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1YJ.Y middle
is to make
sense
of Plato's to unify
account
of desire what
in the are
To do that
I need
or reconcile
at first sight two quite different accounts: the doctrine of eros in the in the Repub Symposium and the tripartite theory of motivation
lic.1 It may be that the two theories are after all irreconcilable, the Republic.
that Plato simply changed his mind on the nature of human desire
after writing theories This the Symposium end in failure. and before composing must but
to reconcile the
first. some con
temporary
to formulate articulate his view
interest.
a full-scale the concept
Plato,
in the Republic,
theory of desire
of the some
subject critical
Plato of the
assumptions. is perhaps the only major philosopher of twentieth-century central discoveries But view it will within
to the
psychology,
some
in of
Plato and Freud. between comparisons to begin Plato's structive by presenting the contemporary of action. theory
I It is commonly a voluntary plain at supposed, or intentional least that to ex by philosophers, we must a action both identify
1 I ignore whatever For present there may be differences purposes of the Phaedrus between and I and that of the Republic, the psychology to deal with the complications in later works introduced make no attempt I briefly discuss of and Timaeus. the treatment such as the Philebus such as the Gorgias and Lysis. desire in earlier dialogues
Review Metaphysics of Metaphysics 41 (September 1987): 77-103. Copyright ? 1987 by the Review of
CHARLES H. KAHN
the agent's could desire for a
in question will
not motivate in every desire was
lead to
the case.
This
ought Hobbes, spies,
is and
to the to the
abroad
I want
embodies common cized
to call attention
in some
of
theory It is but it is still widely discussions, accepted. treatment in Donald for example, Davidson's influential for action: a reason The is just a desire-belief pair.3 one significant old. With differ very is that, he for action, explanation is funda that motivation difference it, "we desire something we because (no?sis)" The
in question is, in fact, can be traced back it Aristotle avoids give the Humean does
to Aristotle. a two-factor
(Metaphysics A.7.1072a29).
pattern by Hobbes For Aristotle ultimately the slave, ing action. nant form
It is the reversal
the difference.4 double-factor it remains
of this explanatory
theory, the master reason and is not
even
it needs the cooperation of desire though can play this role because Reason boul?sis, in human is fully rational. of desire beings, theory may rightly be regarded as the
Neverthe of the
less, Aristotle's
source
traditional
assumption
that human
action
is to be explained
by
2 Leviathan 1.8. the comments of John Cooper, Compare of Human Motivation," Theory History of Philosophy Quarterly
3-21.
"Plato's 1 (1984):
on Ac See D. Davidson, and Causes," in Essays "Actions, Reasons tions and Events (Oxford, 1980), 3-19 (although Davidson speaks not of but more generally desires of "pro-attitudes"). to the For a challenge Humean view see T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism 1970), (Oxford, 4 or Leviathan 1.6: "But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite that is it, which he for his part calleth Good" (Hobbes's Leviathan, Desire; ed. C. B. Macpherson [Penguin Books, 1968], 120).
29-30.
79
and desire,
in a later if we
It is essential
regard theory. Plato, seem It is hard because this
of Aristotle
quite to us
in this
different
of Plato's
a double-factor so familiar
And there may be passages Plato in the dialogues where himself flirts with such a view.5 But in the Republic, and most mature is his fullest psychological theory, In the Republic not a double-factor at all. is no con there theory can be contrasted with and in this sense that reason, cept of desire of desire. The fun does not have Aristotle's concept simply can be illustrated the two views at the between damental difference of terminology, is also particularly level to be good), and pride), where clear. the historical Aristotle connection recognizes between three species them of
to be the merest
common
Plato
for what
is judged
anger The in gen
genus eral;
which and
with connected feelings or desire for pleasure). is orexis, desire species is to orektikon clear based that upon
principle corresponding psychic of desire). Now the names alone make faculty are directly of desire Aristotle's three species
the
partition
Plato has
But
term. term and no generic The genus comparable never occurs no accident. in his writings; orexis and that is (desire) he may Aristotle the word, have deliber did not invent Although to fit the needs of his theory.6 at stretched its meaning Plato, ately least in the Republic, has no place for a generic concept of desire, as
like Gorgias 51 have in mind passages and Meno 468a-b, 509d-510a, Socrates claims that everyone desires what is good and 77b-78b, where hence implies that doing evil is to be explained in cognition by a mistake out to me (by Alexander rather than volition. It has been pointed Ne to construe be tempted the contrast that one might the between hamas) as a distinction in the Phaedrus and the two horses charioteer be myth tween reason and desire; but I think that would be a misconstrual. The not reason alone but rational desire: he relies upon charioteer represents the horses for his locomotion but not for his motivation. His desire to is precisely the desire for knowledge behold the Forms and the good that (I will argue) is constitutive of reason in the Republic. 6 The only earlier use of orexis is in three fragments of Democritus at least two of which appear genuine (DK B.72, 219, 284), (no.s 219 and seems to use orexis and epithymia Democritus 284). interchangeably.
80
Freud
CHARLES H. KAHN
Plato (psyche) Reason Desire Aristotle (psyche) Sensation Nutrition
1.
ego
2. ?
