agent to be used against Israel, but there has not been any proof that such an agent can be developed. Assessments in the chart indicate capability to do relational toxicology, not the intent to use it for nefarious means.
III-5-37
DATA SHEET III-5.3. BIOREGULATION

Development of chemicals which modify hormonal systems or serve as mood-altering agents. Specialized drugs with unique hormonal modification properties. None identified. Interactive chemical and biochemical modeling. Three-dimensional interactive modeling. Evaluation techniques to assess the efficacy of mood-altering and other nonphysical effects on personnel performance. Possible medical and pharmaceutical. Expected to be large, complex, and difficult-to-synthesize molecules and hence rather costly.
RATIONALE Agents of this type could serve as subtle and possibly covert incapacitating agents used to control the response of large segments of a population. Although the United States has foresworn the use of CW in warfare, such materials might be the products of pharmaceutical research and considered for internal law enforcement purposes. As a corollary, a rogue state or large extra-national group could use commercial (or specially derived) pharmaceuticals to control large segments of the population. The United States must understand new technologies so that it can develop defensive measures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Rogue nations and extra-national organizations could be expected to pursue this type of capability. Assessments in the chart indicate capability to develop bioregulation agents, not the intent to use them for nefarious means.
III-5-38
SECTION 5.4CHEMICAL DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION

Highlights Sensors that detect chemical attack at great ranges and provide warning to specific military units that may be affected are part of full-dimensional protection. Adequate warning may allow forces to avoid contamination. Point detectors with significantly improved specificity and sensitivity will allow increased protection for exposed troops and improved capability to avoid localized chemical contamination.
OVERVIEW This subsection reviews forecast changes to current technology and predicts how these advances might be applied to problems and shortfalls in the detection and identification of chemical agents. The assessment takes into consideration both combat operations and the application of detection technology to terrorist events where the military is likely to be involved. The range of operations includes actual combat situations where U.S. troops are deployed against a discrete enemy force during actual hostilities or in an international peacekeeping operation. The application of detection and identification also extends to civil operations where an act of suspected chemical terrorism has taken place and military forces have been deployed to provide assistance to local authorities. The following are the principal issues in the detection arena: Improvements in sensitivity to all significant threat agents to permit detection down to or below the respective threshold limit values. In this manner not only could the agents be effectively detected but a safe level for removal of protection be determined. Improved specificity in agent identification becomes crucial when agents might be employed in an urban or industrial environment. Current detection schemes are more or less fail-safe and yield many false positives, but generally preclude false negatives. This works reasonably well in a battlefield environment, where there are few interfering substances, but can become a major problem where extraneous substances abound. Generally, multiple procedures and comparisons are required for specific identification, which is critical in urban sites where treatment and assured cleanup are dependent on knowledge of the material involved. The complexity and logistics of this task has limited development. The inability to conduct tests in open-air conditions with real materials places limits on the realistic evaluation of many sensors, particularly stand-off detectors. The inability of a sensor to purge previous sensings and rapidly be available for additional tests is an operational limitation. The ability to clear sensors almost immediately or to provide an alternative path for sensing would provide a significant improvement in detection operations. Remote sensing at low levels is another area where progress is needed. For example, it is currently difficult, if not impossible, to detect terrain or other materials contaminated with a low-volatility substance such as VX without direct contact with the liquid.
Fortunately, the technologies that underlie improved detection and identification have undergone an accelerated development in the last decade, in large degree due to the explosive growth in photonic and electronic technologies and miniaturization. These changes have permitted adaptation of instruments that were in the recent past only suitable for research applications in the laboratory to field applications. These trends are expected to continue, partially as fallout from increased computational capabilities. The sensitivity of instruments has increased at a similar rate.
III-5-39
In the future the following improvements in technology will be realized: Sensitivities in technologies applicable to a broad area of substance sensing, such as surface acoustic wave (SAW) technology, will be improved. The result will be economical production of highly sensitive (and relatively small) individual detectors. At present small is limited not so much by the SAW crystals themselves but by the size of the peripheral equipment required for proper functioning. Pumps are required to move air samples over the SAW crystals, temperature control is necessary to compensate for drifting frequencies, and trap-and-purge is necessary for realistic specificity (purging requires significant amounts of electrical power or batteries). In addition, the increases in sensitivity necessary have yet to be demonstrated and require further research and development Current instruments that have quasi-field capabilities, such as combined gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) and mass spectrometry-mass spectrometry (MS-MS), will be improved and miniaturized to the point where they can be taken to the field, where identification of the substance used is vital. Comparative spectra will be assembled and committed to compact disks (CDs) or memory chips that will form an integral part of the system and permit instant identification. If miniaturization is successfully achieved, the combined analytical power of gas chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry will provide a remarkably versatile capability. Very high sensitivity light detection and ranging (LIDAR), which will be able to discriminate the vapor associated with clouds or ground deposition, will be developed. Using UAVs, also equipped with GPS receivers and ground-scanning radar, the system will provide a field commander with a capability for instantaneous terrain contamination mapping. A hand-held or vehicle-mounted version of the airborne system will be available for use by either military or civilian personnel for rapid contamination mapping in instances of terrorist attacks. Miniaturization will permit either double- or multiple-probe capabilities. Such systems will sample selectively after the initial probe has been saturated and provide field instruments that will switch to secondary and tertiary probes upon sensing overload on initial probes. The systems will automatically begin purging the saturated probes so that a detection capability will always be available. The merging of analytical chemistry techniques, often called hyphenation, usually improves the quality of analytical results. The possible merging of technologies such as SAW with ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) and/or infrared (IR) or other combinations would result in enhanced detection systems. With the miniaturization of systems and techniques, such as sensor data fusion, pattern recognition, neural networks, and high power lasers, hyphenation of detection techniques will certainly become an important aspect of chemical detection.
For more complete battlefield management, the ongoing results from all sensors will be electronically transmitted to a computer at brigade level that integrates the results with terrain maps and meteorological data to provide an instantaneous picture, and warning where required, of any chemical attack or contamination on the battlefield. RATIONALE Joint Vision 2010 describes the four operational concepts that will be developed for the future: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. New sensors that will be deployed to detect chemical or biological attack at great ranges and provide warning to specific units that may be affected are part of the Joint Vision 2010 concept of full-dimensional protection. It is clear that U.S. forces must be prepared to wage war in an environment that includes the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is expected that some of the new types of agents mentioned in subsection 5.3 will be solids, making them very difficult to detect with current techniques. All current analytical methodologies require the sample to be in the gaseous state when presented to the detection transducer. Normally, for any of the current techniques to be applicable to detection of solids, vaporization of the solid has to occur. This requires heat to be applied locally and thus precludes remote detection. As a future development, it is conceivable that the sample could be tested by a surface light spectroscopic technique such as resonance Raman spectroscopy. In this case the sample need not be vaporized since the Raman spectrum can be generated from the surface scatter. Because the Raman spectrum is akin to IR
III-5-40
spectra, some degree of specificity can be accomplished. Lasers can also be used to vaporize extremely small samples of a solid deposit, while laser spectroscopic methods could be employed to analyze the miniature vapor cloud. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Detection is an area where active development is occurring throughout the world for a multitude of reasons. Because this technology is rarely classified or limited for other than commercial purposes, the spread of new detection technology is expected to be rapid and worldwide. In the UK, the DERA (Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) staff at Porton Down has been at the leading edge of chemical and biological defense. Projects exist in the following research areas: chemical and biological detection, aerosol science, ion chemistry, rheology, gene probes, sensor technology, and microelectronics. Graseby Dynamics (UK) is one of the world leaders in detection technologies. The company maintains a substantial investment in R&D, with multidisciplinary skills spanning the wide range required for the design and development of sensing systems for trace quantities of chemical and biological materials. The following are other countries and companies involved in detection equipment: Canada Anachemia, Ca China Research Institute of Chemical Defense France Giat Germany Bruker-Saxonia Analytik GmbH Finland Environics OY Israel Elbit Limited Russia State factories Sweden Akers Krutbruk Protection AB Switzerland Louis Schlieffer AG United States Environmental Technologies Group, Inc. (ETG) Calspan Advanced Technical Products Proengin SA
Several countries produce reconnaissance systems, and mobile detection systems: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Romania, Russia, the UK, and the United States. Those involved with command, control, communications and intelligence, which is essential to tying capabilities together, include Denmark, Germany, South Africa, the UK, and the United States.
III-5-41
Country Australia Canada China Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan Poland Russia Slovak Republic South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Detection
Warning
Identification
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.4-1. Chemical Detection, Warning, and Identification WTA Summary
III-5-42
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-5.4. CHEMICAL DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS).....................................................................................................III-5-45 Mass Spectrometry (MS)................................................................................................................III-5-47 Gas Chromatography (GC)Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) .............................................................III-5-48 Gas Chromatography (GC)Mass Spectrometry (MS).........................................................................III-5-49 Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW).........................................................................................................III-5-50 Field Ion Spectrometry (FIS)...........................................................................................................III-5-51 Gas Phase Ion Chemistry................................................................................................................III-5-52 Passive Infrared (IR).......................................................................................................................III-5-53 Absorption LIDAR........................................................................................................................III-5-54 Spectroscopy (Electro-optical Properties) ...........................................................................................III-5-55 Sample Collection.........................................................................................................................III-5-56
III-5-43
III-5-44
DATA SHEET III-5.4. ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY (IMS)

Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications Affordability
Hand-held, lightweight Sensitivity at <1 g/m3 for nerve agents with sample preconcentration, <1 mg/m3 for blister agents. Sensitivity at 0.1 mg/m3 for nerve agents in <1 sec, <20 mg/m3 for blood agents. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Data bases. Computational capability. Detection of low vapor pressure or solid agents. Solid samples. Environmental monitoring. Process control. Contraband detection. Fire sensor (IMS using variable field strength). Moderately expensive.
RATIONALE IMS systems such as the chemical agent monitor (CAM) offer the capability of point detection of general classes of agent in the field and ascertaining if decontamination has been effective. This is normally accomplished using a radioactive source to ionize chemical substances drawn into the instrument and measuring the time it takes the particular ionized particle to traverse a drift tube and register on a detector. Each ion type has a characteristic mobility time and can be measured semiquantitatively. Although the technique directly measures the material in the air drawn into the system, it is affected by the humidity, temperature, and composition of the substances in the air. Because the technique looks at a generic part of the molecule it is subject to false positives. IMS instruments can theoretically be of high sensitivity and, if combined with a different sensor type, could be a tool for determining specificity to a high probability for the agent or agents involved. In the future, U.S. forces will have a greater need to detect toxic chemicals in the field because of the increased possibility of the use of chemical weapons against them. Detection technologies fall under the Joint Vision 2010 concept of full-dimensional protection. Hand-held equipment with increased sensitivity is essential to identifying chemcial agents and ensuring that proper protection is taken. IMS is not a new technology, but computational capability will allow miniaturization and application in a hand-held device. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt Hungary Israel Pakistan South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Finland India Japan Poland Sweden United States
China France Iran Libya Russia Switzerland
Czech Republic Germany Iraq North Korea Slovak Republic Syria
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The development of small IMS devices is being spearheaded by the military. The following countries produce detectors that use IMS: Canada Defence Research Establishment
III-5-45
Finland Environics OY Germany Bruker-Saxonia Analytik GmbH Russia State factories UK Graseby
Hungary has the GVJ-2, which uses IMS, under development.
III-5-46
DATA SHEET III-5.4. MASS SPECTROMETRY (MS)

Miniaturization (field-portable units) especially for peripheral equipment; one-man portable; ability to ruggedize. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Data bases. Computational capability. Mutivariate data models to enhance ion identification. Environmental monitoring. Process control. Contraband detection. Analytical chemistry. Expensive.
RATIONALE MS uses an ionizing source to split the measured molecules into a number of charged components. These are measured on a detector as a characteristic spectra and compared with known spectra of substances of interest (e.g., chemical agents). The spectra, when combined with another detection tool, can result in a high sensitivity and a probability of specificity. It does, however, rely on a previously generated spectral library. This technology, which can be used to detect toxic chemicals in the field, addresses the concept of fulldimensional protection in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt India Japan Poland Sweden United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Finland Iran Libya Russia Switzerland

Significant R&D
China France Iraq North Korea Slovak Republic Syria
Czech Republic Germany Israel Pakistan South Korea UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Most development is being accomplished within the military. The German company Bruker-Frazen Analytik GmbH produces a detector (MM-1) that uses MS. In France, MGP Instruments is developing the DAXEL analyzer, which uses MS-MS.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY (GC)ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY (IMS)

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications
Low power consumption GC. Smaller, shorter, faster GC columns. Sensitivity at <1 g/m3 for nerve agents, <1 mg/m3 for blister. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Multivariate data models. Data bases. Computational capability. Environmental monitoring; process monitoring; pesticide analysis; leak detection; stack monitoring; worker exposure determination; quality assurance and quality control; food industry for use as an electronic nose. Moderately expensive.
Affordability
RATIONALE The combination of GC with IMS will provide partial identification of low levels of chemicals in the field, provided GC and IMS spectra are available. This detection technology addresses the need to detect toxic chemicals in the field. Full-dimensional protection in Joint Vision 2010 includes the ability to detect the chemical agents to enable forces to take protective measures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
FemtoScan Corporation has developed what is reported to be the first commercial GC/IMS instrument for process and field applications. Based on IMS technology for ultrasensitive detection of gas-phase analytes with highspeed automated vapor sampling (AVS), the instrument uses transfer line gas chromatography (TLGC) sampling and separation capabilities developed by FemtoScan and the University of Utah (www.utah.edu./marc/ homepage.htm). The device is a sensitive and selective, near-real-time vapor detector. IDS, Intelligent Detection Systems Inc. (CA), has a proprietary chemical trace detection technologya combination of GC and IMS (GC/IMS)which is a sophisticated chemical analysis tool that can detect minute molecules and vapors of the chemicals associated with drugs and explosives. Orbital Sciences is developing the GC/IMS-Chemical Agent Detector (GI-CAD). The UK (Graseby Ionics Division) produces an environmental vapor monitor (EVM) that combines gas chromatography and IMS technologies.
III-5-48
DATA SHEET III-5.4. GAS CHROMOTAGRAPHY (GC)MASS SPECTROMETRY (MS)

Lower power consumption GC. Smaller, shorter, faster GC columns. One-man portable. Ruggedization. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Data bases, computational capability; miniaturization of ancillary equipment. Environmental monitoring. Process control. Field analysis. Analytical chemistry. Expensive.
RATIONALE The combination of GC with MS allows the detectors to measure compounds that have eluted from gas chromatograph column at specific elution. The combination of recorded and compared spectra and GC elution temperature provides a high probability of specific identification of a substance. There is a need to detect toxic chemicals in the field. Full-dimensional protection dictates the capability to identify the use of toxic chemical agents. Fast GCs exist, but size and power consumption are issues. The airport security swipes of hand-carried luggage is an example of fast GC analysis. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Germany (Bruker-Franzen Analytik GmbH) has developed a detector that uses GC-MS. In the United States, Viking Equipment has assembled a detector that also employs GC-MS. Shimadzu (a multinational company founded in Japan) introduced a GC-MS device in 1992 that can be used for forensic analyses, drug testing, environmental monitoring, component identification, and product impurity identification. Efforts continue to improve this instrument.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. SURFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE (SAW)

New coatings to interact with target materials. Sensitivity at <1 g/m3 for nerve agents with sample pre-concentration; <0.1 mg/m3 in <1 minute for nerve agents, <1 mg/m3 for blister agents. New coating materials. None identified. Pattern recognition, neural networks. Signal-processing algorithms to decrease response times (1015 sec, depends on concentration); computational capability; miniaturization of ancillary systems supporting SAW operation. Making the process readily reusable. Specialty chemicals for polymer development that can be used for coating the SAW device. Monitoring hazardous chemical vapors, potential fires and environmental pollutants. At present, moderately expensive.
RATIONALE SAW is believed to be a technology that could result in an individual point alarm for the soldier or civilian first responder. Although false positives would remain a potential problem, the system could prove extremely useful in surveying suspected contaminated environments. System detection limits for SAW are in the parts per trillion area. The system operates autonomously with a simple gas sampling system and without the need for support gases. Individual SAW devices operate by generating surface mechanical oscillations in piezoelectric quartz with frequencies in the megahertz range. Coating the SAW devices with different polymeric materials that selectively absorb different gases allows gas detection by changes in SAW frequency. Arrays of polymer-coated SAW devices detect different gases, and pattern-recognition techniques interpret data and identify unknowns. This technology responds to the need to detect toxic chemicals in the field. It addresses the concept of fulldimensional protection embodied in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
At the Prins Maurits Laboratory TNO, work on SAW chemical sensors is being performed. The main subjects have been implementation of SAW technology on a silicon chip, the development of a SAW sensor for NO2, and the development of a SAW sensor for chemical warfare agents.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. FIELD ION SPECTROMETRY (FIS)

Improved selectivity by separating compounds. Improved scientific understanding. Able to analyze subparts per million and in some cases subparts per billion. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Immaturemany unknowns, e.g., theoretical modeling; interaction of radio frequency with IMS. Ruggedization. Databases. Analyzes gas or vapors and solids if they are vaporizable [it is possible that a small yttrium aluminum garnet (YAG) laser could be incorporated in this technology to serve as a plasma generator with a focused beam to produce an ion sample from solids]. Environmental monitoring. Contraband detection. Fire sensing. $20,000 for a single component analyzer, plus an additional $1,000 per extra component.
RATIONALE FIS is a new technology (less than 5 years old) that has been developed for trace detection of narcotics, explosives, and chemical warfare agents. This technology incorporates a unique ion filter using dual transverse fields, which allows interferences to be electronically eliminated without the use of GC columns, membranes, or other physical separation methods. FIS is related to IMS in that it is a technique for separating and quantifying ions while they are carried in a gas at atmospheric pressure. In addition, both methods use soft ionization methods that yield spectra in which the species of interest produce the main features. The sensor has no moving parts except for a small recirculation fan and no consumables except for the replaceable calibrator and gas purification filters. The size of the instrument is 0.8 ft3 excluding a computer for control and display. The sole manufacturer of the FIS has reported limits of detection in the low picograms for common explosives such as RDX, PETN, and TNT. In addition, a response time of 2 sec for a single component and approximately 5 sec for each additional component is advertised. To date, there are no independent test data available for the FIS. The instruments estimated selling price is $20,000 for a single component analyzer, plus an additional $1,000 per extra component. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Mine Safety Appliances Company (U.S.) is the only known U.S. company considering FIS. The Institute for National Measurement Standards (CA) is offering a mass spectroscopic detection system for FIS (R. Guevremont, R. Purves, C. Pipich) as a business opportunity.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. GAS PHASE ION CHEMISTRY

Improved ion sources (nonradioactive) for complex matrices, e.g., soil and water samples. None identified. None identified. Unknown, perhaps pattern recognition if coupled with traditional specroscopy. Product separation, data, kinetic mechanisms. Ruggedization. Soil and water monitoring. Analytical chemistry. Environmental monitoring. Moderately expensive.
RATIONALE There is a need to provide a sampling and preparation technique to generate a gas phase sample from complex soil and water sources that then can be measured by some of the techniques previously mentioned. Increasingly there is a need to detect toxic chemicals in the field. Full-dimensional protection in Joint Vision 2010 can be construed to include force protection off the battlefield as well as on it. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Commercial requirements drive this technology. Work is ongoing throughout the world.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. PASSIVE INFRARED (IR)

Faster signal processing (terabytes/sec). Smaller, faster systems. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Obscurants; subtraction of background; optics; cooling. Environmental monitoring. Expensive.
RATIONALE IR detection measures the characteristic absorption bands for a gaseous substance. By ascertaining the wavelength and strength of these bands, vapors can be detected and partially analyzed or identified. Standoff detection is needed to detect the use of chemical weapons and enable forces to avoid contamination. As part of full-dimensional protection espoused in Joint Vision 2010, standoff capabilities are a necessity. There is also a potential to use passive IR detection for land mine detection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt Hungary Israel Pakistan South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Finland India Japan Poland Sweden United States
China France Iran Libya Russia Switzerland
Czech Republic Germany Iraq North Korea Slovak Republic Syria
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States developed the M21 remote sensing chemical agent alarm (RSCAAL), which uses a passive IR sensor. Hungary is developing a passive IR detector, too.
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DATA SHEET III-5.4. ABSORPTION LIDAR

Backpack system; gigabytes/sec processing speed. Increased sensitivity to detect low level vapor concentrations in aerosol clouds. None identified. None identified. Pattern recognition. Obscurants. Smaller, better, more powerful. Tunable lasers. Environmental monitoring. Expensive.
RATIONALE LIDAR measures the composition of a cloud by firing a laser or lasers into a cloud and measuring the characteristic absorption or backscatter from the vapor components. When the clouds consist of particulates of low volatility (for example, VX droplets), LIDAR is ineffective. In the future, however, it may also be possible to aim a LIDAR at surfaces to identify deposited substances, whether solid or liquid. Technology may provide possible standoff detection of low volatility clouds which could not be detected by current IR detectors. Military applications for atmospheric trace gas sensing include remote detection of industrial emissions (particularly as they pertain to nuclear weapons treaty verification and illicit drug manufacturing), identification and targeting of mobile rocket launch facilities, identification of underground or concealed bunkers and warehouses, the detection and identification of chemical warfare agents, and remote sensing of emissions from ballistic missiles and low observable aircraft. There is a need for standoff detection as part of the Joint Vison 2010 concept of full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The military is leading this effort although it could be used for environmental monitoring. The Czech Military Technical Institute of Protection, Brno, developed a differential absorption LIDAR (DIAL) detector, but it is complicated to operate and prohibitively expensive to produce. In France, the Centre dtudes du Bouchet (CEB) and Compagnie Industrielle des Lasers (CILAS) conduct research in absorption LIDAR. THOMSONTRT Defence is developing the SYDERAL chemical threat warning and identification system.
III-5-54
DATA SHEET III-5.4. SPECTROSCOPY [ELECTRO-OPTICAL (E-O) PROPERTIES]

Remove spectrum gaps for solid, liquid, and gas phases. Establishing a surfaceenhanced resonance Raman spectroscopic signature. None identified. None identified. None identified. Eye safety under operational environment. Sources, detectors, analysis of spectra. Environmental monitoring. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Spectroscopy is the next generation of detection technology. Spectroscopy would enable detection of CW and BW simultaneously. It would help to provide for full-dimensional protection as envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The military is spearheading the development of this technology, although it could find use in environmental monitoring.
III-5-55
DATA SHEET III-5.4. SAMPLE COLLECTION

Aerosols and particulatesair, liquids, solidssurfaces. Increased sensitivity; reduced bias. None identified. None identified. None identified. Materials compatibility. Environmental monitoring. Process control. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Effective and accurate means of identifying materials and determining their concentrations are highly dependent upon accurate and reproducible sampling procedures. It has long been recognized that different methodologies give different results. If results are to be used to pronounce an area safe and fit for unprotected habitation or for evidence in the instance of criminal terrorism, it is important that they be scientifically valid and reproducible. This will require establishing and validating procedures to be applied across a broad spectra of chemical compounds and different physical states. Sample collection supports full-dimensional protection in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
R&D on ways to improve sample collection is accomplished throughout the world.
III-5-56
SECTION 5.5OBSCURANTS
Highlights If used properly, obscurants can negate the value of high-technology reconnaissance, target acquisition, and precision-guided munition systems Obscurant R&D, which resumed in 1972, is still being well funded in many countries. The effectiveness of technologies used in U.S. military systems can be degraded with obscurants at a fraction of the cost of the U.S. technologies. Historically, employment of obscurants has not been complex.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers obscurants, materials that degrade or defeat sensors that operate in any part of the electromagnetic spectrum. An obscurant is defined as: Any gas, liquid, or solid particle, either man-made or natural, suspended in the atmosphere that affects any part of the electromagnetic spectrum by: Scattering Absorption Radiance Reflection, or Refraction.
Obscurants are identified by their application in the various parts of the electromagnetic spectrum: visible, visible and near-IR, visible through far-IR, mid- and far-IR, millimeter wave (MMW), centimeter wave (CMW), visible and MMW, visible and CMW, visible through millimeter wave, MMW, and CMW. RATIONALE Smoke has been around since man discovered fire. The methodical, planned use of smoke in battle, however, was a development of World War I. At the end of that war research in smoke was emphasized in many countries. During World War II the Soviet Union and the United States used smoke extensively. After the war, interest in smoke declined because most countries believed that the new sensors coming into the field could easily penetrate smoke clouds. It was thought that in spite of the success of smoke in World War II, practical limits in screening capabilities had been reached. In 1959 the Poles showed that by combining different World War II obscurants, a new combination obscurant that was effective against the then-fielded sensors, including radar, could be created. However, real interest in obscurants did not reawaken until after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During that war it was shown that antitank weapons were very effective and that obscurants, if employed correctly, could seriously degrade, and in many cases defeat, these weapons. By the mid 1980s, however, funding for obscurant research again declined, with only a few Warsaw Pact countries continuing research. Attitudes changed again during Desert Storm. The world saw the effectiveness of the fielded smart munitions on television and was impressed. Many countries reevaluated the target acquisition, reconnaissance, and precision-weapon threats to themselves. As a result of their analyses, these countries began looking for countermeasures, including obscurants. Consequently, countries with an obscurant R&D capability began to fund such research again. Countries without R&D capability started
III-5-57
buying new obscurant dissemination systems and agents to fill their needs. In many cases, this led R&D-capable countries to expand their efforts even further. Obscurants enjoy a number of advantages over other countermeasures: They are less expensive to produce and therefore less expensive to buy. Individuals employing obscurant systems require virtually no special knowledge or skill; training can be accomplished in very little time. Except for large smoke generators, obscurant-disseminating systems require little maintenance. There are no sanctions against these countermeasures. Any country can buy them with no restrictions.
Research on obscurants has resulted in upgrading World War II disseminating systems and agents to make them more effective on todays battlefield. Theory and testing have shown that with changes in the geometry and conductivity of these materials, they are effective in a wide range of wavebands. By employing these agents using the correct doctrine, an obscurant that is normally effective in only the visible and near-IR wavebands can be made effective in the visible through the far-IR wavebands. Research on upgrading World War II conventional chaff by using microfibers is also being conducted. Other research is being done on plates of different geometries, cylinders, and nanometer-sized particles. Research on charged vs. neutral particles is being conducted to determine if one has a decided advantage over the other. Commercial research on dissipating fog for civil aviation has military application. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Although the United States has devoted some resources to obscurants, foreign countries have more motivation to develop new obscurants and new disseminating systems that will either seriously degrade or defeat technologically advanced U.S. sensors for reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and precision-guided munitions.
Country Australia Canada China Czech Republic Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan North Korea Pakistan Poland Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Legend: Visible and Near IR
Visible thru Far IR
Mid and Far IR
MMW
CMW
Visible thru CMW
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 5.5-1. Obscurants WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-5.5 OBSCURANTS

Millimeter WaveScattering and Absorbing......................................................................................III-5-61 Mid and Far InfraredRadiance........................................................................................................III-5-62 Multispectral (Visible, Infrared, Millimeter, and Possibly Centimeter).....................................................III-5-63 Spectral Direction Selectivity ..........................................................................................................III-5-64 Temporal Selectivity......................................................................................................................III-5-65 Environmental..............................................................................................................................III-5-66 Technology Coupling ....................................................................................................................III-5-67 Precision Particle Production...........................................................................................................III-5-68 Creation and Packaging of Nanomaterials...........................................................................................III-5-69 Measurement................................................................................................................................III-5-70 Projected Obscurants......................................................................................................................III-5-71 Obscurant Clearing........................................................................................................................III-5-72
III-5-59
III-5-60
DATA SHEET III-5.5. MILLIMETER WAVESCATTERING AND ABSORBING

Packing density >75% of the material density; dissemination efficiency for large area systems >80% and for projected systems >50%; Extmm significantly greater than 2. Metal microwires; metal-coated fibers. Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. Obscurant modeling; transport and diffusion. Reduction of logistics burden, toxicity, re-aerosolization. Employment of obscurants is not complex. Ram for high structures, electronics. Inexpensive, especially in relation to the assets that are protected. Also a very costeffective means for an adversary to negate precision weapons systems.
RATIONALE Obscurants across the electromagnetic spectrum protect limited and expensive assets from observation and targeting. They counter enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities. Obscurants can also be used for signaling, deception, and other uses. Radar and thermal homing sensors operate in the millimeter wave band and can therefore be degraded with obscurants that affect that wavelength. Joint Vision 2010 includes full-dimensional protection as one of four operational concepts for the future. Although not explicitly stated, degrading enemy RSTA that employs new technologies should be considered to be a component of this concept. Advanced technologies in the hands of an adversary will increase the importance of protection at all echelons. Note that increased reliance on precision capability by the United States and its allies will increase interest in obscurants by potential adversaries. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Czech Republic France Iran Japan Norway Slovak Republic Sweden United States
Legend:
Bulgaria Denmark Germany Iraq Libya Pakistan South Africa Switzerland Vietnam
Canada Egypt Hungary Israel Netherlands Poland South Korea Syria
China Finland India Italy North Korea Russia Spain UK
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
A number of countries have increased their work on obscurants since Operation Desert Storm. The United States has some work underway, but funding is needed to see it to fruition.
III-5-61
DATA SHEET III-5.5. MID AND FAR INFRAREDRADIANCE

Emissive obscurant effectiveness parameters; methods for direct comparison with enemy smoke effectiveness. Activated metals; reactive metals; pyrophoric materials. Field instrumentation; production quality control; aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. Obscurant modeling (new models required). Increasing the radiance at correct wavelength; reduction of logistics burden; toxicity. Survivability mensuration.
None identified. Inexpensive, especially in relation to the assets that are protected. Also a very costeffective means for an adversary to negate precision weapons systems.
RATIONALE Obscurants across the electromagnetic spectrum protect limited and expensive assets from observation and targeting. They counter enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition capabilities. Mid- and far-IR radiance obscurants can also be used for signaling, deception, IR decoy, and other uses. Laser range finders, laser designators, thermal imagers, and thermal homing sensors operate in the midfar IR band and therefore can be degraded by obscurants in those wavelengths. Joint Vision 2010 includes full-dimensional protection as one of four operational concepts for the future. Although not explicitly stated, degrading enemy RSTA that employs new technologies should be considered to be a component of this concept. Advanced technologies in the hands of an adversary will increase the importance of protection at all echelons. It should also be noted that increased reliance on precision capability by the United States and its allies will increase interest in obscurants by potential adversaries. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Czech Republic France Iran Japan Pakistan South Korea UK
Legend:
Bulgaria Denmark Germany Iraq Netherlands Poland Sweden United States
Canada Egypt Hungary Israel North Korea Russia Switzerland
China Finland India Italy Norway South Africa Syria
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
III-5-62
DATA SHEET III-5.5. MULTISPECTRAL (VISIBLE, INFRARED, MILLIMETER, AND POSSIBLY CENTIMETER)
Packing density >50% of source density; dissemination efficiency >50%; extinction coefficient >2. Conductive fibers or a mixture of materials that are used for the various wavelengths. Field instrumentation; obscurant modeling; production quality control; aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. Obscurant modeling. Reduction of logistics burden, toxicity, reaerosolization. None identified. Inexpensive, especially in relation to the assets that are protected. Also a very costeffective means for an adversary to negate precision weapons systems.
RATIONALE Obscurants across the electromagnetic spectrum protect limited and expensive assets from observation and targeting. They counter enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. Obscurants can also be used for signaling, deception and other uses. Joint Vision 2010 includes full-dimensional protection as one of four operational concepts for the future. Although not explicitly stated, degrading enemy RSTA that employs new technologies will be an important component of this concept. Advanced technologies in the hands of an adversary will increase the importance of protection at all echelons. It should also be noted that increased reliance on precision capability by the United States and its allies will increase interest in obscurants by potential adversaries. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt India Japan Poland South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada France Iran North Korea Russia Spain United States
China Germany Iraq Norway Slovak Republic Switzerland Vietnam
Czech Republic Hungary Israel Pakistan South Africa Syria
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
III-5-63
DATA SHEET III-5.5. SPECTRAL DIRECTION SELECTIVITY

Limit screening to specific regions of the spectra. Specially controlled sizes and shapes of conductive and semiconductive particles or techniques for polarization of an obscurant cloud. Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. Battle modeling. Effectiveness and maintenance of cloud polarization. None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Spectral direction selectivity would theoretically allow friendly troops equipped with the correct instrumentation to look through their own obscurant cloud. If screens were able to be deployed in designated regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, U.S. forces would be able to use sensors in other portions of the spectrum for military systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Israel Norway South Africa United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India Japan Pakistan South Korea Vietnam
Egypt Iran Netherlands Poland Syria
France Iraq North Korea Russia UK
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
A number of countries have increased their work on obscurants since Operation Desert Storm. The United States has some work under,way but funding is needed to see it to fruition.
III-5-64
DATA SHEET III-5.5. TEMPORAL SELECTIVITY

Precisely select amount of time (e.g., 5 minutes or 5 days). Irradiated clouds; using slow heating which would allow selection of screening times in the infrared; degrading coatings. Aerosol test chambers, transmissometers, test ranges, nephelometers. None identified. Past attempts at using red phosphorus in this capacity have met with limited success. None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Being able to select the precise amount of time that an obscurant would be employed would give a tactical edge to the employing party. Only that force would know how long the obscurant would be used, and the attacker would be forced to wait until the obscuration had dissipated. Protecting forces would fall under Joint Vision 2010s concept of full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Israel Poland Syria
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India Japan Russia UK

Significant R&D
Egypt Iran North Korea South Africa United States
France Iraq Pakistan South Korea Vietnam

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
III-5-65
DATA SHEET III-5.5. ENVIRONMENTAL

Signaling and screening obscurants that are environmentally benign, i.e., zero damage to the environment. Environmentally benign substance that still provides significant attention-gathering characteristics. None identified. None identified. Cost and complexity of complete environmental evaluation. None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The use of relatively benign signaling smokes and combat obscurants would permit more realistic training in the use and value of battlefield obscurants. Improved training would result in a force being better prepared for actual combat. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Israel Norway South Africa United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India Italy Pakistan South Korea Viet Nam
Egypt Iran Japan Poland Syria

Moderate R&D
France Iraq North Korea Russia UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
III-5-66
DATA SHEET III-5.5. TECHNOLOGY COUPLING

Concurrent application of use of obscurants, camouflage, and electronic obfuscation to enhance battlefield operations. None identified. None identified. None identified. Potential redundancy and its costs; information introduction. None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The application of multiple technologies has the potential for enhancing each individual effect. Improved battlefield screening could be realized with consequent reductions in combat losses. Although not explicitly included, technology coupling falls within Joint Vision 2010s concept of full-dimensional protection. Technology coupling in this area has been successfully applied previously by U.S. Allies. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Czech Republic France Iran Japan Norway Slovak Republic Sweden UK
Legend:
Bulgaria Denmark Germany Iraq Libya Pakistan South Africa Switzerland United States
Canada Egypt Hungary Israel Netherlands Poland South Korea Syria Viet Nam
China Finland India Italy North Korea Russia Spain
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Developments are military both domestic and foreign. A number of countries have increased their work on obscurants since Operation Desert Storm. The United States has some work underway, but funding is needed to see it to fruition.
III-5-67
DATA SHEET III-5.5. PRECISION PARTICLE PRODUCTION

Ability to uniformly create specific particle shapes and sizes within a narrow range. None identified. Particle size and shape distribution measurement. None identified. Quality control of manufacturing techniques and its costs. There is currently no impetus for the precision of control of particle shape and size in industry, so procedural development would be required. Paint pigments; microwires; electronics. Reduce logistics burden.
RATIONALE Control of particle size and shape would allow for more selectivity in the screening performance. Battlefield screening can be better tuned to known enemy sensors, reducing the amount of material required and hence the overall logistic burden. Some corporate proprietary data is believed to be involved. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Czech Republic India Japan South Africa UK
Legend:
Bulgaria Denmark Iran North Korea South Korea United States
Canada France Iraq Pakistan Sweden

Moderate R&D
China Germany Israel Russia Syria
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Current particulate shaping and sizing techniques are being developed by commercial firms.
III-5-68
DATA SHEET III-5.5. CREATION AND PACKAGING OF NANOMATERIALS

Ability to create specific particle shapes with dimensions less than 100 nm. Conductive or semiconductive materials that can be made as specifically shaped nanoparticles. Accurate measurement of particle size and shape as well as standardized measurement of extinction coefficient. None identified. The creation, reduction in packaging volume, and dispersion of high length/diameter (l/d) conductive particles. Some development may be required, depending on the nanoparticles created to date. Catalytic reactions. As the technology develops, costs will decrease.
RATIONALE The creation of nano-sized particles with diameters between 40 and 70 nm theoretically permits the attainment of extinction coefficients much higher than currently thought possible. This appears to be especially true if the particles are charged. Developing the technology would potentially lead to major reductions in obscurant logistics. Some corporate proprietary data is believed to be involved. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Austria Japan United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Sweden

Significant R&D
Germany Switzerland
Italy UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Research in nanotechnology exists in varying degrees throughout the industrial world. The main countries involved are the United States, Germany, Japan, the UK, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Sweden. For a more complete discussion of nano-particle manufacturing, see Section 12.1.
III-5-69
DATA SHEET III-5.5. MEASUREMENT

Ability to separately measure in the field location, extent, concentration, path length and extinction coefficient. None identified. Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. Data bank related to correlation of measurement techniques and errors of measurement. Field measurement is currently limited by vagaries in micrometeorology and accuracy of assessment techniques. EPA monitoring; weather monitoring. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Current techniques permit a field measurement of extinction coefficient only by inference based upon concentration measurements and calculated path length to yield an approximate value. Enhanced measurement would provide a better picture of what is being developed, how it works, and the performance of sensors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia France Iraq North Korea South Africa UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Israel Pakistan South Korea United States
China India Japan Poland Sweden

Moderate R&D
Denmark Iran Netherlands Russia Syria
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Countries that endeavor to maximize employment of obscurants require enhanced field measurement techniques.
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DATA SHEET III-5.5. PROJECTED OBSCURANTS

Ability to project and successfully disseminate infrared and millimeter-wave material. Carrier fluids that would greatly decrease or eliminate particle clumping and agglomeration in launch and dissemination environments. Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. None identified. Fragility of millimeter-wave screening materials. None identified. Potentially expensive.
RATIONALE Currently capabilities exist for IR and millimeter-wave screening only with self-protection smokes and largearea screening smokes. Projected obscurants would blind a remotely placed enemy. This would extend their use and open new possibilities for full-dimensional protection as espoused in Joint Vision 2010. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Egypt Iran North Korea South Africa United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada France Iraq Pakistan South Korea
China Germany Israel Poland Syria
Czech Republic India Japan Russia UK
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Foreign developments in this area are unknown, although any nation with obscurant capability could be expected to be working on it.
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DATA SHEET III-5.5. OBSCURANT CLEARING

Ability to use particle subsidence or other methods to create holes in obscurant clouds; ability to use energy to create holes. None identified. Aerosol test chambers; transmissometers; test ranges; nephelometers. None identified. Continued movement of the cloud may negate value of hole formation. Fog clearing at airports. Variable.
RATIONALE Although total cloud clearing appears logistically infeasible, it may be possible to create selective, albeit relatively short-lived, holes. This would allow U.S. forces to clear an area that was presumed to be obscured, allowing target acquisition in a surprise mode. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Israel Poland United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India Japan Russia

Significant R&D
Denmark Iran North Korea Syria
France Iraq Pakistan UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Countries that are subject to having obscurants used against their military forces are most likely to be interested in developing this technology. It would have significant commercial application at airports.
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SECTION 7: ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
November 1999
SECTION 7ENERGY SYSTEMS

Scope 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Energy Conversion and Power Generation ........... III-7-21 Energy Storage............................................... III-7-43 Power Conditioning........................................ III-7-69 Biological Energy Systems .............................. III-7-99 Highlights Energy system technologies provide for power generation and energy conversion, energy storage, and power conditioning. The Joint Chiefs have recognized high-energy density power converters as a technology priority. The militarys goal is to increase system power densities by two to five times, depending upon the specific system. Power converters typically take up approximately 50 percent of system volume. Stringent military requirements demand reliable, intelligent/survivable, and affordable energy systems that can perform in battlefield threat environments. Budget pressures and the militarys need for reduced volume and weight, increased performance, and graceful degradation make it difficult for military and commercial compatibility. Advances in power electronics, packaging, and thermal management will drive the performance advances in the state-of-the-art. OVERVIEW This section discusses the developing critical technologies for energy systems embedded in the following subsections: Energy Conversion and Power Generation Energy Storage Power Conditioning Biological Energy.
Energy and power system technologies are among the least visible, and their functions are usually taken for granted because we assume that reliable power will always be available. However, many weapon system platforms, because of different energy and power requirements, integrate a host of diverse technologies for power generation, energy storage, and power conditioning. Because of the weapon system platforms variance in application and mission criteria, a wide range of energy requirements exist. These platforms need not only pulsed or continuous power but also need many niches and diverse technologies to satisfy low-, medium-, and high-power requirements. Factors that influence the development of military energy systems include the critical need to occupy smaller volume, have low weight, provide long life-cycle performance, and be highly reliable and survivable in threat and extreme environments. Because of the militarys stringent performance requirements, the advances in power electronics packaging and integration and in thermal management will be the key drivers in the successful realization of the militarys future vision. The Joint Chiefs have recognized high-density power converter systems as a technology priority, and these systems will require new technology design and packaging approaches that are expected to revolutionize the power electronics industry.
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Specific load requirements (e.g., power level, duration, pulsed, or continuous) drive the system design and the component technologies. To a large extent, the power level required determines the primary energy source and often severely limits the options available to choose from. The mission duration is also a critical factor since certain power-system technologies have inherently useful lifetimes, while others are capable of continuous and extended missions. Finally, the distinctions between single-shot, repetitive, and continuous power systems are critical since the duty cycle places different stresses and performance requirements (e.g., voltage, current, frequency, and temperature) upon the components used. . . . Power levels range over many orders of magnitudefrom milliwatts of continuous power in handheld electronic devices to terawatts in certain directed energy weapons. Durations range from small fractions of a second for single-shot, pulsedpower applications to months or even years for remote power and/or space systems (ATAR, p. I-3). Figure 7.0-1 addresses the complex taxonomy of energy systems. As a real-world example, take a mobile platform (e.g., an air vehicle) as the system. Integrated mission requirements include the ability to hunt and kill (mobility, navigation, and lethality), to communicate, and to ensure the safety of the aircraft and its crew (environment and survivability). Each mission requirement results in the need for distinct subsystems driven by either continuous or pulsed power. The power supply system is, therefore, a conglomeration of energy conversion and power-generation systems driving energy storage, power conditioning, and pulse-forming networks. The energy systems are subject to strict constraints of thermal management, scalability, and integrated functionality. Beneath this layer lie the supporting technologies and components that make everything possible. Stepping from one function to the next reduces output and capability by less than perfect efficiencies.
Mission
Mission Requirements
Lethality Mobility Survivability Communications Environment Computing Navigation
Waveforms
CW Pulsed
Energy Systems Biological Power Conditioning Storage Generation and Conversion
Components Supporting Technologies
Figure 7.0-1. Energy Systems Taxonomy
RATIONALE Energy is generally collected or available from a prime source at low-power levels and power densities. To meet common military load requirements, such as high power (density), the energy is released from storage over an extremely short duration and converted into pulsed-power form. Power is energy per unit time. Therefore, by compressing the duration of time over which energy is supplied, one achieves higher powers. After additional
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compression of the pulsed power, it is delivered to a load with great amplification of power and power density (see Figure 7.0-2).
Low Power Accumulation High Power Output
Primary Energy Source
Energy Storage
Pulse Forming Power Conditioning
Load
AC/DC Charge
s Pulsed Discharge
ns Pulse Power
Figure 7.0-2. Typical High Pulsed-power System (Adapted From Pai, 1995)
In many cases, military energy requirements have a much broader range of demands than the commercial segment. Figure 7.0-3 shows the large variation in peak power output and duty cycle for several types of missions. With the exception of a few commercial radars, navigation systems, communication systems, and industrial processes, typical commercial energy systems do not have the high-output requirements of the military systems shown in Figure 7.0-4. Because of this disparity, only a portion of advanced technologies developed to serve as commercial energy system components can be directly transferred into military systems. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies are competitive in size and cost and are enabling when components can meet requirements of military systems. There is an enduring military vision for reducing weight and volume while increasing performance, reliability, and, most importantly, survivability. This is true for most sizes of applicationsfrom the individual soldier to the largest platforms. Figure 7.0-5 highlights current Soldier Power System and Land Warrior power requirements, and Figure 7.0-6 highlights the electrical power applications for a sample mobile platform (repetition rates are measured in pulses per second). In the latter case, system design is a significant challenge because of the need for both continuous wave (CW) and pulsed subsystems and dense packaging. In one sense, Soldier Power Systems are a mobile platform; however, we mention them specifically because of their unique requirements. Equipment for the dismounted soldier must be both compact and rugged. Availability of fuel, specific energy, specific power, minimal signature (electronic, thermal and acoustic), simplicity of operation, and environmental impact are also major considerations. The mass a soldier can carry on a mission is already approaching its limits forcing a trade-off of bullets or food for batteries to power electronics (NRC, p. 28). Mobile Platform Energy Systems combine the propulsion and electric energy generation functions. In the future, mobile platforms may benefit from integrating the power system to include power for weapons and for propulsion (mobility) and other vehicle electric functions. With careful planning and a well-thought-out control strategy, a central power system may feed the continuous, transient, and pulsed loads while reducing the platform size and increasing the efficiency. Developing technologies are going to enable the military to move toward replacing heavy, inefficient systems with more efficient more electric platforms. Critically developing technologies are essentially converging towards all-electric vehicles. Currently, some commercial hybrid vehicles, primarily transit buses, are being made in quantity. In the United States and Europe, several programs have made prototypes or electric or hybrid-electric military vehicles, and some are even being tested.
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1.0 continuous Soldier Systems Primary Platform Power
Electronics
Approximate "Duty Cycle"
0.1
Long-life Remote Sensors
Terminal Guidance and Fuzing 0.01
EM Launcher (Rail Gun)
Tactical Radar 0.001 High-Power Microwave Weapons
103
106
109
1012
Peak Power Output in Watts
Figure 7.0-3. Peak Power and Duty Cycle for Pulsed and High-Energy Systems and CW Energy Systems for Several Applications or Missions (Adapted From ATAR)
1011 1010 109 108 107 106
(Nuclear) Explosives (Conventional) Fuel Combustion Pulsed Rotating Machinery
Inductors Capacitors
Nuclear Power
105
Continuous Rotating Machinery

104 103 102
Fuel Cells Thermal and Reserve Batteries Primary Batteries Solar
10
Secondary Batteries
1 ns s ms s 10 s 1m 10 m 1 hr 10 hr 1d 10 d 1m 1y 10 y
Approxim ate
Missio n Duration
Figure 7.0-4. Trends in Discharge Times of Power System Technologies (Adapted From ATAR)
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Figure 7.0-5. Sample Power Requirements of Soldier Power Systems (Source: NRC, 1997)
Figure 7.0-6. Advanced Hybrid Ground Vehicle (Source: ATAR)
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BACKGROUND To create useful power, energy is converted from potential to kinetic and either stored or conditioned and then delivered to a load. This power can be provided continuously or in pulses. Varying military applications require power to be delivered in time periods ranging from extremely short durations (on the order of nanoseconds, 10-9 sec) to continuous duty. Specifically, many specialized advanced weapons require pulsed power. Power electronics and other components used in continuous systems have very different characteristics from those used in pulsed systems. Not only are the materials and component advancements in energy systems key, but design philosophies are essential for delivering a product in the most efficient and affordable manner. The approach of Synchronizing Enabling Technologies (SET) is the assessment and the development or implementation of enabling technologies to support a thrust area. It is analogous to knowing the ingredients for a recipe and timing their preparation and introduction into the amalgam. To be successful, a proper assessment of needed enablers should be completed during the early phases of a technologys development. Enablers can range from parallel developments to components or materials, such as composites, that are in the research and testing phase. Synchronizing technologies is an important management issue that will be reiterated further in relevant technology areas. Soldier Systems
Soldier Power Systems (see Figure 7.0-5) will provide the 21st century warrior with power sources that are enabling for a host of man-portable electronic devices ranging from communications and sensors to weapons. The warfighter will be the keystone of the future digitized Army. Power requirements have been estimated as high as 500 W, with 22.9 W as the current power assessment for the (Army) approved Land Warrior system (NRC, 1997). In the far term, nuclear power and rotating machinery (microturbines) offer choices for soldier power. Nuclear power has not yet come to practical design because of significant system-implementation issues associated with radiation near biological tissue and social feelings towards ionizing radiation. The specific energy of radioisotopes, however, which can be greater than 100 MW hrs/kg, combined with more efficient energy converters, could easily solve power-generation issues for the unmanned future soldier. Continued efforts may also see other power technologies come into use for the infantry. Such technologies include biological energy sources (for milliwatt applications) and advanced capacitors and converters. Mobile Platform Energy Systems Mobile military systems combine the prime propulsion and onboard electrical power-generation functions. The net effect is an energy system that has operational advantages of reduced signature, increased energy density, lower weight and volume, greater flexibility in configuration, and greater economy/reliability. Electrical energy components are characterized by a significant reduction in moving parts, the elimination of rigid connections, and an improved ability to use small and irregular spaces within a vehicle. Potential application areas for migrating to a more-electric drive include: Active suspension Active protection Drives Computations Motor controllers and electric filters Actuators Weapons Sensors.
Energy systems for all types of combat vehicles are broadly characterized by the level of energy required and the time over which the energy is demanded (pulsed or continuous). Components of the platforms energy system include an engine-generator, which is sized to meet the average energy requirements of the vehicle. (This is not always true, however, especially in critical military systems that must be redundant and survive battle damage.) Coupled to this are the energy-storage and energy-management components that make it possible for the system to meet the peak energy demands required in mission execution. Energy density, thermal management, cost, and
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packaging are critical parameters for military energy systems. Aggressive management, combined with deliberate restraint of system designs to those that satisfy required parameters, will be essential to producing economical, reliable, and high-performance systems. Thermal and electromagnetic capability (EMC) properties will remain essential design and performance parameters. Electronic Packaging And Thermal Management Some of the major considerations in the Soldier Power and Mobile Platform Energy Systems are electronic packaging and thermal management. The method by which components and assemblies are integrated play a vital role in the performance and reliability of an end product. Some of the major advances in power technologyboth in performance and in costwill be the result of electro-mechanical-magnetic packaging. Packaging occurs at all levels of product development. Because it is ubiquitous, the following definition indicates how it is used in our discussions: Each level in the electronics hierarchy has within itself the combining of parts to make an assembly. For example, a semiconductor has a die, wire, housing, and leads to form a component. The manner in which these parts are put together is called packaging. Packaging mainly involves thermal management, structural integrity, interconnections, and electromagnetic compatibility. We can apply this same example to each level of assembly in an electronic system (e.g., begin with components and then move to subassemblies, power supplies, DC-DC converters, and functional systems). Finally, when all these parts are integrated together (system packaging), the result is an end product. One of the revolutionary new packaging approaches is to integrate individual components into each other to form a new component that has increased functionality, lower cost, and higher reliability because of reduced interconnections. An example of this is integrating resistors and capacitors into the internal layers of a printed circuit board. This results in greater packaging density, lower cost and reduced interconnection (compared with discrete components) and, thus, higher reliability. Another example would be integrating semiconductor dies directly into magnetic assemblies, such as a transformer. This is a new approach and will have a profound impact on discrete component manufacturers as the technology matures. For example, if capacitors were directly embedded in a printed circuit board, the demand for discrete capacitors would be less. Understanding the physics and manufacturing processes needed in this functional integration is critical for making significant advances in packaging. Electronic packaging is a rapidly advancing technology that has been fairly dormant for many years. While advanced electronic packaging techniques have been developed in microelectronics, little significant work has been done in the higher levels of the interconnect hierarchy (subsystems and systems packaging). Packaging, with respect to power systems, must be viewed from an end-use perspective in order for the system to be efficient and effective. This is becoming more important with the introduction of integrated functionality, where multiple discrete components are being integrated and built as a new discrete component. Advanced packaging is critical for meeting the demands of efficiency, thermal management, and power density in future power systems. Integration at all levels will be needed, including interconnections such as direct die attach technology. To illustrate, capacitors and magnetics are critical components that require improvements to meet the new packaging demands. Further, high-temperature and high-efficiency power semiconductors are also important component needs. In all cases, necessary technological advances include the materials and processes used in building such components. Advances in thermal management will come from heat spreaders and selective cooling approaches. In cases where integrated functionality is used, hybrid test equipment will be needed to evaluate the parameters and characteristics of multiple components in one (component). High-technology processing equipment will also be needed for areas previously satisfied by lower technology processes. Education and establishing a systems-level packaging mentality are the main issues in evolving to advanced packaging capabilities. Change is required to overcome the headset of single-level packaging. Effecting this change will be difficult because of the subsystem mentality that exists and the way parts are designed and manufactured in todays environment. Power technology has moved forward in the last several years at a fairly rapid pace, although, in general, it has not moved nearly as fast as it has within the semiconductor industry. This difference in sector performance is evident across the military and the industrial communities. Many of the packaging demands for higher density, higher performance, lower weight, and lower cost power systems are common to both areas, especially in the area of more cost-effective semiconductors. The comparatively large physical size of power system components, compared with the rest of the electronic package, has inhibited system density improvements. Reactive components tend to be large,
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heavy, and inefficient. Spatial compression of these components produces increased power density (W/cm3), without decrease of thermal impedance, resulting in localized heat build up. Semiconductor design philosophies can be extended to high-density power converters and to regulators, where system packaging is critical. Proper partitioning, with special attention given to electromagnetic interference and thermal management, will be needed. Thermal management will enlist a combination of active and passive cooling technologies to control hot spots. Thermally conductive materials will play a bigger role in thermal management, with heat spreading being used to a larger degree. Systems packaging will require the integrator to understand clearly each subassembly and how it will affect system performance. The application of high-density power regulators into the systems architecture will be key to enhanced system performance. Integrated Functionality An area that is emerging from the packaging discipline is Integrated Functionality. The role of the packaging engineer is to integrate components into a functional assembly using processes and assembly techniques made available to the manufacturer. This in itself may be viewed as integrating functionality; however, it is also starting to emerge at a lower level. This function actually involves the discrete components, such as resistors, capacitors, and semiconductors used in assemblies. We call this integrating functionality at the component level. The result of this activity is the creation of new components that contain the collective features of multiple components (see Figure 7.0-7). This change is profound since it will change the supplier base to the power supply industry. The rationale behind the development of integrated functional components is increased reliability, better performance, space reduction, and cost benefitsfeatures that are desired in power product development programs at all levels.
New Functional Printed Circuit Board
Embedded Resistors
Embedded Capacitors
Planar Magnetics
Embedded Semiconductors
Interconnection Device
Embedded Windings
Figure 7.0-7. Example of Integrated Functionality
The challenges in integrating the functionality of components are significant but can result in major advances in end-product cost and reliability. For example, to be able to combine the desired features of multiple components, a good understanding of the individual components is necessary. This includes understanding the way in which the components are manufactured and knowing their constraints. With this knowledge, combining features of multiple components into one part can, in many cases, become a reality. An example of integrated functionality can be seen in planar magnetics. This is where the windings for the magnetics are incorporated in the printed circuit board using etched circuit traces. The core material is inserted in holes or slots in the printed circuit board and bonded, to complete the magnetic assembly. This operation, in essence, replaces a discrete component. It also eliminates the core winder and creates a more functional printed circuit board. It takes manual labor out of the winding process, which, in turn, will improve cost and quality. The printed circuit board manufacturer is developing new skills in producing planar magnetics, but these new skills do not significantly affect the manufacturing process. A result of planar magnetics is the elimination of a discrete component in the overall assembly, which, in turn, increases reliability. The business ramification is a reduction in purchased magnetic assemblies. Eliminating the need for particular discrete magnetic components takes a certain amount of business from the transformer companies but also provides some packaging flexibility by core geometry selection, especially in low-profile applications.
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While this change had little affect on the printed circuit industry, other component integrations will have a profound impact. An example is the emerging technology of embedded capacitors. Significant reductions to the size of a power supply can be realized by replacing discrete capacitors mounted on the printed circuit board by embedding capacitors within the layers of a printed circuit board. As new dielectric material technology with high-energy storage features becomes available, a breakthrough in power density could result. This integration would have a large impact on printed circuit board manufacturers. They would be building a capacitor(s) into their boards, thus becoming a manufacturer of an electronic component and an interconnection component. This would involve enhancing the knowledge base of printed-circuit people in many areas. They would be required to learn new manufacturing processes and deal with new materials and would have to be able to test their embedded capacitors. They would require much of the knowledge of capacitor manufacturers. This would be like building a capacitor without a package (as in a discrete component). Terminations of the capacitor would be included in circuit traces and plated through holes. The new processes that will be needed to build this product presently exist in the semiconductor and other industries and can be easily transitioned. The equipment required would include vacuum deposition equipment. Although the printed circuit business will change, the financial rewards could be huge. The power supply industry desperately needs higher power density and the replacement of discrete capacitors. Capacitors currently consume about 20 to 30 percent of the volume of a power supply, depending on the type of power supply. Capacitors also account for about 20 percent of the cost of a power supply. This could be a very lucrative new business. However, again, there are business ramifications. New capital equipment purchases would be needed and the labor force would have to be trained. This new component will affect the discrete capacitor manufacturing companies by decreasing the need for discrete components. Other examples of integrated functionality have also had an impact on power electronics [e.g., applicationspecific integrated circuits (ASICs)]. ASICs have replaced many discrete components with a single package. Before ASICs, many electronic circuits required several discrete components to provide a certain function, such as housekeeping circuitry for sensing power supply functions. Some standardization was developed and ASICs became very practical devices. Replacing several discrete components with a single component that has the reliability of an integrated circuit has had a large effect on power supply reliability. A mean time between failure (MTBF) of over 1 million hours for a DC-DC converter is not unusual today. Much of this improvement can be attributed to integrated functionality and improved designs. Direct die attach technology is another area being used more frequently. This eliminates a level of interconnection and can increase power density and improve reliability. Other designs that demonstrate additional ways of integrating functionality (by combining parts and reducing the amount of interconnections) will soon be introduced to the market. This interesting trend will have a significant impact on todays discrete component supplier. Suppliers that today sell discrete components must become involved in this activity if they want to preserve their markets or open new markets. Improvements from military mobile systems with integrated functionality include: Simplicity Permanent magnetic materials Reliability Efficiency Operating temperature Power density Thermal management Energy extraction.
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Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) When dealing with electromagnetic emissions, two important considerations are conducted emissions and radiated emissions. Conducted emissions are generally managed with in-line electromagnetic interference (EMI) filters. Radiated emissions usually require containment with ferrous metal materials and shielding design approaches to eliminate radiation. Shielding materials would include products such as fingerstock and braided mesh for seams and doors or ports to the electronic equipment. High-Energy Density Conventional Systems High-density conventional systems will be used for many applications in mobile platforms. High-density conventional systems are those comprising components/subsystems rated at less than 500 kW. Such systems are found in almost every military operating system, including multiple components of major weapons. Critical technologies in this section cover both energy sources and power-conditioning activities. Energy systems are fundamental components, which are often specifically tailored for each of the other major technology areas within the list of Military Critical Technologies (MCTs). Technologies for components or systems rated at less than 500 kW are migrating toward revolutionary changes in energy density and precision. This is critical to the military because of the needed improvements in system performance: new capabilities are becoming possible. Power system miniaturization is an important element and has led to micropackaging on a chip and distributed packaging to perform a function such as track motor or flight control. In the near future, many weapons systems that now commonly use mechanical, hydraulic, or pneumatic components will rely on electrical systems. Major initiatives include the More-Electric Aircraft, All-Electric Ship, and the Future Combat Vehicle (Army). Military requirements for energy systems are distinguished primarily by the need for ruggedized packaging, and high-energy and high-power densities. Thermal stress is the primary concern, with shock stress an important secondary regard. Thermal management or components capable of functioning at high temperatures are keys to reduced failure rates and improved system survivability. Military demand for low failure (total life-cycle reliability) drives new design architectures. As a result, approximately 40 percent of the total demand for military energy systems results in custom-designed applications to fit military systems requirements. Such requirements create pervasive pressures to reduce production and product costs. High-Density Converters An example of high-density conventional systems would include high-energy density converters. DC-DC power regulators in the military and the commercial sectors have become smaller and more powerful. One of the driving factors in the military sectors is weight as it applies to a payload. In the commercial arena, this trend has been driven by the fast-moving semiconductor industry. Hardware size in telecommunications, networking, and computer systems has been greatly reduced by the high-performance semiconductors now in the marketplace. Slow to follow this technology trend are the DC-DC power regulators. However, in industry, significant gains have been achieved in reducing of the size and increasing the reliability of DC-DC power regulators. In industry, regulators designed today can be packaged in volumes of 70 to 100 W/in3 and have a MTBF of over 1 million hoursnumbers that would look very much like a military requirement just 5 to 10 years ago. The resulting designs of these high-power density regulators are accomplished by designing new topologies, developing new components, increasing the functionality of components, and mastering electro-mechanical packaging. This is the way to get to high-density regulators. However, as the semiconductors progress to lower and lower voltages and the chip power levels increase, the issues of high current distribution and the associated power losses become significant, putting more difficult constraints on the design engineers. The National Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors developed by the Semiconductor Industry Association has projected the power supply voltage to be 1.8 V by the year 2001 and down to 0.9 V by the year 2010. The maximum power associated with these numbers is also projected to increase significantly. In 2001, the power at 1.8 V is expected to be 120 watts, and, in 2010, the power at 0.9 V is expected to be 180 W. With this level of chip power density, power regulator designers must consider several strategies. Power system architecture ranks as one of the most important considerations. With the very-high-power requirements of the semiconductors, one design option is point-of-load power architecture, which means placing the regulator as close to the actual load as possible. This would minimize the power distribution losses. This would also require the designer to view the power supply at the system level, integrating it into the system efficiently. This effort requires the use of advanced systems-packaging designs with careful considerations for thermal management.
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Thermal cooling technologies become an important factor in this overall package, and chilled air becomes an important choice, especially in chip cooling. Another option is distributed power. This approach would locate the power regulators close to the load but not at the point of load. This approach would use larger regulators that provide power to more than a single chip. The problem of power losses caused by the high current levels is addressed with power bussing techniques. The interconnection design must receive careful consideration. To minimize power losses, hard connections, such as bolted on bussbars, would be preferable to removable connectors. An advantage of this power architecture is that the approach will easily accommodate n+1 redundancy. This configuration provides an extra regulator paralleled with the primary regulators. If a regulator fails, the extra regulator will automatically be activated. This will afford the overall system higher availability and will appear to the user as increased reliability. If current sharing is being used with the paralleled regulators, actual reliability is increased because of the reduced loading on the individual regulators. This approach is possible but not nearly as suitable as the point-of-load power architecture, since it would take up real estate that is not readily available and would not be as cost effective. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Table 7.0-1 highlights technology groups, their function and relevant waveforms, and some applications where they may be found. Figure 7.0-8 compares the relative parameters of power electronics.
Table 7.0-1. Technology Groups and Their Functions (Adapted From ATAR)
DIRE CTE D EN ERG Y WE ELEC APO TRO NS NIC WAR RAD FAR AR E
X X X X X X X X X X
POW ER C OND ITIO NING
ENDURING TECHNOLOGY GROUP
Batteries Fuel Cells Capacitors Switches Rotating Machinery Inductors
CW, P CW, P
CW, P
STO RAG E
CW, P P CW, P CW, P CW, P
CW, P CW, P P P X
SOL DIER SYS TEM S COM MUN ICAT ION COM PUT ERS ELEC TRIC VEH ICLE STEA S LTH HPM
X X
X X X X
X X
X X
X X X X X X
X X
FUNCTIONALITY
MILITARY APPLICATION
CW = P=
Continuous Pulsed
Batteries A battery is a device that converts chemical energy to electrical energy. The two types of batteries are primary and secondary (rechargeable). Batteries are desirable because of their reduced thermal and acoustical signature, ability to be molded into many configurations (mission specific), portability, and ability to store energy at high densities. Table 7.0-2 displays the status of the North American military battery industry as of 1994. Battery design and fabrication is a proprietary, art-intensive activity in which details of know-how are closely held and protected. Factors of particular interest include high-temperature materials; high-conductivity electrolytes; the selection, refinement, and use of specific catalysts; electrode design and fabrication; packaging (especially corrosion and safety seals); additives for electrodes and electrolytes; and flexible small-lot manufacturing
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ACT IVE P ROT ECT ION NUC LEA R EF FEC TS S LAS IMUL ER W ATIO EAP N ONS RAIL GUN S
X X X X X X X X X X X X
GEN ERA TION
& CO NVE RSIO N
Figure 7.0-8. Relative Capabilities in Power Electronics
technology. In addition, the controlled (graceful) degradation in performance over timeas opposed to a sudden catastrophic failureis a very desirable military trait. Figure 7.0-9 displays the inherent tradeoffs in battery technology. Increasing stored energy comes at the expense of power performancewith one caveat: For traditional battery construction and electrochemistries, an apparent trend indicates that a single battery is typically not able to provide both high power and high energy efficiently.
Table 7.0-2. Status of North American Military Battery Industry by Chemistry (Source: NATIBO)
Military/ Commercial Demand Medium military demand. No commercial demand. Potential for emergency power systems in commercial. Military demand for lithium sulfur dioxide decreasing. Increased military interest in other lithium chemistries. Small commercial demand. Commercial demand for lithium ion and lithium polymer increasing. Military demand decreasing. Small, niche commercial demand. Present Supplier Health One healthy supplier. Others considering entry. Healthy. Projected Business Climate Stable and flat.
Chemistry Thermal
Base Health
Convertibility N/A.
Lithium
Five companies with poor-to-good health.
Diversification from military to commercial market is a concern because of a rapid military decrease and a slow commercial increase. Military transition to lithium maganese dioxide should support at least two suppliers. Suppliers looking for commercial market to sustain business. Not required.
Need product diversification based on increased commercial demand.
Lithium sulfur dioxide to be replaced by lithium maganese dioxide. Lithium thionyl chloride dual use today (bobbin configuration). Lithium ion dual use for future. N/A.
Mercury
Presently stable. Eventually supplier will disappear.
Market going away.
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Table 7.0-2. Status of North American Military Battery Industry by Chemistry (Source: NATIBO) (Continued)
Military/ Commercial Demand Mostly military demand. Some commercial demand. High commercial demand. Piggyback military applications. New commercial applications for the future. High commercial demand. Piggyback military applications. Small military demand. Small commercial demand. Present Supplier Health Four suppliers with fair-to-good health. Projected Business Climate Stable, but overall demand decreasing. Excellent and expanding.
Chemistry Silver
Base Health Healthy. Silver cadium going away. Healthy.
Convertibility N/A.
Lead Acid
Four healthy suppliers.
Full convertibility and dual use.
Nickel Cadium Magnesium
Three healthy suppliers. Two healthy suppliers.
Healthy.
Excellent and expanding. Stable and flat.
Full convertibility and dual use. Army uses dualuse batteries. Navy does not use dual-use batteries.
Healthy.
Figure 7.0-9. Tradeoffs in Battery Technology (Source: IEEE, Nov. 1998)
Fuel Cells A fuel cell is a continuous-feed electrochemical device of limited pulse power capability (ATAR, p. II-14). It produces electricity by oxidizing hydrogen. Fuel cells are categorized by the electrolyte that is contained within them and by their operating temperature. Air or oxygen is used as the oxidant, and hydrogen or hydrogen derived from a
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carbonaceous fuel is used. (Hydrogen is the simplest fuel from an operational viewpoint, with increasing difficulty in consuming more complex fuels from methanol through diesel.) However, storing hydrogen on the battlefield is difficult because it needs to be maintained at near absolute zero temperature and is a formidable fire hazard. Present systems require that such hydrocarbon fuels be reformed or partially oxidized to yield hydrogen. Current smaller (200300 W) systems are anticipated to use hydrogen and, subsequently, methanol as a fuel. For small power source applications, direct methanol fuel cells will emerge early in the next century (about 2005). Although hydrogen is a difficult logistics issue, it can supply more kilowatt-hours per kilogram than other fuels (see Table 7.0-3).
Table 7.0-3. Specific Energies of Various Fuels (Source: NRC, 1997) Fuel Hydrogen Gasoline Diesel Methanol Propane Specific Energy (kWhrs/kg) 33.3 12.2 11.9 5.5 12.8
Fuel cells that can use diesel JP8 fuel are of special interest to the military since these fuel cells would reduce the logistics burden of supplying multiple fuel types to the battlefield. This requires a reformer, however, to process the fuel before it is used. As electric vehicles (EVs) and high-technology, low-weight, electrically powered devices expand in number and importance, the market for fuel cells is likely to expand rapidly. All fuel cells have tradeoffs. The advantages: they are lightweight; have high energy output, significantly reduced thermal and acoustic signatures [e.g., proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFCs)], cogeneration abilities, and clean operation (primary byproduct being water; and are very durable. The disadvantages: they are expensive, occasionally inconvenient, and sensitive to airborne contaminates. Most scientists believe that these problems will be solved relatively quickly as research and development (R&D) proceeds in this area. Early in the next century, fuel cell costs should approach U.S. $50/kW and be more competitive with internal combustion engines. Among the vehicular applications for fuel cells are spacecraft, aircraft, industrial, automotive, ship, and submersible vehicles. Of these, only spacecraft and submarine applications have reached the commercial stage. Industrial and automotive applications are in the near-commercial and R&D stages, respectively. Ships and aircraft powered by fuel cells are the applications that are furthest from the market because they are still in the conceptual stage. Ballard of Canada has developed small fuel cells for possible use in manpack radio sets and laptop computers. Fuel cells are still in the early phases for battlefield usage. Currently, only PEMFCs demonstrate practical applicability for soldier power. Figure 7.0-10 forecasts the average power for fuel cells. These data represent the maximum demonstrated power of the largest fuel cells. Fuel cells are also being tested for electrical power for buses, cars, and other vehicles. Many prototypes currently exist. Among the military applications for the fuel cell are EVs and the Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE), both of which would provide more power and less weight for the vehicles and man-portable units. Another application for large-scale fuel cells is prime power generation. Fuel cell power plants have been developed and are being used in several remote areas to generate power for small communities. Moreover, fuel cells have been used in large-scale cogeneration applications, where they produce heat and electricity for buildings. This is possible because fuel cells generate a great deal of heat during operation. As fuel cells become more commercially available, they are expected to take a significant market share from batteries because of their greater power and
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Figure 7.0-10. Fuel Cell Average Power Forecast
lighter weight. The final size of the market for vehicular fuel cells will be determined by the developers ability to decrease the cost-per-watt of energy. As the cost for the fuel cells is reduced, the market will grow. Commercial production of automotive fuel cells is expected by 2005, and production over 100,000 units per year by 2010. Capacitors Capacitors (see Figure 7.0-11) are a basic component for energy storage and power conditioning in a variety of pulsed and continuous applications. Areas of application include filters in alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) systems, AC resonant-charging power supplies, switched-mode power supplies, energy storage system, and high-frequency bypass circuitry. Major types of capacitors are usually described by their insulators, such as polymer, ceramic, chemical double layer (CDL), electrolytic, and mica (see Figure 7.0-12). Performance depends upon the usage (burst vs. continuous), the duty cycle, and the amount of energy or charge transferred. The major technical problem involves developing new dielectric materials and the related manufacturing processes to produce very-highenergy density capacitors that will operate at very-high-power levels. Capacitors have wide applications in consumer electronics, telecommunications, computers, medical instruments, aircraft, spacecraft, robotics, and automobiles in the defense and the commercial sectors. These applications determine the performance of the capacitor market. For example, if a country has a strong consumer electronics sector in its economy (such as Japan), the capacitors found in those types of applications are going to perform particularly well. Most of the capacitors being manufactured are for small electronic devices, primarily consumer oriented. The economic forces affecting these devices are well known, and there is a wealth of market data available. The economic forces affecting the consumer market are quite different from those affecting the capacitors of interest to this analysis. Capacitors capable of very-high-energy density at very high power are a special subcategory, and little economic information is available since this is such a specialized market. However, certain comparisons can be made. Capacitors, in general, are following the trend in semiconductor technologies: components are getting smaller, lighter, and more powerful. Greater amounts of capacitance are being fit into the same or smaller sized packages. These developments have compelled manufacturers to keep up with industry demands, and these demands have created pressure on the manufacturers to make huge capital expenditures on manufacturing equipment so they can produce state-of-the-art technology. This causes a market consolidation. Firms who cannot maintain these
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No R&D
Figure 7.0-11. (High-Energy Density) Capacitor Technology Forecast Note for Figure 7.0-11: The diamonds represent a future without R&D in capacitors, while the squares identify an extrapolation with continued R&D.
expenditures either fold, get bought out, or find a niche where they can remain solvent. Consolidation has occurred mostly in the capacitor market, and those firms who are present and functioning in the market will most likely continue be a factor in the future. Ultracapacitors (also known as supercapacitors and CDL) are emerging as viable energy storage devices for hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs), uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), and automotive and aircraft ignition systems. Presently, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia have active ultracapacitor research, development, and engineering (RD&E) programs. HEVs with ultracapacitors have been demonstrated in France, Italy, Japan, and Russia. Several foreign countries produce high-quality capacitors for the electronics industry (France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom). The United States is the world leader (based on energy density, W hrs/kg) in highpower capacitors, especially those suited for the very-high-pulsed-power applications needed by the military. Maxwell Labs and Aerovox are the two leading manufacturers. In addition, Martin Marietta, General electric (GE), and some smaller companies (Power-One, Giner, Pinnacle Research, Evans) are involved in certain types of specialpurpose high-power or high-density capacitors. Filtering applies to mainly AC ripple suppression in DC bus and power transmission systems. The specific capacitor technology employed is application specific and dominated by ripple frequency. In some applications, large fractions of the stored energy are removed from the capacitor during some portions of the mission, making the capacitor internal losses a dominant consideration in applicability and efficiency. Switches Switches are critical components for high-power conditioning and pulse formation. They are mainly used in networks designed to convert power from one form to another. A switchs internal environment can be solid state, gas, magnetic, or liquid. The driving requirements in switch technology are high efficiency (greater than 98 percent), negligible internal inductance (<< 1 nH/A), and increased operating temperatures (55 through +500 C desirable). The latter is being realized through Silicon Carbide (SiC) switches, which are an emerging approach to the temperature problem. Applications are motor control systems, UPSs, power conditioning, high-voltage DC
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Figure 7.0-12. Types of Capacitors (Source: Mallory Capacitors)
transmission, inductive heating, and many other commercial applications. Figure 7.0-13 compares voltages and speeds for various switches, and Figure 7.0-14 highlights the trends for several switches.
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20
Thyristor 15
GTO 10
5 MCT IGBT 0 0.1 1 10 10 2 10 3 10 4 10 5 10 6 Switchin g Speed (H z)
Figure 7.0-13. Speeds for Switching Devices (Source: ATAR)
Figure 7.0-14. Trends for Switching Technology (Source: NRC, 1993)
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In establishing operating parameters of high-energy switches, care must be taken to avoid subjecting the device to conditions that are potentially capable of causing a fault. For the SCR [Silicon Controlled Rectifier] switch, a fault is a catastrophic event. The spark gap and the triggered vacuum switch, however, regain most, if not all, of their capabilities after a fault. A fault can also cause damage to the overall system as well as the loss of the effectiveness of the shot or the shot itself (H. Singh et al. 1999). Rotating Machinery Rotating machines offer the potential for storage and generation of electrical energy. The key requirement is a reduction in size. The Department of Defense (DoD) is interested in several types of rotating machines various pulsed and continuous applications. These applications range from electromechanical energy storage systems using flywheels to high-power density alternators and generators for power generation. Measuring the size of the rotating machine market depends upon what type of device is being explored. Many different devices are referred to as rotating machines, including various motors, generators, and flywheels. The market for the EV application of a rotating machine is likely to expand quickly. California has enacted a series of strict emission laws that require all car manufacturers to produce zero-emission vehicles by the early 21st century. Among the technologies being introduced to meet these deadlines, the most viable seems to be the EV. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 7.0-15) Foreign capability will not necessarily follow the same progression as the United States. Culture and diverse needs may be factors that affect developing technologies in different nations. An extensive list of global fuel cell developers can be found at http://216.51.18.233/fcdevel.html .
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Country Australia Canada China Finland France Germany India Ireland Israel Italy Japan Norway Russia South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Ukraine UK United States
Section 7.1 Energy Conversion and Power Generation
Section 7.2 Energy Storage
Section 7.3 Power Conditioning
Section 7.4 Biological Energy Systems

Significant R&D Moderate R&D

Limited R&D

Extensive R&D
Figure 7.0-15. Energy Systems Worldwide Technology Assessment (WTA) Summary
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SECTION 7.1ENERGY CONVERSION AND POWER GENERATION

Highlights The future battlefield will require systems supplying power at levels ranging from milliwatts to gigawatts. Advanced precision weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), radar, and electronics countermeasures and communications systems are enabled through next-generation high-energy electronics systems, including the prime energy sources.
OVERVIEW Energy conversion and power generation encompass the transformation of biological, chemical, electromagnetic, nuclear, mechanical, and thermal energy or reactions into electrical power. The output may pulsed, burst, or continuous. The future battlefield will require systems supplying power at levels ranging from milliwatts to gigawatts. Pulsed power is generated by the inherently pulsed nature of the source, such as explosive technologies, or derived through the use of pulse-forming networks. Further, pulsed sources can be used in conjunction with fast switches to provide pulses of shorter duration, higher frequency, and greater peak power. Burst is a form of pulsed power with the duration between shots (off) being much greater than the on duration. Continuous power, by definition, is supplied on a continual basis by sources ranging in size from batteries to large turbines. RATIONALE All military platforms are subject to volume and weight constraints. In addition, since the ability to initiate actions without awareness by any adversary is becoming more significant, the need for stealthy land, sea, and air platforms is more important. With the exception of hydrocarbon-fuelled air vehicles, all others can be optimized for limited missions using electrical energy. HEVs and all-electric vehicles will integrate traditional power-generation devices (e.g., combustion engines and generators) with power sources (e.g., batteries and fuel cells). Further, ultracapacitors and batteries have been used with regenerative brakingthe process of reclaiming energy through deceleration. All-electric vehicles rely strictly on batteries for power generation, while HEVs combine batteries with other sources of power. Series HEVs use combustion engines or fuel cells to generate electric power and use electric motors to drive the wheels. Parallel HEVs take some of the power from the combustion engine as shaft power and deliver this power directly to the wheels in parallel with the electric motors. These robust platforms eliminate the use of hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical power, and the benefits are numerous. Mobile platforms are important in this discussion because their subsystems require pulsed or continuous power, which is provided by the larger power-generation system. Mobility itself has its own power requirements, which vary with the motion of the vehicle. For example, acceleration requires more power than deceleration. In battle conditions, an HEV would need to provide continuous power to computer, environmental, and low-observable subsystems, radar and mobility. Pulsed power would be required for weaponization [including high-power microwave (HPM), lasers, electronic warfare (EW), and directed energy (DE)], for active protection, and for augmenting propulsion. Mobile platforms include attack vehicles and support vehicles. Pulsed-Power Generation Pulsed-power systems are necessary to parts of current and future military systems. Current use ranges from laser range-finders and tactical communication to radars, jammers, and electronic countermeasures. In the future, pulsed-power systems will be critical enabling subsystems for military weapons and other systems ranging from kinetic energy (KE), microwave, and laser weapons to pulsed jammers, mine destruction, and active protective systems. Such particular applications may be powered by a unique combination of the prime power source, energy storage, and power-conditioning and pulse-forming networks.
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Continuous Power Generation Continuous power-generation systems are those ranging from several watts for soldier systems to many gigawatts for EVs. Fuel cells, one source of continuous power, are of interest to all branches of the military because of their low signature, high-energy density, and efficiency characteristics. A significant problem in current fuel cell design is weight because of the requisite pressurized vessels that are heavier than the fuel. While this is not as great an issue for ship platforms, non-electric ground mobility will find more supportability and functionality in internal combustion turboshaft engines in the near term and probably the mid-term. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT China, Germany, Japan, and Russia are the world leaders in this category, whereas the United States is the world leader in most facets of mobile electric platform energy systems. Commercial counterparts are unlikely to be developed because of performance, volume, and environmental demands, combined with low production volumes. Most foreign endeavors to develop total mobile electric platform energy systems will be regarded as highly competitive military activities and would require monitoring in the absence of a strong outlook for cooperation Japan has very advanced commercial fuel cells, and Canada has strength in the niche area of fuel cells.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-7.1. ENERGY CONVERSION AND POWER GENERATION
Lithium Thermal Battery (Primary) ......................................................................................... III-7-25 Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) ....................................................................... III-7-27 Solid Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) ............................................................................................... III-7-29 Microturbines ...................................................................................................................... III-7-31 Photovoltaics (PVs) .............................................................................................................. III-7-33 Thermionic Converters .......................................................................................................... III-7-35 Explosive Magnetohydrodynamic Generators (EMHDGs) ............................................................. III-7-36 Magnetic Flux Compression Generators (MFCGs) ..................................................................... III-7-38 Alkali Metal Thermal to Electric Converter (AMTEC) .................................................................III-7-40
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. LITHIUM THERMAL BATTERY (PRIMARY)

Lithium thermal batteries are a fairly mature technology, and major advancements are not expected. They are an energetic system, capable of high power densities with ultralow impedance (Z); can tolerate severe shock, vibration, and acceleration; will provide 1,5002,000 W/s; and may be assembled in cell stacks for voltages ranging from 2.5500 V.
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Run times Shelf life (yrs) Activation time (ms) 1999 850 seconds to hours over 15 ~ 110 Projected by 2010 Similar Similar Similar Similar Nature's Limit
Critical Materials
Better cathodes; electrolytes; insulation materials and heat sources; thermal management systems; squib activators; molten salt electrolytes; separators that tolerate high temperatures; and boron nitride fibers and felts. None identified. None identified. Reduction in external case and insulation materials to reduce size and weight and increase energy and current density (transitioning to automation is a key factor since devices are currently assembled by hand); extending the discharge period for high-rate lithium-iron disulfide thermal reserve batteries; and battery disposal. None identified. Cost-to-performance ratio considerable (i.e., expensive).
RATIONALE The lithium thermal battery, an unusually reliable and dependable power source, provides energy for seeker head spin-up, infrared (IR) target acquisition with audio confirmation, stabilization of the lead sulfide sensor and internal guidance control system before launch ignition. The thermal battery survives rough handling during transport and adverse environmental combat conditions in the field. Perhaps most impressive are the low demands of technical competence required from users of thermal batteries. This battery is for single-shot use and is activated pyrotechnically. Lithium thermal batteries are essentially unique to military applications and are directly applicable to beyond-visual-range missiles and munitions. The Air Force Research Laboratory (Propulsion Directorate)/Battery Branch (AFRL/PRPB) Technology Roadmap: Military applications consist of thermal reserve cells used in ballistic missiles and aerospace systems, aircraft ejection seats, fuses, torpedoes, guided artillery, countermeasure devices, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), pulsed high-energy weapons, munitions, aircraft emergency power supplies, and inexpensive nuclear triggers. No special access is required. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China India Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Israel UK

Significant R&D
Germany Japan United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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The United States is the world leader in this technology: AFRL/PRPB, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), Ohio; Eagle-Picher Technologies; LLC, Joplin, Missouri; Argonne National Laboratory; and Invitec, Inc. In addition, the United States pushed this technology for the Poseidon missile system. Several other countries have known production capability. In particular, Germany (Silverkraft), Israel (Tadiran), and Russia. India may be using these batteries in their ICBMs. Russias thermal battery remains the power source for the SA-7 Strella, a shoulder-fired ground-to-air anti-aircraft missile. Although the SA-7 is early 1970s technology, it remains in multi-national service, with improvements.
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. PROTON EXCHANGE MEMBRANE FUEL CELL (PEMFC)

State-of-the-art PEMFCs can operate for thousands of hours with little loss of performance and can deliver about 700 mW/cm2 at 80 C, operating on pure hydrogen at 3 atmospheres pressure and oxygen or air at 5 atmospheres pressure. Catalyst loadings have been reduced to about 0.3 mg platinum/cm2 for the cathode and less than 0.1 mg platinum/cm2 for the anode. At ambient atmospheric pressure, performance is reduced to 350 mW/cm2 of electrode area (NRC, 1997). PEMFCs consist of a polymer film that permits the passage of protons while blocking electrons and gas.
Pulsed
Parameter Specific power (kW/kg) Specific power (kW/L) Operating temperature (C) Efficiency (%) 1999 1 1 4080 4050 Projected by 2010 2 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Specific power (lb/kW) Operating temperature (C) Efficiency (%) 1999 6 4080 4050 Projected by 2010 0.1 Nature's Limit
High-conductivity electrolytes; materials for seals or seal fuel/oxidant storage; and high-performance electrodes. None identified. None identified.
technology;
light
Hydrogen storage; electrolyte membrane durability; higher power densities needed for military applications; and impurities (the platinum electrocatalyst is highly sensitive to impurities in the hydrogen fuel, such as carbon monoxide and sulfur compounds). Providing hydrogen fuel is one of the major challenges for this technology. Two approaches to surmounting this challenge are hydrogen storage or fuel reformation. Reforming fuel is the focus because of difficulties in storing hydrogen on the battlefield. Such problems include cryogenic, pressurized containment (may or may not be directly exposed to munitions), and the lack of a hydrogen infrastructure to provide remote fueling.
EVs; on-site power, portable power, power substations or distributed power, and residential cogeneration. Because of their inherently slow reaction rate, PEMFCs require an expensive platinum catalyst to speed the process. They currently cost approximately $800 to $1,000/kW, with $50 to $100/kW forecasted by 2005.
RATIONALE The PEMFC is also known as a solid polymer electrolyte fuel cell (SPEFC), the proton exchange or polymer electrolyte fuel cell (PEFC), and the ion exchange membrane fuel cell (IEMFC).
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PEMFCs could provide space-based weapons an electrical power source with minimal vibration and torque and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) an extended mission life and minimal signatures. The Air Force Research Laboratory Propulsion Directorate/Power Division (AFRL/PRP) plan for space power: electrical power source for weapons and propulsion power for all-electric UAVs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Norway United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Denmark Italy Spain

Significant R&D
Finland Japan Sweden

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Approximately 85 organizations, including 48 in the United States, are developers. Some of these organization include: United States: GE (with Plug Power), H Power, and Avista Laboratories (Spokane, Washington). Canada: Ballard, a company of approximately 400 workers and a market of $500 million, in Vancouver, is the world leader. Denmark: Mainly academic work. Germany: Daimler-Benz, Siemens. Italy: DeNora. Japan: Toyota ($800 million over 5 years), Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Sanyo. Norway: Norsk-Hydro. Spain: ICTP-CSIC. United Kingdom: Vickers. A Scandinavian consortium exists. It will develop fuel cells and market them in Scandinavia.
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. SOLID OXIDE FUEL CELL (SOFC)

For SOFCs, pulsed wave applications are mainly applied to weapons, while continuous applications are applied to utilities.
Pulsed
Parameter Specific power (lb/kW) Power Density (W/kg) Power density (W/L) Operating temperature (C) > 1,000 > 1,000 6501,000 1999 Projected by 2010 0.05 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Specific power (lb/kW) Operating temperature (C) Efficiency (%) 1999 2 > 1,000 4050 Projected by 2010 0.1 Nature's Limit
High conductivity electrolytes; materials for seals or seal technology; light fuel/oxidant storage; and high-performance electrodes. None identified. None identified. Intercell sealing; long-life at high operating temperatures; start-up times; thermal cycling; and higher power densities needed for military applications. EVs, on-site power, residential power, cogeneration, and thermal power plants. About $1,000/kW by 2005.
RATIONALE SOFCs could provide space-based weapons an electrical power source with minimal vibration and torque and UAVs an extended mission life and minimal signatures. Technology is contained in the AFRL/PRP plan for space power: electrical power source for weapons and propulsion power for all-electric UAVs. Once the technical issues have been overcome, SOFCs should be an excellent power source for HEVs and for mobile and portable power from logistic fuels. The high operating temperature of the SOFC enables tight thermal integration with the reformer required for logistic fuels. The SOFC can tolerate the impurities from imperfect reformation. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Netherlands United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Sweden

Significant R&D
Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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Approximately 40 companies worldwide are pursuing this technology. The largest was created with the Siemens purchase of Westinghouse Power Generation in 1998. SOFC development includes: United States: EPRI, Ztek Corporation, SOFCo, McDermott Germany: Siemens Netherlands: Very good in ceramics and thermal engineering. Sweden: Academic work.
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. MICROTURBINES

Microbearings spinning speeds: 1.2 million rpm Compressor efficiency: 65 percent (theoretical) May consume less than 10 gal/hr of hydrogen fuel 50 W of power with a volume < 1 cm3 Natures Limits Power per unit airflow is set by: Combustor exit temperature (material properties such as creep, oxidation) Component efficiencies (fabrication constraints, viscous effects, and design technology) Cycle selection (simple vs. recuperated, cooled vs. uncooled) Overall pressure ratio (compressor wheel speed, and heat flow into the compressor).
Airflow limits are set by:

Rotor blade height constrained by root stress (300900 m) Engine diameter (rotor dynamics, manufacturing) Flow separations from angular geometries at low Reynolds Number (flow blockings can be > 50 percent).
Liquid fuels; hydrogen; and silicon and SiC structures. Deep reactive ion etching. Small-scale flow and heat transfer code. The following fundamental technology challenges exist: Creep of Si at high temperature; technology for refractory material microfabrication; high-temperature electrical properties; decoupling of electrical and fluid performance; diffusion at low Reynolds numbers; and improving turbomachinery performance, compressor efficiency losses (approximately 53 percent of loss sources), and catalytic combustion. Scaling issues include viscous forces (increases at microscale); surface-areato-volume (increases at microscale); chemical reaction times (invariant); electric field strength (increases at microscale); and manufacturing constraints.
Power for sensors and portable communication systems. Costs of Si manufacturing of complex systems.
RATIONALE Microturbines provide high energy and power density and thrust for micro-air vehicles (MAVs), sensors, and portable communication systems at reduced volume and weight. The three enabling technologies for the miniature heat engine are combustors, rotating machinery, and high-temperature material fabrication. Figure 7-1.1 provides a metric comparison of microturbines and lithium batteries.
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Figure 7.1-1. Metric Comparison of Microturbines and Lithium Batteries (Source: DARPA)

United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. PHOTOVOLTAICS (PVs)

Information concerning generation technologies that produce air mass 0 (AM0)-specific power densities > 400 W/kg is likely controlled. In addition, efficiencies are rated at about 18 percent for the space station, with up to 40-percent achievable (efficiencies are load specific) and a theoretical limit of approximately 50 percent. For radiation-hardened, space-qualified PV arrays: specific power > 160 W/m2 under 1 kW/m2 tungsten at 2,800 K illumination at an operating temperature of +28 C.
Cell Technology
Amorphous silicon Polycrystalline silicon Single-crystal silicon Gallium arsenide Indium phosphide Copper indium diselinide Multibandgap Concentrator array
Commercial Availability
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Limited
Cost
? Low High High High High High High
Power Density (W/m )

5070 130140 200 200 200 130 250 250
2
Efficiency (%) AM0 (space AM1.5 spectrum) (terrestrial)

510 1415 18 20 1718 1718 1517 2530 30
Adapted from: NRC, 1997 Critical Materials
Semiconductor material names can be mentioned (i.e., GaAs, GaInP, and so forth), but specific semiconductor growth and solar cell device processing techniques may be classified if government and proprietary if commercial. Parameters such as layer thickness, doping densities, and metal organic chemical vapor depositions (MOCVD) growth gases, growth temperatures, and growth times may be classified if government and proprietary if commercial. None identified. None identified. All specific MOCVD semiconductor processing conditions for solar cells with AM0 conversion efficiencies in excess of 20 percent can be classified (if government) or proprietary (if commercial). Expect more graceful aging of component materials 15 to 20 years out. Output of PVs vary seasonally and diurnally. High-power communication satellites, remote operations, village power, and recharging batteries. Conventional space Si cells can be ~ $100/W; high-efficiency Si cells are ~ $175/W; and the multijunction cells range from ~ $300500/W.
RATIONALE PVs convert solar radiation into electricity. Advantages include stealth, environmentally friendly, long lifetime, modular, and low maintenance. PVs have application for UAVs (extreme high altitude) for power (propulsion).
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Australia Germany UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India United States
France Japan

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
China, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are expected to make attempts to control the future market of solar cells for space applications. China is attempting the capability; however, they are attempting to control the space market by feeding into the competition between GaAs and Silicon. Germany and China are developing GaAs cells for space applications. Sharp (Japan) is the current world leader in silicon-based solar cells for space applications and is looking to control the GaAs market. In Germany, Daimler-Benz Aerospace and the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems are beginning development with GaAs and Siemens is active in PV development. In the United Kingdom, BP Solar is developing thin, lightweight PVs. In the United States, United Solar Systems, Inc., Spectrolab, and Tecstar are active in PV development.
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. THERMIONIC CONVERTERS

Lightweight (< 1kg/m2), deployable, high-performance solar concentrators.

Parameter Converter efficiency (%) 1999 > 18 Projected by 2010 ~ 30 Nature's Limit
Critical Materials
High-temperature metals and ceramics; super alloys for vacuum envelops; mono- and polycrystalline refractory alloys for emitter and collector electrodes; oxidationresistant vacuum envelop materials for terrestrial applications; and lightweight, high reflectivity materials for solar concentrators (e.g., inflatable space structures). Refractory alloy fabrication; metal-to-ceramic joining techniques for high-temperature applications; and single crystal refractory alloy manufacturing. None identified. None identified. High power for space satellites. Specialty materials (refractories, ceramics) contributes to present high cost.
RATIONALE Thermionic converters are simple, robust, radiation-hard energy conversion devices, which can make them competitive with other forms of energy conversion. The mass of a solar-thermionic power system at power levels above 50 kW can be lower than an equivalent PV-based power system. Preliminary studies indicate the mass of a 50 kW system can be reduced by about one-third. However, this result is strongly dependent on the mass and performance of the solar concentrator used in the thermionic system. For space power applications, solar concentrators must also be considered as a critical technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Netherlands UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Russia United States
Sweden
Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. EXPLOSIVE MAGNETOHYDRODYNAMIC GENERATORS (EMHDGs)

The following table assumes power conditioning for many pulses per second (pps).
Parameter Efficiency (%) Energy (depends on frequency: pulses per second) 1 pps 1100 pps 1001000 pps Voltage, radial design (kV) 10 MJ 100500 kJ 1 kJ ~ 20 100 MJ 110 MJ > 1 kJ > 20 1999 512 Projected by 2010 > 12 Nature's Limit
(Source: ATAR) Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software
None identified. None identified. 1D (Lagrangian), 2D (Eulerian), 3D (not yet available) magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) codes and other modeling software, such as circuit modeling for system integration and explosive modeling software (JWL EOS). Understanding use of, reducing effects of, or eliminating Rayleigh-Taylor instability; design techniques/know-how; high temperature materials; explosive technology (packaging, shapes and sizes); and magnetic and superconducting cable technology. Because of pollution concerns, use for more than burst modes of operation may not be practical. The commercial market for explosive magnetohydrodynamic (EMHD) technology is likely to be small because of the nature of the conversion process. The primary applications for MHD technologies are pulse generation, electric guns, radio frequency (RF) weapons, and so forth. Because this technology is in the early stage of development, predicting the size of the future market is difficult. The high-pulse energy generation aspect of the technology will probably never appeal to a wide market. EMHD technology, however, has definite potential for several high-energy military consumer applications. None identified.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE MHD is an energy conversion technique. It converts the chemical energy of a gas, liquid, or solid fossil fuel directly into useable electricity. For an EMHDG, the potential energy contained in a small amount of explosive is quite large, typically ranging from 4,500 to 6,000 J/g for common explosives. Because the available energy is large and because a solid explosive produces very high gas temperatures and, hence, high electrical conductivity, even MHDGs with relatively low conversion efficiencies are attractive for providing high-energy pulses. Pulses with energy levels in the range from hundreds of kilojoules to hundreds of megajoules and with repetition rates ranging from single shot (at very high energies) to about 1,000 pps (at lower energies) are possible. The major technical problem has been increasing efficiency. Military applications for such a high-energy pulse energy supply are quite diverse, and successful development of a viable system could significantly impact programs ranging from electromagnetic guns to EW systems.
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China Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
A few countries (China, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom) have done work on EMHDGs. Russia, however, has made a breakthrough in the development of repetitively pulsed EMHDGs, and it appears to be the only country with capabilities that would benefit the United States. The following foreign organizations have capabilities in MHD generator technology: Russiathe Institute of High Temperature (Moscow) and the High Energy Density Research Laboratory; Chinathe Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics and the Electrical Engineering Institute (Beijing); Japanthe Tokyo Institute of Technology, the National Chemical Laboratory for Industry (Tsukubu), Kobe Steel, Fuji, Nichicon, [also supported by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Agency of Industrial Science and technology (AIST)]; Germanythe Messerschmidt Boikow Blohm (MBB); and the United Kingdomthe Royal Military College of Science (Shrivenham, Swindon) and the Royal Armament R&D Establishment (Chertsey, Surrey). U.S. firms that have been involved in various aspects of MHD include Babcock and Wilcox, Montana Power Company, TRW, Textron, Westinghouse Electric, STD, ARTEC, and Hercules. The Russians have thoroughly studied the many complex design and plasma interaction variables that affect linear, disk, and radial EMHDG performance. They have built and operated several experimental generators and confirmed newly formulated, heretofore unreported, interaction phenomena and design concepts. Special repetitively pulsed radial flow cylindrical designs, which take advantage of shockwave phenomena and reduced effects of the Rayleigh-Taylor instability, offer the most promise. The Russians allude to the operation of a large radial generator repetitively using 10 kg explosive charges. This would probably equate to almost 10 MJ/pulse, probably at 20 kV and 1 pps, which is an extraordinary 20-percent efficiency equivalent.
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. MAGNETIC FLUX COMPRESSION GENERATORS (MFCGs)

Parameter Discharge time ( s) Energy (eV/ 3) Current pulse (MA) Efficiency (%) 1999 few to 500 several > 250 < 10 20 Projected by 2010 Nature's Limit
Discharge Time: varies from a few microseconds to 500 s currently. This can be longer but probably begins to be impractical. Energy: 20 eV/3 (3 MJ/cm3) projected by 2010. This projected energy density is based on the Russian claim of a 28-MG field. Current Pulse: The limit is mainly an economic one. The output conductor should carry probably not much more than 700800 kA/cm in the time scales for useful power sources. Thus, 1 GA needs a 10- to 15-m wide output conductor. Practically, one would parallel several smaller devices. Efficiency: Efficiencies are very much generator type and load dependent, seldom exceeding a few percent for practical loads.
Highly conductive materials, such as copper and aluminum. In addition, these materials should also have good elastic properties. Helical flux compression generators (HFCGs) have low impedance and thus require conditioning to match that of the load. This conditioning must also provide temporal matching since loads may require very fast rise times (hundreds of nanoseconds). MACH3: Three dimensional (3-D) MHD code under development. Blow-by in propellant-driven systems. None, because of single-shot nature. None identified.
Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications Affordability
RATIONALE An MFCG uses explosive energy to compress a magnetic field, thereby creating an intense energy pulse. This technology is generally single shot since the explosion destroys parts of the device. An MFCG functions by building up a magnetic field in coils and setting off an explosion (destroying many of the windings). With the reluctance of the circuit altered, the magnetic flux is compressed, increasing the strength of the field and producing an intense current. When the desired output is an intense magnetic field itself, the technique is generally referred to as MFC, and when the desired output is an intense current pulse for some electrical load, it is generally referred to as a magnetocumulative generator (MCG) (ATAR, 1994). As a side note, MCGs are mainly a Russian designation. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
MFCG research is taking place in Russia at the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) and at TRINITI. Most of the MFCG research in the United States takes place at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
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DATA SHEET III-7.1. ALKALI METAL THERMAL TO ELECTRIC CONVERTER

Parameter Cell efficiency (%) System efficiency (%) Total power (kWe) 1999 25 15 > 50 Projected by 2010 30 20 100 Nature's Limit 50 30 100
Source: NRC, 1995
Beta alumina solid electrolyte, seals, membranes, bearings, and insulators. Thermo-vac chambers. Any thermodynamic-electrochemistry-coupled code. Joining technologies (ceramic/ceramic, ceramic/metal, metal/metal) capable of surviving sodium vapor environment (900 C) for 10 years; materials that maintain strength, thermal conductivity, and emissivity (properties) at high temperature (900 C); high-performance electrode/collector/beta alumina solid electrolyte (BASE) systems and wick structures; and gas-to-converter source of efficiency loss. Bottoming cycles for power-generation plants; cogeneration systems; stand-alone and remote power supplies; and space applications. This technology has the potential to become affordable ($10/We) and must become so to compete with existing technologies terrestrially.
RATIONALE An AMTEC device can convert heat from any source to electric power. A solar thermal power conversion system based on an AMTEC has advantages over other technologies (including PV systems) in terms of the total
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power that can be achieved with such a system and the simplicity of the system [which includes the collector, energy storage (thermal storage with phase change material) and power conversion in a compact unit]. The overall system could achieve as high as 14 We/kg with present collector technology and future AMTEC conversion efficiencies. The energy storage system outperforms batteries, and the temperatures at which the system operates allows long life and reduced radiator size (heat reject temperature of 600 K). The AMTEC technology is based on a unique material (BASE) that allows the energy conversion to take place. This material is well known, but supplies are limited because of the present small market. BASE is not difficult to makenor are any other components that make up an AMTEC cell. Thus, the hope is that the result will be affordable. The technology is being developed by several agencies interested in its use, including the United States Air Force (USAF) the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). The USAF is solely pushing the technology toward a highperformance goal. The major technical issues that need to be addressed are use of the proper high-temperature materials that exhibit the most ideal properties, joining technologies, and component technologies, such as the collector/electrode system, wicks, condensers, and so forth, that can withstand operation in a high-temperature sodium environment for approximately 10 years. This technology is capable of achieving greater than 50 kWe on a space platform and, therefore, is enabling for several technologies and missions in space. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Japan
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
In the United States, the following organizations are developing this technology: Westinghouse; Advanced Modular Power Systems, Inc.; Dynamic Structures and Materials; LCC; Thermacore; and Trition. India is using AMTEC for terrestrial purposes.
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SECTION 7.2ENERGY STORAGE

Highlights Energy is stored either chemically, mechanically, or electrically, with durations of microseconds to years. Fast-storage devices are militarily critical for weaponry.
OVERVIEW Energy storage devices are intended for pulsed applications requiring short-term storage (microsecond-to-second) through long-term storage (several years). These devices can be charged and discharged in a pulsed or near-continuous manner. Examples of technologies used as energy storage include batteries, capacitors, inductors, and flywheels or rotating machinery. Energy can be stored chemically, mechanically, or electrically. For mechanical storage, the energy is stored in the rotary motion of machinery, such as a flywheel. For electrical storage, the energy is stored in the electric field of the dielectric medium, such as a capacitor, or in the magnetic field of the dielectric medium, such as an inductor. For chemical storage, the energy is stored in the reactants (as in batteries). For pulsed-power applications, once energy is stored, it can then be extracted completely or in small portions. In the mechanical case, the flywheel storage device can be coupled to a switch or a switching network that, depending on the speed and other characteristics, can deliver pulses of power to some load. Some devices integrate the switching into the storage device and feed its pulsed output directly to the load. Once charging is complete, the switch is closed and a pulse is delivered to the load. High-frequency inverters (DC-to-AC) can be used as a power supply to charge the storage device in a few milliseconds. Once charging is complete, a switch is closed, and pulsed power is delivered to some load. In the high-energy case, mainly for weapons applications, systems of average powers in excess of 100 MW, for times of seconds to minutes, are integrated with pulsed-energy conditioning to create gigawatt-class repetitive pulses of energy from milliseconds down through submicroseconds, at voltages from several kilovolts up to megavolts. There may emerge selected military applications, such as high-power radars, electronic countermeasures, and directed energy weapons (DEWs), that demand a class of precisely conditioned electric energy that has no direct foreseeable commercial or industrial application. However, industry may be able to use for different applications the components used to produce these levels of output. High-energy electronics have no current commercial applications. Assured development, therefore, will require government sponsorship. Peak power, pulse shape, pulse duration, repetition rates, firing rates, silent watch, and system energy storage recharging times represent militarily critical performance parameters that, in many cases, transcend known commercial, industrial, or consumer applications. In addition, high-energy electronics packaging currently requires parallel/series combinations of components in the power train to achieve reliability, fault tolerance, and graceful aging at performance levels greater than 10 times todays commercial standards. RATIONALE Fast-storage devices are militarily critical for weapons. However, energy is generally collected or available from the prime source at low-power levels and power densities. To meet common load requirements, such as high power, the energy is released from storage over an extremely short duration and converted into a pulsed-power form. Electric power systems are critical enabling technology subsystems in all nuclear devices and nuclear weapons effects simulators. Some of these applications require single-shot devices. Many of the specific technologies involved are dual use.
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WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The United States is a world leader in many areas of battery technology, but Japan is ahead in specific areas. In addition, the Europeans have a strong capability in small-lot production of high-reliability batteries that could be of great benefit to the United States. The U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium (ABC,) consisting of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Argonne National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and the Nonlinear electronics Laboratory (NOEL) are major government players working with the big three auto makers [Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors(GM)] to develop batteries for EVs. In addition, the following private firms have ongoing R&D in advanced batteries: Eagle Picher (nickel-metal hydride, lithium thermal) Yardney (lithium ion) Electro Energy (nickel-metal hydride) Valence Technology (lithium polymer) SAFT America (lithium ion) Ovonics (nickel-metal hydride) Duracell (nickel-metal hydride) Eveready (lithium ion) Rayovac (lithium ion) Wilson Greatbatch (lithium ion).
Lithium battery research elicits particular interest. Table 7.2-1 lists the main North American R&D contributors in industry. Table 7.2-2 lists the North American contributors from laboratories and universities. Table 7.2-3 lists the lithium battery R&D contributors from foreign industry. Table 7.2-4 lists the lithium battery contributors from foreign universities. Table 7.2-5 lists the lithium battery R&D contributors from foreign laboratories.
Table 7.2-1. North American Industry Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO)
Companies Advanced Energy Technologies, Inc. Advanced Technology and Research, Inc. Alliant Techsystems Inc. Applied Power International ARCO Medical Arthur D. Little, Inc. ATT Bell Laboratories Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation Ballard Battery Engineering, Inc. Bellcore Bell Labs Catalyst Research Coastal Systems Station Covalent Associates Dowty Batteries Delco Remy Duracell, Inc. Eagle-Picher Industries ECO Energy Conversion EIC Laboratories Electrochemica Corporation Electrofuel Energy Conversion Eveready GE Neutron Devices General Dynamics Space Systems General Motors Gould, Inc. HED Battery Corporation HEDB Corporation Hoppecke Battery Systems, Inc. Johnson Controls Lithium Energy Associates Martin Marietta Aerospace Maxell Corporation of America Medtronics, Inc. Microchip Technology, Inc. Mine Safety Appliances Company Moli Energy Panasonic PolyPlus Battery Company Power Conversion, Inc. Ray-O-Vac SAFT - America Sony Sharp SRI International Technochem The Aerospace Corporation Ultralife Technologies U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium UCAR Caron Company Valence Technology Westinghouse Electric Corporation Wilson Greatbach Limited W.R. Grace
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Table 7.2-2. North American Laboratory and University Lithium R&D (Adapted From NATIBO)
Laboratories AFRL ARLs Argonne National Laboratories Bell Labs Marshall Space Flight Center Naval Warfare Center Hydro Quebec Jet Propulsion Laboratory Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory National Research Council, Canada Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak Naval weapons Support Center Oak Ridge National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Center U.S. Army EDTL Wright Patterson Air Force Base Universities California Institute of Technology Harvard University Polytechnic University Texas A&M University University of Dayton Research Institute University Kentucky University of Minnesota University of Pennsylvania University of Texas University of Texas at Austin University of Waterloo University of Ottawa
Table 7.2-3. Foreign Industry Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO)

Country United Kingdom AEA SAFT NIFE Dowty Batteries Dorutcy British ARE Oakdale Batteries Vickers VSEL Germany Varta AG BAFF Bayer Fulrik Hoppecke Betterien Siemens Tadiran Israel Defense Forces Power Sources Division SEDEMA RENATA Company Chemistry Rechargable lithium batteries Lithium ion secondary and lithium thionyl chloride Lithium manganese dioxide batteries Lithium manganese dioxide batteries Lithium iron sulfides Lithium aluminum iron sulfide secondary batteries for submarines Lithium iron sulfides Lithium aluminum iron sulfide secondary batteries for submarines Lithium polymer secondary and lithium thermal Lithium polymer secondary and lithium thermal Lithium polymer secondary and lithium thermal Lithium primary batteries Lithium primary batteries Lithium ion Lithium ion Rechargable lithium cells Secondary lithium batteries
Israel
Belgium Switzerland
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Table 7.2-3. Foreign Industry Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO) (Continued)

Country Japan Company Central Glass Company Ltd. Sony Toshiba Asahi Chemical Joint Venture Hitachi Sanyo Asahi Yuasa Matsushita Mitsubishi Petrochemical Company Sharp Honda Research and Development Corporation France SAFT Chemistry Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium iron sulfide, and lithium ion cells Lithium ion technology Lithium ion secondary, lithium polymer, lithium thionyl chloride, lithium thermal, and lithium vanadium pentoxide Rechargable lithium cells Rechargable lithium cells
Alcatel INSA
Table 7.2-4. Foreign Universities Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO)

Country Bulgaria China Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Bejing Institute of Spacecraft System Engineering Changchun Institute of Applied Chemistry Chinese Academy of Sciences Tianjin Institute of Power Sources Institute of Physics, Academia Sinica Tianjin University, Department of Applied Chemistry Wuhan University Technical University of Denmark CNRS - FranceCzech Academy of Sciences SORAPEC Universite Bordeaux Dresden University of Technology, Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University of Greifswald Fraunhofer-Institute for Chemical Technology Merseburg University, Institute of Macromolecular Chemistry University of Munster University
Czech Republic Denmark France
Germany
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Table 7.2-4. Foreign Universities Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO) (Continued)

Country Greece Israel Italy Japan Aristotelian University University of Ulm Bar-Ilan University Tel Aviv University Universita di Bologna Chuba University Iwate University Keio University Kyoto University Mie University Rikkyo University NTT Interdisciplinary Research Laboratories Shinshu University Tokyo Institute of Technology Yamaguchi University Delft University of Technology Central Laboratory of Batteries and Cells Technical University of Poznan, Institute of Chemistry and Applied Electrochemistry University of Warsaw A.N. Frumkin Institute of Electrochemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences Frumkin Institute of Electrochemistry Institute of Chemical Engineering Institute of Transportation Engineering Russian Academy of Sciences Saratov State University University of St. Andrews National Institute of Chemistry National Central University Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology University
Netherlands Poland
Russia
Scotland Slovenia Taiwan
Table 7.2-5. Foreign Laboratories Lithium R&D (Source: NATIBO)

Country Australia France Laboratory Australian Army Engineering Development Establishment Laboratoire dIonique et dElectrochimie du Solide, Institute National Polytechnique de Grenoble Laboratoire de Chimie du Solide Mineral
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-7.2. ENERGY STORAGE

Flywheels ........................................................................................................................... III-7-51 Lithium Ion Battery (Rechargeable) ......................................................................................... III-7-53 Lithium Polymer Battery (Rechargeable) .................................................................................. III-7-56 Nickel Metal Hydride Battery (Rechargeable) ............................................................................. III-7-58 Silver Zinc Battery (Rechargeable) ........................................................................................... III-7-60 Electrostatic Capacitors ......................................................................................................... III-7-62 Electrochemical Capacitors .................................................................................................... III-7-64 High-Energy and Power Density Pulse Alternators and Compulsators ............................................ III-7-66
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. FLYWHEELS

A flywheel is an energy storage system. As such, its performance is defined by the following parameters: Total energy density (based upon maximum rotational speed) Useable energy density (depth of discharge, from maximum/minimum speed ratio) Power density Life (i.e., number of cycles to failure) Output voltage variation (i.e., approaches that minimize this may be militarily critical) Coefficient of friction (i.e., drag) caused by idling losses in support system. are spinning bodies, an additional parameter that defines acceptable (e.g., allowable spectrum at bearing mounts) imparted to the host be considered. Further, a key parameter is tip speed, the product of and radius.
Since flywheels vibration levels platform should angular velocity
Research objectives include high-energy density and high-energy rate (power) extraction for a variety of high-energy consumer applications (e.g., DEWs and HEVs).
Critical Materials
High strength-to-weight ratio materials (composites) for energy storage rotor; hightemperature superconducting materials for LOW-drag passive magnetic bearings; techniques for high-energy rate/high peak power extraction; magnetic (and other) bearing technologies for long storage life and efficient operation; and materials such as Kevlar, Metglass, and graphite epoxy. Flywheels are typically high-energy devices that require a high-vacuum spin pit for operational testing. Fabrication of the flywheel typically requires precisely controlled filament winding machinery (if it is a spun composite wheel). Equipment is in place for balancing rotating electromagnetic equipment (at rotational rates > 2,500 rpm and having a rotating mass > 1,000 kg). However, one aspect of magnetic bearings is that they allow the rotor to spin about its inertial center. The rotor auto-balances when operated at typical speeds of interest for flywheels. The balance has to be fairly precise, but other applications are probably more demanding from this standpoint.
Unique Software
Active magnetic bearings are often used for flywheel suspension. The control logic is typically custom designed and implemented on a digital signal processor board. Specialized analysis codes, often proprietary, are used for analysis of flywheel stresses and system dynamics. System safety; design approaches offering graceful degradation; predictable rotor dynamics and stability; platform vibration suppression for space applications (closely related); and overall system integration for the battlefield environment (a major technical challenge). UPSs, utility-level energy storage, low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, and rock splitting (fracturing). None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Rotating energy storage is of interest because it potentially offers higher power densities than batteries and higher energy densities than capacitors. Electromechanical storage systems (flywheels) use the mechanical
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inertia in a rotating mass. Because the energy stored increases with square of the angular velocity and only linearly with mass, current developments stress the use of composite material capable of withstanding the centrifugal forces and angular decelerations associated with extracting high peak powers (109 watts) from masses rotating at thousands of RPM. Flywheel systems can be used for continuous or near-continuous duty (e.g., in electric vehicles) as well as for pulsed applications (ATAR, p. II-45). A flywheel system can be effective at storing and delivering energy. These two functions are independent (i.e., power density and energy density are decoupled). System mass savings are significant in space applications, where the functions of attitude control and energy storage can be combined. Comparing this technology with batteries is logical. If a battery satisfies the requirements of a particular application, the battery is likely a simpler device and should be used. However, for some applications, the flywheel will be the best choice when life-cycle cost is considered (i.e., the necessary derating factors, increasing control and system complexity, and possibly limited life of batteries). Flywheels and batteries should be considered complementary, with each having its own applications. Flywheels are being used in conjunction with high-temperature superconductivity to produce a nearly frictionless flywheel that will be able to store high levels of energy, with little energy lost in the process. Such flywheels are enclosed in a vacuum to reduce rotational friction loads. Flywheels are being used as advanced energy storage devices in EVs. Materials such as Kevlar, Metglass, and graphite epoxy and their production processes for flywheel forming are still being tested to determine operating limits and optimum choices. Such materials tend to fail when operated above design speeds. Testing must be extensive to take into account effects of temperature, fatigue, and creep. There are ongoing efforts to address flywheel safety in the United States. One way to ensure safe operation is to derate the system so that it is never stressed to anywhere near the limits of the materials used in the rotating element. Potential military applications of flywheel technology include HEVs, satellite energy storage, and small- or medium-caliber electric guns. These developments are long term and partially driven by the fact that the development of the technology for electric cars is not expected to move beyond the prototype stage for many years. Recent technology development and integration programs at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), especially the Combat Hybrid Power Systems (CHPS), will be the first demonstration of robust military mobile platform energy systems that explicitly maximize energy management at the system level. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Ukraine

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The major foreign players for flywheel technology include: Canada: Flywheel Energy Storage (Ottawa); France: ONERA, Peugeot; Germany: Magnet-Motor (flywheels are used commercially in a large number of transit buses); Japan: Toyota, Kawasaki, Yanmar, Toshiba, Nippon Steel; Russia: Yfremov Inst. (St. Petersburg), Institute of Atomic Energy (Moscow), Institute for Electrophysical Apparatus, Institute for Electrophysics, Institute of High Temperature; Ukraine: Institute of Electrodynamics (Kiev), Physical-Technical Institute (Kharkov); and the United Kingdom: British Petroleum (BP). For equipment to balance the rotating electromagnetic equipment, the United States leads in development followed by the United Kingdom, Germany, and Brazil (which would rate equally thereafter).
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. LITHIUM ION BATTERY (RECHARGABLE)

The rechargeable lithium ion batterya solid-state type battery system originally developed by Sony of Japan and based on lithium intercalculation chemistry and lithium-ion transport systemsis a relatively new and rapidly developing technology. This battery is a safe and sealed system, does not use metallic lithium, and can be recycled with reclaimed materials. Estimated cost is $400600/kW. By 2005, projections indicate a very high cell voltage (3.6 to 4.2 V/cell) and production in prismatic and cylindrical configurations. Expected commercial markets include EVs, computers, telecommunications, and portable electronics. This system is very attractive for military use in soldier systems. A 270-V and/or bipolar designs are expected.
Pulsed
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Recharge time (hrs) 1999 7080 360 5001,000 30 to +50 24 Projected by 2010 150200 1,000 (1820 sec pulse) > 4,000 30 to +50 2 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Recharge time (hrs) 1999 100150 250 > 500 20 to +50 > 10 Projected by 2010 220 8001,200 1,2002,000 (up to 5 yrs.) 30 to +50 ~ 10 Nature's Limit
Graphite FiberLithium Ion Rechargables (Projections) Several R&D efforts are directed at a rechargable battery based on graphite fiber electrodes and a lithium ionic salt in an organic electrolyte. Preliminary projections give:
Continuous
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Projection 120 360 1,000s 20 to +60
Pulsed
Projection
up to 1,000 1,000s 20 to +60
Critical Materials
Carbon materials: powders, platelets, fibers, and nanotubes; new organic electrolytes and electrolytic additives to enhance lithium-ion conductivity and reduce resistivity; lithiated transition metal oxides of cobalt, nickel, and manganese; composite electrodes; spinels of managnese oxides (e.g. MnO2 and M2O4); high-conductivity polymer electrolytes; and high-energy density anodes and cathodes. None identified. Modeling and software codes are advanced and possibly available to the commercial market.
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Technical Issues
Cost; improvement of low-temperature performance and safety; development of carbon materials with greater reversible lithium intercalculation capacity; less costly lithiated nickel-metal oxide electrodes and less costly electrolytic salt additives to enhance lithium ion conductivity; high conductivity over a broad temperature range; less sensitive cathodes with a broad charging voltage range; individual cell control during charge; and large capacity cells with 25- to 200-Ah capacity. Critical emphasis for military R&D is the development of low-temperature electrolytes. Carbon particles may pose a safety problem (flash fires). The electrodes are made of fine carbon particles with high density. The shock wave from a munition may incite a pyrophoric reaction. These batteries have only been field tested for transportationnot for combat.
Automobiles, aircraft, and avionics; air/sea rescue systems; navigation aids; marine and boating; EVs; commercial satellites; cell phones; laptop computers; and portable electronic devices. The last three applications are not driving military technology development. Most applications in this area are separate from the more robust military applications. Currently, commercial and military markets are quite disparate in this area; driven primarily by SAFT (France) and U.S. technology.
Affordability
RATIONALE Lithium ion batteries could provide 50-percent or greater reduction in battery weight and volume for space and other applications. The eliminate cadmium and lead use in rechargeable batteries and will replace nickel-cadmium rechargables. Lithium ion batteries are an affordable secondary battery with a low self-discharge rate and extend service life. In addition they promote the use on an environmentally friendly and recyclable power source. Note: Lithium ion batteries represent the fastest growing and most profitable sector of the battery market and industry. These batteries are a hot academic topic. AFRL/PRPB Technology Roadmap: Aircraft, UAVs, space-based radar (SBR), space-based laser (SBL), and all satellite power supplies. Non-radiation hardened commercial batteries suffer a separator breakdown in a space environment, therefore, commercial batteries cannot be used in space applications. Development programs for specific military applications are needed. Military applications include portable electronics, soldier support systems, computers, night vision, lasers, telecommunications, EVs, robotics, aerospace, missiles, satellites, aircraft, and avionics. These batteries will strongly compete with nickel-based batteries. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada France Russia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Germany South Korea
Denmark Italy Taiwan

Moderate R&D
Finland Japan UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Lithium ion batteries are commercially produced in China, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. Most batteries are small cylindrical or prismatic cells, made by numerous small and large manufacturers. In the United States, the following organizations are involved in developing this technology: AFRL/PRPB, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; SAFT (America); Yardney; Eveready; Rayovac; and Wilson Greatbatch. PolyStor (Dublin, California) is producing a combination of lithium ion battery (or other rechargables) and an ultracapacitor for a smart power source. For man-portable power supplies, this significantly reduces weight. For example, the capacitor aspect would be used in pulsed applications, with overdrain of the battery charging the capacitor.
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Foreign companies working to achieve this goal include the following: In France, SAFT (France) [producing nickel-hydrogen batteries (SAFT America)]; in Germany, Varta Battery, Sonnenschein Lithium GbH, and Accumulatorenwerke Hoppecke (developing secondary lithium ion for space use); and in Japan, Matsushita Battery Industrial Company (Panasonic), Sony Corporation, and Mitsubishi Petrochemical Co., Ltd. Granaria Corporation of the Netherlands is attempting to purchase Eagle-Picher, a U.S. manufacturer and world leader in space batteries, particularly nickel-hydrogen. Eagle-Picher currently has the space battery market. Several foreign nations are in the lead for developing secondary lithium ion batteries for space use. These countries include France, Germany, Israel, Japan, and the Netherlands. Japan and France are attempting to capture the space battery market (to include foreign satellites), while Israel would like to produce the batteries compatible with their own spacecraft. France, Germany, and Japan have state-of-the-art battery research programs. The commercial market is rapidly growing, with portable electronics and emerging EVs as the drivers. The cycle life and depth of discharge are the major differences between military and commercial applications. Commercially, Japan is and will continue to be the world leader in this tecnology.
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DATA SHEET III- 7.2. LITHIUM POLYMER BATTERY (RECHARGABLE)

The rechargable lithium polymer battery is a new and emerging technology (more recent than lithium ion batteries). It is a solid-state battery based on Ion conductivity in polymers. The system is lightweight and safe and uses non-toxic materials. The rawbacks are poor low temperature and high rate performance. Pulsed applications include weapons and acceleration for HEVs, while CW applications may focus on EVs. By 2005, the following are projected for rechargable lithium polymer batteries: use of a solid conductive polymer membrane electrolyte or gel electrolyte; very compact size and cell design; more flexibility; and able to have battery molded in various shapes and configurations. Key problems are poor low temperature performance (below 0 C) and low charge/discharge rates. Battery uses lightweight materials. Projected costs are ~ $200 to 300/kW.
Pulsed
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Recharge time (min) 1999 125 200 200300 20 to +100 > 15 Projected by 2010 300400 400 2,000 40 to +150 ~ 15 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Recharge time (min) 1999 < 125 100 300 20 to +100 > 15 Projected by 2010 300400 400 5001,000 40 to +150 ~ 15 Nature's Limit
Critical Materials
High conductivity polymer electrolytes and gels; high-energy density anodes and cathodes; gelionic materials; conductive elastomers (rubbers); complex organolithium salts; carbon powders; carbon platelets and fibers; and new polymers with high breakdown voltages. Assembly or production must take place in a dry atmosphere because of lithiums reactive nature with moisture. In addition, the battery must be hermetically sealed. None identified. High conductivity over a broad temperature range; less-sensitive cathodes with a broad charging voltage range; cost reduction; making high-rate batteries; and large capacity cells with 10- to 100-Ah capacity. Commercial satellites; cell phones; laptop computers; and portable electronic devices. Primary drive is form flexibility, high cell-packing density, and reduced weight. The last three applications are not driving military technology development. None identified.
Affordability
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RATIONALE Rechargable lithium polymer batteries offer a 50-percent or greater reduction in battery weight for space applications, flexible battery configurations, amd greatly improved packing density and spce/volume use. Batteries can tolerate additional flexing, distortion, bending, shock, perforation, and vibration. The battery is perhaps the most attractive power source emerging for soldier support systems becaues of its form flexibility. Military applications include lightweight, compact power supplies for soldier support systems. AFRL/PRPB Technology Roadmap: SBR, SBL, and all satellite power supplies. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Asian countries, particularly Japan, are key technology developers for commercial applications. In the United States, the following organization is active in developing this technology: AFRL/PRPB, WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio. In Japan, the following organization is active in developing this technology: Sony Corporation. The world leader is a joint U.S.Canadian venture that includes 3M, Argonne National Laboratory, and HydroQuebec.
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. NICKEL METAL HYDRIDE BATTERY (RECHARGABLE)

The rechargable nickel metal hydride battery is a commercial technology developed to find an environmental replacement for NiCd batteries, particularly in portable electronic devices and EVs. These batteries are environmentally safer and offer longer operating times and higher energy output but cost approximately 25 percent more than similarsize NiCd batteries.
Pulsed
Parameter Energy density (kW/kg) Recharge time (min) 1999 >1 510 ~5 Projected by 2010 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Energy density (W hrs/kg) Power density (W/kg) Cycle life (# cycles) Temperature range (C) Recharge time (min) 1999 6590 160 6001,000 10 to +30 60180 Projected by 2010 160 500 1,5003,000 25 to +50 30 Nature's Limit
Metal hydride materials. None identified. None identified. Longer cycle life; degradation mechanism; tighter charge control algoriths; compatibility with existing aircraft power systems. Operation over the temperature range from 40 to +70 C. Large commercial automotive batteries limited to 10 to +40 C operation. Automobiles; commercial aircraft;power tools; and personal electronic devices. Prices currently driven by the personal electronic device applications. EV batteries are expensive because of limited production ($300400/kWh). Projected costs for an aircraft battery are estimated at $500/A hr.
RATIONALE Rechargable nickel metal hydride batteries eliminate cadmium and lead use in rechargeable batteries. For aircraft applications, they reduce size and weight by 35 to 50 percent. AFRL/PRPB Technology Roadmap: aircraft, UAVs, and satellite power. Cost reduction for military applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Russia Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel South Korea United States
France Japan Taiwan

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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The United States appears to be the only country developing this technology for aircraft applications. Foreign companies are concentrating on commercial terrestrial applications. Most of the commercial development is in Asia. In Japan, the following organizations are active in developing this technology: Matsushita, Sanyo, Toshiba, and Yuasa Battery Company. The following are the North American NiMH R&D organizations: Industry. COMSAT Corporation; Duracell; Eagle-Picher Industries; Electro-Energy, Inc.; Eveready Battery Company; Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company; Maxell; Ovionic Battery Corporation; Rockwell International; and the Aerospace Corporation Laboratories. Argonne National Laboratory; Idaho National Laboratory; NASA Johnson Space Center; NASA Lewis Research Center; and AFRL/PRPB, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio Universities. Rutgers University, Texas A&M University; Texas Research Institute; and University of Alabama at Huntsville.
In the United States, only Ovonics Battery Corporation in Troy, Michigan, is developing the transition metal AB2 metal hydride alloys for EVs. Ovonics appears to have a lock on patents for manufacturing of the AB2 metal hydride alloys. Electro Energy, Inc., Danbury, Connecticut, a small business, is developing a bipolar design using the AB5 metal hydrides. No other company worldwide is known to be pursuing a bipolar design metal hydride battery. In Europe, the following organizations are active in developing this technology: In Germany, Varta AG, BAFF, Bayer Fulrik, Siemens, and, in France, Aerospatiale, Alcatel, and SAFT. In France, SAFT is developing the lanthanide series AB5 alloys for EV applications and other applications as are the various Japanese and Korean companies. The United Kingdom gets some of these batteries from Japan.
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. SILVER ZINC BATTERY (RECHARGABLE)

The rechargable silver zinc battery is a mature well-established technology with a limited, mostly military/aerospace market because of high cost. Because of the maturity of this technology, little progress or advancement is expected by 2005. Secondary silver zinc alkaline batteries are very energetic, have a cell voltage of about 1.8 V/cell, wide operational temperature range (40 to +50 C), and relatively high energy density (100250 W hrs/kg) depending on battery and cell design. In addition, bipolar cells are capable of attaining high power densities (> 1 kW/kg). Such high power batteries must be cooled and do have a short life cycle. The drawbacks of these batteries are their high cost and relatively short life cycle (500 to 600 cycles max). These batteries have a flat discharge and can be designed for high-rate applications at the expense of a reduced cycle life. These batteries are used in tactical aircraft, submarines, satellites, and other aerospace systems. Note: Countries with considerable expertise include Canada, China, France, Germany, and Russia. Silver zinc primary reserve batteries are a well-established, mature technology used mainly for the military/aerospace market. These energetic batteries have a cell voltage of 1.8 V/Cell and energy density of 100300 W hrs/kg and can be designed for high discharge rate/high power output applications. The battery has a wide temperature range (40 to +60 oC), and cells can tolerate extreme stress (acceleration, vibration, and shock). The battery is compact and can be activated by physical forces (acceleration or shock/impact) or by electric valve or gas pressure (remote activation). The activation time is in milliseconds and is highly reliable. The primary market is military systems (missiles, munitions, and torpedoes). These batteries are quite expensive. Note: Countries with expertise include Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. In addition, India, Iran, and Pakistan could possibly have this technology and capability (speculative).
Electrolytic-grade silver foils, powders and fibers. None identified. None identified. Reducing costs; recharging the battery. (The zinc electrode has limited the number of recharges, but research efforts continue.) Commercial markets are limited because of very high costs. None identified.
RATIONALE Silver zinc batteries are a highly reliable, energetic, compact, modular battery system capable of high-rate, high-power applications. These batteries have the potential to be enabling for high-energy weapon systems. Bipolar SiZn batteries can be used for space weaponry. Military applications include tactical aircraft, missiles, ballistic missiles, satellites, munitions, torpedoes, submarines, and emergency pulsed-power systems.
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Canada Germany Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India UK

Significant R&D
Denmark Israel United States
France Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The R&D for this technology is as follows: India: Limited. Their MIGs borrow this technology from Russia. Russia uses these batteries in their satellites. At one time, the U.S. Navy used these for a deep submersible and rented the silver from the U.S. Treasury.
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. ELECTROSTATIC CAPACITORS

Parameter Energy density (J/g) Capacitance (F) Pulse rate (pps) Dissipation factor (loss) Temperature range (C) 1999 07 110 0.2 0.005 55 to +80
Pulsed
Projected by 2010 10 110 1020 0.0001 55to +200 Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Energy density (J/g) Capacitance (F) Dissipation factor (loss) Temperature range (C) 1999 03 110 0.005 55 to +80 Projected by 2010 8 110 0.0001 55 to +200 Nature's Limit
Novel polymers, ceramics, diamonds, nitrides, glass-ceramic composites, ceramicpolymer composites, impregnants, and so forth. None identified. None identified. Novel dielectric and impregnant development with concentration on increasing voltage breakdown strength and dielectric constant while decreasing the dissipation factor; superior capacitor device design, especially for high-voltage, high-energy density with rapid pulse delivery; and improved packaging for high-temperature, high-energy density capacitors with rapid, low-inductance delivery requirements. Arc welding, oil/well drilling, medical defibrillators, high-power flash lamps, EVs, motor start circuits, and so forth. This technology will remain largely for military applications; however, cost can be reduced as other applications in the market become known.
RATIONALE Essentially, few R&D dollars have gone into the pulse power dielectric/capacitor area since the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) days over 10 years ago. The current 1999 technology is basically what was achieved back in 1988. If ample financial resources are available from 2000 through 2010, significant progress can be made to enhance a critical component needed in our future military weapon systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Korea United States
Germany Russia

Moderate R&D
Italy Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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Russia is a leader in pulse-power technology and reportedly has advanced pulse-power capacitor devices greater than our own. Japan, together with Germany, develops and makes nearly all state-of-the-art capacitor-grade dielectrics (polymers) for the world market.
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. ELECTROCHEMICAL CAPACITORS

Electrochemical capacitors: energy storage/pulse repetition rate/back-up power, milliseconds. Parameters are listed for commercially available devices. Pulsed and CW requirements will demand similar capacitor parameters.
Pulsed
Parameter Capacitance (F/cm ) Series resistance (mohm) Energy rensity (J/cm ) Power rensity (W/cm 3)
3 3
1999 2.6 4 8 80
Projected by 2010 5.2 1 80 320
Nature's Limit
Continuous
Parameter Capacitance (F/cm ) Series resistance (mohm) Energy density (J/cm 3) Power density (W/cm )
3 3
1999 2.6 4 8 80
Projected by 2010 5.2 1 80 320
Nature's Limit
Critical Materials
Electrode materials and electrolyte. One also must perfect packaging process along with materials development. Another area that remains unexplored is the development of power electronic converters matched to the unique requirements of these devices. Production methods for these devices are well known. Testing of these devices can be accomplished with relatively simple equipment. Test procedures borrowed from traditional capacitor and battery testing methods can be used. None identified. Energy density and power density; unfamiliarity among engineers; voltage limit of 3 V can be a limitation in some applications. Advancements in power and/or energy density will enable more widespread use. Electrochemical caps will see aplication as a battery load leveler and a battery replacement (motor drive bus ride-through, UPS, portable electronics, automotive electronics). Presently used for memory backup. Cost is one limiting factor to the widespread use of these capacitors. Cost must come down to make these devices a viable commercial product. Current cost for Japanese capacitors is about $0.25/F.
Affordability
RATIONALE Niche applications for these devices at present state of the art; however, industry seems stalled at the present state of the art. To increase the market for electrochemical capacitors, improvements in energy density and power density will have to be achieved. Best electrochemical capacitors right now seem to be carbon electrode capacitors with an organic electrolyte. New assymetric electrode approaches are now surfacing and may significantly improve energy density.
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Australia Germany Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States seems to be behind Japan in production of a low-cost, good-quality package.
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DATA SHEET III-7.2. HIGH-ENERGY AND POWER DENSITY PULSED ALTERNATORS AND COMPULSATORS
Parameter Energy density (J/g)
1999 12
Projected by 2010 1020
Nature's Limit 100
Compulsators have been built at the University of Texas (UT) Center for Electromechanics that have demonstrated 1 J/g energy density. Every indication is that pulsed disk alternators (PDAs) could achieve the same or better performance; however, because of funding constraints, the Army was not able to build and test compulsators and PDAs at the same time after 1993.
Critical Materials
High-strength fibers for composites; high-temperature, tough, low-conductivity resins; high-strength, high-conductivity, low-resistivity conductor materiel; silicon carbide switches. Test. High-power electromagnetic railgun facility at UT Center for Electromechanics Production. Not in production as of this date Inspection. Vertical plane imaging (VPI) ultrasound and x-ray tomography; electrical property measurement; and rotor balancing.

EMAP-3D (electro-thermodynamics code). Energy storage technology sufficient to meet Army needs; advanced composites required for applications beyond 2010; advanced switching and control; system electromechanical efficiency; and thermal management. Vacuum must be maintained. Launch of lightweight packages to LEO. Moderate.
RATIONALE High-energy density devices are required for pulsed-power military applications, such as railguns, lasers, RF weapons, and so forth. One approach for delivering high-energy/power pulses is by using rotating machines, such as compulsators, PDAs, and homopolar generators. Compulsator is a term coined by UT and stands for compensated alternator, which is the generic name. Another machine design is a pulsed disk alternator, or PDA, which was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s under Army Focused Technology Program for Electromagnetic Guns by Kaman Sciences. Air-core and Iron-core variants of these machines have demonstrated an ability to efficiently drive low impedance pulsed loads. Other advantages of these machines over PFNs [pulse-forming networks] include lower operating voltages, higher burst firing rates, and the ability to store a substantial number of shots in rotor energy. In addition, a wide variety of pulse shapes are possible and the current profile can be varied from shot to shot if needed (Walls, Pratap, Chryssomallis, 1997).
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China India Russia Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Japan South Korea UK
Significant R&D
Germany Netherlands Sweden United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Research is being conducted in the United States at UT, Austin.
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SECTION 7.3POWER CONDITIONING

Highlights Power conditioning is the process involved in modifying the source output to meet load characteristics. Voltage, current, time (pulse length), pulse shape, and frequency characterize power conditioning. Loads require power to be delivered in specifically shaped continuous or pulsed waveforms. Advanced weapons of precision and wide-area mass destruction, radar, countermeasures, and communications systems are enabled through next-generation-plus-high-energy electronics systems, including the prime energy sources.
OVERVIEW Power conditioning is the process involved in modifying the source output to meet load characteristics. Such loads can include military and commercial applications. Military applications range from charging a battery or forming pulses for a weapon subsystem to electric motor drives. Two types of conditioning are defined by the amount of time over which power is supplied: continuous duty and pulsed or burst mode. To revisit, continuous duty is defined as power supplied to a load continuously, which, in this discussion, implies bursts lasting longer than 1 second (since semiconductor devices reach their thermal equilibrium in less than 1 second). Bursts lasting less than several seconds are considered pulsed power and generally have higher average powers. Pulsed power conditioning discharges a high-energy storage bank in a low repetition-rated burst mode (see Figure 7.3-1). For some applications, long pulses that last from several microseconds to seconds may be fed into a fast conditioning stage, which creates bursts with high power lasting from microseconds and femtoseconds. Pulse conditioning subsystems are comprised of both discrete and transmission-line-type components. The circuit functions can be described by lumped element equivalent circuitry provided that the characteristic times of energy discharge are far longer than parasitic IRC (inductor, resistor, capacitor) time constants of any system component. These subsystems are intimately tied to the load, with efficiency and reliability often constraining the types of near-term solutions available. In the future, advanced component development and enabling new energy control topologies will permit considerable reduction in system size and mass for next-generation systems. A considerable aspect of power conditioning is the pulse-forming functions. Pulse formation is dominated by the characteristics of the switches used. Switch performance is summarized and defined in terms of the following parameters: Peak voltage is the maximum voltage that can be applied while the switch is open without breakdown. Peak current is the maximum current reached by the pulse. Charge is the amount of current a switch can pass while conducting over a period of time. Voltage drop is the maximum voltage across the device when the current has reached its maximum value. Current density is the current per unit area of conduction. Action in a switch is the impact that occurs in a short interval of time because of a force associated with the high-energy pulse. The force introduces stresses and strains in the switch. These stresses can induce microcracks and fractures, which ultimately lead to device failure. If the value of the action exceeds the fusing capability of a solid-state device, failure is catastrophic. As a result, solid-state switches have to be operated at action levels well below their fusing limit. When devices are connected in parallel, including a fuse in series with each switch may be necessary (H. Singh, et al. 1999).
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Figure 7.3-1. Pulsed Power Conditioning
di/dt is the maximum rate of current rise that the switch can tolerate. dv/dt is the maximum rate of voltage rise that will not turn the switch on. Thermal management is the ability to remove heat energy generated by device. Reverse blocking is the peak voltage that can be applied across the device in reverse direction immediately after a high current in the forward direction. System volume and mass include the componentry: gate drives, protective drives, and so forth. Life is the predicted number of shots or pulses the device may deliver before failure. Cost is measured in dollars per switch.
Additional parameters include series and parallel operation, reliability, commercial availability, duration, and repetition rate. RATIONALE In the high-energy case, mainly for weapons applications, systems of average powers in excess of 100 MW for times of seconds to minutes are integrated with pulsed conditioning to create gigawatt class repetitive pulses of energy from milliseconds through submicroseconds. Voltages range from several kilovolts in the first case up through nearly megavolts in the latter case. This technology is used in commercial radar, smelting plants, and so forth. In addition, all aspects of the energy system demand significant technology base development at high risk. Thus, if needed, industry would possibly develop the capability but only if fully funded by the government. In addition, with the government technology investment base continuing to erode in militarily unique aspects of modern military systems, many industry senior management personnel feel that they are working as rapidly as possible to develop other customers, and, when these are in place, will be unwilling to redirect valuable internal
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expertise into government programs. There may emerge selected military applications, such as super energy radars, electronic countermeasures, and DEWs, that demand precisely conditioned electric energy of a class that has no direct foreseeable commercial or industrial application. Power conditioning and pulse-forming networks are systems for the conversion of prime electrical energy into the necessary short pulses of electrical energy needed for loads such as DEWs and kinetic energy weapons (KEWs) and high power microwaves. Peak power, pulse shape, pulse duration, repetition rates, firing rates, silent watch, and system energy storage recharging times represent militarily critical performance parameters that transcend known commercial, industrial, or consumer applications. In addition, high-energy electronics, which are necessary to provide the power conditioning for a variety of military consumers, require parallel/series combinations of components to achieve reliability, fault tolerance, and graceful aging at performance levels an order of magnitude better than todays commercial standards. Advances in technology for conditioning, regulation and distribution of power will be required to support advanced sensors, avionics, vehicle electronics (VETRONICS), and command, control, and communications (C3). These advances will address EMI, reliability, thermal management, packaging for high-energy densities, and so forth and will be equally critical to future commercial developments. Fielding smart weapons and remote unmanned sensors will also demand advances in high-energy density, high-energy military batteries. Essential to the operation of almost all advanced weapons systems are well-regulated and high-energy density electronics systems supporting technology. This also includes technologies for continuous and pulsed systems, which are essential for a variety of industrial, commercial, and military applications. Typical examples of energy systems and components controlled specifically for nuclear and non-nuclear applications are identified in Part I, Section 15 of the 1996 Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). Electrical power systems, although absolutely essential to the operation of virtually all modern military systems, have been viewed as supportive rather than enabling. Where energy density drives enabling feasibility, they are clearly recognized as critical. While these are among the most noticeable applications, reliability, availability, maintainability, and energy quality constitute a significant portion of size, weight, and cost of military systems. In this context, prime energy and conditioned energy are recognized as critical elements for future military battlefield systems. Mission-compliant energy forms critical elements, with the application areas in systems fielded at present and in systems that will be fielded in the future. Critical to future mission areas are affordable energy systems that enable stealthy mission compliance. This includes operating regimes that range from long life, continuous low drain (AA penlight cell energy levels for many weeks (submilliwatt energy levels at unattended locations) through terawatt peak power (single or limited burst duration) systems for DEW or nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) special effects weapons. Single-shot pulsed power at multi-megajoule energy-per-pulse levels for nuclear effect simulators is quite specific to that application and, being of little general technology applicability, is covered separately within the MCT Part III. In general, conditioning can be divided into three areas: bus power conditioning, slow power conditioning, and fast power conditioning (NRC, 1993). Bus Power Conditioning Bus power conditioning takes the feed from one of the prime power sources into a conditioning stage where the voltage or frequency level is altered for optimum, reliable power distribution to other power conditioning stages. Slow Power Conditioning The slow power conditioning stage produces repetitive electrical pulses in the millisecond time frame. Switches, capacitors and transformers are the major components used. Fast Power Conditioning If required, particularly for weaponization, a final stage of power conditioning can be used to compress or transfer the millisecond-duration input pulses into microsecond, nanosecond, or picosecond pulses. This stage uses transmission lines/capacitors, switches, and magnetic devices as the primary components. Figure 7.3-2 and Figure 7.3-3 display the trends for repetitive and microsecond power conditioning, respectively. In both figures, burst duty implies 100 sec on with several hours off, while continuous duty
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indicates 24-hour operation. The barrier in Figure 7.3-3 is a performance barrier, which can be overcome with significant R&D.
Figure 7.3-2. Repetitive Power Conditioning
To reiterate, power conditioning is the delivery of reliable and quality power, specifically pulsed power, where energy is provided in the necessary short pulses required by the load, such as weapons or other systems. For pulses of extreme short duration, special storage, switching devices, and packaging are required. Technologies for conditioning include inductors, resonant transformers, inverters, semiconductor diodes and switches. In contrast to high-density conventional systems, pulsed and high-energy systems operate at average powers well above the 100-kW level. In this power regime, almost all applications are military, and many of these militarily unique applications project small-quantity procurements for the foreseeable future. Since the ability to initiate actions without awareness by any adversary is becoming more significant, the need for stealthy land, sea, and air platforms is more important. With the exception of hydrocarbon-fuelled air vehicles, all others can be optimized for limited missions using electrical energy. Integration of hydrocarbon/nuclear fuels into future scenarios remains a possibility if signature management can be incorporated into initial designs.
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Figure 7.3-3. Microsecond Power Conditioning
For high-energy electronics systems for military systems, operating at multimegawatt average powers becomes viable only if available in very compact volumes. Successful implementation will only proceed through direct DoD investment in high-energy switching, enhanced through international cooperative activities with our allies who have similar interests. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT U.S. manufacturers are capable of meeting approximately 30 percent of the actual U.S. demand for high-power semiconductors. The remaining balance is imported from France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Several other countries, therefore, dominate the current power electronics market. Several U.S. manufacturers and the government are making headway towards expanding the U.S. market share in the high-power, high-temperature electronics area. Specifically, they are looking toward the potential future market in the SiliconCarbide- and Nitride-based systems.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-7.3. POWER CONDITIONING

Low-Repetition-Rate (LRR) and Burst Capacitors ...................................................................... III-7-77 Medium-Repetition-Rate Capacitors ........................................................................................ III-7-79 High-Repetition-Rate (and Continuous) Capacitors ..................................................................... III-7-80 Dielectrics for Pulse-Power Capacitors ..................................................................................... III-7-81 Chemical Double Layer (CDL) Capacitors ................................................................................ III-7-84 Soft Switch Inverters ............................................................................................................ III-7-86 High-Temperature Superconducting (HTS) Wires ....................................................................... III-7-87 Pulse Transformers ............................................................................................................... III-7-89 Wide Bandgap (WB) Semiconductors ........................................................................................ III-7-91 Diamond Semiconductor Switches ........................................................................................... III-7-93 MOS-Controlled Thyristor (MCT) .......................................................................................... III-7-94 MOS Turn-Off Thyristor ....................................................................................................... III-7-95 Integrated Pulse-Forming Networks (IPFNs) and Capacitors ......................................................... III-7-96
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. LOW-REPETITION-RATE (LRR) AND BURST CAPACITORS

LRR is approximately 110 pulses per second, < 5 percent duty cycle Burst operation is approximately 100 sec on-time, < 5 percent duty cycle
Parameter Energy density (J/kg) Energy density (J/cc) Number of shots (nominal) Pulse repetition rate (Hz) Discharge efficiency (%) 1999 1500-2500 315 1,000 0.110 85 Projected by 2010 5,000 15 1,000 < 100 95 1,000's 100 99 Nature's Limit
Very LRR: LRR: Burst:

0.1 Hz, 1 kJ/kg, 100 shot, 75 kJ, 50 kV 600 J/Kg; 104 shots; 50 kJ; 20 kV 180 J/Kg; 100 Hz; 105 shots, 0.5 kJ, 40 kV
Dielectrics. Winding machines. None identified. Discharge efficiency is an important characteristic for high-energy applications. Commercial power. None identified.
RATIONALE Some applications demand very high energy but only for very brief periods of time. Typically, LRR involves 110 pulses per second and a 5-percent-or-less duty cycle. This type of operation places extreme demands on capacitors (and other elements in the system) in terms of maximum voltage, current, and power that must be handled. The discharge rate and efficiency of different capacitor materials determines their application. For pulses on the order of tenths of a second duration, CDL capacitors hold great promise at high-energy densities. For pulses of millisecond or microsecond duration, polymer capacitors seem best suited. For very brief pulses (nanoseconds), ceramic capacitors are required. The United States is currently the technology leader in these areas. Capacitors permit energy to be stored over a long period of time and then released as required over a very short period under controlled conditions. Burst operation involves high-power activity for intermittent periods. Typically, this might be 100 sec on-time and a 5-percent duty cycle. Peak levels are not as great as LRR, but the level is sustained for considerably longer periods and the limiting factor becomes heat dissipation. CDL and polymer capacitors are of most interest for this type of operation. LRR and burst capacitors have the following military applications/general research objectives: Military applications. DEWs (laser, radar, RF, microwave, charged particle beam); electromagnetic and electrothermal launchers; electronic countermeasures/jammers; electromagnetic armor/active protection system; and mine clearing. General research objectives. higher energy density; greater discharge efficiency; increased number of shots; increased pulse repetition rate; graceful degradation; improved materials (films and foils, dielectrics, and impregnants); and improved manufacturing techniques.
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Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Russia

Moderate R&D
Italy Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The major foreign players by country and company or organization for this technology include: France: Thomson CSF, Institute of Saint Louis, Haefely Trench Germany: Siemens and university research United Kingdom: Syfer Technology.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. MEDIUM-REPETITION-RATE CAPACITORS

Medium repetition rate is nominally 100 Hz to 20 kHz

Parameter Energy density (J/kg) Capacitance (F/cm3) Resistance (ohms) Temperature (C) 1999 55200 510 < 0.010.005 55 to +80 Projected by 2010 1,000 30 < 0.005 55 to +125 Nature's Limit
Critical Materials
Improved materials (dielectrics, films, foils, insulation, impregnants); improved package (novel winding and casing design); improved manufacturing techniques (deposition limit for film). None identified. None identified. None identified. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Medium-repetition-rate capacitors have application in EW, communications, and laser radar. A major function of these capacitors is to reduce ripple in DC power supplies and to filter out unwanted higher frequencies in AC power systems. In both cases, frequency response and thermal management become critical issues. Conditioning for electric drive vehicles is another important application. Capacitors for filtering and power conditioning must be capable of medium frequency operation at high efficiency with low volume and weight (high-energy density) and equivalent series resistance (ESR). The ESR times the energy density is a figure of merit. Medium-repetition-rate capacitors have the following military applications/general research objectives: Military applications. EW, communications, and laser radar. General research objectives. Higher energy density, higher specific capacitance, lower internal resistance, higher temperature operation, and graceful degradation.

Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Russia

Moderate R&D
Italy Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The major foreign players by country and company or organization for this technology include the following: In France: Thomson CSF, Institute of Saint Louis, Haefely Trench; in Germany: Siemens and university research; and in the United Kingdom: Dowty.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. HIGH-REPETITION-RATE (AND CONTINUOUS) CAPACITORS

High repetition rate is nominally greater than 20 kHz.

Parameter Energy density (J/kg) Capacitance (F/cm3) Resistance (ohms) Temperature (C) 1999 55200 510 < 0.010.005 55 to +80 Projected by 2010 1,000 30 < 0.005 55 to +125 Nature's Limit
Continuous: 20 J/Kg, 100 Hz, 108 shots.

Critical Materials
Improved materials (dielectrics, films, foils, insulation, impregnants); improved package (novel winding and casing design); improved manufacturing techniques (deposition limit for film); and fault tolerance for high i2t energy pulses that can be applied during conditions found under survivability situations. None identified. None identified. None identified. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE High-repetition-rate and continuous-operation capacitors have application in power conditioning, filtering, and inverters. A major function is to reduce ripple in DC power supplies and to filter out unwanted higher frequencies in AC power systems. In both cases, frequency response and thermal management become critical issues. Conditioning for electric drive vehicles is another important application. Capacitors for filtering and power conditioning must be capable of high-frequency operation at high efficiency with low volume and weight (high-energy density) and, in addition, very low internal inductance [equivalent series inductance (ESL)] and equivalent series resistance (ESR) to ensure high operational efficiency. The energy density divided by the product of ESR and ESL is a figure of merit. High-repetition-rate capacitors have the following military applications/general research objectives: Military applications. continuous). Power conditioning, filtering, and Inverters (high repetition rate and
General research objectives. Higher energy density; higher specific capacitance; lower internal resistance and inductance; higher temperature operation; and graceful degradation.

Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Russia

Moderate R&D
Italy Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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DATASHEET III-7.3. DIELECTRICS FOR PULSE-POWER CAPACITORS

Develop superior dielectrics with greatly improved dielectric constant, voltage breakdown strength, dissipation factor, and discharge capability. Polymers, polymer-polymer composites, polymer-ceramic diamond like carbon (DLC), and polycrystalline diamond. Superior winding machines critical to fabricating reliable device. None identified. Discharge efficiency, tan delta, voltage breakdown strength, and temperature capabilities. Utilities, oil/well drilling, medical defibrillators, aircraft, satellites, and lasers. None identified. composites, nitrides,
RATIONALE Capacitors are a pervasive technology in every military and commercial application. Thousands of capacitors are used in military systems and are considered a critical link and a common area of failure. Future military systems will rely on the development of pulse power, high energy density capacitors. These devices will be the enabling technology. In the near term, the material that will make these pulse power devices possible will probably be a polymer or a polymer-based dielectric. The DoD will have to develop the dielectric materials since the superior performance required of these capacitor devices are unique to the military. The commercial sector typically does not require such high-performance devices under incredibly stressful repetitive conditions. Consider the following about capacitors: They are the weakest link in all DoD pulse power electronics. They are the heaviest and most space-consuming component in all pulse power systems, They are the enabling technology for a multitude of military applications such as DEW, HPM, SBL, Directed Energy Advanced Technology Aircraft (DE ATAC), uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV), moreelectric aircraft (MEA), electromagnetic/electrothermal launchers, and so forth. Reasons for failures: thermal overload and runaway, metal delamination, instability of dielectric properties within extreme environments, inadequate performance, high losses, and inhibiting size and weight, and so forth. Current energy densities are not sufficient. Major size, weight and volume reductions are imperative to field such systems. Advanced capacitor research for pulse power applications is not being actively pursued in the commercial sector without DoD support.
Several dielectric materials are currently being developed and may have the potential to improve our capability. These materials have improved electrical and/or thermal properties and may reduce the size, weight and volume of the current state of the art. Table 7.3-1 lists new materials that may be available in the future and indicates the research leaders. Other dielectric material developments exist, using a variety of approaches to energy storage and use. For example, the USAF has been particularly attentive to applications of DLC. As these technologies are developed further, they should be considered equally for critical military applications.
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Table 7.3-1. Future Dielectric Materials and Leading Researchers (Source: F.P. McCluskey, 1997) Dielectric Material Polysilseqioxane Teflon Perflouroalkoxy (PFA) Polyimide (PI) Nomex 410, 418 Commercial Source David Sarnoff Research Center DuPont DuPont DuPont Properties and Advantages Good electrical properties up to 250 C; superior to Kapton and Tezfel; can dip or spray coat Good mechanical and electrical properties to temperatures as high as 200 C Small variations in dielectric loss to temperatures as high as 200 C Aramid papers of synthetic aromatic polyamide polymer; chemically and thermally stable to > 220 C; radiation resistant; 418 grade contains 50-percent inorganic mica platelets and is designed for high voltage High-temperature stability; low dielectric constant Very-high-temperature stability (300350 C), significantly exceeding the performance of Kapton and Tefzel High-temperature stability combined with resistance to flash-over Resistant to ionizing radiation; high thermal; stability to > 200 C Linear thermoplastic polymer; excellent thermal stability and strength retention to > 300 C Combines possibility of polyimides with the hightemperature properties of liquid crystal polymers (LCPs) Readily available from Ube/ICI and DuPont; thermal stability exceeds Kapton and Tefzel Paper composed of aramid fiber and neoprene binder; low water absorption and high dielectric strength; thermally stable to > 200 C Thermally processible; high-temperature stability (Tg > 380 C) Thermally processible; available in several configurations; high purity Resistant to ionizing radiation; high thermal stability Stable dielectric strength to temperatures as high as 250 C; may lose some of its good mechanical properties when exposed to elevated temperatures for long periods of time Readily available; high-quality films; moderate thermal stability Readily available, high-quality aromatic films useful up to 250 C
Deflator-PZBT Tetraflouro-PZBT PBO
Foster-Miller, Inc. Foster-Miller, Inc.; Dow Chemical Foster-Miller, Inc. Garth Wilkes; VPI Hoechst Celanese Hoechst Celanese Hoechst Celanese; Ube Industries/ICI America; DuPont Lydall, Inc.
PBO-flourinated IPN Organo-ceramic hybrid nano composites Polybenzimidazole-PBI Flourinated PBO-PI Flourinated polyimides
Voltex 450
Thermoplastic PBO with hexaflourinated moieties PQ-100 polyquinolines Polysiloxaneimides Poly-P-Xylene (PPX)
Material Lab; WRDC Maxdem McGrath; VPI Nova Tran, Ltd.
Flurocarbonhydrocarbon polymers FPE Proprietary Aromatic Polyester
DuPont 3M
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The military has a great need for high-temperature capacitors, which would also have superior electrical properties above those offered on the market today. Since capacitors can be heated by use, by their environment, or by both, the many failures caused by overheating dramatically underscore the need for higher temperature capacitors. Capacitors for our planned future superior weapon systems will operate at such a rate that internal heat would surely cause immediate failure to todays deviceseven without the addition of environment heat. With this knowledge, material development for a high-temperature film for use in capacitors was performed under the High Temperature Dielectric Program funded by the Air Force Research Laboratory (Propulsion Directorate)/Advanced Dielectrics and Capacitor Devices (AFRL/PRPE). The goal of this program was to develop a high-temperature capacitor film for maximum operating temperature of > 500 K (227 C) and minimum operating temperatures of < 219K (55 C). The program was successful. FPE has 2X the voltage breakdown strength and 2X temperature capabilities of popular polymers used today, with a low dissipation factor superior to polycarbonate. No other types of high-temperature films possess both the electrical and thermal characteristics of Fluoro Poly Esther (FPE). Imation currently holds the patent rights to the FPE film. Increased performance and smaller size has also been the main focus of current AFRL research in DLC dielectrics for applying high-energy density capacitors. DLC possesses the unique properties of high dielectric strength, high resistivity, high decomposition temperature, chemical inertness, radiation hardness, and good thermal conductivity. It has been demonstrated that very thin (0.5 m) DLC films can be deposited directly onto smooth aluminum surfaces with good adhesion and that amorphous DLC films are highly flexible, making them suitable for the production of wound capacitor devices. The DLC capacitors are inherently rugged and will provide improved reliability and lifetime in all applications. AFRL/PRPEs development of this technology began in-house and continues now under an Air Force contract. Rolled DLC-coated aluminum capacitors can offer large volumetric efficiencies over the standard polymer types. The enabling technology has been demonstrated, and a prototype manufacturing system is currently being constructed. AFRL/PRPE owns a patent on the DLC capacitor technology. AFRL/PRPE has also funded a successful program in cryogenic capacitors. The cryogenic ceramic capacitor research is unique and is essentially one-of-a-kind. The cryogenic ceramic devices (operating at 77 K) have extremely high dielectric constants, low dissipation factors, and low relaxation times. The low temperatures ensure decreased resistivities of the metal components and lower dissipation factors and give much higher voltage breakdown strengths. In addition, liquid nitrogen is an inexpensive cryogen. This cryo-ceramic capacitor technology will have tremendous benefits for commercial and military ground-based and space-based systems. These devices also appear to be suitable for DC filtering applications and energy storage and quick pulse power energy delivery. The capacitors have shown repetition rate pulsing up to 250 pps, with energy densities approaching 6 J/cc. This cryogenic technology will provide capacitor devices that will alleviate many problems associated with utility uninterruptible back-up power systems. For the 77-K applications, a dielectric constant of 16,000 can be obtained with a dissipation factor of 0.002. Today, with the same dissipation factor, a typical ceramic provides a dielectric constant of only 2,000. The commercialization looks good for military and civilian markets. The worldwide UPS market is approximately $4 billion, of which the domestic U.S. market is $1.2 billion. CeramPhysics, Inc., holds the patent rights to the cryogenic capacitor technology. Other new pursuits include the following: A novel metal-organic polymer through Foster-Miller, Inc., which may provide an energy density of 10 to 15 J/g A co-polymer solid solution blend dielectric through Lithium Power Technologies, Inc., with a potential energy density of 8 J/cc A synthesized polyimide-siloxane co-polymer through TPL, Inc. with a potential energy density > 4 J/cc.

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Russia can produce diamond nanocaps. Additional companies pursuing advanced research for possible pulse power applications include DuPont Films, Sigma Laboratories, Inc., Custom Electronics, Inc., Aerovox, Dow Chemical Company, Maxwell Laboratories, Inc., and Physics International Company.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. CHEMICAL DOUBLE LAYER (CDL) CAPACITORS

Projected performance by 2005 for (pulsed) CDLs: Discharge time of 1300 sec Charge time of 1300 sec Energy density ~ 5 W hrs/kg (inorganic electrolytes), 1015 W hrs/kg (organic electrolytes) Power densities > 10 kW/kg Charge/discharge efficiencies ~ 80 percent at high rates and 98 percent at low rates Cycle life >100,000 cycles at 100-percent depth of discharge Charge and discharge current densities > 100 Temperature range 55 to +85 C, 98-percent-plus reliability. CDLs, which are produced in modular units and scalable in size for meeting power load requirements, are designed for HEVs. Most likely serially assembled in banks of capacitors to meet selected power loads. Produced mostly in cylindrical configurations out of materials that provide very large active surface areas for the electrode/electrolyte interface to support the generation and storage of ions along the surface.
Critical Materials
Improved organic and inorganic electrolytes with higher breakdown voltages; improved microporous polymeric separators; and improved active carbon materials with extremely large active surface areas (over 3,000 m/g) (e.g., carbon nanotubes and glassy carbon fibers). CY91 R/T: CDL scaling verified to > 100-kJ levels R: intrinsic break down-laminates, impregnants and model sections T: continuous: > 30 J/Kg; 20 kHz; > l08 cycles; 2 F; 1.5 kV; inverter.
None identified. Develop improved electrolytes with greater conductivity, ionic transport, and higher breakdown voltages. Also, develop improved polymeric separators that can tolerate high voltages over thousands of cycles. HEVs, automotive ignition systems, portable electronics, computers, telecommunications, avionics, remotely controlled actuators, and emergency back-up power supplies. Note: To date, very few CDL products are on the marketplace. None identified.
Affordability
RATIONALE CDL capacitors are also known as ultra-capacitors, super capacitors, super-caps, and electric double layer capacitors. This type of energy storage represents a rapidly emerging and promising technology that can be used to develop high-power energy storage systems that are durable, reliable, affordable, compact in size, lightweight, and capable of having a long service life (over 100,000 cycles). The system is robust and can tolerate extreme temperatures (55 to +85 C), severe shock, vibration, and acceleration. This system can survive extreme battlefield conditions and is an attractive energy storage device/system for use in combat vehicles, robotics, weapon systems, electromagnetic armor, portable electronics, and soldier-support systems. CDL capacitors are safe, use low-cost environmental-friendly materials, can be quickly charged and discharged, and produce very high current and power densities. This technology is being is being driven by automakers developing energy storage devices for HEVs.
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CDLs are an attempt to produce a robust, compact, and affordable energy storage device with a high-power density, quick discharge/charge capability, and long cycle life (100,000 cycles or ~ 10 years). This system would be safe, environmentally friendly, sealed, and maintenance-free. It would also tolerate abuse. Compared with conventional capacitors, CDLs have a greater energy and longer cycle life but have a much slower discharge and charge rate and a lower power density. Military applications for CDLs include automotive ignition systems, EVs, portable electronics, soldier support systems, avionics, aerospace systems, missiles, remotely controlled actuators, and possibly electromagnetic armor and high-energy weapon systems. CDLs can augment lead-acid starter storage batteries in combat/transport vehicles and have also been demonstrated in foreign HEVs and solid-state automotive ignition systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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To date, CDL capacitors have been demonstrated in prototype EVs in Japan and Europe to provide burst power for acceleration and hill climbing. In addition, Subaru (Japan) and a Russian firm produce CDLs to supply boost power for starting heavy-duty vehicles, especially in cold weather. Centers of foreign expertise for CDLs include production and marketing in Japan, France, and Russia. Russia may now be using CDLs in military vehicle ignition systems and in serially produced silent military HEVs. Considerable foreign research involves conductive polymers, gel-ionics, rapid-ion transport systems, and advanced carbon nanomaterials. Presently, the leaders in CDL technology include Japan, France (SAFT), Germany, Russia, and the United States (Maxwell, Aerovox). In March, 1999, LANLachieved 2.7 million charge/discharge cycles.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. SOFT SWITCH INVERTERS

Parameter Power density (MW/m ) Switching speed (kHz)
3
1999 5 20
Projected by 2010 20 100s1000
Nature's Limit
SiC Wide Bandgap (WB) materials. None identified. Integrated microprocessor controls. Topology, EMI reduction, and switch safe operating area (SOA). Computers, high-speed transportation (Maglevs), and EVs. None identified.
RATIONALE Power switches are an integral part of any power converter circuit. Unfortunately, they are also the major source of power dissipation in the circuit. This power dissipation is caused by two features. One is conduction voltage drop in the switch while the switch is conducting. Some devices have lower conduction drops (MCT, BJT) (hence, lower conduction losses), while other devices have medium to high conduction drops (IGBT, MOSFET) (hence, medium-to-high conduction losses). The other cause of energy dissipation in a power switch is the dynamics of the switching. Switching of current in the presence of a switch voltage and vice versa, commonly referred to as hard switching, causes power losses in the switch. The switching loss increases with the switching frequency. To reduce the switching loss very fast devices are built. These devices have very fast turn-on and turn-off characteristics. However, high di/dt and dv/dt associated with this fast switching increase stresses on the switch and causes EMI. To alleviate the difficulties associated with hard switching, the concept of soft switching was introduced. The main underlying principle in soft switching is to switch the power device at the instant when the switch current is zero, known as zero current switching (ZCS), or switch the device when switch voltage is zero, known as zero voltage switching (ZVS). This way both the switching loss and switch stresses can be reduced (Source: Ehsani, 1997). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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In the United States, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is developing this technology.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. HIGH-TEMPERATURE SUPERCONDUCTING (HTS) WIRES

Parameter BSSCO critical current density (kA/cm 2) BSSCO conductor length (m) BSCCO engineering current density (kA/cm 2) 1999 70 (77 K,SF,short) 1,000 (Jc=15 kA/cm 2) 13 (77 K,SF,long) Projected by 2010 70 (77K,SF,long) > 1,000 35 (77 K,SF,long) 1,000 (77 K,SF,long) 100's 50 (77 K,SF) > 10,000 (77 K,SF) Nature's Limit
YBCO critical current density (kA/cm 2) 2,000 (77 K,SF,short) YBCO conductor length (m) YBCO engineering current density (kA/cm )
2
1 10 (77 K, SF)
Critical Materials
Reduction in the Ag content of the BiSrCaCuO conductor to reduce cost of the cable and development of YBCO-coated conductor architecture [non-magnetic substrates, buffer layer(s)]. None identified. None identified. Grain boundaries and interconnectivity for BSSCO and YBCO.; long-length production of YBCO with high current densities; and increase in thickness of YBCO and decrease in thickness of substrate. Power cables for utility transmission lines; fault current limiters; smaller, more efficient transformers; and efficient, compact motors and generators. Ag sheathed BiSrCaCuO cable is expensive because of the large amount of Ag needed. YBaCuO wire is in development and may offer a less expensive alternative and the ability to maintain high current densities in large magnetic fields at 77 K.
RATIONALE Copper-based equipment generates waste heat and resistive loss, has limited capacity for carrying large currents, and is heavy. HTS wires are the converse. They generate minimal heat, may carry large currents, and are much lighter. Superconductivity offers significant theoretical advances in capability and performance for several power applications. Low-temperature superconducting (LTS) wire is fairly well-developed by U.S. and Japanese companies and is being applied to magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) medical imaging and other systems (mechanical and magnetic). LTS, however, is not currently a candidate for battlefield use because it requires liquid helium, which involves unacceptable logistics and handling problems. Recent advances in closed cycle refrigeration systems, however, may allow LTS in certain vehicle applications (primarily Navy). HTS wire offers potential in rotating machines (and several other areas) if processing techniques can be developed that allow practical lengths of HTS wire to be produced. Recent advances by U.S. and Japanese firms offer promise that high-current cables of hightemperature (77 K) superconductors can be fabricated and could have future practical application in DEWs and KEWs if the thermal management requirements can be met. High-temperature superconductivity has received a great deal of public attention, and, in many cases, exaggerated or premature claims have been made concerning the revolutionary changes it will effect. For the most part, high-temperature superconductivity is still in the early research stage. However, significant advances have occurred in the area of HTS wires. High-current cables consisting of high-temperature (77 K) superconductors are being fabricated in kilometer lengths. This may allow practical application of HTS in DEWs and KEWs, and allelectric vehicles. HTS is identified in the DoD Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) as having potential for a significant breakthrough in EV propulsion. Presently, the drivers for this technology are in commercial power, specifically in coils and magnets, fault current limiters, transformers, and superconducting
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underground cables for power transmission, especially in urban areas needing increased power capacity (see Figure 7.3-4).
Figure 7.3-4. Basic Research Challenges on Superconducting Wire Materials

Europe
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Japan and the United States are currently laying test cables for use by the public. European leaders include France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. PULSE TRANSFORMERS

Fast charging: 0.11 s. 1.5 MV; 20 Hz; 1.5 kJ (Air Core). 0.8 MV; 100 Hz; 27 kJ (Iron Core). Lightweighting by 10 X required: burst and continuous operation. Vacuum operation in some systems. Move to higher frequencies is counter to insulation strength trends. New materials needed. Space compatibility and traceability, reliability, maintainability, and availability (TRMA) require validation. Capacitor charging: 2 MV; 100 kJ; 20100 s; 1,000 Hz; 1,000-sec burst; 5-percent duty factor. Flat top: 13 MV; 100 kJ; 0.520 s; 1,000 Hz; 1,000-sec burst.
Critical Materials
Core material (composites), ferrites. High T operations, Wire technology, HTS Magnetic materials/insulation: New, low loss Metglas (2X) High stress grading insulation with molecularly designed polymers (5X) Near ultimate (2530 kV/mil) insulation Vapor mist.
Purity of raw materials/device design. None identified. Need to minimize stray elements and develop manufacturing technology (magnetics, core types (including air), windings and close tolerance fabrication). Power flow: Litz wire replacement with composites or new winding topologies to reduce power loss. For pulse transformers, higher peak current (2X). Fault management: Fusing and optimum conductor topologies/materials (R/T).
Air pollution control, food processing, water purification, rock breaking, multikilohertz lasers, and research accelerators. None identified.
RATIONALE Pulse transformers, or pulse-charging transformers, are a power-conditioning device and are used when highvoltage gains and efficiencies are required. Essentially, they are employed when one needs to tailor voltage to a load. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China India Switzerland
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The United States is superior to all others in high-action specialty transformers for weapons. Potential contributors include DuPont, Pennwalt, and 3M. This technology has little commercial value.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. WIDE BANDGAP (WB) SEMICONDUCTORS

WB semiconductors are an enabling technology for many military systems (e.g., space-based observation and weapons platforms; ground-based systems, such as DE, radar, and laser systems). Further, these systems require electronics that can tolerate higher temperature operation, thereby eliminating bulky and heavy cooling systems. WB semiconductors can also be used for power conditioning and pulseforming network applications for all of the aforementioned systems and platforms, which are designed to be employed over the next 20 years (10- to > 100-kV-type levels; discrete high current devices > 1,000 Amps; high operating junction temperatures > 500 C; reliable device operating temps > 450 C; discrete device blocking voltages > 5,000 V; and power switching frequencies > 200 kHz for power levels above 10 kW and > 500 kHz for power levels from 110 kW). WB semiconductor materials include SiC, III-Nitrides, BC, diamond, and TiC and thermally stable dielectric materials with low dielectric constants and large field strengths; low resistance; high thermal stability packaging; direct bended copper (DBC), aluminum indium nitrade (AIN)-based materials; low resistivity (< 10-6 -cm2); thermally stable (> 600 C) ohmic; and Schottky contact technology. Surface mount technology; electro-deposition processes; large volume expitaxial reactors; large volume substrate production facilities for WB semiconductor materials such as SiC, III-Nitrides, BC, diamond, TiC; and thermally stable dielectric materials with low dielectric constants and large field strengths. Material issues: micropipe and other defect effects, and large area growth. Fabrication issues: dry etching, ion implantation, oxidation, ohmic contacts. Device design Issues: transistors, thyristors, dynistors, insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs), metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs), and MOS-controlled thyristor (MCT) design. Growth of materials with near-zero defects.
Critical Materials
None identified. The growth of large area, defect-free material is critical. The critical factors driving the maturation of this technology are primarily materially based. Present day limitations include material quality and fabrication issues (etching, contact formation, ion implantation doping, acceptor doping, and stable dielectrics with low interface state defect densities). Europeans are claiming a safety issue (biological effects) above 500 kHz. Research objectives should include device design (thyristor, diodes, transistors, MOSFETs, IGBTs, MCT); current density and action; maximum voltage; operating temperatures; forward voltage drop; and switching speed.
High-power utility electric power distribution, high-frequency tranceiver for personal communication; opto-electronic applications for visible emitters [blue and green light emitting diodes (LEDs) and laser diodes] with significantly reduced power consumption. None identified.
Affordability
RATIONALE SiC material properties offer the potential to develop devices with much higher (10-fold increase) voltage capability and much lower (by a factor of 100) power dissipation (at equal currents) than more conventional silicon devices. SiCs potential for making devices with higher operating temperatures (500 C) makes it superior where cooling system size and weight are important and where very high-power handling capability or higher temperature
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operation is required. Near-term SiC Schottky diode rectifiers may provide higher voltage, faster switching, higher temperature, and lower loss replacements for the widely used silicon rectifier diodes. The performance potential of the WB semiconductor materials for power semiconductor switching applications far exceeds that of present-day Si technology. Potentially realizable goals include 100X lower on-resistance and 10X reductions in switching losses. SiC devices are expected to be able to withstand temperatures in excess of 500 C in contrast to a temperature of 150 C for silicon. This significantly changes thermal management constraints when the device is integrated into a system (i.e., using engine oil to cool a switch). Military applications include EV drive, inverters, power conditioning, pulsed power for electric guns, and DEWs and KEWs for programs such as All-Electric Ship, More-Electric Aircraft, All-Electric Main Battle Tank, and so forth. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The major foreign players by country and company or organization for this technology include: Japan: all major companies (more than 25) Russia: Loffe Physical Technical Institute (St. Petersburg) and several others France: Numerous locations performing research Sweden/Switzerland: Asea Brown-Boveri (ABB), and the Industrial Microelectronics Center (IMEC) Germany: Siemens (devices and bulk substrate material) and others.
In the United States, the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Pulse Power/Rutgers has demonstrated 1,000 V 6H Schottky diodes for high-power field-effect transistors (FETs) and have fabricated and tested functioning 6H silicon carbide thyristors. Several groups have demonstrated SiC MOSFETS up to about 180 V and 0.5 Amps. Evidence has recently been reported that micropipe defect-free 6H material can be grown. Growing material with low defects over the large area required for power devices is an important challenge.
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. DIAMOND SEMICONDUCTOR SWITCHES

These switches may have the following capabilities: operation at average power levels greater than 100 kW, duty cycles greater than or equal to 0.01, peak current density in pulsed mode greater than 100,000 A/cm2, voltages greater than 100 kV, rise times less than 1 ns, and internal inductance < 1 nH/A. When used in pulse-forming networks for narrow-band HPM, they are required to deliver at least 1 MJ per pulse. They also exhibit radiation hardness for operation in a nuclear environment. These switches and related contacts and leads must be capable of operating at high temperatures because of the intrinsic energy dissipation inherent in switches. This would suggest materials that have high specific heat and high conductivity. Equipment that can fabricate a system of switches that provide the required synchronism better than 1 ns for parallel operation. Software that can support the fabrication process. These switches are applicable for both narrow-band and WB HPM applications. To produce peak powers greater than 1012 W, several switches operating in parallel and without jitter are required. Technical issues are concerned with meeting the operating requirements while making the devices compact and capable of dissipating the heat. So far, the only applications for this technology have been military. Potential commercial opportunities include applications in electric power, the automotive industry, and electric drives. Too early to establish. Could be a big issue.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Switches that meets the projected operational requirements of both ultra-wideband (UWB) and narrow-band HPM systems are essential for building a viable weapon system. Diamond semiconductor switches show promise for meeting the requirements. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. MOS-CONTROLLED THYRISTOR (MCT)

Research objectives: higher voltage, current, action, and current density.

