Documents From The U.S. Espionage Den Volume 12 Part 3

CONFIDENTIAL
COLTTRY TEAM MINUTES

AUGUST 9, 1978
The Charge opened the meeting by welcoming Harry Burton, the

new FAA chief. He then briefly discussed the upcoming Camp
David summit, noting that our efforts to have a high-].eve1
official come to Iran to brief the Shah on this latest
stage in the Middle East peace process have so far been
unsuccessful.
The Charge asked all Counselors and section chiefs to prepare
"While You Were Away" memos for the Ambassador's return
later this month. The memos should be turned in to Mr.
Boyce by August 22-23.
General Huyser, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of European forces
and Vice Admiral Foley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, will
be visiting Iran in the near future.
Mr. Zischke introduced Richard Aker, a new junior officer
trainee for ICA. He then discussed recent incidents in
Shiraz concerning the Iran-America Society there. Mr.
Bannerman reported on the most recent incident, which
occurred last night when a crowd of 200, marching directly
on the IAS, was dispersed by police. This would be the
first time that IAS was specifically singled out, as opposed
to being merely one stop enroute to many others.
General Gast introduced General George Kertesz, who is
General Secord's replacement and who will be acting as
Chief of Armish-MAAG in Genral Gast's absence.
General Gast reported the latest news on the F-4s and the
Wild Weasel. The Iranians now say they are not interested
in the F-4s (sans Group A wiring) because, to meet attrition
needs, they prefer the higher-technology F-16s. The same
view applies to the Shrikes.
On the frigates, the GO1 has decided that it wants the NT,IX;,
which provoked some discussion among the Country Team members
as to how the Dutch and Germans will feel about this. It
was concluded that the Germans will be somewhat happier
with the news.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONE I DENT I AL 2.
General R a b i i t o l d General Gast t h a t t h c I I ~ I I I ~ ~

n rIcI Inot
H
going t o pursue t h e ATLIS I 1 Laser Deslynot~,r !;yst c l n urlt i l
t h e USG d e c i d e s whether o r -not i t w i l l usc i t .
General Gast s a i d he had l e f t a paper on t h e Roving t i c l i c o p t e r s

on M r . M a r t i n ' s desk. The Charge b r i e f e d t h e Cour~tryTeam
on t h e r e v i v e d c r i t i c i s m of our m i l i t a r y s a l e s program t o
I r a n stemming o u t of t h e i n c i d e n t .
D r . Stempel reviewed v a r i o u s s o c i a l n o t e s from around town

a s w e l l a s t h e l a t e s t p o l i t i c a l news. He revlcwed t h e h a s l c
i s s u e s h t h e problems w i t h t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s , advislnq
a l s o t h a t t h i s appears t o be t h e s i l l y season f o r t h e rumor-
mongering set. He r e p o r t e d a number of approaches by v a r l o u s
h i g h l e v e l I r a n i a n s who asked him what t h e Americans were
p l a n n i n g t o d o t o h e l p I r a n f i g h t communism. He advised
t h e Country Team t o be on t h e lookout f o r s i m i l a r odd
probes, q u e r i e s and i n t e r r o g a t i o n s .
Dr. Stempel continued h i s r e p o r t by n o t i n g t h a t t h e Xhomeini

f a c t i o n of t h e - r e l i g i o u s group a r e s t a r t i n g t o p l a y f a i r l y
rough, e s p e c i a l l y concerning m i n o r i t i e s .
M r . Neeley r e p o r t e d t h a t I r a n w i l l probably import more
f e e d g r a i n s t h i s year t h a n l a s t .
D r . Adler s a i d he has a copy of t h e F a r s i t e x t of t h e n u c l e a r

b i l a t e r a l accord and w i l l send it t o t h e Department w i t h a
Washington-bound t r a v e l e r . Mansur t o l d D r . Adler t h a t he
s e e s August 20 a s a l i k e l y s i g n i n g d a t e .
M r . Taylor h a s f i n i s h e d c o l l a t i n g h i s c o n f i d e n t i a l bank
survey. The banks g r e a t l y exceeded t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s
r e g a r d i n g l o a n s t o I r a n , with exposure r i s i n g 6 4 % i n t h e
l a s t year.
DISTRIBUTION:
AMB ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL SHIRAZ
DCM CONS INR/NEA ISFAHAN
POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TABRIZ
ECON DAO
POL/MIL ICA
OR S/ A
CONFIDENTIAL
I h a r e r a c e i t a d a l e t t e r for R i m I m p e r i a l MaJeaty
Tho Bhahanrhsh tram Proaidont C s r t e r concornin6
t h e f o r t h a o n i n 6 m e t i n g a t Camp David on the
Mid610 L a s t peso. proeeaa. I would very much appre-
e i r t e your h a r i n g t h i a l a t t e r paeeed t o H i 8 I m p e r i a l
M a j a r t ~ . who ii a v a r r t h a t he 18 to r o c o i v e s nearnag.
i r o n t h e Prosidont.
With high artoom and v s r r poraonsl r e g a r d s ,
His Imperial Majesty
Mohammad R e z a P a h l a v i A r y a m e h r
Shahanshah o f I r a n
Your I m p e r i a l M a j e s t y :
I have a p p r e c i a t t , d ? h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s and c o r r e s -
p o n d e n c e we h a v e h a d i n t h e p a s t o n m a t t e r s o f h i g h
concern t o o u r two c o u n t r i e s . I know how s e r i o u s l y
you r e g a r d t h e need f o r r e a l p r o g r e s s towards a
l a s t i n g s e t t l e m e n t of t h e Arab-Israel c o n f l i c t and
I w i s h t o s h a r e w i t h y o u some t h o u g h t s o n t h e f o r t h -
c o m i n g M i d d l e Esst m e e t i n g a t Camp D a v i d .
We a r e g r a t i f i e d t h a t P r i m e M i n i s t e r B e g i n a n d
President Sadat have both responded p o s i t i v e l y t o
t h e i n v i t a t i o n t o m e e t w i t h me n e x t m o n t h i n a m a j o r
new e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h a f r a m e w o r k f o r a B i i d d l r
East peace settlement. We h a v e p u r p o s e l y n o t s e t a
f i x e d d u r a t i o n f o r t h e t a l k s , s c h e d u l e d t o b e e i n on
S e p t e m b e r 6 , s o a s t o b e a b l e t o a l l o w a s much t i m e
a s i s needed f o r o u r e f f o r t s t o succeed. This is
an e n c o u r a g i n g i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e s e r i o u s n e s s w i t h
which a l l p a r t j e s a r e a p p r o a c h i n g t h i s meeting.
I e x t e n d e d t h i s i n v i t a t i o n b e c a u s e I b e l i e v e we
have reached a c r u c i a l p o i n t i n t h e s e a r c h f o r
peace i n t h e Middle E a s t . Nine months have p a s s e d
since President Sndat ~ n d Prime M i n i s t e r Begin
o p e n e d s i g n i f i c a n t new p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r n e g o t i -
a t i n g w i t h t h e h j s t o r i c r n ~ ~ t i n gi ns J e r u s a l e m a n d
i n Ismailia. T h e s i d e s h a v e made p r o g r e s s t o w a r d
r e s o l v i n g some o f t h e i s s u e s t h a t d i v i d e t h e m a t
t,his time, but recently, as you are aware, an
Impasse was threatehed. I am convinced that we
rnnnot afford an impasse, since the positions
would then harden and the atmosphere deteriorate
to the point where the present opportunity for
peace could well become another of the lost oppor-
tunities that have marked the history of this
tragic conflict.
The objective at the Camp David meeting will remain

R E it has been defined by the two sides themselves
in negotiations this year: To make progress toward
agreement on a framework, based on Security Council
Resolution 242, that would allow steady p r o p e s s
tovard agreement on specific issues, within the
context of the agreed goal of a stable, just, and
comprehensive peace. Such an agreed framework
might help to bring other parties to the conflict
into the peace negotiations.
Our experience in attempting ta facilitate and

promote negotiations this past year has demonstrated
that it is impossible to carry negotiations beyond a
rertain point on the crucial iqsues unless the Headd
of Government themselves can be engaged in a direct
exchange. This was one of the donsiderations that
led me to the decision t6 extend invitations to the
two leaders to meet with me at Camp David. Our
objective will be to achieve agreements at the
political level which can ptovide guidance 'for the
negotiators on the key issues. I plan to do every-
thing within my power to help President Sadat and
Prime Minister Begin achieve the progress for which
ve are all searching.
As we move into this crucial new phase of Middle

East negotiations I wanted to share with you my
reasons for taking this step and thoughts about
what we hope to accomplish. I know you will agree
vith my sense of the importance of these talks,
vhich hold the prospect of a major step forward,
despite the real difficulties. I hope that I can
count on you for understanding and full support in
the task on which we are embarking.
You bave met recently with some of the partici-
pants and key observers of the negotiations and I
would value your impressions. Iran's support for
the peace process has been extremely valuable and
ve look forward to continuing cooperation in the
interest of world peace.
With my best wishes.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY TEAM MTNUTES

August 16, 1978
T11n c'harge opened the meeting by saying that the Embassy

* ~ ~ \ I I be
~ I issuing a pracautionary bulletin concerning the
~ C . C . L I I ity situation. The period of "deep mourning," i. e.,
A ~ I ~ I I I : ;24-27
~ and August 31, is to be considered a good
~ I I I I C . to be quiet and fairly circumspect in one's movements
~ I , tCtown. UI Section chiefs will inform their employees.
Charge said that the Marine Guards have-had trouble
1'11~-
I,.,e.11t1yin locating the duty officer. He stressed the
1 lous responsibility borne by the duty officer to let
2 ~ 1
tl~o.Marines know his whereabouts at all times.

111,.Charge reported on his recent audience with the Shah.
111,.occasion was General Huyser's visit. The Shah strongly
~~..~Efirmed that the liberalization process will continue.
Il$~wrver, he is also determined that recent "senseless
v.lnclalisrn" should end.
Stempel reported on "a couple of odd items." After
1 1 1 .
~ or
X seven nights of steady violence in south Tehran,
I
tenor of the demonstrators'rhetoric is swinging toward
t l 1 1 3
Is.lahan-styleanti-Westernism. In a related note, the

~'~~litical section will be covering the upcoming military
t l lals here in Tehran.
H I . Taylor commented on the divergence in the local press'

(.c~verage of the passage of the foreign aid billd Depending
1)1i which paper you read, it represents either a slap at,
of a victory for, President Carter.
Mr. Taylor continued his analysis by disclosing the Central

ndnk's balance of payments forecast, which sees a 17%
increase in payments for imports.
nuring a brief discussion of the status of the nuclear
illlateral accord, the Charge asked Mr. Carleon to report
o n yesterday's editorial on the Australian deal.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
M r . Snow reviewed p l a n s f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a new IAS

academic b u i l d i n g . He hopes t o s i g n t h e c o n t r a c t and
b e g i n c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h i n t h r e e weeks.
DISTRIBUTION :
AMB ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL ISFAHAN

DCM CONS INR/RNA SHIRAZ
POL DEA ARMISH/MAAG TAB RI z
ECON DAO
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OR S/A
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ulJ[l,a@l;i(JM
I';&~ As Y TEHRAN
CL*SS,F,CAIION
SECRET/NOFORN
1 ACTION:
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
IMMEDIATE 1
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
USCINCEUR
SECRET TEHRAN 0788 2

NOFORM
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
I TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, IR
I SUBJ: IRAN: WHERE ARE WE NOW.AND WHERE kRJ3 WE GOING?
A) TEHRAN 7 6 5 9 (NoTAL) B ) TEHRAN 7456 (NOTALI

C) TEHRAN 7 7 0 0 (NOTAL) D) TEHRAN A-80 (NOTAL)
E) TEHRAN 7 7 0 2 (NOTAL)
II SUMMARY: THE S H A H ' S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH AND THE I W W S I -
T I O N O F MARTIAL LAW I N ISFAHAN I N D I C A T E THAT HE I S COMMITTED
1 MORE FIRMLY WITH THOSE WHO STIMULATE VIOLENCE. MAJOR
I QUESTION I S WHAT IMPACT RELIGIOUSLY I N S P I R E D AGITATION
WILL HAVE ON IRANIAN P O L I T I C A L SYSTEM AND WHAT GOVERNMENT'S
REACTION W I L L BE. P O L I T I C A L VIOLENCE HAS BEEN T R A D I T I O N
I N IRAN. SHAH I S ON A T I G H T ROPE -- TRYING T O M I N I M I Z E
VIOLENCE WHILE CHANNELING P O L I T I C A L CONFLICT I N T O

- DRIPTING DITE TEL. C X T . COWIEYIS .NO CLASSIPICITION APP+D my-
C W N ~ ~ ~ / P O L : J D S8 ~/ 1 ~7 / 7 8 CHARGE :CWNaa
OPTIONAL FORM 162lHl

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ELECTORAL REALM. SUCCESS I S TO, A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT 1

DEPENDENT ON CONTINUED EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY ARMY
AND SECURITY FORCES. W E BELIEVE HE MUST MANEWER
CAREFULLY, PERHAPS INCLUDING SOME S T E P S TO MEET OPPOSITIOPI
DEMANDS, I F VIOLENCE I S TO BE REDUCED. GIVEN THE
NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, THE SHAH MAY ULTI-
MATELY HAVE TO RESORT TO FORCF. THE PRIMARY HOPE OF
AVOIDING T H I S OPTION IS TO RESHAPE MODERATE OPPOSITION
ATTITUDES AND .IMPROVE GOVERNMENT S E N S I T I V I T Y I N THE
PROCESS O F FURTHER P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY
1. WITH THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW I N ISFAHAN AND
THE STATIONING OF MORE MILITARY UNITS ELSEWHERE FOLLOW-
I N G CLOSJ~LY ON THE HEELS OF THE SHAH'S CONSTITUTION
DAY SPEECH (REFS A AND B ) which REAFFIRMED H I S COMMITMENT
TO P O L I T I C A L LIBERALIZATION, I T SEEMS A GOOD TIME TO
REVIEW WHERE WE ARE AND TAKE A TENTATIVE AND SPECULATIVE
LOOK AHEAD. T H I S I S A PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL
TURMOIL I N IRAN FROM WHICH MANY OUTCOMES ARE THEORETICALLY
POSSIBLE. MANY O F THE GIVENS O F THE PAST ARE BEING
CALLED INTO QUESTION, NOT ONLY BY VOCAL OPPONENTS OF
THE REGIME BUT BY THE SHAH HIMSELF.
2. I T I S CLEAR TO US AND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF
DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HERE THAT THE SHAH I S SINCERE
I N H I S DESIRE TO LEAD IRAN TOWARD LIBERALIZED POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS (REF C ) . THERE I S SOME QUESTION I N H I S

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tlWN MIND AS TO EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTS AND HOW HE I S 1

'I'O ACHIEVE H I S BROAD OBJECTIVE, AND THERE REMAINS DEEP
SUSPICION OF H I S INTENTIONS AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE LONG
OPPOSED HIM. AFTER ALL, HE HAS NOT EVER WILLINGLY PL.qYE5
THE DEMOCRATIC GAME #BEFORE: WHY NOW? THE ANSWER, WE
RELIEVE, I S I N H I S REAL B E L I B F THAT H I S SON CANNOT SUCCESS-
FULLY SUCCEED HIM UNLESS I R A N ' S P O L I T I C A L TRANSITION
TO MORE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS I S MANAGED BEFORE THE
CROWN PRINCE TAKES THE THRONE. THE SHAH, MORE THAN ANY
OTHER MODERNIZING MONARCH, I S CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM
OF SUCCESSION. HE HAS STRESSED THE NEED TO PREPARE THE
GROUND FOR H I S SON TO THE a?MBASSP;DOR, TO ME, AND MOST
FOREIGNERS HE RECEIVES. HE REMEMBERS H I S OWN D I F F I C U L T
F I R S T YEARS AND HAS GRADUALLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT ROOM MUST BE MADE FOR IRAN'S EXPANDING MIDDLE CLASS
I N THE POLITICAL PROCESS. T H I S DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER,
e
THAT HE I S PREPARED TO TURN THE COUNTRY OVER TO MEN HE
REGARDS AS U N P A T ~ ~ O T I C OBSCU
, T I S T AND IRRECONCILABLY
ONTINUATION
HOSTILE TO THE MONARCHY. THE KmKZXXIXXXX OF THE MONARCHY
FOR THE SHAH I S MORE THAN SIMPLY AN ARROGANCE -- HE WANTS

70
THE PAHLAVI DYNASTYfSURVIVE AND CONTINUE H I S P O L I C I E S .
HE DEEPLY BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN HISTORY P R O W S THE NEED
FOR A MONARCH TO GIVE THE LEAD TO H I S DISPARATE AND
HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY. HE I S , HOWEVER, PREPARED TO
BEGIN A POLITICAL PROCESS D E S P I T E MISGIVING ABOUT SOME

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Claarification MRN
1
3. HOWEVER, MANY SO-CALLED LIBERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS
AT HEART BELIEVE HE SHOULD REMOVE HIMSELF FORTHWITH
FROM THE GOVERNING PROCESS. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS WHO
ADMIRE AND SUPPQRT TBE SHAH BELIEVE AS WELL THAT HIS
FOR CRITICISM WHEN THE POLICIES IN PRACTICE DO NOT WORK

WELL AND THAT HE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD REIGNING AND NOT
.RULING. A SUBSTANTIAL,IF NOT- OVERWHELMING, MAJORITY
OF IRANIANS HOWEVER AGREE WITH THE SHAH THAT THE MONARCHY
REMAINS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNTRY BUT THEY WISH TO SEE
ITS OPERATIONS ADJUSTED.
4. THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE MOSSADEQ PERIOD (1949-53)
SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT MANY OF THE OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE
CHANGED THEIR OWN AUTHORITIARIAN COLORATION DESPITE THEIR
RHETORIC TODAY ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. RELIGIOUS
OPPOSITION RETAINS THE VIOLENT ELEMENT THAT HAS MARKED
SHIITE ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT SINCE THE EIGHTH
CENTURY. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, ALL STRAINS OF RELIGIOUS
LEADERSHIP, FROM THOSE FAVORING MODIFIED CONSTITUTIONAL
RULE TO THOSE SEEKING A RETURN TO THE DAYS OF SHAH ABBAS.
THERE IS ALSO AN E S S E N T I ~ YANARCHIC MASS RESPONSIVE
TO THE LOUDEST VOICE. THOSE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS PRESENTLY
DOMINATING THE IRANIAN SCENE, BOTH ORGANIZATIONALLY AND
IDEOLOGICALLY, ARE COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE AND OBSTRUCTION
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AS TOOLS FOR ATTAINING POWER. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS 1
SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR THE SHAH'S VIOLENT REMOVAL AND
SOME OF HIS FOLLOWERS IN ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ HAVE OPENLY
CALLED FOR THE DEATH OF THE SHAH. (THIS EXTREMISM WAS
IN PART THE REASON THE POLICE CRACKED DOWN ON THE HUNGER-
STRIKING MULLAHS -- TEHRAN 7618). MODERATES SUCH AS
AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI DO NOT AT THIS TIME FEEL CAPABLE
OF OPPOSING KHOMEINI OPENLY, THOUGH THEY REPORTEDLY STILL
5
WORK FOR MODERATION WITHIN THE RELIGIOU MOVEMENT AND
E
WOULD DOUBTLESSLY WELCOME A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN
AN ELECTORAL PROCESS WHICH MIGHT NOT LEAVE THEM WHOLLY
SUBSERVIENT TO KHOMEINI, WHO REMAINS OUTSIDE THE
COUNTRY. IN SHIA ISLAM THERE IS NO INSTITUplNALIZED
HIERARCHY: A RELIGIOUS LEADER
OPTIONAL F O R M 112.(HI
IFormerly FS-413lnl.l
Jenuarv 1975
o e ~ tof
. stmm
SOME OF THE VIOLENCE WE ARE WITNESSING HERE RESULTS FROM
A FERVID COMPETITION FOR EMIN~NCEBY THE AYATOLLAHS;
MODERATION APPARENTLY DOES NOT BEGET FOLLOWERS FROM THE
WORKERS, SMALL SHOP KEEPERS AND ARTISANS AT THIS TIME.
A TRADITION OF THRONE/OPPOSITION DIALOG DOES NOT EXIST
IN IRAN, AND NEITHER TEMPERMENT NOR TRADITION FAVOR
WESTERN CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL CONCILIATION AND BROKERAGE
5. WHATEVER THE SHAH WISHES TO DO NEXT, HE MUST MEET
HEAD ON THE VIOLENT CHALLENGES TO BOTH HIS GOVERNMENT
AND IRAN'S SOCIAL FABRIC. IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS
SEEN HERE AS A SIGNAL TO VIOLENT ELEMENTS THAT THIS TYPE
OF ACTIVITY WILL NOT BE TOLERATED. FOR IRAN, IT IS A
SURPRISINGLY RESTRAINED REACTION SO FAR. THE ARMY HAS
BEEN ORDERED TO HOLD ITS FIRE AND RESTRAINTS AGAINST
PREMATURE POLICE USE OF WEAPONS REMAIN IN EFFECT.
IRONICALLY, THIS LAUDABLE RESTRAINT HAS ITS DISADVANTAGES:
MANY IRANIANS OF THE MIDDLE AND WEALTHY CLASSES BELIEVE
THE SHAH IS NOT ACTING FORCEFULLY ENOUGH, THAT HE IS
WEAK AND INDECISIVE. SOME BELIEVE THE AMERICANS FORCED
HIM TO BE RESTRAINED, SINCE THEY CANNOT CONCEIVE OF HIS
WILLINGNESS TO DO SO IN HIS OWN INTEREST. THE IMMEDIATE
DANGER IS THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF (OR ARMY UNITS GOADED
BEYOND PATIENCE) WILL REACT INDISCRIMIIJATELY AND ATTEMPT
TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH BULLETS INSTEAD OF BALLOTS.
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THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO DO SO UNLESS OPPOSI- 7

TIONISTS MOVE FROM STONES TO FIREARMS.
6. MANY OBSERVERS HERE HOPE THAT THE END OF RAMAZAN WILL
BRING SOME SURCEASE BUT WE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
DUBIOUS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, EVEN THE MODERATES, ARE
FEELING THEIR OATS AND ARE UNLIKELY, WE BELIEVE, TO EASE
OFF THE PRESSURES UNTIL THEY RECEIVE AT LEAST SOME
SATISFACTION. THE SHAH IS ON A CLEFT STICK AT THE MOMENT.
SUCCESSFULLY
HE COULD ALMOST CERTAINLY/SUPPRESS the RELIGIOUS DISSIDENTS
FOR THE TIME BEING BY MASS ARRESTS AND VERY CONSIDERABLE
BLOOD LETTING. IT WOULD NOT BE EASY, HOWEVER BECAUSE
UNLIKE 1963, DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES ARE WIDESPREAD IN THE
COUNTRY AND VANDALISM IS USALLY PERPETRATED BY A NUMBER
OF GROUPS IN SEPARATE PARTS OF THE CITIES AND TOWNS. IF
HE TAKES THIS PATH, HOWEVER, IT WOULD NEGATE HIS
OBJECTIVE OF LIBERALIZATION AND BRING DOWN ON HIMSELF
SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CRITICISM TO WHICH HE IS SENSITIVE.
7. THE SHAH AND THOSE AROUND HIM, WE NOW BELIEVE, HAVE
UNDERESTIMATED THE CHALLENGE. IRAN REMAINS BY AND LARGE
A CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC STATE AND, ONCE LIBERALIZATION
OPENED THE POLITICAL SCENE, THE LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS
AGAIN BECAME CENTERSOF POLITICAL POWER--AS THEY WERE WHEN
THE LID WAS PUT ON IN 1963. (OUR A-80 DEALT WITH SOME
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL/ECONOMIC/SOCIAL FACTORS WHICH HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FRUSTRATIONS WERE.) ALSO, SINCE THAT
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IFormrlv FS413(H).l
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G I M E COMMUNICATIONS HAVE VASTLY IMPROVED I N THIS COUNTRY

1
AND THE VARIOUS LEADERS CAN DAILY STAY I N TOUCH WITH EACH
OTHER. NEITHER THE INTELLECTUALS AND BUREAUCRATS OF THE
RASTAKHIZ PARTY, THE OLD NATIONAL FRONTERS, NOR THE
LEADERS OF THE NEW GROUPS HAVE DEEP-ROOTED POLITICAL
POWER OR INFLUENCE. I N THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCENE, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AVOID DEALING WITH THE
RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS.
8. THE EARLIER EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH THE
MORE MODERATE LEADERS WERE NOT PURSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR
AND THE OBJECTIVE OF SPLITTING THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP
HAS SIMPLY NOT WORKED SO FAR. PART OF THE REASON FOR THIS
LATTER FAILURE HAS BEEN THE THREATS ANDHRASSMENT OF THE
MODERATES BY THE WELL-ORGANIZED KHOMEINI FANATICS; ALSO,
AS NOTED EARLIER, NO AYATOLLAH WISHES TO LOSE H I S
FOLLOWERS BY APPEARING SOFT. FURTHERMORE, THE AMOUZEGAR
GOVERNMENT (AS OPPOSED TO THE SHAH AND THE COURT) HAS
PROVED SURPRISINGLY INEPT AT DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS
ELEMENTS ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN A TAKE I T OR LEAVE I T
BASIS.
9. I F OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT I S VALID, THE SHAH HAS TO
FIND A WAY TO OPEN SERIOUS GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH THE SO-
CALLED RELIGIOUS (AND SOME POLITICAL) MODERATES (THIS
WILL BE HARD TO SWALLOW BECAUSE OF H I S UTTER DISDAIN FOR
"THE PRIESTS"). WE SHOULD R E A L I Z E 6 THE OUTSET THAT THISJ
L
OPTIONAL F O R M 1'
FS-41
(Formerly,.nuar,
SECRETINOFORN 9
Peg.-06 - ---L
Cless~f,cet~on MRN
rMAY ULTIMATELY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THEIR ULTIMATE

1
DEMANDS (AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THEY MIGHT ACCEPT AS PART OF
AN ON-GOING PROCESS) WOULD MEAN RELIGIOUS CONTROL OF
THE GOVERNMENT AND REDUCTION OF THE SHAH TO A CONSTITU-
TIONAL MONARCH. THE SHAH WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE FIRST
AND WOULD SEE THE LATTER EMERGING ONLY IN THE CONTEXT
OF RULE PASSING TO HIS SON. THE CURRENT "WANT LIST"
OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IS UNCLEAR, BUT WE UNDERSTAND
THAT A CHANGE OF PRIME MINISTER AND AT LEAST SOME CABINET
MEMBERS TOPS THE LIST--THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TOO TARRED
WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE BAST EIGHT MONTHS AND IS SEEN
AS NOT AT ALL RESPONSIVE TO THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUENCY.
EVEN SOME ESTABLISHMENT FIGURE'S NOW TALK THIS WAY PRIVATELY.
ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE WIDELY PERCEIVED TO
HAVE CORRUPTLY BENEFITTED FROM I W ' S RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IS NEXT. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY TOUGH ONE BECAUSE THE
POPULACE HAS SEEN ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS COME AND GO
AND A NEW EFFORT WILL HAVE NO CREDIBILITY UNLESS PERSONS
VERY CLOSE TO THE SHAH ARE AT LEAST REPRESENTED IN ANY
ROUNDUP. A NUMBER OF LESSER MATTERS ALSO REQUIRE ACTION:
MORE HAJ SEATS AND BETTER ALLOCATION OF EXISTING CAPACITY
BY IRANAIR, MORE RESTRAINED MOVIE ADVERTISING, ETC.
10. CONCESSIONS OF THIS NATURE MIGHT AT LEAST BRING
THE MODERATES INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND PERMIT THE
GO1 TO DIRECT ITS POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AGAINS
L 3
SECRETINOFORN
OPTIONAL FORM 152dHJ
(Formerly FS-4131n)al
January 1975
Dapt ot Srate
L x T R E M I s T s WHO m mDouBTEDLY RECEIVING HELP FROM
EX-TUDEH PARTY ELEMENTS, AND OTHER OUTSIDE FORCES.
HOWEVER, GIVEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL FLUIDITY OF THE
OPPOSITION, I T S PENCHANT FOR PRESSING FOR THE JUGULAR
RATHER THAN COlQ'ROMISING AND SIMPLY THE EVANESCENT
NATURE OF PUBLIC OUTBREAKS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS,
EVEN T H I S MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH. AT SOME POINT, THE
SHAHMAY BE FORCED TO 'REPRESS AN OUTBREAK WITH THE IRON
F I S T AND NOT THE VELVET GLOVE I F IRAN I S TO RETAIN ANY
ORDER AT W . WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL W SO I F
THAT BECOMES ESSENTIAL. HE I S NOT DEALING WITH DEMO-
CRATIC GROUP P O L I T I C S AS WE I N THE WEST KNOW AND PLAY
THEM, AND HE I S MINDFUL. O F WHAT VACILLATION BROUGHT
AYUB KHAN AND BHUTTO I N PAKISTAN.
11. FOR THE U . S . AS WELL T H I S I S A DELICATE PERIOD. AS
WE HAVE MENTIONED I N PREVIOUS REPORTING, VIRTUALLY ALL
IRANIANS BELIEVE THAT FOREIGN HANDS ARE INVOLVED I N
WHATEVERWPENS HERE. WHATEVER WE AS A GOVERNMENT OR
AS OFFICIALS SAY WILL BE MISCONSTRUED BY SOMEBODY HERE
EITHER AS SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH. THIS
PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE I N FACT GIVES US SOME INFLUENCE.
WE WILL XAVE FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON OUR ROLE HERE OVER
THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AFTER THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS.
12. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
L
SECRETINOFORN
CIa..iNcrtfon OPTIONAL FO
w1m 901
-18-
FROM
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
EL6S.I FICATION
SECRET NOFORN I
* J ACTION : SECSTATE WASHDC 1
I crm~ r r IUS1
INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
NT BAGHDAD
4 IN MBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECRET TEHRAN
07880
NOFORN
E.B; 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PORS, PINS, IR
SUBJECT: INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT
REF: A, TEHRAN 7311, B. TEHRAN 7793
il A S W Y : RHETORIC AND CROWD ACTIVITY IN TEHRAN IS INCREASING
DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THREE-DAY MOURNING FOR DEATH OF IMAM ALI.