(orexis) 1. boul?sis
2.
thymos
3. id (libido)
3. epithymia ("appetite")
3. epithymia
opposed to some other psychic faculty. The tripartition of the Re public is not the division of a faculty of desire but a division of the
itself. psyche the soul can reason appears all From also another be described not as some of view, Plato's of point tripartition as a partition But of desire. then distinct but as a particular principle
form of desire.
distinguishes
When Aristotle
three from
divides desire
reason,
sense-perception,
When
out
Plato divides
Platonic to us that that
the psyche
concept it may even
it with
is why
commentators
of the Republic
the for his necessary
is a tripartition
consequences of philosophy
of desire7
for Plato's as a form
Plato's, good,
conception in mapping his remarks, or the rational he calls boul?sis, in Plato's logistikon, "in the
rational,
part of the soul" (De Anima 3.9.432b5), but this is an understate ment. For Plato the rational desire for what is good just is the
part of the soul. reason itself. for Plato, rational Aristotle's rational principle of desire is,
I begin with a sketch of this extraordinary the Republic, in the context of the tripartite
7 Notably Press, 1977),
Motivation,"
T. H. Irwin, Plato's Moral (Oxford at the Clarendon Theory "Plato's Theory of Compare Cooper, p. 192 n. 20, p. 195.
\*. 5-6.
81
on the subject of dialogues a unified account Plato gives
of eros.
theory
And
of love
I end by considering
compatible
the question
with the
II To begin with
reason be there regarded are as
of
as a form
that may
controversial
Plato says at Republic 9.580d7 is that for the three parts of the soul
to each part, and similarly "one proper pleasures, to each part). and three rules" there are three desires (one proper seem more to construe It might to reason natural the desire proper or property reason not as reason which itself, but as an attribute there three has. I think, but however, between that any such distinction between reason
cannot be a distinction
two essential characterizes
between
hand as the capacity to calculate and to think things through (to logistikon) and as "that by which we learn" (580dl0), but also, on the
other hand, as the philomathes, so that it is called the part which loves to learn, and
which
things
is "always wholly
stand,"
directed
to knowing
"lover of
learning
and lover of wisdom (philo-sophon)" (581b9, in book 9). It was the notion of to philomathes (intellectual curiosity and precisely by
love of learning) followed that Plato first introduced us to the rational prin
the mention
we to the part learn" by a reference "by which Thus the two descriptions, "lover of learning" and "that we we calculate"), are used both learn" in (or "by which
designations
is that nothing
to the four passages cited see book 4.439d5 (hoi logizetai), "Lover of learn and 586e4 (to philosophon). (h?i manthanomen) is of course a standard of the philosophic ing" (philomathes) description both in the Republic temperament, (5.475c2,6.485d3,490a9, etc.) and in the Phaedo Socrates (67b4, 82cl, d9, etc.); in the Phaedrus, applies the term to In addition 9.583a2
82
CHARLES H. KAHN
us want to learn. So although the soul) to learn if it did not make we may and conceptually between the capacity distinguish verbally to know, to know and the desire between just as we may distinguish the theoretical ity to calculate In each Plato. are to know capacity and deliberate, case?theory the these truth are and not the practical capac real distinctions for
only distinguishing This unity principle. that he never makes Aristotle's distinction between Plato's thought in contemplation, exercised wisdom and the theoretical sophia, in action wisdom exercised and delibera the practical phron?sis, tion. This unity of that of what has as and practice theory of truth must the knowledge is worth pursuing, so that
reason and desire?we practice, a single two aspects of what is, for Plato, in is so fundamental of theory and practice and
the truth will ultimately be a desire to know and to possess the good. As Plato tells us inRepublic 6, the good is "that which every
soul pursues and for the sake of which it performs for Plato a desire all its actions"
(505dll).
And
and
of the Good
all reality, rational desire knowledge a desire the good. to know and obtain be not only soul is (or essentially comprises) a desire like Aristotle's for the good, also come clearer The three as we
So the rational
boul?sis.
our sketch of the tripartition. complete are introduced in book 4 by a distinction parts
be
16 [1971]: As Richard has noted Robinson (Phronesis (230d3). the parts of the soul both as instruments by which 46-47), Plato describes we do things and also as agents in their own right. the instru However, or faculty, view of the parts must be seen as an expository device mental, to introduce since it is our actions them at the level of the explanandum, The agent-view of the parts ("lover of learning", that are to be explained. "lover of honor," etc.), on the other hand, represents them as theoretical Plato's of human character entities with explanatory power. explanation in terms of the interaction of these parts. and conduct is given exclusively There is no room for a person or self over and above the three parts on the over in book 9 to the person "handing level of the explanans. References a pictur the throne of his soul" to one or another of the parts constitute not to be taken literally feature of Plato's esque but eliminable exposition, as part of the explanatory It remains model. to be seen how far an to the model. of the three parts is essential conception anthropomorphic see Julia Annas, of anthropomorphism discussion For an interesting here, An Introduction toPlato's Press, 1981), 'Republic' (Oxford at the Clarendon
142-46.
83
which we learn, (2) the thymoeides, the principle "by which we get principle (to philokhr?maton) or angry," and (3) the money-loving
the part begetting we desire the pleasures with concerned food and "by which are distin Thus the parts and the like" (435e-436a).
to so many from the beginning different by reference guished types or impulse.9 or appetitive The third of drives, desires part (to
epithym?tikon)
into biologically non-necessary nal show
will
desires
be elaborately
and further
subdivided
subdivided
necessary are
non-necessary
are latent in everyone, which These criminal desires, impulses. as Plato in a famous in dreams, describes themselves anticipa the rational ele tion of the Freudian "then, when Oedipal insight: . . ment the wild and beastly and is freed from part. sleeps, [wakes] It does not hesitate to try to have inter or with in imagination, anyone else, man, god or beast; it is ready for any deed of murder, and will abstain from no transi, after Shorey). kind of food" (9.571c-d Plato's of the picture all shame and course with a mother epithym?tikon thus corresponds with rather nicely to Freud's depiction reason.
of
the Freudian
have
in Plato's
principle
of anger
(to thy
to domi
prestige, (philoni to win") and philotimon 'lov "loving literally, "loving victory," " terms As these honor' Plato's indicate, ing principle (9.581a-b). is self-assertive to competition and directed outwards with others, internalized affinities In view and with of this like the superego.11 self-punishing the love of power and with the desire essentially social character, the It has to be is
thymoeides
See 436b2: The question is whether it is with a different in principle each case "or with the whole soul that we engage in these activities, when we are impelled to do so (hotan horm?s?men)." 10 A. J. P. Kenny, in Plato's Republic," "Mental Health in The Anat omy of the Soul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 1-27. 11 In the Leontius does seem to act the part of the story the thymoeides in reproaching the eyes for their compulsion to gaze at the superego, cannot be its essential But self-reproach corpses (439e-440a). function, since in the parallel (at 441b) from Odyssey 20.17 it is Odysseus' example reason that upbraids his thymoeides (for urging punishment immediately, without regard to the larger plan of action).
