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Final Paper: Soviet- US Foreign Policy during the 20th Century

History 596 (Independent Study) Dr. Bergman, CCSU

By

Luke Jajliardo

5/9/2011

2 Soviet-American foreign policy during the Cold War is a topic of great debate, John Lewis Gaddis and Nikolai Sivachev offer juxtaposed views of how each state has interacted with the world community. John Lewis Gaddis argues in both The Cold War and We Now Know that the United States developed a foreign policy during the Cold War that, for the most part, kept the real threat of Soviet communism from spreading throughout Europe and protected American interests abroad. Nikolaiv Sivachev argued in Russia and the United States, that the United States acted aggressively against the Soviet Union since its conception and that international communism was not designed to overthrow democratic governments. Furthermore, using the lens of Marxist ideology, Sivachev argues that the Soviet Union simply reacted to the foreign policy of capitalist governments that wished to exploit workers and markets for profit. Even though these arguments are diametrically opposed to one another, ideology plays a crucial role in their arguments. Sivachev fails to see that the one goal of the comintern was spread communism through revolution. He also failed to see the exploitation of his own people through leaders like Stalin and the system of communism itself. Gaddis on the other hand, over estimates the power of nuclear diplomacy and underestimates the role that Soviet leaders had in the demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis and Nikolaiv Sivachev view Soviet-American foreign policy as a result of one nation reacting to another. Sivachev argues that the United States acted aggressively toward the Soviet Union through an imperialist foreign policy. Gaddis takes the opposite view, that the United States reacted to the policy of international communism in order to safeguard democracy and American interests abroad. Gaddis takes his argument one step further in The Cold War, stating that I am quite sure, [the world] is a better place for that conflict [the Cold War] having been fought in the way that it was and won by the side that won it. Gaddis likens

3 the Cold War to that of the American Civil War, which was a necessary contest that settled fundamental issues once and for all.1 However, what were those fundamental issues? Both Gaddis and Sivachev make it quite evident that the Soviet Union and the United States held diametrically opposed ideologies. In many ways, the Cold War was a fight to prove if Communism or Democratic Capitalism were supreme. Gaddis argues that despite the hot wars, and climate of fear that the Cold War produced, it is a good thing that the United States won. 2 Gaddis Sets up a brad argument in his book The Cold War, and sets the stage for the conflict by the end of World War I. For both Soviet and non-Soviet historians this is a turning point in both American foreign policy and the balance of power. Sivachev argued that until the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union perused a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. Lennon handed down the tenants of the new nations foreign policy, and according to Sivachev, the United States took an aggressive anti-Soviet approach to the nation from its inception. Sivachevs argument is not totally clouded in Marxist ideology; US troops were landed in the Russia during the Russian civil war. This foreign intervention appeared to be yet another foreign invader to many Russian leaders. Because the role that the troops played was very limited, Sivachev spends little time on this point, instead he rambles on about Americas economic imperialist agenda in the Soviet Union. Much like the arguments in Marxs Das Capital, his critique of history and the capitalist system seems to rest on singular examples from history and often obscured by his opinions rather than solid historical research.3 John Lewis Gaddis takes the time to trace the roots of the Cold War back to WWI and Wisonian internationalism. Not surprisingly, Gaddis views American foreign policy after the
1 2

John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), xi. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, xi. 3 Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Russia and the United States: US- Soviet Relations From the Soviet Point of View (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 35-60.