SECRET TALKS BETWEEN GO1 AND GOVERNMENT CONTINUE. RELIGIOUS
LEADERS SEE CIIANGE NECESSARY. END SUMMARY.
1. EYEWITNESS IRANIAN SOURCE TELLS US THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST
CONTINUAL MINOR UPHEAVAL IN SOUTH TEHRAN FOR PAST SEVEN TO
TEN DAYS. AYATOLMS AT MAJOR MOSQUES HAVE BECOME'MORE AHTI-
GOVERNMENT AND IN SOME CASES ANTI-FOREIGN AND DIRECTLY ANTI-
AMERICAN. RESULT HAS BEEN SMALL GROWS OF MEN IN THEIR TEENS
t, # . ..
P . p . l o f ____.-
MRN
'THE LOW LEVEL VIOLENCE THUS FAR HAS BEEN SPORADIC. 7

2. FIRST SERIOUS INDICATIONS THAT MOSQUE CROWDS MAY BE
PREPARED FOR DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING EARLY AFTERNOON
PRAYER SESSIONS CAME AUG. 15. LARGE CROWD LEAVING MOSQUE
AT SHAHNAZ SQUARE REFUSED TO DISPERSE WITH USUAL ENCOURAGE-
MENT BY POLICE AND LED AUTHORITIES ON A BIT OF A CHASE UP
TO THE CORNER OF TAKTE JAMSHID AND OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD, SOME
SIX BLOCKS FROM THE EMBASSY. GO1 THAT DAY BEGAN PRECAU-
TIONARY STATIONING OF MILITARY UNITS AT KEY POINTS IN THE
CITY. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE HAS BEEN NO
OUTBREAK OF SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE, BUT POLICE REMAIN IN
POSITICN AROUND MOSQUES TO ENCOURAGE SUFFICIENT SWIFT
DISPERSAL AFTER MAJOR PRAYER MEETING. ON AUG. 16, TEHRAN
BAZAAR WAS CLOSED, BUT TROOPS WERE NEEDED TO BREAK UP
CROWD EXITING FROM BAZAAR MOSQUE.
3. OUR SOURCES CLOSE TO THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SAY
THAT MORE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PLANNED FOR THE AUG. 24 TO 26
ALI. ONE SOURCE TELLS US THAT SOME SOUTH TEHRAN MOSQUES

ARE CIRCULATING SIGN-UP LISTS FOR A SIT IN TO BE HELD ON
THE SHAHANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY AUG. 26. WE UNDERSTAND XKR3X%&X
V I N ~ ~ X M 6 ~ E M X K & ~ ' &
THE
i ARMENIAN
F B MOSQUE
NEAR THE BAZAAR HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR A WEEK.
4. POLITICAL BYPLAY AMONG RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND BETWEEN
THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED RAPIDLY OVER THE PA T
L 3
OPTIONAL FORM 1
IFormsrly F S 4
Janue,
Deor.
SECRETINOFORN - PO,. 2.1-
TyYC -
Cless~l~carzon MRN
1 FEW WEEKS. AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI TOLD AGENCE FRAL~CE 1

PRESS (AFP) THAT HIS PEOPLE WERE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND
THAT THE SHAH HIMSELF SHOULD SPEAK WITH THE PEOPLE.
SHARIATMADARI CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
DEMONSTRATIONS IN SHIRAZ AND OPPOSED MARTIAL LAW IN ISFAHAN
HE STRONGLY OPPOSED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF HIS
FOLLOWERS BUT SAID THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE FOR THE
PEOPLE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM ONE WELL PLACED SOURCE THAT
COURT MINISTER HOVEYDA WAS VERY IRRITATED WITH THIS INTER-
VIEW, BUT WAS TOLD BY A SENIOR IRANIAN THAT "AFTER ALL,
SHARIATMADARI IS NOT A MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF."
5. WITHIN PAST FEW DAYS AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI SENT SHARIAT-
MADARI A MESSAGE TO STOP TALKING ABOUT A CONSTITUTION AND
PARLIAMENT SIN(EKHOMEIN1 OPPOSED THEM ALL. SOURCE WHO
HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT/RELIGIOUS DISCUSSIONS TELLS
US SHARIATMADARI SENT KHOMEINI "PUT UP OR SHUT UP" MESSAGE
TO THE EFFECT THAT IF KHOMEINI WAS SO STRONG, HE SHOULD
COME TO TEHRAN AND SPEAK FACE TO FACE WITH THE AYATOLLAHS
WHO LIVE IN IRAN. SHARIATMADARI NOTED KHOMEINI LIVED FAR
AWAY FROM IRAN AND HAD REFUSED TO CRITICIZE THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT WHEN IT TOOK SEVERE ACTION AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS
IN NAJAF ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. SHARIATMADARI HAS TOLD HIS
ADVISORS THAT HE "DOES NOT WISH TO BE SHAH" BUT WANTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND A PARLIAMENT. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS,
KHOMEINI REPORTEDLY ISSUED A PROCLAMATION CALLING ON ARMY
i _I
SECRET/NOFORN pq..6d - 17670
MRN
CIa..lllcarlon
I AND POLICE OFFICERS NOT TO FIRE ON THEIR BROTHERS AND d

AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. ONE SOURCE REPLIED THIS IS THE
FIRST OCCASION IN SOME TIME THAT ONE OF HIS MESSAGES HAS
FALLEN ON DEAF EARS.
6. VERY SENSITIVE SOURCE RELAYED TO US THE SUBSTANCE OF
A MEETING BETWEEN SAVAK CHIEF MOGHADDAM AND SHARIATMADARI'S
SON-IN-LAW ABBASI NIGHT OF AUG 15. MOGHADDAM REPORTEDLY
ASKED WHAT THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WANTED AND ABBASI TICKED
OFF FOLLOWING POINTS: A) THERE MUST BE A NEW GOVERNMENT.
THE PRESENT CABINET IS UNRESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE AND IS
BLAMED FOR THE KILLING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE JANUARY.
B) THE NEXT GOVERNMENT MUST AT A MINIMUM CALL TO ACCOUNT
SOME OF THE MAJOR INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CORRUPTION, SUCH
AS ALI REZA'I, MANSOUR YASSINI AND MAJOR INDUSTRIALISTS
LAJEVARDI AND FOULADI. C) THE ACTIVITIES OF PRINCESS ASHRAF
ANATHEMA
ARE TO THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY. SHE MUST BE CURTAILED.
THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS OF THE
ROYAL FAMILY, C H O W REZA, AND MAHMOUD REZA MUST AT A
MINIMUM BE REINED IN. ABBASSI TOLD MOGHADDAM CRITICALLY THAT
MAHMOUD'S FRIEND MOZZAFARI JANDARI SHOULD BE FORCED OUT OF
THE OPIUM GROWING BUSINESS. D) THE PEOPLE MUST BE FREE TO
OF THE SHAT'S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH AND MOGHADDAM WAS

TOLD TO TELL THE SHAH THIS. MOGHADDAM REPLIED HE WOULD BE
SEEING THE SHAH THAT EVENING.
L
OPTIONAL FORM
(Formerly FS-4
Janul
S E C
I.**~lic.tion
y p q . L o ( '10
URN c"
'7. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION. THREE MAJOR 1

AYATOLLAHS, SHARIATMADARI, GOLPAYGAN AND MARIASHI, DECIDED
TO ISSUE A BULLETIN WHICH, -WHILE AN~I-GOVERNMENT IN TONE,
WILL CALL FOR MOSLEMS TO STOP KILLING THEIR BROTHERS AND TO
REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC DISORDER. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR BEST
SOURCE THAT RELIGIOUS GROUPS AT SOME POINT HAVE DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE PRIME MINISTERS TO REPLACE AMOUZEGAR. MODERATE
RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP B~LIEVESSENIOR STATESMAN IS NECESSARY,
SOMEBODY WITH CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SHAH AND PEOPLE. OUR SOURCE
THOUGHT TWO NAMES HAD BEEN BANDIED ABOUT: ALI AMINI AND SENATE
PRESIDENT SHARIF EMAMI. HE HIMSELF ADDED SHAH'S ADVISORS
FARDUST AND MOINIAN. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, SHARIF EMAMI
WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE BEST CANDIDATE BECAUSE HE IS A VERY
RELIGIOUS MAN HIMSELF AND HAS SOLID POLITICAL BACKING.
8. OUR RELIGIOUS SOURCES ARE ALL PESSIMISTIC THAT FURTHER
VIOLENCE CAN BE AVOIDED UNLESS THERE ARE SOME CHANGES IN
THE OFFING. RADICAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP PLAYS ON EVERY
INCIDENT TO WHIP UP MORE FEELING AND THE MOOD. PARTICULARLY
IN TEHRAN, IS COMING TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF MORE DEMONSTRATIONS.
NAAS
OPTIONAL FORM 162.IHl

(.Formerly FSIlJ(HIa1
J.nu.ry 1975
Dwf. of stat.
...
O"10*.L
I"Lv ,...
.m"
,011 "0.10
.O1.lO,.
1.1 "I),
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

101.11,.
C~NFIDENTIAL
Memorandum
?r, : Ambassador DATE: August 22, 1978
$9
PROM : John D. Ste p 1, Acting Head of Political
smJEcr: While You Were Away ...

...theplace really didn't turn to crap, but it might have
looked like it:
Domestic Scene
--July and August saw an increase in religious pressure
on the novernment (Tehran 7890 and 7311). A discreet split
between-the Khomeini and Shariatmadari factions may have
become public as a result of the Abadan Theatre disaster,
when the moderates condemned the firebombing and nothing has
yet been heard from the Khomeiniites. Anti-western and anti-
American sentiment has increased significantly in the past
two-three weeks.
--The Shah's Constitution Day speech (Tehran 7456) put
Iran squarely on the road to liberalization in a public way.
This may undergo some shifts, as the Shah noted on August 17
(Tehran 7949), if violence continues. Rumors of the Shah's
ill health (Tehran 7043) caused much toing and froing, but
now appear laid to rest.
--Earlier in the summer, a number of older politicians.
such as Ali Amini, began to take advantage of the liberaliza-
tion to make political statements. We received a number of
approaches from people who want our aid or seek support for
$heir own anti-communist (of course!) schemes.
--The July Cabinet shift made no major changes (Tehran
6975).
--The Prime Minister finished a year in office. Our
assessment (Tehran 7702) suggested he needs more political
finesse.
Foreign Affairs
--Iranians were delighted with the Sino-Japanese peace
treaty and the forthcoming visit of Chairman Hua will
probably be the major foreign policy event of the year.
--Iran has been itchy over potential communist threats--
castigating Castro (Tehran 7187); worrying about the
Mauretanian coup; seeing two choppersshot down by the Soviets
(Tehran 6912), and, most recently, making us aware of their
concerns over the "Sovietization" of Afghanistan (Tehran 7770)
CONFIDENTIAL
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Sdvingr Plan

IpICIII
-24-
CONFIDENTIAL 2.
1l111nan Rights
--We are following the story of 38 prisoners who were
~ l l c g e d l y tried by civil court, released and then picked up
I j y SAVAK for Military Trial.
--The 28th Amordad (Shah returns in 1953) Amnesty on
h~~~:ust 19 saw 62 anti-state prisoners released in a flock
b t 711. No names yet.
--The new Bar Association leadership remains active.
n ~ ~progressive
d faction lawyers have continued to defend
~l,.monstrators--some get off, some don't.
lI11. Next Few Days
You could have a busy weekend ahead. August 24 to 26
r t r the high mourning days of Ramazan. Until the Abadan
Illvatre tragedy, many demonstrations were expected, perhaps
t v c w a sit-in on the Shahanshahi Expressway. The fire may
l n g a public reaction against violence. We also understand
~ t ~GO1 r has recently picked up a number of the more fractious
~ ~ ~ l l a hso s ,the expected confrontation may not be as great
.I.. previously expected. August 26, the day which commemorates
1t1v actual death of Imam Ali, could still be a very sticky
. ' / I hours given the emotionalism and fanatacism which has
, o m e to mark demonstrations in the past two weeks.
CONFIDENTIAL
-25-
Tehran, August 23, 1978
His Excellency
Jafar lladim
Undersecretary for International
and Economic Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tehran
Dear Jafar:
In vier of our recent discussion on the World Confer-
ence to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. I
thought you vould be interested in the folloving state-
ment rhich vas released by the White House on August 18.
I very much appreciate the encouraging vords on this
subJect rhich you passed Oo me the other evening.
"This veek representatives of many nations are meeting
in Oeneva in a vorld conference to combat racism and
racial discrimination.
"The Conference marks the mid-point of the United
]rations Decade for Action t:, dombat raci8m and r a c t d
discrimination, a decade vhose initiation the
United 8tates supported strongly. But the United It8h.S
is unable t o participate in this potentially i I 4 ~ 0 r t a e
conference. although ve vill closely monitor the pro-
ceedings, because the definition of "racismw has be-
perverted for political ends by including Zionism as
one of its forms. The United State. cannot associate
itself rith the Decade so long as it endorses the
patently false definition of Zionism as a form of racism.
"Inmtead, ve hope that this Conference vill return to
the original purpose of the Decade. so that we might
rejoin this international effort to eliminate racism
throughout the vorld. We vill vork tovards this end
beaause ve knov the challenge that racism poses, and
for more than a century we hare struggled to heal its
scars. We know our goals have not been fully accomplished,
jet ve are encouraged and deeply committed t o them.
Domestically and internationally, ve rill continue to
pursue this great common purpose in the context o f
other uncompromised efforts.
"We call on all nations to respect the original obJec-
tlres of the United Nations Decade Against R8cism and
to resist efforts that distort its purpose and erode
I t . moral force."
Ylth high personal regards.
Sincerely.
Charles W. Naas
Minister-Counselor
The DCM c?;ncc: t.he m e e t i n a by i n t r o d u c i . l g new menlbc-rs c,f t h e
Country l'-.am t c Anbassa?or S u l l i v i l n . The 1L.n!~1asador s:.ii: 1.e
w i l l :,pc-::r! cc,?c:; and tomorrow n:orr.irig r e a d i ~ yar!P c ~ t . c l l i n q LLP,
and w i l l s e e s e c t i o n c h i e c ; s t a r t i n g t o ~ , ~ o ~ ~ .e';ti?r-lio,.n.
o-:?
The Amb.:ssacl~r reviewed :;is t:;o s t o p o v e r s I Q Wash?.i.-:{.o;~. iie

s a i d t h z f ' r s c p e r i o d , bnc!c F:i Z u f i e , f,-cl;saJ. r;ri;nzrily or,
l a n g u a g s f o r :)?a n u c l e a r t . i i z t . ; r a l a c c ~ r dand o n crr.-.ri(.:n-
n e n t s f o r a Pi<C r;.eering. Tile s e c o ~ l i iv i s i t w a s nocc c r m -
c e r n e d v i t h e'?c'nts i t 1 I r a n . ?is s a i d t h e r e i s grfa: c o n c e r n
i n Washj.?;top znJ i n neiglstcsZ s~ c o u n t r i e s *;nc-.r t l ~ s:..:.cr!::-.
a c t i v i t y nerc.
On t h e n : . c l e a r b i l a t e r a l . .:>e h n i a s s a d o r rep2rCeS :hat t h e

N u c l e a r ?rq:.Za+:ury Commission s p l i t 2-2 G , . j t , ~ ~ h l c. : dhl 1 1
P t t r a c t a ceytain a n o u x t ci : : t t z n t i o n b c l i ~ r c . it. g o a s u a t s r . ?
Congress. Thc :',r;.bhcsad~x a.iic: 1.e ,~+:nt t o t h e I:ii! and xpI5k0
w i t h a :!?in;:or 2: L.ej l e g i s ' . r t o r s a b o u t t i l e s c ~ ~ i l d ?To
. --,:.A?
problems :az2 C::rtlsern,. a s i d e I'roln Clie e x p e c t e d e f f o r t t:o u + e
t h e i s s i l o c s ? mfi-.:I; f o r r: l v i r ! ~~r?.lcr.sepuhllci*:y c q Trap.
The Anlsassci:'.or r e v j ;::.led ocher new.; from W d s i ; i r . q t ~ n , z.?ti n l

t h a t C o n g r e s s w i l l p r o h n b l y rctth:: f o r a lane-cluck s e s s i o n
f o l l o w i n g t h e e l e c t i o n s . Irzni-la s t u d e n t s i n t k L'.S.
remain a s a c t i v r 2s e v e r . T112.r- i.s a c e i ' t a i n a ~ a o n tzf
c o n c e r n I n washingtor, o v e r Che q e u ~ o l i t i c a is e a b l l - t y o f
t h i s regi!:::, p a r t i c u l a r l y ir! 'lye .-.ft.zr~stn of t:;- ki?I:*i:
coup.
The DCY r=por:e< o n t h e ex+a!i:,:i:ve ciar.qca oaee t.y rhe
I r a n i a n s i n the F h r s i t e x :;: Cho l u c i e a r acco1.5. r.0tii:c;
t h a t t h e C O I hopes t o s i p ';kc lu::!r.,ent by $e&cein.ir:-. -LO.
Mr. S h e 3 l e n b c . r ~ - : discuss:-5 c1.e jnflr?w ui V e s t e r n 21%s s tr.>

I r a n followinrr t h e hhedan @is?!:ter. ?ic announced t h a t
Mayor Bra&:!ey n!?y come t o 'i'ehrrin avo ~ 8 4 3part i n a;? 1r.S
program o n ~ ~ a n i e i p s l i t i e s .
G e n e r a l Knrtesz r e p o r t e d c n the ::row,: Princc's a c : . i V i t i e s
i n t h e U.S. The Ambasssdtir. ir:.:t:irzd <*bout ti;%? 1231 '6
d e c i s i o n tc. buy 1 h e 31 F-JE's, s a y i n ? ir!lat h e ho;>c-d th~2.1
were u n d e r no i l . l u s i o n s t h n t t h e y w a u l 9 c e 1 : r ~ a l l ybe ::!:le
t o p u t Grcu? 9 w i r i n g i n .
-CONPIEENTIRL
Mr. Westley r e p o r t e d on t h e v i s i t of Westinqhouse's Chair-

tr~~rn of t h e Board. The Bnbasszior saLd he had iiad a long
..vssion with Messrs. Bergsten and I;olomon., c7ho Ere con-
t.c.rned with t h e o i l p r i c a . @
!: sa'rd t h a t Sec.retary
ltlumenthal may come t o I r a n i n October. The Ambassadcr
n l s o suggested t o Under S e c r e t a r y Cooper t h a t he c o n s i d e r
~wmingt o I r a n l a t e r t h i s y e a r t o c h ~ L ra n c t h e r s e s s i o n
l l f t h e u.S.-Iran J c i n t Comzlssitn.
Irr. John Stempel r e p o r t e d or. news accounts of t n e r e c e n t

Abadan t h e a t e r f i r e . He noted chat :nooeracis who e a r l i e r
were n o t wont t o c r i t j z e .?.)atollah Khon~einiwere u s i n g t h i s
opportunity t o do s o i n a i r e c t l y by co?demning t1.e f i r e .
l l ~ eAmbassador c h d r a c t c r i z c 3 Chis a s " t r u e Khomeini g r i t . "
Ilr. Stempel noted tha: t o d a y ' s Kaynan i; c a r r y i n g SenatoL

Fia~r.i's s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e ~ocarcb'-is irot heinq k e p t f u l l y
informed .
M r . M i l l s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e itegional Ycdicdl 0 E ; i c e r w i l l
I)c i n town from Aucust 24 t o 2 8 . Those wis1.Ll.g LO s e e k 2 c 1
should c a l l t h e Health Unit f o r an appointracst.
('n t h e s u b j e c t o f Ouildinrj ccrr-tructio:~, t h e Ambassador

r e p o r t e d t h a t M r . Gingles h a s secured t h e necessary $2.3
m l l l i o n f o r t h e new o f f i c e b u i l d i n g , e f f e c t i v e i i s c a l 1980.
This was follawed by some Aiscussion o f t h e I r a n s h a h r v s .
I r a n G a l l e r i e s l o c e t i o n s a s s i t e s f o r interit:. o ~ e r a t i o n e .
Mr. Taylor r e p o r t e d t h ~ ft i g u r c s now a v a i l a b l e f o r e c o n o m ; ~

accounts f o r t h e f i r s t f o u r rcoqths of t h e y e a r show a $1.3
I ~ ! l l i o nd e f i c i t . With a n a n t i c i p a t e d $8 bi1lic.n t o $10
b i l l i o n budget f o r t i e e n t i r e p a r , susl, a d e f j c i t i s n o t
running a t a p r o r a t a l e v e i .
Meanwhile, b a l d m e of payments dccoznts f c r tilt: f i r s t

q u a r t e r a r e i n b a l a n c e b u t showi~igs i g n s of 111oving i n t o
d e f i c i t . W e e x p e c t a $ 1 b i l l j c n deficit over f h e y e a r .
A budget d i r e c t i v e h a s gone o u t t o t h e E l i n i s t r i e s f o r
p l e p a r a t i o n o f t h e 2 5 3 8 hudgnt, i n d i c a t i n q t S a t i t may
be p r e p a r e a on time t h i s y e a r .
Yr. Snow r e p o r t e d t h a t , sayre f c r studen:: 01-ielic?tion,

I A S h a s no progranls d u r i n q Ramazan. The Center has no
e x t r a p o l j c e a s s i g n e d t o i t , b u t more a l e a v a i l a b l e i f
necessary.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
kr. Ryno offered the latest news on the Trade Center.