84 perhaps cept. wisdom reason ians will "good more But Plato's like Aggression we will focus here of reason than on the like any the
CHARLES H. KAHN
other part. social Freudian con
rational at
level
with
the
represents counsel"
in the psyche.
in the state what represent the knowledge of the guard excellence will be euboulia, They must deliber
ate on behalf
judgment
of the whole
will
be good
The cor
concerning
the welfare
as a whole.
responding
virtue
which
be the excellence
the
of the
which
(441cl); which "has a care for the whole soul" (441e5) and "deliber ates on behalf of the whole soul and body" (442b6). Wisdom con
sists in this part's and ruling the whole person which and giving orders based
on "the knowledge
of the parts
of what
for
is advantageous
(to sympheron)
is common to all
for each
three"
the whole
(442c5-8).
has and as
its specific
"loves
is (orwhat
I shall
This is the
in the
thesis
reason
Republic
good. tageous three; whole at At
at what
community.
Hence
desire,
of reason
such, is neither
said
to be, on egoistic of Plato) readings but the good in every case, nity alone, as such. Good This reason identification, with for desire or at the least can this be
necessary confirmed
good
the distinction
between
reason
as an example a thirsty man Plato who proposes appetite. on the basis from drinking himself of a resistance that prevents comes "from reasoning" thirst pulls him on to drink, (ek logismou): but this pull is "over-powered" force drag (kratein) by a rational
that thirst
85
as desire
This passage has sometimes been for good drink (437d-439a). thought to imply that the appetite (epithymia) in question is a
"blind course, desirable. elemental for other no cognitive with of its object;12 grasp craving," but, as drinkable its object thirst must and hence recognize So a minimum appetite. appetitive A more drives, of gets the angry of cognition complex such as the even is implied form of cognition love of money for the most is required or the pursuit of as
of a sexual object.
are characteristic which moeides, been wronged. component emphasizes
judgments
of the
of a moral
the
sort
part soul, thy it thinks it (i.e., the person) has element of some kind is an essential soul.13 The for drink reason is a desire why Plato as such, and not
of the
to deny
a cognitive to appetite to insist upon element but because he wants to all considerations the appetite's other than getting indifference reason it wants. what In order to establish the distinction between
and appetite Plato must here define, for the first time, the notion of a desire that is essentially independent of any judgment concerning
what or advantageous beneficial, as synonymous). In earlier dialogues, as desire for something construed desire is good, these three terms (taking Plato had systematically to be good or bene judged
ficial.14
view
Opinions will
of the historical the position the represents Socrates, more or (as I believe) a delib naive Plato, of a younger, psychology on Plato's erate to make the part, designed simplification plausible in the Socratic contained On any reading of insights paradoxes. this earlier Plato must with it in order break to view, decisively of desire reason factors and in the as separate con and potentially appetite as a desire It is precisely soul. for what is
distinguish flicting
that reason
is set apart
from
12 J. to Plato's Introduction 'Republic' 139. 13 Annas, This has been argued at length by Jon Moline, "Plato on the Com of the Psyche", Archiv f?r Geschichte der Philosophie, 60 (1978): plexity 14 77c-78b. See Section Gorgias 468b-c, 499e; Meno III, below. 15 195: reason of consists So, rightly, Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, "rational desires for the over-all good." Plato's Theory Similarly, Cooper,
1-26.
CHARLES H. KAHN
parts rational of the soul are
of recogniz only capable must some use of means-end rea also make they their goal, at least in the intra-psychic competition very or appetite of spirit possibility since it obviously takes some form to succeed (How this con seizing or analogue
in the Humean
The
as much, trol implies of intelligence for these parts reason for their own ends. seen below.) But what if all
in enslaving to use reason, is to be understood will be represented are its twin as minimally goals: (a) the
three
intelligent,
is distinctive
theoretical
love of knowledge,
concern it is primarily the second, more is good. And that practical reason on the in the arguments to distinguish Plato must rely upon For it is not any theoretical basis of psychic conflict. conclusion about the nature of the beverage but only the practical decision that
itwould be harmful
resists impulse In order to see the
help to distinguish
to be speaking of
rule
rational
deliberation
to be pursued but only in ends. On this view, any pursued, when considered." its
count
However, fied, as
things is independently advantageous speci reason con in the hedonistic of the Protagoras: calculus not the ends. we may trols only the means, in fact while Now is not a case that Plato will this as a rational this life, regard as one in which reason describe "rules" he may (archei); though what
consequences
judged as counts
21 n. 18. But Cooper distinguishes about the of Motivation, "judgements the good" from "desires for good that follow upon them," thus introducing Aristotelian of rational and rational desire. bifurcation judgement (On p. 6 he thus speaks of reason having desires.) I do not think this does justice to the radically Platonic of reason as constituted different conception by
desire.