Parameter Action (A 2 - sec) Switching speed (kHz) Current density (A/cm ) Max blocking voltage (kV) Max peak current (kA)
2
1999 0.25 50200 400500 23 0.151.2
Projected by 2010
Nature's Limit 1
250 500 4 1.2
MHz > 500 5
High-temperature materials. Production of devices on SiC and other high-temperature-capable substrates. None identified. Reduce forward voltage drop in on-state; increase maximum operating voltage and current and SOA; and improve materials doping and processing. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE The MCT is a high-power, high-frequency, low-conduction-drop, rugged device that seems to be the leader for medium- and high-power applications. It offers the power handling capability of a near-ideal thyristor but is controlled in turn-on/turn-off by an MOS transistor acting as a gating device. In addition to fewer losses and higher switching speed, MCT offers lighter weight, smaller space, and lower operating costs. It can be used in inverters, motor controllers, and power controllers but may also have application in pulsed-power systems. The MCT, because it can handle higher voltages, operate at higher temperatures, and offers higher current density (which means a smaller package is required), may take over the markets now dominated by gate turn-off thyristors (GTOs) and IGBTs. Devices being sold now for industrial applications can control up to 120 kW. Utility-scale MCTs are now available. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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For this technology, the major foreign players by country and company or organization include: In Japan, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and numerous other companies; in Germany: Siemens; and in Switzerland: ABB. The U.S. governments Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) recently awarded a 2-year grant to Harris Corporation and EPRI for R&D to develop a new generation of power electronic building blocks (PEBBs). Based on MCTs, these will have broad application in power conversion and conditioning circuits for commercial and military applications. In Japan, MCTs are also referred to as MAGTs (MOS-Assisted Gate Thyristors).
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. MOS TURN-OFF THYRISTOR

Parameter Turn-off time (s) Turn-off gain 1999 10's 45 Projected by 2010 < 10's 100's Nature's Limit
None identified. Monolithic processing. None identified. Integration of MOS with thyristor wafer; noise generation. Power switching, power conditioning. None identified.
RATIONALE The MOS Turn-off Thyristor will replace the GTO because of its increased turn off time. GTO turn-off times are currently hundreds of microseconds where the MOS Turn-off Thyristors are currently tens of microseconds. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-7.3. INTEGRATED PULSE-FORMING NETWORKS (IPFNs) AND CAPACITORS

Energy Discharge IPFN: Material-limited; > 100 Hz prf; burst/continuous duty 1520 kJ/kg energy density IPFN at 1520 MJ/m3; multimegajoules per unit, including switching and inductors.
Filter and inverter capacitors:

Material-limited: > 10 kHz prf; burst/continuous duty > 10 MVA/kg power density installed in case.
Materials with a high dielectric constant and strength. Winding machines. None identified. Packaging. Medical industry, food sterilization, and air pollution control. Depends on availability and cost of dielectrics.
RATIONALE The following approach should be followed to satisfy the requirements. Road Map Manufacturing technology: plastic, and coaxial metal cans for > 1 kJ; clam-shell and Scyllac size (114 kg) units for > 1 MJ; close tolerance fabrication Insulating films: new molecular polymers for lower losses and higher breakdown (10X) inorganic films (e.g., mica)(2X) Impregnants: permittivity match/miss-match confirmation; thermal and field induced degradation/control (5X) Power Flow: assess impulsive limits and charge/discharge techniques to minimize inductance and losses (2X decrease overall; present range 2060 nH) Fault management: fuzing and optimized conductor topologies/materials (R/T) Low loss electrolytes (5X) Metallized dielectrics and current conductors developed for maximum current density (2X). LRR: Burst: CY01 LRR: 2 kJ/kg; > l-Hz rep. rate; > 103 shots: > 250 kJ/unit; 1020 kV; low-loss, < 5 0.5 kJ/kg; 100 Hz; > 105 shots; 10 kJ; 50 kV > 5 kJ/kg; > 10-Hz rep. rate; > l04 shots; > 0.5 MJ/unit; l020 kV; low-loss, < 5 percent
Milestones: CY99 percent
Continuous: 0.1 kJ/kg; 100 Hz; > 1010 shots; 0.l kJ; 50 kV.
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Burst: New Programs CY02
> 2 kJ/kg; > 10-Hz rep. rate; > l03 shots; 50 kJ; 50 kV
Continuous: > l kJ/kg; 100-Hz rep. rate; > 108 shots; l0 kJ; 50 kV. T: TRMA feasibility established (all categories) T: Operability and survivability issues satisfied and verified (discharge capacitors and IPFNs) T: MMT demonstrated for high TRMA/volume production feasibility T: > 2 kJ/kg validated for electrolyte and CDL. CY03 > 515 MJ/m3; 510 kJ/kg (validated for energy discharge IPFNs and filter/reservoir capacitors); energy density is application driven over the ranges specified here by the systems designers. R/T: LLRC 1520 kJ/kg; > 10-Hz rep. rate; > 104 shots;> 1 MJ/unit; 1020 kV at high TRMA (> 99-percent confidence) in IPFN to yield 1015 kJ/kg integrated energy density; specific densities are application specific R/T: Continuous > 60 J/kg; > 50 kHz; > 1010 cycles; 10 F; 5 kV; inverters; all other issues above satisfied R/T: CDL > 10,000 J/kg; > 10 Hz; > 104 shots; > 50 kJ; 5 kV at high TRMA (> 99-percent confidence). The materials component is not included in this programmatic framework. This is a serious challenge since costs to develop new thin insulating films could easily exceed $100 M/year unless industry can be persuaded to invest because of commercial, high volume spin-off markets. In this program, the out-years assume a shift from the high-energy capacitor development into the IPFN arena, including additional costs for the switching development if an early transition to solid-state switching is warranted. The true costs to develop multimegajoule, high i2t switches of this millisecond-duration current conduction time is likely to exceed $250 M through the prototype level unless high-reversal capacitor elements can be developed that negate the need for clamping diodes and fuses. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:
CY05

Extensive R&D
Germany UK

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
R&D for this technology is being conducted as follows: Energy discharge and filters. Aerovox, High Energy Corporation, Maxwell Laboratories, Condenser Products, Capacitor Specialists, and GE Inverters. Capacitor Film Inc., Maxwell Laboratories, and High Energy Inc. Mica. Custom Electronics, Cera-Mite Corporation, Chenelec Company, Stanley Electronics, and Corona Film, Inc. Ceramic. TDK, Murata, Kemet, High Energy, and AVX Ceramics Electrolytic. Sprague, Philips, Siemens, Mallory, and Sangam.
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SECTION 7.4BIOLOGICAL ENERGY SYSTEMS

Highlights Results in biotechnology research indicate that low-power, energy-generating elements will be produced commercially. Proton pumps and electron transfer systems have been created from lipids that are capable of self-assembly (and thereby forming membranes) and from proteins that perform pump functions. Proteins functioning as molecular motors have diameters of 2050 . Energy is derived either from the oxidation of organic molecules to carbon dioxide and water through the process of metabolism or from the absorption of energy from light sources.
OVERVIEW Electrical power systems are intrinsic elements of offensive and defensive operation in the modern military. Examples of these systems include communications, weapons detection, weapons guidance, and sensors. Associated with new technologies is the increasing burden borne by the infantry soldier; approximately 2535 percent of the weight carried is related to power generation. Because of the high weight burden devoted to power supply, alternative power sources are in development. One source of energy may be based on biological system models or mimetics of biological power generators. The new era of biotechnology has created opportunities for using biological systems or biomimetics as powergenerating systems and as nanoscale motors. These electrical power systems are based on the ability of biological membranes to generate electro-osmotic gradients and proton pumps. RATIONALE During the past 2 decades, much has been learned about the mechanisms involved in the living systems production of energy from nutrients and light. Living organisms generate electrical potentials, synthesize large organic molecules, and perform other tasks that require energy. Energy is derived either from the oxidation of organic molecules to carbon dioxide and water through the process of metabolism or from the absorption of energy from light sources. The mechanisms involved in the oxidative phosphorylation metabolism of organic compounds and in the transduction of light energy to chemical energy require the generation of an electro-osmotic/electrochemical gradient across a membrane. The gradient is associated with transfer of electrons and/or protons, which results in the synthesis of high-energy compounds in the cell. The most ubiquitous of these high-energy compounds is adenosine triphosphate (ATP), which is recognized as a common currency of energy needs in a living cell. In the metabolic process, the oxidation of the major nutrients results in the removal of electrons from the fat, carbohydrate, or amino acid substrate compounds and the stepwise transfer of the electrons in the mitochondrion to molecular oxygen, which then reacts with protons to form water. The removal of protons from the substrate and the creation of a proton pump across the cell membrane is an integral aspect of substrate oxidation. The production of ATP from adenosine diphosphate (ADP) by oxidative phosphorylation operates at an efficiency of approximately 40 percent and is, therefore, relatively efficient. The energy released by oxidation, not coupled to ATP production, is emitted as heat. Hibernating mammals use the oxidation of brown fat in a relatively uncoupled manner to generate heat needed to maintain body temperature. In the photosynthetic process, larger organic compounds are generated from water and carbon dioxide using the energy of light. In this process, light interacts with a porphyrin-like tetrapyrrole component of chlorophyll in the thylakoid membrane of plant chloroplasts to cause the generation of molecular oxygen from water. The chlorophyll obtains an electron from the water as the molecular oxygen is generated. In this process, the electrons are passed from an antennae-like system of clustered chlorophyll molecules to a photochemical reaction center (PCRC). The PCRC has a particular arrangement of chlorophyll molecules that permit transfer of excited electrons from the
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antennae to electron receptor molecules. A proton pump, which generates ATP in a manner similar to that seen in the mitochondria during oxidative phosphorylation, is generated as part of the process. The time required for the processes is approximately 100 s. In a related system, halophilic bacteria-like organisms, called halobacterium halobium, use a tetrapyrrole bacterial rhodopsin to generate a proton pump. For these systems to operate, an intact membrane is required, and the proteins acting as electron transfer agents are required to be organized in two dimensional (2-D) space. The proton pump is generated across the membrane, and the electron transfer process is generated in the plane of the membrane. Because lipids are capable of self-assembling and thereby forming membranes, constructing proton pump and electron transfer systems is technically feasible. Such systems have been constructed. The generation of one molecule of molecular oxygen requires the transfer of four electrons. The production of 6 molecules of oxygen therefore requires 48 photons. Approximately 10,000 kJ are required to make 1 mole (mol) of glucose possessing 2,840 kJ. From these considerations low power, energy generating elements will probably be produced commercially. These components can be used for generation of power for changing opaqueness of a visor, for driving sensors, or for read-write information storage components. In the Biological Technology section of Part III of the MCTL, the utility of bacterial rhodopsin as an information storage material is described. Insertion of bioreceptor-ion channel molecules into lipid bilayers permits production of electrical switches at the nanometer scale. The lipid bilayer of electrically excitable tissues, such as muscle and nerve cells, contain molecular pumps that generate an ion gradient (hence a voltage drop of 70 mV) across the membrane. Sodium and potassium are the ions involved. Nerves and muscles also contain protein molecules that serve both as receptors and ion channels. The acetylcholine receptor (AChR) is an example of such a protein. When incorporated into a lipid bilayer 70- thick, these AChR molecules will bind to acetyl choline on one side of the membrane and cause an opening of the relevant ion channel. The ions will transiently cross the membrane resulting in a reduced gradient and lowering of the electrical potential.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-7.4. BIOLOGICAL ENERGY SYSTEMS

Photochemical Reaction Center Synthesis/Structure (PRCS) ...................................................... III-7-103 Chemically Modulated Ion Channel ....................................................................................... III-7-104 Molecular Motors .............................................................................................................. III-7-105
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DATA SHEET III-7.4. PHOTOCHEMICAL REACTION CENTER SYNTHESIS/STRUCTURE (PRCS)

This is a two-photon capture system. The primary critical parameter is a miniaturized power source.
Parameter Highly conjugated porphyrinlike center with extended conjugated carbon chain. Compound 50- dimensions. 1999 Isolated PCRC fragments of membranes with densely packed PCRC. Projected by 2010 Nature's Limit
Densely packed arrays Biomimetics can of PCRC aligned on maximize PCRC surface. packing density (nearest neighbor packing of PCRC is ultimate limit).
Requires a light source (e.g., sunlight). None identified. None identified. None identified. Sensors (also military), charged-coupled devices (CCDs), data storage (read/write), camouflage, LEDs. None identified.
RATIONALE The PCRC is used by chlorophyll in plants to capture photon transmission and transduce to chemical/electrical energy. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Brazil France Japan Russia United States
Legend:

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Canada Germany Netherlands Spain

Significant R&D
China India Norway Sweden

Moderate R&D
Finland Italy Pakistan UK
Limited R&D
Germany is the world leader in this technology, with competition from the United Kingdom and the United States. The 3-D structure of the PCRC was determined in Germany by Deisenhofer, Huber, and Michel. The leaders in this technology are the United States, Germany, Japan (Osaka University), and the United Kingdom, with strong efforts in Russia and the Netherlands.
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DATA SHEET III-7.4. CHEMICALLY MODULATED ION CHANNEL

Parameter Voltage flux (mV) Process time (ms) 1999 a few mV to +20 < 10 Projected by 2010 150 to +20 Nature's Limit ~ 150 (lipid membranes)
Proteins that form channels and where channels open/close in response to chemical or voltage gradients. Production of lipid bilayer with ion channel proteins oriented appropriately. None identified. None identified. Sensors. None identified.
RATIONALE Chemically modulated ion channels permit voltage flux to go from 70 mV to +20 mV in millisecond times by ion passage across gradient. The enabling phenomenon is the transduction of a chemical event to an electrical signal. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Brazil France Italy Pakistan UK
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Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Japan Russia United States
China India Norway Spain

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The leading nations in this technology include the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The 3-D structures of ion channels have been characterized in the United States and Japan.
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DATA SHEET III-7.4. MOLECULAR MOTORS

The nanoscale molecular motors are protein molecules that exhibit vectorial movement along a surface. These proteins have diameters with dimensions of 2050 . Dynein and kinesin are driven by the hydrolysis of ATP (~ 56 kcal/mol). Dynein moves in one direction while kinesin moves in the opposite direction. This behavior is analogous to the inverse flow of electrons and holes across a diode junction. None identified. None identified. None identified. Switches (molecular). None identified.
RATIONALE In recent years, proteins that function as molecular motors have been isolated from neural tissue. They propel themselves along a surface in a linear manner and are powered by the hydrolysis of a biomolecule and ATP. The attachment of several such motors to a particle will result in the propulsion of the particle in a fixed direction. Emerging biological energy system technologies are enabling for nanoscale motors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany UK
Legend:

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China Japan United States
France Russia

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The application of molecular motors into functional non-biological systems is a long-term (> 15 years) effort. Applications are in the early phase of development
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SECTION 8ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Electronic Components/Microwave Tubes .............. III-8-5 Electronic Materials ................................................ III-8-15 Electronics Fabrication ........................................... III-8-23 Microelectronics ..................................................... III-8-45 Nanoelectronics ....................................................... III-8-63 Highlights Moores Law, which states that the number of transistors per chip will double every 18 months, continues to drive the electronic evolution and will enable smaller size, lower power, higher reliability, and lower cost electronics. However, the electronic materials and manufacturing technologies must be advanced to allow this rapid progress to take place, and this advance will be very costly. Nanoelectronics (below 100 nm) will be the successor to microelectronics but will require much research and development (R&D) in all areas since a paradigm shift in physics, materials, and processing is required. Microwave and other radio frequency (RF) components continue to progress, with increased power and frequency capability and reduced size and weight.
OVERVIEW This section discusses the general-purpose integrated circuit (GPIC) devices and the materials and processes, software, test, and packaging technologies required to produce and maintain the finished product. These circuits can be digital, analog, hybrid digital and analog, analog-to-digital (A/D), and digital-to-analog (D/A) converters, microwave, and optical and optoelectronic if integrated on a GPIC or a module (see Section 11.5 for optoelectronics). Also included are: General-purpose modules made of these devices if packaged as multi-chip modules (MCMs) or printed circuit boards (PCBs) Other combinations of optical, microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), or micromachines used as sensors, effectors, input, output, or internal processing functions resulting in a system-on-a-chip Microwave components, vacuum tubes [e.g., traveling wave tubes (TWTs)] and their constituent parts General-purpose electronic equipment (e.g., test equipment, tape recorders, and their media and other general-purpose structures).
The electronic materials and fabrication technologies covered are unique to electronic manufacture and generally operate at the submicron dimension for electronics. One exception is the MEMS area, which produces devices at the multiple micro to submicron dimension using the same technology described in this section and which can be integrated into devices containing MEMS, electronic, and optical technologies. Other machine technologies can be found in Section 12, Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology. The general trend of these technologies is to create rapidly the higher performance, smaller size, lower power, higher reliability, and greater integrated functionality necessary to perform a wide range of applications. The use of these products is pervasive across all applications, both commercial and military. The commercial sector is the pri-
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mary driver and market for these products. However, the military sector has the same requirements for high performance, small size, lower power, and integrated functionality and has a greater requirement for reliability, temperature range, and radiation-hardened (rad-hard) characteristics. The technologies involved in these products result in increasingly higher reliability and rad-tolerant devices because of the materials and processes involved. The major force driving the electronics technologies is the goal of increasing the density of devices, with improvements in all the other characteristics noted previously and generally adhering to Moores Law, which anticipates halving device size every 3 years. For instance, the goal stated in the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) National Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (NTRS) for the year 2000 is 250 to 150 nm for production chips. These dimensions are pushing the present optical lithography technologies to their limit. Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography will help continue the reduction in feature size (see Section 8.3). However, attaining the next two generation goals of reduction to less than 100 nm will require a new paradigm of electronic technologies where Moores Law may not apply. The new physics and the new fabrication processes necessary to reach this nanoelectronic capability are a huge challenge for the next century (see Section 8.5). As noted, commercial industry is the driving force for many advances in electronics technologypushing lightweight, smaller size, and lower power devices as far as possible for laptop computers, handheld devices, and so forth. However, the military has the same goals for personal wearable electronics, land-vehicle electronics, ultralightweight and unmanned surveillance aircraft for the battlefield of the future, ocean applications (e.g., smart mines), and space electronics. Many of these military applications require even lower power, smaller size, and higher reliability than any commercial application. RATIONALE Electronics are pervasive across all military systems and dramatically improve system performance. This continual improvement in the electronics performance gives the United States a distinct advantage in the military arena. High-performance electronics are used in strategic and tactical air, ground, surface and underwater, and space applications. The parameters of small size, low weight, low power, high reliability, and affordability give modern electronics systems their superiority. Almost all the advances in electronic technology, particularly microelectronics, are made in the commercial arena. The large costs involved in the fabrication of microelectronics prohibit the military from pursuing technology development in these areas, except in rare instances. However, the military is moving to use commercial electronics directly through the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) program. The COTS option is possible because advances in electronics inherently make electronic devices more immune to environmental characteristics, such as temperature, shock, vibration, and radiation. Increasing miniaturization toward system-on-a-chip reduces overall off-chip connections, PCBs, and so forth while reducing size and weight, thereby reducing susceptibility to shock and vibration. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Commercial products (e.g., high-performance computers and microprocessors; handheld portable electronics general-purpose computer devices; very small portable telephones; and small, high-performance but low-power electronics) will continue to define the electronics technology. The 1997 SIA NTRS defines the future expectations for the semiconductor industry to the year 2012. They expect that semiconductor feature size will be 50 nm by that time; however, the roadmap timing has recently slipped several years because of more than excess effort to achieve the next-generation fabrication technology. In addition, the expectation of reaching 50 nm in 2012 was very optimistic since passing the region between 150 nm and 200 nm is a stretch for present fabrication. Reaching sizes below 100 nm requires a complete paradigm shift in all aspects of the device physics and in cost-effective fabricating techniques. Sections 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5 detail these technologies. The SIA NTRS predicts the production of 4-GB memories and the sample introduction of 16-GB memories by the year 2006. Also at that time, it predicts 40 million gates per chip in microprocessors. One might ask, when does the need saturate and is there less utility in further increases in density? The answer so far is that the market has been completely elastic and all performance improvements have been absorbed by the products offered to the consumer. As the new century gets underway, a large increase is expected in the integration of electronics, MEMS, and optoelectronic components. This integration has been named system-on-a-chip. Of course, lower level integration of
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digital, analog, and hybrid electronics has been occurring and will continue to accelerate. Integration of optical and electronic components on a chip is described in Section 8.5, Microelectronics. Continual development in satellite communications requires better technology in vacuum tubes and RF components, and the improved miniaturization, power, frequency, and reliability of millimeter-wave (mmW) components are required to maintain superiority in all the information technologies (see Section 11.3). Intelligence gathering requires improved recording technology, such as optical tape recorders and media (see Section 8.4). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 8.0-1)
Country Canada China Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK Ukraine United States Legend: Electronic Components
Electronic Materials
Electronics Fabrication
Microelectronics
Nanoelectronics

Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Figure 8.0-1. Electronics Technology WTA Summary
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SECTION 8.1ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS/MICROWAVE TUBES

Highlights Microwave power modules (MPMs) offer increased power and frequency capability, with reduced size and weight. Improved cathodes with lower work functions will result in microwave tubes that can operate with greater efficiency, higher current density, and longer cathode life. Overall improvements in TWT technology will result in TWTs capable of operating in the kW power range, at frequencies greater than 90 GHz.
OVERVIEW This section addresses developing technologies in the field of high-power microwave components, with particular application in surveillance, satellite communications, electronic warfare (EW), missile seekers, and tracking radar. These modern weapons require high levels of microwave power, and semiconductors are presently not suitable for these high-power applications. Although development of SiC semiconductor devices may alleviate this shortcoming, microwave tubes are presently the most effective devices for these applications. Efforts to enhance the performance of these microwave components include improving each of the inherent parts of conventional TWTs (including the cathode), improving the cooling of the RF section (particularly in helix tubes), improving the ability of the electron beam to focus, and combining the technologies of TWTs with solid-state devices to form assemblies called MPMs. Research to improve the cathodes includes efforts on thermionic and nonthermionic cathodes, specifically developing new coating materials to extend the life of the cathodes and their current densities and evaluating the use of field-emission cathode arrays (cold cathodes). Improved cooling of the TWT has a significant effect on the power handling of the tube, and studies are being performed on the effect of substituting diamond-coated rods, with their superior thermal conductivity, for the more conventional support rods used in helix tubes. Focusing is a critical aspect of tube design and manufacture since energy that falls on (is absorbed by) the RF structure decreases the efficiency of the tube. Studies are also underway to develop stronger and more reliable magnets to minimize the stray energy, thus improving the efficiency of the TWTs. MPMs combine several technologies: mmW integrated circuits (MMICs) for amplification, helix TWTs for power amplification, and an electronic power conditioner (EPC). This combination of technologies provides optimum use of each of the technologies: frequency amplification by the MMICs and power amplification by the TWTs. RATIONALE Microwave components are used in military ground, ship, missile, and airborne applications. This includes radar, fire control, EW, decoys, missile seekers, and communications. Radar, fire control, and EW have an increasing need for all-weather, high-performance systems capable of penetrating obscurants to achieve target detection. To accomplish these tasks, devices that have power levels of greater than 10 kW, frequencies greater than 30 GHz, and wide bandwidths must be developed. Satellite communications, whether military or civil, are dependent on the power, frequency, and reliability of mmW components. Improvements related to these parameters are essential in developing and maintaining the information superiority described in Joint Vision 2010. Miniaturization of mmW components is necessary in decoys, missiles (and missile seekers), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). MPMs with improved capabilities will be used even more in these applications.
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WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 8.1-1)

Gyrotron Oscillator and GyroAmplifier FieldEmission Cathode Arrays
Country China Belgium France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Switzerland Ukraine UK United States Legend:
OxideCoated Cathodes
Improved Cooling of Helix Tubes
mmW TWTs
MPMs

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Figure 8.1-1. Electronic Components/Microwave Tubes WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-8.1. ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS/MICROWAVE TUBES

Gyrotron Oscillator and Gyro-Amplifier ................................................................................................................... III-8-9 Improved Cathodes: Field-Emission Cathode Arrays (Cold Cathodes) ................................................................. III-8-10 Improved Cathodes: Oxide-Coated Cathodes ......................................................................................................... III-8-11 Improved Cooling of Helix Tubes ........................................................................................................................... III-8-12 Millimeter-Wave (mmW) Traveling Wave Tubes (TWTs) .................................................................................... III-8-13 Microwave Power Modules (MPMs) ....................................................................................................................... III-8-14
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DATA SHEET III-8.1. GYROTRON OSCILLATOR AND GYRO-AMPLIFIER

Continuous wave (CW) power greater than 5 MW and a frequency greater than 30 GHz. Superconducting coils; exit window material. None identified. None identified. Magnetic properties; mirror; optical window capable of handling the RF power. Fusion research; thermal processing of materials (ceramic sintering and welding); driving linear colliders. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Gyrotron oscillators have opened up the mmW region (1-to-10 mm) for high-power applications. Present gyrodevices are capable of operating at continuous power levels approaching 1 MW at frequencies exceeding 100 GHz. Present gyro-amplifiers (e.g., gyro-klystrons) are capable of operating at average power levels of 10 kW over a 1-GHz bandwidth at a center frequency of 94 GHz. Military applications are mmW radar (e.g., fire control radar and tracking radar for targets close to the sea surface). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
III-8-9
DATA SHEET III-8.1. IMPROVED CATHODES: FIELD-EMISSION CATHODE ARRAYS (COLD CATHODES)
Current densities of 1,000 to 2,000 A/cm2. Silicon; diamond (carbon); GaN; other materials being researched to form field emission tips. Photolithographic equipment; plasma etchers; and so forth. Computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM). Developing a material with an improved lifetime of the tips in the cathode array. Space electronics; radar systems; flat panel displays (FPDs). Not an issue.
RATIONALE Field-emission cathode arrays hold great promise for improving microwave devices. They should provide much greater current densities (and, thus, greater output power) than more conventional heated cathodes and do not require external heaters. Thus, TWTs using this type of cathode could not only produce greater power, but, because of the absence of heaters, produce this power in a smaller device envelope. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Russia UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan Switzerland
Netherlands Ukraine
Significant R&D
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Limited R&D
III-8-10
DATA SHEET III-8.1. IMPROVED CATHODES: OXIDE-COATED CATHODES

Reduce work function from 2.0 eV to 1.2 eV. Oxide-coated cathodes: barium and strontium oxides, scandate (Sc2O3); indium and scandium oxides; and indium as an additive; impregnated cathodes; lanthium hexaboride cathodes. Deposition techniques (usually plasma deposition); pulsed laser deposition. None identified. Coating composition and uniformity; avoiding cathode poisoning. Space electronics and radar systems. Not an issue.
RATIONALE By developing cathodes with lower work functions, microwave tubes can operate with greater efficiency (i.e., greater output power at the same level of dissipated heat) and higher current density and enjoy longer cathode life. These improvements would be of value for a range of microwave tubes, TWTs, magnetrons, and so forth. Improvements in these tubes will have considerable effect on military electronics, including radar, EW, and space electronics. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Netherlands
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Japan United States
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET III-8.1. IMPROVED COOLING OF HELIX TUBES

Increase in thermal conductivity by a factor of 5 to 10; a reduction in the coefficient of thermal expansion by a factor of 2 to 3. Diamond-coated components; high thermal conductivity ceramics. Chemical vapor deposition (CVD) equipment for the deposition of diamond films. None identified. Use of materials with high thermal transfer (e.g., diamond-coated tube components). Space electronics and radar systems. Not an issue.
RATIONALE All mmW components generate heat, and the dissipation of this heat is important for the proper operation of the components. Continued improvements in these devices will depend, along with other developments, on improved methods to dissipate heat. TMD Technologies Limited (United Kingdom), has announced preliminary results of research in which components of the microwave devices have been coated with diamond films. Initial results indicate that the CVD diamond offers increased electrical resistivity combined with a tenfold increase in thermal conductivity and a decrease in the coefficient of thermal expansion. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

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Germany
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Japan
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UK
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DATA SHEET III-8.1. MILLIMETER-WAVE (mmW) TRAVELING WAVE TUBES (TWTs)

Frequency > 90 GHz; output power 200 W average; weight < 20 kg; bandwidth 10%. Scandate (Sc2O3) cathodes; diamond-coated rods; Samarium Cobalt magnets; high thermal conductivity ceramics. Machine (including micromachines) tools to manufacture the TWT components. CAD/CAM. Improved cathodes; improved cooling (perhaps diamond); improved magnets for better focusing. Space electronics; radar systems. Not an issue.
RATIONALE TWTs are essential components in radar, EW, countermeasures, missile electronics, UAVs, communications, and space applications. Research is being conducted to address the following characteristics: broad bandwidth, high efficiency, high gain, high voltage stand-off capability, low noise, compact size, low weight, lower cost, and improved reliability. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany UK

Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET III-8.1. MICROWAVE POWER MODULES (MPMs)

Power greater than 1.5 kW in X-band; power greater than 1 kW in I/J-band; efficiencies greater than 50 percent; size/weight less than one-fifth of conventional TWTs. Silicon or gallium arsenide for the integrated circuits (ICs). Standard equipment for the manufacture of ICs; machine tools for the manufacture of the TWT components. CAD/CAM. High gain of MMICs; lower cathode voltage of helix TWTs; power conditioning systems. Space electronics and radar systems. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The MPM is capable of providing high power over wide bandwidths at high efficiency. It is also smaller and less expensive than conventional TWTs. Initial and projected military applications include X-band radar, EW, UAVs, and communication systems. MPMs include three basic parts: a vacuum power booster (VPB) (a helix TWT), a solid-state amplifier (SSA) (an MMIC), and an EPC. The EPC converts the input voltage to the proper operating voltages for the VPB and the SSA and monitors the condition of the module. The SSA receives the RF input, amplifies it, and provides the RF drive to the VPB. The VPB provides the high-power RF output. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Netherlands

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Italy United States
Limited R&D
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SECTION 8.2ELECTRONIC MATERIALS

Highlights Separation by the Implantation of Oxygen (SIMOX) silicon-on-insulator (SOI), made by high-energy implantation of oxygen into a heated silicon substrate, results in a thin layer of silicon separated from the substrate by an insulating layer of silicon dioxide. SiC-based electronics and sensors can operate in hostile environments where conventional silicon-based electronics (limited to 350 C) cannot function.
OVERVIEW This technology area includes preparing and processing new and current electronic materials from the purification of the basic elements to the final wafer or substrate material ready for device fabrication. Materials handling and their processes are currently undergoing rapid changes to meet the future demands of the electronic industry. These materials are made of very pure starting materials. Depending on the material under consideration, preparation methods are numerous, including SIMOX made by high-energy implantation of oxygen into a heated silicon substrate. SIMOX wafers are created by implanting oxygen atoms below the surface of a silicon wafer in sufficient quantity to transform the silicon-to-silicon dioxide. After implantation, the wafers are carefully annealed at high temperatures, typically 1,325 C, to repair defects introduced by the oxygen implantation and to crystallize the silicon dioxide. The insulating silicon dioxide separates the top silicon layer from the substrate, and ICs are then fabricated in the top silicon layer. A second method used to form SOI uses ion implantation and wafer bonding technologies. Starting with two wafers, the silicon surface of one wafer is first oxidized to form what will become the buried oxide layer of the SOI structure. An ion implantation step, using hydrogen ions, is then executed through the oxide layer by a standard high-current ion implanter to form a usable thin layer of silicon and a layer of microbubbles at the path length of the hydrogen implant. The second wafer is then bonded to the oxide layer. The sandwiched wafers are thermally treated and break apart at the microbubble layer, which is then annealed and polished. The surface silicon of the finished wafer has very low defect levels that approach those in bulk silicon. The oxide layer is pinhole free. The successful growth of heteroepitaxial SiC with high resistivities and low-defect densities, improved epilayer doping, and thickness control on large area substrate materials [greater than 3 in. using metallo organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD)] and epitaxial growth equipment are critical to military electronics. RATIONALE An important military application of SOI technology is its increased radiation hardness, particularly in the area of dose rate survivability and single-event upset (SEU). Additional advantages of this technology include performance (speed) improvements, size reductions, and increased temperature range. COTS chip sets are not sufficiently radiation resistant, use too much power, or do not have required reliability for long-duration space missions. The insulating layer isolates the active transistors from the silicon substrate and gives the chip set very high immunity from high-radiation dose rates created by nuclear detonations, which could cause transient or permanent failure in the processor. Further development of circuits optimized for SOI could yield much greater performance results, while reducing chip size and power consumption. IBM has forecasted that SOI would offer a 20-percent performance improvement because of reduced capacitance (a by-product of having a thin oxide layer under the transistors) and is working the development of a gigahertz-level microprocessor. In addition, metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) made in thin-film SOI substrates present very small junction areas, and their high-temperature leakage current can be 3 to 4 orders of magnitude lower than those of regular metal-oxide semiconductor (MOS) devices. The functionality of 16-K and 256-K static random access memories (SRAMs) at high temperatures (up to 300 C) and of SOI comple-
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mentary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) ring oscillators up to 500 C has been demonstrated. The ability of SiC to function in high-temperature, high-power, and high-radiation environments will enable large performance improvements to a wide variety of military systems and applications. IBM, one of the leaders in the development of this technology, believes the low-power aspects of SOI technology will be key to the creation of multifunction, handheld information appliances of the future. Although the technology behind SOI has been explored for some time, technical hurdles made its application in high-volume, mainstream chip making difficult and expensive. IBM claims that its approach allows SOI to be used in mainstream semiconductor manufacturing, with few changes or additions to existing fabrication lines and at little additional cost. The new process represents the culmination of more than 15 years of collaboration between IBM research and the companys manufacturing and development teams. Two major changes were made to effect this development. On the substrate itself, the implant and anneal steps were optimized to get the lowest defect per density. In addition, the device design and the process were optimized to fabricate partially depleted SOI devices, where the undesirable effects (e.g., the floating body effect) can be addressed. In terms of development work, Motorola, Inc., is said to be using the material at some level for wireless communication chips in pilot-scale operations. The company is already home to at least one Ibis Technology Corporation implanter. They could be moving SOI into production sometime in the near future. Honeywell has also placed some emphasis on SOI. The company, which has close ties to SOI wafer supplier Silicon-On-Insulator Technologies (SOITEC) of France, has been putting more and more of its CMOS devices into SOI. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 8.2-1)
Country Belgium Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D SiC SOI Separation by SIMOX

Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
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Figure 8.2-1. Electronic Materials WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-8.2. ELECTRONIC MATERIALS

Silicon Carbide (SiC) ............................................................................................................................................... III-8-19 Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) Separation by the Implantation of Oxygen (SIMOX) ................................................. III-8-21
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DATA SHEET III-8.2. SILICON CARBIDE (SiC)

SiC-based electronics and sensors can operate in hostile environments where conventional silicon-based electronics (limited to 350 C) cannot function. The performance of these devices is severely degraded at elevated temperatures, at the highest RF powers, and in harsh radiation conditions. SiCs ability to function in high-temperature, high-power, high-frequency, and high radiation conditions will enable large performance improvements to a wide variety of military systems and applications. These include solar blind detectors; microwave/millimeter radar; communication; EW and missile seeker systems; high-current, high-voltage; and high-speed requirements of CW and pulsed electrical subsystems in emerging hybrid-electric and all-electric combat vehicles, more electric airplanes, and naval ships. Research is focused on developing the base crystal growth and device fabrication technologies necessary to produce a family of SiC high-temperature, high-power electronic devices and circuits to meet system demands for hostile environment. SiC bulk crystals; thin films of epitaxial-grown SiC. MOCVD; epitaxial growth equipment; bulk and surface lifetimes measuring systems for ultrathin films; spectroscopic ellipsometer; spectrophotometer; defect detection and classification equipment; interferometeric measurement equipment. Special algorithms to control the growth process of the materials; metrology equipment software. Increase substrate diameter (6 in.) with high (108) resistivity for microwave applications; control resistivity of epilayer; reduce dislocation and micropipe densities. Higher growth rates (> 5 m/hr) while maintaining high quality, accurate and reproducible process control, homogeneity of all relevant properties, electrical characteristics and yields, are necessary for SiC devices to be considered more than just a niche market. Capability of operation in the 600-C region at power levels of 1,000 V and current densities exceeding 1,000 /cm2 provides electronic devices and circuits to meet system demands for hostile-environment electronics. In addition, solid-state electronics have to improve the transmission, distribution, and quality of electric power in the utilities Industry. In addition to substrate price, the development of an inexpensive epitaxial process for SiC is a major precondition for manufacturing SiC devices at a lower cost.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Conventional semiconductor electron devices, such as field-effect transistors (FETs), are fabricated using silicon or compound semiconductors, such as GaAs. The performance of these devices is severely degraded at elevated temperatures and in harsh environments where harmful radiation may be present. In the last decade, a concerted worldwide effort has emerged to develop the next generation of electronic devices that would be able to operate at elevated temperatures and in harsh environments (e.g., outer space). Such devices would be fabricated using semiconductor materials that have a large bandgap [more than 2 eV (i.e., about twice that of conventional semiconductors such as silicon and GaAs)]. Examples include SiC and diamond. Unlike silicon, SiC-based devices can operate reliably in environments in excess of 150 C and are capable of operation in the 600-C region. The use of SiC eliminates the need for remote cabling or cooling systems by enabling devices to function in the hot areas of high-speed airframes, aircraft, and internal combustion engines and in other macro devices, platforms, and systems that operate at temperatures in excess of 400 C. In the field of power electronics, SiC distinguishes itself as being capable of handling several thousand volts in reverse mode and at least 1,000 /cm2 in forward mode for use in high-power switches operating at 1,000 V and at current densities exceeding
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1,000 /cm2. Specific issues that need to be resolved include suitable substrate for epitaxial growth, suitable dopants for p- and n-type materials, reduction of dislocations that arise in epitaxial layers because of differences in the lattice constants and in coefficients of thermal conductivity, and the ability to grow materials over large wafer areas. This technology is accessible through U.S. government agencies and commercial companies. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.2. SILICON-ON-INSULATOR (SOI) SEPARATION BY THE IMPLANTATION OF OXYGEN (SIMOX)
More precise, high-energy oxygen implantation technology for the production of 200- to 300-mm-diameter wafers with thin single crystal silicon (less than 1000 ) and oxide insulating layer (less than 300 by the year 2006) wafers (see Background). Large area (200- to 300-mm) silicon wafers. High-energy (250 keV) oxygen and low-energy (100 keV) hydrogen implanters; atomic absorption; X-ray reflective measuring equipment. Ion implantation beam; metrology; diagnostic software. High-energy implantation of oxygen into a heated substrate of silicon (known as SIMOX). Wafers are created by implanting oxygen atoms below the surface of a silicon wafer in sufficient quantity to transform the silicon to silicon dioxide (SiO2). SOI wafers are also fabricated using a chemical bonding UNIBOND technique, which involves two wafers in combination with a hydrogen implant (see Background). Low-power, high-speed, and high-temperature applications (see Background). Cost of SOI wafers is basically twice the cost of bulk silicon. The primary benefit commercializing SOI will be the reduced starting material costs and the producibility of SOI starting material.
RATIONALE SiO2 films play a central role in semiconductor technology. SiO2 is used as a very thin film separating the gate electrode and the Si substrate in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (CMOS FETs). The CMOS FET is an essential device for most ICs, including gate arrays, microprocessors, dynamic random access memory (DRAM), flash memories, silicon-on-chip system ICs, and so forth. The SiO2 films resistance against degradation is crucial to the reliability of the CMOS-FETs and, hence, to the IC chips themselves. The thickness of the film is an important parameter in determining the performance (signal speed) and level of integration. To reach the level of 4 Gbits/chip DRAM integration and performance level, the SiO2 thickness must be scaled down from its present thickness of 3.5 nm to a thickness of approximately 2 nm. Advantages of SOI technology include high speed, size reduction, and increased temperature range. An important military space application of SOI technology is its increased radiation hardness, particularly in the areas of dose rate survivability, and SEU. Advanced gigahertz-level microprocessors are capable of surviving high radiation dose rates. The SIA NTRS estimates that IC manufactures will continue to use SiO2 as gate-dielectric material up to the 4 Gbits/chip DRAM level. New materials are expected to replace SiO2 above that level. Technology is available from U.S. companies, such as IBM and Motorola, Inc. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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BACKGROUND High-energy implantation of oxygen into a heated substrate of silicon is known as SIMOX. Standard SIMOX wafers are created by implanting oxygen atoms below the surface of a silicon wafer in sufficient quantity to transform the silicon to SiO2, while maintaining a thin surface layer of circuit-quality, single-crystal silicon. After implantation, the wafers are carefully annealed to repair defects introduced by the oxygen implantation and to crystallize the SiO2. The insulating SiO2 separates the top silicon layer from the substrate, and ICs are then built in the top silicon layer. One important military space application of SOI is its increased radiation hardness, particularly in the area of dose rate survivability and SEU. Additional advantages of SOI technology include performance (speed) improvements, size reductions, and increased temperature range. COTS chip sets are not sufficiently radiation resistant, use too much power, or do not have required reliability for long-duration space missions. The insulating layer that isolates the active transistors from the silicon substrate gives the chip set very high immunity from high-radiation dose rates created by nuclear detonations, which could cause transient or permanent failure in the processor. Further development of circuits optimized for SOI could yield much greater performance results, while reducing chip size and power consumption. Because of the hardness of SOI to all radiation environments, this technology spans the full range of high-reliability space applications. High-temperature space applications are also a concern. Thermal shielding for satellites is quite heavy, and the weight of a satellite has a direct impact on the cost of placing it in orbit. In some special applications (Venus probes), shielding is no longer possible, and high-temperature electronics are absolutely required. Much higher temperature tolerance is required from engine-monitoring electronics, such as electronic injection systems, where precision control of the injector position is controlled by electronic components located close to or within the engine block. Modern antilock braking systems (ABSs) also require electronic control systems placed close to the brakes, and these systems are exposed to high temperatures when the brakes are activated. The ability of SOI CMOS to operate at high temperatures, combined with the possibility of integrating power devices with low-power logic on a single, dielectrically isolated substrate, renders SIMOX the ideal technology for such purposes. High-temperature airplane applications include onboard electronics and, of course, engine control and surface control (wing temperature). The production of UNIBOND wafers uses both ion implantation and wafer bonding technologies. Starting with two wafers, the silicon surface of one wafer is first oxidized to form what will become the buried oxide layer of the SOI structure. An ion implantation step using hydrogen ions is then executed through the oxide layer by a standard high-current ion implanter to form a usable thin layer of silicon and a layer of microbubbles at the path length of the hydrogen implant. The second wafer is then bonded to the oxide layer. The sandwiched wafers are thermally treated and break apart at the microbubble layer, which is then annealed and polished. The surface silicon of the finished wafer has very low defect levels that approach those in bulk silicon. The oxide layer is pinhole free. The remaining wafer, which is still within Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) standards for thickness specifications, is reclaimed and polished. It is then used as the support wafer for producing the next UNIBOND wafer. This SOI UNIBOND technology solves the two limitations of conventional bonding. The uniformity for thin SOI layers is obtained because ion implantation is used, and, since the second wafer is saved, the traditional waferbonding cost barrier caused by the consumption of two starting wafers to produce one SOI wafer is eliminated.
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SECTION 8.3ELECTRONICS FABRICATION

Highlights Lithographic technologies use 193-nm ultraviolet (UV) lithography and EUV lithography (EUVL) for fabrication devices with line widths of 100 nm. Lithographic technologies use proximity X-ray, electron beam (e-beam) projection, electron-beam direct write (EBDW), and ion projection for the fabrication of semiconductor devices. Lithographic technologies can generate and transfer highly complex patterns for MEMS. Nanotechnology provides the capability to design, fabricate, and test electronic devices with critical feature sizes below 0.1 m. MEMS technology enables the development of chemical, biological, and mechanical smart systems. Specially designed semiconductor processing modules provide a unique integrated system for sequential multiple processing of wafers in a vacuum environment.
OVERVIEW This section addresses the developing semiconductor processing equipment technologies used to fabricate devices for military systems. (The same process is used in commercial fabrication.) The technologies will either provide a superior final device or reduce the cost of fabricating the existing device. These technologies involve the growth of epitaxial layers, implantation of dopants, the use of cluster tools for the deposition and etching of thinfilm layers, single-wafer processing, delineation of patterns using lithographic techniques, and testing and packaging of ICs. They are also used for passive and active devices, MEMS, and sensors in military equipment and systems. Optical lithography continues to be the mainstream technology for the semiconductor industry and is being used in production at 250-nm design rules. Extensions of optical technology are being used to support 180-nm product and process development. Advanced technologies, such as X-ray and EBDW, have been used to fabricate functional semiconductor devices below 100 nm over small field sizes at low throughput. In addition, various technologies have been proposed, and studies are underway for resolution capability down to 50 nm. One promising technology that builds on the optical experience is EUVL using 10- to 14-nm soft X-ray photons; however, overlay and critical dimension (CD) improvements have not kept pace with resolution improvements. The estimates for overlay appear to plateau around 30 nm. This will be inadequate for ground rules less than 100 nm. Overlay and CD control over large field sizes will continue to be a major concern for < 130-nm lithography. Continuous improvements in mask-making technology (mask writers, inspection, repair, and substrates) continue to be required to support the technical and manufacturing needs of optical lithography below 250 nm. MEMS include sensors and actuators that are fabricated using IC production processes. Automotive, biomedical, aerospace, and robotic MEMS devices are produced with combinations of bulk and surface micromachining. MEMS processing uses these technologies to create structural components that are essentially submillimeter-sized machine parts. High-energy oxygen implanters are used to produce SOI wafersa technology that has long been relegated to radiation-hardened circuits for military and space environments, a small niche market. Ion implanters to be used in fabricating large-area SOI wafers for the development of gigahertz-level microprocessors are being developed. SOI would offer a 20- to 35-percent performance improvement because of reduced capacitance, a by-product of having a thin oxide layer under the transistors. RATIONALE Semiconductor technology is one of the key areas that gives the United States superior military capabilities. It is one of the most crucial and pervasive technologies contributing to the current technological edge that U.S.
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systems have over systems of adversary countries. These technologies are used in the production of every weapon system in the U.S. arsenal and enable dramatically higher performance and reliability with smaller size and less weight. Lithography involving wafer delineation, resist processing, and mask making is the prime determinant of feature size and, hence, density of ICs and is therefore one of the most critical elements in the high speed and high density required for todays military systems. Cluster tools can be used for plasma-enhanced CVD, dry etch, highpressure oxidation, rapid thermal anneal, and numerous other processes either as a batch system performing one process or as a system doing sequential processing steps. Processes that could not be done by using standalone systems can now be done using a cluster tool. Microcircuits, sensors, and active and passive semiconductor devices are widely used in military systems for this reason and are common in missiles, avionics, torpedoes, smart munitions, proximity fuses, sonobuoys, and secure communication satellites. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Deep ultraviolet (DUV) 248-nm lithography has recently demonstrated the ability to print features as small as 100 nm (0.10 m). Argon-fluoride (ArF) excimer laser 193-nm lithography, still in the development stage, requires new lens designs, new lens materials, and new resist chemistries. Critics claim that it is far too expensive for economical production. Supporters of 193-nm lithography point out that extending DUV is also expensive. At 100 nm, DUV exposure requires optical proximity correction (OPC) and phase-shifting masks (PSMs). OPC adds subresolution features to the mask to correct for printing and etching errors, increasing the mask write time. Both techniques increase the mask cost. The cost of a complete DUV mask set for the 130-nm technology node could exceed $500,000. While such costs are tolerable for high-volume products (e.g., memories), they are prohibitive for many other applications. Although 193-nm lithography still requires resolution enhancements, such as OPC, the shorter wavelength offers improved depth of focus and widening of the process window. It is expected that 193-nm lithography will be used for critical layers beginning with the 130-nm technology node, which is expected in production in 2001. This schedule coincides with current expectations for 300-mm production. However, few chipmakers are likely to introduce a new lithography technique and a new wafer size at the same time in the same lab. Current lithography uses a variety of techniques to make a mask that is used to etch the patterns on silicon to create the IC. Efforts are continuing to decrease the feature sizes and position errors on these masks. A fundamental breakthrough would be to enable maskless lithography. R&D programs are pursuing several approaches leading to direct computer control of parallel electron beams for maskless patterning of wafers. Another approach has been the use of supersonic gas jets for direct patterned deposition of semiconductor material, thus eliminating several resist and etch processing steps. These maskless lithography developments offer faster prototyping and reduced fixed costs for the low-volume production typical of military systems.
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Enhanced Optical Lithography NextGeneration Lithography
Cluster Tools Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Hong Kong Iran Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Nanotechnology

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Figure 8.3-1. Electronics Fabrication WTA Summary (1 of 2)
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Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Hong Kong Iran Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Optical Metrology
Small CriticalDimension Lithography
Soft Lithography for MEMS
Technology for MEMS

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Figure 8.3-1. Electronics Fabrication WTA Summary (2 of 2)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-8.3. ELECTRONICS FABRICATION

Cluster Tools ............................................................................................................................................................. III-8-29 Enhanced Optical Lithography ................................................................................................................................ III-8-31 Nanotechnology ........................................................................................................................................................ III-8-34 Next-Generation Lithography .................................................................................................................................. III-8-36 Optical Metrology (Wafer Inspection) ..................................................................................................................... III-8-39 Small Critical-Dimension Lithography ................................................................................................................... III-8-40 Soft Lithography for Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) .......................................................................... III-8-41 Technology for Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) .................................................................................. III-8-43
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. CLUSTER TOOLS

Cluster tools will enable an extensive set of sub-0.15m gate, capacitor, and shallow trench isolation applications, with excellent CD control, operational flexibility, and damage-free results for sub-0.15m device designs with sub-20 gate oxides. Cluster tools superior degree of process control offers high-etch-rate in situ process integration capability, near vertical profiles, high selectivity of substrates, and excellent repeatability of results. The tools new controllable magnetic field technology and advanced temperature control will provide uniform, damage-free results over an extremely broad operating window. The systems advanced and emerging interconnect technology (in situ damascene integration, main dielectric etch/PR and polymer removal/nitride barrier removal, copper interconnects, low-k dielectrics, and advanced contacts) provides chip makers with next-generation 0.10-m extendibility that delivers high throughput, enhanced reliability, and the flexibility to deliver advanced applications for new and emerging interconnect technologies. In addition, upgrades and retrofits are available for existing tools to facilitate the deposition and etch solutions needed for 0.15 m, 0.10 m, and beyond. Surface finish of metal components, hardness, and chemical inertness; outgassing properties; dimensional stability. Real-time closed loop in situ automated process control; defect detection and classification; wafer tracking and transport; communication standardization. Specially designed algorithms for process control. Maintaining environmental integrity between process modules; surface finish of metal components, hardness, and chemical inertness; outgassing properties; dimensional stability. For the semiconductor industry, integrated processing was the newest technology driver of the 1990s, and cluster tools became the vehicles for implementing the concept. In the next few years, more and more IC processes will be implemented in cluster systemsnot only for the most often-cited reasons (contamination control, yield improvement, throughput, and so forth) but also because of increasing competitive pressure on the worlds semiconductor manufacturers for improved, economically efficient manufacturing. The cost of cluster tools is very high. They remain a major precondition for manufacturing state-of-the-art ICs.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Cluster tools are semiconductor fabrication processing systems that have some of the following unique features: a stored program, controlled, automatic loading central wafer handling system; specially designed interfaces for wafer input and output; specially designed semiconductor processing modules or chambers capable of doing process steps such as epitaxial growth, CVD, physical vapor deposition (PVD), etch, oxide growth, passivation, and anneal; a communication system that provides an integrated system for sequential multiple processing of wafers in a vacuum environment; single wafer and sequential multiwafer processing; and sequential batch processing. Cluster tools can be divided into two areas: A highly sophisticated system that provides an integrated system for sequential multiple processing of wafers A system that does batch processing where one processing step (i.e., deposition or etch) takes place in a highly controlled environment.
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The evolution of cluster tools has progressed from the addition of load locks and process systems, to load lock, preclean, process, and passivation, to the integration of more than one process step in the same system. Cluster tools can be used for plasma-enhanced CVD, dry etch, high-pressure oxidation, rapid thermal anneal, and numerous other processes either as a batch system performing one process or as a system performing sequential processing steps. Processes that could not be done using standalone systems can now be done using a cluster tool (e.g., the selective deposition of tungsten). With an integrated process, one can first use an etch chemistry to remove any ambient-formed oxide and condition the silicon surface at the bottom of the plug (because tungsten does not adhere well to silicon oxide) and then immediately begin growing tungsten. Both steps can take place under vacuum and in rapid sequence, thus inhibiting the formation of oxide layers between films, which reduce selectivity and increase contact resistance. Military devices for microwave, mmW, and high-speed digital FETs for real-time signal processing devices for EW systems would be seriously degraded without this processing step. Microwave diodes, such as IMPATT (IMPact Avalanche Transit-Time), Gunn, TRAPATT, (TRApped Plasma Avalanche Transit-Time), PIN (Positive-Intrinsic-Negative), and CATT (Controlled Avalanche Transit-Time), primarily used in phased-array radar, personnel detection, weapons delivery, digital communication, and miniature jammers, could not be fabricated reliably or with the same properties without cluster tools. DoD has always recognized the criticality of cluster tools in providing the military with low-volume, leadingedge devices; however, DoD is not the only market for low-volume devices. In the near future, lithography clusters capable of robotically changing and aligning a reticle in less than 1 min will be in commercial production lines and will enable manufacturers to have wafers with different devices in the same batch. Because the days of commercial production lines dedicated to military circuits are coming to an end and military systems are using more COTS parts, the capability for low-volume production becomes very important. This capability serves the low-volume requirements of the military and the commercial sectors. With the transition to larger 300-mm wafer sizes, single wafer processing tools have become a requirement to maintain reliable process control. In these systems, multiple process modules, each independently processing individual wafers, cluster around a single wafer handler. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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BACKGROUND In the mid-1980s, the military was faced with the problem of obtaining spare part semiconductor devices for equipment that had been developed and fielded 20 years ago. The processing lines that produced these devices no longer existed, and the inventory of spare parts was quickly dwindling. The military realized that the devices developed and produced during the Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program would face the same fate because it was not economically feasible for semiconductor manufacturers to maintain militarily certified production lines to produce a relatively small quantity of devices. The individual Services took different approaches to the problem of replacing spare partsa problem that exists to this day. At the Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) in San Diego, California, the Navy built small pilot lines to duplicate past processes and fabricate the required spare parts. The Army at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in cooperation with LSI Logic, duplicated the function of the required spare parts by using LSI Logics design software and their ASIC devices. The Air Force immediately started stockpiling finished wafers of devices used in their systems. However, they soon realized that this would not be a viable solution and, in 1988, awarded a $112 million contract for a Microelectronics Manufacturing Science and Technology (MMST) program to Texas Instruments to develop new, creative, and cost-effective solutions for manufacturing low-volume military ICs, microwave devices, and sensors. The programs goals of rapid cycle time, low-volume capability, and process flexibility required replacing traditional batch processing equipment with single wafer processing equipment.
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. ENHANCED OPTICAL LITHOGRAPHY

Lithographic technologies for the generation and transfer of highly complex patterns for microelectronics and micromechanical structures using 157-nm UV lithography and EUVL employing 1014 nm soft X-ray photons [see Background; Lithographic Requirements (Table 8.3-1); Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography (EUVL)]. Advanced resist systems (bi-layer, thin-layer imaging, chemically amplified); optical materials; antireflective materials for optical; EUVL. Optical, EUVL exposure equipment; phase shift masks; mask inspection equipment; wafer level defect recognition and analysis. Defect recognition and analysis; OPC; statistical quality control (SQC). Alignment and registration accuracy; minimum resolvable feature size; increased depth of focus; exposure source integrity; process-generated defects; mask inspection; mask defect repair; metrology equipment for critical dimension and overlay. Military requirements not being addressed by the commercial sector are focal plane arrays (FPAs) with unique infrared (IR) requirements for military electronics and sensors. Lithography is used in fabricating all semiconductor devices, ICs, and MEMS devices. Not an issue.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Lithography is the enabling technology that has supported the IC industry for decades. Lithography and micropattern transfer technology used to fabricate devices and ICs are the keys in determining their performance and maintaining a strategic edge in a wide range of military sensors, EW devices, communications, command and control (C2), and offensive and defense weapon systems. New, advanced lithographic technologies are required to adhere to the advanced performance projections for IC devices in the 21st century. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Hong Kong Russia UK
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BACKGROUND LITHOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS Optical lithography (nominally defined for wavelengths of 157 nm and greater) continues to be the mainstream technology for the semiconductor industry. It is about to enter in production at 180-nm CD design rules. Improvements to optical technology will be required to support product and process development at CDs of 180 nm and below. Resolution enhancement techniques (RETs) include wavelength reduction (193 nm157 nm) and off-axis illumination, as well as PSM and OPC. The key challenge to optical enhancement at the 130-nm CD level will be maintaining an adequate and affordable process latitude (depth of focus/exposure window) necessary for 10-percent post-etch CD control. Mask-making capability exists for 250-nm generation chrome binary masks. Capability for
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complex PSM, OPC, and 180-nm binary masks are in development and pilot production. Solutions for rapidly growing data volumes need to be developed, especially for optical proximity correction in the < 250-nm regime. Advanced I-line resists are in manufacturing, with resolution capabilities down to 300 nm. DUV resists at 248 nm are commercially available and are being used to manufacture 64-MB DRAM and MPU products. Overlay requirements are among the most difficult technical challenges in lithography. Overlay and CD improvements have not kept pace with resolution improvements. The estimates for overlay appear to plateau around 30 nm, which will be inadequate for ground rules less than 100 nm. Overlay CD control over large field sizes continues to be a major concern for < 130 nm lithography. Advances in stage technologies, environmental controls, interferometers, and alignment systems will be needed for < 65 nm overlay. Continuous improvements in maskmaking technology (mask writers, inspection, repair, and substrates) are required to support the technical and manufacturing needs of optical lithography below 250 nm. Table 8.3-1 lists projected advances in lithography and overlay. Mask inspection requirements will become more aggressive as optical lithography pushes to finer resolutions. Major process and materials development is required to achieve the tolerances and mechanical properties necessary in the unique substrates used in these advanced technologies. Key issues will be identifying and repairing defects and the ability to keep masks defect free in manufacturing.
Table 8.3-1. Critical Level Lithography Requirements (Source: SIA NTRS)
Year of Production Technology Generation Product Application DRAM (bits) MPU (logic transistors/cm2) ASIC (usable transistors/cm2) Minimum Feature Size MPU Gates (Isolated lines) DRAM (Dense lines) Contacts Gates (nm, 3 sigma) Overlay (nm, mean + 3 sigma) DRAM Chip Size (mm2) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 MPU Chip Size (mm2) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 360 290 220 400 240 240 430 260 260 520 310 310 620 370 370 750 450 450 400 320 240 480 390 290 560 450 340 790 630 480 1120 900 670 1580 1300 950 140 180 200 14 65 120 150 170 12 55 100 130 140 10 45 70 100 110 7 35 50 70 80 5 25 35 50 60 4 20 1G 6M 14M 2G 10M 16M 4G 18M 24M 16G 39M 40M 64G 84M 64M 256G 180M 100M 1999 180 nm 2001 150 nm 2003 130 nm 2006 100 nm 2009 70 nm 2012 50 nm
EXTREME ULTRAVIOLET LITHOGRAPHY (EUVL) Optical lithography has provided the enabling technology to support the IC industry for several decades. However, new approaches will be required to maintain the Moores Law projections for IC manufacturing in the 21st century. One promising technology, which builds on the optical experience, is EUVL using 10- to 14-nm soft X-ray photons. For these wavelengths and 4 reduction, low numerical aperture (NA) imaging systems with printing resolutions less than 100 nm and a depth of focus (DOF) greater than 1 nm are expected. Technology scaling is expected to support several IC generations down to possibly 0.03 nm.
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Because extreme ultraviolet (EUV) photons are highly absorbed in most materials and gases, special reflective optics contained in a vacuum environment are required to produce imaging. In the late 1980s, Bell Laboratories, LLNL, SNL, and Japanese researchers performed early research using soft X-ray projection lithography. During the early and mid 1990s, research continued, and laboratory cameras were demonstrated. In 1996, DOE reduced funding for EUV work at the national labs and research within Bell Laboratories. With the support of Motorola, Inc., and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), Intel Corporation sponsored the formation of the EUV Limited Liability Corporation (EUVLLC) consortium. A Virtual National Laboratory (VNL), comprised of LLNL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and SNL, is working with the EUVLLC to continue EUV R&D work. The EUVLLC lithography goals include: An engineering test stand (ETS) in late 1999 Stepper beta tools by 2001 Pre-production and production tools by 2002 and 2004, respectively.
The initial lithography tool goals for the illuminator include using a continuous, recycling xenon gas jet laser plasma source and a 13.4-nm condenser delivering > 98-percent uniformity and < 2-percent nonuniformity illumination over a 1.5 26 mm ring field with a partial coherence of 0.7. The production lithography tool targets a scanned field the size of 26 mm 52.5 mm printed on 300-mm wafers using 150-mm and 300-mm reflective masks and 4:1 reflective reduction projection optics. Wafer and reticle-handling interfaces will support a 300-mm system in a contamination-free vacuum environment with a throughput of 40 wafers per hour. At the International Society for Optical Engineering (SPIE) symposium in March 1999, Cymer, Inc., announced the availability of a doubly ionized lithium dense plasma focus laser source producing 13.5-nm radiation, 30-PM bandwidth, 760 MJ per pulse, and a 200-Hz repetition rate that they claim has significant advantages over currently available EUV sources.
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. NANOTECHNOLOGY

Develop material, processing technologies, < 100-nm lithography, quantum and conventional devices, and device architectures for a next generation of information processing systems and subsystems with critical feature sizes well below 0.1 m. Improve speed, density, power, and functionality to achieve speeds 10 to 100 times faster than current systems, density by a factor of 5 to 100, and lower power by a factor of more than 50. Resist for 193-nm and soft X-ray lithography, elastomeric polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) for soft lithographic replication. Highly anisotropic reactive ion etching (RIE) system; scanned probe microscopies; atomic force microscope; nano-positioning devices; nanoprobes for diagnostics; auger spectroscopy; high-temperature X-ray; neutron-scattering techniques. None identified. Designing, fabricating, and testing electronic devices with critical feature sizes well below 0.1 m; real-time control of the nanostructure fabrication for future quantum device-based electronics; techniques to enable combining III-V quantum device and standard CMOS electronics; resist development for 193-nm and soft X-ray lithography; lithographic replicating techniques; molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) with in situ process control. For the manipulation of materials and data at the atomic level for applications such as computer storage technology, single electron tunneling (SET) devices are predominantly aimed at high-density, low-power memory markets. Resonant tunneling diodes (RTDs) have demonstrated numerous applications, and potential markets include digital-to-analog converters (DACs), clock quantisers, shift registers, and ultralow power SRAM. The RTDs can be designed for much higher speeds than CMOS for DACs and so forth, typically in the speed range 10 to 100 GHz, or for much lower power than CMOS, such as the SRAM technology. Phase shifter/frequency translator based on serrodyne modulation of a nonlinear transmission line for integrated sensor applications using terahertz signals. In reference to Moores Law, manufacturers state that CMOS production past 100-nm ground rules is inevitable, but DRAM producers are more concerned that economics may limit future DRAM generations even before 100 nm is reached. The major companies are predicting that Moores Law will slow toward 2010, but the reduction in cost per function on the chip will continue at the same rate because of changes in systems design, including self-test and error-tolerant architectures and increased integration levels leading to the system on a chip. The most important driver for new technology is the ability to reduce the cost per function on a chip. Present limitations are cross-talk and the lack of a silicon light emitter to increase functionality. Eventually, RF and optical functions (optical interchip/intersystem and on-chip interconnects) will be integrated onto CMOS/BiCMOS2 chips to reduce systems costs. MCMs having two- or three-chip solutions instead of a one-chip solution may be a less expensive approach over complete systems-on-a-chip. Figure 8.3-2 is an example of a future system-on-a-chip.
Critical Materials
Affordability
BiCMOS technology is a combination of Bipolar and CMOS technology. CMOS technology offers less power dissipation, smaller noise margins, and higher packing density. Bipolar technology, on the other hand, ensures high switching and input/output (I/O) speed and good noise performance.
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Figure 8.3-2. Future System-on-a-Chip (Source: ESPRIT Microelectronics Advanced Research Initiative Nanoelectronics Roadmap) http://www.cordis.lm/esprit/src/melari.htm
RATIONALE Industrial-applicable nanofabrication techniques must be able to produce millions or billions of these small structures in a quick, reliable, and cost-effective way. These techniques must be able to connect these structures in a predefined manner. For this reason, parallel techniques, such as conventional circuit lithography techniques using mask alignment and pattern transfer, seem to be the only currently realistic way to fabricate circuits that are highly integrated. Serial techniques, such as scanning probe techniques or e-beam lithography, may be useful for mask making, or single component fabrication but do not supply adequate throughput for large-scale ICs. Nanotechnology seeks improved speed, density, power, and functionality beyond that achieved by simply scaling transistors. Specific military applications of this technology have not been clearly defined. Indications are that this technology will produce extremely small, very fast computers, integrated sensor applications using terahertz signals, and lightweight compact communication equipmentall with low power consumption. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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R&D is being carried out throughout the industrial world. Countries with large efforts include the United States, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. NEXT-GENERATION LITHOGRAPHY

For microelectronics, lithographic technologies for the generation and transfer of highly complex patterns below 100 nm and to extend resolutions to 50 nm, using proximity X-ray, e-beam projection, EBDW, and ion projection [see E-Beam Stepper; Background; Lithographic Requirements (Table 8.3-2); and Scattering With Angular Limitation in Projection Electron-beam Lithography (SCALPEL)]. Advanced resist systems (bi-layer, thin-layer imaging, chemically amplified); X-ray, charged beam materials; antireflective materials for X-ray, e-beam, ion beam. e-beam, X-ray, ion beam exposure equipment; mask inspection equipment; scanning probe microscopy (SPM); scanning capacitance microscopy (SCM); wafer level defect recognition and analysis. Defect recognition and analysis; OPC; SQC. Alignment and registration accuracy; minimum resolvable feature size; increased depth of focus; exposure source integrity; process-generated defects; mask inspection; mask defect repair; metrology equipment for critical dimension and overlay. Military requirements not being addressed by the commercial sector are FPAs with unique IR requirements for military electronics and sensors. Lithography is used in the fabrication of all semiconductor devices, MEMS devices, and ICs. Not an issue.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE The lithography and micropattern transfer technologies used to fabricate semiconductor devices, MEMS devices, and ICs are the keys in determining their performance and in maintaining a strategic edge in a wide range of military sensors, EW devices, communications, C2, and offensive and defense weapon systems. Lithography is the enabling technology that has supported the IC industry for decades. New, advanced lithographic technologies are required to adhere to the advanced performance projections for IC devices in the 21st century. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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BACKGROUND LITHOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS Advanced technologies, such as X-ray and EBDW, have been used to fabricate functional semiconductor devices below 100 nm over small field sizes at low throughput. In addition, various technologies have been proposed and studies are underway to extend resolution to 50 nm. X-ray mask capability for 180-nm generation is in development. Overlay requirements are among the most difficult technical challenges in lithography. Overlay and CD improvements have not kept pace with resolution improvements. The estimates for overlay appear to plateau around 30 nm.
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Table 8.3-2 lists projected advances in lithography and overlay. This will be inadequate for ground rules less than 100 nm. Overlay CD control over large field sizes continue to be a major concern for < 130-nm lithography. Advances in stage technologies, environmental controls, interferometers, and alignment systems will be needed for < 65 nm overlay. Continuous improvements in mask-making technology (mask writers, inspection, repair, and substrates) required to support the technical and manufacturing needs of optical lithography below 250 nm. Mask inspection requirements will become more aggressive as X-ray and e-beam lithography push to finer resolutions. In addition, significant improvements will be necessary for all nonoptical approaches, especially 1 proximity X-ray. Major process and materials development is required to achieve the tolerances and mechanical properties necessary in the unique substrates used in these advanced technologies. Key issues will be identifying and repairing defects and the ability to keep masks defect free in manufacturing.
Table 8.3-2. Critical Level Lithography Requirements (Source: SIA NTRS)
Year of Production Technology Generation Product Application DRAM (bits) MPU (logic transistors/cm ) ASIC (usable transistors/cm2) Minimum Feature Size MPU Gates (Isolated lines) DRAM (Dense lines) Contacts Gates (nm, 3 sigma) Overlay (nm, mean + 3 sigma) DRAM Chip Size (mm2) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 MPU Chip Size (mm2) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 360 290 220 400 240 240 430 260 260 520 310 310 620 370 370 750 450 450 400 320 240 480 390 290 560 450 340 790 630 480 1120 900 670 1580 1300 950 140 180 200 14 65 120 150 170 12 55 100 130 140 10 45 70 100 110 7 35 50 70 80 5 25 35 50 60 4 20
2
1999 180 nm
2001 150 nm
2003 130 nm
2006 100 nm
2009 70 nm
2012 50 nm
1G 6M 14M
2G 10M 16M
4G 18M 24M
16G 39M 40M
64G 84M 64M
256G 180M 100M
SCATTERING WITH ANGULAR LIMITATION IN PROJECTION ELECTRON-BEAM LITHOGRAPHY (SCALPEL) In January 1999, Lucent Technologies, Inc., Applied Materials, Inc., and ASM Lithography Holding N.V. announced their intention to cooperate in accelerating the development of SCALPEL e-beam lithography. The ultimate goal of this effort is to commercialize SCALPEL technology as a production-worthy manufacturing tool for building future generations of silicon chips. Several of the worlds leading semiconductor companies have also expressed interest in supporting this effort. SCALPEL is emerging as a viable choice for producing lithography generations below the 180-nm critical dimension. It provides image resolution and fidelity beyond the reasonable diffraction limits of advanced UV optical lithography tools. Wafer throughput will be a major factor in determining which post-optical lithographic technology candidate will provide the best productivity per unit cost. The SIA NTRS illustrates the need for device productivity in the post-optical generations, with increasing wafer size and multiple shrink generations. In evaluating new lithography approaches, throughput must be normalized to various initial and continuing costs of the tools, masks, resists, metrology techniques, and supporting infrastructure.
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In the past, e-beam lithography lacked sufficient throughput to be economically viable for chip manufacturing. In contrast EBDW systems, SCALPEL is a projection imaging system, distinguished by its use of an electron-scattering contrast generation mechanism. Proponents expect SCALPEL to overcome the limitations of optical lithography and enable the migration of chip technology to the 50-nm generation and beyond. An e-beam has a wavelength many times shorter than that of the UV light source used in todays lithography tools and has already demonstrated capability to pattern images well below 100 nm. Electron optics designed for the SCALPEL approach can typically provide a 3-mm wide wafer-scale effective field in which an imaging subfield of 0.25-mm width can be dynamically deflected without mechanical stage motion to expose the 3-mm area. High throughput is enabled by associating mechanical-stage motion in conjunction with the unit area to cover the wafer.
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. OPTICAL METROLOGY (WAFER INSPECTION)

An important area in optical metrology is wafer/mask inspection. The required precision for critical dimensions is in the tens of nanometers for critical dimensions of 250 nm and below. This presents a fundamental challenge and requires research on several fronts. Two approaches to solve this challenge are vector beam imaging and near-field optics. Critical technology parameters are CD measurement precision (5 nm) and minimum detectable particle size (5 nm). Materials for ultrasharp metal tip fabrication (near-field optics); bulk material for polarization control and waveguide optics for polarization control. Near-field optical systems (currently in production but techniques for enhanced sensitivity and resolution are in active development); vector beam imaging (in its infancy and needs considerable research investment); precision mechanical systems for scanning (important in both fields). High-speed acquisition/processing of digital images. The determination and implementation of optimum vector field distribution in the object plane. Semiconductor inspection; biological imaging. No near-field systems suitable for automated semiconductor inspection are currently available. Laboratory systems are $12 K.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE The use of silicon ICs pervades defense and commercial communication systems and military weapons systems. For ICs to continue to support the current requirements, they must become two to four times more dense in terms of computer power. As line widths and device sizes decrease, critical dimension measurement and particle detection become very critical. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. SMALL CRITICAL-DIMENSION LITHOGRAPHY

In 10 to 20 years, the applications for microchips will require width or feature dimensions in the 5- to 10-nm range. Critical-dimension lithography technology requires the UV reflective and transmissive and catadioptic optics to address these wavelengths. Thin-film resist technology for 5- to 10-nm wavelengths and nonlinear material for super-resolved writing need to be developed. EUV light sources in the 5- to 10-nm range, in combination with near-field and nonlinear processing technology, will be required to accomplish this task. Thin-film resist material. Mask overlay and alignment to better than 1 nm and defect (amplitude and phase metrology) measurements to 0.2 nm root mean square (rms) must be developed. Advanced aspheric polishing techniques and low-absorption refractory materials will be required. EUV phase-shifting interferometrics to characterize defects clearly is also required. High-bandwidth schemes for maskless lithography and new considerations for optical design in the X-ray region will be required. Optical component phase measurement algorithms will be needed to characterize defects. Maskless systems must be developed to minimize the constraints of going to short wavelengths. High-power, short-wavelength sources are required to sustain high throughput. Metrology and testing of EUV systems are not currently sufficient to develop this technology fully, so improved capability with higher resolution is needed. Many commercial applications (everything from computers to vehicle microprocessors) will benefit from this technology. In the 5- to 10-nm feature regime, one can fit three to five times as many chips on a given semiconductor substrate, thereby significantly reducing the cost of a given chip.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
RATIONALE This technology will inherently reduce the susceptibility of space electronics to radiation. The smaller features reduce the footprint of the electronics and allow many more algorithms and redundant circuits to fit on the same size chip that is currently used. Many military applications will benefit from this technology, especially since the overall cost will be reduced with the decrease in feature size (thus increasing the yield of chips per substrate). The small patterns are then used in combination with deposition, lift-off, and implantation technology to produce microcircuits on semiconductor chips. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. SOFT LITHOGRAPHY FOR MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS)

Lithographic technologies for the generation and transfer of more complex patterns, for micromechanical structures using EUVL that employ 10- to 14-nm soft X-ray photons; 193 nm UV lithography; proximity X-ray; e-beam projection; EBDW; ion projection; soft lithography for MEMS. Advanced resist systems (bi-layer, thin layer imaging, chemically amplified); X-ray, charged beam; EUV; optical materials; antireflective materials for optical, EUV, X-ray, e-beam, ion beam. Optical, e-beam, X-ray, ion beam exposure equipment; front and backside mask alignment; mask inspection equipment; SPM; SCM; wafer level defect recognition and analysis; surface proflier; SEM. Defect recognition and analysis; OPC; SQC. Alignment and registration accuracy; minimum resolvable feature size; increased depth of focus; exposure source integrity; process-generated defects; mask inspection; mask defect repair; metrology equipment for critical dimension and overlay; processes and equipment that will expedite the affordability and manufacturability of MEMS devices and systems. Lithography is used in fabricating all MEMS devices. MEMS devices and macro systems will have broad commercial applications ranging from biomedical, diagnostics, automotive, robots, sensors, communications, and aerospace to printers. Lithographic fabrication processes for MEMS must be based on high volume and low cost.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Using an ever-expanding set of fabrication processes and materials, MEMS technology will provide parallel micro-assemblies, nonsilicon substrates, and fully 3-D structures, with the advantages of small size, low power, low mass, low cost, and high functionality. MEMS, when inserted into weapons systems ranging from smart munitions and sensors to high-maneuverability aircraft and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, will bring to the military new levels of situational awareness, information to the solider, and precision strike capability. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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BACKGROUND SOFT LITHOGRAPHY Soft lithography refers to a set of low-cost techniques that will expedite the affordability and manufacturability of MEMS devices and systems. This approach relies on elastomeric elements to print organic inks (microcontact printing), to mold polymers (replica molding, micromolding in capillaries, and microtransfer molding), and to perform lithography in the near field. Fabrication of patterns and structures with feature sizes as small as 30 nm on both planar and nonplanar substrates has been demonstrated. The soft lithography techniques use an elastomeric PDMS element with patterned relief on its surface to generate features. The PDMS elements are prepared by casting prepolymers against masters formed by conventional lithography. The methods can generate features on curved and reflective substrates and can pattern large areas rapidlyboth metals and polymers. Distortion currently limits the methods to fabrication of single-layer structures. Near-term applications could include optical devices like polarizers, filters, wire grids, and surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices. Long-term goals include optical data storage systems, FPDs, and quantum devices. Soft lithography is not currently competitive with conventional lithography for multilayer fabrication where there are critical requirements for pattern regularity. Soft lithography techniques include: Nearfield phase shift lithography. A PDMS element with micron-scale surface relief in conformal contact with a layer of photoresist modulates the intensity of light in the nearfield region. At phase boundaries, an intensity null results from a p-phase shift between recessed and unrecessed regions. Feature size range is 50 to 100 nm. Replica molding. A PDMS element is cast against a conventionally patterned master. Polyurethane is molded against the PDMS secondary master, thus replicating the original without damage. Feature size range is 230 nm. Microcontact printing. An alkanethiol solution is used to ink a patterned PDMS stamp. The stamp is brought into contact with the substrate, and the thiol ink is transferred and then forms a self-assembled monolayer that acts as a resist to etching. Feature size range is 300 nm. Micromolding in capillaries. Continuous channels are formed when a PDMS element is brought into conformal contact with a solid substrate. Capillary action fills the channels with a polymer precursor. The polymer is cured, and the stamp is removed. Feature size range is 1 nm. Microtransfer molding. A PDMS element is filled with a prepolymer or a ceramic precursor and placed on a substrate. The material is cured, and the stamp is removed. Feature size range is > 250-nm multilayer capability. Solvent-assisted microcontact molding. A PDMS element with a small amount of solvent spread over it is brought into contact with a polymer such as photoresist. The solvent swells the polymer, expanding it to fill the surface relief of the mold. Feature range is 60 nm.
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DATA SHEET III-8.3. TECHNOLOGY FOR MICROELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS)

MEMS technology enables the development of chemical, biological, and mechanical smart systems. MEMS is based on a manufacturing technology that has roots in microelectronic fabrication technology. It merges the functions of computing, communication, and power together with sensing, actuating, and control to interact with the physical world. Thick photo resist; silicon substrates; SiC substrates; thin-film polysilicon; fluxless solder; piezoelectric thin films. Front and backside mask alignment; surface proflier; plasma processing (etch and deposition); SEM; cluster tools; MBE; MOCVD. CAD software for process, system, and packaging simulation. Tools, processes, and equipment that will expedite the affordability and manufacturability of MEMS devices and systems; new concepts in the integration of multiple devices to form dynamic systems (e.g., distributed plug-in sensors interconnected by wired or wireless networks sharing a common communication/power bus); new interface/packaging technologies for applications that require MEMS devices to be integrated intimately into a macro device (e.g., arrays of actuators or deformable gratings where systems require controlled access to selected physical parameters that are either being sensed or controlled); MEMS standards, particularly in packaging and bonding techniques. MEMS devices and macro systems will have broad commercial applications ranging from biomedical, diagnostics, automotive, robots, sensors, communications, and aerospace to printers. MEMS devices will be a small fraction of the systems cost, size, and weight but will be critical to its operation, reliability, and affordability.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Using an ever-expanding set of fabrication processes and materials, MEMS technology will provide parallel microassemblies, nonsilicon substrates, and fully 3-D structures, with the advantages of small size, low power, low mass, low cost, and high functionality. New device concepts include the integration of micro devices with communication, control, computation and power components; miniature electromechanical signal processing elements (tuning elements, antennas, filters, and mixers); miniature optoelectromechanical devices; switches; fiber-optic interconnects and aligners; deformable gratings and tunable interferometers; force/motion balanced accelerometers and pressure sensors; atomic-resolution data storage; process control; and simultaneous, multiparameter sensing with monolithic sensor clusters. Advanced device and process concepts exploit integrated, collocated actuators, sensors, and electronics to achieve new functionality, increased sensitivity, wider dynamic range, programmable characteristics, designed-in reliability, and self-testing. MEMS inserted into weapons systems, ranging from smart munitions and sensors to high-maneuverability aircraft and IFF systems, will bring to the military new levels of situational awareness, information to the soldier, and precision strike capability.
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SECTION 8.4MICROELECTRONICS
Highlights The 1997 SIA NTRS predicts a very fast-paced growth of semiconductor technologies to the year 2012. Feature sizes of 50 to 100 nm and densities of 275 Gbits/chip for DRAMs and 1.4 Gbits/chip for microprocessors (108 transistors/cm2) are predicted. All the microelectronic characteristics projections are based on current techniques. Continual evolution of existing technologies [see Volume I of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL)] are shown herefrom microprocessors, converters, memories, and gate arrays to the evolution of such emerging devices as neural networks, artificial intelligence (AI), optoelectronics, new materials, and advanced packaging. Microwave and other RF devices at the IC level are continuing to advance with higher frequency and power, following the rest of the technology but at a slower pace. SiGe, Si, GaAs, InP, and GaN are enhancing this effort. Advanced packaging technologies will increase the usability of density, speed, heat control, integration, and environmental technologies, which the extreme densities require. Radiation and temperature tolerance are improved by the application of new materials and fabrication.
OVERVIEW Semiconductor devices are pervasive in all military applications involving electronics. This section contains all the digital, analog, and hybrid (analog and digital combined) technology semiconductor devices at the IC level, PCB, or module level. Environmental technology, such as temperature and radiation tolerance, is included for these devices. Also covered are the MMICs and other RF devices operating at higher frequencies and power and not incorporating the emerging applications of SiC and GaN; IC design and testing involving the CAD of chips, PCBs, and modules; and specialized materials and materials techniques, such as SiC and SOI. Virtually all space, air, ground, and ocean military systems involve microelectronics and are dependent on the advances in this technology to achieve their superior performance. Extremely low power, size, and weight allow advanced ICs to be used effectively in wearable electronics, in ground-vehicle electronics, and in ultrasmall reconnaissance aircraft. Very-high-performance microprocessors of the future will be the main element in supercomputers made of networks of microprocessors. The extreme numbers of elements on a chip will allow an individual microprocessor to be a supercomputer itself, composed of multiple processors networked on the chip along with a very large memory and multiple I/O channels to form very powerful systolic arrays. The integration of electronics and mechanical structures called MEMS will enable complete 3-axis inertial navigation systems-on-a-chip, including Global Positioning System (GPS) processing and interface, error modeling, drift compensation, and initialization. RATIONALE Microelectronic ICs are pervasive across all commercial and military systems and continue to improve the system performance. New IC technology is being inserted into new systems, and this continual improvement in electronics performance gives the United States a military advantage. High-performance electronics are used in strategic and tactical air, ground, underwater, and space applications. All smart weapons are totally dependent on ever-improving IC performance. The parameters of small size and low weight, low power, high reliability, and affordability give modern electronics their superiority.
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The advanced technologies described in this section have some military benefit inherent in their characteristics. SOI and GaAs are inherently harder to total dose radiation, although smaller feature sizes are more susceptible to SEU. The use of diamond substrates and diamond coatings with better heat dissipation allow denser packaging and less susceptibility to shock and vibration. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 8.4-1)
Country Canada China Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Advanced Packaging of ICs AI and Learning ICs Compound Semiconductor ICs Converter ICs
ASICs

Extreme Environment ICs

Significant R&D

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Figure 8.4-1. Microelectronics WTA Summary (1 of 2)

Field Programmable ICs System-ona-Chip ICs
Country Canada China Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Singapore South Africa South Korea Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Memory ICs
Microprocessor ICs

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Figure 8.4-1. Microelectronics WTA Summary (2 of 2)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-8.4. MICROELECTRONICS

Advanced Packaging of Integrated Circuits (ICs) ................................................................................................... III-8-49 Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) [Custom Integrated Circuits (ICs)] ......................................... III-8-51 Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Learning Integrated Circuits (ICs) ........................................................................ III-8-53 Compound Semiconductor Integrated Circuits (ICs) .............................................................................................. III-8-54 Converter Integrated Circuits (ICs) .......................................................................................................................... III-8-55 Extreme Environment Integrated Circuits (ICs) ...................................................................................................... III-8-56 Field-Programmable Integrated Circuits (ICs) ........................................................................................................ III-8-58 Memory Integrated Circuits (ICs) ............................................................................................................................ III-8-59 Microprocessor Integrated Circuits (ICs) ................................................................................................................ III-8-60 System-on-a-Chip Integrated Circuits (ICs) ............................................................................................................ III-8-61
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. ADVANCED PACKAGING OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

The advanced mobile military systems will require increased functionality per unit volume, and this need can be met only through innovative packaging and interconnect approaches [e.g., chip scale packaging (CSP) using flip chip technology]. Next-generation technologies must be developed for high-speed, mixed-signal circuits and increased level of integration, including embedded components and MEMS devices, to achieve functionality and miniaturization. High-density interconnect substrates [e.g., those using laminated multi-chip modules (MCM-Ls)], such as flex tape, are primarily multilayer plastic packages made up of copper and epoxy resin, ceramic multi-chip modules (MCM-Cs), deposited thin-film multi-chip modules (MCM-Ds), and built-up multilayer technology, such as MCM-L/D and MCM-C/D for wafer scale processing. For micro-via technology, laser and photo-imageable dielectric layers and plasma etch technology are critical.
Critical Materials
Burn-in and test fixtures and testers for MCMs or multi-chip assemblies (MCAs); thermal enclosure/interface systems for control of high temperature during testing; wafer level burn-in and testers for known good die (KGD); interconnects using copper; and optical microscope for solder reflow process control for bumping. Design tools software; test and analysis software; process control software; thermal management software. Design tools and design experience; modeling and simulation for 3D packaging; heat dissipation, thermal mismatch, and size; reliability and thermal management of plastic and ceramic packages. Solid-state memory; embedded processors for hand-held and portable products, desktop personal computers (PCs), notebooks, smart cards, camcorders, medical devices, analog/digital wireless applications, high performance computing (HPC) platforms, signal processors, communications, automotive, engine controls, and system-on-a-chip prototypes. In commercial markets, volume is the driver. Electronics-packaging and interconnect technology advances are leading to a small-die-size, ultrathin, lightweight, and low-cost package. CSP (flex tape and flip chip) technology represents only 25 percent of the total IC units assembled (leadframe packages). At present, advanced packaging is 3 times (1.5 cents vs. 0.5 cents/lead) the cost of thin small outline package (TSOP) and shrink small outline package (SSOP). However, with growing applications and existing manufacturing infrastructure, coupled with improvements in substrate materials and processes, it is expected that the prices will be as good or better. Smaller size, lower weight, and higher performance CSP and enhanced CSP packages are much more affordable and provide a better payoff to the system designer.
Affordability
RATIONALE Multichip packages provide higher performance and increased miniaturization over individually packaged devices. Initial applications are in high reliability, high-speed modules, and compact functions. Since the inception of ICs, every improvement has required packaging innovations that do not degrade the ICs performance. Until the last several generations, these improvements have been achieved in a standard way. Todays and future generations of ICs, with high-speed (gigahertz), high-heat dissipation (up to 50 W), and dense complex structures (gigabytes of memory and 1012 logic elements), require new approaches and new
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technologies. The large heat dissipation requires improved heat transmission from the active elements and the substrate. The higher temperature operation requires all the elements of the package to have similar or compensating differential expansion so the structure is not ruptured. Diamond films (and diamond substrates) have superior heat transmission. Copper runs have lower resistance and therefore generate less heat and conduct heat efficiently. Flipchip and solder-bump connection techniques improve density and connectivity of larger MCMs. All these technologies must not degrade the performance of high-speed chips at the subsystem interface layer. The MCM technology is a prototype for even denser chips that can incorporate multichips into a single chip as well as become the ultimate system-on-a-chip, which will include MEMS, optoelectronic functions, and hybrid analog and digital circuits. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. APPLICATION-SPECIFIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ASICs) [CUSTOM INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)]
By 2012, 100 million gates/cm2 at 1.5 GHz, with standard cells (microprocessor, memory, hybrid, I/O, A/D, and so forth) integrated into system (system-on-a-chip) ICs. Will perform almost all required applications and be competitive with GPICs. ASICs will be a large part of the future system ICs. Wafer flatness; minimum defects; uniformity for advanced ICs. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment; chip probing. Standard cell software simulation and modeling; high-level development language (HDL); common application environment (CAE); and automated test equipment (ATE). Quantity of production, size of chip in transistors, and speed. Need a military rapid prototyping tool development for unique military applications. Pervasive to all commercial and military applications. Will compete with GPICs. Developed by commercial.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE ASICs are hardwired (e.g., nonreprogrammable) logic devices that can contain complex logic, memory [DRAM, read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM)], I/O circuits, and so forthall on a dense chip with a large number of transistors (106 to 107 in future). The technology is much like designing a general-purpose microprocessor or other special-purpose processors. Rather than use a programmable system in high-production electronics, a better approach is to fix the complete functionality of the chip (by using programmable devices) in an ASIC. The resulting chip is smaller, more economical, and more reliable than software-programmable devices. ASICs are generally composites of cells transferred from other designs directly, such as logic for a whole microprocessor, a large DRAM and/or programmable read-only memory (PROM) [erasable programmable readonly memory (EPROM) or EEPROM], standard I/O structures for interfaces, timing circuits, and other whole functions desired. ASICs can be hybrid ICs (i.e., a mixture of analog, digital, and conversion functions). In the future, a large percentage of mass-produced ICs will be ASICs. The ability to design a whole new unique structure using rapid prototyping design techniques (software or firmware) and HDLs can be done economically, fast, and correctly with minimum test time because the individual cells have been used many times and are therefore thoroughly tested and reliable. ASICs allow the user to use ICs when ordering a standard device is impractical. The specified parameters indicate speed capabilities, which separate these devices from run-of-the-mill devices. Most ASICs have resulted from commercial development, but some have originated through military development. ASICs can be produced in large quantities. They are reliable and are at the lowest cost per unit. Almost any electronic system house can create ASICs. The military can follow the same pattern using existing or specially designed commercial chips (e.g., COTS). The military can also replicate a design using MIL-SPEC designs, cells, and packaging to achieve a MIL-SPEC chip. Rad-hard chips can be created in the same fashion using the special materials and semiconductor structures required.
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AND LEARNING INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)
By 2017, 100 million neurons, with self-learning capability artificial neural networks (ANNs). Programmability of ICs for modeling and learning systems. Wafer flatness; minimum defects; uniformity for advanced ICs. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment. Training algorithms; simulation algorithms; simulation and modeling; HDL; CAE; ATE. Number of chip interconnects; optimization for broad range of electronic systems using massive parallelism; military system application (requires reconstituting learning/ teaching/programming for specific application of AI and learning machines). Robotics; nonlinear systems; modeling; control systems; central controller for very large systems; air traffic control; power plants; distribution networks; modeling of weather systems and other unpredictable systems. Cost of applying to specific military application.
Affordability
RATIONALE High performance is required in complex control and decision-making systems (expert or self-learning systems), parallel processing systems, sonar signal discrimination, and speech and image recognition. Hardware and generic programming technology are available. Overlap between commercial and military applications could be large, allowing compatible usage. Military use will be critical in battlefield control systems, decision-making systems, intelligence analysis, and so forth. However, the military will be using the commercial output for its technology base. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. COMPOUND SEMICONDUCTOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Denser ICs to achieve complex functions; matching packaging materials for uniform expansion at high temperatures. Compound materials (semiconductor, e.g., III/V and II/VI); GaAs epitaxial wafers; wafer flatness; minimum defects; uniformity for advanced ICs. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment; chip probing modified for compound materials. Simulation and modeling; HDL; CAE; ATE. Manufacturing difficulty; availability; difficulty in processing high-quality GaAs. Military must drive much of the development for radiation hardening, wide temperature range, and so forth. Space electronics requiring radiation tolerance; jet engines for wide temperature range. One of the more expensive developments for the military but large payoff for both military and commercial areas.
RATIONALE Compound semiconductor ICs have attributes for high-radiation and/or high-temperature usage in a wide range of systems. They can be used to develop the integration of multiple-material ICs and can be used for all electronic equipment requiring unique properties for radiation hardening, wide temperature range, and so forth. Military and commercial areas share much basic research. Compound semiconductor ICs have not reached their full potential for military applications because of modest volume and infrastructure needs that cannot be satisfied without compromising affordability. They have also not fully met their promise because of difficult materials and fabrication problems. These technologies have not had the large development funding or experience that the silicon ICs have had and are therefore running behind. However, the promise of special operational capabilities (rad-hard, high-temperature) have continued to propel these technologies forward. They will grow in capability as their properties become better understood and as the infrastructure is built to further the technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. CONVERTER INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

100 MHz to 1 GHz samples/sec; 12- to 20-bit accuracies. Wafer flatness, minimum defects, and uniformity for advanced ICs. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment. Simulation and modeling; HDL; CAE; ATE. Digital accuracy (e.g., bit size); fast conversion; linearity; drift; cost of commercial products directly usable by military (COTS) if these products do not meet MIL-SPEC requirements. Sensors, inertial guidance and navigation, control systems; display systems; medical systems. Military sometimes requires higher bit accuracies than commercial (e.g., 20- and 21-bit accuracies for ballistic missile aiming).
RATIONALE Converter ICs are critical components in all sensor-related systems (military and commercial). Fast, accurate converters are key and critical to real-time physical systems (e.g., sensor, inertial guidance and navigation, control systems, and so forth; display systems; digital mapping). These ICs are immediately available from commercial output. Overlap between commercial and military application could be large, allowing compatible usage. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. EXTREME ENVIRONMENT INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Radiation > 5 106 rads (Si); total-dose-five merging devices; jet engine and automobile controls to 400 C. Wafer flatness, thickness, defects, and uniformity for advanced ICs; ceramic, metal ceramic, diamond substrates, and diamond coatings; uniform expansion/contraction developed to mitigate thermal shock; SOI wafers; dielectric materials. Dielectric isolation; SIMOX ion-implanter for deep implant on silicon-on-sapphire (SOS) and SOI; controlled doping; MBE; surface passivation; controlled radiation testing; reliability and failure analysis. Computer modeling and simulation software; pre- and post-radiation modeling; SEU models; thermal analysis models; diagnostics for modeling of starting materials. Dielectrically isolated substrates; SOS or SOI technologies; field shields, diffused guard-bands, or hardened field oxides; use of diamond, GaAs, or SiC devices; device design base material (e.g., SiC or diamond vs. Si); thermal management; ceramic/metal substrates; additional radiation hardening for nuclear requirements. All future large, low-power, high-speed, and high-density ICs as nanoelectronics are approached; commercial communications satellites; jet engines. Future commercial ICs in military systems will be more usable by COTS materials if military specifications are not too stringent. For military rad-hard devices, cost is an issue because of unique rad-hard-specific processes and low-volume requirements.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The ability of ICs to withstand the extreme environments of radiation, temperature, shock, and vibration improves the probability of reliable operation for all space-based military and nuclear systems. Generally, midtemperature range has been accepted as an indication of improved long-term reliability for commercial systems, but the capability to operate at specified temperature extremes is critical in certain applications (e.g., missiles and nuclear systems) and may require special processing and packaging. Commercial IC capabilities are continuously evolving to keep pace with the SIA NTRS. New technologies (e.g., SOI and SiGe wafers with Cu and low-k dielectric interconnects) are being implemented for low-power and high-speed complex ASICs, memory, and processors. However, the rad-hard-specific CMOS/SOI process and technologies are two to three generations behind the commercial IC device development and manufacturing. As the COTS products become more common in the DoD environment, system designers can take advantage of the commercial capabilities and, by making modifications to the existing process and packaging techniques, develop systems to meet the radiation-tolerant applications for future military systems. However, for more stringent rad-hard and extreme-temperature devices, special circuit design/modeling, materials, and process development efforts are needed to keep pace with the commercial capabilities.
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. FIELD-PROGRAMMABLE INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Merging gate arrays and logic arrays into best architecture for field-programmable ICs; very large devices for all ranges of applications (especially ASICs); 1 million usable gates by 2012. Wafer flatness, minimum defects, and uniformity for advanced ICs. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resist for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment. Standard cell software simulation and modeling; HDL; CAE; ATE. Gates per chip; gate speed; throughput of custom architecture vs. custom ASIC; large military software development for field application. Same as all future applications competing with GPICs. Commercially developed.
RATIONALE Field-programmable ICs will be used to prototype, modify, and upgrade military systems such as avionics, computers, radar, and guidance systems. Field-programmable gate array devices allow on-field changes to be made to existing firmware or software because of software changes, database changes, or additions to firmware or software. For military systems, a changed database could involve retargeting missiles, changing ballistics in fire control or missiles, or inserting new algorithms or programs to change the function of weapon processors. A prime commercial use of field-programmable ICs is for programming a system temporarily for field test (e.g., Beta Site) before finalizing production design. These ICs can be used in the same way for military systems. Therefore, these devices can be compatible or interchangeable between commercial and military systems. Field-programmable ICs are available from the commercial sector. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. MEMORY INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Very large (256 GB) and very fast (10 GHz) memory ICs (DRAM, SRAM, EPROM, EEPROM); large memory cells to be integrated into general-purpose microprocessors or ASICs by 2012. Wafer flatness, minimum defects, and uniformity for advanced ICs; GaAs, SiC/compound semiconductors. Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment. Standard cell software; simulation and modeling; HDL; CAE; ATE. SRAMshigh storage capacity, high speeds and nonvolatile; compound semiconductor memoryhigh storage capacity, very high speeds, and rad hard; military usage developing GaAs, SiC, and other compound semiconductors for specific needs. Pervasive to all commercial and military electronic systems. Commercial development will supply almost all military requirements if COTS products can be used or the commercial output can be directly converted to MIL-SPEC devices.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Memory devices are critical components in almost all electronic systems; computer systems; equipment using avionics, missile control, and detection systems; air traffic control; guidance and navigation systems; communication systems; and complex electronic systems, subsystems, and products. It is expected that memory, like all ICs that follow Moores Law, will advance to the next generation every 2 to 3 years. The only constraint is the ability to invest large sums of money (approaching $1 billion in the future) for the highly complex fabrication equipment that also must evolve in the same fashion. Certainly, gigabytes of memory on a chip will be available in several generations. Further in the future, the role of memory in ASICs will begin to replace general-purpose microprocessors in many applications (not considering PCs, workstations, and so forth). Although ASICs for special-purpose functions in electronic systems are becoming very large and complex, they are easy to design and produce. So, the large bulk of future ICs will be for special-purpose functions with all firmware and databases stored in memory driven by a simple controller and complex interfaces. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. MICROPROCESSOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

System-on-a-chip, including MEMS and optoelectronics; megabytes of SRAM on chips by 2012 for program and cache memory; 10-GHz speed by 2012; 1.4-B transistors/chip, including SRAM. Wafer flatness, minimum defects, and uniformity for advanced ICs; diamond substrates and coatings; efficient interconnects (such as copper). Lithography, epitaxy, deposition masks, and resists for high-density chips; high-speed testing equipment. Simulation and modeling for complex systems; HDL; CAE; ATE. Parallelism; reduced instruction set computers (RISCs) vs. complex instruction set computing (CISC) (architecture); density; yield in production; operating voltage and noise; heat dissipation; on-chip memory; performances of general-purpose microprocessors; I/O structure and memory access; price per function. In many cases, commercial output can be used directly by military (COTS). Virtually all commercial applications; digital signal processors (DSPs); systolic arrays; massively parallel systems. Commercial (free) development allows direct use by military. Additional cost is incurred if military must meet MIL-SPEC requirements.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Microprocessor ICs have become necessary and critical components in military and commercial systems. They are pervasive in all advanced military systems (e.g., radar, sonar, sensor, real-time signal- and image-processing systems). DSPs and other processors are also critical. Immediately-available schedule of military insertion affects field timing. It includes digital filters and other digital implementations usually designed as ASICs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-8.4. SYSTEM-ON-A-CHIP INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Integrate electronics, MEMS, optoelectronic, and hybrid circuits on a single chip, with all appropriate interfaces and A/D and D/A conversion. None identified, other than those noted on other data sheets. Probe testing; total system testing; partial chip testing; ability to fabricate all these dissimilar technologies on a chip. Simulation and modeling, including electronic, mechanical, optical; HDL. Ability to integrate different fabrication techniques on same chip; interfaces and heat control; applications to justify cost of development, design, and test; required signal integrity (grounding, shielding). MCM could be used. Navigation and guidance; sensors; effectors; medical testing; miniature systems needing all characteristics. Design and fabrication cost will be high. Sufficient production will be required to justify cost.
RATIONALE Initial efforts will take advantage of extreme functional density to fabricate all electronics, including generalpurpose computers (GPCs), DSPs, hybrid electronics, memory, and interface electronics for a large system function. Additional efforts will include integration of these same technologies, combined with MEMS, to develop gyros, accelerometers, medical sensors, and any miniature electromechanical functions. Electronic and optoelectronic integration will improve the development of computers, digital filters, and other signal-processing functions. The eventual goal will be to integrate all these functions into a single chip. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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This technology is in its infancy and has not yet taken advantage of the extreme functional size of even todays ICs. Some work has been done to put electronic interfaces on a MEMS accelerometer and gyroscope to create a workable function to interface with other navigation and guidance functions. Since MEMS are fabricated by IC equipment at micron-size features, the technology must be pushed to submicron features to be more compatible with todays dense chips. Many sources are conducting exploratory R&D. Medical in-body sensors may drive the technology to new heights. Satellite navigation and guidance requiring the smallest size will also drive the technology.
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SECTION 8.5NANOELECTRONICS
Highlights All the attributes of microelectronics (see Section 8.4) are further enhanced by entering the nanoelectronics feature size range. EUV, X-ray, or ion-projection lithography will be used to break through the 100-nm barrier to achieve feature sizes down to 10 nm. The extreme density and speed of nanoelectronic devices will enable supercomputers on a chip. Integrated optical, mechanical, and electronic systems on-a-chip, such as complete inertial navigation systems, will be possible. Nanoelectronics will enable very small, low power, low cost, sophisticated space probes; microminiature biological probes for the human body; and battlefield surveillance using very small unmanned flying vehicles.
OVERVIEW Nanoelectronics can be broadly defined as those developing technologies required to push the size of devices down into the 100- to 10-nm (0.1 to 0.01 m) region initially and then into the 10- to 1-nm region. Todays advances in microelectronics technology continue to shrink the feature size of Si-based FETs and is projected to be 100 nm (0.1 m) somewhere between 2003 and 2005 or earlier as per the SIA NTRS. A nanometer is a billionth of a meterabout the size of two large atomsapproximately 10 atomic diameters. As this feature size shrinks below 100 nm, it will be more difficult and costly to fabricate these devices. Some investigators even question their functional effectiveness below 70 nm (by the year-2010 SIA NTRS) in ultradense ICs. A 25-nm dimension has been demonstrated, but many technical problems must be overcome before production can be achieved. In addition, packaging, interconnects, and heat will exacerbate the problem. In fact, these problems may be the initial stumbling block as current efforts approach the 100-nm region. Research has been ongoing for approximately the past 40 years to explore the alternatives for nanometer-scale electronic devices that can perform both as switches and amplifiers, just like todays transistors for supercomputing applications. The operating principle for FET is the movement of mass electrons in bulk silicon. In the nanoelectronic world, atoms and molecules rule, and devices take advantage of quantum mechanical phenomenon including the discreteness of electrons. Molecular electronics is a relatively new approach that would change the operating principle and the materials used in the electronic devices. It uses, primarily, covalently bonded molecular structures, electrically isolated from a bulk substrate. The molecules are naturally occurring nanometer-scale structures and can be made exactly the same by the millions and trillions easily and at low cost for the industrial scale nanostructures needed for the ultradense nanocomputers, where as it is difficult and expensive to fabricate millions and billions of nearly identical nanometer-scale structures in solids. Working at the molecular level could also lead to huge advances in optical communications and photonics, as well as ways to probe individual cells (speculative for now). In recent years, researchers have, for the first time, put together molecular electronics devices that measure only a few nanometers and are viable and inexpensive. Among the molecular switching device categories, the electric-field-controlled molecular devices and electromechanical molecular switching devices are promising because they descend from the solid-state microelectronics and nanoelectronic devices and show promise for super dense integration and super fast computing. The breakthroughs required for extreme miniaturization fall into the following categories: Device science. Research on molecular electronics has been made feasible and important by the inventions of the new exciting methods called mechanosysthesis and chemosynthesis. Mechanosynthesis is the fabrication of nanostructures, molecule by molecule, using nanoprobes such as the scanning tunneling
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microscope (STM), atomic force microscope (AFM), and the new MEMS chips that contain arrays of these STMs and AFMs. Chemosynthesis is the fabrication of chemical sub-assembly of nanostructures using methods available from biochemistry, molecular genetics, and the organic synthesis of molecular electronic devices in individual organic molecules. It takes advantage of the driving force and speed of bulk chemical processes to make great quantities of nanometer-scale structures, such as molecular switches, nanowires, and selfassembled mono layers. A new device science is required other than the bulk-effect FET. A potential new device might take advantage of quantum mechanical phenomenon that operate at these small feature sizes, including single electron actions. Two such classes are: Solid-state quantum-effect and single electron devices. This approach takes advantage of the long years of experience on semiconductor transistors. Molecular electronic devices. This approach is inherently nanometer in scale as it is molecular in nature. However, it requires new materials and processes.
Packaging. Packaging for the nanometer-level devices will require extending the known approaches, and inventing completely new approaches, to overcome several difficult problems: Heat dissipation reduction and control Improved interconnects Vertical integration of gate structures 3-D packaging using vertical interconnects New parallel architectures to optimize the chip layout.
Substrates and MCMs will have to use diamond coatings and metal ceramic technologies to achieve the required cooling. Copper runs (using Damascene and double Damascene techniques) and low-K insulators to achieve the desired speed and cooling will be required, as well as yet unknown techniques. The kinds of challenges that need to be addressed are type of interconnection or linkage between molecules and small devices and solid substrate; electromigration and cross-talk problems in thin wires in ultradense structures; redundancy for error correction and reliability; heat dissipation; and the problem of how to arrange enormous numbers (between 109 and 1012) of individual devices ultradensely and ultraprecisely on a surface or in a lattice structure. Also, the production of molecules that exhibit requisite electronic effect (e.g., Coulomb blockade) has to be shown. RATIONALE For Moores Law2 (double chip density and speed every 18 months) to continue in force, the feature size of semiconductor devices must continue to shrink below 0.10 m (100 nm) somewhere near the limit of optical lithography. These feature sizes are required for the destiny of chips to achieve the ultimate size required to build very large electronic systems-on-a-chip. These densities will also allow the integration of optical (both analog and digital), MEMS, and digital and analog electronics on a chip. The applications for chips of these sizes, both commercial and military, will be innumerable. The commercial market will drive the requirements for these developments, but these developments will be directly applicable to future military requirements. The chips have some inherent capabilities to meet some military specifications (e.g., radiation tolerance, temperature range, shock, and vibration). Even if these advanced chips do not directly meet the required specifications, they are so small that they can be easily packaged to meet the requirements (e.g., shielding for radiation, heat sinks for temperature control, and shock and vibration mitigation).
Moores Law reflects the changes in IC technology but is used as the Bible by the Industry.
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Country Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Hungary Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Molecular Electronics Silicon-Based ICs

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Figure 8.5-1. Nanoelectronics WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-8.5. NANOELECTRONICS

Molecular Electronics ............................................................................................................................................... III-8-69 Silicon-Based Integrated Circuits (ICs) ................................................................................................................... III-8-71
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DATA SHEET III-8.5. MOLECULAR ELECTRONICS

Molecular electronic technology (MET) includes devices relying on the electronic properties of molecules that may contain more than one electron and are not only single electron in nature. MET includes single electron (quantum cascade or quantum dot) or relies on electron spin. An example is the use of the position or spins of single electrons as the bistable logic gate in implementing nanometer-scale devices (below 10 nm). Microelectronic devices use silicon semiconductor current switching to accomplish bistable elements, whereas MET uses the location of single electrons or their spins as the switching element. Research at the University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana, created nanometer-scale devices called quantum dot cellular automata as a logic gate. The Japanese have put effort into using not only the charges of electrons, but also their spins. The applications of these nanometer devices will ultimately improve greatly in performance, size, weight, power, heat dissipation, and perhaps radiation tolerance. Spin-controlled materials called magnetic semiconductors or multilayers of these materials have potential for these applications. Semiconductors and metals differ in the number of charge carriers involved. There are too many electronics in metals to be controlled. In semiconductors, the resistivity can be controlled by controlling the number of carriers, as in electrons or holes. Merging semiconductor and magnetic properties in a single material has been ongoing research for decades. II-VI alloys of magnetic and semiconductor materials are called diluted magnetic semiconductors (DMSs). Bulk forms of these II-VI DMS materials, thin films of III-V DMS (In,Mn)As, and a ferromagnetic DMS (GA,NM)As are the various combinations. A family of new test, production, and inspection (T, P, and I) equipment comparable to that used in microelectronics will have to be developed. It is not clear how many of the existing techniques can be transferred to nanoelectronics. Since software is generally independent of hardware, chip tests and systems test for microelectronics might be adapted to nanoelectronics requirements. Testing and inspection during nanoelectronics production will require a completely new set of software. Application software generally should be interchangeable. The extremely large future cost for these nanoelectronic devices (in development, production, and application) must be weighed against the performance improvement that is expecteddown to single-digit nanometer feature sizes. Further development is the only way to determine if the technology is feasible, practical, or even realizable. Achieving stable, reliable binary states for single electrons may be difficult. In theory and in the laboratory, it can be achieved; however, making it practical may not occur or may take excessive time, effort, and cost. All the same applications used in microelectronics can be used in nanoelectronics. The major emphasis is on applications in which extremely small size, weight, power, and heat dissipation are essential, such as wearable electronics (both commercial and military); remote sensor systems (e.g., satellites, space probes, and biological in-body); ultrasmall, remotely piloted vehicles (e.g., microvehicles); and other smart vehicles (e.g., those used for underwater exploration). The initial discovery of the physics of silicon semiconductors has encompassed over 40 years of development and billions of dollars in expenditures. The development of MET has barely entered this kind of cycle. Certainly, initial discovery and analysis of molecular phenomenon has taken place during the last several decades, but the total thrust of development has been for silicon semiconductors. However, industry consensus is that silicon semiconductor technology cannot continue below 10050 nm. All the technologies required for entering this regimematerials, lithography, deposition,
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Affordability
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Affordability (Continued)
production equipment, testing methodology, equipment, and so forthmust be redeveloped. Certainly, the large, highly trained work force developed during the last 5 decades can collapse the timetable to achieve practical devices. So the final analysis is the cost to enter this technology. The cost to industry will be even higher because the two paths will inevitably be followed simultaneouslydriving the present silicon technology to its ultimate limit and entering the new MET arena with all its uncertainties. History tells us that technologies tend to continue to proceed past their predicted limits. Surely, this will be the case with silicon technology since optical lithography has already exceeded recent predictions.
RATIONALE The commercial and military market will pressure electronics to continue to follow Moores Law (double density every 18 months) and supply ever-higher performance. A challenge is whether the cost will be prohibitive and the users will be trained to accept a slower growth curve. However, the users can be expected to expand their system requirements, particularly with system-on-a-chip. The integration of digital and analog electronics, MEMS, and optoelectronics on a single chip will need ever smaller, lighter, lower power, higher performance, and rugged electronics. In the end, this will determine if the best in silicon technology is good enough to meet all market requirements. The development of these devices cannot take advantage of all the microelectronic design, production, and application knowledge developed during the past few decades. The silicon technology of the past has become embedded in the culture, and this evolution has allowed tremendous advances to be achieved. However, MET will be a departure from all these existing technology and will require new physics, design, and production technology to be developed at great cost and over a long period of time. The question is, will industry will pay the price? Simpler departures in the past have not made the grade (two terminal devices comes to mind). However, literature search shows that progress is being made in harnessing the principles of quantum mechanics to design and build molecular devices that can function well in nanoscale even after miniaturization of solid-state FETs has ceased to be feasible and cost effective. Before the nanofabrication methods become feasible, the industry may leverage the present microelectronics technology developments to pursue a hybrid solution for aggressive miniaturization by employing quantum effect and bulk devices. This may increase the logic density by as much as 100 or 1,000 times as that presently feasible. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Israel Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
EU (Consortium) Netherlands UK
Germany South Korea
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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DATA SHEET III-8.5. SILICON-BASED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs)

Since industry has continued to invest in time and money in silicon-based semiconductors, it is locked into pushing the technology as far as it will go. It appears that the market will be satisfied for most of the next decade with predictable (some risk and large dollar investments) improvements in the ability of the underlying technologies to design and produce the required ICs into the less than 100-nm range. This is by no means a certainty since fundamental limits not approached to date will certainly at some point come into effect. Optical lithography may allow producing chips down to 50 nm in feature size, but this is not a certainty because of the need for extreme defect-free substrates and other fundamental problems. SIA NTRS projections for 2012 are: Memory (DRAM) to 200 1011 bits/cm2 Microprocessor (MPU) to 108 bits/cm2.
Present capability is approaching 130 nm in production.

Critical Materials
Low-k dielectric deposition, copper chemical-mechanical planarization (CMP), and SiO2 gates to achieve low delays (speed > 2 GHz by 2012). For silicon nanodevices, defectfree and flat wafer, thin epitaxial Si or SiGe deposited films, new resist materials and light-sensitive coatings, low-k dielectric deposition, and interconnect materials (e.g., Cu) are critical. For Si nanoelectronic devices growth, and uniformity of SiO2 to 5-nm thickness as a natural insulating barrier is important. Materials with low defect size, resists compatible with EUVL (see Section 8.3); heat sinking materials and techniques, such as diamond films, to allow 175 W per chip.
The existing T, P, and I equipment has kept pace with development to allow good ICs to be produced. For the next generation of ICs, this equipment is expected to continue to evolve. The T, P, and I parameters must always be better than the product to test properly beyond the product specifications. This means gigahertz frequencies and nanometer size. For scale-down field tests, development of lithography tools, masks, CMP tools, epitaxy and etch tools, and in-line automated defect inspection equipment with programs to analyze and categorize defects are needed for production. Also needed are ATE that has built-in test and advanced ATE that uses better probes and handling capabilities. The T, P, and I technology is pressed to the limits. A technique to help this situation is placing a permanent built-in test in the chip. Since future chips will have 10 power gates, these chips will have excess real estate available for redundancy, duplication, parallel data paths, stored test software and data, and so forth. This will be true for chip and chip-aided system tests.
Unique Software
New, extensive simulation and modeling capability; HDL, CAE, and ATE; defect monitor and failure analysis software programs for the in-line test. However, this should be an extension of the existing technology. The CAD software must be sophisticated to handle extremely large systems-on-a-chip, which entails analog, digital, optical, and mechanical engineering. The primary technical issue will remain the ultimate limit that will inevitably be reached where Moores Law no longer applies. This will occur when the limits of optical lithography and attendant masking and resists are reached. In addition, the limit on current switching techniques as used in silicon-based technology will be reached when the physics involved no longer works. Some of the issues that can cause functional problems are shrinking feature size, quality, and uniformity of gate barrier to prevent tunneling; heat dissipation; vanishing bulk properties because of fewer dopant atoms; and
Technical Issues
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Technical Issues (Continued)
possibility of avalanche breakdown caused by high electric field. Interconnect and packaging for small devices may require new ways to avoid cross-talk and electromigration. Reducing power dissipation at these densities (50-nm feature size) will require reduction in voltage drain drain (VDD) to less than 0.5 V (possibly as low as 0.1 V).
All the major commercial applications stated in Section 8.4 apply here, except that the extremely large chips produced at the 50-nm feature size will be system-on-a-chip ASICs and very large computers on a chip (does not seem right to call them microprocessors anymore). These chips will likely be micro-optics-electro-mechanical systems (MOEMS) to take advantage of the large amount of space on the chip not needed for electronics alone. Since there will be a large availability of low cost yet capable chips at large feature size (e.g., in the 100 or less nanometer range), the use of these denser and more expensive chips may need to find their own market nichesin areas such as telecommunications, aircraft, and missiles using small inertial devices; supercomputing; optical communications; and photonics that are expected to be in large systems-on-a-chip. The SIA NTRS projects that the cost of new fabrications will increase to $5 billion over the first decade of this century. The semiconductor industry has been meeting these costs as the new technology and the market demands. To date, the market has increased to absorb the costs and leave the industry profitable. New companies and consortiums have appeared to continue to provide the required output. However, as we approach the physical limits to the technology (projected in 2012 to 2014 at about 50 nm), the incremental costs will grow as elements of the technology become more difficult. Researchers project that to go beyond 50-nm device feature size, the Si FETs may be too expensive and inefficientand thus unaffordable. At this point, the industry must shift to a new technology (the new paradigm) to continue the improvement in the product. The previous data sheet, Molecular Electronics, describes this new technology. It is not certain how the industry will absorb the costs of a new technology while in the midst of the most expensive part of the old technology. Since the market will not wait, the two technologies (old and new) must be pursued simultaneously so the transition is seamless.
Affordability
RATIONALE The SIA NTRS predicts continual growth to the year 2014, following Moores Law (double density every 18 months). To continue the march of aggressive miniaturization per Moores Law and fabricate nanoscale (70 nm to > 5 nm) devices, optical lithography as we know it today will have reached its physical limit by year 2005 and will require new generation of lithography tools/technology to cross the barrier. Next-generation lithography (NGL) technologies, such as EUV using soft X-rays (being developed by an Intel consortium) and SCALPEL using electron-beam lithography (being developed by a Lucent consortium), are the prime considerations by SEMATECH/SIA member company experts. IBMs candidateX-ray lithographyis also in the race. The future cost of new facility using such new tools could run as high as $3 to $5 billion, excluding the cost of development. Shrinking microelectronics have driven the exponential growth of Silicon Valley, but that growth will stop unless nanoscale computer chips can be fabricated. To continue this trend of miniaturization, the SIA NTRS projects that feature size to shrink to 100 nm by year 2005 (memory) and allows Moores Law to be in force. Researchers have projected that semiconductor transistors beyond 100 nm may not function as well. The problem is that dominant technology used to make chips. Optical lithography uses light whose wavelength may be too large to do the job. However, it has been shown recently that using phase shift masks and Numeri software techniques may extend optical lithography to 70 nm. Major semiconductor manufacturers and tool buildersmostly in partnerships in United States, Europe, and Japanare developing the alternatives (i.e., EUV, SCALPEL, and X-ray) being considered to surmount this barrier. These developments, coupled with interconnect materials and technologies, will also allow the fabrication of system-on-a-chip, which would integrate mixed signal devices and MEMS on the same chip. These lightweight, low-power, less costly, highly dense, and high-speed devices have tremendous applications in the commercial, space, and defense areas.
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Canada Germany Japan Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China India Netherlands UK

Significant R&D
Czech Republic Israel Russia United States
France Italy South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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SECTION 10: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
May 2000
SECTION 10INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Scope 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 Information Communications ....................... III-10-11 Information Exchange .................................. III-10-25 Information Processing ................................ III-10-37 Information Security ................................... III-10-57 Information Management and Control ............ III-10-105 Information Systems Facilities ..................... III-10-117 Information Sensing ................................... III-10-133 Information Visualization and Representation .. III-10-145 Modeling and Simulation ............................ III-10-159 Highlights Information systems (ISs) will be pervasive in supporting the warfighter in future operations. Advances in technology will allow for capability improvements that will be as natural as normal human physical and mental functionsonly enhanced. Non-physical conflict, supported by information operations (IOs), will be ongoing and may replace physical conflict in some cases. Avoiding the hazards of ill-conceived ISs and their inherent vulnerabilities will be an important consideration for the future warfighter. The enemy of the future will include anyone who deems to cause harm to militarily critical information of ISs. ISs will be adapted to the needs and natural style of the individual, allowing the warfighter to concentrate on the battle at handbe it physical or mental. ISs will support the government and military in all phases of military operations, from training to postconflict analyses, to provide the United States with the most productive and prepared military ever.
OVERVIEW This section addresses information technologies (ITs) that support IOsincluding Information Warfare (INFOWAR)that are vital to National Security. In the past several decades, reliance on ITs has grown to the point where many vital commercial, government, and military enterprise operations are now critically dependent upon them. Consequently, threats against ISsand information itselfcan place the continuity of critical government, military, and commercial operations at grave risk. Joint Vision 2010 states that Improvements in information and systems integration technologies will also significantly impact future military operations by providing decision makers with accurate information in a timely manner. Information technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information. The fusion of allsource intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster. Advances in
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computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations. Joint Vision 2010 further states that . . . forces harnessing the capabilities potentially available from this system of systems will gain dominant battlespace awareness, an interactive picture which will yield much more accurate assessments of friendly and enemy operations within the area of interest. Although this will not eliminate the fog of war, dominant battlespace awareness will improve situational awareness, decrease response time, and make the battlespace considerably more transparent to those who achieve it. Reflecting on this development, the Department of Defense (DoD) has determined that it must be prepared for missions that range from peace to war. These missions include military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, that may be opposed by a wide range of adversaries including state and non-state proponents. While all editions of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) address ITs, the organization and presentation of data have evolved, and the terminology has been refined. To facilitate the establishment of standard terminology, this section adopts DoD Directive (DODD) S-3600.1 definitions and supplements them where DODD S-3600.1 is silent or where additional expository detail is needed. For clarity, the list of definitions in Appendix A presents DODD-S-3600.1- and MCTL-augmented definitions. For consistency, definitions established in this Part III, Section 10 will apply herein and in all future MCT publications, including upgrades to the existing Part I and Part II documents. Section 10 identifies ITs that enable increasingly superior DoD operations or that maintain superior capabilities more affordably. Specifically, these technologies support IOs responsive to the DODD S-3600.1 requirement that DoD activities shall be organized, trained, equipped, and supported to secure peacetime National Security objectives, deter conflict, protect DoD information and information systems and to shape the information environment. If deterrence fails, Information Operations shall seek to achieve U.S. superiority in times of crisis or conflict. The range and types of information addressed in this section facilitate the large number and variety of DoD operations specified in DODD S-3600.1. Joint Vision 2010 states that We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversarys ability to do the same. Because the same IT may be critical to many of the operations defined by DODD S-3600.1, a brief overview of those operations is presented as a context for explanations of why particular ITs are treated. Figure 10.0-1 illustrates the range of IOs mandated by DODD S-3600.1. The basis for distinguishing, at the highest level, among pre-hostility and post-hostility operations is that National Security cannot be assured in the absence of appropriate pre-hostility DoD operational capabilities. IT requirements are often markedly different in pre- and post-hostility scenarios for secure and covert operations and corresponding capabilities to sustain operations under electronic warfare, physical damage, and chemical and biological and other threat-driven environments. Explicit reference to the need to support offensive and defensive operations reflects DODD 3600.1s definitive statement that IOs are actions taken to affect adversary information and ISs while defending ones own information and ISs. Joint Vision 2010 declares that information superiority will require both offensive and defensive INFOWAR. Offensive INFOWAR will degrade or exploit an adversarys collection or use of information. It will include traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversarys command and control (C2) capability, and non-traditional methods, such as electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers. Defensive INFOWAR to protect our ability to conduct IOs will be one of our biggest future challenges. Traditional defensive INFOWAR operations include physical security measures and encryption. Non-traditional actions will range from antivirus protection to innovative methods of secure data transmission. In addition, increased strategic level programs will be required in this critical area.
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Information Operations
Any action, or combination of actions, on information. Information operations may include any or all activities for sensing, accessing, intercepting, collecting, recording, exploiting, generating, structuring, organizing, affecting, transferring/communicating, switching, routing, multiplexing, securing, processing, managing, or controlling information, usually performed as part of a plan.
Information Systems Functional Areas

Information Communications Information Exchange Information Processing Information Security Information Management and Control Information System Facilities Information Sensing
Capabilities to move or transfer information from one location to another.
Capabilities to switch, direct route, multiplex, or inversemultiplex information.
Capabilities to (1) enter, store, retrieve, display, duplicate, transform, translate, print, publish, assure, or otherwise manipulate existing information without changing content or meaning; (2) destroy information; or (3) take any of a myriad of computational, logical, algorithmic, rulesbased, or other machine or human intellectual actions that create new or extended content and meaning from existing information.
Capabilities to (1) safeguard information privacy, secrecy, integrity; (2) control access to information; (3) authenticate and validate information content, representations, sources, and sinks; and (4) enforce nonrepudiation in either accidental or intentional threat environments.
Capabilities to plan, organize, design, optimize, engineer, implement, operate, monitor, provision, maintain, synchronize, provide signaling and supervision, manage, control, administer, and account for information, Information Operations, or Information Systems.
Capabilities to house, energize, transport, protect, and provide appropriate operating conditions and/or human habitation and life support for IS infrastructures under benign or naturally occurring or manmade, conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear warfare threat-driven environments.
Capabilities to (1) detect any single or multiple faceted manifestation of properties, qualities, quantities, or other descriptive representations of material or immaterial entities and (2) produce output signals analogous to the original manifestation sensedin formats suitable for use in Information Systems. Entities can be in the form of matter (i.e., exhibiting mass properties, position and motion characteristics), information, or energy.
Information Systems
The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, components, or methods designed to conduct or accomplish specified Information Operations.
Figure 10.0-1. Information Systems Functional Areas
Historically, a direct relationship has always existed between technologies supporting correlative offensive and defensive military operations. For example, encryption technologies are consummately interrelated to code-breaking technologies and vice versa. Similarly, electronic countermeasure (ECM) techniques essentially may define effective electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCMs). Numerous other examples exist, and, despite U.S. non-aggression policies, National Security makes incumbent the need to pursue, develop, and employ offensive and defensive ITs. Within Part III, Section 10, technologies supporting adverse Information Systems-Affects Operations are presented within sections treating related Functional Areas (FAs). For example, encryption code-breaking technologies are addressed in the Information Security section (10.4). From a National Security perspective, the most familiar IOs are those invoked after active conflict has commenced. Examples of post-hostility IOs include command, control, and intelligence (C2I) operations, ECMs, psychological warfare, and operations in support of logistics and other military operations associated with conventional and other warfare.
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What needs to be emphasized is that post-hostility does not mean post-military conflict alonenor does it infer target sets limited to physical entities with military-only value. Targets may include manufacturing, transportation, utility, political institutions, and even information itself. Economic, political, and INFOWAR battles can be fought and won or lost in the total absence of any physical military conflict. Pre-hostility IOs are all other IOs that play direct or indirect roles in U.S. National Security preparedness to conduct any and all forms of authorized offensive and defensive warfare. From a National Security perspective, this IO category includes any IOs that help avert hostilities where possible and ensure victory otherwise. Thus, in accordance with DODD S-3600.1 directives, pre-hostility IOs include all operations needed to prepare for conflict, or, if possible, to prevent escalation to military or other combat. Some pre-hostility operations continue during and after hostilities. As noted, ITs are used to design and implement ISs, which, in turn, are employed to activate or conduct a wide range of IOs. The enormous range of IOs implied in the definitions gives rise to literally hundreds of categorically different ISs and an almost countless number of identifiable ITs. The selected approach is consistent with the industry-wide practice of specifying large ISs in as many as seven FAs, which are subsets of IS capabilities that accomplish or support specified categories or subsets of IOs (see Figure 10.0-2). FA requirements are normally, and purposefully, defined and/or specified so that engineers are afforded the greatest possible freedom in making particular hardware or software design choices.
PARSING DODD S-3600.1 INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Pre-Hostility IO Supporting Preparation for Defensive and Offensive Hostilities
Post-Hostility IO Supporting Defensive and Offensive Hostilities
IO Providing Indirect/Unintended Support to National Security
IO Providing Direct/Intended Support to National Security
IO Supporting Hostilities wherein Targets are other than Information
IO Supporting Hostilities wherein Targets are Information
Enterprise/ Agent Operations
Typical Operations R&D Design, Development Integration, Test Production Marketing/Sales Management
Typical Operations R&D Design, Development Integration, Test Production Management Training/Exercise
Typical Operations Economic Terrorism Criminal Conventional Nuclear Chemical Biological
Typical Operations Espionage - HUMINT - Electromagnetic - Intelligence - Physical Theft Psychological - Physiologically based - Psychosomatic based - Adverse Information System Affect
FA Operations
Information Communications
Information Exchange
Information Processing
Information Management and Control
Information Systems Facilities
Information Sensing
Industry
Government
Military
Others
Figure 10.0-2. IO and IS FAs
Given this freedom, vendors in competitive environments are able and motivated to be as creative as possible in proposing IS designs that meet all FA requirements and result in the lowest possible cost and the highest possible operational effectiveness. As an example, procurement specifications written in terms of bandwidth, signal quality, reliability, availability, and other generic communication FA performance parameters leave designers free to make optimum media and product selections. In this case, vendors attempting to win competitive procurements are highly
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motivated to propose among metallic or fiber-optic cable, satellite, or terrestrial radio media and product alternatives. These selections not only satisfy all procurement communications FA mission requirements, but also optimize overall life-cycle IS cost and operational effectiveness. Similar Militarily Critical Technologies (MCT) assessment and documentation advantages accrue when IT performance levels are stated in terms of generic FA characteristics rather than in terms of extant hardware and software product capabilities. This approach obviates the need to provide MCT updates in response to what may be rapidly evolving performance levels of any particular product or technology type. Thus, MCT updates are only required when: Changing mission objectives or operational requirements demand corresponding adjustments to critical or sufficient IT parameter levels (Parts I and II) Technological developments advance generic FA performance in ways that enhance the superiority of DoD operations or maintain a superior U.S. capability more affordably (Part III) When changes in non-U.S. capabilities necessitate adjustments in Worldwide Technology Assessments (WTAs) (Parts I, II, and III).
A separate section is allocated to each of the seven FAs and to each of the two supporting technology areas of Information Visualization and Representation and Modeling and Simulation. Each section begins with the definition and a narrative description of its IS FA and characteristics. Examples of operations, missions, and objectives and how they relate to cited FA capabilities are included. Technology details and additional expository information are presented in the several data sheets associated with each section. For presenting ITs, options other than FA decomposition are possible. For instance, information processing (IP) and all the other basic FAs can be subelements of sections treating, for example, Command and Control Systems, Electronic Warfare, any of the other categorical MCTL Part I subdivisions, or any new subdivisions envisioned under the rubric of INFOWAR. The problem with this alternative is that unless one sees FA technology developments as being unique to particular IOs or INFOWAR types, the danger exists that the same FA technologies (e.g., Information Processing) may be assessed differently by various warfare-operations-specific technical working or author groups, using potentially dissimilar criteria. At best, even if perfectly consistent results are obtained, eliminating the duplication of effort and inefficient use of scarce resources is difficult. Thus, other options for organizing the IT section for Part III have been considered but have been determined to be less useful for the purposes of this document. Although most ITs are treated in this section, some ITs are covered elsewhere. For example, certain information sensor technologies that have traditionally been treated in the Information Sensors section are still treated there. Other exceptions made for organizational convenience are noted in the FA sections. Regardless of the MCT section in which ITs are addressed, the definitions and criteria in this section apply. RATIONALE The list of pertinent IOs depicted in Figure 10.0-1 is extensive because long-term National Security really depends upon military and economic parity or superiority and, therefore, is also dependent upon effective, ongoing operations of all supporting industry, government, and military infrastructures. It is axiomatic that a nation must have a solid and sustained financial-economic foundation and, ideally, a position of leadership to become or remain a military superpower. Thus, any and all IOs essential to enterprises critical to a nations economic health are also essential to its National Security and merit consideration herein. When the United States was subjected to cold or hot war threats from other military superpowers, it was logical to stress or place a priority on technologies directly related to military crisis or post-hostility operations (i.e., physical, military warfare, and threat-related operations). However, our current decisive military superiority makes it highly unlikely that even technologically advanced third-world nations would be motivated to line up tanks, ships, aircraft, or even missiles against the United States in an all-out, physical military conflict. Rather, a militant and determined third-world adversary bent on hostilities toward the United States is far more likely to expend his resources attacking economic, social, or political targets and, because of the central importance of ISs, attacking IOs
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and information itself. Because first- and second-world countries may not possess or be able to mount hightechnology INFOWAR/psychological operations-based aggression, the threat that they pose to the United States may be limited to overt or covert economic and geopolitical human operations and acts of terrorism. The logic then is compelling. At this particular time in history, all adversaries attempting to undermine U.S. economic and military superiority (i.e., those who seek to confiscate, destroy, manipulate, sabotage, or control tangible resources and/or political, military, and civilian organizations) are most likely to target the day-to-day IOs upon which these institutions and resources relyusing their own IO-intensive weapons instead of military force. Moreover, if information is regarded as the basis of technology and technology is the basis for future wealth and economic superiority, the United States is the primary worldwide target since it currently possess the greatest share of economically valuable information. Perhaps most important to decisions regarding the range and scope of IOs and technologies that must be addressed is this: Not only can INFOWAR be conducted in the total absence of physical conflict, but, unless the United States anticipates such attacks and develops counter technologies to detect and defeat these attacks, our adversaries may be able to mount attacks and achieve victory undetected. This reasoning, however, in no way diminishes the importance of IO superiority as constituent elements of conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear warmaking preparations and capabilities. However, pursuing only those strategies directly linked to physical wartime scenarios ignores the most near-term and dangerous threats to our National Security. Completing the rationale for the broad spectrum of IOs illustrated in Figure 10.0-2 and addressed herein is recent experience demonstrating the value of military and commercial technologies. Unlike the past where DoD, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and other United States Government (USG) agencies dominated and sponsored most frontier developments, most technologies supporting todays ISs are driven by civil IO requirements and the commercial products responding to those requirements. Thus, we must consider the extensive range of IOs represented in Figure 10.0-2 and the large number of ITs that must be assessed and documented herein. BACKGROUND MCTP Core Information Technology (IT) Definitions Because ITs are essential in designing and implementing ISs and because ISs are used to conduct or perform IOs, concise definitions for these word-pairs, as well as for each word taken separately, are crucial. Understanding the need later in this section to define Information Processing, Information Security, Information Communications, Information Encoding/Decoding, Information Translation, and so forth clearly, the key word for which unambiguous definition is most needed is information. Because information appears so frequently in conversation, one might jump to the conclusion that its meaning is universally known and accepted. However, standard and scientific dictionaries not only exhibit large definitional discrepancies, but often employ terms that require exposition. Although DODD S-3600.1 is silent, the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms defines information as: Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.
As satisfactory as these statements appear, the first definition raises questions about whether information and data are always equivalent and interchangeable. The second definition employs the term meaning, a word that may be as susceptible to subjective interpretation or misinterpretation as is information. To serve as a basis upon which all manner of IOs may be explained herein, data are defined as Representations, such as characters, symbols, or analog quantities, that may or may not explicitly relate to or describe a material or an immaterial entity or process, and information is defined as Characteristics, qualities, properties, descriptors, or instructions (elements of information) of any material or immaterial entity or process.
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A practical example of how information and data often differ is to compare the recitation of (1) pairs of numbers and corresponding baseball team-pairs representing yesterdays game results with (2) the simple recitation of the same numbers, either in pairs or singly, with no reference to any team or inference that the numbers correspond to baseball scores. Most people have little difficulty in grasping the notion that item (1) is a good example of information, whereas item (2) is more appropriately categorized as data. Because these two terms are so fundamental and literally serve as a point of departure to everything that follows, it is important, in constructing the preceding definitions, to use words that for most people require no further exposition and to produce explications that apply universally. For the latter point, it is possible, for example, to hold that information is only information if it is not already known. Certainly, situations exist for which this alternative or specific definition not only applies, but is useful. Importantly, since the notions of new information and old information are valid, such an alternative definition does not apply universally and is therefore problematic as a basis for the more complex word-pair definitions that are treated throughout the remainder of this section. DODD S-3600.1 defines Information Operations (IOs) as Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones own information and information systems. In the context of the other DODD S-3600.1 parts cited previously, this definition applies to offensive and defensive operations in missions extending from peace to war. It clearly encompasses all actions taken on information under adversarial conditions. It does not, however, explicitly address an almost countless number of incidences of IOs of a non-adversarial nature. Because many non-adversarial operations are nevertheless vital to National Security, such IOs and their corresponding ITs are considered herein. Without diminishing the DODD S-3600.1 definition in any way, the following definition is used in the MCTL to describe how ITs, or their amalgamation within complex ISs, are used to support all incidences of IOs. More broadly then, Information Operations are any action, or combination of actions, on information. Information Operations may include any or all activities for sensing, accessing, intercepting, collecting, recording, exploiting, generating, structuring, organizing, affecting, transferring/communicating, switching, routing, multiplexing, securing, processing, managing, or controlling information, usually performed as part of a plan. This last expository statement is added to provide concrete examples with which many readers may be familiar, thereby clarifying the meaning and intention of the shorter, hopefully universally applicable, basic definition. Although some experts may find even the expanded list of IO activities incomplete, the named activities reflect recommendations of the MCT Information Technology Technology Working Group (TWG). DODD S-3600.1, Joint Publication 6.0, and past MCTL versions define ISs as . . . the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. More recently, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines ISs as The organized collection, processing, transmission, and dissemination of information, in accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. In information warfare, this includes the entire infrastructure, organization, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. At first reading, these two definitions do not appear to differ in any substantial way. However, in Joint Publication 1-02, the first sentence defines ISs as actions themselves (i.e., The organized collection, processing, transmission, and dissemination of information). In contrast, the second sentence represents ISs as the entire infrastructure, organization, and components that have the capability to collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. To be precise, ISs are physical entities and people that can takeor be inaction, but they can also be in stand-by or stood-down modes and, therefore, inactive. That is, ISs are capabilities designed to conduct or
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accomplish IOs but are not actions themselves. Moreover, most complex ISs are designed to support a wide range of IOs. Explained in more detail below, this fact is central to the decision to organize the list of MCT presentation of ITs in terms of IS FAs, as opposed to categories of either IOs or systems. Consequently, the DODD S-3600.1 definition for ISs, augmented and shortened as follows, is adopted for use in this document: Information Systems are the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, components, or methods designed to conduct or accomplish specified Information Operations. The augmentation adds to DODD S-3600.1 by explicitly recognizing that ISs are used to conduct or accomplish specified IOs. Note, because the previous IOs definition lists example activities, there is no need to repeat the DODD S-3600.1 list as expository information in the definition of ISs. Both DODD S-3600.1 and Joint Publication 1-02 are silent on the definition of the word technology. The Export Administration Act of 1979 defines it as The information and know how (whether in tangible form, such as models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or manuals, or in the tangible form, such as training or technical services) that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including computer software and technical data, but not the goods themselves. Existing MCTL versions define technology as Specific information and know-how necessary for the development, production, and use of a product. This includes the hardware and software necessary to achieve that purpose. Since systems engineering and integration (SE&I) are pivotal in complex IS design and deployment, henceforth, for MCTL purposes, technology is defined as Specific information and know-how necessary for the development, production, and use of a product. This includes engineering and integration for systems (groups of interacting elements acting as a complex whole) as well as individual hardware and software elements necessary to achieve that purpose. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.0-3) The WTAs in Section 10 reflect the performance levels that are typically encountered in commercial, military, or non-military government IS technologies and that have been identified in this document as having significant potential in warfighting scenarios. Installed baselines and/or the ability to produce, acquire, and use those technologies are key WTA parameters of interest and are summarized in Figure 10.0-3. The United States leads in system engineering and integration of complex ISs, closely followed by the Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Underlying technologies for IS and wide area integration of such systems are driven largely by commercial needs and markets. A significant number of countries have developed network switching and transmission capabilities equivalent to those of the United States. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because the it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities (see Part III, Section 8: Electronics Technology, and this section). While the United States continues to be the only country with critical capabilities in all IS technology FAs, equivalent capabilities are found in one or more other countries in every FA. The growing multi-nationalization of IS developments has increased the worldwide availability of advanced technologies. IS knowledge transfer from the United States to foreign competitors occurs through open-source U.S. trade journals, technical literature, various international forums, the Internet, commercial competitive analyses, and traditional intelligence services. As a result, the U.S. technology leadership in communications and computer systems has declined in recent years relative to Europe and Japan.
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Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands New Zealand North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan - R.O.C. UK United States Legend:
Information Communications
Information Exchange
Information Processing
Information Management and Control
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.0-3. Information Systems WTA Summary
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Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands New Zealand North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan - R.O.C. UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Information Systems Facilities
Information Sensing
Information Visualization and Representation
Modeling and Simulation

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Figure 10.0-3. Information Systems WTA Summary (Continued)
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SECTION 10.1INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS

Highlights Basic electromagnetic communications requirements can be accomplished using a wide variety of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and military-specified products, each with greater or lesser abilities to support military and industrial operations before, during, and after hostility. Industry requirements are typically pursued for economic reasons, whereas military and other government needs are driven by adversarial threatswith affordability playing a lesser-but-still-vital role. Systems ostensibly procured for peacetime civilian use can be reprogrammed for military applications and may achieve levels of survivability far surpassing lower capacity dedicated military systems. Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications are essential for remote reconnaissance and damage assessment, aerial strikes launched from one country on targets in an adversary country, and battlefield C2 within large tactical arenas. In mixed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional conflicts, survivable communications are critical to sustaining chemical or biological offensives.
OVERVIEW The Information Communications (INFO COM) FA is defined as capabilities to move or transfer information from one location to another. Implied in this definition are capabilities to move or transfer information in any cognizable form. For instance, information may be in the form of still or moving visual imagery or alphabetic, pictographic-hieroglyphic records. Alternatively, it may be in the form of spoken words, audible alarms, or other acoustic energy. This FA includes transmission systems; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) information systems; and aspects of electronic attack and electronic protection. INFO COM capabilities encompass the means to physically transport information from one location to another or to relay it via electromagnetic, acoustical, or other transmission mechanisms. Figure 10.1-1 shows the range of capabilities that the INFO COM technologies identified in this section support. At least two basic technologies require development to meet future needs for INFO COM: 1. 2. Increasing the total capacity of carriers Increasing the amount of information that can be transmitted per unit time over any given carrier.
High-speed carriers with enormous bandwidths and an exponential growth capability are becoming a commodity, with cost or usage rates becoming insensitive to time or distance charges. Allied technologies provide improved availability, reliability, efficiency, and protection from abuse, unauthorized intervention, and capacity saturation. Physical Transport Despite technological advancements in modern electromagnetic communications networks and their now nearly global extent, physical delivery remains an important INFO COM mechanism. The persistence and popularity of physical information delivery can be partially attributed to advances in information storage technologies such as compact disks [compact disk-read only memory (CD-ROM)], videocassette recorder (VCR) video tapes, digital audio tapes, smart cards, and countless others. Advanced storage technologies (discussed in Section 10.2) that keep physical delivery competitive are impacted by storage and networking technologies. For example, while most personal computer (PC) application software is physically distributed via CD-ROMs, a considerable amount of software can now be downloaded via
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INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS
Physical Transport
Non-Physical Transport
Delivery Services Physical Information Container Carrier Government Industry Private Electromagnetic Tape Hard/Soft Disk Non-Electromagnetic Papers Text Based Graphics Based
Guided
Unguided
Electromagnetic Information Carrier Fiber-Optic Cable Medium Space capacity highly reliable/survivable Point-to-Point, Networked Broadcast Copper-Cable Medium Point-to-Point, Networked, Broadcast Single Conductor Paired/Multi-paired Coaxial/Triaxial Other Metallic or Dielectric Waveguide Media
Electromagnetic Information Carrier Fiber-Optic Cable Medium Using Radiometric, Visible, or Invisible Light Spectrum Point-to-Point, Networked, Broadcast LOS Point-to-Point, Networked, Broadcast BLOS Terrestrial/Satellite Relay Long Wavelength Troposcatter/Meteor Burst Point-to-Point, Networked, Broadcast HF
Acoustic Information Carrier Atmospheric Medium Solid/Liquid Medium
Figure 10.1-1. Taxonomy of INFO COM Technologies
the Internet. Similarly, should the cost of viewing video tape recordings (VTRs) via networks drop below the cost of physical distribution and be available for immediate viewing anytime (video-on-demand), the economic case for physical VTR distribution will certainly be diminished. Another physical delivery tradeoff factor is consumer/user preference. Notwithstanding equality enhancements in electronic display technology, many people continue to demand that certain types of information be delivered in hard copy format (newspapers, magazines, books, and so forth). However, even assuming a permanent preference for hard copies, the question arises as to whether personal printers will eventually provide high enough quality and low enough per-page costs to justify printing daily newspapers in offices or kitchens. Along with storage devices that appear to sustain demand for physical information movement or transfer, technologies that may mitigate against such demand (e.g., electronic displays, printers, and associated computer and peripheral equipment) are treated in Section 10.3. Non-Physical Transport As depicted in Figure 10.1-1, INFO COM via non-physical transport uses either guided or unguided media. Guided media, including metallic wire cable, fiber-optic cable, and rigid or non-cable-type metallic or dielectric waveguides, constrain electromagnetic waves within boundaries established by their physical construction. Unguided media are those in which boundary effects between free space and material substances are absent. The free space medium can include a gas or vapor. Unguided media include the atmosphere and outer-space-support terrestrial and satellite radio and optical transmission. In normal circumstances, liquids constitute an unguided media, usually supporting undersea acoustic communications and sonar systems. As generally defined, non-physical transport communications systems include transmission facilities, [i.e., the medium (free space, the atmosphere, copper or fiber-optic cable) and electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium]. In this context, equipment amplifies (analog systems) or regenerates (digital systems) signals and provides termination functions at points where transmission facilities connect to switching or multiplexing systems. Multiplexers (described in Section 10.2) combine many separate sources of traffic into a single signal to enhance transmission efficiency. In modern designs, transmission termination, switching, multiplexing, and other functions can be integrated in a single piece of equipment and, in combination, play major roles in defining network capability, latency, communications services, grade of service, maintenance, reliability, availability, and survivability.
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This section addresses a wide range of equipment used in local and long-distance communications. Included among non-integrated types are simple repeater/amplifiers, channel service units (CSUs), data service units (DSUs), and modems. Modems (MODulator/DEModulator) are devices that transform digital signals generated by data terminal equipment (DTE) to analog signal formats suitable for transmission through the extensive, worldwide connectivity of public and private, switched and non-switched telephone voice networks. CSUs/DSUs are termination equipment required to connect digital customer premises equipment (CPE) to telecommunications networks and typically provide transmit and control logic, synchronization, and timing recovery across data circuits. Modern, fourth-generation-and-beyond switches and digital cross-connect systems (DCSs) incorporate switching, multiplexing, and line-termination functions. Other examples include satellite, terrestrial microwaves, and cable transmit and receive terminals (transceivers), which, in most instances, include multichannel capabilities. In public cellular or specialized mobile radio (SMR) equipment, basic INFO COM FA capabilities are combined with traditional application-level functions, such as call set-up and take-down dialing, signaling, and so forth; advanced features, such as caller identification (ID); and acoustic and other human interface capabilities. Within cellular or SMR telephones, these application-level functions are typically implemented in software running on embedded microprocessors. In fact, although concepts for mobile cellular telephony existed long ago, practical and commercial viability came only with the appearance of powerful, low-cost, low-power, small, and lightweight microprocessors. Throughout Section 10, integrated product technologies are presented in tables of the FA sections to which they are most closely related. For instance, cellular telephone and system technologies, now under discussion, are listed in tables associated with INFO COM FA. Generic ITs, such a general-purpose microprocessors and software, are listed in the IP FA tables. RATIONALE Basic electromagnetic INFO COM requirements can be accomplished using a wide variety of COTS and military-specified products, each with greater or lesser abilities to support military and industrial operations before, during, and after hostilities. Moreover, whether implemented in modern integrated or prior-generation stand-alone products, as indicted below, INFO COM FA capabilities are pervasive in and critical to vital operations of the National Security infrastructure. INFO COM FA characteristics are important to all National Security infrastructure operations (i.e., critical industry, government, or military operations during pre-, trans-, or post-hostility time frames) and include: Global (national and international BLOS or long-distance), near-instantaneous service Ultrahigh reliability/survivability Mobile or transportable user or operations center connectivity.
Although industry, government, and military organizations depend on these capabilities, industry requirements are typically pursued for business efficiency, competitive advantage, profit, or other largely private economic reasons. Conversely, governmentand in particular militaryneeds are often driven by adversarial threats (physical and otherwise) against life, property, and even the environment itself, with affordability playing a lesser-but-stillvital role. In cases where WMD are factors, hostile environmental conditions may involve chemical, biological, radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) hazards. Also, on post-hostility time frames, one must anticipate manmade jamming, spamming, or other overt or covert INFOWAR-type attacks to degrade communications environments. As already noted, the number of situations where unique, military-specified products remain the only option against such attacks is rapidly diminishing. In recent years, the commercial sector has made monumental strides in developing practical, common-user, or public systems yielding ubiquitous, high-reliability, high-survivability, fixed and mobile INFO COM FA capabilitiesoften at performance levels not achievable with dedicated military facilities. Figure 10.1-1 lists these developments and the rationale describing how and why they relate to the INFO COM FA technologies. Long-distance communications can be accomplished using cable-based networks, terrestrial or satellite radio relays, long-wave (below 3 MHz/BLOS) radio transmission, or combinations of these techniques. Military long-distance systems can be built from either government-owned, dedicated facilities or shared-facilities obtained
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from public or industry-owned common-user networks. Increasingly, modern facilities of either dedicated or shared design are able to provide integrated voice, data, facsimile, imagery, and video services. At the low-cost end, single-channel long-distance communications can be made today with standard cellular, SMR, or personal communications system (PCS) telephones, interconnected to local and long-distance switched networks. In the near future, end-to-end national and even global mobile voice and narrowband data services will be available form one or more of the following systems: International Marine/Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT), Global Star, ICO Global Communications, Skycell/MobileSat, and ORBCOMM. Broadband satellite-based services, with throughputs on the 264 Mbps range, anywhere in the world, are currently planned in the Teledesic, Celestri, and Skybridge programs. Given an increasing number of efficient mechanisms for long-distance, global communications, the following discussion focuses on the rationale for and emerging technologies that can imbue modern INFO COM capabilities with ultrahigh survivability and reliability operational characteristics. The discourse assesses offensive and defensive requirements from both the United States-allied and adversary-national perspectives. Requirements for survivability of BLOS military communications arise in strategic and tactical battlefield warfare scenarios. For missile and manned or unmanned aircraft attacks, where the distance between launch points and target designated ground zeros (DGZs) exceeds point-to-point line-of-sight (LOS), there is a need for some form of long-distance communications. Operational situations in which this occurs include aerial strikes launched from one country against targets in another country. Typical targets might include civilian shipping and transportation ports, industrial centers, military command centers, supply depots, and actual battlefield areas. For example, during an ongoing conflict, an aggressor might attempt to create a plague port to inhibit an adversarys ability to receive supplies or debark allied or peacekeeping forces. BLOS communications are needed to relay information generated by sensors or individuals in the vicinity of the DGZ back to the strike-force headquarters. Such information may include force status reports; micro-meteorological indications and other intelligence data; situation reports; and damage assessment reports. In the near term, voice or low-rate data communications capabilities from ground-based individuals or manned or unmanned airborne reconnaissance platforms may suffice. In the future, sophisticated adversaries may require BLOS communications to relay data from disposable (possibly airdropped), wide-area, array sensors systems. In-country telecommunications systems with extraordinary availability and survivability can be implemented using emerging commercial fiber- and Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)-based telecommunications technologies. [In the United States and elsewhere, these systems are built to Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) standards, which, although not identical to International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standards, are equivalent.] Although these systems can ostensibly be procured for peacetime civilian use, with appropriate information exchange switching, multiplexing, and digital cross-connect facilities (see Section 10.2) and information management and control capabilities (IM&C) (see Section 10.5), they can: Be reprogrammed for military applications Achieve levels of survivability and immunity to physical attack, far surpassing lower capacity, dedicated military designs.
The reason for the extraordinary programmability and survivability of modern commercial telecommunications is twofold. First, the flagship and most profitable telephone carrier offerings today are their Software Defined Network (SDN) offerings. SDN allows carriers to offer large customerswho in the past may have opted for private, dedicated facilities-based networksthe option of equivalent virtual private networks using the highly redundant and enormous reserve capacity of shared public network facilities. Second, these networks not only offer large industry (or military) customers service indistinguishable from dedicated facilities-based private networks, but they deliver these services at lower cost. Moreover, SDNs greatly augment capabilities to modify, optimize, and customize carrier services, in accordance with changing business or, in times of physical warfare, military requirements. The reason why modern commercial telecommunications networks are now designed to exhibit unparalleled reliability and survivability is purely economical. For instance, one major U.S. carrier supports the equivalent of 300,000 Washington-to-New York voice circuits. Loss of that connection translates into revenue losses of $30,000 or more per minute. The advent of high-capacity fiber transmission makes it possible to carry an enormous number of voice conversations over a single fiber. Recent advances in wavelength division technology have extended
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commercially available fiber-optic capacities to 80 Gbps in a single strand. For the first time in modern telecommunications history, from a reliability-design point of view, this makes possible essentially free bandwidth. Still, because of the funnel factor, to ensure profitability and network availability, one must not concentrate that much traffic without adequate back up or redundant connections. Fortunately, SDH/SONET standards addressed this problem from the outset. In conjunction with automated management and control and appropriate switching and multiplexing facilities, in SDH/SONET networks, this disposable bandwidth allows one to design networks that tolerate massive switch and cable-cut failures. In many instances, service restoration is virtually automatic, and restoration is accomplished in 15 ms, a time span short enough to prevent the disconnect of existing calls. Importantly, use of dual homing and 2 or 4 fiber-based bi-directional line switched ring (BLSR) diversity among switching/multiplexing hubs, along with designed-in capabilities (e.g., embedded SDH/SONET protection routing and automated performance monitoring and diagnostic management functions), yields survivability performance levels that older military systems with precedence, priority, pre-emption, and even dynamic nonhierarchical routing (DNHR) cannot approach. Older techniques preserve or restore service on a call-by-call basis only. By comparison, Sprint has debuted a U.S. network plan for 38 interlocking rings, with 16 nodes per ring, enabling hundreds of thousands of equivalent voice circuits to be restoredalmost instantaneously. Since SDH/SONET systems accommodate the worlds largest common-user network traffic, bandwidth or channel capacity requirements encountered in military warfare scenarios can be met without employing state-of-the-art switching speeds or ultra-broadband transmission systems. Satellite-based services are another example of commercial communications offerings exhibiting extraordinary availability and survivability. One class of service providing virtually undeniable service is mobile communications via hundreds of satellites through Teledseic, Globalstar, INMARSAT, and the other systems mentioned previously. Another class of highly reliable and survivable satellite service employs very small aperture terminals (VSATs), which employ small suitcase-packaged equipment packages and require antennas of only 1.56 ft in diameter. Finally, high-capacity, multi-channel trunk satellite service can be supported with larger-but-still-transportable earth terminals. Not only is it difficult to jam electronically or physically disable the large numbers of satellites providing such services, but to do so would interrupt service to thousands of worldwide users whether or not they are involved in a conflicta result with potentially enormous negative world-opinion hazards. Thus, for practical purposes, satellite-based communications exhibit dual, BLOS, and equivalent high-survivability capabilities. Third-world countries are already using satellite services. A case in point is Zambias presidential limousine that is followed by an INMARSAT satellite-dish-equipped Suburban truck. This provides the president with constant communications connectivity even in rural areas. See Figure 10.1-1 for additional survivable INFO COM technology capabilities with significant enterprise and warfighting potential. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.1-2) Figure 10.1-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments (FTAs) for the INFO COM FA by country. All the developed Western nations in the G-8,1 except for recently joined Russia, plus the Scandinavian countries, Israel, and Taiwan, have capabilities in all elements of the INFO COM FA in their installed base. These capabilities include transmission facilities and required electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium. Of the G-8, only Russia requires considerable development before it reaches the level of the other members. However, like China, this comparatively late development may be an advantage to Russia because it is not burdened with a large installed base of outmoded analog equipment and bandwidth-limited, non-fiber-optic transmission. Therefore, Russia, China, and other less-developed countries can more readily expand their capabilities with modern equipment, avoiding performance penalties involved with hybrid facilities. The China assessment may be understated since one indicator of Chinas INFO COM FA capabilities is that the United States alone accounts for up to
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
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40 percent of Chinas exports. Part of this 40 percent, in which Chinas trade surplus with the United States is greatest, is telecommunications equipment. China manufactures its own fiber-optic cable. Most other countries with less-developed telecommunications (Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Poland, and Vietnam) have fewer INFO COM FA capabilities, and even those tend to be concentrated in larger population centers. However, these deficiencies could be corrected in comparatively short periods. For example, although Irans telecommunications installed base is concentrated in and around Tehran, Iraqs baseline telecommunications capabilities extend country-wide. See Section 8.11 in Part I of the MCTL.
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands New Zealand North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan - R.O.C. UK United States Legend: Physical Transport Fiber-Optic Cable Metallic Cable Line of Sight Beyond Line of Sight

Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.1-2. Information Communications Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.1. INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS

Network Access to the End User ........................................................................................................................... III-10-19 Optical Networks .................................................................................................................................................... III-10-21 Ultra Wide Band (UWB) Communications ........................................................................................................... III-10-23 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Adaptive, Frequency Agile Front Ends [Including Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) and Thin Films] Advanced Coding Technologies Dynamic Firewall Technology Low Probability of Intercept (LPI)/Low Probability of Detection (LPD) Waveforms Message Tracing/Security Technology Multi-user Detection Technology Real-Time Conferencing Smart Antenna Technologies Software Radio Technologies Spoofing Detection and Protection Techniques
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DATA SHEET III-10.1. NETWORK ACCESS TO THE END USER

This technology for connecting the end user to the high-speed fiber network addresses the use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum between 24 and 38 GHz, encompassing local multi-channel distribution service (LMDS) and other slots suitable for broadband high-capacity wireless services. None identified. Production of rooftop or window-mounted millimeter-wave radios operating roughly in the 24- to 38-GHz range. Software to convert digital bit streams to and from the fiber and the radio. This technology should be used in conjunction with code division multiple access (CDMA). CDMA is good in spectrally noisy environments. The commercial potential in the United States is the connection of office buildings to the high-speed fiber backbone. This is the most inexpensive way to upgrade current military facilities for the last mile and will be much less costly than retrofitting fiber.
RATIONALE This technology uses higher frequencies that are better suited to carrying large volumes of information. It is particularly useful where infrastructure is not currently available. For example, the radio transmission could reach a low earth orbit (LEO) satellite to be relayed to the terrestrial fiber center. It provides more bandwidth than other technologies for connecting the fiber network to the end user. The U.S. military can use this technology for communicating in battlefield or other hostile environments where fiber is not available. For optimal value in the military, this technology depends upon the simultaneous use of CDMA and LEO and using the microwave spectrum between 24 and 38 GHz. BACKGROUND Internet traffic doubles every few months and is moving the spectrum up to higher frequencies better suited to carrying large volumes of information. The new source of bandwidth frequencies is between 24 and 38 GHz, which encompasses LMDS and other slots suitable for broadband, high-capacity wireless services. Today, the patch from fiber trunk to end-user is done in a variety of more or less unsatisfactory ways: Cable. Cable is promising in many ways, but chiefly serves residential. Asymmetrical digital subscriber line (ASDL). ASDL is rolling out relatively slowly and mostly offers less bandwidth than cable.
In the future, microwave radio transmission is the answer for the military end user. It provides the missing link between a high-capacity backbone and the military facility that cannot be served by fiber or would be prohibitively expensive to be served by fiber. High bandwidth and relatively low cost make systems affordable. Also, in many cases, the commercial availability of a provider will allow a system to be set up in several daysif not hours. The short distances and focused beams mean channels can readily be reused without fear of interferencejust the thing for military local access. One of the most promising end-user solutions is up-spectrum wireless. With connections to the fiber backbone provided by networks of rooftop or window-mounted millimeter wave radios operating roughly in the 24- to 38-GHz range, these systems can run as fast as 200 Mbps15 times as fast as any coax or digital subscriber line
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(DSL) link. In addition, the systems can be installed for $5,000 to $20,000 per building (figures that are likely to decline further) compared with a typical cost of $300,000 for a commercial downtown building direct fiber connection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
Presently the United States leads in this technology roll-out. Europe uses the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), which is a variant of time division multiple access (TDMA). GSM is inferior to CDMA. GSM is prevalent everywhere outside North America. The migration of the rest of the world to CDMA should be mostly complete in the 5- to 25-year time frame. Qualcomm has more than 400 CDMA patents. Globalstar is Qualcomms CDMA satellite partner. Globalstar is pioneering LEOs for CDMA.
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DATA SHEET III-10.1 OPTICAL NETWORKS

Developing Critical Technology Parameter Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment
An all-optical, circuit-switched backbone network will provide abundant, reliable bandwidth. High quality fiber cable; erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA). Significantly reduced attenuation fiber at key wavelengths, called AllWave, is made by only one manufacturer, Lucent.2 Simple passive filters and waveguides are needed to support wave division multiplexing (WDM). An optical switch is needed for production. Software to run and configure the optical switches. The relatively low number of wavelengths per fiber strand, which is a constraint with other fiber technologies, is much improved with AllWave technology because there are more wavelengths available per strand. The need to remove each color of light from the fiber and convert it into an electronic bit stream to amplify and generate the signal every 50 km or so is not a constraint with EDFA. These issues have been solved in early commercial prototypes and installations. Anything that communicates digitally. Not an issue. Indeed, an optical network is the lowest cost way to make available large bandwidth for communications. Early military adoption of commercially available resources is not only affordable, but also imminently cost effective.
RATIONALE Information superiority is the basis for virtually every vision and plan of the U.S. military. Information superiority is attained sometimes by large amounts of dataoften by speed of sending or receiving data and informationand always by the reliability of the data and information. More bandwidth is necessary to enable these supporting factors leading to information superiority. Optical network research and development (R&D) represents an eminent future technology for providing more bandwidth, faster throughput service, and greater reliability. An example of a future military application of reduced attenuation fiber and EDFA to optical networks is the use of these techniques to achieve near-real-time conferencing involving several dispersed physical locations. These future optical network technologies will provide the bandwidth to serve thousands of destinations. BACKGROUND WDM and SONET use fiber but with very significant differences. WDM multiplies the capacity of fiber optics by sending messages on many different colors of lightmany wavelengths down the fiber at the same time, allowing a single fiber to bear multiple streams of messages. Having many wavelengths allows communications payloads to be divided into segments that can be more easily managed and manipulated. If a single wavelength is used, as in SONET, each of hundreds of thousands of messages have to be broken into multiple packets and time slots and coded for reassembly at the other end. Every header in every packet in the flow has to be read to find the packets needed. This approach, acceptable for plain ordinary telephone systems (POTS), performs acceptably for the smaller bandwidths available with copper. However, with the enormous capacity offered by fiber and needed by the military in the future, performing this processing can require the equivalent of
AllWave is a trademark of Lucent.
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a supercomputer, as well as slow and costly transformations from photonics to electronics and back. WDM offers a low-cost and simpler alternative. It promises to break down the bit stream into hundreds of separate message-bearing wavelengths that can be processed by simple passive filters and waveguides. SONET is good for point-to-point backbone links and giant corporate, government, and university clients in big cities, but it will not serve the militarys future large bandwidth needs. SONET will not upscale affordably to provide adequate bandwidth for the U.S. military in the future. To upgrade the SONET bit rate involves prohibitively expensive equipment upgrades and replacements; however, new technologies for WDM will come to the rescue. In the past, a showstopper for WDM was that every 50 km or so the system would have to remove each color of light from the fiber and convert it into an electronic bit-stream to amplify and regenerate the signal. Each optoelectronic conversion entailed nine expensive bipolar transistors and a host of other devices. However, U.S. commercial companies now have EDFA, which can amplify all the colors at once without having to remove them from the fiber. The contents of the pipe are divided into thousands of wavelengths, each of which can be switched independently with passive optics. If photons do not have to be converted to electrons for regeneration, huge cost savings can be realized on the networks by using passive optical switches and converting to electronics and reading packet headers only on the edge of the network in a router on the local area network (LAN). This powerful development will allow an all-optical network, in which messages travel from origin to destination entirely via photons. For WDM, dividing the contents of the pipe into thousands of wavelengths requires a way of accessing the network that is far less costly than the existing multiplex of opto-electronic converters, packet engines, gold-plated interface cards, and add-drop muxes. With wavelength routing, the perhaps 80 percent of wavelengths that at any given node bear only pass-through traffic can proceed on their way unread, leaving the electronics to manage only the 20 percent of wavelength packets that must be processed. The all-optical network will not switch packets. It will shuffle wavelengthsa much more efficient process. Now in development by U.S. companies is a product using dispersion management tools and modulation schemes to enable optical signals to travel not 600 km, but 3,200 km. This product uses EDFA technology, which is the final piece of technology to ensure the leap in performance and quality to make feasible the much-increased bandwidth needed in the future. Also, the complex protocols devoted to guarantee quality of service at higher levels will be unnecessary. With optical networks, the future outlook is more reliability and more potential capacity with simpler protocols. Available bandwidth is doubling every 3 to 4 months. This projected availability of bandwidth promises to change the face and sometimes the nature of virtually every critical military IT application in the 5- to 25-year time frame. With millions of times more reliability and more potential capacity than electronics, optical networks largely banish or trivialize all constraints inherited from the electronic networking industry. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
Presently, the United States leads in this technology R&D. Lucent has sought a patent on the AllWave manufacturing process. Dow Corning could also have this capability if patent laws and business conditions allow. Access to the optical network technology is available through U.S. companies. Lucent is the exclusive producers of AllWave fiber. Other U.S. companies produce optical cross connects (routers). In the 5- to 25-year time frame, this technology should be in place for the U.S. military. Optical network technology replaces SONET technology and will be much less costly when rolled-out and installed.
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DATA SHEET III-10.1. ULTRA WIDE BAND (UWB) COMMUNICATONS

Waveform design for anti-jam, low probability of intercept, and bandwidth/power efficiency. < 1 ns impulses, bandwidth > 1 GHz; fractional bandwidth > 25 percent, processing gain > 40 dB. Silicon Germanium process integrated circuitry. None identified. None identified. Pules position modulation can be used for carrying data. Low-cost, high-performance analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) and digital signal processors (DSPs) are required. Mixed analog/digital circuits are designed for impulse operation rather than sinusoidal operation. Range is short and synchronization acquisition time is long when compared with conventional narrowband radios. Automotive, smart homes, wireless LANs, large-asset tracking, model control, wireless microphones, radio frequency (RF) ID, and process control. Leveraging commercial technology will minimize cost.
RATIONALE UWB telecommunications technology supports the warfighters capability for dominant battlespace awareness in the Joint Vision 2000 conceptual template. It allows multimode units to be fabricated by combining radar, identification friend or foe (IFF), and communication functions. Current priority is for the development of short-range radar. UWB technology supports covert radar and space positioning (relative position/location) as well as communications and combat identification (IFF) for squad-level operations. UWB provides relief for frequency allocation problems that are becoming increasingly critical for the military. UWB allows more users per unit of bandwidth and is more efficient in spectral utilization than existing tactical radios. An applications demonstration system available in the first half of 2000 will have the following characteristics (Ref.1): 500 ps pulse @ 10 Mpps transmit and receive 32 kbps to 2.5 Mbps communications mode Radar and ranging modes Timing resolution 3 ps Timing jitter < 20 ps RMS.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is considering unlicensed, Part 15 compliance and possible interference with Global Positioning System (GPS) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aeronautical communications (Ref. 2).
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W)ORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Australia China Greece Norway UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel Russia United States
Belgium France Italy Spain

Moderate R&D
Canada Germany Japan Sweden
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
UWB research is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At the present time, The United States appears to be the world leader. On November 12, 1999, Siemens Mustang Ventures made a $5-million investment in the Time Domain Corporation to further the development of UWB products. Other are expected to follow (Refs. 3, 4). The following organizations/individuals have active research programs: United States: Aetherwire (Marian County, California), IBM (Burlington, Vermont), Intelligent Automation (Rockville, Maryland), MultiSpectral Solutions (Rockville, Maryland), and Time Domain (Huntsville, Alabama) Australia (Eagle & Partners (Victoria) Canada: Applanix (Markham, Ontario) and Centraxx (Mississuaga, Ontario) Finland: Center for Wireless Communications (Tutkijantie) Germany: TEMIC Telefunken (Grossmehring) India: Dr. Bhagavathula (Bangalore) Israel: Ishay Lev (Mevaseret Zion) Italy: Cheechia Systems (Rome) and Mediando Communications (Bologna) Netherlands: Parellelweg2 (Groenio) New Zealand: IndraNet Technologies (Auckland) Russia: Aelita (Moscow).
REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. University of Michigan, PowerPoint Briefing on Office of Naval Research Communications Technology Program, 8 February 2000. John Markoff, FCC Mulls Wider Commercial Use of Radical Radio Technology, The New York Times, December 21, 1998, p. C1. William Scott, Task Force Says Labs UWB Deals Were Legal, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 November 1999, p. 50. 1999 International Ultra Wide band Conference Proceedings, http://www.uwb.org/.
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SECTION 10.2INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Highlights Circuit switching, packet switching, and multiplexing capabilities are generally available and installed worldwide. Stored program control central office and digital cross-connect switching are key to SDNs that can be used for survivable communications supporting Joint Vision 2010. Fast packet, asynchronous-transfer-mode-based switching and multiplexing support voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video requirements.
OVERVIEW The Information Exchange (INFO EXCH) FA is defined as capabilities to switch, direct, route, multiplex, or inverse-multiplex information. Acting together, systems and equipment implementing INFO COM and INFO EXCH capabilities make up telecommunications networks. Formally, a telecommunications network is a system of interconnected facilities designed to carry traffic that results from a variety of telecommunications services. The network has two differentbut relatedaspects. In terms of its physical components, it is a facilities network. In terms of the variety of telecommunications services that it provides, it can support many traffic networks, each representing a particular interconnection of facilities. Networks consist of nodes and links. Nodes represent switching and multiplexing offices; service provider line termination and other access facilities; user or customer premises; and diverse types of network facility junction points. Links are transmission facilities, and, accordingly, traffic is the flow of information within networks, among nodes, and over links. Figure 10.2-1 is a taxonomy of the major INFO COM and INFO EXCH system and equipment capabilities that are present in many telecommunications networks. At the highest level in the INFO EXCH category are FA capabilities of switching and multiplexing. BACKGROUND Multiplexing is a technique that enables several communications channels to be combined into a single broadband signal and transmitted over a single circuit. At the receiving terminal, demultiplexing of the broadband signal separates and recovers the original channels. Two basic multiplexing methods used in telecommunications systems are frequency division multiplexing (FDM) and time division multiplexing (TDM). FDM divides the frequency bandwidth (spectrum) of a broadband transmission circuit into many sub-bands, each capable of supporting a single, full-time communications channel on a non-interfering basis with other multiplexed channels. FDM multiplexing can be used with analog carrier transmission systems. Standard amplitude modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) broadcast radio are examples of FDM, where different stations occupy FCC-assigned portions of the standard broadcast band. Cable television is another example, where different stations are assigned frequency bands on a single cable medium and are selected by appropriate frequency conversion equipment using either stand-alone converter boxes or cable-ready television set tuners. In fiber-optic transmission, WDM is a form of FDM by which multiple signals of different wavelength are transmitted over the same fiber. Today, a single wavelength channel typically supports 2.5 Gbps of traffic. Eight-channel WDM systems (20 Gbps) are commercially available, with 32-channel systems (80 Gbps) currently possible in the laboratory.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS NETWORK MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL CUSTOMER PREMISES EQUIPMENT
Informatio Exchange Functional Area
SWITCHING
MULTIPLEXING
Informat Communicati TRANSMISSION Functio Are
Packet
Circuit
Time Division
Frequency Division/ Wavelength Division
Equipment
Media
Port Sharing Variable Bandwidth
Dedicated Circuits Fixed Bandwidth
Conventional
Fast Packet
CallbyCall
ChannelSwitching Multiplexers
NonSwitching Multiplexers
Media Access/ Interface Devices
Guided
Unguided
e.g., X.25
CO Switches PBXs Key/Hybrid
Networking T1 multiplexers Asynchronous Digital Hierarchy Crossconnects (Drop and Insert) Synchronous Digital Hierarchy Crossconnects (Flexible Payload Drop and Insert)
Frame Relay
Routing/ Bridging
Cell Relay
Miniaturized Multiband Transceivers VSAT Satellite Terminals Erbium Doped Fiber Amplifiers Soliton Transmission Coherent Optical Transmission/Detection
Atmosphere Space/Vacuum Undersea
Variable Length Frames
Fixed Sized Cells
Fiber-Optic
Metallic
Conventional/Halide Fiber
ATM Paradigm
STM Paradigm
SONET
Bi-direction Line-Switched Rings (2 and 4 fiber) Unidirectional PathSwitched Rings
Figure 10.2-1. Taxonomy of INFO EXCH and INFO COM Capabilities
In TDM, a transmission facility is shared in time rather than frequency (i.e., signals from several sources share a single circuit or bus by using the circuit or bus in successive time slots assigned to each signal source). In the early 1960s, T1-type digital carrier TDM was introduced within the old Bell system in which 24 digital voice channels were combined in a single signal. Subsequently, a five-level Asynchronous Digital Transmission System (ADTS) evolved. The first level (referred to as Digital Signal-1 or DS-1) supports 24 separate 64-Kbps digital traffic channels (i.e., Digital Signal-0 or DS-0 channels). DS-1 devices generate output signals at the rate of 1.544 Mbps, which accounts for the multiple DS-0 input channel, synchronization, and other overhead information. By comparison, deployed DS-4 systems accommodate 4,032 digital DS-0 channels and produce 274.176-Mbps signals. Most modern switch matrix designs use TDM in time-slot interchange arrangements. Moreover, nearly all high-capacity switches provide time-division-multiplexed outputs at one or more of the DS-n levels. Both of these developments affirm close interrelationships between switching, multiplexing, and the ongoing trends toward even higher levels of equipment and functional integration.
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Switching systems interconnect transmission facilities at various network locations and route traffic through a network. Switching includes all kinds of related functions (e.g., signaling, monitoring the status of circuits, translating address to routing instructions, alternate routing, testing circuits for busy conditions, and detecting and recording troubles). As illustrated in Figure 10.2-1, all forms of circuit, packet, and SDH/SONET transport networkbased line and path routing and switching are implied. In circuit switching, the INFO EXCH FA encompasses callby-call [e.g., central office (CO) telephone exchange] and channel switching. In the past, channel switching was implemented manually at technical control centers. In the United States, by the late 1980s, DCSs began to be installed in 24-channel (T1, or more properly, DS-1) group-based ADTS. Some DCS equipment provides not only channel switching at DS-1 rates (1.544 Mbps), but also add and drop multiplexing without breaking out each 64 Kbps DS-0 channel and supergroup (DS-n) channel switching. Moreover, these functions are achieved in compact, programmable equipment. Much of this vintage equipment is still in operation and continues to yield enormous economic and functional performance enhancement advantages. Today, ADTS DCS equipment is being replaced by SDH, ITU G-Series, or SONET-compliant synchronous byte interleave multiplexer equipment. SDH/SONET-based DCS equipment exhibits all basic asynchronous DCS features. Beyond basic features, SDH/SONET DCSs capitalize on all the considerable advantages of synchronous transmission and multiplexing. Among these advantages is the ability to support synchronous payload envelopes (SPEs) that extend add and drop economic and performance advantages across all SDH multiplexing hierarchy levels. In addition, to enhance survivability and availability, SDH/SONET-based BLSRs provide reusable bandwidth for more efficient internode transport in evenly meshed networks.3 Half the available bandwidth in BLSRs is allocated as a working rate evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations. The other half is reserved for protection routing. Thus, in an optical carrier, OC-48,4 application, working traffic is placed in the first 24 STS-15 time slots, with time slots 25 through 48 serving as the protection facility. In conjunction with ITU Telecommunications Management Network (TMN)-based management functions (or vendor product equivalents), this can result in unparalleled recovery from transmission failureswhether these failures occur naturally or from intended or collateral enemy attack damage. Network designs using early versions of these techniques have dramatically improved restoration from manmade or natural outages. For example, in 1991, it typically took 120 minutes after a failure to restore 35 DS-3 circuits [about 24,000 equivalent DSO (or voice circuits)]. On July 30, 1996, more than 200,000 circuits were taken out of service when a water department crew bored into a fiber-optic cable in North Carolina. In this case, 92.8 percent of the service was restored in 3 minutesnearly 10 times the number of circuits in 3 percent of the time. See Section 10.5 for a discussion of automated IM&C FA technologies that can lead to this kind of performance in networks used to support military and other missions vital to National Security. Programmable switching, multiplexing, and computer-based network control technologies alone do not make performance improvements of this magnitude possible. As noted in Section 10.1, with broadband fiber-optic cable and capacity-extending WDM for availability and survivability purposes, designers can virtually assume that spare or reserve capacity is free. That is, in large commercial or public networks, the 50-percent BLSR call fill-rate has no appreciable negative cost or revenue impact. Another technology category included in the INFO EXCH FA is the wide variety of equipment generally described under the rubric of packet switching. As Figure 10.2-1 shows, packet switching encompasses conventional and fast packet realizations in frame and cell relay appearances. Although modern telecommunications systems are increasingly able to integrate voice, data, video, and other services (as observed earlier), an even more systemic form of integration is occurring: the integration of switching and multiplexing within single equipment envelopes. The most recentand perhaps the most promisingmanifestation of the integration of switching and multiplexing functions in common equipment is the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) digital facility. However, more
3 4 5
A meshed network means traffic is more or less evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations. OC n, the nth level in an optical carrier multiplexing hierarchy. Sytronic equivalent to OC-1.
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common so-called LANs, routers, bridges, switching and non-switching hubs, and numerous satellite access schemes also provide a means for sharing common circuits among multiple traffic channels (multiplexing) and for providing either connection-oriented or connection-less switching functions. A LAN connects a set of computers to one another across distance via some medium such as twisted pair, coaxial cable, optical fiber, infrared (IR), or radio. Communication from each computer is often first passed to some central command junction, a configuration called a star-wired LAN. That common point, containing a hub or switching system, manages data flow to, from, and among computers connected to the LAN. A hub connection limits its members to some maximum information bandwidth (the number of bits/second the LAN is physically capable of transferring). For example, if a 10-Mbps Ethernet hub were busy handling a 7-Mbps message from one computer, all other computers on the LAN would be collectively slowed as they competed for use of the remaining 3-Mbpsspectrum space. On the other hand, a switch provides each connected computer exclusive use of the full systemdesigned information bandwidth while providing connections on an as-needed basis. A router is a device that connects a LAN to one or more than other LANs or to one or more other wide area networks (WANs). Routers forward packets by using their knowledge of the protocols contained within packets. Routers can connect to multiple LANs and WANs and can pass traffic formatted in a variety of protocols. A detailed system configuration defines what actions the router should take in each command instance. A bridge is a device that connects two separate LANs. A bridge forwards packets of information from one LAN to another, when appropriate, and does so without being concerned for the content or protocol headers contained within the packets. Protocols are communication instruction sets. Since no common standardization of protocols exists across software applications, an instruction translation capability has to be included within WAN software. Messages of more than a few hundred bytes are commonly broken down into shorter lengths of numbered packets. Each packet can travel by totally different paths to the final destination where the packets are then reassembled in serial order to recreate the original message. Packeting technology optimizes use of available media resources. Protocols include rules governing how data are structured into packets and sent from one machine to another. A particularly important protocol is the Internet Protocol (IP). Protocols and international standards are constantly evolving. In addition to the aforementioned switching and integrated switching-multiplexing equipment, equipment assigned to the INFO EXCH FA also includes older non-switching channel bank and flexible digital TDMs and all forms of analog electronic and photonic multiplexers (e.g., the modern WDMs). Each of these LAN and WAN components, supported by appropriate protocols, will have increased capabilities in the future. Routers will evolve to include an extended capability for routing critical military messages. This will be done by using multiple communication capabilities, such as satellite links, moon bounce, passive refraction from orbiting reflectors or meteor ionized trails, very high frequency (VHF) forward tropo scatter, oceanic subthermocline paths, and very low frequency (VLF) American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII). Under degraded conditions, this will be done by using aging resident technologies, such as radio teletype (RTTY). Data compression algorithms will continue to progress, freeing up data bandwidth and reducing transmission time for critical battle content (e.g., topographic maps and imagery). Current text compression methods are sophisticated and reliable. Graphic content has remained somewhat resistant to digital compression techniques that can shrink file size without producing information degradation. Before leaving a site, data are processed through an encryption device. Given sparse assets at any particular location, queuing for crypto processing tends to behave as a significant choke point within the communications operation. Non-destructive compression algorithms will reduce the load on those devices and the generic media load. Software quality is a critical factor in exchange. Reliable software created by software development methodologies and implemented by trusted, competent developers using rigorous quality control (QC) methods will include intrusion detection as an intrinsic part of the software. Collection of auditing and test data, including that needed for forensic analytic or certification purposes, will be a resident subset of the software and will assist in identifying and removing back-doors, Trojan horse code, and open hooks within software applications. Software may eventually become reliable enough to protect against external cracking attempts. Crackers usually exploit existing software errors (structural mistakes resident in the delivered product). Counter-cracking technology will evolve so that crackable errors in INFO EXCH computers will be detected and corrected before the
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software is installed on a system. These errors are detected during the software certification processes on software developed in trusted or untrusted development environments. International protocols will gradually become more comprehensive and will support maturing requirements more fully. Full international protocol standardization or convergence to a single protocol set is unlikely because of nationalistic and proprietary propensities. Both software development languages and system design concepts remain dynamic. A decision to tie our systems to any existing protocol set is implicitly a decision to couple our capability to obsolescent technology. Periodic software system upgrades will remain an appropriate solution. RATIONALE Enhancing performance and affordability, the principal criteria for citing MCT Part III technologies, coincides with the fundamental purpose of switching and multiplexing within telecommunications networks, namely, making better and more efficient use of transmission facilities. More specifically, the reasons INFO EXCH FA capabilities are so important to National Security IOs are the same as the reasons they have commercial significance. Quite simply, INFO EXCH capabilities are required as constituent interconnection elements for any IS that extends beyond a stand-alone desktop installation. For example, stored program control CO and digital cross-connect switching are key to SDNs. One of the principal advantages of SDNs is that they permit near-real-time network reconfiguration to optimize performance for a wide variety of traffic types and loading or in response to network damage or outages. These same programmability features allow peacetime civilian networks to be converted rapidly to highly survivable communications assets that can support crucial military or civilian disaster operations. Equally valuable in military or critical industrial operations is the increased accessibility that end-user organizations have to telephone-company-based SDN IM&C facilities that allow them to create and optimize individual subnetworks in accordance with unique customer (or force element) service and configuration profiles. In fact, with the exception of long-wave radio, all BLOS and wide area communications network survivability capabilities described in Section 10.1 depend critically upon INFO EXCH capabilities. Terrestrial or satellite, fixed, cellular, or specialized mobile telecommunications systems are not built without switching and multiplexing. A recent urban warfare study revealed that the Russians in Chechnya, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the British in Northern Ireland resorted to commercial cellular services for mobile troop communications when military-issue portable radio performance proved unsatisfactory within cities. Operational, Iridium, Teledesic, and other satellite-based capabilities will be even more relevant in satisfying urban mobile communications requirements since the service will involve reduced relianceor none at allon indigenous telecommunications facilities. Clearly, all these systems depend critically on highly sophisticated INFO COM, INFO EXCH, and IM&C FA technologies. Satellite-based mobile telecommunications is one example of commercial technology for which no practical military or government-owned alternative appears to exist. This statement is true unless one wants to defend the position that some country in the world is willing and able to deploy an Iridium or Teledesic-scale satellite constellation for dedicated government-only use. However, although military components are functionally equivalent, these components usually demand higher reliability as measured by a low mean time between failure (MTBF). A combat area is not filtered or air-conditioned. Corrosive explosive residues, vehicle exhaust products, arthropods, mud, water, and dirt are endemic environmental components of battle or of operations in an underdeveloped area. COTS dual-function switches combining CO and tandem switching capabilities are also available. Thus, in combination with SDH/SONET transmission systems discussed previously, the physical location of switching within a network no longer needs to be fixed or pre-assigned. This results in enormous survivability and service-restoration benefits. In the same vein, dual-function switches also enable a cost-effective means of time-phased upgrading of obsolete telephone systems in urban areas (e.g., Moscow or many third-world metropolitan areas). Transportable COs used for disaster recovery by telephone companies represent another commercial technology with significant military operations survivability potential. Figure 10.2-1 lists specific INFO EXCH technology capabilities.
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WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.2-2) Figure 10.2-2 contains a comparative representation of FTAs for the INFO EXCH FA by country. The INFO EXCH FA capability profiles of most countries are similar to their INFO COM capabilities. However, some exceptions exist in smaller or less-developed countries. Iraqs, Germanys, Japans, North Koreas, Russias, and South Africas INFO EXCH FA capabilities are assessed as greater than their INFO COM capabilities, whereas Israels, Polands, and Taiwans INFO EXCH FA capabilities are assessed as less than their INFO COM FA capabilities. These lesser INFO EXCH FA capabilities can significantly affect the overall performance of their ISs. The switching and multiplexing capabilities associated with the INFO EXCH FA are common to military and civil systems and have become readily available through joint developments or foreign sales. The ranking of INFO EXCH FA capabilities largely reflects the effects of international standardization. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have overall INFO EXCH FA capabilities equal to those of the United States, although U.S. capabilities may surpass them in some niche technologies (e.g., optical systems). All these countries, plus Italy, sell switching equipment worldwide. In most cases, their export equipment is technologically advanced even though it may incorporate somewhat limited capabilities. For example, their multi-level switching and pre-emption equipment may contain only two levels rather than three to five levels.
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Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands New Zealand North Korea Norway Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan - R.O.C. UK United States Legend:
Packet Switching
Circuit Switching
TDM
FDM

Limited R&D
SONET
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Figure 10.2-2. INFO EXCH Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.2. INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Network Attached Storage (NAS) ......................................................................................................................... III-10-35 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Adaptive Video Codes Adaptive Voice Codes Amplifying Techniques [Erbium Doped Fiber Amplifier (EDFA) and Raman] Counter-Cracking Technology
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DATA SHEET III-10.2. NETWORK ATTACHED STORAGE (NAS)

NAS will reduce access time to storage by eliminating the general-purpose server overhead. None identified. Specialized thin clients. Software or firmware for the specialized thin clients. Feasibility because of the requirement for high-speed connections. Big databases on the Internet; news on demand; music on demand; movies on demand. NAS will reduce the cost of storage by replacing comparatively slow complex server operating systems with comparatively fast, specialized thin clients. It also makes the storage more readily available to everyone.
RATIONALE The explosion of bandwidth requires a complement of storage. The network has to become a colossal storage system. Many future military applications will require the ability to share large amounts of information. Battle planning and execution require coordination between many dispersed military units, in addition to diplomatic and political input. All the players must be working from coordinated plans and a consistent battlefield view. BACKGROUND Linking storage devices directly to the network used to be impractical because the network was too slow to serve as a connector between storage and the rest of the computer. Because of the limits on network speed, storage had to be enslaved to a single computer or server. To get to the storage, the user had to go through the computerhence, the term captive storage. Storage needs were modest and mostly localmodest, in fact, because they were mostly local, comprising only that data likely to be used by the server or its own clients. However, the Web makes this arrangement intolerable. Storage needs are no longer either modest or mostly local, and placing a general-purpose master server between the storage device and the world is extravagant and inconvenient. The new paradigm is that storage is autonomousthus the term network attached storage, or NAS. This new paradigm, now commanding between 2 and 5 percent of the commercial market, will take it over during the next 5 years. Storage, long a low-cost peripheral, is expected to account for over 75 percent of all expenditures on computer hardware during this period. The new system of autonomous storage feeds on a network bandwidth breakout and a traffic transformation. Ethernets are rising to gigabit and even 10-gigabit speeds, while electronic commerce (e-commerce), digital video teleconferencing, video-on-demand, training video, video editing, audio, and other multimedia threaten to swamp all existing storage systems. In the NAS model, the storage facilities enslaved to a specific server operating system with a specialized file format and expensive proprietary features are gone. The computer then becomes a series of peripherals attached to the network. Storage is becoming another abundant commodity. The rapidly collapsing price of storage dictates architectures that waste storage and economize on processing and customer time.
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The simultaneous explosion of bandwidth and storage dictate a similarly massive growth in web caching, a solution that paradigmatically wastes these two crucial abundances, while conserving the two great scarcities of telecommunications: the speed of light and the span of life in the form of the customers time.