4 First World War as an effort to restore the balance of power in Europe. Gaddis describes Wilsons global vision as one that would respect the rule of law and would act multilaterally. Wilsons failure was a result of the lack of public support for his aggressive international policy, and Americas intervention in the Russian revolution. Gaddis did not argue that landing troops in Russia was a good thing; however, he did argue that ideas that prompted their deployment such as keeping the world safe for democracy were abandoned with Wilsons fall from grace. Sivachev argued that these were lasting ideas of US foreign policy, where Gaddis took the opposite stance.4 The stark contrast between reality and Sivachevs arguments are a product of his Marxist ideology in conjunction with the States view of history. According to Cynthia A. Roberts of Columbia University, students of foreign policy would be disappointed by Sivachevs book. Roberts uses the tone of the book to point out the extent to which current Soviet concerns have colored the authors interpretation of past events.5 The most delusional argument that Sivachev made was that the Soviet Union did not wish to spread revolution throughout the world. Roberts exposes this argument by simply quoting Sivachevs summary of international communism. He stated that international communism help[s] peoples struggling against colonial oppression. 6 The past has shown repeatedly that the people who use the teachings of Marx and Lennon to shed colonial rule often resort to violent revolution such as the case in Algeria. The expectations that historians had for Sivachevs book were high with respect to its unique perspective, its prolog even states that it is the first of its kind to be published for the American audience. The hype fell short of the reality. Sivachev fell into the trap of regurgitating
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John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, 16. Cynthia A. Roberts, Review, Political Science Quarterly,95 no. 2 (Summer, 1980) : 343. 6 IBID

5 state policy rather than conducting historical research. The only redeeming quality of the book is that it shows the influence that ideology can have on a historians view of the past. One also must wonder if state minders were influential in producing such a book that does not criticize the Soviet Union for anything. The strengths of Gaddiss The Cold War fall in his ambition to write a book for an audience of historians that did not live through the Cold War. His sweeping narrative of the conflict is both opinionated and well written. When reviewing Giaddis book, Timothy J. Write concluded that the books great virtueis that it is extremely well-written. If historians are meant to provide a narrative account of the past, few will question Gaddiss ability to tell the story of the Cold War.7 Despite his apparent success in creating a monograph synthesized the Cold War into a relatively short account, some historians find his congragalatory tone too much to take. When Fred J. Greenstein reviewed Gaddis work in Political Science Quarterly, he noted that some professors in the academic field would be hard pressed to assign a book that starts, the world is a better place for the cold war having beenwon by the side that won it.8 What Greenstein is essentially saying is that Gaddis has a clear bias that can be viewed as ethnocentric at times. In Gaddis scholarship, America was reacting to the Soviet Union and essentially that Americas foreign policy was well informed. Though he is critical of the United States, he generally uses a very positive tone. Professors of the Cold War may be uneasy about this monograph because of the strength of his argument and that he does not present views that differ from his own.

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Timothy J. Write, Review: The Cold War, The Review of Politics, 68 no. 4 (Fall, 2006), 685. Fred J. Greenstein, "Review: The Cold War: A New History," Political Science Quarterly, 121 no. 2 (Summer2006 2006): 322.

6 John Lewis Gaddis addresses the concept of the Comintern nearly at the start of his book We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. The title of this book suggests that he, and other Cold War historians, know a great deal more after the fall of the Soviet Union than Sivachv could have in the early 1980s. Being mindful to reassure the reader that the Soviet and American governments are still declassifying documents and accounts of the war, he underscores the constant change in Cold War Scholarship. With this fact aside, he is more than willing to argue that the Cominterns goal was to destabilize governments. In an effort to debunk Soviet historians claims at the start he states that The Comintern, the agency he created in 1919 to spread revolution through the worldBarely concealed attempts to overthrow capitalist governments made it difficult for Soviet diplomats to negotiate with them.9 The origins of Cold War policies are rooted in the very ideals of international communism. It is reasonable to assume that if a nation created policy and organizations to overthrow democracy, than US foreign policy would resist it. Gaddis argued that though there may have been serious ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union as early as 1917, the true start of the Cold War came at the end of the Second World War. Gaddis argued that there were similarities between Hitler and Stalin but the main difference between the two existed in when they expected to take full control of Europe. Hitler acted impetuously, where Stalin was able to wait as long as necessary for workers to embrace communism and revolution.10 By developing Stalins character in this way, he also developed one of his key arguments, that the Cold War was unavoidable. After World War II, Gaddis developed both the

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John Lewis Gaddis, We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 8. John Lewis Gaddis, We now Know, 10.