He announced that the Trade Fair will open on Sepkerber 19,
with the U.S. hoping to have the best presentation in
history.
DISTRIBUTION:
AMB ADMIN N E A / I ~ ~MCONSULISZAKAN
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POL DEA ARM1 SH/MAAG TAEIRI2
ECON DAO
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OR S/A
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Tehran, September 6, 1978
David McGaffey, Esquire

American Consul
American Consulate
Isfahan, Iran
Dmar David:
In recent weeks the Ambassador and I have received
from several high-level officials thinly veiled
accusations that the U.S. is somehow involved in the
demonstrations and is supporting the opposition. The
Ambassador m e t these charges directly with firm denials
and the offer to w e t at any time to review or analyze
any evidence they thought
You should, if it is neces
In the months ahead Iranians of a11 political hues will
be looking for indications of the U.S. attitude on the
domestic developaents. This will present for all o f u s
tricky and delicate situations which can easily lead to
misunderstandings. Therefore, I am certain you will be
vary discreet and meld the following points as appro-
priate into your discussionsr
-- 0.8.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly
basad on enduring mutual interests.
-- Iran has been decrmad to be of great importance to
the U.S. since World War I1 by both Republican a&
Daoacratic Presidents: in December 1977 President
Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strength and
Iran's strength ia ours."t
-- The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and
militarily and politically stabler
CONFIDENTIAL
-- The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberaliaation

policy" which aims to develop over time a demo-
cratic political system; we have no doubts as to
his sincerity about the process;
-- The monarchy is a deeply important institution in
Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual
most suited to lead the Iranian people to a more
democratic system;
-- It is signally important that responsible political
figures work within the system as it develops to
assist the Shah and his government in this dndeavor;
-- Violence will only work againat the achievement of
a democratic system and play into the hands of those
forces of the extreme left and right who do not want
Iran to prosper;
I am writinq similarly to your colleagues at the other

Consulates.
Sincerely.
Charles W. laas
Minister-Counselor
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL-INFOE
Victor Tomseth, Esquire
American Consul
American Consulate
Shiraz, Iran
Dear Vic:
demonstrations and is supportinq the ooposition. The
Ambassador met these charqes directly with firm denials
and the offer to meet at any time to review or analyze
any evidence they thought indicated U.S. finagling.
You should, if it is necessary, be just as firm.
In the months ahead Iranians of all political hues will
domestic developments. This will present for all of us
very discreet and meld the following points as appro-
priate into your discussions:
-- U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly
based on enduring mutual interests;
-- Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to
the U.S. since World War I1 by both Republican
Democratic Presidents: in Dedember 1977 Presiden4ed
Carter said, "our strenqth is Iran's strength and
Iran's strength is ours.":
militarily and politica&ly stable:
-- The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization
cratic political system; we have no doubts as to
his sincerity about the process:
-- The monarchy is a deeply important institution in
democratic system;
-- It is signally important that responsible political
- figures work within the system as it develops to
assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor;
-- Violence will only work against the achievement of
forces of the extreme left and night who do not want
Iran to prosper.
I am writing similarly to your colleagues at the other

Consulates.
Sincerely,
f!hafles W. Naas
Minister-Counselor
CONFIDENTIAL
-34-
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
Michael Metrinko, Esquire
American Consul
American Consulate
Tabriz, Iran
Dear Mike:
demonstrations and is supporting the opposition. The
Ambassador met these charges directly with firm denials
and the offer to meet at any time to review or analyze
nny evidence they thought indicated U.S. finagling.
You should, if it is nece$sary, be just as firm.
In the months ahead Iranians of all political hues will
domestic developments. This will present for all of us
very discreet and meld the following points as appro-
priate into your discussions:
-- U.S.-Iranian relations are excellent and solidly
based on enduring mutual interests.
-- Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to
the U.S. since World War I1 by both Republican and
Democratic Presidents: in December 1977 President
Carter said, "our strength is Iran's strenqth and
Iran's strength is ourm.":
militarily and politically stable;
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 2.
-- The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization

cratic political system: we have no doubts as to
his sincerity about the process;
-- The monarchy is a deeply important instituatim in
democratic system;
-- Tt is signally important that responsible political
fiqures work within the system as it develops to
assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor;
-- Violence will only work aqainst the achievement of
Iran to prosper.
I am writing similarly to your colleagues at the other

Consulates.
Sincerely,
Charles W. Naas
Minister-Counselor
CONFIDENTIAL
- 36-
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY TE&I MINUTES

September 6, 1978
I'he Ambassador opened the meeting by discussing the large

but nonviolent demonstrations September 5 in Tehran. He
said it is unclear whether a new pattern has been set by
the peaceful character of those demonstrations. It is, in
a n y case, a double-edged tactic, possibly meant to discourage
5ecurity forces from vigorous action in the future. The
Ambassador will query the Iranian Minister of Interior for
l~isview of future prospects during his visit today. Tomorrow
I s the traditional seventh day of mourning for chose killed
in earlier demonstrations. The Bazaar will be closed, as
w ~ l lshops elsewhere. Mr. Bannermarl said shopkeepers have
hren told to keep shops closed tomorrow. Dr. Stenpel said
that tomorrow is meant to be a quiet day, not an actual
,:enera1 strike.
i'he Ambassador said talks are continuing with Iranians who
.are trying to persuade the Shah to be conciliatory. One of
rhese mec, Hushang Ram, has supported rumors that the mullahs
re out to get Hoveyda. Although Hoveyda is a practicing
Muslim, his father was linked to the Bahais, and he is thereby
tainted. There are heavy rumors to the effect that Zahedi,
who has returned from the United States, will replace Hoveyda.
'Yhe Ambassador said he met last evening with some Israelis
who expressed concern that Jews will be the next target of
Muslim fanatics. The Israelis do not, however, seem worried
about the impact of such an eventuality on Iran-Israeli
relations.. He asked the DCM tb have. a c.able sent, giving
the Israeli analysis of the sitbation.
The Ambassador asked Dr. Stempel to prepare a cable on the
Shahls.visit to Romania and East Germany. He.requested a
report from Berlin, since that is the headquarters of the
Tudeh Party.
The Ambassador mentioned the international women's meeting
underway in Tehran. He called for a cable on the state of
women's affairs, now that the Ministry for Women's Affairs
has disappeared. Someone should contact Afkhami; perhaps
Lauri Tracy can take over this area after she arrives.
The Ambassador asked Mr. Westley to have Mr. Bash examine a
CIA study regarding projected oil production in Iran. The
study predicts a sharp drop in production.
The Ambassador asked COL. Finehout :o look into the matter
of a lost wallet and Imperial Iranian Car Company.
CONFIDENTTAL
CONFIDENTIAL 2.
The Ambassador announced that rhe U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan

will visit Tehran.
Mr. Shellenberger recounted his conversation with a NIRT
commentator, who said NIRT's International broadcasting
will be less open than the Farsi reporting. The NIRT
reporter also revealed that relations between the Inter-
national and Farsi staffs at NIRT are poor. Mr. Shellenberger
said he spoke with someone from Abadan who said Tehran is
like Cedar Falls in comparison, due to the tense security
situation in Abadan. Mr. Shellenberger reported rumors that
the Embassy has issued instructions regarding evacuation
procedures. The Ambassador noted that one-half of the
population of Abadan is Arab, a fact which may affect the
response there toward the security situation.
Mr. Shellenberger said he expects to receive a list today
of the sixteen university presidents. Not all will
necessarily be new to the position.
COL. Finehout said this is the day for LOA's but drily four
have been issued. The Ambassador attributed this to the
current budget crunch.
COL. Finehout reported that an Iranian police garrison, which
shares facilities with his transportation section, was hit
this morning; a guard was killed. A Citroen eas left there
ready to explode, but failed to do.so. This took place about
0530.
Mr. Westley said Glenn Watts of AFL-CIO will be Jisiting
Tehran. He has made his own travel arrangements. The
An~bassadorasked Mr. westley.'to confirm Mr. .Battsr hotel
reservations.
Mr. Westley said he spoke with the head of Pepsi distributing
-company,'whoreveal'ed that four years ago, Shariarma'dari
was paid to promote Pepsi operations in Iran. Mr. Westley
said the American Chamber of Commerce has invited the Ambassador
to speak at a luncheon in November. The Ambassador agreed in
principle. There was discussion as to whether Secretary
Blumenthal would address the chamber when he visits Iran.
It will have to be a breakfast, due to his tight schedule.
Dr. Stempel reported that Tabriz Majles Deputy Nejad, the
number two man in the Workers Organization, has announced
he is joining the opposition. Dr. Stempel said Arya Mehr
University will remain open this year. He reported that 134
teachers at Tehran University have refused to teach this fall
unless other faculty who were forced into early retirement are
reinstated. He discussed a peaceful demonstration last night
at Jaleh Mosque. Demonstrators have begun to offer money to
security forces, telling them they are not paid enough to do
that kind of work.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 38-
CONFIDENTIAL 3.
Mr. Neeley said crop conditions in the north are good. The
road south of the mountains to Mashad is very poor; one
should take an alternate route.
'The Ambassador asked whether there was any special reason
why Elam should have had so much trouble.
Mr. Greene said with reference to a newspaper story that no
1 l . S . rifles are being used by the Iranian Army The
Gendarmerie does, however, still uSe some M-1 rifles they
received a long time ago.
Mr. Burton said Moniri is out of the country. He would like
to be the next head of Iran Air but has no support.
Mr. Dedich reported that several Asian traffickers have been
arrested in Amsterdam. Evidence points to a link between
Asian and Iranian traffickers. Yesterday two tons of hashish
were seized near Maku; it was destined for Europe. There is
no sign that Afghanistan is.drying up:
Mr. Adler reported information from a non-GO1 source which
indicated Iran is reassessing nuclear power According to
this contact, no additional units will be purchased beyond
current 9,000 megawatts. This is the first sign of a
radical shift and.cutback. The Ambassador said he had
heard Frapce will get all the nuclear business here as
compensation for restraint in PakistaA.
COL. Shaefer reported loss of a helicopter flown by police;
it may have been IIAF A First Sgt. was killed:
Mr. Bannerman discussed the security situation for tomorrow.
We expect stores to be closed throughout the city and peaceful
marches. He announced, in order to get a consistent policy,
.that the Embassy recommends any scheduled events to take
place as scheduled. For example, the chili cookout will be
held. The Ambassador endorsed this recommendation, adding
that on the other hand, he would not recommend a ladies club
tour of the bazaar. He instructed section heads to relay
Mr. Bannerman s assessment. Mr. Snow said IAS has scheduled
normal registration for English classes 8:00 to 12:00 tomorrow.
He reported that last Monday night the police were doubled UP
at tl-evozara facility, but it seems police are spread fairly
thin. Mr. Bannerman said this has been the case, but with
Ramazan over, the police will go back to keeping a mobile
reserve force. Mr. Snow noted there is an archeological
lecture scheduled for tomorrow night. It will take place as
scheduled.
POL:WGPerett:9/10/78
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES-9/6/78
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AMCONSUL ISFAU4N
" SHIRAZ
" TABRIZ
CONFlDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

I.'KOM: POL - john D. Stempel
I)ATE: September 7, 1978
The evening of September 3 I was invited to the Foreign

Ministry club for cocktails with Special Assistant to the
Prime Minister Darious Boyandor. Boyandor wanted to talk
with me about recent events in Iran and my views on them.
I noted that the U.S. was watching with interest and
npproval the Shah's and Prime Minister's efforts to
liberalize the political system and conciliate the
religious leaders. In response to a question from
Boyandor, I reaffirmed that the U.S. felt the monarchy
wns an important institution in Iran and that the Shah is
a key figure in the liberalization process. I concluded
with the hope that responsible political figures from all
quarters would work within the system.
We discussed the hard..linethe opposition had taken toward
government concessions in the political sphere and Boyandor
confirmed the government's invention to go forward with
considerable liberalization of the political atmosphere.
ltowever, the Prime Minister and others, he said, were
becoming concerned that there was no sense of give'
within the opposition and that religious and other figures
felt they had the government on the run and would press for
concessions or demand changes which would be impossible.
Violence, he added, might continue. This would raise two
fundamental questions: 1) What happens if the "crunch"
comes? What would be the USG's attitude toward the reestab-
lisment of order by force? 2) Would democracy work in Iran?
Are there enough good leaders and modem political figures
to prevent the country's regressing to a fundamental
religious form of government?
With respect to U.S. attitudes toward the maintenance of
public order, I pointed out that the so-called "American
emphasis" on human rights had not, contrary to the opinion
of many, advocated chaos instead of public order. Speaking
personally. I thought the U.S. government would be sympathetic
towards efforts to establish public order if taken within
the context of a system which offered ample opportunity for
political participation. The Embassy understood that the
Prime Minisiter had in effect taken the lid off a very
difficult situation. We were hopeful that the government
will do what is necessary to limitunrestrained force to
maintain order. The better the political case for the use
of force, the easier it would be for Iran's friends abroad
in Europe and the U.S. to defend it.
CONFIDENTIAL
-41-
CONFIDENTIAL 2.
With respect to the ques€ioad,whether Iran could support

democracy, I replied that this seemed to be a question for
Iranians themselves to work out. Boyandor replied more
leadership was needed and expressed his personal belief that
the government had to do more. The supporters of the govern-
ment should organize themselves better. He expressed some
doubt that the Prime Minister himself was willing to do this
and was not optimistic about the groups he had already
seen enter the political arena. We concluded the discussion
with expressions of hope for a successful outcome of the
political liberalization process.
Boyandor, who is a career foreiqn service officer, said
he had been asked to remain on the Prime Minister's staff
and, of course, would do so. Personally, however, he hopes
to go back to foreign affairs within to three months
because "it takes ten months to break in a Prime Minister
and this will be my third!"
Comment: I don't believe Boyandor was specifically directed
by his boss to-raise the question of U.S. reaction to confim
measures against anarchy, but I have no doubt that my basic
response to Boyandor's questions will reach senior levels
in the Prime Minister's office.
POL:J D B t e a 1 a . b :9/11/78
CONFIDENTIAL
-42-
.
itm mu^ Po""
IYLT q r n
.
nomo~
me.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

I.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Memorandum
: All Section Chiefs (see distribution) DAm: Sept. 7 . 1978
Uu : POL - JohnD. Stekbl
HJI(3: U.S. Posture Toward GO1
At staff meeting September 3, the Ambassador spoke of the

need to make clear the U.S. Government's attitude toward
the changes now going on in Iran. Accordingly, he has
approved the talkin points listed below for use with
your Iranian contacfs:
--U.S.-Iranian reTations are excellent and solidly
based on enduring mutual interests.
--Iran has been deemed to be of great importance to
the U.S. since World War I1 by both Republican and
Democratic Presidents; in December 1977 President
Carter said, "our stren~this Iran's strength and
Iran's strength is ours
.--The U.S. wishes Iran to be strong economically and
militarily and politically stable.
--The U.S. has welcomed the Shah's "liberalization
policy" which aims to develop over time a democratic
political system; we have no doubts as to his sincerity
about the process.
--The monarchy is a deeply important institution in
Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most
suited to lead the Iranian people to a more democratic
system.
--It is signally important that responsible political
figures work within the system as it develops to
assist the Shah and his government in this endeavor,
--Violence will only work against the achievement of
Iran to prosper.
Distribution
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0CHARGE TO
FROM CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL

E.0. 1 1652:
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IACTION : SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
SUBJECT: INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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88614
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E.O. 11652: GDS
OR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, IR
CRU-2
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN
1. DURING PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE MET WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER ASHRAF, EDUCATION MINISTER NAHAVANDI (LEADER
OF LARGEST BLOC IN CURRENT GOVT), SENIOR MILITARY
OFFICERS, AND HAD AN AUDIENCE OF OVER AN HOUR WITH THE
SHAH. IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR DEPT AND INFO ADDRESSEES
I TO HAVE SOME FLAVOR OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

0
CONFIDENTIAL
CLAS9lrDATION
-44-
CONFLDENTIAL
Clasalllcation
pop._2_01 yd c t -
MRN
r2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM I MET SEPT 8, SHORTLY

1
AFTER DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, SPENT MOST OF OUR
MEETING EXPLAINING AND JUSTIFYING THE INTRODUCTION OF
MARTIAL LAW. SINCE THE MEETING WAS AT HIS REQUEST, HE
WAS WELL PREPARED WITH COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY
OPPOSITION, WITH TEXTS OF BANNERS DISPLAYED IN MANI-
FESTATION SEPT 7, AND WITH RATIONALE FOR GOVT ACTION.
HE WAS UNWILLING TO CONCEDE ANY DEFICIENCIES lRXXHE
ON THE PART OF THE SHAH OR THE GOVT AND PERSISTED IN
DEPICTING THE DISTURBANCES AS FOREIGN-INSPIRED. HE
SHOWED LITTLE SENSITIVITY TO THE DEATHS THAT HAD
OCCURRED IN THE CLASHES EARLIER THAT DAY AND INSISTED
THAT NO MORE THAN TEN HAD DIED. (HE LATER TELEPHONED
ME AT HOME TO CHANGE THAT FIGURE TO "ABOUT 100.")
HE SEEMED EAGER TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL U.S. REACTION TO
EVENTS AND ASKED IF I HAD ANY VIEWS ABOUT NEXT STEPS
IRAN MIGHT TAKE.
3. EDUCATION MINISTER NAHAVANDI, BY CONTRAST, INDICATED
GREAT CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MARTIAL LAW.
DURING SEPT 9 MEETING (WHICH WAS HELD AT MY REQUEST) HE
CONTINUED TO RECEIVE TELEPHONE REPORTS ON VARIOUS
POCKETS OF VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT CITY. HE SAID CABINET
MEETING MXEH2 NIGHT OF SEPT 7 WHICH HAD DECIDED ON
MARTIAL LAW HAD BEEN AN EMOTIONAL ONE, AND HAD BEEN
P E L D UPON THE INSISTENCE OF THE MILITARY. HE SAID HE
J
CONFTnENTTAL
CI.s.rhcar#on
-
AND HIS GROUP HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESIS THAT
"FOREIGNERS" HAD CAUSED ALL RECENT DISTURBANCES AND
HAD PROPOSED SWEEPING REFORMS ("NETTOYAGE TOTALE") .
HE OBVIOUSLY FEELS THAT HIS VIEWS HAVE NOT RPT NOT
BEEN ADEQUATELY ACCEPTED AND HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC
STATEMENT SAYING THAT BgE3 REFORMS MUST FOLLOW MARTIAL
LAW.
4. HE THEN WENT ON TO MAKE "UNE OBSERVATION INFANTILE."
HE SAID THE UNITED STATES GOVT COULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN
CURRENT SITUATION. PERHAPS WE HAD MORE INFLUENCE WITH
SHAH THAN THE GOVT DID. WE SHOULD ACT TO USE THAT
INFLUENCE. "FAITES VITE ."
5. IN TALKING TO SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, I FIND THEM,

ON THE SURFACE, EXPRESSING GREAT SATISFACTION WITH
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. THEY, LIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER
-1, EXPAND AT GREAT LENGTH ON THE MALICIOUS
INTENTIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS AND THE EXTENT OF THE
THREAT TO THE NATION. IN THE COURSE OF DETAILED
DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, THEY DISPLAY REAL NERVOUSNESS
ABOUT FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS. THEY EXPECT TERRORISPI,
SABOTAGE, AND INDUSTRIAL STRIKES. THEY WERE CLEARLY
SHAKEN BY THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS,
PARTICULARLY THAT OF SEPT 7 .
6. AS FOR THE SHAH, WHOM I MET SEPT 10, I FOUND HIM
-TIRED AND UNHAPPY, BUT CONSIDERABLY MORE SPIRITED THAN
-m
OPTIONAL FO
Cla.a#flcarlm
-46-
I-0- Pe9.4-I n b ' Y
MRN
CIaseificalion
I IIE WAS A WEEK AGO. HE DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLY GREATER 1

SENSITIVITY TO THE DEATHS THAT HAD OCCURRED THAN DID
HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE PERSISTS IN SAYING THAT HE
SEES THE SOVIET HAND IN ALL THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND
DISTURBANCES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE. AT THE SAME TIME,
HE SAYS THAT "PAST MISTAKES" MUST BE CORRECTED. HE SAYS
IIE HAS ORDERED A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION. NINE
ARRESTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE AND WILL SHORTLY BE
ANNOUNCED. MORE ASSISTANCE WILL BE GIVEN THE COUNTRYSIDE.
THE PROCESS OF LIBERALIZATION WILL CONTINUE. LEGIS-
LATION ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND OF PRESS WILL BE
INTRODUCED EX INTO THE PARLIAMENT. THE ELECTIONS
WILL BE HELD--AS FREE ELECTIONS--IN JUNE.
7. HE IS EAGER FOR SOME PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF U.S.

SUPPORT FOR HIM, FOR HIS REGIME, AND FOR HIS PROGRAM.
HE HAS A MORE COHERENT PLAN OF ACTION THAN HE EARLIER
DISPLAYED. HE CATEGORICALLY ESCHEWS ANY SUGGESTION THAT
HE WILL ABDICATE OR FLEE THE CURRENT SITUATION. ON THE
OTHER HAND, HE DOES NOT MINIMIZE THE PROBLEMS HE FACES.
HE REALIZES THAT MARTIAL LAW MAY FORCE HIS OPPOSITION
UNDERGROUND AND INTO ACTS OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE.
HE IS CONCERNED THAT A WAVE OF INDUSTRIAL STRIKES MAY
BE IN THE OFFING. HE APPRECIATES THAT THE IMAGE OF
MARTIAL LAW WILL BE OFFENSIVE TO MANY INTERNATIONAM,
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.
I- _I
.-oc
CIaa.rfieatlon
r8. THE NET IMPRESSION I DERIVE FROM THESE SEVERAL

INTERVIEWS IS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN IRAN IS BADLY
SHAKEN BY RECENT EVENTS. THERE IS STILL A STRONG
ELEMENT, NOT ONLY IN THE MILITARY, BUT ALSO IN THE
CABINET WHICH FAVORS THE RETURN TO A HARSH,
AUTHORITARIAN ROLE TO SUPPRESS THE OPPOSITION.
THERE IS, AT THE SAME TIME, A SIGNIFICANT GROUP IN THE
LEADERSHIP THAT BELIEVES REPRESSIVE ACTION WILL NOT
WORK AND THAT THE TIME IS OVERDUE FOR ACTIONS WHICH
WILL MEET LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES. THE SHAH, IN THE PAST
FEW WEEKS, HAS PLAYED A HAMLET-LIKE ROLE, WITHOUT
ASSERTING HLS INFLUENCE IN EITHER DIRECTION. HE SEEMS,
AS OF TODAY, TO HAVE RECOVERED SOME OF HIS FORMER CON-
FIDENCE AND TO HAVE RESUMED CONTROL OF GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION. HE IS CONVINCING WHEN HE SAYS THAT HE HAS
SIDED WITH THOSE WHO WANT REFORM AND WE CAN EXPECT HIM
TO ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT THOSE CHANGES.
9. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO ESTIMATE WHETHER
HE WILL BE ABLE TO DO WHAT HE SAYS HE WANTS TO DO WHILE
HE IS SADDLED WITH THE HUBRIS OF A SULLEN POPULATION
CHAFING AT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL OPTIONAL F O
Classification
-48-
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m vIrns-
-1 .mm a.' 0 1 1 8.1.1 1.
UtirmD STATBS OOvmNIumT
DCM - Mr. Naas
ions with members of the American community in southern Iran,

both with individuals and with groups, had been taking the
line that while civil unrest here has had an underlying anti-
foreign bias, it had neither been directed ar foreigners in
~eneralnor Americans in particular. Under such circumstances,
we advised that it was unlikely that Americans were in ser-
lous danger as long as they avoided situations where they
might be caught by accident or as targets of opportunity in
protest actvities. More recently, conversations that Consu-
late staff members (and spouses) have had with a broad cross-
section of Iranians in Shiraz, Ahwaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan
indicate a shift in attitudes that may make our earlier as-
xssment invalid.
While viewpoints vary, the rapid emergence of anti-American
sentiment in recent days in almost every instanced can be
traced to widespread dissatisfaction with the regime, con-
tlnuing powerlessness of opponents to bring about fundemen-
tal change in the situation (in this re ard, the appoint-
ment of the Sharif-Emami government is dverwhelmingly seen
as no more than cosmetic), and a widely shared belief that
the United States is capable of doing much more to manipu-
late events than is in reality the case. Thus, a single in-
dlvidual can blame us both for the unrest (the Administra-
tion's human rights policy) and for the regime's ability to
maintain itself in power (military equipment sales and sup-
port).
fxpressions of anti-American sentiment (asice front Yankee
go home posters and graffiti which blossomed before the im-
position of martial law) have been indirect for the most
part, often taking the form of, "We have nothing against
CONFIDENTIAL
f
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BUJ U.S. S k g s &ndr R0sJm'y on #be PqmU saving^ Plan
-49-
you personally, but Iranians dislike Americans because 1)
you keep the Shah in power, 2) American weapons kill our
people, 3) you are a bad moral influence on our children,
4) you do not respect Islam, 5 ) you have caused inflation
and shortages, etc." Several people, out of genuine concern
for individual Americans they know, have advised that they
leave Iran quickly lest something happen to them. This con-
cern may be exaggerated, but it is indicative of a situation
they unquestionably perceive as inhospitable to Americans.
The Americans living in southern Iran are not oblivious to
these sentiments. Colleagues at work and neighbors see to
that. Perhaps because they feel more isolated than Americans
in Tehran, they have tended to be extremely nervous about
the security situation and to look to the Consulate for
advice and regular reassurance. While our assessment of the
situation does not lead us to conclude that Americans should
start packing their bags, the potential for trouble invol-
ving Americans does seem to have increased considerably in
recent days. Conveying this view to the American community
involves some risk of exacerbating fear which is perhaps
already overblown among many of its members, but if we are
too relaxed, we stand in danger of loosing our credibility.
There has already been some talk to the effect that the U.S.
Government cares less about its citizens than about its
relationship with the Shah. While the analogy is both far-
fetched and inaccurate in its details, the case of Vietnam
has been cited as an example of our sacrificing the safety
of American citizens for the sake of an illusion.
Given the circumstances here, we believe that for the time
being we should take the following line when approached by
Americans regarding the security situation: Conditions are
not such to warrant an organized evacuation of Iran, ei-ther
on a selective basis or in toto. Indeed, the imposition of
martial law in several c ~ ~ t h u g h o the
u t country gener-
ally seems to be having a salutary effect as far as civil
unrest is concerned. However, Enti-American sentiment among
certain segments of the Iranian population appears to have
increased recently. Its emergence suggests that American
citizens living in southern Iran need to be especially con-
scious of precautionary measures that will help them to
avoid situations which potentially could be dangerous to
them. These measures, if adhered to, as well as martial law
provisions themselves, will inevitably entail a certain
degree of restricted freedom,.particularly as they affect
dependents. It is up to each lndividdal to determine whether
or not this restricted freedom will be within the bounds of
tolerance for him or her and his or her family members.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
While such advice may lead to some individuals sending their
dependents home and make it relatively more difficult for
companies and organizations to recruit for Iran, we think
it will reassure members of the American community in general
of our concern for their welfare without leading to a panic.
The number of dependents has been falling in any event, and
what appears in the news media in the United States will have
Kreater impact on recruiting than what we say here. Thus.
In effect we would not be in the vanguard of a policy shift
but rather lending a rationale to trends already underway.
O n balance, a reduced presence might not be such a bad thing.
cc: CONS - Mr. Goelz

SY - Mr. Bannerman
POL - Mr. Stempel
CONFIDENTIAL
co@'
CONFIDENTIAL
&/P='~
d"
COUNTHY TEN1 MINUTES
September 13, 1978
TIE Anbassador opened the meeting with a review of the activities
of the past week. Re said the Thursday demcnstration caused great
concern.within the goveznment due to its size and obvioas organiza-
tion. He characterized the Friday shootings at Jaleh Square as
unfcrtunatfly indicative of the nature of the martial law authority
the troops were dressed in fulP battle gear and using &ombat
rather than crowd control. weapons. He said the government's task
now is to sort ouc the orderly from the disruptive elements of the
opposition. He stressed the importance for the officiai community
to observe the naztizl lsw regulations. Xe instrrlcted that
Mission reporting sh0ui.d emphasize che factual rather than analytia
for t h e time being, The Embassy has been commended by Under
Secretary Newson for its reporting during the recent period.
In runninq through several other odds and ends, the Ambassador
noted that hc had been hearinq com?laints from American businessme
concerning tardy payments by the Jranians for services rensered.
This fits in \d,ithour growing inpression of a severe budgetary
crunch. Sue;? a situati~ncould be due to paralysis under tbe new
ministers or fear of making paynients that have the possible taint
of corruption. Anyone hearing more in this area should report
to John Mills.
On the subject of curruption, we may be on the verge of losing a
number of friends and contacts. For example, Etemad and Mansur
have been ordered cot to leave the country as they are under
investigation.
The Ambassador discussed a message he has received from Deputy
Under Secretary Read announcing plans for FY 80 bndget and p0siti0
cuts. The Department is to take a cut of $55 million and 461
positions, many of which will be overseas. One proposal under
consideration would be to cut N I v slots in low-fraud countries.
Mr. Goelz scoffed at this idea, saying it would not release many
positions.
Secretary Blumenthal will visit lran later this year. Messrs.
Naas and Mills will begin putting together a program. The Secreta
will be invited to stay at the Residence.
The head of the Consortium has scheduled a cocktail party for the
same time as the Ambassador's reception for John Kills. The
Ambassador wants to meet with the Consortium people at some point,
but will regret the invitation.
CONFIDENTIAL
-52-
Mr Shellenberqer discussed the live TV coverage of the Majlis,
,7rrying
that it is having a tremendous effect, acting as a sort
o f safety valve for letting off steam.
IcA has received an hour-long videotape from Washington, depictin?
.Igroup of Iranian students discussing their experiences. The
film will be available at the student counseliing center.
Mr. Mills discussed the effect recent events have had on the
d,conomy, noting that there does appear to have been a shift in
t)udget priorities from defe~seto agriculture.
In political news, the Noori arrested today is the same mullah
who has been pushing the anti-~ewishline. He was also invoped
I n the Jaleh Square incidents.
Mr. Butler confirmed the new availability of funds for agriculture.