Canada
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
Presently, the United States leads in this technology implementation. Microtest pioneered this technology in the early 1990s. Storage area networks (SANs), a transitional step to NAS consisting of multiple storage devices linked by specialized fiber channel hubs and software, are available today from Vixel, Brocade, and Gadzooks. All these are U.S. companies. Network Appliance of Santa Clara, California, is the most aggressive NAS company today. It owns 42 percent of the NAS market. An early adaptation of this technology can be found on mp3.com, which has chosen Network Appliance as their primary storage provider.
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SECTION 10.3INFORMATION PROCESSING

Highlights In view of the rapid pace of commercial technology development, the performance of COTS Information Processing (IP) technology is generally far superior to military standard counterparts. COTS IP design, development, test, and evaluation tools facilitate adaptation and upgrade of older military and commercial ISs, delivery systems, and other WMD elements. Extraordinary performance growth in ever smaller, lighter, lower power packaging makes the introduction of powerful IP products possible and greatly augments survivable transportable command centers.
OVERVIEW The IP FA is defined as capabilities to enter, store, retrieve, display, duplicate, transform, translate, print, publish, ensure, or otherwise manipulate existing information without damaging content; to destroy or remove data selectively; or to perform computational, logical, algorithmic, rule-based, and other machine or human emulating intellectual actions that derive new meaning from, or extend the usefulness of, an existing set of information. Figure 10.3-1 is a taxonomy of the major IP system, software, and hardware capabilities required for successful IP operations.
INFORMATION PROCESSING
Organizational/ People Assignments/Authority/Roles
System Components
Methods and Procedures Technologies
Hardware (Physical Equipment/Machinery)

Central Processing Units/Microprocessors Arithmetic/Logic Internal Memory RAM, PROM, EPROM, Flash Control Units Parallel Processing/Symmetrical Multiprocessors Networks or Clusters of Symmetrical Multiprocessors External Memory Devices Magnetic Fixed Single, Multiple, and Array/RAID Hard Drive Removable Floppy/Diskette Removable Bernoulli/Cartridge Conventional/DAT Tape Optical CD-ROM Laser Disks/DVD/DIVX Input Devices Keyboard/Tablets/Mouse/Pointer Tactical Screen Scanners Voice, Auditory, and other Sensor/Transducer Instrumentation Still and Motion Picture Camera Communications Network Ouput Devices Conventional/Holographic Displays and Projectors Printers/Developers Synthetic Voice, Auditory, Visible/Invisible Light, Mechanical, and other Transducers
Software
Operating System Single/Multiprocessor Computer Operating Systems Executive Resource, Device, Communications Network (DE) Inputting, Outputting, and Application Drivers and Controllers Standards (OLE, DCE, other) Enforcement and Transfer Administrative and Operational Configuration Controllers Diagnostic, Recovery, and Maintenance Support User Services/Options Support Network Operating Systems Real-Time Network Operations Management and Control Network Resource Device Drivers and Controllers Communications Network (DCE) Interface Controllers Network Traffic and Flow Management, Metering, Recording Administrative and Operational Configuration Control Diagnostic, Recovery, and Maintenance Support User Services/Options Access and Support User Application User Work-function/Database Productivity Text/Word Processing/Hypertext/Mathematical Drawing/Graphic/Imagery/N-dimensional/Hypermedia On-line Transaction and/or Analytical Processing (OLTP/OLAP) Flat, Hierarchical, Network, Relational, Object, Intelligent Object Class/Metaclass/Inheritance Capable, Data Warehousing and Mining Programs Application-Specific/Integrated Programs Content Cognizant User Conventional and Virtual Reality Interface Visual/Auditory/Somesthetic/Hard-copy Input-Output Language Machine (1 GL), Assembly (2 GL), Procedural (3 and 4 GL), Object (4 GL) HTML, HTL, DDL, DML, and other Standards
Figure 10.3-1. Taxonomy of IP Infrastructure Capabilities
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National Security and commercial organizations need an IP capability that generates timely, reliable, and accurate, data products and services that can be tailored to each users needs. Queries must be processed by systems capable of selecting relevant information from among many distributed sources and able to find information immersed in extraordinary quantities of data. After data are found, the system must proceed with a comprehensive analysis and then synthesize or merge analytic results into a coherent projection. Classic systems have been dedicated to processing history archived as events, transactions, or lists. Future systems will use historic data to project probable consequences of action and to present optimal solutions to problems bound by defined constraint parameters. To remain militarily superior and to prevail in future conflicts, sophisticated IP systems must be available for preparation, training, and support of combat forces in the field. IP trends will be characterized by maturing complexity, searches through huge amounts of data, and a compelling requirement to locate and analyze specific information rapidly. Military applications will access and sort through data stored in public and private domains. A continuous increase in the quantity of data accessible through networks will dwarf rational expectation. Microprocessorsalready components of automobiles, ovens, clocks, and credit cardswill become ubiquitous subcomponents of manufactured objects, packaging, and garments. Passive unit processing code (UPC) bar codes will be replaced by active microprocessors that entertain customers, advocate purchases, and record the transaction. The checkout clerk, along with most single-point transaction processing, will disappear. The most mundane interactions of individuals with their surroundings will be noted and recorded by one system or another. The exponential growth in haystack-to-needle ratio will compel the development of agile processing technologies capable of insightfully selecting from among distributed sets of data, correlating and analyzing data swiftly, and presenting results to decision makers at any level of military organization. Disparate data will be gathered from a variety of distributed sources. Most data will be internally organized using different data structures. Some data heaps will lack any recognizable structure or consistent organization. Data mining, use of fuzzy logic6, and verification of data integrity techniques will be managed automatically, and the results will be presented to the user in a quickly understandable form. IS technology will be constantly challenged to produce results now. ISs will manage predefined activities for the user, such as scheduling, recurrent training, flagging events, making case-by-case decisions, and initiating appropriate action. These systemic-level services will remain useful for automating linear logistic flow (e.g., ration quantity levels as troops move into or depart from a battle area) but will not be useful for initiating replacement of non-linearly consumed items, such as bombs, jet fuel, or generic munitions. Underconsumption or unusually high consumption of items will be flagged as will season- or climatedisparate requests (e.g., requisition of parkas for troops in an equatorial area). By increasing the power of automated IP to aid in the rapid conversion of raw data into information, IP systems will augment military capabilities while reducing the number of personnel required to format and enter data queries or to monitor system functions. Speed will provide commanders with the information they need to adapt, modify, or intervene while sufficient time and opportunity still exist. RATIONALE COTS capabilities are intrinsically capable of supporting National Security missions; however, constructing automated strike planning, damage assessment, battle management, sensor and intelligence data fusion, modeling and simulation, weapon inventory and control, and numerous other IP functional capabilities requires significant customization. There is no question that the COTS design, development, test and evaluation (T&E) technologieswhich are available on the open marketfacilitate the adaptation and technology infusion or upgrade of older military and commercial ISs and delivery systems. Because a transfer of COTS technologies to the IS baseline capabilities does not involve composite material, fuel processing, propulsion system, weapon payload integration, and similar structural and mechanical dependencies, rogue countries (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others) can accomplish a lot at reasonable levels of effort and within aggressive schedules. COTS products [e.g., Internet and Intranet capabilities, distributed computing environments (DCEs), client-server structures, on-line analytical processing (OLAP), and on-line transaction processing
6
Most computers use logic in which a zero represents False and a one represents True. Fuzzy logic technology allows for degrees of truth by permitting any real number between zero and one to be false, partially true to some degree, or totally true. Internal Fuzzy inference rules vary from the standard predicate calculus and are useful for evaluating incomplete expression terms. Fuzzy simply indicates that there is no excluded middle ground.
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(OLTP)], a growing family of enterprise software developments, and other commercial developments offer tremendous potential in streamlining and improving WMD and conventional warfare operations. Multimedia personal power-computers are significant for conflict situations in which transportability and information-supported weapons [e.g., remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)] are crucial to mission success. Highperformance laptop PCs can be conveniently taken to temporary maintenance and repair depots, flight decks, launch vehicles, and battlefields. Slightly larger suitcase-size packaging, augmented with survivable communications and GPS capabilities, extends information-based, warfighting potential even further. At desktop/workstation capability levels, one can achieve in single-van, transportable command centers what 10 years ago demanded a convoy of vans and support vehicles. This advancement reflects increased IP performance and reliabilityall accomplished with greatly reduced computer processor and peripheral size, weight, volume, power consumption and, consequently, scaled-down prime power and environmental control support facilities. Figure 10.3-2 lists specific IP operational capabilities.
INFORMATION PROCESSING OPERATIONS
Information Transformation
(Manipulation of existing information without changing existing or creating new or extended content or meaning) Information Inputting Mechanical Keyboarding Tactile/Other Transducing Auditory Visual Text/Line and Photographics Scanning Still or Motion Imagery Sensing/Transducing Electromagnetic from Components/Networks/ Systems Information Storage and Retrieval Information Printing/Publishing Information Conversion Analog-to-Digital Digital-to-Analog Encoding/Decoding Information Outputting Outputting to Display for Human Perception (Personal or Broadcast, Local or Remote) Conventional Auditory Visual (Text/Graphic/Still or Motion) Imagery Tactile/Other Outputting to Inanimate Mechanisms/Networks/ Systems Electromagnetic Mechanical/Other Transducers
Information Destruction
Information Development
(Creating new or extended content or meaning from extended information)
Hardcopy Format Mechanical Shredding Electromagnetic Format Mechanical Dissolution Embedded Eradication/ Erasure Standalone Eradication/ Erasure Human Recollection Psychological Brainwashing Overt Forced/Complicit Covert Physiological (drugs, conventional or radiationbased lobotomies) Psychosomatic-Induced Hypnoses
Transaction Processing Financial Inter-Bank/Institution Wire Transfers Credit/Debit Card ATM/Wire Transfers Stock/Bond/Property Trading Mercantile/Retail/Commerce Point-of-Sale Checkout/Inventory Maintenance Remote Sales/Ordering/Cancellation/Electronic Commerce (e-Commerce)/Inventory Maintenance Mercantile Industry/Wholesale Commerce Supplier/Manufacturer Trading/e-Commerce/ Inventory/Stock Maintenance Military Materiel Requisition/Delivery/Inventory/Stock Maintenance Message/Frame Packet Interchange Analysis/Synthesis Processing Arithmetic/Statistical Logical Algorithmic Human/Artificial Intelligence/Rules and Case-based Neural Network or Computer-based Decision Support Pattern Recognition Process and Control Processing Design, Engineering, Development, Implementation, Test, and Evaluation Support System, Hardware, Software, Firmware CAD/CAE/CAM/CAT&E Modeling/Simulation Production/Manufacturing Support Systems Management and Control Support Productivity Applications
Figure 10.3-2. IP Operational Capabilities
High-performance computing is an enabling technology for modern tactical and strategic warfare. It is the principal technological force multiplier that gives U.S. forces their superior ability to detect, localize, and effectively engage enemy forces in a high threat/target-rich environment. It also enables the processing of massive amounts of imagery and sensor data for real-time data fusion and the generation of synthetic environments for dynamic training and simulation, mission planning and rehearsal, and operational battle management. Embedded computers are key enabling elements for improved sensors and smart weapons; for navigation, guidance, and control of military platforms; and for all aspects of operational command, control, communications, computers, information, and intelligence (C4I2). Using libraries of generic algorithms, software will adapt and evolve to solve problems without new programming effort. Dynamic applications will be generated and internally quality controlled without having to write additional code. A particular display will be generated, depicted, and then dissolved without having to evaluate or
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observe (externally) the underlying algorithmic structure. Algorithms that emulate human reasoning processes will be developed and will perform faster (while mastering a greater depth and span of data) than any human brain. Computer algorithms will approach the raw computing capability of the human brain within the next decade. Neural networks will evolve and emulate the human brains parallel processing structure. These networks will be able to derive and prove some inductive conclusions. Computerized algorithms will synthesize new knowledge from analytic recognition of previously unnoticed data relationships. Algorithms will be adaptive in the sense of learning from mistakes or through their modification of an initial problem-solving strategy to accommodate an unstable context presented by a changing set of data. Advanced artificial intelligence (AI)7 and a subset of expert systems applications will perform well as decision agents or intelligence agents. These programs will appear to behave much as humans when performing duties evaluating an information niche. Over time, autonomous IP niches, originally developed for narrowly defined purposes, will merge with others that they encounter while actively processing adjacent data turf. Niche-utilities will discover one another, interact, and expand the scope of these merged applications. Curiosity behavior, a prelude to intelligence and adaptation, will evolve within AI software applications. Information space, with mathematically defined properties analogous to those defined for a vector space or Hilbert space, will be the domain of transaction and interaction. Boundariesthe edges of computabilitywill be mathematically derived from those formal properties of information space. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.3-3) The United States leads the world in most of these technologies and must continue this lead by a significant margin. U.S. military offensive and defensive capabilities are growing increasingly dependent upon ISs. Being just slightly ahead of other nations risks vulnerability by sustaining an unwarranted overconfidence. Other countries that contribute to advanced IP research are Canada, Germany, Israel, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Basic mathematics research is published worldwide, without much constraint. The interval between publication and widespread comprehension may extend for decades. Once understood, mathematics becomes available to all commercial interests, worldwide, for inclusion in their software development. This open flow of emerging IT across borders does not imply that a processing equilibrium or an international parity in system performance will result. Complex and sophisticated software for support of the military will be written by developers who are not constrained by market economics and generic performance specifications that produce so much commercially available software of poor or deceptive quality. The IP capability profiles of most countries are similar to their INFO COM and INFO EXCH capabilities. However, some significant exceptions exist. India and Iran are assessed as having IP capabilities greater than those capabilities in both their INFO COM and INFO EXCH FAs. Iraqs IP capabilities exceed its IM&C and ISs facilities. Japan, North Korea, and Pakistan have IP capabilities that exceed their INFO COM and INFO EXCH FAs. Only Australia, South Africa, and Switzerland are assessed as having IP capabilities that are less than their INFO COM and INFO EXCH FAs. Some of the country capability assessments in Figure 10.3-3 may be conservative because the IP capabilities in almost all countries are growing rapidly because of the rapid Internet expansion. IP technology status statistics by country are difficult to locate; however, some indication of various countries capabilities were revealed by a recent world survey of the Internet host and PC populations. This survey reported that Finland, with a population of 4 million, has the worlds largest Internet host density, with ~ 535 per 1,000 population. The United States still leads the world in PC density with ~ 390 PCs per 1,000 population; however, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland are close behind the United States in PC densities, with more PCs per 1,000 than Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Software is changing the economic and military balances in the world. An accelerating intellectual capital transfer of software development know-how is now in progress through the Internet. Intellectual capital transfer takes place through aggressive computer hardware and software marketing, conferences, trade journals, and technical literature on software development and through the graduates of colleges and universities who teach IP skills and
7
AI is concerned with emulating human intellectual procedure and behavior through automated models. Humans, with apparent ease, process ambiguous natural language, recognize faces, react to body language or tonality of verbal response, and sense of humor or distress. Automating these human behaviors for robotics or computers is an AI challenge.
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abilities in the United States and other countries. IP know-how transfer also takes place in personnel transfers overseas and training conducted by U.S. multinational companies. However, the United States still currently leadsand is forecast to continue to leadthe world in software innovation, the development of large complex systems, and system engineering and integration through at least the year 2005 or 2010. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities. See Sections 5 and 10 in Part I and Sections 8 and 12 in Part III of the 1996 MCTL. The United States is having a great deal of software developed by foreign nationals, either within their own country or as part of a team in the United States. For example, communications software is being developed in India by a subsidiary of a U.S. communications company. In another case, a critical DoD system being developed under contract in the United States has Russian nationals on the development team. Software developed today is so complex that any programmer(s) could put in viruses, Trojan horses, back doors, and time bombs that could go undetected all the way through installation, particularly if there is a cooperative group effort.
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High Performance Computing
Computer Software
Intelligent Systems
Human Systems Interface
COTS Integration
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.3-3. IP Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.3. INFORMATION PROCESSING

Data Representation and Visualization .................................................................................................................. III-10-45 High Performance Computing (HPC) .................................................................................................................... III-10-47 Quantum Information Processing/Communications (QIPC) ................................................................................ III-10-50 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Analytic Recognition of Data Relationships Data Correlation Data Storage and Retrieval Data Warehousing and Mining Dual Native Language Translation Capability Dynamic Application Generation Human Voice Identification Intelligent Agents Massive Database Search Algorithms Native Language Identification Techniques Search Engines Unstructured Database
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DATA SHEET III-10.3. DATA REPRESENTATION AND VISUALIZATION

Size and complexity of the data set. Resolution and response time. None identified. None identified. Specially designed software that supports direct interaction between the human operator and computer-generated data resources. Key issues are identifying the most effective metaphors for representing different types of large data sets and generating effective algorithms to allow user to manipulate the underlying computational resources. Scientific modeling and enterprise modeling operational control, including computer and telecommunications networks, traffic, financial markets, and so forth. No alternative.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE One of the primary goals of Joint Vision 2010 is to achieve and maintain dominant information superiority by giving the commander an overarching perspective and awareness of the battlespace. This will require that the system be able to manipulate and represent the state of readiness and movement of many thousands of individual force elements and their operational capabilities as a function of the state of readiness and battlespace environmental factors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The global state of the art in data visualization is growing rapidly because of a combination of growing requirements to deal with very large complex systems (e.g., the Internet, biological systems) and software. The following listing of Centers of Excellence should be considered exemplary but is far from definitive. It focuses on the most frequently cited institutions. Within the United States, the High Performance Computing Management Office, IBMs Watson Research Center, Xerox, and SGI report substantial corporate research efforts. Georgia Tech University and Carnegie Mellon University (Sage Visualization Group) have broad programs in visualization, and numerous other institutions have efforts aimed at specific visualization applications, very commonly Internet and software development related. Other frequently referenced centers include: Helsinki University of Technology in Finland Technical University of Karlsruhe, University of Paderborn, and Dresden University of Technology in Germany Computer Sciences Department at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom.
In Canada, the University of Toronto and the Advanced Computation and Visualization Centre also have efforts aimed at visualization applications. These are two of the six consortia being funded by the Canadian
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Foundation for Innovation. Other consortia members include the Memorial University of Newfoundland, University of New Brunswick (Fredericton), University of Prince Edward Island, and St. Francis-Xavier University. Centers identified in China include Tsinghua University Chinese Academy of Science and the Peoples University of China. In France, the Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique is the primary focus of computing research. Its five major strategic areasall of which are related to this topic (the last two directly)relate to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Control of distributed computer information Programming of parallel machines Development and maintenance of safe and reliable software Construction of systems integrating images and new forms of data Analysis, simulation, control, and optimization of systems.
Japanese industry and academia are heavily involved in data visualization developments. Academic Centers of Excellence include University of Tokyo, Osaka University, and Waseda University.
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DATA SHEET III-10.3. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING (HPC)

Ability to aggregate effective computational throughputs in excess of 1 TeraFLOP. None identified. None identified. Low latency message passing protocols. Development of effective parallel code and low latency message passing. Pervasive. Commodity clusters. USG programs such as the NASA Beowulf and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiatives have the explicit goal of making HPC more accessible.
RATIONALE HPC is the single most important enabling technology for modeling and simulation (M&S). Advances in distributed computing networks underlie the development and implementation of the high level architecture (HLA) and the distribution of discrete event (DE) modeling for real-time applications. HPC also supports the calculation of solutions to complex non-linear mathematics, which are used to characterize many physical phenomena, and the generation of realistic environments (visual, auditory, and dynamic) for dynamic training simulations. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Netherlands

Significant R&D
France UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Mass market availability of low-cost network switching and powerful microprocessors has resulted in the rapid proliferation and expansion of HPC capabilities. Nearly all the requisite knowledge and software technology required for clustering computers to achieve high performance is in the public domain. One example of the availability and distribution is the NASA-supported Beowulf program, from which detailed guidance and software for assembling a computing cluster can be accessed and, in the case of the software, downloaded. In the United States, the High Performance Computer Modernization Office (HPCMO) Common High Performance Computing Software Support Initiative (CHSSI) works specifically in the Force Modeling and Simulation (FMS) area, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Cluster is involved in HPC work, the California Institute of Technology/Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is researching Time Warp development, and NASA funded Synchronous Parallel Environment for Emulation and Discrete-Event Simulation (SPEEDES), a variant of Time Warp. Because of the increased accessibility of the technology, the number and diversity of activities involved in HPC have increased dramatically. The following paragraphs highlight some specific examples of recognized Centers of Excellence in HPC research. Canada has a strong initiative in distributed HPC. Nortel, the Canadian telecommunication firm, is a world leader in fiber-optic switching technology, and Canada has established what is advertised as the worlds first national optical R&D network, C3.ca, which is a 7-year plan to build a computational infrastructure on a scale that is globally competitive and that supports globally competitive R&D.
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Canadas HPC community includes research facilities worth over $70 million. The project will receive $23 million in capital from the Canada Foundation for Innovation. Six universities and regional consortia, which are all C3.ca members, were approved for funding to establish facilities for computation and visualization, including approximately a dozen parallel, shared memory, and vector systems for advanced computing and six new multimedia visualization centers. Research initiatives of interest to Canadian defense include parallel/distributed intelligent agents, virtual prototyping M&S, and a wide range of software research activities in parallel and distributed computing. Centers of Excellence funded under this effort include: High Performance Computing Facility, University of Victoria. Multimedia Advanced Computational Infrastructure, University of Alberta. University of Calgary, University of Lethbridge, and University of Manitoba. The University of Calgary has conducted many research programs in optimistic parallel processing techniques. It is one of the early and leading HPC research activities. Physical Science Computer Network, University of Toronto. Interdisciplinary Research Facility for Innovative Applications of Information Technologies, Concordia University. Rseau Qubcois de calcul de haute performance, Universit de Montral, Centre de recherche en calcul applique, Universit de Sherbrooke, with research centers at cole polytechnique, McGill University, Universit de Qubec Montral, and Concordia University. Advanced Computation and Visualization Centre, Memorial University of Newfoundland, University of New Brunswick (Fredericton), University of Prince Edward Island, and St. Francis-Xavier University.
In France, the Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique is the primary focus of computing research. Areas of primary research are organized into five major strategic areas: (1) control of distributed computer information, (2) programming of parallel machines, (3) development and maintenance of safe and reliable software, (4) construction of systems integrating images and new forms of data, and (5) analysis, simulation, control, and optimization of systems. The German National Research Center for Information Technology oversees and coordinates research in several areas of interest, including basic architecture and software research, autonomous intelligent systems, scientific computing, and distributed collaborative computing. The University of Mannheim, the Technical University of Karlsruhe, and the University of Paderborn are recognized HPC Centers of Excellence. Collaborative work within Europe is coordinated through the European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics (ERCIM), which aims to foster collaborative work within the European research community and to increase cooperation with European industry. Leading research establishments from 14 European countries are members of ERCIM, whose collaborative activities also extend beyond the European Union (EU). The European Commission has awarded ERCIM a grant to coordinate an EUChina industrial cooperation initiative in HPC. The initiative is also partially financed by the Chinese government through Chinas National Center for Intelligent Computing (NCIC),8 with additional funding coming from European and Chinese industry. The goal is to promote SinoEuropean cooperation by raising Chinese awareness of EU technologies and expertise and to inform the EU business community about market opportunities in China. Participants in relevant Esprit projects will be invited to take part. This High Performance Computing and Networking (HPCN) initiative is part of a range of EUChina industrial cooperation activities in science and technology now being organized under the auspices of the Chinese government and the European Commission. NCICs R&D activities in HPC include parallel and distributed computers and carrying out fundamental research on HPCs and intelligent computing systems, especially in the area of natural language interface. While one of NCICs goals is to develop competitive commercial computer products, results to date appear better suited to
8
The NCIC was founded in March 1990 under the leadership of the Steering Committee of National High-Tech R&D Program (the so-called 863 program) on Intelligent Computing Systems.
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developing a fundamental understanding of the underlying technology than to engage in global commercial competition. The Dawning family of parallel computing hardware trails the state of the art in terms of its embedded microprocessor and interconnect technologies. However, as research tools, these projects have provided a foundation for investigating effective parallel computing methods. One area of research that may have military application in coalition warfare and interoperability is the NCICs Intelligent Machine Translation Research Center, which is conducting theoretical research, system design, and product development of intelligent machine translation systems.
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DATA SHEET III-10.3. QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING/COMMUNICATIONS (QIPC)

Developing Critical Technology Parameters
Critical parameters cannot be quantified but will be determined by the degree of coherence that can be obtained and the development of effective methods of error correction. High-purity materials for quantum devices and specially formulated fluids for molecular and nuclear magnetic resonance quantum computing. Scanning tunneling and atomic force microscopic equipment for fabrication and inspection of devices. Measurement equipment for determining quantum state, both for testing and as an output mechanism and for implementation of quantum computers. The inherent ability of the quantum bit (qubit) to exploit superposition to encode larger numbers will require development of special algorithms. Error correction algorithms to control decoherence will be crucial to practical implementation of QIPC systems. Ability to control decoherence and perform fault-tolerant operations. Devising suitable methodologies for harnessing decoherence, which would include error correction algorithms, redundancy, and architectural design. Scaling properties in terms of number of qubits, time per gate, and physical size. Developing applications and applications software with commercial markets. Quantum information storage and retrieval, including associated error control. Techniques for initialization of quantum computers, and measurement techniques for efficient read-out of information for internal control and applications. Development of practical repeaters to extend the range of quantum communications. Driving commercial applications are distant at best. At present, the nearest term prospects appear to be in communications and cryptology. Affordability of access to state-of-the-art computational capability is likely to remain an important consideration. The current movement is toward the concept of centralized HPC resources accessed by what are called thin clients. If this paradigm catches hold in the market, pricing strategies for computing will change dramatically, in ways and to an extent that are difficult to project.
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Commercial Applications
Affordability
RATIONALE Quantum information processing (QIP) holds long-term promise for revolutionary advances in computing, communications, and cryptology. Moores Law,9 which characterizes the rate at which component feature sizes and densities will increase, has proven remarkably durable. However, by the 20002015 time frame, projected feature sizes will reach molecular scale. Further advances in computational power will demand some form of computation at the submolecular scale (i.e., atomic scale.)
The observation that the logic density of silicon integrated circuits has closely followed the curve (bits per square inch) = 2^((t - 1962)), where t is time in years; that is, the amount of information storable on a given amount of silicon has roughly doubled every year since the technology was invented. This relation, first uttered in 1964 by semiconductor engineer Gordon Moore (who co-founded Intel 4 years later) held until the late 1970s, at which point the doubling period slowed to 18 months.
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Quantum computing is perhaps the most promising mechanism yet identified to meet this demand. Since 1994/1995, the amount of work in this area has increased dramatically. This technology is still in its very earliest research phases; however, the amount of the activity and the apparent commitment of the EU and large businesses to support research in this area hold out the possibility of rapid advances. The time scale for practical implementation of QIP technology is almost certain to lie beyond the 2010 time frame. However, if successful, QIP will enable advances across the full range of military objectives currently envisioned to ensure information superiority. As noted in the Background section that follows, quantum computing, if successfully implemented, will provide a practical means for rapid code breaking of public key systems. Similarly, quantum communications, in theory, provide a practical counter to this cryptanalytic capability. These capabilities will affect assured services, secure communications, and complete battlespace awareness. Potential military applications include any in the area now supported by HPC, with unique capabilities in code breaking and secure communications. At present, this work is largely at the stage of basic scientific research into underlying physical phenomena and devices, with some thought being given to algorithm development. The devices themselves are about where the conventional semiconductor transistor was in the late 1950s. The research is widely disseminated and accessible. Because of the problem of decoherence, quantum computers are likely to be inherently much more susceptible to upset than conventional solid-state computers. This suggests potential susceptibility countermeasures that could defeat or degrade such a computer in military applications. At present, it is not possible to predict the extent to which basic isolation measures developed to meet the requirements for general-purpose use will address such vulnerabilities. BACKGROUND Richard Feynman first suggested the notion of a quantum computer in 1982. From the initial idea in 1989 through the early 1990s, David Deutch and Peter Shor of Bell Labs are generally credited with defining the first practical quantum-computing algorithm, a factoring algorithm applicable to decrypting public key information. Since 1982, rapid progress has taken place in the basic science underlying QIPC. Theoretical analyses indicate that quantum mechanics can be exploited to process and transmit information. Researchers appear confident that a primitive quantum computer can be built or that fully secure cryptographic systems can be implemented using quantum effects. Recent breakthroughs in componentry [e.g., the demonstration of elementary quantum logic gates using ion traps, cavity Quantum Electrodynamics (QED), and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) technology; the development of error correction and search algorithms; and the quantum teleportation experiments] have helped accelerate quantum computer development. Potentially, QIPC could revolutionize IT. The field is in its earliest phases, and novel ideas and applications will most certainly emerge. While the scientific foundations of QIPC have been reasonably established, technological approaches for practical implementation of QIPC systems do not yet exist. Preliminary results indicate that quantum computers can perform computations regarded as intractable on any classical computer. Theoretical research indicates that quantum computing has the potential for orders of magnitude increases in the speed at which large numbers can be factored. If this aspect of quantum computing can be made practical, it will have a revolutionary impact on cryptoanalysis. All public key cryptosystems, which are fused nowadays to protect and to certify electronic documents, will become vulnerable to quantum cryptoanalytic attacks. Data security will require different cryptosystems. Quantum cryptography may provide the means for secure communication. Basic research is still necessary in this area to implement quantum logic elements using quantum optics (trapped ions, cavity QED, and so forth). Quantum gates have already been realized in the laboratory. A focused attack on the effects of decoherence on quantum computers is necessary, and quantum error correction codes need to be designed to preserve the quantum information from the deleterious effects of dissipation. Opinion on the long-term feasibility of quantum computing remains strongly divided. Researchers point to the quality and soundness of the underlying science and argue that the remaining problems are technologicalnot fundamentalin nature. However, the problem of decoherence (caused by the interaction of the atomic spin state with its external environment) is a daunting problem because it increases exponentially with the number of qubits. For this reason, other scientists predict that systems will be limited to those on the order of 10 qubits.
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By comparison with computing, research in quantum communication has been more successful. The partial quantum computers demonstrated secure communication over distances as great as 10 km. Issues of affordability and application requirements will drive future developments. However, implementation of a practical quantum computer capable of decrypting public key cryptography in seconds could dramatically spur demand for quantum encryption. Among the unanswered questions are: Can the problems of scaling up be solved affordably? Are there practical solutions to the problem of initializing and maintaining data coherence? What classes of problems will QIPC systems be well suited to able to solve? In the area of communications, can the quantum phenomena be scaled to practical distances? Are quantum repeaters feasible? Are there other applications that may lend themselves to smaller scale systems?
To explain what makes quantum computers so different from their classical counterparts, we begin by having a closer look at a basic chunk of information, namely, one bit. From a physical point of view, a bit is a physical system that can be prepared in one of the two different states representing two logical values: no or yes, false or true, or simply 0 or 1. In todays digital computers, the voltage between the plates in a capacitor represents a bit of information: a charged capacitor denotes bit value 1, and an uncharged capacitor denotes bit value 0. One bit of information can be also encoded using two different polarizations of light or two different electronic states of an atom. However, if we choose an atom as a physical bit, quantum mechanics tells us that apart from the two distinct electronic states, the atom can also be prepared in a coherent superposition of the two states. This means that the atom is both in state 0 and state 1. No equivalent of this superposition exists in the classical world. It is a purely quantum mechanical phenomenon. Because of superposition, a quantum register composed of three qubits can encode eight numbers in a quantum superposition. Storage capacity increases exponentially with the number of qubits. Thus, L qubits can store 2L numbers at once. Once the register is prepared in a superposition of different numbers, we can perform operations on all of them. In theory, suitably tuned laser pulses could be used to arrange the atomic electronic states and to manipulate initial superpositions of encoded numbers into different values. The result would allow a massively parallel computation. A quantum computer might perform in one computational step the same mathematical operation on 2L different input numbers encoded in coherent superpositions of L qubits. Thus, a quantum computer offers enormous potential gain in both speed and memory capacity, With regard to communications, theoretical results indicate that two-state systems can carry more than one bit of information if quantum entanglement is employed. This and related phenomena (e.g., quantum teleportation) may improve channel capacity and optimize data-compression schemes. As noted elsewhere, greater initial success has been realized in the area of quantum communications, and this is where the heaviest industrial participation appears to be focused. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Italy United States
France Netherlands
Germany Japan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
QIPC research is global in naturewith active research efforts in, and collaborative efforts between and among, many different countries. Advances in the underlying science are characterized as revolutionizing the possibilities for processing information on the quantum level. Countries with an evaluation of are supported by primary references to specific relevant research and/or multiple citations as Centers of Excellence by other
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recognized Centers of Excellence. Lower ratings may be inferred from participation in EU programs or other collaborative efforts, where the specific nature of their contributions is not given explicitly. Commercial firms with potential to be major developers of QIPC technology include the IBMs Thomas Watson Research Center, British Telecom, Hewlett Packard Laboratories, Thomson CSF, and AT&T Labs. Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) of Japan has what appears to be a comprehensive effort in quantum optical computing.10 This list, while not all-inclusive, provides an indication of current interest and shows where the driving impetus for further commercialization may arise. CENTERS OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT European Union (EU) The EU is particularly active in the quantum computing area, with several programs directed toward advancing the state-of-the-art. The ESPRIT-sponsored CERION Working Group will coordinate the research of 17 European and 8 Canadian nodes, actively participating in research on nano-electronics, nano-optics, and the technology of advanced nano-structures. Numerous multilateral efforts are ongoing in the EU, under the Future and Emerging Technologies QIPC Initiative.11 The Laboratory for Theoretical and Quantum Computing at the University of Montreal is also cited frequently as a center for QIPC research, particularly cryptologic applications. The goal of the EU QIPC is to develop novel systems and techniques for IP, transmission, and security by exploiting the properties of quantum mechanical operations. The EU initiative presumes that fulfilling these objectives will require many years and numerous projects. Several specific objectives have been defined as guidance and are representative of objectives being pursued in this area, worldwide: Development of an elementary scalable quantum processor. Although the practical importance of an elementary (e.g., 4-qubit) quantum processor may be limited in itself, it may represent an important step toward larger scale quantum computing. Evaluation and selection of promising component technologies. To date, all the candidate approaches are affected by rather severe practical limitations. At this juncture, continued exploration of competing approaches (NMR, ion traps, cavity QED, quantum dots, and so forth) and continued research into novel alternative approaches are necessary. Alternatives include the extension of semiconductors and quantum networks that interconnect many simple quantum-processing elements. Quantum algorithm development. This objective includes the automated discovery of new quantum algorithms. So far, other than in the area of factoring for cryptology and algorithms directed toward quantum mechanical problems, few algorithms tackle problems of practical significance. More applications will be needed to justify future investment. Longer distance and secure quantum communication. A challenging objective is to scale quantum communication protocols in distance and to demonstrate compatibility with the telecom infrastructure, such as optical fibers. In the area of cryptology, the objectives are to expand quantum key distribution toward longer distances, truly single or entangled photons, multi-party quantum key distribution, and free-space key distribution. The development of quantum key repeaters is seen as an important enabling element of practical communications.
Commercialization of quantum computing technology will ultimately require evolution of an engineering design and development tool-box of components, interface standards, and engineering processes that perform specific quantum tasks to be used as building blocks of a QIPC system. Components of interest under the EU QIPC initiative include light sources with controlled fluctuations for photon-based QIPC; non-linear optical fibers for guided photon-pair generation; and coupled semiconductor quantum dots for single-spin or single-photon applications. Examples of quantum engineering processes include quantum measurement techniques, production and use of correlated optical solutions, and quantum interferometry techniques.
10 11
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Quantum Optical State Control Research Group, at the web address http://www.brl.ntt.co.jp/physics/butsusei-g/index.html. European Union Future and Emerging Technologies QIPC Home Page: http://www.cordis.lu/ist/fetqipc.htm.
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The following examples shed some light on EU projects that are representative of a much larger overall effort directed toward these areas. The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Ile de France heads the EU Advanced Quantum Information Research program, in which the France Telecom/Centre National Detudes de Telecommunications also participates. Other participants in this program are Friedrich-Alexander-Universitt Erlangen-Nrnberg and the Universitt Konstanz (Germany), Istituto Nazionale per la Fisica della Materia (Italy), Rijksuniversiteit Leiden (Netherlands), and the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) (United Kingdom). The Institut Superieur Delectronique Du NordRecherche heads the EU effort on scanning tunneling microscope lithography for quantum devices. Other participants in this program are the Universit Catholique de Louvain Laboratoire de Microelectronique (Belgium), Instrumat Sa (a French industrial participant), and Omicron Vakuumphysik Gmbh (Germany). Another EU project in this area is the Spin-Dependent Nano-Electronics, the objectives of which are to combine expertise in semiconductor quantum structures and nano-magnetics to target the field of magnetoelectronics as an important and potentially useful class of quantum devices. Four main objectives are defined: 1 . To develop a fabrication technology of mesoscopic magnetic/semiconductor quantum structures by employing the full strength of state-of-the-art nano-fabrication and semiconductor technology, with emphasis on large-scale fabrication and compatibility with integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing 2. To explore the physics and mechanisms of spin-dependent transport in integrated semiconductor/ferromagnetic structures 3. 4. To build optimized devices starting from the three defined concepts: a Vertical Spin Transistor, a Lateral Spin Transistor, and a Magnetically Modulated Semiconductor Transport device To assess magnetoelectronic circuit applications in the fields of non-volatile memory, programmable logic, and reconfigurable input/output circuits, with the first efforts in design and simulation.
This effort is lead by Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre in Leuven, Belgium. Other participants are Thomson CSF (France), Universitt Regensburg and Rheinisch-Westflische Technische Hochschule Aachen (RWTH) (Germany), Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel), University of Twente Mesa Research Institute and University of Groningen (Netherlands), and University of Nottingham and University of Cambridge (United Kingdom). United Kingdom The United Kingdom has been active in quantum computing, with major research efforts under way at Oxford, Imperial,12 Plymouth, Hewlett-Packard Labs, and elsewhere. The Centre for Quantum Computation, based at the University of Oxford, conducts theoretical and experimental research into all aspects of QIP and into the implications of the quantum theory of computation for physics itself. It is one of the most frequently cited Centers of Excellence for QIPC research. Quantum cryptography is one part of this field where the United Kingdom has a substantial worldwide lead because of the efforts of researchers at Imperial College (Blackwell Laboratory), Oxford, Strathclyde, DRA Malvern, and BT Laboratories. The basic scientific methodology derives from past activity on non-classical light. Secure quantum communications techniques have been realized in demonstrations. The next step is to use this in network applications. Germany German academic institutions are active in the quantum computing area, with ongoing research at the University of Hamburg, the University of Karlsruhe, the University of Bielfield, and the University of Tuebingen. Much of the material cited is available only in German, and German institutions are commonly cited as partners in EUfunded research in this area.
12
Simon Bone and Matias Castro, A Brief History of Quantum Computing. This site at the Imperial College in London can be found at http://wwwdse.doc.ic.ac.uk/~nd/surprise_97/journal/vol4/spb3/. It contains a good presentation of the history and basic principles of quantum computing, together with an extensive bibliography and links to other useful sites.
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Russia There are reports of Russian work in Quantum Chaos Generation at the Institute for High Performance Computing and Databases in St Petersburg. This research may have potential relevance to quantum computing. Russia, within the Former Soviet Union (FSU), was historically strong in molecular computing. However, the world-leading aspects of this work were primarily in biomolecular computing. Work in optical and quantum nano-electronic devices was, in 1990, assessed to be lagging behind work being done in the United States and Japan. Japan Japan is extremely active in QIPC, with work at the University of Tokyo, the University of Kyoto, the University of Osaka, and the University of Hiroshima. Research is reported at Kochi University on Quantum Computing Solid Block Systems of Nonlinear Dipole-Dipole Ensembles. The NTT Quantum Optical State Control Research Group conducts research across a wide range of topics, all relevant and many directed specifically to future development of QIPC systems. Japanese efforts appear to extend to applications of interest, including work on algorithms at Chiba University and the Science University of Tokyo, and a joint report of research in search and recognition of image data in quantum computers at Kagawa University and Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. United States The United States shares or holds world-leading positions in virtually every aspect of quantum computing. There is extensive research in the United States, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Rutgers University, the Particle Beam Physics Laboratory at UCLA, Stanford University, and dozens of other sites. DARPA and the Army Research Office (ARO) are supporting a MIT/IBM/Stanford NMR computing consortium, which is investigating a wide range of basic topics aimed at moving quantum computing from science to practical engineering. Efforts include synthesis of molecular computers; demonstration of quantum algorithms, including a compiler and algorithms for quantum error correction to control decoherence; scaling investigations, including development of a desktop NMR quantum coprocessor; and a 10- to 40-qubit quantum computer. The California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) is recognized as a world leader, particularly in techniques for combating decoherence. DARPA is also funding Cal Tech to address specifically potential future military applications of quantum computing. Dr. Neil Gershenfeld at MIT and researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) are leaders in work toward a concept called the coffee-cup supercomputer, because of the use of a liquid NMR phenomena. In fact, Dr. Gershenfield believes that a quantum co-processor could be a reality within 10 years if the current pace of advancement continues. Other techniques, such as quantum dots, also show promise.
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SECTION 10.4INFORMATION SECURITY

Highlights Information Security (INFOSEC) cryptologic technologies are an increasingly important set of present and future militarily critical technologies (MCTs) required to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information within processing or storage nodes and while en route over communications networks. Strong personnel, facility, equipment, standardization, training, and T&E security programs as well as defensive IOs and Operation Security (OPSEC) are required. Commercial INFOSEC products are available on world markets, with capabilities deemed adequate for military IOs in COTS versions, many of which can be customized for more sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence for the warrior (C4IFTW) applications. Open market-based INFOSEC R&D in cryptology, computers, software and key management architectures, related standards, and the functional specification of key management infrastructures and protocols are required for U.S. forces to maintain information dominance. As commercial and government INFOSEC technologies advance, the INFOSEC products necessary to maintain the existing superior U.S. INFOSEC capabilities will become more affordable.
OVERVIEW The INFOSEC FA is defined as capabilities to safeguard information privacy, secrecy, and integrity; to control access to information; to authenticate and validate information content, representations, sources, and sinks; and to enforce non-repudiationin either natural or manmade threat environments. INFOSEC FA capabilities are countermeasures intended to prevent or circumvent information loss, degradation, compromise, or improper use. This may occur within systems hardware or software, within communications or physical transport systems, or directly among people. The range of possible threats is broad. At the highest level, INFOSEC threats are either natural or manmade. Natural threats include earthquakes, floods, sunspots, and phenomenological electromagnetic events. Manmade threats can occur because of actions or events caused by people or other system components internal to an IS (insider/inside threats). Alternatively, manmade threats can involve external actions or events (outsider/outside threats). At the next lower level, manmade threats can be subdivided into either deliberate-intentional or accidentalfailure categories. According to analyses of documented information-loss cases conducted over the past decade, about 3 percent are attributed to natural causes, and 97 percent are attributed to manmade causes. Of losses attributable to manmade threats, about 92 percent are traceable to insider/inside threats, and 6 percent are traceable to outsider/outside actions or events. Of the 92 percent of cases resulting from insider/inside threats, about 83 percent occurred because of unpremeditated personnel or system failures (e.g., errors in judgment or performance; hardware or software failures). Insider actions, intentional sabotage, theft, or compromise attacks caused the other 3 percent. Of the 6 percent of cases resulting from outsider/outside threats, about 3 percent occurred because of unintentional personnel or system failures (e.g., power outages and plane crashes). Outsider, intentional sabotage, theft, or compromise attacks caused the other 3 percent. Few commercial, government, or military information systems do not employ technologies cited in this INFOSEC section. Moreover, within military IS, a nearly universal requirement exists for INFOSEC system protection to conceal intent during the planning, preparation, and operational phases of military operations. Joint Vision 2010 emphasizes the importance of INFOSEC to information superiority by explaining that
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There should be no misunderstanding that our effort to achieve and maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful enemy attacks on our information systems. Defensive information warfare to protect our ability to conduct information operations will be one of our biggest challenges in the period ahead. Traditional defensive IW operations include physical security measures and encryption. Figure 10.4-1 is a taxonomy of major system, equipment, process, and procedural defensive or countermeasures and offensive or counter-countermeasures INFOSEC technology capabilities. In the figure, INFOSEC capabilities are depicted under five categories that are related but largely non-overlapping functionally.
INFORMATION SECURITY
Information Content, Privacy, Secrecy, and Security (Cryptography)
Information Origination, Possession, and Transmission Security
Information Access Control and Network/Systems Security
Information Content Integrity-Assurance Security
Information/User Identification/ Attribution/ Authentication/ Non-Repudiation Security
Figure 10.4-1. INFOSEC Applications
The Information Content, Privacy, Secrecy, and Security (Cryptography) category (see Table 10.4-1) lists all manner of techniques to prevent unauthorized apprehension of informations substantive meaning or significance as conveyed by its content. Included among various technologies safeguarding the content of information in electromagnetic formwhether it is contained within electronic or photonic devices or en route over suitable mediaare encryption, scrambling, and concealment, using steganographic or secure modulation schemes. Physical protection of information content is accomplished by using protected red-enclaves, protected wire distribution facilities, diplomatic pouch and other secure physical transport, and the manual application of various encoding and steganographic mechanisms. The Information Origination, Possession, and Transmission Security category (see Table 10.4-2) includes technologies to conceal the origination, storage, existence, or possession of information at any node or location; to conceal the fact that information is, or has been, transmitted from one location to another; and to ensure successful transmission under natural or manmade threats. In conjunction with appropriate electromagnetic, acoustic, and visual emissions control technologies (e.g., TEMPEST-protected structures), the established OPSEC procedures (e.g., the creation of black or compartmented programs and facilities) comprise the principal mechanisms for keeping secret the generation, storage, use, or existence of sensitive information. In the unguided electromagnetic signals domain, transmission concealment or hiding is typically achieved by using spread spectrum. The transmission of signals is concealed in guided electromagnetic communications systems by using emission-suppressing protected wire distribution facilities employing either fiber or metallic cable. Again, in the unguided electromagnetic signals domain, transmission assurance relies on the use of spread spectrum, high-power, steerable, narrow beam antennas, or hybrids of these technologies to achieve robust anti-jam, anti-spoofing communications capabilities. High-transmission survivability and availability are attained through the use of redundant media (e.g., multiple satellite, terrestrial radio, and wireline communications); high reliability and fault-tolerant, fault-detection, and fault-correction designs; and, when required, radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP)/high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)/system generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) hardening. Although the transmission concealment and assurance technologies just described can be properly assigned to the INFOSEC FA, they also qualify as INFO COM technologies and, for organizational reasons, are listed in INFO COM tables.
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Table 10.4-1. Information Content, Privacy, Secrecy, and Security (Cryptography)

Offensive Counter-Countermeasures
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Cryptanalytic attacks Known plain text Chosen plain text Chosen cipher text Brute force Electromagnetic Encryption/decryption Symmetric-key (secret-key) Block and stream ciphers Substitution and transposition ciphers Digital signatures and hash functions Authentication and identification One-time pads Operational codes Asymmetric-key (public-key) Factorization Discrete log Elliptic curve Mixed symmetric-asymmetric (hybrid)
Protocol Massively parallel/symmetrical multi-processors Black-bag enhanced Escrowed encryption Time/frequency analysis synthesis Image processing/pattern recognition Static/dynamic scrambling Frequency domain Time domain Hybrids Secure non-linear pseudo-noise modulation Steganography
Defensive Counter-Countermeasures
Physical Protected red-enclave Protected wire distribution Diplomatic pouch and other protected physical transport Manual hardcopy encoding/steganography
Technologies providing Information Access Control and Network/Systems Security (see Table 10.4-3) again encompass both electromagnetic and physical protection measures. Unlike previously discussed encryption technologies that attempt to conceal content, the information access control and network/systems security technologies protect information by denying unauthorized access to sources of information or system/network resources. In the electromagnetic class, techniques for limiting access include digital certificate, certificate authority, and associated key management technologies. Trusted IS designs include an extensive array of system/network security technologies. These technologies range from sophisticated techniques to ensure defect- and bug-free software and hardware, multilevel security, firewalls, and so forth, to less complex password and management/control and common channel signaling encryption. In another aspect of access control, emerging technologies prevent outright theft of intellectual property and yet permit IS marketing and sales distribution using secure container and metering capabilities. In addition, a major facet of electromagnetic information access control is the detection, neutralization, and prevention of successful unauthorized interception and infiltration attempts. At the logical network and application level, pertinent technologies include access-seeking transaction monitoring and auditing and the detection and removal of software (virus, Trojan Horse, and spoofing) and hardware sabotage attacks. Finally, in the physical access control arena, tamper-proof packaging is critical when equipment containing sensitive information must either be given toor may be stolen bypotential adversaries. Other physical access protection approaches include protected red enclave and simpler electronic or mechanical locks. The wide-ranging variety of room-building-campus perimeter access control, intrusion detection, and alarm capabilitieswhen used to safeguard informationmerits inclusion among the technologies identified in this section. However, for organizational reasons, these technologies are discussed in Section 10.6.
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Table 10.4-2. Information Origination, Possession, and Transmission Security

Communications Transmission Concealment Unguided Electronic signals intelligence/exploitation Radio fingerprinting Enhanced radiometric detection Spoofing/communications deception Guided Authorized/clandestine wiretapping
Communications Transmission Assurance Unguided Jamming, spoofing, repeating Radio fingerprinting Guided Transmission facility sabotage Counter Operations Security Operations Intelligence
Communications Transmission Concealment Unguided Low probability of intercept Spread spectrum Low power/duty cycle Hybrids Steerable/narrowbeam antennas Facility/equipment TEMPEST protection Guided Protected wire distribution Fiber-optic/metallic cable Steganographic Decoy Transmission Transmission Assurance Unguided Survivable/anti-jam communications Spread spectrum High power Steerable/narrowbeam antennas
Unguided/guided High survivability and availability Redundant multimedia networks High reliability fault tolerant designs Radiation, EMP/HEMP/SGEMP hardened
Operations Security Identifying, controlling, and protecting evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities Actions to conceal information origination and/or existence of Secure compartmented programs Special access programs Information, facilities, and equipment
Technologies providing Information Content Integrity-Assurance Security (see Table 10.4-4) apply only to information that, at least at some point, exists in electromagnetic form. These technologies are designed to detect and, if possible, mitigate naturally occurring errors or intentionally induced manmade alteration of the information content en route between senders and receivers. Such errors often occur because of natural background noise and intentional or unintentional interference that degrades communications channel quality. Information coding technologies that either detector both detect and correcterrors are commonly used in data communications to circumvent or at least alert users that received information may be corrupted or invalid. Of greater consequence is adversarial tampering with information content even though this information appears valid to receptors. The attack scenario here is not an enemy trying to deny transmission all together; rather, it is delivering to unsuspecting recipients fraudulent information that appears legitimate. In many circumstances involving National Security, the satisfactory reception and use of altered, fallacious, and misleading information may be more dangerous than if communications had been denied altogether because it is nearly always true that falsehood is never so false as when it is very nearly true.13 The key countermeasure to such information manipulation involves use of secure hash functions.
13
G.K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, 1933.
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Table 10.4-3. Information Access Control and Network/Systems Security

Espionage Electromagnetic Transmission interception Unguided (terrestrial/satellite surveillance) Guided (e.g., wiretapping) TEMPEST emission surveillance Storage media/equipment theft Escrowed encryption Network, switch, server, router, multiplexer attacks Jamming, spoofing, repeating Public key factoring attacks Automated password/war dialer attacks
Physical hardcopy theft/duplication Acoustic and visible and Invisible lightwave activity surveillance
Systems Influence System, network, product hardware and software Operating system, executive, and application software ASIC System, network, product hardware and software operational phase sabotage Remote/networked virus, spoofing, spamming attacks On-premises hardware and software attacks
Electromagnetic Digital certification and authorities Key management Key backup and recovery Key updating and revocation Key registry and distribution Network security Multilevel security Firewalls, passwords, smart cards Encrypted management/control and common channel signaling Systems security Trusted IS designs Defect/virus/trapdoor free software Defect/bug free hardware Intellectual property theft-deterrence/secure container/usage metering Threat/attack detection, response, prevention
Steganographic Decoy Transmission Transmission Assurance Unguided Intrusion-resistant fiber-optic cable Metallic cable shielding and time domain reflectometry Transaction (e.g., long-on/penetration attempt) monitoring and auditing Operational detection and neutralization of software (e.g., virus, Trojan Horse, spoofing) and hardware sabotage attacks Physical Tamper-proof packaging Electronic/physical locks Protected red enclaves
Information operated on by hash functions produces message digests. Because two messages can hash to the same digest, secure reception of a message digest along with the message itself provides means to ensure receivedmessage integrity. Since messages with errors introduced during transmission, whether unintended or induced, produce different digests, comparing locally generated and transmitted digest yields a foolproof method for detecting corrupted or altered content. To be effective, the technologies for Information/User Identification/Attribution/Authentication/Non-repudiation Security (see Table 10.4-5) are typically employed in unison with those of other categories. For example, recipients in most INFOSEC environments require assurance that messages have not been surreptitiously intercepted and plain text-content revealed (which demands effective encryption technologies), assurance that message content has not been altered (which demands effective hash functionality), and some means to authenticate and validate that particular messages were sent or approved by some authority and source that can be positively identified. To satisfy the third requirement (i.e., that messages were sent or approved by some authority and source that can be positively identified), correlation of positive sender identification and validation with error free and
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Table 10.4-4. Information Content Integrity-Assurance Security

Electromagnetic Record Security Counter-Countermeasures Unguided Jamming/repeated-signal transmission denial attacks Deceptive signal transmission attacks Unguided/guided Random/deterministic content manipulation Transmission denial attacks
Information/Knowledge Accuracy Counter-Countermeasures Psychological operations Philosophically based Physiologically based Psychosomatically based Industrial/financial-economic/scientific disinformation operations Government/political disinformation operations Military situation disinformation operations
Electromagnetic Record Assurance Error detection and correcting codes Secure hash functions Information/Knowledge Accuracy Assurance Psychological operations detection/countermeasures Philosophically based
Physiologically based Psychosomatically based Industrial/financial-economic/scientific disinformation operations Government/political disinformation operations Military situation disinformation operations
Table 10.4-5. Information/User Identification/Attribution/ Authentication/Non-Repudiation Security

Information Attribution Electromagnetic Counterfeit source/sink/date/container/file location/time-to-user ID attacks Physical Counterfeit hardcopy substitution/delivery
User Identification Counterfeit badges/cards Unauthorized use of user-unique information
User Identification Badges/cards/personal identification numbers (PINs) Smart cards Biometrics Thermograms Hand or eye scanning Voice printing Keyboard rhythm Fingerprint Signature dynamics
Digital certification Digital signature algorithms and techniques
Information Attribution Electromagnetic Source/sink/date/container/file location/time-touser ID correlation Physical Registered/certified mail Diplomatic pouch/carrier/commercially validated hand delivery
content-assured-received secure messages is needed. Capabilities supporting user ID include thermogram, hand or eye scanning, voice printing, keyboard rhythm, fingerprint, signature dynamics, and other biometric technologies; a broader set of digital-certificate-based techniques; and simpler PINs and individual-unique data (e.g., a mothers
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maiden name or birthday). With third-party Digital Certificate Authorities, these technologies also support objective non-repudiation capabilities. RATIONALE All the INFOSEC critical developing technologies listed below could support U.S. efforts to achieve and maintain information dominance in future years. The data sheets outline the detailed rationale for including each developing technology. Cryptology Distributed key generation Electronic cash (e-cash) transfer systems Elliptic curve cryptosystems Hardware-based random number generators High-speed encryption Image steganography Key management Key recovery system (KRS) failure mode and effects analyses Massively concurrent processor (MCP) Message integrity and non-repudiation Programmable embeddable communications security (COMSEC) Pseudo-random number generation Quantum computers Quantum encryption Secret sharing schemes Stream ciphers Zero-knowledge proof (ZNP)
For additional information, see the following: For an exploration of the idea of developing cryptographic strength metrics, see Annex B to IDA Document D-2121, Addendum to IDA Group Report GR-4 Identification of Militarily Critical Technologies, Part I: Weapons Systems Technologies, Section 8.5: Information Security, December 1997. Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Information Warfare-Defense, unclassified version, Executive Summary, paragraph 9. For statistics on foreign availability of cryptographic products, visit http://www.tis.com/research/ crypoto/crypt_surv.html. Testimony by Mr. Stephen T. Walker, President of Trusted Information Systems, for the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, October 12, 1993, p. 8.
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TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT
Scientific facts are established through open publication of experimental results that may or may not prove to be reproducible in identical peer experiments. The assumption regarding the strength of a cryptographic algorithm is difficult to prove since algorithm strength is based on a belief in the hardness of the solution to the particular mathematical problem on which the cryptography is based. Beliefs are harder to prove than reproducible scientific facts. The strength of a cryptographic algorithm can be established only through open scientific publication that invites peer review. The longer an algorithm is in the public domain and no cryptanalytic solution is found, the greater the cryptographic community confidence becomes that the algorithm is strong and can be trusted. The best way to establish the cryptographic strength of an algorithm is by challenging cryptanalystsin open publications and on the Internetto test the strength of the assumption regarding the hardness of the problems on which encryption and algorithms are based. Some developers offer large rewards for those who break their cryptography when testing the strength of their algorithms and providing data for estimating cryptographic life cycles, which are based primarily on processor power and mathematical knowledge. This period of rapid growth and change in the Information Age is being accelerated by the exponential expansion of the Internet, which has become a world information infrastructure (WII). However, the Internet, like all networks, has also introduced serious vulnerabilities. Exposing the enormous Internet network to crackers all over the world has created an exponential market for cryptographic systems to protect National Security information, intellectual property, e-mail, and the e-commerce conducted on the Internet. The international competition among INFOSEC system manufacturers for market share is intense, and the race is on for the shortest-time-to-market and the largestmind-and-market share for INFOSEC products, all of which incorporate some form of cryptography. The international demand for INFOSEC products has resulted in an increased rate of acceleration in the critical developing technologies identified in this section. This acceleration is reflected in intense international interest in developing INFOSEC technologies. In recent years, newspapers, trade journals, and technical literature have published a stream of national and international INFOSEC articles and papers about cryptography and cryptanalysis. This rapid rate of change in cryptologic technologies is expected to continue. Until a knee in the Internet growth curve occurs, scientific discovery and technological implementations are likely to lag behind demand. This is especially true for mathematics, elliptic curve cryptographic systems, stream ciphers, image stenography, key escrow or recovery archiving systems, key management, and related infrastructures. The ensemble of INFOSEC technologies described in this section, if properly designed and combined, comprise defensive countermeasures capabilities that present formidable challenges to those designing or using offensive counter-countermeasureswhether these technologies are implemented with U.S. government/military or COTS products. Although past experience indicates that only 10 percent of information losses are the result of intentional offensive attacks, the ever-increasing use of Internet and Intranets will greatly expand the value of INFOSEC targets. Thus, we can reasonably expect an increase in the absolute number of INFOSEC attacks and in the percentage of losses attributable to them. Most successful commercial cryptographic systems are based on algorithms in the public domain, which have survived years of peer investigation by the worlds best cryptographers. Cryptography is considered to be strong by most internationally recognized cryptographers as long as no cryptanalytic technique is discovered that is more efficient than an exhaustive key search. If no short-cut cryptanalytic technique can be found to break the algorithm and if the system equipment and protocols are secure when the algorithm is integrated, the strength of the cryptographic system becomes largely a function of the size of the key space. The longer the key, the stronger the system. The most important area for improving affordability is the adoption of COTS products to provide protection for sensitive, but unclassified, information. Pilot tests of COTS INFOSEC systems are now underway in various USG departments and agencies. The Internet-driven competition among suppliers should enhance the affordability of the COTS IS security products needed for supporting the national infrastructure assurance for all nations. This competition and the worldwide availability of INFOSEC products should make COTS products better and less expensive in the future. If COTS products can meet military requirements, the adaptation of COTS products could eliminate some of the need for inventory, depots, storage, and related life-cycle support costs. Through standardization, product life might be extended so that new INFOSEC software and hardware are less frequently requiredfurther reducing
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replacement costs because of obsolescence and life-cycle costs. A wide selection of competitive COTS products that may meet USG requirements for protecting unclassified sensitive data are already available. One development that merits further discussion is the growing risk of adversary system influence sabotage during the design, development, and manufacturing phases. For instance, massive scale IC technologies now exist to build single chips with 108 circuits. Since only a relatively small number of IC input/output pins are available, the ability to embed Trojan Horse-type hardware defects exceeds current abilities to test for such defects. Analogous situations exist in the software regime. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.4-1) In the field of cryptology, the United States has serious competition because more science and mathematics students in many countries are studying cryptology. Cryptology has been studied almost as long (or longer) and intensively in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as it has in the United States. These and several other countries have world-class cryptographers. This MCT development cycle has identified other countries that are developing, producing, and distributing commercial cryptography that is as strong as any commercial cryptography developed and produced in the United States. The demand for strong cryptography in the Information Age is growing exponentially with the Internet. In 1993 Congressional testimony, Mr. Walker reported that . . . we have identified 264 foreign hardware, software, and combination products for text, file and data encryption from 21 foreign countries. . . . Since 1993, U.S. restrictions on exporting strong cryptography have created a window of opportunity during which foreign cryptographic publishing houses and distributors are increasing their global market share at the expense of U.S. industries. About 4 years later, in December 1997, there were 474 foreign products (up from 264 products in 1993) in at least 68 foreign countries (up from 21 countries in 1993). The reality of the strong foreign commercial cryptographic products, which are widely available in the international market place, increases the value and importance of U.S. cryptology research. The increasing worldwide cryptologic R&D activity in industry and academia, in response to network requirements for increased INFOSEC and infrastructure assurance, is producing a large body of knowledge that is being published in the open literature. Participation by USG representatives in national and international standards cryptographic technical working groups provides an opportunity to assess and exploit commercial R&D discoveries. The scientific and technological aspects of the state of the art, as well as developing cryptologic technologies and protocols, are often important issues discussed during meetings of national and international INFOSEC standards groups.
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Country Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hong Kong India Iran Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Russia Singapore South Africa Rep. South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan-R.O.C. UK United States Legend:
Information Content, Privacy, Secrecy, and Security (Cryptography)
Information Origination, Possession, and Transmission Security
Information Access Control and Network/Systems Security
Information Content IntegrityAssurance Security
Information/User Identification/ Attribution/ Authentication/ Non-Repudiation Security
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.4-1. Information Security Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.4. INFORMATION SECURITY

Cryptology .............................................................................................................................. III-10-69 Distributed Key Generation ......................................................................................................... III-10-71 Electronic Cash (e-cash) Transfer System ....................................................................................... III-10-73 Elliptic Curve System Security .................................................................................................... III-10-75 Hardware-Based Random Bit Generation (RBG) ............................................................................... III-10-77 High-Speed Encryption (HSE) ..................................................................................................... III-10-79 Image Steganography ................................................................................................................. III-10-81 Key Management ...................................................................................................................... III-10-83 Key Recovery System (KRS) Failure Mode and Effects Analyses ....................................................... III-10-85 Massively Concurrent Processing.................................................................................................. III-10-87 Message Integrity and Non-Repudiation Authentication .................................................................... III-10-89 Programmable, Embeddable COMSEC Technology ......................................................................... III-10-91 Pseudo-Random Number Generation ............................................................................................. III-10-93 Quantum Computers .................................................................................................................. III-10-95 Quantum Encryption .................................................................................................................. III-10-97 Secret Sharing Schemes .............................................................................................................. III-10-99 Stream Ciphers ....................................................................................................................... III-10-101 Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZNPs) .................................................................................................. III-10-103
III-10-67
III-10-68
DATA SHEET III-10.4. CRYPTOLOGY

An example of basic research in mathematics, which could benefit existing cryptanalysis capabilities, is computational number theory research. In the next 15 years, number theory discoveries that could produce improved cryptanalytic techniques (e.g., more efficient solutions to the problem of factoring large integers) are possible. None identified. None identified. None identified. The integration process will be the principal developmental effort required for military use of this technology. There may also be intellectual property issues. The difficulty in recruiting, training, and retaining cryptologists who are U.S. citizens is a challenge. Mathematics (cryptology) is the basis for the emerging strong dual-use cryptography. The INFOSEC industry supplies cryptographic applications to the financial services industry, telecommunications industry, legal and medical services, and the developers of a wide variety of e-commerce applications and personal privacy products. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Cryptology is a field of mathematics based on algorithms that perform calculations to encipher and decipher text, files, and data. Mathematics is a science that has been in the public domain for a long time, and cryptology is now widely studied in industry and academia. Number theory and discrete mathematics are important areas in this field. Continuing basic research in the cryptology branch of mathematics is needed to prove the strength of existing commercial cryptographic systems and to develop more robust protocols and more efficient cryptanalytic techniques and tools. Increased commercial interest in cryptology has significantly influenced the search for potentially profitable new discoveries. Networks are driving commercial and government cryptology R&D programs toward stronger cryptography and protocols and improved cryptanalytic techniques. Cryptology is used by government and intelligence elements in secure C4IFTW and authentication systems. C4IFTW systems provide hours/days/months of strategic warning to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and minutes/hours of tactical warning. Improved cryptanalysis techniques could be the product of new discoveries in mathematics. Better cryptology will provide increased information superiority and more secure C4IFTW capabilities at lower costs. Although national governments are no longer the universal leaders in this field, governments universally classify cryptologic applications developed for military and government use. Some government-developed cryptology has been placed in the public domain [e.g., the data encryption algorithm in the Data Encryption Standard (DES) (FIPS Pub 46-2)]. The successor to DES, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), is now being developed and will also be placed in the public domain. Efficient cryptanalysis systems are a key capability required for information dominance. The integration process will be the principal developmental effort required for military use of this technology. To ensure access to leadingedge technologies, the United States should provide continuing support for a healthy R&D program in mathematics and cryptology in the USG and at U.S. colleges and universities.
III-10-69

Argentina Canada Denmark Greece Ireland Israel Mexico Poland South Africa Rep. Switzerland
Legend:
Australia China Finland Hong Kong Iraq Italy Netherlands Portugal South Korea Taiwan-R.O.C.
Austria Costa Rica France India Israel Japan New Zealand Russia Spain UK
Belgium Czech Republic Germany Iran Italy Korea Norway Singapore Sweden United States
Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Historically, governments have been the centers of cryptologic development. However, the civilian sector is now advancing the development, production, and marketing of cryptologic products. The business potential of networks is driving the commercial development of cryptography-enabled e-commerce applications. Some of the prominent producers of mathematics based cryptologic systems are: Canada: Entrust [Nortel] and Certicom United States: RSA Data Security, Inc., [Security Dynamics], Cylink, IBM, Motorola, CertCo, BBN Technologies [GTE], Fischer International, and TIS.
There are many more U.S. companies and over 700 foreign cryptographic products for sale in the world market for text, file, and data encryption.
III-10-70
DATA SHEET III-10.4. DISTRIBUTED KEY GENERATION

Distributed key generation is the delegation of key generation to various entities (e.g., end users) in the public key infrastructure (PKI). Currently, many DoD systems use a central key generation facility. None identified. None identified. None identified. No developmentother than the promulgation of standards and integration into existing applicationsshould be required for the military use of COTS public key systems that provide distributed key generation. Intellectual property rights may encumber this technology. A ubiquitous directory infrastructure is required for certificates and related information. A sound PKI is an important element of strong scaleable commercial cryptographic systems. The INFOSEC industry already supplies PKI systems, which are used by the financial service industry, the telecommunications industry, the legal profession, and medical delivery services. Many cryptography houses are developing a wide variety of distributed key generation PKI e-commerce applications. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Distributed key generation is fundamental to meeting the requirement for secure, scaleable cryptographic systems. It is a basic requirement for security products designed for use in large, distributed C4IFTW environments. The civilian sector already uses various forms of distributed key generation in commercial systems. A proactive signature scheme might also perform distributed key generation, with each signing device generating its own key fragment pair internally (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). A sound PKI is one of the most critical elements of a distributed key generation protocol. National and international standards bodies are working on PKI issues. The Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI) Technical Working Group meets monthly and is moving rapidly to develop a standard for USG certificate management. A robust PKI that supports distributed key generation is a dual-use item that could be used by governments and military forces. Secure C4IFTW systems could provide hours/days/months of secure strategic warning to NCA and minutes/hours of secure tactical warning to battlefield commanders. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany Italy Russia UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Belgium India Japan South Africa Rep. United States
Canada Ireland Netherlands Sweden
France Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
III-10-71
Governments are developing dual-use distributed key generation and PKI systems. In the United States, military development programs include distributed key generation and public key features. Commercial developers already produce public key system products that support distributed key generation. National and international standards organizations are, in fact, the principal centers of PKI protocol development. Some of the principal producers of cryptographic public key systems that support distributed key generation are: Canada: Entrust [Nortel] and Certicom United States: RSA Data Security, Inc., [Security Dynamics], Cylink, IBM, Motorola, CertCo, BBN Technologies [GTE], Netscape, Spyrus, TIS, VeriSign, and Xcert [Fischer International].
There are many more U.S. and foreign public key management products for sale in the world, most of which support distributed key generation.
III-10-72
DATA SHEET III-10.4. ELECTRONIC CASH (e-cash) TRANSFER SYSTEM

Interoperability of secure payment software among purchasers, merchants, and financial institutions is the difficult goal of standards organizations and most e-cash system developers. Trust is also an important characteristic of e-cash. All parties to the payment transaction must be assured that payment information will be protected from alteration and disclosure. It may take 5 or 10 years to establish complete e-cash transfer system interoperability and trust. None identified. None identified. None identified. Anonymity in commercial cybercash transactions on the Internet is a desirable feature for e-cash payment systems. However, anonymity introduces the potential for money laundering and counterfeiting. The Federal Reserve could have difficulty maintaining control of the money supply. The widespread use of e-cash would increase the vulnerability of national financial systems to INFOWAR attacks. The major commercial applications for e-cash will be among the financial services and in e-commerce conducted over the Internet. Interest in e-cash is growing exponentially with the growth in e-commerce. Not an issue.
RATIONALE The purpose of an e-cash payment system is to instruct a financial institution to make near-term payment to a merchant from a purchasers account. E-cash transfer systems are an obvious target for those who might attempt to compromise U.S. economic security. A significant form of e-cash, anonymous cash, raises issues that must be resolved by finding a balance between the privacy rights of the individual and integrity of the nation/state monetary systems. Forms of E-cash could make military supply decentralization and savings possible. Anonymous cash could be used in clandestine operations and certain special access programs (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 1006, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Some e-cash transfer systems are now in use and will be used more in the future by governments and in secure C4IFTW systems to provide cash disbursements for operations with widely dispersed forces. Integration of e-cash functionality into legacy military systems will be required. E-cash technologies are available in the United States; however, patents may encumber these technologies. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Ireland Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel Switzerland

Significant R&D
Germany New Zealand United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
III-10-73
The commercial sector is clearly leading the development of this technology. Many elements of e-cash systems are the product of years of basic research. Some producers of various types of e-cash systems, including e-cash and smart cards are: Canada: SCI Finland: Avant France: Schlumberger and Bull Japan: Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC Netherlands: DigiCash United Kingdom: Serif PLC and Mondex United States: Cyber-Cash, CertCo., Bell South, Diebold, and Mastercard.
III-10-74
DATA SHEET III-10.4. ELLIPTIC CURVE SYSTEM SECURITY

Elliptic curves are gaining widespread acceptance. Several companies have already developed elliptic curve cryptographic systems. The USG may soon incorporate elliptic curves in USG Type 1 cryptographic systems. More basic research to discover proof of elliptic curve system security is needed. Additional research may firmly establish universal belief in their strength. It is critically important that their assumed strength be proven or established as soon as possible. In 5 to 15 years, the required proof could be discovered or their strength could be established. None identified. None identified. None identified. Faith in the security of elliptic curve cryptographic systems is limited. Many argue that a longer period of peer review is necessary to establish the strength of elliptic curves and win the trust of potential users. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) offers highefficiency and low overhead for encryption, digital signature, and key management applications because of its presumed strength (with shorter keys and high processor efficiency). This dual-use cryptographic technology is maturing rapidly. Additional R&D is required to prove, or firmly establish a universal belief in, the strength of elliptic curve cryptographic functions. International peer review, aided by the prizes offered by Certicom, will be a valuable supplement to funded R&D. There will be the usual requirement to integrate the commercial elliptic curve cryptographic functions with the other functionality in military applications. The efficiencies of elliptic curve cryptosystems for authentication, data integrity, nonrepudiation, and confidentiality are beneficial in military and civilian applications where computational power and IC space is limited, such as in IC Cards (smart cards), PC Cards [formerly Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards], and portable and transportable wireless (RF) devices. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE The security of elliptic curve systemstheir main attractionis based on the assumption that the analogue of a discrete logarithm problem in these curves is apparently much harder to solve than the discrete logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem that provide security in other public-key systems. Given current knowledge and processor power, elliptic curve systems are relatively strong. There are efficiencies in elliptic curve cryptosystems for applications in which computational power and IC space is limited. With processor power doubling every 2 years and the constant threat of a cryptanalytic breakthrough, keys must be lengthened to maintain constant cryptosystem strengths. A relatively short (~ 160-bit) elliptic curve key is popularly believed to provide a strength that approximates the strength of discrete log and factorization public key systems using much longer (~ 1,024-bit) keys. ECC is ideally suited to small, light C4IFTW portable field equipment. Elliptic curve systems may be particularly beneficial to RF device applications where processor power, bandwidth, and IC space may be limited. They may also be ideally suited to smart card and PC card applications that could be used to supply encryption and digital signatures to secure the transmission of orders and reports.
III-10-75
Several cryptographic suppliers will soon provide comparatively inexpensive tool kits for adding elliptic curve cryptographic functionality at standard cryptographic application programming interfaces (CAPIs) in military systems. Elliptic curves may soon be incorporated in the digital signature standard (FIPS Pub 186). ECC, with its anticipated virtues, could become ubiquitous in small systems with limited bandwidth and processing power in civilian and military applications if full confidence in its comparative cryptographic strength is established. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Sweden
Significant R&D
Switzerland
UK
Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The civilian sector is driving the technical development of this technology. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9.F.1 is developing a standard for the use of elliptic curve systems by financial services in key management. Among the cryptography houses known to be developing elliptic curve systems are RSA [Security Dynamics] in the United States and Certicom in Canada. RSA has announced an elliptic curve tool kit addition to their product line. Certicom is a center of expertise and probably the present industry leader. Eventually, most prominent cryptographic developers in the United States and overseas may offer cryptographic products based on elliptic curves.
III-10-76
DATA SHEET III-10.4. HARDWARE-BASED RANDOM BIT GENERATION (RBG)

The security of many cryptographic systems depends on the generation of secret quantities or values in the form of random bits. In 10 to 20 years, it may be possible to generate improved random numbers with hardware or some combination of hardware and software, which are more nearly random and thereby increase the strength of cryptographic systems. None identified. None identified. None identified. Present RBG methods that may be perform well in laboratories cannot yet be duplicated in versions that are suited to use in small, lightweight, inexpensive computers or datacapture peripherals. RBGs are available in the United States but may be encumbered by intellectual property rights. What seems to be needed is a ubiquitous RF (or similar) natural source that could inexpensively supply perfectly random bit streams, which could be supplied through a system somewhat similar to the way GPS provides location data. The major commercial application of hardware-based RBGs will be in cryptographic applications for use in e-commerce operations. More nearly perfect random bit strings will strengthen those cryptographic applications that depend on the randomness of bit streams for their strength. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Hardware-based RBGs can be used to exploit the randomness that occurs in some physical phenomena. Hardware generation is covered separately because it is different from pseudo-random number generation, which is often accomplished with software. Hardware-based random number generators can be used to generate the seed for pseudo-random bit generators. This is important because cryptographic system keys must be generated efficiently. The most efficient way to generate the seed for pseudo-random bit generators is to produce strong keys. In many systems, this can be accomplished by using hardware rather than software. Small, portable C4IFTW terminals that have to generate keys on the battlefield will need optimized hardware random number generators (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Improved random bit strings could increase the strength of military encryption. To meet the requirements of trusted systems, hardware-based RBGs in commercial products must pass the FIPS Pub 140-1 randomness tests. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Israel New Zealand UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Italy Russia United States
France Japan Sweden

Moderate R&D
Germany Netherlands Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
III-10-77
Governments and industries are sponsoring random number and bit generation R&D. The goals of these basic and advanced research investigations are to find efficient, low-cost methods for generating random bits or capturing and converting natural noise for economical use in random bit generation. Many cryptographic system developers depend on various methods for the generation of pseudo-random bit streams; however, producers of COTS products that incorporate hardware-based random number generators were not identified.
III-10-78
DATA SHEET III-10.4. HIGH-SPEED ENCRYPTION (HSE)

USG HSE R&D is for data rates in the 1 to 10 Gbits/sec range and is addressing a variety of challenges (e.g., how an originator authenticates in nanoseconds). The current front-end HSE work is concentrating on developing ATM technologies for even higher rates. Old approaches to data security and integrity and authentication and access control are not fast enough to cope with the new high-speed, broadband networks. HSE should be application ready in 10 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. WANs often suffer from transitory disruption. This requires real-time data and key resynchronization. A key management infrastructure for key management must be put in place. Solutions and supporting standards for these high-speed network encryption problems and issues must be found soon. This is expected to become a dual-use technology because of the commercial requirement to increase the speed and security of communications. (Cylink already has 45 Mbit/sec ATM encryption technology on the market.) The financial service community and e-commerce interests are now demanding more bandwidth and more secure telecommunications for electronic funds transfer applications and various e-commerce applications. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE HSE is a technology that could minimize the performance impact of secure communication services in highspeed networks [OC-12 (622 Mbit/sec) and above]. HSE is important because high-speed, real-time, dynamically reconfigurable, reliable packet switched networks are the predominant near-term way of implementing wide band, WANs. C4IFTW systems will increasingly depend on the global, installed telecommunications base of backbone packet systems, which are rapidly replacing the legacy circuit systems (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Leading edge HSE technologies will improve the overall speed and security of Global Command and Control Systems (GCCS) and C4IFTW systems. However, although commercial products will have to comply with applicable national and international standards to be marketable, they may not fully comply with the government security requirements. Military HSE technology products may require further development and integration. The United States has access to this technology through the USG-sponsored Fastlane and Key-Agile programs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia India Japan South Africa Rep. United States
Legend:

Significant R&D
Germany Italy Russia UK
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
III-10-79
The centers of HSE development are commercial. Fastlane is a USG-sponsored (622 Mbit/sec) ATM link encryption technology program. Key-Agile is another USG-sponsored encryption program that is developing the technology for encrypting each 53-byte cell in an ATM stream with a different key. Cylink sells InfoGuard 100, a 45 Mbit/sec ATM encryptor; SECANT Network Technologies, Inc. has gained approval for exporting its 168-bit key DES CellCase ATM network security products; GTE, under contract with the USG for Fastlane, is considering a commercial ATM HSE version; and Microelectronics Center, under contract with the USG for Key-Agile (622 Mbit/sec), should be able to develop commercial HSE products. At least two U.S. firms are now marketing 45 Mbit/sec ATM encryption products. Interoperability, authentication, and access control features will require new protocols, which current high-speed, network-signaling protocols do not provide.
III-10-80
DATA SHEET III-10.4. IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY

The human eye can detect only about 6 bits of information per pixel. Many image files have 8 bits. The lower two bits can be encoded covertly. A picture file could carry a 5to 10-percent randomly embedded information set before it becomes statistically detectable. Binary executable files also can be encodedbut at a lower rate. In 5 to 10 years, even better image encryption and steganography techniques could be application ready. None identified. None identified. None identified. Image steganography can be used to conceal an encrypted message. The technique of combining image steganography and encryption or multiple encryption could present an almost insoluble problem to National Security and law enforcement agency cryptanalysts. Even if a message were known to exist in an electronic image, the message bits would have to be identified and isolated for cryptanalysis. This process could make plaintext recovery time consumingif not impossible. Some steganographic applications in the public domain could be made suitable for military use to supplement cryptography in their present COTS versions. In military applications, integration of the image steganographic functions and other functionality is required. Building on the current image steganography market, commercial uses for image steganography in the protection of intellectual property could be even wider. Copyrighted data could be watermarked with image steganography. Digital forms of works of art should be especially easy to watermark to provide proof of ownership or origin, as would any other electronic data image products sold in e-commerce over the Internet. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Steganography is that branch of cryptology that attempts to obscure the existence of data through the use of subliminal channels. Now, encrypted information can be randomly embedded in the quantization noise of image files and other data, without increasing the size of the host file. Image steganography may be available through the LANL researchers, who hold the patent on a new method of image steganography. Widely available steganographic programs can incorporate a 64-kilobyte message in a 1024 1024 grayscale picture without changing the graphical image noticeably. The new LANL approach embeds data in images without making the changes to the image detectable. This technique could be used to send sensitive information over open communications lines. For additional strength, the information can be encrypted before embedding. Image steganography could have many other applications (e.g., putting extra identifying features on documents, maps, and pictures). It could be used to protect military maps and other sensitive defense imagery by making it possible to detect spoofing attempts that might have been made during transmission. It could be used to guarantee the integrity of picture badges and identification cards. It would also be useful in maintaining the security of sensitive operations, covert operations, and special access programs. Electronic data steganographic techniques are reasonably well understood and in the public domain. Comparatively inexpensive steganographic applications run on desk-top computers. Many good commercial applications, including shareware, are available in the Internet. Various forms of steganography have important intellectual property protection potential.
III-10-81

Australia Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Belgium Switzerland

Significant R&D
Canada UK

Moderate R&D
South Africa Rep. United States

Limited R&D
The apparent USG center of image steganography R&D is LANL. There are developers like SynData Technologies, Inc. in the United States and Deus Ex Machina Communications in Germany that may be conducting proprietary image steganography R&D. Also, Colon Moroney, the U.S. author of Hide and Seek for Win95, is a candidate developer. A total of 31 programs have been written for 6 different operating systems available on the Internet for embedding messages in graphics. U.S. companies sell six of the seven Windows programs. One Windows program, Steganos for Win95, is produced in Frankfurt, Germany. Source code for 10 of these steganographic products is also available.
III-10-82
DATA SHEET III-10.4. KEY MANAGEMENT

The Infosecurity News Buyers Guide for 1998 lists more than 27 data encryption key management products. Early versions of this technology are here now. However, it may be 10 to 15 years before systems are trusted for critical National Security functions and the Services are manned, trained, and equipped with trusted systems that support key management. None identified. None identified. None identified. A major key management issue in the use of asymmetric-key systems is the establishment of the pairs of secure keys. Using either symmetric-key or asymmetric-key techniques, the key management problem becomes a crucial issue, especially if the network is large. Although the USG has access to this technology, considerable R&D work will be required over the next 10 years to develop and maintain the level of trust required for military applications and infrastructure assurance. Integration of commercial key management functions with the other functionality in military applications is required. The civilian sector is advancing the development and production of commercial key management systems. Commercial applications are used by the financial service industry and in e-commerce. Certification authorities (CA) are not yet widely available to support the integrity of commercial public keys. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Key management is the most significant item in the critical path for the development and use of large cryptographic systems. The design of key management protocols is usually the pacing item in system development. Key management must certify the validity of keys that are put in service and promptly revoke those that are no longer valid. Both NIST and ANSI have published key management standards; however, because the NIST and ANSI standards were not developed for C4IFTW systems, DoD is developing a program that includes key management experiments and demonstrations. In some C4IFTW systems, large networks exist in which many possible two-party communications could take place. The management of large numbers of keys introduces risks. A trusted third party (TTP) must certify the public key of each entity to bind the identity of an entity to its public key. If the TTP is compromised, all communications are insecure until new secure keys are established. Cryptography should be an integral part of all information systems, which is essentially transparent to end-users in the next 20 years. Trusted key management systems and protocols and trusted public key infrastructures and protocols are prerequisites. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Argentina Canada UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Australia South Africa Rep. United States
Austria Sweden

Moderate R&D
Belgium Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
III-10-83
The USG is leading an effort to establish an FPKI. NIST has an FPKI Working Group that includes many members from the financial banking services and industries that produce key management products or offer Certification Authority services. The USG is also receiving key management support from industry. The Navy is developing a program to distribute and manage cryptographic keys for all the military Services and some USG civilian services. SAIC has a 3-year Navy contract to distribute and manage cryptographic keys for all of the military Services and some USG civilian agencies. Industry and standards organizations are leading the development of public key infrastructures for e-commerce. The top five key management companies are Certco, IBM, Cyber Trust [GTE], and VeriSign in the United States and Entrust in Canada. Other prominent U.S. key management system developers, producers, and service providers are AT&T, Atalla, Cylink, Lockheed Martin, Prime Factors, RSA Data Security, Inc. [Security Dynamics], SAIC, and ViaCrypt [Network Associates]. Many others provide key management products and services. There are also companies developing these products and services in Europe and Asia.
III-10-84
DATA SHEET III-10.4. KEY RECOVERY SYSTEM (KRS) FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSES
Key escrow and recovery archiving systems are developing tocols for these systems do not have the proven integrity, the traditional protocols that involve only the sender and the security of cryptographic keys. It may take 10 years before these new protocols are accepted. None identified. None identified. None identified.
rapidly. However, the propredictability, and trust of recipient to guarantee the the technical strengths of
The commercial key recovery technology is maturing rapidly. A general key escrow system is equivalent to (can be reduced to) a chosen-ciphertext-secure system, and an escrow system (with certain accountability features) is equivalent to a non-malleable cryptosystem. Much is known about chosen-ciphertext-secure and non-malleable cryptographic systems. Integration of the commercial key recovery functions with the other functionality in military some applications is required. Patents encumber these technologies. Basic research in protocols is required for early discovery of any flaws that might be inherent in these systems. The commercial business requirement is for access to, or recovery of, stored encrypted datanot data in transit. There is no commercial business requirement for USG key escrow. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Key recovery is one aspect of the key management problem that stands out in importance. It is a broad term that applies to many different techniques that provide users with the ability to recover plain text from encrypted text, files, and data. The whole area of key management must be investigated more intensively. In key escrow and recovery archiving systems, the risks associated with introducing a third party (escrow agent) into what has traditionally been a two-party (sender and recipient) model have not been established. There is almost no theoretical background on the effect of an escrow agent protocol on cryptographic system security, and there has been little practical experience with these systems on a large scale or with interoperation among systems built by different vendors. Any flaws that may exist in these third-party systems might be discovered early and inexpensively with more third-party protocol applied research emphasis now. An improved theoretical underpinning for escrow/recovery agent archiving systems might help to silence some of the opponents of the USG key escrow policy. KRSs are an important factor in military continuity of operations planning. In anticipation of the use of public key systems for key management in some military systems, key recovery systems and protocols will be required to provide emergency access to encrypted data. The European Community has formally rejected the U.S.-sponsored key escrow requirements.
III-10-85

Australia UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada United States
Sweden
Moderate R&D
Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
There are shared Centers of Excellence in government and the private sector for key escrow/recovery technology development. Trusted Information Systems (TIS) and IBM are probably the leading key recovery pioneers and may be the current leading producers of key recovery systems. However, the Key Recovery Alliance now has 71 international members. The long-term objective of the Key Recovery Alliance is the global deployment of interoperable, customer-driven key recovery. Other developers are certain to challenge this leadership. There are already 33 products offering different key recovery schemes, with characteristics yielding different operational and security capabilities.
III-10-86
DATA SHEET III-10.4. MASSIVELY CONCURRENT PROCESSING

A Whitney MCP/total object processing system (TOPS) machine could have an effective sustainable high-speed performance of > 125 Teraops (125 trillion operations per second) on all jobs, at very low life-cycle cost. The principal advantage of the Whitney machine is TOPS. With TOPS, all data, information and procedure specifications (programs) are, and must be, true objects capable of independent identification, specification, and accountability. An assembly line processor system (ALPS) is an assembly line, high-speed processing approach to the production of information products. This machine could be application ready in 15 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. The MCP/TOPS Whitney computer will have a new all-hardware operating system that will be incompatible with the installed base of legacy software operating systems. When the Whitney gets beyond the concept definition phase, the biggest issue will be the cost for the replacement of the installed base of legacy operating systems. Also, applications for the Whitney computer will have to be written, rewritten, or transliterated into versions that will run on the new TOPS operating system. No specific commercial applications for MCP/TOPS Whitney computers have been developed because the computer is still in the concept development phase. However, the Whitney will compete for the same commercial customers who now use large mainframe computers and super computers. Their speed and optical bandwidth capability will make them ideal gateways for Internet service providers and data warehouse nodes. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE This is a new information processing concept advocating a completely new computer architecture standard that could eventually replace the current von Newmann computer architecture with an all-hardware TOPS. The Whitney could be the eventual successor to the 100-Teraflop computer. The Whitney does not use a computer software operating system. With the ALPS for Information (ALPS/I), all functions, usually provided by an operating system, are provided by hardware or hardware logic controlled by a read-only memory provided by the manufacturer. All information entered into the system must be in the form of true objects. (An object is defined as a thing that can be identified and described independent of its environment and present or past use.) The APLS could provide a highly secure, high-speed processing system ideally suited to military information processing requirements (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). MCP/TOPS computers could be used for computation-intensive applications. With appropriate programming, MCP/TOPS computers could significantly shorten the time required for exhaustive key searches and the time required for computation-intensive operations, such as primality testing, key generation, and statistical tests to assess the strength of cryptographic algorithms. The MCP/TOPS will be a true dual-use item. The same basic processor should meet civilian commercial and military requirements. Fifteen years of development will probably be required for either commercial or military use. Additional development time will be required to develop the applications that will run on the Whitney. The United States has the only access to this technology at this time. The three joint patent holders are U.S. citizens, and the United States is the unilateral leader in this technology. Since the Whitney could significantly enhance U.S. competitiveness, this technology
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should not be transferred to foreign business interests. A Whitney MCP/TOPS principal is Dr. Edward Davis of North Carolina State University, Computer Science, 226 Withers Hall, Raleigh, NC 27695. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The center of development for the MCP/TOPS Whitney computer is commercial at this time. The MCP/TOPS computer is still in the concept development phase and is not yet in production. The Whitney Computing Company of 54 Holly Lane, Darien, CT 06820 holds the MCP/TOPS patent and will be the developer and initial producer. No foreign competitor to the Whitney computer concept has been identified.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. MESSAGE INTEGRITY AND NON-REPUDIATION AUTHENTICATION

Protocols exist for message authentication, with message authentication code (MAC) and digital signature schemes to prove integrity and non-repudiation; however, these protocols have not been proven to the satisfaction of interested parties. To prove the security of message authentication and non-repudiation protocols, 5 or 10 more years of R&D may be required. None identified. None identified.
None identified. The equivalence of digital signatures with written signatures is still in question. Most authorities believe that the electronic equivalent should be recognized as having the same legal status as a written signature. However, digital signatures have not yet been directly challenged in court. Since no large body of case law exists, some authorities still question their legal status. Key management security questions must still be answered. Investigations of the security of existing digital signature schemes should be continued.. The major commercial applications will be those developed for e-commerce. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Message integrity and non-repudiation authentication convince a receiver of the identity of the message sender and message integrity. Non-repudiation provides the data sender proof of delivery and the data recipient assurance of the senders identity, so that neither can later deny having processed the data. More research is needed in the INFOSEC areas of Message integrity and non-repudiation authentication. For example, scientific investigations should be made into the various impersonation attack and substitution attack methods against algorithms used in current and future authentication schemes. Methods should be developed for computing deception probabilities with which to specify the strength of authentication codes and their protocols. Message integrity and non-repudiation authentication are important to the full cycle of military command and control from orders to situation reports (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Classified military information is protected by Type I USG cryptographic systems, which should provide message integrity and non-repudiation authentication. However, some sensitive, but unclassified, defense information and other USG information will require a guarantee of message integrity or non-repudiation authentication protection. There is a requirement to integrate the commercial digital signature cryptographic functions with the other functionality in tailored military applications. COTS applications that DoD is likely to use to protect sensitive unclassified traffic have digital signature systems that could be easily integrated. There is a digital signature standard (FIPS Pub 186) for sensitive but unclassified USG text, files, and data.
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Argentina Canada Finland Hong Kong United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Australia China France India

Significant R&D
Austria Czech Republic Germany Iran
Belgium Denmark Greece Ireland
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The commercial sector and governments are driving the development of trusted message integrity and nonrepudiation authentication systems for commercial and government applications. The United States is probably the leading producer of digital signature products. Many companies that have been listed as suppliers of products for data protection also produce products that perform message integrity and non-repudiation authentication functions. Examples are: Canada: Entrust United States: AT&T, Atalla, CKS, Cybersafe, Cygnus Solutions, Cylink, Enigma Logic, Spyrus, IBM, Lockheed Martin, Motorola, Netscape, Semantec, RSA [Security Dynamics], TIS [Network Associates], and Wang Government Services.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. PROGRAMMABLE, EMBEDDABLE COMSEC TECHNOLOGY

This technology provides INFOSEC functionality to a system on a modular basis. Support will be given to multiple algorithms simultaneously. This technology, because of its modularity, will reduce costs associated with accreditation. It could be application ready in 5 to 10 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. This technology is not yet accredited and has not undergone an extensive field operational testing period. The associated operational and maintenance protocols must be developed and tested. Commercial applications were not identified; however, the programmable, embeddable COMSEC concept might make cryptography more affordable in commercial applications. Life-cycle costs could be reduced for some operating systems and applications if the programmable, embeddable cryptographic functionality could be ported from version to version. There could be significant savings in life-cycle costs. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Programmable, embeddable COMSEC technology allows the implementation of multiple, cryptographic services and algorithms simultaneously. It is an interoperability technique that places all critical security functions within a COMSEC module. This modular approach ensures that the approved security level will be maintained when host systems are modified or changed. As a result, hardware upgrades based on this technology are easier to implement, host interfaces can be changed and upgraded without impacting the INFOSEC requirements, and recertification efforts will be reduced significantly. This technology will make INFOSEC functionality more affordable for military forces and civilian organizations by reducing the cost of changing hosts and extending the useful life of the INFOSEC modules (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). It could be used in C4IFTW systems and subsystems that incorporate cryptographic functionality. It has not yet been proven to be suitable for commercially viable products, and COTS products offering this technology may not be immediately available. Commercial programmable, embeddable COMSEC technology products have not been identified. An example of this technology is the Programmable Embeddable INFOSEC Product (PEIP) being developed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). PEIP emulates multiple cryptographic devices using cryptographic channels. Once configured, PEIP can encrypt, decrypt, and generate keystreams without intervention. Other embeddable COMSEC efforts are the Advanced INFOSEC Module and the Cornfield Embeddable COMSEC program. No other development efforts were identified. For the foreseeable future, access to the programmable, embeddable COMSEC technology will have to be through the NRL contractors and subcontractors.
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Legend:

Significant R&D
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The NRL is the present government center of development. Motorola, Raytheon, Group Technologies, and Tracor are commercial centers of development. Since the programmable, embeddable COMSEC technology is in the prototype phase of development, there are no major producers at this time; however, there may be potential producers among the NRL contractors and subcontractors. Motorola is currently working on the Advanced INFOSEC Module and Raytheon Corporation is working on the Cornfield Embeddable COMSEC program.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION

There are several well-known pseudo-random bit generators (PRBGs) in use that are relatively fast and secure, such as those based on RSA and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) encryption functions. PRBGs that are based on the fundamental problem of factoring and the discrete logarithm problem may be proven to be secure, given some plausible computational assumptions. However, 10 or more years may be required before more efficient, provably secure, random number generators can be developed and proven to produce true random bit strings. None identified. None identified. None identified. A fundamental rule for generating keys requires that every bit of the active key be generated or selected at random such that every possible combination of bits in a key has an equal probability of being selected. A cryptographically secure random number generator must not only generate statistically random sequences, but it must be computationally infeasible to predict what the next random bit will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or hardware generating the sequence and all of the previous bits in the stream. Pseudo-random bit generation is one of the fertile areas of cryptology research. Improved random number generators will increase the security of commercial cryptographic systems used by the financial services industry and for e-commercial and individual privacy. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Deterministic (von Neumann) digital computers generate pseudo-random numbers that form a predictable, repeating sequence. The period of the repeating sequence can be so long that such pseudo-random numbers can be considered random for all practical purposes, except cryptography. Pseudo-random number generation is a critical key generation function in most cryptographic applications. Secure keys for cryptographic systems must be generated efficiently with software in many systems. These keys must be unknown to an adversary, and software random number generators are the best-known method for producing such keys. High-security military plans and operations must be protected by secure cryptography. Perfect randomness, the equivalent of the old signal one-time pads, is required for strong cryptographic systems (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Many forms of cryptography used in C4IFTW ISs depend on random numbers employed to encrypt and decrypt voice and message traffic. Cryptography is extremely sensitive to the properties of random-number generators. Most state-of-the-art commercial cryptography and cryptographic tool kits have PRBGs included for key generation that will produce a sequence without any readily discernible pattern. However, FIPS Pub 140-1 specifies statistical random number generator tests for cryptographic modules that have to be incorporated in all common criteria security levels. Many pseudo-random bit generation methods are in the public domain, and pseudo-random bit generation technology is generally well understood. A completely different approach to the generation of random numbers is covered in the hardware random number generator technology.
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Australia Denmark India Japan South Africa Rep. United States
Legend:
Austria Finland Ireland Netherlands Sweden

Significant R&D
Belgium France Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Canada Germany Italy Russia UK
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Both government and industry conduct secret and proprietary random number generation R&D and maintain centers of development for this technology. U.S. manufacturers who comply with ANSI X9 (Financial Services) incorporate random number generators in their cryptographic modules. Underdeveloped producers also offer products that have PRBGs.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. QUANTUM COMPUTERS

Scientists have shown that there is a possibility that quantum parallelism can be exploited to perform in a few seconds certain calculations that would take billions of years on the most powerful classical computers. NIST Researchers in Boulder, Colorado, have already built and tested a simplified version; however, it may be over 20 years before quantum computers are application ready. None identified. None identified. None identified. If there is less than perfect isolation, decoherence error could become an overwhelming problem affecting the accuracy of quantum computers. Decoherence is caused by continuous interaction between the system (in this case, the quantum computer) and the environment. Ultimately, the survival of the promise of general-purpose quantum computing lies in the success of quantum error correction. Specific product development programs may be proprietary. The quantum computer could be regarded as a hybrid R&D challenge because both hardware and significant software work will be required. There are no published reports of major civilian applications for quantum computers other than basic quantum research; however, there is wide international R&D interest, which suggests that there may be several potentially valuable commercial applications that are still proprietary, or in the case of governments, classified. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Scientists believe that ions trapped in an electric field and cooled to fractions of a degree above absolute zero could be coupled to produce quantum logic gates in a quantum computer. Quantum computers could make military and civilian public key cryptography obsolete. A cryptographic quantum algorithm has been found for quickly factoring numbers so huge that they might take a time period the equivalent of the age of the universe (~ 12 billion years) to factor using current von Newmann processors and current state-of-the-art factoring algorithms. If quantum computers become widely available, public key cryptographic schemes based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers will be vulnerable. Cryptanalysis is an important potential military application for quantum computers. The quantum computer could also be a valuable tool for basic and applied mathematics research and research in other complex fields (e.g., weather modeling and forecasting) that could be of military value and importance. Quantum computers are not yet at the commercial technology stage, and years of development may be required before they are ready for military use. There is adequate access to this science and technology through the network of interested international scientists and multinational corporations performing quantum computer research. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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The United States has the unilateral lead in quantum computer technology. There is considerable commercial and academic interest in quantum computers; however, there are no producers or developers at this time. This technology is still in the research stage. NIST is the center of USG R&D. IBM and AT&T are probably the leading commercial centers of research. Active scientists include Don Simon of Microsoft Corporation in Redmond, Washington; Ignacio Cirac of the University of Castilla-La Mancha in Spain; Peter Zoller of the University of Innsbruck in Austria; Richard Hughes of LANL; David DIVincenzo and Charles Bennett of IBMs Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York; and P.W. Shore, AT&T Bell Laboratories of Murray Hill, New Jersey.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. QUANTUM ENCRYPTION

Laboratory researchers are experimenting with quantum encryption, which theoretically could provide an unbreakable system for protecting messages sent over fiber-optic cables. In the next 15 years, discoveries that could produce transmission capabilities over long distances and improved quantum encryption techniques may be possible. This technology could be application ready in 20 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. The present limitation is range since any amplification technology (even laser-pumped, erbium-doped fiber) changes the photons quantum characteristics. Quantumencrypted signals have been successfully transmitted over ordinary optical fiber only 48 km (~ 30 miles). No immediate commercial applications for quantum encryption were identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Quantum encryption takes advantage of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which holds that the accurate measurement of an observable quantity necessarily produces uncertainties in the knowledge of the values of other observables. If encrypted information were inserted into the quantum properties of individual photons in an optical path, cryptanalysts would be unable to attack the messages without altering them. They could determine a photons location, or they could determine its energy; however, they could not determine both properties without destroying the message, because if they stop the photon along its optical path, they alter its quantum characteristics. Extensive development of this technology will be required before it will be ready for military use. Under laboratory conditions, this technique inserts information into the quantum properties of individual photons. Each photon carries a single bit of data. By placing the encrypted information in the quantum states of photons, scientists have been able to provide interception-proof encryption in the laboratory. At present, this is a laboratory artifact and has not progressed to the point at which it could be commercialized. No reports of quantum encryption technology work outside the United States have been identified. The only experiments being carried out are at LANL. This technology could be used to transmit ultra-sensitive military information and objects, such as secret encryption algorithms or master keys (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). It could also be used to send sensitive messages, secret encryption algorithms, or master keys between C4IFTW nodes. Even with the present range limitation, quantum encryption could be used between command centers clustered relatively close together (e.g., in the Washington Metropolitan Area and on Oahu, Hawaii). If some discovery eliminates the present range limitation, this technology could be used between all C4IFTW nodes served with fiber-optic connectivity. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Argentina
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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The only identified center of quantum encryption development is the LANL. No commercial developers or producers of quantum encryption systems were identified. The only R&D work, outside academia, is either classified or proprietary experimental laboratory work, and reports have not been located in open source material.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES

Secret sharing schemes are at the heart of some key recovery systems in which several participants in the access structure may hold portions of the key. The key must be shared in such a way that only authorized subsets can determine the key. A simple example of a military secret sharing scheme is the one used for the two-man control of nuclear weapons. The execution order verification code is divided between two crew members so that both crew members must contribute their part of the code to verify that an order is valid and authentic. Various forms of this technology are application ready now; however, mathematically provable schemes may be 5 to 10 years away. None identified. None identified. None identified. The proactive signature schemes ensure that the private key is never assembled in one place where it could be compromised and are more sophisticated versions of secret sharing. (The proactive signature techniques are important in Root or Bridge Certification Authority applications.) There may be intellectual property issues. Secret sharing schemes are used by the financial services industry to protect master keys. CA use secret sharing schemes to protect the root private key. Many commercial enterprises use secret sharing schemes for key recovery in case emergency access is required. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Cryptographic secret sharing schemes are various methods of sharing a key among a limited set of participants. The USG key escrow scheme (FIPS Pub 185) is a form of secret sharing in which the law enforcement access field (LEAF) portion of a cryptographic key is divided between two agencies and then re-divided within each agency, in effect providing four-person control. Most commercial key recovery schemes also use some form of secret sharing. Improved secret sharing schemes are needed to increase the robustness, reliability, and availability of key management in C4IFTW systems. Secret sharing schemes would be useful for split control keys for functions such as nuclear multi-party control and for key availability. As an example, the key could be split into 10 pieces, any 7 of which could be used to reconstitute the key (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Secret sharing schemes could serve as an authentication scheme for orders and reports in sensitive operations. These schemes have applications in C4IFTW systems to provide secure methods for the channels of communications from the NCA to the weapon system commanders. Primitive forms are in use now for authenticating nuclear control orders in the C2 systems for nuclear weapons. Although some secret sharing schemes in the public domain are fairly mature, others will require further development. Integration of the commercial secret sharing features and protocols with other functionality in military applications is required.
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Australia Israel Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Netherlands UK

Significant R&D
Germany Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The USG developed the basic secret sharing scheme for nuclear control orders. Commercial interests have large secret sharing R&D efforts. Commercial interests want schemes that can be used in commercial key recovery systems and key management infrastructures. A provision for secret sharing to protect master and private keys is incorporated in the key management systems developed and produced by AT&T, Atalla, CertCo, Cylink, IBM, Lockheed Martin, Prime Factors, and RSA Data Security, Inc. [Security Dynamics] in the United States and Entrust in Canada. This is not a complete list of producers. This list was arbitrarily compiled from a 1998 list of key management system developers.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. STREAM CIPHERS

There is a large body of theoretical knowledge on stream ciphers. Various design principles for stream ciphers have been proposed and extensively analyzed and could be significantly advanced and be application ready in 10 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. There are many published stream ciphers. Most have been developed for simplicity and ease of implementation. A stream cipher applies simple encryption transformations, according to the keystream being used. There are still discoveries to be made in the generation of optimum keystream ciphers, and research is needed to develop optimum encryption transformations for the type of keystream being used. Developmental integration effort will be required in this technology for use with or in weapons systems. Most stream ciphers that are incorporated in cryptologic applications are either proprietary or highly classified. Governments universally classify the cryptologic applications developed for military and government use in protecting classified information. Some of the COTS applications that could be put to military use may contain stream ciphers. The same characteristics that make stream ciphers of value in secure military systems make them of value in protecting civilian network traffic. Eventually, all network traffic will be protected by link encryption, end-to-end cryptography, or both. Business, industry, and personal network applications will also be required to perform in situations where transmission errors are probable. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Stream ciphers operate on the plaintext a single character at a time. The security of the system depends solely on the keystream generator, which outputs a stream of bits that are combined with plaintext bits to produce a stream of ciphertext bits. The keystream changes with every character. Stream ciphers are generally faster than block ciphers and are easier to implement in hardware. They may be more affordable for certain telecommunications applications in which buffering is limited or characters must be individually processed as they are received. Error propagation, which depends (among other things) on the length of the internal registers used in the keystream generator, can be limited. Stream ciphers are also advantageous in situations where transmission errors are highly probable. There is a comparatively small body of open source stream cipher literature. In combat situations where transmission errors are probable, stream ciphers will introduce little error propagation. Stream ciphers are a form of cryptography that is well suited to the protection of military RF links with small, lightweight C4IFTW portable field equipment. They are also used for applications in which the data must be processed one symbol at a time and in equipment that has no memory or in which data buffering is limited.
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Argentina Canada Denmark India Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Australia China Finland Iran Switzerland

Significant R&D
Austria Costa Rica France South Africa Rep. UK
Belgium Czech Republic Germany South Korea United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Governments may be the center of stream cipher development. Since any government-sponsored stream cipher R&D in progress would be classified, the status of such programs cannot be independently assessed. Similarly, commercial developments are proprietary. Therefore, the center of stream cipher development has not been identified. Informal information indicates that the following are U.S. stream cipher developers and producers: RSA Data Security, Inc. [Security Dynamics], IBM, Cylink, and Motorola. There may be companies developing products in Europe and Asia that have not announced or prominently advertised their stream cipher products.
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DATA SHEET III-10.4. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS (ZNPs)

A variety of ZNP protocols specifically designed to achieve identification could be application ready and have practical use in 10 to 15 years. There is a continuing C4IFTW requirement for authentication and verification of execution orders and situation reports, certain categories of which might benefit from the incorporation of ZNP schemes. None identified. None identified. None identified. ZNP protocols are difficult to implement and can be computationally intensive and time consuming. ZNP systems are available in the United States but may be encumbered by intellectual property rights. Although there has been extensive basic and applied scientific research has been coordinated on minimum-disclosure and various types of ZNP, this is still an open field of research. The ZNP characteristic of anonymity is an important part of some concepts for e-commerce transactions. Proof of certain generic authority or credit credentials might be provided for e-commerce by using ZNP systems. Not an issue.
RATIONALE ZNPs are methods for proving knowledge of a secret without revealing any knowledge of the secret (e.g., proving knowledge of a key without revealing anything about the key). ZNP protocols provide trusted authentication mechanisms and anonymity. For example, one could prove U.S. citizenship or majority without providing any other specific information such as name, address, or exact age. There may be unique defense requirements for ZNP systems. Some form of ZNP might be adapted for use in IFF systems, which could be used to reduce the incidence of inadvertent engagements in combat (see Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Armys FM 100-6, Information Operations, and the U.S. Air Forces New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century). Efficient ZNPs must be tailored to and integrated into each application. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Significant R&D
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
There are commercial ZNP R&D efforts to produce schemes that are suitable for use in various forms of e-commerce. In the United States, this is an area of intensive research by DigiCash and CertCo, but no commercial products were identified.
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SECTION 10.5INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Highlights Information Management and Control (IM&C) FA capabilities are fundamental to normal day-to-day and stressed-mode complex system operations. As ISs grow and add more components, more functions, and more users, IS IM&C becomes more difficult and complexyet increasingly important. Adequate IM&C capabilities are necessary to convert civil telecommunications or other complex IS systems to military use.
OVERVIEW The IM&C FA is defined as capabilities to plan, organize, design, optimize, engineer, implement, operate, monitor, provision, maintain, synchronize, supervise, manage, control, and administer entities, systems, elements, processes, organizations, and events. Demonstrating the breadth of IM&C functionality, each capability item implies additional or subsidiary capabilities. For example, in telecommunications systems, the ability to monitor normally implies comprehensive performance assessment facilities to detect, isolate, report, and record network faults; to measure offered and refused (busy condition) traffic; and to measure call completion items, call duration, and numerous other parameters critical to efficient operations. IM&C refers to both the capability to manage and control information, IO, and ISs and the ISs configured to provide capability to manage and control entities, systems, devices, processes, organization, and events whose primary purpose and application are other than IOs or ISs. Historically, most advanced IM&C technology and standard developments have been related to ISs, in general, and telecommunication systems, in particular. Fortunately, because the variety of telecommunications services, operations, configurations, and devices is so great, the bulk of such work produces generalized paradigms, architectures, communications protocols, and managed-object naming and attribute description conventions that can be applied to almost any IM&C requirement. The strategy and rationale underlying modern IM&C design is best described by the conditions and impetus that led to the development of todays advanced technologies. Until the mid-to-late 1970s, telecommunications networks supported limited sets of services derived from a relatively small set of basic technologies and used equipment from only a few vendors. As we begin a new century, divestiture, deregulation, privatization (overseas), and rapid technological expansion have resulted in significant growth in the number of private and public telecommunications networks. These networks support a myriad of services derived from wide varieties of network elements and use equipment supplied by hundreds of manufacturers. To cope with the added functional complexity, while reducing manpower requirements, network operators are placing more processors in voice communications networks (VCNs). Analogously, the trend away from centralized mainframe designs and the immense popularity and exponential growth of the Internet have spawned a large number of data communications networks (DCNs), which are now needed to connect distributed processors in client/server configurations. Networks are now more complex and software driven than ever. Not surprisingly, as networks proliferate and add more components, more functions, more users, and more automation, network management (NM) becomes more difficult and complex and increasingly more important. For example, in the United States, divestiture has meant that many end-to-end connections require services and/or facilities from two local exchange carriers (LECs), one or more interexchange carriers (IXCs) or backbone networks, and often two LANs comprising CPE from a variety of manufacturers. End-to-end service management, therefore, requires not only the IM&C of each separately owned LEC/IXC/CPE domain, but an integrated management and
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control capability spanning all domains connected to and interoperable with each managing entity. In overseas markets, similar situations exist among interconnected pan-European national networks and in countries where privatization has spawned a variety of alternative service providers. The fast-growing cellular telephone industry, particularly for roaming applications where one carriers subscribers must be recognized and served by other carriers networks, adds new dimensions to telecommunications management. The emerging mobile communications industry has also highlighted the urgent need to couple or integrate technical and business IM&C. In early cellular systems, customer service representatives, with access only to account information, had no way of confirming or dealing with customer-reported dropped-calls or other outages. Modern designs anticipate customer-service-representative needs for highly integrated, user-friendly, graphical user interface (GUI)-based access to business accounting, marketing, and technical IM&C data and processing capabilities. As competition and technology reduce basic telecommunications services to commodity status, true market discriminators among alternative carrier and service provider offerings must be derived from what can best be described as telecommunications business management. From a technical and implementation viewpoint, this multi-functional, multi-network, multi-domain, heterogeneous vendor equipment environment poses enormous end-to-end IM&C challenges and creates a large demand for advanced, standards-based NM technologies. To meet this demand, competing companies quickly introduced numerous proprietary, vendor-specific NM products to the market. At one point, a large computer company assigned 1,000 people to NM. In another large company, NM was the third largest development project in its history. Over 120 vendors offering NM products are now enrolled in anothers partnership programillustrating the high level of industry interest. In the mid 1980s, the worldwide standards-setting organizations recognized NMs essential role in complex networks and the lack of compatibility among early NM products, and they embarked on the development of architectures and frameworks for interoperable telecommunications NM systems. In the VCN arena, the European Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CETP), and the European Institute for Research and Strategic Studies in Telecommunications (EURESCOM) produced architectures and strategic plans incorporating standards-based, pan-European integrated NM systems. In particular, the ITU Telecommunications Sector Study Group IV and the ETSI NA4 Technical Subcommittee are completing a set of standards (the M.3010 recommendations) entitled Principles for a Telecommunications Management Network (TMN). In the DCN arena, the three principal standards activities are as follows: 1. The International Standards Organization (ISO) has been working on several Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) NM standards. OSI standards include the Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP), the Common Management Information Service Element (CMISE), and several subsidiary standards. The Internet Activities Board (IAB) has spearheaded the development of two NM standards: the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) (versions v.1 and v.2) and the Common Management Information Services Over TCP/IP (CMOT). The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) has assumed the lead role in defining management standards for LANs and metropolitan area networks (MANs). IEEE has also produced a draft standard entitled LAN/MAN Management. When CMIP is used in conjunction with IEEE standards, such use is often referred to as CMIP Over LLC (CMOL).14
2.
3.
Important aspects of these standards and the impact on NM and control technologies are summarized below. Perhaps more than in any other IS FA, IM&C technology value and criticality are determined by the degree to which open-system operations are available and supportable by practical and affordable products. For this reason, as a basis and rationale for including specific IM&C technologies, the remainder of this Overview focuses on emerging, standards-based, interoperable IM&C architectures, functional designs, protocols, device naming, and attribute specification conventions.
14
LLC stands for Logical Link Control.
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The ISOs Management Framework Standards, ITU-TS X.700, recommendations and the Internet Activities Boards requests for comments (RFCs) characterize management systems as consisting of the following components: A Structure of Management Information (SMI) A Management Information Base (MIB) A management protocol such as CMIP or SNMP.15
ISO/Internet management frameworks are based on the Agent Process/Manager Process paradigm, depicted conceptually in Figure 10.5-1. A management process is defined as an application process responsible for management activities. Resources supervised and controlled by NM are called managed objects. An agent process performs management functions on managed objects. Agents often reside in managed objects, reporting the object status to a manager and responding to manager queries and other controlling commands.
Operators Position(s) User Terminal(s) TMN Interface To Other Management Systems/Domains
TMN Managing Entity Interface
User Interface
Operator Interface
TMN Interface To Managed Physical or Logical Entities (Objects) or Processes
MANAGING PROCESS
Get Set Create Delete Event-Report Action
MANAGED (or AGENT) PROCESS
MANAGED OBJECT attribute 1 attribute 2
attribute n MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL (e.g., CMIP or SNMP)
Managing Process/ Operations System
Telecommunications Management Network
Managed Process/ Managed Objects
Figure 10.5-1. Agent Process/Manager Process Paradigm
Managers possess initial and updated global information on whatever physical or logical entity (object) the management system is designed to administer. These entities might be business applications, telecommunications services, physical networks, network elements, or network protocol layers. Managersimplemented in single consoles or within ensembles of distributed consolesinclude GUIs, databases, and facilities to communicate with the objects they manage. The consoles enable human managers to access and invoke a variety of software management applications (configuration control, performance monitoring, fault isolation, diagnostics, and so forth). GUIs display
15
Protocols are strict procedures (implemented in transmitting and receiving devices) for the initiation, maintenance, and termination of data communications. Protocols define the syntax (arrangements, formats, and patterns of bits and bytes) and the semantics (system control, information context or meaning of patterns of bits or bytes) of exchanged data and numerous other characteristics (e.g., data rates, timing, and so forth).
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inter-alia topologies of managed objects. Typically, operators can retrieve related status and MIB information stored in database repositories by simply clicking on objects depicted on a GUI display. MIBs define information about managed objects. Within MIBs, managed objects are described in terms of object attributes and characteristics, operations performed by or on object, notifications or reports objects can make, and an objects behavior or response to operations performed on it. The SMI identifies information structures describing managed object attributes, operations associated with attributes (e.g., get, set, add, remove), and operations relating to the managed objects themselves (e.g., read, delete, action). With hundreds of network-managed product vendors and even larger numbers of managed network elements, the absence of object naming, attribute, and communications protocols standards would render open system IM&C impossible. In Figure 10.5-1, the telecommunications management network (TMN) provides communications among managing and managed entities, is always logically distinct from managed networks, and, where possible, is implemented on separate, highly redundant and reliable facilities. In addition to the managing and managed entity interfaces, the TMN also provides interfaces to workstation functions (i.e., both operator and user of customer terminals) and an interface to TMNs in other management domains. Just as fourth-generation languages are shifting significant software development capabilities directly to end users, remotely programmable managed objects and advanced IM&C technology are shifting the ability to design and build software-defined complex systems and networks directly into the hand of network managers. For example, virtual private networks (VPNs) or SDNs provide services that are virtually indistinguishable from yesterdays custom-designed private networks but are carried on public networks at rates significantly lower than dedicated facilities-based service costs. Moreover, most features and network design and configuration options can be selected from operator management consoles, with some control available directly from customer terminals. Thus, the role of network managers now includes negotiations of service-level agreements with users and the network design tasks necessary to fulfill those agreementstasks previously allocated to third-party network designers. This new role and the increased burden of performance management, fault isolation, current configuration, and trouble-history tracking in todays more complex and software-driven networks place a premium on a more capable, credible, and usually larger NM staffs. Offsetting this demand for human resources are intelligent alarm correlation; applications of rules and case-based reasoning for performance monitoring; fault isolation and trouble-ticket generation; use of time- and object-oriented software and databases; and natural language processing. These technologies are now being embedded in advanced IM&C designs. Of particular importance are the modular and scalable expert system approaches that accommodate a range of capabilities and the exponential growth of data, cellular, personal communications, and other popular services. Figure 10.5-2 summarizes IM&C capabilities (i.e., the cardinal IM&C functions, IM&C domain categories, and categories of managed and controlled entities, objects, and events) described in the preceding discussion. Considering the breadth of possible applications, it is not surprising that users, product vendors, and standards-setting groups classify and organize IM&C functions differently. The functional decomposition depicted in the figure uses five canonical or largely non-overlapping subareas, under which functions specified in ISO/OSI, Internet, IEEE, and other standards-setting organizationsas well as functions defined in proprietary vendor productscan be accommodated. Of course, the managed and controlled entities/events items listed represent only examples of a very large set of possibilities. RATIONALE Without effective NM and control, complex voice, data, video, or integrated telecommunications, networks are simply not possible. In the past, truly effective communications NM was primarily the domain of the old Bell System and the PTTs. More recently, new carriers and most private network operatorsleft with inadequate NM by divestiture and privatizationhave discovered its central importance. From a business perspective (or from a government, military, or private network operational cost perspective), many operators have concluded that network administration and billing (or cost allocation) systems are as critical as
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Information Management and Control Functions
Resource
Operations
Planning, Development, Change Systems Engineering and Integration Manufacturing Test/Evaluation Maintenance Technology Insertion
Performance
Support
Cash/Capital Assets Inventory Software Intellectual Property Personnel
Enterprise Business Government Military Technical
Financial Technical
Training Education Exercise Security
Information Management and Control Domains*
Location/ Geographic Extent
Ownership
Hierarchy
Element/ Object
System**
Service/ Process
Organization Activity
Managed and Controlled Entities/ Events
Switches, Multiplexers, Servers,Transceivers, Modems, Transmission Media Mainframes, PCs, Workstations Input/Output Devices/Transducers/ Sensors, Human Interfaces Memory Devices, Integrated Circuits, Facilities Computer Program Components, Communications Protocols Databases, Information
Desktop/Standalone Complex, Distributed/ Networked FixedTransportable/ Mobile
Voice, Data, Video Transmission, Switching Processing, Directory Security Manufacturing, Assembling, Testing, Feedback, Robotic
Level Headquarters Division/Subsidiary Departmental/Individual Category Civil/Military/Commercial
Notes: * Domain Categories Location/Geographic Extent Ownership Hierarchy User/Customer/Client-Owned Administrative Personal/Office Service-Provider-Owned Building/Campus Headquarters Private Enterprise Local/Metropolitan Division/Subsidiary Government Administration Wide-Area/National/Global Department/Individual Military Technical System/Network Segment Component ** System Categories Systems may be Dedicated or Common-user. Dedicated or Private Systems/Networks may be facilities based or software defined (virtual).
Figure 10.5-2. IM&C Capabilities
switching and transmission. For example, the underlying cost for a hypothetical fiber-optic, full-duplex link between New York and Los Angeles is currently projected at about 2.6 108 cents per bit or about 18/100ths of a cent for a 1-minute conversation. At these prices, administrative costs exceed transmission costs by an order of magnitude. In the last several years, we have witnessed significant progress in reducing administrative costs. For example, one of the nations largest telephone companies announced a 13-percent reduction in its workforce (17,000 jobs). This company stated that automation and more efficient computerized equipment allowed it to reduce the number of network management centers from 19 to 1 and to consolidate 171 customer service centers into just 11 locations.
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Overall, the number of employees per 10,000 lines is expected to drop from 42 to the low 30s, a productivity improvement of 20 percent. NM is as critical to achieving reliability, availability, and continuity of service goals as it is to cost-effective operations. Historically, in public switched voice networks (PSVNs), communications NM is synonymous with mechanisms that prevent catastrophic loss of service caused by congestion resulting from heavy traffic overloads or network element failure. Normally, transmission networks and common-control switching systems make efficient use of facilities by distributing traffic among alternate paths as the primary routes reach capacity. However, in the absence of modern IM&C and signaling systems, when traffic loads exceed engineered levels (e.g., Three Mile Island and the Los Angels earthquake or when failures occur), continued call attempts may actually decrease usable capacity and the number of calls that a network can carry. Unchecked, such situations result in a degenerative process that quickly leads to widespread service disruption throughout an entire network. In the past, NM and control system limitations have placed responsibility for continuity of service during crisis situations squarely in the hands of experienced and knowledgeable human network administrators. Todays advanced digital switching and fiber-optic transmission systems offer significantly more capacity than the capacity offered just a few years ago. However, because these systems tend to concentrate ever-increasing amounts of traffic within single switching and transmission mechanisms (the funnel factor) to avoid extended and large-scale service interruptions, these new technologies mean higher levels of pre-planned routing diversity and improved, computer-assisted, automated, and near-real-time management systems. The fire in Hinsdale, Illinois, the blackout in Manhattan, and the recent loss of one vendors Internet service are examples of catastrophic failures that produce prolonged service interruptionssituations that must and can be avoided in the future. To offset the greater risk associated with failures, enhanced survivability and security are key attributes and objectives in SDH specifications for emerging SONET and International Telecommunications Union-Telecommunications Standard (ITU-TS) transmission systems. SDH/SONET-based BLSRs provide reusable bandwidth for more efficient internode transport in evenly meshed networks and greatly increase reliability and survivability. Half the available bandwidth in BLSRs is allocated as a working rate evenly distributed among all nodes (rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations), and the other half is reserved for protection switching and routing. In conjunction with ITU TMN-based management functions (or vendor product equivalents), this can result in unparalleled recovery from transmission failureswhether these failures occur naturally or from intended or collateral enemy attack damage. Recent progress in automatic restoration of broadband systems is dramatic. For example, in November 1988, a backhoe severed a primary Washington-to-New York fiber cable, disrupting service for 16 hours. In August 1992, a similar mishap in Mississippi disconnected tens of thousands of circuits, all of which were restored within 5 minutes. This improvement was made possible by computer-based, rapid-acting, automated restoration, and real-time network routing IM&C systems. Although military systems can be built to exhibit higher levels of resistance to certain types of threats (e.g., nuclear radiation and HEMP) and excess capacity can be designed into military systems to account for losses in warfare, capacity requirements sufficient to handle peacetime civilian traffic are generally orders of magnitude larger than any justifiable military overbuild design. Consequently, IM&C technologies enabling public telecommunications to be restored and/or reconfigured rapidly for military purposes during conflict situations are clearly the most effective strategies against large-scale physical attacks. While the greatest advancement in automated complex IM&C has occurred in the commercial sector, IM&C is a prime example of a function that enables clever adversaries to use commercial technology as an effective weapon in their war-making arsenals (as discussed in more detail in MCTL, Part II, Section 2). Beyond military criticality issues, national economic security is enhanced when superior IM&C leverages the U.S. share of the multi-trillion dollar worldwide IT market. Even though much IM&C development occurs as an adjunct to telecommunications, those capabilities, because of the confluence of computers and communications, find widespread use in most IT applications and in many non-IT markets in which ITs are key to business operations.
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For example, the PC hardware and computer software industries have adapted, improved, and now almost totally rely upon automated, real-time customer service centers pioneered in mobile communications and LAN and WAN administrative help desk installations. Shipping and transportation industries employ sophisticated package tracking and inventory/conveyance control programs upon which efficient operations and competitive market positions are critically dependent. Moreover, in designing and developing such complex systems, computer-based systems engineering and integration support are now an indispensable project management tools. Automatic process control in manufacturing and in testing during manufacturing are similarly crucial for successful, low-cost, highquality production. Executive, mid-level, and departmental organization, planning, and problem-solving operations are becoming increasingly dependent upon modern, local, and distributed (teleconferencing) hardware, software, and network-based decision-support management capabilitieswhether these resources are used for commercial, civilian, or military enterprises. A final example of economic and military rationale for IM&C criticality is the need for industrial training and education. Streamlining planning, development, and production has produced crises in sectors where it is possible to introduce new high-technology products and equipment (weapons for military situations) faster than company or military personnel can be trained to market, support, or employ them. Responding to this need, personnel managers are applying a growing inventory of advanced, hypermedia-based classroom, distance-learning, and self-study technologies. This trend is shifting the balance from predominately classroom and other off-premises arrangements to onjob trainingan action that, implemented properly, saves time and money while improving learning. Todays successful education and training approaches do not merely employ new hardware and software technologies to existing learning processes; rather, breakthroughs occur only when managers employ new pedagogies that optimize learning through advanced IT capabilities. In this regard, as in CMIP/SNMP management standards, new paradigms, new implementing architectures, and even a new structure of training information (i.e., the arrangement and presentation of scientific and technical information) need to be defined. Complementing education and training trends are expanding abilities for remote technology insertion. As a generally accepted practice, software upgrades are downloaded via networks with minimal or no user or local operator participation. Standards-based plug and play hardware and automatic managed object reporting and location further support and dramatically enhance traditional configuration management and change control. Figure 10.5-2 indicates that effective planning, development, implementation, operation, and maintenance of all ITs are critically dependent upon IM&C capabilities. Although many ITs are rapidly achieving commodity status and can easily be acquired in world markets, their assembly into useful and sustainable industrial or military operating entities is totally dependent upon IM&C systems and the knowledgeable and competent individuals who create them. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.5-3) Figure 10.5-3 contains the IM&C Technology WTA summary. Most of the IM&C R&D is being done by commercial organizations in Canada, Germany, Israel, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other countries construct individualized software systems using commercially available software for network control, system monitoring, and protection.
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Extensive R&D
Resources
Operations
Planning Development Change
Performance
Support
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.5-3. IM&C Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-10.5. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Network Management .............................................................................................................. III-10-115 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Anomaly Prediction, Detection, and Diagnosis Automated Self-Protection Distributed Process Management (Systems Engineering) Meta Management Meta-Data Network Manager Process and Data Mirroring Techniques
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DATA SHEET III-10.5. NETWORK MANAGEMENT

Bandwidth and transmission speed. None identified. None identified. Server operating systems, network fault detection, network performance monitoring, network security services, storage back-up and mirroring, network mapping, and network routing optimization. Transaction sequencing. Internet usage by general public. Cost will be less than current solutions.
Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications Affordability
RATIONALE Processing of applications and storage of data and information will become available to users who do not have a powerful computer as an access device. Many of these I/O devices will be very small, with just a chip for any kind of computing power. Some current examples are mobile phones or credit-card types of devices. In many cases, even users with a PC will not necessarily use the PC for anything more than a workstation. A network of servers would do processing. The servers would contain all the software applications, the users databases, and any parameters needed to specify user preferences in presentation. The servers would also have password information or any other personal identification to verify the users identity. Currently on the Internet, several commercial sites obtain information on the user and user preferences. These sites contain all the application software and the database of common information and the database on the user preferences. A primitive example of this type of site would be Amazon.com, which recognizes a user accessing the site and charges items and makes suggestions based upon previous data on customer usage and preferences. With processing and data storage becoming the function of the server, users will expect the server to perform all functions of any responsible computer services provider: data protection, privacy, security, availability, performance assurance, fault detection, software maintenance, tamperproofing, and reliability. Thus, the server will become a system as comprehensive and complex as just about any mainframe computer or transaction server known today. Users would be burdened by nothing more than a mobile device that possibly accepts nothing more than voice input and provides small-screen output or even just audio output. For the military, this has tremendous implications. With the adoption of wearable computers, each warfighter could have access to information and processing power with the individualized security that comes with applications such as voice recognitionbut without interfering with necessary physical functions. This individual would also have much broader access to information, command, and personal communications than that which is currently available. Commercial development will go a long way as the basis for such systems, but the military user will have additional special needs, particularly for security, fast access, and, in some cases, consolidation of data with associated analysis.
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Australia Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France UK

Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Any country with a big presence in the current telecommunications marketplace must have extensive R&D in this area. Mobile phones, hand-held computer input devices, and even stationary phones are beginning to use this technology. Also, several of the more popular Internet sites are providing capability in their servers that previously had been accomplished on individual PCs or individual computers. Examples of server-provided software and data storage can be found in some of the Internet stock-tracking sites. Such a site would identify a particular user, accept input on stocks of interest to the user, access stock trading databases available to the server, and provide the user with spreadsheets, graphs, news, and so forth based upon the user request.
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SECTION 10.6INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES

Highlights Older military or commercial high-technology, highly survivable transportable/mobile IS facility capabilities are readily available to proliferants. Advances in processing power, coupled with dramatic reductions in space, weight, and power consumption, allow IS capabilities to be packaged in much smaller volumes. In many cases, the total cost per transportable IS facility may be an order of magnitude less than the cost of a single precision-guided conventional weapon.
OVERVIEW The IS Facilities FA is defined as capabilities to house, energize, transport, protect, and provide appropriate operating conditions and/or human habitation and life support for IS infrastructures under benign, naturally occurring, manmade, conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear warfare environments. IS facilities encompass any or all of the following capabilities: exterior physical shelter and interior room; equipment and other IS support structures; prime power generation and/or co-generation; power conditioning; environmental heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC); chemical and biological filtration and protection; EMP protection; TEMPEST shielding; radiation protection; and human habitation and life-support accommodations. IS facilities are used to collect, monitor, and protect information in a variety of ways appropriate to a particular mission or operational condition. Facilities can be attended or unattended by humans. They may be either physically occupied or remotely attended. Facilities can be designed for either defensive and/or offensive purposes. Some facilities may be intended for human occupation, occasionally occupied, or never intended for human visitation. Thus, facilities will need to be designed with a capacity for automated self-protection, automated maintenance and repair, and automated disaster detection and recoveryall of which must be performed in a reliable, secure manner. Figure 10.6-1 is a taxonomy of major IS facilities capabilities. Clearly, not all these capabilities are required for every instance of military operations. Physical shelters can be fixed or transportable in ground mobile, airborne, or shipborne configurations. These shelters may support manned command, control and intelligence (C2I) centers, manned IP or INFO COM centers, or unattended IS resources. Civil IS shelters typically may not involve sleeping quarters or other overnight accommodations but, instead, merely provide facilities housing IS equipment and personnel in common office work environments. The Cold War era taught that a fixed command center or IS operations building will not survive a determined attack if nuclear weapons are involved. Not even so-called deep underground command centers, regardless of cost, could be certified as survivable. As a result, mobile facilities may be the only viable option in military scenarios where long-term survivability is mandatory. From a U.S. perspective, preparation for global nuclear warfare, beginning with the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) program in the 1970s, led to the investment in military, mobile command, surveillance, and IS-center technology. The airborne command center, the Airborne Warning And Command System (AWACS), and the Ground Mobile Command Center (GMCC) are illustrative developments. For tactical scenarios, the Tri-ServicesTactical Communications (TRITAC) program developed a wide variety of mobile/transportable voice and data switching, communications satellite and terrestrial terminals, and various IOs processing center products to support moving battlefield theater locations. In Europe, the Deutsche-Bundespost placed cable hocks within civilian telecommunications networks, permitting mobile switching and multiplexing gear to be connected with surviving transmission media to restore service interrupted by intentional or collateral wartime damage.
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES
Virtual Facilities
Physical Shelter and Support Facilities
Fixed
Virtual Offices/Stores/Malls Machine-Level Interaction Tactile/Voice/Video/Biometric User Inputting Options Browsing/Interaction Outputting Options Conventional GUI/Holographic Virtual Reality-based Still/ Animated/Motion Graphic/ Video Displaying Voice/Auditory/Biometrically Enhanced Service Options Visitor/Client-to-Office Interaction Messaging/In-Out Baskets Product-Service Information Retrieval/e-Commerce Information Processing/File Downloading Real-time n-Party Personal Conferencing/Interaction Chat-Room Data/Voice/Video Common Document Viewing/ Projection/Modification Shelters Exterior Structures Equipment Only (Unattended) Equipment and Operators (Attended) Operator Habitation Interior Structures Workspace/Equipment Rooms/ Closets Equipment Racks/Housing
Transportable (Operate When Stopped)

Land Containerized Tractor-Trailer/Van Ground Mobile Command Center Van-Mounted Central Office Switching Cellular/PCS Base Stations Satellite Ground Stations Media Broadcast Control Centers Rail/Railroad Crisis/Disaster Deployment Capabilities Rapid MobilizationSet-Up/ Tear-Down Pre-positioned Storage and Operating Site Planning Operating Site-of-Opportunity Planning Convoy/Protection Planning
Mobile (Operate in Transit)

Land Mobile Vehicular Terrestrial/SatelliteBased Terminals Supporting Voice, Data, Video, and Position Location Service
Air Mobile Airborne Command Posts AWACS TACAMO
Support Systems Power Utility Interfaces/Power Conditioning Uninterruptible Power Supplies Conventional/Fuel Cell Battery Back-up Motor/Alternator Internal Combustion Fossil Fuel Turbine Atomic Cogeneration Environmental Control (Human/ Equipment/Laboratory) Conventional HVAC Humidity Control, Air Filtration, Lighting Life Support Water/Water Treatment/Food/ Supplies Sanitation Survivability/Continuity of Service Blast/Overpressure Covert Location Underground/Undersea Chemical/Biological/ Radiation EMP/HEMP/SGEMP Radiation Security/Life Safety Site Security/Access Control Alarming/Halon/CO2/Other Fire Protection Intelligent Building Facilities
Ship Mobile Support Systems Power Environmental Control Life Support Survivability/Continuity of Service Security/Life Safety Intelligent Building Facilities
Air/Ship Containerized, CompactContainerized, ConveyanceIndependent Portable VSAT Terminals Suitcase Office Suites
Virtual Learning/Training Centers/ Resources Machine-Level Interaction (same options as above) Virtual Environments Leader-Led Classroom/Lecture Hall Collaborative Study Among Students/Teachers/Aides Self-study Network or Local Memory-based Student Interaction Simulation-based Training Services Full/Half Duplex Real-Time Conferencing Student Interaction Message-based Hypermedia/Hypertext Links Among all Primary and Reference Pedagogical Resources
Support Systems Power Environmental Control Life Support Survivability/Continuity of Service Security/Life Safety Intelligent Building Facilities
Headquarters/Command Centers Machine-Level Interaction (same options as above) Virtual Environments National/Higher Authority Military/ Corporate Boardroom Operational Planning/Battle Management/Intelligence Fusion Public/Private and Mixed Personal/Conference Room Configurations Desktop/Personal and Mixed Personal/Conference Room Configurations
Figure 10.6-1. IS Facilities Capabilities Taxonomy
Because of these advances, the trend toward transportable IS facilities accelerated in the 1990s. Today, satellite terminals able to operate in military or civilian bands are encased in suitcases. COTS office in suitcase products incorporate multimedia telecommunications, position location devices, and rich varieties of distributed computing environment data processing functions. Worldwide, many commercial telecommunications carriers inventory central office, tandem, and dual-function switches; cellular/Personal Communications System (PCS) base stations; digital loop carriers (DLCs); and other capabilities in transportable/mobile configurations. Alternately, with broadband, fiber-optic transmission, traffic can be affordably back-hauled great distances to restore damaged or otherwise failed switching, multiplexing, DLC, or other facilities (equipment) remotely. Because so many commercial enterprises now depend upon continuous telecommunications and data processing operations and because downtimes of even
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15 min can have catastrophic revenue and profit consequences, many businesses have elaborate internal or thirdparty, contract-based, disaster recovery IS capabilities. Figure 10.6-1 lists an emerging and increasingly important class of IS facilities best described as virtual facilities. All Virtual Facility users must reside in some physical facility. This means that no matter how advantageous they may be, virtual facilities can never totally supplant physical counterparts. Virtual facilities are a form of virtual reality (VR), which is a computer-generated environment with which and within which people can interact. VR encompasses a range of interactive computer environments, from text-oriented on-line forums and multiplayer games to complex simulations that combine audio, video, animation, or threedimensional (3-D) graphics and scent. Some of the more realistic effects are achieved using a helmet-like apparatus [e.g., HMDs or binocular omni-oriented monitor (BOOM) displays], often with tiny computer screens, one in front of each eye and each giving a slightly different view so as to mimic stereoscopic vision. Sensors attached to the participant (e.g., gloves, bodysuit, footwear) pass on the persons movements to the computer, which changes the graphics accordingly to give the participant the feeling of movement through the scene. Computer-generated physical feedback adds a feel to the visual illusion, and computer-controlled sounds and odors reinforce the virtual environment. Other VR systems, such as flight simulators, use larger displays and enclosed environments [e.g., Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) four-to-six-wall graphic projection mechanisms] to create an illusion of virtual presence. VR is becoming prevalent in electronic games, in amusement-park attractions, and for simulating design, construction, and other industrial development projects. Less-complicated systems for PCs manipulate images of 3-D space on a computer screen. Actual, experimental, and envisioned uses encompass electronic mail-based commerce (e-commerce, as manifested in virtual offices, stores, and malls); education and training (to include a variety of virtual classroom, distance learning, and telepresence capabilities); virtual headquarter and command centers; so-called chat rooms; industrial design; surgical training; art; and others. Figure 10.6-1 highlights examples of currently popular virtual facilities. RATIONALE IS facilities intended for human occupation must contain organic security means to identify reliably the people who can enter a facility and to deny access to people who should not enter a facility. In a permissive environment where the people are cooperative, recognition and authorization to enter can be effected by a combination of technologies that depend upon the perceived threat of unauthorized access and its consequences for a system. Security measures are a continuing overhead cost. The degree of security applied must be appropriate to that which is being protected. The technologies used for personnel identification can be flexibly modified, enhanced, or diminished, as threat conditions and missions change. Recognition can be performed by finger, thumb, or palm-print analysis; multispectral image analysis of iris or retinal characteristics unique to an individuals eye; handwriting; fast Fourier transform analysis of the harmonic content of a human voice; absorption spectroscopy; bio-photonic fluorescent properties of an individual; physical body characteristics; or by all or any combination of these. Validating identity through combinations of these individual physical and physiological properties precludes unauthorized entry because of the difficulties encountered in counterfeiting living biological characteristics. With such security access measures in place, entry will be controlled to attended, remotely attended, or unattended facilities. Technologies will identify those who should not be admitted to a facility. Identification of attempted unauthorized entry will be specific (e.g., an individual by name, an enemy troop, or even a feral moose or bear). This technology will alert a security team or an assigned tactical reaction force, will provide details of the attempted entry, and will log the event at a different site so that the sequence of events will be preserved if the attempted entry later proves to have been a prelude to destruction or assault. Since actions will be taken confidently based upon this systematic identification process, it must be reliable, with proper safeguards for independent verification. To protect the facility, the environment inside and outside the facility will be monitored continuously. Sensors for environmental variables will report ambient air and hardware temperatures, humidity, inundation, vibration, fire, barometric overpressure, selected gas partial pressure ratios, chemical agents, movement of people or objects, alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) bus parameters, coolant failure, and RF activity. This will permit monitoring of facilities too dangerous for human presence or monitoring many areas when insufficient numbers of people
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are available to cover all locations. Activities conducted within hostile territory can be monitored remotely through use of such sensor technologies. Occasions will arise when communications will become necessary between or among people who do not share a common spoken language. The communication process will involve real-time gathering of information concerning each speakers native language and will be followed by dual-translation activity. Translation modes will be selectable: audio voice, a video narrative display, print, or any combination of these. Language translation capabilities in a variety of languagesto and from Englishwill be employed. Real-time cross-language conferencing will be conducted in denotative terms without inducing ambiguity. Robotics will be used to perform physical functions, both within the facility and the immediate area. This will provide for protection of a facility located in a hostile environment and not maintained by humans. The relevance of older military or commercial, high-technology, highly survivable IS facility capabilities in warfare is evident from the preceding discussion. If a potential adversary possesses only fixed IS and support facilities, U.S. and allied precision-guided and other conventional weapons can be effective. In future conflicts, adversaries may have deployed, or will be able to deploy, transportable or mobile IS facilities. In many cases, the total cost per transportable IS facility may be an order of magnitude less than the cost of a single precision-guided conventional weapon needed to target and destroy such a facility. Clearly, the wartime utility of high-technology, high-survivability IS facility capabilities by National Security users must be understood fully by U.S. strategists and planners if effective countermeasures and counterstrike alternatives are to be available. With the advent of virtual facility technology, the need to concentrate command, surveillance, and intelligencefusion center facility capabilities in single physical locations is greatly diminished. This means, for example, that target information required by robust, integrated air defense systems does not have to be obtained from radar equipment collocated with, or exclusively dedicated to, the surface-to-air weapons they control. Thus, neutralizing an adversarys air defense surveillance capability may require attacks against non-air defense and potentially non-military active or passive radar facilities and/or IS infrastructures. Also, since modern teleconferencing nearly eliminates operational penalties associated with distributed or virtual command center designs, transportable or mobile command center elements can be reduced in size, number of people, and complexity. This makes them easier to support and move and, consequently, even more survivable. In the same manner, using distributed-location, virtual fusion centers enhances the integration of tactical-battlefield and strategic-global intelligence and situation assessments, while simultaneously improving overall intelligence-function survivability. On the economic, commercial, and industrial side, physical and virtual manifestations of IS facilities are increasingly recognized as key competitive factors impacting individual enterprises and the United States overall position in world markets. As companies streamline operations to stay ahead of rivals, the use of smart or intelligent building designs to minimize facility and utility costs and the need to provide efficient production, attitude, and morale-enhancing work environments have never been greater. In the virtual facility arena in particular, the Internet, Intranets (private networks using Internet protocols and software), and supporting technologies and standards are currently able to support myriad forms of e-commerce. In many cases, imaginative entrepreneurs reacting to this technology push are creating entirely new and highly successful business ventures and business processesentities that literally have no precedent. The potential of such groundbreaking endeavors for military use is enormous. Similar progress is evident in the virtual classroom or university domain. Here, at least initially, the most striking successes occur when a technological or an arts and sciences subject matter is so new that no single college or university has sufficient instructor expertise or other resources to offer comprehensive curricula. The emerging biocomputing field is noteworthy because in response to those needs, significant research, distance learning, and database sharing are already taking place via the Internet. International standards and advanced objected-oriented software that enable open-systems interoperation among competing vendor services and products are facilitatingand indeed fuelingrapid growth in e-commerce, with its
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virtual stores and malls; teleconferencing-based virtual conference rooms and headquarters; and leader-led, self-study and collaborative forms of educational VR. Key high-tech standards include the ITU-TSS G and H suites that define encoding, encryption, inter-codec (encoder-decoder) signaling, video, voice, imagery and graphics link multiplexing, link initiation/disconnect, and so forth. Also important are the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) and the Moving Pictures Expert Group (MPEG) standards for compression of still-photograph and moving-picture digital signals. At the heart of all virtual facility designs is the ability to support multiple users simultaneously, with some level of interactive features. In virtual merchandize marts, for example, users (customers) can search for and, at a minimum, browse through text-based product information. More elaborate accommodations allow users to navigate through and examine a spatially oriented environment. This may be a graphical representation of an actual physical store and often allows users to pick-up objects and view them from any angle. Still-more-elaborate designs allow users to interact in real time with each other and with processor-based virtual facility features, such as those mentioned previously. Chat rooms are a low-end, text-based example. However, many virtual classroom, headquarters/command center, and other network-based decision support arrangements offer sophisticated voice, video, graphics, and imagery operational capabilities that make electronic collaboration equal to or, in some circumstances, preferable to what can be accomplished in physical face-to-face meeting places. Predecessors of todays technology include early (1979) multi-user interactive role-playing games on the Internet, most of which employ Multiple User Dimensions (MUDs). MUDs are synchronous (real-time), text-based multi-user VR environments that allow users to interact with the environment and with other users. MUD Object Oriented (MOO) is most popular in education VR since it employs a highly sophisticated, built-in programming language. The development of more flexible and powerful virtual facility technologies will be important in future military training. No matter how potent virtual facilities may become, they can only be accessed by human users via some sort of physical facility. Such physical facilities fall into two broad categories: 1. There are large, multi-person, private or public teleconferencing facilities usually equipped with full complements of large-screen displays, automated and/or manually directed audio and video equipment, and leaderled and individual participant-controlled text and graphic information I/O and presentation devices. At the other end of the spectrum are PC-based terminals that enable individuals to observe passively conferences, decision-making, or learning sessions or to interact actively with other individuals and/or machinebased intelligent processes in those sessions.
2.
In either large complex or personal physical facility cases, users may be furnished with conventional PC-like keyboard and audio and visual I/O devices. For more complete immersion in and with virtual-facility cyberspace, users may be equipped with more exotic HMD, Binocular Omnidirectional-Oriented Monitor (BOOM), ComputerAided Engineering (CAE)-type displays, and other apparatus. MCT Part III, Section 3 (Biological Technology), Section 5 (Chemical Technology), and Section 15 (Nuclear Technology) present specific technologies that provide personal and shelter-based protection from biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons effects, respectively. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.6-2) All these IS technology components are or will be available on world markets. Thus, the possibility that potential adversaries will be able to use transportable or mobile IS facilities to mount highly survivable offensives must be fully considered in the planning by U.S. or allied forces. The United States leads the world in most of these technologies. Robotics technology is being developed and applied in several countries, primarily for repetitive production and manufacturing purposes. Robots capable of performing independent functions are being developed in Canada, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, other European countries, and in Japan. There is no clear leader in free-ranging robots outside the U.S. entertainment industry.
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In Figure 10.6-2, only 10 of the 38 countries listed have extensive R&D capabilities in all the IS Facilities FA technologies: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden, The United Kingdom, and the United States. Several countries have limited capabilities in IS Facilities FA technologies: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Poland, and Vietnam.
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Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands New Zealand North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan - R.O.C. UK United States Vietnam Legend: Extensive R&D
Virtual Facilities
Fixed Facilities
Transportable Facilities
Mobile Facilities
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.6-2. IS Facilities Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.6 INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES

Finger, Thumb, and Palm-Print Identification ............................................................................... III-10-127 Wearable Computing Systems (WCSs) ....................................................................................... III-10-129 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Absorption Spectroscopy Automated Self-Protection Automated Video Identification Correlation Techniques for Validation of Identification Environmental Monitoring Lasers (for Transmission Over Fiber Optics) Personal Identification, Cooperative Personnel Identification (Specific and Generic), Uncooperative Robotics (Free-Roaming) Selectable Communications Mode [Audio, Video, Print, Virtual Reality (VR)]
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DATA SHEET III-10.6. FINGER, THUMB, AND PALM-PRINT IDENTIFICATION

Processing speed. None identified. None identified. None identified. Identification accuracy. Financial institutions. Other biometric identifiers may become less costly for the reliability offered.
RATIONALE Finger, thumb, and palm-print identification technologies are closely related to the technologies that appear in the Information Systems Security section (9.4), almost all of which require positive identification of individuals participating in USG and civilian critical IP functionswith a probability approaching 1.0. For brevity, fingerprint identification is used as a collective term in this technology item. By definition, fingerprint identification systems include both overt and surreptitious finger, thumb, and palm-print data capture, correlation, analysis, display, storage, and retrieval elements. In ancient China, rulers sealed important documents with thumbprints. Now, fingerprint imaging is the most commonly used method of biometric recognition. Other biometric technologies are also based on identifiable traits, which can include hand contours, retinal patterns, voice patterns, keystroke rhythms, and handwriting acoustic emission. There are still other emerging biometric technologies in the research stage. Some, such as knuckle creases, hand veins, acoustic head resonances, and even body odors, seem a little bizarre. Fingerprint identification technology is relatively mature, reasonably accurate, and more acceptable legally than other biometric technologies. However, fingerprint identification is far from absolute. Because the current fingerprint identification system hardware, software, and protocol elements introduce significant uncertainties, priority R&D by the USG and industry is required. Experts generally agree than 1 in every 50 people have fingerprints that todays technology cannot handle. Even at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which handles between 30,000 and 50,000 fingerprint cards every day, 1 of every 10 prints checked in 1998 was not clear enough to provide positive identification. Because of variations in sensor contact pressure and the angle and location of the fingerprint area in relation to the sensor, no two consecutive captures of the same fingerprint data are identical. Fingerprint data capture software robustness is not yet sophisticated enough to compensate for fingerprint positioning variations. The technical specifications, standards, and test protocols required for unbiased fingerprint identification product evaluations have not yet been developed. Highly adaptable and easily integrated fingerprint identification systems that have a universal probability of positive identification approaching 1.0, with very low false acceptance ratios (FAR), may be 10 to 15 years away, depending on the priority given this technology by the USG and industry. Positive identification and subsequent verification of a person open up new ways of providing vertical services to more people. Positive identification is not a blessing in the view of a significant minority. There is a Fight the Fingerprint web site, which argues against fingerprint identification, making the proclamation We stand firmly opposed to all government-sanctioned biometrics and social security number identification schemes! Civil libertarians warn about the loss of privacy, the potential for misusing fingerprint information, and the danger of aggregate user profiles being assembled and sold. To avoid the dangers of centralization and unauthorized disclosures, some
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biometrics developers are considering one-to-one matching systems, which use the finger image for corroborative authentication after a user presents a password, PIN, or card. In such systems, a scanner captures a finger image, extracts its features, and converts it into data in the form of a mathematical calculation. The fingerprint data can be stored on a card. For identification, an individuals captured finger image must match the one stored in the card in the possession of the individual. The only drawback to this form of 1:1 system is that users must carry a card to identify themselves, and this card can be forgotten or lost. The ideal biometric system should not be intrusive and should replace PIN numbers, keys, passwords, and access cards. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Argentina Canada Finland Hong Kong Israel Mexico Poland South Africa Rep. Switzerland Vietnam
Legend: Extensive R&D
Australia China France India Italy Netherlands Portugal South Korea Taiwan R.O.C.
Austria Costa Rica Germany Iran Japan New Zealand Russia Spain UK
Belgium Denmark Greece Ireland Korea Norway Singapore Sweden United States
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
R&D for finger, thumb, and palm-print identification is being done more extensively in countries with a strong military interest or a strong financial interest. Commercially, however, fingerprint identification will be overshadowed by voice identification and other forms of identification more easily handled by telecommunications input.
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DATA SHEET III-10.6. WEARABLE COMPUTING SYSTEMS (WCSs)