7 Soviet and American post war foreign policy. Both policies sought security and power, however, Stalin achieved security by, depriving everyone else of it.11 The linking of Stalin to Hitler mirrors the comparison that Hanna Arendt made in, The Origins of Totalitarianism. There seems to be a clear connection between Gaddis comparison and Arendts concept of totalitarianism. Both Hitler and Stalin were driven by ideological fanaticism and desired total control. Each personality strove to complete their control over Europe with a complete lack of respect for human life and genocide. In keeping with their early history, the Soviet Union refused to sign the declaration of human rights decades after the start of the Cold War. According to Gaddis argument, Soviet foreign and domestic policy lacked a respect for life giving light to their use of atomic diplomacy, a policy the United States was unwilling to use. Many American historians view the United States as the victor during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Gaddis offers another point of view. Though the Soviets eventually tuned the missiles around, the fate of Cubas revolution was secured. According to Gaddis, Khrushchev viewed the Cuban revolution as a success for international communism and the Comintern. By placing nuclear weapons in range of the United States, Khrushchev was able to have assurance that Kennedy would not invade Cuba.12 Kennedy, and no other American president, had the gumption to challenge the Soviet Union with the use of nuclear diplomacy to affect foreign policy in this way. There is a sense from Gaddis that the United States reluctance to use this tool of policy was a lost opportunity. The Cuban Missile Crisis did bring the world to the brink of nuclear war; however, Cuban communism is still alive today because of it.

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John Lewis Gaddis, We now Know, 15 Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).; John Lewis Gaddis, We now Know, 278.

8 The real lost opportunity for using nuclear diplomacy was at the end of the Second World War where the United States had a nuclear monopoly. This is the only point in time where Gaddis is correct in his argument regarding nuclear diplomacy. The United States had a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and failed to flex their muscles. It was clear that Stalin was a megalomaniac, even if the full extent of his human rights violations were not known at the time. Soviet belligerence in the post-war era met little resistance from America, and Gaddis argued that it is difficult to see that the United States got any political advantages form it nuclear monopoly. The Soviet response was simply they frighten us with the atomic bomb but we are not afraid of it.13 Truman did not have the nerve to use them as a bargaining chip, but Stalin would show the world that he did by detonating his own in 1949. Gaddis does take a strong stance on the side of American foreign policy. In many ways, he argued that America was reacting to aggressive Soviet policy and actions. He does make a convincing argument that the United States held back their greatest weapon, nuclear diplomacy. Khrushchev had no problem with using his nuclear weapons as a force to tip the scales of the balance of power during the Suez Canal crisis. Gaddis stated that Khrushchev was, publicly threatening rocket attacks, presumably with nuclear warheads, on Great Britain, France, and Israel if they did not at once accept the cease-fireit was a way of rattling the West while winning favor with the Arabs.14 Gaddis suggested that the Soviet Union was willing to use nuclear diplomacy to force British and French troops to withdraw from the Suez Canal, and the US was not willing to use similar tactics. Gaddis made a great point in both We Now Know, and The Cold War, that the United States had a nuclear monopoly after WWII and was unwilling to use it as a legitimate barging tool to make foreign policy. As the title of Gaddiss book suggests,
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John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, 56 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, 172

9 historians now know that the Russians would not have gone through with their threats even though it may not have been as clear in the moment. Gaddis believes that the United States missed the opportunity to use its nuclear monopoly to its fullest advantage, but he rarely criticizes US policy. He views the actions of the US as morally exceptional compared to that of the USSR. Gaddis dwells much on the human rights violations of the Soviet Union and the governmental system itself. In Carolyn Eisenbergs review of We Now Know, she states that he takes particular offence to authoritarian rulers [who] controlled their own people and projected their cruel, sometimes crazy, often cynical ways on the international stage. 15 Though Gaddis is quick to pass moral judgment on the action of the Soviet regime, he does not do the same with American policy. Eisenberg points out that Gaddis skims over American involvement in the Third World. This is especially true of early engagement in the Philippines, as well as Central America. Often American interests have come before the humanitarian interests of the people in which America is involved. The clearest example of this is in Vietnam. The United States backed Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of South Vietnam. Diem used violence and terror to root out both real and imagined communist party leaders. The Vietnam War seems to be the greatest quagmire of the 20th century that has faced American foreign policy. The morality of the engagement seems to be highly in question; Gaddis is unwilling to tackle this topic.16 In The Cold War, Gaddis argued that exceptional political leaders such as Ronald Reagan acted as actors during the Cold War. Politicians like Reagan had the ability to inspire audiences to follow them..[and like] all good actors, they brought the play at last to an end.17
15 16