The Ambassador is to call on the new Minister in the near future.
('olonel Schaefer reported that iiillianr "Your Man" Braniqan had
called the DAO, expressing chagrin over his erroneous reporting
that Iranian riot troops had been using American rifles.
Mr. Bannerman reported on a recent security meeting attended by
over 187 companies.
Mr. Goelz reported the not-too-surprising news that inquiries
concerning U.S. visas have zoomed.
Mr. RynO confirmed that the Trade Fair will open as scheduled on
September 19. t
AMB ARMISH/MAAG
IICM AGR
1'OL ICA
POL/M
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nno
CONFIDENTIAL
1 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN I CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
ACTION: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
POL-3
AMB
DCM
t CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN
LIMDIS
08794
P7M E.O. 11652: GDS

OR
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, IR
NEED FOR
SUBJECT: --/CROWD CONTROL EQUIPMENT IN IRAN
1. ONE TROUBLING FEATURE ABOUT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL
I LAW IN IRAN IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY UNITS WITHIN THE IRANIAN $

1 ARMY WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR NON- 1
( LETHAL CROWD CONTROL. WHEN TROOPS WERE BROUGHT INTO 1
TEHRAN LAST WEEK TO TAKE OVER FROM THE POLICE, THEY CAME
i
D R I F T E D BY:
EQUIPPED IN FULL BATTLE DRESS, ARMED WITH G-3 RIFLES, WITH
FIXED BAYONETS.
n DmAFTINO DATE TEL. EX?.

n I
9/14/78
CLEARLNCES:
I. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN THESE TROOPS WERE ATTACKED BY A 1
STONE-THROWING, CLUB-WIELDING CROWD AT JALLEH SQUARE,
THEY HAD NO WEAPONS WITH WHICH TO RETALIATE OTHER THAN
THEIR RIFLES. THEY WORE HELMETS, BUT CARRIED NO
SHIELDS. WHEN THEIR RIFLE BURSTS INTO THE AIR FAILED
TO STOP THE ADVANCING CROWD, THE RESULTING SLAUGHTER
WAS INEVITABLE.
3. IT IS SIMILARLY INCONGRUOUS TO SEE THE CHIEFTAN TANKS
POSTED CONSPICUOUSLY AROUND THE CITY, WITH THEIR ENORMOUS,
LONG-BARRELLED CANNONS. IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE HOW THEY
COULD BE USED AS A CROWD-CONTROL INSTRUMENT EXCEPT TO THE
ACCOMPANIMENT OF SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION WELL
BEYOND THE NEEDS OF ANY ANTICIPATED CIRCUMSTANCE.
4. THE INCONGRUITY OF IRANIAN MILITARY WEAPONRY FOR THE
CURRENT SITUATION IS EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT IRAN, DURING
THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS WHICH HAVE SEEN CIVIL UNREST IN OTHER
DARTS OF THE WORLD, HAS NEVER EXPERIENCED THIS PHENOMBNON
DOMESTICALLY UNTIL RECENT MONTHS. PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES HAVE
USUALLY BEEN ABORTED BEFORE THEY BEGAN BY THE CONSTANT
SURVEILLANCE OF SAVAK.
5. WHEN IRANIAN AUTHORITIES BEGAN TO RELAX SAVAK CONTROLS
AND PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE OVER THE LAST
FEW MONTHS, IRAN BELATEDLY UNDERTOOK TO ACQUIRE A LIMITED
NUMBER OF SHIELDS, HELMETS, AND TEAR GAS FOR THEIR POLICE
LfORCES. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROFESSIONAL
.J
TTAT. Page_3__of
Class8ltcet#on
TRAINING ASSISTANCE FOR THESE FORCES, THE POLICE
PROVED SIGNIFICANTLY INEPT IN THEIR NEW ROLES.

6. THE RESULT OF ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS AN UNEASY
SITUATION IN WHICH A RENEWED OUTBREAK OF PUBLIC AGITATION

COULD PREDICTABLY RESULT IN MORE VIOLENT DEATHS. THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THAT FACT MAY SUCCEED IN INTIMIDATING

POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATORS AND, INDEED, SOME SENIOR ARMY
OFFICIALS ARE COUNTING ON THAT VERY FACT IN THEIR
ASSURANCE THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL SUCCEED.
7. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS THE SHAH'S AND THE GOVT'S

ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION WHICH WILL
PERMIT PUBLIC ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE NEAR

FUTURE. THE TRANSITION TO THIS NEW FEATURE OF PUBLIC
LIFE IN IRAN WILL REQUIRE A READJUSTMENT OF OFFICIAL
IRANIAN THINKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF CROWD CONTROL.
8. I HAVE SPOKEN IN RECENT DAYS TO THE SHAH, TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COI\lMANDERISSTAFF, GENERAL AZHARI,
AND TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR ABOUT THIS PROBLEM.
I HAVE DESCRIBED DEMONSTRATIONS I HAVE SEEN IN TOKYO WITH

FAR GREATER NUMBERS OF PARTICIPANTS AND FAR GREATER
PROVOCATION BY THE PARTICIPANTS WHICH WERE EFFECTIVELY BROKEN
UP WITHOUT A SINGLE FATALITY. THEY ALL AGREE THAT IRAN
MUST CHANGE ITS CURRENT POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO CONTROL
OF CIVIL DISORDER. (GEN. AZHARI GAVE ME A GRAPHIC
DESCRIPTION OF FINDING HIMSELF IMMOBILIZED IN HIS AUTO-A

-
C OPTIONAL FOR
Clsss,bcotron
-56-
CONFIDENTIAL Pw*
Classification MRN
rMoBILE ON THE FIRST NIGHT OF MARTIAL LAW BY A SOLDIER 1

WHO HAD HALTED HIS CAR AND KEPT ITS OCCUPANTS UNDER
THE MUZZLE OF HIS GUN FOR OVER TEN MINUTES UNTIL A
POLICEMAN "SLOWLY" CAME TO CHECK IDENTITIES.)
9. THE NET RESULT SEEMS TO BE A CRASH EFFORT ON THE
PART OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR TO OBTAIN NON-LETHAL CROWD
CONTROL EQUIPMENT. AT THE MOMENT, FOCUS SEEMS TO BE
ON BRITISH AND GERMAN EQUIPMENT WITH SOME GROWING
INTEREST IN THE JAPANESE. I ASSUME THERE WILL
CONTINUE TO BE THE USUAL DEMAND FOR PATT DERIAN'S
CONFIDENTIAL
OPTIONAL F O R M 152a(Hl
Classification (Formerly FS-4131HJal
January 1975
Deof. Of Sfate
-57-
September 18, 1978
Bear George:
Thank you for including me in the September 7
meeting. As promised, here are comments on issues
raised there.
Iranian Character - Alternate Leaders
~t the meeting, a number of conclusions were drawn
on the basis of sweeping assumptions about the Iranian
character and its unchangeability. There are, it
is true, well-known negative characteristics,in the
Iranian personality such as cynicism, self-consciousness,
and archaic individualism which are personally and
socially negative. These have been described over
and over again by comentators on Iran, and are
catalogued in Zonis' book, The Political Elite of Iran.
(I hope that sometime soon you will be able to read
the last chapter of this book --
only 11 pages --
if
you have not already.) Some of the speakers in the
meeting seemed to think that the only effect of these
characteristics is to strengthen the Shah. However,
that is only part of the atory, the importance o f which
is rapidly ebbing. Iranians have always been intensely
and unashamedly aware of these defects and now resent the
way in which the Shah's method of rule reinforces them.
It is a cliche of both standard academic literature on
politics in Iran i ill, zonis, Cottam, Binder, Jacobs),
and of the common conversation of Iranians themselves,
that the Shah's system o f control and governance uses
and depends on the failings in the Iranian characters
thereby strengthening them. The Shah himself admits as
much in Mission for My Country. This way of governing
associates the Shah in the minds of Iranians with what
they most dislike in themselves, continually generating
profound and continuing resentment against him. It has
done much to prevent him from being accepted (as he
yearns to be by his people) as the supreme natimalist.'
Furthermore, many Iranians believe that the same defects
on which the Shah capitalizes politically also seriously
retard economic developtent, education, social respectability,
and the growth of modern consciousness.,'Their awareness
of these vices, and the way in which the Shah plays on
Illern, continually builds up a sense among aware Iranians
tt~at the Shah's regime anomalously seeks forced-draft
-I-onomicmodernization through profoundly reactionary
voverning methods which endanger the country's future
ia~liticallyand as a society.
his feeling is particularly strong among those
--
tJrOUpS businessmen, professionals, which could
~'rovidealternate leaders. The conventional wisdom
1 8 that such leaders are not to be found because those
utl~)might become leaders are co-opted or otherwise
nrutralized by the Shah's carefullyplaying on the
I Iranian personality. This is only partly true. Iran
t1
.8 the normal (small) proportion that any nation may
mrpect of brave, socially conscious and responsible
mmn. Some of these men have found ways to lhre, and
llve reasonably well in Iran, outside but closely
r~t~mervant of the governing process, without losing their
.elf-respect and sense of integrity. There are also
tliose vho, out of religious, political or professional
itrlnciple, or for other reasons have openly opposed the
I rit~nh, such as the signatories of the Charter of 32, in
1, a~.tlonswhich require considerable courage whatever the
wrtives for them may be.
I
1 After the Shah, what?
Another feeling which underlies the current opposition
I8 that the Shah's time in history was a real and important
--
t,rle for Iran which is now over. In this perspective,
t~issystem of government, which was necessary and important
In pulling a fragmented people together and preserving
tt~elr independence, now is seen as an obstacle to Iran's
auplrations and the future development of all the important
ampects of its national life. This may seem obvious
and academic, but it has a double importance. First, it
I m a main source of the Iranian sense of im rmanence
aI)out the Shah's regime which several peo-eting
n1)ted-- the feeling that the Shah "will not last my life
tlme." Second is the sense among a great many Iranians
all classes that there is nothing in their government
mxcept the Shah. This in turn comes from the perception
tt~nt not only has he not established any structure of
q~<lvernment which can survive a transition, but also that the
monarchy as he conceives it will not be acceptable to most
Iranians when he goes, nor will any other authoritarian
v~~vernment which tries to rule in his Style. (This is one
tcnson why I do not think a purely military takeover in
m~~ccession to the Shah has much chance of stability or
1 1l~lgetivity.)
This is why, in addition to the clear and pressing
issue of human rights and rational ,evelopent in Iran,
continuing liberalization is so important to many
Iranians and to us. The right kind of liberalization
can make a start on a permanent framework for Iranian
political life, and on some experience in using it.
Otherwise, whoever succeeds the Shah will have to re-
organize Iranian politics and government from the
ground up, and do it in the center of a whirlwind of
domestic fears and unleased emotions, and of outside
pressures.
Sh'ism
The meeting may have left the impression that
Sh'ism and the Shiite clergy are innately and totally
reactionary. In fact, Sh'ism's formal indifferences
to politics make it possible for its devoted followers
to support many different forms of government. Sh'ism
is inheritently nationalistic since it represents the
adoption of Islam to the Iranians' desire to have a
religion of their own not dominated by the Arabs. Further-
more, Sh'ism has a greater potential for adaptation
and accommodation to new circumstances and governments
than Sunnism because it holds that the Gate of Interpretation
is still open, whereas Sh'ism in theory forbids theological
interpretations not follnd in the Koran or the teachings
of the Prophet. The Shah's repression of religion in Iran
has made Sh'ism's predominant groups dogmatic a+
conservative in the course of defending themselves, just as
Roman Catholicism has become in Communist countries. Even
so, I see Sh'ism as conservative socially, but with an
inherent anti-authoritarian bias politically. For this
reason, in an Iran in which there is freedom of religion
and religious organization and practice, and freedom to
express religion convictions politically, I would expect
that, as in Turkey and Israel, there would be one party
devoted to conservative religious positions, particularly
on social issues, and a number of other parties across
the political spectrum to which devoted persons would
belong without much sense of violating their religious
beliefs or being opposed by their religious leaders.
Next Steps
The consequences of what has been described in this
letter are that Iran is a country with very considerable
economic development which is acutely underdeveloped
politically. Iranians are totally and painfully aware of
this.
This means that we have only two realistic possibilities
1 ,lroose between. These are the turbulence of a
'rntry dynamically trying to work out its own r-rmanent
I tm of government, or the turbulence of a people
.fruqgling with regimes which do not understand or
rlncrously reject the process of trial and error in
l~tcvinga lasting polity. If the Shah can bring himself
1 colerate turbulence in the search for a permanent
.'tucture of government and the emergence of such a
1 vcrnment which would have real power of its own, two things
1 - has never been able to do in the past, then progress
-11 begin while it is still in power. Accordingly,
arter's emphasis on continued liberalization in his
t r , t bnt telephone call to the Shah was right on target.
w, must consistently press for liberalization with the
1
. so that Iranians, seeing this, will at least give
j r n t , credence to the idea that we mean it and that we will
I '. similarly insistent with future regimes. 'If the Shah
I . t l l y does proceed with free elections, political parties,
I 1 -
freer Majles, and a freedom of political expression,
wlll begin to rescue his country from its almost
/ 1 ? a 1 political underdevelopment and hope of
rrasonably stable future after him. ?his outcome
.
w ~ ~ l
I II~-term
make
d up in some degree for all of our indiscriminate
j'ox-tto the Shah in the past, and offer Iran the best
chance to be a viable nation able and willing
I ) ) l a y the role we hope for it in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, however, intermittent repression is

..~,.tt more likely, making it quite possible that the Shah
- . I I be removed in the next decade by assassination,
, I I ~ , , or irrestible population pressure. The best possible
f irure government for us in these circumstances would be
. . I ( , . dominated by an alliance between civilians and younger
nllltary officers. The worst would be a regime dominated
I , senior military officers. This is, however, the one w e
n.3; be most likely to get initially, although I think there
1:. a possibility of a move directly to civilian government
-'~Ic-h would have a good chance of success.
If a military government of older officers emerges
first there will be strong public and private pressures
18 us to embrace it unreservedly. These pressures must be
lt.,.~sted fiercely. Such a government would not last.
: I would be rent by internal factionalism and strongly
i,i'osedby civilians and younger officers. Its leaders
w t lld not know how to rule except by repression. It is
--bfremelylikely that younger officers and conscript
ldiers would not shoot fellow Iranians to keep reactionary
,,#-lleralsin power. Above a very great majority of
11.1r1ians regard such a regime as certain to be much worse
than the Shah's. It is therefore critically important
that we are never seen as encouraging such a regime, no
matter in what straits the Shah finds himself) or
what chaos initially succeeds him.
In the meantime, we must use the present episode,
even if the Shah weathers it.to get it finply
established among ourselves that our need to know and
understand Iran's internal political developments now
permanently outweighs any damage we may do to the Shah,
or to our relations with him, by being aeen to be making
our own independent assessment of those politics. Indeed,
his awareness that we are doing this may well add weight
to our encouragement of continued liberalization. At
the same time, our identification with the Shah, particularly
through such public events as arms sales and,public
statements should be discreetly but constantly cut back
as far as it is consistent with our not being perceived
as simply abandoning him.
Finally, it may be that some of the following actions
have not yet begun. If so, I think that they should be
started immediately:
A. Top priority atst be given in both the Embassy
and CIA to reporting on internal events and domestic
politics in Iran. You know what is needed here far
better than I, and we both know the excruciating
difficulties of doing this. It may be worth nothing that
the consulates should be given the mandate and resources
necessary to get fully involved in this. Access is much
easier outside of Tehran and many of the significant
activities are going on where the consulates are.
B. There should be regular and systematic consultation
with the academic community. Many academics have been
calling the shots on Iranian politics much more accurately
than we have. There are many unused resources here to
use them, and these men and womenshould know that their
advice is needed and wanted. This consultation, which
should deeply involve ICA, should also include regular
monitoring of pu$lications. The materials so covered ought
to include PhD thesgs. W n y on Iranian matters noted in
the American Political Science Association Journal appear
to cover in depth matters on which we are particularly
ignorant. The Middle East Institute should be regularly
tapped for its expertise and tactfully encouraged to devote
more of its resources to Iranian studies. The American
Institute for Iranian Studies based at the University of
rannmylvania pnd which apparently has been almost
Ignored by us im a very important resource. Acadcmicn
who have worked in Iran on other disciplines, such
a. at Harvard8# Iranian Center for Management Studies,
mhould also be regularly conferred with.
t
C. Either through academics or directly, discreet
I-ontactshould be established with Iranian exiles
and their organizations in the US. For example,
what do we know about the newly-established Committee
ror Ruman Rights in Iran which is apparently the American
arm of the Charter of 32 group?
D. Colamerce should be asked to assist in contacts

I with American businessmen, many of whom are remarkably
perceptive and who frequently have unusual access.
I vould be& to talk over with you how these
oonsultations might be organized. It will not be easy
to overcome euspicion of us among private American groups
Interested in Iran, especially academics.
This has been a long letter. I hope it is useful.
Please use it in any way that you wish. Please
also let me know whenever there is any other way I
can be helpful. Good Luck:
Sincerely,
John Washburn
7
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL I
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 7
INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ISL-VIABAD
AMEMBASSY J I D D A
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY P A R I S
USLO PEKING
USCINCEUR
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 091b7

LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, P I N R , P I N S , P I N T , IR
SUBJECT: IRAN AND THE SHAH: A ROCKY ROAD AHEAD
1. I N THE COURSE O F THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, AND I N THE
SHADOW O F A MAJOR EARTHQUXKE DISASTER I N EASTERN IRAN,
THE NEW GO'VT O F IRAN HAS RECEIVED I T S VOTE O F CONFIDENCE
I N THE PARLIAMENT AS WELL AS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL FOR
S I X MONTHS O F MARTIAL LAW. AN A I R OF CRLM HAS BEEN
RESTORED TO THEI=;3iE CITIES, EXCEPT FOR MINOR INCIDENTS
OF LAWLESSNESS, BUT THE SHAH AND THE GOVT FACE ENORMOUSLY
(Formerly F S '13 ,.I

JanL.3.). 1 1 7
oept c : s:a<
mi?+.
CI.,lc.l,'n
COMPLICATED PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE.

2. THE GOVT NOW FACES THE COMPLICATED TASK OF
ESTABLISHING ITS LEADERSHIP, CREATING SOME SENSE OF
CONFIDENCE IN GOVT ITSELF, AND ACHIEVING A POPULAR
CONSENSUS FOR ITS POLICIES. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, IT
MUST MOVE CONVINCINGLY TO LIBERALIZE AND BROADEN ITS
BASE SO THAT RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL GROUPS WITH DEMO-
CRATIC AMBITIONS CAN PLAY A ROLE IN THE RX PROCESSES
OF GOVT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST PLACATE THE MANY
WHICH
WHO HAVE LENT THEMSELVES TO A LEADERSHIP/IIXXR HAS
CALLED FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE CURRENT REGIME.
IF IT DOES NOT SUCCEED IN THE LATTER EFFORT, IT IS
PREDICTABLE THAT THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
RE-OPENING OF THE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS WILL RESULT
ONCE AGAIN IN THE TURBULENCE OF THE RECENT PAST AND
A REVIVAL OF THE SORRY CYCLE OF MILITARY SUPPRESSION.
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SHAH AND THE: MONARCHY COULD
BE OMINOUS.
3. THE SHAH HAS BEEN DIRECTING HIS LIBERALIZATION
PROGRAM OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS ON LARGELY AN AD HOC
BASIS. EVENTS THEMSELVES DETERMINED THAT TWO HISTORIC
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WOULD BE REOPENED: THE INDE-
PENDENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF,AND RESPONSIBLE TO, THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE POWERS OF THE SHI'A ISLAMIC CLERGY AS TRADI-
- A
-c
CI.sr#bcaIron
-66-
I-TIoNAL GUARDIANS OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND EXPONENTS 1
SETTLED IN THE SHAH'S FAVOR, ONE WITH SUPPRESSION OP
MOSSADEGH AND RESTRAINT OF HIS SUCCESSORS IN THE 19501s,
THE OTHER WITH REPRESSION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S MOBS
IN 1963. OVER THE PAST SUMMER THE SHAH DEMONSTRATED
THAT HE WAS WILLING TO YIELD SOME POWER TO A PRIME
MINISTER AND PARLIAMENT AS PART OF THE LIBERALIZATION
LEADING TO PROMISED FREE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NEXT
JUNE. HE AND THE AMOUZEGAR GOVT SHOWED LESS WILLINGNESS
OR ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE THE SHI'A CLERGY OR TO RECOG-
NIZE THE AREAS OF POPULAR DISCONTENT WHICH THAT CLERGY
MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT.
4. CONSEQUENTLY, THE CLERGY USED CENTURIES-OLD
TECHNIQUES TO CALL OUT THEIR MASSES. BOTH THE MODERATE
CLERGY BEHIND AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI OF GHOM (WHO IS
ALLIED WITH NATIONAL FRONT AND OTHER MIDDLE CLASS
CONSTITUTIONALIST POLITICIANS WHO HAVE SOPHISTICATION
BUT NO MOB APPEAL) AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EXTREMIST
COALITION OF FANATIC MOSLEMS LED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI
IN IRAQ (WHICH HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN PENETRATED AND IS
ASSISTED BY A VARIETY OF TERRORIST, CRYPTO-COMMUNIST,
AND OTHER FAR LEFT ELEMENTS) LAUNCHED STRONG APPEALS
TO LARGE SECTIONS OF THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED
ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY WHO NURSE A WHOLE HOST OF ECONOMIC
I- _I
OPTIONAL FORM (SZalH)

(Formerly FS4131HIa)
&).nu.r), 1976
Depl. 01 Sl.1.
__ -- C_OBEUDE_NTIJL-p pag.A- 01
Clarsll8callon
AND SOCIAL GRIEVANCES. THESE ARE GRIEVANCES BROUGHT
ON TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BY THE FRUSTRATIONS,
I N E Q U I T I E S , CORRUPTION, AND R I S I N G EXPECTATIONS
LN(;I.NDERED BY THE SHAH'S PBOGRMI O F ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT AND WESTERNIZED SOCIAL REFORM S I N C E 1963.
S I N C E THESE DISCONTENTED PEOPLE HAVE L I T T L E TO LOSE
AND S I N C E THE ElODERATE CLERGY HAD L I T T L E GAIN TO OFFER
THEM, THEY SOON LENT THEMSELVES TO THE MORE RADICAL
ZEADCRSHIP OF KHOMEINI, WHO CALLED FOR THE OVERTHROW
O F THE SHAH AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM.
5. THE GRIEVANCES WHICH MOTIVATED T H I S EXTREMIST
O P P O S I T I O N ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT SHARED BY MANY
P O L I T I C I A N S AND OTHER C I T I Z E N S WHO SUPPORT THE SHAH
AND WHO FEAR THE CHAOS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THE
NEVERTHELESS, THE
END O F THE MONARCHY. XXHK/MODERATE LEADERS KIBIIPPI
COOPERATED WITH THE EXTREMISTS TO SCARE MORE CONCES-
S I O N S OUT O F THE SHAH, AND THE SHARIATMADARI CLERGY
D I D NOT DARE TO LET I T S E L F BE OUTFLANKED ON THE L E F T
AND LOSE MASS SUPPORTERS TO THE EXTREMISTS. THE NET
W S U L T WAS AN APPARENT COALESCENCE O F ALL STREAMS OF
OPPOSITION I N ONE MASSIVE FIRESTORM DIRECTED AGAINST
THE SHAH.
6. I N PRACTICE,
AS INDICATED I N THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS,
UNIFIED
THE NATURE O F THE OPPOSITION I S NOT AS/IWXEXmB A S I T
MIGHT APPEAR.
-
MOREOVER, THE PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH 13
C Q N F I D E N T I A L OPTIONAL FOR
Cl.ss~frc8i~on
-68-
1
I IS NOT AS SIMPLISTIC AS SOME HAVE SUGGEST
t!. FOR
EXAMPLE, THERE ARE SOME WITHIN THE GOI, AND PARTICULARLY
IN THE MILITARY, WHO BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM THEY FACE
CAN BE HANDLED BY THE INCARCERATION OF OPPOSITION POLITI-
CIANS AND LESSER MULLAHS AMONG THOSE WHO LEAD THE
MALCONTENTS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE SUBVERSIVES.
MORE SOPHISTICATED OBSERVERS, INCLUDING THE SHAH,
RECOGNIZE THAT THE TOP RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS
KHOMEINI AND SHARIATMADARI ARE ABOVE ARREST UNDER
PRESENT CONDITIONS AND IN ANY CASE OTHER LEADERS WOULD
SOON TAKE THE PLACE OF THOSE ARRESTED. RATHER, THE
PROBLEM MUST BE MET BY ADDRESSING THE SOURCES OF DIS-
CONTFNT, WHILE GAINING TIME FOR GOVT PROGRAMS TO TAKE
EFFECT.
7. AS PART OF TiIIS HOLDING ACTION, TO PLACATE THE
DISCONTENTED, THE SHAH HAS AUTHORIZED A CAMPAIGN
AGAINST PAST CORRUPTION FEATURING ARRESTS OF FORMER
MINISTER4 AND OTHERS YET TO COME. THE ULTIMATE
RESULTS OF THESE ARRESTS--WHICH ARE ORGANIZED BY
SAVAK UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT
SUFFICIENT PROOF CAN NEVER BE
IS GENERALLY BELIEVED/J~MSIMRPJ~~BBN~!XRREBRXB~XBXRRXBW
PRODUCED TO CONVICT MANY OF THE ARRESTEES IN A CIVILIAN
COURT OF LAW--MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THERE ARE
MANY AMONG THE SHAH'S SUPPORTERS AS WELL AS THE
LOPPOSITION WHO CRITICIZE HIS THRONING OF FORMER _I
OPTIONAL F O R M 1 S Z r l H )
IFarmmrlv FS.413IHIaI
J."".." 1975
oept. Of stat.
CONFIDENTIAL
CIasall%caflon
SUBORDINATES TO THE WOLVES AS A MATTER OF EXPEDIENCY