Size; weight; power consumption. Weight is a major factor for Marines since each Marine carries < 100 lbs of equipment. Thermal management. None identified. Real-time operating systems. Response time, signature control, power consumption, heat dissipation, network architecture. Law enforcement, fire fighting, equipment maintenance, medical, and tactical and special forces. Development of WCSs is based on the integration of COTS components. The true discriminator is size. As size decreases, component cost increases significantly.
RATIONALE WCSs consist of head mounted displays (HMDs), non-traditional input/output (NTI/O) devices and low powered, single-board computers. The availability of complete WCSs is driven by commercial consumer product interest. In fact, for approximately $1,000, a rudimentary WCS can be built with components that are easily assembled, widely available, and come with instructions on the Internet. The component capabilities are increasing rapidly, while size and cost are decreasing. A WCS is physically always with the soldier. It must be extremely lightweight, comfortable, user-friendly, rugged, and unobtrusive and must enhance IP capabilities without hindering other operational tasks. The WCS can exist as a system of systems connected via physical wiring or wireless LAN (so-called body LANs). Advances in WCS technology are directed toward overcoming the limits of desktop, laptop, or hand-held computers by allowing the user operational mobility. The WCS uses NTI/O, sensors to increase the soldiers natural remote sensing capabilities with automatic change notification, and instant data access. These characteristics combined allow the soldier to concentrate on mission requirements and not the computer itself. The WCS will enhance combat effectiveness, act as a force multiplier, and increase soldier survivability. The enabler characteristics of WCS include command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); sensor integration providing real-time data for targeting and direction; navigation; threat warning; performance/status monitoring; and supporting missions logistics (eliminate volumes of equipment and documentation) to improve Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) capabilities. Ultimately, WCS will support operational capabilities for NTI/O (e.g., hands-free operation of weapons and equipment); real-time wearable language translation (increasing communication effectiveness during coalition warfare); and GPS/Geographic Information System (GIS) integration (very high resolution). Integration into soldier systems poses unique technology problems in terms of power consumption (to increase mobility, extend operating life, and decrease logistics load) and thermal management (for soldier survivability, both in terms of the temperature environment and IR signature).
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Canada
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
Presently, the United States leads in systems integration of WCSs. The state of the art is assembly from COTS components. The technologies for others to build some level of WCSs from components are universally accessible, and a growing body of detailed data on how to assemble a WCS is available on the web. The key discriminators between the state-of-the-art and future developing technologies are size and power dissipation. Advances in these attributes are being made continuously at the component level, with the cost premium required to obtain the state of the art in small size and power consumption being one of the determining factors for component selection. Developments in component technologies are driven by mass market applications, while interest in true wearable computing (as opposed to hand-held computers) is being fostered by groups in academia and vertical markets with specific requirements (e.g., the military). NRL has just developed and delivered an advanced computer system for the United States Marine Corps (USMC): the enhanced End User Terminal (EUT) for the individual Marine. The EUT is a ruggedized, wearable computer configured on a Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment (MOLLE) vest. The EUT consists of a full-function Windows NT computer with a Pentium Processor and a touch screen that provides situation awareness to the user and situation reporting to higher level echelons. Complete with a GPS receiver, the users location is transmitted over an RF link back to headquarters. User locations, locations of other Marines, and threat information are displayed on a 6-in. color liquid crystal display (LCD). The computer system, the GPS, and the RF transmitter are powered form a MIL-SPEC nickel metal hydride (NIMH) battery, which provides approximately 6 hrs. of continuous operation. A recent experiment, Limited Objective Experiment #6) at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, California, was the operational debut for NRLs EUT. The ability to transmit position reports, situation reports, and other tactical messages, such as Call for Fire, over a digital link will help reduce the potential for fratricide and increase the warfighters effectiveness in future combat operations. Planned enhancements will further ruggidize, lighten, and increase the functionality of the EUT. NRL will deliver an additional 10 EUTs for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory experiments scheduled in September 2000 in Gulfport, Mississippi. MIT is also developing a wearable system [see http://www.media.mit.edu/wearables/ (The MIT Wearable Computing Web Page) or http://vismod/www.media.mit.edu/tech-reports/TR-467/node4.html (Prototype of an Affective Wearable Computer)]. The version of an affective wearable computer that MIT has built uses the PC 104 board standard and private eye display. Attached to this is a medically approved bio-monitoring system made by Thought Technologies. This bio-monitoring system has the ability to monitor simultaneously respiration, galvanic skin response (GSR) (skin conductivity), temperature, blood volume pressure (BVP), heart rate (from BVP), and EMG (electromyogram, for muscular electrical activity). All these can be sensed painlessly from the surface of the skin. Future versions of the systemalready under developmentinclude audio and video inputs and displays, wireless links to the Internet, and wireless localized sensors. Current functionality includes the monitoring of four sensors by a Linux-based operating system. The input from the four sensors can be displayed on a text-based screen, such as the Private Eye, with an option for concurrent user annotation. The annotations are automatically timestamped by the system and stored in a separate log file. In the near future, MIT hopes to add a third log file that will record the user's location at periodic intervals by using GPS for outdoors and a system of fixed IR location broadcasting stations for inside MITs laboratory. Core Components NTI/O is accomplished with either voice or text input. The leading voice recognition engine is based on IBMs Via Voice software. Non-traditional text input is accomplished using a technique called chording. Chording is the ability to type the complete standard American National Standards Institute (ANSI) text characters by using one hand and not looking at the keyboard. The United States leads in NTI/O technology.
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WCS HMD displays are designed to allow the user to interact fully in their normal operating environment. Single-board computers allow for the integration of central processing units (CPUs) and related components onto very small platforms. For comparison, using a single board, a Computer Science professor at Stanford University built a 486-based, 340M hard drive web server that is only 4 in3 in size (the size of a pack of cigarettes) and runs a full-sized operating system. Japan presently leads the industry in both HMD and single-board computers. Japan leads because of its success in miniature consumer electronics, such as digital cameras and personal music systems. Based on this precursor to success, we can assume that China, South Korea, and Taiwan will soon possess similar capabilities. Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other industrialized nations are developing capabilities in both HMD technologies and complete WCS systems integration. The United States leads in integration of COTS components into viable WCS. Several companies sell complete systems. Xybernaut Corporation of Fairfax, Virginia, and VIA Corporation and Interactive Solutions, Inc., of Sarasota, Florida, sell sophisticated WCSs as COTS items for between $3,000 and $5,000. Presently, cutting edge advances in WCS integration are being driven by the academic community and by demands in vertical markets such as the military. Key academic leaders are Professors Vaughn R. Pratt, Stanford University; Steve Mann, University of Toronto; and Thad Starner, Georgia Institute of Technology. Pratt is the designer of the earlier mentioned web server and developer of tactile chording glove. Mann is considered the inventor of WCSs during his 20-year quest to develop something he calls personal imaging, in which an individual wears a camera all the time. Starner, along with Mann, founded the wearable computer project at MIT. The University of Bristol and the University of Essex in the United Kingdom are also key players in WCS systems integration research and offer undergraduate projects in the field. Canada has an active program in wearable computing human systems interface (HIS), which is relevant to this topic. Centers include the University of Toronto and the Memorial University of Newfoundland. At the critical component level, WCS display technology is a key enabler. Sony, Olympus, and Canon of Japan are leaders in display technology suitable for WCS usage. Liquid Image, in Canada, is developing and marketing state-of-the-art lightweight liquid crystal displays (LCDs) designed for monocular wearable computing applications and for biocular virtual reality (VR). In terms of data presentation, the University of New Brunswick is a recognized world leader in presentation of large data sets of environmental data (e.g., 3-D presentation of bathymetric data). Epson and Seiko Corporations of Japan are jointly developing the next generation of single-board computers with the capabilities of full-sized systems. The leading fully integrated WCS is the U.S.-based Xybernaut Corporation, Mobile Assistant (MA) II, which features an Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) 133MHz, 32 MB Extended Data Out (EDO) Random Access Memory (RAM), 2 GB hard drive and a pair of PCMCIA slots. The MA II is priced at approximately $5,000 and is the result of a joint venture between Xybernaut Corporation and Sony Corporation of Japan.
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SECTION 10.7INFORMATION SENSING

Highlights Proper operation and maintenance of IP and software is highly dependent upon sensor laser test instrumentation and techniques. Development in new sensor technology enabling materials is emerging as an important facet of sensor technology assessment. Sensor arrays and complex system performance attributes are the products of advanced systems emerging and integration that reduce to practice innovative sensor algorithms, signal processing and software technologies. OVERVIEW The Information Sensing FA is defined as capabilities to detect any single or multiple faceted manifestation of properties, qualities, quantities, or other descriptive representations of material or immaterial entities and to produce output signals analogous to the original manifestation sensedin formats suitable for use in ISs. Entities can be in the form of matter (i.e., exhibiting mass properties, position, motion, chemical, biological, or other characteristics), information, or energy. Considering the wide variety and the different forms in which material and immaterial entities exist in nature, the number of sensor devices or systems needed to determine properties, qualities, and other pertinent characteristics (measurands) of these entities is large. Moreover, because sensor data are used in so many different applications and the requirements for accuracy, resolution, and numerous other parameters are so diverse, the number of measurement technologies, techniques, and products is even larger. The sensing areas of MCTL Parts I and II focus, respectively, on sensing technologies playing vital and critical roles in maintaining U.S. military superiority and those considered sufficient in WMD scenarios. Because the MCT Part III addresses affordability in military as well as economic and INFOWAR operations, the range of technologies of interest encompasses all categories of sensors and numerous incidences of specific techniques and products. The Information Sensing assessment for this large field of technology items requires a highly structured and systematic method of addressing the great number of categories, techniques, devices, and systems. To accomplish this, sensors are analyzed first in terms of single, stand-alone devices that normally, or ideally, respond to only a single stimulus or measurand. Next, two classes of sensor arrays or systems are examined. In the first class, arrays of similar or identical devices are arranged to enhance single measurand detection sensitivity, accuracy, or some other desirable quality. The second class includes a wide range of systems comprising a multiplicity of sensors (possibly dissimilar) or devices, usually deployed to monitor or compare spatial, geographic, temporal, or some other measurand gradation, as opposed to using multiple measurements to enhance sensor quality. The second class also includes the use of dissimilar sensors to detect multiple measurand attributes for one or more entities. For example, to measure kinetic energy, the mass and the velocity of an entity must be determined. Finally, because sensor capabilities are often enabled or constrained by the platforms upon which they are affixed, this section addresses important platform-related sensor requirements, capabilities, and corresponding technology solutions. Using examples, Figure 10.7-1 illustrates this analytical structure and the assessment approach used herein. In this figure, the right-most column presents a partial listing of measurands associated with solid, liquid and gaseous materials. For most of these measurands, measurements require only a simple or single-device sensor apparatus. Also depicted in this grouping are measurands relevant to atmospheric and other environmental conditions, which are important in all military combat scenarios but particularly important for chemical and biological monitoring of environments.
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INFORMATION SENSING
Representative Sensor Platforms
Representative Multi-Device Sensing Arrays or Systems

Measurand Sensing Enhancement Arrays/Systems Bottom-Mounted and Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor Systems Hull-Mounted Hydrophone Systems Global Positioning and Timing System Steerable, Conformal Phased-Array Antenna
Representative Sensing with Single Devices
Platforms Airborne Heavier than Air Fixed Wing Powered Unpowered Rotating Lighter than Air Dirigibles Tethered Balloons Un-tethered Balloons Terrestrial Fixed Mobile Air-Dropped Shipborne/Marine Satellite/Extraterrestrial
Non-Material Measurands Energy Gravitational Kinetic Elastic Electrical Electromagnetic Electrostatic Magnetostatic Electromotive Force Chemical Radiant Nuclear Mass Energy Transfer-Rate/Force Work Power/Current Force/Torque Event Detection/Capture Data/Information Meaning Detection/ Recognition Word/Text Pattern/Image Speech/Audio Signature/Fingerprinting
Solid/Liquid Measurands Mass Properties Weight Center of Gravity Moment of Inertia Product of Inertia Temperature Position/Attitude Velocity/Acceleration Volume Liquid/Moisture Flow Rate Chemical Biological Resistance/Conductance Impedance/Admittance Inductance/Inductive Reactance Capacitance/Capacitive Reactance
Measurand Spatial-Gradient Sensing Arrays/Systems Troop Monitoring Systems Weather Balloon Systems ELINT/COMINT Systems Active and Passive Radar Systems North Warning System (formerly Dew Line) National Air Traffic Control Radar System Hubble Space Telescope Mars Pathfinder
Atmospheric/Gas Measurands Temperature Barometric Pressure Wind Humidity Particulate Chemical Biological
Figure 10.7-1. Information Sensing Taxonomy
The second column from the right depicts measurands associated with non-material entities. This grouping comprises eight kinds of energy,16 examples of energy transfer-rates and force, events, and data/information-meaning detection and recognition. The last category includes word/text recognition (e.g., optical character recognition, textto-speech synthesis, and so forth), pattern and image recognition, speech recognition, and audio signature detection/ recognition. Described in more detail below, for each measurand listed in the two rightmost columns, there exists a plurality of basic techniques and numerous incidences of vendors and vendor products capable of sensing and measuring the indicated measurand. The third column from the right illustrates the multi-device sensor arrays or systems. The first grouping depicts arrays comprised of similar or identical (homogeneous) sensor devices. A classic example of this type of array is the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), in which hydrophonic sensors are mounted and spaced along the length of submerged cables and towed by a ship. By combining signals received from each hydrophone, beams are formed in the direction of sound emitters permitting the detection of acoustic energy at distances not possible with single devices. Applications include anti-submarine warfare, oil exploration, and drug interdiction. An example in the second class of systems using dissimilar sensors or devices is the deployment of large numbers of untethered weather balloons. Such balloons typically carry instrumentation measuring several different meteorological parameters. In this case, the intent is not to improve the quality of any particular parameter measurement, but to monitor or compare spatial or geographic measurand variation. Finally, the fourth column from the right demonstrates the wide variety of platforms used in sensing operations. When platforms support only sensing missions, they are often designed to optimize sensing operations. When
16
These kinds of energy are defined in Six Easy Pieces, Richard P. Feynman, Addison Wesley Publisher.
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sensor operation is only one of many missions and platform designs cannot be optimized for that purpose, platformgenerated interference mitigation and compensation techniques become major sensor technology attributes. For organizational convenience, most computer system peripheral technologies germane to MCT assessments are, in fact, identified and treated in the tables included in Section 10.3. Likewise, MCT Section 17, Sensors Technology, addresses many of the complex sensor arrays/systems alluded to previously. Section 17 provides definitional context for and defines capabilities unique to information sensors technologies independent of where in the MCT they are treated in detail and directs the reader to sections presenting sensor technology assessments. Most computer system peripherals (i.e., information inputting, outputting, storage and retrieval, printing and publishing, and encoding and decoding devices) are employed in what is most aptly described as information transformation applications. For this reason, as noted previously, the assessment of information transformation technologies, defined as capabilities to manipulate existing information without changing existing or creating new or extended content or meaning, is presented in Section 10.3. BACKGROUND Sensing Technology Description in the MCT The Information Sensing FA definition at the beginning of this section is formulated to apply universally to all incidences of sensing technology. In developing the definition, it was discovered that several authoritative references offered significantly different technical explications of the term sensor. For example, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) defines a sensor as an equipment which detects, and may indicate, and/or record objects and activities by means of energy particles emitted, reflected, or modified by objects. More elaborately, the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, defines a sensor as the generic name for a device that senses either the absolute value or a change in a physical quantity such as temperature, pressure, flow rate, or pH, or the intensity of light, sound or radio waves and converts that change into a useful input signal for an information-gathering system; a television camera is therefore a sensor; a transducer is a special type of sensor, also known as a primary detector, sensing element. As part of an even more comprehensive definition, the Communications Standard Dictionary, by Martin H. Weik, D.Sc., describes a sensor as equipment that detects the presence or intensity of illumination, radio waves, ionization density, electric fields, or magnetic fields; or equipment that detects the presence of chemicals, such as pollutants and irritants; or the presence of radioactivity. Most detectors are in fact transducers, since they convert energy to another form and amplify it. According to these sources, transducers, analog-to-digital (A/D) and digital-to-analog (D/A) converters, other types of converters, and a wide variety of encoder/decoders are legitimate incidences of sensor technology. Consequently, under these definitions, virtually all computer system input/output peripherals are sensors. To visualize capabilities unique to sensors, consider Figure 10.7-2. Although the figure uses a thermocouplebased temperature sensor as an example, the distinction between sensor-unique capabilities and common metrology, recording, processing, storage, and other general-purpose technology capabilities made here applies to virtually any sensor product or apparatus. In Figure 10.7-2, a primary iron-constantan17 thermocoupleis used to measure the temperature of a gas or some other entity represented by the THot symbol. Using primary and secondary thermocouple junctions as shown, an
17
An alloy of 45 percent nickel and 55 percent copper, used chiefly in electrical instruments because of its constant resistance.
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Adaptable Recording, Processing and Storage Technology Analog Instrumentation Example
Adaptable Metrology Technology (+) eT ()
Sensor-Unique Capability
eT = kThot + c
Strip Recorder
Cu Cu TRef
Iron Constantan THot
Digital Instrumentation Example
text xxx 1 text xxx 2 text xxx 3 text xxx 4
Printer
58.64397
(+) eT ()
Cu Cu TRef
Iron Constantan THot
Data Base
Processor
Notes on using thermocouples Dr. Robert J. Moffat, Stanford University

00-1115-01
Figure 10.7-2. Thermocouple Example Depicting Sensor-Unique Capabilities
electrical voltage, eT, is generated. This voltage is directly proportional to the primary thermocouple temperature. In this example, the technology uniquely ascribed to the sensor comprises only the thermocouple apparatus and arrangement that results in the generation of the analog voltage, e T, which is proportional to the entity temperature being measured. From this point on, the figure illustrates both analog and a digital techniques (not uniquely designed for sensors) for converting the temperature tracking voltage, eT, into visible displays for human observation or information that can be processed further and stored by general-purpose computer or process-control equipment. While some bimetallic-strip and mercury thermometers directly display temperature readings, the analog approach depicted the top half of Figure 10.7-2 uses a meter to provide visual indication of test-entity temperature. Such meters are typically standard electrical voltmeters with scales calibrated in degrees rather than in volts. The use of COTS strip recorders for continuous time-varying measurement is another example of the adaptation of generalpurpose instrumentation in analog sensor equipment. (Note: Section 12.3, Metrology, assesses measurement technologies for sensor and other applications.) The bottom half of Figure 10.7-2 presents the digital equivalent of the analog voltmeter and strip-recorder, as well as the possibility of sending digitized temperature data to computers for further processing, storage and future retrieval. Implicit here is an A/D converter to digitize the analog, temperature-dependent voltage, eT. As noted in extant technical references, because A/D converters can be viewed as sensing analog variables and convert them to digital format, they are sometimes defined as sensors in their own right. However, in this example, a fundamental difference between thermocouple action and A/D conversion action is evident. As a primary sensor, the thermocouple responds directly to an existing entity condition (a real phenomenonin this case, the actual entity-temperature) and produces informationin analog voltage formatthat describes or quantifies that temperature. By contrast, the action of the A/D converter can be described best as simply transforming the thermocouples analog output voltage information to information about the same entity-temperaturebut in digital format. Although employing A/D converters to sense electric potential (an energy-related entity) directly and produce information describing that entitys magnitude is theoretically possible, A/D convertersin most applicationsare used to simply transform information in analog format to the same information in digital format.
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Identifying and Assessing Sensor-Unique Capabilities Effective and efficient sensing technology assessment and documentation demands that these efforts focus on sensor-unique capabilitiesas opposed to technology capabilities that, although essential in sensor operations, are addressed in other assessment activities and sections. Figure 10.7-2 reveals the difference between unique primary and adjunct or general-purpose sensor component capabilities in simple, single-device sensors. To minimize duplication of effort and the possibility of conflicting results from multiple working groups assessing the same technologies, sensor system components have been assigned to the respective list of MCT activities and document sections in which their use and application are dominant. When assessing primary, single-device technologies, characteristics considered sensor-unique include accuracy, resolution, linearity, cross-measurand measurement distortion, environmental requirements and susceptibilities, stability, repeatability, fungibility, size, weight, volume, reliability, availability, maintainability, and life-cycle cost. Beyond these technical performance capability considerations, developments in new sensing technologyenabling materials is emerging as another important facet of sensor technology assessment. For instance, fiber-opticbased sensors, while exhibiting significant technical performance advantages over electromechanical and chemical predecessors, continue to be introduced for an ever-expanding number of measurands, with the following products now commercially available:
Fiber-Optic-Based Sensor Measurands
Temperature Pressure Flow Liquid Level Displacement (Position) Vibration Rotation Magnetic Fields Acceleration
Chemical Species Force Radiation pH Humidity Strain Velocity Electric Fields Acoustic Fields
In the domain of sensor arrays and complex systems, unique capabilities occur as top-level sensor system functional performance attributes. These attributes are the products of advanced systems engineering and integration techniques that reduce to practice innovative sensor algorithmic, signal processing, and software technologies. Although some aspects of these developments are unique to or developed specifically for sensor systems, to a large extent, they are all implemented by adapting standard or multi-purpose hardware and software configuration items. In todays modern SURTASS ocean surveillance sensors, unique and standard or multipurpose components are easily identified. In these systems WSC-6 [super high frequency (SHF)] satellite communication (SATCOM) links are used to relay acoustical array information from ships to shore-based processing facilities. Clearly, the common-user WSC-6 communications and the composite theoretical performance (CTP) of shore-based computers, while important to sensor operations, are not the unique characteristics of interest in assessing sensor technology. On the other hand, top-level, SURTASS-unique functional capabilities are sensor unique and, therefore, relevant to sensor technology assessment. Included in this category are all manner of accuracy, resolution, and other effectiveness parameters associated with beam-forming; null steering; automated target detection, identification, and tracking; platform and external noise reduction; ice-thickness measurement; and a myriad of similar system-level performance characteristics. RATIONALE Because MCT Part III treats technologies that produce increasingly superior military performance or maintain superior capability more affordably, both MCTL Part I and Part II sensor technology assessment rationale indirectly
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apply to Part III. From the Part I perspective, the truth of this assertion rests in the fact that possessing technologically superior sensors remains a national U.S. military goal. The Part II rationale is applicable for this reason: While sensors are required in most military actions, they are critical in chemical and biological warfare. Part I and II assessment rationale statements are relevant in Part III because any Part III sensing technology that improves superiority or reduces cost could be cause for reassessing that technology in terms of Part I or Part II criteria. Sensing systems that might prove invaluable in warfare but are now prohibitively expensive may be rendered affordable to proliferators by some Part III developing technology. Thus, the Part III affordability criteria takes on a much larger significance if it reduces the cost of a particular sensor system and enables operations not previously supportable. Parallel arguments also apply to Part I. Should developing technologies reach levels of performance that are used to improve adversary military capabilities, these technologies might challenge or mitigate a U.S. position of superiority. That such capability advances are planned and likely to occur is reflected in the Joint Vision 2010 statement that new sensors and information dissemination systems will be deployed to detect chemical or biological at great ranges and provide warning to specific units that may be affected. Beyond Part I- and II-related rationale, a more compelling and far-reaching rationale exists for assessing sensor technology against Part III criteria: In accordance with DODD S-3600.1, assessment must take into account operations other than war and the ability to secure peacetime National Security objectives. The Part III effort must assess sensing technologies by their impact on the conduct of economic warfare and INFOWAR, whether those physical, violence-free campaigns are waged in the midst of or in the absence of military conflict. Sensors must be viewed as key factors in the conduct of economic warfare because they are integral and necessary components of almost every automated industrial process (from basic research; to CAD product development, manufacturing, test, and evaluation; to point of sale retailing; to financial institution, postal and private delivery service document processing; to complex IS continuous or scheduled performance measurement; to numerous others). While the importance of IP and software is generally taken for granted and the rationale for assessment assumed to be self-evident, it is no exaggeration to state that proper operation and maintenance of these superpower technologies is highly dependent upon sensor-based test instrumentation and techniques. Moreover, the information processors and the software directing their operation are powerless to affect the outside world except via appropriate inputting and outputting devices. Figure 10.7-1 (and corresponding figures in other sections containing portions of overall MCTL sensor assessment) identify and describe specific instances of technologies meeting Part III criteria and fulfilling the important National Security functions outlined previously. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.7-3) The United States leads the world in technologies that deal with large amounts of disparate data. Systems that process large amounts of data rapidly and reliably do exist within many national and international financial institutions and telephone systems. These ISs are well organized and used in predictable ways. In the technologies of mathematical modeling and the statistical application of data correlation, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, some other European countries, China, India, and Japan and are also strong. The basic principles and, increasingly, the components necessary for implementing advanced digital processing techniques are increasingly available. Implementation of militarily critical signal processing functions rests largely on empirically validated target and engineering design databases and empirically optimized algorithms. The United States, by virtue of many years of investment in development, test, and operational use of advanced military sensors, has a significant worldwide lead, and is followed closely by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Japan also has all of the underlying technology elements and has developed a variety of military systems (IR sensors, mortar location radars, satellite communications, and so forth) that require state-of-the-art signal processing. Italy, Sweden (airborne radar), and other members of the European Union (EU) have capabilities in specific sensor areas, as do India, Israel, South Africa, and Russia.
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Extensive R&D
Sensor Platforms
Measuring Sensing Enhancement Arrays/Systems
Measuring Statistical Gradient Sensing Arrays/Systems
Non-Material Measurands
Solid/Liquid Measurands
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.7-3. Information Sensors Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.7. INFORMATION SENSING

Information Tamperproofing ...................................................................................................... III-10-143 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time: Bio-Photonic Fluorescent Properties Identification Chemical Agent Sensors (Variety of Chemicals) Fast Fourier Transform Analyses Technologies and Implementation Sensor Management and Integration Sensor Tasking Algorithms Sensor Fusion
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DATA SHEET III-10.7. INFORMATION TAMPERPROOFING

Processing speed. None identified. None identified. Rapid data storage and processing. Response time, storage design, and network architecture. Law Enforcement, financial institutions, historical archives, and news media. Development of algorithms and software is within current technology ability. Cost of additional bandwidth and memory will be low in the 5- to 25-year time frame.
RATIONALE For any system that collects data for military purposes, there is a growing need to protect that data from tampering. The military depends upon the integrity of data used for decision making. This includes data in almost any format: messages, commands, sensor output, photos, audio recordings, videos, web pages, and real-time transmissions. One of the techniques in information warfare is to distort data upon which decisions are made. In some cases, these attacks will take the form of obvious corruptions (e.g., web pages that have been changed or defaced as a prank or a political statement). Even attacks that appear to be simply malicious can be a means of influence in information warfare (e.g., the bogus news story that affected certain company stock prices). This kind of attack is usually discovered, albeit after some possibly unrecoverable damage has occurred. In many cases, however, attacks will take the form of subtle changes to critical datachanges unnoticed by humans and contained in vast databases (e.g., changes in map information used for bombing calculations, photos used in news releases in a conflict, wording in diplomatic agreements, and sensor data used to monitor border crossings). The damage from this tampering could range from none to disastrous, depending upon the decisions based upon that data. Depending on the uses of the data, various levels of tamperproofing protection will be needed, with the greatest protection given to life-critical information (e.g., medical directives for troops in the field or troop locations). Some data will need little protection because of the obviousness of the change. However, almost all data for military use will need some level of protection from tampering. Sensor data will most assuredly need protection from tamperingall the way from collection to transmission to storage to retrieval. Information tamperproofing will be a strong pillar in defensive information warfare. Some techniques for providing information tamperproofing are possible with current technology. Encryption, user identification, data correlation, consistency checking, and error correction techniques would all be applicable. However, the actual development of cohesive methodologies that could be applied to military data is mostly unaddressed. In the short term, data tamperproofing is more of a problem to the military and certain other critical infrastructure organizations than it is to the commercial market. Even a bank can tolerate some level of tampering since their loss is usually money, the loss of which most large banks have accepted as they would any other fraudulent loss. For the military, however, much more may be at stake.
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Canada
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
Much of the R&D on encryption is applicable for use in information tamperproofing. (See Section 10.4 for more information on this topic.) Some R&D is being done on watermarking (photos in particular) for copyrighting purposes. However, the R&D needs for the military extend far beyond watermarking techniques.
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SECTION 10.8INFORMATION VISUALIZATION AND REPRESENTATION

Highlights Decision makers will become immersed in their environment by using a 3-D representation, such as holographic imaging or VR capabilities. Using visualization and VR, decision makers will not be required to be sophisticated technologically or be expected to initiate or define the details of inquiring methodology.
OVERVIEW Information visualization and representation is defined as those capabilities employed to view, or make visible, an abstraction of information using physical techniques that include those processing capabilities used to present a data abstraction in a clear and appropriate manner. In the future, information will be presented in a manner that is easy to comprehend quickly at any level of decision making and in a presentation style chosen by the user. This capability will be available for individual or group presentation, without requiring users to have knowledge of the underlying IS structure or internal activities. ISs will collect, monitor, and protect information with such accuracy and reliability that the user is confident of the quality of the data representation and accepts it as a basis for decision making. The underlying ISs will contain an ability to initiate automated self-protection, automated maintenance and repair, and automated disaster detection and recovery. This will be done in a reliable, self-checking and selfdeconflicting fashion. When users are presented displays constructed from within an IS, they will have confidence in the validity of these displays. Data and analytic presentation will be rapid and inexpensive so that multiple users can simultaneously access and inquire about the same information while residing at different locations and using quite different viewer style preferences. Rapid what-if analyses will be processed simultaneously, without interference or delay to others engaged in similar inquiry. RATIONALE Decision making in a military situation can be based upon manifold, interdependent (although not obviously so) events or situations occurring anywhere in the world. Analyses and correlation of event content may require a search through substantial amounts of data maintained in different formats distributed across memory located in different, geographically distant systems. Decision makers will not be required to be sophisticated technologically or be expected to initiate or define the details of inquiry methodology. Decision support data will be made rapidly available to command authorities. A numeric data credibility level will be declared as a component of the results of each inquiry. Decision makers need analytic results of event correlation to be presented in a fashion congruent with their own personal mode of thinking and understanding. Genetic variation creates humans who process information in quite discordant dominant modes and in different combinations of visual, quantitative, or verbal preference. To reduce misunderstanding, ambiguity, or delay in forming a combat decision, data presentation styles will include a selective capability to accommodate those individual preferences. A variety of scenario options that can be explored automatically by the IS and presented in summary form will be available. Decision makers will be able to select and view any desired level of detail upon voice command. Uttering an oral request will modify presentation scale. Analyses will be initiated on request by pointing to a remote graphic, map, chart, or table displayed on a wall using a lightpen or wand.
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There may be a need for real-time gathering of information with ongoing specialized analyses, based not only upon requested information but also upon algorithmically derived scenarios offered for optional consideration by the decision maker. The IS will be able to present a projection of the consequences of actions currently being employed and in progress. For example, the viewer could be presented with possible results of the current course of action, based upon automatic algorithmically derived options. Combat is always less than predictable and infested with surprise. This real-time analytic capability does not ensure the outcome, but it does improve a capability to discover errors while sufficient time remains to intervene, recover, or support a stressed force. In the future, many decision makers will become immersed in their information environment by using a 3-D representation, such as holographic imaging or VR capabilities. The 3-D presentations will be appropriate for use by individuals and groups. In some situations, robots will be employed to represent individuals acting in a scenario. Individuals will not have to be collocated physically to participate but will appear to other participants in surrogate likeness or simulation. This capability will compensate for situations with personnel limitations. In addition to use in decision making, these presentation capabilities will be used for training and in a variety of other aspects of military preparation. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.8-1) The United States leads the world in most of these technologies. They are primarily resident technologies now being employed throughout the commercial entertainment industry. Exceptions are in the area of VR. Several countries, notably Sweden and the United Kingdom, are also strong in VR technology and implementation. For integrated distributed visualization and analysis systems [e.g., Multi-dimensional User-oriented Synthetic Environment (uSE), MUSE Technologies of Albuquerque, New Mexico, is an international leader in the development of perceptual computing software and solutions that help computer users understand complex information by presenting data using sight, sound, and other methods of representation. Users of the uSE can engage in dynamic collaboration and share insight and information across all types of networks. For additional information on uSE Software Development Environment 2000, see http://www.musetech.com/index.html).
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Sensor Platforms
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Measuring Measuring Sensing Statistical Gradient Enhancement Sensing Arrays/Systems Arrays/Systems
Limited R&D
Figure 10.8-1. Information Visualization and Representation Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.8. INFORMATION VISUALIZATION AND REPRESENTATION

Graphics Accelerator Technology ................................................................................................ III-10-151 Virtual Reality (VR) Display Technology .................................................................................... III-10-153 Virtual Reality (VR) Human Representation ................................................................................. III-10-155 The following developing technologies have been identified, but data sheets are not available at this time:
Algorithmically Derived Scenarios Coordinated Distributed Activities (Communications, Database Retrieval, and So Forth) Cross Section of Images Distributed Virtual Reality (VR) Scenarios Group Virtual Reality (VR) Holography Presentation Based on Viewer Style
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DATA SHEET III-10.8. GRAPHICS ACCELERATOR TECHNOLOGY

Ability to process and generate a dynamic scene at rates exceeding 1.5 Gpixels/sec on a single or multiple display devices. None identified. None identified. Digital scene generation software and manipulation tailored to model dynamic response of military platforms and sensors. See Background for amplifying discussion. Ability to fabricate and integrate key elements of circuitry, including internal memory access channels with bandwidths exceeding 10Gbyte/sec and external bandwidths or 3.2 Gbyte/sec or greater. Ability to fabricate high density very large-scale integration/very high-speed integrated circuit (VLSI)/VHSIC chips at .15 micron or lower Effective integration of hardware support for advanced image-generation features, including anti-aliasing, texture and lighting effects, and bump-mapping. Development and implementation of scalable processing techniques and algorithms, especially those based on open standards that might allow the use of low-cost mass market commodity graphics boards in a high performance (> 1.5 Gpixel/sec) system.
Technical Issues
Games, entertainment, including interactive digital video disk (DVD). This technology is likely to be driven by mass market products.
RATIONALE Augmented-reality displays involving effective integration of live or computer-generated dynamic scenes with knowledge representation from very large data sets will be required to allow the level of battlespace awareness required to achieve information superiority objectives defined in Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010. To be effective, commanders and other combatant personnel must be able to operate effectively for extended periods of time. One of the key research areas will be the effects (both operational and long-term) of extended use of visually coupled systems. This critical developing technology addresses four closely related functional aspects of displays that are known to affect operator performance: the frame rate, response time, resolution, and fidelity of the representation. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel Singapore UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Italy South Korea United States
France Japan Spain

Moderate R&D
Germany Netherlands Sweden
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Graphics generators/accelerators represent perhaps the single fastest-advancing segment of the IT market, with performance increasing 8-fold every 18 months. The current state of the art now provides an affordable means of
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generating stereo imagery at pixel fill rates that approach the requirements for fully immersive systems. However, further advances will probably be needed to realize the level of fidelity and performance needed to support operational military requirements. (See Background for discussion of state-of-the-art and drivers.) The United States and Japan are world leaders in this technology, which is driven by the commercial sector. Leading firms include nVidia and 3Dfx (in chip technology), Quantum3D (which uses the 3Dfx chips in high-end multichannel systems), and Evans & Sutherland in the area of complete systems. In terms of complexity and performance, the Sony PlayStation2 chipset is the state-of-the-art. The chip set includes a general purpose microprocessor [based on a Multimission Image Processing Subsystem (MIPS) design] capable of delivering 6.2 GFLOPS and a graphics processor chip which U.S. industry representatives have calculated to be capable of 1.2-Gpixels/sec performance. These chips are extremely large (approaching 1 in. on a side) and the advertised price of the complete PlayStation is on the order of $320 U.S. dollars. Canada (Matrox and ATI) has traditionally been a world leader in this technology. However, based on advertised performance, they appear to be one or two generations behind the world leaders. Similarly, the EU program High Performance Kiosk and Desktop System (HIPER-KIDS) is basically a high-performance rasterizer with limited graphics processing capabilities. This project developed a graphics rasterizer based on Xilinx field programmable gate array chip technology. A Finnish firm, BitBoys Oy, advertises to have the potential capability to design a state-of-the-art chip that, according to their corporate literature, will be fabricated by Infeon (a spin-off from Seimens). This development is significant because it promises the fastest performance yet indicated (2.4 Gpixels/sec). However, at the current time (January 2000), a lower performance product (advertised as capable of 1.2 Gpixels/sec) is not scheduled for release until spring 2000.) In France, the INRIA Project SIAMES (Synthse dimage, animation, modlisation et simulation [trans. Synthesis of image, animation, modeling and simulation) is active in a range of supporting activity algorithm development activities, including state-of-the-art parallel processing techniques. New developments in DRAM-based technologies provide designers with the opportunity to integrate huge amounts of dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), and logic on a single chip. The process of embedding logic in DRAMs is being offered by SMST (Germany), a recently established joint venture of Philips (headquartered in the Netherlands) and IBM. In addition, Philips is actively pursuing the development and marketing of graphics processing for DVD applications, such as the TriMedia (TM1300) Programmable Media Processor. This product is aimed at the mass market for multi-media and does not have the performance or functionality of the state-of-the-art graphics processors. However, this product is indicative of a capability. BACKGROUND The rate of advance of the state-of-the-art is advertised by the industry to be an 8-fold increase in performance every 18 months. One or more of the handful of industry leaders cited brings a new generation to market about every 6 months. The followers in the market tend to trail the state of the art slightly. For example, the current leaders are using 0.18-micron technology, while the followers are in the range of 0.20.25 micron technology. The rapid advance to date has been the result of larger scale application of semiconductor manufacturing (the massive chips used in the Sony Playstation2 being an example.) Recent reports are that the Semiconductor Industries Association (SIA) Road Map accelerates the projected availability of 0.13-micron technology. Two major Taiwanese foundriesTaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing and UMC Groupare reported to be targeting 2001 for a 130-nm ramp. See Internet web site http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19991122S0013. The availability of state-of-the-art design and fabrication may be a significant factor in the evolution of global capability. The advance of application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) technology and field programmable gate arrays (which are the basis of the HIPER-KIDS chipset) make the technology accessible. At the same time, the state of the art is clearly being driven by a small number of firms that have the experience with and the access to much larger scale VLSI/VHSIC technology.
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DATA SHEET III-10.8. VIRTUAL REALITY (VR) DISPLAY TECHNOLOGY

Ability to match human vision acuity over a field of view exceeding 90 degrees (horizontal) by 70 degrees vertical, with a refresh rate > 100 frames/sec. None identified. None identified. Digital scene generation software and manipulation tailored to model dynamic response of military platforms and sensors. Ability to achieve full-immersion for training and/or to enhance operator tactical responsespecifically, to match visual acuity with low response time for realistic operator training (see background discussion.). Human factors design and packaging to achieve non-intrusive immersion and response to head and eye movements. Commercial applications parallel those of the military and tend to fall into high-end dynamic training for aircraft, helicopters, and land and marine vehicles. Advances in the underlying technologies, at the present and for the foreseeable future, are driven by mass-market demand for entertainment and gaming products. At present, systems that begin to approach the levels listed as critical are relatively expensive ($50,000$100,000). Because the technology is being driven by the gaming sector, cost/performance will continue to decline.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Significant advances will be required in visually coupled displays to achieve the level of VR required to support future combat mission rehearsal needs. (See Background for discussion of current state of the art and limitations.) The critical developing technologies should provide sufficient fidelity and realism to allow combatants to proceed from training and rehearsal directly to operation without an appreciable recovery time. In addition, full immersion, when coupled with improved capabilities for and knowledge representation from very large data sets, will allow the level of battlespace awareness required to achieve information superiority objectives defined in Joint Vision and Army Vision 2010. A specific military requirement to which this technology would contribute is in future follow-ons to rapid battlefield terrain visualization Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Japan United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Netherlands

Significant R&D
France Sweden

Moderate R&D
Germany UK
Limited R&D
Two key global trends are likely to have a dramatic affect on the rate at which technology for immersive displays develops over the next 5 years. The first trend is the rapid advance in graphics acceleratorswith performance increasing 8-fold every 18 months. The current state of the art now provides an affordable means of generating stereo imagery at pixel fill-rates that approach the requirements for fully immersive systems. The second trend is the global investment in the development of underlying display materials technologies.
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Within the United States, the following organizations are identified as being active in VR display technology: University of Washington, Human Interface Technology (HIT) Laboratory MIT, Media Laboratory University of Illinois/University of Iowa [Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE)]18 NRL Commercial companies (e.g., Barco, Fakespace) University of North Carolina [image-based modeling and spatially immersive display (Office of the Future)].
In evaluating worldwide technical capabilities, it must be noted that none of the existing displays, with the possible exception of the CAE Link fiber-optic product, appear to approach the levels defined for the next-generation critical developing technology. The specific products described indicate an investment and position in the market that portend a future potential to advance the state-of-the-art to the critical developing levels identified. Much of the other current research cited tends to be in the areas of supporting image representation and generation and, within the EU, in display materials. Canada has traditionally been a world leader in this technology. The CAE Link fiber-optic HMD (developed in the early-to-mid 1990s) remains the state of the art. Among the features it provides are full stereo imaging capability and an eye-slaved high-resolution inset in the center of the field of view (2.2 arc-minutes/pixel) and 1.2 million pixels distributed between the inset and the lower resolution (6.0 arc-minute/pixel) in the background. With a 120 H 55 V field of view, it is also one of the most immersive of the visually coupled subsystems. Canada is also well positioned in the mid-range of products, represented by liquid crystal. Canada has a strong underlying infrastructure in supporting data visualization and digital scene generation to support applications development. The Human-Computer Interaction Laboratory at the University of New Brunswick is a recognized Center of Excellence for Visualization. Other centers include the Media and Graphics Interdisciplinary Center at the University of British Columbia and the VR group at McGill University. The United States and Japan have strong efforts in visual display technology. Most of the effort in Japan is aimed at mass market consumer computer and gaming products. The Sony Glasstron is the state-of-the-art for lowcost gaming displays. Ericcson Saab Avionics of Sweden manufactures an HMD with high resolution (2.5 arc-minutes/pixel) over a 53 H 41 V field of view. However, the CRT technology used makes for a relatively heavy unit (8 lbs). Most of the work within the EU ESPRIT and BRITE/EURAM programs is aimed at more conventional displays and on supporting graphics processing and representation techniques required to meet display requirements for a wide range of business, engineering design, and medical applications. BACKGROUND The current level of technology for visual VR displays does not adequately support realistic immersion to the point where effective, time-critical combat mission rehearsal can be conducted. Existing combat mission simulation is adequate for general operator training. However, the lack of true stereoscopic immersion and the minute delays in response time caused by processing delay and frame rate create anomalous training effects that may degrade performance if a sufficient recovery time is not allowed between training and live operation.
18
The CAVE is a surround-screen, surround-sound, projection-based VR system. Projecting 3-D computer graphics into a 10 10 9 cube composed of display screens that completely surround the viewer creates the illusion of immersion. It is coupled with head and hand tracking systems to produce the correct stereo perspective and to isolate the position and orientation of a 3-D input device. A sound system provides audio feedback. The viewer explores the virtual world by moving around inside the cube and grabbing objects with a three-button, wand-like device.
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DATA SHEET III-10.8. VIRTUAL REALITY (VR) HUMAN REPRESENTATION

Ability to produce realistic avatars of human actors/operators, with sufficient fidelity to allow effective interaction of live human operators and system-generated resources in real-time tactical environments. None identified. None identified. Specially designed applications software for adapting state-of-the-art imagegeneration software incorporating "texture and lighting" and bump-mapping capabilities to specific military applications; software models characterizing human physical and behavioral response to military-operations-induced stress. Understanding/characterization of human response to military situations and the response of human operators to computer generated avatars; quantification of the potential benefits of using computer-generated avatars in tactical situations; development of specific design criteria and specification for the degree of fidelity in representation required to achieve benefits and meet requirements. Commercial applications in gaming and entertainment are driving this technology. The texture and lighting and the bump-mapping features are now standard embedded features of commercial software for mass-market commodity graphics boards for PCs and games. The growing COTS capability will yield affordable hardware. The driving aspect of affordability relates to the potential for increasing crew effectiveness at reduced manning levels.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE R&D activities in tactical decision making and training give strong evidence that human interaction has a significant impact on the effectiveness of INFO EXCH. With increased pressures for lower staffing levels in all aspects of combat, activities are investigating the potential of avatarscomputer-generated agentsto help improve the flow of information to increase situational awareness and reduce stress. Improving the flow of information is a critical aspect of maintaining information superiority and ensuring timely and effective action for precision engagement and full dimension protection as envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. Past events have indicated that, in many cases of combat loss or collateral damage, the systems worked properly (i.e., the targets or threats were correctly sensed and the data presented). The breakdowns that occurred resulted because operators failed to notice or attend properly to the data presented. Introducing the "human" element in the sensor presentation has the potential to increase operator alertness and attention, particularly under information-rich conditions. Beyond the near-term (510 years), improved abilities to model multiple-actor interactions will allow more realistic and effective trainingboth crew training and command decision making. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Czech Republic Israel Russia Sweden United States
Legend:
France Japan Singapore Switzerland

Significant R&D
Germany Netherlands South Africa Ukraine
India Norway South Korea UK
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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Activity in this technology is driven increasingly by a combination of a demand for improved realism and fidelity in computer-generated characters for gaming and entertainment and a growing availability of technology and university programs in human performance modeling. The activities and organizations cited are examples and do not constitute a comprehensive or exhaustive listing. Military research in the United States includes Activities at NRL The Computerized Anthropometric Research and Design Laboratory and the Crew System Ergonomics Information Analysis Center (CSERIAC) at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio The U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Survivability/Lethality Directorate work in modeling of casualties Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Division San Diego, work in Tactical Decision-Making Under Stress (TADMUS), while not directly related, has relevant research relating to human operator response to voice input.
Other efforts identified in the United States include: George Washington University. National Crash Analysis Center (NCAC). The NCAC is a Federal Highway Administration (FHA)-funded research center concentrating in Human Modeling/Occupant Safety vehicle crashworthiness research http://www.ncac.gwu.edu/ Georgia Tech. work in simulating Human Motion http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/animation/Areas/ humanMotion/humanMotion.html New York University. Media Research Laboratory and the Improv Project, a system for real-time animation of behavior-based Interactive Synthetic Actors (http://www.mrl.nyu.edu/improv/index.html) University of Pennsylvania, Department of Computer and Information Science, Center for Human Modeling and Simulation. This department conducts research in modeling and animation of human movement and related research ranging from image synthesis to natural language interfaces. Applications include MediSim, and JACK, a 3D interactive environment for controlling articulated figures featuring a detailed human model that includes realistic behavioral controls, anthropometric scaling, task animation and evaluation systems, view analysis, automatic reach and grasp, collision detection and avoidance, and many other useful tools for a wide range of applications.
Among foreign activities, the following are highlighted: University of Geneva, MIRALab ( http://miralabwww.unige.ch/). The MIRALab research group at the University of Geneva was founded in 1989 by Nadia Magnenat-Thalmann (one of the world leading experts in the field of virtual humans and virtual worlds). It includes VR, computer animation, and telerobotics work A key objective of the lab is to assemble researchers from several disciplines (computer science and electrical engineering, physics and mathematics, networking and multimedia, architecture and design, psychology, videoart, and so forth) and to forge links between them in a broad effort to understand human functionality and to simulate it in a realistic way. An important policy is to work toward their research goals in the context of productions accessible to the general publicnot just demos but interactive shows where the audience is entertained while being brought up to date on technical innovations, and can judge and react. The general research areas at MIRALab include the design of networked virtual worlds, real-time recognition of emotions and interactive reactions of virtual humans through emotional models, rapid photograph-based cloning techniques that allow simulation of facial expressions, and direct communication between real and virtual humans using speech, emotions, and facial expressions. The group also specializes in the simulation of physics-based deformable models, such as clothing and hair. Other work focuses biomechanical models in the simulation of wrinkles and the aging process.
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Approximately one third of the research is dedicated to medical informatics, including topological models for the reconstruction of muscles, bones and skin, as well as simulation processes. MIRALab is funded largely through its intensive participation in several European projects and its collaborations with the private sector. Much of the fundamental research is supported as part of the Swiss National Research Projects. Loughborough University (Leicestershire, United Kingdom) has a program, Human Measurements, Anthropmetry and Grow Research Group (HUMAG) at the Department of Human Sciences. The major objective of HUMAG is to promote and pursue applied research in human structure, growth, and function and to develop techniques relevant to this purpose (e.g., the novel 3-D whole body scanner). The organization and undertaking of anthropometric survey work has been a prominent feature of this group's activities. University of British Columbia (Canada). The universitys FaceMaker is based on a hierarchical spline modeler, called the dragon editor. It is a WWW front end to the animation subsystem, and does not incorporate interactive modeling tools (see http://zeppo.cs.ubc.ca:5656/) Laboratoire d'infographie (LIG)/Ecole Polytechnique Fderal de Lausanne (EPFL). The Computer Graphics Lab (LIG) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) in Lausanne was founded in July 1988. The laboratory is mainly involved in computer animation and VR. LIG is especially well-known for the creation and animation of virtual actors. Research is oriented towards virtual humans in virtual worlds. Researchers model body and face surfaces, and then motion is generated based on physical laws, AI, and behavioral laws. Efforts include models for walking, grasping, motion synchronization, collision detection and perception. Also included is work on more complex models based on muscular mechanics for medical applications. Researchers are investigating techniques of VR and real-time interaction to allow the immersion of the user in these virtual worlds and the use of gesture-based commands, interactive physical deformations, and shared virtual environments.
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SECTION 10.9MODELING AND SIMULATION

Highlights To assist human decision makers, models based upon behavioral characteristics of psychological and social disciplines will be developed. Simulators will contain sufficient logic to collect, analyze, and present information automatically and in such a manner that the user will have confidence in the resulting data analyses and representations being presented. Every military system will be aided by simulation, either to expand the capability of the human user or to replace entirely certain functions that were previously performed by human users.
OVERVIEW Modeling is defined here as the mathematical, statistical, or algorithmic representation of real-world aspects that can be used to determine characteristics and parameters of interest. Simulation is defined here as the capabilities of taking on the appearance, form, sound, or other characteristics of some aspect of the real world, most often associated with a time progression when implemented. In common usage, the term modeling has acquired a wide range of connotation and application, which generically includes concepts such as a business model, a toy, advocated behavior, or someone displaying clothing fashions. Without constraint or loss of generality, special consideration is given to models described with terms such as theoretical, analytic, stochastic, discrete, continuous, empirical, or deterministic. Provided with a data flow, models can interact with other models, with simulations, or with external objects. Modeling, as an information tool, remains useful across a substantial range of applied and theoretical disciplines that include, but are not limited to, physical, biological, social, and computational systems. Imperfection is a property of every model to the extent that the model fails to replicate the irrational behavior occasionally encountered in humans or physical phenomena not previously observed. Having created a model of appropriate complexity to mirror some object or systemic behavior adequately, one can employ a model for simulation purposes. Basically, simulation exploits a models structure by constraining selected variables, thus permitting examination of resulting consequences through use of what if kinds of inquiry. Decision making in a military context will continue to require timely analysis based upon disparate, interdependent (although not obviously so) facts arising anywhere in the world. With an increase in the abundance of data flowing into C2 nodes, analysis will require systematic capability and deliberate correlation of data arriving in different formats from many different systems that may have been designed for other purposes. Decision makers are not required to be sophisticated or knowledgeable technologically concerning the details of computational processing. Humans will defer underlying control aspects of information gathering and presentation to systems while retaining active professional judgment, participatory evaluation, and intervention decision choice over any analyses or correlation recommendations presented by the system. Systems of superb design are quite capable of finding unexpected correlation between or among events that seem to share no common or plausible relationship. Since correlation does not imply causality, a careful evaluation of all results presented by any IS remains an essential, active, and participatory function of decision makers at every user level. A system will automatically evaluate a variety of expanding options for presentation in routine formats and selected reports. Uncritical or complacent acceptance of system-generated wisdom is not recommended. Blind faith in a system can result in military tragedy. M&S will be used for a wide variety of purposes: what-if analyses; game-playing analyses; predicting or enumerating likely future action of an opponent; replacing the human interface; and testing, validating, or assessing security of other systems. Essentially, every military system will be aided by simulation, either to expand the capability of the human user or to replace entirely certain functions that were previously performed by a human user.
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Simulation will aid in policing ISs for security; managing the systems to optimize efficient use; detecting internal faults and automatically correcting them; scheduling and integrating events; and training personnel. Simulation systems will adapt to the user automatically to provide an appropriate interface while requiring no special user knowledge of the internal workings of the IS on which they are based. For training purposes, simulation will serve as a productivity enhancement. Simulation will broaden essential skills, maintain skills currency, and serve to extend organic unit performance capabilities during periods of personnel stress or manpower limitation. RATIONALE There will be an enduring need for real-time gathering of information that requires ongoing, specialized analyses. Analytic performance will be structured upon formally requested information and upon algorithmically derived scenario generation. An IS will be able to present a rational projection of consequences and requirements of courses of action currently being considered, integrating both tactical and logistic factors. For example, the viewer of a status condition or inquiry can be presented with information germane to the current course of action or with particulars essential to a current decision process, based upon algorithmically derived options and limitations. Modeling support to these simulations will require the use of several disciplines not conventionally associated with IS operations activities. To represent the human decision maker and social and group behavior, models based upon psychological and social disciplines will be developed. Simulations will contain sufficient logic to collect, analyze, and present information automatically and in such a manner that the user has confidence in the analyses and representations being presented or displayed. The underlying ISs will have a built-in capability for automated self-protection, automated maintenance and repair, and automated disaster detection and recovery. All this will be done in a reliable, self-correlating, and automatic deconflicting manner. Processing and presentation will be sufficiently rapid and responsive to permit multiple users to work interactively, or in isolation, simultaneously on the same problem in a coordinated fashion (e.g., in a war gaming situation). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (see Figure 10.9-1) The United States leads the world in most of these technologies. Strength in M&S also exists in Germany, France, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Japan is particularly strong in use of simulating processes.
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Modeling and Simulation
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 10.9-1. Modeling and Simulation Technology WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-10.9. MODELING AND SIMULATION

Behavior Modeling .................................................................................................................. III-10-165 Deterministic Modeling ............................................................................................................ III-10-167 Discrete Event (DE) Simulation ................................................................................................. III-10-169 Distributed Simulation ............................................................................................................. III-10-171 The following developing technology has been identified, but a data sheet is not available at this time: Biological and Psychological Models Cross Section of Images Mathematical Modeling of Behavior Multi-resolution Modeling Natural Environment Modeling Virtual Prototyping Modeling
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DATA SHEET III-10.9. BEHAVIOR MODELING

Ability to predict reliably individual and group human performance and response to a realistic range of military situations as a function of any of a number of variables, including fatigue, threat intensity, and physical or psychological stress. None identified. None identified. Specially designed software and algorithms characterizing human response. Wide variability and lack of subject uniformity and subject response to different conditions. Significant economic dimensions associated with application of the technology to personnel evaluation, marketing, and effective management of human resources. None identified.
RATIONALE The initial objectives of emerging research in this area will be directed toward meeting simulation requirements for realism in computer-generated actors (CGAs). Current models of CGAs depend upon scripted or random actions, which may be only generally related to the current situation as it exists at a given time in the model. As a result, the actions are either sub-optimal (i.e., the random or scripted selection may not reflect the optimal decisions that a human operator would make) or predictable (i.e., more easily circumvented by human operators). Current simulated forces behave unrealistically and lack higher cognitive capabilities. The opportunity exists to: Exploit novel architectures and knowledge representation schemes to improve model robustness and capability Inject optimization techniques, such as genetic algorithms and neural networks Explore applications of fuzzy logic fuzzy neural systems already proven effective in high-level robotic control Inject realistic behavior modulator (e.g., fatigue) effect
Adopt integrated architectural approaches to improve model cognitive skill, scalability, flexibility, and usability at the individual, team, and organizational levels.
In the near term (510 year time frame), the goal is to develop CGAs (individuals and groups) whose behavior will accurately simulate for training purposes the range of responses that human operators will exhibit when exposed to the same tactical situations. Beyond that time span, further research will be needed to determine whether modeling of human behavior can be made accurate and reliable enough to permit probabilities of actions and behavioral tendencies to be predicted for mission planning and rehearsal and operational C4I2 support.
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France Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Switzerland

Significant R&D
Italy UK

Moderate R&D
Netherlands United States

Limited R&D
The United States has the largest body of research directed toward CGAs for military M&S; however, modeling of human behavior is an area of widespread academic research. Much of this work is focused on meeting the objectives of the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW). In the United States, key players in the area of CGAs include the NASA Virtual Environment Technology Laboratory, University of Houston, U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM), and related work at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, which is a recognized Center of Excellence for M&S. The Advanced Distributed Simulation Research Consortium (ADSRC), consisting of Grambling State University, Florida A&M University, the University of Houston, and the University of Central Florida, conducts research in the application of parallel and distributed evaluation, visualization, and AI reasoning to advanced distributed interactive simulation (DIS). Other activities identified include those at the Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence (NCARAI) at NRL, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), and University of Michigan (Soar)19. The Soar Intelligent Forces (IFOR) effort is a collaborative effort between researchers at the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) School of Computer Science, the University of Michigans Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, NCARAI at NRL, and the University of Southern Californias Information Sciences Institute. The European Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Engineering (EURISCO) in Toulouse (France), the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands, and the School of Computer Science University of Birmingham Cognitive Science Research Centre in the United Kingdom have programs in modeling of human behavior. The objective of the United Kingdoms University of Cambridge cognition and emotion program is to develop a theoretical understanding of the nature of emotion and of the cognitive (e.g., attention, interpretation, memory) and brain processes that support normal emotional behavior and response, as well as emotional disorders. The Geneva Emotion Research Group is part of the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences at the University of Geneva and conducts emotions research, including experimental studies on emotion-antecedent appraisal, emotion induction, and physiological reactions to emotional behavior in autonomous agents. While this work is primarily directed toward modeling and understanding of individual and group interactions in civilian settings, the underlying data and techniques should be transferable to military scenarios.
19
Soar is a mature, state-of-the-art AI architecture conceived in the early 1980s.
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DATA SHEET III-10.9. DETERMINISTIC MODELING

Use of deterministic models to characterize and/or predict performance of complex non-linear systems of multi-element forces in tactical environments. None identified. None identified. Specially-designed software and algorithms for effective modeling of chaotic behaviors of complex, non-linear systems. Because of the inherent nature of chaos and non-linear systems in linkages between computer simulation, deterministic model equations and natural phenomena can break down at virtually any arbitrary scale. Significant economic dimensions associated with application of the technology cause a wide range of non-linear systems design problems. Currently, largely an area of academic research. None identified.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Deterministic models can be used to represent heterogeneous force structures and terrain, such as obstacles, gradients, and so forth. One example, Oak Ridge National Laboratorys DCOR,20 has been stated to accurately compute a variety of maneuvers including splitting, turning, and regrouping, among others. This program has also been benchmarked against results of staggered defense scenarios to verify its accuracy. Visualization and animation techniques have been developed to reduce the complexity and sheer size of the generated data to graphical depictions easily comprehendible by the user. Benefits of deterministic modeling include efficient use of human resources by simplifying input preparation and output interpretation; efficient use of computational resources; rapid execution of sensitivity analyses for optimal strategy (what if scenarios); and versatility resulting in quick adaptation of the code to more general and even nonmilitary competitive situations (e.g., economic competition, coalitions, low intensity conflict, and so forth). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The growing cost of hardware development and test in virtually every product area, coupled with the worldwide availability of low-cost computing power, has made M&S a major area research worldwide. The Society for Computer Simulation International (SCSI) boasts worldwide participation. Among the activities of interest (as a measure of globalization), SCSI has established a virtual institute, the McLeod Institute of Simulation Sciences, whose purpose is to promote the advance and dissemination of M&S technology. International institute members include:
20
Belgium: University of Ghent
DCOR is a deterministic combat model code (see http://nas.cped.ornl.gov/nas-codes/docr.html).
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Canada: the University of Calgary, Laurentian University, and the University of Ottawa Germany: Technical University of Clausthal Hungary: Hungarian Academy of Sciences Italy: National Research Center (CNR) Latvia: Riga Technical University Mexico: Universidad Panamericana; China-Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Poland: Polish Academy of Sciences Scotland: University of Edinburgh United Kingdom: De Montfort University.
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DATA SHEET III-10.9. DISCRETE EVENT (DE) SIMULATION

Techniques for distributed parallel modeling of discrete events to permit faster than real-time modeling of complex military operations. None identified. None identified. Software for distribution of discrete event modeling for processing of multiple parallel processors. Monitoring and control of sequencing and dependencies among multiple discrete events and characterization and assurance of processes between discrete events, particularly for complex systems in environments whose characteristics are not wellordered or predictable. Process control and transportation modeling. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The purpose of a DE simulation is to study a complex system by computing the times that would be associated with real events in a real-life situation. While one can carry out a simulation in real time (clock timethe clock on the wall), a DE simulation permits the system to compute, as quickly as possible, the physical times that still occur in real time in a physical system, without waiting for the delays between events to occur in real time. Thus, DE modeling lends itself to faster-than-real-time simulation, which, in turn, allows the exploration and exercise of multiple scenarios and alternative battle management options to optimize force and weapon assignments. Turnaround time increases with the level of fidelity in each entity or increased number of entities and/or longer simulation time in the scenario. The critical technology for solving this shortfall is to apply parallel processing techniques, such as optimistic parallel processing. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China UK

Significant R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The DE domain provides a general framework for time-oriented simulations of systems such as queuing networks, communication networks, and high-level models of computer architectures. In this domain, events happen at discrete points on the real time line. Each event corresponds to a change of the system state. Each event also has an associated time stamp, which results in a totally ordered set. Faster (DE) simulation can be achieved by using dedicated co-processors to speed up event evaluation or control task execution or by developing or improving algorithms and protocols to operate on switched clusters or networks of workstations. As with other aspects of M&S, international interest in DE modeling is extensive. Centers of Excellence identified in the United States include Virginia Tech University, the University of Central Florida, Syracuse University, the University of Arizona, the University of Florida, and the University of California Berkeley. Also for DE simulations, much research is being conducted and much expertise resides in U.S. DoD
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Laboratories [e.g., NRL, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), ARL, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) and so forth] and in Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) [e.g., RAND Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Center for Naval Analyses (CAN), and so forth). European sites identified as doing work in DE modeling include the Universit de Bretagne Occidentale in France and the University of Magdeburg in Germany. Several universities and private concerns in the United Kingdom are also active in this area, primarily as a tool for structured systems analysis and design.
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DATA SHEET III-10.9. DISTRIBUTED SIMULATION

Ability to seamlessly inter-network 1,000 or more real actors and CGAs, with sufficient fidelity and response time so that the actors perceive themselves as interacting in realtime with the actual tactical environment. None identified. None identified. Software for real-time evaluation and optimization of network and processing tasks designed specifically to implement the M&S HLA and Run-Time Infrastructure (RTI) for military DIS. Real-time management of distributed networks and routing and local storage of critical information resources, particularly in video resource-intensive environments. M&S of distributed industrial and business enterprises. Ability to model and verify operational characteristics of geographically dispersed units provides major cost savings over traditional field exercises.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In considering this subarea, it is useful to distinguish between the formal standard called DIS (Distributed interactive simulation), which is a mature and relatively limited technology, and critical developing technologies for distributed simulation. Ultimately, the use of DIS is envisioned as improving force readiness and effectiveness by allowing forces stationed in geographically dispersed locations to train together in a realistic, many-on-many environment. As implied in the entry under technical issues, distribution of knowledge about the entities is critical. Older DIS standards assume distribution of the complete database to all entities before the simulation starts. Ultimately, something more robust will be required (e.g., allowing dynamic accessing of knowledge from other entities in the simulation as well as global information about the battlespace environment and the state of other players). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Netherlands
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Switzerland

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Italy United States

Limited R&D
The United States is a world leader in this area, and the HLA and RTI have emerged and are becoming widely accepted as de facto standards for distributed simulation by the international community. Even though the United States has made strides in distributed simulation technology and HLA had provided a great leap in capability, many shortfalls still exist in distributed simulation, such as lack of: Robust time management Multi-level security Data servers Federation verification, validation, and authentication (VV&A)
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Real-time support Consistent natural environment representation, interpretation, and calculation and translation of the environmental effects in different simulations in a federation.
Examples of global research in the development and application of HLA include work at the Interactive Information Institute, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, a cross-faculty institute that is becoming a major base for simulation technology research in Australia. The Distributed Knowledge Processing Group at the United Kingdoms University of Surrey is also actively pursuing techniques for distributed simulation. In Germany, the University of Magdeburg, the University of Hamburg, and the German National Research Center for Information Technology are also active in this area.
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SECTION 11: LASERS AND OPTICS TECHNOLOGY
September 2000
SECTION 11LASERS AND OPTICS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 Lasers......................................................................... III-11-7 Optics....................................................................... III-11-57 Optical Materials and Processes............................. III-11-75 Supporting Technologies and Applications .........III-11-113 Optoelectronics and Photonics Technology.........III-11-143
Highlights Lasers (coherent radiation) permit observation of the structures and dynamics of molecules, crystals, and proteins. This technology is predicted to become a revolutionary tool for better understanding molecular physics, particularly in the field of medicine. Microreplication and fabrication of microelectronic components using lasers will be significantly improved by means of shorter exposure times, higher intensity excellent collimation, and better resolution available with newly developed laser technology. Rapid advances in laser diode bar and array manufacturing are now pacing solid-state laser development for DoD mid-infrared (IR) countermeasures (CM), remote battlefield sensing, illumination, and laser range finder (LRF)/designators and laser weapons. Short-wavelength coherent laser radiation may permit observation of the structures and dynamics of molecules, crystals, and proteins in vivo. The battlefield efficiency of modern (platforms) armor, aircraft, missiles, and infantry will be greatly increased through the use of new lasers, along with the use of sophisticated detection and imaging systems for target acquisition, tracking, fire-control systems, and remote communications. The deeper penetration of the high-energy photons (X-ray, -ray lasers) in a target overcomes the countermeasures designed against beams that deposit energy on the surface such as long-wavelength lasers. Nanotechnology will result in significant improvement in electro-optic and nonlinear optic devices, which will have widespread military applications. Micro-optics will begin complementing and then replacing electronic components on chips, reducing heat and improving speed and throughput while reducing cost. Continued advances in optical coating material technologies will result in improved hardness capability of various military optics hardware. Lightweight technology for space optics, vital to our space requirements, will be addressed by numerous new technology applications of high-strength composites. Integrated design, fabrication, test, and assembly methods will permit the transition of todays hybrid optical devices into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and high performance in future products. Real-time, computer-controlled optical grinding and polishing, along with micropolishing, will cut the time required to fabricate aspheric optics by a factor of 10 or more.
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Highlights (continued) Integrated design, fabrication, test, and assembly methods will permit the transition of todays hybrid optical devices into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and high performance. Multispectral sensors are an enabling technology for the commercial sector as well as the military. High-sensitivity night vision (NV) optical sensors and improved coatings will greatly improve current NV capabilities.
OVERVIEW This section covers militarily critical technologies being developed for lasers, optics, optical materials, optoelectronics, and photonics, as well as specific supporting technologies and applications. The primary goal in this section is to identify and list technologies and materials that could conceivably result in major improvements in currently available as well as developmental military laser/optics systems and components; the development of significantly new cost-saving approaches to the generation of both low- and high-power coherent radiation sources; the development of high-efficiency, lightweight optical components and systems; the development of information technology and telecommunication optics/laser components; the improvement of adaptive-optics compensation; the development of micro and nano-technology as they pertain to optics and lasers; and the expansion of the range of operability of lasers to shorter wavelengths (including X-rays and the -ray regime).
High-energy laser (HEL) and low-energy laser (LEL) systems are covered in this section. High-power lasers (HPL) used in Directed-Energy Systems are covered in Section 6 of MCT Part III. The HEL/LEL cutoff is at 20 kW of power CW and 1 kJ of energy per pulse. HEL lasers are designated as those that produce a continuous wave (CW) or repetitive pulsed-average power level in excess of 20 kW. Technologies applicable to the development and production of lasers and laser systems in the infrared (IR), visible and ultraviolet (UV) regions of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum (0.01 m to 30 m) capable of achieving militarily significant levels of energy or power are covered in this section. In addition, short-wavelength lasers based on electronic transitions, X-ray lasers (0.01 m and shorter wavelengths), and -ray lasers based on nuclear transitions (104 to 106 m and shorter) are covered in this section. Although -ray lasers have not been developed yet, work on technologies that could provide the basis for these lasers is ongoing and covered in this section. Lasers consist of the laser hardware (the device) and the laser medium (or host material). Lasers may operate in a continuous, repetitive, repetitive burst, or single-pulsed mode, depending on the application and requirements. Laser systems incorporate components such as amplifier stages, frequency conversion components, Raman cells, multiplewave mixing components, or other major elements, in addition to the laser oscillator. Reliability of laser diode bars operated in high-density/high-power arrays is critical to most solid-state laser applications. The optics covered in this section include all optics, optical components, and optical materials being developed for future optical, laser, or combination laser-optics systems that appear to have significant military system applications. The optics covered in this section include elements designed to operate in the same wavelength range as that of the lasers, 30 m to 10 6 m. Critical optical technologies encompass optical materials; optical filters; fiber optics; nonlinear optical (NLO) components; and optics for LEL, HPL, and HEL military applications on land, sea, air, and in space. The primary use of nonlinear optics is for wavelength conversion and optical on-chip switching, as well as beam-phase conjugation and image-enhancement applications, including shared aperture technologies for both directed-energy weapons (DEW) and HEL weapons (DEW/HEL). NLO are also used in pointing and tracking applications, as well as missile guidance systems. Cooled-laser optics for both active- and passive-cooling applications are also covered.
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Laser brightness and beam collimation contribute to greater range capability. Laser tunability and wavelength diversity are critical for optical counter and counter-countermeasures. Micro-optical devices are envisioned to replace some chip electronics with significant cost reductions while providing higher efficiency and reliability. Optical storage of information is envisioned to replace current magnetic computer memory. Optical advances are also being developed for national defense in surveillance, night vision, laser systems, fiber optics, displays, and special countermeasure applications. A prime application for the military is in the weapons field, for search, track, and guidance systems, as well as laser weapons. The developing technologies for HEL systems are covered in the DEW section of Part III; however, the new developing laser technologies, which may be applicable to those weapons, are outlined in this section. This section outlines developing technologies in all applications of lasers and optics used for military applications, including weapons, missile guidance, rangefinding, optical information processing, telecommunications, storage and transport, optical filters, optical displays, sensing, and illumination, as well as associated technologies in optical and laser components and materials being developed for future military applications. These lasers, optics, and associated power systems are listed in their appropriate subsections as independent items. RATIONALE The method of fighting wars is changing. Optics and lasers are constantly encountered in military systems, from low-cost components to complex and expensive systems, and have dramatically changed the way wars are fought. Sophisticated satellite surveillance systems are a keystone of intelligence gathering. Night vision imagers and missile guidance units are allowing our armed forces to own the night. Lasers are used for many applicationsfrom targeting and range finding to navigationand may lead to high-power DEWs. Reconnaissance warfare is based on real-time, all-weather, accurate and secure information systems combined with long-range, unmanned, smart, highly lethal weapons designed to achieve pinpoint precision kills. Optics and laser technologies enable us to reduce dramatically our response time as political and military events warrant. Lasers are used in many military applications. HPLs, such as those with lethal energy for missile applications, include CO2 lasers, as well as chemical lasers and chemical transport lasers such as oxygen-iodine lasers. The principal applications of critical military systems that employ long-wavelength lasers, however, are those that seek to facilitate the conduct of military operations at night or under conditions of limited visibility and those used for guided munitions. The critical military applications include the following: rangingfor artillery systems, helicopters, and armored vehicles; target designationday/night; semi-active guidancefor laser-guided weapons; imagingfor target acquisition.
Lasers currently employed on the battlefield, as well in air and naval military systems, mainly use neodymium: yttrium/aluminum garnet (Nd:YAG)-based lasers. These operate in the near-visible region (approximately 1,000 nm). They can be easily detected by most night-vision systems, but they are capable of sensor blinding as well as eye blinding. Consequently, a new family of eye safe lasers has been introduced for a number of applications (e.g., range finders, target illuminators). These operate between 1,400 and 2,000 nm, in the eye safe regime. Long-wavelength lasers are a vital part of modern battlefield systems. They are currently incorporated as part of guided ordnance such as laser-guided bombs. LELs have found utility on the battlefield for covert communications, ranging, and aim-point selection, and have the capability to blind personnel. They are used as illuminators in conjunction with low-light imaging systems. LELs with a wavelength between 1.3 and 1.55 m have applications in very long distance fiber-optic communications, providing links for command and control. Moderate power lasers are used for in-band sensor blinding to negate optically augmented ordnance. HELs and HPLs are being developed as long-range lethal weapons for target destruction or mission abortion. [The principal military applications for short-wavelength lasers are space-based DEWs and high-resolution fabrication and material processing techniques (see Section 6).] In less than 40 years, the laser has grown from a laboratory demonstration to a standard industrial, medical, and military usage. Early on, it was evident that lasers required special opticsoptics that had very low absorption and
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high reflectivity. Today, the applications for lasers cover a vast horizon, from information technology, profile and distance measuring, and telecommunications; to welding, cutting, and heat treatment; to illuminators and scanners; to medicine, surgery, and health care applications; as well as specific applications for national defense. The application of optics has grown significantly as well. Lasers need optics to function, and as a result, the expansion of optics technology in both the purest sense as well as in the manufacturing phase has grown exponentially. The Desert Storm conflict pointed out the militarys need for and advantage of lasers and optics with laser-guided bombs and night-vision optical sights, both of which provided a significant advantage for the allies. Optics has grown in military importance hand-in-hand with laser technology. According to a National Research Council (NRC) report: Throughout history, new technology has had a profound effect on how wars are conducted. Usually, the victors were those best able to apply the new technology. Over the course of the past 50 years, nuclear weapons, microwave radar, guided missiles, and other developments have led to major realignments of defense strategy. Today, the traditional modern strategy of massing large numbers of military personnel and materiel to engage enemy forces is giving way to high-tech methods of conducting warfare that minimize casualties. The U.S. military mission now requires a versatile fighting force capable of both conventional field and urban warfare in a global venue. To improve the effectiveness of the combatant while reducing casualty rates, the military has a number of efforts under way that include reliance on speed and stealth to overcome opposing forces; a better equipped land warrior; rapid detection and control of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats; and dissemination of real-time intelligence on enemy targets. Optics plays a key enabling role in these plans. For the future, optical systems are sure to be the basis for entirely new classes of defense applications that will change yet again the way wars are conducted.1 BACKGROUND Lasers and optics constitute a diverse body of technologies. Since the discovery of lasers in the late 1950s, there has been an exponential growth of laser and laser-related technology. The U.S. military led the charge in laser development during the 1960s and 1970s in the various government laboratories. Over the years, industry has found many commercial applications that justify corporate funding, resulting in broad-based industry involvement today. The development of the ruby laser in 1960 provided resurgence to optics and the field of lasers and electrooptics. The optics technologies described in this section are being developed to improve efficiency, provide longer life expectancy, reduce costs, and replace outdated technology in other application sectors such as electronics. Optical communications and optical memory storage are just two areas in which optics are rapidly replacing electronic components. Lasers and optics have become a key part of everyday lifethey are found in the scanner at the grocery checkout counter and in compact disc (CD) players. Lasers and optics have solved many requirements for military applications; new, advanced technologies are anticipated to make significant improvements in the future. Early laser research workers had visions of firing lasers at missiles and destroying other targets with a speed-of-light weapon. It has taken many years (some 30) to demonstrate such a capability. Although airborne and space lasers are now on the drawing boards, they have many limitations because of materials and manufacturing process issues. A new area of research in which optics and lasers are playing a vital role is microelectromechanical systems (MEMS). MEMS technology may have a profound effect on the military and civilian sectors. For example, MEMS devices might be used in microsatellites having a total mass less than 1 kg for battlefield surveillance. In addition, MEMS devices with motors and repositioning mirrors have been constructed for use with on-chip technology. Optics and laser technologies have matured in the specialized telecommunications information technology arenas and in three-dimensional image storage devices. Optics and electro-optics research technologies are now the predominant emerging technologies in the laser optics field. Many new technologies are being developed that will address one or more military applications. Some of the key issues identified in the NRC report include the following:
1
NRC, Harnessing Light: Optical Science and Engineering for the 21st Century, 1998.
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High efficiency, lower manufacturing cost, laser diode arrays. Diode array pumped solid-state lasers for lightweight, high-efficiency laser range finders (LRFs). Eye-safe solid-state lasers for friendly near-range battlefield issues.
The laser weapon concept has been demonstrated both on the ground and in airborne configurations; however, there are numerous technical challenges left that must be solved. At first glance, HPLs would seem to serve only military needs; however, advances in these technologies have provided many other uses for scientific and commercial applications. The NRC report lists the following technical challenges in the HPL area: Stabilizing optical resonators under high thermal loading conditions. Producing high optical quality, near diffraction limited beams with high efficiency. Improving propagation by suppressing nonlinear optical effects along the propagation path. Improving adaptive optics to correct for beam distortions during propagation. Solving operational issues such as environmental factors and lethality for different target classes.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Optics is a pervasive enabling technology. Lasers require optics in every facet of the laser system. Not surprisingly then, optics and lasers are rapidly becoming an important focus for new business in the global economy. In the United States, both large and small businesses are significant players in emerging optics and laser technology. Optics and lasers are used in many military and commercial applications. Lasers are finding more homes everyday in military systems, from weapons applications to ranging to information transmission and communications. As the impact of optics and lasers has increased, changes have become necessary in the design, manufacturing, and process controls of these new technologies to provide affordable systems. One example is the emergence of a new class of computer-controlled optical grinding and polishing machines that reduced the time necessary to complete the fabrication of an aspheric lens element to less than 1/10 that of conventional methods and with a higher degree of figure control. The use of commercial optical and laser items and technologies is important in the overall affordability of a military component or system; however, many commercially available optics and laser products require special parameters or special adaptations to meet military needs. For example, displays in the military environment must work in high ambient light levels, and many optical and laser devices must withstand high ambient temperatures. These special DoD operational requirements, combined with the need for only limited quantities, dictates the need for continued DoD support of these research and manufacturing technologies. To summarize a number of recent reports, including the NRC report, a coordinated multiyear DoD plan needs to be implemented and followed. This plan should cover development of the specialized technologies required to improve performance and reduce cost for optical and laser systems and development of an RF photonic phased antenna-array technology for radar and communications. In addition, key technologies such as HPL activities and new optics and optical technologies should continue to be pursued by DoD to improve affordability and efficiency of U.S. military systems, while providing a clear technological advantage in the next generation of weapons. Optical microtechnology and nanotechnology, combined with information technology and biotechnology, will enable real-time, noninvasive monitoring of the health status of military or civilian personnel. The chip-level integration of optics, lasers, and electronics will lead to wearable devices capable of real-time sensing of body fluids, the on-chip processing of the sensed information, and the transmission of the processed results to medical facilities. Technology has driven each military eras definition of precision. In the 21st century, it will be possible to find, fix, or track and target anything that moves on the surface of Earth using lasers and optics. This emerging reality will change the conduct of warfare and the role of air, land, sea, and space power.
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WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Many industrialized nations have the technological know-how to produce specialized lasers and optics for use in both military weapon and non-weapon roles. Several smaller countries are making inroads into the laser rangefinder market, cutting the U.S. and Russian share. The United States and Russia have the broadest overall capability in lasers. Whereas the UK, France, Germany, and Japan have specialized capability in selected types of commercial and military lasers and optics, at least 75 percent of the militarized countries in the world today have deployed some non-weapon lasers. Most of these systems use Nd:YAG lasers at 1,064 nm. (This wavelength can damage the unprotected eye.) The number of nations with a capability to produce the newer eye safe lasers (wavelengths greater than 1,200 nm) is still limited because of limited dual-use applications. It is clear that defense against ballistic and cruise missiles is an increasingly important element of U.S. national security. The rapidly growing theater and global threat posed to the United States and U.S. interests by cruise and ballistic missiles of Third World countries is accelerating the national interest in developing a defense architecture to counter this threat. Optical surveillance and guidance systems, partnered with high-power lasers, are believed to be effective for theater and ballistic missile defense. New and developing technologies in the laser and optics disciplines are increasing at an exponential rate worldwide. Many of our allies, as well as our adversaries, have the capability to develop advanced optics and laser technologies for military applications. Many are pursuing one or more key technologies that are of utmost importance to our military. As a result, this technology assessment will include any known developing technology that the international community is pursuing.
Sec. 11.1 Lasers Sec. 11.2 Optics Sec. 11.3 Optical Materials and Processes Sec. 11.4 Supporting Technologies and Applications Sec. 11.5 Optoelectronics and Photonics Technology
Country Australia Canada China France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands Norway Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK United States Legend:

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Figure 11.0-1. Lasers and Optics Systems WTA Summary
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SECTION 11.1LASERS
Highlights Microchip lasers and photonic crystal lasers in NLO media will revolutionize the current electronic chip industry. Laser-coherent radiation permits observation of the detailed structures and dynamics of molecules, crystals, and proteins. Microreplication and fabrication of microelectronic components using short-wavelength lasers will be improved with shorter exposure times, higher intensity excellent collimation, and better resolution. In spectroscopy, with shorter wavelength lasers, higher energy resolution will permit greater discrimination, while deeper penetration will permit inspection of thicker samples. Solid-state lasers have a much higher volume density of ions, permitting construction of the smallest and most portable systems when pumped with laser diode bars/arrays. Short-wavelength coherent radiation may permit observation of the structures and dynamics of molecules, crystals, and proteins in vivo. The battlefield efficiency of modern (platforms) armor, aircraft, missiles, and infantry has been greatly increased through the use of lasers, along with the use of sophisticated detection and imaging systems for target acquisition, tracking, and fire-control systems. Propagation through the atmosphere is a major issue because of attenuation and scattering, but judicious selection of the laser wavelength and pulse mode along with active atmospheric compensation can alleviate the problem and restore required energy delivery on target. Because the beam travels at the speed of light, tracking problems associated with slower beams (particle beams) are avoided. The deeper penetration of the high-energy photons (X-ray, -ray lasers) in a target overcomes the countermeasures designed against beams that deposit energy on the surface like long-wavelength lasers. An X-ray (-ray) laser weapon is nominally considered only for space applications, to be used against missiles and satellites. Laser tracking permits more accurate and faster determination of target position. High-power laser weapons can be used in strategic and tactical scenarios. A -ray laser beam (graser) could penetrate deeply into a target and would be capable of producing a range of lethal mechanisms from soft kill to hard kill.
OVERVIEW This section identifies developing laser technologies that could conceivably have a significant impact on future DoD systems. Laser developments include the following: (a) major improvements in currently available lasers; (b) the development of significantly new cost-saving design, fabrication, and logistic support technologies for the generation of both low- and high-power coherent radiation sources; and (c) the expansion of the laser operability range to shorter wavelengths (including X-rays and the -ray regime) and smaller dimensions (including micro- and nano-chip level lasers). Lasers may operate in a continuous, repetitive-pulse, repetitive-burst, or single-pulsed mode, depending on the application and requirements. Laser systems sometimes incorporate components such as amplifier stages, frequency conversion components, optically pumped semiconductors, Raman cells, and multiple-wave
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mixing components or other major elements, in addition to the laser oscillator. Both HEL and LEL systems are covered in this section. HELs are lasers that produce a CW power level in excess of 20 kW or pulsed lasers. Technologies applicable to the development and production of lasers and laser systems in the IR, visible, and UV regions of the EM spectrum from 0.01 m to 30 m will be outlined. In addition, short-wavelength lasers based on electronic transitions, X-ray lasers (0.01 m and shorter wavelengths), and -ray lasers, based on nuclear transitions (104 to 106 m and shorter) are covered in this section. Although -ray lasers have not been developed yet, work on technologies that could provide the basis for these lasers is ongoing and covered in Section 6. RATIONALE The method of fighting wars is changing, and lasers are expected to play an increasingly critical role. In the future we expect to see more short, intense regional conflicts, and our military will seek to project lethal power without putting a large number of forces at risk. Massed forces will be replaced by the massed firepower of lasers and precisely placed munitions on targets. Optics and lasers are constantly encountered in military systems, from low-cost components to complex and expensive systems, and have dramatically changed the way wars are fought. Sophisticated satellite surveillance systems are a keystone of intelligence gathering. Night-vision imagers and missile-guidance units are allowing our armed forces to own the night. Lasers are used for many applications, from targeting and range finding to navigation and high-power DEWs. HPLs are used in industry for many applications, including the welding, cutting, and shaping of metals. Their ability to provide enough energy at the surface of a remote target to drill holes and destroy structures, and to do this at the speed of light, is useful to the military. HPLs with lethal energy for missile applications include CO2 lasers, as well as chemical lasers and chemical transport lasers, such as chemical oxygen-iodine lasers (COIL), hydrogen fluoride (HF) lasers, and high-powered, solid-state lasers. The military has found applications for HPLs in both tactical and strategic programs. Four applications of HELs in military programs were identified at a recent DDR&E seminar on emerging technologies (December 10, 1999): Airborne laser (ABL) using a COIL device for killing missiles in the boost phase. Tactical high-energy laser (THEL), a ground-based deuterium fluoride (DF) device to protect civilian population and military assets against missile attack. Space-based laser (SBL) using an HF device for missile defense. Ground-based, solid-state laser for point defense. Airborne tactical laser, a COIL device for attacking ground- and sea-based platforms.
Other applications of military systems that employ long-wavelength lasers are those that seek to facilitate the conduct of military operations at night or under conditions of limited visibility and those used for guided munitions. These critical military applications include the following: Rangingfor artillery systems helicopters and armored vehicles; Target designationday/night; Semi-active guidancefor laser guided weapons; Imagingfor target acquisition; LELsfor electro-optic and photonic applications; and Infrared countermeasures (IRCM).
Many lasers currently employed on the battlefield, as well in air and in naval military systems, mainly use Nd:YAGbased lasers. These operate in the near-visible region (approximately 1,000 nm). They can be easily detected by most night-vision systems, but they are capable of sensor blinding as well as eye blinding. Consequently, a new family of eye safe lasers has been introduced for a number of applications (e.g., range finders, target illuminators). These operate between 1,000 and 2,000 nm.
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Lasers are currently incorporated as part of guided ordnance such as laser-guided bombs. LELs have found utility on the battlefield for covert communications, ranging, and aim-point selection and have the capability to temporarily blind or daze personnel. They are used as illuminators in conjunction with low-light imaging systems. LELs with a wavelength between 1.3 and 1.55 m have applications in very long-distance fiber-optic communications, providing links for command and control. Moderate power lasers are used for in-band sensor blinding to negate optically augmented ordnance. HELs and HPLs are being developed as long-range and short-range lethal weapons for target destruction or mission abortion. Principal military applications for HEL and HPL lasers are space-based DEWs and high-resolution fabrication and material-processing techniques. DoD has supported laser development from the beginning and has found many applications for the various technologies that were developed. The Desert Storm conflict, and more recently the Kosovo action, pointed out the militarys need for the advantage of lasers and optics with laser-guided bombs and night-vision optical sights, both of which provided a significant advantage for the allies. Today, the applications for lasers range from information technology, profile and distance measuring, and telecommunications, to welding, cutting, and heat treatment, to illuminators and scanners, to medicine, surgery, and health-care applications, as well as specific applications for national defense. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Lasers have become an important focus for new business in the global economy as well as for the military. In the United States, both large and small businesses are significant players in emerging laser technology, and lasers are finding more uses every day in military systemsfrom weapons applications, to ranging, to information transmission and communications. As the impact of lasers has increased, changes have become necessary in the design, manufacture, and process controls of these new technologies to provide affordable fieldable systems. The use of commercial laser technologies is important in the overall affordability of a military component or system; however, many commercially available laser products require special parameters or special adaptations to meet military needs. These special DoD operational requirements, combined with the need for only limited quantities, dictates the need for continued DoD support of these research and manufacturing technologies. Technology has driven each military eras definition of precision. In the 21st century, it will be possible to find, fix, or track and target anything that moves on the surface of Earth using lasers. This emerging reality will change the conduct of warfare and the role of air, land, sea, and space power. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Many industrialized nations have the technological know-how to produce specialized lasers for use in both military weapon and nonweapon roles. Several smaller countries are making inroads into the laser rangefinder market cutting the U.S. and Russian share. The United States and Russia have the broadest overall capability in lasers. Whereas the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Israel have specialized capability in selected types of commercial and military lasers and optics, at least 75 percent of the militarized countries in the world today have deployed some nonweapon lasers. Most of these systems use Nd:YAG lasers at 1,064 nm. (This wavelength can damage the unprotected eye.) The number of nations with a capability to produce the newer eye safe lasers (wavelengths greater than 1,200 nm) is still limited because of limited dual-use or commercial applications. It is clear that defense against ballistic and cruise missiles is an increasingly important element of U.S. national security. The rapidly growing theater and global threat posed to the United States and U.S. interests by cruise and ballistic missiles of third world countries is accelerating the national interest in developing a defense architecture to counter this threat. Optical surveillance and guidance systems, partnered with high-power lasers, are believed to be effective for theater and ballistic missile defense. New and developing technologies in the laser and optics disciplines are increasing at an exponential rate worldwide. Many of our allies, as well as our adversaries, have the capability to develop advanced laser technologies for military applications. Many are pursuing one or more key technologies that are of utmost importance to our military. As a result, this technology assessment will include any known developing technology that the international community is pursuing.
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Country Australia Canada China France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Taiwan Ukraine UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Sec. 11.1 Lasers
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 11.1-1. Lasers Technology Systems WTA Summary
BACKGROUND A laser is a device which produces a beam of light that is monochromatic and highly directional. In practice, however, one always observes light with a small spread of frequencies even under the best conditions. Also, although to a first approximation all the energy (photons) is emitted in the same direction, in actuality there is a small beam divergence (but not like that from an ordinary light source such as an incandescent light bulb). Laser light is also highly spatially coherent, which, when combined with the single frequency output, allows interference effects. The divergence from a laser is nearly a diffraction-limited ( /D) beam when observed far from the source and a long time after emission. Thus, laser light is quite different from ordinary light, and it has been used in many unique applications. There are many different types of lasers and many different applications. These applications require different levels of energy in the beam or perhaps different pulse-time sequences. Control of the beam and pulse size is also important and can be adjusted, as required, by selecting the laser and the appropriate operational parameters. Some lasers are large and produce a lot of power. Others are small, require less power, and produce less power. A laser pointer produces a spot on a wall that we can see; a high-powered COIL or CO2 laser produces a hole that we can see through, in a few seconds, in a 1-in. thick sheet of metal. How much variation in or control over the wavelength, power, coherence, and pulsing sequence is available today and what can we expect to be able to achieve in the future? This is the question we are trying to answer in this document, and it is paced by development of efficient and reliable pump sources. History The invention of the ammonia maser in 1954 initiated an era of intense competition in a search for new sources of coherent radiation. The first success was the ruby laser in 1960. It was followed by many devices, which spanned the spectrum from IR to UV. Their emissions were highly directional and of great spectral purity. The development of lasers has been continuously supported by DoD since the beginning. Much effort was devoted to finding new sources at increasingly shorter wavelengths and higher intensities. The driving forces have included scientific curiosity, the need to observe increasingly smaller structures, improving submicron lithography, and obtaining better
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directed-energy beams for industrial and military uses. The X-ray regime, employing atomic transitions, was reached. The search for systems capable of producing lasing with nuclear transitions continues. Laser Types At present, there are available probably thousands of lasers of all types, and many others are in various stages of development. There are several ways of classifying lasers. For the purposes of our discussion, we can divide the field into the type of active medium used: gas, liquid, solid state (condensed matter), and plasma. Nuclear isomers have also been suggested for -ray lasers, and the research is proceeding, but these have not been developed yet. There are also concepts based on special approaches, which are more esoteric (i.e., free electron, gas dynamic, exploding wire, and flame). Gas Lasers Neutral AtomicExcited by weakly ionized dc- and rf-excited discharges, pulsed-afterglow discharges, and short-rise-time pulsed discharges (i.e., He-Ne laser). Ionized GasExcited by large dc or rf discharge (i.e., argon ion, HE-Cd, krypton). MolecularThe CO2 laser is a good example. It can also be used to pump other molecular lasers, producing output further in the IR. Chemical and Chemical Transfer LasersA system in which the lasing species is produced by the formation or breaking of chemical bonds on a reaction, regardless of how the reaction is initiated. Excimer LasersUse heteronuclear and polyatomic excited molecules to produce UV light at high efficiency and peak powers. Transfer LasersA compound (oxygen) is chemically excited to an excited level (the O-singlet state) by a chemical reaction (usually involving hydrogen perioxide). The lifetime of the excited state (oxygen) is quite long, and it is collisionally mixed with another species (iodine) to form the laser excited state (COIL) concept).
Liquid Lasers Dye LasersOne can get lasing by optically pumping a dilute solution or organic dye. The main advantage of dye lasers is that they can be tuned. Because dyes have fast relaxation times, they generally require very intense and rapid pumpingeither by flashlamp or another laser.
Solid-State Lasers SemiconductorGenerally lower power, highly divergent lasers operating at LN2 temperatures. Color Center, or F-centerLow-power devices pumped by AR+ or KR+ lasers. These lasers use color centers in alkali halide crystals. Insulating Crystal (such as Nd:YAG)These lasers are usually flashlamp pumped. In addition to Nd, there are many other rare earth dopants to produce other laser wavelengths. As the cost of diode pumping approaches $12/W, the technology will be utilized more extensively.
Others Free electron laser X-ray laser
-ray laser
Jet flow or gas dynamic laser
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Other lasers based on different storage and excitation techniques such as: plasma excitation exploding wires shock waves nuclear isomer energy storage.
Applications In medicine, lasers are used to cut like a scalpel, to destroy cells by heating, and to join cells togetherlike welding tissue. Lasers used as a scalpel have at least two advantages. They do not introduce bacteria into the cut, and they seal the blood vessels by coagulating the blooddry cutting. Lasers are also used for eye surgery to correct vision and for observation of internal regions of the body. Use lasers and fiber-optics, instead of electrical impulses and wires, revolutionized communication. More information (23 orders of magnitude) can be carried by 100 times lighter carriers as a result. Laser beams are used in construction by engineers to guide machinery and to measure distances. In industry, lasers are used for highly accurate cutting (parts for motor vehicles), welding (fine focusing produces fine welds), and drilling holes in metal. In space applications, lasers have been used to measure distances in space and to study shifting of continents on Earth from locations in space. Using holographic techniques, lasers can be used to make three-dimensional images of objects. Laser technologies have matured in the specialized telecommunications information technology arenas and in three-dimensional image-storage devices. Optics and electro-optics research technologies are now the predominant emerging technologies in the laser optics field of disciplines. The military uses laser for communication, for designation of targets to be tracked or destroyed, and as weapons. Other military applications of lasers span the electromagnetic regions from the UV to the IR. This diversity of coverage requires a wide range of technologies. Each wavelength regime demands different materials, and each poses different technical challenges. The following lists some of these applications: Rangefinders, especially those which are eyesafe. Target designators. Laser radar for target acquisition, homing, and obstacle avoidance. LIDAR for biological /chemical detection and identification. Laser-based countermeasures, especially at mid-IR wavelengths.
The laser weapon concept has been demonstrated both on the ground and in airborne configurations. At first glance, high-power lasers would seem to serve only military needs; however, advances in these technologies have provided many other uses for scientific and commercial applications.
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SECTION 11.1 BACKGROUND SUPPLEMENT I: FREE ELECTRON RADIATORS1

It has been known for a long time that accelerating charged particles convert part of their kinetic energy to electromagnetic radiation. Several experimental arrangements that have been devised to show this effect provide effective and in some cases practical sources of coherent EM energy. We list some of them here. A. SYNCHROTRON RADIATION
This radiation occurs when electrons are guided in circular orbits at high energies in accelerators. Since the 1940s, synchrotrons have played an important role in nuclear and high-energy research. The three leading synchrotron radiation sources (SRSs) in the United States, existing or planned, are the Advanced Photon Source to be constructed at the Argonne National Laboratory, the Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source (CHESS), and the National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The following tabulation gives some important parameters for these SRSs and the Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory (SSRL) source:
Source Energy (GeV) Current (mA) Peak Field (kG) Bending Radius (m) Ec (keV)
APS* NSLS CHESS SSRL

*
7.0 2.5 5.5 3.0
100 250 75 100
6 12 5.7 7.9
39.0 6.87 32.0 12.6
19.6 5.0 11.5 4.7
The Advanced Photon Source to be constructed at the Argonne National Laboratory. There are plans to use a positron beam in APS. The other sources accelerate and store electrons.
B.
CHERENKOV RADIATION
Cherenkov radiation is produced when a charged particle traverses a dielectric medium at a speed exceeding the speed of light in that medium. The radiation is produced by a collective motion of the particles in that medium as they point toward the passing particle (electron). Both Russian and American groups have studied the Cherenkov effect and have used it to construct light sources tunable from the infrared to the soft X-ray regime. A Stanford group (Ref. 1) has used the electron beam at the Stanford linear accelerator (SLAC), together with a 7-m long gas cell containing helium at low pressure, as well as air at somewhat higher pressures. C. COMPTON BACKSCATTERING
In 1923, A.H. Compton discovered that X rays scattered by atoms consist of two components. One component is radiation of the incident wavelength; the other, the so-called modified component, consists of radiation of a longer wavelength. In recent years, major research centers both here and abroad have been causing beams produced by highenergy electrons to collide with intense photon beams from lasers. In 1975, the Frascatti National Laboratories (Ref. 2) initiated a project to produce an X-ray source suitable for photonuclear research in the few-to-many-MeV regime. An argon ion laser and the Adone electron storage ring were united to produce what is referred to as the LADON photon beam.
Material in this section is taken from Cohen, L., Free-Electron Radiators, IDA Paper P-2993, December 1989.
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D.
WIGGLERS
The wiggler (or undulator) is a magnetic structure which has been used for many purposes: to enhance synchrotron radiation, to amplify laser radiation, and to generate the spontaneous radiation as a component of a freeelectron laser (FEL). Wigglers were incorporated as part of the plans for the development of new synchrotron radiation sources; however, in recent years, they have played a more prominent role as a major component of a FEL. With the probable exceptions of the SRS and Compton backscattering, each type of radiator discussed in this section could, in principle, be placed in a suitable resonant cavity and be made into a lasing device. This possibility became a fact for the wiggler in 1977 when the Stanford group (Ref. 3) first generated and amplified optical radiation in the near IR. E. CHANNELING RADIATION AND COHERENT BREMSSTRAHLUNG
In analogy with the man-made wiggler, nature provides periodic structures with which charged particles can interact to produce tunable monoenergetic radiation. Channeling radiation (CR) occurs when the incident beam is so nearly parallel to the crystal planes that the particles channel. As the misalignment angle is increased, a critical angle is reached when the coherent bremsstrahlung (CB) begins to dominate the X-ray spectrum. Much theoretical and experimental work on CR and CB was done in the 1980s, and many of these studies were performed in the GeV regime. Most of the research was devoted to work with thin crystals. One Russian group (Ref. 4) has reviewed previous work on the prospects of producing a -ray laser based on channeling. The work was extended to include the consideration of a visible laser, with the conclusion that both -ray and visible lasers would be difficult to develop at present because of constraints of current density. F. SMITH-PURCELL RADIATION
Smith-Purcell radiation occurs when an electron is forced to move at right angles to the ruling of a conductive grating. An image is induced in the grating and oscillates with the periodicity of the grating. The moving dipole moment produces the radiation. Since the initial discovery of this effect, much theoretical work has been carried out both here and abroad to extend the very simple theory of Smith and Purcell and to attempt to structure infrared and millimeter radiation sources based on Smith and Purcell. In 1960, di Francia (Ref. 5) explained the radiation somewhat differently: a relativistic electron produces an electromagnetic field which is resolved into Fourier amplitudes; the amplitudes, representing evanescent waves, are attenuated with distance from the electron; and the latter waves are diffracted by the grating to form the Smith-Purcell radiation. G. TRANSITION RADIATION
Transition radiation occurs when a charged particle crosses the boundary between two media of different dielectric constants. Frank and Ginsburg predicted this phenomena in 1946. In 1959, the phenomena was observed by Goldsmith and Jelly. In the early 1980s, the Stanford group studied the production of soft-to-hard X rays using various foils and both electron and positron beams with energies ranging from tens of MeV to several GeV. Soft X-rays ranging from 0.8 to 2 keV were produced with 90 MeV electrons and stacks of beryllium, mylar, and aluminum foils (Ref. 6), and X-rays from 2 to 6 keV were observed with mylar stacks and electrons at 66 and 104 MeV (Ref. 7). Later, 4-GeV positrons were used to produce peaks at 11.6 and 12.8 keV (Ref. 8), and a tunable source was produced by rotating the stack through angles from 0 deg to 60 deg, thereby moving the peak from about 10 keV to about 20 keV (Ref. 9). In all of the above work, results were in agreement with calculations and led to a study and a proposal (Ref. 10) to use transition radiation (TR) as a tunable source of X rays. Recently, the properties of TR have been applied as diagnostics to study the characteristics of particle beams. Using e-beams ranging from 63 to 97 MeV (Ref.11), coherent and incoherent angular distributions were observed and compared for equally spaced and randomly spaced mylar stacks.
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H. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
REFERENCES Rothbart, R.G., et al., Rev. Sci. Inst. 50, 411 (1979) Casano, L., et al., Laser Unconventional Opt. J. 55, 3 (1975); Federici, L., et al., Il Nuovo Cimento, 59, 247 (1980) Deacon, D.A.G., et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 38, 892 (1977) Kalashnikov, N.P., and M.N. Strikhanov, Sov. J. Quant. Electron. 11, 1405 (1981) di Francia., G. Toraldo, Il Nuovo Cimento 16, 61 (1960) Chu, A.N., et al., J. Appl. Phys. 52, 22 (1981) , Rev. Sci. Inst. 51, 597 (1980) , IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. NS29, 336 (1982) Finman, P.F., et al., IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. NS29, 340 (1982) Pantell, R.H., Stanford University Proposal to DARPA, SSEL 1283 (1983) Piestrup, M.A., et al., IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. NS35, 464 (1988)
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III-11-16
SECTION 11.1 BACKGROUND SUPPLEMENT II: X-RAY LASERS
OVERVIEW The concept for X-ray lasers goes back to the 1970s, when physicists realized that laser beams amplified with ions would have much higher energies than beams amplified using gases. In X-ray lasers, a pulse of light strikes a target, stripping its atoms of electrons to form ions and pumping energy into the ions (exciting or amplifying them). As each excited ion decays from the higher energy state, it emits a photon. Many millions of these photons at the same wavelength, amplified in step, create the X-ray laser beam. The highly ionized material in which excitation occurs is a plasma The shaded area of Figure 11.1-2 shows the region of the EM spectrum that is of interest in X-ray laser research in general. This region stretches roughly from about 100 nm to less than about 0.01 nm. Although ions with transitions that emit hard X rays at higher energies exist and could possibly support lasing, the majority of the research effort has been spent on this X-ray energy region.
Figure 11.1-2. The X-Ray Laser Region of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
Most applications of X-ray lasers fall into one of four categories, although some overlap into more than one: Scientific applications (investigations of atomic structures, nuclear decay modification, and radioactive chemistry); Technical applications (preparation of small structures-gratings/grids, spectroscopy of solids, and metallurgy); Biomedical applications (microscopy, holography radiography in vivo or at least in the natural state); and Military applications.
Military applications range from production of components, using lower energy X-rays, to X-ray weapons using higher energy X-ray lasers. Laser weapons will project coherent electromagnetic energy to a distant target at the speed of light. Such beams have been suggested for exoatmospheric applications. We concentrate on concepts that rely on conventional (nonnuclear) pumping processes because these seem the most promising. Certainly more research has been devoted to these concepts, but they are limited to photon energies below 1 keV, in the range of 10 to 109 keV, although other concepts, with the potential of producing more energetic photon beams, have been proposed. RATIONALE An X-ray laser beam delivers energy at the speed of light; however, scattering and absorption impose limits on the distance over which short-wavelength EM beams can propagate through the atmosphere. Therefore, in industrial
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applications, X-ray lasers can only be used at close distances in air for material analysis and modification. In space, which permits longer ranges, X-ray lasers can be used as a weapon. Energy from visible, UV, or even soft X-ray (long wavelength, low photon energy) is deposited on the surface. At shorter wavelengths the energy is deposited more deeply in the target, over a range that depends on the wavelength or photon energy. This adds another dimension to the kill mechanism/CM considerations when the laser is considered as a weapon. Also, the deeper penetration in solid materials is useful in analytical work and in industrial applications. The short wavelength of X-rays coupled with the coherence properties, directionality, and intensity of lasers is necessary for holography and crystallography of small structures like static atoms. The short time pulses (on the order of 1012 to 1015 sec) are required and invaluable for studying the dynamics of these structures. BACKGROUND The invention of the ammonia maser in 1954 initiated an era of intense competition among members of the scientific community in a continuing search for new sources of coherent radiation. Beginning with the ruby laser in 1960, many new sources of electromagnetic radiation began to appear. Their emissions are highly directional and of great spectral purity. Wavelengths range from about 1 mm to about 1 nm; power levels, to greater than 1,012 W. All of these devices depend upon electromagnetic transitions between pairs of precisely located quantum levels in an ensemble of atoms, of molecules, in crystal lattices, or upon the interaction of electron beams with man-made structures. Gain depends on the amplification produced by the stimulated emission of radiation from an inverted population of the level pairs and on the feedback supplied by a pair of precise mirrors in a resonant cavity. Much effort was devoted to finding new sources at increasingly shorter wavelengths and higher brightness. The driving forces behind this effort have included scientific curiosity, the need to observe increasingly smaller structures, improving submicron lithography, and obtaining better directed-energy beams for industrial and military uses. This drive led to the X-ray regime and, ultimately, to gamma-ray lasers. In the X-ray case, except for harmonicgeneration techniques, those quantum states comes into play that are located in atoms either deprived of their inner electrons or made highly charged by having outer electrons stripped off. THE X-RAY REGIME Atomic energy levels to a good approximation are inversely proportional to the square of the principle quantum number and the square of the mass or nuclear charge. Photons with energies in the X-ray region are generally obtained from transitions between inner core electronic levels. In the dentists office, X-ray images are produced by using as a source a tungsten target bombarded by electrons. A small number of ions are generated, and X-rays are emitted. In the process, a small number of tungsten atoms are ionized and quickly neutralized. To get lasing, a larger number of atoms have to be ionized to produce an inversion first. Thus, to produce an X-ray laser, both the power requirement and inversion condition lead naturally to plasma as the active medium. The X-ray regime of the EM spectrum is a difficult part of the spectrum to deal with in generating a laser. First of all, the resonant cross-section decreases with the square of the frequency (inverse square of the wavelength), imposing more severe requirements on the pumping power, and photon emission is severely inhibited by competition from internal conversion below 1 keV, in the X-ray regime. Working in this high-energy regime introduces other problems not usually encountered at lower energies: (1) There are no effective mirrors so that one is forced to consider only single-pulse devices. (2) The short lifetimes of atomic transitions require high pumping rates to obtain inversion. (3) The high pumping rates and the need to work with inner shell electronic levels restricts the selection of the active medium to plasma, a difficult state to work with. PUMPING METHODS Although pumping power requirements are extremely demanding, work continues to extend the lasing region to higher energies. The most recent work in X-ray lasers has concentrated on the following approaches for pumping to inversion.
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Collisional excitation with electrons. In this method an electron excites a multiply ionized ion to the upper lasing level, u, which participates in the lasing transition to the lower lasing level, l, as shown in Figure II.1-3(a). The difficulty with this process is that a metastable upper level is required to minimize the effect of the reduction of the inversion by the concurrent population of the lower lasing level by this indiscriminate pumping source.
Figure II.1-3. The X- Ray Laser Pumping Schemes
Photoexcitation. In this method [Figure 11.1-3(b)], absorption of photons of the proper frequency provides selective excitation of the upper level while avoiding population of the lower level. The difficulty here is finding a wavelength match between pump and laser ions. Electron-collisional recombination. This process is the inverse to electron-collisional ionization from excited levels. A free electron is captured in a high bound quantum state of an ion. This is followed by a cascade down to the lower states, resulting in a population density inversion Charge transfer. In this process, an ion acquires an electron from an atom, rather than a free electron, and ends up in an upper lasing level state. The process is as shown in Figure II.1-3(c), with the exception that an atom is the source of the electron. The process is energy resonant between the binding energies of the electron in the ground state of the atom and that of the upper lasing level. Electron-collisional ionization. In this process [Figure II.1-3(d)], an innershell bound electron is released through ionization, following an inelastic collision between a free electron and an ion. This process creates an atom in the next lower state of ionization, forcing a transition to the upper lasing level. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES Harmonic generation and frequency mixing. Free electron laser, extension to higher frequencies. Others.
EMISSION MODES At present, because of the lack of adequate mirrors for radiation in the laser regime, the X-ray laser is generally a single-pulse devise. In principle, pulsed X-ray laser emission can occur in two possible forms: superfluorescence (SF) and amplified spontaneous emission (ASE). SF is cooperative spontaneous emission from many nuclei, whereas ASE is the result of a photon spontaneously emitted from a single nucleus and amplified as it propagates
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through a medium. Both SF and ASE need an inverted medium for their occurrence, although the requirements on SF are more severe and require slower decorrelation processes. The ASE phenomenon, like SF, can be obtained from an inverted population of atoms or nuclei constrained to an acicular region, and it is initiated by spontaneous emission from a single atom or nucleus. The emitted photon is amplified as it propagates along the axis of the high-gain medium. Spontaneous emissions in other directions are not amplified, so that they affect the ASE pulse propagating along the axis only to the extent that they reduce the inversion and therefore the amplification gain. The axial position of the emitter that initiates the process is a stochastic variable; thus, for a complete treatment of the phenomenon, the emission from all points along the axis must be taken into account. For SF to occur, the emitting dipoles in the system form correlations so that acting collectively as a single dipole they emit a pulse proportional to N2, where N is the number of cooperating nuclei. Unlike SF, the ASE pulse intensity is directly proportional to N. Whether SF or ASE occurs depends on the strength of the dephasing mechanisms that can destroy the correlations between the dipoles necessary for SF. Generally speaking, the emission of an SF pulse requires the preparation of an inverted population of identical radiators. Experimentally, the emitted pulses are characterized by a pulse width and a delay time, , following the inversion of the population. From simple theory, the relationship between SF and and the density of cooperating radiators, , the natural radiative lifetime, 0, the wavelength of the emitted light, , and the cavity length, l, can be obtained. In terms of these parameters
R =
8o , 2 1
D =
1 R ln N , 2
and the pulse intensity Is(t) is given by the inverted pendulum expression
Is(t) =
1 1 2 N / R sec h (t D ) R 2
(Ref. 7), where t is measured from the time of the (instantaneous) inversion. Three regions are delineated according to the magnitude of the dephasing time (or decorrelation time) relative to the product of D , the delay time, and SF, the SF time. Figure II.1-4 shows three different pulses representing SF, ASE, and spontaneous emission without gain as a function of the inverse of the dephasing time, .. These pulses were calculated using the Haake-Reibold theory of SF. By varying the dephasing time, one theory produces the variety of pulses expected from an inverted population of resonators.
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Figure II.1-4. Type of Emission Expected from an Inverted Population of Atoms or Ions
In the SF regime
D SF < ,
correlations between emitters develop, and strong pulses are emitted in both directions along the axis. In the ASE regime
SF < <
D SF ,
and correlation between emitters are suppressed by the dephasing mechanisms, but the median still amplifies spontaneously emitted pulses. When <SF there is no gain in the medium, and only natural decay contributes to the emission. Figure II.1-5 shows how the delay time varies as a function of the inverse of the dephasing time over the three regions SF, ASE, and SE.
Figure II.1-5. Delay Time of Pulse from an Inverted Population of Resonators D as a Function of the Inverse of the Dephasing Time, ()1
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POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS Soft X-rays cannot penetrate a piece of paper, but they are ideal for probing and imaging high-energy density ionized gases, known as plasmas. High-energy radiation is capable of deep penetration of dense materials, however. In iron a 1 MeV -ray (with an attenuation coefficient of a 0.4 cm1) has almost 106 times the penetration of a 1-keV -ray. This feature, together with other characteristic features of photons emitted in nuclear transitions (such as high-energy resolution), and the ability to ionize atoms and molecules, coupled to the attributes of a laser beam (such as high coherence), would permit good focusing at high intensity and could provide a new powerful technique for probing and modifying materials. The following are some potential applications of -ray lasers: -ray and X-ray spectroscopy, where higher energy resolution would permit greater discrimination, while deeper penetration would permit inspection of thicker samples. Holography, where short wavelength coherent radiation might permit observation of the structures of molecules, crystals, proteins, and genes. Precision frequency measurements, where measurements based on interferometric techniques could be extended to the nuclear region, thus greatly increasing the precision in the determination of nuclear properties (with possible applications to reactor design and fusion investigations). Imaging techniques (CAT scanners), where monochromatic radiation would permit lower doses to patients, while higher resolution would allow discrimination between molecular species and not just between density variations. NLO effects at nuclear energies could be investigated with applications to high-energy particle and nuclear studies. Nuclear reaction modification, where the high intensity of the highly monochromatic -radiation would permit selective removal of electrons and thus charge density modification in and around the nuclear volume. Microscopy and structure determination, where the high intensity would allow short exposures, and high collimation would permit Fresnel-limited resolution. Microreplication and fabrication of microelectronic components, where high intensity and excellent collimation will shorten the exposure time and ensure good resolution. Material science, where the high intensity of the ionizing radiation will provide massive ionization of materials on a local scale, leading to violent structure modification. Diagnostics of fusion pellets, where the X-ray laser can provide a penetrating probe for the analysis of high-density plasmas which are compressed to ion densities of greater than 1027 cm3. Solid-State Studies for fine tuning the equation of state of a variety of materials, including those used in making weapons.
Material for this section was obtained from several sources, notably: 1. Elton, R.C., University of Maryland, private communication (1999) 2. , X-ray Lasers, Academic Press (1990) 3. Balko, B., et al., Applications of Gamma-Ray Laser, IDA Report M-141 (1985) 4. Balko, B., and I. Kay, IDA Gamma-Ray Annual Summary Report (1989): Investigation of the Feasibility of Developing a Laser Using Nuclear Transitions, IDA Paper P-2335 (1989) 5. , IDA Gamma-Ray 1993 Annual Report, IDA Document D-1483 (1994)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-11.1. LASERS

Transfer Lasers (COIL) ............................................................................................................................................ III-11-25 Excimer Lasers (LELs)............................................................................................................................................. III-11-27 Novel <111> Piezoelectric Optoelectronic Devices for 1.01.23 m Laser Wavelength Range ......................... III-11-29 Surface-Emitting Lasers ........................................................................................................................................... III-11-31 Mid-IR Lasers ........................................................................................................................................................... III-11-32 Edge-Emitting Laser Diode Array Process Technology ......................................................................................... III-11-34 Solid-State Lasers (HELs)........................................................................................................................................ III-11-36 Solid-State Lasers (LELs) ........................................................................................................................................ III-11-38 Optically Pumped Lasers.......................................................................................................................................... III-11-40 X-Ray Lasers ............................................................................................................................................................ III-11-42 Gamma-Ray Lasers .................................................................................................................................................. III-11-44 Lasers in the 315 m Range ................................................................................................................................... III-11-46 Photonic Crystal Nanocavity Lasers........................................................................................................................ III-11-47 Mid-IR, CW, Power-Scalable Fiber Laser............................................................................................................... III-11-49 Double-Clad Fiber Lasers ........................................................................................................................................ III-11-50 Ultra-Fast Fiber Lasers ............................................................................................................................................. III-11-53 Organic Semiconductor Thin-Film Edge-Emitting Lasers ..................................................................................... III-11-55
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. TRANSFER LASERS (COIL)

Critical parameters are complex functions of wavelength, peak power, and average power. The following regimes resulting from different applications can be identified. Required: Power >20 kW for CW laser and energy >1 kJ pulsed laser Wavelength in the range of (0.330 m) Available Wavelength/Bandwidth: DF/C0210.6 m; COIL (Chemical OxygenIodine Laser)1.3 m. >10s kW demonstrated.
Critical Materials
Fuels and fuels handling materialssurface passivated, fluorine compatible. Low-loss glass, fused silica, and silicon for COIL laser optics. Diodes for diode pumping scheme of resonances in oxygen to produce singlet oxygen.
Numerically controlled machine tools. Laser-diagnostic equipment, for >20 kW for CW laser, >1 kJ pulsed laser. Steering-errors testing equipment to <10 rad. Beam-quality testing equipment. Computer-controlled machinery.
Unique Software
Computer design and operation codes. Codes for beam-target interaction effects. Nonlinear correction at HEL levels. Optical design codes and ray tracing codes. Aerodynamic and solid window design codes.
Technical Issues
Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse-rate energies. Laser-beam transmission through atmosphere. Beam-phase conjugation. Beam stabilization, precision phasing, and enhancing laser interaction with system. Production of low-cost diode pumps. Efficient coupling of pump to host. Match of resonator mode volume and pumped region to maximize efficiency. Improvement of flow by advances in design of valves and venturis. Improvements in combustion theory and experimental work. Improvements in aeroflow path, theory, and design. Understanding of target interaction physics and kill assessment: Power and energy required to kill target, Nature of the failure mode and type of kill, and Laser wavelength and pulse format related to vulnerability parameters.
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Technical Issues (continued) Major Commercial Applications
Introduction of diode pump to excite oxygen state at resonant wavelength. Heating problems with diode optical pumping scheme. Remote sensing. Welding and material forming. Fabrication.
Affordability
Not applicable.
RATIONALE At high energy and power, this system will provide a long-range lethal weapon for target destruction or mission abortion in space-based defense. Short wavelength means less diffraction spreading. It will provide capability for disabling missiles, satellites, or airplanes. This laser can also be used for midcourse discrimination and/or soft kill. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Czech Republic Italy United States
France Japan

Moderate R&D
Germany Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States is a leader in this research with a significant effort, and UK, France, Japan, Germany, and Russia with moderate to limited R&D. BACKGROUND Oxygen is chemically excited to the O-singlet state by a chemical reaction, usually involving hydrogen peroxide. The lifetime of the excited oxygen is quite long, and it is collisionally mixed with iodine to form laserexcited state. Iodine may be in form of CF3I or C5F7I (iodated freons), which have a higher vapor pressure at room temperature than pure I2. When lower level of iodine ion recombines, it reforms donor molecule and hence can have a closed-cycle laser.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. EXCIMER LASERS (LELs)

Critical parameters are complex functions of wavelength, peak power and average power. The following regimes resulting from different applications can be identified. General: Power >1 kW average and wavelength in the range of 0.8 m0.5 m Power >1 kW average at 455 or 486 nm 70 J/pulse discharge Specific: Wavelength/Bandwidth ArF (0.19 m) generally narrow lines KrF (0.24 m) generally narrow lines Xe Cl (0.385 m) generally narrow lines XeF (0.35 m) generally narrow lines F(0.13 m) generally narrow lines
Critical Materials
Optical coatings. Foil support made from special high-strength maraging steel (also used for torpedos).
Numerically controlled machine tools. Laser diagnostic equipment for >1 kW for CW laser and >1 kJ pulsed laser. Beam quality testing equipment. Computer-controlled machinery.
Unique Software
Computer design and operation codes. Codes for beam-target interaction effects. Nonlinear correction at HEL levels. Optical design codes and ray-tracing codes.
Technical Issues
Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse-rate energies. Laser beam transmission through atmosphere. Beam phase conjugation. Beam stabilization, precision phasing, and enhanced laser interaction with system. Match of resonator mode volume and pumped region to maximize efficiency. Understanding of target interaction physics. Power and energy required to kill target, Nature of the failure mode, type of kill, and Laser wavelength and pulse format related to vulnerability parameters.
Underwater communications and imaging. High-resolution lithography. Fabrication.
Affordability
Not applicable.
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RATIONALE This system will be useful for high-resolution lithography, in the range of 0.180.25 m feature sizes, underwater communication and imaging, and ground-based space applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Italy United States
France Japan

Moderate R&D
Germany Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States is a leader in this research with significant R&D, followed by the UK, France, Japan, China, Italy, and Russia with moderate to limited R&D. BACKGROUND Electron-beam dissociates rare gas (Kr, Ar) and halide (F2 or CI2) and forms dimer (excimer) in excited state, e.g., KrF*. Upon emission of a photon, dimer ion decoys to ground state which is unstable (shallow or no potential well). Ions split up leaving Kr, Ar and F2- or Cl2- (which reform F2 + C12).
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. NOVEL <111> PIEZOELECTRIC OPTOELECTRONIC DEVICES FOR 1.01.3 m LASER WAVELENGTH RANGE
New or improved reliability laser diodes with 1.01.3 m emission on GaAs substrates. New 1-V optoelectronic absorption modulator exploiting the piezoelectric (PE) effect for operation at 1.01.3 m. Natural integration/coupling of lasers, waveguides, and modulators. Optoelectronic switches with gain. Enabling technology for integrated optoelectronic circuits exploiting exciton transport. Future integration of III-V optoelectronic devices with Si electronics. Possibility of giant quantum-well (QW) structures for long-wavelength devices on GaAs: terabit intersub-band optical switching at 1.6 m and novel thermophotovoltaic (TPV) devices based on piezoelectric-quantum well infrared photodetectors (PEQWIPs) for conversion in the 1.74.0 m. Piezoelectric sensors and their integration with optoelectronic devices.
Critical Materials
High In content InGaAs (In > 30%) on polar <111> gas. InGaAs/gas/AlGaAs strained QW with piezoelectric field on <111> GaAs with high optical quality. For device structures, highly conductive n- and p-type gas and AlGaAs layers with device quality surfaces on <111> GaAs.
Metal organic vapor phase epitaxy (MOVPE) or molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) epitaxial fabrication. Optical spectroscopy: Photoluminescence and photoreflectance. XR spectroscopy. Electron microscopy. None identified. The envisaged device applications relate to (1) the existence of a large PE field in <111> QW structures; (2) a larger critical layer thickness (CLT) for <111> orientations compared with conventional <100>; and (3) the achievement of very high-quality heterointerfaces. Excellent <111> QW device structures have been achieved at 1.0 m by CU and a few other groups in the world. Further R&D will be needed to extend to 1.3 m and other wavelength ranges. Long-wavelength ( 1.3 m) emission and modulation have not been achieved using GaAs substrates at the level of practical applications. The realization of a practical 1.3 m laser diode and modulator on a GaAs substrate would lead to integration of optoeletronic devices and reduction in product costs. Low voltage (<1.5 V) modulator theoretically demonstrated but not developed yet. PE-field can be exploited to produce a high ratio of ON/OFF wavefunction overlap even at low voltage.
Satellite and optical-fiber communications. Energy conversion. Uses present GaAa fabrication technology (see Section 8).
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RATIONALE This technology could replace the cathode-ray tube (CRT) as the standard for information display in many military and commercial applications. In addition, analog SLMs with world-class performance for optical signal processing and image analysis would result from this work. The high-resolution potential and high efficiency of this mass-producible technology warrants increased development funds. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Japan Sweden United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Russia Switzerland

Significant R&D
Israel South Korea Taiwan
Italy Spain UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Japan and the UK are leaders in this field with significant R&D, followed by France, Sweden, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan, and Spain.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. SURFACE-EMITTING LASERS

Technology of grating coupled surface-emitting GaAs and AlGaAs laser diodes is a continuing, ongoing development with a number of different manufacturing technologies, including tapered gratings and circular gratings. Some applications require these lasers to be steerable. Being developed are 1.55-m distributed Bragg reflectance (DBR) lasers using grating coupling, which have the potential for high-power, lowdivergence, rapid-steering, low-weight devices in the data link operation as well as eyesafe operation. Circular gratings and tapered gratings on surface emitters and transparent indium-tin oxide electrode material. Long-distance pointing and tracking testing with millisecond response. Mode selection and the dynamics of steerable grating coupled surface-emitting lasers. Mode control of the lasers, array of high-power steerable lasers, high-speed modulation. Space and terrestrial communications. Need to reduce the cost significantly in large-volume production.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Many surface emitting laser diodes are being developed. The advantages to this technology are that higher power, low divergence, and rapid steering should be achieved using the grating coupling technology. This technology has both affordability issues and technology issues. Long-range communications require 1.55-m laser sources with low divergence and outputs above 100 mW for eye safety and low atmospheric absorption. This technology would provide a significant improvement to current laser communication devices. This technology will provide very compact, lightweight, steerable laser modules for jamming-free optical links between stationary or mobile objects and rapid deployment in remote areas. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Japan Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Russia UK

Significant R&D
France Singapore United States
Israel South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Japan, China, and the United States are leaders in this field, followed by Canada, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, France, Russia, the UK, Germany, and Singapore.
III-11-31
DATA SHEET III-11.1. MID-IR LASERS

High average power diode pumped solid-state lasers with frequency agility/diversity in the 2 to 5 m spectral region with closed loop operation. 2.0 W per line at 20 kHz pulse repetition frequency (PRF) in Band I. 2.0 W in Bands III and IV. Lightweight (total system weight of 20 lb or less). Cryocooler with better than 10 W at 77 K. High brightness and high beam quality at all power levels (57 diffraction limit).
Critical Materials
Low optical absorption optical parametric oscillator (OPO) materials for all three wavelength bands. High-efficiency phase conjugation material. New, high-efficiency lasers are needed, including diode-pumped semiconductors. Low thermal distortion OPO materials need to be developed. Only U.S. ZGP material with acceptably low absorption has been demonstrated.
Diode array far-field power and spatial distribution testing equipment. M2 beam quality measurements. None identified. High average power with high-efficiency frequency conversion in the 25 m region has not been demonstrated. Laser diode array efficiency and average power level must be improved. High average power pump lasers are required to meet military system requirements for remote sensing. Thermal effects must be minimized in zinc germanium phosphide (ZGP) and other OPO materials at high PRF.
Since the primary requirement is for a bright laser source in the mid-IR for countermeasure applications, it is not clear what direct commercial applications might result. Improving the efficiency of OPOs and reducing the cost and weight of the devices will spin off many of these technologies to commercial application.
Affordability
Affordability must be addressed at all levels of development to provide DoD with logistic options.
RATIONALE The top three Service Priority List items concern infrared countermeasures (IRCM) issues. There have been significant advances in OPO materials and new lasers in the last few years, providing a basis for optimism that a mid-IR laser system can be developed. An agile mid-IR laser for CM and counter-countermeasure (CCM) purposes is desperately needed. All three Services have major programs on hold until this technology is developed. This set of technologies needs to be worked in concert to maximize trade-offs during the technology-development phase. The decision to proceed into the engineering-development phase with an OPO or direct semiconductor must be made within the next fiscal year. Dilution of critical funds to carry multiple approaches is a problem. Direct semiconductors that can be made to operate efficiently at 120 K is a requirement which needs to be developed.
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France Norway Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Russia UK

Significant R&D
Israel South Korea United States
Japan Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
There is significant to extensive R&D effort in the United States and the UK. Only U.S. ZGP material with acceptably low absorption has been demonstrated. Germany is sponsoring moderate R&D, while other nations sponsor limited R&D.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. EDGE-EMITTING LASER DIODE ARRAY PROCESS TECHNOLOGY

Laser diode arrays are currently hand-labor intensive. Automation and process technology need to be developed to provide a more cost effective and reliable product. It is imperative that oxidation be carefully controlled during the soldering process to prevent debonding. Process technologies that need to be developed include bar metalization and mounting technologies, gold/platinum soldering process technology with minimal diode degradation, uniform pitch process technology (nominally 200 m), and mounting procedures that eliminate voids in the metallization and soldering processes.
AlGaAs, InGaAs, and GaP. M2 (beam quality) measurements to within less than 1 percent of diffraction-limited quality and spatial distribution measurements of arrays. Everything should be 100 percent inspected. It is critical to apply a proper testing procedure for the mounted arrays, as well as to the individual diodes, to ensure reliability of mounted diodes in the future use of the device.
None identified. Previous mounting technologies have left voids in the soldering layer, causing premature failure to the device. Hand lay-up of the arrays has proven too costly to be competitive with other illumination sources for many applications. An automated mounting process must be developed that is efficient and provides high yield. Night light sources for police and security guards, welding, optical pumps, laser surgery sources, ship mast illumination, printing drums, and telecom are currently being considered. If automation process technology can be achieved with pick-and-place equipment and the gold/platinum soldering, then a cost-effective mass-produced array will be available.
Affordability
RATIONALE Currently, both the military and commercial sectors need significant cost reduction in the manufacturing of laser diode arrays for applications ranging from welding to optical pumping sources for laser rangefinders and remote lighting sources in submarines or on ship masts. Many other diode array lighting applications will become cost effective once the benefits of this proposed manufacturing technology (cost reduction factors of 8 to 10) are demonstrated. This development will be a significant economical boost to the EO industry and provide a much needed resource for the military. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany Netherlands South Korea Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel Norway Sweden UK

Significant R&D
Finland Italy Russia Switzerland United States
France Japan Singapore Taiwan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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The United States, France, Germany, Finland, and Japan have significant R&D efforts. The UK, Taiwan, and Russia are behind, with moderate efforts.
III-11-35
DATA SHEET III-11.1. SOLID-STATE LASERS (HELs)

Critical parameters are complex functions of wavelength, peak power, and average power. The following regimes resulting from different applications can be identified. Required Power >20 kW for CW laser and energy >1 kJ pulsed laser. Wavelength in the range of 0.3 m30 m. Achieved Wavelength/bandwidth Typically 1.03 m (ytterbium), 1.05 m (yttrium), or 1.06 m (neodymium). Power Level 100,000 J/pulse from NOVA laser at Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in an energy storage mode. 3.6 MJ planned for Natural Ignition Facility laser (LLNL). Russians reported >10 kJ in literature; for t >2/msec, 1 MJ.
Critical Materials
Very pure glasses and crystals for host materials. Fusion bonded composite (doped and undoped) laser materials.
Numerically controlled machine tools. Laser diagnostic equipment. Steering errors testing equipment to <10 rad. Beam quality testing equipment.
Unique Software
Computer design and operation codes. Codes for beam-target interaction effects. Nonlinear correction at HEL levels.
Technical Issues
Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse-rate energies. Computer -controlled machinery. Laser beam transmission through atmosphere. Beam phase conjugation. Beam stabilization, precision phasing, and enhancing laser interaction with system. Production of low-cost but high-reliability (long lifetimes) diode pumps. Efficient coupling of pump to host. Match of resonator mode volume and pumped region to maximize efficiency. Improvement of flow by advances in design of valves and venturis.
Laser fusion. Industrial applications. Not applicable.
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RATIONALE This system will provide capability for disabling missiles, satellites, or airplanes. This laser can also be used for midcourse discrimination. In addition to CM applications, this laser can be used for range finders, target designators, and remote sensing. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has best developed diode pump and crystalline composite materials. Russia has nonlinear technology, including phase conjugate MOPA. Germany and Japan are close behind the United States. There is considerable interest in 57 kW lasers for industrial use. Russia and Ukraine have strength in phase conjugation, and their nonlinear optics are the best in the world. Cooperation with the United States makes for some real transparency on HEL solid-state lasers. BACKGROUND Optical pumping into absorption based of laser ion causes a population inversion. (For Yb:YAG p = 950 nm and L = 1030 nm.) After ion lases, ions in lower state rapidly decay to ground state nonradiatively.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. SOLID STATE LASERS (LELs)

Solid-state lasers are rugged, lightweight, and readily available in a number of powers and wavelengths in both rod and slab geometry. Common materials include Nd:YAG and neodymium-glass (Nd:glass). Tunable solidstate lasers are made from alexandrite and titanium. All lasers can be frequency doubled (or multipled) by the use of nonlinear crystalline materials that create harmonics of the input frequency. Power Flashlamp-pumped (CW powers in the kilowatt range) Diode-pumped (10s of W). Laboratory systems (100s W to 1 kW) Achieved: Alexandrite Er:Yb:Glass Ho:YAG Nd:Glass Nd:YLF Nd:YV04 Ruby Trn:VAG Ti:sapphire Some characteristics of some lasers (0.70.9) m 1.54 m 1.05 m 1.054 m 1.047 m 1.06 m 0.69 m (1.72.006) m (0.671.07) m Highly tunable Eyesafe wavelength CW to a few W Pulsed to 100 W CW or pulsed to 10s of W CW to I0s of W Low rep-rate but high-energy pulses CW to a few W Broadly tunable
Critical Materials
Solid-state lasers typically use crystalline material, such as YAG or YLF, or are glass doped with a rare earth or metal ion (Nd, Er, Cr) as the lasing medium. Common materials include Nd:YAG and neodymium-glass (Nd:glass). Tunable solidstate lasers are made from alexandrite and titanium. Common materials used in diode-pumped solid-state lasers are Nd:YAG, Nd:YLF and, more recently, Nd:YVO.
Numerically controlled machine tools. None identified. Efficiencies of solid-state lasers need to be raised. At present, range from less than 1 percent for some flashlamp-pumped systems to 10 percent for diode-pumped Nd:YAG systems. Efficient and reliable diode pumps and growth of high-purity, defect-free crystals with high optical quality are the most critical issues. Temperature control is a limiting factor in obtaining high powers. Temperature gradients generate thermal lensing phase aberrations and diffractive losses.
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Fabrication. Micrography. Medical/biological imaging in vivo or at least in realistic sample environments. Long-range biological standoff detection. Low-power scanners (mW). Medium-power medical (W). High-power industrial cutting tools (MW). Materials processingannealing, cutting, welding, marking, bonding, drilling, heattreating and alloying, and robotics. Medical/biomedicalarthroscopy, orthopedics, photocoagulation, plastic surgery, general surgery, cancer treatment, dermatology, obstetrics, angioplasy, ophthalmology, and otorhinolaryngology.
Affordability
Not an issue.
RATIONALE At the high end (energy, power, frequency), this system will provide near-instantaneous kill, warhead detonation, structural breakup, and electronic upset. Effective as a weapon for space applications and for material modification at ground level. Knowledge of the physics of target interaction is useful for offensive and defensive system designers but for different reasons. For offense, this knowledge can improve system design and operation; for defense, can improve protection through innovative materials design. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT.
Country Australia China France Germany Israel Japan Russia UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Laser Systems
Diode Arrays
Nonlinear Materials

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Figure 11.1-1. Solid State Lasers Technology Systems WTA Summary
The United States and Japan are leaders in laser system development, diode array development, and nonlinear materials research. The United States has a slight lead in diodes, and China has extensive R&D work in nonlinear materials.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. OPTICALLY PUMPED LASERS

Critical parameters are complex functions of wavelength, peak power and average power. The following regimes resulting from different applications can be identified. <150 nm, E >50 mJ/pulse, peak power >1 W. 150 nm < < 800 nm, E >1.5 J/pulse, peak power >30 W. 800 nm < < 1,400 nm, E >0.5 J/pulse, peak power 50 W. >1400 nm, E >100 J/pulse, pulsed peak power 1 W.
Critical Materials
Titanium-doped sapphire, alexandrite, DCR4+ :YAG, and other solid-state g-switch materials; two engineered materials such as periodically poled LiNiO3 and fusionbonded composites (i.e., doped and undoped YAG); and YalO3 and sapphire. Optical pumped semiconductors (GaSb). High-power/high-reliability diode pumps. High-power optical coatings, low-loss optical material, and space-qualified components.
None identified. Computer design and operation codes. Codes for beam-target interaction effects.
Technical Issues
Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse-rate energies. Beam phase conjugation. Production of low cost, but reliable (long life), 2 m diode pumps. Efficient coupling of pump to host.
Underwater imaging, remote sensing, and surgical applications. Medical underskin surgery. As optically pumped semiconductors are operated at higher temperatures (above 110 K), the system cost/volume complexity are all reduced.
RATIONALE At the high end (energy, power, frequency) this system will provide capability for disabling and/or destroying sensors. In addition to CM applications, this laser can be used for range finders, target designators, and remote sensing. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Italy Ukraine

Significant R&D
Germany Russia
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Many countries have R&D efforts in optically pumped lasers or in supporting technologies. France has strength and extensive R&D in precision optics (RIOSC). France, Germany, the UK, and Italy have significant R&D
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in new materials, and especially diode-pumped solid-state lasers. China has strength in materials development. Israel uses U.S. diodes in its diode-pumped solid-state lasers. Russia and Ukraine have strength in phase conjugation, and their nonlinear optics are the best in the world. Cooperation with the United States makes for some real transparency on HEL solid-state lasers.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. X-RAY LASERS

Beam Generation: amplified spontaneous emission, superfluorescence Available: Wavelength: 34 nm Energy: ~mJs Efficiency: 106 Pulse width: to ps range Directions of work: Multiphoton ionization Shorter pulsed lasers Technology for laser-produced plasmas Electric discharge technology Desired achievements: Wavelength: ~ 100 to 0.1 nm (concepts using plasma as active medium) Pulse Length: 1012 to 1015 sec or shorter Energy Stored/Power Out (depends on transition energy and inversion): 5 1014 W/cm3 pump irradiance. >10 cm1 laser linear gain coefficient. Beam Intensity: >5.0 1011 W/cm2 Application requirements: Scientific: 100 to 0.1 nm, 1012 to 1015 sec Technical: 0.52 nm (fabrication) Biological/Medical: 0.1100 nm (spectroscopy) Military: >1 nm
None identified. Ion source preparation technology. Precision plasma technology. Precision plasma measurements.
Unique Software
Computer design and operation codes. B-field and E-field mapping codes.
Technical Issues
Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse rate energies. Work concentration on smaller, table-top lasers, implying lower power lasers. Work on more energetic/powerful lasers needs to be pursued. Multiphoton ionization technology needs to be developed. Concepts for shorter pulsed lasers need to be developedespecially for biological/ scientific applications. Technology for laser-produced plasmas. Electric discharge technology. Improvement in beam qualityespecially for lithography.
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Micrography. Medical/biological imaging in vivo or at least in realistic sample environments. Welding, material forming.
Affordability
Not applicable.
RATIONALE At the high end (energy, power, frequency) this system will provide near instantaneous kill, warhead detonation, structural breakup, and electronic upset. An X-ray laser is effective as a weapon for space applications and for material modification at ground level. Knowledge of the physics of target interaction is useful for offensive and defensive system designers but for different reasons. For offense, this knowledge can improve system design and operation; for defense, can improve protection through innovative materials design. At the lower end, X-ray lasers will extend scientific investigations of fast dynamic processes in solids, liquids, and biological molecules. In industry, speedier fabrication will be possible at higher resolution of electronic and electro-optical components. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The research on X-ray lasers in the United States has been declining since the 1990s, with no major work funded at present. There are small efforts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and at Colorado State University (building on 1990s successes). As far as foreign research and development is concerned, there is a small effort in France; a small, declining effort in Germany; but in Japan there is a good solid research effort directed toward lithography, with some interest in biological applications.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. GAMMA-RAY LASERS*

Beam Generation: nuclear SF, ASE Wavelength: ~ 1 to 0.01 nm (concepts using recoilless emission) ~ 1 nm and below (gas graser conceptsingle phonon emission) Lifetime of Isomeric Level: ~ 100 sec to 1,000 sec (concepts using direct emission from isomeric level) ~ 1,000 sec and above (upconversion concepts) Temperature: ~109 K (for gas graser concept) Energy Stored/Power Out (depends on transition energy): > 5 108 J/cm3 > 5 1010 W Beam Intensity: >5.0 1011 W/cm2 Status: -ray laser is in theoretical, concept development state. Some experimental work on upconversion concept performed recently claimed observation of enhanced emission from Hf isomer. This is controversial. Developments in nanotechnology show promise for preparation of clean (very low level inhomogeneous broadening) samples and specially designed crystals for active media to reduce attenuation. This would enhance possibility of observing lasing using the concept of direct emission from isomeric levels.
Critical Materials
Isomeric nuclei with closely spaced levels (0.1 eV to 100 keV). Isomeric nuclei with Moessbauer transitions. Numerically controlled machine tools. Nuclear source preparation technology. Precision nuclear measurements. Ultra low temperature technology (<109 K). Technology for manipulation and control of individual atoms. Computer design and operation codes. Accelerator cavity alignment inspection code. B-field mapping codes. Computer codes for accelerator design. Magnetic beam line design. Optimization of subsystems to reach required power pulse-rate energies. Computer-controlled machinery. Beam control. Charged particle beam (CPB) fusion. Inertial fusion. Nuclear defense simulation and hardening test. Welding and material forming. Not applicable.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Affordability
See Section 6 for background.
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RATIONALE This system will provide near-instantaneous kill, warhead detonation, structural breakup, and electronic upset. A gamma-ray laser is effective as a weapon for space applications and for material modification at ground level. Knowledge of the physics of target interaction is useful for offensive and defensive system designers, but for different reasons. For offense, this knowledge can improve system design and operation; for defense, can improve protection through innovative materials design. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
There is a limited to moderate effort in the United States to extract energy from nuclear isomers as a precursor to lasing. Some experimental work was also done in Germany and France. In Russia and Ukraine the work is mostly of theoretical nature, dealing with concept development and investigation of esoteric propagation effects.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. LASERS IN THE 315 m RANGE

Diode-pumped and optically pumped lasers are needed in the 315 m wavelength region, where chemical and biological contaminants and drugs absorb radiation. IR CM against heat-seeking missiles is a very critical issue. Candidate lasers such as lead salt lasers and the inter-subband quantum cascade laser have shown promise at lasing beyond 3 m. Type II diodes with AlGaAsSb broadband-waveguide separate confinement regions in quantum wells recently became the first electrically pumped lasers in this region and have shown increased gain and efficiency. At 300 K, a 10 quantum well device had a peak output power greater than 2 mW and a lasing spectral width of 12 nm centered at 3.3 m wavelength. CW operation has been achieved at 170 K with an output power of 68 mW. These optically pumped Type II devices with rotationally symmetric active regions (called W configurations) recently attained the highest cw operating temperatures of any semiconductor lasers emitting between 3 and 6 m. Lasing action has been obtained out to 7.3 m, which is 2 m beyond the previous interband III-V lasing compound. High purity Type II W configuration materials are needed to demonstrate higher efficiency. None identified. None identified. Research is necessary to optimize the optical pumping injection cavity structures, such as GaSb/AlAsSb distributed Bragg reflectors, which are required above and below the W well active region. This etalon cavity, required for the pumping beam, has been shown to increase the absorptance to as high as 56 percent. Higher absorptance should be possible providing higher efficiencies. Laser spectroscopy, laser surgery, and infrared illuminators are the prime candidates. Since all of the physical layup is done via thin-film and molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) deposition, the process should produce cost-effective devices once the technology is better understood and tradeoffs are established as the operating temperature increases.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Currently, semiconductor diodes dominate the market for near-IR lasers; longer wavelength devices emitting beyond 3 m are needed to provide chemical and biological detection of gases and drugs as well as IRCMs against heat-seeking missiles or imaging systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States is the leader in this technology, with Germany and Japan closely following.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. PHOTONIC CRYSTAL NANOCAVITY LASERS

Two-dimensional photonic crystals have been microfabricated into InGaAsP slabs, which constitute the smallest lasers to date. These lasers produce lasing, which is then wave-guided in a thin membrane and reflected in the lateral direction to define a high-Q laser cavity. The waveguiding is done with high index contrast slabs in which light can be efficiently guided. Microfabricated two-dimensional photonic bandgap mirrors provide the geometries needed to confine light into extremely small volumes with high Q. Thus, two-dimensional Faby-Perot resonators with microfabricated mirrors are formed when hole defects are introduced into the periodic photonic bandgap structure. Defects are introduced into the periodic photonic bandgap structure and then used to tune these cavities lithographically by changing the precise geometry of the microstructures surrounding the defect. High Q values in the range of 15,000 to 25,000 have been measured in these crystals. These lasers can operate at room temperature in volumes as small as 0.03 m3 in InGaAsP emitting at 1.55 m with a 1-W nominal peak output power. The critical technology parameters concern the understanding of the defect requirements on the geometry of the cavity and improved coupling techniques. It is important to find techniques to decrease these cavity mode volumes even more because it is known that the coupling efficiency and the lasing mode can be significantly improved. The spontaneous emission coupling efficiency can also be improved if the linewidth of the semiconductor emission is narrowed. High-coupling techniques are needed to improve this technology to provide faster modulation response and lower lasing thresholds.
Critical Materials
Typical InGaAsP devices are structured with four 9- to 10-nm thick InGaAs quantum wells separated by three 20-nm thick InGaAsP barriers and InGaAsP layers on the top and bottom of the quantum wells. InGaAsP material has been chosen since it does not suffer from large surface recombination losses and is relatively easy to microfabricate with the desired structural features. Other similar material composites will also be utilized during the optimization processes. None identified. None identified. Optimization of the microfabrication of the laser cavities. These lasers suffer from heating problems. Precise optimization of the laser wavelength by means of the lithographic process and subtle changes in the microstructures adjacent to the cavity, which can also determine the direction of the laser output. Optimization of the lasing frequency through changes in the lattice parameters. Many, including optical computing and optical integrated circuits. This technology should be very affordable since all steps of the process can be envisioned as additional steps in the chip-manufacturing process.
RATIONALE This laser technology has great potential for on-chip manufacturing for optical loops and switches. The laser output can be easily coupled into photonic crystal waveguides within the photonic crystal structure. Note that multiple wavelength emitters can be arranged on a single membrane array via variance in the defects and cavity structures. This permits tens to hundreds of discrete wavelengths in the 1.4 to 1.6 m range with this material composition for wavelength discrimination requirements. This technology has evolved to a level that allows the
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control of light within etched microstructures. New technology that is under way will optimize the output and directionality while improving the efficiency. With laser cavity sizes far below a cubic wavelength, it is now possible to couple them together into coherent systems and provide additional advantages from cavity quantum electrodynamic effects and coupling. The next step is to use this technology for the design of active and passive devices. These laser cavities provide functionality in the form of filters and laser resonators, as well as the building blocks for miniaturized photonic integrated circuits. This technology has the potential to revolutionize integrated circuits and optical processors, as they are known today, and to provide a significant improvement in optical computing endeavors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Norway United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Significant R&D
Germany Taiwan

Moderate R&D
Japan UK
Limited R&D
The United States and Norway have the lead in this technology, with Japan closely following.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. MID-IR, CW, POWER-SCALABLE FIBER LASER

This is a compact, tunable, high-efficiency mid-IR laser that has been demonstrated to produce 40 mW at a wavelength of 2.7 m with 780 nm Ti:Al2O3 laser pump. With diode pump at 980 mm, it achieved 10-mW operation. Experiments at 980 nm indicated no saturation of output so the laser can presumably be scaled to higher levels. It is estimated that the laser can be scaled to produce watt power levels at wavelengths of 2.7 m. The laser uses a double-clad fiber 5.5 m long with Er:ZBLAN center as the lasing medium. Ability to tune the laser has been demonstrated over 50 nm.
Double-clad Er:ZBLAN fiber. Numerically controlled machine tools. Doped-fiber fabrication technology. None identified. Identification of new/alternative fiber material. Increase of efficiency, achieving higher power. Determination of limits on scalability. Increase photon coupling efficiency to fiber core.
Fabrication. Micrography. Medicine: general surgery, cancer treatment, dermatology, obstetrics, angioplasty, and ophthalmology. Environmental monitoring of industrial gases (NO, H2S, ozone).
Affordability
No information available (TBD).
RATIONALE This particular laser has great potential for military applications in the field because it is compact, efficient, and tunable. It can be used for mid-IR countermeasures, monitoring the environment for toxins, and in medical applications for field diagnostics and surgery because of the strong absorption of 2.7 m in human tissue. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States is a leader with a significant R&D effort, followed by Japan, UK, France, Germany, and Russia with limited efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. DOUBLE-CLAD FIBER LASERS

The double-clad or dual-clad fiber laser is compact, tunable, and highly efficient. The fiber creates an optical laser cavity that can be tens of meters long with a large area for heat dissipation. This, together with double cladding, permits high-power operation. The double-clad fiber geometry ensures high pump light absorption, leading to high pumping efficiencies (>60 percent). Yb fibers are the most efficient (>70 percent). Two claddingseach with different index of refractionallows efficient power consumption. No cooling is required at low powers. At higher powers cooling needed, as heating at 1.5 C/W of power observed. Good spectral and spatial quality is observed, and the system maintains diffractionlimited beam quality independent of system age or environmental changes. 55-W output power at 1,110 nm has been demonstrated. The potential for 10100 kW output power is anticipated. Rare-earth doped fiber is used as the active medium. The fibers can be Neodimium-doped ( for visible-near IR) Ytterbium-doped (1,080 nm) Erbium-doped (1,560 nm) Thulium-doped (1.72.006 m). Erbium/ytterbium co-doped fibers provide better utilization of pump power and thus attain higher efficiency. Ytterbium broadbands (920980 nm) absorb the pump light (from multimode diode lasers) and transfer resonantly to erbium atoms.
Critical Materials
Neodimium-doped fiber. Ytterbium-doped fiber. Erbium-doped fiber. Thulium-doped fiber. Co-doped fibers like ytterbium/erbium. YAG fibers. Phosphate glasses.
Numerically controlled machine tools. Doped-fiber fabrication technology. None identified. Identification of new dopants. Identification of new fiber-cladding geometries. Identification of new/alternative fiber material. Increasing efficiency, achieving higher power. Overcoming ion clustering and ion pair quenching.
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Micromachiningwelding, bonding, soldering, stress relieving, and heat treatments. Magnetic and optical storagesemiconductor and electronics industry. High-power amplifierscommunications industry. Telecommunications. Materials processing. Medicinegeneral surgery, cancer treatment, dermatology, obstetrics, angioplasty, and ophthalmology.
Affordability
No information available (TBD).
RATIONALE Because of their high power, compact design, efficiency, and ability to be tuned, double-clad fiber lasers have great potential for military applications in the field. They can be used for countermeasures, monitoring the environment for toxins and other hazardous materials. In medical applications they can be used for field surgery and diagnostics; they are especially durable. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France UK

Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States is the leader, followed by Japan, UK, and Germany, which have moderate research programs underway. BACKGROUND The dual-clad fiber has revolutionized fiber laser power levels. The current state-of-the-art demonstration has been at 110 W at SDL, Santa Clara, California. The AFRL has a number of efforts with SDL funded and underway and is looking at kilowatt-capable fiber laser devices. Single-fiber laser devices have been operated at the 100-W level, and the United States is pursuing kilowatt-capable, singleelement fiber lasers at this time. Arrays of fibers are being pursued with the anticipated power levels of 1100 kW capabilities 5 or more years into the future. Research worldwide is occurring, predominantly in the following locations: UK (moderate R&D)Southampton University (D.J Richardson), Manchester University, Fibercore (commercial), and others. Germany (moderate R&D)IRE-POLUS Group (commercial). Japan (moderate R&D)NTT Photonics Lab. United States (significant R&D)AFRL and funded small businesses (fewer than one dozen) and collaborating laboratories (NRL, MIT/LL, LLNL). All others are limited R&D.
There is a shortage of components to conduct research in this area. For example, the number of facilities to draw the fibers is limited: SLD Cambridge (former Polaroid); NOI/ION (Canada); Spectran (now purchased by Lucent);
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Lucent (Spectran and Lucent are not commercially involved with DC fiber devices or components); Boston University (Ted Morse); and Kigre (with Rutgers University for phosphate glass fibers).
Lucent has indicated a willingness to participate with the government to supply limited quantities of DC fibers and components. Spectran has experience in this area of DC fibers; Lucent has experience with the components only. Components such as isolators, gratings, circulators, phase modulators, etc., do not exist for Yb-doped fiber wavelengths. A significant increase in funding in this area is needed to stimulate U.S. research in this technology area.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. ULTRA-FAST FIBER LASERS

The ultra-fast fiber laser is compact, tunable, highly efficient, and rugged. A typical system comprises an erbium-doped fiber laser oscillator and an erbium-doped fiber amplifier followed by a frequency doubler. No cooling is required. Diode lasers provide the pump energy, and the fiber creates an optical laser cavity that can be tens of meters long with a large area for heat dissipation. The laser system is relatively temperature insensitive. Operates over 30 C temperature range (around room temperature) without user adjustments. The system can be made compact. A 20 by 20 by 10 cm package can produce 100 to 200 femtosecond pulses with an average 10 to 25 mW. For comparison, a bulk laser with this repetition rate would require a free space optical path length of 3 m. Emission from erbium-doped fiber is at 1,550 nm. Good spectral and spatial quality is observed and the system maintains diffractionlimited beam quality independent of system age or environmental changes. Fiber-based architecture makes the laser relatively free of thermally induced beam wandering. Beam pointing stability is 1 rad, typically.
Critical Materials
Erbium-doped fiber. Other rare-earth doped fibers.
Numerically controlled machine tools. Doped-fiber fabrication technology. None identified. Identification of new dopants. Identification of new fiber-cladding geometries. Identification of new/alternative fiber material. Increasing efficiency, achieving higher power. Overcoming ion clustering and ion pair quenching.
Biological imaging with two photon scanning microscopy. Telecommunications. Medical diagnostics. Medicine: general surgery, cancer treatment. High-speed circuit testing of high-speed electronic devices. Terahertz measurements using coherent detection instead of power detection. Hyperspectral imaging in the terahertz regime. Detection of gases in flames. Inspection of injection-molded plastic. Mapping of doping concentrations in silicon wafers.
Affordability
Cost is not a major factor.
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RATIONALE Ultra-fast fiber lasers have great potential for military applications in the field because of compact design, efficiency, and durability. They can be used for monitoring the environment for toxins and other hazardous materials. In medical applications they can be used for field surgery and diagnostics; they are extremely durable and unaffected by changes in the environmental conditions. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France S. Korea

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Japan United States
Limited R&D
The United States is the leader in the R&D and production with a significant effort. Japan, China, Russia, France, Germany, UK, and South Korea have limited R&D involvement. A significant effort is dedicated to analogto-digital conversion with high repetition and short pulse rate.
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DATA SHEET III-11.1. ORGANIC SEMICONDUCTOR THIN-FILM EDGE-EMITTING LASERS

Laser action in thin-film organic semiconductors has been demonstrated. Both semiconductor waveguide and double-heterostructure devices were used. Edge effect emission was observed. Efficient, long-lived, and intense electroluminescence in both polymeric and smallmolecular-weight organic thin films motivated the search for laser action in these materials. Optical pumping in both semiconductor waveguide and double-heterostructure devices was used, indicating a new class of electrically pumped laser diodes may be possible. The thin-film active material for both geometries was tris-(8-hydroxyquinoline) aluminum (Alq3) doped with 2.5-percent DCM (laser dye). The slab optical wave guide laser was grown on InP substrate pre-coated with a 2-nm-thick layer of SiO2, deposited by plasma-enhanced chemical vapour deposition. A 300-nm-thick film of Alq3/DCM (with optical index of refraction n = 1.7) formed a slab optical waveguide, with SiO2 (n = 1.4) as a cladding layer on one side and air (n = 1) on the other. The double heterostructure in-plane waveguide was made by sandwiching a 50-nm-thick film of Alq3/DCM between two 125-nm-thick Alq3 cladding layers. All conducting organic layers produce both electrical and optical confinement, which idicates that lasing may occur under electrical injection. The pump was a pulsed nitrogen laser beam ( = 337 nm). Threshold pump energy was ~ J cm2 for a 5-mm-long double-heterostructure laser. These lasers, at = 645 nm, in vacuum-deposited organic semiconductor thin films are characterized by high efficiency (70 percent), narrow-linewidth (< 0.1 nm), high-outputpower (> 50 W) lasing at = 645 nm in vacuum-deposited organic semiconductor thin films. The pump threshold for an electrically pumped laser made from organic double heterostructures is estimated at 10 nm cm2.
Tris-(8-hydroxyquinoline) aluminum (Alq3) doped with 2.5-percent DCM (laser dye). Numerically controlled machine tools. Plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition. Not determined. Identifying new/alternative thin-film material. Increasing efficiency, achieving higher power. Determinating limits on scalability. Increasing photon coupling efficiency to thin film. Methods of electrical pumping the thin-film structures. Demonstrating electrically pumped laser action.
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Communications. Opto-electronic devices (see Section 11.5). Not determined.
RATIONALE This particular laser has great potential for military applications in the field where opto-electronic devices are required (see Section 11.5) because it is compact, efficient, and tunable. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Austria United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
In this technology, the United States is the leader, followed by Japan. The remaining countries, Germany, Austria, and UK, have a basic capability.
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SECTION 11.2OPTICS
Highlights Micro-optics will begin complementing and then replacing electronic components on chips, reducing heat and improving speed and throughput while reducing cost. Nanotechnology will result in significant improvement in electro-optics and nonlinear optics, which will have widespread military applications. Continued advances in optical coating material technologies will result in improved hardness capability of various military optics hardware. Reducing the weight of technology for space optics, vital to our space requirements, will be addressed by numerous new technology applications of high-strength composites. Integrated design, fabrication, test, and assembly methods will permit the transition of todays hybrid optical devices into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and high performance in future products. Real-time, computer-controlled optical grinding and polishing, along with micropolishing, will cut the time required to fabricate aspheric optics by a factor of 10 or more.
OVERVIEW Optics and optical systems are used for military applications ranging from surveillance, navigation, and night vision systems to fiber-optic communications and display technology. Optics has become the pervasive enabler for a significant number of other disciplines such as telecommunications, physical security, and more recently data storage and optical computing. This subsection covers the broad discipline of developing optics, optical materials, and optical component technologies, which are envisioned to be of critical military utility once developed. This section includes those technologies ranging from night-vision optics and lightweight space optics to improved process technology for aspheric lenses, reflectors, and nonconformal optical surfaces, as well as developing technologies for nonlinear and fiber optics. The optical material technologies include new development, refinement, and production processes for metal and dielectric optical substrates, as well as new optical composite materials. The optical materials will also include developing technology in crystalline and organic nonlinear optical materials. Developing technologies in the area of optical substrates, including ceramics, low-thermal-expansion glass, metals, and optical composites will also be addressed. Optical systems technologies will be presented here if they are generic in nature; otherwise, they will be referenced if covered in one of the sections of this report. BACKGROUND The impact of optics has increased significantly in the last few years. Major changes have been necessary to improve component utility while improving efficiency and reducing costs by means of mass production process technologies and greater use of computer design and fabrication technologies. These changes have manifested themselves in ways that were not even dreamed of 20 years ago, but which today significantly affect the way optical components and systems are now designed, fabricated, and tested. As recently as a decade ago, most optical components were made in small specialty optics firms with the support of master opticians. This was the result of stringent specifications required by the military and other government agencies as well as many scientific researchers. At that time, however, the market was not big enough to support the costs of developing massproduction process technologies. In some cases, the technologies being developed today were not even a gleam in the opticians eye, let alone contemplated.
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Today, thanks in a large part to the ever-expanding commercial sector, which uses optics and optical components, optical manufacturing technologies are seeing a resurgence, and new process technology is under way. This continual maturing of optical technologies has permitted a new focus, that of micro-optics technologies, which are now enabling complex systems to be constructed in areas such as spatial light modulators, integrated optoelectronic arrays, opto-electronics, and quantum opto-electronics at the chip level. In addition, fiber-optic components and systems represent an area in which commercial investment has led the way for DoD applications. Basic data-transmission systems have been adapted and improved for battlefield environments, with the commercial sector leading the technology development. The use of fiber-optics on aircraft, satellites, ships, and submarines has started to expand following similar commercial successes. This increased utility of fiber-optics along with optical imaging technologies and optical storage devices is pushing the technology envelope in related areas such as optical parametric amplifiers and nonlinear optical materials development for waveguide and switching applications in the micro-optics field. The performance of almost all optical and electro-optical material is critically dependent on the quality, composition, and dimensional control of the materials used in the manufacturing process. Every stage of crystal growth, material processing, and device fabrication requires stringent control of defects, interfaces, and layerdeposition rates. A precise knowledge of the interrelationships among material quality process parameters and device performance is also needed. As is well known from laser-absorption studies and subsequent laser damage studies, reducing absorption in optical materials has a major impact on optical components such as high-energy laser optics and space optics. Absorption will probably have a significant impact on micro-optics because of the very thin optical paths and waveguides that are used. Considerable progress has been made in recent years, and continues to be made, in improving the defect density of commercially important substrates, crystals, and nonlinear materials. Materials processing and equipment designs need to improve significantly in order to increase the yields on complex micro-optical devices and improve cost-reduction techniques. The technologies outlined in this section include optical systems, equipment, and components. The final area of technologies includes optical countermeasures, which are needed for many military applications on and off the battlefield. A key technical challenge for optical design and fabrication of miniaturized components is the ability to integrate everything from the design phase through the fabrication phase, with testing and assembly methods that include assembling active optical components into fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and improved performance in future products. Some of the other key technical challenges of optics and optical components include cost-effective manufacturing of general aspherics and conformal components; development of VUV optics for microlithography to permit the continued reduction of feature size and enlargement of chip area; low-cost, low-volume, surge-capable optical manufacturing processes which are essential to maintain efficiency and support the continued development of military optical systems; and integrated design, fabrication, assembly, and test methods, which permit the smooth advance of the hybrid micro-optical devices of today into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and high performance required in future products. In addition, there are some issues that cut across the diversity of optics development and manufacturing process technologies. These include improvement of optical designs and in situ optical polishing using increased computer power, which can provide real-time feedback, and advances in optical metrology, which provide the wherewithal to measure what you make in these small micro-optics components. Some specific military requirements will be addressed by technologies outlined in this section. These include long-range chemical detection using light detection and ranging (LIDAR) or other stand-off techniques to give tactical advantage, an effective detection and identification system for various mission requirements, a method to determine ultra-low species concentration detection, lightweight space optics, and high-sensitivity hyperspectral surveillance imaging systems. Optics manufacturing technology, especially that of aspherics and nonconformal optics, is also a major concern to the military. Those developing technologies are covered in this subsection as well. RATIONALE Throughout history, new technology has had a profound effect on the conduct and outcomes of wars. Almost without exception, the victor possessed and applied technology not previously seen or used. Nowhere was this more evident than in Operation Desert Storm. During Desert Storm, the accuracy demonstrated by laser- and optics-
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guided munitions, space surveillance capabilities in near real-time, and the realization that night-vision optics gave the allies control of the night pointed out the necessity of maintaining our technological advantage by developing improved military optics and electro-optics systems. The military has a number of efforts under way to improve current capabilities. These include reliance on speed and stealth; detection and control of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats; and real-time information dissemination. Optics will play a key enabling role in all of these efforts. As the recently published National Research Council (NRC) report entitled Harnessing Light: Optical Science and Engineering for the 21st Century states, For the future, optical systems are sure to be the basis for entirely new classes of defense applications that will change yet again the way wars are conducted. In its November 1998 report entitled A Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force, the Air Force Science Advisory Board stated that research and technology funds should be allocated for military-unique technology needs not likely to be met by commercial sources, identifying and pursuing opportunities to insert technologies in commercial and military applications, and maintaining longer term high-risk/high-payoff technologies where commercial companies cannot justify investing. The report goes on to say that DoD should focus on critical technology needs (e.g., low-cost, lightweight space optics). To a remarkable degree, the cost of all competing concepts of directed-energy in space is driven by the optics required on orbit. DoD requires both primary warning and tracking of objects in high orbits. Advances in both optics and optical materials are needed to accomplish these missions. Use of optics and optical systems, which improves current manufacturing capabilities and enable new ones, is revolutionizing modern manufacturing in the commercial and military sectors. Light is being used to process and probe materials. For example, it is used remotely, through windows that separate the optics from a harsh environment or vacuum, to evaporate coating material in a vacuum chamber or weld. On assembly lines, optics and lasers are used to scan large surfaces while comparing minute details at phenomenal speeds. Numerous optical techniques critical to the manufacture of products such as semiconductor chips and car bodies are used throughout industry. Technologies that make large space and airborne optics lighter, quicker, and less expensive, both for high-fluence optical weapons applications and for sensor systems that utilize low optical fluences, would benefit virtually any military and some commercial optical systems. These improvements from enabling optics technologies will provide the next-generation field officer with a near-real-time visualization of the battle scene via space communications and remote UAV surveillance. The optics, optical materials, and optical countermeasures outlined in this section were chosen with those concerns in mind. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLGY ASSESSMENT The world has experienced a major technological push in many areas in recent years, but especially in optics and electro-optics. Optics, combined with micro-electronics, has seen overnight advances. Numerous international technical conferences now have sections devoted to micro-optics-electromechanical systems (MOEMS), where optics and electronics are combined in what have typically been MEMS or just electronic chip processor components. Advanced process technology for optics, micro-optics, and optical components has changed the way we think about manufacturing optical systems. Many European countries and Asian countries also have participated in this resurgence in optics as an enabling technology for many applications. These advanced manufacturing process technologies are now present in varying degrees throughout the entire industrialized world. In general, the United States has a significant lead in militarily critical optical systems, components, materials, and optical countermeasures technologies. However, many of our allies (including Israel) are more advanced in some specific areas. Russia and China are more advanced in other specific areas, such as NLO and crystal-growing technology. A number of other countries have one or more niche technologies which are of military significance. Manufacture of mass-market optics components and some optical materials is now dominated by companies in Asia and the Pacific Rim, but some recent developments are enabling U.S. industry to recapture selected market segments. As the NRC report points out, one example of U.S. emergence is the recent development of a new class of numerically controlled optical grinding and polishing machines. Another example is improved understanding (and data base) of the characteristics of optical materials, from glasses to polymers to metals, thus permitting broader use of these automated technologies. Some of these key optical manufacturing process technologies are required to provide affordability for one-of-a-kind or limited numbers of specific military components or systems. A key strength of the U.S. optics industry is its computer-aided optical design capability, which has been revolutionized by the development of fast and affordable ray-tracing software. This strength is currently being threatened by some of
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the Asian nations as a result of improved capabilities in computer software and the proliferation of high-processorspeed computers.
Country Australia Canada China France Germany Israel Italy Japan Norway Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Sec. 11.2 Optics
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Figure 11.2-1. Optics Technology Systems WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-11.2. OPTICS

Precision Conformal Optics ..................................................................................................................................... III-11-63 Micro-optical Elements (MOEs) on Micro-optical Table Systems (MOTS)......................................................... III-11-65 Subwavelength Structured (SWS) Surfaces ............................................................................................................ III-11-67 Glass Photosensitivity Technology.......................................................................................................................... III-11-68 Optical Metrology (Aspheric Surfaces)................................................................................................................... III-11-70 Holographic Optical Elements in Photo-Thermo-Refractive Glass ....................................................................... III-11-71
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. PRECISION CONFORMAL OPTICS

An ongoing effort is to develop the optical system design, fabrication, and testing capabilities to produce precision conformal optical missile domes for military applications requiring aerodynamically shaped windows on the missile. This technology requires nonrotationally symmetric optical domes. The goal is fine grinding and polishing of nonrotationally symmetric aspheric missile dome surfaces. None. Unique profilometer designs and interferometer configurations appropriate for steep aspheric surfaces and wavefronts will need to be developed. A new polishing technique called rock and roll polishing, based on a loose abrasive/slurry approach, is also being studied. Software will be part of the developed metrology instruments. The primary metrology issue relates to the degree of asphericity present on the surfaces. Too many interferometric fringes are present to test conventionally. Null lenses can be used, but are expensive. New metrology techniques are needed to enable the use of aspheric surfaces in many optical systems. Develop the rock and roll polishing technique to provide the necessary surface figure. Illumination systems, scanners, microlithography. The rock and roll polishing technique is relatively inexpensive if it can be perfected for this application.
RATIONALE There is a significant loss of missiles due to overheating of the missile dome during high Mach flights. Sometimes the missile dome cracks under the high thermal gradients produced by the friction of flight. Current domes are predominantly hemispherical in shape. If a cone is used, the drag would be reduced by a factor of 2 or more; however, the optics behind the dome must see though the dome, requiring a window of some type. This has resulted in a hemispherical dome being the choice over the years. Modern technology permits exploration of nonconventional shapes such as fast aspheric domes, which approach the shape of a cone. These shapes have been modeled, showing the following attributes: As much as 50 percent of the drag of a missile is due to the hemispherical nose dome. A conformal dome will reduce this aerodynamic drag significantly, reducing the heating effect. An aspheric conformal dome will provide additional operational speed or range for the missile.
CaF and sapphire are two of the primary conformal dome materials of interest. Missiles equipped with conformal domes will fly faster and further than current spherical domes. Potential candidates for this technology include the Stinger, Hellfire, and Javelin missiles.
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WORLDWIDE TECHOLOGY ASSESSMENT

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In the United States, the Precision Conformal Optics Technology (PCOT) consortium comprises DARPA, Boeing, Rochester Photonics Corp., Sinclair Optics, University of Arizona/Optics Sciences Center (UA/OSC), U.S. Army MRDEXC, Raytheon, and the University of Rochester/Center for Optics Manufacturing. The U.S. Air Force and Navy have done considerable research on the development of this technology. There is U.S. Army funding of this effort as well. Currently, Raytheon Corporations Tucson Missile Division is actively working on a Navy manufacturing technology program aimed at developing a strengthened dome material and reshaping the dome in a conformal configuration to decrease the resistance and thereby the heating of the missile dome. Other U.S. firms developing this technology include the other PCOT consortium members: Boeing, Rochester Photonics Corp., Sinclair Optics, Optical Research Associates, and Morton CVD. The Center for Optics Manufacturing, at the University of Rochester in Rochester, New York, is developing computer-controlled grinding and polishing technology to support this effort along with the Optical Sciences Center at the University of Arizona. Their major programs are called advanced Anti-Radiation Guidance Demonstration/ High-speed Anti-radar Missile (AAGD/HARM) and Low-Cost Precision Kill (LCPK). The Center currently has 14 Government, Service, and industry support programs that include conformal optics research as part of their effort. At this time, there is limited knowledge of research in other countries, but Germany, UK, and Russia are known to be doing research in this area, and China has the capability to develop solutions to this technology issue.
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. MICRO-OPTICAL ELEMENTS (MOEs) ON MICRO-OPTICAL TABLE SYSTEMS (MOTS)
Tight tolerances are required for optoelectronic components such as micro-lenses and micro-beamsplitters. Position tolerances of less than 1 mrad are required but currently exceed 10 mrad in some applications. Positioning placement errors are extremely tight in some applications such as lenses and gratings, where positioning tolerances of less than 1 m are required. None identified. None identified. None identified. The microchip substrates must allow rounding of corners to make protrusions deeper. Optical elements need to be patterned in a hybrid sol-gel glass in situ. Many MEMS technologies have appeared in products. Similarly, MOTS technologies will emerge in the optoelectronics industry products. It is anticipated that major cost savings can be achieved by this technology.
RATIONALE The field of micro-optical and microelectro-optical device technology is growing exponentially. There are many applications for such technology, from cell phones to missile guidance systems. MOTS will replace many macro-system components in the future. The DOE laboratories and especially Sandia National Laboratory have extensive research in this technology area. Sandia Laboratory plans on spending $300 million over the next few years on the Microsystems and Engineering Science Applications (MESA) facility. Virtual reality and micromachines would be wed at MESA, with the aim of making both weapons and commercial products, says Paul McWorter, spokesperson for SNL. This technology incorporates new structures on chips, enabling new functionality. In this way, the plan is to make chips that not only think, but can sense, act, and communicate. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLGY ASSESSMENT
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In the United States, the DOE laboratories and especially Sandia National Laboratory have extensive research in this technology area. This technology incorporates new structures on chips, enabling new functionality. Currently, a number of U.S. universities, including the University of Rochester and the University of Arizona, are working on specific technologies in the MOEs, MOEMS, and MOTS fields. U.S. industry partners include Adaptive Optics Associates, ADE Phase Shift, Alcatel Vacuum Technology, Dynamics Research Corp., Labtek, Newport Corp., SpectroLab Analytical, and West Coast Research. One U.S. firm, Potomac Photonics, Inc., has expanded its product line to provide complete microcomponent fabrication such as electroforming, micromolding, and micromachining, using various lasers to form the 2 and 3D features as small as a few microns. Leica Microsystems Corp. in Germany is working in this technology area, as is Exitech, Ltd., in Oxford, UK. In Mainz, Germany, researchers held the Third International Conference on Micro Opto Electro Mechanical
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Systems. The Institut fr Mikrotechnik Mainz, GmbH, has taken a lead role in developing this technology. In addition, Limo-Lissotschenko Mikrooptik, GmbH, Germany, has published a brochure highlighting its micro-optical components, which include microlenses, collimation lens arrays, and beam transformation optics on hybrid optical chips.
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. SUBWAVELENGTH STRUCTURED (SWS) SURFACES

SWS surfaces can replace multilayer dielectric coating for antireflection, narrowband filters, polarization components, and graded phase plates. This technology uses etching of the substrate surface to produce the physical equivalent of these multilayer coatings. The SWS process uses surface structure (small compared to the illumination wavelength) to synthesize an effective index of refraction. The critical parameters include uniformity (to 10 percent of the wavelength) of the etch channel widths and profile and process technology to provide uniform (to 10 percent of the wavelength) periodic embedded regions within the substrate. None identified. None identified. None identified. Producing the desired profile to fractions of the desired wavelength of light while holding tight tolerances in terms of shape, straightness, etc. Narrow-band filters for spectroscopic applications, polarization control in auto windshields, and beam-steering components for store checkout scanners. Much more affordable than current multilayer dielectric technology, once the process parameters are achieved.
RATIONALE The military utility for this technology is quite extensive. Uses range from battlefield optics, scopes, nightvision equipment, and laser rangefinders to polarizers for field glasses and narrow-band filters when lasers are being deployed. The technology uses the principle that the effective index of refraction (neff) of the surface can be synthesized by varying the duty cycle of the etched profile on the substrate. The advantages over thin films are the following: (1) an ideal quarter-wave surface can be designed; (2) there are no material cohesion problems; (3) there are fewer fabrication steps; and (4) there are less stringent material constraints. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The only known research in this technology area is the work at University of Rochester Institute of Optics and at the Rochester Photonics Corporation, Rochester, New York. There is some technology in this area that is currently surfacing at conferences out of Japan but nothing has been published to date. A number of countries identified above are known to possess the basic understanding of the technology involved, but no known research is underway at this time anywhere else.
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. GLASS PHOTOSENSITIVITY TECHNOLOGY

Ultraviolet photosensitive glass produces positive index of refraction changes with increasing intensity of irradiation. Volume holograms can be formed in bulk Ge-doped silica. The sol-gel technology can produce photosensitive glass. Synthesizing high-quality germanosilicate glasses using the sol-gel growth method. None identified. None identified. None identified. Photosensitive glass can be used in applications ranging from control of optical parameters to providing 3D hologram storage of optical information. Very long fiber Bragg gratings can be formed to provide dispersion manipulation for optical communications as well as optical pulse synthesis. Phase gratings in optical fibers are used for controlling reflection and allowing unique control over both the amplitude (pulse shaping) and phase (dispersion) of optical signals. Demonstration of the capability to make large quantities of high-quality, low-cost, photosensitive glass using the sol-gel technique will establish the cost savings.
Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications
Affordability
RATIONALE The practical implementation of applications like holographic optical data storage is limited by inadequate optical materials. Organic polymers possess many of the required qualities, such as high photosensitivity, but due to density changes upon writing, holographic images degrade when multiple holograms are multiplexed. New approaches maintain the high photosensitivity of existing polymer materials that results from quantum amplification (one photon induces many reactions) but exhibits little or no density change. One new approach is based on isomerization of a high concentration of reactant molecules that are dispersed in a rigid polymer matrix. Ultraviolet photosensitivity and synthesis in bulk germanosilicate glasses have proven to be a good 3D holographic storage technique. Glass has low loss, high homogeneity, low birefringence, and excellent mechanical properties. The nonzero photosensitivity of glass needs to be studied to extend its range of applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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This technology is rather new and limited in funding. Russia and Japan are developing capabilities for photosensitive glass fabrication. A number of co-inventors of this technology work at the State Optical Institute in Russia. They can bring this technology to a commercial level if the Russian Government funds the corresponding program. The recent publication of a Japanese research group (K. Miura, J. Qiu, H. Inouye, T. Mitsuyu, K. Hirao) published Photowritten Optical Waveguides in Various Glasses with Ultrashort Pulses, which shows that they created these photosensitive glasses but still cannot overcome the problem of spontaneous crystallization. If
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professional glass developers in Japan will be involved in the program, they can improve glass composition and technology after several months of efforts. A group of researchers led by V.I. Smirnov and O.M. Efimov have written numerous publications, including (1) High-Efficiency Bragg Gratings in Photothermorefractive Glass, by O.M. Efimov, L.B. Glebov, L.N. Glebova, K.C. Richardson, and V.I. Smirnov, Appl. Optics, Optical Technology and Biomedical Optics (OT&BO), 38, 619627, 1999; (2) Polychromatic GlassesA New Material for Recording Volume Phase Holograms, by L.B. Glebov, N.V. Nikonorov, E.I. Panysheva, G.T. Petrovskii, V.V. Savvin, I.V. Tunimanova, and V.A. Tsekhomskii, Sov. Phys. Dokl., 35, 878, 1990; and (3) Photowritten Optical Waveguides in Various Glasses with Ultrashort Pulses, by K. Miura, J. Qiu, H. Inouye, T. Mitsuyu, K. Hirao. It is necessary to establish a serious R&D program in the United States to gain affordability of new holographic material and create access to this new photosensitive optical glass technology. It appears that the United States is on an equal footing with Japan and Russia but needs to accelerate this important technology. The Center for Research and Education in Optics and Lasers at the University of Central Florida (CREOL/UCF) and UA/OSC are two university centers currently working on this technology.
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. OPTICAL METROLOGY (ASPHERIC SURFACES)

The precision measurement of aspheric optical elements is an expensive task, yet aspherics are often the key to the design of simpler, lighter, and less expensive optical systems. Surface testing techniques that do not require the use of null lens elements yet provide high precision are therefore important. The combination of multiple wavelength interferometry using sub-Nyquist sampling and deterministic fringe imaging offers a promising solution, but is still in the research and development stage. Critical technology parameters: Dynamic range (1E5), and PV accuracy (< 5 nm).
Stable laser sources and megapixel image sensors. Aspheric optical element testing can be improved significantly with the use of multiplewavelength interferometry combined with deterministic fringe imaging. This technology needs to be developed. High-speed acquisition/processing of digital images. Alignment tolerances and corrective ability at high dynamic range. Aspheric optics for displays, video cameras, medical imaging, and projection lithography. Currently there are no commercial systems that will provide the necessary dynamic range.
RATIONALE The use of aspheric optics offers weight and cost reduction and provides for flexible designs in the context, for example, of conformal optics (in which a front surface must conform to a nonoptical specification). An interferometric test for a single aspheric surface can cost upward of $25,000. Thus, both military optics and consumer optics would benefit from a method of non-null testing of aspheres. The optics community has long required a cost-effective technique to measure the accuracy of aspheric surfaces. There is no significant effort in any country to solve this problem. Null lenses are difficult to design and also difficult to test. Once a null lens is fabricated, it is almost as difficult to test as the aspheric it was designed to measure. Therefore, this technology is the best practical solution to this problem. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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There are few researchers in any country working on solutions to this testing issue. The United States and Germany are actively trying to solve this problem in a cost-effective and time-efficient manner. Thomas Brown at the University of Rochester/Institute of Optics is actively working to solve this by the technology outlines above. No other significant foreign efforts are currently known.
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DATA SHEET III-11.2. HOLOGRAPHIC OPTICAL ELEMENTS IN PHOTO-THERMO-REFRACTIVE GLASS

Holographic optical element (HOE) fabrication is a rapidly developing technology because of great advantages in decreasing of weight and sizes of laser-based optical systems. A volume HOE in a durable inorganic photo-thermo-refractive (PTR) glass with diffraction efficiency of 40 percent originally was developed by State Optical Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia. This technology was significantly improved at CREOL/UCF and resulted in diffraction efficiency increasing up to 95 percent. PTR/HOE have thermal, chemical, and mechanical properties of routine multicomponent silicate glasses; are tolerable to IR, visible, and UV radiation; can be designed for transmitting and reflecting configurations; and a number of components can be superposed in the same element. By 2010, projections indicate dramatic increase of sizes and decrease of losses in UV and middle IR regions. There is expected use of PTR/HOE in commercial markets for high-quality laser systems, optical communications, data storage, and data processing. All these applications are very attractive for military applications because of high thermal stability of PTR/HOEs. The most promising application is for laser radar, specifically for laser beam cleaning, angular beam scanning, and spectral filtering in receivers. Commercially, Light Processing and Technologies, Inc., recently spun off CREOL for research, development, and manufacturing of PTR/HOE. Parameter Spectra range of photosensitivity (nm) Spectra range of operation (nm) Diameter (mm) Thickness (mm) Spectra selectivity at 633 nm (FWHM, pm) Angular selectivity at 633 nm (few1, mrad) Diffraction efficiency at >400 nm (%) Diffraction efficiency at <400 nm (%) 1999 280370 3001100 5 2 700 0.5 9095 1012 Projected by 2010 280800 2504000 250 20 50 0.02 9599 5070
A number of R&D efforts are directed to the development of higher quality PTR glasses (optical homogeneity, homogeneity of sensitivity, shift of photosensitivity to the visible and IR regions) to study of features of diffraction process in super thick holograms.
Critical Materials
PTR glass, which is sodium-zinc-aluminum-silicate glass doped with silver, cerium, and fluorine. The single glass melting facility specialized in PTR glass fabrication is at CREOL/UCF. The glass can be fabricated at conventional optical glass melting facilities. High-quality hologram writing facility is necessary for PTR/HOE writing with UV laser. Power requirements are about 10 mW/cm2. Commercial software is available for glass fabrication and PTR/HOE design and fabrication.
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Technical Issues
Development of PTR glass fabrication technology which enables homogeneity of refractive index and photosensitivity at large diameters, development of hologram writing, and development of technology which enables homogeneity of diffraction efficiency and spectral and angular selectivity for high-power laser applications. These issues are to be solved in the development process of powerful laser systems design for military applications. Basic skills for R&D, design, and fabrication are the combination of conventional skills for optical and optical materials industries. Specific glass with volatile components and recording processes in the UV region require some additional skills for technical personnel. The commercial technology of PTR/HOEs does not require further development for military applications except to meet specific requirements for larger sizes for high-power laser systems.
The main commercial applications of PTR/HOEs are spectral and angular filtering for optical communications, spectroradiometers, and spectral analysis, laser-beam steering; mode selection in lasers; and attenuation and splitting of collimated beams. PTR/HOEs will be drivers of new design because of potential low cost, feasibility of large-scale manufacturing, environmental stability, and high optical merits. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE Volume holographic optical elements in PTR/HOEs may provide unique merits for optical systems as narrowband spectral filters, angular selectors, and beam deflectors. Compared to the conventional optical elements, they decrease weight and size of optical components. Compared to known HOEs fabricated from dichromated gelatin or lithium niobate, they increase thermal stability and lifetime. These features are most attractive for laser systems on aircraft- or space-based platforms. Potential military applications are such components of laser radar as mode selectors, beam deflectors and spectral filters, selective mirrors in telescopes directed to provide images in the narrow spectral region (including UV), and spectral filters in WDM for optical communications. A number of such applications are of high importance for new DoD programs: Detection of signals or images in narrow spectral lines (air- and space-based telescopes and radiometers, laser radars, range finders, etc.). Maximal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of a receiving optical system operating under conditions of strong external illumination (enemys lasers, radiation of explosions, etc.) is reached when the spectral width of a receiver is about of the spectral width of a signal. An interference filter is one of the conventional systems used for spectral selection in receivers; however, the interference filters allow selection of spectral regions of 1 or more nanometers with transmission below 50 percent [see, e.g., Refs. 1 and 2)], although the spectral line width of laser radiation can be hundreds of times smaller. A more promising way to detect narrow-band radiation is the use of a volume Bragg grating because a higher spectral selection can be achieved (Refs. 3, 4). There are a number of materials applied for volume Bragg recording, but none meets all requirements for a reliable holographic material (Ref. 5). The proposed approach is based on recent success at CREOL/UCF in a study of hologram recording in photosensitive inorganic glasses (Ref. 6), which was supported by BMDO contracts for the last 3 years (Contracts N6600197C6008 and N6600198D6003). Formation of Bragg grating in PTR glass is a result of a two-step process including an exposure to UV radiation followed by thermal development. This medium allows high-diffraction efficiency of transmitting Bragg gratings; excellent response at high spatial frequencies; and perfect thermal, optical, and mechanical stability. A patent applicationPhoto-thermo-refractive optical elements and methodson behalf of the University of Central Florida was recently submitted. Thus, PTR reflectors in telescopes, radiometers, laser radars, and range finders enable a design of new generation of narrow-band receivers in target and background tracing. Laser-beam deflection, splitting, and attenuation (scanning and beam shaping systems in laser radars and range finders, e.g., STAB program at DARPA). Low losses, high diffraction efficiency, low sensitivity to
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polarization, and sharp angular dependence of diffraction efficiency of gratings allow fine gradual attenuation with the uniform attenuation in diameter and simultaneous beam cleaning like a spatial filter. The feature of Bragg grating to split a beam to components with the same polarizations allows beam splitting with stepless ratio of intensities. Finally, this approach can give an arbitrary number of beams with arbitrary desirable intensities and the same polarization. It is clear that the grating rocking can produce a variable splitting ratio or scanning system. Scanning rate in configuration of the regular compact disc can be up to 10 kHz for a 3-mm diameter beam. The use of Bragg gratings in PTR glasses allows a development of several designs, which can overcome some problems, usually encountered in electro-optical and acousto-optical modulators (small angular deflection). The combination of traditional scanning with a matrix of holograms allows realization of a high scanning rate and wide angular deflection. Recording of multiple gratings in the same volume, readable under different angles, allows switching between different regimes by rocking the matrix. Thus, PTR deflectors, attenuators, and beam splitters in air- and space-based laser systems can significantly decrease the size and weight of systems, while improving beam quality. Selection of transversal and longitudinal modes in laser cavity to enable single-mode operation (laser radars, range finders, aims, etc.). Application of laser radiation for target recognition or for range finding requires a very high quality of laser beams. Mostly, it should be a single-mode operation to secure a diffractive limit of divergency and narrow spectral line. The main conventional methods of transverse mode selection are based on spatial filtering using different spatial mode distribution in a laser cavity (Ref. 7). However, it is clear from Reference 7 that the main difference between transverse modes of different orders is in their angular distributions. In this case, angular selection by volume diffractive gratings looks more beneficial. The first promising results of angular mode selection were shown in Reference 8. What mainly restrains an application of diffractive elements is the lack of reliable materials for Bragg grating fabrication (Refs. 35, 8). Thus, the use of PTR mode selectors in resonators of portable high-power laser systems will increase both power and beam quality while overall dimensions and weight will be decreased.