Carolyn Eisenberg, Review of We now Know, The Journal of American History, 84 no. 4 (Mar., 1998), 1463. Ibid 17 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, 197.

10 Gaddis is very perceptive in his theory that influential people were at the heart of SovietAmerican policy, however, he fails to see the importance of Soviet actors such as Mikhail Gorbachev. Gaddis stated that it followed then, Reagan concludedthat the march of freedom and democracywill leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.18 His argument hinges on Reagans most significant deed, the implantation of the Star Wars program. According to Gaddis, Reagan was able to ramp up the arms race by rejecting the idea of mutually assured destruction through programs that aimed to destroy nuclear weapons before they reached their targets. Equivalent Soviet programs essentially forced them into the poorhouse. Gaddis was able to make many decent arguments in The Cold War, but he overestimates Reagans role as an actor of history.19 Martin Malia argued in his book The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, that Gorbachevs reform communism approach was the true harbinger of death for the Soviet government. Gaddis argues that Reagan was the trigger to the collapse of the Soviet economy; however, in reality Malia states that, half-measures of Perestroika and to effect not a graft of market methods onto the plan, but rather the real transition to a market-driven economy. First, the government once again revised its strategy of economic reform.20 Malia made a clear argument that the Soviet collapse was a result of rapidly changing internal markets, and reform communism unleashed a firestorm of social, economic, and political change that was beyond Gorbachevs control.21 At the end of World War II, it would have been hard for leaders to predict that several decades later their citizens would be cowering in fear of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and America. It is clear from Nikolai V. Sivachevs book, Russia and the United States, and John
18 19

John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, 224. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, 228. 20 Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1994), 477-478. 21 Martin E. Malia, 480

11 Lewis Gaddis books, We Now Know and The Cold War, that there are themes in US-Soviet foreign policy that lead to the real threat of nuclear war. It is obvious from the historiography that policy between the two nations had been influenced by ideology. Communism and Capitalism are at odds with one another. The Soviets established a comintern would attempt to expand communism throughout the world, despite Sivachevs inability to admit its true mission. Gaddis is able to expose the weakness of Soviet ideology and effectively synthesize the events of the Cold War. However, Gaddis falls short in his argument because he overestimates the importance of American policy makers such as Ronald Reagan. By placing Reagan as the ultimate victor of the Cold War, he discounts Gorbachevs approach to reform communism that inevitably led to a chain of events that were out of his control. The ideological differences between Gaddis and Sivachevs are apparent, but each has an ethnocentric approach to the narrative of the conflict. Even though Gaddis argument may have opposition in the field, it is terrific monograph that is based on solid research, Sivachevs is not. Furthermore, Gaddis argued that the Soviet Union was willing to use nuclear diplomacy where the United States was not. Just as ideology influenced foreign policy throughout the 20th century, Sivachev and Gaddis reveal that it also affected the historiography.

12 Bibliography Arendt, Hanna. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. Eisenberg, Carolyn. Review of We now Know, The Journal of American History. 84 no. 4 (Mar., 1998). Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Gaddis, John Lewis. We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Greenstein, Fred J. "The Cold War: A New History," Political Science Quarterly, 121 no. 2 (Summer2006 2006). Malia, Martin E. The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1994 Roberts, Cynthia A. Review. Political Science Quarterly. 95 no. 2 (Summer, 1980) : 342- 343. Sivachev, Nikolai and Nikolai N. Yakovlev. Russia and the United States: US- Soviet Relations From the Soviet Point of View. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Write, Timothy J. Review: The Cold War. The Review of Politics. 68 no. 4 (Fall, 2006).