WHEN HE HIMSELF HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MAJOR
POLICIES UNDER EVERY GOVT IN THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS OR
MORE.
8. THE REAL ISSUE YET TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER, IN
THE SHORT SPACE OF THE SIX MONTHS OR SO WHICH THE GOVT
HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO TERMINATE MARTIAL LAW AND PUSH
THROUGH LIBERALIZING LEGISLATION, IT CAN CONVINCE THE
IRANIAN PUBLIC THAT IT IS SINCERELY TACKLING THE CAUSES
OF DISCONTENT AND PLACATE, ISOLATE, OR OTHERWISE
PREVENT THE OPPOSITION FROM INITIATING THE MOB ACTION
WHICH WOULD AGAIN THREATEN THE WHOLE ESTABLISHMENT
EDIFICE. THE SHAH AND HIS BUREAUCRACY HAVE A MANDARIN
MENTALITY WHICH WILL HAVE TO STRAIN ENORMOUSLY TO
EMPATHIZE SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE MALCONTENTS.
9. MEANWHILE, THOSE POLITICAL LEADERS--WHETHER IN
SUPPORT OF OR IN OPPOSITION TO THE CURRENT GOVT--WHO
WISH LIBERALIZED EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE WILL HAVE TO
EXERT THEMSELVES SIGNIFICANTLY IF THEY ARE TO ACHIEVE
%HE DEGREE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION REQUIRED TO BE
SUCCESSFUL IN THE SORT OF FREE ELECTIONS WHICH THE
SHAH HAS ORDAINSD. AS OF NOW, MANY OF THEM HAVE ONLY
THE LEAKIEST POLITICAL VESSELS WITH WHICH TO CONTEST
THE ELECTIONS. THEY THEREFORE STAND THE RISK OF BEING
SWAMPED BY THE ONLY APPARENT POLITICAL FORCE WHICH
-
CONFIDENTIAL
Clers#frcalion
-70-
I - CURRENTLY E X I S T S I N IRAN--THE RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL-
1
EXTREMIST OPPOSITION.
10. THESE, THEN, ARE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
SHAH mm H I S NEW G o v T FACE THE I w E D I A T E FuTJRE. THE
FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY REMAINS INTACT,
BUT THE XMREMEEpElg TURBULENCE OF THE RECENT PAST, L I K E
THE EARTH TREMORS WHICH CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE EASTERN
PROVINCES, ARE SYMPTOMS O F THE SORT O F DISRUPTION WHICH
COULD POTENTIALLY OVERWHELM T H I S SOCIETY. THE EMBASSY,
I N SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES, WILL ATTEMPT TO A S S E S S THE
STRENGTH O F THE VARIOUS FORCES AT WORK, THE COURSES
O F ACTION THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW, AND THE INTER-
OPTIONAL FORM 152,IHl

lForrn.ilr FS413IHImI
January 1975
D*P~.0 1 State
CLA551rlCATION
-
MEIIhG
+I A N DL I1.I C
CONIImNTI 2L A-7
-- DEPARThIENT OF S rATE (VIA INTERNAL POUCH)
DATE:9/22/78
-In g e n e r a l , f o r e i g n e r s i n I r a n l e a d r e l a t i v e l y s h e l t e
l i v e s when ~t comes t o d e a l i n g w i t h t h e l o c a l b u r e a u -
c r a c y . Plost a r e t r a n s i e n t s , and a s s u c h t h e s e r v i c e s
t h e y r e q u i r e a r e I l m ~ t e d . Beyond ~ m m ~ g r a t l om natters
and work p e r m l t s , and p e r h a p s such t h l n g s a s d r i v e r ' s
l l c e n s e s and custonis c l e a r a n c e s , t h e y seldom have o c -
c a s i o n t o e x p e r i e n c e t h e f u l l f o r c e of I r a n l a n h u r e a u a
c r a c y a t work. Fsen i n t h o s e a r e a s where t h e y do d e a l
w i t h I r a n i a n g o v e r n ~ n e n t a g e n c l e s t h e Impact i s f r e -
q u e n t l y m l t i g a t c d by i n t e r m e d l a r ~ e sp r o v l d e d by t h e
s p o n s o r i n g cornpdny o r o l g a n i z a t i o n 1.11osc j o b i t i s
t o c u t t h r o ~ ~ gbh~ l r e a u c r a t i c r e d t a p e . N o n e t h e l e s s ,
~t seldom t s k e s foreigners more tha11 a few d a y s h e r e
t o d i s c o v e r what I r a n ' s n a t i o n a l l e ~ d e r so n l y l e a r n e d
f o l l o w ~ n ge i g h t months o f c i v ~ u l n l c s t and s c o r e s of
c a s u d l t ~ e s - - t h a tb u r e a u c r a t i c a r r o g a n c e and a r h l t r a r v ,
o f t e n seemingly I r r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s i n this c o u n t r y
a r e a n a t i o n a l s c a n d a l and a s o u r c e of c o n s l d a r a b l e
popular discont c n t .
e r of reasons f o r t h e un-
e a u c r a t s and t h e p o o r
s c r v l c e t h e y p r o v i d e . Among t h ~ m 1 ) u n q u a l l r ~ e dand
1, 2 ) i t r u c t u r a l l n s t a b l
3 ) no t l a d i t i o n o f p u b l i
T D U - D J \-rL\I.
A 7----.--.---- c-,.*s,<-, 2
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, R A F T ~ >r ,
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A
~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ o i n s e t h 9;/ 2v2 l, t 78
r
'( - o h ~N O
' il ? O ( j 1 ?O.\
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I ~ F - ~ ~ ~ CA ~ - ,~O Vl L D
If?
n v a~
- 72-
3 1 4 OC ' 2 1
S h i r a z A-22
CONFIDENTIAL 2
s e r v i c e , 4 ) an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b i a s t h a t f a v o r s v e r t i c a l l i n e s
of communication, 5 ) a h i g h d e g r e e o f agency c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,
6 ) t i m i d i t y a t t h e l o w e r and middle l e v e l s and s u s p i c i o n a t
t h e t o p , and 7 ) p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n s o f how b u r e a u c r a c y works
and t h e n a t u r e o f p u b l i c b e h a v i o r e n g e n d e r e d t h e r e b y . These
a s p e c t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d f u r t h e r below.
I'ew I r a n i a n b u r e a u c r a t i c e n t i t i e s have s y s t e m a t i z e d r e c ' r u i t -
ment and t r a i n i n g programs. Most r e c r u i t m e n t f o r government
a g e n c i e s i s c a r r i e d o u t t h r o u g h t h e p l a c e m e n t of a d v e r t i s e -
ments i n newspapers and o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h
drawing from a p o o l o f c a n d i d a t e s p r e v j o u s l y s c r e e n e d by means
o f an examing p r o c e s s . The a d v e r t i s e m e n t s s i m p l y s p e c i f y
t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r each p o s i t i o n a s determined
by t h e S t a t e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r A d m i n i s t r a t i v e and Employment
A f f a i r s . Usually, r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r weight i s given t o edu-
c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t t h a n t o - d e m o n s t r a t e d p r a c t i c a l knowledge
o r t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s . Thus, an i n d i v i u d a l may b e r e q u i r e d t o
p o s s e s s a n e n g i n e e r i n g d e g r e e , b u t h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l compe-
t e n c c i s n o t o t h e r w i s e measured. F i n a l l y , w h i l e government
s e r v i c e i s no l o n g e r t h e e x c l u s i v e domain o f members o f
I r a n ' s s o c i a l l y p r o m i n e n t f a m i l i e s , f a m i l y c o n n e c t i o n s and
parti b a z i ( i n f l u e n c e ) a p p a r e n t l y do c o n t i n u e t o b e impor-
t a n t i n h i r i n g , o f t e n w e i g h i n g more h e a v i l y t h a n o t h e r more
objective factors.
Professional t r a i n i n g i n t h e Iranian bureaucracy i s generally
l i m i t e d t o t h e o n - t h e - j o b v a r i e t y . The e d u c a t i o n a l q u a l i -
f l c a t i o n s s p e c i f i e d by t h e S t a t e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Adminis-
t r a t i v e and Employment A f f a i r s a r e u s u a l l y assumed t o e n -
compus t h e g e n e r a l knowledge a job a p p l i c a n t r e q u i r e s f o r
the p o s i t i o n he i s seeking. T h e r e a f t e r , i t is expected t h a t
be w i l l a c q u i r e w h a t e v e r s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge o r t e c h n i c a l
s k i l l s may b e r e q u i r e d w i t h work e x p c r i e n c e . Formal c a r e e r
levclopment programs a r e a l m o s t t o t a l l y l a c k i n g . While some
l e g r e e o f p r o f e s s i o n a l competence i s u s u a l l y a r e q u i s i t e f o r
sdvancement, i t i s n o t t h e o n l y f a c t o r n o r even t h e most:'im-
) o r t a n t . As i n t h e c a s e o f h i r i n g , a r t i b a z i i s o f t e n men-
Lion-d by b u r e a u c r a t s t h e m s e l v e s a s P a s i n e ua non f o r a
j u c c e s s f u l government c a r e e r . Only r a r h a i ~ i a cn i v i l
Z c r v a n t s g i v e n specialized t r a i n i n g . As a r e s u l t , even s e n -
Lcr b u r e a u c r a t s o f t e n p o s s e s s no more t h a l a r u d i m e n t a r y
tnowledge o f t h e l a b s and r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t govern t h e i r
\ark and t h e y a r e tlius I n c l i n e d t o make d e c i s i o n s on t h e
> a s i s o f e x p e d i e n c y a s much a.; r e g u l a t o r y p r e c e d e n t . Incon-
j j s t e n c y , and h e n c e t h e w i d e s p r e a d i m p r e s s i o n o f b u r e a u -
CONFIDENTIAL
S h i r a z A-22
CONFIDENTIAL 3
c r a t i c arbitrariness, i s the inevitable r e s u l t .
A l l I r a n i a n government a g e n c i e s p o s s e s s a g e n e r a l o r g a n i -
z a t i o n a l framework ( e . g . , a m i n i s t r y i s d i v i d e d i n t o d e p a r t -
ments, d i v i s i o n s , p r o v i n c i a l ' o f f i c e s , e t c . ) , b u t s t a f f i n g
o f an agency i n p r a c t l c c i s o f t e n more a f u n c t i o n o f i n t r a -
and i n t e r - a g c n c y power r e l a t i o n s h i l ~ s t h a n r a t i o n a l i z e d man-
power r e q u i r e m e n t s . I f a p a r t i c u l a r m i n i s t e r i s a dominent
f i g a r e i n t h e c a b i n e t , he and h i c s u b o r d i n a t e s may t r y t o
t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h a t f a c t t o b u i l d e m p i r e s . As a c o n s e -
q u e n c e , c a r e e r c i v i l s e r v a n t s may f i n d t h e m s e l v e s one day
members o f l a r g e s t a f f s w i t h v e r y l i t t l e i n t h e way o f d e -
f i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a n o t h c - t h e o n l y man i n t h c o f -
f i c e b u t w e a r i n g s e v e r a l h a t s , a l l depending on t h e waxing
and waning f o r t u n e s o f t h e i r p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s
leadership? Exacerbating t h i s s i t u a t i o n of i n s t a b i l i t y with-
i n t h e personnel s t r u c t u r e of Iranian bureaucracy i s t h e
t e n d e n c y o f s c n i o r government o f f i c i a l s t o i n s i s t on h a v i n g
t h e i r own p e o p l e i n kcy p o s i t i o n s a r o u n d them. A change a t
t h e t o p u s u a l l y means numerous p e r s o n n e l changes on down
t h e l i n e . None of t h i s i s u n f a m i l i a r t o American c i v i l s e r -
v a n t s who have e x p e r i e n c e d t h e v i c i s s i t u d e s o f c h a n g i n g a d -
m i n i s t r a t i o n s and c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s , b u t t h e phenomenon's
d e g r e e o f s e v e r i t y i s much more pronounccd i n I r a n t h a n i n
c o u n t r i e s w i t h r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e b u r e a u c r a c i e s . The r e s u l t -
i n g i n s e c u r i t y amony I r a n i a n b u r e a u c r a t s p r o d u c e s a t e n d e n c y
among them t o n e g l e c t t h e p u b l i c ' s i n t e r c s t s i n f a v o r o f
t h e i r own.
I r a n , l i k e most pre-modern s o c i e t i e s , h a s no t r a d i t i o n o f
p u b l i c s e r v i c e . F o r m e r l y , government o f f i c i a l s were e x p e c t e d
t o make t h e i r l i v i n g s from e x a c t i o n s l e v i e d on t h e I r a n i a n
p o p u l a c e s u b j e c t t o t h e i r w i l l . 'The a t t i t u d e s s u c h a s y s t e m
e n g e n d e r e d a r e s t i l l much jn e v i d e n c e w i t h i n t h e I r a n i a n
government s e r v i c e e v c n though i t s members have l o n g b e e n
p a i d from t h e n a t i o n a l t r e a s u r y . Most c i v i l s e r v a n t s con-
t i n u e t o view t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e p u b l i c a s one o f
p a t r o n and s u p p l i c a n t . They s e c t h e m s e l v e s a s p r o v i d i n g
f a v o r s t o p e o p l e w i t h no s p e c i a l r i g h t t o t h e s e r v i c e s t h e y
r e c e i v e . T h i s p e r c e p t i o n h a s produced a s e n s e o f s u p e r i o r i t y
among them which o f t e n i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from a r r o g a n c e .
P r o c e d u r e s , t o o , a r e n o t s e e n p r i m a r i l y a s a way o f p r o v i d -
i n g s e r v i c e s , b u t f i r s t and f c ~ r e l e o s t a s a means o f e x e r c i s -
i n g government power. The c o n c e p t t h a t a c i t i z e n h a s a r i g h t
t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e r v i c e i s g e n e r a l l y a l i e n among I r a n i a n
b u r e a u c r a t s , a l t h o u g h t h e y may b e p r e p a r c d t o p r o v i d e i t
s o l o n g a s p r o p e r c o n t r o l s can b e m a i n t a i n e d . I n s u c h c i r -
CONFIDEKrIAL
tlmstances, no t h o u g h t i s g i v e n t o t h e c i t i z e n ' s convenicr.ce
lrlce a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n c e r n s axe a1wa)s s e e n a s t a k i n g p r c -
cdence.
r a n i a n government a g e n c i e s secm t o have g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y
ommunicating w i t h one a n o t h c r b e l o w t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l s .
l l u s t r a t i v e o f t h i s phenomenon, directors g e n e r a l a t t h e
r o v i n c i a l l e v c l a r e o f t e n only a b l e t o t a l k o f 1 i c i a l l y
o one a n o t h e r througll t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m i n i s t e r s i n Tch-
an. As s o c i e t y grows more complex i n I r a n t h i s v e r t i c a l
i a s - makes b u r e a u c r a c y a p p e a r i n c r e a s i n g l y u n r e s p o n s i v e
9 p u b l i c needs. I n d u s t r i e s , f o r example, e n c o u n t e r p r o -
racted delays i n receiving nccassary clearances f o r p l a n t
pansi ion from t h e v a r i o u s government a g e n c i e s concerned
3 i c h h a v e few h o r i z o n t a l l i n e s of communication.
is s i t u a t i o n i s r e F l e c t e d i n and e x a c e r b a t e d hy t h e h i g h l y
m t r a l i z e d n a t u r e o f most I r a n i a n government a g e n c i e s .
-w o f f i c e s o u t s i d e T e h r a n have s i g n i f i c a n t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
~ t h o r i t y .Even t h e most r o u t i n e m a t t e r s must o f t e n b e r e -
:red t o t h e c a p i t a l where t h e e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g workload
lkes d e l a y s more and more p r o l o n g e d . The d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n
'ogram i s d e s i g n e d t o a l l e v i a t e p r e c i s e l y t h i s problem,
it i m p l e m e n t a t i o n h a s p r o v e n f a r more d i f f i c u l t t h a n con-
: p t i o n . E f f o r t s t o s h a r e powcr r u n c o u n t e r t o a fundemen-
11 law o f b u r e a u c r a t i c n a t u r e and t h e system c o n t a i n s con-
~ d e r a b l eb u i l t - i n i n e r t i a . Moreover, i n f l u e n t i a l i n t e r e s t
^ o u p s , i n c l u d i n g e l e m e n t s of t h e p u b l i c i t s e l f which f e a r
)me of t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f d i s p e r s e d power c e n t e r s , have
Lso r e s i s t e d e f f o r t s t o d e c e n t r a l i z e t h e b u r e a u c r a c y .
- a n i a n s o c i e t y , and i t s c i v i l s e r v i c e a s w e l l , i s permeated
a s t r o n g d e s i r e t o a v o i d p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r any
. t i o n t h a t may s u b s e q u e n t l y b e c r i t i c i s e d a s w e l l a s t h e
) n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e world i s b a s i c a l l y a h o s t i l e place.
l e s e a t t i t u d e s a r e r e f l e c t e d i n extreme b u r e a u c r a t i c t i i n
l i t y a t lower and i n t e r m e d i a t e l e v e l s and s u s p i c i o n o f t e n
) r d e r i n g on p a r a n o i a a t t h e upper l e v e l s . J u n i o r and middle
> v e l b u r e a u c ~ a t sl i v e i n c o n s t a n t f e a r t h a t any a c t i o n t h e y
~ k emay b r i n g down upon them some p o w e r f u l i n d i v i d u a l ' s
. a t h . The f r e q u e n t consequence i s r e f e r a l of d e c j s i o n s t o
le n e x t h i g h e s t l e v e l which o f t e n r e f e r s them t o a s t i l l
g h e r l e v e l . T h i s syndrome n e a t l y m i r r o r s many s e n i o r bu-
a u c r a t s ' a n x i e t i e s ; t h e y want t o have u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l o v e r
c i r s u b o r d i n a t e s ' a c t i o n s l e s t t h e i r own p o s i t i o n s be
dermined by them. I h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f I r a n i a n b u r e a u -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 5
c r a c y r e i n f o r c e s o t h e r a s p e c t s , s u c h a s t h e h i g h d e g r e e of
c c r ~ t r a l i z a t i o n , which r e s u l t i n t h e d e l a y s t h a t have l e d
t o the bureaucracy's reputation i o r unresponsiveness.
F i n a l l y , t h e I r a n i a n p u b l i c i t s e l f b e a r s s i g n i f i c a n t blame
f o r t h e p o o r s e r v i c e i t r e c e i v e s from i t s b u r e a u c r a t s i n
t h a t any o r g a n i z a t i o n u l t i m a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
s o c i e t y which p r o d u c e s i t . I n t h i s r e g a r d , one f e a t u r e o f
I r a n i a n b e h a v i o r a p p e a r s t o be o f - s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . Few
P e r s i a n s , i t seems, have much a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e impor-
t a n c e of r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s a s d e f i n e d b y laws and r e g u l a -
t i o n s . As o r ~ cW e s t e r n - t r a i n e d I r a n i a n c i v i l s e r v a n t p u t i t ,
most I r a n i a n s b e l i e v e t h e y c a n always g e t t h e i r way i f t h e y
j u s t whine l o n g enough. I f v i s a a p p l i c a n t s can b e t a k e n a s
a r e a s o n a b l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sample o f I r a n i a n s o c i e t y , t h a t
i s a view w i t h which c o n s u l a r o f f i c e r s a t t h i s p o s t c a n
r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y . Many p e o p l e h e r e a p p e a r t o b e convinced
t h a t by p u l l i n g t h e r i g h t s t r i n g o r i n v e i g l i n g t h e r i g h t
I n d i v i d u a l t o make a p e r s o n a l a p p e a l o r s i m p l y p l e a d i n g
t h c n ~ s e l v e sw i t h s u f f i c i e n t p a s s i o n a n y t h i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c
can be a c c o m p l i s h e d . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , I r a n i a n c i v i l s e r -
v a n t s , no l e s s t h a n c o n s u l a r o f f i c e r s , a r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o
the temptation t o r e s o r t t o s u r l i n e s s i n t h e face of t h e
p u b l i c ' s i n d i s c i p l i n e and r e f u s a l t o a c c e p t answers i t does
n o t want t o h e a r .
.Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s and n o t w i t h d t a n d i n g M i n i s t e r o f
S t a t e Manouchehr Azmoun's r e c e n t p r o m i s e " t h a t a f t e r y e a r s
of u n h a p p i n e s s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n /The I r a n i a n p e o p l e 7 can
l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h e f a s t e l i m i n a t i o n of unhappiness,"-mean-
i n g f u l improvement i n t h e I r a n i a n b u r e a u c r a c y w i l l n o t come
o v e r n i g h t . Not o n l y w i l l t h e b u r e a u c r a t s t h e m s e l v e s have t o
d e v e l o p r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s from t h o s e which have
g e n e r a l l y p e r t a i n e d h e r e t o f o r e , b u t t h e I r a n i a n p e o p l e have
much t o l e a r n a b o u t t h e p u r p o s e o f laws and r e g u l a t i o n s and
t h e l i m i t a t i o n s t h e s e impose b o t h upon t h e b u r e a u c r a t s who
implement them and t h e p u b l i c which i s s u b j e c t t o them. .In
t h e meantime, t h e l a c k o f b u r e a u c r a t i c r e s p o n s i v e n e s s i s '
l i k e l y t o continue t o c o n s t i t u t e a source of public discon-
t e n t and hence a weakpoint i n t h e I r a n i a n s o c i a l and p o l i -
tical fabric.
TOMSETH
CONFIDENTIAL
D A T E : ~ / Z ~ / ~ ~
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: Reccnt c o n v e r s a t i o n s