Japan
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
In the United States, technologies of PTR glass fabrication and volume diffractive gratings recording are established at CREOL/UCF. Light Processing and Technologies, Inc., is working on commercialization of PTR/HOE. A lot of research efforts all over the world are directed to creation of reliable HOEs. No special cooperative agreements concern PTR holographic elements. Russia and Japan can easily develop capabilities for PTR glass fabrication and HOE creation. A number of co-inventors of PTR technology of holographic element fabrication (Refs. 9, 10) still work at State Optical Institute in Russia. They can move this technology to commercial level if the Russian government funds the corresponding program. The recent publication of a Japanese research group (Ref. 11) shows that they created PTR-like photosensitive glass but still cannot overcome the problem of spontaneous crystallization. If professional glass developers in Japan will be involved in the program, they can improve glass composition and technology after several months of efforts. It is necessary to establish additional serious R&D programs in the United States to gain affordability of new holographic material and create access to new holographic optical elements. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Coherent, The Catalog for Laser and Photonic Applications, 1999. Quantum Optics Company, Catalog, 1999. Rakuljis, G.A., and A. Yariv, Patent USA 5,684,611, November 1997. Semenova, I.V., and N.O. Reinhard, Spectral Selectivity of Volume Holograms: Two Limiting Cases, in Holographic Materials V, Ed. T.J. Trout, Proc. SPIE 3638, 7886, 1999. Hariharan, P., Optical Holography. Principles, Techniques, and Applications, Chapter 7, Practical Recording Materials, 95124, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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6.
7. 8. 9. 10.
11.
Efimov, O.M., L.B. Glebov, L.N. Glebova, K.C. Richardson, and V.I. Smirnov, High-Efficiency Bragg Gratings in Photothermorefractive Glass, Appl. Optics, Optical Technology and Biomedical Optics (OT&BO), 38, 619627, 1999. Siegman, A.I., Lasers, University Science Books, Mill Valley, California, 1986. Ludman, J.E., J.R. Riccobono, N.O. Reinhard, I.V. Semenova, Yu.L. Korzhinin, and S.M. Shahriar, Holographic Nonspatial Filter, Proc. SPIE 2532, 481490, 1995. Borgman, V.A., L.B. Glebov, N.V. Nikonorov, G.T. Petrovskii, V.V. Savvin, and A.D. Tsvetkov, Photothermal Refractive Effect in Silicate Glasses, Sov. Phys. Dokl., 34, 1011, 1989. Glebov, L.B., N.V. Nikonorov, E.I. Panysheva, G.T. Petrovskii, V.V. Savvin, I.V. Tunimanova, and V.A. Tsekhomskii, Polychromatic GlassesA New Material for Recording Volume Phase Holograms, Sov. Phys. Dokl., 35, 878, 1990. Miura, K., J. Qiu, H. Inouye, T. Mitsuyu, and K. Hirao, Photowritten Optical Waveguides in Various Glasses with Ultrashort.
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SECTION 11.3OPTICAL MATERIALS AND PROCESSES

Highlights Optical materials protect sensors in hazardous atmospheric conditions while still allowing signals to pass. Optical coatings are used to Reduce scatter and reflection by gradually modifying the index of refraction along an optical path, Selectively filter incoming radiation to the sensor, and Protect optical elements. Nonlinear optical (NLO) materials are used to shift the wavelengths (or frequency) of radiation to more desirable levels. Optical materials, including laser-diode-pumped fibers, are used to transfer information faster and at higher bandwidth than electrical wires. Optical materials are used for protection against unwanted radiation. Optical materials are used as a medium for lasing. Many optical processes that cut grinding and polishing time by an order of magnitude are being developed. Optical processing can now occur on the chip, which allows optical processing and computing information to be considered in many new and revolutionary ways.
OVERVIEW This section includes optical materials, optical material technologies for linear and nonlinear materials with transmission in the visible and/or IR spectral regimes, and optical processing. This subitem includes both bulk materials and thin films and coatings. Depending on the application, these materials/coatings may be required for either broad- or narrow-band applications. Special emphasis is placed on materials and coatings which are affordable, maintainable, and durable in harsh environments experienced in military operations, such as exposure to high-energy lasers, high temperatures, or high structural loads associated with high-speed, maneuvering flight. This section includes optical materials for (1) high strength, multispectral optical applications; (2) supersonic IR window/domes; (3) multifunction IR coating materials; (4) specialty transparent materials for optical coatings and filters; (5) NLO materials for wavelength conversion; and (6) photonic crystals which can be used to control light switching and directional flow of light. Optical processing is covered as it relates to new, innovative technology for computer-controlled optical grinding and polishing, as well as new and revolutionary processing of optical components on chip-level components. In most cases, the mission requirements of individual weapons platforms and their associated optical systems dictate the specific capability of the optical materials and coatings in the components thereof. Capability not only refers to the accuracy of the system or sensor component, but it also includes durability, availability, and cost of ownership. Many factors involving electro-optical countermeasures are peculiar to the military. As an exception, some of the nonlinear optical materials will likely be utilized in lasers for detection and identification of chemical species in environmental pollutants, and some forms of the optics coating technology could be adapted by the optical industry for commercial aviation of night vision (IR) sensors and other applications.
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RATIONALE The accurate assessment of target location through surveillance and subsequent pinpoint delivery and guidance of missile assets is critically linked to the durability and survival of the optical sensor/seeker systems on board the delivery platform and the munition. Both must endure adverse environmental and hostile conditions, such as rain and dust and electro-optical countermeasures, often at supersonic speeds. These capabilities are provided, in part, by optical materials and/or coatings, and directly determine the delivery accuracy and lethality of manned and unmanned guided weapons systems. Access to materials and coating technology would amplify threats to regional stability to a critical extent by making available to hostile forces a much superior material and/or optical coating/ filter for windows, missile domes and optical elements for electro-optical sensor systems capabilities. The current U.S. technology lead translates into a combat and performance advantage for U.S. military forces, and the technologies outlined in this section have the potential to maintain or enhance this advantage. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Some of the materials and coatings technologies covered in this subitem are being developed and/or produced in the UK, France, Israel, and Japan, and perhaps in China and the former Soviet Republics.
Country Canada China France Germany Israel Japan Malaysia Netherlands Norway Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Sec. 11.3 Optical Materials and Processes
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 11.3-1. Optical Materials and Processes Systems WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-11.3. OPTICAL MATERIALS AND PROCESSES

Nonlinear Material Development for the 3.5 m-Wavelength Region .................................................................. III-11-79 SoL-Gel Waveguides for Integrated Optics ............................................................................................................ III-11-80 Self-Channeling NLO Materials Development Technology .................................................................................. III-11-81 Electro-Optic and Photorefractive NLO Polymer Technologies ............................................................................ III-11-83 Photonic Crystal Technology ................................................................................................................................... III-11-85 Plastic Optoelectronics ............................................................................................................................................. III-11-87 Computer-Controlled Optical Grinding/Polishing .................................................................................................. III-11-88 Laser-Aided Semiconductor Processing.................................................................................................................. III-11-91 Optical Fluoride Materials........................................................................................................................................ III-11-94 IR Optical Elements.................................................................................................................................................. III-11-96 IR Coating Materials ................................................................................................................................................ III-11-98 Specialty Transparent Materials.............................................................................................................................III-11-100 NLO Materials ........................................................................................................................................................III-11-101 High-Energy Laser (HEL) Optical Materials ........................................................................................................III-11-103 Ferroelectric Liquid Crystal (FLC) Material .........................................................................................................III-11-104 Polymer Liquid Crystal Flake Material .................................................................................................................III-11-106 High-Accuracy, Thin-Film IR Optical Coatings ...................................................................................................III-11-109 Transition Metal Dithiolene Dye Material.............................................................................................................III-11-111
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. NONLINEAR MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR THE 3.5-m WAVELENGTH REGION
Nonlinear materials for frequency conversion at the important 3.5-m wavelength region, where hydrocarbon molecules absorb and can be detected in the atmosphere. Nonlinear crystals must meet the physical requirements of a large nonlinear coefficient, have good optical quality, be chemically stable, easily grown, and easily fabricated into optical components and devices. Inexpensive tunable parametric oscillator (NLO) materials. None identified. None identified. Lithographic planar processing is required for mass-producing nonlinear crystal chips. Air pollution monitoring. Since thousands of chips of lithium niobate can be produced on a 4-in. diameter wafer, the cost could be reduced to a few dollars per chip.
RATIONALE Recently, nonlinear materials manufacturing technology has led to the use of lithographic process technology to apply various materials to silicon wafers. This technology could reduce the cost by factors of 10 to 100, possibly by 1,000 or more. If lithium niobate can be applied to this lithographic planar processing technology, it would be possible to fabricate nonlinear chips for both commercial and military applications. The nonlinear effects, such as conversion efficiency, can be optimized by using spatial modulation of the ferroelectric domains to achieve quasiphase matching. This would permit wavelength selection into appropriate absorption bands. Lithographic planar processing techniques for mass production of silicon integrated circuits is a possible solution. Lithium niobate is a prime candidate material. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada India Russia Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel Singapore UK

Significant R&D
France Japan Switzerland United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
China has the lead in this technology with significant R&D effort, followed closely the United States, Israel, and Russia.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. SOL-GEL WAVEGUIDES FOR INTEGRATED OPTICS

The development of sol-gel waveguides and Bragg gratings for use with integrated optics is needed to provide low-loss optical components and feedback resonator gratings for on-chip applications. This technology will provide a simple, low-cost approach to heterogeneous integration of optoelectronics, multiwavelength lasers with optimized linewidth, and a wide range of integrated optical components on integrated chips. The sol-gel technology needs very low-loss materials to make this technology feasible. High-purity sol-gel materials with very low optical attenuation and absorption loss. Packaging and reliability testing under harsh environment. Testing to less than 0.05-percent absorption is required. Capable, fast, and accurate design tool for heterogeneous integration. Improved reliability and reproducibility for large-volume production. The technology will provide for the transmission of different wavelengths in parallel, which will increase the transmission capacity, and allow simultaneous transmission of different signal modes (voice, data, image, etc.). The immediate applications are for optical networks and supercomputer links. This technology not only will significantly reduce the cost of service but will provide a component that does not exist in the current optoelectronic technology inventory.
Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications
Affordability
RATIONALE The Bragg grating sol-gel technology will open a wide choice of applications in the optoelectronics area. Lowcost multiwavelength sources, wavelength filters, and splitters are key components for advanced optical systems. This technology will provide a low-cost addition to current technology in this area and significantly increase the possibilities for optical links. Combining sol-gel and semiconductor technology will provide a new dimension to the heterogeneous integration of optoelectronic components. The technology will provide new chip-scale highperformance, low-cost modules for terabit optical links and RF-lightwave transmission systems for radar, navigation, and communication. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Italy UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Spain

Moderate R&D
Germany Sweden
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States, Japan, UK, France, and Germany have the lead in this technology with significant R&D.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. SELF-CHANNELING NLO MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY

Generation of spatial solitons (beams of light that propagate long distances without spreading) and light bullets (ultrashort pulses that propagate without spreading in time or space) for applications such as directed-energy delivery and optical logic. Establishment of self-channeling of light waves in air for applications such as the generation of electrically conducting channels. Optical power limiters for sensor protection.
Critical Materials
Need development of new second-order and third-order NLO materials. Need materials with low absorption and high resistance to laser damage. Composite materials offer an attractive means for improving material performance if they can be developed with the properties required.
Materials assessment using self-focusing techniques (such as z-scan). Assessment of the ultrafast dynamics of photonic materials by time resolving the field evolution of an optical pulse.
None identified. Generation of light waves with exotic quantum statistical properties (so-called squeezed light fields) for performing noise-free measurements. Unique imaging opportunities using terahertz optical pulses, including imaging through biological materials. Elucidate role of composite structures in optimizing properties of photonic materials. The use of NLO methods for image processing.
Tunable light sources based on NLO interactions. Photonic switching for optical communications. NLO is intrinsically a low-cost solution once development is complete.
RATIONALE NLO constitutes the study of the interaction of intense light with material systems. The military utility of this technology includes understanding how targets respond to intense laser radiation, the use of nonlinear techniques for image recognition and low-light-level imaging, the transmission and switching of optical signals in both free-space and fiber-optic environments, the enhancement of sensor characteristics, and the development of optical data-storage devices. These specific attributes are the key reasons that improved NLO materials are needed to provide better visibility at night, better covert communication links, and improved high-bandwidth audio/video for many military applications.
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Australia Czech Republic Hungary Israel Netherlands Russia Switzerland UK
Legend:
Cuba Germany Iraq Malaysia Poland Sweden Ukraine
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Australia, the United States, and Japan have the lead in this technology with extensive R&D, followed by Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, UK, Canada, Italy, France, South Korea, Germany, and Sweden with significant R&D programs. Limited R&D is under way in several other countries.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. ELECTRO-OPTIC AND PHOTOREFRACTIVE NLO POLYMER TECHNOLOGIES

With the emergence of electro-optic/photonic technologies in areas such as range finding, data storage, and telecommunications, where information is coded, transported and routed optically, there is a significant technological demand for highperformance NLO materials. The second-order NLO materials exhibit the linear electro-optic effect in which the refractive index of the material can be controlled through the application of an external electric field. A fundamental understanding of the interrelationship between the chemical and NLO properties of these materials is required, and an optimization of parametric effects is necessary to fully utilize the inherent capability of these NLO materials. Organic dyes and polymeric organic systems such as stilbenes or diphenyl polyenes. None identified. None identified. A method of producing dye concentrations in electrically poled polymers to achieve a noncentrosymmetric orientation of the molecules with enhanced NLO properties is needed. NLO materials with temporal stability at elevated temperature are required. Many commercial applications in the field of telecommunications, data storage, and computing are just a few of the potential applications where optical devices will replace electronic devices. To be determined, but should be significantly more affordable since higher efficiency, higher data rates, and small data storage space is required for the same electrical capability.
Affordability
RATIONALE The second-order NLO effects occur only in molecules lacking a center of symmetry. This effect can be used to impress information on an optical carrier signal by modulating its phase or amplitude with an applied field varying in time and in amplitude. Such materials can therefore be used for the fabrication of ultrafast integrated electro-optical modulators. The NLO properties of materials can be used to control the phase, the state of polarization, or the frequency of light beams at very high rates. The method most widely used to impart noncentrosymmetry in noncrystalline systems is the poled-polymer approach. When combined with the photoconducting and photorefracting properties of these materials, this effect can be used to store information optically by spatially modulating the refractive index of a photorefractive material. The photorefractive effect is based on a combination of photoconducting and electro-optic properties, and it can lead to high refractive index variations under the illumination of low-power lasers. Therefore, NLO materials can be used to store and restore information optically or to deflect light beams and thereby route optical information between fiber-optic channels. The key to this technology is the development of a range of compounds with diverse NLO bulk properties in noncentrosymmetric materials. Some of the newer polymers exhibit additional orientational effects which are largely responsible for the high performance of this new class of materials and have drastically changed the optimization criteria of photorefractive polymers. Photorefractive materials are suitable for recording and storage of optically encoded information. They are also reconfigurable, so the recording of optical information can be performed in real time. Hence, photorefractive materials are not only suitable for optical storage but also show particular promise for real-time optical processing applications. Until recently, the photorefractive effect has been studied mainly in inorganic crystals that are difficult to produce and to process. In contrast, highly efficient photorefractive polymers, such as the plasticized polyvinyl carbazole-based polymers, exhibit an orientational contribution to the refractive-index modulation. This so-called orientational enhancement effect is due to the ability
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of the chromophores to orient at room temperature under the influence of an electric field, which is the result of the superposition of the internal modulated field and any externally applied field. As a result, in steady state after photorefractive hologram or three-dimensional image formation, the molecules no longer have a uniform orientation but can have an orientation that is spatially modulated both in magnitude and in direction. That periodic orientation of the chromophores doubles the effect of the electro-optic contribution and, more important, leads to a modulated birefringence that significantly enhances the total refractive-index modulation. Hence, there is a strong need for photorefractive polymers with a high glass transitional temperatures; in other words, photorefractive polymers that are stable at relatively high temperatures. Such polymers are poled and have stable electro-optic properties. These materials will find homes in many applications requiring three-dimensional storage of information. The Services have a significant need for low-cost, high-data-storage write and rewrite information systems. This NLO photorefractive technology will be a good fit to that need once the development phase is complete. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel Singapore
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Italy Taiwan

Significant R&D
France Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has the lead in this technology, followed by UK and China.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. PHOTONIC CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGY

Photonic crystals are materials that have a patterned periodicity in their dielectric constant. This periodicity creates forbidden frequency bands called photonic bandgaps. Photons with energies within the bandgaps cannot propagate through the crystal. As a result, this phenomena can be used to control the flow of light for photonic information technology. The main difficulty to date in designing an all-photonic circuit is the lack of optical components analogous to the electronic transistor. Photonic crystals hold the key to continued progress toward an all-optical system. In a semiconductor, the atomic lattice presents a periodic potential to the electron propagating through the electronic crystal material. In a photonic crystal, the periodic potential is due to a lattice of macroscopic dielectric material instead of atoms. In an optical analog of the electronic bandgap in semiconductors, photonic crystals control light flow by the photonic bandgap, and defects within the crystal can be used to manipulate the photons even further. The introduction of a defect in the crystal allows generation of electromagnetic states with specific properties. Therefore, photonic crystals show great promise for controlling the flow of photons in future photonic networks. To this end, it is necessary to develop an understanding of photonic structures on the same level as has been done for electrons in semiconductors and find NLO materials which work analogously to them. New photonic crystals and parameter evaluation of same for specific applications. Advanced microlithography techniques to fabricate the crystal structures. Electronbeam lithography and X-ray lithography are required. Computer codes to run the crystal-layering process in fabrication. Understanding what defects are required for specific properties within the crystal. NLO materials which perform functions analogous to electron transistors are needed. Manufacturing process technology of photonic crystals with inherent dielectric periodicity is needed.
The commercial applications are numerous, including every conceivable device that currently has an electronic circuit. The most probable use will be in processors and computers where speed and efficiency are required in yet more miniaturized packages with less heat removal. This technology will be much more affordable than that of electronic chip circuits; it will be an order of magnitude smaller in size than todays technology permits because of less heat being generated and thus capable of operating at higher speeds. It will take considerable effort to develop the photonic crystals and parameterize them for various defect concentrations. When this development is complete, the technology should provide a basis for higher efficiency, lower heat removal, higher speed, and longer lasting chip technology.
Affordability
RATIONALE Light (i.e., photons) can eliminate the increased resistance and higher levels of power dissipation in electronic chip circuits. Photonic crystals can be used with photons in much the same way that ordinary semiconductor crystals affect the properties of electrons. In the quest for improvement in high-density integration and system performance, scientists are now developing photonic crystal technology for photonic networks. This technology provides significant improvement in the miniaturization and high-speed performance of integrated electronic circuits. Light can travel at much greater speeds than electrons in circuits. Light can also carry
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a large amount of information per second. The bandwidth of dielectric materials is orders of magnitude larger that that of metals. Despite the numerous advantages of photons, an all-optical circuit has yet to be commercially available on a mass-produced scale. The difficulty in designing a multipurpose optical component analogous to the electronic transistor has slowed the development of optical circuits. Photonic crystals may hold the key to the continued development of an all-optical system. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan UK

Significant R&D
Germany Singapore
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
China and the United States have the lead in this technology with significant R&D, followed by Japan and the UK with moderate R&D efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. PLASTIC OPTOELECTRONICS

The critical technology parameters center on low-optical-loss materials development. Sources, transmitters in the gigahertz plastic optical fiber (POF) and 100-GHz electrooptical modulation, and electronic drivers in organic or polysilicon are required. Organic light-emitting displays with 20 lm/W and with a minimum of 180,000 cd/m2 CW operation are needed. Low-optical-loss electro-optic polymers, organic photorefractive materials, organic electroluminescent materials, high-cross-section two-photon absorbing materials, and improved electrolytes for Li batteries. None identified. None identified. Better structure/property relationships with improved performance and reliability are required. One key technical issue is the development of a theoretical framework for charge transfer in highly polar multifunctional polymers. In addition, low-cost manufacturing needs to be demonstrated. Telecommunications, displays, and security applications are the major areas of interest at this time. Syntheses of molecules and polymers can be achieved at low cost. New environmentally friendly manufacturing as now available in microprinting will improve the cost factor.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Plastic optoelectronics is a window of opportunity based on recent breakthroughs in organic photonic materials. The telecommunications and display business are an immediate marketplace for this technology. Many applications in military sensors and communication systems will benefit from the reduced weight and cost of these components. Defense applications include correlators for security checking, high-speed modulators in the GHz range, head-mounted displays, organic laser diodes, laser eye and sensor protection, and plastic optoelectronic circuitry. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
There is only limited R&D in plastic optoelectronics activity in France, the United States, Japan, Russia, and the UK.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. COMPUTER-CONTROLLED OPTICAL GRINDING/POLISHING

This critical technology addresses new production methods and affordable manufacturing technologies needed to produce the optics required for critical defense optical systems and sensors. Nontraditional computer-controlled optics are needed to significantly reduce costs while increasing the detection range of electro-optical/IR sensors, improving their angle-of-arrival determination, enhancing the probability of detection, and reducing false alarms. Nontraditional optics are unique in that they conform to the reduced-signature mechanical shapes and aerodynamic requirements of the airborne platform on which they are mountedall while significantly reducing the production costs of these systems. Surface accuracy <0.5 m and surface microroughness <1 nm rms will be required for visible and multispectral optics. The precision needed to attain these requirements over a large working volume exceeds the capabilities of commercially available machine tools and processes by 2 to 3 orders of magnitude.
Critical Materials
There are no specific critical materials. System materials range across the UV, visible, multispectral, and IR spectrum. Extend deterministic microgrinding and magnetorheological finishing processes to computer-controlled machining platforms that will produce non-axisymmetric and freeform optical surfaces that conform to the platform shape into which they are mounted. New machining and finishing centers to automate the production of a wide spectrum of refractive and reflective optics in nontraditional shapes are required. Manufacturing tools, methods and practices must be developed to accommodate the affordable production of these complex, freeform optical shapes. Metrology for axisymmetric and nonaxisymmetric shapes is unavailable because of the unique technical requirements and limited market size. Metrology for in-process and final inspection measurements of freeform surfaces is needed.
Unique Software
Computer-aided design (CAD) and system software to support five-axis freeform machine programming, on-machine inspection, and feedback automation are needed. Real-time computing of surface figure via interferometry is still required. Situation awareness, fire-control accuracy, and ultimate battlefield control are directly related to the precision of the optics. Improved optics extend system performance and expand the limits of possible target detection, identification, and imaging resolution. Additional challenges include fabricating these shapes in the wide variety of UV, multispectral, and IR materials preferred. Materials for advanced military applications, such as chemical vapor deposition (CVD) diamond, sapphire, and metal matrix composites (MMCs), are among the hardest and most difficult-to-work materials known. Many optical materials have unique anisotropy and/or grain structures that cause significant machining asymmetries. This makes the fabrication of extremely accurate, nontraditional optical shapes very difficult. Current coordinate measurement and profilometry metrology lack the precision and accuracy required to quantify freeform optical surfaces. Optical test methods, including interferometry, are not available for the unique shapes required.
Technical Issues
Military unique applications drive the importance of these technology developments. Commercial requirements for these types of optics will quickly emerge when it is demonstrated that an affordable manufacturing technology is available.
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Affordability
The combination of extreme accuracy, unusual shapes, and difficult-to-work materials results in next-generation optical systems that are well beyond current fabrication capabilitiesat any affordable cost. The alternative to developing adequate optics manufacturing technology is controversial design workarounds, unsatisfactory performance reductions, and cost penalties for future military systems. Manufacturing technology investments are required to minimize life-cycle costs and achieve affordable no-compromise optical performance for next-generation military systems. Cost reductions of 10 are being achieved for aspheric optics as a result of past DoD manufacturing technology investments.1,2 Making similar DoD investments that will build on and advance these manufacturing technology developments is the only solution that will achieve the goal of affordable conformal optics.
RATIONALE This cross-cutting, nontraditional, conformal optics-manufacturing technology is broadly applicable to all military Services and nearly all weapon systems and sensor platforms. Both axisymmetric and nonaxisymmetric conformal shapes in a combination of aspherical, spherical, cylindrical, conical, toroidal, plano, or ogive shapes are required. In some extreme cases, there may be no symmetry to the optical surface at all, a true freeform shape. Performance criteria impacted by this parameter include improved detection range, target acquisition, and resolution, which ultimately improve weapon and system performance. Conformal optical shapes provide significant improvements in low observability, reduced signature, aerodynamic flow, weight, and drag reduction. As next-generation weapon systems evolve, military prime contractors are finding direct conflicts between the requirements for increased optical sensor performance and the requirements for low-observable, lightweight, highspeed systems. Attempting to mitigate these conflicts using traditional optical shapes (spherical lenses, flat windows) results in unacceptable compromises for next-generation systems. Affordable nontraditional optics are needed to meet these new requirements.3,4,5 Only the development of this unique, cutting-edge optics-manufacturing technology will provide superior combat capabilities to the warfighter. The battlefield requires threat detection and recognition systems, in combination with optical targeting and guidance systems, that operate in hard-to-distinguish threat environments, in all conditions, day or night. Optics are critical components of surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Since UV, visible, and IR optical systems remain the ultimate solution for these requirements, highly precise optics are pervasive in the militaryranging from the least complex land warriors night vision system to the far more complex laser range finders, target designators, missile seekers, aircraft threat detectors, and precision-guided munitions required for ultimate battlefield control. All projections for future military systems indicate that the trend toward higher performance optical solutions will continue to escalate. The Defense Technology Area Plan6 calls for increasing the detection range of electrooptical/infrared sensors by 100 percent; improving their angle-of-arrival determination to better than 1 deg; enhancing the probability of detection to more than 95 percent; and reducing false alarms to less than one per hourall while reducing the production costs of these systems. The combination of ultraprecise surface shapes and difficult-to-work materials causes the nontraditional optics required for next-generation systems to be well beyond current fabrication capabilitiesat an affordable cost. These defense-critical and defense-unique requirements must be met by systematically resolving the manufacturing technology issues and cost drivers that prevent the use of nontraditional optical shapes that will provide improved optical capability. Designers of combat systems will not be constrained by current design rules and a new class of war-fighting capabilities and weapon systems will evolve.
1 2 3 4 5
Army MantechOptics Manufacturing Modernization Program. DARPA Technology Reinvestment ProgramAsphere Manufacturing Program. Texas Instruments Missile Application Assessment ReportDARPA Physical Optics Program. Boeing Aircraft Application Assessment ReportDARPA Physical Optics Program. Defense Manufacturing in 2010 and BeyondMeeting the Changing Needs of National Defense, National Research Council, pp. 78. Defense Technology Area Plan, 1997.
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Australia France Russia Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Singapore Taiwan

Significant R&D
China Israel South Korea UK
Czech Republic Japan Sweden United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Japan, Israel, Germany, and Russia have significant R&D programs in this technology, followed by the United States, the Czech Republic, the UK, China, Taiwan, Switzerland, and France.
III-11-90
DATA SHEET III-11.3. LASER-AIDED SEMICONDUCTOR PROCESSING

To fabricate useful silicon carbide (SiC) semiconductor devices, several technologies must be developed. For example, to construct a junction field-effect transistor (FET), other FETs, or light-emitting diodes, the planner technologies of doping, oxidation, and metallization are needed, as well as patterning technologies. Laser-conversion technology has been found to be successful in generating conducting and insulating tracks (two basic elements of electric circuits) on SiC samples. Laser-doping technology can induce n- and p-type semiconducting properties in SiC. The parameters of interest are the crystal (cubic, hexagonal, and rhomohedral) structures of SiC and the laser fabrication/microprocessing parameters, for example, laser power, pulse length, scanning speed, solidification rate, nonequilibrium structures of SiC, and dopant implantation. The electrical parameters include voltage versus current characteristics, high-temperature annealing, and thermal stability of the SiC device.
Critical Materials
SiC, SiOC (silicon oxycarbide), Si1-yCy structures, dopants (e.g., B, Al, N), AlN film, oxygen and inert gases for laser processing. SiOC and Si1-yCy structures are produced during laser treatment to impart electrically conducting and insulating properties to the SiC surface. The AlN film deposited on SiC can be decomposed with a laser beam to implant aluminum and nitrogen into the SiC matrix in a single laser irradiation step. This will generate n- and p-type semiconductors and p-n junctions in a single laser microprocessing step.
The testing equipment includes a four-probe resistivity measurement instrument and an inert or vacuum furnace for testing the thermal stability of SiC devices and evaluating their electrical properties at high temperatures. Other testing equipment includes materials characterization tools such as the scanning electron microscope (SEM), atomic force microscope (AFM), and X-ray photoelectron scattering (XPS). The processing equipment include lasers such as continuous wave CO2 and Nd:YAG lasers and pulsed lasers of nanosecond pulse length and shorter. The fabrication technique is unique (see the section on critical materials).
Unique Software
The software to scan the laser beam on the workpiece in a predetermined pattern is generally available. Laser process modeling software needs to be developed to understand the interaction of lasers with SiC and the formation of new structures with different electrical properties at the SiC surface. Such mathematical models will be useful in optimizing the processsing conditions and developing process control and monotoring systems.
Technical Issues
The technical issues that drive/significantly influence this technology are (1) new solid state devices for high-temperature operational capability, (2) new laser microprocessing technology to fabricate such devices, and (3) the reduction of size and cost of electronic equipment. The technical hurdles/challenges are (1) micropipe substrate defects; (2) dielectric deposition, etching, doping, and oxidation; and (3) metallization of source, drain, gate, interconnects, and vias. (continued)
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Technical Issues (continued)
The technical approach to overcome these hurdles would be to develop laserconversion technology to synthesize SiC insulators, semiconductors, and conductors in SiC substrates to produce devices and sensors (U.S. Patents Nos. 5345741 and 5837607). The ability to use this technology is not constrained by a scarcity of professional, scientific, or technical personnel or skilled labor or other factors. However, this technology needs to be developed through systematic research, mathematical modeling, and device-characteristic evaluations. The military application does not require specialized adaptation or further development of commercial technology.
The commercial applications of SiC device technology include high-temperature sensors for temperature, pressure, flow rate, and gas or liquid sensing. The following table summarizes some of the applications. Table III-11.3. Current and Projected Operating Temperatures and Reliability of Electronic Devices
Current Operating Temp. (C) Future Operating Temp. (C) Targeted Reliability (h)
Applications Automotive Aircraft Spacecraft Oil logging Geothermal Development Power Electronics
Affordability
125140 300 175 200 125
165250 125 500 175 250260 250500
10,000 20010,000 1,00030,000 10,00030,000 10,00030,000 10,00030,000
This should not be an issue based on current chip microprocessing technology.
RATIONALE There has been a tremendous interest in SiC because of its potential application in electronic and optical devices. Compared to Si, SiC has superior properties for high-power, high-frequency, and high-temperature electronics applications. Conventional Si devices exhibit high losses because of low breakdown voltage and are limited for use below 150 C. SiC exhibits a breakdown strength of about 4.5 kV (10 times higher than that of silicon), resulting in lower losses. SiC also operates at higher temperatures (approaching 650 C) and is, therefore, considered the material of the future for high-temperature applications. Power semiconductor device applications include diodes, thyristors, transistors, and rectifiers. Since SiC has high thermal conductivity and SiC devices can be operated at high temperatures, the requirement for thermal management (e.g., cooling system) is reduced. This results in the reduction of size and weight, and the cost of thermal management hardware. SiC technology contributes to military superiority because it enables use of low-weight, high-temperature electronics without being limited by the thermal management hardware equipment. E. R. Brown of the DARPA Electronics Technology Office has highlighted the required development of wide bandgap semiconductors, particularly SiC, to enable solid-state electronics operating beyond 1 MW. Applications exist in this range of power for both military and commercial applications. Recent small business innovative research (SBIR) and small business technology transfer program (STTR) solicitation tasks address development issues with wide bandgap semiconductors. Military applications of SiC high-power devices and circuits include uncooled switching devices and integrated circuits for electrical power transmission and distribution systems and more-electric aircraft. SiC-based inverter can provide power for the traction motors for hybrid- and all-electric vehicles.
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Microwave devices made from SiC will exhibit high-power, high-frequency operation with higher package density and reduced cooling subsystem requirements. In addition to military application in tactical radars, commercial applications of semi-insulating SiC includes high-definition television (HDTV) transmitters for the broadcast industry and tube technology replacement in airport surveillance and tracking radars. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Japan United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Russia

Significant R&D
France South Korea
Germany UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has the lead in this technology with a significant R&D program, followed by Japan, Russia, France, and the UK. Several other countries are sponsoring limited R&D efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. OPTICAL FLUORIDE MATERIALS

Fluorides are very important materials for optical applications. They are used in a wide range of applications such as lasers, optical fibers, nonlinear crystals, UV windows (as CaF2 ), coating materials (as ThF4 ), and recently as scintillators for detection of smuggled plutonium. With their extended transparency into the deep UV, fluoride crystals are important for lithography. A new nonlinear fluoride crystal (BaMgF4), when periodically poled, has demonstrated feasibility of conversion into the deep UV. Because of their lower energy phonons and longer lifetimes (high storage capacity), fluorides are important as efficient diode laser pumped lasers. One major drawback in pursuing fluoride technology was that there have been no reliable sources of high-purity fluoride starting materials. This has changed in recent years, and the major technology impetus is on high-purity, low-absorption material. At the projected power levels, high-purity bulk material is still a requirement. BaY2Fa3 m Er and 4 m Ho Lasers
Parameter 1999 Projected by 2010
Er: CW power (W) Er: Pulsed Energy (J) Ho: CW power (W) Ho: Pulsed Energy (W)
1 0.01 0 0.005
10 0.1 1.0 >4.0
Periodically Poled Nonlinear BaMgF4

Parameter 1999 Projected by 2010
Wavelength Range (nm)

Critical Materials
500250
500150
The critical materials are the high-purity fluorides needed for the growth of fluoride laser crystals. Critical materials for production of high-purity fluoride starting materials are high-purity oxides and carbonates, water-free hydrogen fluoride gas, platinum, platinum/rhodium, and monel for the hydrofluorinator parts. N/A. N/A. Even though 100-percent hydrogen fluoride is used, the process is safer because it involves only gas that is completely neutralized during the process and does not pose risks for the operators or to the environment. The resulting fluorides are crystalline materials, resistant to oxidation, with no dust formation. All fluoride laser crystals need be oxygen free to avoid scatter losses, and the only way to guarantee this purity is to start with pure fluoride materials.
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The fluoride materials are used as starting materials for growth of laser crystals, nonlinear crystals, optical windows, and scintillator crystals; for glass optical fibers; and for optical coatings. Critical materials for production of high-purity fluoride starting materials are high-purity oxides and carbonates, water-free hydrogen fluoride gas, platinum, platinum/rhodium, and monel for the hydrofluorinator parts. Oxides and carbonates of high purity are widely available. When the starting fluoride materials are of high quality, the crystal growth yield increases, cutting manufacturing costs.
Affordability
RATIONALE Contrary to oxides, fluorides are fragile, and their low thermal conductivity precludes their use in high-power applications. With the advent of laser diodes, however, fluoride laser crystals became important because of their superior storage capacity. They can, for example, be incorporated in a very compact laser system, which is important for nonproliferation surveillance. They are, for example, potential candidates for countermeasure applications, being the only systems that have a good chance of efficiently emitting in the 3- to 4-m range, while being able to be incorporated in a compact and lightweight system. They are also filling a need for materials transparent in the deep UV. One fluoride crystal, Ho:BaY2F8, which lases around 4 m, will be assessed for countermeasures applications. This crystal will be pumped by another fluoride crystal. Both crystals are very dependent on the starting materials purity. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Brazil Italy United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan

Significant R&D
France Russia

Moderate R&D
Germany UK
Limited R&D
Fluoride laser crystals have been grown in Russia, Brazil, and France for at least a decade. The significant current R&D prgrams are being sponsored in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Germany. Recently, Japan, UK (Scotland), Italy, and Germany have started small crystal growth programs, mainly in YLF and LiSAF (chromium and cerium-doped). Currently, AC Materials, a small business affiliated with CREOL, has started commercially supplying these materials and fluoride crystals as well. CREOL and AC Materials cooperate in several projects developing new fluoride crystals through SBIR programs and other R&D subcontracts for U.S. companies. For example, CREOL is developing two mid-IR lasers based on BaY2F8, a low-phonon laser host.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. IR OPTICAL ELEMENTS

Bulk materials in combination with appropriate coatings materials, including transparent overlays for any portion of the 1- to 12-m spectral band, with a strength greater than 48 Mpa (7 ksi), including the following properties for plate size >5-cm diameter and missile domes of any size: Ability to withstand 2-mm diameter raindrop impacts at 2.5 cm/hr rate at Mach >1.0. Ability to withstand heating rate >100 W/cm2.
Critical Materials
Free-standing diamond. Gallium phosphide (GaP). Strengthened sapphire. Single-crystal silicon carbide. Aluminum oxy nitro (ALON).
Equipment for rapid polishing of IR windows and domes, especially diamond. Single-point diamond turning machines. Diamond deposition production equipment. Equipment for rain and sand testing and damage assessment.
None identified. Unique materials processing and polishing. Fabrication processes for making specially designed optical elements. Low-cost optical finishing. Fracture toughness and strength at temperature. Deterministic micro-grinding processes need developing.
Optical-quality bulk diamond is a possible microwave window for very high power transmitters. Optical quality diamond will remain very expensive for the foreseeable future, but its use will provide payback in terms of maintainability.
RATIONALE Affordable IR windows for maneuvering systems are required to protect IR sensors from the environment. In particular, high strength for thermal shock resistance and rain and sand erosion at high speeds is required for protection of the sensors. Multispectral optical performance is required for longer range target detection and defeat of countermeasures. Particular military applications are for IR seekers, IR missiles, IR surveillance, FLIR window/dome, and IRST window/dome.
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China India Pakistan Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Italy South Africa Taiwan

Significant R&D
Germany Norway Spain United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States and Japan have the lead in this technology with extensive R&D, followed by China, South Korea, and the UK with significant R&D. Other known programs are either moderate or limited.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. IR COATING MATERIALS

IR coating materials for protection in hazardous environments such as in rain-, sand-, and dust-erosion conditions. Improved fracture strength and stability. Antireflection capable and oxidation resistant at over 700 C. EMI shielding or low-observable characteristics.
Critical Materials
Diamond. Sapphire. Stoichiometric carbon nitrite (C3N4). Zinc sulfide and zinc selenide.
Diamond deposition production equipment. CVD equipment. Physical vapor deposition-laser evaporation equipment. MBE equipment. Equipment for measuring absolute reflectance of 0.1 percent. Equipment for rain and sand testing and damage assessment.
None identified. Unique processing of coating materials. Optimum material composition and diffusion to attain desired characteristics. Optimum design of multilayer stacks to attain desired transmission/reflection/ absorption characteristics.
None identified. Although more expensive than current coatings, the payback in durability and maintainability will offset the initial expense over the lifetime of the optical system.
RATIONALE Affordable IR windows and domes for maneuvering systems are required to protect IR sensors from the environment. Special coatings allow sensor windows to operate in rain and sand environments without significant optical loss. Oxidation resistance at temperatures greater than 700 C permit operation at speeds greater than Mach 4. Multi-spectral optical performance is required for longer range target detection and defeat of countermeasures. Particular military applications are for IR seekers, IR missiles, IR surveillance, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) window/dome, and IRST window/dome.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Japan Sweden

Significant R&D
Germany Norway Taiwan

Moderate R&D
India Pakistan UK
Limited R&D
The United States has the lead in this technology with extensive R&D efforts, followed by South Korea, France, Japan, and the UK. Other known efforts are moderate or limited.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. SPECIALTY TRANSPARENT MATERIALS

Specialty transparent materials for coating and/or filters. NLO elements. Selectable/variable bandpass or narrowband rejection in the 0.2- to 20-m spectral region.
Selected oxides and dielectrics (application dependent). Controls for deposition of coatings and in-situ characterization of coatings. CVD. Sputter deposition. MBE deposition. PVD. Electron beam, ion beam, and laser-enhanced deposition. Ion plating and laser evaporation.
Software for control of coating deposition, especially thickness and composition. Unique deposition of materials and processing controls. Medical and astronomical applications and eye safety. The primary extra expense will be for capital costs for precise processing control equipment. Once in place, the coatings can be produced in standard commercial coaters.
RATIONALE Optimum operation of visible and IR sensors, especially under hostile conditions, is highly dependent on the availability of specialty transparent materials for coating and/or filters and NLO elements. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Italy Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Japan Taiwan

Significant R&D
France Norway UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has the lead in this technology with an extensive R&D effort, followed by China and Japan with significant R&D.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. NLO MATERIALS

NLO materials for wavelength/frequency conversion with spectral bandpass in the 1- to 12-m region. Transmission of NLO material in this bandpass region is needed, and the development of NLO technologies in this region is severely inadequate to provide the materials currently needed for specific military applications. Critical materials for production of high-purity fluoride starting materials are high-purity oxides and carbonates, water-free hydrogen fluoride gas, platinum, platinum/rhodium, and monel for the hydrofluorinator parts. Oxides and carbonates of high purity are widely available. Isomorphs of potassium titynal phosphate phosphate (KTP), for example, High Purity: KTiAsO4, RbTiOAsO4, ZnGeP2 Quasi-phasemathed materials (QPM), e.g.: GaAs, ZnSe Periodically poled ferroelectrics, e.g.: LiNbO3 (PPLN) AgGaSe2, AgGaS2, CdGeAs2, NLO polymers: ZnGeP2 Periodically poled KTP and BaMgF4 BBP BaMgF4 (Other NLO material in the 1- to 12-m bandpass region)
Critical Materials
None identified. None identified. Material homogeneity, stochiometry, and purity. Absorptionthe convertible power density must be increased and the damage threshold improved. Spectral transmission. Unique materials and processing. Higher second- and third-order nonlinearity (third order for switching).
Industrial and medical lasers as well as microchip optical processes. Nonissue for these materials.
RATIONALE NLO materials are needed to provide new and variable laser wavelengths in the 1- to 12-m region of the spectra. These NLO materials need to be developed to fully utilize the potential of current lasers for specific medical, industrial, and military applications.
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China Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Norway United States
Germany South Korea
Italy Sweden
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
China and the United States have the lead in this technology with extensive R&D efforts, followed by Japan with significant R&D.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. HIGH-ENERGY LASER (HEL) OPTICAL MATERIALS

Materials for HEL components: mirrors, beamsplitters, and windows. Improved efficiency and run-time capability. Substrate diameter >0.2 m. Low water fused silica (<100 ppm water) for diameter <35 cm. Optical coatings with total loss from absorption and scatter (200 ppm).
Critical Materials
Si, SiC. Low water fused silica. Coating materials: ThF4, ZnSe, SiO2, TiO2, ZrO2, Nb2O5, Al2O3. ZuS, ZnSe, Al2O3.
Single-point diamond turning coating/vacuum chambers. Computer-controlled grinding and polishing. Characteristic equipment to measure absorptance (laser calorimetry), total integrated scattering (TIS), bidirectional reflectance distribution function (BRDF)scatter reflectance.
None identified. For mirrors: very low absorption, low scatter, high reflection coatings, low stress (especially for large diameters up to 4 m, durable and stable). For substrates: homogeneous properties, low absorption, and low inclusion contenthigh purity. For beam splitters and windows: antireflection/bandpass coatingsdurable, stable. Bonding techniques for larger substratesmirrors only. Cooling technology.
Cutting and welding technology. Need long run time, so cooling is important and may affect cost.
RATIONALE HEL optical materials are needed to provide new and variable laser wavelength transmission elements that can withstand the high level radiation impinging on them. These HEL optical materials need to be developed in order to fully utilize the potential of current lasers for specific medical, industrial, and military applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Norway UK

Significant R&D
Italy South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in this technology with extensive R&D, followed by France with significant R&D.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. FERROELECTRIC LIQUID CRYSTAL (FLC) MATERIAL

Compact (size of a quarter), lightweight (grams), low-power FLC devices operating in the extended scattering mode (ESM) for optical modulation in the near- to mid-IR spectral range. Originally investigated as a solid-state replacement for a motor-driven, germanium disk chopper device for uncooled, focal plane array (FPA) detectors (812 m wavelength regime). Operates by forward scattering, not polarization rotationno polarizers required; ideal for IR applications where incident radiant energy is low. Square-wave optical modulation patterns can be produced at response rates ranging from 100 s to several seconds. A 40-percent modulation depth of incident broadband 812 m light has been demonstrated; performance improves with shorter incident wavelengths (35 m to visible region).
Critical Materials
Need to develop FLC materials with both improved transmission characteristics in the mid-IR region (35 m and 812 m) and low operating voltage requirements. Special high-transmission conductive coatings are required for use with nonconductive, IR transparent substrates (e.g., ZnSe, BaF).
Diamant bridge for characterization of FLC spontaneous polarization and hysteresis. Optical test bench for temporal response characterization using broadband 812 m IR source. Optical test bench for determining angular distribution of both modulated and off-state forward scattered light.
Nonedrive waveform generation software is commercially available. New FLC materials must be designed and synthesized to maximize mid-IR transmission in regions of interest (35 m and 812 m). Bulk material properties (viscosity, spontaneous polarization, helical pitch, mesophase range) must also be taken into account during material design stage to ensure low operating voltage requirements, fast response, and broad operating range. Angular dependence of forward scattering has been initially characterized in the visible (HeNe), but extensive mid-IR characterization must be undertaken to better understand device physics and make a realistic assessment of potential performance. Effects of temperature on device performance have not been characterized. Work needs to be done to understand effect of electrical drive waveform shapes and voltages on FLC scattering characteristics in order to optimize performance at desired wavelengths of operation. As modulation components for uncooled FPA detector-based imaging devices (night vision goggles, rifle sights, and surveillance equipment). As an electro-optical defocusing device for power limiting and sensor protection. Any high-speed electro-optical modulation applications that can use forward scattering as the optical modulation mechanism in the visible or near-IR regions.
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None identified. Drive electronics hardware and software are commercially available. Conventional liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturing techniques can be used to assemble these devices.
RATIONALE For imaging applications employing uncooled FPA detectors, obtaining further reductions in size, weight, and power requirements without sacrificing performance is paramount. The current technology employs a motor-driven, rotating mechanical chopper containing a germanium disk with a series of lenslet arrays ground into its surface at various positions to alternately defocus (diffuse) and transmit the incident IR radiation. Replacement of this mechanical chopper with a compact, low-power, solid-state modulator scalable to detector size would be highly desirable. Liquid crystal (LC) devices capable of modulation by forward scattering are an excellent alternative for this application due to their low power consumption, short path-length requirements, scalability of size, and excellent transmission characteristics in many regions of the near- and mid-IR. For both dynamic scattering in nematic LCs and the cholesteric-nematic phase transition, temporal response times are too slow for this application. Only FLCs operating in the extended scattering mode (ESM) have demonstrated the capability of modulating incident IR radiation optical radiation by forward scattering at sufficiently rapid temporal rates. The duration and frequency of the scattering state in FLC ESM devices can also be readily controlled by drive waveform shaping to produce a square-wave optical response with pulse periods of hundreds of microseconds. Although FLCs generally exhibit lower transmission in the 812 m region of the IR than do their nematic counterparts, FLC transmission characteristics can be substantially improved by designing molecular structures in which 812 m chromophoric linkage groups (e.g., CO, CN, OH, and NH bonds) have been minimized or completely eliminated. Using this design philosophy, ferroelectric liquid crystal compounds that show a 30-percent improvement in 812 m transparency, as compared to commercially available materials, have been synthesized. Similar improvements in the 35 m area are also possible if materials with by perfluorinated terminal groups are used. Considerable work still remains to be done both in improving IR transparency of FLCs and in understanding the effect of electrical drive waveform shapes and voltages on FLC scattering characteristics to optimize performance at desired wavelengths of operation. These FLC ESM devices can be valuable for any high-speed electro-optical modulation applications that can make use of forward scattering as the optical modulation mechanism in the visible or near-IR regions. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Russia UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany South Korea
Japan Taiwan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
China leads in this technology with significant R&D, followed by the United States and Japan with moderate R&D efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. POLYMER LIQUID CRYSTAL FLAKE MATERIAL

Polymeric cholesteric liquid crystal (pCLC) films, when fractured into flake form, can be used as polarizing pigments to produce coatings with unique optical properties. The flake form maintains all of the advantageous physical properties of the parent pCLC film (temperature insensitivity, physical and chemical robustness, and selective reflection). pCLC materials with selective reflection wavelengths ranging from the visible to the near IR are readily available either in single-component form or by blending. pCLC flakes can be produced in sizes from a few to hundreds of micrometers in crosssection as needed for any particular application. When pCLC flakes are prepared by photolithographic curing of reactive LC monomers, patterned particles can be formed in different sizes and shapes with numbers, letters, or other patterns encoded on the flake surface. When suspended in a fluid host, pCLC flakes can be reoriented by either AC or DC electric fields to produce a change in selective reflection color. Only a few degrees of flake rotation are required to see a substantial change in reflection properties. Encapsulation of the pCLC flake/fluid suspension into a binder would produce an electrically-addressable conformal coating material that could be switched between two (or more) reflective (or colored) states, depending on the properties of the flake/fluid host system.
Critical Materials
pCLC flake materials derived by thermal and mechanical fracturing of pCLC films. pCLC patterned particles prepared by photolithographic curing of reactive LC monomers. A fluid host. An encapsulation binder. Agents to help prevent particle agglomeration and enhance switching uniformity.
Film-casting equipment for preparing pCLC films (knife coater, roll-coater, or slot-die coater). Thermomechanical film-fracturing equipment for forming flakes from prepolymerized pCLC films. Particle sizing and sorting equipment (e.g., sieve shakers). Particle size distribution characterization equipment. Photolithographic equipment and UV sources for producing patterned pCLC flakes. Dispersing equipment for encapsulation of pCLC flake/fluid suspensions in polymer binders. Test benches for characterization of device response time, drive voltage requirements, and optical contrast.
Unique Software
None identified.
III-11-106
Technical Issues
Several passive pCLC flake device applications have already been demonstrated (e.g., vehicle paints). pCLC flake electro-optical switching has only been demonstrated over a small active area; considerable work remains in demonstrating highly uniform switching over a large active area. Long-term stability of flake/fluid systems has not been determined. Electro-optical switching of patterned flakes in a host system has yet to be demonstrated. Encapsulation of pCLC flake/fluid suspensions in a polymer binder has not yet been attempted. Passive reflective pigments with unique optical polarization properties for the visible region (decorative, anticounterfeiting, document security, and identification). Electrically switchable conformal coatings for camouflage, signature reduction, information displays, reflection control, privacy windows, identification, coding, and information storage.
Passive reflective pigments with unique optical polarization properties for the visible region (decorative, anticounterfeiting, document security, and identification). Electrically switchable conformal coatings for camouflage, signature reduction information displays, reflection control, privacy windows, identification, coding, and information storage.
Affordability
All materials (pCLC flakes, fluid hosts, and encapsulation binders) are commercially available in large quantities at low cost.
RATIONALE Coatings technology plays an important role in many military operations as well as in the private sector. Coating materials with special optical properties that could be electrically switched are of special interest in emerging military and commercial applications. A unique form of liquid crystal technology is based on the formation of particles, or flakes, generated by thermal fracturing of pCLC films. These flakes exhibit optical properties identical to the parent films from which they were derived, and because they originate from an aligned CLC polymer film that has a relatively high glass transition temperature (Tg), their selective reflection wavelength, birefringence, and alignment quality are frozen-in and are thus essentially insensitive to thermal or mechanical disruptions. Because the selective reflection colors are highly saturated and show a dependence on the angles of illumination and observation, their visual appearance has been used as the basis for art or the manufacture of commercial products like paints and cosmetics. For cross-linkable pCLC materials, specialized curing cycles can be used to induce a pitch gradient into the CLC film. By controlling the gradient of the pitch, films have been developed that show broad reflectance bands ranging from the visible to the near IR. This attribute opens up the possibility for their use as broadband, nonabsorptive polarizers in LC displays. The unique optical properties of these flakes can be transferred to other polymer systems by dispersing the flakes into a solution of the polymer host and using it as a binder. This process has been used to prepare passive (i.e., nonswitchable) conformal coatings with unusual optical properties for applications ranging from document security to exterior coatings for motor vehicles. If a suitable quantity of pCLC flakes with appropriate physical, chemical, and optical properties are dispersed into a fluid host medium in which the pCLC flake is insoluble, the pCLC flakes can be reoriented in the presence of an applied electric field, with a resultant change in the optical properties (i.e., selective reflection color) of the device. The mechanism for orientation depends on the composition of the pCLC flake material and the host material in which it is dispersed. Such an electrically tunable optical polymer system could find applications in a number of key technology areas, including switchable coatings for applications in military security, camouflage, substrate reflectance control, document security and anticounterfeiting, and object tagging and identification. Other applications in information displays for either flat or curved surfaces (large-area signs, automobile dashboards, heads-up displays) or as switchable and tunable devices for color manipulation or polarization control are also possible.
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Canada Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Singapore United States
France South Korea
Germany Taiwan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
China, Japan, and the United States lead in this technology with significant R&D efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. HIGH-ACCURACY, THIN-FILM IR OPTICAL COATINGS

Improved yield of complex multilayer coatings using stabilized processes and real-time error correction. Provide multilayer optical coatings with multiple spectral requirements for high- or lowpower laser applications. Make process available to optics system integrators. Process capable of rapid development time for complex coating designs.
Critical Materials
Materials for coatings that exhibit stable accurate characteristics during deposition and good IR properties. Mid-IR detector-array spectrometers for real-time in-situ monitoring, 1.712 m. Software drivers for interface to detector array.
None identified. Optimization and characterization dynamic link library (DLL) modules that are computationally intensive but very fast. Current routines are written and owned by a group from Moscow State University Success of this technique would be dependent on finding a deterministic, stable coating process. Three methods should be explored: E-beam deposition, Ion-assisted E-beam deposition, and Magnetron sputtering. Once process/material is identified, the process is optimized using both in situ optical monitoring and multiple crystal arrays to monitor vapor plume. All systematic errors in process are first identified using reverse engineering methods. Random and measurement errors are then determined and quantified. Real-time error correction may then be used on the stabilized process.
This has a high potential for commercial applications and could be retrofit to existing coating equipment. Because this technology is expected to reduce production cost and improve yield, it will pay for itself in a short time.
RATIONALE Optical coatings are used in practically all optical systems. Military optical systems make extensive use of the mid-IR region of the spectrum. A high-precision deterministic coating process has been developed specifically for the use of high-power fusion lasers in the UV, visible, and near-IR range. This system also has a capability of automatically correcting errors that have been made during the coating process. The error-correcting system is particularly useful for complex designs with many layers that may be coated onto costly substrates. A system can be developed which designs and fabricates a coating, observing the characteristics of the coating and correcting any errors made during the fabrication. The system would be based upon a highly developed process that could be used for a wide variety of coating requirements in military optics. Despite the obvious need in the industry, fewer and fewer individuals are opting to study coating design, and there are no institutions in the United States granting Ph.D.s in the field of optical coating design. Given this
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shortage of expertise, it would be useful to have equipment that is capable of both the design and fabrication tasks for a systems integrator. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France UK

Significant R&D
South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in this technology with significant R&D, followed by China, Taiwan, France, Germany, the UK, and South Korea with moderate R&D efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.3. TRANSITION METAL DITHIOLENE DYE MATERIAL

Nickel dithiolene near-IR dyes are zerovalent transition metal complexes that are highly soluble in LC hosts. When synthesized with appropriate terminal groups, transition metal dithiolenes can possess liquid-crystalline properties on their own; this allows them to be added to LC host materials in high concentrations without affecting the ordering of the host material. Dichroic switching with a contrast ratio of 5:1 and a blocking extinction of optical density (OD) 3.5 at 860 nm has been demonstrated in a commercially available LC host containing a mesogenic nickel dithiolene 780 nm. The near IRmax transition metal dithiolenes is extremely strong ( < 50,000) and can be adjusted by synthesis to between 600 and 1,500 nm. Nickel dithiolenes with chiral terminal groups can function as a chiral dye and can induce a cholesteric phase when added to a nematic LC host.
Critical Materials
Nematic liquid-crystal host suitable for electro-optical applications (e.g., broad temperature-range mixture with positive or negative dielectric anisotropy). Transition metal dithiolene dyes with appropriate terminal groups to (1) enhance solubility in an LC host, (2) induce liquid crystalline properties in the dye itself, or (3) induce chirality in the LC host.
Equipment for fabrication of LC devices (spin-coater, alignment layer buffing machine, Class 100 clean room area, and ovens). Electro-optical characterization test bench (contrast ratio, response time).
None identified. High-contrast dichroic switching at both 780 and 860 nm has been demonstrated in a commercially available LC host containing a mesogenic nickel dithiolene; optical modulation has recently been demonstrated at 1,054 nm using a nonmesogenic nickel dithiolene dye in an LC host. Induction of cholesteric mesophase by addition of nickel dithiolene with chiral endgroups to a nematic host has only recently been demonstrated in one system. Switching behavior has not been characterized. Nickel dithiolene complexes enhance conductivity of the LC host when added in high concentrations, which is detrimental to LC device operation. Palladium and platinum derivatives are much less conductive and would be better choices; however; these are considerably more difficult to prepare, and only a few examples exist in the literature. The materials are not commercially available and must be designed with appropriate physical properties and synthesized.
Optical modulators for near IR communications. Shutters, choppers, and modulators for near-IR wavelengths. Guest-host switchable polarizers for the near IR. Active element in a point-diffraction interferometer. Switchable circular polarizer or notch filter (chiral dye). Tunable blocking filters for sensor protection.
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Affordability
Primary cost is in synthesis and development of the dyes. Devices utilize standard LC materials, equipment, and techniques used in fabrication of commercial LCDs.
RATIONALE There is considerable interest in LC devices capable of modulating or otherwise affecting the properties of incident radiation in the near-to-mid IR region. Although applications exist for guest-host LC devices with such a capability in both the commercial and military sectors in areas such as free-space IR communications and sensor protection, there has been little recent activity in this area with respect to LC devices. A primary reason for this relative inactivity is that there is a severe lack of near-IR dyes with (1) sufficient solubility in the LC host, (2) low impact on the inherent order of the LC phase, (3) good thermal and chemical stability, and (4) a large absorbance maximum that can be tuned by structural modification over a broad range of the near-IR region. Transition metal complexes based on a nickel, palladium, or platinum dithiolene core show substantial promise in meeting the abovementioned requirements. Because these materials are zerovalent, they exhibit high solubility in LC hosts (up to 10 percent weight percentage) and, with certain terminal functional groups, can exhibit their own liquid crystal phases. The max in these materials can range from 600 nm to 1,500 nm, depending on structure. The recent synthesis of a nickel dithiolene dye with chiral end groups has shown that these dyes can induce a chiral mesophase in a nonchiral nematic host. This finding opens the possibility of generating novel LC mixtures with two degrees of tunabilityan electronic absorbance band tunable by synthesis and a selective reflection band tunable by temperature or applied electric field. Such a materials system would be particularly advantageous in sensor protection for dealing with frequency-agile laser threats. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel South Korea United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan Sweden

Significant R&D
France Russia Taiwan

Moderate R&D
Germany Singapore UK
Limited R&D
Japan and the United States lead in this technology with significant R&D, followed by the China, Taiwan, and the UK with moderate R&D efforts.
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SECTION 11.4SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS

Highlights Integrated design, fabrication, test, and assembly methods will permit the transition of todays hybrid optical devices into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and high performance. Optical tape recording will provide data and image recording capability of 160 MB/sec. Full color UXGA display format (600 1,200 pixels) head-mounted displays are expected by 2004. Technology to provide high-quality night vision systems without large pixel image sensors is underway. A means for rapidly detecting nuclear explosions and chemical/biological weapons is proposed, using the free electron laser.
OVERVIEW This section provides a variety of applications, test facilities, and component developments that marry lasers and optics. They range from atmospheric probes, display technology, and optical recording to molecular cooling using lasers. These applications do not fit neatly into the other four sections of Lasers and Optics; more such technologies are expected to be added with the explosive growth of the area. RATIONALE Optics and lasers in combination provide many new opportunities and technical challenges that are both high pay-off and enabling technologies. Key technical challenges for optical components include integrated design, fabrication, assembly, and test methods, which permit the smooth transition of the hybrid micro-optical devices of today into the fully integrated optical systems required for miniaturization and to meet high performance goals of future military products.
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Sec. 11.4 Supporting Technologies and Applications
Country Australia Canada China France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Poland Russia Singapore South Korea Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 11.4-1. Supporting Technologies and Applications Systems WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-11.4. SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS

Optical Tape Recording Technology .....................................................................................................................III-11-117 Heterogeneous Integration of Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Lasers (VCSELs) and Photodetectors with Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) Circuitry ......................................III-11-119 Quantum Nano-Optics of Semiconductors (QNOS) .............................................................................................III-11-120 High-Resolution Microdisplay Technology Using FLCs on CMOS Silicon.......................................................III-11-125 Variable Addressability Imaging Systems ............................................................................................................III-11-127 Atmospheric Probes in the 50800 m Region of the Spectrum for Pollution and Nuclear Weapons Test Detection ........................................................................................................................................III-11-129 Two- and Three-Dimensional, Optically Written, Real-Time Displays ..............................................................III-11-131 Advanced Optical Sensing Technology.................................................................................................................III-11-133 Passive Optical Limiting ........................................................................................................................................III-11-135 Laser Refrigeration by Means of Molecular Cooling ...........................................................................................III-11-138 The following developing technologies are very early in the research phases, so numerical values and specific goals for some of the critical parameters have not yet been identified or determined at this time. Variable Wavelength Imaging Spectrometers.......................................................................................................III-11-139 MEMS and FPA Adaptive Optics..........................................................................................................................III-11-140 Displays for Wearable Computers .........................................................................................................................III-11-141
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. OPTICAL TAPE RECORDING TECHNOLOGY

Recording data rate >1,300 Mbit/sec. HDTV places the greatest current commercial demands on recording technology. The real-time output of an HDTV camera is approximately 1,300 Mbit/sec, well beyond the capability of standard digital magnetic tape-recording techniques. Archival HDTV recording currently employs data compression to reduce the data rate down to approximately 150 Mbit/sec. However, the compression algorithm is very lossythe original 1,300-Mbit/sec data stream cannot be fully reconstructed. None identified. None identified. None identified. Development of a lossless compression algorithm. Demonstrate 160 MB/sec data rate.
HDTV. The optical tape recorder is expected to be less expensive than a magnetic recorder. The cost of the higher density tape cassettes is expected to be about the same as the current lower density magnetic tape cassettes.
RATIONALE To meet the rigorous information demands of the warfighter, commander and National Command Authority (NCA) in 2020, a system and architecture must exist to provide a high resolution picture of objects in space, in the air, on the surface and below the surfacebe they concealed, mobile or stationary, animate or inanimate. The true challenge is not only to collect information on objects with much greater fidelity than is possible today, but also to process the information orders of magnitude faster and disseminate it instantly in the desired format. Air University SPACECAST 2020 Technical Report. Full exploitation of high-resolution pictures requires the ability to acquire, store (record), and display with equal resolution. Recording technology lags the other two technologies. In addition to the recording of imagery, a continuing requirement of the intelligence community is to store enormous amounts of data currently archived on magnetic tape, which has a far lower recording density than optical recording. The volumetric ratio of optical to magnetic tape is approximately 20/1. The technology will be accessible to DoD. The commercial HDTV-related effort derives from a 50/50 costsharing grant from the National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST). A DoD program to exploit optical archival recording is being sponsored by the intelligence community on behalf of all DoD potential users. A consortium of five companies led by LOTS Technologies, Sunnyvale, California, is executing the NIST program. They have demonstrated many of the individual techniques on an optical bench. Other firms involved are Avid, Pluto, Polaroid, and Lucent. The industrial participants in the DoD program are LOTS Technologies, Kodak, and TRW. The interest here is in a straight data recorder without regard to format; it will be a general-purpose recorder.
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In 1999, the DoD program has demonstrated a 25-MB/sec prototype, and Kodak has established a reliable, low-cost production capability for optical tape. The Phase 2 goal, to be started in 2000, will demonstrate a 160-MB/sec data rate using optical tape on reels holding 1.6 terabytes. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
No related R&D has been identified outside the United States. Other nations identified have existing capability in magnetic tape recording; hence, they are the most likely to initiate programs in optical tape recording.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. HETEROGENEOUS INTEGRATION OF VERTICAL CAVITY SURFACE EMITTING LASERS (VCSELs) AND PHOTODETECTORS WITH COMPLEMENTARY METAL OXIDE SEMICONDUCTOR (CMOS) CIRCUITRY
Optical interconnections allow the development of terabit optical links for higher density computers. Pixel-based processors allow imaged analysis over 1 million times faster than conventional CCD cameras. Heterogeneous Integration of VCSELs and photodetectors with CMOS circuitry.
Critical Materials
CMOS circuitry. High-performance VCSELs and photodetector epilayer material.
High-speed digital test equipment. Electro-optic test equipment. None identified. Advance architecture. Optics design. Electo-optic processing techniques.
Parallel processing. Image processing. Optical interconnects. High-density computing systems.
Affordability
Affordability will depend on the desired complexity of the system and must be tailored to meet the appropriate needs.
RATIONALE Data acquisition of a 100 100 miles square region with 10 bits of terrain information per square foot requires 2.8 Tbits of information. Providing terabit optical links would allow for real-time retrieval, storage, and computation of this data, which is desired in battlefield situations. Increasing computational ability provides a technical advantage for a variety of critical objectives. Also, the small size and light weight of this dense computing system makes it ideal for micro air vehicles. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The major activity is primarily limited to the United States and Japan and the main motivation is commercial. This is one of many options for optical interconnects.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. QUANTUM NANO-OPTICS OF SEMICONDUCTORS (QNOS)

Joining linear nano-optical techniques and semiconductor growth and fabrication capabilities to produce semiconductor microcavities in the quantum regime. Pushing the technology of semiconductor microcavities to small volumes (less than 1 cubic m). Developing quantum dots (100200 nm diameters) with large dipole moments and short radiative lifetimes. Large perfect quantum dots with large dipole moments ideal for light matter interaction. Improved semiconductor crystal quality will have longer coherence length important for quantum interference devices and larger coherence areas. There is a requirement for high-finesse 3D nanocavities with guided mode cutoffs such that Beta is on the order of 1, where Beta is the fraction of total light going into the desired cavity mode. Solid-immersion lenses used for photoluminescence excitation and NLO characterization of single quantum dots and quantum-dot nanocavities with nominal 0.25 m spatial resolution. External mirror fabricated by MEMS for making a 10-m long single-quantumdot microcavity. Evaluation techniques include scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) luminescence excitation (similar to photoluminescence excitation, except the excitation is done through the tunneling tip and detected by the resultant luminescence). Near-field scanning optical microscopy is also needed for evaluations. Software will need to be developed to solve the many-body theory of trade-offs for quantum dot dipoles vs. size of the quantum dot for 1-photon interactions. To build a solid-state implementation of a single atom in a microcavity able to exhibit entanglement and a quantum phase gate in which a single control photon changes the transmission for a single probe photon. Active displays emitting light and not relying on reflected light will use this technology. Higher density memories and lower energy switching technology require this technology for efficient systems. Since QNOS essentially reduces the size and energy requirements of optoelectronic devices, it is certain to have spinoffs in implanted sensors, memories in general, and control devices such as small computer modules. As electronic and optoelectronic devices are made smaller and smaller, quantum effects will become increasingly important. It is a wise investment to have physicists, material scientists, and computer scientists developing cost-effective techniques and technology now.
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE In the near term (15 years) this technology is expected to produce the lowest threshold VCSEL nanolasers, nanoLEDs with high efficiency and very low power consumption, and the lowest energy optical switches. In the longer term (520 years) this technology is expected to provide nonclassical light sources, entanglement systems, quantum phase gates, and amplifiers for quantum teleportation of entangled signals. The importance to military systems is the impact this will have on battlefield electro-optical systems and telecommunications. Smaller electronic and optoelectronic devices mean that the soldier, as well as missiles, for that matter, can have much greater computing and communicating capability while carrying lighter equipment. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Japan
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
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Quantum optics is a field that will take 10 to 20 years to mature. Considerable research interest exists in many countries worldwide. The following site provides links to many of these. Because the field is still in early development, most countries are given equal R&D ratings. Quantum Optics and Atom Optics links http://www.theo1.physik.uni-stuttgart.de/~liebman/qolinks.html BACKGROUND The following is a list of facilities with experience in quantum optics. The list is sorted by country, university, center, etc., as applicable; and field of research or name of laboratory or group conducting the research. Australia Australian National University Atom Manipulation Project; Atom Optics; Optics Research Macquarie University Quantum Optics MelbourneUniversity Atom Optics Group Photonics Research Laboratory Queensland University Laser Cooling and Trapping Theoretical Quantum Optics Austria Innsbruck University Anton Zeilingers Quantum Optics Group Peter Zollers Theoretical Quantum Optics Group Belgium P. Mandels Quantum Optics Group Canada Ontario Laser and Lightwave Research Centre Montreal University Lab for Theoretical and Quantum Computing Toronto University Laser Physics and Quantum Optics Denmark Aarhus University Theoretical Quantum Optics Group Finland Helsinki University Quantum Optics Group France Lcole Normale Superieure Le Laboratoire Kastler Brossel Institut dOptique, Orsay Quantum Optics Group
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Germany Abert Ludwigs-Universitt, Freiburg Theoretische Quantendynamik Freiburg University Quantum Stochastics Ludwig Maximilans Universitt, Mnchen Theoretical Quantum Optics Max Planck Institut fr Quantenoptik, Garching Theoretical Quantum Optics Group Universitt Konstanz Jurgen Mlyneks Group Quantum Metrology Group India Physical Research Laboratory, Ahmedabad Laser Physics and Quantum Optics Group Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Madras Optics Group Israel Weizmann Institute Quantum Optics Group Japan Kyoto University Quantum Optics Group The Netherlands Eindhoven University of Technology Atom and Quantum Optics Theoretical Atomic Physics and Quantum Electronics New Zealand Otago University Laser Physics and Quantum Optics Group Russia Lebedev Physical Institute, Moscow Quantum Optics Group Spain Universidad de Salamanca Optics Group UK Essex University R. Loudons Nonlinear and Quantum Optics Group Imperial College, London Peter L. Knights Laser Optics and Spectroscopy Group Oxford University Chris Foots Laser Cooling Group Keith Burnetts Atomic and Laser Physics Group Quantum Computation and Cryptography Strathclyde University Nonlinear and Quantum Optics
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United States Alabama U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal Chuck Bowdens Quantum Optics Group California California Institute of Technology Jeff Kimbles Quantum Optics Group Ken Libbrechts Atomic Physics Group University of California, Berkeley Raymond Y. Chiaos Quantum Optics Group University of California, Los Angeles Quantum Information page, Center for Advanced Accelerators Stanford University A. E Siegmans Group ERATO Quantum Fluctuation Project Colorado University of Colorado at Boulder and JILA Center for Theoretical Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics JILA Atomic Physics Connecticut University of Connecticut Phil Goulds Laser Cooling Group Theoretical Optical Physics Yale University Atomic Physics and Quantum Optics Florida University of Miami Quantum Optics Laboratory Louisiana Louisiana State University Atomic Physics Maryland University of Maryland Quantum Optics Group NIST Electron Physics Group Massachusetts Boston University Philosophical Foundations of Physics Group Harvard University Mara Prentiss Group (Atom Optics) The Consortium for Light Force Dynamics (also at NIST)
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Michigan University of Michigan Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics New Mexico Los Alamos National Laboratory Quantum Information Group
New York State University of New York, Stony Brook Experimental Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics and Quantum Electronics University of Rochester Carlos Strouds Quantum Optics Group Institute of Optics Leonard Mandels Quantum Optics Experimental Group Quantum Optics Group Rochester Theory Center for Optical Science and Engineering Shaul Mukamels Optics Group Oregon Oregon State University Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics University of Oregon Howard J. Carmichaels Quantum Optics Theory Group Mossberg Laboratory Raymer Laboratory
Texas Rice University Atom Cooling (Bose-Einstein Condensation) University of Texas Mark Raizens Quantum Optics and Atom Optics Group Virginia University of Virginia The University of Virginia Laboratory for Optics and Quantum Electronics Wisconsin University of Wisconsin Atom Trainers
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. HIGH-RESOLUTION MICRODISPLAY TECHNOLOGY USING FLCs ON CMOS SILICON
High information content microdisplays for near-to-eye and projection applications are of military and commercial interest. FLCs provide an outstanding electro-optic modulation layer, and when integrated with CMOS silicon backplanes, provide outstanding performance in binary light modulation. While binary modulators running at high frequencies can provide full color and gray scale by temporal averaging, combination of the high switching speeds, characteristic of FLCs, with true analog modulation would be very attractive for high-quality information displays. Achieving this goal requires development of new materials and device geometries. Technology is developing to eliminate color break-up or other undesirable artifacts of the time-sequential driving scheme. A full-color frame rate of 1.5 kHz (pixel refresh rates of 50 kHz) is required. Analog FLC-based devices for optical correlator applications such as fingerprint recognition or person recognition (e.g., in security systems for large installations) and photonics applications such as beam steering will be available as prototypes in 2001. High-resolution analog modulators for optical correlators and beam steering will be available in 2003.
FLCs and special alignment materials. Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) microscope, optical microscope, synchrotron X-ray source (the microscopy equipment will be customized for our purposes, but the basic equipment is not unique). Optical simulation software, that is, software for large-scale simulation of liquid crystals, is unique. Critical parameters in this case are materials and devices. Design of FLC materials is aided by the LC simulation software, while design of optical devices is aided by optical simulation software. While progress can be made absent the software, time to develop the targets is lessened with good software tools. These tools are thus critical to meet the timelines implied above. Regarding bistable FLC/Si devices, the key technical issues now revolve around alignment and cell design. There is a scarcity of technical personnel to address the issues involved. Delivery of the necessary capabilities for first-generation devices has occurred. Improvements with regard to reliability, lifetime, and quality require delivery and assimilation of new technology. This should occur by 2001. Analog FLC/Si is much less mature. Basic technical blocks at the material and device levels are present. Technology for first-generation materials and devices (this is really second generationthough first-generation solutions are not usable in real-world applications) should be available in 2002. An approach for analog modulation must be adopted, then specialized materials and devices fabricated and tested. Eventually, custom analog CMOS backplanes must be fabricated just to demonstrate the approach. Actual production would then follow.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
HDTV, head-mounted computer displays, rear-projection computer displays, highresolution front-projection systems, optical correlators for machine vision, and beam steering devices. In volume, FLC on silicon chips could be as inexpensive as dynamic random access memory (DRAM). The cost of illumination and optics depends upon the application. There is clearly a substantial cost benefit relative to large-area direct-view analog modulation LCDs.
Affordability
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RATIONALE Binary FLC on silicon microdisplay-based commercial products will become available next year. These will include very small digital cameras with FLC/Si viewfinders as key elements and HDTV sets using microdisplays in rear-projection. By the year 2002 very high resolution head-mounted displays based upon FLC/Si chips should be available. By the year 2004 full-color UXGA (1,600 1,200 pixel) head-mounted displays for voice-controlled portable computing will be available. Bistable FLC/Si in combination with projection optics or near-to-eye optics and illuminators could replace the CRT as the standard for information display in all military and commercial applications. In addition, analog spatial light modulators with world-class performance for optical signal processing, image analysis, and beam steering could be produced. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The indicated countries have commercial firms that are also engaged in advanced development activities. Commercial web sites United States http://www.microdisplay.com/ http://www.kopin.com/ http://www.comicro.com/ UK http://www.meko.co.uk/ China http://www.varitronix.com/ Japan Japanese Display Report http://www.meko.co.uk/interlingua.html Magazines and Info Sites http://www.mdreport.com/ Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA): http://www.vesa.org/ The TFCG group is a research group in the department ELIS at the University of Gent in Belgium. It is involved in several research topics, situated mainly in interconnection technology and microdisplays. http://www.elis.rug.ac.be/ELISgroups/tfcg/index.html
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. VARIABLE ADDRESSABILITY IMAGING SYSTEMS

Current night-vision sensors have an inadequate number of pixels to create high-quality images over a large field of view. Visible image-intensifier sensors with about 1 M pixels can provide the equivalent of 20/50 vision over a 30 40 deg field of view. IR sensors with about 76 K pixels can provide the equivalent of 20/150 vision over the same field of view. As the required field of view increases by 24 times in the next 15 years, the image quality becomes even worse. Trends in sensor development show an increase in pixel count over the next 10 years, but not at an acceptable rate. In addition, a special class of optical systems (variable resolution addressability optical sytems) that can use the available sensor pixels more efficiently, thereby simultaneously increasing the image quality and the field of view, needs to be developed.
The system requires a precise, aspheric optical element made of glass or plastic. The aspheric elements are small and have a large, but precise, variation in surface figure that cannot be measured on existing surface profilometers. Special techniques will need to be developed to inspect these optical elements. Special figures of merit for optimizing high-distortion optical systems must be developed for use with commercially available lens design programs. The variable addressibility technology effectively reduced the number of image sensor pixels that are needed in a visual optical system by taking advantage of the variable acuity across the field of view of the eye. Needed is at least a 10 decrease in the number of image sensor pixels by using variable addressibility. Hence, image quality, as well as field of view, must be improved compared to current, conventional technology. Because fewer pixel means less data, the technology offers image data compression as well. Compactness and simplicity of optical design. Optimum pixel distribution for various applications. Human factors associated with using variable addressability systems. Improvement of task performance when using variable addressability system compared with constant addressability system. Extension to creation of programmable, dynamic, pixel allocation. Extension to coupling of eyetracking to pixel allocation.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Electronic binoculars. Night-vision viewers. Robot vision and inspection systems. Head-worn displays.
Affordability
Variable addressiblity promises to achieve (1) the performance of an expensive, largeimage sensor using a commodity-priced, small-image sensor, thus enabling high-volume applications that are cost sensitive, and (2) the performance of an extremely large-image sensor that does not yet exist. Because variable addressability allows the use of a smaller image sensor, there is also an improvement in size and weight of the sensor. For head-mounted sensors, this may be a significant, enabling advantage.
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RATIONALE Advantages of Variable Addressability Night Vision Systems Enables high-quality night-vision systems without need for extremely large pixel image sensors. Smaller image sensor allows smaller and lighter night-vision system, which are more suitable for the user to wear. Smaller image sensor is less expensive and easier to manufacture. Fewer pixels means less data to handle for transmission and storage. Pixel distribution can be matched to different applications by using different lenses with the same image sensor.
There is an increasing need for night vision systems using visible and IR sensors that have larger fields of view and improved image quality. In 1999, both image quality and field of view are severely limited by the relatively small sensor arrays currently available (about 576 1414 for visible and about 240 320 for IR). In fact, neither of these sensors can provide the user with a 20/20 equivalent view of the world. At a 30 40 deg field of view, the visible sensor is 20/46 at best, and the IR sensor is only 20/150. The pixel count of sensors is increasing, but not at a fast enough rate to meet the demand. As the field-of-view requirement increases to 60 80 deg and the required visual quality to 20/20 by 2008, there needs to be 17M pixels in the image sensor if conventional approaches are still used. This is nearly 20 times the size of night-vision sensors available today. Fortunately, there is a new technology that uses pixels in a more economical mannervariable addresssability. With variable addressability, the most pixels are placed where they can do the most good, namely in the center of the visual field of view. For head-mounted sensor applications where the user moves the head to scan a scene, variable addressability gives the user a high number of pixels at the center of the field, and fewer pixels at the edge of the field where the users visual acuity is less. By redistributing pixels to where they are needed, there are significant benefits. First, a smaller number of pixels on the sensor means a smaller, less expensive, lighter, and more manufacturable image sensor. Second, with fewer pixels there is less data to handle, which simplifies data storage and transmission. Third, custom pixel distributions can be created by using different lenses with the same image sensor. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan UK

Significant R&D
Germany Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
This technology appears to be a unique concept under investigation at the University of Colorado, Boulder, in the Optoelectronic Computing Systems Center. The other nations have basic capability in conventional night-vision system display technology.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. ATMOSPHERIC PROBES IN THE 50800 m REGION OF THE SPECTRUM FOR POLLUTION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST DETECTION
This technology will provide the capability of probing the atmosphere in the terahertz spectral range (50800 m) for the presence of signature chemicals produced by nuclear explosions, chemical or biological weapons, and other atmospheric pollutants. The key to this effort is the development and use of unique, tunable, high-power, very narrow bandwidth FEL light to the study of the spectroscopy of the atmosphere in the terahertz range. Preliminary modeling of the atmospheric absorption suggests that many windows that will allow remote sensing of atmospheric pollutants exist in the terahertz range. In addition, studies can reveal the potential for identifying isotopically distinct compounds that may result from nuclear explosions.
None identified. 50800 m, continuously tunable FELs. Terahertz spectroscopic instrumentation and atmosphere simulation facilities. Expanded data base for such programs as HITRAN as well as refined spectral modeling. Technical issues include FEL upgrades; terahertz high-resolution spectroscopy facilities and innovations; refined models of the spectra of expected pollutants and nuclear explosion products; and upgraded atmospheric data bases. Commercialization requires further development for military applications in the areas of FELs, spectral models, terahertz spectroscopy facilities development, and atmospheric modeling that are demanded by military applications but will be used by commercial applications.
Technical Issues
Pollution monitoring, acid rain source detection, and greenhouse gas studies are a few of the applications that will drive this refined atmospheric pollution detection technology. When solid-state sources are developed to probe specific pollutants the technology will be affordable. The research is essential to this technology, it is essential to the military, and it will have significant nonmilitary payoffs.
RATIONALE The technology of studying the atmosphere in the 50800 m region with extremely high spectral resolution will enable rapid detection of nuclear explosion and the use of chemical and biological weapons, and it will provide early warnings to the military of such events. It can do so by using the precisely tunable, very narrow band emission from FELs to probe this spectral region in the many windows that exist. Further, it will identify means to detect specific pollutants and provide data for modeling the atmosphere in designing terahertz probe systems. It provides a new means of examining the atmosphere and a means of detecting contaminants. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Switzerland
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
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These countries have been identified as conducting research programs in detection of pollution, but none appear to be concentrating on this wavelength region or the use of a FEL as a source for collection of data. Within the United States, NASA has major related programs, but none have been identified in this wavelength region. Most concentrate on airborne or spaceborne probes. MODIS Atmosphere Overview http://modarch.gsfc.nasa.gov/MODIS/ATM/modatm.html NASA JPL Program, Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS) http://makalu.jpl.nasa.gov/docs/workshops/98_docs/toc.htm Airborne Imaging Spectrometry at DLR, German Aerospace Center http://atlas.op.dlr.de/dais/dais.htm Remote Sensing Applications Division, Department of Geography, University of Zurich http://www.geo.unizh.ch/~dschlapf/tracegas.html BACKGROUND Because the resources to conduct this study exist at the School of Optics/CREOL at the University of Central Florida (FEL and spectroscopy), the University of Hawaii (FEL at higher frequencies), the University of Alaska (atmospheric range), and the University of South Florida (atmospheric spectroscopy and LADAR), it is likely that the results necessary to identify appropriate target pollutants can be obtained in the 5-year time frame. As such compounds are identified, research towards solid-state laser sources to probe specific compounds will be started.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. TWO- AND THREE-DIMENSIONAL, OPTICALLY WRITTEN, REAL-TIME DISPLAYS
Materials that can be excited by two photon processes to emit visible light and that can be dispersed as particles within a passive host are dye doped plastics and rare earth doped fluorides. We can optimize the particles for emitting red, green, and blue light and then place them throughout a medium. This approach allows us to form monochromatic or polychromatic displays in both 2 and 3D versions of any desired size and shape. Parallel to the materials research and spectroscopy, modulators and scanners for the light to address the necessary locations in the display are being developed. Studies are necessary to identify the optimized red, green, and blue emitters for twophoton or two-step absorption excitation, which then must be prepared in particle form. Particle size and density in the host medium must be selected. The host medium will be an optical plastic allowing for any desired size and shape. The materials studied as potential emitters include dye doped plastics, rare earth doped fluorides, and other crystalline or glass hosts. None identified. While this technology is developed into actual 2 and 3D displays, software will have to be developed or adapted to drive the scanners to address the necessary pixels or voxels in the display medium with the necessary scan speeds and accuracy. This technology will compete with existing video, LCD, LED, and plasma displays. Unlike these others, this technology has the potential to provide 3D and 2D displays of virtually any size and shape. The issues influencing the development of this technology are identifying optimized red, green, and blue emitters, identifying selective excitation processes for each type of emitter, preparing emitting particle host combinations that have least scatter, designing modulators and scanners compatible with the demands of the desired displays, and integration of these issues with software into true 2 and 3D displays. This technology requires optical scientists and technicians as well as engineers versed in display technologies. The technology is not yet commercially developed. Thus, it can be developed for military uses in specific versions that meet military demands.
Critical Materials
Technical Issues
Commercial applications range from small, head-mounted, transparent displays for physicians, machine operators, drivers, pilots, and maintenance workers to windscreen displays in autos and aircraft, to 3D displays for air traffic control, product design, and engineering. Not an issue.
Affordability
RATIONALE The technology of optically written, real-time 2 and 3D displays will provide superior, lightweight, conformable displays employing inexpensive display media (emitting particles dispersed in plastic hosts) and diode laser excitation sources. When the research and development stage is finished, the cost of 2D versions of these displays will be competitive with and perhaps less than other types of displays. With proper opto-mechanical engineering, displays of this sort can be developed for head-mounted applications, windscreen displays, and 3D
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displays in air traffic control, medicine, and engineering applications. No other display technology can produce true, real-time 3D images, so cost comparison is not relevant. This technology will lead to lightweight, inexpensive multicolor displays. It is based on optical, two-photon or two-step absorption in specially prepared materials that then emit visible light. It will make possible head-mounted and conformable windscreen displays that are transparent and rugged. Further, it will make possible for the first time multicolor, real-time, 3D displays for the management of 3D problems. These include the battlefield, military and civilian air traffic control, space and spacecraft management, and medical training and treatment, to name just a few. The development of display materials and systems for 3D systems also makes possible 2D displays having unique and useful features. The advent of powerful, reliable, inexpensive diode lasers in the near IR makes possible development of a new display technology. The light from such lasers can be absorbed by many materials through either two-photon or twostep processes to excited states that can emit visible light. The concept of using such two-photon absorption to excite visible light emission in a display was suggested nearly 30 years ago. Unfortunately, the light sources, materials, and beam-handling optics were not available until now. Research efforts in the 1990s resulted in 3D displays of limited size, color content, and spatial resolution. These employed (1) rare earth doped chalcogenide glasses or (2) rotating helices as display media. In the first case, they are severely limited in size, and in the second, the limitation is that of a mechanically moving display medium. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel Sweden United States
France Russia Taiwan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Display technology is underway throughout the industrialized world.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. ADVANCED OPTICAL SENSING TECHNOLOGY

There are outstanding problems associated with atmospheric imaging over long paths in the presence of particulates, aerosols, and turbulence for both visible and IR detection, identification, quantification. Combustion products, solid propellants, and particulate emissions of different origins are only several other examples where structural characterization requires opticalbased instruments and techniques that allow on site or remote, continuous measures without sampling. Particulate matter monitoring could become especially important because of the evolution of new environmental standards. Another area where a particulate description of the media is appropriate includes underwater imaging and special operations involving the interaction of light with the ocean, including ocean boundaries (sea surface and ocean floor) and the specific atmosphere within tens of meters of the ocean surface.
None identified. None identified. None identified. Further development should be based on improved understanding of wave progation and scattering phenomena: Novel design for imaging (scattering) techniques; New photon sources and detection systems with specific time, polarization, and wavelength properties; and New image assessment, enhancement, and pattern-recognition methods that account for quantitative aspects of multiple-scattering contributions.
Remote, real-time metrology and diagnostic technologies are crucial in all the technological applications associated with particulate systems. Particulate systems as a core technology affect advanced material, chemical, pharmaceutical, ceramic powder, pesticide, paper, cosmetic, and environmental industries, among others. The unavailability of on-line analysis, monitoring, and control methods determines a lack of knowledge on structural properties of dense systems and prevents efficient processing and utilization of particulate systems. Noninvasive determination of structural aspects in biological tissues is crucial for a variety of diagnostic and radiation delivery applications. To directly probe microscopic properties of tissues, a particulate description, where components such as particles, fibers, macromolecules, and cells act as individual scattering centers, is needed. Biological tissues can be described as particulate systems, but the inhomogeneity, multilayered structure, and anisotropy make their characterization a challenging task. There is also another aspect that makes light scattering appealing for diagnostic applications. Unlike X ray and magnetic resonance imaging, which utilize very short or very long radiation wavelengths in comparison with typical scale lengths to be investigated, optical methods probe an intermediate frequency regime that facilitates detection of metabolic abnormalities leading to tumor formation. This distinguishes the optical methods from their counterparts that respond to structural damage resulting from abnormal metabolism.
Affordability
Not an issue.
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RATIONALE There are many outstanding problems associated with atmospheric imaging over long paths in the presence of particulates, aerosols, and turbulence for both visible and IR detection, identification, and quantification. This technology addresses many of those outstanding issues. Combustion products, solid propellants, and particulate emissions of different origins are only several examples where structural characterization requires optical-based instruments and techniques that allow on-site or remote, continuous measures without sampling. Particulate-matter monitoring could be come especially important because of the evolution of new environmental standards. The military needs this technology to determine various exhaust products, which helps identify the type of vehicle being used. It can also lend itself to identifying rocketand missile-plume emissions. Another area where a particulate description of the media is appropriate includes underwater imaging and special operations involving the interaction of light with the ocean, including ocean boundaries (sea surface and ocean floor) and the specific atmosphere within tens of meters of the ocean surface. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan Sweden
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Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Germany Russia UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has the largest programs.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. PASSIVE OPTICAL LIMITING

Passive optical limiting is a means of protecting eyes and other optical sensors from laser damage. Although fixed-line filters can be used for known threat laser wavelengths, they are not a solution for tunable lasers. Active switches are expensive and too slow for many pulsed-laser threats. NLO materials offer a low-cost and wavelength-agile method to block high-intensity lasers by nonlinear absorption, nonlinear refraction, or nonlinear scattering. Materials with high broadband linear transmittance over this range (see table) while clamping transmitted energy below 1 J in the worst casepreferably below 0.1 J for eye protectionare needed and must work for multiple threat lasers
Limiters for nanosecond pulsed lasers

Parameter Max. Transmitted energy (J) Transmission bandwidth (nm) Photopic transmittance Damage threshold (mJ)
Critical Materials
1999 0.5 100 25% 5 mJ
Projected by 2005 0.1 200 50% 50 mJ
Nature's Limit N/A N/A N/A N/A
Organic reverse-saturable absorber and two-photon dyes, carbon-particle suspensions, and copper chloride. Material must have high damage threshold. None identified. Modeling software is required for the design and optimization of devices. This is in an advanced state of development for dyes, but not for suspensions. None identified. Single materials do not exhibit large enough limiting properties over a sufficiently broad bandwidth to provide protection combined with large transmittance over the visible spectrum and good color vision. Ways to make suitable mixtures of materials and encapsulate them in stable, solid-state hosts are required. A predictive capability for the excited state absorption of dyes is needed. Nonlinear effects are small enough to require that the nonlinear material is in a focal plane to provide sufficient energy density. This means an intermediate focal plane is needed. This is fine for sensors, sights, binoculars, etc., but for bare eye protection, goggles with intermediate focal plane are needed. Nonlinear materials must have high damage threshold. Typically, nonlinear materials have low damage thresholds, but tandem designs can greatly increase thresholds. When a device is damaged, it must be fail-safe, that is, become opaque in the damaged spot.
Technical Issues
Eye protection against industrial accidental exposure. Passive systems are much less expensive than active switches. Materials are generally inexpensive. One issue is the cost of possible redesign of systems to incorporate protection.
RATIONALE Military applications include eye protection for soldiers, pilots, sights, and periscopes. Sensor protection requirements are for the visible, near-IR (600900 nm), and mid-IR (112 m) wavelengths.
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Australia Germany Netherlands South Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada India Norway Sweden United States
China Israel Russia Taiwan

Moderate R&D
France Japan Singapore Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Research in this area is conducted in many nations. Selected references follow. Optical Limiting References United States Tran, Phuc, Optical Limiting and Switching of Short Pulses Using a Non-Linear Photonic Band Gap Structure with a Defect, NAWC, China Lake, JOSA B, October 1997 Abstract: An extension of the recently introduced nonlinear finite-difference time-domain (NFDTD) technique [P. Tran, Optics Letts. 21, 11381140 (1996)], for the study of electromagnetic wave propagation in a nonlinear Kerr medium, to include absorption, is presented. Theoptical limiting and switching of short pulses using a nonlinear quarter-wave reflector (a one-dimensional photonic bandgap structure) with a defect is studied. Comparison with an optical limiter and an optical switch using a perfect nonlinear quarter-wave reflector shows that introducing a defect can improve the performance of these devices. The Army awarded nine Phase II contracts from FY97 STTR Program. GELTECH, INC Optical Limiting Windows for Eye and Sensor Protection from Laser Radiation. Perry, Joseph J., et al., Enhanced Reverse Saturable Absorption and Optical Limiting in Heavy-Atom Substituted Phthalocyanines, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. Japan TOYOTO CROL Optical Limiting Property of Fullerene-containing Polystyrene, J. Mater. Sci. Lett., 16 (1997), 20292031 Second-Order Optical Nonlinearity of Urethane-Urea Copolymers: Influence of Main-Chain Structure, Jpn. J. Appl. Phys. Part 1, 369A (1997), 55185522. Reprints of the papers are available upon request. Please send request e-mail to revank@mosk.tytlabs.co.jp. Australia The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 Organometallic Materials The Organometallics Materials group is interested in the synthesis, structure, bonding, reactivity, and physical properties of organometallic materials, specifically those with a transition metal-carbon bond. At present, major foci of research are the chemistry of metal cluster complexes and the NLO properties of organometallic complexes. The Group is headed by Dr. Mark Humphrey.
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UK Refractive Nonlinearity of Novel Molecular Materials Professor D.D.C. Bradley, Department of Physics and Centre for Molecular Materials, Sheffield University, Hicks Building, Hounsfield Road, Sheffield, S3 7RH. Professor A.E. Underhill, Department of Chemistry, UCNW, Bangor, Gwynedd, LL57 2UW. Abstract: These showed a very large reverse saturable absorption response which gives an optical limiter performance that is very promising for application. Switzerland Prof. Dr. Fritz K. Kneubhl (emeritus), Time-dependent Optical Limiting of Laser Pulses by Thermal Lensing and Kerr Nonlinearity in CS2, ETH, Zurich. Abstract: Passive optical limiters with various materials and lasers are of wide interest, i.e., for protection of laser optics, human eye protection, or as power limiters when inserted inside the laser cavities. We have investigated such an optical limiting device consisting of a CS2 filled vessel with our pulsed TEA CO2laser system. The limiting characteristic depends on the pulse duration of the incoming laser radiation. For laser pulses which are much shorter than the built-up time for a thermal density change, focusing through Kerr nonlinearity dominates. Pulses that are longer than this built-up time are influenced by the thermal defocusing which exceeds the effect of focusing by an order of magnitude. We have shown that the device of optical limiting can also be applied to perform various beam shaping. Thus, we can control the pulse duration by simply placing the limiting sample into the proper position. We have also demonstrated for the first time the use of an optical limiting device for the production of pulses with cw-lasers. Finally, we have succeeded to formulate a simple theoretical approach which gives a good quantitative agreement with the experimental results. This agreement is equal to that of previous sophisticated theories. Contacts: M.O. Baumgartner, D.P. Scherrer, F.K. Kneubhl. See also: http://www.iqe.ethz.ch/irp/Welcome.html http://www.iqe.ethz.ch/irp/office/PhoneList.html Germany Modeling of Picosecond-Pulse Propagation for Optical Limiting Applications in the Visible Spectrum, S. Hughes, J.M. Burzler, and T. Kobayashi. J.Burzler@Physik.TU-Chemnitz.de Abstract: Efficient beam propagation methods are employed to model, quantitively, the roles of internal and extental propagation effects from the optical limiting materials, zinc selenide and chloroaluminium phthalocyanine. By exploiting the nonlinear absorptive and refractive nonlinearities, excellent optical limiting behaviour is demonstrated at 532 nm, provided that sufficient sample thickness can be accommodated. Journal: Journal of the Optical Society of America B, Vol. 14, No, 11, pp. 29252929 (1997).
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. LASER REFRIGERATION BY MEANS OF MOLECULAR COOLING

Ultracold Molecules can be formed by means of lasers using coherent state-selected beams of molecules formed from Bose-Einstein condensates (BEC). Developing techniques to produce molecules in this low vibrational state to form ultracold refrigeration is the long-term goal. Laser photoassociation has achieved molecular cooling to 300 K within no cryosources. Colliding pairs of these cold molecules form only one vibrational energy state. Development of this technology requires generating a database for BEC statistics and determining which molecules have the greatest potential to be cooled under laser radiation. None criticalmaterials such as potassium can be used to trap and cool the molecules (to less than 106 K). Optical spectroscopic methods need to be developed for both the destructive and nondestructive characterization of ultracold molecular samples. None identified. Cooling of alkali metal molecules has been produced using near-IR lasers. The extension of this technique to other molecules will require a narrowband visible or UV laser. Commercial applications are speculative at this point; however, two such applications are refrigeration or quantum computing in which an optical lattice is developed where two state-selected atoms can be converted into a single state-selected molecule or an atom-molecules superposition state. Affordability is speculative at this point although costs of BEC are decreasing rapidly.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE The ability to cool a small area within a microchip or computer chip will become increasingly important in the near future for both commercial and military systems. This technology of using BECs is developing techniques and the process and procedures necessary to produce very low-temperature molecules by means of laser radiation. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The concept is being studied at the University of Connecticut, Photonics Research Center. No similar work has been identified elsewhere.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. VARIABLE WAVELENGTH IMAGING SPECTROMETERS

The technology required to image different wavelength intervals of interest in subsequent planes within an imaging cube FPA is emerging. Each volume pixel (Voxel) is associated with an x, y coordinate and a different wavelength interval in the z direction. This is done without scanning in the Mooney-Descour imaging spectrometer. The key is the dispersing element used in form of the 3D FPA. High resolution 10,000 10,000 FPA. None identified. None identified. Fabrication of grating pattern in situ or via LCD to exact tolerances. Many applications could use a high-resolution FPA. Cost must be reduced from the current high-resolution FPAs. This new technology should lead to significant cost reduction over current designs.
RATIONALE High-resolution images taken simultaneously with discrete wavelength intervals (typically 1020 bands) is possible. This technology is required to discern camouflage material and paint from organic and background materials. Since camouflage and paint typically have absorption spectra that are distinct and different from that of organic materials, it is important to be able to image in different wavelength bands and look at image differences. This technology has the potential of providing this information and processing it so that many variations of the data can be reviewed from many different applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Israel Singapore UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan Sweden United States
France Netherlands Switzerland
Germany Russia Taiwan
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States, China, Japan, and Switzerland have significant R&D related to imaging spectrometers. The technologies covered here are under investigation at the University of Arizona, Optical Sciences Center. The concept requires very complex focal plane arraysan area where the United States is a world leader.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. MEMS AND FPA ADAPTIVE OPTICS

The ability to control the phase of a propagating optical wave front is a key enabling technology for a host of scientific, commercial, medical, and defense applications. By controlling the phase of a propagating beam it is possible to correct aberrations in optical systems, control the shape of a focused laser beam, and even redirect the laser beam. Scientific and defense applications include high-speed optical wave-front control for correcting atmospheric turbulence effects for astronomy, space surveillance to provide higher resolution imagery, and control of fixed aberrations in optical systems to allow the development of simpler lens and mirror arrangements. Silicon and associated semiconductor materials and processes. Test/inspection equipment capable of operating 2D optical MEMS arrays to measure such parameters as input/output power and component alignment. Computerized driver equipment capable of controlling hundreds or thousands of microactuator channels in real time. Optical simulation software. Development of fundamental MEMS science for high optical power applications. Development of packaging of MEMS devices for high optical power applications. Understanding of the performance of MEMS for optical power handling ability, dynamic range, frequency response, and beam-shaping characteristics.
HDTV, solid-state device focus control for camcorders, and beam-quality control for line-of-sight laser communications; optical interconnects between high-speed electronic modules. Medical applications for optical wave-front control technology as related to laser eye surgery. The bottleneck now is in not having affordable fast computers capable of controlling thousands of channels in real time.
Affordability
RATIONALE The ability to control the phase of a propagating optical wave front has significant defense applications, as well as commercial applications. The use of MEMS technology is making optical phase control practical. Correcting aberrations has application to optical communications and to imaging and focus control. The technology permits the use of optical correlation with application to target acquisition. Laser beams can be steered and focused to improve target tracking and displays. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The concept is based on R&D under way at the University of Colorado, Boulder, NSF Center for Advanced Manufacturing (CAMPmode). MEMS R&D is extensive throughout the industrial world, but this is a specific area of investigation.
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DATA SHEET III-11.4. DISPLAYS FOR WEARABLE COMPUTERS

Wearable displays are rapidly evolving as a result of recent progress in new approaches, as well as evolving technologies such as diffractive and aspherics optics. Specifically, novel technologies to be applied to wearable computers include eyetracking capability; multiple focus to avoid conflicts of accommodation and convergence; and projection optics that allow for small, compact, and lightweight devices. Critical technical parameters: Projected Head-Mounted Displays Parameter FOV (degree) Weight (g) Ergonomy Brightness Image Quality Eyetracking Capability 1999 3040 1000 nonoptimized 12 FL no MTF at 101p/mm No Projected by 2010 8090 20250 eyeglass type 50100 FL limited by visual acuity Yes
Critical Materials
A critical technology required for wearable computers is microretroreflective material, which comes in sheets. Currently, microprisms or microbeads are sold by 3M and Reflexite Technology. The technology parameters are, however, not optimized for imaging applications. New developments in retroreflective material must be initiated for applications to imaging. Ultimately, desirable properties of the material are optimally sized microstructures, zero observation angle, and minimization of ghost images via proposed approaches. Moreover, new material for miniature low-cost displays should be investigated.
None identified at this time. Ability to generate true stereoscopic images based on interpupillary distance of the user. Virtual worlds or augmented reality environments. Miniaturizing the optics. Requires developing retroreflective sheeting material that has properties for imaging applications (Hua et al., AO2000; ODALab/UCF). Requires developing high-resolution 510 m pixels miniature color flat-panel display types of about 11.5 in. diagonal; optically written displays? Eyetracking integration in head-mounted devices is ultimately required. The commercial technology requires further development for military applications(s), including eyetracking integration. (above).
Technical Issues
Personal display, wearable computers, teleconferencing, remote teaching, telemedicine, surgical display aids, teleconferencing, remote teaching, training systems, vehicular heads-up displays, and aircraft displays.
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Affordability
Technology can be commercialized because of the low cost of the miniature optics and retroreflective material compared to computer automatic virtual environment (CAVE) types of environments.
RATIONALE Because of the new capability to miniaturize the optics, projection lenses for 3D displays may be designed to be head mounted, suppressing the need for multiple high-cost projection lenses (e.g., Barcos) placed in a room as found in CAVE environments. Thus, there is no need to calibrate the multiple projection lenses and no need to set the overall CAVE-type environment. Sheeting material positioned in a few seconds can serve as a projection screen. This technology is portable, quickly set up and removed; it may be created at low cost. Sheeting material such as provided by 3M and Reflexite technology is very inexpensive (~ $1/m2). This technology will strongly compete with CAVE-type systems or provide substitutes for a large spread of such 3D visualization environment when less than immersive field of views are required. Among several approaches, optical see-through technologies have the highest potential because they can ensure safety of the user. Also, hybrid optical/video see-through where video input is used to either measure the distance and orientation of objects in the scene or to capture information that can be used to enhance the real scene (e.g., IR camera recording) will play critical roles in new developments of the technology. Among optical see-through technologies, a novel approach to miniature displays is projective head-mounted displays. In projective displays, the optics are equivalent to projection optics (rather than magnifier optics). The key difference is the ability to correct optical distortions, as well as other optical aberrations, a critical component related to miniaturizing the technology. Furthermore, it has been established in the literature (Rolland et al., AO 2000) that multifocus devices are required to minimize conflicts of acommodation and convergence in head-mounted displays. So novel technologies providing multiple focus will need to be conceived. Also, eyetracking integration reveals the importance of head-mounted displays. Eyetracking capability can be used as an input device (hands-free operation), as well as an assessment tool to investigate how such systems are used. By 2005, projections indicate that devices using projection optics will become ultralightweight, similar to eyeglasses but with large FOVs (e.g., 70 deg). Such devices are attractive to the military because they can be used outdoors. Military applications include portable displays for the battlefield; aircraft displays; 3D displays; and visualization for military planning, rehearsing, and debriefing; soldier support environment/display/remote communication; soldier kit, including medical data quickly visualized in case of emergency; teleconferencing; and training systems. Drivers are teleconferencing and training systems. These devices also have nonmilitary applications in creating collaborative environments, telemedecine, teleconferencing, remote teaching, training systems, and 3D visualization. There are no special requirements such as a cooperative agreement or vehicle for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Japan Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Germany Russia UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
There is considerable commercial activity in wearable computers. China, Japan, France, Germany, and Russia have moderate R&D programs underway. The United States has significant R&D in progress. This particular data sheet describes programs with military potential.
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SECTION 11.5OPTOELECTRONIC AND PHOTONICS TECHNOLOGY

Highlights Micro-optics will begin complementing and then replacing electronic components on chips, reducing heat and improving speed and throughput, while reducing cost. Nanotechnology will result in significant improvement in electro-optic and NLO devices, which will have widespread military applications The use of optoelectronics technology in military applications has a number of advantages over classical electronic technology. Among these are radiation hardening, greater bandwidth, lower power consumption, reduced size/weight/volume, electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) considerations, and memory size. Photonics is a major developing technology within DoD.
OVERVIEW Note that the term optoelectronics is typically used to describe devices and components (hardware) that respond electrically to photons, whereas the term electro-optics is typically understood to be the science of the relationship between electricity and optics. Optoelectronic devices can be regarded as the set of devices and components used to implement a variety of military, industrial, and consumer photonics applications. Optoelectronic devices are also used extensively to interconnect the photonic and electronic domains. The Photonics Dictionary defines optoelectronics as: Pertaining to a device that responds to optical power, emits or modifies optical radiation, or utilizes optical radiation for its internal operation. It relates to any device that functions as an electrical-to-optical or optical-to-electrical transducer. Electro-optics is often erroneously used as a synonym. Photonics applications have been considered for many years. Applications have been limited; however, DoD now has a major thrust underway to introduce photonics applications into a number of existing or new military applications. Industrial and consumer applications are also being considered. The Photonics Dictionary defines photonics as: The technology of generating and harnessing light and other forms of radiant energy whose quantum unit is the photon. The science includes light emission, transmission, deflection, amplification and detection by optical components and instruments, lasers and light sources, fiber-optics, electro-optics instrumentation, related hardware and electronics and sophisticated systems. The range of applications of photonics extends from energy generation to detection to communications and information processing. DoD uses the following definition for photonics in program reviews: Concept for computing and data transmission using photons in place of electrons; pertaining to devices and systems that utilize photons instead of electrons for computational purposes and information transmission.1 Photonics generally involves the replacement of components or applications based on pure electronics with components or applications implemented with technology based on light wavelengths. Many of these components and applications exist or are under development in many military applications such as avionics, acoustic surveillance, radar, shipboard systems, space, land vehicles, and night vision. Some reports use the terms photonics or optoelectronics interchangeablythere is not yet universal agreement on the definitions.
Photonics Pre-TARA Review, Working Group C, DoD Advisory Group on Electronic Devices (AGED), 2930 January 1997.
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A typical photonics application is the replacement of avionic fly-by-wire control systems with fly-by-light. Another application is interconnect technology for radar phased arrays. Typical optoelectronic devices employ lasers (especially surface-emitting and edge-emitting semiconductor types), fiber-optics, detectors, and various optical signal-processing techniques. The use of MEMS technology is increasingly important in many of these devices RATIONALE This section provides a variety of applications and component developments that marry lasers and optics. Many are examples of the concept of optoelectronicsthe art of combining the world of electronics with photons. Moving the base band for information transfer and processing from the gigahertz (GHz) region to the terahertz (THz) region results in a 2 to 3 orders of magnitude increase in available bandwidth and data transfer The continual maturing of optical technologies has permitted a new focus, that of micro-optics technologies, which are now enabling complex systems to be constructed, such as spatial light modulators, integrated optoelectronic arrays, opto-electronics, and quantum optoelectronics at the chip level. In addition, fiber-optic components and systems represent an area in which commercial investment has led the way for DoD applications. Basic data-transmission systems have been adapted and improved for battlefield environments, with the commercial sector leading the technology development in areas such as wavelength diversity multiplexing (WDM) and time division multiplexing (TDM) using fiber-optic transmission lines. The use of fiber-optics on aircraft, satellites, ships, and submarines has started to expand, following similar commercial successes. This increased utility of fiberoptics along with optical imaging technologies and optical storage devices is pushing the technology envelope in related areas such as optical parametric amplifiers and NLO materials development for waveguide and switching applications in the micro-optics field. The use of optoelectronic devices in military applications has a number of advantages over classical electronic technology. Among these are radiation hardening, greater bandwidth, lower power consumption, reduced size/ weight/volume, improved EMI/EMC considerations, and greater memory size. The primary applications include telecommunications, local and wide area networks, optical interconnections, and optical storage. The field of optoelectronics/photonics is exploding, and other applications can be expected to rapidly develop. Optical sensors (electro-optical sensors) are covered in Section 17.5. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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A new center has been established at the George Mason University under the joint sponsorship of DARPA/ MTO. Their mission statement: We are pleased to announce the formation of the Consortium for Optical and Optoelectronic Technologies in Computing (CO-OP). The CO-OP is expected to draw its membership from industry, universities and government agencies. The purpose of the CO-OP is to promote the development of optical and optoelectronic platform technologies by making them widely accessible and by a cooperative sharing of test data and design methodologies among the consortium members. The primary emphasis will be to work with the existing technologies rather than to work ON developing new technologies or improving their performance. In that regard, the purpose of the consortium is complementary to the already existing R&D efforts in technology development. The consortium is expected to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art optoelectronic devices in advanced systems and applications by making them easily accessible. We will determine the overall direction of the CO-OP in consultation with an advisory committee. The consortium will conduct its operations through an Administrative Office located at George Mason University in Fairfax, VA.
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http://co-op.gmu.edu/ This is a potential platform for exploitation of the Developing Technologies identified in this section of the MCTP, when they are proven.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III- 11.5. OPTOELECTRONICS AND PHOTONICS TECHNOLOGY

Coherent RF Photonic Processing for Adaptive Arrays........................................................................................III-11-149 Silicon-Based Optical Interconnects......................................................................................................................III-11-151 Chip-Level Optical Interconnection.......................................................................................................................III-11-152 Optical Packet Switching .......................................................................................................................................III-11-154 Optical Networks and Self-Organizing Systems...................................................................................................III-11-156 Digital Optoelectronic Systems..............................................................................................................................III-11-158 Chip-Based DNA Sequencing via Nanometer Holes in Semiconductors ............................................................III-11-160 WDM Microcavity Waveguides ............................................................................................................................III-11-161 Ultra-High-Speed Photonics for Networking, Instrumentation, and Signal Processing......................................III-11-162 Optoelectronic Micro Network Technology..........................................................................................................III-11-164 MOEMS Manufacturing Technology ....................................................................................................................III-11-169 Optical Waveguides via Current Steering of Beam ..............................................................................................III-11-171
The following developing technology is in the very early research phase, and numerical values and specific goals for some of the critical parameters have not yet been identified and/or determined at this time. WDM Microcavity Waveguides ............................................................................................................................III-11-173
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. COHERENT RF PHOTONIC PROCESSING FOR ADAPTIVE ARRAYS

Optimal signal processing for the receive mode of large, wideband phased-array antennas is enormously challenging, requiring petaFLOP computational throughputs. Appropriate coherent optical techniques incorporating true-time-delay and adaptive signal combination are required to solve this problem. Holographic adaptive-array processing requires either high-speed photorefractive materials for use with Broadband and Efficient Adaptive Method for TTD Array Processing (BEAMTAP) processors or cryogenically cooled photon-echo materials to operate as intrinsic true-time-delay processors. Finding materials compatible with all of the other system components represents a compromise in performance between the laser, modulators, detectors, and dynamic hologram. Time delay in a traveling-wave photoconductive detector (GaAs, Si, or SIC) is a critical requirement.
Critical Materials
Antenna array processor testing requires generation of the broadband signals that would be received by such an array, and this presents an extraordinary challenge. The simulator for a single received signal is actually the same type of system used to produce the necessary signals required for true-time-delay transmit mode of operation, and simulating numerous signals is typically required. The BEAMTAP algorithm has been implemented as an interactive data language (IDL) graphical user interface (GUI) for algorithm exploration, and it is amendable to a variety of scenarios. Numerous variants, including linear arrays, circular arrays, narrowband jammer nulling, broadband jammer nulling, beam steering, effects of element couplings, effects of modulation nonlinearities, and tradeoffs of spatial aperture vs. tapped-delayline length, have been investigated using this software. Squint-free broadband operation requires time-delay-and-sum processing. Dynamic Range of 140 dB is only possible using coherent processing gain. Coherent fan-in allows efficient low noise figure operation. Algorithm convergence may be slow in presence of many strong jammers. Array topology can be arbitrary and in a dynamically varying space. Closed-loop adaptation senses component variability and compensates. Rapid control of array scanning required.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Large array processing finds application in DoD systems and in radio astronomy where systems are being envisioned with 1,000,000 elements. These systems will only be feasible using coherent optical processing. By utilizing parallel optical processing that scales to arbitrarily large arrays without increasing the processor complexity, the cost of processing arrays with 1,000 or more elements becomes manageable.
Affordability
RATIONALE The large number of parallel wideband channels that must be controlled and processed in RF antenna arrays presents an enormous signal-processing challenge for conventional digital techniques. The transmission of these RF signals from the antennas to the processor will inevitably use optical fiber, and by utilizing coherent optical processing of this arrray of signals cohered by dynamic holograms, least mean square (LMS) adaptive array processing can be implemented in real-time. The use of either BEAMTAP or photon echo processing enables these
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systems to accomplish broadband, true-time-delay, squint-free beamforming and jammer nulling. Such advanced, university-based, systems-oriented research can dramatically enhance critical mission capabilities and simultaneously alleviate requirements on the development of devices and components. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. SILICON-BASED OPTICAL INTERCONNECTS

Source: Modulation speed (10 GHz), quantum efficiency (10 percent), lifetime (1 106 hours), power (>100 W). Modulators: speed (10 GHz), power dissipation (<100 W), modulation depth (>90 percent). Silicon-on-insulator (SOI) wafers. Very high purity starting materials. None identified. All equipment should be standard semiconductor processing equipment. Waveguide analysis and 2D E/M modeling software. Materials compatibility, energy efficiency, device lifetime, and modulation speed. SOI applications. Silicon-compatible integrated modulators and detectors. SiGe heterostructures. SOI technology has demonstrated that a $300$400 increase in wafer cost increases the cost of the final processor by 1015 percent. Thus, any proposed improvements should take final device cost into account.
RATIONALE The use of silicon integrated circuits pervades defense and commercial communication as well as military weapons systems. For integrated circuits to continue to support the current requirements and become two to four times more dense in terms of computer power, optical interconnects and switches must become as ubiquitous as their electronic counterparts. While hybrid technologies (such as flip-chip bonded VCSEL arrays) may serve well in the interim, thermal management and reliability considerations suggest that the development of monolithic solutions needs to be addressed. The steady reduction in electronic device size and increase in clock speed has led to a significant need for dense, high-speed, very large scale integration (VLSI)-compatible interconnect technologies. Two approaches for this are (1) silicon-based lightemitting devices and (2) silicon-based optical modulators. Devices based on emerging technologies such as SOI and copper metallization technologies are particularly critical. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The United States, as a world leader in semiconductor technology, is pursuing this technology very aggressively. It is key to greater performance. The other industrialized nations that are leaders in semiconductors also have substantial efforts.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. CHIP-LEVEL OPTICAL INTERCONNECTION

The need is for a family of low-cost (<$0.001/interconnect) optoelectronic chips that can form the building blocks for computing systems that are packaged either in 3D stacks or as integrated wafers. A typical chip would contain hundreds of optical interconnects (OIs), each operating at several Gbits/sec, yielding a chip I/O rate >1 Tbit/sec. Optical crosstalk can be controlled by adding MEMS to maintain an alignment accuracy of the optical channels within 2 m laterally and 5 m longitudinally. Silicon and gallium arsenide wafers and other materials used in the microelectronics fabrication industry. Test/inspection equipment capable of performing parallel measurements on operating 2D optoelectronic arrays to measure such parameters as transceiver input/output power, component alignment, cross-talk between adjacent channels, channel bandwidths, and bit error rates. Optical simulation software. Optical transmitters and receivers having lower power dissipation. Lower cost, integrated source and detector arrays. Lack of architectural knowledge on how to partition chip with existence of OI. Lower noise and higher gain detectors. Improved techniques for integrating optoelectronics (OE) with silicon chips. Need for packaging that is compatible with chip-level OI. Reduced OE power requirements so as to be compatible with Si power levels. Testability. Manufacturability (process compatibility with silicon and process scalability). Ability to easily establish and maintain alignment. Need for new optical models that can work for such small feature sizes.
Critical Materials
High-performance parallel computers/switching systems for: High-resolution, real-time image processing (e.g., highly detailed operations in remote environments, maintaining worldwide databases on human demographics, and 3D display). Image synthesis (e.g., entertainment/games and training with virtual environments). Multidimensional modeling and simulation (e.g., real-time weather prediction, DNA synthesis, electronic structure of macromolecules, world ecosystem modeling, and flow in porous media such as oil reserves). Video on demand.
Affordability
Orders of magnitude increase in computing throughput will reduce the required computing resources.
RATIONALE Many processing algorithms important to DoD have high computational and communication requirements. One future design under consideration by DARPA calls for a 2D FFT corner turn (between range processing and azimuth compression) for synthetic aperture radar (SAR) processors consisting of a 32 32 array of processors
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interconnected by a 64-bit wide network. This will require over 65,000 connections. For these connections, optical links with their 1 mW per link power requirements are far superior to electrical links with power requirements in the range of 60100 mW per link. The cost savings of interconnecting processing elements with a fully connected network, which optics can provide, rather than the partially connected networks, which electrically connected systems use, could be in the millions of dollars per system. This is because of the high cost of developing software for systems whose networks are running in excess of 50-percent utilization due to their partial connectivity. That is, the limitations of electronic networks lead to greater software development costs than for optical networks. An appealing alternative to making larger and larger chips to address the need for more computational power is to provide optical interconnects between many smaller chips located in proximity to one another. Electrically interconnected multichip modules (MCMs) and 3D chip stacks have been tried, but concerns exist regarding their cost competitiveness. MCMs require costly multilayer substrates to support the electrical interconnects, and a major cost factor for electrically interconnected chip stacks is the failure of the entire stack when a single chip fails. A focused effort in chip-level optical interconnection is needed to develop the enabling technologies for realizing a low-cost optoelectronic chip that can be used either in a cost-competitive wafer-based module or in a modular chip stack. The result will be a high-performance chip with terahertz I/O capability and with the ability to be packaged with many other chips in either a planar or stacked configuration. The cost savings promises to be significant. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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This technology is one of the keys to greater semiconductor device performance and is being emphasized strongly by most industrialized countries with semiconductor capability.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. OPTICAL PACKET SWITCHING

This technology applies to monolithic integrated all-optical and optoelectronic devices. This technology will enable very high speed processing and routing of very high frequency digital optical data trains. All-optical signal processing enables on-the-fly decoding of packet address information and routing of the packets to the designated destinations. Monolithic integration is key to making this technology viable for reliable, error-free operation. The ultrafast semiconductor all-optical and optoelectronic switches are useful for de-multiplexing 100-Gb/sec signals in TDM applications. They can be configured to perform automatic packet address decoding and packet routing of WDM packets with latency times less than twice the duration of the packet itself. The devices can also be easily configured for parallel interconnects for local area networks and computer backplanes running at a full 64-bit data bus. Packet switching of optical data at rates exceeding 1-G packets/sec assuming packet size between 128256 bits.
Critical Materials
High-quality semiconductor quantum-sized structures including multiple quantum wells and multiple quantum dot materials. 6 6 optical space switch. Custom ASIC router control. Passive WDM components.
High-bandwidth electronic/optical interfaces. High-bandwidth bit error rate (BER) equipment. Low-latency electronic host/network interface, not significantly different from existing software used to operate the current technology. Improvement of the energy required for switching. Issues with effects of residual free carriers than linger on long after the switching event. Reduction in cost of fabrication and packaging. Deflection routing protocol optimization. Scaling to large systems.
Technical Issues
Future generation of very large bandwidth optical telecommunication networks with many WDM channels operating at 100 Gb/sec. Optical backplane interconnects for local network of very high performance computers and supercomputers. Optical internet protocol (IP) switching for backbone telecomm carriers. Distributed high-performance computing.
Affordability
Affordability must be addressed at all levels of development to provide DoD with logistic options.
RATIONALE This technology will play a significant role in distributed radar data processing, distributed real-time battlefield command and control, and distributed high-performance computing. As this technology is developed, each of these will be significant to the military in the out years. Monolithic, integrated, all-optical packet switches will be enablers for the ultimate in high-bandwidth optical telecommunications, as well as for local supercomputer networks. All-optical packet header address decoding removes a lot of the overhead penalty associated with traditional electronic packet switching.
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The military will benefit strongly from the implementation of systems incorporating semiconductor all-optical switches. A network of computers interconnected via a parallel optical bus would run military software codes specifically written for parallel computing applications such as target recognition, missile course intercept calculations, and other remote targeting applications. Automatic optical packet header decoding and packet routing will significantly enhance the network switching capability of telecommunications networks. High-bandwidth secure networks will strongly enhance the military strength in remote battlefield scenarios. Increased program funding is required in the area of developing semiconductor structures that possess advantageous nonlinear properties and ease of integration. For example, coupled quantum well structures and multiple quantum dot structures can be envisioned for such applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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In the United States many companies in the telecom industry are spending significant resources in this area. In Japan, NTT and most of the large electronics firms such as NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, etc., are also doing a lot of research in this area.In Europe, consortiums have been formed between several companies and universities to develop such technologies into working products. Countries involved are UK, France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, etc.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. OPTICAL NETWORKS AND SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS

Optical networks and self-organizing systems require nonlinear optical materials, very large NLO coefficients, and high efficiency at specific laser wavelength. Nonlinear materials. There is a need to develop materials with an increase in the nonlinear optical coefficient by a factor of 10 to 1,000 in order to reduce the required power densities to average values of a few milliwatts for a single nonlinear optical operation. Higher order nonlinearities (n > 3) would be highly desirable.
Optical measurements on nanometer scale. Improved scanning microscope techniques will be needed to work with quantum well and light emitters involving a few molecules in order to control the uniformity of large arrays and to control optical interconnections between nanodevices.
Simulation software. Development of materials with large optical nonlinearities at low power densities. To perform logic operations, switching should occur with pulse energies of picojoules. This limits the peak powers which can be used, and therefore requires large nonlinearities. The exact numbers depend on the geometry, the wavelength, and the pulse lengths and repetition rates. Switching with gain. Current optically driven optical switches have loss and variable time delays. For optical logic, gain is required in order to satisfy the fan-in and fan-out requirements. Additionally, timing for the pulses needs to be synchronized or restored as the pulses propagate through the circuit. Current optical amplifiers have relatively long relaxation time constants and turn on RC time constants. There is a need for switches with gain that can operate on a sub-picosecond timescale. Unilateral Devices. Most of the present optical devices are two-terminal, and it is difficult to isolate the input from the output. An all-optical three-terminal device would make optical circuit design much easier. Optical Memory. The methods for storing optical information without converging to electronics need to be reduced in the space required to store a given set of bits for variable time lengths. Additionally, the access into and out of these memories needs to be improved. Photon confinement, guiding, coupling. It would be highly desirable if simpler methods for confining optical beams to small regions of a surface were available to be compatible with submicron electronic circuits. Additionally, simple methods are needed for coupling into and out of optical circuits. Rules for interconnections in self-organizing optical systems and their implementation. As the complexity of the level of organization becomes large, it becomes impossible to write centralized control software which is reliable. Thus, when manufacturing either very large numbers of devices or in organizing them, it is necessary to define rules for the system of devices to organize themselves. Fundamental rules need to be formulated for self-organizing systems as one progresses from the elementary device toward higher levels of organization to the applications.
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Display systems. Routers, address resolution. The Internet (self-organizing systems). It is impossible to write a centralized control for all of the websites on the Internet and the communication links tying them together as fast as changes are made. Thus, the rules must be defined that allow the nodes to control the routing between the nodes and to locate addresses which are self-organizing.
Affordability
Undetermined at this time.
RATIONALE The military will benefit strongly from the implementation of systems incorporating self-organizing optical systems and optical display systems. A network of computers interconnected via a parallel optical bus would run military software codes specifically written for parallel computing applications such as target recognition, missile course intercept calculations, and other remote targeting applications. Automatic optical packet header decoding and packet routing will significantly enhance the network-switching capability of telecommunications networks. Highbandwidth secure networks will strongly enhance the military strength in remote battlefield scenarios. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Japan and the United States currently lead the world in this technology.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. DIGITAL OPTOELECTRONIC SYSTEMS

Exploiting precise temporal control in the overall systems design to optimize photonic switching. Signal quality restoration distributed over the system. Designing systems on the basis of optoelectronic component interaction and interconnection. Minimizing system impact of electronic/optical conversion.
Critical Materials
Complete set of optoelectronic devices for closed circuit switching systems. Compatible material systems for optoelectronic integration. Using the same format for controlling and controlled signals or very inexpensive format converters. Low power per device for complex systems.
Device dependent instrumentation. Interacts strongly with simulation software. CAD tools for timing analysis and design. New algorithms are needed for determining distribution of signal quality restorers. Integrated optoelectronic layout tool are required for design and analysis of these optoelectronic systems. Detailed level timing and signal quality simulator.
Technical Issues
Latency-tolerant, high bandwidth system architecture. Low-cost, distributed signal quality restoration. Signal format matching between optical devices. Achievable integration levels. Robustness. Device coordination (cascading, synchronization, and power requirements).
After technology matures enough to compete with digital electronics. Telecommunications. High-speed multiprocessor computing. Most areas of application of digital electronics.
Affordability
Affordability is one of the major criteria for selecting devices and materials systems and eliminating expensive format conversion. System-level research required to determine cost savings. Precise control over signal delay is possible via optical format reducing cost and achieving high clock rates in spite of latency.
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RATIONALE The cost savings of interconnecting processing elements into systems with a fully connected network, which optics can provide, rather than with the partially connected networks, which electrically connected systems use, could be in the millions of dollars per system. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The United States and Japan lead in this technology, but several industrialized countries have important programs underway. There is high commercial motivation.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. CHIP-DNA SEQUENCING VIA NANOMETER HOLES IN SEMICONDUCTORS

Fabrication of nanometer-scale holes in semiconductors surrounded by charge sensors. Understanding DNA dynamics well enough to design an operational chip within fabrication constraints.
None beyond state-of-the-art semiconductor fabrication materials and processes. In situ monitoring of pore size during fabrication. Computer simulation of DNA dynamics at the atomic scale in an ionic solution flowing through a semiconductor pore/hole. Controlled nanometer-scale holes in semiconductors have not been demonstrated, although holes of the right size have been fabricated. Embedded FETs or other charge sensors sufficiently small have not been demonstrated, although the state of the art is not too far away.
Technical Issues
Rapid, unambiguous identification of individuals from microscopic biological samples. Rapid identification of an individuals inherited allergies and susceptibilities to a wide range of diseases, allowing preventive countermeasures (e.g., frequent sensitive tests for cancers and diets/medicines to avoid Alzheimers disease). Detection of microscopic biological pathogens in the environment.
Affordability
Potentially a compact, largely electronic module no more complex than many current measuring instruments in a clinic.
RATIONALE The genetic code of biological agents is the determinant of infectivity of the agent and identifies those gene products in the infectious organism responsible for pathogenicity. Knowledge of the code for the agent allows development of therapeutics and prediction of the methods by which each agent can be weaponized and disseminated. (See also Part III, Section 4, pp. 15 and 16.) WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The only known work in this technology is in the United States and in France.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. WDM MICROCAVITY WAVEGUIDES

Submillimeter-scale optical WDM passive and active components. Deeper penetration of waveguide optical components into high-performance computer and communication systems.
Critical Materials
3D fabrication of complex wageguide structures. Thin (70-nm) layers of electro-optical material.
Expensive, but available in optoelectronic research labs. Maxwell equation solvers for large volumes in space and time to optimize design. Achieving high-Q cavities in production quantities. Integration of active control.
Set-top boxes for fiber high-bandwidth connections directly to residential end users. Backplanes for high-performance computing and communications switching. Potentially less expensive and smaller than any other option. May be no other way at any cost to reach the highest bandwidths.
RATIONALE Compact, high-performance data processing with optical interfaces is required to achieve higher radiationhardened space electronics and for micro-optical chip designs. These will have a significant impact on military applications ranging from lighter weight field electronics for the soldier to higher survivability for space applications to WDM optical switching systems. A civil application of WDM is in the optical switching area. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The United States and Japan have the largest programs; the Japanese motivation is mainly commercial. Israel and Sweden also have military interest.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. ULTRA-HIGH-SPEED PHOTONICS FOR NETWORKING, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SIGNAL PROCESSING
This area of device and systems technology focuses on advancing the state of the art in available devices, components, and systems for ultra-high-bandwidth information based technologies and applications. The critical technology parameter in these general areas are (1) bandwidth, (2) signal-processing speed (e.g., sampling speed and resolvable bits in analog-to-digital converters), and (3) agility and flexibility of device technology platforms. The critical materials most generally employed in these technology areas are primarily active semiconductor media (semiconductor lasers, photoreceivers, electro-absorbtion modulators), electro-optic media (lithium niobiate, organic polymers), and glass (for waveguides, fibers, diffractive optical components, etc.). Unique test equipment may be found in developing the next generation optical function generators for testing networks and signal-processing functionality. Particularly important test equipment is the arbitrary optical waveform generator, which is the optical analog to the conventional electrical waveform generator. This will allow system designers to generate arbitrary optical waveforms to test critical operational characteristics. Critical software is mandatory to capture and process data at real-time rates of 1,000s of Gb/sec. This issue has always been the bottleneck of high-speed networking and signal-processing management. For example, high-speed optoelectronic technology has been in existence for many years; however, its incorporation into networking has been hampered by the slower development of software to manage the technology. Two technical issues that influence this technology are cost-effective packaging capabilities and minimizing insertion loss. Other technical issues may lie in the relatively large investments necessary to develop the infrastructure to allow timely development of the technology. Further development of this technology may be required for military development (e.g., radiation-hardened materials, robust operation over temperature ranges that exceed that required for telecommunication environments, and immunity to vibration and shock for mobile platform deployment may be required). Note that the use of this technology by personnel with technical training is not required.
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Telecommunications, high-resolution analog-to-digital converters, and optical sampling oscilloscopes (all applications related to optical networking, instrumentation, and signal processing). A 2-in. wafer could potentially produce 50,000 devices. With the cost of a wafer being ~$5,000, the typical device cost could be as little as 10 cents. We have shown that we could build functional 100 Gb/s for all optical networks based on SOA devices.
Affordability
RATIONALE The technology described in this assessment will provide increased superiority in military and commercial applications that require high-bandwidth information links and signal processing. As the military battlefield evolves into the digital battlefield, high-bandwidth optical links with bandwidths exceeding 100 GHz will be required. Moreover, as we continue to evolve the digital battlefield into the remote or virtual battlefield, information-based technologies will be the primary enabling technology. Clearly, to realize the remote/virtual battlefield, the bandwidth requirements will easily exceed many terahertz, thus mandating the developing of robust, cost-effective, high-speed optoelectronic devices, components, and systems.
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Specific Device/Technology Platform Hybrid WDMTDM Technology: This technology allows state-of-the-art information transmission and processing speeds without relying on a completely WDM or TDM technology platform. Ultra-high-Resolution Photonic Analog-to-Digital Converter (PACT) This technology will allow the quantization and digitization of analog RF signals with carrier frequencies extending to 50 GHz, relying primarily on low bandwidth electronics operating at 1 GHz. RF Lightwave Integrated Circuits (RFLIC) The development of the arbitrary optical waveform generator will allow for the synthesis of analog optical signals with over 100 GHz of analog bandwidth. In addition, this technology does not require ultra-high-bandwidth modulators with low operating voltages. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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There is broad interest and activity among the industrialized nations because of the extensive commercial and military applications of broadband technology.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. OPTOELECTRONIC MICRO NETWORK TECHNOLOGY

Developing Critical Technology Parameters
Dense (Gb/sec/10 mm sq.), low power (<50 mW/Gb/sec) optoelectronic transceivers and associated micro network (passive optical interconnect fabric polymer waveguide distribution circuits) which will cost effectively ($10/Gbps). Deuterated and perflourinated polymer material. Indium phosphide.
Critical Materials
None identified. None identified. New class of batch-fabricated laser, the VCSEL. This laser eliminates need for driver chip, monitor detector, and control loop as a result of milliamp thresholds; it also eliminates need for expensive lenses and alignment procedures due to mode profile compatibility with fiber. Breakthrough in deuterated and perfluorinated polymer material with loss <10 dB/100 m and 3 GHz/100 m bandwidths, and flat loss to 1.3 m wavelengths.
Civil networks will benefit from improved data handling through multiwave transmission in single optical fibers, enhanced network security, and greater internetwork operability. Successful development of deuterated and perfluorinated polymer material promises to drastically reduce costs because of the availability of very low cost connectors (relative to glass fiber connectors), which dominated costs on military platforms under $100 M.
Affordability
RATIONALE The goal of the DARPA Broadband Information Technology (BIT) thrust is to develop the advanced optical network technologies, architectures, and protocols to utilize the 30-THz bandwidth of optical fibers. This thrust will develop and demonstrate key enabling technologies for terabit optical fiber networks with global reach and capable of meeting critical DoD needs. Optical network technology offers characteristics that satisfy many DoD requirements. These characteristics include improved data handling through multiwave transmission in single optical fibers; enhanced network security; greater internetwork operability; and reduction in hardware replacement costs through use of reconfigurable, transparent, interoperable, and cost-effective modular system components. The BIT thrust focuses on the development and the manufacturability of integrated optoelectronic components capable of multiple-channel transmission at over 100 Gb/sec per fiber. This thrust pushes indium phosphide technology, potentially enabling the packaging of transmitter, receiver, and all ancillary components on a single chip. The technology impact resulting from the BIT programs is expected to be comparable with the impact of highspeed VLSI silicon integrated circuits on communications systems. The goal for optoelectronic micro network technology is to replace copper cabling as interconnects to the 1-m scale in future military platforms. This is expected to achieve a 3 order-of-magnitude reduction in the cost*power* footprint) metric over current devices and greater than 2 orders of magnitude over projected commercial estimates by year 1999. Military Applications Military applications include enabling digitized sensor signals [radar, electronic intelligence (ELINT), electronic warfare (EW)] to be processed [e.g., space-time adaptive processing (STAP)]; SAR on-board platforms in real time rather than on the ground, eliminating remote processing/transmission delays (1.5 hrs. for F/A18R);
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reducing threat from low radar cross-section targets, enhancing resolution and potential cost savings of greater than $1 billion, by means of: reduction in required resources by allowing shared access to all resources (through 50 signal BW*density improvement); and effective use of A/D converters near the radar aperture allowing distributed sensor architectures that facilitate 85-percent reduction in the number of boards, thus enabling STAP on-board combat aircraft.
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Extensive R&D
Germany Switzerland

Significant R&D
Italy UK

Moderate R&D
Japan United States
Limited R&D
The European Union supports significant research in optoelectronics. At a Conference taking place in Bonn, August 1997, ministers of 29 European countries agreed on a number of key principles that will pave the way for a rapid growth in Europe of the use of Global Information Networks. The emergence of Global Information Networks will have a profoundly positive impact on the industry and citizens. Cross-border trade and services will be boosted as never before. The significant but high-risk investments in technology, services, and infrastructure will be taken care of by industry and will be market led. Entrepreneurship is the crucial factor and will lead to new industrial structures either from scratch or through rearrangements of current businesses. Entrepreneurs and industrialists need an appropriate business environment because of the risks involved. Governments are responsible for creating this environment. Global Information Networks furthermore need a global regulatory framework that provides maximum opportunities and freedom for industry.2 Japan and United States have significant cooperative programs and extensive R&D. BACKGROUND Center of Technical Developments The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, MTO Significant Research Centers University of Colorado, Optoelectronic Computing Systems Center. Jneff@colorado.edu University of Arizona and University of Maryland. http:www.best.com/~worktree/f/56/202f.htm Optoelectronics Group, Cavendish Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK. The group was formed in 1993, when four members of the Physics and Chemistry of Solids Group decided to operate as a separate entity, with the common study of opto-electronic properties of materials as the link between their activities. Since its formation the group has grown continuously, with the addition of university faculty and Royal Society Research Fellows doubling the senior staff of the group. pob1001@cus.cam.ac.uk Microelectronics Research Center, Georgia Institute of Technology. http://www.ece.gatech.edu/research/labs/ iorg/Abstracts/ThruWaferJLT.html Canada NRC, Photonics Systems Group Sweden, Micro Interconnect Research Center (MIRC) Belgium. http://www.elis.rug.ac.be/~jvc/oiic/rationale.htm National Microelectronics Center of Ireland (NMRI). http://www.nmrc.ucc.ie/groups/AMT/optoRes.html
2
http://www2.echo.lu/bonn/industry.html
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Stanford University, Optical Interconnect Research, Prof. David A.B. Miller, http://www-snf.stanford.edu/ cis/research Major Producers/Developers The Cost-Effective Embedding of High-Performance Optical Interconnects (ChEEtahO) team is led by Honeywell, with membership consisting of 3M, Sun Microsystems, IBM, Cabletron, Mercury Computer, Cray Research, Boeing, Lockheed, Computing Devices International, and Northrop Grumman. Optical Link to Radar Digital Processor Focused Research, Inc. (FR) will design, develop, and deliver 10 functional 10-Gb/sec multimode fiber serial transmitters and receivers designed to operate over a wide temperature range at a low cost for military applications. The Plastic and VCSEL Network (PAVNET) team is lead by Packard-Hughes, with members consisting of Boeing, Boston Optical Fiber (BOF), Honeywell, and Lucent Technologies. The Parallel Optical Network Interconnect (PONI) team is led by Hewlett-Packard (HP), with membership consisting of Harris, McDonnell-Douglas Aerospace (MDA), Mercury Computer, SDL, USC, and BOF.
BACKGROUND DARPA Program Managers LtCol David A. Honey, USAF Phone: (703) 696-0232 Fax: (703) 696-2206 email: dhoney@darpa.mil Dr. Robert Leheny Phone: (703) 696-0048 Fax: (703) 696-2206 Expert Opinions Photonics in Telecommunications Prof. P. Lagasse University of Ghent Department for Information Technology Sint Pietersnieuwstraat 39 9000 Ghent, Belgium Phone: +32 9 264 3315 Fax: +32 9 264 42 99 email: lagasse@intec.rug.ac.be Internet: http://www.intec.rug.ac.be Paul Lagasse received a Masters degree in electrical engineering in 1969 and a Ph.D. degree in 1972, both from the University of Ghent, Belgium. In 1981 he became professor of electrical engineering at the University of Ghent, where he is now head of the Department of Information Technology (INTEC). In 1985 he also became Director of the INTEC-Division of the Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC) in Leuven, and since 1993 he has been Secretary-General of the International Union of Radio Science (URSI). After originally working in the area of surface acoustic waves, he is now mainly active in the fields of optoelectronics, high-frequency technology, and broadband telecommunications. He is member of the board of the Flemish Institute for Science and Technology, corresponding member of the Belgian Royal Academy of Science, President of the Scientific Committee of the Royal Observatory of Belgium, and since 1997 member of the Board of Governors of IEEE Lasers and ElectroOptics Society (IEEE-LEOS).
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Abstract: Over the last 20 years, photonic technology has resulted in important paradigm shifts in telecommunications. The fact that the semiconductor laser and the optical fibre were invented in the dawn of the digital age has had an important synergistic effect. The cost of transmitting information over a given distance-bandwidth product has since decreased exponentially. Currently, photonic technology for telecommunications is facing two new important challenges. First, will cost-effective photonic solutions be developed and produced, allowing to bring the fibre over that last mile to the customer? Secondly, will photonic technology provide competitive solutions for signal-processing functions such as switches that have so far been the monopoly of silicon? These challenges come at a time when regulatory, market, and technological changes are making the evolution of telecommunications impossible to predict, and when investment in long-term research is dwindling, making correct strategic research choices even more crucial. Photonics in Recording and Displays, Professor G. Brown email: robert.brown@sharp.co.uk
Robert G.W. Brown graduated in Physics from London University in 1973. Most of his research career has been spent at the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment in Malvern, UK, the UK Governments Electronics and Radar Research Centre. There he researched photon correlation techniques and their applications to measurement of velocity and macromolecular supensions, specialising in the use of new opto-electronic technologies. In 1990, he was appointed Head of Opto-Electronics Research at the newly formed Sharp Laboratories of Europe in Oxford, a European Research Centre for the Japanese company Sharp Corporation. Since then, the laboratory has grown substantially, now exceeding 60 scientists and engineers, with strong activities in semiconductor opto-electronics and displays. Professor Brown is a Fellow of the Institute of Physics, a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, and a Special Professor in the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at Nottingham University. Recently, he co-authored A History of Optics and Opto-electronics in the Twentieth Century, published in Twentieth Century Physics, by IOPP and AIP, 1995. Abstract: Our daily lives are influenced by opto-electronics to a remarkable extent. Two opto-electronic systems are now familiar to everybodyCD (compact disc) optical data storage and flat-panel displays using liquid crystal devices. Over 100 million CD systems and over 1 billion CDs are sold each year. The LCD market is many billion dollars annually. In the field of optical data storage, research and development currently includes new laser sources, new recording materials, read/write/erase capabilities, compact optics, super-resolution, and electronic data formats. In the field of flat-panel displays, liquid crystal screens are getting brighter, faster, and larger in size, but they have limits. How are those limits going to be exceeded? Will technologies such as plasma displays, organic electroluminescence, and field-emission prove competitive? What else do we want from displays? This lecture will look briefly at the physics and technology of existing systems and then move on to describe research and development activities in progress to create future devices and systems. Key limitations and competitive ideas will form the focus for presentation and discussion. Photonics in Interconnects for Digital Information Processing Prof D. Miller Stanford University Ginzton Laboratory Mail Code 4085 Stanford, CA 94305 USA Phone: 415-723-0111 Fax: 415-725-9355 email: dabm@ee.stanford.edu Internet: http://ee.stanford.edu/~dabm/ David Miller received a B.Sc. in Physics from St. Andrews University and a Ph.D. degree in 1979 from HeriotWatt University, where he continued as a Lecturer from 1980 to 1981. From 1981 to 1996, he worked at Bell Laboratories, since 1987 as a Department Head. He is currently a Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University. His research interests include quantum-well optics and optoelectronics and fundamentals and applica-
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tions of optics in switching, interconnection, and computing systems, including smart pixel technologies. He has published over 180 technical papers and holds more than 30 patents. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, IEEE, OSA, and APS, and was President of the IEEE Lasers and Electro-Optics Society in 1995. He was awarded the 1986 Adolph Lomb Medal of the OSA, was co-recipient of the 1988 R.W. Wood Medal, and received the 1991 Prize of the International Commission. Abstract: As silicon electronic technology advances to larger numbers of faster devices, and as applications require more, higher speed connections to supply high-bandwidth information, demands on interconnection technology grow. The ability of electrical wires to carry digital information, however, does not scale to keep up with these capabilities and demands. The problems for wires are relatively basic, coming from the underlying physics. Optics, by contrast, can avoid many of the physical limits and problems of electrical connections. Long, thin, high-speed interconnections work well with optical fiber. Problems of, for example, impedance matching, pulse distortion, loss at high frequencies, voltage isolation, and highfrequency cross-talk can largely be avoided with optical interconnections. Optics can fundamentally reduce power for interconnections, can offer the radical solution of free-space connections for thousands of parallel channels and global interconnect topologies, and can solve clock-and signal-timing problems. Recent years have seen many exciting developments in the necessary optical and optoelectronic technologies, including, for example, the demonstration of greater than 4,000 high-speed optical interconnections directly into and out of a conventional silicon chip. The combination of optics, optoelectronics, and electronics offers opportunities not available from any one technology, and may allow machines to advance to the very high capacities required, for example, for future multiprocessors and telecommunications switching. The use of optics for interconnection may become crucial in providing the information-processing performance required in the next decades.
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. MOEMS MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY

Developing Critical Technology Parameters Critical Materials Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues
Develop technologies for efficient manufacturing. Specific parameters will be developed during the program. None identified. None identified. None identified. Adapt computer-aided design tools to model optical systems. Use the innate sensing and actuating capabilities of MOEMS systems to automate onchip assembly alignment and calibration.
Telecommunications, imaging, medicine, entertainment, and information technology applications. This is an affordability issue because the program should provide lower cost devices for DoD systems. The program is intended to provide an infrastructure for the eventual mass production of MOEMS at low cost.
Affordability
RATIONALE The goal of this program is to develop technologies for efficient manufacturing of MOEMS. MOEMS will have many uses in generating, modulating, guiding, amplifying, and detecting optical radiation. This program is designed to help position U.S. industry to dominate the emerging market for these products in telecommunications, imaging, medicine, entertainment, and information technology. DoD is potentially a major user of MOEMS and can benefit from improvements in manufacturing technology. A typical military application for MOEM devices is the fly-by-light networks planned for military aircraft. This concept replaces copper networking with optical networks. (See also Data Sheet III-8.6Optoelectronic Micro Network Technology.) WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Finland Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Sweden

Significant R&D
Germany UK

Moderate R&D
Italy United States
Limited R&D
Specific non-U.S. programs have not been identified. A number of nations may have the basic capability to launch such a program (e.g., the European Union Global Information Network initiative). http://www2.echo.lu/bonn/industry.html The United States industrial sponsor, in cooperation with the NIST Advanced Technology Program: Xerox Corporation Wilson Center for Research and Technology 800 Phillips Road Webster, NY 14580
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BACKGROUND Program Synopsis from the NIST Web Site The United States dominates the global market for MEMS but controls less than 10 percent of the market for photonics components. A new market now is emerging for combinations of these technologies. To provide an infrastructure for the eventual mass production of such devices at low cost, Xerox Corp., together with Maxim Integrated Products (Sunnyvale, California); Microcosm Technologies, Inc. (Raleigh, North Carolina); Optical Micro-Machines (San Diego, California); Standard Microsystems Corp. (Hauppauge, New York); and Microscan Systems, Inc. (Renton, Washington), will develop technologies for efficient manufacturing of MOEMS. Infrastructure support for this project will include the Industry-Cornell University Alliance for Electronic Packing (Ithaca, New York); Cornell Nanofabrication Facility (Ithaca, New York); the Center for Integrated Circuits and Sensors (Ann Arbor, Michigan); and Washington Technology Center (Seattle, Washington). MOEMS will have many uses in generating, modulating, guiding, amplifying, and detecting optical radiation. The consortium plans to develop a robust, low-cost process that controls the optical and other properties of devices and assembles and aligns them precisely, for multiple applications. The innate sensing and actuating capabilities of MOEMS will be used to automate on-chip assembly alignment and calibration. Computer-aided design tools will be adapted to model optical systems. The partners will use the new process to fabricate prototype MOEMS devices at Standard Microsystems Corp., a commercial foundry. This is a NIST Advanced Technology Program (ATP) that is a cooperative program with industry. The ATP project brings together a team of technology developers and end users that otherwise would not exist to tackle complex, multidisciplinary research. If successful, the project would position the United States to dominate the emerging multibillion-dollar MOEMS market and increase its share of the roughly $40 billion photonics market. The technology will have broad applications in telecommunications, imaging, medicine, entertainment, and information systems. For project information: Kathy Knapp, (716) 422-1207 kknapp@crt.xerox.com NIST ATP Project Manager Philip Perconti, (301) 975-4263 philip.perconti@nist.gov
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DATA SHEET III-11.5. OPTICAL WAVEGUIDES VIA CURRENT STEERING OF BEAM

This technology applies to monolithic integrated all-optical and optoelectronic devices. This technology will enable very high speed processing and routing of very high frequency digital optical data trains. This technology provides all-optical signal processing, on-the-fly decoding of packet address information, and routing of the packets to the designated destinations. Monolithic integration is key to making this technology viable for reliable error-free operation. The ultrafast semiconductor alloptical and optoelectronic switches are useful for de-multiplexing 100-Gb/sec signals in TDM applications. They can be configured to perform automatic packet address decoding and packet routing of WDM packets with latency times less than twice the duration of the packet itself. The devices can also be easily configured for parallel interconnects for local area networks and computer backplanes running at a full 64-bit data bus. High-quality semiconductor quantum-sized structures including multiple quantum wells and multiple quantum dot materials. None identified. Not significantly different from existing software used to operate the current technology. Improvement of the energy required for switching. Issues with effects of residual-free carriers that linger on long after the switching event. Reduction in cost of fabrication and packaging. Future generation of very large bandwidth optical telecommunication networks with many WDM channels operating at 100 Gb/sec. Optical backplane interconnects for local network of very high performance computers and supercomputers. Not identified.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Monolithic integrated all-optical packet switches will be enablers for the ultimate in high-bandwidth optical telecommunications, as well as for local supercomputer networks. All-optical packet header address decoding removes a lot of the overhead penalty associated with traditional electronic packet switching. The military will benefit strongly from the implementation of systems incorporating semiconductor all-optical switches. A network of computers interconnected via a parallel optical bus would run military software codes specifically written for parallel computing applications such as target recognition, missile course intercept calculations, and other remote targeting applications. Automatic optical packet header decoding and packet routing will significantly enhance the network switching capability of telecommunications networks. High-bandwidth secure networks will strongly enhance the military strength in remote battlefield scenarios. Increased program funding is required in the area of developing semiconductor structures that possess advantageous nonlinear properties and ease of integration. For example, coupled quantum-well structures and multiple quantum dot structures can be envisioned for such applications.
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Australia Germany Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Italy Taiwan

Significant R&D
China Japan UK

Moderate R&D
France Sweden United States
Limited R&D
The United States, Germany, Canada, Japan, UK, and France have significant R&D programs. Several other nations are exploring the technology on a limited basis.
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SECTION 12: MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY
September 1999
SECTION 12.0MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGY

Scope 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 Advanced Fabrication and Processing .....................III-12-5 Bearings ..................................................................III-12-25 Metrology................................................................III-12-31 Non-Destructive Inspection and Evaluation ..........III-12-39 Production Equipment ............................................III-12-49 Robotics...................................................................III-12-69 Highlights The continued development of rapid prototyping and near net-shape manufacturing will result in reduced costs, faster prototyping, and the ability to form a product closer to design (final product tailored to need). Higher speed machining capability means less time for the machining operation and, thus, reduced costs. The development and implementation of nanotechnology should result in improved military hardware. Quieter, longer lasting bearing assemblies will be used in submarines and helicopters. As manufactured dimensions become smaller, improved metrology equipment is necessary to maintain quality control and keep costs down. As manufactured dimensions become smaller and hardware becomes more expensive, more effective methods of in-process evaluation and non-destructive evaluation (NDE) are necessary to determine the quality of final product. Advanced land, sea, and air military robots will extend military capabilities in several areas, including reconnaissance and mine detection.
OVERVIEW This section describes selected developing critical technologies for the production of U.S. military hardware. Such technology is important if the U.S. military is either to produce increasingly superior military performance or reduce the costs of existing hardware. In most cases, the technologies, the equipment, and the know-how are dual use and impact civil applications, where considerations of costs, agility, flexibility, competitiveness, and so forth have also become major concerns. All technologically advanced countries are pursuing similar programs if only to maintain a commercial advantage. Several technologies included in subsection 12.1 are rather mature and are included as affordability issues. Affordability usually is considered in the context of a life-cycle allocation of resources. Major considerations for affordability include the following: (1) meets the consumers performance parameters; (2) has resources available; (3) is available when the consumer requires it; (4) can be maintained through its life cycle with or without hostilities and without undue shortages at projected budget levels; (5) has importance established compared with other requirements; and (6) reduces cost of operation; and (7) increases reliability, effectiveness, or efficiency. The technologies addressed in this section either allow prototypes to be produced in a fraction of the time required by conventional methods or, in some cases, actually produce one-of-a kind parts, in a first-time-right concept, without the need of expensive stocks of spare parts. Other technologies (e.g., nanotechnology and several
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coating technologies) are aimed at effecting significant improvement in military hardware. Bearings (see subsection 12.2) addresses the development of three new types of bearings. In two of the technologies, the new bearings would be critical parts of the improved (high-speed) spindles used in machine tools. There is also the possibility that larger types might find application in quiet-running machinery (e.g., submarines). The remaining bearing development has potential application in electric power generation. Developing technologies (see subsections 12.3 and 12.4) address techniques either to inspect dimensionally (metrology) the final product or test the final product for latent failures. Continued development of these technologies will result in more accurately produced and reliable products. Subsection 12.5 addresses production equipment. Technologies listed include both affordability issues (high-speed spindles, machine tool monitoring, and so forth) and technologies that might improve the overall capability of military hardware [hexapods, precision grinders, micromachines/microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), and so forth]. Subsection 12.6 discusses robots that might find increased use in actual battlefield applications. In short, the items addressed in this section address two critical points: Can we make it better and can we make it more affordable? RATIONALE The U.S. military presently faces two challenges: One is well known, but the other is rather new. The former addresses the requirement to improve existing hardware and to develop newer, more advanced hardware. The latter addresses the need to accomplish both of the former requirements at reduced costs. This section includes the various technologies used to manufacture not only military hardware but also a wide range of commercial hardware. The United States is not the world leader in all these technologies, and less technologically advanced countries are slowly improving their capabilities, by either purchasing advanced technologies or developing indigenous capabilities. As these advanced manufacturing technologies are proliferating throughout the world, the United States must continue to improve the technologies used to manufacture hardware, both from a military viewpoint and a commercial, competitive standpoint. At the same time, in a period of reduced military budgets, technologies must be developed to produce the hardware faster and at less cost. BACKGROUND For years, manufacturing and fabrication equipment has been a mainstay of industrial societies. This equipment was instrumental in bringing about the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, the continued development of a wider range of machines in the 19th century, and the development of the concept of automation in the early 20th century. The mid-to-late 20th century witnessed a rapid expansion, with the introduction of automatic control of the machining axes and the incorporation of additional axes of motion. Indeed, one can trace the development of our present industrial society, as well as the sophistication of military hardware, to the development of manufacturing and fabrication equipment. While rudimentary machines have been used throughout history, machines, as we know them today, were first developed in England and the United States. In England in 1775, J. Wilkinson invented a precision horizontal-boring machine to bore out cylinders for the newly invented steam engine. In the United States in 1798, Eli Whitney, invented machinery to produce interchangeable parts for the assembly of army muskets. The 19th century saw the development of milling machines and turning machines (for rifle stocks), gear-cutting machines, sewing machines, harvesters, grinding machines, and automatic screw machines. The early 20th century witnessed the development of automation. This, coupled with the existing machines, opened the world to mass production. Products could now be manufactured in higher volume and at much lower cost, and the world experienced the mass-market appeal of automobiles and numerous other consumer products. Consumer products became affordable to a much wider range of the populations. At the same time, the military used this capability during World War II to produce tanks, planes, and ships in unprecedented numbers and at costs previously unheard of. Such machines were critical for the manufacture of engine parts and nuclear weapons. However, automation alone was not sufficient to meet some of the post-World War II military needs, as more sophisticated weapons were developed. Production of these weapons required not only high accuracy, but also high repeatability. From this need came the development, in 1952, of a three-axis machine with the rudiments of
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numerical control (tape instructions). Development continued, with the introduction of automatic tool changing, four- and five-axes machines, and computer numerical controllers. Most subsequent improvements involved materials, better cutting tools, more accurate raceways, and faster and more stable spindle assemblies. At the same time that these later developments were being introduced, composite materials were developed. To make best use of these new materials, new machinestape-laying and filament-winding machineswere developed. This revolutionized the production of a wide range of commercial and military products (e.g., strong and lighter aircraft assemblies and automobile and tank parts). Along with these continued improvements in manufacturing technology came continued requirements to perform both dimensional inspection and non-destructive inspection (NDI) of the final product. The technology for coating various substrates has also experienced rapid growth and development during the 20th century. In earlier centuries, coatings were mainly applied for surface protection, and the most common media were paints or similar coatings. The perfection of equipment to produce vacuum environments increased rapidly the range of coating materials and technologies. Technologies moved from simple vacuum evaporation to chemical vapor deposition, plasma spraying, sputter deposition, ion implanting, and so forth. The refinement of these various technologies resulted in faster, more reliable jet aircraft (improved gas turbine engines); improved canopies for aircraft; longer-life bearings for applications in jet engines, machine tools, drive trains of automobiles, trucks, and tanks; specially designed dielectric layers and wear coatings for optical systems and sensors; and coatings to reduce low observability of weapon systems. Other products addressed in this section, bearings and robotics, have experienced similar developments. While bearings, in their simplest concept, have been used for many years, it was not until the 19th century, with the introduction of machine tools, that they were recognized as individual, important components. In the mid 20th century, the development of tapered bearings, high-speed bearings, and miniature bearings were instrumental in improving automotive drive trains; high-speed machine tool spindles; and navigation systems and gyroscopes, respectively. Robots, as they are known today, have developed as a direct result of the invention of computers. They have matured from interesting playthings to important production tools in most state-of-the-art factories, whether as robotic welders or material delivery tools. In more sophisticated applications, they are used in nuclear facilities and are being developed as a battlefield replacement for soldiers in some dangerous environments. In addition, unmanned flying vehicles (robots) are receiving increasing attention as reconnaissance vehicles (including normal reconnaissance and as sensors for chemical or biological weapons). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.0-1) For most of the technologies included in this section, the United States is not the world leader but is a major player among other advanced technological countries. This is particularly true in manufacturing equipment, where Germany, Japan, and Switzerland are world leaders, either in the number of machines sold or the technical level of their machines. Advances in these technical areas (including bearings) are driven more by commercial needs than by military needs. Metrology and non-destructive testing have received considerable support from the European Union (EU) and, as a result, several European countries have active research programs in these areas. Japan is also very active. The United States appears to have the unquestioned lead in battlefield robots. Other countries have developed robots more for industrial purposes [e.g., robotic welders and robots for space application (Japan)] or for use in the nuclear industry.
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Sec. 12.1 Advanced Fabrication and Processing Coating
Sec. 12.2 Bearings
Sec. 12.3 Metrology
Sec. 12.4 NDI and NDE
Sec. 12.5 Production Equipment
Sec. 12.6 Robotics
Country Argentina Austria Australia Brazil Canada Croatia Czech Republic China Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary India Indonesia Israel Italy Japan Korea Netherlands Norway Romania Russia Singapore Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK United States
most
many
some
at least one
Figure 12.0-1. Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology WTA Summary
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12.1ADVANCED FABRICATION AND PROCESSING