87
in any particular to decision "prevails" (kratei) from acting.16 2. A stronger notion of the rule of reason that the ends of requires not only the means) be rationally For action determined. (and this means that if reason will rules, the goal to be pursued Plato, act or refrain be defined mum by a specific of which version of human the mini welfare, conception is given of virtue in the by the account
Socratic dialogues
the aims introduction at a good life,
(before
develop
of reason
ment
3. In the to be
constituting
activity.
Whereas
tical, here it is both practical and theoretical: it is as knowledge of reality and the Forms (including the Form of the Good) that
reason These progressively sively stronger between both three specifies levels and of provides the rule of the content are of the good life. reason distinguished by to progres corresponding as the goal virtue of rational
richer
accounts
of reason,
characterizations
of the good
action.
ference
The distinction
Plato's
between
account
the dif
in Repub
virtue
in books 5-6.
(But the
and speech of the Re
innovation here: both Diotima's view stronger the doctrine of the Phaedo these later books anticipate
public by identifying
including composed philosophy, 4 access to as a defense Plato
is explicitly Since the Republic Forms.) as a defense of justice and only secondarily of does not emphasize the distinction between (2)
our noticing
of reason"
in books
that it be reason 439c7 it is essential that prevails (kratein), role for though, as we shall see, Plato hints at a more than instrumental reason here. in the In the case of the repression desires of spendthrift but of some appetities oligarchic soul, he speaks not of reason prevailing others dominating kratousas, (epithymias epithymion [554dl0]).
88
CHARLES H. KAHN in (1) and its teleological role in (2) and (3) is
as slave the and and slavish pains, wisdom
reason marked: this is the difference between sharply as master of the passions. Thus the Pha do deprecates of virtue based upon a balancing of pleasures conception in contrast to the life of genuine virtue determinedly
(68d-69c). The Gorgias had argued earlier that no version of (1) can be fully coherent unless it coincides with (2), and hence that the only rational life is one that accepts the Socratic notion of the good.17 A similar argument is implicit in the account of the deviant lives of Republic 8-9, where the rule of reason is identified with the life of the just man (here equated with the philosopher). If reason is able to rule in the soul, itwill specify the life of virtue (the life of philosophy) as the good to be aimed at. If it does not succeed in
doing so, that that can is because it has been so "overpowered" of the good, other even has the by an spirit or
the good.
conception, consequence parts reason a mistake of causing to make in its recognition of the ends to be pursued. it means That is what to be enslaved.18 for reason
conception of the
Reason
to say only
its rule
in (3)?only
philosophy. Plato of reason does not
if it is fully enlightened,
could his present the before 4, even the weaker not
that
in book need
of the rule conception of philosophy. But he his initial in argument all, the tripartite model not only to virtuous Plato's example the notion is of
of the tripartite support psychology. to apply is designed to human beings men, much to philosophers. only so as not under-described, less
generally, Hence
skillfully
to presuppose
reason ruling in the soul that will be specified in the following definition of the virtues.19 All he requires is a single instance in
17 See my "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1, ed. Julia Annas, (1983), 113-18. 18 Here I am agreeing with Cooper (Plato's Theory ofMotivation, p. 19 n. 9 and p. 20 n. 18), against lives as Irwin, who speaks of the deviant a "rational following plan," being "controlled by (the) rational part," or from "a rational resulting choice, made by the rational part" (Plato's Moral I see no textual support for this interpretation. Theory, 227-34). 19 The application seems quite general, of Plato's since the argument is not explicitly limited to the case where reason sets the ends of example
89
some
calculation tion
of reason
of long-term established
of this result. is capable over intense ment prevail answer Plato's here, a primitive contains, tially derivative geous. soul what duct ment urge That is what
But the weakest concep an argument how it must explain can a faculty and judg of cognition
even
the good is "what every is acts": the good it always and for the sake of which pursues our con Whenever we all want in so far as we are rational we can say either it is a judg that is under rational control, to claim that our action that determines is advantageous a rational is good. On Plato's for what desire led by the the good and wanting is no gap between there knowing be that we desire statement something (Even Aristotle's what it seems good to us might have been rejected by Plato as
to pursue it means
is that reason I submit, just is, or essen non for the good, an irreducible, desire to be good and advanta it takes what
misleading,
distinct book
since it suggests
or events.) the good function
episodes
of in terms of the psychology Now means each part of the soul wanting just In the anthropo in a harmonious way.
morphic
will one
Plato
describes
the interaction
of
parts,
judgment. and its judgment thing, over and above to rule is just the expression its desire is beneficial: for what desire is beneficial.20 or the spelling-out for what of its desire that the other reason in ruling, succeeds Whether is, whether in the soul is not some
concerning to them
of the soul the other parts with to perform in harmony to rule desire So reason's
use of reason in what Plato calls include the instrumental action but might Plato cunningly "slavish virtue" However, calculus). (as in the hedonic in the described rule of reason (which is gradually the virtuous insinuates that the desire to drink in his pages, 440a-441e) by suggesting following or disease" "affect (path?mata) is due to excessive (439d2), thus example If is aimed at health and welfare. calculation that the rational implying we would the role of reason were thought of here as merely instrumental, to establish in fact not get the division of psychic parts that Plato wants 7-8 n. 9). reasons developed Plato's Theory of Motivation by Cooper, (for 20 with Cooper to be a disagreement Here there seems (p. 6) who In the end, however, to reason "an innate taste for ruling." ascribes desire for good (p. 8). this from the more fundamental Cooper too derives
90
In order for appetite to listen to reason, and anger be properly hence the need for the scheme of they trained; education in books 2-3. too must Reason be pre-philosophical
properly trained in order to give the right commands; hence the need for philosophy, and for the theory of knowledge and higher education in books 5-7.21 By the end of book 6 we know that the
learning part of the soul will not be adequately prepared to rule
the only knowledge that can satisfy its desire, of namely cognition the Good "which in all its actions." soul pursues The every itself, we find in earlier which such as the Gorgias and principle dialogues the Meno, the universal of reason. and which was cited in book 4, that "everyone desires
and as the essential desire beings for Plato all knowledge culminates
in knowledge
knowable see that the
all things
as well
identical with
but which, to state see
is
according but
knowable.