w ~ a ~ e ~ f I n f s o upt h e r~n I rEa n have
r e v e a l e d c o n s i d e r a b l e unanimity a s r e g a r d - d i s -
l i k e f o r t h e regime hcaded by t h e Shah b u ~l l t t l e
u n i t y on o t h e r i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g t h e p l a c c o f I s l a m .
The discontent i s u n d o u b t e d l y p r o f o u n d , b u t , a s ~ d e
f r o a s t u d e n t s of t h e r a d i c a l l e f t and r e l l g l o u s
z e a l o t s of t h e r a d i c a l r i g h t who a d v o c a t e o v e r -
throw of t h e Shah and e s t a b l i s h m a n t o f a r e p u b -
l i c , few p c o p l e c a n a g r e e on a c o n s t r u c t i v e a l -
t e r n a t i v e t o government a s i t h a s been p r a c t i c e d
f o r t h e l a s t 15 y e a r s . C a l l s f o r e a r l y - e l e c t l o l l s
f r e e from m a n i p u l a t i o n a r e h e a r d f a i r l y f r e q u e n t l y .
However, t h o u g h t f u l I r a n i a n s , even t h o s e whose
d i s l i k e f o r t h e p r e s e n t regime i s i n t e n s e , c o n -
cede t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f c o n s t r a i n t s on who
can r u n and u n d e r what c o n d i t i o n s e l e c t i o n s a r e
l i k e l y t o p r o d u c e a M a j l e s whose members w i l l h e
i n c a p a b l e o f u n i t i v g on any i s s u e o t h e r thari
t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s w i t h p a s t governments. Under
s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t seems i n e v i t a b l e t h a t
d e s p i t e lack of enthusiasm f o r h i s l e a d e r s h i p ,
t h e Shah w i l l c o n t i n u e a s I r a n ' s u l t i m a t e p o l i -
t i c a l arbitrator. K ND SUMMARY-AND IN?'ilOIl~ICTION
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION
-77-
Shiraz A-23
CONFIDENTIAL 2
I t h a s been e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d anyone i n s o u t h e r n
I r a n w i t h a good word f o r t h e Shah i n r e c e n t d a y s . I r a n ' s
p o p u l a t i o n p r o f i l e g i v e s some i n d i c a t i o n why. Almost h a l f
o f a l l I r a n i a n s have been b o r n s i n c e 1963, t h e l a s t time
t h e c o u n t r y f a c e d an economic o r p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s o f s i g -
n i f i c a n c e . Almost two t h i r d s have been born s i n c e 1953, t h e
l a s t t i m e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e S h a h t < r u l e was a s e r i o u s
p n s s i h i l i t v . Few p e o p l e among t h i s group a r e impressed w i t h
comparlsonS o f t h e n and now, comparisons t h a t have profound
meaning f o r someone who h a s s e e n I r a n t r a n s f o r m e d from a
p o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n c o u n t r y whose s o v e r e i g n t y was i g n o r e d by
t h e g r e a t powers t o one of t h e w o r l d ' s w e a l t h i e r and more
i n f l u e n t i a l n a t i o n s and who p l a y e d a key r o l e i n t h a t t r a n s -
f o r m a t i o n . The p o s t - 1 9 5 3 g e n e r a t i o n h a s been promised t h e
m i l l e n i u m and i t s comparisons a r e made by t h a t s t a n d a r d .
Even t h o s e o l d enough t o remember t h e bad o l d days of 1953
and e a r l i e r have t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s w i t h t h e regime. These
r a n g e from t h e s e c u l a r i z a t i o n of t h e s t a t e t o t h e a r r o g a n c e
o f h i g h government o f f i c i a l s t o t h e c o l l a p s e of t h e r e a l
e s t a t e m a r k e t t o c o r r u p t i o n t o c o n t i n u i n g (and o f t e n grow-
i n g ) i n e q u i t i e s i n I r a n i a n s o c i e t y . The Shah and h i s a d -
v i s o r s have n o t been unaware o f s o u r c e s of d i s c o n t e n t such
a s t h o s e enumerated a b o v e , and have u s u a l l y r e a c t e d t o them.
However, sometimes a c t i o n s t a k e n t o a l l e v i a t e p r e s s u r e s
b u i l d i n g i n one a r e a ( e . g . , c o n t r o l s on r e a l e s t a t e s p e c u -
l a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o c u r t a i l t h e number o f o v e r n i g h t m i l l i o n -
a i r e s and c l o s e t h e gap between r i c h and poor) have c r e a t e d
new p o c k e t s o f u n h a p p i n e s s ( i . e . , among l a n d owners, n o t
a l l o f whom by any means c o u n t t h e i r h o l d i n g s i n numbers
o f v i l l a g e s , who hoped t o s e l l t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s f o r enough
money t o s e n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o c o l l e g e o r f o r a r e t i r e m e n t
n e s t e g g ) . O t h e r t i m e s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o modernize I r a n
h a s l e d t o d e c i s i o n s ( e . g . , g i v i n g women t h e v o t e ) which
were known would be opposed ( i . e . , by r e l i g i o u s c o n s e r v a -
tives) .
Change always p o s e s a t h r e a t t o v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s , b u t i t
d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e changes t h e Shah h a s wrought i n
I r a n were f o r e o r d a i n e d t o p r o d u c e t h e d e g r e e o f o p p o s i t i o n
t o h i s r u l e which i s now s o m a n i f e s t among t h e I r a n i a n
p o p u l a c e . R a t h e r , i t would a p p e a r t h a t t h e manner i n which
t h e s e c h a n g e s were e f f e c t e d h a s o f t e n been a more fundemen-
t a l f a c t o r i n t h e r e a c t i o n t o them t h a n t h e changes them-
s e l v e s . I r a n i a n s seem overwhelming t o r e s e n t h a v i n g been
e x c l u d e d from v i r t u a l l y a l l p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s of t h e l a s t
CONFIDENTIAL
Shiraz A-23
CONFIDENTIAL
1 5 years. As one middle-aged Iranian, who says he remembers
what it was like during Mossadeq's time, put it. "It bothered
me less that the government decided to impose an exit tax
on Iranians leaving the country than it did to have /Former
M~nisterof Information Darioush7 Homayoun announce %e de-
~ s i o nwithout going to the troiible of consulting the Maj-
Ics whose members in accordance with the constitution are
."
..upposed to represent my interests in government Another.,
n businessman, refering to government interference in the
hours shops can be open, said: We Persians for the most part
retain a 'hand-to-mouth mentality,' the heritage of the time
when Iran was still a poor country. Small shopkeepers are
thus inclined to maintain hours convenient to housewiVes
whose habits are conditioned by the memory of a former day
uhen they might not have known at noon when buying bread
lor lunch where the money would come from to buy the ingre-
dlents for dinner. In pract-ice,we may not work more than
the forty-hour week common in the West, but we do not like
to be told by Harvard-educated bureaucrats who think they
know better than we what is best for us how and when to work
It ."
A5ide from their commonly shared unhappiness with their
government, however, Iranians in southern Iran are.deeply
J~videdon most other issues. Rural people, for example,
while they may be deeply religious, are generally unin-
tcrested in the agitation for the return of Ayatollah Kho-
mcini which has taken place in many urban areas. They are
~nclinedto view the issue as irrelevant to their major
{oncerns--the weather, the availability of water, the price
o f wheat, etc. Recent arrivals from the countryside in cities
where religious agitation has taken place, on the other
hand and notwithstanding the attitudes of their rural rela-
tlves, have often figured prominently in such activities.
[he explanation for this seeming contradiction appears to
11e in the trauma they experience in trying to adjust to
urban life. Frequently, their religion is the only instEtu-
tlon familiar to them in their new surroundings, and they
are thus highly susceptible to the religious emotionalism
that surrounds a cause such as Khomeini's.
Ihe business community, too, is divided on the religious
Issue. The more fervent among its members ha 6 willingly
c losed their shops in protest against the Jernment and
I I I mourning for fallen martyrs, often at great financial
loss. Others have usually closed as well, but often more
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S h i r a z A-23
CONFIDENTIAL 4
i n f e a r of r e t a l i a t i o n f o r n o t c l o s i n g t h a n i n sympathy f o r
t h e c a u s e s espoused by t h e ulema. They may t a k e t h e i r r e -
l i g i o n s e r i o u s l y and d i s l i k e regime e v e r y b i t a s much
a s t h e f a n a t i c s , b u t t h e y a r e a l s o concerned a b o u t t h e i r
b u s i n e s s e s and t h e y r e s e n t t h e d i s r u p t i o n s f r e q u e n t c l o s u r e s
bring.
Contempt f o r t h e I s l a m i c f u n d e m e n t a l i s t s i s p e r h a p s e v e n
more profound t h a n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e regime among many mem-
b e r s o f t h e m o d e r n i s t element o f s o c i e t y i n s o u t h e r n I r a n .
An Ahwaz b a n k e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h o s e who had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n
r e l i g i o u s d e m o n s t r a t i o n s (and numerous bank t r a s h i n g s ) i n
t h a t c i t y a s " i l l i t e r a t e Arabs who had t a k e n , l e a v e of t h e i r
s e n s e s under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s h a r d l y l e s s
ignorant than themselves." A s e n i o r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r i n
S h i r a z d e s c r i b e d t h e c l e r g y i n g e n e r a l a s t h e w o r s t of
I r a n i a n s o c i e t y , l a z y l o u t s who - e n t e r e d r e l i g i o u s s c h o o l s
f o r no more n o b l e r e a s o n t h a n t o a v o i d c o n s c r i p t i o n . An
American-trained engineer a t S h i r a z ' s Iran E l e c t r o n i c s In-
d u s t r i e s i n comparing Reza Shah (whom he a d m i r e s ) t o Ata-
t u r k c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e l a t t e r was a g r e a t e r l e a d e r b e c a u s e
h e had g o t t e n r i d o f a l l o f T u r k e y ' s ulema whereas Reza
Shah had made t h e m i s t a k e o f l e a v i n g = a l i v e . H i s mas-
t e r y o f h i s t o r i c a l f a c t might have been shaky) b u t he l e f t
no doubt a b o u t where he s t o o d on t h e r e l i g i o u s i s s u e .
Lack of u n a n i m i t y on t h e p l a c e o f I s l a m i s p a r a l l e l e d on
s e c u l a r p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s a s w e l l . Aside from t h o s e who have
demanded t h e S h a h ' s o u s t e r and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a r e -
p u b l i c ( a view which s t i l l seems t o b e c o n f i n e d t o r e l a -
t i v e l y s m a l l m i n o r i t i e s on t h e extreme l e f t and r i g h t i n
s o u t h e r n I r a n ) , few I r a n i a n s seem t o have c o n s i d e r e d a l -
t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e k i n d of l e a d e r s h i p he h a s p r o v i d e d .
C r i t i q u e s a r e u s u a l l y l i m i t e d t o where he h a s f a i l e d w i t h
l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n g i v e n t o how p a s t d e f i c i e n c i e s might
be r e c t i f i e d . There does seem t o be a consensus t h a t t h e
p r e s e n t M a j l e s and a l l t h o s e who have s e r v e d i n governments
during t h e p a s t 15 y e a r s a r e d i s c r e d i t e d . Accordingly, e a r l y
e l e c t i o n s f r e e from government m a n i p u l a t i o n a r e f r e q u e n t l y
advocated.
T h o u g h t f u l I r a n i a n s , however, r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e i s a s
y e t l i t t l e of the discipline required for orderly elections
p r e s e n t i n t h e i r c o u n t r y . Most of t h e p a r t i e s and p o l i t i c a l
g r o u p i n g s which have emerged i n r e c e n t weeks a r e h e l d t o -
g e t h e r by n o more r e l i a b l e g l u e t h a n t h e p e r s o n a l i t i e s of
t h e i r l e a d e r s . Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e s e I r a n i a n s con-
CONFIDENTIAL
Shiraz A-23
CONFIDENTIAL 5
ccdc t h a t e l e c t i o n s w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n s on who c a n run and
r h c s i z e o f p a r t i e s which c a n f i e l d c a n d i d a t e s a r c l i k e l y
r a produce a M a j l e s whose nembership would be a n assemblage
' ) t m i n i - p a r t i e s i n c a p a b l e o f u n i t i n g on any i s s u e o t h e r
Illan t h e inadequacy o f p a s t governments, h a r d l y a v i a b l e
~ l t e r n a t i v et o t h e Shah.
111 sum, I r a n is c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a d i f f i c u l t dilemma. Many
I I lnians, i f southern Iran can b e t a k e n a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
' ~ f t h e r e s t of t h e c o u n t r y , a r e d i s s a t i s f i e d with the char-
I ~ t r ro f t h e l e a d e r s h i p t h e y h a v e , b u t t h e y c a n n o t a g r e e on
w l ~ t~h e t y want i n i t s p l a c e . F u r t h e r , s h o r t of v i o l e n t r e -
.elution and t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a regime which i n a l l l i k e l i -
Ilood would be e v e r y b i t a s a u t o c r a t i c a s t h e S h a h ' s , t h e
l ~ ~ n i ap eno p l e do n o t a p p e a r a t t h i s time t o p o s s e s s t h e
c t l f - d i s c i p l i n e t o i i n d a way o u t o f t h e i r p r e d i c a m e n t .
~ I I I I S , i t seems t h a t by d e f a u l t t h e Shah w i l l c o n t i n u e a s
111cu l t i m a t e a r b i t r a t o r o f I r a n ' s p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e .
TOMSETH
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY TEAM MINUTES
O c t c b e r 4, 1978
The Ambassador o p e n e d t h e m e e t i n g b y o f f e r i n g h i s i n s i g h t s
i n t o t h e d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l scene. The Government f a c e d a
t e n s e p o l i t i c a l a t m o s p h e r e t h i s week due t o t h r e e m a j o r
incideots: t h e r e a c t i o n t o K h o m e i n i ' s house a r r e s t i n I r p q ;
t h e r e c e n t r a s h o f i n d u s t r i a l s t r i k e s ; and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n
r e g i o n s n o t s u b j e c t t o m a r t i a l l a w . The Ambassador h a s s e e n
t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r t w i c e t h i s week and t h e s e i n c i d e n t s w e r e
discussed. Ambassador S u l l i v a n f o r e s e e s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r
f u r t h e r u n r e s t n e x t week due t o t h e o p e n i n g o f P a r t i a n t e n t on
F r i d a y and t h e t e n t a t i v e r e s u m p t i o n o f U n i v e r s i t y c l a s s e s .
The Ambassador w i l l b e m e e t i n g w i t h b o t h Mr.. A n s a r y and Mr.
Hoveyda, and w i l l s e e k t h e i r v i e w s o n c u r r e n t I r a n i a n p o l i -
tics.
T h e - A m b a s s a d o r t h e n r a i s e d a f e w i s s u e s f r o m r e c e n t com-
munications:
S e c r e t a r y Vance h a d a good m e e t i n g w i t h F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r Afshar. Mr. A f s h a r t a l k e d w i t h t h e I r a q i s
i n New Y o r k and i t a p p z a r s I r a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a q
have eased c o n h i d e r a b l y .
-- The Ambassador h e a r d t h a t t h e N o r w e g i a n s h a v e p u l l e d
o u t o f t h e Gas D e a l . The Economic S e c t i o n w i l l i n -
vestigate.
-- The Ambassador i s sbmewhat c o n c e r n e d a b o u t o u r r e a u -
l a t i o n g o v e r n i n s t h e s a l e o f POV1s. Admin w i l l a d -
v i s e on e x i s t i n g safeguards a g a i n s t p r o f i t - m a k i n g on
POV s a l e s ,
-- Many o f oGr v i s i t o r s c o n t i n u e t o k e e p us i n suspense
as t o t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e i r t r a v e l a n d s c h e d u l e p l a n s .
The S e c t i o n C h i e f s t h e n r e p o r t e d news f r o m e a c h o f t h e i r
operations:
Mr. S h e l l e n b e r g e r s a i d t h a t r e g i s t r a t i o n f o r I A S l a n g u a g e
c l a s s e s i s b e y o n d t h e i r w i l d e s t dreams ( o r n i g h t m a r e s ) . As
a r e s u l t , t h e t e a c h e r s h o r t a g e r o b l e m h a s worsened. The
E x h i b i t i o n i n A r t s , Tehran-78./?hncelled as i s t h e
deKooning E x h i b i t i o n .
CONFIDENTIAL
General G a s t i n t r o d u c e d General S t o n e , t h e new Army C h i e f .
General G a s t r e p o r t e d t h a t c o n s c r i p t s do n o t s e r v e i n t h e
Imperial Guard, but may s e r v e i n t h e L o g i s t i c s B r i g a d e .
Mr. John M i l l s r e p o r t e d on t h e r e c e n t s t r i k e s . Bank M e l l i
and t h e Telephone Company have s e t t l e d , b u t NIOC i s s t i l l
a n u n c e r t a i n t y . Mr. M i l l s p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e g e n e r o u s
s t r i k e s e t t l e m e n t s a r e c e r t a . i n t o have s e r i o u s macro-
economic i m p l i c a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e new s a l a r y b e n e f i t s w i l l
accrue t o a l l c i v i l servants.
Mr. Ryno noted t h a t t h e rough f i n a l Trade F a i r f i g u r e s a r e
q u i t e s a t i s f y i n g . Most American Trade F a i r p a r t i c i p a n t s
found i t a b e n e f i c i a l u n d e r t a k i n g .
Mr. Lambrakis commented on t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . He
noted t h a t many new p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a r e b e i n g formed.
There i s a new e d i t o r a t t h e F a r s i - l a n g u a g e Kayhan. I t
a p p e a r s t h e f o r m e r e d i t o r was u n s e a t e d due t o t h e prominent
t r e a t m e n t Kayhan gave t o Khomeini's s i t u a t i o n i n I r a q .
Mr. Neeley r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e i s much c o n c e r n and d i s c u s -
s i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r a l c i r c l e s o v e r food p r i c e i n c r e a s e s .
Mr. Adler i n d i c a t e d t h a t he p l a n s a t r i p t o t h e Tabas a r e a
with a USGS team. The group i s t r y i n g t o s e c u r e a h e l i -
c o p t e r t o t%rrnit a viewing o f t h e f a u l t l i n e .
Dist:
AM8 DAO CONS N E A / IRN'
DCM HAAG DEA INR/RNA
POL POL/OR AMCONSUL ISFAHAN
ICA AMCONSUL SHIRAZ
SY AMCONSUL TABRIZ
CONFIDENTIAL
-83-
CONFlDENTl!,t
DEPARTMENTOF STATE
W.lhlnlton. D.C. 10510
bmdORANDUM October 4, 1978

TO : S/P
S/P
- 1%. Arnold
- Mr.
Paul Kreisberg
Raphel
S/P
S/P
-- Mr. Peter Wilson
Mr. Philip Kaplan
FROM : Theodore H. Moran, Consaltant to
Policy Planning Staff
SUBJECT : Pessimism about Iranian Stability
SmIMARY: A young, well-placed Tlranian official

(see tearsheet) recently back fron -an, paints a grim
picture of the underlying instability in the country in
the aftermath of the martial law decree and the theater
fire. Usually upbeat, he was visibly shaken by the
fragility of the regime. Here are his observations, and
his analysis of what kinds of policies are needed to restore
stability over the medium term.
1. The fragility of the regime in Iran is dramatically
underestimated in the Western press, and by senior U.S.
officials, (examples named). The West's need for a strong
Shah blinds Americans to the fact that the Iranian system,
with its vast ministries, modern annaments, ar,d showcase
industries is a hollow shell.
2. During the end of August and first two weeks in
September, the highest members of the Iranian government
(Cabinet level and above) were t o W y paralyzed, acing
behind shuttered windows like nobility waiting for the
summon's of an unknown Robespierre to t ? e guillqtine.
3. Everyone in Tehran talks nervously about a coup
from the army. The immediate danger, however, comes not
from some upstart faction in the armed seroices, but from
the loss of legitimacy for the entire regime that comes
from loyal troops refusing to fire upon (or act decisively
against) common people chanting verses from the Koran as
they demonstrate. This undermines the authority of the
Shah more surely than the plottings of colonels and (unlike
the latter) cannot be guarded against or planned for.
CONFIDENTIAL
4. The stresses in Iran come from the cultural
#hock of modernization, the exaggerated expectations
about economic development, and the reality of too
little social infrastructure. The proximate cause of
Iran's troubles lies in the vast influx of migrants from
the countryside to the overpopulated fringes of the cities.
5. The short-term method of responding to popular

<:omplaints has been to promise more le.g. the Minister
of Education promises 18,000 houses for school teachers).
This is the worst outcome imaginable since a) it is
impossible to achieve; and b) it stimulates the demands of
others with complaints.
6. Any real long-term program for stability in Iran
will have to massage the egos and &ver structure of
traditional Islam as it responds tD IAe real (Western)
demands for sewers, roads, houses, and services: will
have to reduce or reverse the internal migration to the
cities (the recent limitation of taxes on agricultural
production was a step in the right direction); and will have
to build a political party for support among those middle
class and lower middle class groups that are benefitting
from the government's programs. As things now stand, those
people who support the Shah are not at all able to act.
Indeed, in retrospect, the failure to flesh out the
Resurrection Party may go down in history as the Shah's
biggest failure.
7 . The disappearance of the Shah would be a catastrophe,
not so much because a Qadafi might take power and organize
a cohesive radical government but because there would be no
other leader with the charismatic force or the brute
strength to govern Iran coherently, An Iran without the
Shah would probably see coup after coup, with waves of
unrest' draining the nation's strength, and eliminating the
capacity for any creative regional role.
Attachment: copy to P. Kreisberg only

lNDlClTe
0C O L C L C T
a C H h I C . L TO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10 6 1
E.O. 11652: GDS
PGOV, PINR, PINS, PINT, IR
THE SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT : AN ANALYSIS
AND PROJECTION
TEHRAN 9157
WILL ANALYZE IMPORTANT FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE IRANIAN

INTERNAL SITUATION AS PROMISED IN REFTEL. THE SHARIF-EMAMI
GOVT OF ACCOMMODATION BEGAN LIFE UNDER HANDICAP OF MARTIAL
LAW AND IS STILL STRUGGLING WITH THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF
CONFIDENTIAL
CLIIS1FICATION
- 86-
CONFIDENTIAL p W . 2 0 f j/db 6/
CIaa.ilicat on MRN
ADMINISTRATION, AND O F ASSEMBLY WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY
C R I T I C I Z E D AS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE SITUATIONS THEY
WERE SUPPOSED TO CORRECT. I T I S NEVERTHELESS DETERMINED
TO SOLDIER ON, HAVING MADE CONCESSIONS TO THE RELIGIOUS
LEADERS (WITH WHOM I T I S AT PRESENT TRYING TO NEGOTIATE),
APPROVED LARGE WAGE INCREASES TO SILENCE STRIKING C I V I L
SERVANTS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT WORKERS, AND PRESSED I T S
ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN I N RESPONSE TO PARLIAMENTARY
AND PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR PUNISHMENT OF PROFITEERS. FAILURE
I N THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY BRING EARLY DEMISE OF T H I S GOVT. EVEN SUCCESS
I N REACHING A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THEM, HOWEVER, DOES NOT
I N I T S E L F GUARANTEE GO1 LONGEVITY. THE G O I ' S DEMONSTRATED
LACK O F FORESIGHT, PLUS THE PROBLEMS OF SERVING A D I F F I C U L T
MASTER I N THE SHAH AND COORDINATING WITH A SEPARATE
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION, HAVE CREATED A HOST OF S I D E
PROBLEMS. THESE MIGHT CONTINUE TO GENERATE UNREST WHICH
THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS CANNOT CONTROL. ANY GO1 RESORT
TO REPRESSIVE MEASURES INVOLVING BLOODSHED THEN COULD
FORCE THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO RENEGE ON THE MODUS
VIVENDI. END SUMMARY
1. FACED BY INCREASINGLY LARGE SCALE PROTESTS UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES, THE SHAH DISMISSED
THE AMOUZEGAR TECHNOCRAT GOVT AND ON AUGUST 27 APPOINTE

L
CONFIDENTIAL
CIa#.ificlllm OPTIONAL FORM 152aiH)
CForrnerlv FS-413(HIal
Jsnuary 1975
DOC?. 01 Srdt.
-87-
rA NEW GOVT UNDER SHARIF-EMAMI. I T S M I S S I O N WAS T O
THE UNREST AND ACCOMMODATE I T S E L F T O R E L I G I O U S AND
OTHER ELEMENTS O F T H E P O P U L A T I O N INVOLVED I N WIDESPREAD
DEMONSTRATIONS. T H E NEW C A B I N E T R E P R E S E N T S A P O T P O U R R I
OF VARIOUS SKI& AND INTERESTS. ITS OVERALL AGE IS
CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN I N AMOUZEGAR'S C A B I N E T ,
THERE ARE F A R FEWER M I N I S T E R S T R A I N E D I N THE U . S . , AND

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
Pop.-of 3 /@6/
MRN
PARTY MEMBERS. SHARIF-EMAM1 HIMSELF I S A FORMER PrM.AND
S I X OF H I S MINISTERS, MAINLY I N ECONOMIC AREAS, ARE CARRY-
OVERS FROM THE PREVIOUS CABINET. THE REST ARE MAINLY
ELDER STATESMEN WHO PROMISED GREATER S E N S I T I V I T Y TO
POPULAR GRIEVANCES. I N A SYMBOLIC GESTURE, THE MINISTRY
FOR WOMEN AFFAIRS WAS ABOLISHED AND THE ENDOWMENT FUND
(THE OLD ISLAMIC VAQF) WAS RAISED TO CABINET LEVEL UNDER
KANI, A MINISTER WHO I S VERY POPULAR WITH THE RELIGIOUS
SECTOR. SHARIF-EMAMI HIMSELF, COMING FROM A RELIGIOUS
FAMILY, WAS REPUTED TO HAVE STRONG RELIGIOUS T I E S , AS WAS
MINISTER FOR EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS AZMOUN. NEVERTHELESS, THE
GOVT REMAINS ONE OF SHAH LOYALISTS, THE PRIME MINISTER
HIMSELF BEING KNOWN AS PERSONALLY VERY CLOSE TO THE SHAH.
MOREOVER, THE RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS OF SHARIF-EMAMI AND
AZMOUN ARE WIDELY QUESTIONED AMONG OTTHODOX RELIGIOUS,

NON-RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR
CIRCLES, WHO CONSIDER T H E I R REPUTATIONS FOR CORRUPTION AND/
TO HAVE TARNISHED T H E I R RELIGIOUS BIRTHRIGHTS. ~

2. REPORTS PUT OUT AT THE TIME OF SHARIF-EMAMI's PRESEN-
TATION OF H I S GOVT TO THE SHAH SUGGESTED THE NEW PRIME
MINISTER HAD DEMANDED AND GOTTEN A GREAT DEAL MORE INDE- I
PENDENCE THAN AMOUZEGAR OR HOVEYDA BEFORE HIM, AND THAT HE
WOULD BEGIN A TRANSITION TO STRONGER MINISTERIAL GOVT.

II
I
INDEED HE MOVED FAST I N ATTEMPTING TO DEFUSE THE MOST
EXPLOSIVE I S S U E , GRANTING SEVERAL CONCESSIONS I N THE

L
OPTIONAL FORM 162.(HI

(Fwmerly FSIlJ(Hl.)
J.nu.rv 1976
CONFIDENTIAL P,..A
CIa..ilication
FIELD. THE HEGIRA CALENDAR REPLACED THE PAHLAVI IMPERIA!L
CALENDAR (ONLY INTRODUCED A FEW YEARS AGO), IRAN'S FEW
GAMBLING CASINOS FOR THE VERY RICH WERE CLOSED, A FEW
PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE BAHAI RELIGION -- AND OTHERS
SUSPECTED OF T I E S TO T H I S GROUP DETESTED BY ORTHODOX
S H I I S M (SUCH AS HOVEYDA HIMSELF) -- WERE DISMISSED FROM

HIGH O F F I C E , AND THE SHAH'S TWIN S I S T E R , P R I N C E S S ASHRAF --
ARE AIRED'
whc MANY COMPLAINTS DIS
FROM NEWS COVERAGE. INDEED MANY PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE
ROYAL FAMILY (WHO ARE WIDELY ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION) HAVE
L E F T THE COUNTRY. ONLY THE QUEEN HAS SHARED RECENT PUBLIC
APPEARANCES WITH THE SHAH.
3. UNF~RTUNATELY, SHARIF-EMAMI'S ELAN WAS SEVERELY JOLTED
W E N LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS I N TEHRAN AT THE END OF RAMAZAN

I
ALARMED THE ARMY, GOVT, AND SHAH TO THE POINT THAT MARTIAL
LAW WAS N S T I T D T E D I N 11 IRANIAN C I T I E S (ADDED TO ISFAHAN,

I1
THE ONLY C I T Y WHERE I T ALREADY E X I S T E D ) . THE ARMY MET I T S 1
F I R S T CHALLENGE FROM DEMONSTRATORS I N TEHRAN'S JALEH SQUARE
ON S E P T 8 BY K I L L I N G LARGE NUMBERS OF THEM. T H I S "MASSACRE

I
IMMEDIATELY TURNED EVEN THE MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP
AGAINST SHARIF-EMAMI~S GOVT, AND HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO L I V E

11
DOWN THAT INCIDENT S I N C E .
I
4. ANOTHER MAJOR PROGRAM LAUNCHED BY SHARIF-EMAMI I S THE
1
CONSISTED OF PUBLIC ARRAIGNMENT OF THE FORMER MINISTER 0
TEALTH
(UNDER HOVEYDA AND AMOUZEGAR GOVTS) AND CHARGES
CONFIDENTIAL
ct...ificatim
-90-
CONFIDENTIAL ~ ~ 5 . 6 /&6/ I
CI.ablfic.tlon URN
LODGED AGAINST A HANDFUL OF LESSER HIGH OFFICIALS, 7

AS W L L AS THE NAMING OF SEVERAL LARGER BUSINESSMEN AS
I
TARGETS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (ONE OF WHOSE PARLIA-
MENTARY IMMUNITY WAS REMOVED). THERE IS TALX OF A LIST
OF PEOPLE TO BE INVESTIGATED GOING INTO THE THOUSANDS
AND HUNDREDS HAVE REPUTEDLY BEEN WARNED NOT TO LEAVE THE
COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS, MINISTER OF JUSTICE BAHERI
(HIMSELF A TUDEH COMMUNIBT PARTY MEMBER IN HIS YOUTH)
I
HAS WARNED THAT LEGAL PROCESSES WILL TAKE TIME AND
I
PROOF OF WRONG-DOING WILL NOT BE EASY TO PRODUCE IN MANY
CASES. MEANWHILE, A LEGAL CASE HAS BEEN PUT WITH THE
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM AGAINST FORMER SAVAK CHIEF GEN.
N A S S I ~ N E W
COURT MINISTER ARDALAN (WHO HAS REPLACED
HOVEYDA) HAS ANNOUNCED WITH HEAVY PUBLICITY THAT THE SHAH
HAS BARRED MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY FROM INOLVEMENT IN BUSXNBSS 1I
DEALS. ALL THIS HAS SO FAR BEEN RECEIVED WITH NOTICEABLE
I
SKEPTICISM BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE'. AS WELL AS THE IRANIAN E
PARLIAMENT, WHERE EVEN MANY PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO ARE
I
CONSIDERED CONSERVATIVES AND LOYAL TO THE SYSTEM HAVE
BEGUN TO ATTACK PAST GOVT PRACTICES ALLEGING WIDESPREAD
I
CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE GO1 BUREAUCRACY.
5. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THE SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT HAS MOVED
VIGOROUSLY BUT CLUMSILY. IT DELIBERATELY BROUGHT THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SINGLE GOVT PARTY, THE u ~ (RESURGENCE)
~ ~
PARTY, AND HAS ENCOURAGED ITS REPLACEMENT BY A MULTIPLIC TY
I- f
CONFIDENW
Clasorbcallon
-
OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND PARTIES IN PREPARATION FOR THE
FREE ELECTIONS PROMISED BY THE SHAH NEXT JUNE. THE
PRESS HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO BECOME ASTONISHINGLY FREE AFTER
YEARS OF MUCH MORE STRINGENT, E X P L I C I T OR I M P L I C I T ,
CENSORSHIP. L I V E RADIO AND TV CARRIED I N FULL MANY
STRONG ANTI-GOVT SPEECHES FROM PARLIAMENT FOR THE F I R S T
TIME I N RECENT MEMORY. A FEW DAYS OF CENSORSHIP BY
MILITARY LAW AUTHORITIES OCT 12-14 HAS RESULTED I N AN
UNPRECEDENTED "CHARTER" GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FROM SHARIF-EMAM1 ON BEHALF OF H I S GOVT. MEANWHILE,
THE GOVT INTRODUCED I N RAPID S U C C E 5 O N THREE NEW DRAFT
LAWS TO GOVERN FREEWM OF THE PRESS INDEPENDENCE OF
THE U N I V E R S I T I E S , AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY. UNFORTUNATELY
THE F I R S T AND THIRD OF THESE B I L L S HAD BEEN DRAFTED
BY THE OUTGOING GOVT, AND NONE OF THEM WAS SHOWN TO
MEMBERS O F THE CONSTITUENCY MOST AFFECTED. THUS THERE
WAS AN IMMEDIATE OUTCRY FROM MEMBERS OF THE PRESS, FROM
UNIVERSITY FACULTIES AND ADMINISTRATORS, AND FROM
LAWYERS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS, ALL ALLEGING THAT THESE
B I L L S WERE I N FACT MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE SITUATIONS
THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE CORRECTING. CONSEQUENTLY, WHAT-
EVER THE DETAILED MERITS OF THESE C R I T I C I S M S MAY BE, ALL
THREE B I L L S RAN INTO TROUBLE I N PARLIAMENT AND HAVE BEEN
RECALLED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND EMENDATION. THIS