Highlights Rapid prototyping and near net-shape manufacturing will result in reduced cost of producing prototypes and end products. More accurate grinding machines will result in reduced cost and improved engine performance. Breakthroughs in nanotechnology will result in significant improvements in electronics, chemistry, and materials, with widespread military applications. Continued advances in coating technologies will result in improved hardness capability of various military hardware surfaces and improved performance in multiple domains.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers two groups of technologies. The first includes equipment for fabricating structures using a wide range of different equipment, ranging from various thermal furnaces and equipment for bending, stretching, or rolling material to form-desired shapes to scanning tunneling microscopes (STMs). The second group includes the development, refinement, and production of nonorganic coatings on non-electronic substrates. Such substrates include ceramics, low-thermal-expansion glass, metals, polymers, and so forth. Coating materials include ceramics, metals, dielectric layers, abradable materials, and so forth. The coating procedures include chemical vapor deposition (CVD), various techniques of physical vapor deposition (PVD), sputter deposition, plasma spraying, and ion implantation. Many of the developing technologies associated with the fabrication equipment involves new and continuing procedures to produce what is needed accurately and affordably. While manufacturing most products, prototypes have to be produced. An ongoing program, rapid (virtual) prototyping allows for a quick three-dimensional (3-D) fabrication of the prototype so that a design can be evaluated before production is initiated. This technology consists of: A computer-aided design (CAD)-generated virtual-reality model of the design, which can be analyzed and altered, as necessary The ability to perform virtual machining (manufacturing) of the virtual part, followed by a computer comparison of the virtual part with the original digital design The capability to produce a model from the pattern in a fraction of the time required to produce a model using conventional model-shop procedures.
Additional effort is being aimed toward extending this procedure to produce not only prototypes, but also final products, thus significantly reducing the time/cost of production. Rapid prototyping is an integral part of the product realization cycle. It permits the fabrication of complex parts in a fraction of the time required by traditional prototyping techniques and, thus, will play a significant role in making products more affordable. Rapid prototyping can be categorized into two areas: virtual and physical. In the former, the computer system (CAD) is used to generate a 3-D image that can be analyzed before final manufacture. In the latter, the CAD program is fed directly to the manufacturing tool that produces either a final product (most often made of ceramic, wax, or plastic) or a mold to produce a metal object. Much effort is being expended to produce high-quality metal objects without the need of a mold. Another ongoing developing technology included in this section is near net-shape. Near net-shape is an ongoing program with the goal of lowering the costs of manufactured products by reducing the amount of raw material used (less waste) and by producing a product so close to the design shape that only a minimum amount of subsequent machining is required to achieve the desired final shape. Casting is an example of a technology in which
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much effort is being expended in near net-shape. The traditional trial-and-error approach of selecting an optimum combination of design and process parameters results in long lead times and excessive material waste. To circumvent this approach, computer simulation of the casting process is being used and evaluated as a means to ensure that defect-free castings are produced in the first attempt. Generally, items manufactured using techniques such as casting, injection molding, hot isostatic pressing, and so forth result in a final shape different from the shape of the container. As a result, historically, many products were manufactured using several steps until the proper shape of the container could be determined. Near net-shape technology uses CAD programs to calculate the resultant changes in shape that occur during cooling of the product so that the final product is near the designed shape. This is of particular importance when fabricating ceramic parts because such items are very hard and subsequent finishing steps can be quite time consuming and expensive. Near net-shape is an approach similar to the philosophy of first-time-right manufacturing. Ausforming is another developing near net-shape technology to manufacture superior spur and helical gears at less cost. It involves contour austenization of case-hardened gear teeth and quenching to metastable austenite, followed by plastic deformation of the gear tooth surface layers to final dimensions and then quenching to marstenite. The potential advantage of this procedure is that it forms the final shape of the gear without damaging the hard surface. It eliminates the need for gear tooth grinding while improving surface durability and fatigue behavior and reducing overall processing time and costs. The objective of the research program is to produce gears of better than 12 American Gear Manufacturing Association (AGMA) quality. Semi-solid metalworking (SSM) is another example of near net-shape manufacturing, incorporating elements of casting and forming. In this process, the raw material is melted and allowed to cool to form a mush of liquid/solid material. This slush is then forced into a die, forming a final product that has higher structural integrity than castings but can be produced at lower cost than forgings. Parts produced with SSM enjoy several advantages: Have higher structural integrity than castings, yet can be produced at lower cost than forgings Are less porous than parts produced with conventional high-pressure die casting Have equivalent properties to parts produced by either forging or conventional machining but require fewer steps.
To date, SSM has been demonstrated with aluminum, titanium, and copper; however, its implementation in either civil or military applications has been hindered by lack of process specifications, process models, training, and experience. The most radical technology in this section deals with nanotechnology, defined as an anticipated manufacturing technology giving thorough, inexpensive control of the structure of matter (i.e., the ability to design and manufacture devices that are only tens or hundreds of atoms across). Nanotechnology is still an emerging technology. Significant advances have been made (e.g., buckyballs and fullerenes), but there has been little commercial activity. Sandia National Laboratories has reported the development of supersensitive coating to improve detection of dangerous materials, and some use has been made of conducting fullerton as a filler material in plastics to make the plastic conductive. However, nanotechnology holds promise of an industrial revolution, as witnessed by the organizationsboth government and industrythat are active in research. At a recent government nanotechnology workshop, agencies in attendance included the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Defense (DoD) (many organizations), DOC, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and DOE. Most of the research technology areas include materials, electronics, and medical devices. In materials, the bulk behavior of materials can be dramatically altered when constituted from nanoscale building blocks, the hardness and strength of nanophase metals can be greatly increased, and nanophase fillers in composite materials yield unique properties. Buckyballs and fullerenes (sometimes called buckytubes) are examples of nanophase materials. They are specific forms of carbon that are one-fourth the weight of steel and greater than 100 times stronger. Such capabilities hold great promise not only for use as improved cables, but as filler material for composite materials. Other potential applications include metal-doped buckytubes that theoretically would be 50 times more conductive than copper. Such tubes would bring about a revolution in power transmission.
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Such a capability holds great promise in biology, electronics, chemical catalysis, and materials. This technology requires the capability to manipulate microscopic atoms, molecules, and so forth to form the desired structures. The procedures used in nanobiotechnology might be significantly different from those used in nonbiological applications. In the former, researchers are studying the molecular behavior of nucleic acids and proteins. In the latter, researchers are actively studying ways to use buckyballs and buckytubes (nanotubes) to produce usable end-items. Some military applications of this technology include biosensors, stronger ceramics and composites, superior coatings, abrasion-resistant materials, and so forth. Buckyball structures are extremely malleable, can be compressed to less than half their original volume, and can be joined readily to other atoms, creating new capabilities. Although there have been no practical applications, as yet, for buckyballs, possible applications include superior armor, superconductor applications, ferromagnetic applications, superior lubricants, and medical applications. Another fallout from buckyballs, and possibly more promising, are buckytubes (or nanotubes). These nanotubes are similar to buckyballs, but, instead of a sphere, the carbon atoms are linked together in a chicken-wire pattern. In certain cases (controllable), the carbon sheets roll together, and the edges join seamlessly, forming a nanotube. In some arrangements, the tube is a conductor. In other arrangements, the tube is a semiconductor. If two such tubes are joined to form a single molecule, the junction acts like a diode. Other possibilities for nanotubes include use as ultrastrong, thin cable and as a means of delivering medicine internally. Presently, conductive nanotubes are used in plastics to make the plastic conductive. Coating technologies include several programs of developing technologies. Research has been conducted for several years on the technology for the deposition of diamond coatings. While some success has been achieved, the widespread application of the technology is still 5 to 10 years away. Nanophase coatings and cubic boron nitride coatings are more recent research programs, and both offer potential in the same technology area as diamond coatingsextremely hard, durable coatings. All these technologies have wide potential applications in military and civil applications. Of the three, nanophase coatings (related to nanophase materials) is probably the most esoteric. Items fabricated from nanophase materials have superior characteristics. For example, nanophase copper and palladium have hardness and yield strengths 500 percent greater than conventionally produced metal, and nanophase ceramic material can be manufactured with much greater ductility than conventionally manufactured ceramics. These same bulk-nanophase characteristics result in similar improvements in the characteristics of nanophase coatings, particularly in applications requiring improved wear-resistant surfaces and increased thermal protection. More recent studies have focused on the use of multilaser sources to heat the surface of a substrate selectivelyresulting in extremely hard, graded surfaces. The technology can be modified by adding specific constituents to the plasma around the surface, altering the surface layer of the substrate and resulting in an extremely hard surface alloy. RATIONALE The fabrication equipment and technologies have significant military application. Along with machine tools (see subsection 12.5), these technologies form the cornerstone for producing mechanical hardware; composite sections for military aircraft, ships, and land vehicles; and various engine and transmission parts. The coating technologies included here address new technologies to improve the high-temperature operation or corrosion resistance of the base materials, or to effect changes in the optical characteristics of the substrate, and so forth. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.1-1) Advanced manufacturing techniques are present, in varying degrees, throughout the industrial world. However, the main countries using these techniques are France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the United States, these efforts are supported by DoD and NSF, with considerable effort by industry and universities. In Europe, the European Commission has funded studies in several companies, and other companies are quite active. These advanced manufacturing techniques include several technologies that are primarily aimed at shortening turn-around time and reducing costs of final product. Coating technologies research is primarily aimed at improving some aspect of hardware operation, whether it be improved hardness, resistance to corrosion, or improved thermal protection.
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Country Brazil China France Germany Hungary Indonesia Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Romania Russia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Ukraine UK United States
Advanced Fabrication and Processing
Coating
many some at least one
most
Figure 12.1-1. Advanced Fabrication and Processing WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS 12.1. ADVANCED FABRICATION AND PROCESSING

Rapid Prototyping Manufacturing (RPM) ............................................................................................................... III-12-11 Improved Near Net-Shape........................................................................................................................................ III-12-13 Semi-Solid Metalworking (SSM) ............................................................................................................................ III-12-15 Technology for Molecular Manufacturing (Nanotechnology)................................................................................ III-12-16 Technology for Diamond Coatings.......................................................................................................................... III-12-20 Technology for Nanophase Coatings....................................................................................................................... III-12-22 Technology for Multi-Laser Surface Modification/Coating................................................................................... III-12-23 Technology for Cubic Boron Nitride Coatings ....................................................................................................... III-12-24
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DATA SHEET 12.1. RAPID PROTOTYPING MANUFACTURING (RPM)

Some early users of this technology report time reductions of 5 to 1 and cost reductions of 10 to 1. This is an ongoing program in a wide range of civil and military facilities. The materials depends on the RPM procedure used, including materials such as photopolymer epoxy resins, acrylates, polycarbonates, nylon, elastomers, certain metals, thermoplastics, polyester, ceramic powder, and so forth. Laser stereolithography, laser sintering equipment, polymer extrusion equipment, and computers (for CAD). CAD programs. Decision on whether to fabricate models or final end product. Ability to convert system to produce metal product.
Aerospace products that are produced in small volume and moulds for items produced in large volume (e.g., automotive). 1. 2. Allows quick fabrication of 3-D prototypes to evaluate of the design before beginning production. Allows rapid production of small-volume products, spare parts, and so forth.
RATIONALE An affordability issue. Potential applications of RPM include the manufacture of dies and molds, the fabrication of 3-D prototypes to allow evaluation of the design before beginning production and, eventually, the fabrication of low-volume final product. In todays marketplace, whether military or commercial, the time-to-market for new products is becoming increasingly critical. To reduce this time, all phases of design and development must be compressed. Rapid prototyping aids this process. RPM can exist solely as a virtual representation of a product (CAD design) so that designers can determine the interface between several virtual objects before the final manufacture of the product. It is also used to produce prototypes of the final product to determine how the shape operates in some environment (e.g., a model to be studied in a wind tunnel). Continued development of the technology should result in the ability to produce a final product on a one-at-a-time basis, particularly after the technique to produce metal and composite structures matures. This should have a particular benefit for the manufacture of low-volume parts, as required for many military applications. It could also play a part in reducing the need for extensive spare part inventories if replacement parts could be produced in a matter of hours. Efforts to improve this technology are being carried out worldwide as the pressure to reduce costsfor military and commercial applicationscontinues. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Research in rapid prototyping is present, in varying degrees, throughout the industrial world. However, the main countries involved in this research are the United States, Germany, Japan, and France. Lesser activity is present in Canada, Israel, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
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In the United States, government, industry and universities carry out research. These organizations include NASA, Los Alamos National Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, Stanford University, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Texas, Clemson University, the University of Maryland, 3-D Systems, Cubital, Stratasys, Inc., Helisys, and Alcoa. In Europe, the following are examples of organizations have active RPM programs: Fraunhofer IPT, RhineWestphalian Casting Institute, Max Planck Institute, Karlsruhe University, Volkswagen, Schneider Engineering, and Wolff Engineering in Germany; the LeMans Center, CREATE, CIRTES, Aerospatiale, SNECMA, and Peugeot in France; and the University of Sunderland, Cranfield University, Laser Prototypes, Ltd., and Rover in the United Kingdom. In Asia the following organizations have active RPM programs: Tohoku University, Osaka University, Nagoya University, Komatsu, Hitachi, Honda, Denkin Engineering, Mitsubishi, and Sony in Japan.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. IMPROVED NEAR NET-SHAPE

This is a continuing, ongoing program, encompassing several different manufacturing technologies. Near net-shape manufacturing is a manufacturing process aimed at producing a final product that closely approximates the final design shape. Advanced simulation software is an important element is most of the processes. As an example, Ausforming, a technique being developed for gear manufacture, minimizes manufacturing steps, preserves the hard surface of the gear, and imparts compressive residual stress into the gear. The technical objective is to produce gears of that are greater than 12 AGMA quality. The goals of near net-shape manufacturing are cost reduction (less final machining to reach the final design shape and less waste) and improved technical characteristics of the final product. Depends on the process used. Fine powder technologies (metal and ceramic). Hot isostatic press, powder press, casting equipment, injection molding equipment, X-ray machines, electron microscopes, metallography, forming press, and so forth. CAD for process simulations. To incorporate algorithms to initiate changes in component form because of compensation for shrinkage, warpage, or other process and material conditions. The specific near net-shape process used (e.g., casting, forging, and so forth), the degree of approximation of the final product to the design, the technique used, and the need to produce lower cost fine powders. Aerospace engines; automotive transmission cases and engine blocks; marine engine blocks and motor mounts; bearings made from powder metallurgy; home appliances (e.g., washers, dryers, and mixers); and office equipment (e.g., printer heads and disc drives); and so forth. If items can be cast, or prepared, closer to their final shape, fewer machining operations are required to reach the design shape, thus reducing cost.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE Both an affordability issue and a technology issue: If items can be cast, or prepared, closer to their final shape, fewer machining operations are required to reach the design shape. As the technology matures, dies and molds should be made at a low enough cost that they could be discarded after approximately a half dozen uses and new ones could be used (more of a mint-final product). This process produces less waste than more conventional processes in which more material must be machined or ground away. This would be valuable to proliferants who have a scarcity of raw materials. The final product is often superior in technical parameters and has a higher yield.
Products manufactured with this technology are used in most military hardware, from helicopters to submarines to jet engines.
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With increased worldwide emphasis on reducing the cost of manufactured products, research in near net-shape manufacturing is widespread throughout the industrial world. This is particularly true in the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In the United States, government, industry, and universities carry out research. These organizations include the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the National Centers of Excellence at Johnstown, Sandia National Laboratories, Consolidated Technologies, Fraunhofer, USA, GE CRD, Lockheed Martin Vought Systems, Penn State College (ausforming), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In Europe, several organizations in different countries have active near net-shape programs: the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Materials Research, the Max Planck Institute, IFW-Dresden, University of Erlangen, DaimlerBenz, BMW, Adam Opel, and Buck GmbH in Germany; the Association pour la Recherche et le Developmente des Methods et Processus Industriales, Ecole des Mines de Paris, Renault, Peugeot, and Citroen in France; Oxford University, Nottingham University, Birmingham University, Jaguar Cars, Ltd., and Bohler-Uddeholm, Ltd., in the United Kingdom. The Institute for Metals Superplasticity Problems (Uffa) in Russia is also active. In Asia, the following organizations have active programs: the University of Tokyo, Mitsubishi Research Institute, Intermetallics Company, Ltd., Mitsui Engineering, NHK Spring R&D Institute, and the Mitsubishi Kasei Corporation in Japan and the National University of Singapore in Singapore.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. SEMI-SOLID METALWORKING (SSM)

This technology offers the potential of significantly reducing the cost of titanium parts (particularly those for shipboard use). Initial studies indicate that parts manufactured using SSM have higher structural integrity than castings and are less expensive than forgings. The base materials used in the manufacture of end product. Casting and forming equipment, X-ray machines, electron microscopes, metallography, and so forth. CAD and process simulation software. The widespread application of SSM has been hindered by the lack of process specifications and process models. Aerospace engines; automotive transmission cases and engine blocks; marine engine blocks and motor mounts; home appliances (e.g., washers, dryers, and mixers); and office equipment (e.g., printer heads and disc drives); and so forth. Pilot work with titanium valves for naval underwater applications have been successful, and estimates indicate that cost savings per valve will be in the $1K to $10K range. If this technology allows conversion to titanium valves, savings could reach $13,000,000 per ship, over a 40-year life.
Affordability
RATIONALE SSM technology is a near net-shape approach to manufacturing wherein the metal, in a semi-solid state (i.e., at a temperature between its solid and liquid states) is formed, using pressure, in dies. This combination of slush and pressure results in a final product with less voids. More conventional processing uses either molten metal (casting) or solid metal (forming). Parts produced by SSM have higher structural integrity than castings and can be produced at lower costs than forgings. The process is capable of producing parts that are essentially free of the porosity associated with conventional high-pressure die casting. At the present time, SSM is being used with titanium and aluminum. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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While SSM research is worldwide, it is not as extensive as in some other technology areas. Principal effort is in the United States, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland. In the United States, the principal organizations active in SSM are MIT, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Cornell University, Drexel University, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Consolidated Technologies (NCEMT), Aluminum Company of America, Northwest Aluminum, Ormet Corporation, Reynolds Metals, and Failure Analysis Associates. In Europe, organizations with research in this area are the University of Vienna in Austria; the EFU Gesellschaft for Ur/Umformtechnik in Germany; the Norwegian Institute of Technology in Norway; the Gteborg University in Sweden; the Eidgenssisches Technische Hochschule (ETH)-Zurich, and Buhler Incorporated in Switzerland; and the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. TECHNOLOGY FOR MOLECULAR MANUFACTURING (NANOTECHNOLOGY)

The manufacture of military items using extremely small and/or extremely strong building materials [e.g., buckyballs (fullerenes), buckytubes (nanotubes), and so forth]. Nanophase materials and nanocomposites are characterized by ultra-fine grain size (< 50 nm). Products manufactured from such materials have the potential of possessing superior mechanical and electrical properties (e.g., higher ductility at elevated temperatures, increased hardness of wear-resistant coatings, higher strength materials, optoelectronic devices, and so forth). The base materials used in the manufacture of end product. Buckyballs and nanotubes are made of carbon. Many potential applications of buckyballs and nanotubes would require the addition of other elements to the carbon structure. This could include hydrogen or fluorine atoms to form fuzzy balls, potassium to form a superconducting material, and so forth. Scanning tunneling microscopes (STMs) for the manipulation of atoms and furnaces to form buckyballs and nanotubes. None identified. The ability to form nano-sized molecules and to form them into final shape still limits the advancement of the technology. The present cost of producing both buckyballs and nanotubes also limits the rapid development of the technology. Applications could include very small, highly sophisticated, low-power electronic systems; stronger, lighter structural members; multifunctional surfaces; small, accurate antennas; and so forth. Not an affordability issue.
Critical Materials
Affordability
RATIONALE Nanotechnology was defined by Drexler as the knowledge and means for designing, fabricating, and employing molecular scale devices by the manipulation and placement of individual atoms and molecules with precision on the atomic scale. This so-called bottom-up approach to manufacture contrasts sharply with the conventional top-down approach, where a bulk material is machined down to meet the designed shape. For the electronic applications of nanotechnology (nanoelectronics), see Section 8.6. The specific military applications of this technology are not clear. However, the following capabilities could result from this technology: superior armor; advanced lubricants; extremely small, extremely fast computers (ability to control strategic operations at very high speeds with low power consumption); lighter and stronger structural members; biosensors; abrasive-resistant materials; and so forth. Reportedly, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NASA, and the NSF are supporting research in ultra-dense, ultra-fast computing elements (DARPA); fast computers, strong and light materials, and active and self-repairing materials (NASA); and synthesis/fabrication of nanostructures, processing of molecules into functional nanostructures, and the fundamental physical, chemical and biological properties of nanostructures (NSF). Research on specific characteristics of buckyballs and nanotubes have demonstrated that: They are unaffected by collisions at speeds of up to 15,000 mph. When compressed, they are harder than diamonds. Their internal cavity is large enough to hold any known element, thus having the possibility of being a carrier for medicines or radioactive materials.
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The addition of hydrogen or fluorine atoms to each of the carbon atoms (fuzzy balls) should result in films with very low coefficient of friction. The addition of potassium atoms can result in either a superconducting material or an insulator, depending on the number of potassium atoms. Nanotubes could be used as fibers in composite materials, resulting in materials superior to carbon-carbon composite materials.
Most of these characteristics can be related to superior military hardware. The resiliency might be of value in rocket fuels or improved personnel armor. The compressibility could lead to improved shock absorbers. The use of nanotubes in composite materials could result in superior aircraft or other vehicle body structures. Improved lubricants have innumerable applications, ranging from engine parts and submarine gear systems to advanced gyroscopes. Figures 12.1-2 and 12.1-3 are computer representations of a buckyball (fullerene) and a nanotube. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Research in nanotechnologyparticularly in buckyballs and nanotubesis present, in varying degrees, throughout the industrial world. However, the main countries involved in the research are the United States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. In the United States, government, industry, and universities carry out research. These organizations include ORNL, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Institute for Molecular Manufacturing, Foresight Institute, Lucent Technologies, Xerox, Dupont de Nemours, State University of New York (SUNY)-Stoneybrook, MIT, Boston University, Widener University, New York University, Arizona State University, Northwestern, University, the University of Southern California, and the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). In Europe, organizations with research in this area include the following: the Max Planck Institute, Stuttgart, IFW, Dresden, MBI, Berlin, the Institute fr Festkrper and Werk, the Technische Universitt Berlin, the Humboldt University, the University of Freiburg, and the University of Munich in Germany; Sussex University, Cambridge University, Birmingham University, Nottingham University, Cranfield University, the New Chemistry Lab, and the Institute of Bioscience and Technology in the United Kingdom; IBM, the University of Basel, and ETH-Zurich in Switzerland; the University of Vienna in Austria; Gteborg University in Sweden; and the Fondazione ELBA, the University of Genova, the University of Bologna, the University of Firenze, and the University of Milano in Italy. In Asia, organizations with research in this area include the following: NEC Corporation, Riken Institute, IIE, Hitachi Basic Research Laboratory, NTT, Fujitsu Limited, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, Hamamatsu Photonics, Sony Corporation, Toshiba Corporation, the University of Tohoku, and the University of Tokyo in Japan.
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Figure 12.1-2. Buckyball (Fullerene) Note for Figure 12.1-2: This figure shows the C60 structure of the 60 symmetrically arranged carbon atoms.
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Figure 12.1-3. Nanotube Note for Figure 12.1-3: Computer simulation demonstrates the nanotube structure, a thin hollow cylinder of carbon capped at each end.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. TECHNOLOGY FOR DIAMOND COATINGS

Extremely hard, durable coatings. Characteristics should approach the following properties of diamond:

Hardness of 8090 GPa Coefficient of thermal expansion (at room temperature) of 0.8 106 K Coefficients of 0.005 Thermal conductivity (at room temperature) of 2 103 W/m/K Very resistant to chemical corrosion Biologically compatible.
Carbon deposition source. Chemical vapor-deposition equipment, sputtering, ion beam and direct current (DC) plasma deposition equipment, multi-laser system. Scanning electron microscopes (SEMs) and various optical equipment to analyze the surface.
None identified. Major concerns are (1) difficulty in obtaining smooth films for potential applications in optics and thermal management, (2) need to increase growth rates while not negatively affecting surface quality, (3) development of a lower temperature deposition requirement. Wide application in materials requiring surface protection from erosion. Not an affordability issue.
RATIONALE Diamond coatings offer extremely hard, durable, transparent coatings for a wide variety of applications. Extensive research is being conducted worldwide, and progress is continuing. Some applications have entered the commercial marketplace [e.g., coating of cutting tools (not applicable for machining ferrous materials) and heat sinks]. Most of the applications with direct military application are primarily in the research or development stage. This includes wear/corrosion coatings for infrared (IR) sensors (weapon systems), nose cones and domes, fibers for the manufacture of improved composite materials, and optical fibers for improved telecommunications. Improved tribological characteristics, coupled with improved wear, could significantly improve such items as bearings and raceways, and engine parts. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Much of the industrialized world is conducting extensive research in diamond coatings. The major research is being done in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The European Consortium for Superhard
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Materials includes 33 German, 5 Austrian, and 7 Swiss universities. Because of the large number of universities and organizations involved in diamond coating research, only a representative sample will be listed. In the United States, organizations conducting this research include NRL, Argonne National Laboratories, NASA-Lewis, Case Western Reserve, the University of California-Berkeley, Rice University, the University of Wisconsin, Vanderbilt University, the University of Florida, Diamonex, Xerox, Crystalline Materials Corporation, Lockheed, and QQC Technology. In Europe, organizations pursuing this research include the following: the University of Wuppertal, the University of Hamburg, the University of Bonn, the University of Kassel, the University of Erlangen, the Technical Universities of Berlin and Chemnitz, Daimler-Benz, and the Fraunhofer Institute in Germany; the University of Nancy, Balzers SA, and the Centre Technique des Industries Mechaniques (CETIM) in France; DRA, Bristol University, Harriot-Watt University, Kings College, University College London, and the University of Glasgow in the United Kingdom; the University of Vienna in Austria; the Centre Suisse dElectronique CSEM, the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne, and the Universities of Neuchatel, Basel, Fribourg, and Bern in Switzerland; the Linburgs Universitair Centrum in Belgium; and the University of Helsinki in Finland. In Asia, Japan is most active, with the National Institute for Research in Inorganic Materials (NIRIM), Osaka University, Mitsubishi Materials, Sumitomo Electric, and Kobe Steel Research having extensive programs. Other Asian efforts exist at the Korea Institute of Science and Technology and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Korea and the Center of Super-Diamond and Advanced Films in Hong Kong (China).
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DATA SHEET 12.1. TECHNOLOGY FOR NANOPHASE COATINGS

Extremely hard, durable coatings and thermal barrier coatings produced from the deposition of particles whose size is in the nanometer range (109 m). Many different materials are being studied (e.g., n-WC/Co, MnO2, yttria-stabilized zirconia, SiC, BN, and so forth). Thermal spray equipment, CVD equipment, DC plasma deposition equipment, PVD equipment, and equipment to analyze the surface coating. None identified. Difficulty in forming nano-sized particles for source material. Wide application in materials requiring surface protection from erosion or high temperatures. Applications would extend to cutting tools, engines, sensor windows, and so forth. Not an affordability issue.
Unique Test, Production, Inspection Equipment Unique Software Technical Issues Major Commercial Applications
Affordability
RATIONALE Nanophase coatings enable increased wear, heat transfer and corrosion resistance, fatigue strength and fracture toughness compared with similar coatings using larger size particles. They offer extremely hard, durable coatings for a wide variety of applications, ranging from engine parts to composite fibers. Thermal barrier coatings are critical in engine technology, allowing operation at higher temperatures. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Research in nanotechnologyparticularly in buckyballs and nanotubesis present, in varying degrees, throughout the industrial world. However, the main countries involved in this research are the United States, Germany, France, Japan, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In the United States, government, industry, and universities carry out research. These organizations include NIST, Edwards Air Force Base, ORNL, NRL, Argonne National Laboratories, Rice University, Widener University, Rutgers University, University of California (Irvine), the University of Minnesota, Drexel University, MIT, SUNYStoneybrook, Stevens Institute of Technology, Dupont de Nemours, Inframat Corporation, Englehard Corporation, Manpower Enterprises, Inc., Science Applications, Inc., and Integrated Systems Analysts. In Europe, the following organizations have active research programs: the Centre de Recherches sur les Tres Basses Temperature, Grenoble, and the Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix, Namur in France; the Max Planck Institute fr Metallforschung, MBI, Berlin, the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Materials Research, and the Technical Universities of Berlin and Darmstadt in Germany; the University of Vienna in Austria; the Gteborg University in Sweden; ETH-Zurich in Switzerland; and Sussex University and Nottingham University in the United Kingdom. The Paton Institute in the Ukraine has world-leading capabilities in E-beam deposition and is active in most phases of film deposition. In Asia, the following organizations have active research programs: NEC, Riken Corporation, the University of Tokyo, Osaka University, and Nagoya University in Japan.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. TECHNOLOGY FOR MULTI-LASER SURFACE MODIFICATION/COATING

Produces either a super-hard outer layer of the base material or a super-hard graded coating made up of the base material and an added constituent. Dependent on the coating to be deposited. The technique has had success with diamond, diamond-like carbon, and titanium carbide, among other sources. Excimer, yttrium-aluminum garnet, and carbon-dioxide lasers. Other laser types might be substituted for these lasers. Programs to control the multiplexing of the three lasers, the furnace temperature, and the gas mixtures. The interaction of the three lasers with the furnace temperature and the introduction of gas mixtures. Wide application in materials requiring an extremely hard surface layer. Preliminary results on steel punches, golf club heads, and fuel-injector nozzles. Not an affordability issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Surface modification/coating offers extremely hard coatings for a wide range of applications and does so with only surface heating. At the present time, the patented procedure can deposit diamond, diamond-like carbon, and titanium carbide films. Most of the applications with direct military application are primarily in the research or development stage. This includes wear/corrosion coatings for IR sensors (weapon systems), nose cones and domes, fibers for the manufacture of improved composite materials, and optical fibers for improved telecommunications. Improved tribological characteristics, coupled with improved wear, could significantly improve such items as bearings and raceways, and engine parts. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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At the present time, the only company known to be developing and using this technique is QQC in Dearborn, Michigan, although researchers at Penn State University have expressed an interest in the technique.
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DATA SHEET 12.1. TECHNOLOGY FOR CUBIC BORON NITRIDE COATINGS

Extremely hard, durable coatings, with a hardness of 5,000 knoop (second only to diamond), a thermal conductivity of 13 (W/cm)(K) and a heat resistance of 1,000 C. Knoop hardness is a method of measuring a materials hardness by its resistance to indentation Boron and nitrogen compounds CVD equipment, sputter equipment, PVD equipment for deposition, and IR spectroscopy to characterize films. None identified. Difficulty in obtaining stress-free coatings and difficulty in depositing films at temperatures < 1,000 C. Wide application in materials requiring surface protection from erosion. Also, should have wide application in the production of superior cutting tools, dies, and molds. Not an affordability issue.
RATIONALE Cubic boron nitride (c-BN) is of great interest for several applications. It possesses great hardness and rigidity, optical transparency over a large wavelength range, chemical resistance (does not react with iron-based metals as do diamond films), and high thermal conductivity. It should find wide military application in the manufacturing of military hardware and in military applications. In the manufacturing of military hardware, c-BN coatings could allow for faster machining or iron-based metals and for increased life to dies and molds. In military applications, c-BN coatings may improve the hardness, tribological requirements of such items as bearings and raceways, moving parts in conventional and jet engines, and super-hard films for optical elements. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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The demand for super-hard coatings is growing rapidly worldwide, and research includes not only diamond and diamond-like carbon coatings, but also c-BN. The principal countries with active programs in c-BN coatings are the United States, Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and the, the United Kingdom. In the United States, organizations with active programs include NASA, Caltech, Northwestern University, Oklahoma State University, Surmet Corporation, General Motors Research Laboratories, and Kennametal. In Europe, the following organizations are pursuing research in c-BN films: the Fraunhofer Institute of Surface Engineering and Thin Films, the Technical University of Chemnitz-Zwickau, and Guenther and Co. GmbH in Germany; Philips BV and Hauzer Technology Coating Europe BV in the Netherlands; the Institute des Materiaux de Perpignan in France; the European Commission, Joint Research Centre in Italy; the University of Linkping in Sweden; and Hull University and York University in the United Kingdom. In Asia, the following organizations are active: the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Osaka University, the Nippon Institute of Technology, and NIRIM in Japan.
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12.2BEARINGS
Highlights Development of magnetic bearings using high-temperature superconductors will result in Improved compressors for space cryocoolers Frictionless bearings for use in high-speed machining Magnetic bearings for use in electric vehicles and magnetic guns.
OVERVIEW Bearings are not only key elements in military equipment that use rotating elements, but they are essential for the operation of precision machine tools and metrology equipment used to manufacture military equipment. For many years, steel roller and tapered bearings were used almost exclusively in advanced military hardware and precision machine tools. In recent years, considerable effort has been expended in developing self-lubricating ceramic bearings. These bearings have longer life, less friction, and lower density than similar steel bearings. More recent effort has been focused on aerostatic and hydrostatic bearings. These bearings use air and liquid to maintain a separation between the surfaces during their sliding or rotating motion. Their potential in high-/ low-speed, high-precision equipment is unquestioned. They also operate quietly, thus offering the possibility of improved quiet propellers. Aerostatic and hydrostatic bearings approaches possess the following advantages: No wear of either surface High precision Operation at both very low and very high speeds High stiffness (hydrostatic bearings only).
Research on high-temperature superconductor, magnetic bearings is still in an early stage. Much of this programs success is related to continued research on high-temperature superconductors. Several potential applications have been discussed. The use of these bearings in space cryocoolers would avoid the problem of heat generation that occurs with the present gas bearings. Other possible applications include the support for the shaft of high-speed motors, the levitation force for high-speed locomotives, and energy storage. The concept of energy storage involves using the bearings with flywheels, where the flywheels rotate at very high speeds. The flywheel concept holds great promise for both off-peak energy storage of power plants and use a power source for vehicles, whether civil or military. A major problem has been related to concerns of flywheel breakage and the requirements to surround the system with heavy production shrouds. Another possibility is application in high-energy weapons. RATIONALE Magnetic bearings, manufactured from high-temperature superconductors, hold promise for a wide range of energy storage devices, particularly flywheel assemblies. Potential military applications include electrically powered vehicles, superior cryocoolers, improved motor operation (machine tools, power generators, and so forth), and magnetic guns. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.0-1) Research in the area of superconducting bearings is widespread. The United States, Germany, Japan, France, and Switzerland are the world leaders. the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Russia, Italy, and Finland also have active research programs.
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III-12-26
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS 12.2 BEARINGS

Technology for Superconducting Magnetic Bearings............................................................................................. III-12-29
III-12-27
III-12-28
DATA SHEET 12.2. TECHNOLOGY FOR SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNETIC BEARINGS

Offer promise for the mounting frame of flywheel energy storage systems (with application in electric vehicles and electric utilities) and spacecraft gyroscopes. High critical temperature superconductive material. Standard machine tools. CAD programs for design of structure. Major concerns are (1) developing superconducting material operating at higher temperatures and (2) problems with the breakage of the flywheel (used in energy storage) at very high rpm and the weight of the shroud necessary for protection. Electric automobiles, electric utility companies, superior coolers, and the superconductive magnetic levitated (MAGLEV) railway systems. Not an affordability issue.
RATIONALE Superconducting magnetic bearings are directly dependent on the advances in the development of superconducting materials. Materials have been developed with transition temperatures (Tc ) in the 135 K range, considerably higher than the temperature of liquid nitrogen (77 K). Research on superconducting bearings is proceeding at a rapid pace throughout the world. The continued development of these bearings opens up a wide range of military applications, as well as civil applications that would directly affect the cost of military hardware. Military applications should include magnetic guns, superior gyroscopes, high-power lasers, improved cryogenic coolers for space optics and guidance systems, and electric vehicles. In the world of civil applications, superconductivity (and the magnetic bearings using that technology) promises to revolutionize electric power systems throughout the world. Such a system would incorporate magnetic energy storage (using magnetic bearings), superconducting generators and motors (using magnetic bearings), and superconducting cable. Such advances in technology could play an important part in reducing the cost of electrical power and, thus, become an affordability issue. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Japan UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Netherlands United States
Germany Russia

Moderate R&D
Italy Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D (
Research in superconducting magnetic bearings is widespread throughout the world because these bearings are necessary items for the development of a new concept in electric power, whether it be for the electric power generation of a city or the power source of commercial vehicles. At present, the United States, Germany, and Japan, are considered the world leaders in the technology of superconducting magnetic bearings. However, several other countries have very advanced programs. In the United States, the following organizations have programs in superconducting magnetic bearings: NASA, Argonne National Laboratories, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Stanford University, the University of Houston, the University of Texas, the University of Virginia, the University of Michigan, Cornell University,
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Georgia Tech, VPI, Texas A&M University, Boeing Defense and Space Group, MAGsoft, B&C Engineering, and Allison Engine Company. In Europe, the following organizations have programs in superconducting magnetic bearings: CNRS, the Centre de Reserche et dEtudes Avancees, the Society of Mechanics and Magnetics, the University of Savoy, and the Ecole Superior in France; the University of the Federal Armed Services, the Institute for Solid State Physics, the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, the IFW-Dresden, the University of Kassel, the University of Kaiserslautern, the Technical University of Chemnitz, and Hchst in Germany; the Moscow State Aviation Institute, the Research Institute of Nizhni Novgorod, and the Institute of Mechanics in Russia; Rutherford Applied Laboratory and Cambridge University in the United Kingdom; Helsinki University in Finland; the University of Bologna and the Polytechnical University of Torino in Italy; Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands; and ETH-Zurich in Switzerland. The European Space Agency (ESA) supports considerable work in this area. In Asia, the following organizations have programs in superconducting magnetic bearings: NEDO, ISTEC, Kanazawa University, Chiba University, the University of Tokyo, and the Central Japan Railway Company in Japan.
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12.3METROLOGY
Highlights As critical dimensions of hardware become smaller, the positioning of the machining tool and the ability to measure that position become more important. The accuracy to which gears can be machined has a direct bearing on the noise and heat generated by the gears. Efforts to extend the metrology capability of gears to the 100-nm range should result in quieter and more efficient gear trains. The ability to operate high-quality coordinate measuring machines (CMMs) in the shop environment would result in a cost saving because the necessity of taking the part to a centrally located measuring room for high-precision dimensional measurements is very time consuming.
OVERVIEW Metrology, in some form, has been used since the beginning of civilization. It took on additional importance during the Industrial Revolution when parts were no longer manufactured as one-of-a-kind. During the intervening years, metrology has advanced from measuring angles and lengths in inches and degrees to measurements in fractions of microns and arc-seconds. Modern metrology equipment includes gauge blocks, surface profilers, angular measuring equipment, laser-based measuring systems, coordinate measuring machines, and so forth. Present developing technology can be separated into two parts: increased measurement capability and the use of advanced equipment in the shop working area (as opposed to operation only in controlled environments). This subsection addresses two technologies in the first part and one in the second. The following programs to increase measurement capability are listed: (1) to produce gear-measuring equipment that is not only faster than conventional equipment but will have measurement accuracies less than 1 m and (2) to improve the capability of more accurately measuring the position of the spindle of a machine tool. Work is also being carried out to produce highquality coordinate measuring machines that can withstand the environment of the shop floor and, thus, carry out inspections next to the production machines. RATIONALE Accurate dimensional inspection (metrology) is essential for designing, developing, manufacturing, and using most military and commercial hardware. In addition, meaningful interchangeability of parts requires that dimensional accuracy be maintained when replacement parts are manufactured. Until recently, it was satisfactory if these instruments had resolutions and/or accuracies in the 0.5- to 1.0-m range. However, demands for ever-decreasing dimensions in productswhether for use in micromachines, MEMS, or semiconductor deviceshave placed increasing demands on the metrology discipline. Considerable effort is being expended in what is sometimes called micro-metrology. Linear measurements in the sub-100-nm range will assume greater importance as the capability of lithography is extended to that range. Improvements in metrology should result not only in more reliable military hardware, but also in reduced costs. A universal agreement concerning the best techniques could make cost reductions significant. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.3-1) Metrology is a critical technology in any industrialized country, and, as a result, most such countries have ongoing programs to improve metrology. The United States, Germany, and Japan appear to have the most extensive programs. However, Denmark, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have substantial efforts, with Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden having niche efforts.
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Country Austria Denmark France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States
Machine Tool Metrology
Gear Metrology
Factory Floor CMMs
most
many
some at least one
Figure 12.3-1. Advanced Fabrication and Processing WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS SECTION 12.3. METROLOGY

Machine Tool Metrology.......................................................................................................................................... III-12-35 Gear Metrology......................................................................................................................................................... III-12-37 Factory-Floor-Capable Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMMs) ....................................................................... III-12-38
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III-12-34
DATA SHEET 12.3. MACHINE TOOL METROLOGY

There are no quantitative parameters for this technology. Studies are being conducted on techniques to measure the position of the spindle more accurately. Techniques include laser triangulation and IR technology. Time frame: 510 years. Sensors to measure displacement, velocity, acceleration and deceleration, force and strain, pressure, or temperature. Standard machine tools. Software algorithm to analyze input from sensors. The sensors used in the system. The ability to measure the spindle position more accurately than present capabilities permit and to reflect that measurement into a feedback to position the spindle more accurately (self-correction).
Critical Materials
Broad application in most machining operations used in the manufacture of commercial hardware. Increased metrology capability and reduced time for measurements reduces overall costs for gears.
RATIONALE Improvements in the measurement (and control) of the spindle position will result in improvements in overall machine tool positioning accuracy. Such accuracy is critical in the machining of certain military hardware. Thermal effects alone can affect the positioning accuracy by 2 m. As the positioning accuracy of machine tools is improved by other methods (e.g., better raceways, bearings, and so forth), the technique to determine the actual position of the spindle must improve similarly. This would be of greatest importance in grinders and diamond turning machines used to finish hardware with the most stringent accuracy requirements (e.g., certain optical elements, hemishells for nuclear weapons, and so forth). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Taiwan

Significant R&D
Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Netherlands United States
Limited R&D
Although the available literature on research in this technology area is sparse, the intense worldwide competitiveness in machine tool sales make it safe to assume that most major machine tool manufacturers have programs. Available literature indicates that the United States and Japan have the most far-reaching programs. It is assumed that Germany and Switzerland also are active. In the United States, the following organizations have programs: Oak Ridge Center for Manufacturing Technology, Sandia National Laboratories, Michigan Technological University, the University of Washington, and Boeing Commercial Airplane Corporation. In Europe, the following organizations have programs: Messtechnik GmbH in Germany; Sipp and Dixi in Switzerland; LGP ENIT and Analogy in France; Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands; and Birmingham University, Nottingham University, and Trent University in the United Kingdom.
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In Asia, the following organizations have programs: Mitsubishi, NTN, Hitachi, Seiko, Toyo Engineering, Nagoya University, and Kobe University in Japan and the National Taiwan University and the National Huwei Institute of Technology in Taiwan.
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DATA SHEET 12.3. GEAR METROLOGY

Measure gear parameters 102 to 103 times faster than CMMs (3 to 4 gears per second), with submicrometer accuracies. Sensors. Standard machine tools. Software algorithm to analyze input from sensors. Measurement technique, analytical programs, and so forth. Application in the manufacture of a range of gears that require very accurate tolerances (e.g., helicopter gear sets and jet engines). Increased metrology capability and reduced time for measurements reduces overall costs for gears.
RATIONALE Improved metrology of gears should result in gears that can meet more stringent specifications. This should result in quieter gears for naval vehicles and gears with increased power density for use in helicopters and other military hardware. In addition, the more accurate and faster measurement of the gears and the resultant improvement in gear quality should improve the reliability and life of gears, and reduce the cost of inspection, maintenance, and replacement. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Research in improved metrology of gears is somewhat limited, with the main effort apparently existing in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the following organizations appear to be the major research institutions: NIST, Penn State National Center for Advanced Gear Manufacturing, Oak Ridge Metrology Center, Ohio State University, Illinois Institute of Technology, Mahar Corporation, M&M Precision Systems Corporation, General Motors Corporation, Bell Helicopter, Caterpillar, and Fellows. In Europe, the following organizations have research programs: the Technical University of Munich, Leitz, and Frenco in Germany and the UK Gear Technology Centre, Stewart Hughes, and the University of Newcastle Upon Tyne and Huddersfield University in the United Kingdom.
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DATA SHEET 12.3. FACTORY-FLOOR-CAPABLE COORDINATE MEASURING MACHINES (CMMs)

The design and manufacture of CMMs so that the critical operating parts are not affected by the shop environment. The goal is to produce CMMs with accuracies in the 3.5 m = L/200, where L is the linear distance being measured, in a temperature from 10 to 35 C. Time frame: 510 years. None identified. Standard machine tools. Software algorithm to analyze input from sensors. Techniques of sealing the critical moving parts of the machine from the shop environment without negatively affecting the machine accuracy. A question also arises concerning the best temperature at which to measure the part (e.g., room temperature, application temperature, and so forth). Broad application in most machining operations used in the manufacture of commercial hardware. Having the CMMs on the shop floor, near the machining centers, would result in reduced costs of performing product inspections.
RATIONALE The necessity of taking the part to a centrally located measuring room for high-precision dimensional measurements is very time consuming. Having high-quality CMMs operating in the shop-floor environment would facilitate the inspection of product, both during and after machining. This would reduce the time (cost) to perform quality checks of product. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Research in this technology is somewhat limited. In the United States, Brown and Sharp, LK Metrology, Inc., SMX Corporation, Cordax, Giddings and LewisSheafield, and Romer, Inc., have developed products. In Europe, Zeiss in Germany has a product, and Aberlink in the United Kingdom has development programs.
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12.4NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION

Highlights The use of shearographic techniques should increase the technical capabilities for the detection of flaws. Smart materials could revolutionize the inspection and evaluation of hardware by incorporating within the hardware sensors that could detect flaws. The application of data fusion technology to NDE should reduce the time/cost to perform more advanced analyses.
OVERVIEW NDE encompasses a wide range of disciplines, including eddy current, magnetic testing, penetrant testing, radiographic testing, and ultrasonic testing. Each of these techniques is used in several different applications; however, they all have one thing in common: They are used for the detection of defects after an item or structure has been manufactured and requires periodic inspection. All these techniques have been used for quite a few years, and only minor changes have been incorporated into the procedures. Most changes have resulted from improvements in detection equipment. In this subsection, we describe three new NDE techniques: digital shearography, the use of smart materials, and data fusion. Shearography is more traditional. It is a technique that is used to analyze finished product. In its simpler sense, shearography is an existing technology; however, it has several drawbacks. Digital shearography is an approach aimed at improving the technique. In short, shearography is a nonscanning, laser-based interferometry system used to detect areas of stress concentration caused by anomalies in materials. Digital shearography combines these techniques with charged-coupled device (CCD) cameras and computers to improve the image and allow analyses of the results. Digital shearography can examine substances as large as 1 ft square and is portable so inspection need not to be place in a laboratory. Shearography has a major advantage over conventional non-destructive test (NDT) techniques (e.g., dye penetrant, magnetic particles, and radiography) used to detect flaws. The conventional techniques detect all visible flaws, but shearography, by examining not the flaws but the flaw-induced strain, provides more information on the criticality of the flaw. Potential military applications include the detection of subsurface flaws in aircraft panels and the detection of voids in composite materials. The use of smart materials is a more radical approach because the sensors used to detect flaws in the structure are built into the structure and can be used to monitor quality/reliability either during manufacture or after the product is completed. The concept of smart materials is also an emerging technology in materials technology. In that application, the sensors detect some designed-for parameter and respond with a counteraction (e.g., damping engine vibrations, silencing refrigerators and aircraft cabin noise, and so forth). Smart materials include technologies such as piezoelectric materials, shape memory alloys, and magnetostrictive fluids. The field of piezoelectric materials is the most advanced, and some commercial applications have been developed. However, widespread use of these technologies is still in the future. Potential civil and military applications abound, with civil applications including sensor determination of aging in building, bridges, and so forth; determination of maintenance requirements for engines, aircraft, and so forth; and chromogenic applications (e.g., self-dimming rear-view mirrors, architectural windows, and so forth). Potential military applications include smart skins for improved submarine signature control (cancel incoming acoustic radiation), improved helicopter rotor-blade trailing edge flaps, and aircraft wings that can change shape to minimize drag. Data fusion is a technique that uses data from a group of NDE sensors rather than using data from a single sensor. It has potential application in a wide range of disciplines. In essence, data fusion is a technique in which data from multipleand perhaps diversesensors are correlated into digitally formatted products. These products
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provide a user with complex information in a user-friendly format so that decisions can be made quickly and accurately. RATIONALE The optimal use of structural materials, as well as the introduction of high-performance systems for military applications, is dependent on the ability to detect and characterize strength-limiting flaws and defects. As military systems become more complex and, at the same time, military budgets decline, existing NDE techniques must be refined and new, more sensitive and less expensive techniques must be developed. The technologies addressed in this section meet both of these requirements. They result not only in increased technical capabilities of the final product, but also in cost savings. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.4-1) Countries with aerospace industries have shown a particular interest in digital shearography because of its potential in detecting flaws in the composite structures commonly used in aircraft structures. (To date, shearography has not detected disbonds in some composite materials.) The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom appear to be the leading countries in shearography development. China, Italy, Portugal, Singapore, and Switzerland have lesser programs, although ETH-Zurich is a world-class facility. Research in smart materials is one of the most intense research efforts worldwide. The United States, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the world leaders. Austria, China, Italy, and the Netherlands are also pursuing research in this area.
Country Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Hong Kong (PRC) Italy Japan Korea Netherlands Singapore Switzerland UK United States
Shearography
NDE with Smart Materials
NDE Data Fusion
most
many
some at least one
Figure 12.4-1. Non-destructive Inspection and Evaluation WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS SECTION 12.4. NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION
Digital Shearography................................................................................................................................................ III-12-43 NDE Using Smart Materials .................................................................................................................................... III-12-44 NDE Data Fusion...................................................................................................................................................... III-12-47
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III-12-42
DATA SHEET 12.4. DIGITAL SHEAROGRAPHY

Provides a large-area, quantitative analysis of stress concentrations resulting from either the vibration of a structure or existing in composite materials in aging aircraft. Inspection speed of an order of magnitude higher than conventional ultrasonic techniques. Time frame: 510 years. Lasers, CCD cameras, and so forth. Laser system, CCD camera, and image processor. Software algorithm to process information. None identified. Useful in a wide range of commercial hardware, particularly aging aircraft. Improved shearography would result in reduced costs for performing some NDI tests.
RATIONALE Shearography can provide a faster, more superior analysis of subsurface flaws in many subjects, including aging aircraft. It is a portable, nonscanning technique and can analyze up to a square foot of surface at one time. It should be useful in a wide range of military hardware, including aging aircraft and hardware that is susceptible to vibration (e.g., launch vehicles, missiles, and so forth). Its development will improve the safety of older aircraft and reduce maintenance costs. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Korea UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Netherlands United States
Hong Kong (PRC) Singapore
Italy Switzerland
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
A wide range of countries are active in the digital shearography, with the United States and Europe appearing to have the most research. In the United States, the following organizations have research programs: WPAFB, NASA/Langley, Penn State University, Michigan State University, the University of New Mexico, Oakland University, Ford Motor Company, and Boeing Defense and Space Group. In Europe, the following organizations have research programs: CISE in Italy; Aerospatiale and SEP in France; the University of Kassel and Dr. Ettemeyer GmbH and Co. in Germany; the University of Surrey, the University of Warwick, and John Moores University in the United Kingdom; Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands; and ETH-Zurich in Switzerland. In Asia, the following organizations have research programs: the City University in Hong Kong (China); the Jun-Bok University in Korea; and the National University of Singapore in Singapore.
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DATA SHEET 12.4. NDE USING SMART MATERIALS

Theoretically, can sense (and often take corrective action) of a wide range of developing problems (e.g., local stress, corrosion, fatigue, vibration, noise, and so forth). Piezoelectric materials, shape memory alloys, magnetostrictive fluids, fiber optic material, and thermoplastics. Many of these are incorporated into MEMS structures. None identified. Software algorithms to process information. The complexity of integrating the signal from the sensor to the control circuitry. Useful for the NDE of a wide range of commercial hardware, including items such as launch vehicles, aircraft, heavy equipment, trains, and so forth. This technology should not only reduce the amount of rejected hardware but also improve the long-term reliability of military equipment. The reduction of rejected hardware, the reduction of built-in latent failures, and the capability of detecting operationally induced failure mechanisms should lead to an overall reduction of costs.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE These materials can sense a wide range of potential problems in critical hardware. They pose the possibility of detecting problems not only in the manufacturing process, but also of detecting defects either built into the end item or defects that might develop during service. The detection of problems during manufacture could lead to the optimization of the manufacturing process and the subsequent reduction of rejected products. This would be an affordability issue, resulting in reduced costs. The early detection of defects will also reduce the number of latent failure mechanisms that might be built into the hardware, thus improving the long-term reliability. The detection of defects that arise in the hardware during operation (allowing the opportunity for corrective action) could reduce catastrophic failure of hardware that could impact not only personal safety, but expensive damage or destruction of the equipment. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Korea

Significant R&D
Germany Netherlands
Italy UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The number of facilities engaged in smart materials is too extensive to list in its entirety. The following is a representative sampling of the facilities. United States Army Research Laboratory (ARL) DOE NRL Naval Sea Systems Command/Crane Langley Research Center
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WPAFB ORNL Sandia National Laboratories JPL Illinois Institute of Technology Virginia Tech University of Maryland A. James Clark School of Engineering University of Buffalo University of Kentucky Iowa State University Johns Hopkins University University of Illinois Honeywell Lockheed Martin Northrup Grumman McDonnell-Douglas Westinghouse. France Institut National des Sciences Appliques de Lyon Bertin St. Cyr lEcole Ecol Central de Lyon Institute de Productique Alcatel CNES MATRA Marconi Cedrat Recerche. Germany University of Stuttgart University of Hamburg University of Bochum Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH Schott Glass DLR Dornier Satelliten Systems GmbH. United Kingdom DERA (The UK Ministry of Defense) University of Hull Cranfield University University of Sheffield University of Bristol Oxford University.
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Austria University of Vienna. Italy Italian Aerospace Research Center. The Netherlands Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven. Japan Science University of Tokyo Tohuko University Chiba University University of Tokyo Kyoto University Kobe University Aichi Institute of Technology National Research Institute for Metals Yasui Laboratories MITI Frontier Program. Korea Postech Pohang.
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DATA SHEET 12.4. NDE DATA FUSION

Improves NDE data collection and assessment by using the input from multisensors (rather than from a single sensor). Processing data and providing an integrated analysis of the item under test. Sensors. None identified. Software algorithms to process information from multisensors. Techniques to embed sensors, type of sensors used, and technique to protect sensors used on equipment operating in hostile environments. Machine tool monitoring, aircraft, automotive, and medical applications. Improved NDE data fusion could reduce the overall costs by reducing waste and improving reliability.
RATIONALE Data fusion, per se, has potential application in a wide range of disciplines. In essence, data fusion is a technique in which data from multiple, and perhaps diverse, sensors are correlated into digitally formatted products. These products provide a user with complex information in a user-friendly format, so that decisions can be made quickly and accurately. Many applications involve rather similar techniques. In machine tools, it might involve the placement of multiple sensors on a machine spindle or within the mass of the machine tool. This would facilitate monitoring spindle placement, temperature, and so forth or overall machine tool condition. In aircraft and automotive, data fusion might involve placing sensors to monitor the condition of the aircraft or automobile (internal temperatures, exhaust, emissions, and so forth). Satellite observation, whether oceanographic, earth resources, or intelligence gathering, is another area of growing interest. Battlefield data collection is a military-unique application in which the collected data could provide timely inputs for command decisions. Mobile robots are another fertile field of research for data fusion. For mobile robots, data fusion includes not only multisensor fusion and control of a single robot, but also cooperative interactions among multiple roots. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Japan United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Denmark Netherlands

Significant R&D
France Switzerland
Germany UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Data fusion research is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At present, the United States, France, and Germany appear to be the leaders. In the United States, the following organizations have active research programs: ARL, NRL, NASA, NIST, Battelle Memorial Institute, LLNL, JPL, and Sandia National Laboratories, the University of Texas, the University of Kentucky, Stanford University, Yale University, the University of Southern California, the University of Illinois, Carnegie Mellon University, MIT, IBM, General Motors Corporation, Boeing Aerospace, United Technologies Research Center, Hughes Research laboratories, Metron, Inc., and PSR.
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In Europe, the following organizations have active research programs: the University of Paris-Sud, Mistral Consortium, EDF-Chatou, Dassault Aviation, INSA de Rennes, ILOG, LIFIA-IMAG, CNRS, Alcatel-Alsthom Research, and Thomson-CSF in France; the University of Reading, CNR, TWI, British Aerospace, and Ellis Harwood, Ltd., in the United Kingdom; FGAN, Humboldt University, Technical University of Braunschweig, and the University of Erlangen in Germany; the National Aerospace Laboratory, Hollandse Signaal, and TNO-FEL in the Netherlands; the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven in the Netherlands; Aalborg University in Denmark; and the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Switzerland. In Asia, the following organizations in Japan have programs in data fusion: Kobe University, Keio University, Nagoya University, Mitsubishi Materials Research, and Hitachi Machine Tool Company.
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12.5PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
Highlights The development of spindles capable of operating at higher speeds and power would reduce the cost of machining. Improved grinding machines would result in more powerful jet and diesel engines and more accurate guidance systems. The continued development of parallel kinematic machine tools may result in improved machining capabilities and reduced cost of the machining operation. The use of MEMS technologies to improve military hardware and to reduce costs may be one of the most significant advances in developing superior and less expensive military hardware. Improved monitoring of machines and tools should reduce the cost of military hardware.
OVERVIEW This subsection addresses various developing production technologies that either will provide superior final product (military and/or commercial product) or will reduce the costs of manufacturing existing product. Included in the subsection are several technological advances that may improve the final product and several modifications that may result in decreased costs. The former includes the following technologies: Improved grinding machines that could result in product manufactured to closer tolerance Machine tools based on the parallel kinematic concept (e.g., Stewart platform or hexapod) Extremely small machine tools (micromachines) that can be used to manufacture miniature hardware MEMS, a revolutionary technology or manufacturing miniature hardware that combines both electronic and mechanical on a monolithic substrate.
The Stewart platform is the basis of the hexapod milling machine design. The design also has application in flight simulators, telescope mounts, and space-borne laser reflectors. In the machine tool arena, particular attention is being given to its development as a tool for manufacturing nanometer-size items (nanotechnology). Hexapods are based on the Stewart platform. Companies in numerous countries are investigating the use of hexapods as machine tools. Indeed, initial designs have been manufactured and are in the process of being evaluated. While some limited use has been found for the equipment, sufficient problems still limit their use at the present time. The main problem is that the positioning accuracies are on the order of five times worse than that of the best milling machines (although comparable to many existing machines). Such equipment might find a niche in the manufacture of micro- or nano-scale products. Tetrahedral tripods are a third class of parallel kinematic machines. Efforts are still in the research stage, but such equipment may avoid some of the problems inherent in Stewart-platform-based equipment. Micromachines are being pursued primarily in Japan, coordinated by the Micromachines Center and supported by MITI. The goals of this program are to manufacture minute items, such as invasive medical micromachines and maintenance systems for power plants. The technology, although different from MEMs, has the same general goals as the MEMS concept. MEMS uses the techniques developed for the manufacture of integrated circuits to fabricate devices that incorporate, on a semiconductor substrate, not only integrated circuits, but also mechanical structures that can be used for a range of applications. MEMS technology includes three important characteristics: miniaturization, multiplicity, and microelectronics. By using semiconductor device manufacturing technology, these packaged
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MEMS-based systems are very small (ranging from 1 mm to 2 cm in size), can be manufactured in quantity using conventional pholithographic techniques, and incorporate complex electronic circuitry. Until the advent of MEMS, miniaturization was a concept most often associated with electronics. The continual miniaturization of electronic systems has been one of the pillars of the advanced technologies used in military and civil hardware. The decrease in size, coupled with the increase in processing power, of computers is a prime example of the advances in electronic technology. In MEMS technology, actuators, sensors, and medical devices incorporating mechanical structures (e.g., levers, springs, motion sensors, and so forth) and integrated circuits are manufactured on semiconductor substrates, thus using the miniaturization capabilities of integrated circuit technology. The use of semiconductor manufacturing technology also results in the batch processing inherent in photolithographic-based semiconductor processing and makes it possible to fabricate thousands of components as easily as a single component. As a result, the cost of the components is reduced significantly, thus extending the use of the products to a wider range of applications. The incorporation of these mechanical structures either into microcircuit chips or on associated substrates (hybrid device) provides the intelligence to the devices that allow their use without the cumbersome external components that were often required to interconnect discrete components. Technologies that may result in decreased costs include: Tool monitoring and sensing, which may result in more cost effective technique for determining tool life Machine degradation monitoring, which may result in a more cost-effective technique for determining machine tool maintenance High-speed spindles, which will decrease the time required to machine many parts, thus reducing the final cost First-part-correct programs, which would reduce the cost of having to make two or three items before the design/manufacturing process was corrected to produce a product that met design specifications.
RATIONALE Numerically controlled (NC) machine tools find wide application in the defense and aerospace industries. Their ability to produce complex shapes with minimum setup time and fixturing makes them critical to the batch processing of components for modern weapons systems. While it is difficult to determine the results of developing technologies (some may never reach fruition), any manufacturing technologies that improve the characteristics of military hardware and/or reduce the cost of that hardware are of significant military importance. For example, improved grinding machines could result in more powerful and efficient jet engines and more accurate guidance systems. While the future of hexapods and micromachines is not clear, significant effort is being expended in these technologies. The use of improved hexapods may result in superior product and/or less expensive product or it may find use in complex parts. The significant interest in the use of the Stewart platform as the motion system for sensitive telescopes should also be noted. Micromachines (primarily pursued by Japan) is envisioned as a technology that may find use in miniature medical and industrial products. Success in these applications would certainly lead to applications in military hardware. MEMS, while included here as a developing technology, is, at the same time, a technology that has found present applications in several commercial applications (e.g., accelerometers for automobile airbag deployment). The future applications of this technology appear to be extensive, and few doubt that the military applications will be significant. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.5-1) Several countries possess advanced machine tool technology, whether in grinders, milling machines, or turning machines, and all are pursuing continued improvements. Efforts to achieve high-speed spindles with large force and feed-rate capabilities, as well as the capability to monitor tool and machine tool condition, has been a continuing effort by many universities and machine tool companies. A large international consortium, IMS-SIMON, has been formed to address the problem of sensor monitoring of machine tools and cutting tools. The consortium includes companies from the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland. Research in parallel kinematic machine tools is extensive in most of the countries with advanced machine tool industries. The United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland appear to be the most involved.
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Country Argentina Brazil Canada Czech Republic China France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Romania Russia Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK United States
Manufacturing
Parallel Kinematic Machines
MEMS
many some at least one
most
Figure 12.5-1. Production Equipment WTA Summary
MEMS research is extensive throughout the industrialized world. While the United States, Germany, and Japan appear to have the most extensive programs, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom also have advanced programs.
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III-12-52
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS SECTION 12.5. PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

High-Speed, High-Power Spindles with High-Feed Rate....................................................................................... III-12-55 Cubic Boron Nitride (cBN) Grinding Wheels for Hardened Steel Gears and Bearings........................................ III-12-56 Precision Profile Grinders ........................................................................................................................................ III-12-57 Parallel Kinematic Machine Tools (Stewart Platform, Hexapod, Parallel Linkage Structures, and so forth)....................................................................................................................................................... III-12-58 Monitoring and Sensing of Cutting Tools and Machine Tools............................................................................... III-12-61 Micromachines.......................................................................................................................................................... III-12-63 Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS)............................................................................................................. III-12-64 First Part Correct (or Valid) ..................................................................................................................................... III-12-68
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III-12-54
DATA SHEET 12.5. HIGH-SPEED, HIGH-POWER SPINDLES WITH HIGH-FEED RATE

The requirement is to obtain spindles that have not only high-speed capability, but can operate at that speed with both high force and feed rates. The overall goal is to develop spindles with the following capabilities: 100,000 rpm @ 100 kW and with a feed rate of 3,000 in. per minute. Bearings, motors, seals, cooling, and lubrication. Standard machine tools. Software algorithms to handle high-speed machining/grinding. Bearings, acceleration, and deceleration of the tool, chip control, keeping the coolant material on the spindle, and having the controller capable of handling the high speed. Large-scale manufacturing: aerospace, automotive. The use of higher speed spindles would allow the fabrication of many critical parts in much less time.
RATIONALE The use of such spindles would fall into the category of affordability. Their use would allow the fabrication of many critical parts in much less time. In addition, the high-speed spindles make lighter and faster cuts and minimize heat transfer to parts. This allows the machining of thinner products, without damage to the products, and would minimize the need for subsequent fabrication steps (e.g., finishing). Applications would include not only the hogging out of bulk materials, but the fabrication of critical dies and molds. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
Switzerland
United States
Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
In a period of high competition in manufacturing, research in high-speed spindles in being carried out in most countries that have advanced machine tool capabilities. The United States appears to be the major area of research, with Germany, Japan, and Switzerland having very capable programs. In the United States, the following organizations have programs: NIST, the University of Florida, Purdue University, Georgia Tech, Milicron, Boeing, and the National Center for Manufacturing Science (NCMS). In Europe, the following organizations are active in research: Datron-Electronic GmbH and the Fraunhofer Institute in Germany and IBAG and Step-Tek in Switzerland In Asia, the following organizations are active in research: Shin Nippon Koki and Toyoda in Japan.
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DATA SHEET 12.5. CUBIC BORON NITRIDE (cBN) GRINDING WHEELS FOR HARDENED STEEL GEARS AND BEARINGS
Important for grinding steel gears (diamond-coated wheels are of limited value in grinding hardened steel) to improve power density of gearbox. cBN. None identified. None identified. Preparation of the cBN, the adherence of the cBN to the wheel, and a grinding machine capable of handling cBN-coated wheels. Helicopters, engines, and so forth. cBN-coated wheels will last much longer than conventional wheels.
RATIONALE Grinding of steel gears is a critical step in the manufacture of helicopter gearboxes, quiet gears, and so forth. Properly ground gears possess improved power density and reliability and operate more quietly than conventionally ground gears. Diamond grinding wheels cannot be used to face steel gears because the iron reacts with the diamond and deteriorates the abrasive properties of the wheel. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Austria Korea
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Switzerland

Significant R&D
Ireland United States
Japan
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Research and manufacture of cBN grinding wheels are widespread in the industrialized world. In the United States, the following organizations have programs: the University of Connecticut, GE Superabrasives, Kapp Tech, Inc., Norton Co., General Motors Corporation, and Weinig, Inc. In Europe, the following organizations have programs: IFW/University of Hannover, Lapport & Sohn, and Lach Diamant in Germany; WST Winterthur in Austria; the University of Dublin in Ireland; and Ewag AG in Switzerland. In Asia, the following organizations have programs: the University of Tokyo and Toyoda in Japan and Korea Tungsten Co. in Korea.
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DATA SHEET 12.5. PRECISION PROFILE GRINDERS

A work head run-out < 0.1 microns and a wheel surface speed > 100 m/second @ 50 kW grinding power help achieve 6-sigma quality for ground parts. None identified. Standard machine tools. None identified. The bearing and the wheel strength. Large-scale manufacturing: aerospace, automotive. Not affordability issue.
RATIONALE Such grinders would result in a product manufactured to much closer tolerances, finer fits, and so forth. This could be of significant value in the manufacture of jet engines and more accurate parts for guidance systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Italy United States
Japan
Moderate R&D
Switzerland
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
While most manufacturers of grinding equipment can be expected to continue efforts to improve their product, only one document was found indicating a specific effort to improve the specifications of their product significantly. NCMS, a consortium of U.S. companies, has listed a precision production grinder as one of their areas of interest. Other U.S. organizations expected to have active programs in developing advanced grinders would include Bryant, CNC Systems, and Campbell. European organizations expected to have active programs in developing advanced grinders include Junker, Overbeck, Schaudt, BWF, and Studer in Germany; Tripet, Kellenberger, Studer, Ewag AG, Voumard, and Doebeli in Switzerland; Tachella in Italy; and Jones and Shipman in the United Kingdom. Asian organizations expected to have active programs in developing advanced grinders include Citizen, Koyo, Okuma, Toyoda, Shigiya, and Toyo in Japan.
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DATA SHEET 12.5. PARALLEL KINEMATIC MACHINE TOOLS (STEWART PLATFORM, HEXAPOD, PARALLEL LINKAGE STRUCTURES, AND SO FORTH)
Parallel kinematic machine tools are a new concept in machine tool design. Existing developmental models have several drawbacks, and considerable research is being done to overcome these problems. If such machines can be improved to possess positioning accuracies of < 10 microns, velocity of 1 m/second, and spindle speeds in the 50,000-rpm range, they would find a definite niche among machine tools. None identified. Standard machine tools. Unique algorithms to control six axes (for the Stewart platform and hexapod) and three axes (for the tetrahedral tripod). Need to improve limitations in accuracy resulting from thermal distortions and to achieve a design that is less costly. Applications would include machining of small, complex parts or for use in pick-andplace systems. Not an affordability issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Proponents of the 6-degree of freedom Stewart platform (hexapod) approach believe that the machines built on this structure will introduce a degree of precision machining productivity and economy not possible with conventional machine tools. The combination of structural rigidity and stiffness, high-speed tool positioning, and full six-axis motion will find wide use in the automotive and aerospace industries. Figures 12.5-2 and 12.5-3 are pictures of a hexapod and a Stewart platform, respectively. Proponents of the simpler tetrahedral tripods believe their approach will be superior because of its speed of motion, larger ratio of work volume to machine volume, lower inertia, and easier solution to the kinematics problems. Both approaches of parallel kinematics machine tools are being pursued, and the end result should be a superior class of tools, albeit for unique applications, that should result in superior, and possibly less expensive, final products. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan Switzerland

Significant R&D
Norway UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Research on the Stewart platform (hexapod) approach concept in quite extensive. The following organizations are actively building and/or evaluating machines: NIST, Giddings and Lewis, Ingersoll Milling Company, and Hexal Tornado in the United States; Mikromat, ZFS/University of Stuttgart, University of Hannover, IFW, and Dyna-M in Germany; Geodetics, ETH-Zurich, and Demaurex Aria Delta in Switzerland; Multicraft in Norway; British Aerospace in the United Kingdom; Lapic in Russia; and Hexa in Japan. JMC in Sweden is pursuing a tripod approach, and the University of Illinois in the United States is researching a tetrahedral tripod.
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Figure 12.5-2. Hexapod
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Figure 12.5-3. Stewart Platform
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DATA SHEET 12.5. MONITORING AND SENSING OF CUTTING TOOLS AND MACHINE TOOLS
No quantitative parameters are available; a continuing, ongoing program. Thin film sensors (coated with a hard protective layer) can be deposited onto the cutting tool and used to measure the condition of the tool. In machine tools, the sensors are mounted within the mass of the machine tool and measure parameters such as temperature, vibration, and so forth. Capacitance gauging, lasers, sensors, and so forth. Computers and sensors. Unique algorithms to monitor cutting tool or machine tool condition. Need for robust sensors for use in hostile machine shop environment. General machine tool operation. Cutting time is the criterion used by most manufacturers for tool life. With sensors mounted on, or in, the tools to measure parameters such as force (radial and thrust) and torque, a more accurate determination of tool life and condition is possible.
RATIONALE Cutting time is the criterion used by most manufacturers for tool life. However, cutting tools experience not only some wear (often uneven) during most of the cutting period, but also chipping or breaking. With sensors mounted on, or in, the tools to measure parameters such as force (radial and thrust) and torque, it should be possible to obtain a more accurate determination of tool life and/or damage to optimize the cutting process. This would result in cost savings to the machine shop operationin avoiding unnecessary tool changes and in minimizing damaged product. Thus, this is an affordability issue. The normal operation of a machine tool generates heat and vibration within the mass of the machine tool. Both can affect the positioning accuracy and cut of the tool. Accurate monitoring of these parameters, coupled with a feedback mechanism, can minimize most of the heat and vibration effects. This should improve the machine reliability and maintainability. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Hungary Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Italy UK

Significant R&D
Germany Japan United States
Greece Spain
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Extensive research is being conducted in machine and tool monitoring worldwide. An international consortium of companies representing seven countries, IMS-SIMON, is directly involved in such research. In North America, the following organizations have active programs in machine/tool monitoring: NIST, LLNL, ORNL, the University of Michigan, the University of Illinois, the University of Maryland, Montronix, Ingersoll Milling Machine Company, and TPS in the United States and the National Research Council Canada, University of British Columbia, the University of Victoria, and Memex Electronics in Canada.
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In Europe, the following organizations have active programs in machine/tool monitoring: the Technische Hochschule Aachen, the University of Passau, the Fraunhofer Institute, Robert Bosch, Prometec, WZL Research Institute, and Laser Zentrum Hannover in Germany; Tekniker, Soraluce, Ikerlan, Danobat, and Ideko in Spain; Giat and Objectif in France; Grau and Epsilon in Greece; Fidia and TXT in Italy; Leeds University, Birmingham University, and Nottingham Trent University in the United Kingdom; Kistler Instrumente and Hindel Gears in Switzerland; and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Hungary. In Asia, the following organizations have active programs in machine/tool monitoring: Nagoya University, Kobe University, Keio University, Mitsubishi Materials Research Center, Hitachi Seiki Machine Tool Company, and NTN Company in Japan.
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DATA SHEET 12.5 MICROMACHINES

No quantitative parameters are available. However, the general concept is to build extremely small machines (using miniaturized machine tools) that can perform the same tasks, albeit on a miniature scale, as conventional machines. Material of end product. Machine tools or lasers capable of producing the micromachines. None identified. Difficulty in producing miniature micromachines with existing technology. Overall applications are unknown. Initial interest includes invasive medical devices and very small items, such as mini-gyroscopes, micromotors, pumps, and robots. Not an affordability issue.
RATIONALE Micromachines are extremely small and comprise minute (millimeter range) functional elements that are highly sophisticated and are capable of performing complicated tasks. The concept of micromachines is similar to that of MEMS technology (i.e., manufacture devices that are extremely small, allowing continued miniaturization of hardware, with the many benefits associated with miniaturization). Military applications could include miniature gyroscopes, and so forth. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Japan
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Research in this field has been conducted primarily in Japan in the following organizations: the Micromachine Center, the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory, the Electrotechnical Laboratory, and the National Research Laboratory of Metrology, the University of Tokyo, Nagoya University, the Tokyo Institute of Technology, DENSO, Toyota Technological Institute, Fujikura Ltd., Mitsubishi, Olympus, Sanyo, Toshiba, and Murata. In the United States, Sandia National Laboratories and SRI International have programs.
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DATA SHEET 12.5. MICROELECTROMECHNICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS)

No quantitative parameters are available. However, the general concept is to build extremely small machines (devices) that can perform the same tasks, albeit on a miniature scale, as conventional machines. In short, MEMS devices should be smaller, less expensive, and more reliable than more conventional devices. Silicon wafers; other materials used in microelectronics fabrication industry. Standard semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including photolithographic equipment, dry etchers, deposition equipment, and systems for reactive ion etching, LIGA, wafer-to-wafer bonding, and so forth. None identified. MEMS is dependent on the technologies associated with semiconductor fabrication. Improvements in MEMS devices is dependent not only on designs, but on improvements in the fabrication techniques (e.g., advanced etching techniques), which can result in higher aspect ratio structures, improved packaging materials and techniques, and improved CAD. Unlimited applications. Present uses include accelerometers for airbag deployment in automobiles; micropressure sensors, medical microfluidic systems; micromirrors for projectors; nozzles for inkjet printers; and fluid flow sensors. MEMS fabrication is less costly than the fabrication of traditional components. MEMSbased systems often have improved performance or reduced size and weight, which leads to further savings.
Affordability
RATIONALE MEMS are micron-scale devices that integrate novel sensing and actuation functions with traditional microelectronics-based data processing and control systems. MEMS are unique because they combine mechanical or structural elements, such as accelerometers and micromirrors, with electronic elements, such as microprocessors and radio frequency transmitters. An example is the wristwatch-size MEMS-based system developed for the Marine Corps that allows an individual soldier to monitor battlefield conditions and transmit the information to others in his unit or back to his command post. Potential military applications include accelerometers for controlling military and aerospace systems; inertial measurement systems for munitions, platforms, and personal navigation; unattended sensors for asset tracking and security surveillance; integrated fluidic systems; weapons safing, arming, and fuzing; mass data storage; integrated micro-optomechanical components; and so forth. MEMS are also being developed for use in chemically and thermally harsh environments, such as jet engines, using materials other than silicon. MEMS are likely to become a pervasive technology in defense and commercial arenas for a variety of applications (presently an industry standard for pressure sensors and accelerometers). The benefits include reduced cost, size, and weight and, in some cases, enhanced performance. Figures 12.5-4 and 12.5-5 are representative of the structures being fabricated. Information on defense applications of MEMS is available at www.ida.org/mems.
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Figure 12.5-4. MEMS Gear
Figure 12.5-5. MEMS Motor
III-12-65

Canada India Norway United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Japan Sweden

Significant R&D
France Korea Switzerland
Germany Netherlands UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Research in MEMS is global. Leaders are the United States, Germany, and Japan. Extensive programs also exist in Canada, Korea, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. Preliminary efforts are starting in China and India. Information on MEMS suppliers is available at http://mems.isi.edu/mems/yp/list-all-company.html. Key industrial, government, and university programs include: United States Analog Devices Boeing Carnegie Mellon University Case Western Reserve University Draper Labs Honeywell JPL MIT Canada University of Alberta China Fudan University France CNRS Institute de Microtechniques de FranceComte Germany Bartels Mikrotechnik Fraunhofer Institute Institute of Microtechnology Mainz IVAM NRW e.V. India Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore Karlsruhe Research Center Max Planck Institute Mikrosystemtechnik Technische Universitt-Berlin LETI Universit de France-Conte Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Microelectronics Center of North Carolina (MCNC) University NIST Raytheon Sandia National Laboratories Stanford University University of California at Berkeley University of California at Los Angeles University of Michigan
III-12-66
Japan Denso Corporation Hitachi Corporation Micromachine Center (Tokyo) Nippondenso Research Laboratories NTT Seiko Korea Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology The Netherlands 3T MESA Research Institute Norway SensoNor Sweden Industrial Microelectronics Center Royal Institute of Technology Switzerland CSEM Microsystems Ecole Polytetch Federale de Lausanne The United Kingdom Applied Microengineering, Ltd. Lammerholm Flemming University of Sheffield University of Southampton University of Warwick ETH-Zurich University of Neuchatel Uppsala University SINTEF Electronics and Cybernetics Twente MicroProducts University of Twente Seoul National University Toyota Central Research and Development Laboratory University of Tokyo and Tohoku University Yokogawa Electric Corporation
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DATA SHEET 12.5. FIRST PART CORRECT (OR VALID)

Ability to take complicated engineering designs from design to manufacturing and have the end product meet all specifications the first time. None identified. Computers and normal manufacturing equipment. Computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing/computer-aided engineering (CAD/CAM/CAE) programs. Most steps in the evolution of the final product (can) contribute to the problem: CAD, CAE, CAM thermal problems in machine, feed speed, strain on spindle, and so forth. All manufacturing operations; however, the most important area would be for items manufactured in small volumes. In small-volume applications, each part that does not meet specification is a significant part of the overall cost.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE This is a significant affordability issue for all products made in small volumes. As the number of required parts decreases, each part that does not meet specifications results in a significant increase in the cost of the delivered product. This is particularly important for job shops that produce small-quantity products and for companies supplying replacement parts. This latter situation is critical to DOEs nuclear program and to the U.S. military. In the former, DOE only has a need only for replacement parts for aging weapons. In the latter, DoD constantly needs replacement parts for hardware that uses technologies no longer in normal commercial production. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Singapore
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Netherlands
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Research in first time right is primarily carried out in manufacturing facilities, whether engaged in largescale production or small-scale production. The former would include large industrial manufactures and organizations, regardless of their size, that had significant interest in producing one-of-a-kind product (e.g., replacement parts in the nuclear arena). The latter would include small job shops that customarily produce small numbers of product. No effort has been made to list companies in the latter category because numbers would be too great. In the United States, the following organizations can only be considered a sampling of the institutions involved in efforts to produce first time right product: ORNL, LLNL, Sandia National Laboratories, National Center for Excellence in Metalworking, Cornell University, AT&T, Milicron, Inc., Eastman Kodak, General Electric, IBM, United Technologies Research Center, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, and Chrysler-Daimler. In Europe, the following organizations can be assumed to have research programs: CNRS, Renault, Peugeot, and Citroen in France; Rohm & Haas, Siemens, Daimler-Benz, BMW, and Volkswagen in Germany; and Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. In Asia, the following organizations can be assumed to have research programs: Japan Synthetic Rubber, Furakawa Electric Co., Mitsubishi, Nippon Steel, Nissan Motors, Toyota Motors, and Honda Motors in Japan and Pioneer Die-Casting in Singapore.
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12.6ROBOTICS
Highlights Advanced sea, air, and land robots will carry out a wide range of military operations, ranging from chemical and biological warfare (CBW) detection and reconnaissance to mine detection. The development of fractal, self-duplicating, self-repairing robots would be a significant breakthrough in the design of military hardware.
OVERVIEW This section covers the developing technology for advanced battlefield robots, encompassing robots for land, sea, and air. Possible robots include: Ground robots. Although these robots could be designed for many different applications, early planning has addressed the fields of cameras, sensors, or equipment for gathering and disseminating information. Seaborne robots that resemble jet skis. These robots can be equipped with a various types of equipment, including underwater cameras, laser scanners, night vision equipment, radar, and so forth. Micro and mini air vehicles (MAVs). Proposed designs of these pilotless machines vary from micro (smaller than 6 in.) to extremely small (8- to 10-in. size) to moderate (on the order of 3- to 5-ft size). Initial plans would be for the craft to carry some type of sensor, although they could also carry small amounts of explosives. Fractal shape-changing robots. These robots can, theoretically, change shape, replicate, self-repair, and perform a wide variety of military tasks.
Considerable effort is being expended to develop MAVs that can serve as observation planes or sensors for WMD. Such a concept will most probably make use of MEMS technology. To be effective, the MAVs would require sensors and transmitters. Classical sensor development has been a major part of MEMS research, and engineers at MIT have developed a TV camera on a chip. Some of the major obstacles are the aerodynamics of such a small plane and the weight requirements of sensors, transmitters, and propellant systems. The fractal shape-changing robots are a form of nanotechnology and are still in the conceptual stage. However, interest has been increasing since the inventor was awarded the 1996 European Invention Competition of Monaco. In addition, statements by personnel at British Telecomm predict, in their 1997 Technology Calendar, that early forms of these robots are most likely to exist by 2005. The concept of self-replication is a basic tenet of nanotechnology, whether one considers classic nanotechnology or molecular nanotechnology. The goals of nanotechnology are low cost, molecular precision, and flexibility. Some authors believe these can only be reached with the development of self-replicating objects. RATIONALE Robots are indispensable in many hazardous military operations, including the handling of munitions, operating in highly radioactive or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) environments, and performing tasks in space. The use of robots in these applications extends the military capability much further than that which could be accomplished with protected humans. The robots addressed in this developing technology volume are extensions of the existing robotic technologies. The more typical sea, air, and land robots addressed are significant advances over what the military presently fields. They should extend the observation/reconnaissance capabilities of existing technologies not only because of their additional capabilities, but because their size should limit their detectability and extend their ability to gain access.
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The eventual applications of the less conventional fractal shape-changing robots are more difficult to quantify. Theory says that they will be very small, almost indestructible (since they are self-repairing); can change shape, if necessary, to gain access to small or odd-shaped openings; and can carry out most operations presently performed by soldiers in the field. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 12.6-1) Robotic research is a major international endeavor. Although most research is carried out by commercial/ university laboratories and most is directed toward civil applications, much of the technology is also applicable to military applications. Military applications include land-based robots (many designed for mine clearing), undersea robots, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Country Australia Belgium France Germany Italy Japan Russia Singapore South Africa Sweden UK United States
Land Robotics
Sea Robotics
Unmanned Air Vehicles
Fractal Robots
most many
some at least one
Figure 12.6.-1. Robotics Systems WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS 12.6. ROBOTICS

Battlefield Robots ..................................................................................................................................................... III-12-73 Undersea Robots....................................................................................................................................................... III-12-75 Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) .................................................................................................................................... III-12-77 Fractal Self-Shaping Robots..................................................................................................................................... III-12-80
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III-12-72
DATA SHEET 12.6. BATTLEFIELD ROBOTS

Perform reconnaissance, mine clearing, material handling, target identification, and CBW detection. Sensors. Standard machine tools, computers, and so forth. Software algorithms to control action of the robot. Reliability, cost, use in inclement weather, and ability to traverse uneven terrain. Law enforcement. Not an affordability issue in dollars and cents matters but definitely an affordability issue in human life and safety matters.
RATIONALE Successful military missions are characterized by rapid response, minimal casualties, and minimal hardware cost. Of particular risk to military personnel are intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Battlefield robots should be able to perform many of these tasks efficiently, at minimum cost, and with significantly reduced threat to personnel. Figure 12.6-2 shows a battlefield robot developed for reconnaissance. Research on battlefield robotics should result in products that can be outfitted with mine-detection equipment (mine clearing), video and IR-sensing systems (surveillance and reconnaissance), sensors for chemical and biological weapons, or sensors for nuclear radiation. Computers and telecommunications equipment are critical components of all these robots. Research robots that use either conventional tire/wheel systems or Archimedes screw-type systems are being developed. The latter may result in more precise directional control, although it may be more expensive than the more conventional approaches. Potential military applications include counterterrorism, surveillance, reconnaissance, intrusion detection, and mine detection (removal). WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Belgium Italy UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Russia

Moderate R&D
Germany Spain
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Robotic research is a major international endeavor. Although much of the research is conducted by industrial/ university laboratories and is directed toward civil applications, much of the technology is applicable to military applications. The United States, France, Germany, and Japan appear to be the most heavily involved, although other countries have active, meaningful programs. Since the number of organizations involved in robotics is so large, the following is only a sampling. In the United States, the following organizations are representative of the effort in robotics: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), ARL, NASA, JPL, LLNL, Sandia National Laboratories, ORNL,
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Figure 12.6-2. Reconnaissance Land Robot
Omnitech, Philips Labs, INEL, MIT, Georgia Tech, Virginia Tech, Caltech, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Maryland, Stanford University, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Rochester, and Cornell University. In Europe, the following organizations have research programs: ENSEA-ETIS, LIFIA, LAAS-CNRS, Ecole des Mines de Paris, ITMI-Aptor, Giat, Dassault Electronique, Sagem, the Paris Robotics Laboratory, and the Complex Systems Group in France; the Technical University of Munich, the University of Wrzburg, the Technical University of Darmstadt, Dornier, and the Institute of Automatic Contro Engineering in Germany; Cambridge University, the University of Birmingham, the University of Surrey, and the University of Newcastle in the United Kingdom; CELL Robotics in Belgium; CNR-IESS in Italy; the University of Sevilla in Spain; and the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. In Asia, the following organizations have research programs: Nagoya University, Meijo University, University of Tsukuba, University of Tokyo, Osaka Electro-Com, Wasada, Toyo, Riken Corporation, Hitachi, Ltd., and Mitsubishi in Japan. The Defense Research Establishment in Canada and the Moscow Bauman State Technical University in Russia are also active in land-based robotics.
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DATA SHEET 12.6. UNDERSEA ROBOTS

Perform reconnaissance, on water surface and underwater, including cameras (visual), laser scanning, night vision, and so forth. None identified. Standard machine tools, computers, and so forth. Software algorithms to control action of the robot. Reliability, cost, use in inclement weather, ability to operate in rough seas, and acoustic transmission between the robot and a mother ship. Underwater research, shipwreck investigations, oil and mineral exploration. Not an affordability issue.
RATIONALE Undersea robots will extend operational range of robotic technology, using low-visibility, expendable vehicles. The U.S. Navy has already placed several robots into service, for reconnaissance and anti-mine tasks. The use of small robots (6 to 10 ft in length) offers a significant technology to the Navy, at costs considerably less than those encountered using larger, more expensive vessels. In addition, it allows operation at considerable depths and in mine-infested watersenvironments that pose significant risks to personnel using more conventional techniques. Figure 12.6-3 shows a robot developed for underwater reconnaissance. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France Singapore

Significant R&D
Germany Sweden

Moderate R&D
Italy UK
Limited R&D
Extensive research in underwater robots is being conducted in most industrialized countries that have significant shorelines, are involved in oil exploration, or are active in ocean salvage. The United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom appear to have the most extensive programs. In the United States, the following organizations have extensive research programs: SPAWAR, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Center, the Autonomous Undersea Systems Institute, Texas A&M University, and MIT. In Europe, the following organizations have programs: DERA, CMPT, Slingsby, Shell-UK Exploration and Production, Heriot-Watt University, the University of Essex, and Cranfield University in the United Kingdom; the Institute Franais de Recherche pour lExploitation de Mer, INRIA, and the Institute Nationale de Recherche et en Automatique in France; the Technical University of Hamburg, the University of Hannover, and the Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH in Germany; CNR-IAN in Italy; and the University of Uppsala in Sweden. In Asia, the following organizations have programs: JAMSTAC; University of Tokyo, Meiji University, Tokai University, the Tokyo Institute of Technology, and KDD in Japan; the Australian National University in Australia; and the Nangyang Technological University in Singapore.
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Figure 12.6-3. Underwater Robot
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DATA SHEET 12.6. MICRO AIR VEHICLES (MAVs)

Perform reconnaissance, target identification, and CBW detection. None identified. Standard machine tools, computers, and so forth. Software algorithms to control the robots action. Aerodynamics at low speed and low altitude, power (batteries or solar), propulsion system, length of flight, cost, use in inclement weather, and low observability. Possible application in agriculture (crop studies), archeology (study of terrain), crowd control, and search and rescue. MAV should be considerably less expensive than conventional drones. In addition, the use of MAVs would minimize the danger to personnel.
RATIONALE MAVs hold great promise as flight platforms for tactical optical, acoustic, electronic, and chemical/biological sensors for operation in hazardous areas. MAVs should allow brigade commanders to ascertain enemy strength, the type of terrain, targeting information, and the presence of chemical/biological weapons before engaging the enemy and without exposing the military personnel to the dangers of such tasks. MAVs should be small enough to be handled in the field by one or two soldiers. They should have the capability of flying for up to an hour and possessing either sensors or cameras and telecommunication equipment. Figure 12.6-4 shows a conventional UAV being developed for reconnaissance duties and an extremely small MAV being developed for a wide range of potential applications. Figure 12.6-5 is an example of a less conventional approach to MAVs, one using the concept of flapping wings. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Extensive research is being conducted on MAVs in the United States, with considerable funding from DARPA. Germany and the United Kingdom also have extensive programs, with some effort also existing in Australia, Canada, and Russia. In the United States, the following organizations have research programs: NASA/Dryden, NRL, SPAWAR, JPL, Sandia National Laboratories, Georgia Tech, MIT, Caltech, Vanderbilt University, the University of Florida, the University of Washington, Teledyne Ryan Aeronautics, TRW, Inc., Aerovironment, Lockheed-Martin, Lutronix Corporation, SRI International, General Atomics, Raytheon, and Carolina Unmanned Vehicles. In Europe, the following organizations are active: Bosch Aerospace, Stenne Flugzeugbau, Daimler-Benz, and STN Atlas Electronik in Germany and DERA-Malvern, the University of Cranfield, the University of Southampton, the University of Bristol, Nortel Technology, and Cranfield Aerospace, Ltd., in the United Kingdom. Others with programs include the University of Sydney in Australia; Bombardier Aerospace in Canada; and the St. Petersburg Institute for Interferometrics and Automation in Russia.
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(a) More Conventional Reconnaissance UAV
(b) Less Conventional MAV Figure 12.6-4. UAVs
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Figure 12.6-5. UAV Flapping Wings Approach, as Researched at Georgia Tech
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DATA SHEET 12.6. FRACTAL SELF-SHAPING ROBOTS

Extremely small (nanotechnology approach), shape-changing, self-repairing cubes. None identified, as yet. Computers. Software algorithms to control action of the robot. None identified, as yet. Potential applications include medical technology, bridge building, space technology, and so forth. Not affordability issue.
RATIONALE A fractal is a shape that, when one looks at a small part of it, has similar (but not necessarily identical) appearance to the full shape. Fractal shape-changing robots presently make use of large numbers of small cubes, each containing a computer chip, programmed to perform specific functions. These functions can include movement, laterally or vertically, and can effect a change in the shape of the final structure. Proposed military applications include mine clearing and weapons or aircraft that have the ability to self-repair damage caused by enemy action. Figure 12.6-5 shows examples of fractal robots. Futurists at British Telecom have predicted the commercial/military use of these robots in the 2015 to 2020 time frame. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
UK
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
At the present time, research in fractal robots is quite limited, with efforts at NASA, Rice University, Nanotechnology Development Corporation, and the Hollotron Corporation in the United States and at Robodyne Cybernetics in the United Kingdom.
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(a) Robotic Demonstration of Bridge Building
(b) Various Examples of Fractal Robot Structures Figure 12.6-5. Fractal Robots
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SECTION 12BIBLIOGRAPHY
DoD PLANS 1998 Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan 1997 Basic Research Plan Research Technology Area Plan, Air Force Research Laboratory WPAFB Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) ADVANCED FABRICATION AND PROCESSING The Use of Rapid Prototyping for Interface Design, Georgia Tech, Internet article. Rapid Prototyping, University of Tokyo, Internet article. Its a Material World, BE, April 1998. Visit to the Fraunhofer Institut Angewandte Materialforschung, ONR International Field Office-Europe, February 1998. Fourth Annual National Manufacturing Technology Conference, NIST, April 1997. ONR-European Office, C2 and Surveillance Newsletter No. 16. R&D Status and Trends in Nanoparticles, Nanostructured Materials, and Nanodevices in the United States, Proceedings of WTEC Workshop, May 1997. First International Forum on Nanotechnology, Rome, April 1999 (Advanced Program). Nanotechnology Magazine (several articles). Ausform Finishing, ARL, Penn State University, Internet article. Performance Testing of Ausform Finished Gears, Navy MANTECH Program, 1998. Semi-Solid Metalworking Technology, NCEMT Thrust Area, Concurrent Technologies Corporation, Internet article. S.B. Brown, Semi-Solid Processing: New Advances in Net Shape Forming, 1996 TMS Annual Meeting. Semi-Solid Metalworking Technology for Titanium Fluid Handling Components, Navy MANTECH Program, 1998. Micron by Micron, Diamond Films Edge Into Marketplace, R&D Magazine, June 1996. Conference on Thermal Spraying of Nanoscale Materials, Davos, Switzerland, August 1997. Gell, M., Nanostructured Coatings, Next Generation Manufacturing Project Overview, Internet article. Three-Laser Method Goes Beyond Diamond Films, Photonics Spectra, March 1998. Batelle TechReach, Spring 1996. High-Flux, Low-Energy Ion Source for High-Rate Ion-Assisted Deposition of Hard Coatings, Plasma Quest Inc., DOE Grant No. DE-FG03-97ER82459. Hard Materials, Physics World, January 1998.
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BEARINGS Flywheel Energy Storage Using HTS Magnetic Bearings, Argonne National Laboratory, Database No. 458-001, Internet article. Advanced Concepts in Energy Storage, Argonne National Laboratory, Internet article. Minami, M., et al., Development on Component Parts of Superconducting Flywheel for Energy Storage System, 10th International Superconducting Symposium, 1997. METROLOGY Gear Metrology and Performance Prediction, Navy MANTECH Program, 1998. Modeling and Control of Machining Process, Michigan Technological University, Internet article. Machine Tool Metrology: Achieving Higher Levels of Manufacturing Precision, LLNL, Internet article. Machine Tool Metrology Under Loaded Conditions, NIST Solicitation 8.11.3T. Shop Floor Measurement at Volvo Truck Adds New Process Control Capability, mfg, the Brown & Sharp Publication of Precision Manufacturing, 1999, Volume 6, Issue 1. NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION Electronic Shearography, NASA Technical Information Sheet, TOPS 93 Exhibit #R-234. Pulsed Digital Shearography, ETH-Zurich, Internet article. ShearographyPractical Approach for Non-Destructive Testing, John Moores University, Internet article. De Smet, M., La ShearographieUne Solution?, 1997 COFREND Congress. SPIE Technical Conference on Sensor Fusion and Decentralized Control in Autonomous Robotic Systems. Smart Materials, Scientific American, May 1996. Smart Materials and Structures Have Potential Applications in the Civil and Military Market, University of Oxford, Internet article. Smart Materials and Structures Research Center, University of Maryland, A.J. Clark School of Engineering, Internet article. Ultrasonic Characterization of Materials, NIST, Boulder, Internet article. PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT Strategic Machine Tool Technologies: Spindles, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, Internet article. Designing Next-Generation Tooling for High-Speed Machining, MAN, May 1998. Carter, C., Trends in the Technical Development of Machine Tools, AMT. Precision Production Grinder, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, Internet article. Sick, B., et al., On-Line Tool Wear Monitoring in Turning Using Neural Networks, Neural Computing and Applications, Vol. 7, No. 4, Springer Verlag, London, 1998. Slater, J., Octahedral Hexapod Review, IDA S&T Memorandum, 1996. Sandia Hexapod Page, Internet article. Characterization, Remote Access, and Simulation of Hexapod Machines, NIST, Internet article. Markle, R., A New Family of Six-Degree of Freedom Positional Devices, Xerox Corp., Internet article.
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The Tetrahedral Tripod, Ferreira, P. and El-Khasawneh, B., University of Illinois. Third Annual Micromachine Symposium, October 1997. Some Micromachine Activities in Japan, Asian Technology Information Program, March 1996. Recent MITI-Sponsored Research in Micromachines, Asian Technology Information Program, November 1997. Aoyama, H., Desktop Flexible Factory Utilizing Miniature Robots With Micro Tools and Sensors, Micromachine, University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, May 1998. Overview of MMCs Activities in Fiscal 1998, Micromachine, May 1998. Hui, E., Micromechanical Systems, University of California (Berkeley), Internet article. Emerging Technologies, MEMS Active Fiber Microactuator, Semiconductor International, December 1997. New Applications Emerging as MEMS Technology Advances, R&D Magazine, July 1998. Trends in Accelerometer Design for Military and Aerospace Applications, Sensors, March 1999, Vol. 16, No. 3. DARPA/ETO MEMS Principal Investigator Meeting, IDA, January 1998. Pisano, A.P., DARPA Vision Statement, DARPA/ETO, August 1998. A-PRIMED Process Improvements, Sandia National Laboratories, Internet article. Carnegie-Mellon University Robotics Institute, Rapid Manufacturing Lab, Internet article. ROBOTICS Tiny Drones May Be Soldiers New Tool, Aviation Week and Space Technology, June, 1998. Rivals Stretch Thinking to Tackle Next-Century Battlefield Demands, Signal, November 1998. Military Robotics, Sandia National Laboratories, Internet article. Robotics and Intelligent Systems, Sandia Lab News, February 12, 1999. Reaching Beyond Human Capabilities, ORNL, Internet article. SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego, Internet article. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles: Technology Demonstration 2, Sea Technology, December 1998. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 20002035: Becoming a 21st Century Force; Future Naval Forces, Chapter 1. Options for Enhancing the Department of Defenses Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs, September 1998. Microtech Leads Foray into Flying, Sensing Entometers, R&D Magazine, June 1998. Interview With Philippe Coiffet, CNRS Research Director, Paris Robotics Laboratory: Trailblazing Robots, Agence pour la Diffusion de lInformation Technologique, Technologie France, No. 22. Tiny Spies in the Sky, Discovery Channel On-Line. Boeing To Test Dragonfly UAV, Aviation Week, December 1998. Fractal Shape Changing Robots, Robodyne Cybernetics, Internet article. Fractal Shape Changing Robots, Nano Technology Development Corp., Internet article. Fractal Shape Changing Robots, British Telecom 1997 Technology Calendar, Internet article. Ian Pearson, Thoughts on the Future, Holodecks, British Telecom, Internet article.
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SECTION 16: POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIME TECHNOLOGY
October 1999 (updated May 2000)
SECTION 16POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIME TECHNOLOGY

Scope 16.1 16.2 16.3 Inertial Navigation Systems and Related Components.................................................. III-16-9 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers........... III-16-37 Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems...................................................... III-16-53
16.4 Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers........ III-16-81 16.5 Precise Time and Frequency (PT&F)................III-16-111 16.6 Situational Awareness/Combat Identification.....III-16-127 Highlights Positioning, navigation, and time (PNT) technology usage has doubled every 5 years, mostly because of the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) program and the miniaturization of electromechanical components. Future PNT usage is expected to double every 2 years because of telecommunication and automobile navigation commercial markets. On 1 May 2000, the President discontinued Selective Availability of GPS. "The decision to discontinue Selective Availability is the latest measure in an ongoing effort to make GPS more responsive to civil and commercial users worldwide. This increase in accuracy will allow new GPS applications to emerge and continue to enhance the lives of people around the world."1 The economic engine for PNT is both the nonmilitary commercial community sector and the expanding need for more accurate position and especially precise time. Military exploitation and harnessing of a three-dimensional position (latitude, longitude, and altitude) and precise time (POSITIME) common battlespace grid reference and use of hybrid multisensor arrays are in the embryonic stage. The impact on the military in terms of situational awarenessthat is, the use of multiple sensor data to reduce fratricide and positively identify friendly forces, foe targets, and neutralswill be significant. Significant advances in PNT technologies should be anticipated from developed nations and less developed nations. This will allow more nontraditional sources in manufacture of PNT products.
OVERVIEW Recent localized conflicts and the evolving role of the U.S. military in antiterrorism points to (1) the future use of more autonomous unmanned vehicles (AUVs) for precision strike and tactical combat, in addition to surveillance, targeting, and covert operations, and (2) more use of long-range, stand-off, precision and laser-guided weapons and other smart weapons, including artillery shells and munitions. Joint U.S. and allied military land, air, and sea forces will also need new levels of situational awareness to reduce fratricide and provide rapid battlefield tracking of troops, both friend and foe. The need to minimize time over target and maximize kill will require accurate and continuous knowledge and location of targets, especially mobile targets, rapid battlefield damage assessment, and in-flight retargeting of missiles and weapons. These capabilities will translate directly into tactical and strategic military
President Bill Clinton, the White House
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advantage, saved lives, and reduced military cost. To achieve this will require using advanced technologies in computer processing, navigation and precise time, telecommunications, and positive combat identification sensors in a system of systems. This will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data that is position and time (POSITIME) tagged across the battlespace. This interactive tactical picture will gain U.S. forces an enormous dominant battlespace awareness, which will decrease response time and make the battlespace considerably transparent for the warfighter.2 Included in this section are descriptions of the technologies necessary to achieve dominant battlespace awareness, including autonomous and cooperative positioning, data-based navigation systems, positive combat identification, and nonintrusive detection of military force elements. Figures 16.0-1 and 16.0-2 show battlespace awareness for two warfare scenarios: sophisticated conventional warfare and military operations in urban terrain, respectively. The latter is the more complex and resource-intensive environment; it requires very precise situational awareness.
Figure 16.0-1. ConceptSophisticated Conventional Warfare
RATIONALE The importance of these technologies and their potential capabilities could be used (by friend and foe) to deliver conventional weapons, a single item (for nuclear), individually targeted remote vehicles (RVs), or a set of items to a level of accuracy appropriate to the destructive footprint of these munitions. These parameters could be achieved either individually or when used as an integrated or hybrid system. Accurate positioning, attitude, pointing, and control of land, sea, air, and space vehicles are essential for effective coordination of highly mobile military forces. These capabilities directly enhance the delivery accuracy and lethality of manned and unmanned guided and unguided weapons systems. In addition, other mission requirements, such as reconnaissance and detection, require accurate
Joint Vision 2010.
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velocity, motion compensation, and positioning synchronization data to maintain real-time knowledge of the enemy. Accurate POSITIME sequencing and use of sensor information are key force multipliers to offset numerical superiority of an adversary and reduce casualties. Access to these technologies would amplify threats to regional stability by making available to hostile forces a much superior capability.
Figure 16.0-2. ConceptMilitary Operations in Urban Terrain
Situational awareness greatly reduces the combat stress of the warfighter. Situational awareness is a fundamental requirement for combat decision making and fratricide reduction. U.S. forces must be able to positively identify all targets in the battlespace for all combat mission areasair to air, air to surface, surface to surface, and surface to air. Surface, in this case, includes land, sea, and subsurface. Combat identification (CID) is essential in order for commanders to effectively field fighting forces that can rapidly and positively identify enemies, friends, and neutrals in the battlespace; manage and control the battle area; optimally employ weapons and forces; and minimize the risk and occurrence of fratricide.3 The greatly expanded military use of the U.S. GPS has created the significant, military advantage of an accurate navigation and time reference system, but at the price that hostile forces will try to locally jam GPS signals or use GPS for their own purposes. The latter could also require the use of local jamming by friendly forces to deny use of GPS by an enemy. Either scenario will require U.S. forces and its allies to use GPS in a high jamming environment. Developing technologies for GPS antijam improvements will mitigate this issue until new developing technologies provide DoD with an affordable, nonjammable, equivalent GPS precision navigation and precise time
Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan: Combat Identification.
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reference for the battlespace. In urban areas, loss of GPS signals due to signal blockage and multipath problems provides a challenge to overcome. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Over the next 2 to 5 years, differential GPS (DGPS) systems will provide very accurate navigation within 12 m in localized areas. Wide-area augmentation systems (WAAS) for air traffic control purposes will provide differential corrections over a wider area than most DGPS. Local area augmentation system (LAAS) will provide differential corrections for air traffic control in the vicinity of an airport. The use of GPS, long-range aid to navigation (LORAN), and other navigation/telecommunication systems [(Russian) Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), European Union GNSS-2, Teledesic, and other satellite telecommunication systems] will provide greater accuracy and minimize loss of satellite signals. Continued improvements in orbit accuracy and time could further improve GPS accuracy from 23 m to 1.5 m and DGPS accuracy to less than 0.6 m. However, radio navigation systems are not completely autonomous, relying on external signals that can be jammed. The military application of geodetic and geophysical databases, such as terrain, magnetic, and gravity matching techniques, offers the possibility of a more autonomous navigation capability, reducing the concern for detection and jamming of GPS and other radio aids. Such geodetic and geophysical data bases can support navigation to near-GPS accuracy when GPS service is not available (see subsection 16.3). Commercial telecommunications growth will continue, providing affordable hand-held cellular communications worldwide, including GPS/digital maps at the local area. On May 1, 2000, with the discontinuance of Selective Availability, the civilian accuracy of GPS was reduced (improved) to less than 10 meters and the accuracy of time broadcast by GPS was improved to within 40 billionths of a second4. By 2001, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has mandated that all cellular phones identify their locations to within 125 m for 911 emergency calls. These decisions will significantly increase PNT usage and research investments. Hybrid inertial navigation system (INS) systems, such as GPS combined with ring laser gyroscope (RLG) or fiber-optic gyroscope (FOG) INS, will be expanded with more combinations of navigation and telecommunication functions. This will minimize the effect of GPS jamming and loss of satellite signals due to terrain or other reasons. Miniaturized GPS (GPS on a chip) will hasten hybrid INS/telecommunication applications at reduced cost (see subsection 16.1.). Maximum utilization of near and far infrared devices (i.e., thermal tapes, BUDD, and Phoenix Light) and image intensifier (I2) devices across U.S. forces, together with increased training, can provide limited improvements in CID. Further integration among the U.S. forces and its allies of new CID technologies, both cooperative and noncooperative, will present a challenge to ensure that they are reliable and affordable. Over the next 5 to 15 years INS could be revolutionized by microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) technology, a fabrication approach that conveys the advantages of miniaturization, multiple components, and microelectronics to the design and construction of integrated electromechanical systems. Current MEMS tuning fork gyroscopes, smaller than a paper clip, have an accuracy of 100 deg/hr, with 10 deg/hr accuracy expected by the end of 1999. Given similar experiences over the past 20 years with RLGs and FOGs, it is very likely that MEMS gyroscopes with accuracy of 0.1 deg/hr are achievable within the next 5 to 15 years, with further improvements thereafter. Concurrently, RLG and FOG aircraft INS performance could continue to improve from 1.0 to 0.1 nmph circle error probable (CEP). MEMS technology could be further enhanced by the continued growth of optical computing/ processing/correlating technologies (see Section 10), especially in georegistration of hybridized data from remote sensors (pseudo-imaging) using highly accurate timing data. The use of MEMS technology within RLG/FOG INS is very possible as part of the affordable INS technology evolution shown in subsection 16.1. Accurate and miniaturized smart gravity and magnetic detection sensors combined with GPS/INS and satellite communications will provide target recognition and real-time movement and direction of enemy forces and large mass items, such as missiles, tanks, and other large weapons. These same sensors combined with biological, chemical, and/or neutron emission sensors could help identify and track movement of biological, chemical, and nuclear emissions on the battlefield. Further cost reductions would allow localized battle areas to be seeded (by mini-AUVs) with these detection devices, providing critical intelligence of troop, missile, tank, and artillery movement. Accurate time,
4
White House, Office of Press Secretary
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combined with multiple optical, vibration, magnetic, and gravity sensors in smart arrays, is a leveraging application of these technologies. The use of a standard time reference with ion clock technology will improve absolute accuracy to better than 1015. Further microminiaturization of low-power clock technologies will provide autonomous flywheel time devices in all navigation and communication equipment, providing direct-Y code acquisition and minimizing the effect of GPS jamming. These improvements will result in a precise standard military time reference for U.S. forces and its allies, providing enormous benefits in precision navigation and rapid and secure communications across the battlespace. Because of its importance, precise time and frequency (PT&F) capabilities are discussed in a separate subsection (16.5). The use of GPS time synchronization to locate the position of 911 cellular users can be adapted by the military to improve situational awareness in urban terrain. Integrated with CID tags and localized terrain maps, mininavigation/low probability of interception (LPI) telecommunication sensors may provide positive ID of friendly forces and thereby reduce the fog of war in urban terrain. Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a leveraging technology. Improvements in the land warrior system, the U.S. Armys first-generation integrated fighting system for dismounted combat soldiers, will integrate telecommunications and navigation technologies with an integrated helmet assembly subsystem including a heads-up display and image intensifier for night operations, a weapons subsystem with thermal weapon sight, close combat optics, video camera with a video capture capability, laser rangefinder/digital compass, and an infrared laser-aiming light. Over the next 15 to 20 years nanoelectromechanical systems (NEMS) technology, a technique of building machines (such as accelerometers and gyroscopes) from individual atoms and molecules, could continue to decrease the size and cost of INS. The low manufacturing cost of this technology could further revolutionize navigation by providing an autonomous INS using multiple NEMS accelerometers (potentially eliminating the need for gyroscopes), at a cost of less than $500. For the military, this could affordably allow a nonjammable INS to be installed on every air, land, and sea vehicle; smart weapon; artillery shell; and warfighter. Integrated with assets, such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), satellites, and AUVs, using advanced electro-optics, infrared radar, video cameras, motion-detection sensors, and sophisticated automatic target-identification algorithms and data bases, this technology will provide a very accurate view of the battlespace, particularly during military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) (see Figure 16.0-2). Expanded use of an affordable, accurate, and autonomous navigation system could better support precision insertion of combat forces and their protection, providing low fratricide and collateral damage, particularly in urban terrain. By 2025, friendly troops and equipment will enter the battlespace with their personal identifiers. The identification mechanisms could be in the form of microchips worn by or imbedded in the soldiers. The same principle could be applied to vehicles. NEMS technology promises to be among the most promising developments of the 21st century. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Depending on national desires and needs, nations have chosen to develop, produce, and use positioning, navigation, and PT&F technologies for military and commercial purposes. Many countries do not have an indigenous aircraft-, ship-, or spacecraft-manufacturing capability and the inherent guidance and navigation technology that are fundamental requirements. The cost for Third World countries to design, fabricate, and apply these technology areas has been a limiting proliferation factor. However, the latest transition of MEMS technology to low cost and highly accurate gyroscopes and accelerometers, coupled with advances in computer memory and speed, have significantly reduced the cost of INS. Historically, an INS was and continues to be more expensive to produce and maintain than a radio navigation system. This and other military mission considerations have led many nations to rely more on radio navigation systems for many military and commercial needs. Continuous gains in microminiaturization of sensors and computer technology will continue to drive down the cost of INS. As INS costs drop, the technology could become available to countries heretofore unable to afford this system, which has the military advantage of an autonomous, covert, and nonjammable guidance and navigation capability for aircraft, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). MEMS technology is already used by Japan, South Korea, and other countries for automotive airbag applications (accelerometers) and ride control and antiskid systems (gyroscopes and accelerometers). Current MEMS technology has been successful in producing accurate linear acceleration sensors, but is years away from providing an
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accuracy similar to a RLG INS. However, low-cost MEMS INS, compounded with the worldwide commercial use of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and its technology advances and the emergence of accurate terrain mapping, will allow for the proliferation and accessibility of highly accurate PNT systems, which will be a challenge to prevent. Currently, the only GNSS that exist are the U.S. GPS and the GLONASS. A regional GNSS, such as the European Union GNSS 2, is a strong possibility. The GNSS 2 may consist of 63 low-Earth-orbiting satellites, providing 5- to 10-m accuracy. The latest satellite-based cellular phone systems could also solve the geolocation problem. Increased proliferation of foreign GNSS capability could provide unbridled and accessible navigation accuracy that could enhance the delivery accuracy of Third World countries missiles and WMD. The radio navigation process supports a magnetic heading reference for the world. The expanding use of GPS has reversed this trend, and the future will see the conversion to true heading for geo-referencing as mapping and imaging technologies converge. Many countries are using the U.S. GPS to improve the accuracy of their weapons and the situational awareness of their operations forces. Jamming of GPS signals by the United States in the event of war would limit its usefulness to an adversary, but doing so would require the United States and its friendly forces to operate effectively in a high jamming environment. Those developing technologies such as accurate, small clocks that allow usability of GPS signals in a high jamming environment are considered critical for military use. Currently, U.S. military needs for crypto, secure telecommunications, and antijam communications are becoming increasingly dependent on the accurate time from GPS. Precise time is key to the future of navigation and communication systems. The need for an autonomous, nonjammable, common time reference source is discussed in subsection 16.5. Precise time technologies will provide accurate and stable time to be disseminated to military forces around the world. The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of precise time technology, including telecommunication, encryption, and data transfer. Some countries, such as France, the UK, and Russia, have been leaders in positioning, including inertial, gravity, and magnetic sensors; radio navigation; and precise time because of their indigenous aircraft and spacecraft industry. These countries have developed their own technologies. For other countries, much of the technology capability has been obtained through U.S. licensing agreement transfers and foreign students attending U.S. universities. Now, however, inertial and GNSS technology symposia are held in Europe, Russia, and China with wide international attendance and paper presentations. Hybrid navigation system technology is also now a common topic at international navigation conferences, and the theory and practice of Kalman filters is well known. Continued cooperation with allies and international bodies is necessary to reduce the proliferation and use of accurate INS, hybrid INS, and GNSS capabilities for use by adversaries in missiles and WMD. The development leaders of situational awareness/combat identification (SA/CID) technologies are for the most part located within the NATO countries: France, Germany, the UK, and the United States. Further details of the foreign technology assessment are provided in the respective subsections.
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Country Australia Austria Brazil Canada China Czech Republic Finland France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Poland Romania Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK Ukraine United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Sec. 16.1 Inertial Navigation and Related Components
Sec. 16.2 Gravity Meters and Gravity Gradiometers
Sec. 16.3 Radio and DataBased Referenced Navigation Systems
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
(Continued)
Figure 16.0-3. Positioning, Navigation, and Time WTA Summary
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Sec. 16.4 Magnetometer and Magnetic Gradiometers
Sec. 16.5 Precision Time and Frequency
Sec. 16.6 Situational Awareness/ Combat Identification

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.0-3. Positioning, Navigation, and Time WTA Summary (Contd)
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SECTION 16.1INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS

Highlights Inertial navigation technologies provide an autonomous, covert, and nonjammable three-dimensional position and velocity reference for land, sea, and space platforms, which will enhance the ability of the military to achieve mission goals. Major reduction in manufacturing complexity, size, and cost of INS will be realized by use of MEMS sensors, electronics, and radio-frequency (RF) interfaces. This will allow expanded military use of INS (for personnel, low- cost vehicles, smart artillery and ordnance, and AUVs) and expanded commercial applications, thereby providing a larger market for more nontraditional manufacturers of inertial navigation technology. Through better noise compensation techniques, RLG and FOG will continue to improve free inertial performance (1.0 to 0.1 nm/hr), providing better platform stability augmentation and weapon delivery. Future developments in nanotechnology, particularly NEMS accelerometers, may eliminate the need for gyroscopes if quantum noise measurement techniques are resolved. If achieved, this may exploit the use of NEMS within the basic building materials for tanks, vehicles, and uniforms, significantly improving situational awareness and reducing fratricide. Military application of INS with embedded GPS, LORAN, and data-based referenced navigation systems (DBRNS) will increase. These hybrid systems bound the time-dependent errors of the inertial gyroscopes. The resulting accuracy of position and time provides a more robust navigation system. Improvements in hybrid systems will lead to port-to-port submarine navigation without need to surface. Built-in redundancy through low cost, small size, lightweight, and highly reliable components will allow an affordable, throwaway logistics concept. This will enable a rapid affordable technology insertion of INS technology.
OVERVIEW An INS is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. The current major obstacle of more universal INS use is its loss of accuracy over time and high cost. Military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and command, control, and communications (C3) systems require high navigation accuracy. Figures 16.1-1 and 16.1-2 address the key gyroscope and accelerometer performance requirements for these military applications, as well the key commercial automotive market driver. INS technology has been enormously affected by advances in computer technology (memory and throughput), sensors, power quality, and electronics. Most current INS use optical gyroscopes: RLG or FOGs. RLG and FOG INS technology will continue to improve free inertial sensor performance from 1.0 nmph to less than 0.1 nmph, while decreasing costs.
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1,000 SCALE-FACTOR STABILITY (ppm)

MISSLE INTERCEPTOR
TO TACTICAN MISSLE AU MIDCOURSE

GUIDANCE
AHRS
100 50 10
STELLAR AIDED REENTRY
CRUISE MISSILE AIRCRAFT
TANKS
SELF-ALIGNING STRATEGIC MISSLE STELLAR-AIDED STRATEGIC MISSILE
MECHANICAL-PENDULOUS REBALANCE ACCELEROMETERS
0.1
0.1
1
HIGH PERFORMANCE
10
50
100
1,000
LOW PERFORMANCE
10,000
MEDIUM PERFORMANCE BIAS STABILITY (ug)
99-0042-1
Figure 16.1-1. Accelerometer Technology Applications (shaded area is militarily critical region)
1 nautical mile < 10 g 10<g < 100
earth rate
TO AU
FLIGHT CONTROL SMART MUNITIONS
SCALE-FACTOR STABILITY (ppm)
1,000
STELLAR AIDED RV AHRS TORPEDOES
TACTICAL MISSLE MIDCOURSE GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION
ROBOTICS
100
STELLAR CRUISE MISSILE AIDED NAVIGATOR SURVEYING AUTONOMOUS SUBMARINE
MISSILE INTERCEPTOR
10
STRATEGIC MISSILE
POINTING AND TRACKING
UNAIDED RV
0.1 0.000015
0.00015
0.0015 0.015
0.15
1.5
15
150
1500
HIGH PERFORMANCE
MEDIUM PERFORMANCE BIAS STABILITY (deg/h)
LOW PERFORMANCE
98-0042-2
Figure 16.1-2. Gyroscope Technology Applications (shaded areas are militarily critical regions)
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RATIONALE INS technology (providing an autonomous, anti-jam, and covert capability of guidance and navigation) will continue to be critical for military use in the foreseeable future. The availability of the GNSS in a tightly coupled approach with the INS provides a system that is robust against jamming and satellite availability and more accurate than either INS or GNSS alone. However, the emergence of low cost INS, coupled with other sensors [forwardlooking infrared radar (FLIR), LORAN, air data, gravimeters, radar and/or laser altimeter] and geo-referenced databases (digital terrain maps including magnetic and gravity data), will provide an alternative to GPS in a high jamming environment. Further improvements in hybrid INS systems, particularly DBRN, will increase covertness and accuracy without use of GNSS. This will lead to port-to-port submarine navigation capability without need to surface. These systems can also provide very accurate guidance and velocity data for an adversarial aircraft, missile, or WMD. The increased reliability and decreased cost of RLGs, FOGs, and MEMS gyros (gyro on a chip) will allow for an expanding list of military and commercial applications. An INS and its respective sensor components have wide applications in commercial transport and civil aircraft, surveying, research, and robotics. While this provides greater opportunities to develop these technologies rapidly, the transfer of technology for non-U.S. military advancements will be a challenge to prevent. Low cost, micromachined inertial technology is receiving wide commercial funding outside of the United States. The General Accounting Office (GAO)/National Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD) Report 93-67 of March 1993 noted that the technical data for nonmilitary INS is the same as for military INS and is particularly sensitive because it enables the licensee to manufacture all or part of the item. This quote is even more germane today. Future key critical technologies are the emergence of low-cost, microminiaturized INS using MEMS (MEMS could revolutionize navigation). The commercial automotive markets are driving the MEMS technology development. Current MEMS gyroscopes are less than 5 1 cm, with an accuracy of 100 deg/hr at a cost of under $50. Industry expectations are to achieve 10 deg/hr by the end of 2000. Depending on military investments in that market, over the next 510 years MEMS-type gyroscopes could achieve tactical accuracy of 1.0 to 0.1 deg/hr. Future miniaturization using NEMS sensors may be possible. The advantage would be the elimination of the gyroscope, using only accelerometers for sensing linear and rotational acceleration in a 360-deg cluster per axis. The issue is the sensitivity of the accelerometer to detect Earths gravity because of the sensors small mass and ability to detect quantum noise levels. Currently, the NEMS market driver is focused on medical commercial applications. This technology has been included because of its potential significant military benefits of reduced of INS cost and size. NEMS technology will lag MEMS technology by 10 years. Figure 16.1-3 shows the INS technology trends and costs projections over the next 1020 years across multiple INS users. Figure 16.1-3 also shows that more sensor hybridization will occur over the next 510 years as GPS and other telecommunication functions are tightly coupled and integrated with INS. This massive production base, as well as the low cost of MEMS and NEMS sensors, could significantly reduce the cost of many military INS to less than $500. As the cost of INS decreases, their use in commercial applications will increase dramatically, especially in active robotic control. Current INS commercial applications already include stabilization of cameras (analogous to weapon sight stabilization) and automotive ride and stability control (analogous to turret stabilization). Foreign availability is increasing rapidly as the need for specialized manufacturing equipment and facilities decreases. Continued decreases in the cost and size of INS technology will affordably allow autonomous, non-jammable, and accurate INS to be installed on most DoD assets and even combat personnel, thereby providing a common coordinated reference system for the military battlespace. The military dependency on GPS, with its inherent susceptibility in a jamming environment, has led to more use of INS tightly coupled with GPS in a hybrid INS configuration. The current tri-Service, embedded GPS/INS [embedded Global Positioning System inertial (EGI)] is an example of the movement of these separate systems (GPS and INS) into a single system, with the attendant reductions in size, weight, and cost. Future technology advances in electronic miniaturization, such as GPS on a chip (refer to Subsection 16.3), as well as satellite-based telecommunication systems using trilateration timing signals (i.e., Celestri, Teledesic and 911 Cellular), will result in further combination of navigation and communications functions. A seamless navigation system using hybrid sensors is a must for urban warfare. The degree of coupling of these external and internal sources and the amount of filtering and state vectors in these filters all play a role in determining the accuracy of the
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resultant hybrid system. Hybrid navigation system technology is now a common topic at international navigation conferences, and the theory and practice of Kalman filters is well known throughout the world. It is possible to procure simulators from a wide range of commercial sources, and the algorithms are published in textbooks and journals. Use of multi-MEMS INS will provide greater accuracy, survivability, and fault tolerance for an autonomous military capability.
NOW
Spinning Gyro/ Gimbals
Spinning Gyro Strapdown
RLG Strapdown
Mini-RLG + GPS Strapdown
FOG + GPS Strapdown
Microelectromechanical (MEMS) Strapdown and GPS and Telecommunication
Nanoelectromechanical (NEMS) Strapdown and GPS and Telecommunication
Navy
ASN-92
ASN-130
ASN-139
Air Force
Aircraft
EGI
(Joint Service)
Army
GGP
(DARPA)
RPV/ Missiles
Gen X
(DARPA)
Smart Weapons
Gen XX
Munitions and Personnel
Vehicles
$200K
$150K
$125K
$85K
$20K
$5K or Less
$1K or Less
Figure 16.1-3. INS Technology Transition Trends1
Gyro astro-tracking devices could enhance navigation accuracy, where terrain and gravity data for geo-mapping may be difficult to obtain from certain areas and when GPS is unavailable. In addition, position errors increase for high altitude and space applications. An alternative approach to autonomous navigation utilizes an INS platform tightly coupled with a star tracker to bound the position error. Star-tracking-aided INS is particularly applicable to high-altitude and space applications. For example, a 1-nm/hr INS corrected by means of Kalman filtering with continuous star fix information can limit the position error on the order of 30 m. The tracker pointing errors, gravity compensation errors, and accelerometer instabilities are the dominant error sources. To achieve this position accuracy, tracker measurements and gravity and accelerometer compensations need to be accurate to approximately 1.0 arc sec each. These accuracies are available today at very high cost. Use of new technology trackers utilizing electro-formed optics on nickel bases with micro-precision sensor arrays, as well as improved processors, gravity
Excludes ship/submarine INS technology evolution because of its unique performance requirements.
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compensations, and future generation strapdown inertial instruments, should significantly reduce cost, size, and weight. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The technology gap between the United States and other nations is rapidly closing. The United States leads the world in most inertial technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, alignment, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. However, France, Israel, UK, China, Japan, and Russia are rapidly closing the gap. Russia and the China have produced conventional inertial products and have initial production capability in RLGs and FOGs. Russia has developed some flexure rotor and magnetically suspended gyroscopes, and the quality of these gyroscopes appears to be on a par with Western equipment. Because tuned-rotor gyroscopes are inexpensive and very suitable for a space reentry guidance application, the acquisition of this type of technology has enhanced gyroscopic capability in maneuvering UAVs. Nations developing an inertial capability include Australia, Brazil, China, India, Israel, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. The increasing use of inertial sensors in very high volume, nontraditional markets, such as automotive and smart shells, has the potential to tilt this paradigm dramatically.
Inertial Navigation System (INS) Hybrid Inertial Navigation Systems (including GNSS)
Gyro Astro Tracking Systems

Moderate R&D
Inertial Sensors
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.1-4. INS and Related Components WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.1. INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS AND RELATED COMPONENTS
Inertial Navigation Systems .......................................................................................................... III-16-17 Hybrid Inertial Navigation Systems (Including GNSS) ....................................................................... III-16-20 Gyro Astro-Tracking Inertial Navigation Systems.............................................................................. III-16-23 Ring Laser Gyroscopes (RLG) ....................................................................................................... III-16-25 Fiber Optic Gyroscopes (FOG) ...................................................................................................... III-16-27 Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) Gyroscopes and Accelerometers ............................................ III-16-29 Accelerometers Other than Micro-Machined Devices........................................................................... III-16-32 Nanoelectromechanical Systems (NEMS) Accelerometers.................................................................... III-16-34
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

In next 5 to 10 years: For aircraft, vehicle, or spacecraft for attitude, guidance, and controlnavigation error < 0.2 nmi/hr 90% CEP. For shipsnavigation error of < 1.0 nmi in 30 hrs. For missilesnavigation error of < 0.8 nmi/hr. Or specified to function at linear acceleration > 10 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and cheaper.
None identified. Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Ships motion simulator. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. INS alignment time for moving platform and transfer alignment techniques. Algorithms for gyro compensation, Kalman filter implementations, and sensor data processing.
Technical Issues
INS is the only self-contained, nonradiating, nonjammable, autonomous navigation technology. Alignment time versus accuracy. High latitude initialization problems. INS performance can be significantly improved by sequentially changing the gimbal orientation.
Aviation, ships, spacecraft. Miniaturization and larger volume markets will significantly reduce costs. Accuracy is a cost driver.
RATIONALE An INS is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. The current major obstacle of more universal INS use is its loss of accuracy over time and high cost. These obstacles are being reduced or eliminated by more accurate gyroscope and accelerometer sensors, as well as advances in computer technology (memory and throughput), power quality, and electronics. Military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy capability. For submarines increased INS performance will result in increased covertness, thereby increasing mission effectiveness. Most current INS use optical gyroscopes: RLGs or FOGs. The move from the older, mechanical technologies has been driven by the commercial and military market demanding lower weight, lower power, and smaller size with improvements in reliability. Tuned rotor gyros, however, continue to be improved, and the size is decreasing. Land navigation that uses many of the older technologies is still viable, using hybridization with GPS. Over the next 510 years, RLG and FOG INS technology will continue to improve its free inertial performance from 1.0 nmph to
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less than 0.1 nmph, while decreasing costs. Future trends toward using MEMS sensors will continue to significantly decrease the cost of this technology. Military applications of this technology will enhance the following: Vehicle, aircraft, spacecraft, ship, and submarine navigation Weather balloon navigation AUV navigation Air vehicle heading, attitude, and angle of attack Accurate velocity for weapon release/targeting Search and rescue Nuclear reset Situation awareness.
This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 precision engagement by providing both delivery application and low-observable technology. This technology also supports the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology (S&T) Plan for precision force. The use of INS during GPS jamming and/or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. In addition, this technology supports the Navy plan for a precise navigation system as a backup to GPS or as a successor system once the GPS technology becomes obsolete. There are no special requirements (such as a cooperative agreement) for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia France Italy Slovak Republic Sweden Ukraine
Legend:
Brazil Germany Japan South Africa Switzerland United States
Canada India Norway South Korea Taiwan
China Israel Russia Spain UK
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The technology gap between the United States, Canada, and the UK and other nations is rapidly closing. The United States leads the world in most inertial technologies and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, alignment, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. However, France, Israel, UK, Germany, China, Japan, and Russia are rapidly improving. Russia and the China have produced conventional inertial systems and have full production capability. Both countries have sponsored international symposia. Nations that are developing an inertial capability include Australia, Brazil, China, India, Israel, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production.
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The following organizations have active research programs: United States Astronautics (Kearfott) Crossbow Technologies Honeywell Lockheed Martin Smith Industries Brazil Embraer Israel Elbit Systems Germany Daimler Chrysler Aerospace France Aerospatiale Matra SNECMA UK British Aerospace Japan Mitsubishi Industries Italy Piaggio Aero Industries LITEF Airbus Industries Boeing Draper Labs Litton Northrop Grumman
Smith Industries
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. HYBRID INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (INCLUDING GNSS)

In next 5 to 10 years: For aircraft, vehicle, ship, missile or spacecraftnavigation error < 1 m 50% spherical error probable (SEP) in position, Or specified to function at linear acceleration > 10 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive.
None identified. None identified. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Source code for combining INS with Doppler, GNSS, or DBRN. INS initial alignment software for moving platform, transfer align techniques, and reference to geoid.
Technical Issues
Use of Doppler, acoustic (bathymetric), stellar, gravity sensing, or terrain data from data bases to improve GNSS/INS beyond uncompensated control level. Except for Doppler and acoustic, these methods are self-contained, nonradiating, and nonjammable. Aviation, ships, spacecraft, and land vehicles. Accuracy and autonomy are the key drivers. Reduced processor costs and memory will significantly reduce costs.
RATIONALE Hybrid INS/GNSS systems combine the best features of different navigation systems to provide an autonomous, covert, and nonjammable system that will locate our forces and, when used with other technologies, can locate enemy troops and targets. In surface and above-surface applications, the INS outputs can be optimally combined with GPS to produce a smooth, blended output, and if GPS is lost (or jammed), then the INS will produce a seamless navigation output. In this latter case increased INS performance will result in a more accurate navigation solution after loss of GPS. GPS by itself does not provide a north direction unless the sensor is moving. Therefore, a north reference from a gyrocompass, an INS, or a simple magnetic compass is needed. Using multiple GPS antennas, adequately spaced on a rigid body, will provide position information which can be used to derive an estimate of geographical heading. Future technology advances in electronic miniaturization, as well as satellite-based telecommunication systems using trilateration timing signals, will result in further combination of navigation and communications functions. Seamless navigation systems using hybrid sensors are a must for urban warfare. The degree of coupling of these external and internal sources and the amount of filtering and state vectors in these filters all play a role in determining the accuracy of the resultant hybrid system. Hybrid navigation system technology is now a common topic at international navigation conferences, and the theory and practice of Kalman filters, modern control theory, and other alternative estimation techniques are well known throughout the world. Simulators from a wide range of commercial sources are available, and the algorithms are published in textbooks and journals. Advanced alternative techniques to Kalman filters are routinely presented at international symposia and in the international academic community. There are little remaining effective control measures because of the widespread dissemination of this knowledge. Use of multi-MEMS INS will provide greater accuracy, survivability, and fault tolerance for an autonomous military capability.
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This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 precision engagement by providing both delivery application and low-observable technology. This technology also supports the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology (S&T) Plan for precision force. The use of INS during GPS jamming and/or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. In addition, this technology supports the Navy plan for a precise navigation system as a backup to GPS or as a successor system once the GPS technology becomes obsolete. Military applications of this technology will enhance the following: Supply location systems Spacecraft navigation Parachute insertion Air vehicle attitude and angle of attack Battlefield targeting Helicopter hover positioning Gravity measuring system HF communications frequency management Encryption/decryption DGPS Ship cargo management Situation awareness Minefield positioning Search and rescue Weather balloon navigation Inertial navigator reset and mapping System integration of sensors Pseudolite positioning system Position reporting for high-value assets AUV navigation Artillery smart round Differential GPS for heading Nuclear reset Construction
There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia France Italy South Africa Switzerland United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Brazil Germany Japan South Korea Taiwan
Canada India Norway Spain UK

Moderate R&D
China Israel Russia Sweden Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Hybrid INS technology is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At the present time, the United States, France, and Germany appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Astronautics Crossbow Technologies Honeywell Lockheed Martin Smith Industries Boeing Galaxy Scientific Corporation Litton Northrop Grumman
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Brazil Embraer Israel Elbit Systems Germany Daimler Chrysler Aerospace France Aerospatiale Matra SNECMA UK British Aerospace Japan Mitsubishi Industries Italy Liral Piaggio Aero Industries LITEF Airbus Industries
Smith Industries
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. GYRO ASTRO-TRACKING INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

In next 5 to 10 years: Navigation error < 0.1 nmph 50% CEP; Azimuth accuracy < 50 arc seconds; Or specified to function at linear acceleration > 10 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive.
None identified. Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Alignment or start-up time versus accuracy. Large size, high weight, and high cost restrict applications to high valued platforms.
Spacecraft stabilization and basic geodetic research. Miniaturization and larger volume markets will significantly reduce costs.
RATIONALE Gyro astro-tracking systems improvements are critical to improving covert accuracy and reducing cost. The military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, and surface ships. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy. Many current astro trackers use optical gyroscopes such as the RLG. RLG and INS technology will continue to improve gyro astro tracker performance while decreasing costs. Future trends toward using MEMS sensors, advanced optics, and infrared sensors will continue to decrease the cost and increase the application of this technology. Joint Vision 2010 identifies this technology because it supports precision engagement by providing both delivery application and low-observable (covert) technology. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this technology for precision force. Its use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Denmark Israel Russia United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Brazil France Italy Switzerland

Significant R&D
Canada Germany Japan UK

Moderate R&D
China India Netherlands Ukraine
Limited R&D
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A space-based stellar compass has been developed at the Technical University of Denmark. This stellar compass with a low mass, low power consumption, and fully autonomous operation, providing a high accuracy quaternion output and low-cost implementation, represents an advance in the art of star trackers. The stellar compass shows promise for both government and commercial use if both cost and weight can be significantly reduced. Obtaining space-qualified hardware that will be needed for future warfighting requirements is one of the objectives of the Navys 2 Space S&T Council. Russia and China have produced conventional astro trackers. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. Gyro astro tracking inertial navigation technology is limited because of its costs and limited commercial applications. At the present time the United States, Russia, Denmark, and Germany appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Astronautics (Kearfott) Northrop-Grumman Denmark University of Denmark Russia Astro-IKI Kuznetsov Research Institute for Applied Mechanics Litton U.S. Naval Observatory
Space Newsletter No 2: rsted Stellar Compass, Office of Naval Research Newsletter, European Office.
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. RING LASER GYROSCOPES (RLG)

In next 5 to 10 years: Drift rate stability of < 0.005 deg/hr for < 10 g, or Drift rate stability of < 25 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g, or Specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive.
None identified. Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics.
Technical Issues
Alignment time versus accuracy. High costs for initial national capability. Dynamic range up to 400 deg/sec. Lock-in problem at very low turn rates. Requires compensation capability or alternative designs. Surface finish of mirror is a major error source.
Aviation, ships, spacecraft, and land vehicles. Miniaturization and larger volume markets will significantly reduce costs.
RATIONALE An INS is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. RLG inertial sensor improvements are critical to improving accuracy and reducing cost. The military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy. Many current INS use optical gyroscopes such as the RLGs. Over the next 510 years, RLG technology will continue to improve free inertial sensor performance from 1.0 nmph to less than 0.1 nmph, while decreasing costs. Applications include single-axis and multi-axis (cube) sensors. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology for precision engagement by providing both delivery application and low observable technology. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this technology for precision force. Its use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Australia Germany Japan South Korea United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada India Netherlands Taiwan

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D
France Italy South Africa Ukraine
Limited R&D
The technology gap between the United States and other nations is rapidly closing. The United States leads the world in most inertial technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration of RLG inertial sensors. However, France, Israel, UK, China, Japan, and Russia are rapidly closing the gap. Russia and China have produced conventional inertial systems and have initial production capability in RLG. Nations that are developing an inertial sensor capability include Australia, Brazil, China, Japan, India, Israel, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. The increasing use of inertial sensors in very high volume, nontraditional markets, such as automotive and smart shells, has the potential to tilt this paradigm dramatically. The following organizations have active research programs in RLG technology: United States Astronautics (Kearfott) Honeywell Lockheed Martin Smith Industries Brazil Embraer Israel Elbit Systems Germany Daimler Chrysler Aerospace France Aerospatiale Matra SFIM UK British Aerospace Japan Hitachi LITEF Airbus Industries Boeing Litton Northrop-Grumman
Smith Industries Mitsubishi Industries
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. FIBER-OPTIC GYROSCOPES (FOG)

In next 5 to10 years: Drift rate stability of < 0.01 deg/hr for < 10 g, or Drift rate stability of < 0.25 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g, or Specified to function at acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive.
None identified. Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics. Reduce environmental sensitivities. Reduce or eliminate dead band at zero input rates. Alignment time versus accuracy. Reliance on commercial optical fiber industry for high-quality fiber. Fiber-winding technology. Optimum sensor for low-cost hybridization with other sensors such as GPS integrated optics.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE An INS is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. FOG inertial sensor improvements are critical to improving accuracy and reducing cost. The military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy. Most current INS use RLGs. INS with FOG are significantly lower in cost than RLGs, and are just now being introduced in military applications requiring less accuracy than RLGs. In the next 510 years, however, FOG INS technology will continue to improve INS performance from 2.0 nmph to less than 0.4 nmph, while decreasing costs. Further accuracy improvement requires a better gravity model for INS with FOG sensors. The Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology for precision engagement by providing accurate delivery application. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this technology for precision force. Inertial sensor use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. The Navy plan identifies miniature navigation systems as a key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Australia France Netherlands Sweden Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Brazil Germany Russia Switzerland United States
Canada Israel South Africa Taiwan
China Japan South Korea UK
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The technology gap between the United States and other nations is rapidly closing. The United States leads the world in most inertial technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration of FOG inertial sensors. However, France, Israel, UK, China, Japan, and Russia are rapidly closing the gap. Russia and China have produced conventional inertial systems and have initial production capability in FOG. Nations that are developing an inertial sensor capability include Australia, Brazil, China, India, Israel, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. The increasing use of inertial FOG inertial sensors in very high volume, nontraditional markets, such as automotive and smart shells, has the potential to tilt this paradigm dramatically. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Astronautics (Kearfott) Crossbow Honeywell Litton Northrop-Grumman Israel Elbit Systems Germany Deutschland GmbH France Aerospatiale Matra SFIM Industries and Photonetics (consortium) UK British Aerospace Japan Hitachi China Kwangwoon University Smith Industries Mitsubishi Industries LITEF Airbus Industries Boeing Fibersense Technology Corp. KVH Industries Lockheed Martin Smith Industries
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. MICROELETROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (MEMS) GYROSCOPES AND ACCELEROMETERS

In next 5 to 10 years: Gyroscope: Drift rate stability of < 0.05 deg/hr for < 10 g, or Drift rate stability of < 0.5 deg/hr for 10 to 100 g, or Specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform. Accelerometer: Bias stability of 400 g, or Scale factor stability of 300 ppm.
None identified. Components require specially designed manufacturing test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics. With respect to frequency stability, as the dimensions get smaller, the noise gets worse. Orthogonality of sensors requires compensation due to miniaturization (mechanical limits). Inherently capable of operation in extreme high g environment (artillery). Quantum noise and frequency measurement.
Technical Issues
Aviation, ships, spacecraft, and land vehicles. Miniaturization will increase application of this technology. Larger volume markets will significantly reduce costs.
RATIONALE An INS is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. The current major obstacle of more universal INS use is its loss of accuracy over time and high cost. Improvements of MEMS gyroscopes and accelerometers are critical to improving accuracy and reducing cost. The combination of size, weight, power, and cost requirements are driving the development of MEMS technology. Military applications in the next 5 to 10 years include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, UAVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy. Most current INS use optical gyroscopes such as RLGs or FOGs. MEMS gyroscope and accelerometer technology could continue to improve free inertial sensor performance over the next 510 years from 10 nmph to less than 3.0 nmph, while decreasing costs, if quantum noise and frequency measurement issues are resolved. Future trends toward using NEMS sensors will continue to decrease the cost of these sensors. Applications include single-axis and multi-axis (cube) sensors. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology for precision engagement by providing accurate delivery application more affordably. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this for precision force. MEMS sensor use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle
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coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. The Navy plan identifies miniature navigation systems as key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. Point Research Corporation, a U.S. company, has developed a dead-reckoning system for the Land Warrior using a triad of magneto-resistive magnetometers for heading determination and a triad of MEMS accelerometers for tilt compensation of the magnetometers and footstep detection. Because of its size and cost reductions over current INS, the system also could be used as a terminal guidance system for smart munitions (i.e., mortars and artillery shells). Continued research is needed to resolve the issue of noise measurement. The following key development areas should be pursued. Develop resonators of temperature-compensated materials Measure quantum noise vs. frequency to determine scaling laws Measure nonlinear effects (drive level sensitivity, acceleration sensitivity, and thermal transient effect) Measure noise vs. helium and hydrocarbon pressures (to measure effects on temperature fluctuation noise, Johnson noise, and adsorption-desorption noise).
Canada India Netherlands South Korea Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel Norway Spain UK

Significant R&D
France Italy Russia Sweden Ukraine

Moderate R&D
Germany Japan South Africa Switzerland United States
Limited R&D
The United States leads the world in MEMS technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration of this technology. However, France, Germany, UK, and Japan are rapidly closing the gap. The paradigm that high development and production cost of new technology in itself limits accessibility has the potential of dramatically changing because of MEMS technologys significantly lower production costs. MEMS technology has the greatest potential of opening this INS capability to nontraditional markets and nations. This field is receiving extensive support from the commercial and automotive industries. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Advanced Micro Machines, Inc. Astronautics (Kearfott) DARPA Honeywell Litton Denmark Mikroelecktronik Centret Analog Devices Incorporated Crossbow Technologies Draper Labs IntelliSense Corporation
Technical University of Denmark
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Germany Fraunhofer Institute LITEF GmbH UK Encoder Technology Spain Centro Nacimal de Microelectronica Sweden Volvo Car Corporation Japan Hitachi Nissan France CEA-LETI Sextant Avionique TIMA
HSG-IMIT
Surface Technology Systems
Nippondenso
SAGEM SGS-Thompson University of Bordeaux
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. ACCELEROMETERS OTHER THAN MICRO-MACHINED DEVICES

In next 5 to 10 years: Bias stability of < 100 g, or Scale factor stability of < 80 ppm, or Specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive by factor of 10.
None identified. Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment; accelerometer axis align stations; ion milling; Plaza Arc; electronic sputtering. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters. Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics.
Technical Issues
Orthogonality of sensors requires compensation due to miniaturization. Inherently capable of operation in extreme high g environment (artillery).
RATIONALE This technology is a major component of an INS that is a self-contained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs. The current major obstacle of more universal INS use is its loss of accuracy over time and high cost. Improvements in accelerometers other than micro-machined devices are critical to improve accuracy and reduce cost. The military applications include both strategic and tactical systems: missiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Targeting, surveillance, and C3 systems require high navigation accuracy. Future trends toward using MEMS sensors will continue to decrease the cost of this technology. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology for precision engagement by providing both accurate delivery application and low-observable technology. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this technology for precision force. Its use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. The S&T plan also identifies miniature navigation systems as key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of timecritical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Australia France Italy Slovak Republic UK
Legend:
Brazil Germany Japan South Africa Ukraine

Significant R&D
Canada India Norway Sweden United States
China Israel Russia Switzerland
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads the world in this technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration of inertial sensors. However, France, Germany, Israel, UK, China, and Japan are rapidly closing the gap. Nations that are developing this inertial sensor capability include Australia, Brazil, India, Italy, Sweden, South Africa, Russia, and Norway. Their major obstacles are access to a market of sufficient size to justify the development costs and the capital equipment costs for high-volume production. The use of accelerometers other than micro-machined devices in very high volume, nontraditional markets, such as automotive and smart shells, has the potential to tilt this paradigm dramatically. However, it appears that the automotive and munitions market will bypass improvements in this area and drive the technology to MEMS and NEMS. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Honeywell UK Encoder Technology Litton
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DATA SHEET III-16.1. NANOELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS (NEMS) ACCELEROMETERS

In next 10 to 20 years: Bias stability of < 200 g, or Scale factor stability of < 200 ppm, or Specified to function at linear acceleration levels > 100 g on any platform. In addition, developing technology will be lighter and less expensive by factor of 10.
None identified. Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment; accelerometer axis align stations. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters Error compensation for environmental effects and technology characteristics
Technical Issues
Size reduction limited by proof mass of sensor. With respect to frequency stability, as the dimensions get smaller, the noise gets worse. Orthogonality of sensors requires compensation due to miniaturization. Inherently capable of operation in extreme high g environment (artillery). Quantum noise and frequency measurement.
RATIONALE This technology has the potential of providing a significant reduction in the cost of an INS. INS is a selfcontained, covert system that provides continuous estimates of some or all components of a vehicle state, such as position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rate, and often guidance or steering inputs This technology is currently in its embryonic stage, with limited R&D investments. Over the next 1020 years, however, development of NEMS accelerometers has the greatest potential to bring INS technology to the widest military applications, providing autonomous navigation at significantly reduced cost. The military applications are the same as those for current INS: strategic and tactical systemsmissiles, AUVs, manned aircraft, satellites, aircraft carriers, submarines, surface ships, and land warfare. Additional usages may be possible because of NEMS significantly lower cost for increased battlefield situational awareness, small munitions, artillery shells, mortars, and miniature AUVs. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology for precision engagement, by providing both accurate delivery application and low-observable technology more affordably. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan also supports this technology for precision force. Its use during GPS jamming or loss and its all-weather capability will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. The S&T plan identifies miniature navigation systems as key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Continued research needs to resolve the issue of quantum noise issues. The following key development areas should be pursued. Develop resonators of temperature-compensated materials Measure quantum noise vs. frequency to determine scaling laws Measure nonlinear effects (drive level sensitivity, acceleration sensitivity, and thermal transient effect) Measure noise vs. helium and hydrocarbon pressures (to measure effects on temperature fluctuation noise, Johnson noise, and adsorption-desorption noise).