can be an object how for see why or how the Good makes other I have no solution to propose to here even without an explication of the
difficult
problems.22
But
21 The theory of the virtues in book 4 is not self-contained, as we can see if we ask what activity of reason constitutes wisdom to book according 4. If reason rules, it aims at the welfare of each part and of the whole as well. But what is the welfare of the rational And what is it for part? reason to do "its own proper work"? for an occasional mention of Except there is no hint of an adequate knowledge (428b6ff., 428cll-d8, 442c6), answer until we reach books 5-7. We can give no non-circular account of what Plato means to by the rule of reason until we can give some content the autonomous as love of (non-instrumental) activity of reason, conceived and pursuit of the good. And here the notion of what is good knowledge must be specified by more than civic concord and psychic harmony, since these both presuppose the notion of the rule of reason. 22 see G. Santas, For discussion of the Good "The Form in Plato's in Essays in Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Republic", Preus P. White, Plato (Albany: SUNY, 1983), 232-63. Compare Nicholas on Knowledge and Reality Hackett, (Indianapolis: 1976), 100-03.
91
factor
the
is
rationality. of the soul have a cognitive seen, all three parts of desire. But only at the level and all three are also forms aspect of reason do the cognitive and desiderative elements fully coincide,
essential
fulfillment must
avoids ascent mechanical
be achieved
repetition of Beauty ascent
together.
and
Al
one-to-one
to the Form
equivalent
to the dialectical
of the Good inRepublic 6-7. Without begging the question whether the Form of Beautiful is to be taken as strictly identical for Plato
with the Form the precisely same of Good, role we can recognize dialogue, scheme desire that the two Forms in each as terminus play for the scheme
of philosophical
tion
enlightenment.
this whole as a universal is structured for the good. by the no A cursory
glance at the earlier dialogues inwhich this theme is developed will help us appreciate the rather different ways in which this desire is articulated in the Symposium and Republic.
Ill
The Gorgias discussion the earliest with any system is, I believe, dialogue of desire. And it is the only dialogue the before a contrast to recognize and Republic between rational desire (expressed by the verb by Callicles boulesthai) as and sensuous
atic
The
life
praised
23 Aristotle's distinction between boul?sis terminological (rational is inherited from the Gorgias, probably by desire) and epithymia (appetite) in the Academy. The Charmides also men way of semi-technical usage a terminological distinction between epithymia tions, in passing, aiming at and boul?sis aiming at some good (167e, where eras is said to be pleasure The author of the Gorgias and Char directed towards something kalon). not suffering from any "Socratic" mides was obviously illusion that all desire is desire for the good. the description of erotic (And compare emotion at Charmides 155d.)
92 goal anger where of a naturally or "spirited" One passage are superior drives even man, as well.24 correspond
CHARLES H. KAHN
roughly to the "appe
include the
appetites
ing attempt to define a rational part of the soul. The psychological The possibility of a theory of the Gorgias is at best incipient.
conflict rational (500a; the Gorgias what he between choice cf. 491dll, thinks desires between is not the envisaged, satisfaction although of good wants we and do hear bad of a desires
a famous
we may closely
as to the
desire.25 desire
all men
good
things; this
object is argued for in the what is bad (Meno claim that "no one
77cl, 78b4).
The Meno wants one to be of Socrates' supports unhappy" protreptic serves as the paradox with Similarly takes the (78a4-5).26 arguments in the Euthydemus, its premiss: "We
as
all
want
to be happy"
(282a2).
As we
this
starting come We
Symposium
"dear structs dear
in what
that is
con
for its own sake." (philon) the regress, and then breaks for the sake of Z, etc.," Socrates
of Y, Y is the notion
of the primary or truly dear thing "for the sake of which all other things are dear" (219c-220b). This alone is truly called dear; other things are dear only for the sake of this primary object, of which
24 in the Gorgias. There is no trace of the thymoeides Presumably Plato had not yet thought of it as a distinct type of desire; but in any case it in the Gorgias. A third there would have been no reason to introduce class of impulses would have spoiled the neat dualism by which Calliclean are opposed to Socratic boulesthai. appetites 25 Here again we have a paradox that Plato echoes in Gorgias 468b-c. do what it wants ruled soul will by no means the Republic: the tyrannically an boul?th?i) Rep. 9.577el-2; 468e5 and d5-7. cf. Gorgias (ha 26 is of course questionable. The logic of these arguments For an to defend in my view makes them too tame, see G. them which attempt and Henley: Socrates Kegan Paul, Santas, (London, Boston Routledge as protreptic must be understood I think these arguments 1979), 187-89. rather than deductive.
93
The
"original" is left open in the Lysis, identity of this mysterious though an interpretation in terms of the good is hinted at (222c4, d5;
cf. 221e3-4). and primarily For dear a fuller we turn account now of what Plato regards as truly to the Symposium.