DID L I T T L E TO IMPROVE THE ALREADY SHAKY C R E D I B I L I T Y OF
-
CONFIDENTIAL
Cla~srlicallon
-92-
CONFIDENTIAL ~ e s . l e f
CIa.rificalion
I
1 THE NEW GO1 1
6. THE G O I ' S EFFORTS TO AVOID ROCKING THE BOAT I N THE
ECONOMIC SPHERE RAN INTO STORMY WEATHER WHEN S T R I K E S
BROKE OUT AMONG A VARIETY O F C I V I L SERVANTS, O I L F I E L D
WORKERS AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. I N THE S P I R I T OF
ACCOMMODATION, THE GOVT HAS SPEEDILY GIVEN I N TO ALMOST
ALL ECONOMIC DEMANDS WITH THE RESULT THAT WAGES HAVE
VIRTUALLY DOUBLED I N MANY AREAS, XElSK-m AND
MORE C I V I L SERVANTS ARE GOING ON STRIKE TO GET S I M I L A R
BE FOLLOWED BY 1NCREASES.TO EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE COMPANIES.
GET FROM CUTTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND I N S T I T U T I N G OTHER
LARGE-SCALE EGONOMIES SUCH AS A FREEZE ON FUTURE PROCURE-
MENT O F NUCLEAR REACTORS.
7. ALL OF THESE ERRORS AND REVERSES, COMPOUNDED BY PARLIA-
MENTARY AND PUBLIC C R I T I C I S M , HAVE NATUAAUY BROUGHT CON-
F L I C T S WITHIN THE CABINET, I T S E L F A DISPARATE BODY OF PEOPLE.
DESPITE UNHAPPINESS BY THOSE I N CHARGE OF THE ECONOMIC
M I N I S T R I E S , AND OTHER REPORTED PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES, ONLY
TWO RESIGNATIONS HAVE OCCURRED TO DATE, THAT OF THE MINISTER
OF HEALTH, WHO WAS IMMEDIATELY REPLACED,AND, ON OCT 1 2 , THE

SCIENCE XND
MINISTER OFJHIGHER EDUCATION (WHOSE RESIGNATION I S NOT
YET P U B L I C ) . A FEW MORE RESIGNATIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT

L _JI
CONFIDE- OPTIONAL FORM 162.(Hl

CI..~ific~tiM( ~s413tn1.1
~ a n u a r y1975
D.Pt. of Stat.
-93-
CONFIDENTIAL
Clsss~frcalron
MENTARY AND OTHER C R I T I C S WHOSE ALLEGATION OF INEFFICIENCY

1
AND CORRUPTION COULD EXTEND TO SOME OF THE PRESENT IN-
I
CUMBENTS AS I T ALREADY HAS TO MANY OF THEIR PREDECESSORS.
NEVERTHLESS, THE SHAH I S DETERMINED TO CONTINUE WITHOUT
A CHANGE I N PRIME MINISTER FOR THE PRESENT AND WE EXPECT

MUTI~G
1
STRONG EFFORTS TO CONTINUE TO BE MADlC E W H W S CABINET ?I
CONFLICTS.
8. THE MOST CRITICAL I M M E D I A T E I PROBLEM FACING THE GOVT :

MID-OCTOBER I S SOMEHOW BRINGING AN END TO WIDESPREAD D I S -
ORDERS WHICH HAVE AFFECTED SCORES OF IRANIAN C I T I E S AND
TOWNS AND CAUSED CASUALTIES AMONG DEMONSTRATORS AS WELL
AS POLICE FORCES. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT I S THE EXTENSIVE
UNREST AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, OFTEN SUPPORTED BY
FACULTY MEMBERS, WHICH HAS EXTENDED RECENTLY TO MANY
SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND T H E I R TEACHERS. THE W V T ' S STRATEGY
I S TO NEGOTIATE QUIETLY WITH THE BLOC OF MODERATE RELIGIOU

I
LJ3ADERS AND OPPOSITION P O L I T I C I A N S AND MEANWHILE CONTAIN I
THE DISTURBANCES, I N THE HOPE THAT SUCH A DEAL WILL ISOLAT:
TROUBLEMAKERS WHO COME FROM MORE EXTREMIST GROUPS. IN-
DIRECT EFFORTS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING MADE TO PROPITIATE

EFFORTS
---.-
I
EVEN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. SHOULD THESE REli@RILS: BE SUCCESSF
THEY WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARD ACCOMMODATING

S ILAR
4- GOW
D I F F I C U L T I E S WITH UNIVERSITY FACULTIES AND THE MAJOR
STUDENT GROUPS. THE GOVT'S OBJECTIVE I S OBVIOUSLY TO AV I

?
--I
T A V I N G TO EXTEND MARTIAL LAW, AND I N FACT TO END
f'SINmPhlPT nT.
Classification
I -IT A s SOON A s PRACTICABLE P R I O R T o NEXT s u m R 1 s 1
ELECTIONS.
AFTER NEARLY ThQ MONTHS
9. THUS, I N O F F I C E I N A PERIOD
OF UNPRECEDENTED TURMOIL, THE SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT HAS
TURNED I N A SPOTTY PERFORMANCE AND, ALTHOUGH THE SHAH
APPEARS READY TO KEEP I T I N O F F I C E FOR THE NEAR FUTURE
AT LEAST, I T I S S T I L L VIEWED AT LARGE AS A TRANSITIONAL

ITS
BODY OF B R I E F TENURE. ' h E ERRATIC PERFORMANCE I S NOT SUR-
PRISING. THE NATION HAS BEEN SHAKEN TO I T S VERY ROOTS
I N THE LAST FEW MONTHS. NO PREVIOUS GO1 I N RECENT MEMORY
INHERITED SUCH A COMPLEX AND VOLATILE S E T OF PROBLEMS.
MOREOVER, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS HAD TO CONTEND I N S I D E

AN r ALOOq,
THE ESTABLISHMENT W I T H ~ N T R O S P E C T I V E ~ A N D
OFTEN ARBITRARY
SHAH AS WELL AS AN ANGRY, IMPATIENT, AND AT TIMES RASH
MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. THAT HE CONSEQUENTLY HAS TO WORK
WITHIN NARROW PARAMETERS I S STARKLY APPARENT.
10. I F SHARIF-EMAM1 I S SUCCESSFUL I N ACHIEVING A MODUS
VIVENDI WITH THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP THROUGH H I S CURRENT
NEGOTIATIONS, HE MAY HAVE TAKEN A MAJOR S T E P TOWARD AN
EVENTUAL ~ A L M I N G OF THE BODY POLITIC. THIS EFFORT CLEARLY
HAD TO BE H I S F I R S T PRIORITY. HOWEVER, H I S GOVT HAS SINGU-
LARLY DISTINGUISHED I T S E L F BY A FAILURE TO LOOX AHEAD TO
THE CONSEQUENCES O F I T S HASTY AND AD HOC ACTIONS. BY ATTEMPT-
ING TO PLACATE VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF THE NATION WITH THE
-- SUCH AS THE LARGE PAY R A I S E S , THE ILL-

J
LQUICK
CONFIDENTIAL OPTIONAL FORM 162.IHI
CI...iflc.tion (For-ly FS113lUteI
January 1976
Dwt. of Sbf.
-95-
CONFIDENTIAL Pep.-
1 0of
Classrbcalton
CONSIDERED P I E C E S OF LEGISLATION, ETC.-HE GO1 HAS U N ~
WITTINGLY CONTRIBUTED TO S T I R R I N G UP A NUMBER OF OTHER
HORNETS NESTS. THESE COMPOUND THE GOVT'S ALREADY CONSIDER-
ABLE PROBLEM OF COORDINATING WITH THE SHAH'S MOODS
AND THE ARMY'S ACTIONS, AND COULD HELP UNDERMINE WHATEVER
THE GOVT MIGHT ACHIEVE I N THE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS.
11. A FURTHER QUESTION I S WHETHER THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS
THEMSELVES CAN FULLY CONTROL OR CHANNEL THE WIDESPREAD
DISORDER. THEY HAVE BEEN LEADING THE UNREST T H I S YEAR;
I T I S YET TO BE PROVEN THAT THEY CAN REVERSE THE TREND
I N VIEW O F THE MANY DISPARATE I

.ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION
NOW AGITATING FOR T H E I R OWN SEPARATE INTERESTS. SHOULD
THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PROVE ONLY PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE I N
T H I S REGARD, THE GOVT WOULD HAVE TO FACE U P TO CONTINUING
DISTURBANCES WHOSE FORCEFUL REPRESSION MIGHT INVOLVE
BLOODSHED -- AND THUS FORCE THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS BACK
ON THE WAReATH TO PRESERVE T H E I R POSITION WITH THE
POPULATION.
d
IRAN NIE
I. Background to Current Unrest

Social Ills
Ewnomic Difficulties
Political Inpasse
1 I. Near Tenn Outlook
Enforcing Martial Law
Calming the *sition
Inpact on Foreign and Defense Policy
I 11. Longer Tern Problems
Econanics and Oil
Domestic Tensions
Regional Role
International Orientation
lv. Outlook Through 1985
Pahlavi Rule
Nilitary Government
Civilian Control
SECRET
SECRET/liOFORh'
DI SCUSSIOK
I. BACKGROUND TO CURRENT UNREST

Iran i n 1978 has been experiencing p o l i t i c a l turmoil and c i v i l unrest
more serious than a t any other time i n Shah bbharmned Reza Pahlavi's 37-year
reign. Ironically, the unrest that threatens the Shah has been born largely
of his success i n promoting social change and economic development i n Iran's
t r a d i t i o n a l l y k e n t e d society. This change has been so rapid that it has
outpaced the a b i l i t y of the country's social, economic, and political i n s t i -
tutions t o adapt. I t was the confluence of serious problems growing out of
each of these areas, rather than any single adverse or unpopular development
that precipitated the escalating s t r e e t demonstrations that led t o the decla
tion of martial law i n Se tember 1978. Despite martial law, popular unrest
t
continued, and bas i n fact assumed new forms such as widespread labor stoppa
and student boycotts.
Social I l l s
ro,>;J .
'Ihe mb&akal modernization of Iranian society i n the past 15 years
cdttcpf,,,~
has brought substantial benefits t o Iran's population, as-ni
medical s e ~ c e s but
, has also created serious dislocations that have contri
buted directly t o c i v i l unrest. The Shah's White Revolution, formally 1
in 1963 and l a t e r designated the Shah-People Revolution, introduced fund
%conplete changes t o the basii&&kf Iranian society, including 1
m e r s h i p , rural development and water distribution, the court system, ed
and health services, and the role of the clergy an&Omen. To the disrupti
SECRET/iW)FORN
-98-
impact of these reforms has been added the social effects of rapid, virtually
forced, industrialization, w' the
accelerated emergence of a modem middle class and P, increasingly rapid
I
urbanization
Those who now challenge the Shah and seek t o refoim or replace Iran's
political system are drawn from groups that have benefitted from the trans-
formation of society, notably the growing nunhers of educated youth, as well
as from the disadvantaged groups that have not, especially unskilled and
unemployed migrants t o the urban areas. Both categories, i f only through
exposure t o t h e media, have partially assimilated modem, secular ideas and
values that have l e f t them ill-equipped t o l i v e i n a harsh, inpersonal urban
+LIJr- rg
environment, and have pronpted them t o challenge a l l authorit)! including-the
Shah an%aditiona1 Islam. This l a s t development has served'to reinfo:
&(finl ~ h - 3 pthf ,crdy
the predisposition of the influential religious leaders, the rmllahs, t o oppose
4 4
modernization.
Economic Difficulties
Until recently the steady and rapid growth of Iran's economy seemed able
t o assure material progress sufficient t o override the ill effects of growing
social problem. Now, however, the Iranian government and people are aware
that the economic benefits already won are not well distributed, that future
benefits w i l l not come a s easily, and that the overall quality of l i f e may
not be improving, even in the areas where the economy has g m w n most quickly.
4k;r
Because the of virtually a l l classes have outpacedpterial gains.
- 2 -
SECRET
.SECRET
moreover, the political impact-bf the kcondc situation has bemw m e I

,dlr/J
troublesome than the economic realit% which almost certainly is that the
typical Iranian enjoys a higher standard of living now than at any time
in the past. Complaints center on inflation, corruption, and the increas
uneven distribution of wealth, as well as on such concrete needs as hws
food. transpo&tion, employment, and essential public services.
The economic difficulties that contributed to the current unrest re$
primarily from the very ambitious industrialization drive of the early and
mid-1970s. Based oil revenues (prices having quadrupled in
At W-P'~
and 1974) the 1973-78 five-year investment prugra~~
included $70 billion
industrial development projects. bring the period 1970-76 Iran enj
average m u a l real CAT growth of over 10 percent, but it also suffered
apd ,C?a.C f t ? k ~ ? r f : l ; ~ ~
related problems: shortages of skilled labo);; overtaxed storaEe, port,
inland distribution facilities; serious bureaucratic delays; gmwing in
(24 percent in 1977); and the relative neglect of agriculture and the pri
sector. The boom came to a halt in 1977 -- when real GNF gmwth fell to
than three percent and more modest goals were adopted -- but the political
damage, especially m g urban workep, small businessman, and artisans,
already been done.
Political Impasse
Iran's political system has proved unable to respond effectively t o
surge of demands on it that has grown out of the cowtry's mytiad social
economic problems. Paradoxically, the Shah and the goverrunent are now su
-
ing the consequences both of his long-time authoritarian rule, which has a1
little opportunity for meani&ful popular participation, and of his recent
political liberalization, which%&k$$m.itted
grievances htae-d to serious unrest.
-100-
the expmlion of
liberalizationprogrm, md
SECRET
for the past two years, has in fact allowed considerable freeda for
the press, has permitted formation of political parties oucide the official
Rastakhiz Party, and has promised free elections in 1979. In addition,
the progran has been acconpanied by a significant reduction in the use of
police state methods by SAVAK and other agencies to monitor and control
political activity. As a result of this liftirig of constraints, political
expression by a wide variety of groups, loyal and disloyal, has rmshmed
beyond the ability of the countryasenfeebled official institutions to
cope. Neither the people nor the to accept the duties
and responsibilities of a democratic political systm.
The Rastakhiz Party has virtually collapsed in this turmoil, and the
Maj lis (parliament) -- although much more active as a :om for debate of
the countryrsproblem than at any the since the 1950s, and therefore
of sane use as a safety valve. -- has failed to provide effective solutions
to or leadership out of the political uncertainty. The burden therefore
has fallen wholly on the S h a h ~ ~ e - n e w - e n d - % e n e r a l l Y - w e a k - g e v ~
balance the need for public order
of Prine-~inis~er-Jefap~har-if.-~aamr~to
with the need.for a political settlement. Senior military leaders have
been pressing the fonnsr; the civilian opposition has been demanding the
latter.
The civilian opposition munting the challen
3= contains two main elements:
the leftist successors to the National Front of the 1950s, now cooperating
to a linited eaemt hder the name Iranian Freedom Seekers Liberation
Movement; and %he consmative Shia religious comity. The nationalists
middle
draw strength fmn the urban and upper class intelligentsia, and oppose
h
authoritarian pemment generally, whereas the religious opposition is
supported by the laver and lower-middle classes, and opposes primarily the
-101-
SECRET
reformist policies of the Shahathat tbreaten the status of religion in

the country. In addition, the organized opposition includes two terrorist
groups -- the People's Strugglers, which draws its membership fm the nl
opposition; and the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, which is leftist orient
and directed and recruits among university students -- and t b 'Mdi
Party. The religious leaders, especially such figures as b l e d Ayatoll
Ruhollah Khomeini or Ayatollah ~hariat3darif m the holy city of Qaa,
great influence with and can quickly mobilize thn: masses, but in the pas
they have demonstrated only a limited ability to organize themselves and
their followers. The leftist parties and termrist m s are better
organized, but comnand a,smaller following. Leaders of the several oppos
groups perceive the need to work together, but their widely differing tact
and goals (discussed below) have ma& effective cooperatiun bpossible,
11. NEAR TERM m K
'Ihe period up to mid-1979 is likely to prove critical in detennin
the ability of the Shah to preserve the powers of the Pahlajl dynasty
Iran's existing political system in even a weakened fonn fmctioning as
they have in the past. The Shah in this time frame will need to denanst
his determination and ability to protect civil ordar, for although martial
law could be extended beyond its scheduled expiration in March 1979, to do
would further weaken his position by *licitly acknowledging failure to
reestablish stability and confidede. Additionally, the Shah has promised-
the quadrennial elections to the Majlis due by early suaner 1979 will be
and will be free. Making good on this pledge will require unparalleled
concessions on the part of both the march and his principal opponents.
the Shah succeeds in meeting these challenges, he will have won himself
respite; if he fails, his p o s i t i o w b e progressively dermincd.
- a -
sLCx-r
r -102-
SECRET
Enforcing Martial Law

Shah and the government will face major difficulties in attenpting
to maintain civil order in the caning months even under martial law. Although
relative stability has been mintained since Septenbr in Tehran and the
eleven other cities where martial lew has been instituted, civil disturbances
and terrorist incidents have spre
stoppages have shut down a great many public and some private sector enter-
prises, and student boycotts have delayed the opening of most universities.
Ironically, the govemnmt's success in restoring order in these circumstances
will turn in large part the continued willingness of its more moderate
opponents to -el restraint to their more radicpl co-religionistsand
political associates. Govenvnent representatives have been consulting with
selected religious leaders and civilian politicians, attempting with some
success to play on their ktsrest in avoiding anarchy and in ensuring con-
trolled change and continued basic stability. lhis tactic kill not end
the disturbances or satisfy the critics, but it may buy time and prevent
further solidification of the opposition while the government seeks to
implement reforms.
& more serious disordefi
'?
ly of force held by
the Iranian a d and security forces ovidshem the capa-
bility to prevent the disturbances from growing out of control, either in
the M i a t e future or in 1979 if an extension of martial law becomes
necessary. Althmgh nonnally not well trained for riot control, these
forces have been provided special equipment and limited additional training
I
and will be able to protect the r e g V g as they remain loyal and
determined to do so. Ihe military at present is supporting the regire
and is prepared to defend it with
SECRET
force, but it is clear there are degrees of loyalty and support amng its
personnel.
Senior officers have the most a t stake i n tha regime, are the most
conservative politically, and turd t o be the mwt loyal t o tha Shah.
they who m i n c e d the Shah t o declare martial law, howaver, and they
be the most tenpted in extreme c i r a m t ~ to
s translate their f n s t r a t
kith
with continued unrest &,,the troubles of the civilian govenrmmt into
iM
demands for a military g o v e m n t or a military coup.
A
"-'u
information wncaming the attitudes of j m i
b d
,the l a t t e r i n particular are drawn largely
ese-
~ 2 2a de-t tors. ?here is therefore less certainty, i f
elements of the military -1d long
t o f i r e on demonstrators solely t o protect the Shah and a govemmnt
by him. Of the several military units available t o enforce martial l a w ,
Imperial Guards, now deployed i n Tehran, the 'Special Forces Brigade, and
h r b o m e troops are considered most reliable by the Iranian government.
Calming the Opposition
sscurity situatian w i l l finally be quieted, i f a t a l l , only f o l l
significant cancessions by the Shah and the g w s m t aver and above
they haw already offend. These concessions will be necessary in a l l a
social, emnmic, and political. Evm sweeping concessions will qot e m
continued calm, however, for theh is an almost miversal tendency m g
Iranians, and certainly among the political and religi- opposition, t o
- 7 -
SECRET
-104-
interpret any concessions as signs of weakness that should be exploited
%c''!c h c 4
rather than as positive elements o $ l i t i c d u T h e Shah and the
government therefore will need to couple well timbd and well &fined con-
cessions with the judicious exercise of sufficient authority and force to
intimidate those who, equating lenience with weakness, would further
challenge tha regime.
Ihe demands being pressed by the several opposition groups vary widely/./
&*
in tams ofAsubstance, the spirit in &id! they a m me&, and the likelihood
of their acceptance by the m g h . The l i a clergy, who are leading the
-
most effective opposition,' a G o differ ammg themselves. The sirrdC. llpst
Uinfluential leader, the exiled &atollah Xhomeini, has for years
Shah and the establishmmt of a theocracy; thus
there is virtually no chance that the Shah or any secular p w e m n t
can $%k
a settlant with hi.. M r e h r a t e religiau fipuns in Iran,
including the well known Ayatollah S h a r i a w r i , dmnnd .Ilt a reduced role
for the Shah and the Lffectiw i~plemntationof existing but hemtofore ignored
by a connittee of
Although there is no
chance that .such a 'body would be allowed a veto pauer, there probably is sonm
roan for a coapromise solution. Regardless of their personal rivalries and
differences over ultimate goals, Shia raligiwr leaders are united
oJbe:.cr.a-
in their dmtnd that the 9uh halt his s o c i u g r a m s , which they
believe have had a degenerating, secularizing effect on traditional I s l d c
society.
G W & k m politicians -- notably those affiliated with the National Front,
but also those leading the sklsll indqrcndrmt parties being f o m d in
SECRET
anticipation of the 1979 elec_tions-- for the most part are demanding a
sharp reduction in the role of the Shah and the establishment of a
hifl, A r n : ~ , i t j ? / b d ~ ~ e n P r ~ l c ) fhe f4eL.
constitutionaP,;IH"
mnarchyh Generally leftist oriented, these politicians
are pressing for greater civil rights, an end to corqtion and privilege,
and a more independent foreign policy, including z o o s e n i n g of Iran's
ties to the US. This group is supported by a significant portion of the
modem middle class, but does not have the widespread, fanatical following
of the mllahs. This amalgam of civilian oppositionists is not opposed in
principle to the Shah's program of modernizing Iran's society and economy,
and stands to gain the most from any expansion of political liberalization.
The Shah and government therefore have a better chance of arranging an
accomodation with this group than with any other element of the opposition.
There is no likelihood that the current regime can find any comnon
ground w i t h the country's two terrorist groups or with the Tudeh Party,
All want to depose the Shah; the Comists and the People's Sacrifice
Guerrillas would install a secular Marxist government, the People's Stru
apparently favor the theocracy called for by the radically conservative
leaders. The Iranian security services over the years have sharply limit
the effectiveness of these radical groups, with the result that they have
not been able to mount a concerted attack on the regime, even though they
are in contact with one another and share some overlapping membership.
These groups maintain clandestine organizations, however, that may enable
them in the future to capitalize more effectively on civil disorder,
especially through the use of terrorism.
- 9 -
SECRET
-106-
SECRET
Ihe Shah has already made a number of concessions i n h i s effort t o

wwl c i v i l unrest and e l i c i t the tol'erance of d e r a t e religious and politicdl
I . In the area of society and religion, he has appointed a prime minister
:'Jl.lrif-Emami) who enjoys good relations with Shia leaders, dismissed some
<corl;fftt r/ ++'{/*:r 5 44 (.k k ~ n t f , iT~D~
-P)
government o f f i c i a l s who were members of the Bahai sect abolished
4'
tie cabinet post f o r women's affairs, elevated responsibility f o r the religiolrs
r111owmentfimd t o cabinet level, closeo gambling casinos, reverted from the
%I4 m(
o c a l l e d Pahlavi calendar t o t h e M a l e n d a r , and opened private nego-
lntions with the religious leaders. To meet economic demands- the government
To
=,settle# numerous s t r i k e s in public sector enterprises%&nerous
rrms -- increased wages, housing allo~:ances, pensions and the like -- and
ndicated its intention t o cut back spending on defense and nuclear programs
favor of projects directly affecting the masses of the people, including
msing, agriculture, transporation, and sanitation. In the p o l i t i c a l field.
ic regime
-0gram
A
- the royal family, launched a vigorous anti-cormption program, and affirmed
le freedom of the press, the right t o assembly, and the independence of
le universities. Shah* also allowed marginally greater latitude t o
&A
than was en'oyed by its recent predece
~ 4
SOTS.,
~ +//;/a
0
Ij,/p /*,
~ 4 ~
None o f
A ,9,J..,,V jrrr/wk&uf Jw ~r,",
I r a n ' s basic problems w i l l be solved in the few mhths that remain
,fore the 1979 elections a r e due, yet it is during this period that the Shah
SECRET
participation in the elections by the moderate opposition, but only if

JYA w7s t f'
government continues-toimpi-sions. mese would
,,
of the c o m n man, to protect or enhance the prerogatives of the mullahs

the role of Islam, to lift martial law as scheduled, d to allow unfette
that the USSR has actively backed dissident groups in Iran, but we have no
Tehran and Mos
of instability that in time would facilitate the expansion of Soviet infl
- 11 -
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-108-
Iran and in the Persian hlf region. Concerned with Iran's domestic
~blems,the Shah&- is likely in the near term to take gnat
re to avoid any changes or difficulties in his relations with the W e t s .
This preoccupaticm with internal developments will also p & p t Iran
seek continued correct relations with its -primary regional rivab,
q,&sitan. 'ih reconciliation reached w i t h Iraq in 1975 has
lured well, and the Iraqis are in any case not likely to seek to take
rantage of Iran's current difficulties, Although the Iraqi regim is
,ologicallyopposed to the Shah, its apprehension about Soviet activities
A, .fbc
6-C - and its concern
lut the attitudes and behavior of the,$alf of the Iraqi population that is
a, incline Baghdad to prefer a continued role for the Shah to the
i* r.4-
ertainties of political chaos,,or the emergence of a reactionary religious
military government. Possessing virtually no capability to influence events
Iran and busy consolidating its own power, the leftist r e g h of
;* fitydI"i~~a-
sident Taraki-is also not likely in the near term to initiate problems r
-with Iran.
Iran's military capabilities
ected, at least minimally, by the demands of enforcing and administering
tial law. The Inprial Guard, the Special Forces, and some airborne troops
deployed in Tehran, and virtually all units around the country have been
w on for troops and equipment to supplement local police forces. lhis
xsion, psychologm a l , a h s t certainly has had a detrhmtal
?ct on readiness levels and morale, and may have had a limited impact on
]at capabilities as well. These problems are not likely in the near term,
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however, to reduce significantly Iran's overall military superiority aver

Iraq or in the Persian Gulf, nor are they likely to stimulate any review
Iranian security policy in these areas. A decision in the interests of
economy to postpone indefinitely or cancel the future purchase of sophis
cated military equipment, especially the projected large nmbers of F-14
and F-16 aircraft and sizable quantities of g m m d force equipment,would
not impact on overall military capabilities until at least the early 198
but by the mid-1980s would begin to reduce Iran's capabilities relative
both Iraq and the USSR.
Iran in fact will cut back or delay purchases of military
and p s i & l y industrial equipment from the US as a result of economic
difficulties growing out of the,current unrest, but this is likely to bQ
if<clC
a limited retrenchment that will not impact on the broader relationship.
A
Clllt Lonomic difficulties presumably will incline Iran again to push fot
moderately higher oil prices, but price policy is not likely to become
tied in any more direct way to near term political developments. Despite
their perennial suspicions that the US is involved in all of Iran's d
orrc :d
affain,,,Iranians consider a continued close relationship with the US,
American backing for the Shah, to be essential in a period of political
uncertainity. If the Shah follows through with his current plan to pu
inplementation of his liberalization program, serious difficulties aver
human rights and other bilateral political issues are likely to be avoid
111. L
O NW TERM PROBLEMS
Iran faces several basic problems drull,that will place impo
constraints on the colmtry's longer-termoptions in domestic and foreign
- 13 -
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-110-
~mlicywhatever the f a t t govemnt. The
C I I rection Iran goes in e determined in large
Ipart by perennial r e a l i t i e s deriving from four principal problem areas:
-- economic growth and declining o i l production;