Denmark United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
This technology is in its embryonic stage, with very few nations currently investing in it for applications in INS. This is seen as an evolutionary path for MEMS. The following organizations have active research programs in nanotechnology: Denmark Mikroelecktronik Centret United States Cornell University Rice University UK Oxford University Japan National Institute for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research Technical University of Denmark Draper Labs
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SECTION 16.2GRAVITY METERS AND GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS

Highlights Gravity sensor arrays will be more viable due to accurate time sequencing, computer speed, and memory advances, providing increased detection and location of submarines, mines, and mobile missiles. Uncompensated gravity disturbances are a large error source for INS initialization and subsequent field operation. Future gravity models will enable more accurate INS compensation. Use of a worldwide gravity database based on better instrumentation and storage/access capabilities, in conjunction with on-board gravity sensors, will provide autonomous and continuous updates to INS, yielding comparable accuracy with projected INS/GPS hybrid systems. A developing technology to compute real-time gravity data from a moving platform may use the difference in acceleration data from an uncompensated INS and the GNSS.
OVERVIEW This evolving and developing technology is used to measure a bodys gravity field (such as Earths), which in turn has applications for detection and localization of mass distributions, covert position determination, and inertial navigation compensation. Increasingly, gravity data will play a major and critical role in future navigation systems. Accurate geodetic and geophysical data (G&G) can improve the performance of inertial navigation systems to what may be near-GPS accuracy. G&G-enhanced INS could prove to be a significant navigation asset when GPS is not available. Specifically, future uses of G&G data will improve military weapon accuracy and increase safety of military and civilian flight by: Improving accuracy of navigation subsystems and stand-alone INS Providing accurate navigation in a hostile environment when GPS is denied Enabling covert terrain-following and terrain-avoidance systems Providing accurate attitude control of AUVs to allow for geodetic quality imagery Detecting underground manmade and natural structures and mass differences.
Present aircraft and ship INS use coarse models of Earths gravity to correct for the sensed acceleration of gravity by the system sensors. Gravity anomalies that are not modeled are a major error source and limit the dynamic performance of deployed INS. Gravity meters and gravity gradiometers are used in static or mobile modes to measure gravity disturbances, deflections of the vertical, and to characterize the three-dimensional gravity vector. G&G data is used to ground align and provide real-time, in-flight updates of local gravity to navigation systems, and these data are critical to both future precision engagement and safety of navigation requirements. Commercially, gravity meters and gradiometers are used to assist in exploration for oil, gas, or minerals by measuring the variations in the magnitude of the gravity vector or the variation in the gravity gradients. Furthermore, G&G data can be assimilated into gravity maps in support of data-based, POSITIME-referenced navigation systems (see Section 16.3). Other uses include tunnel detection, buried material detection, and in arms control regimes, cargo identification, and weigh-in-motion. Covert detection and intrusion classification capabilities are militarily significant, especially for monitoring secure urban areas. International cooperative efforts through the International Association of Geodesy (IAG) exist for comparing absolute gravity standards.
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RATIONALE Moving-base gravity-meter accuracy is essential to generate maps for autonomous siting, INS initialization, and en-route compensation for in-flight gravity effects for WMD delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles and other long-range, unaided, inertial-guided applications including aircraft, AUVs, cruise missiles, and submarines. Applications have been developed to correct, either indirectly or directly, for the local gravity disturbances or vertical deflection on a moving base/platform. The uncompensated vertical deflection is the largest error in many INS scenarios. The indirectand most commoncompensation technique uses vertical deflection map data computed from gravity-meter surveys. The direct method uses a gravity gradiometer for real-time compensation of the vertical deflection. In the latter mode, the spatial gravity gradients are multiplied (scalar product) by the velocity vector and integrated to obtain the vertical deflection in real time. Another application for this technology is to use the gravity meter or gravity gradiometer in a map-matching mode for accurate position determination using previously surveyed map data. Due to roll off of the high frequencies in the gravity anomaly field with altitude, these accuracies could only be obtained at low altitude, if at all. Navigation at GPS accuracy through turns and acceleration is questionable, but could potentially be recovered afterward. These map-matching techniques using sensors giving data only along the flight path are questionable for long-term navigation, as there are likely to be areas where the data does not have adequate spatial variance to achieve these accuracies. In a local area, with proper conditions for the sensor type being used, these POSITIME methods might be useful. Gravity gradiometers have a higher military value than gravity meters, since they have the ability to estimate vertical deflection in real time; however, gravity meters for airborne and marine applications are still of military importance. Gravity meters and gravity gradiometers require stabilization and the associated software to maintain a stable reference frame. The resulting hybrid system has the potential to provide the military with a non-emanating, nonjammable, totally covert system that can be used worldwide for navigation. As noted, the system will require previously surveyed gravity map data as well as a sufficiently distinct gravity signature that can be detected in the background noise. When there is not an adequate signature, the system maybe augmented with magnetic signature map matching (see Section 16.4). Another developing method of determining gravity is by computing the acceleration difference between an uncompensated INS and a GNSS. As measured by a GNSS, the computed acceleration of the platform is the pure acceleration of the vehicle, while the acceleration measured by an uncompensated INS contains the gravity vector and the platform acceleration vector. The difference is the gravity vector. Advanced filtering using optical correlators/processors and GNSS time synchronization are enabling technologies to obtain the gravity vector. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT State of the art in mass-produced gravity meters (gravimeters) is at the 5- to 10-gal level. A specially configured LaCoste Romberg unit has yielded gravity measurements at precision and accuracy levels of 1-gal. A few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity meter and gravity gradiometer technologies, while others are not active in the technology because of economic considerations. Gravity meters (static mode) better than 10 gals are manufactured and used in the United States. Canada, Germany, UK, Japan, China, Russia, and the Ukraine have developed gravity meters that have not yet achieved the 10-gal level. In moving base instruments, several state-ofthe-art gravity meters are currently being manufactured to yield mgal-level precision in the United States and Germany. All require the use of very high-grade accelerometers and are considered to be of high enough quality to be of military importance because the accelerometers are of higher grade than those found in most INS. State of the art in gravity gradiometers is on the order of Eotvos/Hz. This sensitivity is realized in Lockheed Martin (formerly Bell) systems, which are the only mobile systems currently available. Researchers at Yale University are developing an atom interferometry-based gradiometer with a sensitivity potential of 1 Eotvos/Hz using a 1-m baseline. A team in New Zealand is developing a cryogenic gradiometer with potential sensitivity of 0.02 Eotvos/Hz. Countries of concern may not use (or develop) gravity technologies because of their technical complexity, high cost, and marginal military benefits. The alternative of using data from INS and GPS (or other aids) may prove to be more cost effective as a developing technology for data base generation. Countries with proven capability to use this technology for ballistic missiles include the United States, UK, Russia, Ukraine, China, France, and Canada.
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Gravity Meters (Gravimeters) Absolute
Gravity Meters (Gravimeters) Relative
Gravity Gradiometers

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.2-1. Gravity Meters and Gradiometers WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.2. GRAVITY METERS AND GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS
Gravity Meters (Gravimeters), Nonmobile Use............................................................. III-16-43 Gravity Meters (Gravimeters), Mobile Use................................................................. III-16-45 Gravity Gradiometers, Nonmobile Use..................................................................... III-16-48 Gravity Gradiometers, Mobile Use......................................................................... III-16-50
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III-16-42
DATA SHEET III-16.2. GRAVITY METERS (GRAVIMETERS), NONMOBILE USE

In next 5 to 10 years: Accuracy of < 50 gals with a time-to-steady-state registration of less than 2 minutes under any combination of attendant corrective compensation. Continuing development of arrays.
None identified. SQUID sensors require superconducting temperature Dewars. Algorithms and verified data for real-time gravity compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation using arrays. Accurate verticality and low-level vibration environment required. Resource exploration. Detection of underground structures. Cost is proportional to usage. This is not a large-volume production technology. One of the largest manufacturers has sold only about 1,500 units in the last 40 years.
RATIONALE Gravity meters are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of gravity data with position and time and the need for verticality for sensor stabilization. The uncompensated vertical deflection is the largest error in many INS scenarios. The indirect, and most common, compensation technique uses vertical deflection map data computed from gravity meter surveys. The direct method uses a gravity gradiometer for real-time compensation of the vertical deflection. Another application for this technology is to use the gravity meter in a map-matching mode for accurate position determination using previously surveyed map data. Due to roll off of the high frequencies in the gravity anomaly field with altitude, this accuracy could only be obtained at ground level or low altitude, if then. In a local area, with proper conditions for the sensor type being used, these methods might be useful. The knowledge of initial conditions of gravity predetermines accuracy of self-contained, autonomous navigation systems of all types, but especially inertially equipped ballistic missiles. The knowledge of the gravity field allows accurate compensation of INS. Gravity databases are required for strategic aircraft, submarines, unmanned vehicles, and missiles. The detection of underground structures and material composition are other applications. Continuing development of gravity meter arrays using advanced correlation techniques and very accurate clocks will improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the array system. This is considered to be a militarily critical capability. Advanced filtering using optical correlators/processors and GNSS time synchronization are enabling technologies to obtain the gravity vector. Once the gravity map is generated, nonmobile gravity meters can be used for correlation of the grid data. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, gravity meters have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Australia China Germany Italy Romania South Korea Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Czech Republic Hungary Japan Russia Spain UK
Brazil Finland India Netherlands Slovak Republic Sweden Ukraine
Canada France Israel Poland South Africa Switzerland United States

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. State of the art in mass-produced gravity meters (gravimeters) is at the 5- to 10-gal level. A specially configured LaCoste Romberg unit has yielded gravity measurements at precision and accuracy levels of 1 gal. A few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity meter technologies, while others are inactive in this area because of economic considerations. Gravity meters (static mode) better than 10 gals are manufactured and used in the United States. Canada, Germany, UK, Japan, China, Russia, and the Ukraine have developed gravity meters that have not achieved the 10-gal level. Countries of concern may not use (or develop) gravity meters because of their technical complexity, high cost, and marginal military benefits. The alternative of using data from INS and GPS (or other aids) may prove to be more cost effective as a developing technology for data-base generation. Countries with proven capability to use this technology for ballistic missiles include United States, UK, Russia, Ukraine, China, France, and Canada. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Carson Instruments Gravity Exploration Techniques, Inc. GWR Instruments Neese Instrument Company Worden Meter Company G Exploration Instruments Gravity Map Services LaCoste Romberg Scinrex ZLS Corporation
III-16-44
DATA SHEET III-16.2. GRAVITY METERS (GRAVIMETERS), MOBILE USE

In next 5 to 10 years: Moving platform accuracy of < 75 gals with a time-to-steady-state registration of less than 2 minutes under any combination of attendant corrective compensation. Continuing development of arrays.
None identified. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation, or alignment equipment to obtain mobile accuracy. Accelerometer axis align stations.
Unique Software
Algorithms and verified data for real-time gravity compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms or using arrays and time compensation, or both. All modern earthbound gravity meters are affected by motion from all sources (seismic, acoustic, temperature, etc.) and require isolation/compensation. The problem is compounded by mobile usage by the need for compensation. Resource exploration. Underwater terrain estimation. Detection of underground structures.
Technical Issues
Cost is proportional to usage. This is not a large-volume production technology.
RATIONALE Gravity meters on a moving platform are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of gravity data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation for sensor stabilization. Moving-base gravity-meter accuracy is essential to generate maps for autonomous siting, INS initialization, and en-route compensation for in-flight gravity effects for WMD delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles and other long-range, unaided, inertial-guided applications, including aircraft, AUVs, cruise missiles, and submarines. Applications have been developed to correct, either directly or indirectly, for the local gravity disturbances or vertical deflection on a moving base/platform. The uncompensated vertical deflection is the largest error in many INS scenarios. The indirectand most commoncompensation technique uses vertical deflection map data computed from gravity meter surveys. The direct method uses a gravity gradiometer for real-time compensation of the vertical deflection. In the latter mode, the spatial gravity gradients are multiplied (scalar product) by the velocity vector and integrated to obtain the vertical deflection in real time. Another application for this technology is to use the gravity meter in a map-matching mode for accurate position determination using previously surveyed map data. Due to roll off of the high frequencies in the gravity anomaly field with altitude, this accuracy could only be obtained at low altitude, if at all. Navigation at GPS accuracy through turns and acceleration is questionable, but could potentially be recovered afterward. These mapmatching techniques using sensors giving data only along the flight path are questionable for long-term navigation, as there are likely to be areas where the data does not have adequate spatial variance to achieve this accuracy. In a local area, with proper conditions for the sensor type being used, these methods might be useful. The knowledge of initial conditions of gravity predetermines the accuracy of self-contained, autonomous navigation systems of all types, but especially those for ballistic missiles. The knowledge of the gravity field allows accurate compensation of INS. On mobile platforms, continuing development of gravity meter arrays using advanced correlation techniques and very accurate clocks will improve the SNR of the array system. Accurate time is required for compensation. This is considered to be a militarily critical capability.
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Gravity meters for airborne and marine applications are of military importance. Gravity meters require stabilization and the associated software to maintain a stable reference frame. The resulting hybrid system has the potential to provide the military with a non-emanating, nonjammable, totally covert system that can be used worldwide for navigation. As noted, the system will require previously surveyed gravity map data as well as a unique gravity signature, which can be detected in the background noise. When there is not an adequate signature, the system may be augmented with magnetic signature map matching (see Section 16.4). Another developing method of determining gravity is by computing the acceleration difference between an uncompensated INS and a GNSS. The computed acceleration of the platform, as measured by a GNSS, is the pure acceleration of the vehicle, while the acceleration measured by an uncompensated INS contains the gravity vector and the platform acceleration vector. The difference is the gravity vector. Advanced filtering using optical correlators/processors and GNSS time synchronization are enabling technologies to obtain the gravity vector. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, gravity meters have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. State of the art in mass-produced gravity meters (gravimeters) is at the 5- to 10-gal level. A specially configured LaCoste Romberg unit has yielded gravity measurements at precision and accuracy levels of 1 gal. A few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity-meter technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. In movingbase instruments, several state-of-the-art gravity meters are currently being manufactured to yield mgal-level precision in the United States and Germany. All require the use of very high-grade accelerometers and are considered to be of high enough quality to be of military importance because the accelerometers are of higher grade than those found in most INS. Countries of concern may not use (or develop) gravity meters because of their technical complexity, high cost, and marginal military benefits. The alternative of using data from INS and GPS (or other aids) may prove to be more cost effective as a developing technology for data-base generation. Countries with proven capability to use this technology for ballistic missiles include the United States, the UK, Russia, Ukraine, China, France, and Canada. The following organizations have active research programs:
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United States Exploration Instruments LaCoste Romberg Worden Meter Company (Texas Instruments) Institute for Applied Geodesy GWR Instruments Neese Instrument Company G
Germany Japan Kyoto Electronics Manufacturing Company
Russia State Research Centre of Russia (CSRI Elektropribor) ETH-Zurich
Switzerland Finland Finnish Geopetic Institute
Sweden Geodetiska
Other organizations that have active research programs are Scinrex, Carson Instruments, ZLS Corporation, Gravity Exploration Techniques Incorporated, Gravity Map Services, and G. An example of a commercial application is a recently completed aerial survey of Switzerland by ETH-Zurich, using a LaCoste Romberg system coupled to GPS.
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DATA SHEET III-16.2. GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS, NONMOBILE USE

In next 5 to 10 years: Static platform < 0.02 Eotvos/Hz. Continuing development of arrays.
None identified. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation, or alignment equipment to obtain static accuracy of sensor. Accelerometer axis align stations. SQUID sensors require superconducting temperature Dewars.
Algorithms and verified data for real time gravity compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation using arrays. All modern earthbound gravity gradiometers are affected by motion from all sources (seismic, acoustic, temperature, etc.) and require isolation/compensation. The problem is compounded by the need for measurements at different points near the test article. Resource exploration. Detection of underground structures such as sink holes.
RATIONALE Gravity gradiometers are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of gravity data with position and time and the need for verticality for sensor stabilization. The uncompensated vertical deflection is the largest error in many INS scenarios. The indirectand most commoncompensation technique uses vertical deflection map data computed from gravity-meter surveys. The direct method uses a gravity gradiometer for real-time compensation of the vertical deflection. Data-base models developed from gravity gradiometer data are used by certain military platforms. This process was used by the Trident Missile System for stealth (nonradiating) positioning. Other applications include detection of underground structures, and nonintrusive identification of treaty-limited items. Gravity gradiometers have a higher military value than gravity meters because they have the ability to estimate vertical deflection in real time. Gravity gradiometers require stabilization and the associated software to maintain a stable reference frame. Gravity gradiometers can detect underground structures and provide non-intrusive identification of treaty-limited items. Advanced systems will detect masses in the 300-m size at 200-m depths. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, gravity gradiometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Lockheed Martin Corporation is the major U.S. company with proven capability. Other U.S. companies and research institutions include Bell Geospace and the University of Maryland. Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. Few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity gradiometer technologies, while most are passive because of economic considerations. Researchers at Yale University are developing an atom interferometry-based gradiometer with a sensitivity potential of 1 Eotvos/Hz using a 1-m baseline. Using a Superconducting Gravity Gradiometer, researchers at the University of Maryland have demonstrated 0.02 Eotvos/Hz, while Gravitech in New Zealand is also developing a cryogenic gradiometer with potential sensitivity of 0.02 Eotvos/Hz. Countries of concern may not use (or develop) gravity gradiometers because of their technical complexity, high cost, and marginal military benefits. The alternative of using data from INS and GPS (or other aids) may prove to be more cost effective as a developing technology for data-base generation.
III-16-49
DATA SHEET III-16.2. GRAVITY GRADIOMETERS, MOBILE USE

In next 5 to 10 years: Moving platform < 5 Eotvos/Hz. Continuing development of arrays.
None identified. Test, calibration, modeling, compensation, or alignment equipment to obtain mobile accuracy of < 5 Eotvos/Hz. Accelerometer axis align stations.
Unique Software
Algorithms and verified data for real-time gravity compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms, using arrays and time compensation, or both. All modern earthbound gravity gradiometers are affected by motion from all sources (seismic, acoustic, temperature, etc.) and require isolation/compensation. The problem is compound by the need for measurements at different points near the test article. Resource exploration. Underwater terrain estimation. Detection of underground structures such as sink holes.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Gravity gradiometers are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of gravity data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. Applications have been developed to correct, either directly or indirectly, for the local gravity disturbances or vertical deflection on a moving base/platform. The uncompensated vertical deflection is the largest error in many INS scenarios. The indirectand most commoncompensation technique uses vertical deflection map data computed from gravity-meter surveys. The direct method uses a gravity gradiometer for real-time compensation of the vertical deflection. In the latter mode, the spatial gravity gradients are multiplied (scalar product) by the velocity vector and integrated to obtain the vertical deflection in real time. Another application for this technology is to use the gravity gradiometer in a map-matching mode for accurate position determination using previously surveyed map data. Due to roll off of the high frequencies in the gravity anomaly field with altitude, this accuracy could only be obtained at ground level and at low altitude, if then. Navigation at GPS accuracy through turns and acceleration is questionable, but the errors could perhaps be rectified afterward. These map-matching techniques using sensors giving data only along the flight path are questionable for long-term navigation, as there are likely to be areas where the data does not have adequate spatial variance to achieve this accuracy. In a local area, with proper conditions for the sensor type being used, these methods might be useful. Gravity gradiometers with motion compensation provide a total covert undersea worldwide navigational capability using correlation techniques with gravity maps. The knowledge of instantaneous gravity conditions while on a moving platform is needed. Gravity gradiometers can detect underground structures and provide non-intrusive identification of treaty-limited items. Continuing development of gravity gradiometer arrays using advanced correlation techniques and very accurate clocks will improve the SNR of the array system. This is considered to be a militarily critical capability. Gravity gradiometers have a higher military value than gravity meters because they have the ability to estimate vertical deflection in real time. Gravity gradiometers require stabilization and the associated software to maintain a stable reference frame. The resulting hybrid system has the potential to provide the military with a non-emanating, nonjammable, totally covert system that can be used worldwide for navigation. As noted, the system will require previously surveyed gravity map data, as well as a unique gravity signature that can be detected in the background
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noise. When there is not an adequate signature, the system maybe augmented with magnetic signature map matching (see subsection 16.4). Another developing method of determining gravity is by computing the acceleration difference between an uncompensated INS and a GNSS. As measured by a GNSS, the computed acceleration of the platform is the pure acceleration of the vehicle, while the acceleration measured by an uncompensated INS contains the gravity vector and the platform acceleration vector. The difference is the gravity vector. Accurate time is required for compensation. A controlled vibration and acceleration environment is required to improve accuracy. Advanced filtering using optical correlators/processors and GNSS time synchronization are enabling technologies to obtain the gravity vector with better accuracy. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, gravity gradiometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany New Zealand
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Hungary Russia

Significant R&D
Finland Italy UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in gravity gradiometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. In moving-base instruments, several state-of-the-art gravity meters are currently being manufactured in the United States and Germany to yield mgal-level precision. State of the art in gravity gradiometers is on the order of 10 Eotvos/Hz. This sensitivity is realized in the Lockheed Martin (formerly Bell) system, which is the only mobile system currently available. This system requires the use of very-high-grade accelerometers and is considered to be of military importance because the accelerometers are of higher grade than those found in most INS. Researchers at Yale University are developing an atom interferometry-based gradiometer with a sensitivity potential of 1 Eotvos/Hz using a 1-m baseline. Gravitech in New Zealand is developing a cryogenic gradiometer with potential sensitivity of 0.02 Eotvos/Hz. They are in the development stage, and the potential for moving base applications for either of these systems is unknown. An example of commercial application is a recently completed survey in the Gulf of Mexico by Bell Aerospace (Lockheed Martin). The survey used a three-dimensional, full tensor, gravity-gradient system derived from the Trident Missile System for positioning by use of undersea map data. Countries of concern may not use (or develop) gravity gradiometers because of their technical complexity, high cost, and marginal military benefits. The alternative of using data from INS and GPS (or other aids) may prove to be more cost effective as a developing technology for data-base generation. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Lockheed Martin Institute of Elecronic Basics of Computer Science University of Vctoria Gravitech Yale University Germany
Canada New Zealand
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SECTION 16.3RADIO AND DATA-BASED REFERENCED NAVIGATION (DBRN) SYSTEMS

Highlights With the discontinuance of the U.S. GPS Selective Availability (S/A)1 and the use of Differential GPS (DGPS) combined with LORAN and improved LORAN, a navigation accuracy of less than 1 m (6 sigma)/0.3 m (SEP) can be provided to both friends and foes. Autonomous and common three-dimensional POSITIME grid reference will improve battlespace situational awareness by providing a precise POSITIME tag on all battlespace information collected to provide real-time knowledge of location and movement across battlespace of allied and enemy assets. Significant commercial and military growth and dependence on GNSS for position and time will increase as GNSS receivers decrease in cost, weight, and power. International GNSS (GLONAS, European Union 2, and Teledesic) capabilities will continue to be developed as alternatives to the U.S. GPS, as a means of providing better redundancy and integrity monitoring, or both. Increased combination of hybrid navigation and adaptive antenna systems will significantly reduce military dependence on GPS in a jamming combat environment or during signal loss. Future increased combinations of navigation, communication, imaging, and computer functions will improve situational awareness in urban terrain. Data-based referenced navigation technology, leveraged by increased computer speed and memory, will have increased commercial and military usage . OVERVIEW Radio navigation, particularly GPS and LORAN, will continue to be used both by military and commercial users in the foreseeable future. Radio navigation continues to be the smallest and least expensive of the POSITIME systems. The ratio of commercial to military use of GPS and LORAN will probably be greater than 100:1. There is a definite trend to transition GPS from a DoD system to a commercial system. With S/A off, the 10 m accuracy will be available worldwide for all commercial users, who previously were limited to 100-m accuracy. The S/A had previously limited this 10 m accuracy to U.S. and allied military use only. Another issue is the emergence of DGPS, which uses a small ground station outfitted with a GPS receiver whose geographic location is precisely determined, and the difference between surveyed and GPS position transmitted to another user. This procedure can provide an accuracy of better than 5 m. In Europe, a novel technique that transmits DGPS signals on an existing LORAN C, called Eurufix, has demonstrated position-fixing accuracy of better than 3 m. Localized jamming by friendly forces will deny these accurate GPS capabilities to an enemy only if the basic GPS signal is completely jammed. Antijam GPS components and systems, such as an adaptive antenna system, combined with high-speed digital signal processing (DSP) and a closely coupled hybrid GPS/INS will optimize antenna coverage patterns to specific signal and interference environments. This will produce an antenna pattern with nulls in the direction of broadband jammers very quickly. Better time accuracy (see Section 16.5) will allow rapid GPS direct-Y code acquisition, and the use of autonomous, low-power clocks will minimize GPS jamming and loss of satellite signal. In urban areas, loss of GPS signals due to signal blockage and multipath problems is a challenge to be overcome. Like all time difference of arrival (TDOA) systems, the LORAN system accuracy can be improved by more accurate clocks. Similar to GPS receiver improvements and miniaturization,
President Bill Clinton, the White House, 1 May 2000
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LORAN antenna and electronic miniaturization technology continues to improve LORAN receiver capability. Funding for continuation of LORAN ground stations because of the growing number of commercial applications continues to force the Federal Radio Navigation Plan to be revised, and the demise of LORAN is not as evident as it was 5 years ago. Military GPS position accuracy will improve from 3 m to 1 m as a result of recent efforts to link the National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the USAF GPS tracking networks, upgraded Kalman filtering, and reduced prediction error in broadcast navigation (NAV) messages. Using fixed location sites, DGPS can further improve the accuracy to less than 0.6 m. The use of DGPS, however, is currently limited to a localized area and the use of communications that may also be susceptible to jamming. Solar activity over the next 10 years is expected to cause problems in time transfer of 1015 ns. Technology related to radio ranging using normal tactical communication systems will be readily available for use in 5 years. The Armys enhanced position location system is representative of this technology. Communication signal-based ranging is a plausible method of positioning. Smart antenna techniques will be a catalyst, enabling commercial and military-based stations and user modes for personal communication systems (i.e., cellular telephones). This technology can provide a location accuracy approaching GPS. Further GNSS improvements include: Upgrades to U.S. GPS/NAVSTAR capabilities to include incorporation of unencrypted C/A codes on L2, inclusion of third civilian frequency, inclusion of new encrypted military codes on L1 and L2, increase in transmission power, and potential increase in number of space vehicles. Integration of European Union Galileo public/private GNSS with the U.S. GPS system. Improvements in space vehicle orbital definition, increased ground station update frequency, and incorporation of more accurate ionospheric correction models on GNSS accuracy. Use of ground-based transmitters to provide wide area DGNSS corrections. Use of satellites (GEO and LEO) to provide wide area DGNSS corrections, particularly to aviation. Impact of FAA efforts to utilize DGNSS-based en-route and precision landing guidance through the WAAS and LAAS programs and the worldwide proliferation of compatible technology. The use of pseudolites (airborne and ground based) for military application and precision landing support (as envisioned in LAAS).
Further improvements to GPS accuracy, as well as reducing susceptibility to jamming, will be obtained by integration with the following Digital Terrain Data Based Navigation Systems: Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) The World Geodetic System (WGS 84) The Earth Gravitational Model (EGM 96) The International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF).
One of the deficiencies of GPS is that map referencing is not viable unless the receiver is moving to compute directional referencing (north). A magnetic compass or an INS is required for map referencing. The Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM)1 will collect radar data over more than 80% of the earth. This is a major step toward the multi-Service requirement for Global DTED accuracy of 30 m by 2000. Table 16.3-1 shows the projected improvements in DTED accuracy.
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Table 16.3-1. Comparison of Current and Projected Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Accuracy
Absolute Horizontal Absolute Vertical Time Frame
Current DTED Expected DTED w/SRTM Future Possibilities*
50 m 90% CE 20 m 90% CE 510 m 90% CE
30 m 90% LE 16 m 90% LE 510 m 90% LE
Now 2000+ 2015+
* Requires more accurate determination of the space vehicles attitude/altitude for images.
DFAD contains feature data equivalent in feature content to a 1:250,000 scale topographic map. Because urban warfare at the brigade and individual soldier level requires higher resolution than current DTED and DFAD can provide, the U.S. Armys Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center provides higher resolution topographic maps (30-m elevation and a 1:50,000 scale or higher).2 Recent improvement in the EGM 96 has decreased absolute height uncertainty from 26 m (1 ) to 0.51 m (1 ) worldwide. This will benefit not only GPS but also INS accuracy. Figure 16.3-1 shows hybrid INS/GPS accuracy with use of geomapping data after loss of GPS. Closely monitoring WGS and ITRF has led to improvements in the level of agreement between WGS 84 and the ITRF, with the determination that they can now be considered equivalent.3 While the GPS reference is WGS-84, the Russian GLONASS reference is PZ-90. The transformation model is developed and is being refined by the United States and Russians.4
INS Only Navigation Error Loss of GPS GPS-Aided INS INS with Geomapping
Figure 16.3-1. Hybrid INS Performance with Loss of GPS
The integration of three-dimensional digital terrain maps and other geo-mapping data [provided by NIMA and U.S. Geological Surveys National Mapping Divisions Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS)] with hybrid INS/GPS systems could subsequently provide highly accurate position, velocity, and track under dynamic and covert conditions, even after loss of GPS signals. In addition, future improvements to three-dimensional digital map data could include global magnetic and gravity data. As a point of reference, given a gravity map having an accuracy of 1 Eotvos/Hz) and resolution of 0.5 km, an aircraft flying at 200-m altitude at 360 km/hr constant velocity, having a 10 Eotvos/Hz) gravimeter on board with a 0.0001 deg/hr drift rate gyro, could navigate with 510-m horizontal error and 5-m vertical error. All of these capabilities (by use of prestored ground and undersea terrain contour, acoustic, electromagnetic spectrum, magnetic, and gravity sensor data) will significantly increase the hybrid INS accuracy on a continuous basis to that currently provided by GPS at a rate of 1.0 Hz. PT&F form the baseline for telecommunications and navigation, and
2 3 4
www.trac.army.mil/trandata.htr Refinements to the World Geodetic System, 1984, by Stephen Malys, et al., NIMA. GPS World, January 1999, p. 54.
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its importance to military systems is becoming more evident with the operational use of the U.S. GPS (see Section 16.5). Other data bases, such as bathymetric maps, are used by the United States and Russia to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. The process of generating the map consists of registering undersea bottom contours with GPS position data on a surface ship. This then becomes the data base for future map matching aboard a submarine. There are current studies exploring the feasibility of broad ocean bathymetry that would increase the number of available sites for position fixing. RATIONALE Accurate positioning, control, and redundancy for platforms are essential for effective coordination of military activities. Individual system accuracy depends on mission requirements. Encrypted signals of the GPS deny nonauthorized users the full capability of the systems. Null-steerable antennas are a military response to jamming. Hybrid and DBRN systems combine the best features of different navigation systems to provide autonomous, covert, nonjammable information. DBRN technology is partially derived from sensor and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. DBRN technology, leveraged by computer speed and memory, resolves data ambiguities and optimizes navigational sensor and stored data. Three-dimensional position ambiguities and other properties, such as magnetic and gravity signatures, will be resolved and optimized as stored geodetic data for navigation reference using sensors such as radar altimeters, magnetometers, gravity meters, and acoustic sensors. The use of power management and phase-shift key modulation reduces the emitted signal, resulting in a decreased detectability and covert (stealth) operation. Military uses for GPS will enhance the following: Supply location systems Spacecraft navigation Parachute insertion Air vehicle attitude Angle of attack Battlefield targeting Helicopter hover positioning Gravity measuring system HF communications frequency management Encryption/decryption DGPS Ship cargo management Situation awareness Minefield positioning FAAs WAAS corrects the standard GPS signal to provide the accuracy, integrity, and availability needed for civil aviation navigation and precision approaches (Category 1) over a very large geographical area. Some of the critical functions include corrections for navigation satellite clock, satellite orbital data, and the effects of the ionosphere on the GPS and WAAS signals and ensuring the validity of WAAS messages. WAAS will use Geostationary satellites (space-based) transmitting GPS look-alike ranging signals, but with integrity messages and wide-area differential corrections. The LAAS is a ground-based augmentation system providing local area DGPS corrections. DGPS is based on providing corrections of errors that are common to both ground-based and aircraft receivers in the local area. LAAS has the capability of providing integrity using pseudolites (ground-based, lowpowered satellites) and DGPS for accuracy of about 1 m on final approach and taxi. LAAS complements WAAS and will operate independently. For decades, the dismounted soldiers navigation tools have consisted of maps, compass, and individual pace count. Recently, GPS technology has been added to the tool set to improve position determination. Although a significant improvement, GPS can be jammed or blocked (terrain or man-made obstructions), and GPS does not provide accurate azimuth information at slow speeds for map north referencing. Search and rescue Weather balloon navigation Power and communication line failures Inertial navigator reset and mapping System integration of sensors Pseudolite positioning system Position reporting for high-value assets AUV navigation Imaging Artillery smart round DGPS for heading Nuclear reset Construction
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Integrated navigation (INAV) technology introduces a new tool to help compensate for those times when GPS is either unavailable or unreliableautomated dead reckoning. INAV dead-reckoning capability is supplied by a deadreckoning module (DRM), a small, low-power navigator consisting of an electronic compass and a pedometer using MEMS technology accelerometers. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The United States and Russia have independently developed and deployed GPS and GLONASS, respectively. These global systems and other proposed satellite systems are commonly referred to as GNSS. The United States leads the world in radio navigation and DBRN technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. The gap, however, is closing quickly, as the newer technologies require, in some cases, less capital investment in the technology. The European Union GNSS 2 system could be launched starting in 2003, providing accuracy of 510 m. Increased computational effectiveness for a given equipment volume and weight could provide an adversary with distinct navigation payoffs: (1) enhancing navigation capabilities and (2) improving reliability and resistance to hostile actions. Signal detection and processing technology is used to acquire, synchronize, and track desired signals for measurement of navigation parameters. The substantial margin of capability added by this technology is vital to continued U.S. superiority in precision navigation and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. Highly interference-resistant receivers for satellite navigation systems are also vital. Militarily critical signal conversion technologies contribute directly to mission effectiveness by improved anti-jam performance; increased reliability; higher precision navigation; real-time adaptive response to hostile environments; and decreased system size, weight, and cost. The know-how to achieve improvements most beneficial to military applications depends upon integrated circuit technology and the software to support it. In this area, Russia lags the United States by 3 to 5 years. The worldwide growth of high-density semiconductor design and fabrication technology has been an enabling technology. From a control standpoint, however, the design technology is widely taught in universities and available in industry worldwide. Receivers that combine GPS and GLONASS technology are available on the commercial market from U.S. and non-U.S. manufacturers. Many of these receiver designs are for timing purposes rather than navigation. All of these receivers will provide a capability that has better jamming resistance, increased integrity, and higher accuracy than GPS or GLONASS systems alone. The UK, Germany, France, Israel, and Japan are also leading nations that have developed end-use products that use signals from both GPS and GLONASS and DBRN for military applications. The acquisition of dual-use end products could allow the transfer of the necessary know-how for military applications. Russia also has developed the use of magnetic arrays to improve compensation for DBRN systems (see subsection 16.4). Bathymetry maps are used by the United States and Russia to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. Improvements of GPS accuracy in generating those maps will enhance submarine undersea navigation without surfacing. Several countries, including the United States, UK, and France, use terrain databases for updating cruise missile inertial navigation accuracy.
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Radio Navigation Including Telecommunication
Data-Based Navigation (Terrain, Acoustic, Bathymetry, Electromagnetic Spectrum, Magnetic, Gravity, Stellar Referenced)
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.3-2. Radio and Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.3. RADIO AND DATA-BASED REFERENCED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) ................................................................................... III-16-61 Differential Global Navigation Satellite Systems (DGNSS)................................................................. III-16-64 Hybrid Radio Navigation Systems .................................................................................................. III-16-67 Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Radar Altimeters .......................................................................... III-16-70 Data-Based Referenced Navigation Systems ...................................................................................... III-16-72 GNSS Anti-jam Components and Systems (Adaptive Antenna Systems) ............................................... III-16-75 GNSS Anti-jam Components and Systems (Adaptive Narrowband Filters) ............................................. III-16-77 Multi-Chip Module (MCM) Technology (GPS on a Chip).................................................................. III-16-79
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)

In next 5 to 10 years: Signal decryption (antispoof) and/or null-steerable antenna, jamming protection; Accuracy (w/o S/A) of < 1 m 50% SEP in position and < 1 picosecond in time. < 0.1 m/s velocity for > 60,000 ft and for > 1,000 ktslighter and less expensive.
None identified. Antispoofing (A-S); signal simulators and A-S < 1 picosecond measurement capability; electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) or interference resistance receivers. Algorithms including classified, encrypted algorithms and verified data; vehicle attitude determination; direct Y-code algorithms verified through tests; A-S source code verified. Commercial A/C usage for autoland. GPS signal integrity; worldwide availability. Small accurate clocks that provide for direct acquisition of GPS Y code.
Technical Issues
Ground vehicle navigation, aircraft navigation, surveying. DoD has exclusive access to corrected U.S. GPS pseudorange, delta range, and ephemeris data.
Affordability
Accuracy and autonomy are the key drivers. Reduced processor costs and memory will significantly reduce costs.
RATIONALE Accurate positioning, control, and redundancy for platforms are essential for effective coordination of military activities. Individual system accuracy depends on mission requirements. With S/A discontinued5, the 10 meter GPS accuracy will be available worldwide for all commercial users. Encrypted signals of the GPS deny non-authorized users the full capability of the systems. Null-steerable antennas are a military response to jamming. Hybrid and DBRN systems combine the best features of different navigation systems to provide autonomous, covert, nonjammable information. DBRN technology is partially derived from sensor and GIS technology. DBRN technology, leveraged by computer speed and memory, resolves data ambiguities and optimizes navigational sensor and stored data. The use of power management and phase-shift key modulation reduces the emitted signal, resulting in a decreased detectability and covert (stealth) operation. FAAs WAAS corrects the standard GPS signal to provide the accuracy, integrity, and availability needed for civil aviation navigation and precision approaches (Category 1) over a very large geographical area. Some of the critical functions include corrections for navigation satellite clock, satellite orbital data, and the effects of the ionosphere on the GPS and WAAS signals and ensuring the validity of WAAS messages. WAAS uses Geostationary satellites (space-based) transmitting GPS look-alike ranging signals with integrity messages and widearea differential corrections. The LAAS is a ground-based augmentation system providing local area DGPS corrections. DGPS is based on providing corrections of errors that are common to both ground-based and aircraft receivers in the local area. LAAS has the capability of providing integrity using pseudolites (ground-based, lowpowered satellites) and DGPS for accuracy of less than 1 m on final approach and taxi. LAAS complements WAAS and will operate independently. The implementation of these functions combined with the growing reliance on GPS by the world commercial airline industry has created a special area of concern for military planners.
President
Bill Clinton, the White House, 1 May 2000
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Joint Vision 2010 identifies long-range precision capability as a key factor in future warfare. GPS will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. Advances in precise global positioning will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces. Dominant maneuver and precision engagement will entail higher precision requirements, with longer ranges and more accurate targeting. Military uses for GPS will enhance the following: Supply location systems Spacecraft navigation Parachute insertion Air vehicle attitude and angle of attack Battlefield targeting Helicopter hover positioning Gravity measuring system HF communications frequency management Encryption/decryption DGPS Ship cargo management Situation awareness Minefield positioning Search and rescue Weather balloon navigation Power and communication line failures Inertial navigator reset and mapping System integration of sensors Pseudolite positioning system Position reporting for high-value assets AUV navigation Artillery smart round DGPS for heading Nuclear reset Construction
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
GNSS research is being carried out throughout the world primarily because of the extensive commercial applications. At present, the United States, Russia, UK, Canada, France, and Japan appear to be leaders. China, India, and South Africa have recently made significant advances. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Boeing Interstate Electronics Motorola Rockwell Sokkia Garman Magellan Odetics Trimble
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UK Skyforce Avionics Canadian Marconi Synmetricon Navstar Systems, Ltd. Novatel Canada France Dassault Sercel Thomson-CSF Sextant Avionique
Germany Carl Zeiss Geodetic Systems LITEF Datum GmbH
Spain Sena GPS SA
Japan Furuno Electric Company Leica Koden Electronics Mitsubshi Industries Micro-Blox AG
Switzerland
Israel Elbit Rojone Pty Laben S.p.A. San Jose Navigation Rokar International Sigtec Navigation
Australia Italy Taiwan
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. DIFFERENTIAL GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS (DGNSS)

In next 5 to 10 years: Accuracy of < 0.3 m 50% SEP in position and < 1 picosecond in time; < 0.01 m/s velocity > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 ktslighter and less expensive.
None identified. Algorithms including classified, encrypted algorithms and verified data; differential techniques that provide accuracy of < 0.3 m. Algorithms including classified, encrypted algorithms and verified data needed to exceed military critical parameters; differential techniques that provide accuracy of < 0.3 meter; Algorithms that handle corrected pseudorange, delta range, and satellite start/stop position (corrected ephemeris) data and the source code for combining INS with GPS.
Technical Issues
Commercial aircraft usage for autoland. GPS signal integrity: worldwide availability of DGPS; accuracy enhancement.
Ground vehicle navigation, aircraft navigation, and surveying. Accuracy and autonomy are the key cost drivers.
RATIONALE DGPS uses a small ground station outfitted with a GPS receiver, the geographic location of which is precisely determined; the difference between surveyed and GPS position is transmitted to another user via a different frequency. This procedure can provide an accuracy of much better than 1 m. In Europe, a novel technique that transmits DGPS signals on an existing LORAN C, called Eurufix, has demonstrated position-fixing accuracy of better than 3 m. Joint Vision 2010 identifies DGPS as a key technology to provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. Advances in precise global positioning will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces. Dominant maneuver and precision engagement will entail higher precision requirements with longer ranges and more accurate targeting. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan identifies DGPS as a key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. Military uses for DGPS will enhance the following: Supply location systems Spacecraft navigation Parachute insertion Air vehicle attitude and angle of attack Battlefield targeting Helicopter hover positioning Gravity measuring system HF communications frequency management Encryption/decryption Search and rescue Weather balloon navigation Power and communication line failures Inertial navigator reset and mapping System integration of sensors Pseudolite positioning system Position reporting for high-value assets AUV navigation Artillery smart round
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DGPS Ship cargo management Situation awareness Minefield positioning
DGPS for heading Nuclear reset Construction
Australia China Hungary Japan South Africa Switzerland United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland India Netherlands South Korea Taiwan
Brazil France Israel Poland Spain UK

Moderate R&D
Canada Germany Italy Russia Sweden Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States and Russia have independently developed and deployed GPS and GLONASS, respectively. The United States currently leads the world in radio navigation technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. The UK, Germany, France, Israel, and Japan are also leading nations that have developed end-use products that use signals from both GPS and GLONASS for military applications. The gap, however, is closing quickly, as the newer technologies require, in some cases, less capital investment in the technology. The European Union GNSS 2 system could be launched starting in 2003, providing accuracy of 510 m. Increased computational effectiveness for given equipment volume and weight could provide an adversary with distinct navigation payoffs: (1) enhancing navigation capabilities and (2) improving reliability and resistance to hostile actions. Signal detection and processing technology is used to acquire, synchronize, and track desired signals for measurement of navigation parameters. The substantial margin of capability added by this technology is vital to continued U.S. superiority in precision navigation and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. Highly interference-resistant receivers for satellite navigation systems are also vital. Militarily critical signal conversion technologies contribute directly to mission effectiveness by improved anti-jam performance; increased reliability; higher precision navigation; real-time adaptive response to hostile environments; and decreased system size, weight, and cost. The know-how to achieve improvements most beneficial to military applications depends upon integrated circuit technology and the software to support it. In this area, Russia lags the United States by 3 to 5 years. The worldwide growth of high-density semiconductor design and fabrication technology has been an enabling technology. From a control standpoint, however, the design technology is widely taught in universities and available in industry worldwide. Receivers that combine GPS and GLONASS technology are available on the commercial market from U.S. and non-U.S. manufacturers. Many of these receiver designs are for timing purposes rather than navigation. All of these receivers will provide a capability that has better jamming resistance, increased integrity, and higher accuracy than GPS or GLONASS systems alone.
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The following organizations have active research programs: United States Ashtech Garman Lockheed Martin Odetics Trimble Boeing Interstate Electronics Northrop Grumman Rockwell Sokkia
Canada UK British Aerospace Smith Industries Novatel LITEF
Germany
Israel Elbit Japan Mitsubishi
France Airbus Industries SNECMA
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. HYBRID RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (OTHER THAN INERTIAL NAVIGATION)
In next 5 to 10 years: Accuracy of < 1 m 50% SEP in position. Jamming protection < 0.01 m/s velocity > 60,000 ft and > 1,000 kts. For spacecraftPointing accuracy of < 10 arc seclighter and less expensive.
None identified. Components require specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment; GNSS receivers require special simulator testing systems. Specially designed test, calibration, or alignment equipment. Algorithms and verified data needed to exceed militarily critical parameters Source code for combining GNSS with Doppler, LORAN, or DBRN.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Use of Doppler, acoustic (bathymetric), stellar, gravity sensing, or terrain data from data bases to improve GNSS/INS beyond uncompensated control level. Except for Doppler and acoustic, these methods are self contained, nonradiating, and nonjammable. The technical issues for radio ranging include multipath mitigation signal processing methods, low probability of detection waveforms, and low-power receivers. Ground vehicle navigation, aircraft navigation. Accuracy and autonomy are the key cost drivers.
RATIONALE GPS accuracy will improve from 3 m to 1 m as a result of recent efforts to link the NIMA and the USAF GPS tracking networks, upgraded Kalman filtering, and reduced prediction error in broadcast NAV messages. Using fixed location sites, DGPS can further improve the GPS accuracy to less than 0.3 m. The use of DGPS, however, is currently limited to a localized area and the use of communications that may also be susceptible to jamming. Urban positioning is one outstanding military application of a hybrid system. In addition, hybrid GPS systems have better redundancy and integrity monitoring capabilities. Like all TDOA systems, the LORAN system accuracy can be improved by more accurate clocks. Similar to GPS receiver improvements and miniaturization, LORAN antenna and electronic miniaturization technology continues to improve LORAN receiver capability. Funding for continuation of LORAN ground stations because of the growing commercial applications continues to force the Federal Radio Navigation Plan to be revised, and the demise of LORAN is not as evident as 5 years ago. Radio ranging using normal tactical or commercial communications systems will be a mature technology within 5 to 10 years. This technology is likely to give a significant military advantage when GPS is jammed in future conflicts. Further improvements to GPS accuracy, as well as reducing susceptibility to jamming, will be obtained by integration with other radio ranging systems and the following Digital Terrain Data-Based Navigation Systems: Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) The World Geodetic System (WGS 84) The Earth Gravitational Model (EGM 96) The International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF).
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The integration of three-dimensional digital terrain maps and other geomapping data (provided by NIMA and U.S. Geological Surveys National Mapping Divisions EROS) with Hybrid INS/GPS systems could subsequently provide highly accurate position, velocity, and track under dynamic and covert conditions, even after loss of GPS signals. In addition, future improvements to three-dimensional digital map data could include global magnetic and gravity data. As a point of reference, given a gravity map having an accuracy of 1 Eotvos/Hz and resolution of 0.5 km, an aircraft flying at 200-m altitude at 360 km/hr constant velocity, having a 10 Eotvos/Hz gravimeter on board with a 0.0001 deg/hr drift rate gyro, could navigate with 5- to 10-m horizontal error and 5-m vertical error. All of these capabilities (by use of prestored ground and undersea terrain contour, acoustic, electromagnetic spectrum, magnetic, and gravity sensor data) will significantly increase the hybrid INS accuracy on a continuous basis to that currently provided by GPS at a rate of 1.0 Hz. PT&F form the baseline for telecommunications and navigation, and its importance to military systems is becoming more evident with the operational use of the U.S. GPS. The United States and Russia uses other databases, such as bathymetric maps, to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. The process of generating the map consists of registering undersea bottom contours with GPS position data on a surface ship. This then becomes the database for future map matching aboard a submarine. There are current studies exploring the feasibility of broad ocean bathymetric maps that would increase the number of available sites for position fixing. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology by providing increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. Advances in precise global positioning will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces. Dominant maneuver and precision engagement will entail higher precision requirements, with longer ranges and more accurate targeting. This technology also supports the Navy Plan for a precise navigation system. It is critical to provide a backup to GPS or to a successor system, once the GPS technology becomes obsolete. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States and Russia have independently developed and deployed GPS, GLONASS, and LORAN equivalent systems. The United States leads the world in radio navigation and DBRN technology and is progressively improving in the areas of accuracy, size, weight, reliability, cost, and integration with digital processing technology. The gap, however, is closing quickly, as the newer technologies require, in some cases, less capital investment in the technology. The European Union GNSS 2 system could be launched starting in 2003 providing accuracy of 510 m. Increased computational effectiveness for a given equipment volume and weight could provide an adversary with distinct navigation payoffs: (1) enhancing navigation capabilities and (2) improving reliability and resistance to hostile actions. Signal detection and processing technology is used to acquire, synchronize, and track desired signals for measurement of navigation parameters. The substantial margin of capability added by this technology is vital to continued U.S. superiority in precision navigation and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. Highly interference-resistant receivers for satellite navigation systems are also vital. Militarily critical signal conversion technologies contribute directly to mission effectiveness by improved anti-jam performance; increased reliability; higher precision navigation; real-time adaptive response to hostile environments; and decreased system size, weight, and cost. The know-how to achieve improvements most beneficial to military applications depends upon integrated circuit technology and the software to support it. In this area, Russia lags the United States by 3 to 5 years. The
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worldwide growth of high-density semiconductor design and fabrication technology has been an enabling technology. From a control standpoint, however, the design technology is widely taught in universities and available in industry worldwide. Receivers that combine GPS and GLONASS technology are available on the commercial market from U.S. and non-U.S. manufacturers. Many of these receiver designs are for timing purposes rather than navigation. All of these receivers will provide a capability that has better jamming resistance, increased integrity and higher accuracy than GPS or GLONASS systems alone. The UK, Germany, France, Israel, and Japan are also leading nations that have developed end-use products that use signals from both GPS and GLONASS and DBRN for military applications. The acquisition of dual-use end products could allow the transfer of the necessary know-how for military applications. Russia also has developed the use of magnetic arrays to improve compensation for DBRN systems (see Section 16.4). Bathymetric maps are used by the United States and Russia to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. Improvements of GPS accuracy in generating those maps will enhance submarine undersea navigation without surfacing. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Ashtech Garman Lockheed Martin Odetics Trimble Boeing Interstate Electronics Northrop Grumman Rockwell Sokkia
Canada Novatel
Germany UK British Aerospace Elbit Mitsubishi Airbus Industries Piaggio Aero Industries SNECMA Smith Industries Israel Japan France Italy Daimler Chrysler Aerospace LITEF
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. LOW PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT (LPI) RADAR ALTIMETERS

In next 5 to 10 years: Nondetectable in radar frequency range. Integrated with LPI limited-range, forward-looking sensor and terrain databases for better situational awareness in low-altitude terrain avoidance. Altitude accuracy: 1 foot at 0 to 5,000 ft. 25 feet at 5,000 to 60,000 ft.
None identified. None identified. Cross-correlation algorithms and verified data. Ability to determine height above terrain, as well as height above obstacle (i.e., trees and buildings). Expand technology to include Doppler navigation systems.
General aviation, particularly helicopters. However, commercial applications are very limited at this time. The all-digital approach will result in decreasing cost and increasing applications, including commercial.
RATIONALE The use of power management and phase-shift key modulation reduces the emitted power of the radar altimeter system resulting in a decreased detectability and covert (stealth) operation. Altitude above ground is a critical parameter for military and commercial aircraft. LPI imaging radars use a millimeter-wave radar that is scanned to provide all-weather imaging. The application is for terrain following and landing approaches. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology because signature reduction will enhance the ability to engage adversaries anywhere in the battlespace and improve survivability of forces who employ it. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan identifies LPI sensors as key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
Worldwide research efforts of this technology is very limited due to its limited commercial applications. Currently, the UK appears to be the leader.
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The following organizations have research programs: United States UK GEC Marconi-Hazeltine Honeywell Litton
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. DATA-BASED REFERENCED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (Data-Based Digital Terrain, Acoustic, Bathymetric, Electromagnetic Spectrum, Magnetic, Gravity, and Stellar Referenced Navigation)
In next 5 to 10 years: Accuracy < 5- to 10-m grid accuracy. None identified. Unique computer test models for optimization of database manipulation and extraction. Algorithms for image correlation and pattern recognition. Integration and data analysis algorithms and verified data. Data processing rate and throughput. Ground vehicle navigation, aircraft navigation, ship and submersible navigation surveying. Lighter and less expensive will open more commercial applications.
RATIONALE Further improvements to DBRNS is expected to provide an autonomous navigation capability, when GPS is jammed or unavailable (i.e., urban areas). The following are the key data bases that could provide improved accuracy with or without GPS, as an autonomous navigation or terminal guidance system: Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) The World Geodetic System (WGS 84) The Earth Gravitational Model (EGM 96) The International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF).
The SRTM will collect radar data over more than 80 percent of the Earth. This is a major step toward the multi-Service requirement for DTED accuracy of 30 m by 2000. Table 16.3-1 shows the projected improvements in DTED accuracy. DFAD contains feature data equivalent in feature content to a 1:250,000 scale topographic map. Since urban warfare at the brigade-individual soldier level require higher resolution than current DTED and DFAD can provide, the U.S. Armys TRADOC Analysis Center provides higher resolution (30-m elevation and a 1:50,000 scale or higher topographic map).6 Recent improvement in the EGM 96 has decreased absolute height uncertainty from 26 meters (1 ) to 0.51 meter (1 ) worldwide. This will benefit not only GPS but also INS accuracy. Closely monitoring WGS and ITRF has led to improvements in the level of agreement between WGS 84 and the ITRF with the determination that they can now be considered equivalent.7
6 7
www.trac.army.mil/trandata.htr Refinements to the World Geodetic System, 1984, by Stephen Malys, et al., NIMA.
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Table 16.3-1. Comparison of Current and Projected Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Accuracy
Absolute Horizontal Absolute Vertical Time
Current DTED Expected DTED w/SRTM Future Possibilities*

*
50 m 90% CE 20 m 90% CE 510 m 90% CE
30 m 90% LE 16 m 90% LE 510 m 90% LE
now 2000+ 2015+
Requires more accurate determination of the space vehicle attitude/altitude for images.
The integration of three-dimensional digital terrain maps and other geo-mapping data (provided by NIMA and U.S. Geological Surveys National Mapping Divisions EROS) with hybrid INS/GPS systems could provide highly accurate position, velocity, and track under dynamic and covert conditions, even after loss of GPS signals. The United States and Russia uses other databases, such as bathymetric maps, to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. The process of generating the map consists of registering undersea bottom contours with GPS position data on a surface ship. This then becomes the database for future map matching aboard a submarine. There are current studies exploring the feasibility of broad ocean bathymetric maps that would increase the number of available sites for position fixing. Joint Vision 2010 supports this technology as part of precision navigation that will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. Advances in precise navigation will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces. Dominant maneuver and precision engagement will entail higher precision requirements, with longer ranges and more accurate targeting. The Navy plan also supports this technology for a precise navigation system other than GPS. It is critical to provide a backup to GPS, or a successor system, once the GPS technology becomes obsolete. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada India Russia Ukraine
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel South Africa United States
France Italy Sweden

Moderate R&D
Germany Japan UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United Sates, UK, Germany, France, and Japan are leading nations that have developed end-use products that use DBRN, particularly for commercial applications. The expected increased use of commercial vehicle navigation systems should increase the investment in more accurate DBRN systems worldwide. Military applications could build on the commercial investments. Russia has developed the use of magnetic arrays to improve compensation for DBRN systems. The United States and Russia uses bathymetric maps to obtain submarine position fixes without surfacing. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Boeing Northrop Grumman LITEF Lockheed Martin Rockwell
Germany
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UK British Aerospace Elbit Smith Industries Israel Japan Mitsubishi Airbus Industries Thomson CSF SNECMA
France
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. GNSS ANTI-JAM COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS (ADAPTIVE ANTENNA SYSTEMS)
In next 5 to 10 years: Fully integrated multiple-element antenna array and antenna electronics (e.g., signal processing unit). Interface to GPS receiver: RF or intermediate frequency (IF) signal. Creates nearly uniform hemispherical gain pattern when there is no external RF interference. Gain better than 3.5 dB (over a 160-deg solid angle). Creates, in the presence of multiple RF sources, a null in the direction of unintentional or intentional interference signals. Null depth > 25 dB. Adaptive speed < 10 microseconds. Creates, in the presence of multiple RF sources, an antenna gain in the direction desired GPS satellite: gain > 10 dB. Overall processing gain: GPS receiver, antenna, and antenna electronics: > 61 dB total.
Materials to implement low-observable requirements may or may not be used. Test suppression capability verified at NAVSTAR GPS L2 or L1 frequencies. Test scenario(s) used GPS signal in space (SIS), or GPS signal simulator which generates the GPS wave front. (Simulated RF interference source injected or not injected in test scenario.) Operating bandwidth > 20 MHz (centered at L1 or L2). Characteristic or types of RF interference source used (i.e., wideband Gaussian, phase/frequency modulation, spread spectrum, pulse). Key characteristics of interference source or jammer: Range to receiver: 10 to 100 km. Effective radiated power: 10 mW to 100 kW. A signal line replaceable unit design that features a multiple-element antenna: an array of four elements, minimum.
Unique Software
Features validated null-steering, beam-steering, or beam-pointing algorithms. Features validated space-time adaptive processor (STAP) algorithm. Features validated space-frequency adaptive processor (SFAP) algorithms.
Technical Issues
Need a well calibrated antenna (i.e., gain and phase matching of antenna elements), small antenna size, digitization of anti-jam (AJ) components for cost reduction, efficient beamforming, improved receiver technology (i.e., more channels, better correlation). Premature release of military-exclusive interference suppression technology into nonmilitary sector. Fundamental RF interference suppression research (and associated publications) reside in science/engineering work at academia or other science institutions. Research, coupled with know-how leads to formulation of information that exploits capabilities or weaknesses.
Commercial aviation, maritime, and land navigation. Telecommunications. Increased commercialization will significantly reduce cost.
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RATIONALE Anti-jam GPS components and systems, such as an adaptive antenna system, combined with high DSP and a closely coupled hybrid GPS/INS, will optimize antenna coverage patterns to specific signal and interference environments. This will produce an antenna pattern with nulls in the direction of broadband jammers very quickly. Better time accuracy or DSP techniques will allow rapid GPS direct-Y code acquisition, and the use of autonomous, low-power clocks will minimize GPS jamming and loss of satellite signal. Space time adaptive processing (STAP) for anti-jam capability is an active research area. The technology is critical for optimizing adaptive antenna systems. This technology is supported at the national level: Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6 U.S. GPS Policy, March 1996. White House Office Science and Technology Policy and National Science and Technology Council report The GPS: Assessing National Policies by RAND, 1995. Congressional direction to DoD, National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration report The GPS: A Shared National Asset: Recommendations for Technical Improvements and Enhancements, 1996. Report, Defense Science Board Task Force on GPS (1995) and GPS Phase II, 1997. Report, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, GPS Survivability and Denial, 1993.
The Joint Warfighting S&T Plan identifies GPS jamming as a limitation and anti-jam GPS technology as key to enabling rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia France Italy Russia Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Japan South Africa UK

Significant R&D
China India Netherlands South Korea Ukraine
Czech Republic Israel Norway Sweden United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Anti-jam components are a critical military technology for use of satellite navigation systems in a high jamming environment. Anti-jam technology will be a high-cost component of GPS in the future. Many countries have expressed concern in multinational meetings about the low funding levels that are being projected to solve antijam problems of the future. Jamming of GPS can be deliberate or inadvertent in a high-electronics-activity environment. With more use of GPS as the primary navigation system, particularly for commercial aviation, this could increase commercial investment. Currently, the United States is the leader in this research. The following organizations have active research programs: United States DARPA MIT Lincoln Labs Raytheon Lockheed Martin Northrop Grumman USAF Research Labs
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. GNSS ANTI-JAM COMPONENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS (ADAPTIVE NARROWBAND FILTERS)
In next 5 to 10 years: Receive, condition, and convert GPS RF signal to digital IF signal. Apply time, frequency, or amplitude-domain signal-processing techniques to remove interference signal that exists above thermal noise level. Temporal (time) adaptive transversal filter performance 30 dB [narrow band (NB)]. Spectral (frequency) digital excision filter performance 30 dB [continuous wave (CW)]. Nonlinear amplitude domain processor performance 20 dB (CW).
None identified. Need to test against a representative jamming environment (i.e., wide variety of jammer signal characteristics and output powers). None identified. Need a well calibrated antenna (i.e., gain and phase matching of antenna elements), small antenna size, digitization of anti-jam (AJ) components for cost reduction, efficient beam forming improved receiver technology (i.e., more channels, better correlation). Commercial aviation, maritime navigation. Increased commercialization will significantly reduce cost.
RATIONALE Anti-jam GPS components and systems, such as an adaptive antenna system, combined with high-speed DSP and a closely coupled hybrid GPS/INS will optimize antenna coverage patterns to specific signal and interference environments. This will produce an antenna pattern with nulls in the direction of broadband jammers very quickly. Better time accuracy and DSP will allow rapid GPS direct-Y code acquisition, and the use of autonomous, low-power clocks will minimize GPS jamming and loss of satellite signal. This technology is supported at the national level: Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6 U.S. GPS Policy, Mar 96. White House Office Science and Technology Policy and National Science and Technology Council report The GPS: Assessing National Policies by RAND, 1995. Congressional direction to DoD, National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration report The GPS: A Shared National Asset: Recommendations for Technical Improvements and Enhancements, 1996. Report, Defense Science Board Task Force on GPS (1995) and GPS Phase II (1997). Report, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, GPS Survivability and Denial, 1993.
The Joint Vision 2010 and the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan identifies GPS jamming as a limitation and antijam GPS technology as key that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets.
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Australia France Italy Russia Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Germany Japan South Africa UK

Significant R&D
China India Netherlands South Korea Ukraine
Czech Republic Israel Norway Sweden United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Anti-jam components are a critical military technology for use of satellite navigation systems in a high jamming environment. Anti-jam technology will be a high cost component of GPS in the future. Many countries have expressed concern in multinational meetings about the low funding levels that are being projected to solve antijam problems of the future. Jamming of GPS can be deliberate or inadvertent in a high-electronics-activity environment. With more use of GPS as the primary navigation system, particularly for commercial aviation, this could increase commercial investment. Currently, the United States is the leader in this research. The following organizations have active research programs: United States DARPA Naval Research Lab Johns Hopkins (wideband) USAF Research Labs
Significant R&D is being conducted on narrow bandwidth and frequency agile filters to eliminate co-site and cochannel interference in communication systems. DARPA is investing in very narrow high-temperature superconducting filters with fixed frequency.
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DATA SHEET III-16.3. MULTI-CHIP MODULE (MCM) TECHNOLOGY (GPS ON A CHIP)

In next 2 to 5 years: Will achieve GPS capability of less than 0.3 m. Ability to track 24 satellites. Dual frequencies. P-code and codeless. Receiver power consumption: < 150 mW. Signal and bandwidth processing power > 10X current commercial GPS receivers. Weight 0.5 kg.
None identified. None identified. Spread spectrum technology. Antenna designs and power level. Miniature antenna technology such as RFID may be a leveraging technology. Commercial land, aviation, and maritime navigation. Cellular phone location, child locator system. Reduced size and increased commercialization will significantly reduce cost.
RATIONALE This commercially driven electronics packaging technology will significantly reduce the cost of GPS receivers and provide a very affordable location awareness capability to any portable platform. The largest market of this technology is the car navigation system and telecommunications. Its usage is expected to quadruple by year 2001 and substantially reduce the cost of GPS receivers for both commercial and military use. The foundation has been laid by research done under the DARPA Global Mobile program at Stanford University to enable the commercial version of GPS to be built on a chip using CMOS technology. Some further development is required, but it is likely that such a device could be available on the commercial market within 3 years. The Joint Warfighters S&T Plan identifies GPS miniaturization as a key technology that will enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, and handoff and engagement for prosecution of time-critical targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. This technology should be continuously monitored because of the substantial margin of capability added that is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada India Norway Switzerland United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Israel Russia Taiwan

Significant R&D
France Italy South Korea UK
Germany Japan Sweden Ukraine
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
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This is strictly a matter of economics. The fundamental technology for mixed linear and digital applicationspecific integrated circuits (ASIC) is well known and used throughout the semiconductor technology. The improvements in this area are, in fact, driven by the commercial telecommunications industry. Research in this technology is present throughout the industrialized world. At present, the United States appears to be the leader. The following organization have active research programs: United States Axiom Navigation Garman Genesis Hughes Joint Propulsion Lab Magellan Rockwell Stanford University DARPA General Dynamics Honeywell Interstate Electronics Litton Motorola SiRF Technology Trimble
Canada Canadian Marconi SiGEM bloxAG Novatel
Switzerland
Taiwan LeadTek Research
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SECTION 16.4MAGNETOMETERS AND MAGNETIC GRADIOMETERS

Highlights Magnetometer and magnetic gradiometer technology varies with applications and cost. Anticipate more use of low-cost fiber-optic and torsion sensors for land-based usage and optically pumped technology for seabased detection and classification. Magnetometer sensor arrays, a covert detection and classification technology, will be more viable because of accurate time sequencing, computer speed, and memory advances, providing increased detection and location of submarines, mines, and mobile missiles. Knowledge of position, GNSS time, and better computational capabilities using optical processing/ correlation will greatly enhance magnetic array detection performance. Newly developed potassium and helium-4 optically pumped magnetometers are demonstrating performance comparable to superconductive quantum interference device (SQUID) magnetometers at low cost. Medical research and diagnostics is major funding source for future of SQUID sensors and possibly for potassium, if sensor can be reduced in size. Magnetic gradiometers, utilizing either the SQUID or potassium technologies, nearly eliminate the natural geomagnetic background noise. High Tc SQUID technology has matured since its inception in 1987 to the point where nitrogen-cooled superconducting sensors are rivaling their low Tc counterpart. Use of giant magnetoresistive (GMR) sensors is projected for a number of applications for which cost, size, and power are driving factors. Magnetic sensor use for nondestructive testing and inspection of vehicle integrity will increase.
OVERVIEW Magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are of interest to the military because of their covert detection, signature classification, and position determination capability. Although magnetic sensing of direction is thought to be of secondary use by the military, there is a need to provide low-cost map referencing of magnetic north and to maintain magnetic databases using magnetic sensors. Magnetic heading can be sensed by a flux value, for instance, or computed by subtracting magnetic variation from the true heading sensed by an INS. Magnetic variation is obtained from a map data base and can be used in many formats and accuracy levels. The use of true heading vice magnetic heading by the majority of navigation applications has been vastly increased by the quantities of INS and GPS in military and commercial applications in the past 10 years. Using computational techniques, data bases with prior or real-time magnetic field data from magnetometer arrays can be used to reduce the spatial and temporal background noise in the detection of land vehicles, submarines, or mines. Increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of magnetic sensors is a major factor in improving magnetic applications by the military. Both the development technology and the production technology are military critical. Magnetic sensor types of special interest include fluxgate, SQUID, nuclear precession, optically pumped, fiber-optic, and induction coil. Figure 16.4-1 provides a comparison of the current spectral density and frequency range of these sensor types. Figure 16.4-2 provides a projected capability for these sensors within the next 15 years. The performance possible with the more sensitive SQUID, optically pumped, and induction-coil technologies will improve, and the cost and size of these sensors will come down. At the same time, other technologies that have demonstrated limited performance in comparison to the superconducting and total-field technologies will probably become competitive. Thin-film GMR sensor technology appears at present to provide a most promising possibility (see Figure 16.4-2). Using GMR technology, nonvolatile random access memory will have lower power consumption and faster access speeds. GMR circuits, transformers, and logic gates are also viable. For details on mine countermeasures, see Section 17.7.
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10
10-1
DC-Polarized Proton
Fiber Optic
Over Hauser Proton 10-2
Spectral Density (mT/ Hz)
Optically Pumped Rb, Cs, 4He Optically Pumped Proposed He4
10
-3
10
-4
Induction Coil
High Tc SQUID
10
-5
Optically Pumped Potassium 10-6 -4 10 10

-3
Low Tc SQUID 10
2
10
-2
10
-1
10 10 Frequency (Hz)
-0
10
10
99-2281-2
Figure 16.4-1. Comparison of the Current Spectral Density and Frequency Range of Various Sensors
10
0
10-1
DC-Polarized Proton
Fiber Optic
Over Hauser Proton 10

-2
Spectral Density (mT/ Hz)
Optically Pumped Rb, Cs, 4He
10
-3
GMR
10-4
Optically Pumped Proposed He4 Induction Coil
10-5 High Tc 10
-6
Low Tc 10
-7
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10 10 Frequency (Hz)
-0
10
10
10
99-2281-3
Figure 16.4-2. Comparison of Projected Spectral Density and Frequency Range of Various Sensors
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On the one hand, the sensitivity of these sensors will likely increase, and applications involving multiple units of low-cost, short-range, remote sensors will evolve. Active electromagnetic detection of a target illuminated by a low-frequency magnetic or electrical-current source, currently utilized for land mine detection, will likely be utilized in a wider range of applications as underlying sensor technology and signal processing capabilities improve. Further advances in microelectronics, most significantly in the area of high dynamic range, multichannel, analog-to-digital converter technology and DSP, will enhance capabilities and significantly reduce cost and complexity of the underlying sensor technologies. These factors will make concepts involving multiple units of low-cost, short-range distributed sensors more attractive. Similarly, advancements in microelectronics will increase magnetic-sensor capabilities on-board magnetically noisy platforms through large-scale use of distributed sensors monitoring the platform noise. RATIONALE Magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for antisubmarine warfare, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. Magnetic sensors in a tactical missile can be used to detect and localize a target, such as a tank, from the background magnetic field variations. Another application is to determine position for navigational purposes relative to a database containing previously surveyed magnetic field information. Deployment of additional magnetic observatories in open ocean areas will permit magnetic models to be developed with 1-deg RMS magnetic variation worldwide, and the possibility of reduction to 0.5 by 2015 exists. Dual-use applications include clinical diagnostics and geophysical applications. Commercial users may adapt the use of magnetometer arrays, but the main initial (developing) application is military. Ocean bottom arrays, as depicted in Figure 16.4-3, can be used to detect and classify vessels. Land-based arrays, as depicted in Figure 16.4-4, can measure time-varying natural noise for airborne compensation. Of special concern are compensation methods for platform motion and other self-induced magnetic noise. The main differences between military and commercial use are the real-time accuracy requirements for operation from a moving base and the detection and classification capability. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of magnetic sensors in the past decade, with the possible exception of the development of the potassium optically pumped sensor. The experimental results for the potassium sensor gives a magnetic sensor noise level of 10 microgamma (1014 tesla rms) per Hz. Work continues on further development of this new class of sensor. Before the advent of these potassium sensors, the instrument noise level for the best optically pumped magnetometers was about 3 1012 tesla rms per Hz, about two orders of magnitude inferior to the newly developed potassium sensors. Potassium gradiometer accuracy now equals SQUID capabilities, but without the lowtemperature logistic and motion problems of SQUIDS. SQUIDS are vector devices and more susceptible to motioninduced effects. A potassium gradiometer is a scalar device, and an RMS noise of 10 microgammas/meter (or 1014 tesla/meter) at 10-second periods has been achieved. Potassium gradiometer technology permits near elimination of time-varying geomagnetic noise. Laser pumping will improve accuracy by a factor of 2 to 3. During the last decade, multiple-channel, short-baseline tensor gradiometers utilizing low-critical-temperature (low Tc) SQUIDs have been deployed from underwater tow systems and have demonstrated an effective means to detect, localize, and classify sea mines and exploded ordinance. During the same timeframe, a high T c SQUID technology utilizing liquid nitrogen for cooling has matured. High Tc sensors are of interest for military applications because nitrogen cooling reduces logistic issues and permits smaller package sizes, compared to low T c SQUID sensors that require liquid helium for cooling. Significant progress in this technology has been made. High Tc magnetometers have demonstrated sensitivities of 100 microgamma (1013 tesla) per Hz at 0.1 Hz. This figure should be compared to the performance of 10 microgamma per Hz at 0.1 Hz that has been reported for both low Tc superconducting magnetometers and potassium optically pumped magnetometers. Further sensitivity increases are expected as high Tc manufacturing technology improves. For tracking and homing applications in which less sensitivity is acceptable, but cost, size, weight, and logistics are important factors, a multichannel tensor gradiometer has been developed using fluxgate technology. This fluxgate gradiometer is especially useful for providing precise localization in man-portable operations.
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The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. There are four scenarios that will illustrate this potential improvement: 1. Fixed Array of Sensors. When a fixed array of sensors is used on the ground or underwater, the increased knowledge of position and time are coupled to enhance the computation power because of the synergistic effect of the array. The spectral energy density functions for environmental noise can be precisely deduced. Then, in the presence of a signal of interest, the special density function of the magnetic signatures of interest can be extracted from background noise and thus provide an improved SNR than that realizable without the use of energy spectral density techniques. For instance, arrays of three component magnetometers on land or on the ocean bottom have the potential of reducing time-varying geomagnetic background noise by 80 percent or more. This time-varying magnetic background noise is a major impediment to detection of the magnetic anomaly signals from mines or submersibles, depending upon the operational scenario (sensor noise, geology motion, etc.). By placing three to five magnetometers at distances of 10 to 100 kilometers, gradients and amplitudes of natural pulsations may be measured. By using previously determined transfer functions (based on geologic structure and experiment), the pulsation field may be extrapolated to a distant point at sea. The predicted field for the distant point may be telemetered to an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. These predicted fields may be subtracted from the airborne magnetometer output in near real time to significantly increase the signal-to-noise ratio and permit detection of submarine magnetic anomaly signals at greater ranges. Figure 16.4-4 is a graphic display of the remote real-time compensation process. Moving Array of Sensors. If the magnetometry system consist of one or more moving sensors towed behind a ship or plane, the ability for precise position, orientation, altitude (or depth), etc., of the various sensors can be deduced and the background noise spectral density determined. This will enhance the signalto-noise ratio determination of targets of interest. Target Recognition. With the enhanced knowledge of location and orientation of the various sensor(s) when the sensor(s) and target(s) are in relative motion, the SNR will be enhanced as pointed out above. For
,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,
Transmission to Shore
LAND
SEA
3 Component Magnetometers
100 km
Remote, Real Time Target Detection and Classification
50 km
Data Processor
500 km
~ 1 km
Magnetometer Array on Ocean Bottom at Choke Point
Total Field Magnetometer
Remote, Real Time Compensation of Magnetic Total Field for Target Sensing and Classification
99-0178-1
99-0178-2
Figure 16.4-3. Ocean Bottom Arrays
Figure 16.4-4. The Remote Real-Time Compensation Process
2.
3.
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a typical ASW application, the sensors are remote from the target, and thus the target can be treated as a simple dipole and the inverse problem, that is, deducing the location and moment of the target(s) of interest from the magnetic field contours, is relatively straightforward. However, in those scenarios when the target and sensors are nearby (that is, when the length of the target or the lateral dimensions of the sensor array are comparable to or less than the distance between target and sensor array), the target must be represented by dipole as well as higher order poles. In this case, the extraction of the magnetic signature from the magnetic field contours is very demanding on computation power, requiring precise information about the sensor position, orientation, etc. Thus, the future development of smart magnetic sensor systems requires precise position and time information as well as massive computation capabilities. The ability to increase knowledge of locations, time, etc., in packages that can be utilized in costeffective magnetic sensors and sensor arrays is very crucial to these enhanced magnetometer systems. The development of computers with enhanced capability (both speed and memory) and with very low power consumption is crucial for the maturing of these enhanced magnetic detection systems. 4. Submarine Electric Fields. Dissimilar metals or differences in surface properties of the same metal give rise to corrosion currents flowing in salt water in the vicinity of a submarine. The currents produce a static electric dipole aligned with the longitudinal axis of the submarine. This is called the submarine electric dipole moment and is quite variable. The dipole moment, in turn, produces a magnetic field. This electric dipole-produced (EDP) magnetic field falls off as the inverse square of distance, unlike the wellknown hull anomaly magnetic field, which falls off the inverse cube of distance. This means that, although the EDP magnetic anomaly has a smaller magnetic moment than the hull anomaly, at some distance the magnetic field from the electric dipole will begin to get larger than that from the hull moment. In the past, magnetometers were not sensitive enough to detect this EDP magnetic field anomaly, but the advent of the potassium magnetometer means that it may be detectable. The same corrosion currents are modulated by differences in electrical resistance between the journal bearings and the propeller shaft as rotation occurs. The modulation will be at the shaft rotation rate and its multiples. This phenomena gives rise to an oscillating electromagnetic field which propagates through the water and into the air [extremely low-frequency emission (ELFE) signal]. The high sensitivity of the potassium magnetometer promises much greater range for the detection of this signal. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Depending on military and commercial uses, many countries, such as France, Germany, Canada, Russia, and the Ukraine, have developed a capability in most of the differing magnetometer and magnetic gradiometer technologies. Canada leads the world in fluxgate sensors; Russia has developed a unique potassium-resonance magnetometer capability; the United States leads in SQUID development for military; and Japan, Russia, Ukraine, and Germany lead in civil clinical applications. A joint Russian, Canadian, and U.S. team has built optically pumped potassium magnetometers and gradiometers. The potassium magnetometer is based on a preliminary design originally funded by the Soviet Navy in the late 1980s. This magnetometer has achieved noise levels comparable to SQUIDs. The potassium magnetometer does not suffer from the requirement for cryogenic support systems and motion compensation techniques of SQUIDs. This potassium magnetometer should be considered a critical development because the nation deploying it for submarine detection will enjoy a noise level 3 orders of magnitude less than that of systems deployed by the U.S. Navy and others. This translates to a possible 10-fold increase in detection range. When employed as a gradiometer, it has the advantage of near cancellation of time-varying geomagnetic background noise (geomagnetic pulsations). The rms noise level of a single potassium magnetometer has been measured as 14 microgammas (14 femto tesla) at 0.1 Hz. The noise level of a 2-m gradiometer is 10 microgammas (10 femto tesla) per meter at 0.1 Hz. These measurements were made with two complete gradiometers operating side by side in the real Earth field. In an experiment conducted at Kavgolovo (a test site northeast of Saint Petersburg, Russia) it was shown that laser pumping (versus lamp pumping) could further reduce the noise by a factor of 3. Relative to ELFE, propeller-shaft rotation modulates corrosion currents in the 3- to 20-Hz range. Russia has deployed sensors on the ocean bottom and detected this phenomenon. China and Japan have limited
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but expanding capabilities in several magnetometer technologies. Although the United States leads in platform motion compensation, Russia appears to have the lead in the use of compensation using magnetic sensor arrays.
Country Australia Austria Brazil Canada China Czech Republic Finland France Germany Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Poland Romania Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan UK Ukraine United States Legend: Extensive R&D Magnetometers Magnetic Gradiometers
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.4-5. Magnetometers and Magnetic Gradiometers WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERS AND MAGNETIC GRADIOMETERS

SQUID Magnetometers ................................................................................................................ III-16-89 MagnetometersElectron Resonance and Optically Pumped................................................................ III-16-91 MagnetometersNuclear Precession............................................................................................... III-16-93 MagnetometersInduction Coil..................................................................................................... III-16-95 MagnetometersFiber Optic ........................................................................................................ III-16-97 MagnetometersFlux Gate (Valve) ............................................................................................... III-16-99 Magnetic Gradiometers Using Multiple Magnetometers .................................................................... III-16-101 Intrinsic Magnetic Gradiometers................................................................................................... III-16-103 Magnetoresistive Magnetometers.................................................................................................. III-16-105 Nonmagnetic Closed-Loop Refrigeration Equipment ........................................................................ III-16-107 Magnetic Arrays........................................................................................................................ III-16-108
III-16-87
III-16-88
DATA SHEET III-16.4. SQUID MAGNETOMETERS

In next 5 to10 years: Noise level < 0.03 nanotesla (nT) rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level; field deployment problems; requires cryogenic environment; magnetic contamination. Commercial technology suitable for military application. Resource exploration, nondestructive testing, and medical imaging. Medical imaging is funding driver.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. SQUID magnetometers, in particular, are very accurate. They are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors and covert detection and are used in ASW, mine hunting, geology, area surveillance, threat classification, and nondestructive testing. They have an inherent logistic requirement for a cryogen, liquid helium, or liquid nitrogen for superconducting operation. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The emergence of precise location and time information during the last decade and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities has improved the effectiveness of these magnetometry systems. During the last decade, multiple-channel, short-baseline tensor gradiometers, utilizing low T c SQUIDs cooled by liquid helium, have been deployed from underwater tow systems and have demonstrated an effective means to detect, localize, and classify sea mines and exploded ordinance. During the same time frame, a high T c SQUID technology utilizing liquid nitrogen for cooling has matured. This problem of low-temperature operation also introduces the self-generated noise of the cooling device or method. SQUIDS are vector devices which can be packaged into compact, multichannel, tensor gradiometers capable of precise localization and classification as compared to total-field sensors. Because they are vector devices, they are more susceptible to motion-induced effects. Approaches have been developed and demonstrated to compensate for both sensor-intrinsic and motion-induced noise to obtain operational usefulness with extreme accuracy. High T c sensors are of interest for military applications because nitrogen cooling reduces logistic issues and permits smaller package sizes than required for low T c SQUID sensors, which require liquid helium for cooling. The development of nonmagnetic closed-loop refrigerators will eventually eliminate the logistic tail for passive nitrogen cooling. Significant progress in high T c technology has been made. High T c magnetometers have demonstrated sensitivities of 100 microgamma (1013 tesla) per Hz at 0.1 Hz. This figure should be compared to the performance of 10 microgamma per Hz at 0.1 Hz that has been reported for both low T c superconducting magnetometers and potassium optically pumped magnetometers. Further sensitivity increases are expected as high T c manufacturing technology improves. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, SQUID magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
III-16-89

Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Denmark Hungary Japan Russia Spain UK

Significant R&D

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States and Germany appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Magnesonsors Tristan Canada Canadian Thin Films Germany Julicher SQUID G.m.b.H. Denmark NKT Nonlinear Dynamics Group at University of Denmark FIT Messtechnik GmbH Quantum Design
III-16-90
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERSELECTRON RESONANCE AND OPTICALLY PUMPED

In next 5 to10 years: Noise level < 0.03 nT rms/Hz. Sensitivity 0.005 nT Resolution 0.01 nT
None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Indirect detection measurement of Earths electric field. Potassium sensors equal to SQUID accuracy without logistic complication of low-temperature requirements. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There have been major advances in the development of electron resonance and optically pumped magnetometers. In a gradiometer configuration, with one magnetometer at each wing tip of an aircraft, an optically pumped magnetometer can provide not only target detection, but can also indicate the position of a target with respect to the aircraft. This offers a tremendous operational advantage over single-magnetometer systems.1 Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The emergence of precise location and time information in the past decade or so and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities have improved the effectiveness of these magnetometry systems. The experimental results for the potassium sensor gives a magnetic sensor noise level of 10 microgamma (1014 tesla rms) per Hz. Work continues on further development of this new class of sensor. Before the advent of these potassium sensors, the instrument noise level for the best optically pumped magnetometers was about 3 1012 tesla rms per Hz, about two orders of magnitude inferior to the newly developed potassium sensors. Potassium gradiometer accuracy now equals SQUID capabilities, but without the low-temperature logistic and motion problems of SQUIDS. Because of their accuracy potential, electron resonance and optically pumped magnetometers have applications such as covert detection area surveillance and threat classification. In addition, He4 sensors using laser pumping have been developed and demonstrated to have performance of 3 1013 tesla rms per Hz. These sensors are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors and can be used in ASW, mine hunting, geology, and nondestructive testing.
www.rmsinst.com/ct2.htm, July 8, 1999.
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Relative to JCS Vision 2010, electron resonance and optically pumped magnetometers have application in precision engagement. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States, Russia, and Canada appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Geometrics Polyatomic Canada GEM Systems Scintrex Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry) UK AROLAB (Oxford University) China Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources Geophysical Research Institute (University of New England) Raytheon Systems (formerly Texas Instruments)
Sander Geophysics Limited
III-16-92
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERSNUCLEAR PRECESSION

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level < 0.03 nT rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Magnetic contamination. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Nuclear procession magnetometers have covert detection capability and are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors, area surveillance, and threat classification. Other applications include ASW, mine hunting, nondestructive testing, and geology. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, nuclear procession magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, Canada appears to be the leader.
III-16-93
The following organizations have active research programs: United States Geometrics Canada GEM Systems Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry) Raytheon Systems Scintrex
III-16-94
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERSINDUCTION COIL

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level < 0.03 nT rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level reduction of magnetic contamination, normally used for stationary applications. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of this magnetic sensing technology in the past decade. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Induction coil magnetometers have the greatest change of spectral density over a wide frequency range than all other magnetic sensors (see Figure 16.4-1 for details). They are used in ASW, mine hunting, geology, covert detection, area surveillance, nondestructive testing and threat classification. Triaxial magnetic induction magnetometers have been integrated with biaxial (leveling) inclinometers to provide low-cost compass heading, pitch and roll with a 10-nT resolution. Further research in computation techniques should improve the accuracy. This capability, when hybridized with sonar array detectors, is being applied to self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) marine research and detection. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, induction-coil magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
III-16-95

Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States appears to be the leader. The following organizations have active research programs: United States EMI Sonar and Magnetometer Company Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry) Precision Navigation ZONG
III-16-96
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERSFIBER OPTIC

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level < 0.8 nT rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level. Magnetic contamination, normally used for stationary applications. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Applications of fiber-optic magnetometer include covert detection capability, area surveillance, and nondestructive testing. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, SQUID magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
III-16-97
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present the United States and Russia are leaders. The following organizations have active research programs in this technology: Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry)
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DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETOMETERSFLUX GATE (VALVE)

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level < 0.05 nT rms/Hz at frequencies < 1 Hz and 102 nT rms per Hz at > 1 Hz. Continuing development.
None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Only development and production technology should be controlled to reduce proliferation. Magnetic contamination. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW warfare, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of many types of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Magnetic sensing of direction appears to be of secondary use by the military. Flux valve technology has been regulated to the not glamorous category of common sensors like the clock (see Section 16.5). There is, however, a need to provide low-cost map referencing of magnetic north and to maintain magnetic databases using magnetic sensors. A serious lack of knowledge exists relative to geolocation because of the increasing use of GPS as a sole means of navigation and position referencing. GPS does not provide direction unless a significant change of position is detected and north is then computed from the position differences. Magnetic heading referencing by the use of flux valve is the least costly means of solving this problem. Magnetic heading can be sensed by a flux value, for instance, or computed by subtracting a known magnetic variation from the true heading sensed by an INS. All aircraft, ships, and many land vehicles require magnetic heading (north) detection. A multichannel tensor gradiometer has been developed using fluxgate technology for tracking and homing applications in which less sensitivity is acceptable, but cost, size, weight, and logistics are important factors compared to SQUID and total-field sensing technologies. Flux gate gradiometers are especially useful to provide precise localization in man-portable operations. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, flux gate (valve) magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
III-16-99

Australia China Germany Netherlands Sweden United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Switzerland
Brazil Finland Israel Russia UK

Moderate R&D
Canada France Japan South Africa Ukraine
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present the United States and Canada are the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Applied Physics EMD Nanotesla Schoenstedt Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry) Canada Narod UK Bartington South Africa Hermanus Magnetics Observatory Billingsley GEM Systems Quantum Magnetics Walker Scientific
III-16-100
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETIC GRADIOMETERS USING MULTIPLE MAGNETOMETERS

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level of individual magnetometers of < 0.05 nT rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level. Magnetic contamination. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of many types of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Magnetic sensor systems are often configured to detect the spatial variation of the magnetic field intensity from sources external to the instrument, that is, the gradient of the magnetic field intensity, and in this mode are called magnetic gradiometers. Magnetic gradiometers can consist of two magnetic sensors or consist of a single intrinsic magnetic gradient sensor. Cost, application, and sensor capability dictate the choice. Magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors and are used in ASW, mine hunting, geology, area surveillance, and threat classification. They have covert detection capability. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, magnetic gradiometers using multiple magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Finland Israel Poland Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria France Italy Russia UK

Significant R&D
Canada Germany Japan South Africa Ukraine
China Hungary Netherlands Sweden United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
III-16-101
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetic gradiometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States, Russia, and Canada appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States BTI Russia URALS State Technical University (Laboratory of Quantum Magnetometry) Canada CTF Quantum Magnetics
BTI and CTF are advancing this technology using SQUID sensors, while Quantum Magnetics is using flux gate sensors.
III-16-102
DATA SHEET III-16.4. INTRINSIC MAGNETIC GRADIOMETERS

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level of < 0.015 nT/meter rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level. Magnetic contamination. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Resource exploration. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for antisubmarine warfare, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of many types of magnetic sensors in the past decade. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Magnetic sensor systems are often configured to detect the spatial variation of the magnetic field intensity from sources external to the instrument, that is, the gradient of the magnetic field intensity, and in this mode are called magnetic gradiometers. Magnetic gradiometers can consist of two magnetic sensors or consist of a single intrinsic magnetic gradient sensor. Intrinsic magnetic gradiometers, utilizing either the SQUID or potassium technologies, nearly eliminate the natural geomagnetic background noise. They are key elements of magnetic anomaly detectors and are used in ASW, mine hunting, geology area surveillance, and threat classification. Like all magnetic sensors, magnetic gradiometers have covert detection capability. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, intrinsic magnetic gradiometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Denmark Hungary Japan Russia Spain UK

Significant R&D

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
III-16-103
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetic gradiometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States appears to be the worldwide leader. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Geophysical Institute (University of Alaska) Germany Julicher SQUID GmbH Denmark NKT
III-16-104
DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETORESISTIVE MAGNETOMETERS

In next 5 to 10 years: Noise level < 0.03 nT rms/Hz. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms and/or using arrays. Low noise level. Magnetic contamination. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Security applications. Not an issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of many types of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Thin-film giant magnetoresistive (GMR) sensor technology appears at the present to provide a most promising possibility. On the one hand, the sensitivity of these sensors will likely increase and applications involving multiple units of low-cost, short-range, remote sensors will evolve. As sensitivity (high SNR) and compensation techniques improve, a wide variety of applications should evolve, such as covert detection capability, area surveillance, threat classification, and nondestructive testing. Thin-film GMR sensor technology appears at the present to provide a most promising possibility (see Figure 16.4-2). Using GMR technology, nonvolatile random access memory will have lower power consumption and faster access speeds. GMR circuits, transformers, and logic gates are also viable. On the one hand, the sensitivity of these sensors will likely increase and applications involving multiple units of low-cost, short-range, remote sensors will evolve. Active electromagnetic detection of a target illuminated by a low-frequency magnetic or electrical-current source, currently utilized for land-mine detection, will likely be utilized in a wider range of applications as underlying sensor technology and signal-processing capabilities improve. Further advances in microelectronics, most significantly in the area of high dynamic range, multichannel, analog-to-digital converter technology and digital signal processing, will enhance capabilities and significantly reduce cost and complexity of the underlying sensor technologies. These factors will make concepts involving multiple units of low-cost, short-range, distributed sensors more attractive. Similarly, advancements in microelectronics will increase magnetic-sensor capabilities on magnetically noisy platforms through large-scale use of distributed sensors monitoring the platform noise.
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Relative to JCS Vision 2010, magneto-resistive magnetometers have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetometer technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. At present, the United States appears to be the worldwide leader. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Honeywell Nonvolatile Electronics
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DATA SHEET III-16.4. NONMAGNETIC CLOSED-LOOP REFRIGERATION EQUIPMENT

In next 5 to 10 years: Operation < 103 deg K. Continuing development. None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. None. Nonmagnetic cooling environment allows for greater SNR for SQUIDs. Resource exploration and medical applications. Medical imaging is funding driver.
RATIONALE SQUID sensors are optimal (most accurate) when the cryogenic support equipment does not induce magnetic noise into the detection process. In the past, medical applications have been the only funded efforts in nonmagnetic closed-loop refrigeration equipment. With the advent during the last decade of high T c SQUIDs, with critical transition temperatures in excess of 90 K, there has been intensified interest in closed-loop refrigeration for nondestructive evaluation and medical application. The cooling requirements are less stringent than what is required for low Tc technology. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, nonmagnetic closed-loop refrigeration equipment has precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
A few countries like the United States, Canada, Russia, and France have elected to be dominant in the associated technologies of SQUIDs that require superconducting operating temperatures. Other countries are passive because of economic considerations. The following organizations have active research programs: United States ADP Cryogenics Neocera GWR Instruments (Ultra Long Holdtime Dewar)
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DATA SHEET III-16.4. MAGNETIC ARRAYS

In next 5 to 10 years: Decrease of acquisition time and increase of accuracy of detection and location, array spacing, and detection range will increase with improved timing and communication.
None identified. Magnetic contamination control area with field gradient < 0.1 nT/meter. Algorithms and verified data for real-time magnetic compensation and detection (improvement > 10 to 1) for operation on mobile platforms. Arrays provide greater SNR due to synergism of the sensors. Magnetic contamination can be isolated. Commercial equipment suitable for military applications. Intrusion and security control. Not an issue. Availability and use of accurate time is the issue.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In general, magnetometers and magnetic gradiometers are key elements of magnetic anomaly detector systems for ASW, mine fuses, intrusion and ordnance detection, proximity detection (distance to target), underwater mine detection, and active degaussing systems. There has not been significant progress in advancing the state of the art of many types of magnetic sensors in the past decade. Magnetometers on a moving base are a POSITIME-influenced technology because of the interrelationship of magnetic data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The major advances in magnetometry during the last decade or so have been the emergence of precise location and time information and the availability of greatly enhanced computation capabilities. As these capabilities are introduced into magnetometry systems, the effectiveness of such systems could be significantly enhanced. Arrays allow for greater SNR of the system and reduction of SNR of the individual sensors in the array using compensation/synergism techniques. When a fixed array of sensors is used on the ground or underwater, the increased knowledge of position and time are coupled to enhance the computation power. The spectral energy density functions for environmental noise can be precisely deduced. Then, in the presence of a signal of interest, the special density function of the magnetic signatures of interest can be extracted from background noise and thus provide an SNR improved over that realizable without the use of energy spectral density techniques. Applications include classification of objects not normal (intruders) to the environment, area surveillance, threat classification, and choke point control under covert conditions. Other applications include ASW, mine hunting, geology, and medical applications. The use of magnetometer arrays may be adapted by commercial users, but the main initial application will be militarily driven. The main differences between military and commercial use are the real-time accuracy requirements for operation from a moving base and the detection and classification capability. Relative to JCS Vision 2010, magnetic arrays have precision engagement applications. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority.
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Canada
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Military and commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. A few countries have elected to be dominant in magnetic array technologies, while others are passive because of economic considerations. Although the United States leads in platform motion compensation, Russia appears to have the lead in the use of compensation using magnetic sensor arrays.
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SECTION 16.5PRECISE TIME AND FREQUENCY (PT&F)

Highlights The worldwide availability of accurate time via GNSS will increase the combination of communications, imaging, and navigation functions into multihybrid sensor systems. This will provide a common grid reference for battlespace data management. The accuracy of the ionosphere model is a limiting factor on GPS time transfer. Autonomous and common three-dimensional POSITIME grid reference will improve battlespace situational awareness by providing a precise POSITIME tag on all battlespace information collected. This will provide real-time knowledge of the location and movement across battlespace of allied and enemy assets. Accurate time is required for autonomous operation of satellite network geolocation systems and enhanced crypto/transec performance in spread-spectrum communication systems. The importance of PT&F has only recently been recognized in military and commercial usage because of the availability of GNSS time. Foreign sources are currently providing the funding engine for future technology improvements in PT&F, as U.S. R&D funding has declined. The number of U.S. Atomic Frequency Standard suppliers is declining and may be down to one within 5 years.
OVERVIEW PT&F is the key to current and future POSITIME, navigation, communication, and imaging systems. While the need of imaging and communication systems for PT&F is becoming more critical for military use, most current emphasis for PT&F technology is to support navigation and mainly for commercial use. Both the U.S. GPS, with its inherent vulnerabilities (see Section 16.3), and Russias GLONASS worldwide navigation systems are actually PT&F systems. Both systems employ atomic clocks in the satellites. A cesium beam frequency standard is utilized aboard each GLONASS satellite. Both systems are capable of time transfer to a precision of 10 to 30 nanoseconds, but the GLONASS system time reference is not coordinated universal time, (UTC), as maintained at the United States Naval Observatory (USNO), the designated time reference for the United States. GPS uses both cesium and rubidium frequency standards in the current satellites, known as Block II/IIA, and rubidium standards in the replacement satellites, Block IIR. PT&F and signal detection and processing technology are required to acquire, synchronize, and track the desired satellite signals for measurement of navigation parameters. Technologies contributing to superior performance include the application of analog and digital correlation filters, DSP and microelectronics. Increased computational effectiveness for a given equipment volume and weight could provide an adversary with two distinct navigation payoffs: (1) certain navigation capabilities could be enhanced by advance computer technologies, and (2) for a given available volume/weight, the navigation performance could be enhanced in terms of accuracy, reliability, and resistance to hostile actions. The GPS capability to transmit corrections to UTC (USNO) in the navigation message and thereby transfer time is given in the GPS Interface Control Document, ICD-GPS-202, as 28 nanoseconds (1 sigma). The 1997 Master Navigation Positioning and Timing Plan, CJCSI 6130.01A, requires timing accuracy to be 100 nanoseconds or better for all DoD users worldwide. The plan further states that precise time will be valuable to users who must time-synchronize other systems such as JTIDS (see Sections 16.1 and 16.3). The disparity between the documents exists because ICD-GPS-202 was recently updated to reflect increased user requirements. These wide-sweeping capability figures can still be misleading. The capability and conditions of time transfer from GPS depend greatly upon the instrumentation used, user conditions, and period of interest. For example, the time transfer capability of a fixed site, at a well-known position, needing long-term timing, and having the ability to integrate or process data over hours or days is considerably different than for a high-performance aircraft needing time to transfer in real-time
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or from the individual sensors of an array to a central processor. Time-transfer operational performance of GPS and data quoted is to a fixed site. GPS capabilities for military users under different conditions should be given as a more representative capability for system planning. Transfer of this technology will assist an adversary in improving the combat capability of its platforms. The use of stable clocks in a high dynamics platform can significantly improve timing availability by providing smoothing or flywheeling action that preserves time synchronization made under less stressed conditions. Systems-integration technology enables the integration of communication and multiple navigational instruments outputs through advanced digital processing to provide an extended range of operational functions and increased combat performance. These technologies support reduced size and weight of equipment, improvement in navigation accuracy, continuity of operations, reliability, survivability, and resistance to enemy countermeasures. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in precision radio navigation and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. BACKGROUND The importance of PT&F may be clearer with a description of the overall architecture of systems involved with the generation, dissemination, and maintenance of military common time. The overall process is described below. Reference Time. The common time scale to be used by U.S. military forces and systems is that generated, coordinated internationally, and maintained by the USNO. This time scale is designated internationally as UTC (USNO), representing the actual time available as a physical signal output of the USNO master clock. USNO maintains a master clock system of various commercial atomic clocks, remote precise time reference stations, and interface to dissemination systems. The alternate master clock became operational at Schriever Air Force Base in 1996 and is collocated with the GPS master control station as DoDs primary means of global time dissemination. The alternate master clock provides system redundancy and is linked to the master clock by a two-way satellite time transfer system. A severe handicap to users of UTC time, such as in telecommunications, is the yearly insertion of a nanosecond to account for the rotational changes of the Earth due to increases in the moons orbital path around the Earth. In the next 5 to 20 years this correction problem needs to be internationally adjudicated to resolve the communication synchronization problem. Reference Time Dissemination. The dissemination of UTC (USNO) is accomplished by a collection of methods relying upon various systems, predominately POS/NAV systems. This dissemination function is a secondary mission of these systems, and no operational systems exist that are specifically designed and used for PT&F dissemination. Dependence upon secondary mission requirements or capabilities does not support a cohesive system architecture for the many systems that rely on precise time. Since PT&F is a secondary mission, operational control, coordination, and regulation of the time disseminated is an informal agreement without the impact of operational requirements. There are limited efforts underway to provide U.S. forces an affordable, nonjammable, precise, and accurate common time reference for all military electronic systems. User Interfacing. User systems have an increasing role in the distribution and sharing of time information. The Mark XV identification friend or foe (IFF) system and its counterpart North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) identification system had a major problem in the distribution and synchronization of secure communications between their user platforms, which led in major part to the cancellation of the U.S. project. This should be a clear indication that the sharing of time information by user platforms and systems will be increasingly more important as higher data rates and crypto requirements (see Section 10) become more stringent. In turn, this will create an increasingly larger problem of controlling or managing intersystem timing exchange or interoperability. Coordination and standardization of these interfaces is part of the overall coordination role needed to produce robust systems synchronized to a common time reference.
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RATIONALE The importance of PT&F to military systems as a technology area is becoming more evident with the deployment and operational use of GPS. GPS provides the means for accurate and stable time to be disseminated to forces around the world. The application of GPS for timing is increasing, particularly in telecommunications and data transfer. As a result, the technology to maintain and use precise time is becoming of increasing military importance. However, because of the small quantity of Atomic Frequency Standard clocks that are needed yearly, the number of U.S. sources may decline to one within 5 years. Also alarming is the potential demise of the precision crystal oscillator suppliers in the United States in the near term. The oscillators are a critical module of the atomic clock system. There is a need for a precise, robust protocol for setting time across networks. A robust precision network time protocol (PNTP) using broadband communication links is needed for future military systems. The following table is an example of the possible types of needs that should be recognized for PT&F.
Table 16.5-1. User Clock Precision/Accuracy Requirements and Benefits
Platform/System Nominal Use Time Epoch (second) Current Accuracy to UTC (USNO) Future Accuracy to UTC (USNO) Benefit of Improved Time Accuracy
Low-Accuracy Aircraft/Land Mobile
103
109
Quicker network entry for comms/IFF, enhanced crypto. Improved interoperability. Quicker network entry for comms/IFF, enhanced crypto. Improved interoperability. Quicker network entry for comms/IFF, enhanced crypto. Improved interoperability. Better targeting/emitter location such as TDOA. Enable spread spectrum LPI. Quicker network entry for comms/IFF. Improved interoperability. Comms net access. Frequency calibration source for low-power oscillators. Extended autonomous periods. Enhanced network synch. Higher data rates.
Ship/Submarines
106
109
Communication Sites/Aircraft
106
109
Radar/Surveillance/Intelligence
106
109
Frequency (f/f)
Low-Accuracy Aircraft/Land Mobile
1012
1015
Intermediate Land Reference Sites
1013
1015
Long-term Autonomous Timekeeping Large TDMA Systems

Precise Mode (Cesium Calibration Updating) Time Epoch (second)
1013 ~10
11
1015 10
15
ECCM Comm, Radar and Surveillance Systems Submarine Comm, Ship
109
1011
Better targeting/emitter location such as TDOA. Enable spreadspectrum LPI. Enhanced network synch. Higher data rates. Longer autonomy. Enhanced navigation.
108
1011
Current military fielded systems predominantly use cesium beam standards. These well performing and reliable devices have become the workhorse of remote timekeeping systems; however, they are large units not easily incorporated into smaller mobile platforms. Many users are therefore adopting secondary clocks, such as rubidium,
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disciplined by GPS time for long-term performance. These GPS-dependent clocks provide good performance in both long and short time frames, and the timing signals are being incorporated into many commercial systems such as telecommunication and computer networking systems. This dependency on a GPS-disciplined clock is a military concern. The following discusses the PT&F developing technologies that are being investigated for future PT&F requirements. 1 . Time Distribution. More accurate and stable time sources, time distribution, and time transfer methods are required by the military to provide the warfighter with a coherent tactical picture and enable rapid, accurate capability assessment. With the closer logical linkage of combat systems and C2 systems and the proliferation of GPS units within precision weapons, the control of time sources and allowable variation of time provided by those sources to systems and elements across the battle space must be better managed. For example, better monitoring techniques could be utilized to improve time stability/accuracy performance by creating algorithms that combine clock outputs (ensembling) and automatically detect phase jumps or frequency perturbations and/or compensate for them. In addition, robust selection of alternative time source(s) in the event the preferred time source becomes unavailable must be better addressed. Present implementations often use multiple redundant clocks and GPS receivers and have no means of utilizing resources from other collocated systems. There is a strong need to establish a common time reference system, available across the platforms and battlespace, that will be usable by all systems. Such a system would include flywheel clocks at individual systems to provide autonomy from battle damage or loss of external references. Methods of time distribution other than GPS, particularly at the battlespace level, need development. These can include two-way satellite time transfer, fiber-optic systems for use within a platform, and other techniques such as communications systems between platforms. 2 . Atomic/Ion Clocks (Trapped Ion Storage and Slow Atom Technology Clocks). This developing class of atomic clocks will improve absolute accuracy to better than 1015. Initially, these clocks will be larger, heavier, and more delicate than current military and commercial devices, but they have the potential to become competitive or better in size, weight, and power with existing clocks. This is a technology area where the Europeans are making great efforts and, in some cases, lead the United States. a. Cesium Fountain Clocks. Optical techniques for the containment and cooling of atoms, which was the 1997 Nobel Prize for Physics, offers new possibilities in methods for precise clock development. Optically contained neutral atoms can be cooled to close to absolute zero and launched into an interrogation system, which can make very accurate measurements of frequency to less than 1 10 15 sec/day. The immediate application being investigated is a cesium fountain clock. A clock of this type, theoretically proposed by Zacharis in the 1950s, is being developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and USNO. The French have been operating such a clock at the Paris Observatory for several years, and NIST and the French are actively developing this technology for space application. Mercury Linear Ion Trapped Clocks. This type of magnetically trapped and optically interrogated clock is being developed by Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and is being deployed as replacement for the hydrogen master standards in the NASA Deep Space Network. One is to be tested for possible contribution to the master clock ensemble. These units employ mercury ions suspended in a magnetically generated linear trap and optically interrogated. These systems have the potential of extremely good stability for long-term measurements. HP did preliminary commercial product development on a mercury ion clock in the 1980s, but the design did not transition to production. Other Technology Clocks. Research into other types of trapped ion clocks and cooled cavity resonators is proceeding. The potential for migration into usable systems is estimated to be 510 years. These new, high-precision standards could contribute to the definition of reference time and time-scale generation, supporting a worldwide coordinated common time and potentially an improved time scale for DoD systems. The NIST microwave ion clock is pushing 1015 second, and the optical version should realize 1016 second when development efforts are funded to correct the optical frequency to the microwave region where it can be used in electronic systems. Large, research-oriented clocks could play a direct role in timing centers that are involved in the best performance clocks for time-
b.
c.
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scale operation. If successful in timing center improvements, this could again press the state of the art in dissemination and distribution of timing information to users. 3 . Low-Power Clocks. There is a very strong need for clocks that perform at or near the accuracy level of current small clocks but at significantly reduced size, weight, and power. A technology currently in development, the microcomputer-compensated oscillator (MCXO), provides the stability of an ovenized crystal oscillator at or below the input power levels of the traditional temperature-compensated oscillator (TCXO). Another promising area of development is the miniaturized gas cell clock using cesium or rubidium. This approach trades off some performance of the traditional rubidium clock to provide an atomic clock with a volume of about 25 cm3 and a power consumption of less than 1 W. These lower power devices can offer a level of performance suitable for GPS receiver direct-Y code acquisition and communications system synchronization in a package suitable in size and power for manpack or low-power mobile platform users. 4 . Optically Pumped Clocks. The use of laser diodes for optical pumping and cooling of atomic systems to produce clock signals is a developing technology that will be adapted to field or system usable units. Low-power, fixed-mode diode lasers offer a natural means of interrogating and controlling small, ruggedized standards for field or platform use. French and Swiss companies have already introduced prototype small optically pumped cesium and rubidium units. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of PT&F technology for military electronic systems, including navigation, telecommunications, and data transfer. However, this leadership role is waning as U.S. R&D funds for PT&F technology have declined. The U.S. development efforts have been traditionally funded as parts of the host programs they support. As these programs, such as GPS, reached maturity, the funding for PT&F development vanished. NIST is operating a cesium fountain clock and is also developing this clock for space applications. Foreign PT&F developments are increasing, particularly in France, Switzerland, and in the European Space Agency (ESA) and associated research centers.
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Time Distribution Systems
Atomic Ion Clocks
Low-Power Clocks
Optically Pumped Clocks
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.5-2. Precise Time and Frequency WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.5. PRECISE TIME AND FREQUENCY (PT&F)
Time Distribution Systems......................................................................................................... III-16-119 Atomic/Ion Clocks .................................................................................................................... III-16-121 Low-Power Clocks.................................................................................................................... III-16-123 Optically Pumped Clocks ........................................................................................................... III-16-125
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DATA SHEET III-16.5. TIME DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

In next 5 to 10 years: Provide signal phase (time) common synchronization of < 109 sec, relative to UTC (USNO); intersystem synchronization of < 108 sec relative to battlegroup; coordinated use of platform resources for lower cost and robustness; 109 for interoperability, surveillance, and high-speed communication.
None identified. Frequency references for calibration with f/f < 1 1015. Algorithms and verified data to combine clock outputs to improve stability/accuracy performance (i.e., ensembling). Automatically detect phase jumps or frequency perturbations and/or improve reliability from redundancy. Self monitoring. Low noise, especially in the presence of vibration. Maintaining high stability under environmental extremes, e.g., the military temperature range. Survival and maintaining stability under high shock (gun-hardened oscillations). Accurate clocks are needed to provide direct wideband communication links and to provide direct acquisition of GPS-Y code. Flywheeling and other autonomous timekeeping techniques are essential. Power source may require further development for military application.
Technical Issues
Telecommunication, electrical power generation, and grid management. Large volume use.
RATIONALE The importance of this technology is becoming more evident with the deployment and operational use of GPS. GPS provides the means for accurate and stable time to be disseminated to forces around the world. The use of GPS for timing is increasing, particularly in telecommunications and data transfer. As a result, the technology to maintain and use precise POSITIME is becoming of increasing military importance. Sensors, such as magnetometers, magnetic gradiometers, gravity meters, gravity gradiometers, optical, infrared, ultraviolet, and acoustic, especially on a moving base, are POSITIME-influenced technologies because of the interrelationship of sensor data with position and time and the need for velocity and verticality compensation on a moving platform for sensor stabilization. The synergistic effect of the use of multiple sensor arrays is a major technology improvement that must be undertaken as a national policy on time. More accurate and stable time sources, time distribution, and time-transfer methods are required by the military to provide the warfighter with a coherent tactical picture and enable rapid accurate capability assessment. With the closer logical linkage of combat systems and C2 systems and the proliferation of GPS units within precision weapons, the control of sources and allowable variation of time provided by those sources to systems and elements across the battle space must be better managed. For example, better monitoring techniques could be utilized to improve time stability/accuracy performance by creating algorithms that combine clock outputs (ensembling) and automatically detect phase jumps or frequency perturbations and/or compensate for them. In addition, robust selection of alternative time source(s) in the event the preferred time source becomes unavailable must be better addressed.
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Present implementations often use multiple redundant clocks and GPS receivers and have no means of utilizing resources from other collocated systems. There is a strong need to establish a common time reference system, available across the platforms and battlespace that will be usable by all systems. Such a system would include flywheel clocks at individual systems to provide autonomy from battle damage or loss of external references. Methods of time distribution other than GPS, particularly at the battlespace level, need development. These can include two-way satellite time transfer, fiber-optic systems for use within a platform, and other techniques such as communications systems between platforms. Joint Vision 2010 states that advances in computer processing, precise global positioning (precise time), and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations (timely). Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) positioning, navigating, and timing policy addresses the need for precise time and time-distribution systems. The Joint Science & Technology plans address the need for information (precise time and time distribution systems) superiority, including direct integration of GPS (precise time) with sensor outputs, distributed and collaborative virtual planning in real time, and integrated cross-sensor tracking with unique target ID and real-time updates. Potential military applications of this technology include better synchronization, identification, surveillance, reconnaissance, remote sensing, and guidance. Improvements in time accuracy will (1) provide quicker network entry for communications, IFF, and enhanced crypto; (2) provide better targeting/emitter location, such as TDOA, and enable spread-spectrum LPI; and (3) enhance network synchronization and allow higher data rates. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. There is a national need to take POSITIME more seriously in the United States. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in precision radio navigation, battlespace interoperability, and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of PT&F technology for military electronic systems, including navigation, telecommunications, and data transfer. However, this leadership role is waning as U.S. R&D funds for many PT&F technology have declined. The U.S. development efforts have been traditionally funded as parts of the host programs they support. As these programs, such as GPS, reached maturity, the funding for PT&F development vanished. Foreign PT&F developments are increasing, particularly in France, Switzerland, and in the ESA and associated research centers. The French have been operating with cesium fountain clocks at the Paris Observatory for several years and are actively developing one for space application. NASA is currently funding a space clock project to compete with the European effort, but this effort may be too small and too late. The NASA effort is a collaboration of NIST, University of Colorado, JPL, and Harvard Smithsonian. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Absolute Time Corporation Switzerland MOBATIME Datachron Incorporated PRECITEL
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DATA SHEET III-16.5. ATOMIC/ION CLOCKS

In next 5 to 10 years: Provide stability and accuracy approaching 1 1015 sec for reference systems.
Magnetic shields, low-noise local oscillators, and long-life stabilized lasers. None identified. None identified. Short-term performance may require new technology local oscillators for stability performance. Potential small size of high-performance and high-accuracy devices. Production sources of these low-volume units. Power source may require further development for military applications. Weight is critical. Low wattage, stable power required.
Telecommunication. High cost because of low-volume use.
RATIONALE The importance of this technology is becoming more evident with the deployment and operational use of GPS. GPS provides the means for accurate and stable time to be disseminated to forces around the world. The use of GPS for timing is increasing, particularly in telecommunications and data transfer. As a result, the technology to maintain and use precise time is becoming of increasing military importance. This developing class of atomic clocks will improve absolute accuracy to better that 1015 sec. Initially, these clocks will be larger, heavier, and more delicate than current military and commercial devices, but they have the potential to become competitive or better in size, weight, and power than existing clocks. This is a technology area where the Europeans are making great efforts and, in some cases, lead the United States. Atomic clocks are composed of three general modules: a crystal oscillator, the atomic physics package, and the supporting electronics. Crystal oscillator availability from a U.S. source in the out years is of concern for Atomic Frequency Standard clocks. Crystal oscillators are key to the short-term stability and actual timekeeping because the atomic resonance frequency from the physics package is used to give long-term stability to the crystal clock. There are no issues relative to the physics package or the electronics. Joint Vision 2010 states that advances in computer processing, precise global positioning (precise time), and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations (timely). JCS positioning, navigating, and timing policy addresses the need for precise time and time-distribution systems. The Joint Science & Technology plan identifies the need for information (precise time and time distribution systems) superiority, including direct integration of GPS (precise time) with sensor outputs, distributed and collaborative virtual planning in real time, and integrated cross-sensor tracking with unique target ID and real-time updates. Potential military applications of this technology include better synchronization, identification, surveillance, reconnaissance, remote sensing, and guidance. Improvements in time accuracy will (1) provide quicker network entry
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for communications, IFF, and enhanced crypto; (2) provide better targeting/emitter location, such as TDOA, and enable spread-spectrum LPI; and (3) enhance network synchronization and allow higher data rates. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. There is a national need to take POSITIME more seriously in the United States. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in precision radio navigation, battlespace interoperability, and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of PT&F technology for military electronic systems, including navigation, telecommunications, and data transfer. However, this leadership role is waning as U.S. R&D funds for PT&F technology have declined. Another concern is the availability of crystal oscillators from U.S. sources in the 5- to 20-year period. The U.S. development efforts have been traditionally funded as parts of the host programs they support. As these programs, such as GPS, reached maturity, the funding for PT&F development vanished. Foreign PT&F developments are increasing, particularly in France, Switzerland, and in the ESA and associated research centers. For the last 5 years, the majority of symposia papers are non-U.S. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Bliley Electric EG&G HP Kernco Northrop Grumman University of Colorado at Boulder Australia National Measurement Laboratory Switzerland Oscillaquartz Observatory at Neuchatel UK Quartzlock Japan Anritzu NEC Fujitzu Timex/Tekeler Datum FTS Frequency Electronics, Inc. JPL NIST Piezo Crystal
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DATA SHEET III-16.5. LOW-POWER CLOCKS

In next 5 to 10 years: Provide accuracy and stability typical of current cesium and rubidium clocks at greatly reduced weight and power.
Laser diodes, battery technology. None identified. None identified. Achieving high accuracy in a small (1 cc) low-power (< mW) package. Accurate clocks are needed to provide direct wideband communication links and to provide direct acquisition of GPS Y code. Power source may require further development for military applications.
Telecommunication. Large volume potential.
RATIONALE The importance of this technology is becoming more evident with the deployment and operational use of GPS. GPS provides the means for accurate and stable time to be disseminated to forces around the world. The use of GPS for timing is increasing, particularly in telecommunications and data transfer. As a result, the technology to maintain and use precise time is becoming of increasing military importance. There is a very strong need for clocks that perform at or near the accuracy level of current small clocks but at significantly reduced size, weight, and power. A technology currently in development, the MCXO provides the stability of an ovenized crystal oscillator at or below the input power levels of traditional TCXO. Another promising area of development is the miniaturized gas cell clock. This approach trades off some performance of the traditional rubidium clock to provide an atomic clock with a volume of about 25 cm3 and a power consumption of less than 1 W. These lower power devices can offer a level of performance suitable for GPS direct-Y code acquisition and communications system synchronization in a package suitable in size and power for manpack or low-power mobileplatform users. Joint Vision 2010 states that advances in computer processing, precise global positioning (precise time), and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations (timely). JCS positioning, navigating, and timing policy addresses the need for precise time and time-distribution systems. The Joint Science & Technology plan identifies the need for information (precise time and time distribution systems) superiority, including direct integration of GPS (precise time) with sensor outputs, distributed and collaborative virtual planning in real time, and integrated cross-sensor tracking with unique target ID and real-time updates. Potential military applications of this technology include better synchronization, identification, surveillance, reconnaissance, remote sensing, and guidance. Improvements in time accuracy will (1) provide quicker network entry for communications, IFF, and enhanced crypto; (2) provide better targeting/emitter location, such as TDOA, and enable spread-spectrum LPI; and (3) enhance network synchronization and allow higher data rates. Power availability is a weak link in the military. The need for standard, reliable power is one of the most serious problems in warfare. Accuracy is necessary for direct acquisition of GPS.
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There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. There is a national need to take POSITIME more seriously in the United States. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in precision radio navigation, battlespace interoperability, and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of PT&F technology for military electronic systems, including navigation, telecommunications, and data transfer. However, this leadership role is waning as U.S. R&D funds for PT&F technology have declined. The U.S. development efforts have been traditionally funded as parts of the host programs they support. As these programs, such as GPS, reached maturity, the funding for PT&F development vanished. Foreign PT&F developments are increasing, particularly in France, Switzerland, and in the ESA and associated research centers. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Absolute Time TrueTime Incorporated UK Trimble Navigation, Ltd. Hewlett Packard
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DATA SHEET III-16.5. OPTICALLY PUMPED CLOCKS

In next 5 to 10 years: Provide stability and accuracy approaching 1 1016 sec for reference systems using smaller and lower power technology than ion clocks.
Laser diodes. None identified. None identified. Developing stable, long-life laser diodes at the wavelengths required for optically pumped atomic clocks. Fills the gap between low-power technologies and ion clocks for field use. Power source may require further development for military applications. Ruggedized standards required.
Telecommunication. Beyond capabilities of most countrieslow volume.
RATIONALE The importance of this technology is becoming more evident with the deployment and operational use of GPS. GPS provides the means for accurate and stable time to be disseminated to forces around the world. The use of GPS for timing is increasing, particularly in telecommunications and data transfer. As a result, the technology to maintain and use precise time is becoming of increasing military importance. The use of laser diodes for optical pumping and cooling of atomic systems to produce clock signals is a developing technology that will be adapted to field or system usable units. Low-power, fixed-mode diode lasers offer a natural means of interrogating and controlling small, ruggedized standards for field or platform use. French and Swiss companies have already introduced prototype small, optically pumped cesium and rubidium units. Joint Vision 2010 states that advances in computer processing, precise global positioning (precise time), and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations (timely). JCS positioning, navigating, and timing policy addresses the need for precise time and time-distribution systems. The Joint Science & Technology plan identifies the need for precise time and time-distribution systems, information superiority, including direct integration of GPS (precise time) with sensor outputs, distributed and collaborative virtual planning in real time, and integrated cross-sensor tracking with unique target ID and real-time updates. Potential military applications of this technology include better synchronization, identification, surveillance, reconnaissance, remote sensing, and guidance. Improvements in time accuracy will (1) provide quicker network entry for communications, IFF, and enhanced crypto; (2) provide better targeting/emitter location, such TDOA, and enable spread-spectrum LPI; and (3) enhance network synchronization and allow higher data rates. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. There is a national need to take POSITIME more seriously in the United States. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in precision radio navigation, battlespace interoperability, and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States has been the world leader in the development and utilization of PT&F technology for military electronic systems, including navigation, telecommunications, and data transfer. However, this leadership role is waning as U.S. R&D funds for PT&F technology have declined. The U.S. development efforts have been traditionally funded as parts of the host programs they support. As these programs, such as GPS, reached maturity, the funding for PT&F development vanished. Foreign PT&F developments are increasing, particularly in France, Switzerland, and in the ESA and associated research centers. The French have been operating with cesium fountain clocks at the Paris Observatory for several years and are actively developing one for space application. NIST is also active in research in this area. The following organizations have active research programs in this technology: France BNM Laboratories United States NIST
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SECTION 16.6SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

Highlights RFID technology using secure, encrypted, millimeter waveform in the 33- to 40-GHz Ka-band will remain the primary NATO IFF capability to identify friendly forces in the battlespace for the foreseeable future. Advances in RFID technology will continue to improve performance, cost reduction, and size reduction. Advancements in long-range ATR databases, algorithms, and decision-aided tools, reducing the time needed to identify targets by a factor of three, will continue to complement RFID technology for positive identification of friendly, foe, and neutral targets. Increased usage of overhead intelligence, navigation, communication, and imaging sensor assets, using a common three-dimensional position and precise time grid reference, together with RFID/ATR systems, will provide reliable, positive, long-range identification capabilities within the lethality range of weapons.
OVERVIEW At this time, this new section on SA/CID will only focus on the technologies that produce superior CID performance in the air-to-surface and surface-to-surface capability. Future updates of this document may address other SA/CID areas, including: Weather Air and ground traffic control Obstacle/ground/terrain avoidance Missile warning CID (air to air and surface to air).
SA includes all of the environmental, positional, and time conditions (past, present, and projected future) that affect the capabilities of the warfighter. Combat stress levels are inversely proportional to SA. Lack of SA will lead to adverse military decisions at all levels of command. CID plays a major role in achieving the capability to build and maintain a coherent tactical picture as discussed in the Section 16 overview and in Figure 16.6-1 below. CID is the capability to differentiate potential targetsmobile and fixed, over large areas with corresponding long distancesas friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release.1 The technologies include those needed for positive, timely, and reliable identification of friends, foes, and neutrals; classification of foes by class, type, and nationality; and interoperability required among the U.S. military and allied nations. The challenges are enormous, particularly in three specific areas: (1) a cooperative/noncooperative sensor systems; (2) a command, control, and communications (C3) systemsin particular, digital datalinks and radios, each of which contributes a portion to the CID solution; and (3) artificial intelligence tools that will fuse sensor and information, providing the warfighter with near-perfect, real-time discrimination between targets and nontargets on the battlefield. As such, CID is viewed as a capability, not a single system or technology. A system-ofsystems approach is required. This subsection will consolidate the critical technologies addressed in the other MCT sections/subsections [Section 10 (Information Technology), Section 11 (Lasers and Optics), and Section 18 (Sensors)], as well as explore other technologies that will provide increasingly superior performance of SA/CID capabilities.
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This subsection will discuss three classes of technologies: Sensors. The target is characterized either noncooperatively (e.g., jet-engine modulation, high-range resolution radar, or electronic support measures) or cooperatively [e.g., MK XII (IFF) system or Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS)]. C3 (particularly digital datalinks and radios). The target declares (either periodically or when queried) its identification and position in a reference frame that the shooter can correlate with its own weapon and sensor system (e.g., Link 16). Artificial Intelligence Tools. Vast amounts of data will need to be processed, correlated, stored, and displayed in real-time to be useful to a warfighter. AI tools include expert systems, intelligent agents, decision aides, modeling and simulation, and virtual reality.
Figure 16.6-1. Concept Combat Identification
Currently, the cooperative tri-Service Mark XII RF/IFF system (circa 1970s) is the Q&A technology to identify friendly forces. Non-responses are considered unknown. Visual identification is used for neutral identification and foe identification in the air-to-surface and surface-to-surface areas, respectively. There is no long-range positive identification capability on the ground. As the lethality of weapon systems increases, and the speed and ferocity with which land battles are fought become greater, the need for systems that will aid warfighters in reducing fratricide are paramount. Making positive visual identification is difficult with allies and enemies using identical combat platforms and fighting battles under degraded natural and man-made conditions (obscurants, darkness, rain, dust, and fog). As proven in Operation Desert Storm, the confusion of a rapidly moving air-land battle using multinational forces creates a situational awareness nightmare. Limitations in sensor resolutioncoupled with variations in target aspect, state, countermeasures, and the battlespace signal propagation environmentcomplicate the job of target labeling. Improvements in sensors and target databases that expand the envelope of performance for these systems are necessary to increase target range, ID accuracy, and reliability.
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Cooperative identification sensor systems, which only identify friends, have the advantage of being less of a technical challenge; however, they require all friendly potential targets to be equipped with the same corresponding identification equipment. This limitation will require more combined use of both cooperative and non-cooperative sensor systems. Overhead CID technology sensor improvements that can interpret imaging and nonimaging sensor data to reliably identify the target ID in near real time are necessary. Communication improvements in secured data dissemination of SA multimedia information down to the lowest mobile echelon is required. The unprecedented amount of raw information produced by modern sensor systems and the effectiveness of C3 systems can overwhelm the capability of human operators and decision makers, requiring the need for a reliable automated decision aide tool. CID can be highly useful only when it is fully integrated with both C3 and weapon systems. CID requires effective and timely synchronization of communications systems with data from real-time surveillance, target tracking, and intelligence systems. Affordability and exploitability are major barriers to having universal CID capability: Affordability. The cost of CID suites that are properly integrated with the weapon sight (both cooperative and noncooperative) are usually prohibitive if they are not form, fit, function and interchangeable (F3I) with an existing sensor or system. Additional functionality in the form of communications, SA, or sensing is helpful in making CID more affordable. The affordability of a system will also vary significantly depending on the environment in which it is considered. Aviation/maritime systems are generally more expensive than groundbased systems. As a result, solutions that are programmatically affordable for aircraft/maritime platforms are often prohibitively expensive for combat vehicles.
If the identification is determined by an off-board sensor, there is the added necessity to pass, correlate, and provide the warfighter the required information in a timely fashion. This requirement to correlate an identification label with a sensor return in the weapon sight is a key discriminator and a source of significant cost for the systems. Technology that eases the integration overhead of a CID-related system or reduces its component cost is required. Signature Exploitability. Noncooperative techniques of identification are most attractive to warfighters because of their ability to generate labels for foe, friend, and neutral contacts and because they can provide additional identification information on adversaries (e.g., platform type, class, nationality). For air/ maritime targets, the current capabilities of these systems are limited in range, aspect, and timeliness of reporting. The result is that the indications from this class of systems are frequently in the unknown or not available state. Improvements in sensors and target databases that expand the envelope of performance for these systems are necessary. For combat vehicles, the signal environment is such that reliable identification at maximum weapon range remains a significant technical challenge. Limitations in sensor resolutioncoupled with variations in target aspect, state, countermeasures, and the battlespace signal propagation environmentcomplicate the job of target labeling.
Other issues are reliability and security. Unless the system is 100-percent reliable, possibilities exist for fratricide in combat. Antennas and other external devices (the BCIS uses an externally mounted transponder) may be blown off during combat, rendering the system useless. Another problem is security. If an enemy can read, jam, or duplicate the incoming or outgoing signals, the systems effectiveness becomes severely degraded. If the signals are not of an LPI nature, an enemy is likely to be able to localize emission sources and target them. It is also reasonable to expect that some of our systems will fall into enemy hands; therefore, our system must be reprogrammable. A different type of active system does not require interrogations but periodically transmits required information such as identity and status in the blind. This information strobing would have to be spectrally unique to prevent detection, but could simplify the overall system and allow one-half of the ID equation to remain passive. RFID tagging technology has great potential. This bar code system with a brain and voice can provide security in secure areas when the RFID tag is attached to the warfighter. In the next 35 years, RFID technology using secure, encrypted, millimeter waveform in the 33- to 40-GHz Ka-band will remain the primary NATO IFF capability to identify friendly forces in the battlespace for the foreseeable future. Advances in RFID technology will continue to improve performance, cost reduction, and size
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reduction. Figure 16.6-2 shows the architecture interface concept for future U.S. Army combat identification systems to improve air-to-surface and surface-to-surface capabilities.
Figure 16.6-2. U.S. Armys Combat Identification Concept
For surface to surface. Improvements in millimeter-wave technology, such as the U.S. BCIS, will provide identification of friends from unknowns at distances up to 14 km, day or night, with accuracy greater than 97 percent, reducing the risk of fratricide. BCIS allows the gunner or commander to make a rapid shoot/dont shoot decision at the point of engagement. Shooter platforms, e.g., tanks and fighting vehicles, are equipped with BCIS interrogator/transponder units that interrogate suspect platforms and respond to interrogations from other shooters. The interrogation process is automatically triggered by activation of the shooters laser rangefinder, which sends an encrypted query to the targeted platform. If the target is friendly, its transponder receives the query and responds with an encrypted answer (nonshooter platforms are equipped with BCIS transponder-only units). When the interrogator receives an encrypted answer, it gives a friend response to the gunner/commander. If an invalid answer or no answer is received, an unknown response is provided to the gunner/commander, who then must continue using engagement tactics, techniques, and procedures. Responses are provided visually in the gunners sight, as an audible tone on the intercom system, or both, eliminating the need for a gunner to remove his eyes from the target. For air to surface. The U.S. Armys single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) improvement program [SIP(+)] is a Dont Shoot Me System, consisting of a SINCGARS radio modified to use a GPS-coordinate-based message, enabling rotary-wing aircraft to interrogate ground-combat platforms equipped with SIP(+) radios using a Dont Shoot Me net feature.
In operation, the airborne SIP(+) radio transmits the interrogation message, which includes the targeted position. If an interrogation is detected by the SIP(+) ground radio and the target coordinates match, it transmits a Dont Shoot Me response to the airborne interrogator. The total interrogation/response cycle should take a maximum of 2.3 sec. Future improvements may reduce this to less than 1 sec. In the next 510 years, advances in ATR algorithms and systems will provide a passive capability to distinguish between targets and nontargets automatically and noncooperatively. Concurrent with significant advances
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in information systems (see Section 10), ATR algorithms will be used more and more as a complement to RFID systems (i.e., BCIS/SINCGARS + ATR). During this period, ATR algorithm development will achieve significant growth, particularly in integration with multisensors and new ATR techniques (i.e., matched filtering, pattern recognition, model based, and clutter and edge modeling). For surface to surface. The Land Warrior System, a first-generation integrated fighting system for dismounted combat soldiers, will enhance the soldiers battlefield capabilities through the development and integration of a variety of Army components and technologies into a cohesive, cost-effective system. The Land Warrior System includes a computer/radio subsystem, a GPS receiver, a magnetic compass, a deadreckoning navigator, VHF and UHF radios, and a video capture capability. The Integrated Helmet Assembly Subsystem includes a heads-up display and image intensifier for night operations and a weapons subsystem with thermal weapon sight, close combat optics, video camera with a video capture capability, laser rangefinder/digital compass, and an infrared laser aiming light. The system also includes protective clothing, load carrying equipment, body armor, a chemical/biological mask, and a laser detector. Improvements during this period could maximize the tactical CID performance with a view of the battlefield that exploits the timecritical combat information provided by an integrated SA and target identification (TI) system. Future potential capabilities are ATR and external near real-time (NRT) sensor cueing from overhead radar and satellites. To overcome the exploitable issues addressed and approach the 100-percent-reliable ID will require both active and passive technologies to be used. For active interrogation/responses should be multispectral; utilizing acoustics, IR, visual bands, RF, millimeter wave, and laser beams. It is also reasonable to expect that some systems will fall into enemy hands; therefore, the system must be reprogrammable. For air to surface. Improvements in communication systems (see Section 10), such as the Air National Guards Situational Awareness Data Link Forward Air Controller (SADL FAC) system could provide information on friendly ground force positions as well as calculate the position location of laser targets. This system determines friendly ground force positions through use of the SADL (EPLRS) radio. The Mark VII Laser Rangefinder and the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR) generate the target location information. This information is digitally transmitted via the SADL radio to the SADLequipped CAS aircraft. Another example is the U.S. Navys Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) program, which consists of a miniature UHF SATCOM transceiver and an integrated GPS receiver to provide a combined SA/direct-target ID solution for ground platform, fixed-, and rotary-wing aircraft performing air-to-ground missions. A beacon is installed on friendly ground platforms to enable them to periodically transmit an identification code, geolocation (position) information, and other host platform data either directly to line-of-sight receivers using ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios or indirectly via an UHF satellite link using a low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) waveform called Collection of Broadcasts from Remote Assets (COBRA).
In the next 1020 years, further improvements in information systems will provide a new class of high-datarate, networked radio communications as part of command and control systems. These radios will have the ability to deliver data within specified time lines using prioritization and quality of service routing techniques. The combination of higher data rates, more reliable networking, and quality of service routing will enable these networks to provide significant, timely information on friendly situations, to include friendly locations and identifications. This information will contribute directly to Combat Identification. A particularly critical enabling set of technologies for these new high-data-rate radio communications systems will be low probability of intercept (LPI)/low probability of detection (LPD) waveforms. Wavelet overlay technology is particularly critical. Use of multisensors integrated with ATR algorithms and data bases and nanotechnology (providing more affordable position and precise time tagging) will also significantly increase SA/CID reliability and reduce target ID time to near real time. For example, the U.S. Air Force Spacecast 2020 study suggested an exotic space-based target recognition scheme in which a laser beam from a satellite would scan the battlefield, and the reflected energy would be analyzed by sensors on the spacecraft. By comparing the spectra, identification would be possible. Friendly tanks and aircraft could be chemically coated to produce a characteristic spectrum when excited by the space-based laser, proving a degree of IFF capability. Using techniques likened to licking and tasting to identify objects on the ground, the licking would be done by a laser beam fired from a satellite, which would be equipped with sensors that would taste the spectrum of the radiation reflected back from the target. By comparing this with a database of know tastes it would be possible to identify an
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object. Friendly tanks and aircraft could be coated with a chemical that produces a characteristic spectrum when excited by energy of a certain frequency or other characteristic. For surface to surface. The range and reliability at which identification can be reliably accomplished can be improved with increased use of overhead asset data and image technology and more use of smart RFID tagging. All weapons could include semi-passive interrogation systems that read the identity from a tag or label of some type, such as an RFID, on the vehicle or person. Integrated with a passive system, ATR pattern recognition could discriminate enemies from friendly and combatant from noncombatant. Using ATR and pattern recognition logic could assist in threat determination of noncombatants, based on discriminators such as vehicle type, color, and motion, or observations that personnel are carrying weapons, moving in a tactical manner, etc. For air to surface. A fully interoperable NATO C3 system (such as Link 16/22) could provide (1) friend identification automatically (for all friendly combat participants on the network); (2) a medium for passing hostile/neutral identification generated from other sensors/sources; and (3) a medium for passing friend identification (for those platforms not on the network) generated from other sensors/sources. Addressing the interoperability issue, the United States is migrating towards a Jseries family of datalinks to include Link 16 for air operations, Link 22 for maritime operations, and variable message format (VMF) for ground operations. For air, maritime, and ground weapons, this could play a significant role in sorting friend from foe or neutral in the battlespace.
By 2025, friendly troops and equipment will enter the battlespace with their personal identifiers. The identification mechanisms could be in the form of microchips worn by or imbedded in the soldiers. The same principle could be applied to vehicles. An active or passive system could identify friendlies by reading a label attached to an object. As the battlenet sensors detect each target in the battlespace, they apply a physical label to the target. For example, a particle beam imprints coded information on the exterior of specially painted vehicles or irradiates the clothing of exposed personnel. Labels placed on targets could be magnetic, optical, or electronic, and can be sized down to the molecular level. The label contains data that includes the type of target, date time group, and military unit controlling the vehicle or person. Sensors would be required to interrogate an unknown transponder, analyze the response, and determine if the response came from a friendly system or a designated hostile system. If the interrogator receives a response that does not correspond to known friendly systems or fails to receive a response at all, the interrogator activates a separate series of identification methods involving discriminators such as material composition, acoustic, electromagnetic, thermal, or vibration signatures. For situations involving a mixture of hostile forces and noncombatants in an environment where no external evidence distinguishes the two (a riot or urban disturbance, for example), the system may need only distinguish between friendly tagged personnel and others. RATIONALE U.S. forces must be able to positively identify all targets in the battlespace for all combat mission areasair to air, air to surface, surface to surface, and surface to air. Surface includes land, sea, and subsurfaceotherwise known as ground and maritime. The CID need is essential for commanders to effectively field, at any time, fighting forces that can rapidly and positively identify enemies, friends, and neutrals in the battlespace; manage and control the battle area; optimally employ weapons and forces; and minimize the risk/occurrence of fratricide.2 Lack of positive target identification and the inability to maintain SA in combat environments are the major contributors to fratricide. Vehicle commanders, gunners, and attack pilots cannot distinguish friendly and enemy thermal and optical signatures at the ranges at which they can be acquired. Our weapons can kill beyond the ranges where we have clear ID. Our tactics lead us to exploit our range advantage over the enemy. During limited visibility or in restricted terrain, units in proximity can mistake each other for the enemy because of short engagement windows and decision time. We do not have a means to determine friend or foe, other than visual recognition of our forces and the enemys.
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When the enemy and our allies are equipped similarly, and when the enemy uses U.S. equipment, the problem is compounded. Simple, effective fire and maneuver control measures and plans, good SA, and disciplined engagements are absolutely necessary. The long-range vision of CID is to enable U.S. forces to positively identify all targets in the battlespace for all combat mission areas. Our fighting forces must be able to rapidly and positively identify enemies, friends, and neutrals; manage and control the battlespace; optimally employ weapons and forces to increase economy of force; lower combat attrition and increase enemy losses; and minimize the risk and occurrence of fratricide. To achieve this will require significant improvements in these critical technologies: sensors, C3, and AI tools. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The development leaders of SA/CID technologies are for the most part located within the NATO countries. To coordinate national combat identification work, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States established a fournation Combat Identification Working Group (CIWG) in October 1992. A final report in January 1998 recommended Ka-band (3340 GHz) Q&A as the most cost and operationally effective technology for interoperable target identification for the long term (2001+). This was approved, and the four-nation CIWG is working to develop a standardization agreement (STANAG) for NATO target identification. Under a program being jointly conducted by the U.S. Air Forces Wright Laboratory, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, and 15 other university and industry organizations in the United States, signatureprediction codes are being developed. These codes will cope with frequencies ranging from B to K band and with targets consisting of electrically conducting material, homogeneous and isotropic frequency-dependent materials, radar-absorbing nets, and nonmetallic structures made from glass fibre and other semitransparent materials. The task of compiling the more than 10 million signatures and images required for noncooperative target recognition development and operational fielding will take several years, even with fast computers running around the clock.
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada China Finland France Germany Israel Italy Japan Russia South Korea Sweden Switzerland UK Ukraine United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Sensors
C3
Artificial Intelligence

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 16.6-3. Situational Awareness/Combat Identification WTA Summary
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-16.6. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
Identification Friend or Foe, Millimeter-Wave (mmW) Technology..................................................... III-16-137 Data Fusion/Artificial Intelligence/Decision Aids Technology............................................................ III-16-139 Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) Algorithms........................................................................... III-16-142 Wide-Area Imaging and Surveillance Sensors.................................................................................. III-16-145 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse SAR (ISAR) Sensors ..................................................... III-16-148 Infrared Sensors/Devices ............................................................................................................. III-16-151 Laser Radar Sensors/Devices........................................................................................................ III-16-153 Tagging Technology .................................................................................................................. III-16-155 Note: For other related sensor technologies, see Sections 11 and 18. For other communication and information technologies, see Section 10.
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE, MILLIMETER-WAVE (mmW) TECHNOLOGY

In the next 3 to 5 years: Ground-to-ground identification ranges 525 km day or night, clear sky, rain, or dust. Air-to-ground identification ranges 100200 miles. Identification time: < 1 second. Probability of correct ID 90%97%.
None identified. The Battlefield Identification System Environment and Performance Simulator (BISEPS) system has been developed in support of MMW/BCIS performance evaluation. BISEPS computes the probability of correct identification and measures net latency. The various technologies that will reduce fratricide must be integrated into an overall architecture. Can be configured to send, receive, and display secure, digital information with other similarly equipped units on the battlefield.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Requires friendly targets to respond to interrogation. Assumes non-responses as unknowns. Detectability/exploitability of signals.
Air traffic control, vehicle identification, railcar stacking, and location. Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE This technology provides positive identification of friendly platforms and dismounted soldiers from both ground and air weapons platforms and dismounted soldiers. System includes interrogators and transponders combined for shooters and transponders only for nonshooters Improvements in mmW technology, such as the U.S. BCIS, currently provide identification of friends from unknowns at distances up to 14 km, day or night, with accuracy greater than 97 percent, reducing the risk of fratricide. BCIS allows the gunner or commander to make a rapid shoot/dont shoot decision at the point of engagement. Shooter platforms (e.g., tanks and fighting vehicles) are equipped with BCIS interrogator/transponder units that interrogate suspect platforms and respond to interrogations from other shooters. The interrogation process is automatically triggered by activation of the shooters laser range finder, which sends an encrypted query to the targeted platform. If the target is friendly, its transponder receives the query and responds with an encrypted answer (nonshooter platforms are equipped with BCIS transponder-only units). When the interrogator receives an encrypted answer, it gives a friend response to the gunner/commander. If an invalid answer or no answer is received, an unknown response is provided to the gunner/commander, who then must continue using engagement tactics, techniques, and procedures. Responses are provided visually in the gunners sight, as an audible tone on the intercom system, or both, eliminating the need for a gunner to remove his eyes from the target. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of
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dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at their longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. An mmW Transponder for dismounted-soldier CID is under development by the U.S. Army. A prototype brassboard Ka-band transponder, which used a state-of-the-art high-stability dielectric resonator oscillator transmitter for interrogation, was developed and demonstrated. A low-noise receiver and initialization circuitry were designed, built, and used to demonstrate the feasibility of using mmW technology for CID. The mmW approach to soldier CID offers a highly portable device that can penetrate smoke, fog, dust, and rain and have a low probability of intercept and low probability of spoofing or jamming. Continued research to integrate noncooperative technologies, such as ATR, and overhead surveillance/intelligence information, needs to be pursued to validate a Q&A systems nonresponder as foe. Reducing the time for the shooter to obtain a positive identification should also be a major objective of the research. This Q&A technology will remain the primary means of NATO to identify friendly forces in a combat environment for the foreseeable future. However, future integration with other noncooperative and ATR technologies will enhance its capabilities to provide a positive identification, not only of friendly targets, but also foe and neutral targets. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia China Greece UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel United States
Belgium France Italy

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
MMW research for CID is being carried out primarily by NATO countries. At present, the United States, France, Germany, and the UK are the world leaders. The following organizations have active research programs in this technology: United States Magnavox TRW France ALCATEL Germany Daimler-Benz Aerospace AG UK British Aerospace Systems, Ltd. Raytheon
Thomson-CSF Communications
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. DATA FUSION/ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/ DECISION AIDS TECHNOLOGY

Fuses information from a wide variety of sources to bring the confidence factor of the target identity to near 100 percent. None identified. None identified. Algorithms for tracking a large number of targets in a cluttered environment. To develop the capacity to reason in the face of uncertainty and to fuse information from disparate sources. Timely ability to combine, analyze, and integrate enormous volume and variety of data. Multisensor integration requires expanded network communication bandwidth.
Manufacturing quality control, internal medicine, financial market analysis, information retrieval. Multimedia medical database. Waste management.
Affordability
Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE Complex problem solving in warfighting typically requires the problem solver to access and combine data from multiple sources and to develop a dynamic assessment of an evolving situation. Data fusion focuses on providing the distributed tools and systems infrastructure to fuse data from multiple network sources. These data are combined with other knowledge and planning tools to make and evaluate several alternative plans. This could improve the ability to detect new situations, develop and evaluate alternative plans, and respond quickly to new combat threats and opportunities. Advanced information fusion will be expected to provide near-perfect, real-time discrimination between targets and nontargets on the battlefield. AI technologies will be key to solving the awareness/ knowledge problem. AI tools aid decision systems, intelligent agents, modeling, simulation, and forecasting. Vast amounts of digital data will need to be processed, correlated, stored, and displayed without swamping users. The data base of a particular battlespace will have to be continuously updated with real-time information to make it useful to a warfighter. Multisource integration and data fusion will reduce the shooters workload/stress levels by providing relevant and accurate information of the tactical battlespace picture. Current methods of data fusion are Extended Kalman filtering Model-based approaches Wavelet decomposition Artificial neural networks Fuzzy logic. The Quadrennial Defense Review identifies the key to future success for U.S. forces as being an integrated system of systems, linking intelligence collection and assessment, C2, weapons systems, and support elements to achieve battlespace awareness. Achieving this will require vast amounts of data, necessitating automatic decisionmaking tools.
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This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at their longest lethal range. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. The Joint Warfighting S&T Plans precision force identifies the use of multisensors, ATR, and sensor fusion as key technologies to provide a real-time, fused battlespace with integrated decision-aid tools. The Navy CID Working Group concluded that multisource integration and data fusion are required to meet CID requirements. A data-fusion system for identifying and classifying active sonar contacts is being developed by the U.S. Navy. It analyzes various sources of data and fuses the response into a single opinion, answer, or decision. Battle damage assessment (BDA) today is a haphazard, unlinked, slow process largely confined to BDA reports, spot reports, and other intel fragments; gun-camera footage; and CNN. A DARPA program uses models to determine what information is required to assess it, requests that information to be gathered, passes condition-of-interest requests to external situation monitors, reacts to new information by relating it to the requesting model agent, updates models, and produces assessments.3 Methods developed in the field of AI include the following: Common-sense reasoning Nonmonotonic logic Circumspection Algorithms used in neural networks Extensions to Bayesian calculi.
Most ATR development, being based on analysis of single image frames and segmented target regions, is currently limited to the pattern recognition subset of recognition theory. More generalized ATR processing would take advantage of multiple geo-registered information sources and temporally displace data in order to dynamically reason about situations. A future is feasible where sensors and information will be ubiquitous. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. Further research and development is needed to develop the capacity to reason in the face of uncertainty and to fuse information from disparate sources.4
3 4
www.teknowledge.com Information in Warfare, Chapter 3, www2.nas.edu/nsb2/iw3.htm
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Australia China Greece Norway Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel Russia UK

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy Spain United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Data fusion and artificial intelligence research is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At present, the United States, France, and Germany appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States AlphaTech Naval Research Laboratory (Navy Center for Applied Research in AI) Sona Lyst Incorporated Sterling Software Norway Universitetet I Oslo France Alcatel Thompson-CSF Germany FGAN Technical University of Braunschweig UK British Aerospace TWI Laboratory SURFACES University of Paris Humbolt University Coleman Research Company Raytheon SRI
CNR
Switzerland Dalle Molle Institute for Studies on AI Swiss Centre for Scientific Computing Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Netherlands Hollandse Signaal Denmark Aalborg University
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. AUTOMATIC TARGET RECOGNITION (ATR) ALGORITHMS

In next 5 to10 years: Model-based or neural-network-based reasoning integrated with pattern recognition promises reliable target detection with low false alarms (0.01 false alarms/km2).
None identified. None identified. Algorithms for tracking a large number of targets in a cluttered environment. ATR algorithms must cope with three-dimensional objects, the exact shape of which may be poorly known and which may appear at any orientation, under widely varying lighting and visibility. Decoys, camouflage, shadow, or darkness can deceive a shaped-based ATR system. Increasing capacity for dense memory storage, computer processing speeds, and high bandwidth for data transfer.
Tracking high-value vehicle and rail cargo. Robotics. Medical analysis. Integration of ATR and sensor data is a key affordability issue, which can reduce warfighter workload and stress levels.
RATIONALE ATR algorithm technology provides a noncooperative, real-time capability beyond the visual range of target. This capability, when integrated with other cooperative identification systems, provides a very high probability of detection and identification of friend, foe, and neutral targets. The development of both data-driven and model-based approaches using single and multiple sensors are two means to achieve this capability. ATR data-base development includes target signature modeling and scene synthesis efforts that support ATR algorithms for single/multisensor electro-optics and radar systems. Signature modeling is critical to rapid target identification. Synthetic data also provides a practical means of exploring complex, multi-sensor ATR designs. Scene syntheses provide high-fidelity models for distributed, interactive simulations to assess new ATR technologies.5 A new method of edge detection and image enhancement overcomes many of the defects of past approaches by locating edges with subpixel resolution and limiting edge distortion.6 Better clutter modeling techniques will improve detecting a tank or truck in a heavily cluttered environment, such as a battlefield.7 Joint Vision 2010 identifies ATR technology as a means to enhance the detectability of targets across the battlespace, improve detection ranges, turn night into day, and reduce the risk of fratricide. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at its longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of
5 6 7
1997 Defense Technology Area Plan, Sensors, Electronics, and Battlespace Environment. Digital Signal Processing, Seminar, The University of Texas at Austin. www.cis.ohio-state.edu
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the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. An application for ATR systems is the ability to detect targets passively for either direct attack or subsequent attack by conventional or guided weapons. It can also provide high-accuracy terminal guidance for smart missiles. If a gyro navigation system, GPS, or other systems can steer the missile to a precisely defined location, the task of the seeker and the complexity of its ATR algorithms will be significantly reduced. Another application involves a mathematical approach to target identification using a reconnaissance photo that is scanned directly into the ATR system. Matching the entire digitized scene to a real-time infrared image of the target area makes the ATR insensitive to landscape changes that can obscure targets, e.g., scene contrast, battle damage, smoke obscuration, seasonal changes, and thermal contrast. In the future, ATR-type systems will be a significant addition to the NATO Q&A systems, and they will be in high demand for future warfighting, where the requirement is not only to reduce fratricide, but also to reduce collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructures. Currently, this technology is in its infancy, with no single ATR algorithm suitable for all combat situations and environments. For this reason ATR technology should be followed over time. The following enhancements of this technology should be pursued: Larger mass storage devices, rapid retrieval, and faster computing processors, a leveraged technology for ATR systems (see Section 10) Expanded ATR model-based reasoning technology for multiple sensor sources of information Expanded hybrid ATR systems, including clutter modeling, scenario and behavioral models, integrated with sensor(s) for positive target detection and identification.
There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel Russia Taiwan

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy Spain UK

Moderate R&D
Canada Germany Japan Sweden United States

Limited R&D
ATR research is moving to a maturity level. Numerous universities worldwide have research programs in this technology. At the present time, the United States, the UK, Sweden, and France appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs in this technology:
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United States Air Force Research Laboratory Boeing Center for Imaging Science (Washington University) HNC Software Massachusetts Institute of Technology Navy Research Laboratory Raytheon University of Missouri
Air Force Wright Laboratory Carnegie Mellon University DARPA Lockheed-Martin Naval Surface Warfare Center, ID Vision Photon Research Associates SRI
UK British Aerospace GEC-Marconi France Sagem Sweden Ericsson Saab Avionics Norway Kongsberg Aerospace Taiwan Hsiung-Feng Australia Defense Science & Technology Organisation
Defense Evaluation Research Agency Matra BAe Dynamics
Saab Dynamics
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. WIDE-AREA IMAGING AND SURVEILLANCE SENSORS

In next 5 to 10 years. Imaging sensors will be able to detect targets in shallow hide and camouflage or foliage. Interferometric synthetic aperture radar (IFSAR) sensors will provide rapid production of current and high-resolution terrain data over wide-ranging areas from airborne and spaced-based platforms. Laser radars will produce high-resolution DTED maps (see Section 16.3). Resolution: 1 m at 500 km.
None identified. None identified. Integrating ATR algorithms and POSITIME systems with sensors. Processing the images over very large synthetic apertures (2545 deg), removal of man-made interferences (communications and television), and target detection in the presence of numerous large clutter signals (tree trunks). Transmission of ultrahigh volume surveillance information.
Tracking high-value commercial vehicle and rail cargo. Mostly unique military hardware and software that will still rely primarily on government investment. Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE This technology will provide target identification over a wide area of the battlefield, both day and night, and in all weather conditions. Key technologies will focus on the penetration of camouflage and foliage. A new thirdgeneration thermal imaging (TI) camera operating in a 35 m waveband can provide high sensitivity in the detection and tracking of high-temperature target emissions, such as missile plumes and very high velocity airborne threats.8 Target identification can be achieved using sound waves. Time-delay spectrometry can be employed as a way of isolating a desired reflected signal from other reflections. This dramatically increases the SNR when a neuralnetwork-based classification system is used. Propagation of sound in the atmosphere is governed by a number of interacting physical mechanisms, including geometrical spreading, molecular absorption, reflection from a porous ground, curved ray paths due to refraction, diffraction by ground topography, and scattering by turbulence. Accurate predictions of sound signatures from a distant source must somehow account for all of these phenomena simultaneously. Although this goal is still beyond current capabilities, developments in computational tools for predicting sound propagation through the atmosphere have increased dramatically during recent years. The computational techniques now include analytical solutions for propagation above porous ground, analytical solutions for selected
www.bae.co.uk/static/p3108971.html
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atmospheric profiles, ray-tracing techniques which include interaction with the ground and meteorological conditions, and more sophisticated numerical solutions to the wave equation. The U.S. Armys Foliage Penetration Radar technology development program is focusing on detecting critical mobile targets in shallow hide and camouflage. It is testing an ultra-wide-band system that has the ability of 9 penetrating the foliage canopy and detecting objects on the ground. The conversion of interferometric synthetic aperture radar (IFSAR) to obtain highly accurate elevation data is possible using innovative algorithms. Near real-time elevation data determination is also possible using fast correlating stereo and high multiple electro-optical images. Laser radars can be used for the production of highresolution DTED (see Section 16.3) This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at its longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. The following technology enhancements should be pursued: Low-cost, space-based, multisensor system for both detecting stationary and moving targets, which can be launched on demand POSITIME integrated to all imagery and data, providing a common grid reference of the battlespace for theater commanders and intelligence analysts Secure ultra-high bandwidth (> 3 GHz) for near-real-time transmission of surveillance and imaging information Continuous sensor improvements that can interpret imaging and nonimaging sensor data to reliably identify the target ID in near real time Communication improvements in secured data dissemination for SA multimedia information down to the lowest mobile echelon A reliable automated decision-aid tool to handle the unprecedented amount of raw information produced by modern sensor systems and by the effectiveness of C3 systems.
Australia China Greece Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel UK

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Wide-area surveillance and imaging sensor research is limited to NATO countries, Russia, and China. At present, the United States, Russia, Germany, and the UK appear to be leaders.
Statement of Honorable P.G. Kaminski before House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, October 18, 1995.
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The following organizations have active research programs in this technology: United States ERIM International Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab UK British Aerospace Systems and Equipment Germany Daimler-Benz Aerospace, now Dornier GmbH Satellitensysteme Russia Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics at Fryazino Naval Research Laboratory
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. SYNTHETIC APERATURE RADAR (SAR) AND INVERSE SAR (ISAR) SENSORS
Next 5 to 10 years: Recognizing targets under variable sensor and deployment conditions, coping with sensor squint, depression and aspect angles, target articulation, configuration, shadow obscuration, terrain layover, and camouflage. Target mapping in color. Mapping resolution less than 1 ft in both azimuth and slant range. Mapping swath: 10 nmi. Altitude range: 0.2 to 13.1 km.
None identified. None identified. Use of model-driven ATR for both SAR and ISAR sensors. SAR sensors good for stationary targets. ISAR sensors good for moving targets, but required to be stationary. Need to develop a long-distance multisensor good for both stationary and moving targets, on moving or stationary platforms. Increased resolution of sensors for longer range detection and identification.
Imaging technologies are used in medical imaging, law enforcement, robotics, transportation sensing, and multimedia. Precision mapping and images. Combining technologies for both stationary and moving targets is a cost driver, but a high operational payback. Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE This technology, when integrated with ATR algorithms and digital map data bases, will provide long-range positive identification using SAR sensors for stationary targets and ISAR sensors for moving targets. SAR/ISAR advantages include all-weather capability, high resolution, and imaging at long distances. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at its longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. Temporal integration (position and time tagging) of information offers a powerful potential for ATR processing. For example, in automatic mine detection, land mines that are placed sufficiently far underground can fall into the too-hard-to-detect category. However, if a small collection of vehicles is observed in a particular pattern and that information is stored, later retrieval, after evidence of a mine is determined, can correlate the information of the known mine with the position of the suspicious vehicles to determine location of the remaining mine.
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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and U.S. Air Force are developing model-driven ATR technologies for SAR. One of the primary goals of SAR is to develop integrated approaches for recognizing targets under variable sensor and deployment conditions, coping with sensor squint, depression and aspect angles, target articulation, configuration, shadow, obscuration, terrain layover, and camouflage. In the near time frame, it is expected to recognize 20 different high-value tactical and strategic targets under all sensor and deployment conditions. The following technology enhancements should be pursued: Larger storage capacity, rapid retrieval, and faster computing processors for ATR systems Long distance multisensors good for detecting both stationary and moving targets on either a moving or stationary platform POSITIME integrated to all imagery, providing a common grid reference of the battlespace for theater commanders and intelligence analysts.
Australia China Greece Norway United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel Russia

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy Sweden

Moderate R&D
Canada Germany Japan UK
Limited R&D
SAR and ISAR research is being carried mainly by universities and countries involved in space research (i.e., European Space Agency, Canadian Space Agency, and NASA). At present, the United States appears to be the leader. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Boeing Heriot-Watt University Joint Propulsion Laboratory NASA Raytheon TRW UK AEL University of Dundee Germany Daimler Chrysler Aerospace FGAN France Alcatel DLR General Atomics Johns Hopkins University Lockheed Martin Ohio State University (Electro Science Laboratory) Sandia National Laboratories Yale University
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Italy Universita di Pisa China IEAS Canada Canadian Space Agency Russia Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics VEGA-M Scientific and Production Corporation Russian Academy of Sciences
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. INFRARED SENSORS/DEVICES

Next 5 to 10 years: This technology will provide a day/night target detection, classification, and dissemination capability at stand-off ranges. Can identify noncooperative, small-radar-cross-section aircraft, ground vehicles, and ships at extended ranges. Range expected to increase 35 from current capabilities.
None identified. None identified. Target classification systems is required. Positive identification on noncooperative air and ground targets need to be addressed. Law enforcement agency use for interdiction, boarding, and surveillance. Automatic highway systems. Complexity of classification signature data base and integration are major cost drivers. Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE This technology provides day/night target detection and relative distance and velocity of target. Integrated with ATR software it can identify target classification at standoff ranges. Infrared cameras can be used to detect shallowly buried or surface landmines. Other applications vary, from use as night vision and thermal image sensors, to use as an airborne FLIR system that can identify noncooperative aircraft, ground vehicles, and ships at extended ranges. The FLIR sensor performs unresolved target detection and handoff to the laser radar for target exploitation. Targets are interrogated to generate classification signatures by exploiting the return signal from the target. It can then transmit near-real-time target signature and high-resolution imagery to operational theater commanders via wideband satellite links. Infrared devices can be used for signaling and marking, providing an inexpensive means of identification. Such devices include thermal tapes, BUDD lights, and a codeable infrared beacon (i.e., Phoenix light) with a range of 4 km, but with the advantage of reprogramming codes to distinguish within a group. Combining the advantage of night vision goggles (that can pick up visual light sources at large ranges) and IR sensors (that are not susceptible to strong light sources and can work in total darkness) can provide improved situational awareness in urban warfare. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at their longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. The Joint Surveillance/Intelligence plan also identifies this technology as a means to address positive identification of noncooperative targets. The enhancement to integrate POSITIME to all imagery, providing a common grid reference of the battlespace for theater commanders and intelligence analysts, needs to be pursued.
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Current sensors can discriminate for positive identification at ranges up to about 5 km. By 2025 this range could increase by an order of magnitude, and pattern-recognition logic could assist in threat determination by observing discriminators such as vehicle type, color, and motion, or observations that personnel were carrying weapons and moving in a tactical manner. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia China Greece Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Austria Finland Israel UK

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Infrared research is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At the present time, the United States appears to be the leader. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Boeing Epitaxial Technologies (University of Maryland) Honeywell Lockheed Martin Raytheon France Socit Francaise de Detecteurs Infra Rouge Germany Diehl-Aerospace Canada The National Optics Institute DRS Optronics FLIR Systems Laser Devices, Inc. Northrop-Grumman Tracer Technology
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. LASER RADAR SENSORS/DEVICES

In next 5 to 10 years: Three-dimensional laser radar with tunable laser radar for target detection and identification of obscured targets. Wavelength: 1.5 m to 3.5 m. Ground-to-ground: measure the shape of objects at distances of 1 km or more. Can display the shape and directional velocity of moving targets. Range data is measured to an accuracy of 0.005 m. Air to ground: determine target location with accuracy of 0.3 m from 40,000 ft.
None identified. None identified. Integrates GPS, ATR software, and satellite communications. Detecting targets in shallow hide and camouflage or foliage. Vehicle detection and classification as part of intelligent highway systems; automation of agricultural equipment and precise measurement of distances. Integration and interoperability are major cost drivers.
RATIONALE This technology will allow warfighter to rapidly detect, identify, and locate target position within 1-m accuracy and transmit data/imagery to other users. Laser radar and rangefinders can detect and precisely measure the position and velocity of ground and air vehicles. Integrated with a miniature IFF interrogator ATR algorithm, laser radar and rangefinders can provide validated target identification and classification validation of friendly forces, as well as enemy and neutrals. Laser technologies have a wide diversity of military applications, including rangefinders, LPI altimeters, and LPI terrain-avoidance sensors. Laser radar systems can search for specific shapes by ATR algorithm. In this case the analysis is done automatically, and the operator is alerted when target is identified. Laser camera systems can generate complete three-dimensional images of the field of view, particularly for long ranges over 1,000 m in distance. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at their longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. The U.S. Air Forces Spacecast 2020 study suggested an exotic, space-based target-recognition scheme in which a laser beam from a satellite would scan the battlefield, and sensors on the spacecraft would analyze the reflected energy. By comparing the spectra, identification would be possible. Friendly tanks and aircraft could be chemically coated to produce a characteristic spectrum when excited by the space-based laser, providing another degree of IFF capability. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy Spain United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Laser radar research is being carried out throughout the industrialized world. At the present time, the United States, Russia, the UK, and Germany appear to be the leaders. The following organizations have active research programs: United States Coherent Technologies Incorporated Hughes Radar NASA Ames Research Schwartz-Electro Optics Germany Fraunhofer Institute for Laser Technology University of Worzburg Russia Ioffe Physico Technical Institute Lebedev Physical Institute UK AG Electro-Optics Instruments SA France CNRS Ecole Polytechnique; Finland Academy of Finland Sweden Photonics Research Laboratory Laseroptronix Fibertek Incorporated Los Alamos National Laboratory Naval Surface Warfare Center
Molecular Technology GmbH
Institute Atmospheric Optics Novosibirsk State University, Laboratory of Laser Systems British Aerospace Systems & Equipment Incorporated
Japan Mitsubishi Incorporated National Space Development Agency Nippon Laser & Electronics Laboratory Canada Imago Machine Vision, Ltd. China Ahhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics York University
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DATA SHEET III-16.6. TAGGING TECHNOLOGY

In next 5 to 10 years: A micro-silicon chip, no bigger than a coffee grind and a micro-miniaturized antenna will provide a very low-cost ID for installation on any type of material. Tag remains passive until scanned by device (i.e., radio, laser) without having to get near the tag or even have line of sight to it. Transmission can use low probability of intercept algorithms. Scanner can change or add information on the chip.
None identified. None identified. None identified. Low power tag receivers (< 30 mW) and miniature battery (< 0.5 kg) to enable continuos performance for months. Material that when removed from soldier or combat vehicles will render tag useless in case of capture by enemy. LPI/LPD and other security issues. Very low cost requirement for use by all personnel and assets, particularly in a combat urban area.
Replacement for bar codes. Tracking mail, luggage, production parts and spare parts, identification and location. Leveraging commercial technology will minimize cost.
RATIONALE Tags can be used actively or passively to provide vehicles and personnel tracking on which those tags have been implanted, overtly or covertly. The tags can be implanted in equipment upon manufacturing, into raw materials at growth or mining, or onto vehicles, and equipment later (i.e., decals). The location or activity could be scanned from ground or overhead (i.e., UAV or satellite) radio or laser scanners. Use of microminiature RFID tags could provide a low-cost real time beyond line-of-sight positive identification of personnel and combat assets within the local battlefield area, especially in urban terrain environments. This technology supports the Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver, and precision engagement by providing a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace. Knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces and enemy forces will enhance standoff capabilities of weapons at its longest lethal range. CID technology is a major element of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release. DARPA is currently developing an RF tag technology to allow airborne radar (both moving target indication and SAR) to communicate directly with ground devices to provide identification of friendly assets, to communicate information directly from ground sensors to the platform, and to correct for errors in the radar-determined location of targets. This may resolve a technical barrier of obtaining target identification using radar data alone. This is
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especially true in conflicts where a mix of friendly, unfriendly, and neutral forces will be mixed with noncombatants. This technology is in its infancy for combat identification applications, and therefore should continue to be pursued to provide micro-miniature transponding tags with data storage and LPI/D transmission capability which is suitable for long-range military operations. There are no special requirements for the U.S. Government to gain access to this technology. The substantial margin of capability added is critical to continued U.S. superiority in SA and the multitude of missions dependent thereupon. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia China Greece Netherlands Switzerland
Legend:

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D
Belgium France Italy South Africa United States
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Commercial interests are advancing the development and production of this technology. At present, it appears that the United States, Canada, and the UK are leading in the development of low-cost RFID tagging technology for commercial applications. This is an emerging technology for military applications. The following organizations are active in this technology: United States AMTECH BasIQ Systems Biomark ERIM International Inc. Microchip Technology RF Technologies Toyon Research Corporation Avid Inc. Beigel Technology Corporation DARPA Escort Memory Systems Motorola Southwest Research Institute
Canada Identec Solutions, Inc. RFID Systems Corporation Australia Amskan Austria Philips Semiconductors Gratkorn GmbH UK A.P.T. Smart Solutions France Balogh
Kasten Chase Applied Research, Ltd. SAMSys Technologies Inc. Integrated Silicon Design
IB Technology, Ltd.
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Sweden Baumer Iden AB Germany DIEHL Ident GmbH Siemens AG Italy Extel srl South Africa Infotronics Israel Tadian Telematics, Ltd. Netherlands Cross Point b.v. Switzerland EM Microelectronic-Marin SA
Tagmaster AB Scemtec
TNO Institute of Applied Physics
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SECTION 17: SENSORS TECHNOLOGY
March 2000
SECTION 17SENSORS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 Acoustic Sensors, Terrestrial Platform ....................III-17-4 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar ...............III-17-11 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar ..............III-17-31 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform........................III-17-49 Electro-optical Sensors ...........................................III-17-55 Radar .......................................................................III-17-75 Land Mine Countermeasures..................................III-17-98 Sea and Littoral Region Mine Counter measures ................................................................III-17-139 Highlights In modern warfare, the side with superior sensors has a great advantage over its adversaries. Active sensors are used to obtain massive amounts of real-time, highly accurate data while passive sensors are used for covert-type operations. Improved sensor performance is required for offsetting or countering the stealthy targets being introduced worldwide. Sensor performance can be improved by: Multiple, unique interference-rejection techniques. Automated information management, including using more robust discrimination and correct decisions criteria. Fusion of data from multiple looks and sources, including using network-centric warfare techniques. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in sensors will continue, but at an accelerated pace. Nuclear, chemical residue, and hyperfine interactions technologies [nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR)] are being used to correctly identify explosives in buried land mines.
OVERVIEW This section includes the technologies for acoustic and electro-optic sensors and radar, the primary sensors of military interest. Laser sensors are included in the Lasers, Optics, and Supporting Technology section. Gravity and magnetic sensors are included in Positioning, Navigation, and Time section. Inertial, chemical, biological, and nuclear sensors are covered in their respective sections. This section also covers the technologies for the mine detection, minefield detection, and neutralization aspects of countermining. Acoustic and electro-optic sensors, radar, and countermining are already vital and will become even more so in the future for effective and safe military operations, regardless of whether for open conflict, peacekeeping, training, or humanitarian efforts. Most of the major sensors are also vital for many civilian endeavors as well. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in sensors will continue, but at an accelerated pace.
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No single sensor approach has been demonstrated to be effective in finding buried mines. The fusion of ground-penetrating radars (GPR), electromagnetic induction (EMI) technologies, and nuclear detection techniques shows great promise for improved target detection with fewer false alarms. RATIONALE The data obtained from sensors is a basic ingredient for all military operational concepts in use now and projected for the future. Military sensors are vital to operations at both the tactical and strategic levels. They are needed to provide information during all phases of planning and operations and during all circumstances where ranges exceed visual capabilities. In modern warfare, the side with the superior sensors has a significant advantage over its adversaries. BACKGROUND The data obtained from these primary sensors is a basic and necessary ingredient for all military planning and operations. In most warfare scenarios, sensors will be used singly or in combinations, with some serving as primary and others used to confirm or verify the results. Active sensors are used to obtain massive amounts of real-time, highly accurate data. Passive sensors are used for covert-type operations. Military uses of acoustic sensors on land include intruder detection and detection and location of target vehicles and direct-fire weapons. They are also used in airborne munitions to passively detect, identify, and locate noise-radiating targets. Civilian applications on land are intruder-detection alarms and the location and identification of petroleum-producing features in Earths crust. Military uses of acoustic sensors in the marine environment include locating ships, submarines, torpedoes, ocean mines, and objects lost at sea; and weapons homing and activation. Civilian applications are fish finding, geophysical exploration at sea, and petroleum and mineral exploitation. Electro-optical sensors are typically used in night-vision devices by both civilian and military sectors. Military uses include terminal guidance for smart weapons. For the military, radar is used on all types of platforms and fixed sites for detecting and locating targets, for weapon guidance, and to obtain information about Earth features and atmospheric conditions. It is similarly used in civilian applications for traffic control on land, in the air, and on the seas and for weather tracking. Countermining is required to detect and neutralize land mines and minefields in a rapid and safe manner. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT A greater variety of more sensitive and affordable sensors is expected to be required as more and more accurate data are sought for both automated and manual decision making in the civilian and military sectors. Although the sensors covered have widely dispersed functions, they have the common characteristic that the U.S. state of the art throughout the cold war has been comparable to or better than the rest of the world. The U.S. lead in sensors has been driven by its military objectives. Unfortunately, the U.S. military advantage is now eroding with declining budgets, while sensors need continued improvements to counter new, stealthy targets and countermeasures. The situation will be compounded when more and more sensors are developed and perfected by worldwide industry as the full impact of the information age is realized and exploited. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT The United States has clearly led in the development, production, and use of acoustics and electro-optic sensors and radar. The former Soviet Union (FSU) was very active in all areas of sensor development, but rarely reached the technological level of the West. Current Russian sensors remain limited by the lack of production facilities and a motivated work force. Where there is a national priority, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK have developed and produced excellent sensors. These and some other countries are making good progress in catching up. The former substantial lead of the United States in acoustic systems has eroded to a marginal lead over Russia, France, and the UK. Germany and Japan come next, followed by Australia and Canada. The United States clearly leads in cooled staring and uncooled focal plane arrays for thermal imaging, followed by the UK, France, Japan, and
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Germany. The United States is also the world leader in third-generation image intensifiers, followed by Russia. The Netherlands continues to develop and use second-generation devices. China and India have a first- and secondgeneration capability, but it is based on know-how imported from the West. Little development is evident. Further development of image-intensification technology in the United States has slowed in favor of solid-state sensors. The United States continues to lead in radar development, but faces stiff worldwide competition, particularly in the area of synthetic aperture radars (SAR). Countries developing and marketing excellent high-resolution SARs include the UK (Racal), Germany (Dornier), Israel (Elta), and France (Thomson CSF). In the area of foliage-penetration systems, Sweden has led research efforts with its Carabas system. In some of the developing technologies, such as space-based moving target indication radar, the United States leads, but has cooperative research and information exchange agreements with the UK and Canada. In other areas (e.g., stealth radar) the United States has a commanding lead, but countries such as France and China are investing significant research resources.
Sec. 17.1 Acoustic Sensors, Terrestrial Platform Sec. 17.2 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Sec. 17.3 Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Sec. 17.4 Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Sec. 17.8 Sea and Littoral Region Mine Countermeasures
Country Australia Canada China Czech Republic Denmark France Germany India Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Russia South Korea Sweden UK United States Legend:
Sec. 17.5 Electrooptical Sensors
Sec. 17.6 Radar

Extensive R&D
Sec. 17.7 Land Mine Countermeasures
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 17.0-1. Sensors Technology WTA Summary
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SECTION 17.1ACOUSTIC SENSORS, TERRESTRIAL PLATFORM

Highlights Acoustic is the sensor of choice for noise-emitting still and moving targets that are out of the line of sight in a battlefield. Acoustic sensors provide effective detection and tracking of noise-emitting targets for battlefield monitoring and targeting. Acoustics sensors are typically primary in network of unattended ground sensors (UGS). Acoustic sensors provide improved identification and tracking of targets in loud acoustic clutter while rejecting false targets. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in acoustics will continue, but at an accelerated rate.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers technologies for the development or production of acoustic systems for terrestrial (landbased) applications. Military applications include passive sensors contained in airborne munitions that are used for detecting, identifying, locating, and homing on noise-radiating targets on the ground. Ground-based, passive acoustic systems for the detection and location of noise-radiating targets, such as intruders, vehicles, and direct-fire weapons are included. Microphones or geophones are placed for the best reception and maximum received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The criterion for decision making and the selection and weighting of discriminating clues is of paramount importance for these systems. For most of these applications, omnidirectional microphone arrays are also required. Ground vehicles used for the passive reception platform can generate an acoustic environment much louder than the signals to be detected. Self-noise reduction, including but not limited to isolation, is required. Civilian application includes seismic acoustic systems for locating and identifying petroleum-producing features within Earths crust. (The Information Technology section discusses the processing and computational capabilities of seismic land-based processing centers that are considered critical.) Evolutionary, emerging technology developments are highlighted in the following data sheets. There are no known revolutionary emerging developments underway. RATIONALE Passive acoustic sensors in airborne munitions provide a low-cost, nonalerting detection, identification, and location system for targeting noise-generating target vehicles that are out of the line of sight. Passive acoustic systems for intruder detection and location, a current military technique, has a growing number of commercial applications. The unique processing used to discriminate against false targets and identify intruders is specially developed for this application and considered militarily critical. Development of passive acoustic systems to detect and locate target vehicles and direct-fire weapons at distances of up to 5,000 m while the detection sensors operate in a noisy acoustic environment is a highly specialized and militarily critical capability that has no commercial counterpart. The signal-processing and digital-computing capability of seismic land-based processing centers is similar to (and can be used for) antisubmarine warfare (ASW) passive sonar data analysis. U.S. industry has dominated seismic processing and computational development.
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Passive Detection of Vehicles from a Land-based Site Passive Detection of Vehicles from an Airborne Munition
Country Australia Canada Denmark France Germany Israel Netherlands UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 17.1-1. Acoustic Sensors, Terrestrial Platform Technology Systems WTA Summary
Terrestrial acoustic intruder-detection systems are now being developed commercially as well as by the military. Israel has an advanced intruder-detection system. The U.S. military has pioneered the development and use of passive acoustic systems to detect and locate target vehicles and direct-fire weapons. U.S. industry has dominated the worldwide development and use of seismic data-processing and analysis. Various technologically advanced countries have recently developed UGS. Air deployed or hand emplaced, UGSs consist of various passive, low-cost, small sensor technologies for robust, short-range detection, identification, localization, and tracking of ground and airborne targets. These expendable UGS consist of acoustic and seismic as the primary sensors. Coupled with short-haul communication, they are deployed in mass quantities to crate a web of networked sensors for area surveillance and situational awareness.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-17.1. ACOUSTIC SENSORS, TERRESTRIAL PLATFORM

Passive Detection of Vehicles from a Land-based Site............................................................................................. III-17-9 Passive Detection of Vehicles from an Airborne Munition .................................................................................... III-17-10
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DATA SHEET III-17.1. PASSIVE DETECTION OF VEHICLES FROM A LAND-BASED SITE

Detecting, identifying, and real-time tracking from a land-based site of noise-emitting, moving target vehicles that are out of the line of sight in a battlefield. None identified. For air-deployable, all-weather sensors. Validated set of algorithms that provides the knowledge base for identifying potential targets, discriminating against false targets, and providing real-time tracking of moving targets. Implementing the processes that discriminate between noise-emitting targets and nontargets in a battlefield and the real-time tracking of moving targets to within 10 m at 5,000-m range. Also required is quieting of support equipment that otherwise can generate an acoustic environment that is much louder than the signals to be detected. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The importance of ground-based, passive acoustic-detection systems is based on two requirements: (1) realtime battlefield monitoring and (2) real-time detection, identification, tracking, and targeting of mobile, noiseemitting targets in the battlefield. The strategic importance is based on the battlefield being out of the line of sight and not capable of being monitored by other battlefield sensors. This land battlefield-monitoring capability will provide a direct contribution to the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver and fulldimensional protection. The capability for real-time tracking of noise-emitting targets is a direct contribution to precision engagement. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel

Significant R&D
Denmark Netherlands
France UK
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in real-time, passive detection of noise-generating vehicles in a battlefield. Israel has an advanced intruder-detection system that has some similar characteristics. No other development is known. Advanced passive detection of noise-emitting targets is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.1. PASSIVE DETECTION OF VEHICLES FROM AN AIRBORNE MUNITION

From an airborne munition, detecting, identifying, and real-time tracking of noiseemitting stationary and moving target vehicles that are out of the line of sight in a battlefield. None identified. All-weather, airflow-noise-resistant acoustic sensors. Validated set of algorithms that provides the knowledge base for identifying potential targets, discriminating against false targets, and real-time tracking of moving targets. Implementing within an airborne munition the processes that discriminate between noise-emitting targets and nontargets in a battlefield, locate a target, and then track the moving target to within 5 m at up to 5,000-m range. Discrimination is required against the airborne munition airflow. None identified. The cost of expendable munitions is always a factor.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The importance of passive acoustic-detection systems within airborne munitions stems from the need to hit, with high probability, potentially moving targets that are (1) beyond the line of sight and (2) not targetable by other battlefield sensors. The targeting from an airborne munition of a noise-emitting mobile target that is out of the line of sight will provide a direct contribution to the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of precision engagement. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States leads in passive detection from an airborne munition of still or moving noise-generating targets in a battlefield. Germany and the UK have limited developments underway. No other developments are known.
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SECTION 17.2ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, ACTIVE SONAR

Highlights Active sonar systems provide rapid and accurate target location for developing a quick-response fire-control solution. Major improvements in active sonar systems are necessary to counter the more limiting environmental acoustic conditions found in littoral areas. A higher ratio of correct decisions to false alarms is to be achieved for littoral areas by improving computeraided detection, classification, and information management. Major operational improvements are to be achieved by increasing reverberation and countermeasure interference-rejection techniques. Received signal-to-noise levels are to be enhanced by data fusion from multiple platforms and adaptive processing to better match sonar to the acoustic environment. Active sonar for weapons systems is being improved to operate at high speed and resolve, identify, and successfully track small, slow, diesel-electric submarine targets in the adverse shallow-water environment. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in active sonars will continue, but at an accelerated pace.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers the technologies for the development and production of active sonars, which employ acoustic signals to echo range and locate underwater objects and to determine features in Earths crust. Military uses for active sonars include ASW and antiship warfare, weapon homing, torpedo defense, mine warfare, swimmer warfare, deep-sea salvage, and underwater communication and navigation. Commercial uses include locating fish and other objects underwater, seismic exploration at sea, petroleum and mineral exploitation, and academic studies. Dual use includes the detection, classification, and tracking of underwater objects and features for determining bottom depth and mapping and for navigation. Active sonar performance is highly dependent on the acoustic environment and frequency of the system. The most common propagation paths are direct, bottom bounce, and convergence zone. The major limit is the interference from reverberation, which is created by the backscatter of the transmitted signal as it passes through the ocean medium or is reflected back from the ocean boundaries. Reverberation has near-zero Doppler and thus creates many false alarms and interferes most when tracking slow-speed targets that cannot be separated from the reverberation by doppler processing. Propagation loss in the ocean is frequency dependent, and lower frequencies have been selected to gain longer ranges. Antiship and antisubmarine sonars operate in the 100-Hz to 10-kHz frequency band to obtain long ranges out to 30 km. In the shallow water of the littorals, the convergence zone path does not exist and detection ranges are significantly shorter. Mine-detection sonars operate in the 30- to 100-kHz band to have increased resolution, but as a consequence have shorter ranges of up to 2,000 m. To obtain the resolution required to discriminate and identify small targets or features from background clutter, mine classification, bottom mapping, and deep-sea salvage sonars operate in the 60-kHz to 750-kHz frequency band and have ranges out to a few hundred meters. The active sonar in underwater weapons operates in the 15- to 60-kHz band and has ranges on the order of 1,000 m to detect, locate, and track the target and provide steering commands. Marine seismic survey systems use a towed 8- to 200-Hz source and a long, towed hydrophone array to receive the signals bounced off the features deep in Earths crust. By this process, these systems can locate areas that have potential for producing petroleum products. Obviously, there is a sizable amount of overlap between the civilian and military applications. Navy sonars operate monostatically or multistatically from a variety of ships, submarines, and aircraft; from moored or bottom-
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mounted locations; and in all environments. Most active sonar developments have been driven by military use. Civilian sonars are a small but growing part of the active sonar market. Most have dual-use potential for military application. There are important evolutionary, emerging developments in the following data sheets. There are no known revolutionary, emerging technology developments underway. RATIONALE The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the worldwide increased emphasis on littoral versus deep-ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet diesel-electric submarines. Faced with quieter submarine targets or an acoustically cluttered environment, active sonar becomes the sensor of choice. Active sonar is also the primary sensor once an operational engagement commences. Active sonar performance is being enhanced as better performance prediction allows selection of the most effective operating mode and more computational capability is added and used to reduce the false-alarm rate. Active sonars will also be more effective in the future as systems are mounted on several different platforms and are networked together (network-centric warfare). Active sonars remain the most effective sensor for detecting, locating, and tracking sea mines, torpedoes, and swimmers and for the homing and activation of acoustic mines and torpedoes. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Active Sonar Signal and Data Processing for Multiplatforms Reverberation Suppression for Active Sonar ChannelAdaptive Processing for Active Sonar Advanced Active Sonar for Submersibles
Country Australia Canada China France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Russia Sweden UK United States Legend:
Advanced Data Processing for Active Sonar
Environmentally Adaptive Active Sonar

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D

(Continued)
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
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Figure 17.2-1. Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Systems WTA Summary
Submarine Ahead-Looking Active Sonar Multi-Aspect Data Fusion Processing for Active Sonar Active Sonar for Underwater Weapons Active Sonar for Mine Countermeasures Active Sonar for AntiTorpedo Torpedoes
Country Australia Canada China France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Russia Sweden UK United States Legend:

Limited R&D
Significant R&D
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
Figure 17.2-1. Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Active Sonar Systems WTA Summary (Contd)
The United States lead in active sonar development is now only marginal over Russia and the major western producing countries. France and the UK clearly pace the remainder of the western world and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia in many technology areas. Germany and Japan come next, followed by Australia and Canada. All of the above countries have a reasonably complete capability in acoustic sensors and weapons, largely sustained by competent laboratories and industry. Japan obtained a large part of its capability by licensing arrangements with the United States. Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have acoustics capabilities in limited niche areas. Other countries that produce active sonars have a very limited capability.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-17.2. ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, ACTIVE SONAR

Advanced Data Processing for Active Sonar........................................................................................................... III-17-17 Active Sonar Signal and Data Processing for Multiplatforms................................................................................ III-17-19 Reverberation Suppression for Active Sonar ..........................................................................................................III-17-20 Channel-Adaptive Processing for Active Sonar...................................................................................................... III-17-22 Environmentally Adaptive Active Sonar................................................................................................................. III-17-23 Advanced Active Sonar for Submersibles............................................................................................................... III-17-25 Submarine Ahead-Looking Active Sonar................................................................................................................ III-17-26 Multi-Aspect Data Fusion Processing for Active Sonar ......................................................................................... III-17-27 Active Sonar for Underwater Weapons ................................................................................................................... III-17-28 Active Sonar for Mine Countermeasures................................................................................................................. III-17-29 Active Sonar for Anti-Torpedo Torpedoes.............................................................................................................. III-17-30
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. ADVANCED DATA PROCESSING FOR ACTIVE SONAR

Automated or computer-aided detection, tracking, classification, and identification of undersea-warfare (USW) targets in littoral areas or cluttered acoustic environments using empirically validated clues (discriminates), decision criteria, and decision processes. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) identifying and selecting clues that highlight potential targets and discriminate against false targets, (2) implementing the discrimination process, (3) developing the decision criteria, and (4) for normalizing and thresholding the acoustic signals. These sets of algorithms are for the functions of detection, classification, and identification of targets and target-like false targets. Identifying and selecting the weighting of clues that discriminate between USW targets and nontargets and selecting and implementing the decision processes that combined yield a 95-percent probability of detection and classification with a false-alarm rate of less than 5 percent. This is a unique military application and is constrained by the difficulty of obtaining realistic and representative data at sea and perfecting the series of processes. Fish, swimmer, and other object-detection sonar systems. The cost of sea tests to obtain realistic target and target-like false target data in a variety of environments is a limiting factor.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the worldwide emphasis on littoral versus deep-ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet diesel-electric submarines. Faced with quiet submarines in an acoustically cluttered environment, active sonar becomes the sensor of choice. Active sonar is mandatory once an operational engagement commences; however, it is hampered by reverberation interference, low signal strength received, low probability of correct decisions, high false-alarm rate, and operator overload. Advanced data processing has the potential for substantially improving probability of correct decisions and actions, as well as reducing the false-alarm rate and operator overload. Active sonar remains the most effective sensor for detecting, locating, and tracking sea mines, torpedoes, and swimmers and for the homing and activation of acoustic mines and torpedoes. Advanced data processing is vital to the future success of these functions as well. The added capability of the combined technologies of computer-aided detection, tracking, classification, and identification of undersea targets in harsh acoustical environments will aid USW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement, dominant maneuver, and full-dimensional protection.
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Australia Germany Norway United States
Legend:
Canada Italy Russia

Significant R&D
China Japan Sweden

Moderate R&D
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
The United States continues to lead in real-time, automated, or computer-assisted data processing for active sonars. France and the UK still lead Russia and outpace the rest of the world. Germany and Japan are next. Australia, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have advanced data processing in niche areas. Other countries that produce or use active sonars have a very limited advanced data-processing capability. Advanced sonar data processing is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. ACTIVE SONAR SIGNAL AND DATA PROCESSING FOR MULTIPLATFORMS
Real-time processing of acoustic data for fixed, deployed, or mobile arrays operated in the bistatic or multistatic mode to increase target ranges and probability of correct decisions. None identified. Bistatic or multistatic platforms at sea for collection of data. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for synchronizing and normalizing multiple incoming signals, adjusting the dynamic range of multiple incoming signals, and performing data fusion. Synchronizing and normalizing the multiple incoming signals, adjusting the dynamic range for very weak to very strong signals, and performing data fusion such that there is a signal gain of up to 50 percent over that of a single receiver. None identified. The cost of sea tests with multiple platforms to obtain realistic target and target-like false-target data in a variety of environments is a limiting factor.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the worldwide emphasis on littoral versus deep-ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet diesel-electric submarines. Faced with quiet submarines in an acoustically cluttered environment, active sonar becomes the sensor of choice. Active sonar is mandatory once an operational engagement commences; however, active sonar is hampered by reverberation interference, low signal strength received, low probability of correct decisions, high false-alarm rate, and operator overload. Data fusion of advanced signal and data processing from multiple platforms has the potential for increasing the combined target signal levels by 50 percent, thereby extending operating range, improving probability of correct decisions and actions, and reducing the false-alarm rate. Data fusion among multiple sensor platforms will be aided by the emerging network-centric techniques. The added capability of real-time processing for active sonars from multiplatforms will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement, dominant maneuver, and fulldimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
The United States leads in data fusion of signals received from multiple platforms. France, Russia, the UK, and possibly Japan are exploring multiplatform processing. No other country is known to be developing this capability. Advanced data fusion is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. REVERBERATION SUPPRESSION FOR ACTIVE SONAR

Real-time tracking of submarine targets with speeds less than 3 knots that are obscured by reverberation or acoustic countermeasures. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for real-time, dynamically (1) identifying and selecting transmit pulse type, coding, length, frequency, and frequency agility that minimize the interference received with the variations being based on the reverberation and countermeasure interference being received; (2) normalizing the incoming signals; and (3) adjusting the receiver dynamic range for very weak incoming signals in the presence of very strong reverberation or countermeasures. Dynamically and in real-time: (1) select and vary transmit pulse type, coding, length, frequency, and frequency agility to minimize the interference with the variations being based on the reverberation or countermeasure signals being received; (2) normalize the incoming signals; and (3) adjust the dynamic range for very weak incoming signals in the presence of very strong reverberations or countermeasures. None identified. The cost of sea tests to obtain realistic target and target-like false target data in a variety of reverberation fields and countermeasures is a limiting factor.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the worldwide emphasis on littoral versus deep-ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet diesel-electric submarines. Faced with quiet submarines in an acoustically cluttered environment, active sonar becomes the sensor of choice. Active sonar is mandatory once an operational engagement commences; however, active sonar is hampered by interference from reverberation, low signal strength received, low probability of correct decisions, high false-alarm rate, and operator overload. The capability to dynamically adjust the transmit signals in real time to reduce the blinding effect of reverberation and countermeasures has the potential to increase by up to 100 percent the probability of detection and classification of targets moving at speeds less than 3 knots or in the presence of countermeasures. Submarines operating in the littorals will tend to hide on the bottom or move slowly while on reconnaissance or waiting for an engagement. The reverberation received by an active sonar receiver is centered on 0 knots Doppler, and targets moving at speeds of over 3 knots can be separated from the reverberation using narrowband digital filtering. Sonar countermeasure or jamming signals can vary in every parameter and are designed to acoustically blind and confuse the operator. The blinding effect and confusion is best offset by the capability to dynamically adjust in real time the transmitting signal and receiver characteristics used to process targets while rejecting the interference. The added capability of reverberation suppression for active sonar will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement, dominant maneuver, and full-dimensional protection.
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France
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in dynamically adjusting transmit and receive characteristics to suppress interference from reverberation or acoustic countermeasures. France, the UK, and possibly Japan are exploring this capability. No other country is known to be involved. This capability is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. CHANNEL-ADAPTIVE PROCESSING FOR ACTIVE SONAR

Channel-adaptive processing using a probe pulse to characterize the medium and optimize the propagation paths being utilized, thereby increasing signal strength and reliable data rate. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for dynamically identifying and selecting transmit and receive parameters in real time, as a means to optimize the propagation path utilized. The parameter selections are based on information extracted from the signals returned from the probe pulse. (1) Real-time, dynamic identification and selection of transmit and receive parameters required to optimize the propagation path being utilized, with the parameter selections based on information extracted from the signals returned from a probe pulse. (2) Capability to maintain the probe pulse coherency from pulse to pulse to maintain sufficient signal strength for extracting the information that characterizes the medium.
Technical Issues
None identified. The cost of sea tests to obtain sufficient data in a variety of environmental acoustic conditions to formulate the dynamic database is a limiting factor.
RATIONALE The ability to acoustically communicate between aircraft or surface ships and submarines is vital for multiplatform operations. Long-range, underwater acoustic communications are often a subset of the active sonar system. The range of operation is seriously limited by environmental acoustic conditions. The capability to dynamically adjust the transmit and receive parameters in real time to match the optimum propagation path has the potential for increasing reliable data rate by over 500 percent. This improvement will be most pronounced for littoral areas. Such improvements are especially needed for submarine network-centric capability. The added capability of channel-adaptive processing for active sonar will be a major contribution to enhancing underwater communications, which is vital for ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States leads in developing this capability. France and the UK are exploring the capability. No other country is known to be involved. This capability is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. ENVIRONMENTALLY ADAPTIVE ACTIVE SONAR

Dynamically matching transmit parameters to environmental acoustic conditions to minimize multiple arrival of signals that interfere with each other and reduce the signal strength received. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for dynamically selecting and varying, in real time, the transmit parameters pulse length, frequency, and depression angle to minimize the interference from multiple arrivals. The parameter variations are based on historical data and in situ measurements of environmental acoustic conditions such as water depth, water column temperatures, bottom characteristics, and layer depth. (1) Dynamically selecting and varying, in real time, the transmit parameters pulse length, frequency, and depression angle to minimize the interference from multiple arrivals, with the parameter variations based on historical data and in situ measurements of environmental acoustic conditions such as water depth, water column temperatures, bottom characteristics, and layer depth. (2) Affordable, in situ sensors that do not restrict the operation of the sensor platform. (3) Environmental acoustic data that characterizes the propagation paths for operational areas.
Technical Issues
None identified. The cost of sea tests to obtain sufficient data in a variety of environmental acoustic conditions to formulate the dynamic database is a limiting factor. Cost of expendable, in situ sensors is an affordability issue.
RATIONALE The strategic importance of active sonar for ASW has continued to increase with the worldwide emphasis on littoral versus deep-ocean warfare and the proliferation of quiet diesel-electric submarines. Faced with quiet submarines in an acoustically cluttered environment, active sonar becomes the sensor of choice. Active sonar is mandatory once an operational engagement commences; however, active sonar is hampered by reverberation interference, low signal strength received, low probability of correct decisions, high false-alarm rate, and operator overload. The capability to dynamically adjust the transmit parameters in real time has the potential for reducing the multipath interference and thereby increase signal strength by over 20 dB. The potential for interference reduction is greatest in littoral operating areas. The added capability of environmentally adaptive active sonars will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement, dominant maneuver, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
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The United States leads in the capability to dynamically adjust the transmit parameters. France, the UK, and possibly Japan are exploring this capability. No other country is known to be involved. This capability is driven by military applications.
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DATA SHEET III-17.2. ADVANCED ACTIVE SONAR FOR SUBMERSIBLES

Submersible active sonar having feature height finding or beam interpolation, computeraided detection and track, and fine-angle horizontal and vertical resolution for small object location and recovery and navigation in restricted areas. None identified. None identified. Validated set of algorithms for real-time height finding, beam interpolation, and reducing bottom backscatter interference. Feature height finding, beam interpolation, computer-aided detection and track, and fine-angle horizontal and vertical resolution. Submersible object location and recovery sonar, obstacle avoidance, feature height finding, and navigation in restricted areas. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE For submersibles, active sonar is a valuable asset for safely navigating in close-in, uncharted areas and for locating objects while operating near the sea floor or other obstacles. The use of active sonar in these environments, however, is generally hampered by bottom reverberation, cluttered and confusing returns, low resolution and accuracy, and operator overload. This advanced, high-resolution sonar for submersibles has the potential for providing accurate information that aids in detecting, identifying, and accurately locating small objects, as well as for determining the height of targets or bottom features that are ahead of the craft. The added capability of highresolution-feature height finding and navigation for submersibles will provide a significant contribution to the rapid location and recovery of high-value munitions lost at sea, which supports the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
No other country is known to be developing this capability. The capability is driven by military applications.
III-17-25
DATA SHEET III-17.2. SUBMARINE AHEAD-LOOKING ACTIVE SONAR

Ahead-looking, bathymetric active sonar for submarines using monopulse (interferometric) processing and providing system accuracies better than 0.5 percent of the average water depth (below the platform or above the platform for an ice canopy) across the swath and having the information displayed with 3D qualities. None identified. None identified. Validated set of algorithms for real-time, monopulse interferometric processing. Monopulse interferometric processing and an intuitive visualization display that provides 3D qualities. Submersible precision navigation and obstacle location. None identified.
RATIONALE Active sonar is a valuable asset for submarines to safely navigate in close-in uncharted areas, for operating near the sea floor or ice canopies, or for generating charts of these type of areas. The use of active sonar in these environments, however, is hampered by reverberation, cluttered and confusing returns, low resolution and accuracy, and operator overload. Data obtained from multiple aspects will be suitable for developing navigation charts. The added capability of high-resolution submarine navigation will provide a significant contribution for operating in littorals and other cluttered undersea areas, which supports the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
No other country is known to be developing this capability, which capability is driven by military applications.
III-17-26
DATA SHEET III-17.2. MULTI-ASPECT DATA FUSION PROCESSING FOR ACTIVE SONAR
Multi-aspect data fusion processing for submarines and submersibles that provides increased resolution and rapid sensing and visualization of complex shapes. None identified. None identified. Validated set of algorithms for real-time data normalization of multiple channels and data fusion processing. Fusion of data from multiple high-resolution sonar systems or from multiple looks with varying aspect angles using the same sonar and displaying the information from either for rapid visualization of complex shapes with very high resolution. Submersible small object location and obstacle avoidance. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE High-resolution active sonar is a valuable asset for submarines and submersibles to use for safely navigating in uncharted areas; for operating near the sea floor and under ice; and for detecting, locating, and identifying objects. However, reverberation and low-resolution returns that are cluttered and confusing hamper the use of active sonar in these environments. Data-fusion processing of multiple-source data in conjunction with an intuitive visualization display has the potential for rapidly sensing and resolving complex shapes. The added capability of high resolution navigation for submarines and submersibles will provide a significant contribution for operating in littorals and other cluttered undersea areas, which supports the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
No other country is known to be developing this capability. The capability is driven by military applications.
III-17-27
DATA SHEET III-17.2. ACTIVE SONAR FOR UNDERWATER WEAPONS