IV
to the priestess which Socrates attributes great speech into two parts. falls The first and longer section Diotima presents or lesser mysteries of love based upon the universal the preliminary The desire for happiness. The concluding portion of Diotima's speech,
designed for full initiates, describes the philosophic ascent to the Beautiful itself outside of time and place. It will be necessary to
between get clear on the relation to reconcile before we attempt the this exoteric theory and with esoteric the doctrines ac tripartite
count of desire in the Republic. The initial account of love is prefaced by a general definition of desire (epithymia) as wanting (boulesthai) to get what one lacks or keep what one has (200b-e). Although bodily appetities other than
sex are not mentioned, and the analysis is broad enough to apply to
them as well;
money, fame,
it is explicitly
learning,
extended
in addition
to love of children,
to erotic desires
sports,
proper
(205d, 208c ff.). Eros is first specified as desire for what is beauti ful, which includes or is identical to what is good (201c; cf. 204el,
206al). desire ther desire things the possession of good things is happiness, nor admits this desire neither needs happiness; explanation (205a). as for happiness forever and Diotima that the then is, as pursuit eros, as hence reinterprets the desire of But and all men of any the fur
universal good
to possess
immortality
by procre
ation in beauty, beauty either of body or of soul (206b7). At first sight this definition picks out the erotic as a special case of the
general pursuit that all human of happiness. become beings But pregnant since Diotima and have goes on to claim a natural to desire
procreate, and that at the biological level this can be seen as a pursuit of immortality shared even by the animals, it turns out that specifically sexual activity connected with begetting counts less as a
species lastingly than as a sample of eros structure The good. conceived revealed in the as the pursuit of what case of biological is
CHARLES H. KAHN
Heroes, kinds poets and
ordinary
parents
live different
of erotic
lives because they identify in different ways what the Lysis calls "that which is truly and primarily dear," that for the sake of which
all other are valued. things Thus the more popular characterized different by theory choices surveys of the different ultimate forms erotic of love,
object. in
The notion of a
only of mysteries exist" (210al). is good, by pro
possession
mysteries of what
creation
erotic session
led in
matters,
bodies,
then upwards
to the
of knowledge, to the and finally excellence, true knowledge of true beauty, the Beautiful itself. the phi Only can achieve in contact the Form with what every human losopher being wants, immortality in possession of the good, since only the
Form is itself wholly good and lasting, imperishable (211a-b) and divine (211e3). Diotima's ladder of love is not only the true way to
philosophic ness. That this present cal associates knowledge; is, I suggest, doctrine it is also the has true path to human to have with why Plato not in intimate arranged conversation happi Socrates
philosophi but at a prominent social occasion (as in the Phaedo) a group in Athenian of leading before life and culture. The figures over the poets crown in the contest for the of victory philosopher's wisdom public Plato is not claim chose the achievement the teacher of some narrow to be this of what all men but specialist want to know. of Forms a If (as the
occasion
to reveal
his mature
doctrine
I believe,
Beauty
the Form of
was
alone,
of Forms
highest
momentous
Diotima's
a single desire that begins by taking beautiful bodies as its object and ends with the beatific vision of the Form, just as in the Republic
it is a single around, turned cognitive faculty from the shadows that on must the converted, literally cave wall to the vision of be
95
the desire
serves precisely to link the carnal lover to as participants of a common in the pursuit the metaphysical lover, the Platonic philosopher, us with of Plato's the problem But that presents subject of desire.
consistency
on the
The theoretical
unification
ismade
reason of desire between the bifurcation only by ignoring possible was in the Gorgias, and documented which and sensual appetite,
which reappears in the Phaedo before being replaced by the trifur in In following the Meno and Euthydemus cation of the Republic.
as a rational desire for happiness desire the universal in effect considers of Diotima is good, the doctrine only the alto calls boulesthai, and ignores the Gorgias kind of desire which As a con of Calliclean the broader "appetites." spectrum gether which conflict of psychic the phenomena it also sequence ignores construing for what of the richer so large in the Republic. Once we take account the conception how are we to reconcile of the Republic, psychology sources of desire with Diotima's of three or more there independent loom doctrine production of eros, but which ends begins with with the sexuality contemplation for the and the of drive to re
incorporeal
Beauty?
Forms?
How
to be
"transformed"
Or must
the psychology
of the Republic to do
of the Republic?
to the
of diversity justice there is a of conflict. Although there is as far as I can see no clear in any earlier dialogue.27 The
27 the at Phaedo of tripartition We have a foretaste 68cl-3, where else rational love of wisdom and learning here, philomathes (philosophos "love of the body" with the non-rational e.g., 67b4) is contrasted where, as "love of money and honor, either one or both." which is characterized as soon as Plato splits these two "corporeal" loves emerges Tripartition 82c5-8. Some scholars have found the apart, as he does in fact at Phaedo
CHARLES H. KAHN
anticipates the Re
it is incompatible public theory of desire but whether as at first sight it might seem to be. theory,
There are, however, several considerations against
with
the
this
as
sumption that the two dialogues are flatly incompatible on the subject of desire. The first consideration is the doctrine of Forms, identical in the Symposium, Phaedo, and which is substantially It would be strange (though of course not impossible) Republic.
that Plato three should have one dialogues, his mature metaphysical presented a psychological contains of which theory doctrine in in
compatible with that of the other psychology of the Phaedo, though the Republic, is entirely consistent the fact that Plato in the other
abandoned the
two. (I indicate below how the less fully articulated than that of with it.) Even more striking is two dialogues has certainly not
The account is not speech Plato in his by of philo only not presen
of the Symposium. theory of Diotima's love in the last part sophical taken for granted but actually contradicted tation of philosophy as a form of eros
in the Phaedo
and Republic.28
On this score it is not only the metaphysics but also the psychology None of this of the three dialogues that forms a unified whole. is compatible with tripartition; but it proves that Diotima's theory
does at least I suggest be to take of any eros an attempt justify two different ways not as restricted but as an to reconcile in which the two. try nor source ta combine we might desire
and Republic.
to rational undifferentiated parts, instinctual with other
energy ian
for all
three
id or
a pool of be identified
On my
rational
view
by
an
at reference the "three vaguer types of life" in the much or love of 205d to "those who turn to eros in money-making Symposium or love of wisdom So Cornford, (philosophia)". sports (philogymnastia) in G. Vlastos, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium", ed., Plato: A also 2 (Anchor Books, Collection Critical Essays 1971), 123. Cornford of at Symp. 208c3 with "the spirited the pursuit of fame (philotimia) connects we have only the raw part of the soul" (ibid., 125). But in the Symposium it is on its way to being organized in the Phaedo for tripartition; material in triads. 28 490b2-7. Phaedo 65c9, 66b7, 66e2-3, 67b9, 68a2-7, Rep. 6.485b-d, doctrine of
97
on the rechannelling of desire in Republic 6. passage important a person's we know in one direction, incline "When desires strongly in other directions, that they will be weaker like a stream of water directed to flow off into one channel. and So when the someone's desires have set towards with be concerned like, they will itself and will abandon the plea by is truly a lover of wisdom (philo-sophos)" itself literally, the part of the notion of some desires leav
body,
of bodily pleasure
contradict each the
to direct
soul
themselves
towards
ac de
standard
since sires, learning introduce But if we here source desires objects. plaining Freud, for the desires direction in one The
and
belong parts. pleasure bodily a generalized notion of eros as the common of of each part, we see how the strengthening will result
in weakening for other desires in ex model is used by Freud very hydraulic of sublimation. Libidinal his concept says impulses, to one another like a network of communicating "are related same that the is, for abandoning same towards impulse This is the process on their sexual is more aim and
canals filled with fluid"; these impulses show a great "capacity for
displacement," redirecting ble or acceptable. calls "sublimation," original an aim that accessi
of rechannelling which Freud the grounds the that society will recognize a view of eros as aim as "higher."29 The parallel surrogate suggests a common to be distributed between the of motivational energy pool for one means that more in such a way less for three psychic parts Plato's reference force. to rechannelling is not a random is of central The view expressed and their unity claim in wisdom. with
another. image
out
doctrinal theory
for his
of the virtues
virtues:
desirable
perfection
to one who
of
29 viere,
to Psychoanalysis
trans.
Joan Ri
CHARLES H. KAHN
and sensual will hold luxury indulgence so that the virtues of honesty and temper temptations, be trivial of this redirection of desire into consequences image of rechannelling so understood might permits be causally us to see respon
eros. The philosophical how the pursuit of wisdom sible for moral The for many and also virtue. of eros in view
psychology
(the tripartition
already noticed). points
it
It
puzzling
in the
psychology
the tyrant's represents less called This
of the Republic,
soul, which the extreme
namely
passion
in
by identical
is essentially criminal and destructive and of philosophical is neverthe eros, opposite the very same name: er?s or lust (9.572e5, 573b7, d4). nomenclature for the two polar extremes would then
unity of psychic
part.30
Attractive
radical
can be attributed
do nothing to account as independent sources to account for in books the facts 4, 8 and
conflict
by which
reason
of eros
for good
is all, this view in the Sympo on the part of things as prefiguring both
everyone
we find
(205a).
in the Gorgias,
boul?sis and Plato's conception of the logistikon in the What these parallels with Aristotle and with other Republic. works of Plato strongly suggest is that eros in the Symposium
30 This Freudian eros in terms of libido was of Platonic interpretation See his "Group Psychology and the Analysis accepted by Freud himself. of the Ego," in the Standard Edition of Freud's work, vol. 18, p. 91, where he cites studies by Nachmansohn and Pfister that treat Plato as a precur sor of psychoanalysis. is a similar comment There in the preface to the on Sexuality", 4th edition of "Three Essays Standard Edition I 7, p. 134. am indebted here to some unpublished work by G. Santas.
Aristotle's
99
as desire
justice between the erotic ascent of the upon coincidence, verging of the Cave and the cognitive and the Sun. progress Symposium in then becomes: The question how can the interpretation of eros parallel, terms of rational desire explain a solution desiderative the the broad scope of eros in the Sym
of desire
that
in the Republic?
emphasizes to degree in hand go hand the the rule as alter seen, in the it is of
native
components of desire and rechannelling of the soul can be understood phenomenon. reason for their As we own
have
by perverting
lower parts
that the
de
of
by
gaining acceptance
rule over
is beneficial,
that
and thus can harmonize principles and integrate the psyche soul," by its by its "care for the entire of what is advantageous for each one and for the whole "knowledge
which
What
and the rule of reason is the com of psychic metaphors harmony or resistance of emotional interference absence to, the with, plete is in our best rational of what interest. appraisal We reason have in the Phaedo by the sl vivid lower to be enslaved of what it means for description of the soul, which in this parts
dialogue are presented as the desires (epithymiai) connected with the body. The philosopher, who is here designated as the philo
the mathes, and fastened from which (82e-83a). bodily these tense will of learning, that his soul is fettered recognize in a cunning to the body constructed of desire, prison it by gentle he must release admonition and persuasion as far as possible will abstain from The philosopher lover and desires because he sees that to undergo pains, one feels is to suffer harm: "when in cognitive a given and true, so that object, although it takes one is forced it is not. to . . .
pleasures,
experiences or pain concerning pleasure as clearly real this thing regard to the body and makes
Each pleasure and pain is like a nail which clasps and rivets the soul
it corporeal, for real what
100
ever the body cave declares to be so" (83c-d).31 Unless
CHARLES H. KAHN
it is enlightened
by philosophy,
tive ambition one's and
constructed
favorite
lightened
(and assuming
training
is also available),
the guidance of the cognitive aspect parts accept reason what is to their own advantage and will moder concerning to the judgment of reason. ate their own claims is This according as the rechannelling described of de phenomenon is the progressive of reason's half reinforcement sire. (The other own preoccupation It is not that with and the Good.) knowledge or political is transformed ambition into the love sensual appetite one half of the of wisdom; proper reason. directed economy How these by definition, But they now objects. As a result of this to its own proper desires operate remain within attached the the limits desires to their own
will
object
by assigned of reason
in the over-all
place
in the desire
ladder
of love
in
the Symposium.
prison-house
is represented
by the first stage, in which the initiate is enamoured of a single beautiful body (210a). But a skillful erotic guide will use the initial
triggering effect of sexual attraction sense-perception get the lover exemplar in the Phaedo's to see his desired principle of effect (like the triggering account in order to of Recollection) as beautiful, as an and hence object that is to be found elsewhere as
of a desirable
well.