For underwater weapons, active sonar having multiple preformed beams with transmit frequency greater than 15 kHz, able to withstand depths greater than 500 m, to transmit sound pressure levels greater than 220 dB (reference to 1 Pa at 1 m), to detect, classify, identify, and resolve targets at ranges greater than 1,000 m, with angular accuracy better than 5 deg and Doppler accuracy better than 2 knots in clutter. Piezoelectric composites and magnetostrictive terfernol D. Fixed and portable underwater tracking ranges for testing computer-aided processes and obtaining the data base for developing computer-aided processing algorithms. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for real-time target resolution, identification, and tracking. Identifying and selecting the weighting of clues that discriminates between USW targets and nontargets and selecting and implementing the decision criteria that combined provide a probability of detection and classification greater than 95 percent with a falsealarm rate of less than 5 percent for small, quiet, electric-propulsion submarines in harsh, shallow water environments. This unique military capability is constrained by the difficulty of obtaining realistic and representative data at sea and perfecting the series of processes. Additional issues are self-noise and target resolution versus torpedo size. None identified. The cost for obtaining the necessary environmental acoustic database and the cost of weapon proofing are major factors for expendable weapons.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Active sonar is a critical ingredient for the final homing of an acoustic homing torpedo. An acoustic homing torpedo generally acquires a target from information provided by the launching platform or its self-contained passive sonar and then closes quietly until it reacquires with active sonar. Because the target is alerted at that time, the torpedo increases speed for the final homing sequence, and the passive sonar goes blind. Active sonar in the small diameter of a torpedo traveling at speeds of over 40 knots is limited by transmit source level, target resolution, angular and Doppler accuracy, and high self-noise. The combined improvements (see the table) have the potential to overcome these limits, giving torpedoes the capability of acquiring the target at extended ranges and at great depths and rapidly homing by tracking the target at high speeds and at fast turning rates to prevent the target from escaping. The combined underwater weapon advanced technologies of computer-aided detection, tracking, classification, and identification of undersea targets in harsh acoustic environments will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement, dominant maneuver, and full-dimensional protection WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Russia
Legend:
Germany Sweden

Significant R&D
Italy UK

Moderate R&D
Japan United States
Extensive R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in underwater weapons active sonar development. France, Germany, Russia, and the UK follow. Italy, Japan, and Sweden come next. All of these have reasonably complete capability in acoustic sensors and weapons, largely sustained by competent laboratories and industry. The capability is entirely driven by military applications.
III-17-28
DATA SHEET III-17.2. ACTIVE SONAR FOR MINE COUNTERMEASURES

For mine-hunting sonars, an adaptive beam-forming process that steers nulls toward the bottom and surface interfaces to reduce the reverberation interference that blanks the mine targets in the water column. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for real time, dynamic tracking of the sea surface and bottom interfaces with the water column. To identify, select, and track the sea surface and bottom interfaces with the water column in order to steer nulls of greater than 20 dB at the interfaces that are causing reverberation interference. This interference blanks the sonar and suppresses mine targets in the water column, especially for mines that are tethered near the bottom. Detecting fish near the sea bottom. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The importance of active sonar for mine hunting and neutralization has continued to increase with the worldwide emphasis on littoral warfare and the proliferation of relatively inexpensive sea mines. Sea mines have the potential for sinking or severely damaging high-value units, as well as for delaying or removing an option for naval action because of the mine threat to navy vessels and personnel. Active sonar is the most commonly used sensor for detecting, identifying, and accurately locating sea mines. Active sonar has the largest area coverage for rapid clearing of a minefield; however, active sonar is hampered by reverberation interference and the resulting low signal strength received, complex and confusing returns from mine-like false targets on the sea bottom, low probability of correct decisions, high false-alarm rate, and operator overload. The capability to dynamically adjust a null of greater than 20 dB in order to reduce the blinding effect of reverberation has the potential for significantly increasing the probability of detection and classification of mines and mine-like false targets. The added capability of suppressing bottom reverberation for mine-hunting sonars will provide a significant contribution to USW forces, which supports the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France UK
Legend:
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in developing advanced mine-hunting sonars that have null steering capability. France, Germany, the UK, and possibly Japan and Russia are exploring this capability. No other country is known to be involved. This capability is driven by military applications.
III-17-29
DATA SHEET III-17.2. ACTIVE SONAR FOR ANTI-TORPEDO TORPEDOES

To detect, resolve, and track incoming torpedoes at ranges greater than 100 m and with an accuracy of within 5 m. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for real-time target detection, resolution, and tracking. An active sonar incorporated in an anti-torpedo torpedo to detect, resolve, and track incoming torpedoes at speeds greater than 50 knots, at ranges greater than 100 m, and with an accuracy of within 5 m. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE More and more homing torpedoes are being developed and built that have wake homing and other nonacoustic sensors that cannot be readily countermeasured. The nonacoustic homing torpedoes are a serious threat to high-value naval surface units such as aircraft carriers and troop transport ships. Anti-torpedo torpedoes are being developed to hard kill the threat torpedo as opposed to the soft kill (countermeasures) often used against acoustic homing torpedoes. Hard kill is difficult because the target must be resolved, acquired, and tracked to within 5 m for an effective kill. Active sonar is a critical ingredient for the final homing of an acoustic homing anti-torpedo torpedo. Acoustic homing anti-torpedo torpedoes generally acquire a target from information provided by the launching platform. Active sonars in the small diameter of a torpedo traveling at speeds of over 40 knots are limited by target resolution, angular and Doppler accuracy, and high self-noise. Acoustic homing anti-torpedo torpedoes using highresolution active sonar have the potential for overcoming these limits and acquiring a fast-moving target torpedo at ranges over 100 m with an accuracy of within 5 m. The capability of destroying incoming torpedoes regardless of homing features will provide a vital contribution to surface warfare forces, which supports the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:
Germany
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
Extensive R&D
The United States leads in active sonar development for anti-torpedo torpedoes. The UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia have commenced or are considering implementing such developments. All have reasonably complete capability in acoustic sensors and weapons, largely sustained by competent laboratories and industry. The capability is entirely driven by military applications.
III-17-30
SECTION 17.3ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, PASSIVE SONAR

Highlights Passive sonars are totally covert and are the sensor of choice in several operational scenarios. Major improvements in passive sonar systems are required to counter the worldwide submarine-quieting programs. Target transients, which are difficult to quiet, are to be exploited by employing unique processing and data management. Advanced processes are being developed to extend operational target ranges, thereby expanding the search area coverage. Automated target detection, classification, identification, and tracking are being developed for evasive submarine targets. Receiving array gain is being increased and self-noise reduced for both hull-borne and towed arrays. Advanced processes are being developed for reducing the time required for ranging, tracking, and developing a fire-control solution. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in passive sonars will continue, but at an accelerated pace.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers the technology for the development and production of passive sonar systems that are used militarily for the covert location of underwater objects that radiate energy. Passive sonars are used primarily for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare. Functions performed are detection, classification, identification, location, and tracking of acoustically radiating targets. The radiating energy is created by target vehicle propulsion and maneuvering, flow noise, transmitted acoustic signals, weapons launch, mine and torpedo actuators, and performance of housekeeping functions. Passive sonars are incorporated in submarines, surface ships, mines, torpedoes, and bottom-mounted or deployed sites. They are also incorporated in aircraft by using sonobuoy sensors. Passive sensor arrays are both mounted on the hulls of and towed from submarines, surface ships, and torpedoes. Passive sonar performance is dependent on the acoustic environment. The major interferences are own-ship noise, radiated noise from nearby friendly ships, noise from shipping at long ranges, and ambient background noise. The ASW passive sonar frequency band has been extended to the lower few hundred hertz as submarines have become quieter. Propagation paths are the same as for active sonar, except the path is only one way. Detection ranges of 30 to 60 km are possible with towed arrays, and hundreds of kilometers are possible with fixed or deployed sites operating against transiting submarine targets. The detection range is shorter for submarine targets operating in the quiet mode or in littoral areas. Underwater weapons passive sonars are designed to operate out to 20 km, while discriminating the target-radiated noise from the weapon self-noise, ambient background noise, and countermeasures. There are few civilian uses for passive sonar except for academic research. The major concern is with active systemsmarine seismic towed hydrophones arrays (streamers) and ocean bottom cable systemsthat can be used in the passive mode for ASW. Passive sonars have been developed uniquely for naval use. All U.S. Navy passive sonars are U.S. developed and produced. Some advanced technologies are shared with close allies, but relatively few systems are exported. Evolutionary, emerging technology developments are highlighted in the following data sheets. There are no known revolutionary, emerging technology developments underway.
III-17-31
RATIONALE Most successful ASW is performed using a mix of active and passive sonar systems based on the operational scenario. Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode, for the initial contact in an engagement, and for intercepting transients from the opponents platform and weapons. In those roles, towed hydrophone arrays are the most effective ASW sensor used to date. As fixed, bottom-mounted surveillance sites are phased out, more reliance is being placed on long-towed arrays and deployable arrays. Towed and deployed arrays have less detection range than the major bottom-mounted sites, but are readily transported to the operating area of interest. The fixed sites cannot be readily moved. Passive sonar effectiveness is being enhanced by sharing data among several platforms. The effectiveness will increase in the future when such data is shared more widely and faster using an operational network (network-centric warfare). When the long-range passive systems are not available, the fleet is potentially very vulnerable to submarine attacks using long-range torpedoes and standoff weapons. Current passive sonars are limited, in that they are susceptible to noisemaker type countermeasures and loud ambient background noise and may require several minutes to develop a target track suitable for weapons launch. The major technology developments discussed in the following data sheets are expected to overcome these deficiencies. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Intercept Receivers Open-Ocean Deployed Passive Sonar Underwater Weapons Passive Sensors Passive Sonar Target Tracking Passive Sonar Reception
Country Australia Canada China France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Sweden UK United States Legend:
Sonobuoys

Limited R&D

Moderate R&D
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
(Continued) Figure 17.3-1. Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Systems WTA Summary
III-17-32
Country Australia Canada China France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Sweden UK United States Legend:
Passive Sonar Ranging
Passive Sonar Data Fusion
Passive Sonar Array Noise
Passive Sonar Adaptive Beamforming, Null Steering, and Sidelobe Reduction
Passive Sonar Hull-Mounted Receiving Arrays
ASW Volumetric Towed Arrays

Extensive R&D

Limited R&D
Significant R&D

Moderate R&D
Figure 17.3-1. Acoustic Sensors, Marine, Passive Sonar Systems WTA Summary (Contd)
The United States has consistently maintained a comfortable lead in passive sonar systems technology over Russia and the major western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK clearly pace the remainder of the Western World and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia in many technology areas. Germany and Japan come next in quality of passive sonars, followed by Australia and Canada. A few other countries have capabilities in niche areas.
III-17-33
III-17-34
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-17.3. ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE, PASSIVE SONAR

Intercept Receivers....................................................................................................................... III-17-37 Open-Ocean-Deployed Passive Sonar............................................................................................... III-17-38 Sonobuoys................................................................................................................................. III-17-39 Underwater Weapons Passive Sensors.............................................................................................. III-17-40 Passive Sonar Target Tracking....................................................................................................... III-17-41 Passive Sonar Reception............................................................................................................... III-17-42 Passive Sonar Ranging................................................................................................................. III-17-43 Passive Sonar Data Fusion............................................................................................................ III-17-44 Passive Sonar Array Noise............................................................................................................ III-17-45 Passive Sonar Adaptive Beamforming, Null Steering, and Sidelobe Reduction ........................................ III-17-46 Passive Sonar Hull-Mounted Receiving Arrays ................................................................................. III-17-47 ASW Volumetric Towed Arrays..................................................................................................... III-17-48
III-17-35
III-17-36
DATA SHEET III-17.3. INTERCEPT RECEIVERS

Interception of acoustic transients with 360-deg coverage for the full acoustic spectrum of 10 Hz through 300 kHz and having bearing determination with less than 5-deg error for multiple and overlapping targets. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) selecting the clues that classify and identify transients; (2) implementing the identification process; and (3) developing and implementing the decision criteria. These sets of algorithms are for the functions of classification, identification of transient signals, and determining the bearing of the transient source. The identification, selection, and weighting of clues for the classification and identification of intercept signals; for maintaining target bearing accuracy of less than 5 deg at frequencies greater than 30 kHz; and for achieving a false-alarm rate of less than 3 percent. None identified. The cost of sea tests to obtain a wide variety of realistic platform and weapon transient signals and target-like false-target signals is a limiting factor.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode, for the initial contact in an engagement, and for intercepting transients from the opponents platform and weapons. Passive sonar is designed to detect continuous noise sources, often those that are repetitive in nature. Impulse-type noise or sounds of short duration and nonrepetitive nature are discriminated against. The unique role for intercept receivers is detecting, classifying, and identifying platform- and weapon-type transients that are suppressed by the basic passive receiver, but provide a wealth of information on opposing platform and weapon actions. The need is to provide 360-deg coverage, to identify multiple transient sources accurately, and to determine the bearing within 5 deg for all acoustic frequencies. The added capability of full-coverage transient intercept will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany Russia
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Italy Sweden

Significant R&D
China Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in intercept receiver technology over Russia and the major western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK clearly pace the remainder of the Western World and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia. Germany and Japan come next in quality of intercept receivers, followed by Australia, Canada, China, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden.
III-17-37
DATA SHEET III-17.3. OPEN-OCEAN-DEPLOYED PASSIVE SONAR

The detection of multiple electric-propulsion submarines traveling at speeds of less than 6 knots at one convergence zone range (30 to 60 km) using a deployed array. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) compensating for an irregular array shape, (2) data rate reduction, (3) data fusion, and (4) developing and implementing the decision criteria. The method for deploying an expendable array containing hundreds of hydrophones and covering an operating area, powering the deployed electronics, data flow, fusion and management, data processing for the terminating receiver, and affordable cost. None identified. The relatively low cost of the expendable array is critical for effective use.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for monitoring submarine movements through choke points, straits, or barrier situations. Experience has shown that tactical ASW is far more successful if and when general submarine movements are known. With the proliferation of quiet, electric-propulsion submarines throughout the world, the place of engagement will vary from conflict to conflict. Fixed surveillance sites are expensive and limited in use. A deployed, expendable array that has the potential to cover an ocean basin area for a minimum of 3 months provides the best solution. The deployed array is intended as a data source for a conventional passive receiver designed for detecting and locating continuous noise sources, often those that are repetitive in nature. Impulse-type noise or sounds of short duration and nonrepetitive nature are discriminated against. The deployed array, however, can also be used as a data source for detecting, classifying, and identifying platform- and weapon-type transients that are suppressed by the basic passive receiver but provide a wealth of information on opposing platform and weapon actions. The added capability of advanced deployed arrays will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a lead in open-ocean deployed-array technology over Russia, France, and the UK. No other countries are known to have an active program.
III-17-38
DATA SHEET III-17.3. SONOBUOYS

The real-time detection, classification, identification, and determination of the bearing of submarine targets using inbuoy, automated processing, and beamforming, including receiving and processing signals from active adjunct transmissions and providing target location. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) selecting the clues that detect, classify, and identify potential targets, (2) implementing the identification process, and (3) developing and implementing the decision criteria. Also, validated sets of algorithms for determining the bearing of targets in the passive mode or the location of targets in the active mode. The identification, selection, and weighting of clues and the decision criteria and process for automated target detection, classification, and identification for both active and passive modes, for achieving target bearing with an error of less than 10 deg in the passive mode, for achieving target location with an error of less than 10 percent in the active mode, and for achieving a false-alarm rate of less than 10 percent for both. None identified. The achieving of relatively low cost for expendable sonobuoys is critical to acceptance.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Most successful ASW is performed using a mix of active and passive sonars based on the operational scenario. Airborne ASW using both active and passive sonobuoys is a vital part of the mix. The objective is to detect, classify, identify, and locate or determine the target bearing of quiet submarine targets at ranges greater than 1,000 m. With such accuracy, the monitoring aircraft can launch a homing torpedo, guide in ASW ships or submarines, or accurately call for a standoff weapon. The added capability of advanced active/passive sonobuoys will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of precision engagement and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Japan

Significant R&D
China Russia

Moderate R&D
France UK
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in advanced sonobuoy technology over Russia and the major western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK pace the Western World and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia. Germany and Japan come next in quality of advanced sonobuoys followed by Australia, Canada, and China.
III-17-39
DATA SHEET III-17.3. UNDERWATER WEAPONS PASSIVE SENSORS

The real-time automated target detection, classification, and identification of the flow noise from quiet, electric-propulsion submarines maneuvering at less than 5 knots and at ranges out to 20 km to achieve the following: target track with an error of less than 20 percent and false-alarm rate of less than 10 percent while rejecting countermeasures, all from an autonomous underwater weapon traveling at over 30 knots. None identified. Nose assembly and body machining. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) identifying, selecting, and weighting the clues that detect, classify, and identify potential targets, (2) implementing the automation process, (3) developing and implementing the decision criteria, and (4) tracking the target. The reduction of own weapon flow and self-noise; packaging within the small diameter, torpedo-shape-type body; target resolution and tracking when operating from a smalldiameter, torpedo-shape-type body; and robustness against countermeasures. None identified. The achieving of relatively low cost for expendable torpedoes is critical to acceptance.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Most ASW acoustic homing mines and torpedoes initially seek their targets with passive sensors. The challenge is to detect and track slow, quiet submarines in an acoustically cluttered environment at ranges out to 20 km while the weapon is traveling at speeds up to 40 knots. The acoustically cluttered environment may contain jamming and decoying countermeasures. With the weapon operating in the passive mode and traveling at modest speeds, counterdetection at long ranges is minimized. The overall objective is to passively track and overtake the target to within 1,000-m range, at which point the target is reacquired by active sensors, and the weapon then homes in at high speed and with sufficient accuracy to destroy the target. The combined underwater weapons advanced technologies of computer-aided detection, tracking, classification, and identification of undersea targets in harsh acoustical environments will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of precision engagement. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Russia

Significant R&D
France Sweden

Moderate R&D
Germany UK
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in advanced passive acoustic-homing technology over Russia and the major Western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK pace the remainder of the Western World and, though smaller in size, still lead Russia. Germany and Japan come next in quality of advanced passive homing, followed by Australia, China, Italy, and Sweden.
III-17-40
DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR TARGET TRACKING

Passive sonar capable of resolving and real-time tracking multiple submarine targets traveling at various speeds and at ranges out to 30 km. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that resolve and track multiple targets identified as submarines with an accuracy sufficient for a fire-control solution. Capability to resolve submarine targets in order to track multiple, maneuvering targets at ranges out to 30 km in a nonstationary noise field, with enough accuracy to derive a fire-control solution within 5 minutes after target identification. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Most successful ASW is performed using a mix of active and passive sonars based on the operational scenario. Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. In those roles, towed hydrophone arrays have increased the detection range of submarines tenfold. The challenge is to exploit this extended range to advantage and develop the capability to resolve and track multiple, maneuvering targets out to 30-km range in an acoustically cluttered environment. The tracking data is then applied directly to the fire-control solution. The added capability of accurate, long-range tracking of multiple targets will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of precision engagement and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a lead in target tracking technology over France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the UK. No other countries are known to have an advanced program.
III-17-41
DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR RECEPTION

Real-time, computer-aided detection, classification, identification, and tracking of quiet submarine targets at ranges out to 30 km with high probability of correct detections and low false-alarm rates. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated sets of algorithms that provide the knowledge base for (1) selecting the clues that detect, classify, and identify potential targets, (2) implementing the identification process, (3) developing and implementing the decision criteria, and (4) developing and implementing the normalization and thresholding of data received from multiple sources. Also, a validated set of algorithms for determining and implementing target track. The identification, selection, and weighting of clues and the decision criteria and process for computer-aided detection, classification, identification, and track of quiet, electric-propulsion submarine targets traveling at speed of less than 8 knots and at ranges out to 30 km, with a probability of detection greater than 90 percent and a falsealarm rate less than 10 percent, based on flow or propulsor-related noise or the processing of multiple tracks. Also, developing and implementing the process for normalization and thresholding of incoming signals from multiple sources. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Most successful ASW is performed using a mix of active and passive sonars based on the operational scenario. Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. Extensive quieting of electric propulsion submarines, however, has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction has being countered with the use of towed hydrophone arrays. The emphasis on detection and track of submarine targets based on flow and propulsor noise is a further hedge against submarine quieting because these noise components cannot be as easily reduced. The added capability of computer-aided passive sonar decision capability will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Russia

Significant R&D
France UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in advanced, computer-aided processing technology over Russia and the major western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK pace the remainder of the Western World and still lead Russia. Germany and Japan come next in quality of advanced processing, followed by Australia and Canada.
III-17-42
DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR RANGING

Determining target range within 1 min after detection of quiet submarine targets at ranges out to 30 km. None identified. Hull-mounted array installation and alignment. Empirically validated set of algorithms for determining target range using irregular array shapes and for determining the location of array sensors and overall array shape. Determine target range with accuracy to 5 percent using wavefront curvature or triangularization techniques from an irregular array shape configured from hull-mounted and towed arrays; the ability to determine array sensors location and overall array configuration to within a few centimeters. Additional issue is increased array quieting. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. Target range is an important ingredient for an accurate fire-control solution. Passive ranging using time motion analysis requires around 10 minutes with the target on a constant course and speed. Also, the extensive quieting of electric propulsion submarines in recent years has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction has being effectively countered with the use of towed arrays. However, for passive sonar to be effective against targets with standoff weapons, fire-control solutions are needed at maximum ranges. Currently, most fire-control solutions are performed using hull-mounted arrays with limited range. Passive sonar ranging using a mix of hull and towed arrays and employing wavefront curvature or triangularizationtype techniques can be effective for ranging on targets at the maximum detection ranges and within 1-minute duration. The accuracy for this ranging technique is dependent on knowing the location of the array sensors and the overall array configuration to within a few centimeters. Array quieting is also necessary because the noisiest sensor determines the system self-noise that limits range. The added capability of passive sonar rapid ranging will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Japan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Russia

Significant R&D
France UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in advanced, passive ranging technology over Russia and the major western sonar-producing countries. France and the UK pace the remainder of the Western World and still lead Russia. Germany and Japan come next in quality of advanced processing, followed by Australia and Canada.
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DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR DATA FUSION

Real-time fusion of data received from two or more receiving arrays, including those from separate platforms, to increase overall target signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and thereby increase detection ranges by 50 percent. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated set of algorithms for sorting data by specific target and accurately combining like data to increase target signal strength. Sorting and combining large and disparate data bases received from multiple arrays, with the fusion based on specific individual target characteristics such that target SNR is enhanced and detection range is increased by 50 percent. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. Extensive quieting of electric propulsion submarines in recent years, however, has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction is being countered with the use of towed arrays and can be further offset by using the data from a combination of arrays, including those on separate platforms, using network-centric warfare techniques. For the data fusion to be effective, the data must be accurately combined based on specific target characteristics. The added capability of passive sonar data fusion will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States leads in advanced, passive data-fusion technology. France and the UK have or have had datafusion programs. No other successful data-fusion developments are known.
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DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR ARRAY NOISE

Electronic processes capable of real-time reduction of flow and acceleration self-noise by 6 dB or greater to increase target SNR and thereby increase detection ranges by 30 percent. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated set of algorithms for isolating target signals from noise. The isolation of target signals from flow- and acceleration-generated self-noise such that target strength is enhanced and target range increased by 30 percent. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. Extensive quieting of electric propulsion submarines in recent years, however, has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction is being countered with the use of towed arrays and data fusion from a combination of arrays. Further signal-to-noise improvements can be gained from reducing self-noise of mobile arrays by electronic processing. The added capability of passive sonar-array noise reduction will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
No other advanced array self-noise cancellation programs are known.
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DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR ADAPTIVE BEAMFORMING, NULL STEERING, AND SIDELOBE REDUCTION
Adaptive beamforming, null steering, and sidelobe-reduction processes capable of reducing interference from acoustic clutter and countermeasures by greater than 20 dB, thereby increasing detection ranges and nullifying countermeasures. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated set of algorithms for adjusting beams and steering nulls to enhance the target SNR. The isolation of target signals from acoustic noise and clutter normally received, using a combination of adaptive beamforming, null steering, and sidelobe-reduction techniques, such that interference is reduced by greater than 20 dB, thereby enhancing target SNR and increasing target-detection range. The same techniques to be used to nullify the effects of jammer countermeasures. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. Extensive quieting of electric propulsion submarines in recent years, however, has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction is being countered with the use of towed arrays and data fusion from a combination of arrays. Further signal-to-noise improvements can be gained from reducing by 20 dB the noise and clutter received from the acoustic environment by using a combination of adaptive beamforming, null steering, and sidelobe-reduction techniques. The 20-dB interference reduction can increase detection range by 20 to 30 percent. It will also nullify the major effects of jammer countermeasures. The added capability from canceling or reducing distant interfering noise sources received by passive sonars will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in advanced interference-rejection technology. France and the UK have or had such programs. No other successful interference rejection developments are known.
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DATA SHEET III-17.3. PASSIVE SONAR HULL-MOUNTED RECEIVING ARRAYS

Passive sonar capable of platform speeds greater than 20 knots and depths greater than 300 m without being self-noise limited by using sensor matching, array shading, or pressure-tolerant processing with greater than 10 dB self-noise reduction. None identified. Array installation and alignment equipment. Validated set of algorithms for pressure-tolerant processing. The isolation of hydrophone elements from the platform hull, determining and providing uniformity of hydrophone elements, and providing precise installation of the elements. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in an engagement. The extensive quieting of electric-propulsion submarines in recent years, however, has severely shortened the passive-detection range. Detection range is further reduced when the flow noise from platform speed and distortion of arrays from the pressure at depth creates the dominant background noise level. The advanced hull-mounted array installation processes can offset these reductions and allow maximum detection ranges at high speeds and great depths. The added capability from reducing own ship interfering noise sources received by passive sonars will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and fulldimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany UK

Significant R&D
Japan United States
Russia
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States leads in advanced hull-mounted array installation processes. France and the UK may have similar programs. Germany, Japan, Russia, and Sweden may have programs for hydrophone isolation. No other successful developments are known.
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DATA SHEET III-17.3. ASW VOLUMETRIC TOWED ARRAYS

Volumetric towed arrays capable of increased target-detection ranges while maneuvering at tactical speeds by using multiple lines; strength members in hose wall; electronic cancellation of flow or acceleration noise; and vibration isolation and lownoise dynamic leveling with depression force greater than 100 pounds, both at tow speeds greater than 8 knots. None identified. None identified. Empirically validated set of algorithms for electronic cancellation of flow- and acceleration-generated self-noise. Towing multiple arrays without entanglement during tactical maneuvering, incorporating durable strength members in hose wall with operational life of 2 years, dynamic leveling and depression of greater than 100 pounds at speeds greater than 8 knots for the multiple arrays with no increase in self-noise, and electronic cancellation of flow- and acceleration-generated self-noise of greater than 6 dB for the individual arrays. None identified. None identified.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Passive sonar remains the sensor of choice for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare in the surveillance or standoff mode and for the initial contact in a melee engagement. The extensive quieting of electric-propulsion submarines in recent years, however, has severely shortened the passive detection range. This reduction is being countered with the use of towed arrays. Further signal-to-noise improvements and extended detection ranges can be gained from towing several shorter arrays on the order of 50 m instead of one or two arrays that are over 500 m long. In addition, the shorter, multiple-array arrangement will allow tactical maneuvering and speeds. The added capability from towing volumetric towed arrays will aid ASW forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Netherlands
UK
Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States leads in advanced, multiple-line, towed-array technology. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK have small programs. No other successful multiple-line array developments are known.
III-17-48
SECTION 17.4ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE PLATFORM

Highlights Sonar domes and windows are required to protect sonar transducer and hydrophone elements and are an integral part of the operational platform. Acoustic signals are distorted and absorbed by the sonar domes and windows and their supporting structures. Platform self-noise must be reduced to counter the quieter submarine targets. Domes and windows need to be better isolated from the platform to reduce platform self-noise. All noise reduction needs to be effective over the depth excursion of U.S. submarines. The amount of self-noise reduction that is needed will require active noise-cancellation systems. It is envisioned that evolutionary improvements in platform self-noise reduction will continue, but at an accelerated pace.
OVERVIEW This subsection covers the technology for the development and production of the interface of acoustic systems with the marine platform. This encompasses all measures taken to reduce the self-noise of ships, submarines, torpedoes, and other sonar platforms. Platform acoustic technologies have a major impact on the sonar systems capability because they reduce self-noise generated by on-ship machinery or water flow around the platform. Specifically of interest are domes; baffles; the quieting of machinery, including main propulsion, valves, gears, pumps, fans, balancing and mounting of same, measurement techniques, and instrumentation; hull coatings; and active and passive structural noise control. Some of these items are partially covered under signature reduction of radiated noise in Signature Control Technology, Section 18. Radiated noise and ship self-noise that affects sonars often come from the same source, but the process for reduction of these noises can be quite different. There are no known commercial uses for the large acoustic domes and windows that are considered militarily critical. All selfnoise reduction for marine platforms has been driven by military application. The U.S. Navy developed most of the acoustic processes covered in this section. Evolutionary, emerging technology developments are highlighted in the following data sheets. There are no known revolutionary, emerging technology developments underway. RATIONALE For the foreseeable future, active and passive sonar systems are expected to remain the dominant sensors on submarines and surface ships for antisubmarine, anti-surface-ship, and mine warfare. The sonar hydrophones and transducers must be effectively coupled to the water without being subject to damage by marine growth, objects in the water, waterflow, or wave action on the platform. They also need to be isolated from own-ship-generated noise, turbulent flow noise, and propulsor-generated noise. As such, the hydrophones and transducers are acoustically isolated as much as possible from the ship and protected from the ocean by an acoustically transparent dome or window. Unfortunately, structural integrity, acoustic isolation, and acoustic transparency are not generally compatible. A group of special materials and isolation techniques has been developed to minimize the problem.
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Country France Germany Israel Russia UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Acoustic Devices and Materials
Active Noise Cancellation

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 17.4-1. Acoustic Sensors, Marine Platform Systems WTA Summary
The United States has maintained a comfortable lead in nuclear-powered-submarine self-noise reduction (and the companion-radiated noise) over Russia, France, and the UK. The U.S. 688I class submarines were the quietest in the world. Russia then developed the AKULA Class, which appeared quieter. They are now developing a new attack class submarine, the SEVERODVINSK, which is to be even quieter. The latest U.S. attack class submarine, USS SEAWOLF, SSN-21, is slated to be the new, low-noise leader. The United States does not build diesel-electric submarines, but Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and the UK build quiet electric-propulsion submarines. Some of these submarines are reported to be quieter than many nuclear-powered ones. The United States has also led in surface-ship self-noise reduction. Most U.S. surface ships that were designed for ASW have the capability to effectively operate hull-mounted, passive sonars at medium, tactical operational speeds.
III-17-50
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-17.4. ACOUSTIC SENSORS, MARINE PLATFORM

Marine-Platform Acoustic Devices and Materials............................................................................... III-17-53 Marine-Platform Active Noise Cancellation...................................................................................... III-17-54
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III-17-52
DATA SHEET III-17.4. MARINE-PLATFORM ACOUSTIC DEVICES AND MATERIALS

Devices and materials that are capable of combined noise reduction of greater than 20 dB for frequencies less than 2 kHz or greater than 30 dB for frequencies from 2 to 5 kHz, with 90-percent effectiveness at speeds over 20 knots and over the depth excursion of U.S. submarines. None identified. Underwater anechoic test facility with pressure capability of 1,000 psi. None identified. Capability of better isolating hydrophone and transducer elements from the self-noise and vibrations of the submarine hull by the use of advanced baffles, absorbers, conditioners, and decouplers that are effective over the depth excursion of U.S. submarines and maintaining the combined low insertion loss and reflectivity of the acoustic windows at speeds over 20 knots and over the depth excursion of U.S. submarines. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Active and passive sonar systems are expected to remain indefinitely the dominant sensors on submarines for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare. Great strides are being made in improving both active and passive sonar performances. The improvements are limited by the impact of the platform on the acoustic signals. The sonar hydrophones and transducers must be effectively coupled to the water without being damaged by marine growth, objects in the water, or by waterflow. They also need to be isolated from own-ship-generated noise, turbulent-flow noise, and propulsor-generated noise. As such, the hydrophones and transducers are acoustically isolated as much as possible from the ship and protected from the ocean by an acoustically transparent dome or window. Unfortunately, structural integrity, acoustic isolation, and acoustic transparency are not generally compatible. A group of special materials, techniques, and devices has been developed to minimize the problem. Reduction of 20 to 30 dB of platform self-noise is required to exploit the increased performance of future submarine sonars to counter the submarine quieting underway in the worlds navies. The added capability of advanced acoustics devices and materials will aid submarine warfare forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
The United States leads in advanced submarine hull-mounted-array installation processes. France, Germany, Russia, and the UK are recognized to have good capability in hull-mounted-array installations and have some advanced programs. No other significant developments are known.
III-17-53
DATA SHEET III-17.4. MARINE-PLATFORM ACTIVE NOISE CANCELLATION

Noise reduction of greater than 12 dB by active cancellation techniques. None identified. None identified. None identified. The reduction of self-noise by greater than 12 dB using active cancellation techniques, in which the noise is effectively separated from the signal, properly adjusted, and then subtracted from the total incoming data, all without reducing the desired signals. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Active and passive sonar systems are expected to remain indefinitely the dominant sensors on submarines for antisubmarine and anti-surface-ship warfare. Major improvements are being made in both active and passive sonar performances. The improvements are limited by the impact of the platform on the acoustic signals. The sonar hydrophones and transducers must be effectively coupled to the water without being damaged by marine growth, objects in the water, waterflow, or by wave action on the platform. They also need to be isolated from own-shipgenerated noise, turbulent-flow noise, and propulsor-generated noise. As such, the hydrophones and transducers are acoustically isolated as much as possible from the ship and protected from the ocean by an acoustically transparent dome or window. Unfortunately, structural integrity, acoustic isolation, and acoustic transparency are not generally compatible. A group of special materials, techniques, and devices has been developed to minimize the problem. Noise reduction by passive techniques using baffles, absorbers, conditioners, and decouplers will not be sufficient to fully counter the quieter submarine targets. A further reduction of 12 dB or more using active techniques for canceling noise is also required. The added capability of advanced active noise cancellation aid submarine warfare forces executing the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Israel
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The United States leads in advanced submarine hull-mounted-array self-noise cancellation. The UK has a small program. Israel has added this type capability to the flank array in its Gal-class submarines. No other significant developments are known.
III-17-54
SECTION 17.5ELECTRO-OPTICAL SENSORS

Highlights This subsection concentrates on the technology for video sensors, image intensifiers, and focal plane arrays (FPAs) as generic technologies applicable to many military and civil applications. Uncooled FPAs are very significant because of lower cost and weight. Many opportunities for improvements exist. The midwave infrared (MWIR) and short wave infrared (SWIR) region is ripe for further exploitationespecially the 1,000- to 2,000-nm region. The active interest in space applications, both military and civil, have renewed interest in the long-wave IR (LWIR) region. Research and development (R&D) is underway to develop imaging solar blind detectors for air vehicle protection. Present systems are non-imaging.
OVERVIEW The last 40 years of the 20th century brought amazing advances in the ability to create images of scenes at night. DoD, as well as its counterparts in other countries, largely funded the initial development work. The new technology has revolutionized warfare, as demonstrated in Vietnam and the Gulf War. A nations military forces can now conduct operations at night with efficiency unknown before. A statement of Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the Coalition Forces during Desert Storm, best characterizes the new capability: They couldnt see anything through their sights, and all of a sudden their tank exploded. (27 February 1991) Night vision is normally considered to embrace two different technologies, image intensification and thermal imaging. Image intensification, which depends on reflected light from objects in the scene, developed earlier than thermal imagingfrom an operational standpoint. Thermal imaging depends on blackbody radiation from objects in the scene. Imaging with Reflected Photons Image intensification, as it exists in the latest third-generation (vacuum) tubes used in aviation goggles, may be the end of the line for intensified systems development based on the vacuum intensifiers. Little future development is planned. Instead, development is focusing on two different areas of technology: Solid state intensifiers Exploitation of the 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region.
Thermal Imaging Thermal imaging systems for terrestrial applications deployed in the late 20th century operated primarily in two spectral wavelength regions: MWIR (35 m) and LWIR (811 m). These systems originally depended on cooled detector arrays for peak sensitivity, but in the 1990s detectors were developed that required minimal or no cooling. While the uncooled arrays do not achieve the high sensitivity of cooled detector arrays, there are numerous applications that are not possible with the cooled arrays. Without the requirement for cooling engines that consume power, lightweight, affordable systems such as personal viewers and vehicle driving aids are possible. A number of civil applications are appearing in 2000 because of the lower cost.
III-17-55
Space systems operate in several other spectral regions, mainly in the very long wavelength IR (VLWIR) region beyond 11 m. Ultraviolet (UV) applications also exist. These are expensive, tend to use exotic detector materials, and see limited production. Early thermal-imaging systems used scanned linear arrays, and much of the operational inventory has these systems. Upgrades to second-generation staring systems are underway, and most planned systems employ staring arrays that require no mechanical scanning. The key developing technologies in thermal imaging include the following: Larger cooled staring arrays Multicolor and hyperspectral arrays Further improvements in uncooled arrays Exploitation of other spectral regions such as short wave IR (SWIR) and UV Improved affordability and producibility.
RATIONALE Joint Vision 2010 includes the concept of precision engagement, a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required (p. 21). Defense Technology Area Plans include the following: Electro-optical Sensors SE.06 Multifunction Electro-optical Sensors and Signal Processing SE.59 Low-Light-Level Imaging Sensors Electro-optical Technology SE.33 Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology SE.65 Long-Wavelength and Multispectral, Large-Area, Staring Focal Plane Arrays The 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region is important because new families of eye-safe laser illuminators and target designators1 (see Subsection 11.1) are being deployed operationally. Active systems such as laser detection and ranging (LADAR)2 can be exploited. The new lasers are limited to a narrow bandwidth in the 1,000- to 2,000nm wavelength region and are invisible to conventional intensified system or human eyes. The ability to pulse the new lasers allows range-gated viewers that are capable of viewing through fog and smoke screens. Larger cooled staring arrays are important because larger arrays provide more options for system designers. For example, they can trade field of view (FOV) for resolution. Multicolor and hyperspectral arrays are important because they improve target discrimination, identification, and analyses. Further improvements in uncooled arrays are important because higher sensitivity will widen the application spectrum and possibly replace some existing applications that use cooled arrays. Exploitation of the MWIR spectral region is important because this is where missile and aircraft plumes mainly reside. One of the best atmospheric windows occurs around 4 m.
1
These are referred to as eye safe lasers because eye damage from exposure to the laser is limited outside the visible spectrumapproximately 400 to 1,500 nm. LADAR may also be referred to as light detection and ranging (LIDAR). The term LIDAR is most usually applied t o systems for atmospheric monitoring or effluent/chemical/biological detection. See Laurin Publishing, PHOTONICS Dictionary, 1999 edition.
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Exploitation the UV spectral region is important because short-range detection of missiles in the solar blind region aids in the protection of low-flying vehicles such as helicopters. Improved affordability and producibility is important because use of systems for individual warfighters depends on low cost and portability. High-performance thermal imaging systems are expensive and can benefit from flexible manufacturing lines, which can reduce cost by avoiding duplicative production facilities. RANGE OF MILITARY APPLICATIONS A rudimentary form of image intensification existed in the 1940s and 1950s. It was possible to view scenes at night using image converters and IR active illuminators. The early active systems of the 1940s and 1950s used IR blackbody sources, such as filtered searchlights. These still radiated considerable visible energy and were not covert. The filtered IR sources of the early active systems could not be pulsed, as can a laser. The development of cascaded electrostatically3 focused image intensification and the S-20 photocathode in the 1960s eliminated the need for active illumination, creating a covert or passive viewer. The Starlight Scope, deployed first in Vietnam, was the forerunner of an extensive family of intensified night viewing equipment. The most recent manifestation of this technology is the night vision goggle used by both ground troops and aviators. The original passive intensifier required three cascaded devices, each with a gain of ~40 to achieve enough light gain to be passive. The goggle tube uses a microchannel amplifier that provides the same gain as three older tubes. The latest third-generation tubes use a GaAs photocathode with higher gain and production yield than the S-20/25 multi-alkali photocathodes. New lasers are limited to a narrow bandwidth in the 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region and are invisible to conventional intensified systems or human eyes. Thermal imaging systems were deployed experimentally in Vietnam; the best known equipment was the early forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) equipment deployed on the C47 and C130 Gunships. Thermal imaging systems are now (in the late 1990s) widely deployed operationally. These systems range from large, shipboard IR search and track (IRST) systems down to miniature, handheld thermal viewers and include missile night sights and seekers, vehicle driving aids, and airborne FLIR. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
The rate of technology change in thermal imaging is expected to be more rapid than the technology based on reflected photons. Thermal imaging, based on large second-generation staring arrays, provides many new design opportunities not available with mechanically scanned linear arrays. For example, system designers no longer must be concerned about a shortage of photons. On the other hand, large numbers of pixels also require larger displays to benefit from the larger FOV possible. This is a problem in vehicles that frequently have no room for larger displays. A new range of man-machine interface issues arises. Significant progress has also been made in uncooled arrays. These are usually based on ferroelectric materials and microbolometers. Civil applications exist now (late 1999), as well as military applications. These are finding applications for missions that require lower performance than available from cooled arrays. For uncooled arrays to match the performance of cooled arrays, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) estimates that a ten-fold increase in sensitivity is needed. The agency is planning programs to achieve this. The use of image intensifiers (or image converters) in the 1,000- to 2,000-nm region is somewhat speculative and requires considerable research, development, and technology verification. There is believed to be a larger amount of available ambient reflected photons in the 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region due to night airglow compared to that in the visible wavelength spectrum. This needs verification testing. Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) are vehicles for transition. None are identified in S&T documents at this time (1Q2000) but will be added when established.
Electromagnetically focused intensifiers existed and were used by astronomers. They were far too large and power hungry for most military applications.
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Country China Czech Republic France Germany India Israel Japan Netherlands Russia Sweden UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
Image Intensities
Tech for 12 K nm.
Uncooled IR Array
Cooled Staring FPA

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D

Significant R&D
(Continued)
Figure 17.5-1. Electro-Optical Sensors Systems WTA Summary

Country China Czech Republic France Germany India Japan Netherlands Russia Sweden UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D Long and Dual Wave IR Solar Blind Sensor Single Pixel 3-Color

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D
Figure 17.5-1. Electro-Optical Sensors Systems WTA Summary (Continued)
The United States, France, Germany, UK, Japan, Netherlands, and Russia are the current world leaders in EO technology. Several other countries have some capabilitymainly in one or two types of EO sensors. China and India have a production capability for current image intensifiers derived initially from the import of technical data and know-how. China is advertising the sale of 814 m handheld thermal imagers. The specification sheet lists Uncooled Sprite detectors. The SPRITE detector is an invention of the UK government, uses HgCdTe material, and employs time delay and integration (TDI) within the SPRITE chip. It is the basis for UK military IR systems. Because HgCdTe does not work at this wavelength uncooled, it seems likely that this is not the UK product or that the specifications are incorrect. The Czech Republic has a long history with image converters and image intensifiers and was a core resource in the FSU. The United States, followed closely by France, is the world leader in cooled staring IR FPA technology; the United States is the leader in uncooled IR FPAs. Leading technology firms include Raytheon Infrared Center of Excellence, DRS, Litton Electro-Optical Systems, Sofradir (France), ORION RD&P Centre (Moscow), AIM (Germany), Old Delft & Phillips (Netherlands).
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BACKGROUND: Technology Centers of Excellence: United States Raytheon Infrared Center of Excellence 75 Coromar Drive Goleta, CA 93117 Phone: (805) 968-3511 FAX: (805) 562-7373
DRS 13532 N Central Expy. Mail Stop 37 Dallas, TX 75243 Phone: (972) 344-4004 http://www.amber-infrared.com
The Raytheon Infrared Center of Excellence and DRS resulted from the purchase of Hughes Electronics and the Texas Instruments Night Thermal Imaging Group, respectively, in 1996 by Raytheon. These are now the major facilities engaged in U.S. military thermal imaging research, development, and production. The major Hughes facility was the Santa Barbara Research Center, a world-class detector facility. The major TI facility was the Dallasbased producer of the U.S. military modular FLIR systems. Litton Electro-Optical Systems Infrared Products 1215 S 52nd St. Tempe, AZ 85281 http://www.littoneos.com Litton is a manufacturer of infrared detectors and focal plane arrays for IR imaging/detection applications and is active in SWIR and MWIR technology based in lead salt (PbSe, PbS) and indium antimonide (InSb) materials. France Sofradir 43-47 rue Camille Pelletan F-92290 Chatenay-Malabry France Phone: 33 1 41 13 45 30 FAX: 33 1 46 61 48 n84 Jpc@alpes-net.fr Russia ORION RD&P Centre Plekhanov St. 2/46 Moscow 111123 Russia Phone: 7 095 1761639 FAX: 7 095 1767221 Chap@orion.extech.msk.su
Sofradir is the closest competitor for U.S. staring focal plane array manufacturers.
Germany AIM Heilbronn, Germany Netherlands Phillips Old Delft, Netherlands These Russian, German, and Dutch companies are also active in IR technologies.
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-17.5. ELECTRO-OPTICAL SENSORS

Solid-State Image-Intensifier Technology......................................................................................... III-17-63 Technology for the 1,000- to 2,000-nm Wavelength Region................................................................ III-17-64 Uncooled IR Array Technology...................................................................................................... III-17-65 Cooled Staring Focal Plane Array Technology.................................................................................. III-17-67 Long- and Dual-Wavelength IR FPA Technology.............................................................................. III-17-69 Solar Blind Ultraviolet Sensor Technology....................................................................................... III-17-70 Single Pixel Three-Color Layered Detector....................................................................................... III-17-71 Infrared Antennas in FPA Format................................................................................................... III-17-73
III-17-61
III-17-62
DATA SHEET III-17.5. SOLID-STATE IMAGE-INTENSIFIER TECHNOLOGY

1. Low-light level (LLL). 2. 980 1,280 pixels with 10 m pixels, wavelength range: 1,0002,500 nm. 3. High-temperature operation using thermoelectric (TE) cooling.
Mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe) and indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs). Modulation transfer function (MTF) testers, night-vision scene simulators. None identified. 1. Adequate sensitivity with TE cooling. 2. High-speed, low-noise readout integrated circuit (ROIC) at low-light levels. 3. Low (2.5 W) power consumption. This technology is not constrained by a scarcity of professional, scientific, or technical personnel or skilled labor. Use of commercial technology is not applicable because the requirements here are much greater.
The same commercial applications as now exist for vacuum intensifiers (e.g., police and industrial surveillance, rescue missions, and sporting activities) can be expected. The commercial applications are not the drivers of this technology. Must be low cost because the sensors will be used at the soldier level.
Affordability
RATIONALE Current image-intensification night-vision devices operate mainly in the visible spectrum and extend into the near infrared (NIR) by a very small amount. This response is referred to as photopic response. They are not operationally sensitive in the SWIR. Imaging devices that have significant sensitivity in the NIR and SWIR regions have important new capabilities that will extend the capability of photopic devices. They benefit from higher airglow irradiance. They have better camouflage penetration, and can see through glass and buildings. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Czech Republic Netherlands
France Russia

Moderate R&D
India UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
This technology requires solid-state sensor expertise beyond that necessary for vacuum-type intensifiers and pickup tubes. The UK, Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Russia, and France, as well as the United States, have been active in R&D for night vision systems using pickup tubes and image intensifiers, including both civil and military systems. India, the Czech Republic, and China have the capability to produce past and some present generations of these devices. France, UK, Japan, and Germany are the most likely nations able to conduct R&D to meet the requirements described above.
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DATA SHEET III-17.5. TECHNOLOGY FOR THE 1,000- TO 2,000-nm WAVELENGTH REGION
1. Solid-state imaging sensors capable of LLL sensitivity; 2. Optimize sensitivity at the wavelength of eye safe laser illuminators; and 3. 480 640 pixels
III-V and II-VI semiconductor materials to be identified. None identified. None identified. 1. Quantum efficiency for passive operation. 2. Tailoring the spectral response to available laser wavelengths for active, gated operation. This technology is not constrained by a scarcity of professional, scientific, or technical personnel or skilled labor. Use of commercial technology is not applicable because the requirements here are much greater.
None identified. Unknown.
RATIONALE The 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region is important because new families of eye-safe laser illuminators and target designators (see subsection 11.1) are being deployed operationally. Also, because of night airglow, there is believed to be a greater number of available ambient reflected photons in this region than in the visible wavelength spectrum. Active systems such as LADAR can be exploited. The new lasers are limited to a narrow bandwidth in the 1,000- to 2,000-nm wavelength region and are invisible to conventional intensified system or human eyes. The ability to pulse the new lasers allows range-gated viewers that are capable of viewing through fog and smoke screens. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Czech Republic Netherlands
France Russia

Moderate R&D
India UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
This technology requires solid-state sensor expertise beyond that necessary for vacuum type intensifiers and pickup tubes. The UK, Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Russia, and France, as well as the United States, have been active in R&D for night vision systems using pickup tubes and image intensifiers. This includes both civil and military systems. France, UK, Japan, and Germany are the most likely nations able to conduct R&D to meet the requirements described above.
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DATA SHEET III-17.5. UNCOOLED IR ARRAY TECHNOLOGY

High performance: sensitivity = 0.01 C; resolution = 1 mil pixels, 1,000 1,000 pixels. Micro sensor: 160 120 pixels, 2 mil 2 mil pixel size, no cooling, expendable, 1 oz., 10 mW with power management.
Microbolometer and thin-film ferroelectric materials. None identified. None identified. 1. Reduce pixel size. 2. Improve thermal isolation. 3. Increase sensitivity of microbolometers and ferroelectric devices. This technology is not constrained by a scarcity of professional, scientific, or technical personnel or skilled labor.
Vehicle driving aid, perimeter surveillance. Needs to be low cost because it will be used at the "individual soldier" level.
RATIONALE Objectives of this technology: Smaller pixels and increased sensitivity; Larger formats; No mechanical chopper (as in pyroelectric detectors); No temperature stabilization; Lower power requirements; Higher frame rates; and Use of low-cost optics (see Section 11).
Payoffs: Lower cost; Longer autonomous life; Lighter weight; Smaller volume; and High performance (comparable to cooled arrays).
Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology (DTO SE.33) includes both cooled and uncooled arrays. The cooled technology focuses on dual-band and multispectral sensing for detecting dim and camouflaged targets in background clutter. The uncooled technology development aims for improved sensitivity and resolution while maintaining low cost, weight, and power consumption. The integration of IR and LLL FPA imaging in a single package will improve night-time rifle sight effectiveness and allow the development of low-cost missile seekers.
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Military applications include UGS, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), smart munitions, hand-held and helmetmounted systems, vehicle drivers viewer (also civil application), perimeter surveillance, and rifle sight. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Netherlands
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
At the present time (November 1999) the United States has a unique capability in the area of uncooled FPAs. Extensive R&D has been conducted for a number of years, and many applications, both military and civil, already are being implemented or planned. The applications are widespread, and significant improvements are possible. It is almost a certainty that some or all of the countries in the chart above are or soon will be engaged in significant R&D. Opportunities for cooperative R&D should exist.
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DATA SHEET III-17.5. COOLED STARING FOCAL PLANE ARRAY TECHNOLOGY

Mega pixel arrays (from 1,024 1,024 to >2,048 2,048); higher operating temperature using thermoelectric (TE) or mechanical cooling (120180 K) cooling; smaller pixels, 18 18 mm multi-color. HgCdTe None identified. None identified. 1. Achieving adequate manufacturing control for rapid turnaround and affordability. 2. Developing layered HgCdTe detector using molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) or metal oxide chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD) for dual-band sensors. 3. High-density silicon ROICs for on-chip and multi-spectral processing. 4. Alternate materials for selected spectral bands and higher operating temperatures. This technology is not constrained by a scarcity of professional, scientific, or technical personnel or skilled labor. Use of commercial technology is not applicable because the requirements here are much greater.
The technology described will result in extremely high performance and civil applications are not yet obvious. Civil applications are not drivers. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Further improvements and new developments in cooled IR FPAs have significant payoffs for military applications: Improved target detection and discrimination; Longer range target identification; Counter-countermeasure (CCM) capability; Multi-operation modes; Reduced volume and lighter weight; and Lower system life-cycle cost.
Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology (DTO SE.33) includes both cooled and uncooled arrays. The cooled technology focuses on dual-band and multispectral sensing for detecting dim and camouflaged targets in background clutter. The uncooled technology development aims for improved sensitivity and resolution while maintaining low cost, weight, and power consumption. The integration of IR and LLL FPA imaging in a single package will improve night-time rifle sight effectiveness and allow the development of low-cost missile seekers. Military applications of this technology are to detect low/obscured observables, future scout and combat vehicles, aviation, IR threat warning, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
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France Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany UK

Significant R&D
Japan United States
Russia
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The United States, followed closely by France, is the world leader in cooled staring IR FPA technology; the United States is the leader in uncooled IR FPAs. Technology Centers of Excellence: United States Raytheon Infrared Center of Excellence 75 Coromar Drive Goleta, CA 93117 DRS 13532 N Central Expy. Mail Stop 37 Dallas, TX 75243 http://www.amber-infrared.com
Litton Electro-Optical Systems Infrared Products 1215 S 52nd St. Tempe, AZ 85281 http://www.littoneos.com France 4347 rue Camille Pelletan F92290 Chatenay-Malabry France Germany AMI Heilbronn, Germany Russia ORION RD&P Centre Plekhanov St. 2/46 Moscow 111123 Russia China Guangzhou Sat Infrared Technology Co., Ltd. Beijing, China It is unlikely that Guangzhou is developing staring IR FPAs. The company appears to be a box manufacturer.
III-17-68
DATA SHEET III-17.5. LONG- AND DUAL-WAVELENGTH IR FPA TECHNOLOGY

1,024 1,024 LWIR FPAs and 128 128 LWIR hardened for space. Cutoff wavelength in the 14- to 25-m range for space surveillance. MWIR FPAs for threat warning.
Critical Materials
HgCdTe, silicon (Si)/HgCdTe, gallium indium antimony/indium arsenide (GaInSb/InAs) superlattice and gallium arsenide/aluminum gallium arsenide (GaAs/AlGaAs) quantum well materials. None identified. None identified. Develop MBE technology to grow two to three layers of HgCdTe of different compositions monolithically, fuse data from different bands, condense smart readout circuitry into a 25-m cell for ground applications and a 60-m cell for space, discriminate distant cold targets against a cold background space, develop techniques for large-die ROIC. The technology described will result in extremely high performance, and civil applications, other than Astronomy, are not yet obvious. Producibility of low-cost detectors.
RATIONALE The technology described is intended to Provide improvements in the location and classification of missile launches; Provide improvements in location and classification of military forces and points of origin of bullets and munitions; Provide improvements in extracting targets from clutter; and Detect cooled midcourse targets from low-Earth orbit.
An example of an LWIR application is the discrimination of distant cold targets against a cold background space. In the MWIR an objective is two-color detection of approaching missile threats. Producibility of low-cost detectors is an affordability issue. One approach is flexible manufacturing where many detector types are fabricated on the same line. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
In the United States major industrial contributors are Raytheon SBRC, DRS, Rockwell, and Lockheed Martin. Leaders in France are Sofradir and Liris, and in Germany, AIM in Heilbronn.
III-17-69
DATA SHEET III-17.5. SOLAR BLIND ULTRAVIOLET SENSOR TECHNOLOGY

Solar blind detector with a noise-equivalent power (NEP) of 1014. Gallium aluminum indium nitride (GaAlN) with a low (<107 cm2) defect density substrate material. None identified. None identified. Fabrication of GaN-AlN based materials to achieve performance greater than that of photomultiplier tubes. Fabrication/mating of readout circuitry for moderate size arrays.
None identified. Not an issue.
RATIONALE An objective of this technology is the development of III-V nitride materials and detector technology to demonstrate an imaging ultraviolet FPA for threat warning applications. Current operational systems use vacuum, solar-blind photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) and are nonimaging. Military applications are Aircraft and vehicle missile protection to provide high spatial/angulresolution; and Missile hardbody detection for space.
This is a unique enabling technology. Current PMT technology does not permit imaging. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Japan
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
France, Germany, the UK, and Japan are the most likely countries to be engaged in solid-state UV FPA research; however, the only known current activity is in the United States.
III-17-70
DATA SHEET III-17.5. SINGLE-PIXEL THREE-COLOR LAYERED DETECTOR

Highest spatial resolution detector arrays which have the ability to sense red, green, and blue wavelengths by means of layered detectors on a single-pixel-element basis as required. The device, called the buried triple P-n junction (BTJ) structure can be fabricated using conventional bipolar or bipolar complementary metal oxide semiconductor (BICMOS) processes. Spatial resolution is tripled by this triad-stacking process. This technique eliminates the need for spectral filters. The amount of charge carriers generated depends on both the wavelength of the light and the depth at which it is absorbed. The BTJ exploits this by having three buried (layered) junctions, each producing a photocurrent. Sensitivity has been shown to be comparable or to exceed current visible-array detectors. None identified. None identified. Temperature compensation sensitivity algorithms need to be developed. Mapping the device color to the visual range over a wide temperature range is needed. Drift and diffusion currents cause problems in detection. The BTJ structure has a colorspace that is not the same as that of the human eye. The photocurrent represented by the shorter wavelengths is particularly small, and the dark current increases disproportionately with temperature. Temperature compensation must be addressed. Noise sources will need to be minimized and readout compensation from the three layers will have to be addressed. If the processes can be developed for mass production capability on current chips, the market is wide open. This technology will eventually replace current triad (side-by-side) color camera detector arrays. This technology should be more affordable than current technology at comparable resolution.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE The military will be able to achieve three times the spatial resolution of current detector arrays used in many surveillance and remote sensing devices. Battlefield surveillance will provide much higher resolution. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
France
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
The French have developed the first prototype detectors using this technology. Mohamed Ben Chouikha and his colleagues at the University of Pierre and Marie Curie (Jussieu, France) have produced numerous publications on this technology, starting around 1997. There have been some attempts by U.S. researchers to duplicate the technology, but there are no publications by anyone else to date. REFERENCES Proceedings of SPIE, Vol. 3226 (1997).
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Tristimulus color sensitive photodetector in a BiCMOS technology, M. Ben Chouikha, G.N. Lu, M. Sedjil, G. Sou, Universit de Paris VI, France [3226-19]. Buried double pn junction structure using a CMOS process for wavelength detection, G. Lu, M.B. Chouikha, M. Sedjil, G. Souy, G. Alquie, S. Rigo, Universit de Paris VIPierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France [322621]. The XXVIth General Assembly of URS, August 1321, 1999 on the Campus of the University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. This Assembly brings together a majority of the leading researchers in a variety of electromagnetic and radio frequency disciplines. Commission D: Electronics and Photonics; Chair: R. Sorrentino (Italy); Vice-Chair: A. Seeds (UK) D6 Optoelectronic Devices and Integration; M. Wu (USA) August 16, 14:0018:00 Modeling and Investigation VLSI Color Detectors Using Buried pn Junctions, M. Sedjil, G.N. Lu, M.B. Chouikha, G. Alquie, Universit de Paris VI, Paris, France.
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DATA SHEET III-17.5 INFRARED ANTENNAS IN FPA FORMAT

Within next 5 years, antenna-coupled, uncooled IR FPAs will provide high-speed, polarization-resolved, wavelength resolved IR imagery using uncooled FPA technology. Goals are uncooled IR sensors of 10100 NETD. These sensors will be in FPA format of nominal 512 512. These sensors will be tunable in wavelength response over the 35 and 812 m bands, with 0.5-m bandpass. Sensors will be tunable in polarization response for all linear polarization states as well as Left Circular and Right Circular. Tuning shall be in response to a dc voltage of 100 mV.
None identified. Productiondirect-write electron-beam lithography. Testingcustom apparatus currently under development for assessment of tuning functionality. Inspectionusual IC inspection techniques.
None Identified. Demonstration of initial feasibility with an array nominally equal to the uncooled infrared sensors currently in commercial production, at least 160 120 array with 0.100 K sensitivity. Integration with existing IR FPA systems in large formats (500 500+) will require a development effort of industry/university partners over next 5 years. Satellite IR remote sensing systems. Drivers are increased information gathering capability and reduced payload weight. Sensor costs are a declining portion of overall imaging systems because of cost reductions inherent in uncooled IR FPA technology as compared to HgCdTe cooled FPAs. Not an issue.
RATIONALE Key advantage is the ability to provide wavelength-resolved and polarization-resolved imagery in a no-movingparts configuration. Reduces sensor system weight and complexity. Builds on successes of low-cost uncooled IR FPA programs funded by DoD. Enhances discrimination against countermeasures. Target discrimination is enhanced by wavelength-resolved and polarization-resolved imagery. Specifically, avoidance of decoys and immunity to countermeasures for IR imaging and tracking systems. The technology of antenna-coupled IR sensors will allow integration onto the focal plane itself of the wavelength and polarization tuning functions. This accomplishes a no-moving-parts, low-mass solution to the need for hyperspectral imagers and imaging polarimeters, especially in small, airborne vehicles such as missiles, satellites and autonomous airborne platforms. Military applications include surveillance systems, IR sensor suites for targeting, tracking, and missile guidance, imaging spectrometers, hyperspectral imagers, and imaging polarimeters. Present uncoooled IR FPA development programs (primarily DARPA) are concentrated on realization of sensors operating at the background fluctuation limit of sensitivity, and near-equality with cooled sensor performance. This goal, which represents a fifty times increase in sensitivity relative to current uncooled IR sensors, must be achieved in order to realize the full benefits of polarization-resolved imagery.
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Centers of technical development, including BMDO and Lockheed-Martin Corporation, have been major supporters of this research at UCF. DOE-funded programs at INEL, Idaho, and NIST, Boulder. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Finland Switzerland

Significant R&D
Poland UK

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Major Producers/Developers includes UK Royal Signals & Radar Est.; Canada Institute National Optique; Finland Meteorex, Espoo Finland; Poland Military Inst. of Technology, Warsaw.
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SECTION 17.6RADAR
Highlights Improved computational resources and efficient signal-processing algorithms are making it practical to field radars employing space-time adaptive processing (STAP) using large numbers of degrees of freedom for clutter and interference cancellation. Low-frequency systems for foliage penetration (FOPEN) and counter-stealth are under development, but radio frequency interference in the VHF/UHF bands and limits on spectrum allocation may limit utility. Space-based moving target indication (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems providing operationally useful revisit rates will become more practical because of lower cost commercial component development for systems such as iridium or its successors. Low radar cross-section antennas and radomes, combined with power management and low probability of intercept waveforms, together are decreasing the detectability of stealthy aircraft and cruise missiles. Ultrastable solid-state transmitters have increased reliability, produced greater average power, and dramatically increased transmitter stability by replacing conventional tube technology. As a result, radar detection and tracking of sea-skimming and/or land-hugging low-observable missiles and other targets have significantly improved
OVERVIEW This section covers radar systems, the sensors most widely used by all military services. Radars are indispensable for a wide variety of military uses, being installed on the ground and in ships, aircraft, and missiles for search and localization of objects and installations of all types. Radar systems consist of power supplies, transmitters with final amplifiers, antennas, receivers, signal processors, and displays. Emerging radar technology developments include wide bandwidth operation, stability and ultralow noise for coherent operation; advanced software for signal processing; and automatic target recognition (ATR). Development activity includes solid-state transmit and receive modules integrated with antenna radiating elements for active aperture radar, and low radar cross section antennas. Millimeter-wave radars are now being implemented in missile seeker heads. High-power millimeter wave (94 GHz) radars are being considered for imaging nonmaneuvering aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) with inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) techniques. Low frequency (VHF/UHF) radars are being developed for foliage and ground penetration and to counter stealth vehicle developments. Critical technologies at the component level that support these advanced sensor developments and continue to be advanced include RF photonics, RF microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), and millimeter-wave integrated circuits (mmICs). GaAs continues to be the major microwave power generation and application material, but advances in InP, SiGe, SiC, and GaN will result in implementation of these materials in selected future applications. There are a number of evolutionary, emerging technology developments in radar. Airborne moving target indication (AMTI) concepts increasingly depend on STAP advances. FOPEN radar is being explored for SAR and ground moving target indication (GMTI) missions. Bistatic systems continue to be of interest. Space-based AMTI, GMTI, and SAR are under consideration. Advances in target recognition remain key for reduction of fratricide and for effective employment of beyond-visual-range weapons. Ultra-wideband (UWB) radar systems are being employed for foliage/ground penetration and improved target recognition. Ultra-stable solid-state transmitters increasingly are replacing conventional tube technology. Over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, which do not require direct line of sight, have made significant advances. These are highlighted in the following tables. There are no known revolutionary, emerging technology developments underway.
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RATIONALE Radar is critical to a large number of military missions. Its ability to function during the day or night, relative immunity to weather, capability of localizing targets in range, and long range of operation make it the sensor of choice in many situations. At this stage of development, radar might be expected to be a mature technology. That is not the case for several reasons. First, as no sensor technology has appeared with its advantages and capabilities, radar has been pressed into new areas where it has not previously been used (e.g., detection of targets under foliage). Second, as stealth has made targets more difficult to detect and track, radar technology has been improved in an attempt to maintain performance. Third, electronic countermeasures (ECM) continue to remain a concern; it is being addressed with adaptive processing, low sidelobe antennas, and mainlobe cancellation techniques. Finally, the increasing capabilities of coherent, programmable sources, digital signal processing, and computing have allowed implementation of hardware and algorithms that could be only considered theoretically a few years ago. A number of emerging radar implementations embody the technological advances discussed above. Lowfrequency FOPEN systems take advantage of programmable sources to reduce interference to other electronic equipment in the VHF and UHF bands. Advanced signal processing and capable computers are key in FOPEN SAR, UWB target detection and recognition, bistatic systems for counter-stealth, and STAP. Migration into the space environment places severe limitations on weight and volume, while requiring improved performance. This improvement will be provided by increased microwave, photonic, and digital-processing components that provide an order of magnitude decrease in system weight, while operating in hostile electromagnetic and ionospheric environments. Ultra-stable solid-state upgrades to conventional tube technology lead to improved detection of lowobservable missiles and other targets. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT A number of countries currently manufacture radar equipment, but research in the areas discussed in this section is still limited to a relatively few countries. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the decreasing budget investments in military research in Russia have significantly reduced the thrusts from that region into new radar technologies. As might be expected, the major players are the large industrialized countries with commensurate military budgets. One specific exception is in the FOPEN area, where Sweden has actually led the world with the implementation of its experimental CARABAS HFVHF airborne radar. A similar area of increased radar development focus is in the Peoples Republic of China, where a significant investment in low-frequency, bistatic radars for detection of lowobservable aircraft has been openly observed and publicized. Of the technologies discussed, STAP is the most widely pursued because it is generally seen as critical to next-generation airborne-surveillance systems. ATR research is also being pursued in a number of countries because of the desire to employ beyond-visible-range weapons and concerns about fratricide. The remaining technologies are more niche technologies [countries that do not have a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) equivalent have little reason to consider FOPEN GMTI] and are being investigated only in a few places. Most of the downstream radar technologies utilize processing algorithms that are very computationally intensive. As commercially available chips increase in power while shrinking in size, rapidly improving computing capabilities will make many of the technologies discussed more practical for the smaller and less prosperous nations. Even so, most countries will remain purchasers of turnkey systems from major national or multinational manufacturers rather than attempt to develop their own technology.
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Country Australia Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Sweden Taiwan UK United States Legend: Extensive R&D
STAP
FOPEN SAR
FOPEN GMTI
ATR
Stealth Radar
Bistatic Surveillance

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D

Significant R&D
(Continued)
Figure 17.6-1. Radar Systems WTA Summary
Country Australia Canada China Czech Republic France Germany Israel Italy Japan Netherlands Russia South Korea Sweden Taiwan UK United States Legend:
Interferometric SAR
Active RF Tags
SAR/ISAR Missile Seekers
Space-Based GMTI/AMTI
Ultra-Stable Solid State Radar Transmitter
High Power 94 GHz Radar

Extensive R&D

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D

Limited R&D
Figure 17.6-1. Radar Systems WTA Summary (Contd)
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III-17-78
LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATA SHEETS III-17.6. RADAR

STAP for Airborne Radars ............................................................................................................ III-17-81 FOPEN SAR ............................................................................................................................. III-17-82 FOPEN GMTI Radar ................................................................................................................... III-17-84 Radar-Based ATR ........................................................................................................................ III-17-85 Airborne Stealth Radars ............................................................................................................. III-17-87 Bistatic Surveillance Radars........................................................................................................... III-17-89 High-Precision Interferometric SAR Plus Global Positioning System (GPS) for Accurate Topographic Mapping.................................................................................................................. III-17-91 Active RF Tags .......................................................................................................................... III-17-92 SAR/ISAR Missile Seekers .......................................................................................................... III-17-93 Space-Based GMTI/AMTI............................................................................................................. III-17-94 Ultra-Stable Solid-State Radar Transmitter ....................................................................................... III-17-96 High-Power 94 GHz Radar............................................................................................................ III-17-97
III-17-79
III-17-80
DATA SHEET III-17.6. STAP FOR AIRBORNE RADARS

>50 dB adaptive nulls in angle/Doppler space; >10 spatial degrees of freedom; real-time operation. Optical beamformer/signal distribution Channel calibration; tracking, and compensation procedures/hardware, particularly those relating to real-time calibration/compensation during operation. Efficient matrix and spectral signal-processing algorithms. Clutter sample support; discrete clutter suppression; effective suboptimum algorithms; wideband operation. STAP for interference reduction in commercial point-to-point/cellular communications systems. High cost due to multichannel antenna/receiver, high-speed computation.
RATIONALE Airborne radars routinely operate in high-clutter and dense jamming environments. Systems such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) employ ultra-low sidelobe antenna technology to mitigate both clutter and jamming. As target radar cross section (RCS) levels of interest become lower and jamming technology becomes more sophisticated, antenna techniques alone are not sufficient to handle natural and man-made interference. STAP provides such potential because it samples the environment and adaptively forms filters in angle/Doppler space to optimally cancel both clutter and jammers. Because the system is adaptive, it provides much more flexibility under a wide range of circumstances; however, the flexibility comes at significant cost. The system must have sufficient degrees of freedom to cancel all interfering signals. An estimate of the covariance matrix of the interference must be formed, and that requires sufficient independent samples of the background. The mathematics connected with forming the optimum time and frequency weights is computationally intense and requires very large and very fast computers. Suboptimum techniques are being developed to lessen the computational burden and need for background sample support. As the bandwidth of the system or number of spatial degrees of freedom is increased, hybrid techniques that utilize optical processing combined with digital techniques are being developed. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Germany(FGAN) UK(DERA-Malvern)
Legend:
China Italy

Moderate R&D
France Sweden
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
STAP research is widespread and pervasive because STAP is felt to be required for future-generation airborne surveillance radars. The United States leads significantly in research-grade hardware for data collection and exploration of practical STAP algorithm performance. Initial funding was provided by DARPA, with the focus of research in AFRL, NRL, and at MIT/LL. In industry, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon are all studying system concepts or fielding systems that make use of limited STAP (fewer than 10 spatial degrees of freedom). Other countries are more active in algorithm study, with Germany and UK having the most significant investments.
III-17-81
DATA SHEET III-17.6. FOPEN SAR

Wideband antennas and coherent transmitters and receivers covering significant portions of the VHF and UHF bands (e.g., 1090 MHz and 150550 MHz); coherent transmitter notching, radio frequency interference (RFI) cancellation hardware [preanalog-to-digital (A/D) cancellation of >10 signals], wideband high dynamic range A/D converters (>500 MHz and >12 bits). None Wideband and low-frequency antenna ranges (10500 MHz) Real-time image formation algorithms running on multiple parallel processors; effective false-alarm reduction algorithms [false-alarm rate (FAR) < 0.1/km2]. Radio-frequency spectrum allocation and interference mitigation, false-alarm mitigation, automatic target detection/classification, and target association between VHF and UHF images. Topographic mapping under heavy vegetation (e.g., single- and double-canopy forest). Forestry surveys. Ground penetration for mine detection Relatively high cost because of tight specifications on multipolarization, wideband transmitters and antennas, and requirement for powerful but compact processors.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Current SAR systems typically operate in the upper microwave bands and therefore are not capable of detecting targets hidden in forests or under tree lines because of the attenuation and backscatter of the signal provided by the foliage. VHF and UHF systems can provide FOPEN, but there are a number of very difficult technical challenges in developing high-resolution SAR systems in those frequency bands. First, the available bandwidth is not large. At VHF, less than 70 MHz of bandwidth is available, limiting range resolution to greater than 2 m. Even at UHF, bandwidths greater than 450 MHz are difficult to obtain, limiting range resolution to about 0.3 m. Obtaining fine cross-range resolution for these low-frequency systems is even more difficult. For example, a UHF radar would have to generate a synthetic aperture about 25 times longer than that of an X-band radar with similar resolution. Second, the UHF band, in particular, has large numbers of manmade interference sources (e.g., TV stations and military and civilian communications systems) that both limit the usable frequencies and provide receiver dynamic range concerns. Finally, current experimental systems demonstrate much higher FARs than would be tolerable in operational systems, and target detection/classification algorithms under development are computationally intensive. For that reason, polarimetric processing is likely required to achieve acceptable performance. A successful FOPEN SAR, however, would provide significant operational utility in areas such as Kosovo and Bosnia, where militarily important vehicles are often hidden under trees. While research has been focused up to now on VHF/UHF solutions as described above, alternatives at millimeter-wave (mmW) frequencies (35 GHz and 94 GHz, for example) are currently being evaluated for future development. This concept would exploit gaps in the foliage cover and areas of thin coverage, plus short ranges from small, low-flying, low-speed, tactical unmanned autonomous vehicles, to produce high-resolution SAR imagery. Initial mapping measurements through single-layer canopies have been very encouraging, and a proposal has been submitted to DARPA for a more extensive measurement program. Attenuation levels through the canopies are not uniform and are generally tolerable for short-range radars in low-altitude UAVs. The mmW frequencies solve installation issues and provide bandwidth and reasonable frame rates in these relatively slow-speed conditions for high-resolution imagery.
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Legend:

Extensive R&D
Italy
Significant R&D
Sweden
Moderate R&D
UK
Limited R&D
At the moment, this is a niche technology that has been actively explored only by the United States and Sweden. In the United States, efforts have been funded by DARPA, with participation by industry (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon), DoD Laboratories (AFRL and ARL), and FFRDCs (MIT/LL, JPL, and IDA). In Sweden, the National Defense Organization (FOA) has funded development of the CARABAS system and its modifications. Germany, Italy, and the UK have reported on limited FOPEN-radar sensor development.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. FOPEN GMTI RADAR

Multi-aperture UHF antennas, STAP algorithms for clutter cancellation, stable coherent oscillators (<60 dBc/Hz, 5 Hz from the carrier). None High-quality (a few meters CEP) positioning equipment (e.g., differential GPS combined with accurate on-board INS) for good target geolocation. Real time (<1 sec processing time) STAP algorithms; software for registration of GMTI and SAR data, wavelength-diverse waveforms for enhanced target detection. RFI mitigation, false-alarm mitigation. Detection of intrusions and illegal activity under jungle canopy by wide-area surveillance systems. Expensive because of large antenna and extensive computing required for STAP.
RATIONALE The JSTARS radar has shown significant tactical utility in its ability to detect and track moving vehicles in the clear. In forested terrain, however, JSTARS GMTI capability is effectively nonexistent. A GMTI radar that could provide coverage into forests would be extremely useful; however, foliage attenuation is a strong function of frequency, increasing to values in the microwave regime that make a microwave FOPEN radar impractical. This forces operation of a FOPEN GMTI radar into the UHF band or below. The low frequency brings several severe technical challenges. Practical antenna size limitations limit the number of subapertures available and hence the number of spatial degrees of freedom available for STAP. The very low Doppler frequencies generated at desired minimum detectable velocities (e.g., a 1-m/s radial velocity at 300 MHz corresponds to a 2 Hz Doppler frequency) forces long coherent dwells for spectral separation of target and main beam clutter signals and places stringent requirements on transmitter stability. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Sweden
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Research in this area is just beginning. No country yet has a test-bed to evaluate potential system concepts. DARPA has an FY 2000 new start to do an end-to-end system study that will be undertaken by industry (likely Lockheed Martin and/or Northrop Grumman). Sweden is modifying the CARABAS II, under FOA guidance, to attempt to collect FOPEN GMTI data.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. RADAR-BASED ATR

Probability of correct classification levels greater than 90 percent in a multitarget, cluttered environment; ability to operate at detection level SNRs (13 dB SNR); and real-time operation (classification within a few seconds of detection). UWB component technology and polarization diverse waveforms and antenna components are being developed to increase resolution. Some systems concepts use mmW frequencies to obtain very high resolution (a few inches) with modest percentage bandwidths (a few percent) and take advantage of increased Doppler sensitivity at the higher frequencies for imaging nonmaneuvering aircraft. High-power 94 GHz transmitters (10 kW average power) must be developed. RCS ranges capable of generating high-quality HRR and ISAR data (range and crossrange resolutions of a few inches) for use in features databases. Robust ATR algorithms (>90 percent probability of correct classification); efficient signature storage and retrieval algorithms. Achieving high probability of correct classification; generation/storage of target signatures; recognition of target variants; and algorithms appropriate for each radar mode [high range resolution (HRR), SAR, ISAR]. Frequency allocation for UWB system operation. None. Major additional expense is processing and signature storage. Some algorithms that require particular parameters (e.g., multiple polarizations or a given range resolution) might require radar design/modification.
Critical Materials
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The advent of beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles and the concern about fratricide involving friendly aircraft or vehicles has raised the necessity for reliable noncooperative target ID. Because of the ranges typically involved, radar is a prime candidate for implementation of such systems. Research in radar-based ATR has focused on exploitation of target features derived from HRR, SAR, or ISAR data, depending on the application. In all cases, either measured or synthetically generated signatures have been required to provide a library of features used to distinguish among targets. Problems are compounded by variations within targets of the same type (e.g., aircraft with and without external stores or tanks with and without fender skirts) and variability of signatures as a function of frequency, polarization, and viewing angle. Different radar sensors produce very different types of data, making it unlikely that any universal ATR algorithms will be developed. Successful algorithms for air targets and ground targets may or may not be similar. Many algorithms do pattern or feature matching to known target signatures. This requires a large library to be available to cover expected target types and therefore sets a requirement for memory size and access speeds for operational timeline requirements. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China Italy Sweden

Significant R&D
France Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Germany Netherlands United States
Limited R&D
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Target ID is an area being pursued at some level by a number of countries. The United States leads in this area because of fratricide concerns arising out of Desert Storm. Each of the services has target ID work underway, with much of the focus now on an integrated air picture or ground order of battle produced from fusing a number of sensors. A large number of academic and industry participants in DARPA and Air Force programs are investigating algorithms. Foreign efforts tend to be more limited to national defense research establishments (UK, Canada, and France), with industry participation in countries building or considering BVR weapons (Israel, France, UK, and Italy). In China the efforts are being carried out in the academic institutions; however, they are closely tied to the design centers.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. AIRBORNE STEALTH RADARS

Low RCS antennas (>20 dB below platform RCS specification); advanced frequency selective surface (FSS) radomes; low probability of intercept waveforms; and conformal antennas. Transmit/Receive module and radiating element designs for low RCS active arrays. High-strength, low dielectric constant, low-loss radome and substrate materials. RCS ranges with sufficient sensitivity to provide both diagnostic and total RCS measurements at component and subsystem levels (noise floor <80 dBsm); CAD/CAM for accurate, cost-effective manufacture of multilayer radomes. High uniformity T/R Module and radiating element manufacturing. Antenna and FSS design software combining numerical electromagnetic codes with design optimization software; conformal antenna design and optimization software. Integrated antenna/forebody RCS analysis codes. Adaptive signal processing for waveform intercept reduction. Achieving very low signature while maintaining performance; design of difficult to detect [low probability of intercept (LPI)] waveforms; and power management to reduce probability of intercept. None. Systems will be significantly more expensive than conventional radars.
Unique Software
Technical Issues
RATIONALE For an airborne platform shaped for a low RCS signature, antennas of the sensors can be the dominant contributors to the residual RCS. In addition, if the platform desires to use radar for guidance, surveillance, or fire control, it invariably gives its presence and perhaps its position away to opponent electronic support member (ESM) systems. Thus, stealth radars must provide a low RCS and an LPI waveform if they are not to degrade the carrying platforms capabilities. Because shaping is the major technique through which stealth platforms control their signature, conformal antennas have the potential to naturally provide low RCS; however, impedance matching within the antenna is critical to stealth performance. Therefore, the use of frequency-selective surface radomes that pass in-band frequencies but reflect out-of-band signals can make the antenna design task tenable. Those radomes must be designed in concert with the antenna to insure that cross-polarized pattern perturbations are minimized and that antenna tracking capabilities are not jeopardized. In addition, high uniformity of radiating elements, modules, and circulators (where required) is necessary to achieve low RCS. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China Sweden
Legend:

Extensive R&D
France UK

Significant R&D
Russia
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
In general, information on research in the stealth area is tightly held. Released information in the United States pertains mostly to platforms such as the B-2, F-22, JSF, and Comanche. In that arena, efforts have been undertaken by the major U.S. Aerospace firms (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing) and supporting radar contractors (Raytheon and Northrop Grumman). Design information on active array TR modules, mmICs, and radiating elements is particularly sensitive and protected. Efforts in other countries are not well publicized except for
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French cruise missile vendors advertising low-RCS cruise missiles containing radars and some design details on Swedish Viggen and European Eurofighter design (UK, France, and Germany).
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. BISTATIC SURVEILLANCE RADARS

Electronically scanned, multiple-beam antennas for pulse chasing, high (>100 GOPS) throughput data processors for coherent processing, and high dynamic range receivers (>100 dB). None. Ultra accurate Time, frequency, and navigation instrumentation to determine waveform location and timing to 10s of picoseconds accuracy. Matched-filter algorithms involving illuminator waveform; target state determination (location, heading, speed) software; antenna control/beam scanning software; and STAP for bistatic clutter mitigation. Coordination of illuminator and receiver and accurate target location determination. Antenna design for multiple beams and adaptive processing. System dynamic range (>100 dB to >120 dB) for separating direct-path illumination from signal and clutter. None. For a bistatic radar that hosts off of a noncooperative illuminator, transmitter costs are saved and radar stealth is inherent. The receiver/processor, however, will be much more complex than for a standard radar, offsetting much of the cost advantage. If a special illuminator, as well as a receiver, must be developed and built, costs will be greater than for a similar monostatic radar.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Although bistatic radars mostly exist today in the form of semi-active homing missiles, research continues in a number of countries to expand their utility. Bistatic radar concepts under investigation for surveillance operations include those that host off a cooperative illuminator and those that employ noncooperative illuminators. Cooperative illuminators might include ground-based, airborne, or space-based assets. Noncooperative illuminators might include FM radio stations, TV stations, or monostatic radars in the area. Bistatic radar has two significant potential advantages. The first is that the receiver can be stealthy. For a system that hosts off radio or TV stations, the adversary may not even know that radar is being employed. Even where the illuminator is known as such, bistatic operation can add to the stealth potential of aircraft (manned and unmanned), which need employ only a receiver. The second advantage is the counterstealth and survivability potential of bistatic radar. Current stealth platforms are designed to have low signatures against monostatic radars. Bistatic radars, particularly those with large bistatic angles, are likely to see an enhanced signature from stealthy platforms. In addition, for those systems that host off illuminators in the VHF and UHF bands, such as radios and TVs, low-frequency operation will also provide enhanced signatures. On the other hand, the technical challenges in producing operationally useful bistatic surveillance systems are formidable, and hence these radars are excellent candidates for improvement in technology. For narrow-beam, scanning illuminators, the receiver antenna must electronically adapt to the transmit beam so that the receiver is looking at potential targets at the correct time. Multi-beam antenna architectures, an attractive alternative to a fast scanning approach, are being pursued as an outgrowth of the STAP research described in a previous subsection. The receiver system arrays are being partitioned into multiple subarrays to obtain multiple degrees of freedom for the STAP clutter and jamming suppression capabilities. These subarrays produce broad-beam patterns which subtend a large number of transmit pulse positions. The subarray outputs are digitally combined in beamforming algorithms during the STAP operations to form multiple, simultaneous, high-gain, narrow beams across the broad subarray patterns plus the appropriate nulls to cancel clutter and jamming. Although this lessens the severity of the pulse chasing problem, it also combines the technical challenges of STAP and bistatic processing into a common
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development risk. Systems using omnidirectional illuminators such as radios and TV stations must have very high dynamic range receivers (>100 dB, and in some cases, >125 dB), because the radar may be forced to look near an illuminator direction to detect targets of interest. Processing is complicated, and it is not clear that bistatic radars can reliably provide fire-control-grade solutions for all engagement geometries of interest, without a very large number of simultaneous beams and attendant cost of adaptive signal processing. Fire-control arguments aside, bistatic radar does have acknowledged potential for performing the surveillance function. The cooperative bistatic SAR spot mode case is much easier than the air surveillance case. The transmit-andreceive beams are aimed at a common spot in GPS coordinates for the SAR image frame time, so pulse-chasing issues are solved by maintaining a common timing reference between the bistatic transmitter and receiver. Atomic clock references and common GPS coordinates and timing references provide a means for maintaining the common timing references. Northrop Grumman, for example, demonstrated a 1-m SAR over tens of kilometers in a 1998 independent research and development (IR&D) demonstration with these techniques. Combining multiple sequential spots creates a SAR area coverage capability. Similar concepts extend to bistatic GMTI applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
China UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Czech Republic United States
France
Moderate R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Research in bistatic radar in the United States has been ongoing at AFRL for a number of years, with Syracuse Research Corporation as the primary contractor. Much of that work has focused on use of existing military radars (e.g., AWACS) as the illuminator. However, bistatic passive coherent location technology has also been pursued by DoD and industry, often with the goal of hosting off FM radio or TV transmitters as illuminators. The Lockheed Martin Silent Sentry system is an example of such technology. China is showing research interest in bistatic radars based on publications from academics. Institutions include the National University of Defense Technology, Xidian University, and the Beijing Institute of Radio Measurement. In addition, China has collaborated with the French to install an experimental system for development testing. The Russians are marketing a forward-scatter fence radar for detection of stealth aircraft. Called Struna-1, it was built by the Nizhny Novgorod Radiotechnical Research Institute. The UK is also exploring systems similar to Silent Sentry at the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), Malvern. The Czech Republic is exploring a passive system called VERA, which is similar to Silent Sentry.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. HIGH-PRECISION INTERFEROMETRIC SAR PLUS GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) FOR ACCURATE TOPOGRAPHIC MAPPING
Multiple-aperture SAR with sufficient separation to give required resolution and differential elevation accuracy [digital terrain elevation data (DTED) level 5, 1-m posts and sub-foot accuracy]; precise aircraft geolocation knowledge; and precise antenna pointing. Combining two frequencies of operation (UHF and C-Band) for bald Earth mapping and terrain feature classification. None. Differential GPS and inertial transfer alignment to hold fractional wavelength and microradian accuracy on direction of arrival measurements. Efficient and accurate phase unwrapping algorithms. Phase center measurement and transfer alignment to enable high accuracy, absolute height measurement. Precise geolocation and velocity of collecting aircraft (errors <1 m ) and precise antenna relative location and velocity information (fractional wavelength accuracy). Wide potential use for terrain use planning; road route considerations; hydrological analyses. Requires second SAR channel and high phase accuracy hardware, but relatively affordable. FOPEN interferometric synthetic aperture radar (IFSAR) requires second frequency and polarization channels.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE The advent and widespread use of GPS has improved location precision measurements to the point that GPS is now considered sufficiently accurate for targeting. However, to effectively make use of that accuracy, the surface topography in the targeted area must be precisely known. Single-pass IFSAR technology is widespread, but the resolutions and navigation accuracy required to support level 5 DTED are not. Support of autonomous homing weapons that depend only upon geolocation accuracy for effectiveness will require very accurate topography of the target area. The only practical way to achieve such accuracy with the high area coverage rates desired is through single-pass SAR interferometry. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada Israel

Significant R&D
China Russia

Moderate R&D
France UK
Limited R&D
Both NASA and DoD are funding research in the United States. DARPA funded an interferometric SAR program with ERIM and JPL leading to the commercial IFSARE system. JPL has flown several interferometric systems for NASA, doing both two-pass and single-pass interferometry. In addition, JPL has developed a dualfrequency FOPEN IFSAR system for DARPA (GeoSAR). The Discoverer II space-based radar is planned to collect DTED level 5 data. To date, other countries have mostly demonstrated two-pass interferometry, with the exception of Germany and more recently Australia. However, commercial, as well as military applications are likely to drive continued development in this area.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. ACTIVE RF TAGS

Small (<20 mm3), low-power (<5 mW), personnel-portable identification of friend or foe (IFF) transponders; appropriate encrypted interrogation waveforms commensurate with radar operation/performance. High-energy-density batteries (>500 Wh/L in packages <10 mm3). None. Encryption system (low data rate, <1 kb/s). Size and weight of transponders and security of codes when transponders captured. Commercial cellular market. Tracking of rail cars within marshalling yards or trucks within depots. Individual responders should be inexpensive; however, a very large number is required.
RATIONALE Reducing the probability of fratricide has become increasingly important in recent military operations. RF tags would allow radar systems to incorporate a coded signature in a portion of the transmitted waveform. That signal could trigger transponders carried by troops and provide a coded IFF reply. The major technical challenges to this technology are the design of a transmitted code compatible with the radar waveform; the design of a transponder capable of operating at the frequencies of all possible radars that might trigger it, while remaining low-power and lightweight; and the issue of code security with a very large number of deployed transponders, some of which will inevitably fall into enemy hands. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
This technology is in a very early phase. DARPA is currently supporting studies in the area. No efforts in other countries are known.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. SAR/ISAR MISSILE SEEKERS

Very small (<1,500 cm3), lightweight (<5 kg) active radars, missile-electronics compatible SAR/ISAR signal processors, and SAR/ISAR-based ATR algorithms. None. None. ISAR image-formation algorithms for unknown target motion; appropriate ATR algorithms for desired target classes. Weight, size, and power constraints provided by missile limitations, trajectory planning for SAR imaging, and ISAR image formation with unknown target motion. Low-cost mmW smart antennas. None. At least a factor of 2 more expensive than conventional active seeker because of signal-processing requirements. Differential will reduce as processing becomes less expensive.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE In recent conflicts one major goal has been to precisely deliver munitions to the target with a minimum amount of collateral damage. Another goal has been for munitions to autonomously select the desired high-value target among a group of possible targets. For either mission, a missile seeker that can form 2D images provides significant additional information for target selection. Against fixed targets, SAR imaging could be used for map matching during missile ingress and for precise ATR and target selection. Against moving targets, ISAR imaging could be used to provide input to ATR algorithms to more confidently select desired targets. In addition, seekerprocessed data could be linked to remote operators for target verification and battle damage assessment (BDA). The technology challenges revolve around packaging a useful radar and its processor in available space in a missile, in autonomously providing flight paths that produce useful images, in development of affordable mmW antenna technology, and in effectively using the output data. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
This technology is in its infancy. Low-level studies are underway in the United States, funded by AFRL. No known work is underway outside USA.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. SPACE-BASED GMTI/AMTI

Large (>50500 m2), lightweight (4 kg/m2), electronically steered antennas; highefficiency T/R modules (70 percent at X-band). Photonic signal distribution and beamforming technologies. Reliable microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) components for low-loss, lightweight antenna control. Improved batteries (150175 Wh/kg and 500 Wh/L); improved efficiency solar cells (>25 percent); lightweight power conditioners and support structures; high-efficiency, radiation-tolerant T/R modules, new materials, and device structures for receiver power reduction. Lightweight, high-strength, thin-film materials for deployable antennas. Commercial assembly-line production techniques to significantly reduce single satellite costs for large constellations; thin-film RF component assembly and test for lightweight deployable arrays; and standardized spacecraft bus designs. STAP software for real-time clutter cancellation and jammer nulling and on-orbit target detection and classification software to reduce downlink data rates. Integration of SAR/ISAR and GMTI/AMTI waveforms and processing. Primarily an affordability issue. Capability exists to build and launch useful satellites. Required large constellation sizes make current costs unaffordable. GMTI: traffic monitoring; AMTI: air traffic control over oceans. Constellation costs are projected to be very high.
Critical Materials
Unique Software
Technical Issues
RATIONALE AWACS and JSTARS have proven their worth in a number of recent operations; however, both are generally required to stand well back of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), limiting their access to possible target areas of interest. Moving AMTI and GMTI capabilities to space provides a number of benefits, a major one of which is deep access. For low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, however, orbital velocities are around 7 km/s, spreading sidelobe clutter into the Doppler region of targets of interest. Thus, STAP processing will be required for clutter cancellation. In addition, with satellite orbits easily determined, STAP will also be required to cancel high-power, high-gain jammers that could be aimed at the satellite. Although the optimum frequency for GMTI is likely around X-band, AMTI systems would prefer operating at much lower frequencies (e.g., VHF or UHF). However, ionospheric scintillation effects at the lower frequencies may significantly degrade performance. For either type of system, trades will have to be made between many smaller systems in LEO orbits or fewer systems in higher orbits to achieve the desired coverage. For a given orbit, required revisit times will drive constellation sizes, and area coverage rates will drive satellite size. In any event, very large and affordable apertures will be required, as will large (by satellite standards) prime power levels. Antennas are a major cost challenge. Both will drive technology requirements for structures and power to meet needs cost effectively. With the development of suitable waveforms and on-board processing techniques, these satellites can achieve the dual functionality of providing both SAR/ISAR and GMTI/ATMI information via relatively narrowband links to ground stations. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada
Legend:
Extensive R&D
France
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The Discoverer II GMTI and SAR program that plans to launch two satellites in the 20032004 time frame principally represents U.S. efforts in this area. The Air Force, DARPA, and NRO jointly fund that project. The United States, Canada, and the UK have a joint technology exchange program studying space-based AMTI radar. III-17-94
Canadian participation is principally through DREO, UK participation is through DERA Malvern, and the United States is represented by AFRL. DREO plans some limited GMTI experiments using RADARSAT 2, which is primarily designed as an SAR. A European consortium is working with JPL on future low-cost radar satellites (may have multiple channels for some MTI performance). AFRL is also sponsoring space-based antenna work in its TRAM program. The long-term goals of this program address both GMTI and AMTI functions. The latter is to be realized at low frequency, UHF, or L-band.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. ULTRA-STABLE SOLID-STATE RADAR TRANSMITTER

Fourfold increase in amplifier reliability, highly redundant approach, greater average power than tube version, dramatic increase in transmitter stability. Supply of transistors with uniform characteristics. Taguchi methods and robust development techniques within integrated product team with customer and key suppliers as full-time participants. Built-in-test equipment to monitor amplifier health. Transistor uniformity and divider/combiner design approach. Replacement for high-power tube transmitters with improved reliability. Reasonable costs because of unique test and production methods.
RATIONALE Solid-state radar transmitters have replaced aging tube technology, leading to improved reliability, maintainability, and availability. In the United States, this has been accomplished by combining the outputs of 160 transistor amplifiers with low-loss microwave combiners. As a result, average power increased, reliability has grown fourfold, and the stability has increased dramatically. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Australia Taiwan
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Canada UK

Significant R&D
South Korea
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Other countries such as Canada, UK, Australia, Korea, and Taiwan have fabricated subsystems, such as power divider/combiner, which make up the solid-state transmitter. Improvements are expected in the next 5 years.
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DATA SHEET III-17.6. HIGH-POWER 94-GHz RADAR

A 10-kW average power 94-GHz radar is under development for ISAR imaging of nonmaneuvering aircraft and TBMs. Gyroklystron, duplexer, overmoded waveguide, and precise antennas. High-power test equipment. Target classification algorithms for aircraft and TBMs. Weather penetration, Doppler sensitivity, weight, and size. None. High cost, because of limited availability of components at this frequency.
RATIONALE Airborne radars require the ability to classify targets at extended ranges to take advantage of long-range air-to-air missiles. ISAR techniques work well against ships, but they have been less successful against non-maneuvering aircraft because of the lack of motion to generate the synthetic aperture. At 94 GHz there is enough Doppler sensitivity to generate a synthetic aperture with aircraft experiencing only air turbulence. The frequency 94 GHz can also be used to generate ISAR images to discriminate between reentry vehicles, debris, and decoys in counter TBM applications. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Russia
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Legend:
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
This technology has been actively explored by the United States and Russia. In the United States, research has been funded by DARPA and ONR, with participation by industry (Communications and Power Industries, General Atomics, and Diversified Technologies), DoD Laboratories (NRL), and FFRDCs (MIT/LL).
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SECTION 17.7LAND MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Highlights Nuclear and chemical residue technologies that detect the mine main charge explosive will reduce the falsealarm rates. Use of hyperfine interactions technology (NQR) to identify explosive chemicals directly can be used to detect explosive compounds in nonmetallic mines. Use of imaging techniques to obtain more reliable information from GPR and EMI techniques will help to reduce false alarms while concomitantly enabling the detection of both metallic and nonmetallic mines. Use of ATR to fuse EMI, GPR, IR, and explosive detection signals will facilitate the use of multisensor fusion on vehicle platforms. Use of genetically improved bees (or other insects) to identify specific explosive compounds that leak from land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Innovative use of dogs and other animals to locate explosives to provide explosive detection at vehicle speeds. Miniature shape charge arrays that attack the mine main explosive charge will provide high probabilities of mine kill. Directed-energy technologies that either spoof or disrupt mine electronic fuzes will be used to spoof advanced electronic fuzes.
OVERVIEW This section addresses developing technologies for mine and minefield detection and for mine and minefield neutralization. A variety of technologies being developed for both mine detection and mine neutralization are compatible for use in airborne, ground vehicle, and soldier platforms. We therefore address six technology groups: standoff-minefield detection, vehicle-mounted detection, hand-held detection, standoff neutralization, vehicle-mounted neutralization, and man-portable neutralizers. The technologies discussed in this section fall into two categories. The first category contains techniques that have been in the development stage for some time and have been used in other applications very successfully, but their support for mine countermeasures has not been justified to date. We expect major improvements in the future either because of a better understanding of the ground environment, a change in the operational procedure, or synergistic effects with other sensors (examples are radar and IR). In the second category are technologies that have been successfully tested in the laboratory and are being modified for field work (an example is NQR) or those technologies that are still in the laboratory testing phase (genetically modified bees and artificial noses). The mine and minefield detection problems are paced by the large variety in shape, size, and construction of land mines; the variety of environments that they are located in; and also by the amount of clutter in which they are dispersed. EMI techniques have long been used to detect metallic mines, but these techniques detect many forms of metallic clutter found in the ground. New techniques to evaluate the induction decay times peculiar to different targets are being investigated as a means of separating clutter from mine targets. Stepped-frequency GPRs that exhibit high probabilities of detection (higher than 90 percent) of plastic antitank mines and increasingly higher detection rates (70 percent) of the small antipersonnel land mines have been developed. Unfortunately, both active and passive IR techniques have been in the development stage for some time for mine detection. Their appeal has been in the potential to identify minefields from airborne platforms. Unfortunately, the mine signature changes during the diurnal cycle. This variation, coupled with poor performance from current ATR programs, has resulted in
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investigations into more complex approaches like hyperspectral systems to identify more robust target-recognition techniques. Nuclear detection using thermal neutrons to excite prompt gamma response from nitrogen and nitrogen compounds works well for large antitank mines but is limited in its ability to find the smaller antipersonnel mines. NQR techniques have shown promise in detecting explosives containing RDX such as Comp B. More sensitive techniques are being developed to see the weaker resonances of the most common mine explosive, trinitrotoluene (TNT). Technologies that emulate the biological sensory organs to detect the chemical residue of explosives are being investigated to discern the sensitivities required and the performance in a wide range of backgrounds. Biotechnology approaches are being developed that utilize bioluminescence associated with reaction with explosive compounds. ATR is the major enabling technology for all of these explosive-detection technologies. Progress is being made in fusing the EMI, GPR, IR, and nuclear detection methods on ground-vehicle platforms. Traditional approaches to mine neutralization utilize mechanical plows, rollers, and flails to clear mines or activate simple pressure plate mines. Modern mines employ advanced electronic sensors and can attack targets and neutralizers from standoff distances. To counter these new mines, two approaches are being developed. Nets that use shaped charge warheads can be propelled over a section of the minefield and then detonated. The shaped-charge warheads detonate the mine main charge, and a path is cleared through the minefield. Successful deployments of these nets has been recently accomplished. A second approach used to deal with electronic fuzed-mines is the use of directed energy to spoof or disrupt the mine fuzes. RATIONALE Generally, minefields are only deployed with indirect- and direct-fire weapons. The primary purpose of the minefield is to cause delay in enemy operations. Technology approaches to mine detection and neutralization must be compatible with high-tempo operations. Historically, detection and breaching of minefields has taken 6 to 12 hours under direct and indirect fire. IR and wideband radar technologies capable of locating minefields from aerial platforms are needed for standoff detection of minefields. Rocket-propelled nets using shaped charges are needed to achieve a rapid breach through detected minefields. Increasingly, the United States has been involved in peacekeeping missions in which troops are exposed to mines that were previously placed in other nations. Close-in detection and neutralization technologies that are robust and provide high probabilities of detection, Pd, and probabilities of neutralization, Pk, are needed. Slower, more deliberate systems that use a broader spectrum of technologies can be used. BACKGROUND Mines serve three functional roles on the battlefield: (1) they cause delay leading to a loss of synchronization and loss of surprise; (2) they damage or destroy armored vehicles and dismounted soldiers; and (3) they cause fear and anxiety even with battle-seasoned troops. Mines and minefields are generally placed so that they are covered by direct and indirect fire. The longer the offensive force takes to get through the mines or minefield, the greater the casualties inflicted on the offensive force. Mines are historically deemed a defensive weapon, but modern warfare also has placed a premium on the use of flank-protection minefields to allow attacking forces to marshal sufficient force ratios (3:1 or higher) necessary to win offensive operations. In the case of the more traditional maneuver type of warfare, the emphasis in countermine operations is speed of detection, neutralization, marking, and breaching. In recent years, mines have turned from being a military weapon into a weapon that at times is indiscriminately used against civilians. Political turmoil can lead to the use of mines by different political protagonists for specific political or economic gains. U.S. forces are increasingly being deployed in peace-keeping missions to areas of political unrest. In these types of situations, the mine is the weapon of choice for the smaller power or land force. The countermine requirements for these situations require high probabilities of detection and neutralization and low false-alarm rates. These requirements sometimes allow a different set of technologies to be applied for these types of applications.
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The fundamental questions addressed in these analyses are the relationship of the speed of detection and neutralization to the probability of detection of neutralization. Second, the technical risks associated with each technological approach must be related to its potential payoff, that is, the transition of a technological approach into a fielded system that meets user requirements. This assessment also must address the relative maturity of various technology approaches, particularly with respect to evolving capabilities in the United States and other nations. 1. The Role of the Speed of Search
For maneuver warfare, the speed of the detector is paramount. The rate at which mines and minefields can be detected and marked has a significant impact on the timelines of the maneuver force. Relatively few technologies are compatible with the requirements for high-speed search of large land areas from airborne vehicles. In fact, many technology approaches can only be effective in the immediate vicinity of each mine. Figure 17.7-1 shows the probability of mine detection as function of speed of search. In Figure 17.7-1, the speed of search ranges over 6 orders of magnitude, from basically a stationary examination of an area to an aerial survey. The tail of the arrow represents the current state of the technology, and the arrowheads indicate the direction that new research activity can advance. Physical process limitations, background noise barrier, and clutter barriers are also shown. Clearly, the technologies that cannot sustain a speed of search in the hundreds of square meters per minute would not be compatible with airborne systems used to remotely detect minefields. On the other hand, slower detection technologies such as neutron activation and chemical detection could be used as confirmatory sensors for a near-field interrogation to find buried mines. We can define the detection quotient, DQ, as the ratio of true detections to the total mines present multipled by the ratio of true detections and the sum of true detections and false detections: DQ = Detection Quotient = {T/N}{T/[T+F]}, where T = the total number of true detections, N = the total number of mines present; and F = the number of false identifications. In the limit of zero false detections, this definition gives the DQ = true/total. In the limit of high false detections, the DQ decreases to zero even if all the mines are detected. Figure 17.7-2 shows a plot of DQ where the total numbers of mines present is 50. The total number of true detections is plotted on the abscissa and ranges from 0 to 50. The curves are labeled with the number of false identifications, which range from 0 to 50.
1.0
Data Processing Chemical Detection Instrument Optimization Neutron Activation EMI Data Processing Active Heating IR Thermal Passive GPR IR (Surface LASER Polarization Mines Only) Special Techniques Data Processing
Pd
0.5 0.5 1.0 10 Speed of Search (m2/min) 100 1000
Figure 17.7-1.
Mine Detection Technologies and Projections
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1.0 0.8 DQ 0.6 0.4 0.2
- F=0 - F=10 - F=20 - F=30 - F=40
10
20 T
30
40
50
Figure 17.7-2. Detection Quotient as a Function of Mine Detections and False Alarms
The sources of the signals used to detect mines is a method of classifying technology approaches, particularly with respect to selectivity. The most desirable techniques are those that detect specific chemicals or elements that are intrinsic to mines. Since all mines have a main explosive charge, which is generally the largest single component of the mine, detection of main charge explosives should lead to the highest discrimination and lowest false-alarm rates. Nuclear techniques like neutron activation can detect specific atoms contained in the explosive chemical but not the chemical species. However, nuclear techniques can be used in a one-sided geometry and as part of a remote configuration. Techniques that depend on material discontinuities (conductive mine in contact with insulating Earth or vice versa) and detect the casing of the mines are subject to clutter and false-alarm problems. GPR, passive IR, and EMI are examples of these type of detectors. Other techniques that depend on the properties of the bulk mine material (active heating, IR, acoustic) or ground perturbations (radar) become less and less selective and are more prone to false alarms. Table 17.7-1 summarizes the technologies analyzed and places them on a scale of relative selectivity.
Table 17.7-1. Mine Selectivity for Various Technologies
Increase in Selectivity
Technology Neutron activation Chemical spectroscopy Biochemical Radar GPR EMI Passive IR Active Heating (IR Thermal) Acoustic
Perturbed Soil No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bulk Mine Properties Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Specific Atoms Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Explosive Chemical No Yes Yes No No No No No
No
No
Those techniques that can provide high-resolution images are also very desirable because, on the basis of shape, one may be able to reduce the false-alarm rate. Even if the straight signal is not selective, if it can be used to produce images, then the image may be more revealing and thereby increase the selectivity. Techniques that measure the signal from the casing and give a high S/N may be used to produce images. Figure 17.7-3 is a notional graph that relates the effectiveness of detection to the speed of search.
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Effectiveness of Detection Limits of Capabilities Technological Improvements Different Technologies
Speed of Search
Figure 17.7-3. Effectiveness of Detection at Increasing Speeds
As the speed of search increases, the detection capability decreases, as shown by the solid curve. As the speed of search is decreased, the detection capability increases but eventually reaches a limit of detection capability. Technological improvements could increase the detection as a function of speed of search to produce a higher capability at the low speed limit (see the dashed curve). The dashed curve may actually represent a limit in the improvements that can be achieved with the particular technology because of clutter or inherent instrument limits. To further increase the detection (see the dotted curve) at a particular search rate, a different technique may have to be employed. Computing effectiveness of technologies and system concepts requires some selection of pertinent parameters: Discrimination/selectivity Search rate False-alarm rate Probability of detection Sensitivity Missed targets.
These parameters could be related through a theory of measurements or through some theoretical model which would involve an assumption about the environment and sources of clutter as well as instrument settings that determine the threshold for signal acceptance. A low threshold would result in missed targets. With a given instrument one could expect an increase in false alarms with an increase in sensitivity. Along with these trends, one would also expect that a requirement of increased discrimination would result in a necessary reduction of the search rate. In current systems that we have analyzed, there is nothing that can solve all the problems inherent obtaining high probabilities of detection with very low false-alarm rates. The preferred approaches and technologies depend on the kind of targets that are being interrogated, the environment in which they are located, and the rate of search necessary to meet operational requirements. Because there is no silver bullet, it is imperative that we turn our attention to using one or more technologies, together with advanced signal processing and ATR. In this realm, it would be ideal to establish as nearly an orthogonal set of technology measurements as possible so that high probabilities of detection can be maintained or improved while concomitantly reducing the false-alarm rate. Therefore, sensor fusion and ATR are a major factor in future increases in capability to be gained in mine detection as well as the proper selection of complementary technology sensors.
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Finally, in attempting to determine an optimal set of technology thrust objectives for mine detection, it is also important to consider the inherent risks associated with the development of each technology. Some mine countermeasure techniques have been around for some time and the technologies have been well tested in the field. We may have reached the limits of their capabilities. Special approaches and new instrumental developments provide incentive for further investigation of some mature technologies. Other technologies are less mature, but they offer new possibilities for development. One way to evaluate the benefits of these different systems is by comparing the expected payoff against the anticipated risk. The payoff/risk chart is a method for articulating the joint assessment of risk and payoff. We now look at the different technology groups. Technology Group 1: Standoff-Minefield Detection The ability to detect and mark minefields prior to adverse encounter would be a major enabler for present or future fighting forces. Without an ability to see deeply, there will be no way for the Blue Force commander to avoid or be prepared for enemy obstaclesareas where the enemy wants to fight. Table 17.7-2 shows the relative maturity, research and development prospects, potential speed, general applicability, and mobility for technologies that are candidates for remote or standoff detection of minefields.
Table 17.7-2. Standoff Minefield Detection
Technology GPR/SAR IR Active IR Hyperspectral Biotechnology Maturity R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D Prospects High High High High High Potential Speed Fast Fast Fast Fast Slow General Applicability All Weather Most Weather Most Weather Daytime Only All Weather Mobility Moderate Size Small Size Moderate Size Moderate Size Moderate Size
Figure 17.7-4 shows the payoff versus risk associated with passive IR, GPR/SAR, active IR polarization, hyperspectral detection, and the use of biotechnology agents to induce fluorescence in ground absorption of deteriorating mine explosives. All the technologies are rated high payoff because of the high military utility inherent using remote detection. The least mature of these technologies is the biotechnology approach, which is directed at developing enzymes auxotropic for TNT that will bioluminesce when exposed to this explosive. The highest performance to date has been with systems that distinguish the polarization differences between mines and ground reflections. This approach, however, is limited to detecting mines on the surface. Passive IR techniques have been demonstrated to detect buried mines, but the robustness of this approach appears to be limited to particular times during the diurnal cycle. Recent advances in SARs show promise for detecting metallic mines. Work performed at the University of Hawaii indicates the utility of using hyperspectral approaches in the 9-m area to detect the large change in emissivity that occurs when the silicate in top soil is turned under during mine burial.

Biotechnology Hyperspectral
Active IR Polarization

PAYOFF Passive IR
GPR/SAR
RISK
Figure 17.7-4. Standoff Minefield Detection
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Technology Group 2: Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection There are also scenarios such as maintaining lines of communication for logistics forces in which close-in or near-field detection would be beneficial. Because road mines are generally used as part of an enemy ambush, a vehicle-mounted detector solves many of the problems of clearing roads. The Army is developing a vehicle-mounted mine detector for such scenarios. Table 17.7-3 shows the maturity, research and development prospects, potential speed, general applicability, and mobility for technologies that could be applied to vehicle-mounted detection.
Table 17.7-3. Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection
Technology Vapor Neutron Act. Biotechnology GPR EMI Passive IR Active IR Acoustic Laser/Acoustic Biosensors Hyperspectral NQR Water Jet Maturity R&D R&D Research R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D Prospects Good Good High High High Good Good Good High Good Good High Poor Potential Speed Very Slow Slow Slow Fast Fast Fast Fast Slow Slow Fast Fast Slow Fast General Applicability Confirm Only Confirm Only Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Confirm Only Confirm Only Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Confirm Only Primary Sensor Mobility Small Size Large Size Moderate Size Moderate Size Small Size Small Size Moderate Size Large Size Large Size Small Size Small Size Moderate Size Moderate Size
Because vehicle detection is generally an offshoot of handheld detection, there are many countries that have invested heavily in close-in mine detection. Canada, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the United States have significant developments across many mine-detection technologies. Many of these countries use sensor fusion and ATR to assist vehicle-mounted mine detectors. Most countries have significant capability for handheld detection of landmines. Figure 17.7-5 shows the payoff versus risk in development for sensors to be used on vehicle platforms.
QR PR aser iobrometer yperspectral assive IR AYOFF coustic iotechnology apor Detection iosensors eutron Activation
MI
ctive IR ater Jet Detection RISK
Figure 17.7-5. Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detection
The most familiar of these approaches is the EMI detector used to detect the presence of metallic objects. For vehicle-mounted detection of antitank mines, detection thresholds can be set relatively high, and good discrimination
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between mines and clutter can be obtained along roads. To detect nonmetallic mines and mines with relatively small amounts of metal, it is necessary to use other detection technologies. Advances in GPRs have recently demonstrated high probabilities of detection with significantly fewer false alarms than earlier systems. Several systems have been developed and tested that incorporate passive IR detection, but in field tests the false alarms inherent in the IR approach limited its relative success. Future technologies that portend greater selectivity include neutron-activation techniques and vapor-particle detection. Technology Group 3: Handheld Mine Detection Handheld detectors are the time-honored approach for finding individual mines. Because most of the original antitank mines had metallic skins, most of the worlds mine detectors look for metal, generally through EMI detection. Handheld operations are always slow and cannot be conducted in the presence of enemy fire. Recent peacekeeping roles of the United States place troops in areas after mines and booby traps have been deployed by opposing forces. The Army is developing a handheld standoff mine detection system (HSTAMIDS) to meet these requirements. Table 17.7-4 shows the maturity, research and development prospects, potential speed, general applicability, and mobility for technologies that could be applied to handheld detection.
Table 17.7-4. Handheld Detectors
Technology Vapor Detection Biotechnology EMI Passive IR Biosensors NQR GPR Photon Backscatter Maturity R&D R&D Fielded R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D Prospects Good High High Good High High High High Potential Speed Slow Slow Fast Fast Fast Slow Fast Fast General Applicability Confirm Only Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Confirm Only Primary Sensor Primary Sensor Mobility Small Size Moderate Size Small Size Small Size Small Size Moderate Size Moderate Size Large Size
Figure 17.7-6 shows the relative payoffs and attendant risks of the different technologies with respect to the development and fielding of improved handheld detectors. EMI techniques are generally used by most the of the worlds handheld-detector manufacturers. Recent research in EMI techniques has the potential to reduce false alarms through the use of the time constants associated with the rate of decay of the signal generated in the target material. Also, positive test results with GPR systems show promise for finding plastic and low-metallic mines. Emerging results from NQR experiments suggest that this technology could be used as a confirmation sensor.
NQR
Biotechnology
EMI
GPR
Vapor Detection
Photon Backscatter
Biosensors
Passive IR PAYOFF
RISK
Figure 17.7-6. Handheld Detectors
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2.
The Role of Speed of Neutralization
The maneuver force is quickly placed at an extreme disadvantage when it has to extract itself from a minefield. The minefield is doctrinally covered by both direct and indirect fire. Waiting for breaching forces is not an option because the attacking force cannot continue the attack without breachers and will sustain unacceptable losses if it maintains its position within range of enemy direct and indirect fire. Ideally, a standoff neutralization system would complement the ability to remotely detect minefields. Standoff breachers can achieve surprise at the point of attack and permit maneuver forces to spend minimal time transiting the breached lane. Minimizing this transit time is important because it reduces maneuver forces losses to direct and indirect fire while achieving surprise at the point of the breach. Conceptually, there are several approaches to mine neutralization. For certain scenarios each conceptual approach holds some fundamental value. Clearance. In its most simplistic sense, the approach would include manual removal of an individual mine from its location or detonation in situ of individual mines by sapper teams. This traditional engineer operation is tactically very slow, but produces safe lanes for following units. This approach is better suited to peacekeeping operations and is certainly not appropriate for maneuver warfare. Mechanized versions of mine clearance include plows and flails mounted on armored vehicles. The purpose of the plow or flail is to move the mines out of the path of the armored vehicle and subsequent vehicles. From a specific energy point of view, the plow and flail are probably the most efficient techniques to rapidly neutralize mines. From an operational point of view, these approaches are time consuming, and the armored vehicles used to propel these clearance devices are very vulnerable to direct and indirect fire. Signature Duplication. The stimuli that activate mine fuzes can be duplicated to spoof the mines. Rollers mounted in front of armored vehicles produce a pressure signature similar to that of armored vehicles. Vehicle magnetic-signature duplicators (VEMASID) produce oscillating magnetic-flux densities that cause magnetic fuzes to prematurely actuate before the armored vehicle passes over the magnetic mine. These spoofing approaches work extremely well only against certain types of minesthose with simple pressure fuzes or single-axis magnetic fuzes. Some modern mines employ double-impulse fuzes (i.e., the fuze looks for the pressure pulse of the second or third roller wheel of an armored vehicle) or multiple-sensor fuzes. For multiple-sensor mine fuzes, it is important that the clearing system contain a spectrum of spoofing capabilitiesacoustic, seismic, pressure, and magnetic. Blast Effect Reduction. In this approach, the vehicle and its associated mine-detection and mineneutralization items are designed to withstand the blast output of the landmines. Several South African vehicles employ a v-shaped chassis designed to deflect the mine blast wave from the vehicle. In addition, these vehicles employ shielding for shrapnel in the form of specially designed seats to dissipate blast loads before they are imparted to the passengers. The approach is successful in areas where the mine threat does not include shape charge or explosively formed fragments as mine warheads. Directed Energy. There are several directed-energy approaches that can be used for mine neutralization. Lasers. Successful explosive ordnance disposal lasers have been built and tested on armored vehicles to clear airfield runways. A 5- to 10-sec laser pulse causes fracture/opening of the ordnance case. Further application of the laser energy can induce low-order deflagrations or burning of the explosive components. Because the laser energy is absorbed in the first micrometer of the explosive material, it is not clear that current lasers can deposit sufficient energy in the secondary explosives to cause detonation. When the mines or ordnance is buried, the narrow energy absorption in the first micrometer of solid requires that the laser spend enough time and energy to vaporize the dirt between the laser and the mine/ordnance casing. Clearly, the extraordinary times and energy required to vaporize soil prohibit the use of laser for neutralization of buried mines and ordnance. High-Power Microwaves. High-power microwaves (HPM) can be used to attack the electronic/electric components of mine fuzes. The most obvious way is to induce sufficient current in the bridge-wire detonator to cause detonation. Generally, even in open air tests, this approach requires 100 W/cm2 to induce detonation. Usually, the fuze is protected within the mine structure, making it more difficult to produce this high-energy density at the bridgewire. Other neutralization approaches include component burn-out, spoofing, and mine electronic jamming. To
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accomplish these objectives, particularly with metallic mines, requires high-power systems to achieve even modest fields within the mine structure. In addition, each metallic mine will produce varying degrees of shielding at different frequencies. The tighter the production standard of the mine, the larger the source required to achieve useful levels within the mine. Attacking buried mines restricts the frequencies that can be used. Soils that contain significant amounts of water also restrict the robustness of the HPM approach. On the other hand, the HPM, unlike lasers, does not have to burn its way to the mine fuze to induce spoofing, jamming, or burnout. In addition, the HPM can produce significant fields over several square meters. This gives the HPM a large footprint that ultimately can provide moderate neutralization speeds for the host vehicle. Charged Particle Beams. Charged particle beams (CPBs) such as electron beams are strongly scattered in air, particularly at the lower energies. The charged particles are said to have a range in air before they lose 1/e of their initial energy. As the accelerating voltage used to produce these beams is increased, the range of the electrons in air increases substantially. Recent advances in bringing million electron-volt pulses into air show promise for propagation distances approaching a kilometer. Just as the charged particle beams have a range in air, they also have a range in soil and a range in various mine components. Electron beams have been shown to induce detonations in both primary and secondary explosives. In theory, it is possible to design a system based on known energy losses in air, soil, and mine components that will detonate the main charge explosive in landmines. The difficulties found in adopting charged particle beams into military systems are numerous: developing an accelerator that would fit any current land vehicle; providing radiation protection during use; and sustainability of a complex accelerator in a dirty battlefield. Like the laser, the charged-particle beam has an extremely narrow footprint. Rastering the beam to provide blind protection across the vehicle front would slow the vehicle to speeds already obtainable with full-width plows. To truly be useful, the charged-particle beam would need to be tied to a forward-looking mine detector. Although advancements are being made in forward-looking detectors (FLIR and UWB), significant progress must be made in raising the probabilities of detection before a hunter/killer concept using a particle beam could be effective. Explosive Neutralization. Traditionally, explosive line charges and fuel-air explosive devices have been used to clear minefields. This approach is effective against simple, single-impulse mine fuzes; however, there are many single-impulse fuzes that have been fielded that have been modified to require long impulses before fuze actuation occurs. Pressure bladders with different size holes are used to produce impulse-sensitive mines that cannot be actuated by line charges or fuel-air explosives. Other simple pressure systems have been modified so that there is very little surface area that is perpendicular to line charge blast waves. Developments in the United States with explosive powders and in Canada with ladder charges have shown that the main explosive charge in surface land mines can be sympathetically detonated. As the mines are buried deeper and deeper, the efficacy of these approaches degenerates into structural damage to the landmines. But because it can be anticipated that in a mobile war more than 80 percent of the mines would be scattered on the surface, these explosive approaches are attractive. A system approach that incorporated a track-width mine plow, a VEMASID, and an explosive powder line charge would be effective against all types of mines. Shaped-Charge Neutralization. Landmine main charge explosives are susceptible to detonation induced by shaped charges. Even though TNT, a very insensitive explosive, is used by many nations as a landmine main charge explosive, it too is vulnerable to high-velocity shaped charges. The shaped charges are tied together with primacord in a large lattice net that can be rocket propelled over a minefield. The detonation of this explosive net of shaped charges rapidly clears a breach path through a minefield. Standoff minefield neutralization requires a technology capable of causing mine to actuate at large standoff distances or the development of a system that can be remotely placed into the minefield to clear a breach lane. To be truly effective, the approach must also contain the element of surprise. Approaches that slowly and methodologically clear or neutralize individual mines will be quickly reduced by enemy direct and indirect fire and will also alert the enemy to the planned lane of breach. Figures 17.7-7 and 17.7-8 show the probability of surface mine neutralization and the probability of buried (410 in.) mine neutralization, respectively, as a function of speed of neutralization.
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1.0
Hand Charge
Chemical Neutralization
LASER
Plow
Rollers
HPM
Shaped Charge Net Array Explosive Powder CPB
Pk
.001
.01
0.1
10
100
1000
10000
Speed (m2/sec)
Figure 17.7-7. Area Neutralization Speed for Surface
1.0
Hand Charge
Chemical Neutralization
Plow
Rollers HPM
Shaped Charge Net Array
Pk
0.5
.001
.01
0.1
10
100
1000
10000
Speed (m2/sec)
Figure 17.7-8. Area Neutralization Speed for Buried Mines
There are major differences in technology capabilities for surface and buried landmines. As discussed previously, lasers have demonstrated utility for neutralizing surface mines and ordnance and have no capability against buried munitions. The HPM approach will work in dry soils and sands to moderate depths against electronic mines. Electron beams will only become attractive when they can be combined with forward-looking detectors that have a high probability of detection. Advanced explosive systems must be combined with plows for full-spectrum mine clearance because explosive shock pressures dissipate too quickly in air and soil. One approach that does maintain the ability to detonate buried land mines is a shaped charge. The diameter and speed of the shaped charge determine the explosive actuation depths. Explosive net systems that place shaped charges at the lattice intersections of net arrays can achieve rapid neutralization times over large footprints.
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There are operational scenarios that make good use of most of the preceding technologies. Table 17.7-5 shows the increase in capability for the different technology concepts.
Table 17.7-5. Mine Neutralization Technologies
Increase in Selectivity
Technology Hand Clearance Roller Flail Plow VEMASID Chemical Neutralization Laser HPM CPB Explosive Ladder Charge Explosive Powder Line Charge Shaped Charge Net Array
Surface Mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buried Mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Sometimes Yes Sometimes No Yes
Attacks Fuzes No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attacks Main Charge No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
High Tempo Ops No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Yes Yes Yes
To better understand how these technologies can be used in different mine warfare scenarios, we now investigate the applicability of these technologies to the following technology groups. Technology Group 4: Standoff Minefield Neutralization Table 17.7-6 shows the maturity, R&D prospects, applicability, and mobility associated with different technologies that are appropriate for standoff minefield neutralization.
Table 17.7-6. Standoff Minefield Neutralization
Technology Maturity R&D Prospects Applicability Mobility
MICLIC SLUFAE Explosive Ladder Explosive Powder Line Charge Shaped Charge Array
Fielded Type Classified Development R&D Development
Poor Poor Good Good High
Slow Slow Fast Fast Fast
High High Good High High
The fielded mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) is towed in a trailer by an armored vehicle. The MICLIC is effective only against simple pressure plate fuzed mines. The surface-launched fuel air explosive (SLUFAE) is likewise limited in its effectiveness to simple pressure plate mines, but this system has its own dedicated vehicle to insure mobility. The explosive ladder is rocket propelled over a minefield and uses large amounts of high explosive to destroy but not necessarily detonate all mines in or under the ladder charge. The explosive powder line charge disperses explosive powders once the line charge strikes the earth. The high pressures and impulses imparted by detonating the explosive charge cause sympathetic detonation of all mine main charges of surface mines. The shapedcharge array is also propelled as an expanding net over the minefield. The net consists of primacord tied to shaped
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charges placed in a lattice array. The shaped charges induce detonation of all mines under the net. The shaped charge array net is about to enter engineering and manufacturing development. The payoff versus the risks of development are shown in Figure 17.7-9 for different standoff-minefieldneutralization technologies. The technologies offering the highest payoff are those that attack the mine main explosive charge.
Net Array
Explosive Powders Line Charge
Explosive Ladder PAYOFF
SLUFAE
MICLIC
RISK Figure 17.7-9. Standoff Minefield Neutralization
Technology Group 5: Vehicle-Mounted Mine Neutralization There are many roles in which vehicle-mounted mine neutralization systems are used. For combat operations, vehicle-mounted neutralization systems are used to provide organic neutralization capability to the lead breaching vehicle, although standoff minefield neutralization systems may have cleared the breach. Additional combat operations include proofing of cleared lanes and mined areas and maintaining open combat roads and trails. After combat operations, vehicle-mounted mine neutralizers are used to clear mined areas and to proof areas where mines have been detected and destroyed or removed. Table 17.7-7 lists the properties of various approaches to mounting neutralization systems on vehicle platforms. The preferred technology approaches are those that are effective against all types of mines and can be used to create rapid breaches under fire. Rollers are limited to attacking simple pressure-plate mines and some types of magnetic-fuzed mines. Track-width plows can create lanes at the rate of 710 kph, but full-width plows travel at significantly lower speeds. Flails are best used in rear areas because of their very slow rate of clearance. Vehicle magnetic signature duplicators (VEMASID) only attack magnetic mine fuzes and can be used together with mine plows or rollers to enable fast breaching. Directed-energy approaches have applications at the present time limited to attacking electronic fuzes or mines on the surface. Figure 17.7-10 portrays the relative payoffs of different vehicle mounted mine neutralization technologies with increasing risk. The fielded items (i.e., roller, VEMASID, flail, and plow) are the lowest risk systems. The reason for increased payoff of the flail and plow over the VEMASID and roller is the ability of the flail and plow to neutralize all type of mines, irrespective of how they may be fuzed.
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Table 17.7-7. Vehicle-Mounted Mine Neutralization

Technology Maturity R&D Prospects Potential Speed General Applicability Mobility
Roller Plow Flail VEMASID Chemical Neutron Laser HPM CPB Small Shaped Charged
Fielded Fielded Fielded Type Classified R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D Good Good High Good High
< 10 kph < 5 kph < 2 kph < 30 kph < 2 kph < 2 kph < 10 kph < 5 kph < 30 kph
Pressure/Tilt Rod All mine types All mine types Magnetic All mine types Surface mines Electronic mines All mine types All mine types
On/Off road Off road No Combat Breach On/Off road On/Off road On/Off road On/Off road On/Off road Off road
Net Array
Shaped Charge Arrays
Plow
PAYOFF Flail
Charged Particle Beam
VEMASID

RISK
HPM
Laser
Figure 17.7-10. Vehicle-Mounted Neutralization
The plow has more risk than other fielded systems because the current plows are track-width clearance devices. Additional risk is incurred as full-width plows are being developed. Generally, the directed-energy approaches are riskier than the current mechanical and electrical fielded systems, with little additional payoff anticipated. Explosive net arrays, however, portend large leaps ahead in system capability and mobility. Technology Group 6: Man-Portable Neutralizers When mines are detected or found during road marches or road clearance operations, combat engineers carefully located and mark the mine. A decision is made to blow the mine in place, have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expert remove the device, or to drive around the marked mine. For dismounted infantry assault breach situations, the infantry may face a combination of antipersonnel landmines, antitank mines, barbed wire, and booby traps. For the infantry to breach this complex obstacle, the only technologies currently known that can rapidly create a breached lane through the minefield are explosive line charges and explosive line charges with grenades placed at
III-17-111
different intervals. The combination of explosive line charges with grenades helps to clear barbed wire while creating a narrow foot path. For noncombat situations, there are mine suits, special boots, helmets, and visors to protect soldiers performing mine clearance. These operations are dangerous and avoided wherever possible. Dismounted detection and neutralization of mines in rear areas are undertaken only in special circumstances where the mines are an imminent danger to present or anticipated operations. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT With the recent worldwide visibility of the landmine problem, many nations have taken a new interest in developing new close-in mine-detection and mine-neutralization technologies. New programs to test and evaluate mine-detection equipment have been established at ISPRA, Italy, and in Canada. The establishment in the United States of the Joint Unexploded Ordnance Coordination Office (JUXOCO) under OSD leadership also points the way toward benchmarked progress to understand and solve the mine detection problem. These efforts will primarily address technology approaches that are not time sensitive. In the countermine area specifically, there are several historical leaders in the development of mine-detection and mine-neutralization equipment: France, Germany, UK, Israel, South Africa, Russia, and the United States. Germany continues to be a leader in EMI hand-held detectors with Forster and Vallon. Dornier has developed standoff minefield-detection sensors together with Carl Zeiss and ATR algorithms by the Fraunhofer Institute. Elta of Israel has developed a GPR for use on remotely controlled ground vehicles. Both Israel and Russia have been leaders in developing advanced mechanical and spoofing technologies to be mounted on ground platforms. South Africa has developed new methods of using multiple canines for mine detection and for providing blast protection for countermine vehicles. Canada and the UK have recently invested heavily in humanitarian demining detection technologies and systems. In the United States, Tracor (more recently purchased by Marconi) has been a leading developer of handheld and vehicle detectors as well as the developer of explosive arrays using shaped charges to neutralize mines. Coleman Research has developed both handheld and vehicle-mounted mine-detection systems employing EMI, GPR, and IR. EGG and GeoCenters developed vehicle-mounted mine-detection systems that also used these technologies. SAIC has developed vehicle-mounted thermal neutron approaches to detect buried nitrogen and nitrogen compounds. Sandia National Laboratory has developed X-ray backscatter techniques for image identification of mines. The technology assessments for each country are broken out two different ways in the following pages: The first method assesses each countrys capability in different technology groups: minefield detection, vehicle-mounted detection, handheld detection, standoff minefield neutralization, vehicle-mounted neutralization, and man-portable neutralization. These technology group assessments generally include several technologies in each operational area being undertaken by an individual country. The second method addresses each specific technology and offers a separate assessment by country.
This approach provides insight into both the operational investments and technology investments of each country.
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Country Australia Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Vietnam Legend: Extensive R&D
Minefield Detection
Vehicle-Mounted Detection
Handheld Detection

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
(Continued)
Figure 17.7-11. Mine-Detection Systems WTA Summary
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Country Australia Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands North Korea Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Slovak Republic South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria UK United States Vietnam Legend: Extensive R&D
Standoff Neutralization
Vehicle-Mounted Neutralization
Man-Portable Neutralization

Significant R&D

Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Figure 17.7-11. Mine Detection Systems WTA Summary (Contd)
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LIST OF TECHNOLOGY DATASHEETS III-17.7. LAND MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Acoustic Detection .................................................................................................................... III-17-117 Air-Chisel Clearance/Neutralization .............................................................................................. III-17-118 Hyperspectral Detection.............................................................................................................. III-17-119 Biotechnology Detection............................................................................................................. III-17-120 Directed-Energy Neutralization..................................................................................................... III-17-121 EMI Detector............................................................................................................................ III-17-122 Emulated Biological Sensors ....................................................................................................... III-17-124 Explosive Array Neutralization .................................................................................................... III-17-125 GPR Detection ......................................................................................................................... III-17-126 Passive IR Detection.................................................................................................................. III-17-127 Laser-Induced IR Polarization....................................................................................................... III-17-128 Neutron Activation Detection ...................................................................................................... III-17-129 Water Jet Detection.................................................................................................................... III-17-130 Chemical Neutralization ............................................................................................................. III-17-131 Flail Clearance and Neutralization................................................................................................. III-17-132 High-Pressure Fluid Jet Neutralization........................................................................................... III-17-133 Laser Doppler Vibrometer Detection ............................................................................................. III-17-134 Nuclear Quadrupole Detection...................................................................................................... III-17-135 Plow Clearance and Neutralization................................................................................................ III-17-136 Mine Roller ............................................................................................................................. III-17-137 Vapor/Particle Detection............................................................................................................. III-17-138
III-17-115
III-17-116
DATA SHEET III-17.7. ACOUSTIC DETECTION

Synthetic aperture acoustic sensor arrays are used to detect scattering of Raleigh waves by buried objects such as mines. Early results show promise for detecting antitank mines to distances of 10 m. Target cross sections were roughly two to three times actual size in first measurements. Raleigh wave transmission through inhomogeneous variously compacted soils leads to ambiguities in target position and target recognition. Smaller sensors placed in larger arrays will improve both detection and recognition of mine targets in the next 5 years. None identified. None identified. None identified. Discrimination of landmines from wood, rocks, or other clutter sources will be the principal issue in developing this type of detector. Since there is no specific information about the interior of the mine returning in the sound reflected from the mine, there is no a priori reason to expect that other reflecting will not appear the same as mines. The technique does have the advantage of detecting from a standoff distance and permits the fusion of the output of other sensors prior to target identification. Acoustic synthetic aperture arrays can also be used for detection and removal of unexploded ordnance or other environmental contaminants. Development of robust software to manage relatively inexpensive acoustic arrays will be the principal cost driver.
RATIONALE Synthetic arrays can be used to detect scattering of Raleigh waves traveling near Earths surface. This technology could be used to cue either GPRs or EMI detectors to detect buried objects. The ability to see ahead and cue other sensors to probable target locations is a major advantage of this technology approach. This technology would best be suited to vehicle-mounted detectors that address the ground standoff minedetection (GSTAMIDS) operational requirements document (ORD). The technology approach could serve as a block upgrade to the current science and technology (S&T) program Mine Hunter/killer. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
Japan, Germany, the UK, and the United States are currently performing research and development in acoustic techniques for use with hand-held detectors. Because hand-held detectors are small, the acoustic detection techniques used generally involve an acoustic source and a laser vibrometer for target detection (see also laser vibrometer technology section). Advanced wide-area mines developed by Germany, the UK, and the United States utilize Rayleigh wave scattering for vehicle acquisition and targeting, so it is likely that these same countries could incorporate this technology on vehicle-mounted detectors.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. AIR-CHISEL CLEARANCE/NEUTRALIZATION

Once a mine detector has indicated the probable location of a mine, dismounted infantry usually approach the indicated spot in a prone position and use a hand probe carefully to try to find the suspected mine. Air chisels are a mechanized method to rapidly uncover soil, leaves, and other debris from the suspected mine location. Air chisels placed on remote-controlled detection platforms could be used to quickly uncover soil and debris from suspected mine locations. None identified. None identified. None identified. The principal issue is the ability of air chisels to rapidly clear hard and dried soils without causing mine actuation. This approach could also be used for humanitarian demining operations. This approach uses commercial air-compressor technology and would be another tool for quickly finding and identifying buried land mines.
RATIONALE Once potential mines have been identified with electronic detectors, air chisels are an inexpensive and effective method to rapidly remove soil down to and around the mine. This approach is applicable only to the ever-increasing role that peacekeeping operations now play in the deployment of U.S. armed forces. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Finland Japan Spain
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Norway Sweden

Significant R&D
India Pakistan UK

Moderate R&D
Italy South Africa United States

Limited R&D
This technology is the result of humanitarian demining interest in finding relatively mature and cost-effective technologies to detect and find antipersonnel mines. Backpack pressurized cylinders can serve as a high-pressure air source for use in a man-portable detector. Air compressors, as well as fittings to produce high stagnation pressures through small orifices, are commercially available throughout the world. Air compressors could be vehicle mounted and used for both mounted and dismounted operations. Air chisels would be most beneficial in areas with substantial leaf coverage or in relatively soft soils and sand.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. HYPERSPECTRAL DETECTION

By looking at very narrow segments of the optical spectrum it is possible to detect natural artifacts commensurate with the placement or burial of a mine. Natural vegetation can exhibit changes in chlorophyll due to the presence of a mine. Other anomalies include the difference in emissivity of silicate in soil at 9 m. When soil is overturned, there is less silicate at the surface, and the silicate that is at the surface may be obscured by the overturned dirt. The anomaly is detectable sometimes for periods of weeks until the effects of wind and rain return that section to its natural state. The point is that selective absorption or reflection at very narrow frequency bands provide valuable clues as to the presence of man-made objects. High-resolution FPAs are needed to obtain high-resolution images of small objects such as mines that may be at the surface or buried. The higher the detection platform is to be flown, the larger the FPA needed to cover meaningful areas on the ground. None identified. Special algorithms must be developed to identify individual mines and minefields. Overturned soil causes large change in emissivity of soil at 9 m when silicate is present in soils. Effect diminishes with times and with rain. Potential use in evaluating environmentally impacted areas or areas where large amounts of UXO exist. Requires expensive airborne optronic systems and software.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Remote minefield detection is at the heart of maneuver warfare. Detection of minefields before adverse encounter requires technologies employed from airborne platforms. Hyperspectral detection can be accomplished in small UAVs and can be used to complement IR or SAR data gathered from the same or other platforms. Maintaining logistic chains along roads and combat trails requires daily use of mine-detection equipment. Freshly dug holes for mines can be detected by large changes in emissivity at 9 m. Detection of these daily changes could vastly improve present mechanical clearing methods. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
United States

Moderate R&D
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
European community investment in humanitarian demining technologies has resulted in the investigation of technologies for the wide-area detection of mines. Belgium has developed visible and infrared hyperspectral and multispectral approaches for the detection of existent large minefields. Although hyperspectral technology is widely available throughout the world in the visible portion of the spectrum, system costs are driven by the aerial platform needed to cover large land areas. Germany and the United States have invested in using this technology for standoff minefield detection systems.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. BIOTECHNOLOGY DETECTION

Development of enzymes that are auxotropic for TNT and luminescent when they react with TNT. These enzymes can be used to find buried mines and UXO that leak trace amounts of explosives into the environment. Because there are no known natural enzymes that are auxotropic for TNT and luminescent when exposed to TNT, new enzymes will have to be identified. Test programs must be developed to insure that the enzymes are compatible and nonincursive on the environment. None identified. The amount of TNT/explosive residue on plants and vegetation from mines buried in the ground is not known and will be a key to how many enzymes will be required to cover suspected mine areas. This technique could be used for environmental cleanup and UXO remediation of military sites. Potentially an inexpensive means to interrogate large land areas to determine the presence of mines and minefields.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Enzymes can be spread over suspected mined areas and the specific reaction with the mine main explosive charge explosives can be monitored from UAVs. The approach may require many hours between enzyme application and detectable bioluminescence. Alternatively, dismounted soldiers could be used to interrogate specific areas after the enzymes have been emplaced. Both approaches are in line with the current standoff minefield detection ORD to rapidly detect mines and minefields. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The U.S. Department of Energy is developing this novel approach that builds on expertise at Savannah River to detect trace residues of chemicals and other potentially hazardous materials in the environment.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. DIRECTED-ENERGY NEUTRALIZATION

HPMs can be directed at mines employing electronic fuzes to burn out electronic components, ignite the bridgewire fuze, upset electronic functioning, or spoof the fuze into interpreting the microwave signal as a proper firing signal. High-power electron beams can be brought into the atmosphere to attack surface and buried mines. The energy deposit initiates detonation in the mine main charge explosive. While laboratory HPM and electron beam sources exist, they are one-of-a-kind items. Special klystron and electron-beam assemblies must be designed for field applications. Development of radiation-hardened test equipment to test high-power output. None identified. Robustness of approach that either upsets or spoofs mine electronic firing algorithm is a critical issue for HPM applications because it attacks the fuze. Determining both the total energy deposition and the rate of energy deposition within the mine main explosive charge will be crucial to establish the efficacy of the electron-beam neutralization approach, particularly against explosives such as TNT. HPM devices can be used to combat terrorists or subversive groups that rely on electronic devices or communication. Directed-energy approaches are large and expensive.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Modern mines use electronic fuzing tied to one or more sensors for target acquisition. Many mines also employ electronic self-destruct mechanisms. These electronic circuits are vulnerable to directed-energy weapons such as HPM or charged particle beams. Employed from a standoff distance, these devices would meet the requirements for the standoff neutralization ORD. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
The former Soviet Union made large investments in HPM technology and since its dissolution, Russia has marketed HPM technology to neutralize antipersonnel land mines for humanitarian demining. France, Germany, the UK, and the United States have all investigated the use of HPMs for mine neutralization with varying degrees of success. HPMs are most effective against electronic mine fuzes that are not protected, that is, the electronics are not surrounded by a Faraday cage. Success in neutralizing mines incorporating bridge-wire fuzes require high power density levels at the target to initiate land mines.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. EMI DETECTOR

New fast-response EMI detectors that use both real and quadrature data to determine the time constant rate of decay of mine targets have been developed. These new data provide the opportunity to both detect and classify mine targets. This additional information also provides a basis for rejection of clutter, which will result in fewer false alarms. This new powerful technique may also be able to detect the void produced by plastic mines. None identified. Special coils must be developed that can both transmit and detect time constants on the order of 1 sec or less. The time constants associated with different soils and their attendant moisture must also be measured and appropriately archived. New software must be developed to accurately and quickly microsecond interrogations. evaluate these
Unique Software
Technical Issues
Development of physics-based models to help identify and separate mine and clutter objects is necessary, particularly in forming a rational basis to reject the even larger amounts of clutter associated with interrogating this larger spectrum. The use of these detectors in wet soil against small mines is also problematic. Coin relic hunting detectors or commercial detectors to detect metal pipes in the ground or behind walls. Technology is relatively inexpensive and straightforward.
RATIONALE EMI detectors are the most ubiquitous mine- and relic-hunting detectors. High thresholds can be used to distinguish large metallic landmines. Large amounts of metallic clutter on the battlefield lead to extremely high false-alarm rates when EMI detectors are used to find small antipersonnel landmines. New detection capabilities subtend the ability to better distinguish mines from clutter. This approach is consistent with the HSTAMIDS and the ground standoff mine detection system (GSTAMIDS). The new EMI techniques, when used with GPR techniques, may provide keys to providing substantive improvement in both handheld and vehicle-mounted mine detectors. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Austria Denmark India South Africa United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Bulgaria Egypt Italy Spain

Significant R&D
Canada Finland Japan Sweden

Moderate R&D
China Germany Pakistan UK
Limited R&D
The high interest in humanitarian demining has lead to renewed interest and investment in EMI detectors throughout the world. A new Australian EMI approach for military mine detectors has spurred interest in the use of EMI detectors against low-metal content antipersonnel landmines. Austria, Germany, France, and the UK also make high-performance mine detectors. The NATO nations are now investigating the fusion of GPR technology with EMI threshold techniques for use as detectors of both metallic and plastic mines.
III-17-122
Emerging research currently being conducted by multi-university research initiatives through the Army Research Office has demonstrated marked improvements in the rejection of false alarms using time-domain and frequency-domain EMI techniques. Both of these techniques are being combined with advanced signal-processing techniques to produce ROC curves that evidence major growth in the reduction of false alarms.
III-17-123
DATA SHEET III-17.7. EMULATED BIOLOGICAL SENSORS

Sensor response to a wide range of explosive compounds with small vapor pressures is difficult to measure in the laboratory. Performing these measurments in nitroaromatic backgrounds that can vary over more than four orders of magnitude adds greater complexity. The design and synthesis of complementary chemoselective coatings for nitroaromatics is coupled with the use surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices to determine explosive vapor sorption and selectivity. The construction of carbon bolometers to perform reproducible detection of explosive compounds may be difficult to convert from the laboratory to production status. The performance of these sensors in areas already contaminated with explosive materials is currently not known. None identified. The ability to locate mines in environments with high explosive vapor or high explosive residue areas is needed for robust performance in field applications. The sensitivity of these devices in high backgrounds of the explosive to be detected is not currently documented. These devices could be used as explosive detectors for airports and for building security. The technology will be moderately expensive to develop and relatively inexpensive to produce in quantity.
Critical Materials
RATIONALE Emulation of dogs nose will provide detection and discrimination of combinations of many different trace chemical vapors. Systems must reliably detect a wide range of explosive compounds and accurately locate landmines with explosive fills ranging from 1 ounce to more than 20 lb of explosive. Different environments will have varying backgrounds of explosive compounds and their combustion products. It is not clear that sensors sensitive enough to detect 1 ppb or 1 ppt will maintain that sensitivity in the presence of high backgrounds of the same explosive vapor. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
South Africa
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Russia
Significant R&D
UK
Moderate R&D
United States
Limited R&D
Russia uses a technique in which vapor is adsorbed on metal-oxide film. The adsorption of the vapor on the metal film reduces the resistance of the film. The nanonstructure films are sensitive to molecules that can be easily polarized (explosives). Absorption of the molecules onto the boundary layer causes local screening fields, which in turn result in the escape of local electrons. In the United States other approaches are being pursued. One uses thin sorbent coatings on SAW devices to determine vapor sorption and selectivity. The most sensitive of the new polymers exhibit detection limits for nitrobenzene of a sensitivity of several parts per trillion. Measurements of the transport properties of explosive vapors are used to determine residual trace amounts available for measurement. Bolometers are being used to measure responses to trace amounts of complex vapors, that is, explosive vapor plus additional trace vapors.
III-17-124
DATA SHEET III-17.7. EXPLOSIVE ARRAY NEUTRALIZATION

Individual small shaped charges can be used to initiate detonation of buried land mines as they pass through the mine main charge explosive. Matrix arrays of these shaped charges are deployed as a large net with shaped charges at the interstices. The interstices are approximately 15 cm apart so that at least one shaped charge will penetrate any antitank mine covered by the matrix array. The matrix array is deployed after being launched by a rocket over a suspected mined area. None identified. Unique production assembly will be required to produce expandable arrays consisting of shaped charge warheads connected with primacord. None identified. The performance of shaped charges against TNT-filled landmines is an important issue because of the insensitivity of TNT and the diverse methods used to fill TNT-based landmines. None identified. Because the array is consumed in its mine-neutralization mission, the size and cost of the array will determine its ultimate military utility.
RATIONALE Because minefields are covered by both direct and indirect fire, a premium is placed on countermine systems that can quickly neutralize a cleared path from a standoff position. A rocket-propelled net consisting of an array of shaped charges connected by primacord can be placed on suspected minefield locations from significant standoff distances. The array of shaped charges can be detonated over a portion of the minefield to provide a clear path or lane through the minefield. This development is consistent with the standoff minefield breacher ORD and would provide an ideal complement to the standoff minefield detection system. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Recent shaped-charge measurements against mine main charge explosives have been made in the Netherlands, but there has been no attempt to produce a prototype system for humanitarian demining missions. In the United States, the explosive array has been developed for the Army. Tests of both the net launch and shaped-charge kill have been successfully completed.
III-17-125
DATA SHEET III-17.7. GPR DETECTION

GPRs operating between 0.315 GHz can provide reliable detection of objects to tactical mine burial distances (1015 cm). Increasing computing performance helps evaluate radar returns from SARs in real time to provide detection for both hand-held and vehicle-mounted mine detection applications. None identified. None identified. Each radar array demands separate software be developed to interpret radar return signals. Dielectric constant of main charge explosives and that of plastic cases are nearly the same value as that for sand. Therefore, this approach is least sensitive to small AP mines buried in sand. Technique is also vulnerable to heavy moisture conditions and surface reflections.
Technical Issues
Detection of buried pipelines and cables. This is a moderately expensive technology in development and potentially inexpensive for mass production.
RATIONALE Recent tests show high probability of detection against both plastic and metallic antitank landmines with significantly lower false alarm rates than were previously attained using any other detection technology. GPR technology is still limited in its ability to distinguish AP landmines from same-size buried clutter. Approach is vulnerable to standing water on the surface of the earth. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan
Significant R&D
South Africa
Sweden
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
GPR is being used for handheld detection, vehicle-mounted detection, and standoff aerial minefield detection. The European Union interest in humanitarian demining has spawned a number of new investments throughout the European community in GPR, principally for mounting on vehicles to detect antitank mines. France, Germany, UK, Belgium, and Turkey are all investing in a Thomson GPR for research measurements. Elta in Israel has developed a GPR system that has been tested in Canada and the United States. Russia has developed GPR systems to be man portable, as well as for vehicle systems. Five separate North American contractors recently successfully completed advanced technology demonstration (ATD) testing before entering engineering and manufacturing development. GPRs are also being developed in Europe for use on aerial platforms to find entire minefields in humanitarian demining applications. The United States has demonstration synthetic aperture ultra-wideband GPR for aerial platform detection of buried metallic mines.
III-17-126
DATA SHEET III-17.7. PASSIVE IR DETECTION

Mines buried in soil near the earths surface are detectable with passive IR devices for several reasons: the heat capacity of the mine is different from the surrounding soil, so the mine is at a different temperature during most of the diurnal cycle; the amount of moisture above the mine is different from that of the surrounding soil; and the density of the soil put back on top of the mine is different for several weeks after the mine is inserted. As the surrounding soil heats and cools during the diurnal cycle, the mines are differentially heated and cooled so that there are times when the mines are hotter, cooler, or at the same temperature. During the cross-over times, the mines are very difficult to detect. Good results have been achieved in both the mid-wave and longwave IR bands, with the best results usually occurring 1 to 2 hours after sunrise or sunset, where the mines are at the largest differential temperatures from the soil. None identified. None identified. Because the IR signature of the mine changes during the day, software is being developed that will key on specific temperature differences obtained from selected calibrated targets. That the mines are best detected during certain periods of the day limits the military utility to certain scenarios and applications. There are numerous commercial and military uses of passive IR. The uses for the software being developed to find mines could also be used in humanitarian demining applications. Cost of second-generation FLIRs may limit their military utility to being mounted on ground vehicles for road mine detection or on UAVs for remote minefield detection.
Technical Issues
Affordability
RATIONALE This technology is important to the future of standoff minefield detection programs both because of its unique capability to detect surface and buried mines from a standoff distance and also because of the relatively small size and weight requirements it imposes on potential platforms. This approach is limited in that its best performance occurs during specific parts of the day. The technology has been utilized to meet the ORD requirements for the standoff minefield detection system. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany South Africa
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Italy Sweden

Significant R&D
Japan UK

Moderate R&D
Norway United States

Limited R&D
Although many European nations have well-developed FLIR and line scanner production capabilities, the use of this technology for mine and minefield detection is only now emerging as new money is being made available for humanitarian demining research. France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, and Turkey are all currently pursuing research and development programs that include the use of FLIRs for mine detection from both land and aerial vehicles. The United States has extensive experience in the development and testing of both line scanners and FLIRs from airborne, land vehicle, and dismounted soldier platforms.
III-17-127
DATA SHEET III-17.7. LASER-INDUCED IR POLARIZATION

Man-made objects such as the flat and smooth surfaces on mines polarize light differently than the surrounding soil and vegetation. When a laser source illuminates a specific ground area, the land areas exhibiting substantially unique returns can be examined for the presence of mines. Because the same signal also provides information on the size and placement of the suspected object, the approach can be particularly effective in finding surface mines. None identified. None identified. Unique software is being developed to examine specific polarizations, but also to identify mine fields and mine field patterns. Effectiveness of this approach is limited to detection of surface landmines. Polarization data can be concomitantly used with reflected and passive IR data to better discriminate mines from clutter. Humanitarian demining also has requirements to determine the placement and extent of minefields from standoff distances. This is an expensive technology to develop and produce.
Technical Issues
RATIONALE Laser-induced IR polarization returns provide a standoff capability to detect mines and minefields. An active system provides day and night capability against all surface laid minefields. Systems can be made small enough to mount on UAVs. This technology is being exploited to attempt to meet the requirements the airborne standoff mine detection system (ASTAMIDS) ORD. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Finland Japan Spain
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany Norway Sweden

Significant R&D
India Pakistan UK

Moderate R&D
Italy South Africa United States
Limited R&D
Although the use of polarized signals to discriminate man-made targets is broadly available, its development for use in countermine has been limited to research and development programs in both the UK and the United States.
III-17-128
DATA SHEET III-17.7. NEUTRON ACTIVATION DETECTION

Natural californium sources that emit thermal neutrons are used to produce a prompt gamma from nitrogen in explosive compounds. The approach has been to use neutron activation as a confirmatory sensor to detect the presence of explosive compounds in areas where other mine-detection systems have discovered some form of subsurface anomaly. None identified. None identified. Specific software has been developed to process the raw signal counts. Process identifies nitrogen and nitrogen compounds. Process is not specific to explosives or explosive types. Obtaining sufficient signal to background has limited the ability of this approach to finding AT mines and large AP mines (main explosive charge greater than 1 lb). This approach has been used as an explosive detector at a few airports. Although very expensive, this approach could also be used in some humanitarian demining applications. Number, quality, and calibration of sensors are all major cost drivers in what will be a large expensive system.
Affordability
RATIONALE Thermal neutron activation measures nitrogen directly and through this measurement gives location of the explosive. For buried mine detection, the system must interrogate metric tons of soil. Different environments may require different software to compensate for background clutter. Current systems use natural radioactive source. Fielded systems would need to use neutron generators. This technology approach is well suited as a confirmatory sensor for the GSTAMIDS ORD. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
SAIC has pioneered the use of this detection technology in both Canada and the United States. Because of the size and cost of the experimental hardware, many nations look for further development to come from North America. That present systems use natural radioactive sources also limits broader participation. The development of neutron generators may broaden the appeal of this technology for countermine and humanitarian demining.
III-17-129
DATA SHEET III-17.7. WATER JET DETECTION

The concept is to use the stream of water hitting a hard target to carry the reflected sound back to a detector. Although sensors placed directly on the external surface of UXO and mines can measure the sound velocity in the encased explosive, it has never been experimentally shown that the same types of measurement are possible through the water jet stream. Better detection results have been achieved using hot water to heat the mine so that the thermal signature of the mine is contrasted against the colder soil. None identified. None identified. Specific software must be written if the concept can be demonstrated experimentally. Experimental demonstration of concept. If the approach can be demonstrated, it could be used to find buried utility lines and sewers. The approach is moderately expensive.
RATIONALE Arrays of small, high-pressure water jets can be used to rapidly penetrate several inches of soil cover. The scattering of the water jet by buried objects can be monitored to detect objects with different sound velocities. The technology approach is compatible with the GSTAMIDS ORD. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Although water jet technology is widely commercially available, the United States appears to be the only country currently investigating the use of water jets for mine detection. Improved detection rates have been demonstrated when hot water is used to heat mines so that the thermal signature may detect by FLIRs.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. CHEMICAL NEUTRALIZATION

Many countermine situations require that mines be neutralized in situ with no collateral effects. Although explosive ordnance demolition procedures exist to deal with these types of situations, the reality of the combat situation is that EOD personnel may not be available or too many mines may be involved to make the EOD approach viable. In these cases, mine neutralization could be effected by combat engineers if they had a device that would penetrate the mines and place chemical reagents into the main charge explosive. These techniques have been demonstrated using solvent/reagent solutions to rapidly react the explosive to a nondetonable mass. None identified. None identified. None identified. Encapsulation of the solvent/reagent system in containers compatible with current Army depots and logistics systems. This approach is ideal for humanitarian demining situations, in which it is important that the mines be destroyed quickly and in place. Inexpensive system to procure and field.
RATIONALE Methods that chemically change the mine main charge explosive into a nonhazardous residue are needed for future peacekeeping operations. To be effective, the chemical system must quickly chemically react a large variety of secondary explosives. Early systems used both a solvent and a reagent to quickly react the mine main explosive charge. There is currently no ORD or other requirement document for this technology. Attempts have been made to use this approach in humanitarian demining systems. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
United States
Legend:
Extensive R&D
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
The recent interest in humanitarian demining has renewed international interest in the disposition of mines and UXO. Early efforts in the United States used acetone and isopropylamine systems to quickly (15 min) react the main explosive charge in large antitank mines. Current applications for humanitarian demining lead to shorter (5 min) reaction times for smaller antipersonnel landmines.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. FLAIL CLEARANCE AND NEUTRALIZATION

Flails have been used since World War II to neutralize land mines. The counter-rotating flail acts like an end mill clearing the soil and mines. The clockwise rotating flail can detonate simple pressure fuzed mines and cause catastrophic mechanical damage to the mine bodyleaving the primary fuze explosive and booster still in vicinity of main explosive charge material. None identified. None identified. None identified. The rate of mine neutralization is generally very slow and not compatible with maneuver operations. The approach is very useful for peacekeeping missions in which certain areas must be cleared to house troops or equipment. None identified. The flail is a large, massive system that can only be used on the front of large tanks or earth movers.
RATIONALE Flails mounted on the front of slow-moving vehicles have historically been used to remove mines for off-route applications. The process is generally limited to speeds of 12 mph and is best used for clearance in areas not under indirect or direct fire. The United States has developed a small, remotely controlled trail flail that can be used to remotely clear paths through wooded combat trails or along the edge of combat roads where antipersonnel mines have been placed by the enemy. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Germany and the UK are the major suppliers of flails for countermine and humanitarian demining purposes. The German flail produced by MAK is designed to interface with the glacis of armored combat vehicles. The British Aardvark flail design uses a captive, protected prime mover.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. HIGH-PRESSURE FLUID JET NEUTRALIZATION

Optimization of soil and mine case perforation against a wide variety of metal- and plastic-cased mines can be achieved with fluid jets driven at high pressures. The fluid used by the jet can also contain chemicals/solvents to attack the main explosive charge of land mines. Devices that can be backpack mounted have been demonstrated for use by dismounted troops. Larger devices have been demonstrated from tactical vehicles. None identified. None identified. None identified. The amount and type of fluids to be used for neutralization is strongly affected by the number of false alarms that could be anticipated by a complementary mine detection systems. Water jets are already in use commercially for a wide variety of landscaping and gardening applications. This approach is moderately expensive to produce and field.
RATIONALE High-pressure fluid jets are currently used in a number of commercial cutting and gardening applications. Highpressure fluids can rapidly penetrate a soil overburden and perforate a mine casing. A variety of chemicals could be used to react the mine main charge explosives. This technology approach is compatible with the current Mine Hunter/Killer S&T program that is working on block improvements to the GSTAMIDS. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan United States
South Africa
Sweden
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
While water jets are commercially available throughout the world for agricultural and mining applications, the principal focus of their use has been for EOD. The UK has long used this technology to neutralize terrorist devices.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. LASER DOPPLER VIBROMETER DETECTION

Laser Doppler vibrometer detection is an emerging technology that requires line-ofsight access to the soil covering the land mine. A laser Doppler vibrometer measures the soil velocity above and around the buried mine that has been stimulated by an acoustic sound source. The approach is consistent with developmental efforts to decrease the false-alarm rates currently exhibited by EMI and radar technology approaches. None identified. None identified. None identified. Performance in dry, hard soils has not been established. This performance data is necessary to demonstrate the efficacy of this approach in adverse environments. Image acquisition times are currently lengthy and would confine the technologys immediate utility to that of a confirmatory sensor. This approach could be used in peacekeeping and humanitarian demining applications. This is a moderately expensive technology to develop and procure.
RATIONALE Acoustic sources coupled into the earth produce scattering by buried objects. The soil velocity is measured by the laser vibrometer. The current approach is time consuming and relies heavily on knowledge of sizes of mines to classify the target as a mine. This technology approach is compatible with the requirements for a confirmatory sensor the GSTAMIDS ORD. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Germany UK
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Japan United States
South Africa
Sweden
Significant R&D
Moderate R&D
Limited R&D
Laser vibrometers are used for R&D activities supporting a number of commercial products. The University of Mississippi is doing work on the use of laser vibrometers to detect buried mines for both countermine and humanitarian demining applications.
III-17-134
DATA SHEET III-17.7. NUCLEAR QUADRUPOLE DETECTION

NQR can provide specific information on nitrogen-containing and halogenated compounds. NQR is basically a radio-frequency spectroscopy technique that results from the variation of the nuclear electric field from sphericity. None identified. None identified. None identified. Spin lattice relaxation times for TNT limit detection approaches to confirmatory sensors. The SNR is a problem for small mines filled with TNT. The NQR process is vulnerable to ambient radio signals and other noise sources. NQR is also vulnerable to areas with high backgrounds (explosive fragments thrown over interrogation area). NQR technology has been investigated as explosive detectors in airports. This technology is expensive to develop, but could be less expensive to procure.
RATIONALE The NQR process works best when explosives are placed in a controlled geometry with appropriate RF shielding such as is found in luggage inspection machines in airports. Buried landmine detection is a one-sided measurement. There is greater difficulty in shielding extraneous RF noise in the single-sided mine detection configuration. Initial success has been demonstrated with RDX explosives. The NQR approach requires a different frequency to detect other types of explosives such as TNT. TNT detection demonstrated with time constants T1 of approximately 35 sec. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Russia
Legend:
Extensive R&D
UK
Significant R&D
United States

Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Research and development of NQR for mine detection is currently in progress in Russia, the UK, and the United States. The U.S. Army will begin a program to develop NQR as a confirmatory sensor for vehicle applications in the next year.
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DATA SHEET III-17.7. PLOW CLEARANCE AND NEUTRALIZATION

Plows are a traditional method for moving mines from the path of large tracked vehicles such as tanks. For track-width mine plows, speeds of 710 mph can be achieved. Fullwidth plows are being developed, but it is not anticipated that these will function at speeds at or greater than 3 mph. The plow removes all types of mines to depths of 8 in. and has been successfully deployed by many nations in several wars. None identified. None identified. None identified. Full-width plows need depth control to deal with variations in Earths crust. Failure to anticipate large loads will result in unnecessary slowing and stopping. To be useful in combat situations where minefield breachers are exposed to direct and indirect fire requires that the platform pushing the plow proceed through the minefield at the fastest possible speed. This technique can also be used in humanitarian demining situations. Although the technology is straightforward, its implementation is large, heavy, and costly.
RATIONALE Track-width and full-vehicle-width plows mounted on armored vehicles can remove the top soil and buried mines to a depth of approximately 812 inches. This form of rapid clearance is needed for rapid minefield breaching where the breaching forces are under fire. Many countries field some variation of track-width mine plows. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany United States
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China South Africa
Denmark Sweden

Moderate R&D
Egypt UK
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Plows are universally available for agricultural use. The use of plows for mine clearing certainly dates to before World War II. Many countries are investigating the use of plows that protect the full width of combat vehicles as opposed to the generally used track-width plows now in service.
III-17-136
DATA SHEET III-17.7. MINE ROLLER

The use of mine rollers pushed by a tracked vehicle such as a tank is the classic method for defeating simple pressure-pulse mines both on and off road. The simple countermeasure to the mine roller is the use of a double-impulse fuze, in which the first impulse by the roller is ignored and the fuze is actuated by the first bogey wheel of the tank. Mine rollers can also be effective in clearing modern magnetic fuzed mines, particularly under the track of the roller. None identified. None identified. None identified. Survivability of roller banks; repeated exposure to mine blast overpressures leads to failure of the roller bank assembly. None identified. None identified.
RATIONALE Large rollers, mounted together in separate roller banks in front of the tracks of armored vehicles, are used to detect road mines and to proof areas against simple, single-impulse mine fuzes. The method combines speed together with a roller survivability generally limited to two mine detonations at the edge of the roller bank. The survivability of the mine roller is greater if the mine detonations occur under the center of the roller bank. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Canada Germany
Legend:

Extensive R&D
China South Africa
Denmark UK

Moderate R&D
Egypt United States
Significant R&D
Limited R&D
Rollers have been used since World War II to actuate single pressure plate landmines. Most armies throughout the world have rollers that can be pushed from an armored platform to assault minefields. Lighter disposable rollers have also been affixed to lighter platforms for road sweeping and clearing missions.
III-17-137
DATA SHEET III-17.7. VAPOR/PARTICLE DETECTION

Detection of explosive vapor that has leaked through a mine structure or has been emitted by small amounts of explosive in contact with the outside surface of a mine can play an important role with other detection techniques in explosive verification. The difficulty with this approach is that only small residual amounts of trace vapor remain at the earths surface above the buried mine. TNT has a very low vapor pressure, and recent DARPA measurements indicate that it is difficult to find trace amounts even in the vegetation above the buried mines. None identified. None identified. None identified. Unknown and variable vapor/particle emission rates for sealed landmines make it problematical that vapor detection will be a robust method to detect buried mines. Explosive compounds clutter the battlefield, and it is difficult to predict the ability of explosive sniffers to retain sufficient sensitivity to detect trace explosive amounts in large explosive vapor backgrounds. Explosive sniffers are being used in airports and for building security. This approach is also being exploited for use in humanitarian demining. This is a moderately expensive technology to develop and field.
RATIONALE Chemical detectors are an excellent tool to find trace amounts of explosives; however, for the countermine role, the system must detect explosives in a wide range of environments and over clutter differences differing by many orders of magnitude. WORLDWIDE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Legend:

Extensive R&D
Germany
Significant R&D
South Africa
UK
Limited R&D
Moderate R&D
Chemical-vapor-detection technology is in use in many of the worlds airports today. South Africa uses a variety of chemical-vapor-detection schemes coupled with the use of canines for explosive detection.
III-17-138
SECTION 17.8SEA AND LITTORAL REGION MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Highlights Mine hunting systems capable of stream, tow, and recovery operations from helicopters and that use onboard sonars for mine detection and laser sensors for mine identification are being developed. Airborne lidar mine-detection systems are being developed to rapidly detect moored and floating mines. New software that uses both archival and in situ environmental data in mine countermeasure equipment is being designed to improve through the sensor mine detection and mine identification capabilities. Ultrasensitive, optical-fiber, magnetic-field sensors and superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDS) are being developed for detection of metal ocean mines. Superconducting magnets are being developed to project magnetic flux densities sufficient for shallow water minesweeping of mines that use magnetic fuzes. Spectral shaping of plasma discharge acoustic sources are being used to emulate shiplike acoustic signatures for minesweeping applications. Electromagnetic and acoustic sensors are being fused for detecting proud and buried mines in very shallow water environments. Low-frequency synthetic aperture sonars are being developed for detecting mines on or in the ocean floor. Mid-frequency synthetic aperture sonars are being developed for long-range detection and classification of bottom mines. Toroidal volume search sonars are being developed for high area coverage of mines. Streak tube imaging lidar, range gate lasers, and laser line scanners are being developed for mine identification. Laser sensors are being developed for fluorescence detection of plastics and other anthropogenic compounds dissolved in seawater. Expendable fiber-optic tethered vehicles with sonar and video links and that can be deployed from airborne vehicles to hunt and kill individual mines with shaped charges are being developed. Rocket-propelled explosive net arrays and line charges are being developed for the standoff neutralization of mines in the surf zone. Supercavitating projectiles fired from airborne platforms are being developed to rapidly neutralize sea mines. Precision-guided submunitions are being developed to neutralize beach zone mines and obstacles.
OVERVIEW The sea offers strategic and tactical mobility to those who control it. During most of the 20th century, however, control of the sea has been focused on the requirements to transition to war on land. The requirements to ferry massive forces ashore and then provide logistic support to those forces has severely limited maneuverability and has restricted choices of landing areas. In the future, the United States will face many different threats to its security and national interests. Most likely, these threats will be in the littorals because more than 75 percent of the worlds population and its largest and capital cities are on or near coasts. The requirement to project power ashore means the ability to perform forced entry as well as disaster relief. Both sea mines and mines in the littoral regions limit the
III-17-139
ability to maintain pace and sustain operations. It is essential to shape the battlespace in a theater of operations to deal with mines quickly and effectively. Mines are inexpensive weapons of choice for most third world countries, and can be highly effective when employed in the littoral regions, shipping lanes, and ports. Mine countermeasures includes knowing where the mines and surf/beach zone obstacles are, the ability to clear mines and obstacles, and the ability to obstruct or to destroy mine-laying platforms or mine stockpiles. Mine countermeasure equipment and technology is needed to support four different types of operations: (1) mapping, survey, and intelligence operations; (2) surveillance operations; (3) organic mine countermeasure operations; and (4) dedicated mine-countermeasure operations. Therefore, minecountermeasure operationsminesweeping and jamming, mine/minefield hunting, and mine/obstacle neutralizationrequire a spectrum of technology skills ranging from the use of national mapping and intelligence assets to specific mine-countermeasure assets. Shallow-water influence minesweeping relies on projecting false magnetic and acoustic signatures that trick mines employing influence sensors into firing the mine prematurely. Current minesweeping devices use a helicopter to tow a small hydrofoil sled that contains both an electrical generator and a long cable that conducts a large current to project false magnetic-flux densities. MCM ships (Avenger Class) also stream long cables and acoustic devices to project false magnetic and acoustic signals to sweep the mines. New superconducting sources together with plasma discharge acoustic sources are being developed to emulate simultaneously a ships magnetic and acoustic signatures. A variety of organic mine countermeasures equipment is being developed to be used in different situations and environments. The AN/AQS20/X is a helicopter-deployed sensor that uses sonars and laser sensors to detect, classify, and identify bottom and tethered mines. The airborne laser mine detection system uses blue-green laser reflections to rapidly detect moored and floating mines. This system will provide both quick-reaction airborne mine reconnaissance and percursory reconnaissance for dedicated mine countermeasure units. The remote minehunting system (RMS) is an independent platform that will provide surface combatants an organic system capable of detection, classification, identification, and location of moored and bottom mines. RMS uses the AQS-20/X as its sensor payload. The Airborne Mine Neutralization System consists of an expendable neutralization vehicle that can be deployed from a helicopter. The expendable vehicle includes sonar and video links for mine detection and identifica

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Militarily Critical Technologies (MCT)

June 1996 (Through Change 4: March 1999)

Size (kb) MCT Section (pdf)

86 183 70 126 124 77 59 67 185 484 89 29 29 96 53 6

The Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part I, "Weapons Systems Technologies"

SECTION 1MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

Sec 1.1 Theater Ballistic Missiles

Sec 1.2 ICBMs

Sec 1.3 Cruise Missiles

Sec 1.4 Combat FixedWing Aircraft

Sec 1.5 Artillery

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities:

exceeds sufficient level

Figure 1.0-1. Means of Delivery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

SECTION 1.1THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES (TBMs)

Propulsion Storable Liquid Propellant Engines Strap-on Boosters

Weapons Integration Bomblets or Submunitions TEL Manufacturing Separating Warheads

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities:

exceeds sufficient level

Figure 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters

Automatic-guidance/ target-loading software

Acid etch metal removal

Spin, flow, and shear forming machines

Automated welding equipment

Jigs and frames to maintain shapes and rotate large cylinders

Composite filament winding equipment

Helical winding logic

Composite tape laying equipment

Two axis or more control of tape placement

Tape supply and tension numerical controls

Composite weaving or interlacing equipment

Numerical control of the weaving process

Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Hot melt prepregs for composite materials

Prepreg material produced from phenolic or epoxy resins None identified

Hot melt prepreg machine

Adaptive aerodynamic control surfaces and actuators

Mach 0.9 and greater wind tunnels

Schlieren photography or other flow field phenomena recording instruments

WA Cat. 9B; MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B

Short response time instrumentation

Digital control, closedloop vibration test equipment

Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Solid propellant motors

Total impulse of >1,000,000 lb f-sec

WA Cat. 9A; MTCR 2, 20; CCL Cat. 9A; USML IV

Liquid propellant engines Total impulse of >1,000,000 lb f-sec

WA ML 8; USML V; MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C

WA ML 8; USML V; MTCR 4; CCL Cat. 1C MTCR 3; USML IV

MAPO, TEPAN, None identified Catocene, Butacene

Large torsion shaft dynamometers

Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (contd)

Rocket motor/engine test stands

Test stands capable of withstanding a thrust of >20,000 lb.

MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; USML IV MTCR 2; USML IV

Thrust vector control (for strap-on or multiple body missiles)

Telemetry or encrypted telemetry data transmission hardware