This is the first step in the cognitive liberation of the rational principle that will permit it to turn its attention towards its proper object. What is affected by this first step is not the sensual desire to the epithym?tikon) but the as such (which belongs essentially
cognitive component to the extent that it represents the rational prin
to a lovely body, as ciple temporally trapped in the attachment to be good and real and hence as an object of something judged
misplaced rational desire. What happens in the course of erotic
cites William James In this connection (who Shorey appropriately the most in turn to Locke and Berkeley): "Among all sensations, appeals or of pain." W. James, are those productive of pleasure belief-compelling 2 (Dover, in The Principles 1950), 306, cited by Shorey of Psychology, in G. Vlastos, "Plato's Ethics," ed., Plato 2, p. 28 n. 129.
31
101 is directed
and the "he will thinking
"upwards," first
in all this it a small bodies: intense mat relax
of beauty recognition the lover has reached for a single in the body,
same"
despising
stage it and
ter" (210b5-6).
result The
it is the
In
the Symposium,
metaphysical
the rechannelling
takes place
lust to
pro
passion
cess of altering
the description
under which
the object
is initially
the lover's attention from a view of the and thus converting desired, a vision as consisting to of individual world bodies of the incorpo from which this phenomenal real principles world derives whatever beauty and rational structure it possesses. initiate may of a higher Beauty. come This cognitive the redirec
in
a cognitive is essentially Symposium enterprise, to an inadequate attachment from rational desire redirection to its proper goal, "the true knowledge
edge of Beauty itself" (211c7). What the Symposium makes clear is what is only partially indicated by the description of rechannelling
in the Republic: the same time that the process a process of enlightenment for reason of reeducation for the desires.32 is at
VI
has view
I want
that over
Plato's
theory
of desire
ego and
The
advantage
in both
cases
a faculty of cognition
and judgment
32 account
Theory,
167-71,
gives
a partially
analogous
102
CHARLES H. KAHN
source of moti
if not simply identical to, its own autonomous with, as good the recognition of an action Hence vation. or contribution as a component to one's welfare?is of reason, and in favorable the act. of the circumstances a sufficient this practical power Admitting of inventing artificial necessity decision view issues seems all only over Freud's "the ego to me a part
a rational
icant.
is after
purposively modified by its proximity to the dangers of reality. From a dynamic point of view it isweak; it borrows its energy from
the id."34 Freud of rational with which babies, derives has principle begins theory fantile of the ego, as the conception his genetic because of he knowledge, approach: sense of "reality." who have a very weak But a such limited the a
of rational from an in faculty cognition to understand is poorly rational equipped pleasure-principle to account unable for the development and wholly decision-making the motiva and mathematics. of theoretical science By deriving tion sires hand for rational the to know knowledge truth and and obtain action what irreducible de basic, is good, and on the other structure of reason the from from
the content and by deriving as structured of intelligibil of things by objective principles can do more for the existence and than account of science ity, Plato for some people, for example, He can also explain why, philosophy. nature
for a devoted
the world, when we
scientist,
cannot
knowledge
bring
is the most
it is such
important
thing in
ourselves
is the best
The frustration
as the frus
understood to be good.35
33 rea in conceiving For a sensitive discussion of the issues involved see C. M. Korsgaard, son as a source of motivation about "Scepticism 83 (1986): 5-25. The Journal Practical Reason," of Philosophy 34 on Psycho-analysis, trans. Lectures Introductory Freud, New 107. York: Norton, W. J. H. Sprott 1933), (New 35 or eudaimonia If one appeals here to a standing desire for welfare we have in effect Aristotle's to explain notion the efficacy of deliberation, of boul?sis or rational desire, which gets focussed on a particular action by a judgment to act (prohairesis), the fusion of issuing in a choice or decision reason and desire the fusion, saw Plato, recognizing (NE 6. 2,1139b4-5). no advantage in splitting the two apart. On the question of whether his see Section VII. is defensible, position
103
two is or
of desire
of judgement same
belief
Although content,
that
is fundamental
a belief and represent
in any analysis
may very them have different can
of rational
the
thought?
a desire
propositional
between
our beliefs to fit the world, "We require but to fit our desires."36 If the desire is for good as an effort to change to see how it is hard it the world, the world
psychic
principle,
identify this principle with desire for the good. Plato might well respond by suggesting that desire for good is
to be our construed not as an effort ourselves own to an objective in order, soul and our pattern: and this will to change to "imitate include but reality the divine" setting with to conform by setting cognitive nature of
our the
capacity
things.
means
it
the
world
knowing
as it is will
the good more of to the
is good.
notionally such
At
not
the limit,
psycho But are of
logically distinct.
Much something prepared love and would this sort to be to defend a view. unless we ladder is surely his elaborate of the cave implied by Plato, the between parallel as a mere coincidence.37
The 36 Richard
University
of Pennsylvania
The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard Uni Wollheim, versity37 Press, 1986), 53. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Helsinki in March 1983 and before various audiences since then, including a lecture at the Catholic of America in October 1983. I am University indebted to my auditors for many valuable and am particularly comments, to Myles and Alexander Nehamas for their detailed grateful Burnyeat criticism.