-- domestic tensions between modernization and traditionalism,
and between liberalization and authoritarianism;
-- Iran's role i n the Persian Gulf region and beyond;
-- international orientation and dependence on the US.
Economics and O i l
Iran's basic economic problem is t h a t the country's crude o i l productive
apacity i s now approaching its peak, and will begin t o decline, probably
n the early 1980s. A t the same time, large and probably growing sums will
e required t o finance continued diversification of the economy and t o
upport even reduced military and nuclear programs. Beyond this, substantial
lctkr
ew expenditures are certain t o a r i s e as the government
3 meet grawing popular demands f o r economic gains.
Iran's crude o i l productive capability i s 6.8 million barrels per d a y 4

c bid!
n 1978. Sustainable capacity may r i s e t o 7 million b/d by 1980, but w i l l
:cline thereafter, almost certainly f a l l i n g t o 6 million b/d -- and perhaps
~ b s t a n t i a l l yless -- by 1985. The r a t e of decline will depend on the success of
massive and costly gas injection program that is intended t o naintain reser-
~ i pressures
r and f a c i l i t a t e crude output i n the major oilfileds. We consider
)at the entire volume of Iran's 43 b i l l i o n barrel proved reserves probably
11 be exploitable over time with the widespread emplacement of desalting

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units a t the oilfields and as a result of an extensive well a d equipment

maintenance program. An additional 17 billion barrels of probable rese
might be recovered using natural gas injection, although t h i s would be a t

high cost.
With o i l output falling, any Iranian government w i l l come under
growing pressure-to increase o i l prices t o finance on-
going programs and t o cover increased inprts. If there were no o i l p r i c s
increase u n t i l 1980, f o r exanple, Iran's current account would be i n defi
i n that year. In the nun likely circunstances that o i l prices r i s e a t
the same r a t e as Iran's inport prices and o i l production diminishes gr
t o 5.5 million b/d by 1985, Iran's current account w i l l go into substantirf
d e f i c i t in 1982 (figure 1). I f real o i l prices were t o r i s e about five
cent a year over the next several years, on the other hand, Iran might
t o maintain a current account surplus through 1985.
Iran's $13 billion i n official reserves and $6 billion i n o f f i c i a l

reserve assets w i l l enable it to b o r n on favorable t e r m f o r developmn
projects, and borrowing is expected t o increase substantially. The count
has no other ready solution t o its growing foreign payments problem i n
period through the mid-l980s, however. Natural gas production (from rese
of 500-600 t r i l l i o n cubic feet, second i n s i z e only t o those of the USSR)
w i l l r i s e substantially in the next few years, but w i l l not replace o i l as
major foreign exchange earner. An active program t o a t t r a c t foreign inves
ment ha^ recently enjoyed limited success, but it w i l l f a l t e r unless p o l i t

s t a b i l i t y is quickly restored.
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-112-
As a r e s u l t of these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
c:./J
P
ttirasrrr?. f o r the next several
,115 i s l i k e l y t o grow a t a modest r a t e of only four t o seven percent
~t~itally,
and l i t t l e progress is l i k e l y t o be made i n restructuring the
otl~my. Despite the current emphasis on the need t o diversify industry,
I cxample, t h i s s e c t o r w i l l constitute only a s l i g h t l y larger proportion
( W in 1985 than i t d i d i n 1977 (figure 2). Serious domestic constraints
I1 p e r s i s t as a r e s u l t o f the generally inadequate infrastructure, the
i ~ r t a g eo f s k i l l e d labor and technical personnel, t h e lack of productivity

the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and agriculture, and the i n f l a t i o n that w i l l be f u r t h e r
~mulatedby t h e economic concessions now being granted t o quiet popular
rest.
In t h e next few years Iranian policy makers
s h i f t resources away from t h e recently favored military and
l e a r programs t o such fundamental needs as transportation and agriculture.
C
less s i g n i f i c a n t changes in p r i o r i t i e s a r e made, f o r example, the proportion
h
Iran's food requirements produced domestically is l i k e l y t o f a l l from the
rrent 75 percent t o as low a s 60 percent, necessitating a manifold increase
payments f o r food imports and p r i c e subsidies. On the p o l i t i c a l side,
~ r i e n t a t i o nw i l l be e s s e n t i a l t o f o r e s t a l l f u r t h e r unrest as popular expecfa-
Ins a r e deflated by reduced economic growth. I n the coming period of
reling o r declining o i l production, therefore, t h i s w i l l entail- reduc-

,n in t h e 28 per&nt o f annual budget expenditures t h a t now goes t o defense.
W a reduction would leave Iran still able t o finance a m purchases,
: n o t on t h e s c a l e o f t h e 1970s.
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Domestic Tensions
'Ihe disorientation of Iran's society and political system that has
created formidable near-tern problems for the Shah will not soon abate.
will persist for many years -- under any government, with or without the
between the forces of mdernization and those of tradition; and between
the forces of liberalization and those of authoritarianism. The two tonfli
are entwined but distinct; the Shah wntinues to agonize, for example.
whether his strong comnitment to modernizing Iran can best be pursued th
authoritarian or liberal policies.
There is mch in Iranian history to predispose both the ruler and th
led to exercise and to expect authoritarian behavior. %re exists no
tradition of the orderly transfer of authority, --there has been
no real experience with democratic f o m , and there is little feeling of
Iranian nationalism, even though the first Persian empire was founded more
than 2500 years ago. The modern idea of a nation-state arrived late i n 1
as an impo~tationfrom Europe, and did little to inspire Iranian politid
to transcend the c o r n virtues of independence and self-aggrandizementin
the interests of the general welfare. lXis reluctance was also reinforcad
historically by the great physical and cultural diversity of the country.
and by the long succession of alien rulers.
There is in Iran, on the omer hand, an established tradition of a
strong ruler at the head of an authoritarian government, and of general
obeisance to any authority that manifests its will with force. The experi
of the current Shah, for example, superficially suggests that political
stability in Iran is best assured by authoritarian govemment, and that per
- 17 -
-114-
of the greatest political unrest arise hkn the ruler, for whatever reason,
shares authority, as during thehsadeq crisis of 1951-53,or attempts to
introduce additional freedoms, as with the liberalization program of the
mid-1970s. In fact, although the political behavior of Iranians will change
only slowly, the popular appetite for participation in govemment has been
sufficiently whetted by such factors as exposure to the media and Western
valyues,education, and urbanization, that no government will have the option
of turning back permanently. This conflict between authoritarianism and
liberalization is so fundamental . h t it is almost certain over the next
several years to cause continued instability, and therefore major problems
for either the Shah or an alternative military or civilian regime.
The related cultural dichotomy that will ensure continued disorder in
Iranian society is the tension between modernization and traditionalism.
'he Shah has been the chief proponent of rapid mxlernization, but the goals
of the program are supported also by the bulk of the military leadership and
by the secular politicians, many of whom in other respects are opponents of
the Shah. klodernization as promoted by the Shah has focused on land and
economic reforms, women's rights, education and health, and rural developrent.
With progress in these areas, moreover, have come other hdamental changes,
especially rapid urbanization, the alteration of the traditional class structure,
and the general, perhaps irreversible, secularization of society. These, too,
have proved socially and political disruptive.
The inability of Iranian society to accomdate successfully to these social
changes stem in large part from the long-standingand pervasive influence
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of religion and religious leaders. Iran is distinguished frwm a l l other

principal Islamic states in that its population adheres u w m h e ~ l y
to
the heterodox Shia branch of Islm. Although the Shia faith (eight percent
of a l l lhs1i.m~)serves in par€ t o m i @ Iren's trro large ailtural grmsps,
Persian and Azarbaijani, it also provides the devwt with a mindset and 8
leadership that is fanatically opposed t o mDdbmization. Sria Islam f

not merely a religian; rather it is an a l l e n ~ a r p a s s h greligibps, aanomic,
legal, social, and intellectual system t h a t contmls all aspects of l i f e ,
and the sect's leaders, unlike their countexparts in Smni Islam, am belie
t o be completing God's revelati& on earth.
?he tens of .thousands of Shia null ah^, although not well organized
politically, have m r e direct and regular contact with the masses of
Iranians than do goverrpoent pr party officials. Becwss for p a r s ths mll
.have seen t h e i r qorunnic, judicial, administrativb, and social prerogatives
circmscribed by successive gmnnnents and the forces of modernization, the
nullahs are now using their influence t o chmk t h i s trend. Their W l s n g e
now is to the Shah, but f o r a t l e a s t the next sewerel pars thy will retain
, sufficient st* to make oimilay demands any m i l i t a ~ yo r civilian

regime in which they t h ~ e l v a sa r e not heayily tepnsented. We do not fore
any likely circumstances in which a government controlled by r e l i g i a r r Is&
would c a t ~
o power, althargh religiously polit* parties lnsy s*r,
I f meaningful elections are held, +ither in 1979 or therraaftsr, p o l i t i c i

w i l l find it ugeful t o appeal for support fmr the clergy,
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-116-
Regional Role
q a p h y and history together have ensured that Iran for the in8efinit.e
future w i l l face certain difficult constraints i n its relationship with its
regional neighbors. Strategic, econaric, pelitical, and cultural factors
a l l distinguish Iran's interests fmn the often carpeting interests of ths
Ck.4 hC;yfr-'t
Arabs to the West or the hfghimsnto the Eest. Iranian leaders of any political
stripe w i l l find their options in regional f o r e i b and defense policy limited
by the need to protect thQ country's territorial integrity and o i l m a s , and
by their interest in balancing tha anti-Persian outlook and policies of
Iran's met M o t s foreign policy concern is to ensure Iranian

hegemmy in the Persian Gulf regicn, a goal dictated apprehension
Arab radicalism and the e r a b i 1 i t ) r of Iran's o i l fields ad shipping lanes.
In plrwit of this goal, Iran has sought correct bilateral nlatiau with the
States it seas as mst likezy to threaten this hegamolly -- ths USSR. Iraq,
and Saudi rltabia --. & has tried to intersst the Arab Gulf states tn a agimal
collective security am-. Deepseatad Arab distrwt of Perrian smbitim
has precluded my sudh miltilateral w~greennt,Bnd d n ~ $ certain3y
t will
cat- to do so, although the Arabs individually haw been willing t o
norllnlize relatiow wiFh Inn.
Imq and Iraq ham observed scNpul0usly ths M s i o n s of the Algiers
Accord of 197S.thot ended I m ' s involvement in the W s h rebellion and
delineated the two states1 border,
~mnon gnd bilateral relations a;re likely
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to remain stable for the next few years. This stability i s a result prim
of the apprehension Iraqi leaders have of Iran's military strength and
political influence, and their concern about Soviet activities in the ;re
cur r e d l
Iran, for i t s part, is grateful that Iraq i nei'lher meddling i n Iran's
A
domestic problears nor attenpting actively t o subvert the smaller ccmservat
Arab regimes i n the W f . Saudi Arabia's determination t o preserve its s
of influence on the Arab side of the (Xllf, its l~oreconservative policy on
o i l prices, and its apprehensicn about developments inside Iran and about
policy tward Saudi Arabia of a possible post-Shah government are likely t
preclude significantly closer t i e s with I r a n , - . The
two states' shared anxiety about perceived Sovlet and radical Arab threats
probably will lead thean to minimize any contentious bilateral issues, hwe
rrgtbn
I m ' s defense policy i n the Persien Gulf,,is aimed a t creating 4
prepandanmt E m capable of deterring or d i n g costly an attack from
quartdr, and able to project Iranian pamr abroad, especially i n the m
west Indian Ocean. If current plans for the aoquisition of additional dl
aquipment an inplmmtad, these objectives am likely to be sth%mtially
achievd by the aid-1980s as the Iranian a n d forces, alresdy the larflstt
best equipped in tha Wf, incmm their superiority ava the other l i t t o
states. I f .Iran for econanic nascns cuts back sharply o r delays indsfini
its plrchasa of sophisticated military equipwnt, h,- especially F-1
and F-16 aircraft and m j o r ground force equipmnt, the margin of i t s s
over Iraq w i l l be re&ced s i a i f i c a n t l y in the mid-1980s.
- 21 -
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-118-
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Iran's present military superiority over Iraq rests primarily on

the strength of i t s Air Force, which has more hi-gh-performance aircraft,
better pilot training, a greater airborne E(M capability, and ordnance such
as laser-guided bo&s and 'N-guided missiles that are tmavailable to Iraqi
The Iranian Navy also is far superior t o that of Iraq; it could easily d o s e
the W f t o Iraqi shipping, and could attenpt small anphibiats oparatians.
The two statest gmmd foxes are Inore nearly balanced, hcuever, with each
s i b possessing different advantages in term of equipmmt and capable of
incursicxis into the other's territory. The disposition of gnnold forces
(figun 3) and tha greater mobility of Iraqi forces could in fact give
Baghdad a substantial rmmrical advantage along the border during the
initial stages of an attack.
A program of naval expansion ncw
stranghrn Iran's ability t o project its forces into the Indian Ocean and onto
the Arabian peninsula. Despite this accretion of military power, however, we
e s t h t e th.t Iran w i l l continua to act in a trained manner crnsistemt
with its ~ ~ r s policy.
n t
TL~~~M
.t-y p r u u d
Iran W d be likely t o intervene with its forces
A
to cantroi security problems anung the smaller states on the Arabian Penin-
sula anly ii invited to do so or i f tacitly sppmved by the uxnservotivs
-- as was the case uhen Iran i n t e r n e d in
Arabs, aspecially Saudi Arabia
the MUWar in aPsn in tha mid-1970s -- Pnd would move to seize
and control shipping lanes anly i n respoMe to a direct t h m t t o Im's oun
'Ihe distrust tlut cluracter%zcrsrelations be- Iran and Afghanistan i s

virtually certain t o deepen over the next few years as a result of what Iran
considers Afghan President Tarakils steady mvanent tonard a closer
- 22 -
relationship with the
r,
1~
l e f t i s t government
p!
+,
t o MgJm d i s s i w t mupr i f v w r i e i d an opportunity t o mde-
hq*:rfs-
but owing t o Iran's d n . r t i c p m b l a a and appr
about possible Soviet r e a c t i M o t x l y t o interfe, b l a t m l y or
diiectly. On the diplomatic level, Tehran w i l l seek continued correct re
t i e m with Kabul in the h q e of checking the growth of Soviet influence
m Afghanistan o r Pakistan,
Afghanistan. To protect against a longer term deterioratian/\hovever, ( I r
over the next few years will take steps to improve i t s military posture
the eastern border area. Iran's limited forces in the east a t present
sufficient t o defend against any likely military threat, but % haw li
capability t o project power beyond Iran's borders.
International Orientatian
Iranian ~ ~ a & of
r s a l l but the most radical l e f t i s t or t e r m r i s t
share an apprehension about Iran's geopolitical position. They see I r
surrounded not only by basically mfriendly or unreliable are8 states,
also by a superpower, Russia, that is deterndncd aver the long tern t o
Iran's regional influence and internal stability. A s a a u l t of W pa
tian ahd the extensive t i e s that Iran conseqwmtly has developed with th
W t c d States, no sharp reorientation of Ir& policy vis-a-vis,,supe
is likely in the period through th mid-1980s.
he vigoras a n t i - ~ a m ~ n i s lAaf the thh endf most senior I
political and military leaders grew out of th Soviet occupation of Ir
and a f t e r World War 11, and out of th. difficult early years of the Shah'
when the Soviets were seen as the principal th-t to his m l e and to t
b
- 23 -
SfCPXi
-120-
staters territorial integrity. Fears of Moscow's intenti- in the inter-
vening years were sustained by Iran's perception of. Ibrssia's i n t k ~ a s tin
securing warm-water ports h the area, and, in the still more recsnt put, by
indications of a future o i l deficit h the USSR. Iren in the late 197th is
alanned a t Soviet activities in Africa, the People's -1(~tic kpublic O$
Yemen, and Afghanistan, fearing that this "encirclunant" of Iran w i l l cantinus

with efforts to mdennine the security of neighboring Pakistan or of Itan
itself.
Iran in the next few years will continue to take such steps as it cm
t o .cwnter Soviet influence in these areas, but t o protect its crun interests
will also seek continued normal, i f cautious, bilateral relations. By slOuuding
trade and a m purchases with thc USSR and by c a r t h i n g high-level politicnl,
exchanges, the Shah has already provided s t m g hcewives for camthud
Soviet cnoperation. To balance this relati&@, however, Tehran w i l l also
work t o piotect its good b i l a t e r g ties vith China, a c h were estAMebd
when Iran rrcognized the Peking g o ~ m in

t 1971.
Iha Shah and Iranian military leaders c i t e the UcjSR as the grsetes%
long-tenn military threat to Iran, although mithsr they IWU w nar forasw
cimmstances in which Soviet-Iranfsn h o s t i l l t h s might scan. ' J h o t i a ~ t a t i m
of cmly one of the seven Ifenian divisions toward thc M e t frontier suggests,
mreovei, that Iranian leaders &ta SL Iranian fortes could not contain a
Sovlct attack witbut outside assist&ice,either now or in tha future. A
credible kranian defense would require virtually a conplete redeployaant of

Iran's ground foxces to the north, an undertrrking that would taka several
- 24 -
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1f weeks and would eliminate Iran's capability vis-a-visIraq. In these
-'
circumstances, Iranlsstrategy will remain one of deterrence; it seeks to
deploy forces sufficient only to make any Swiet military action unaccept
costly. %d to presexve close ties to the that would increase tte
;
likelihood of a rigorous Western response.
fa The Shah's predisposition to close relations with the US xesulted
primarily from the American backing given him during the early years of his
\
reign and from security concerns about the USSR. Cn this foundation, h
hf \ has been built a network of ties that involves far m o than

~ just the sale
of military equipment or the Central Treaty Organization. Most of Iran's
16' 2 technology and capital goods, for example, and a large portion of its fmd
inpons and manpower assistance come f m western industrial countriesJ
pr@arily the ~ ~ 3 m - West,

e in turn, purchases the+dk of Iran's
In ZAA-
oil. Although many civilian opposition leader~~favor
a more balanced fore
policy, the fundamental inportance of these ties probably would dissuade
but the most radical leftist government from implementing abrupt changes
US-Iranian relations.
US interests will be directly affected in the next several years by
virtually certain Iranian efforts to secure higher real oil prices. With
output leveling off and declining in the 1980s, any government will need
increased revenue higher prices will bring. The vigor with which this g
is pursued, however, will be limited by consciousness in Iran of the count
extensive ties to the industrial nations in all fields, and by the more
policies of some other mefiers of the Organization of Petroleum Export
Countries. These complicating factors may create some receptiviw in Iran
armts
for moderation in oil price increases, especially if serious
1122-
-ecessionin the West seems likely.
Ihe US will remain a principal supplier of sophisticated military
quipment and trained manpower to Iran for the next several years, barring
vi$-*-*is H e C s y e r p a c c - - ~
evolutionary and unlikely changes in the country's& orientati~
he US has been Iran's main arms supplier for some time. and with-
m billion worth of equipment remaining to be delivered, will remain so
t least through the mid-1980s. Iran's Air Force and air defense programs
n particular are almost totally
- dependent
- on the US -- in mid-1978 ahmst
' 500
Americans were in Iran working in the defense sector. Iran's military
eliance on the US is so critical, in fact, that if US support were withdrawn,
he Iranian a d forces probably could not sustain full-scale hostilities
or longer than two weeks.
Iran is attempting to reduce its dependence on the US by diversifying
ts sources of weapons supply, expanding its domestic arms production,
nd launching ambitious education and training programs to provide skilled
mpower. Although progress is being made in all these areas, the increasing
~phisticationof modern weaponry and the rapidly growing demand for trained
mpower in the economy as well as
main for at'least several years
K f e n s e and foreign policy. The US role in Iran's military and eamcq
g decline more quickly than the foreign role generally, however, as a result
~ t hof a m sales ceilings inposed by the US and efforts by the Iranian
wernment to minimize an attractive political issue for the opposition.
SEcWr
problem i t s leaden w i l l face over the next several p a r s , and p

general limits within which policy can be fornulated, inportant dif
remnin, we shall see a political system chastened and changed by the

of 1978, -same basic- albeit a t a reduced
with greater sensitiviq t o attendant pmblems and popular demmds.
be wide variatims in their domestic policies and foreign priorities.

Pahlavi Rule
Ma saa little likelihood that the Shah w i l l step dwy mluntarily
the mid-1980s. Becauge he has for so long i h t i f i e d his fate with that
xp,the ~ u m poaiticai
t intthiiiq 9 i m i y - 1 ~to r e i n f o ~tha
deterainatim to restore order and work toward an orderly ~ucces~ion
tg
ha has almdy demDnstrated willingness t o Mks concassianr t o tha mspau

m i t i a n , and my Mclude i that his role as well r9 that of h$s
0.4- b*sf L C
. -s The political liberalizatim program was in f i c t cones
by the Shah largely a$ a mans t o facilitate broader participation in the
- 27 -
~CRIx
-124-
political process, a step he considered necessary to ensure stability in
a post-succession period.
If the Shah and his designated heirs [current arrangements provide for
the desi&nation uf a regency camcil under Wress Farah if the'Shah, who is
in good heal^, should die before 1980 when the C t w n Prince will be 20 pars
old) remuin in puwer, we anticipate they will continue over the next s m r a l
years to seek political stability through a balsnce of limitep concessions,
Lcl~-dew i6 r t rdr4
us with the liberalization program, and limited force,-ia1 lawn
Additionally, if the royal family r&ains in power, we anticipate a continua-
tion of the essential elements of the Shah's current policies on social
mdernization and economic development. &se policies will, howewr, be
a result of the political and
economic problems Reza or a regency under Farah
would try to project a more liberal h ge tha~the
their sensitivity to t h ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ' 'present
rule wtiuld be likely to lead them to be less authoritarian and more req6nsive
to popular concerns, We sea no likelihood un&r Pahlavi m e of a fu&mmtal
reorientation of domestic policy along the lines advocated by ths Shi8
religious leaders.
'Ihc basic elements of Iran's foreign and defense
remain basically unchanged mder the Pahlavi dynasty. The roylliZ family and
the power structure that backs it -- influential persons in the cabinet,
parlimt, bureaucracy, security forces, andi.thebusiness and comnercial
cormmmity -- share C)Fmrm
a view of the world and of Iran's
A
interests. 'Ihis view
sEcIwl'
centers on the need t o strengthen Iran's hegemmy i n the Persian Gulf,

maximize o i l reveques, counter radical Arab and S w i e t influence i n the
4
area, lnininize instability m the Indian subcontinent, and protett I-!'
relationship with the US. There muy be a significant difference between!
Shah and his heirs w a r d i n g the impleuentation of polic)r , however.
Jk SkaLtc
l a t t d r would be certain initially t o 1 b6-as well as
experience, and they probably would be less bold in pmposing foreign
11
initiatives end mre inclined to weigh the views of ,theif civilian and ;
military advisers, the Foreign Affairs hlinistqy, and Parlianrent. This
process probably waild result in slower and less decisive action.
Military Govexnment
The political unrest that has occurred during 1978 has raised for 1
f i r s t t b in many years the serious possibility that the Shah may be
forced from power sane$m before he would choose to step aside in hm
h i s scn. New uncertainties have also reduced sharply the lilralllrood rhd
succession would go as planned in the event ,of the Shah's death. ,
-
Shah's successors almost inevitably would be weaker than
mid arise if influential political and military figures began
f o r power as a result of the failure of a new regime t o solidify quidclp
its hold on power. I f Cmwn h i n c e Reza ar the Enpress could not establ:
control, tht Pahlavi dynasty would end; the Shah's 12-year old second sa
Ali, has no independent p e r base, although he might be used by others 1
legitimize t h e i r seizure of power.

--
SECRET
I f jll.l' L t h e Pahlavi dynasty is forced t 6 share

paJer o r is driven fran power, the most likely single eventuality warld be
that the military would emerga in t c ~ l t r a l . Although no elements within ths
military a r e now k
n m t o be plotting against the Shah, senior officers
the force Mhind the decisim t o inpose martial law& Septenbt 1978, a d
de76cd
we believe t h a t i n rC cirCIPhStdces t h y would Dress for a military
government o r attenpt a coup. I f a military govennent

while the Shah remained, it almost certainly would be led by senior officers
with views similar i n a l l important respects t o those of the Shah. I f the
military were t o nrnmt a successful coup -- and we have no sound basis on
which t o predict which units o r individuals might atteanpt thls -- ths chances
/
would ba w a t e r that younger officers with l e s s predictablje outlooks would
come t o power.
Most senior and middle-grade Iranian officers apparently endorse
the general aims of the Shah's ecanonric development snd social modernization
programs, a$ well as his efforts t o expand and *rove the aned forces.
On d a m s t i c issues, there&*; a military regime would refuse t o
grant to the religious leaders the p o l i t i c a l o r other concessions t h a t
t?i/V,J *r+ **A =',* , , 4 / * ~ 4 4 - j M 4 - . a * * w --

been demending. 'he generally conservative po i t i c a l artlook of
*fl+t;of&c
the military wauld make it equally m l i k c l y t h a t it wmld accoanodate ths
4
d e d o f the opposition l e f t i s t gmups. fibst military governments in f a c t
would be more likely than the Shah t o use f o n a to quell u n n s t such as has
occurred in 1978, and mi@ well reintroduce more repwssive controls of the
kind that existed before the Shah's liberalization program %as implemented and
the most notable hrnran rights violations eliminated.
SECRET
Concerning foreign and defense policy, a military regime over the next
few years probably would pursue the same basic goals as the Shah, but --
lacking h i s experience,and with fewer financial resources than he had
available i n the mid-1970s -- would do so w i t h greater caution and a t a
slower pace. This might manifest i t s e l f i n a more restrained program of na
l e f t i s t military officer o r group wflf stage a successful coup i n the next

few years. Were t h i s t o occur, however, the result might well be the
*lanentation of a foreign policy that h- i n i t i a l l y neutral or xenophobic
but resulted in the progressive emsion of close t i e s and cooperation with
from younger elements of the officer corps, and t o have had ties with the
civilian opposition groups, including the extremists. Accomnodation with
such groups therefore would not be unlikely, but the nature of such a relat
ship and the extent t o which these groups might participate in government
\io,rld be wholly a function of the ideology v personaljty of a new leader.
Civilian Control
Leaders o f I r a n ' s present c i v i l i a n e l i t e -- p o l i t i c i a n s , bureaucrats,
b-4
l,~lsinessmen, the clergy other professionals- -- a r e not in a
I*
1:ood position 'to assume power unless they a r e backed by the Shah o r the
~ r ~ i l i t a r y .Past e f f o r t s t o promote responsible p o l i t i c a l ac-tivity, by the
j:overnment o r the opposition, have not successful, with the r e s u l t
Lhat no well organized p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have developed t h a t might provide
obviously qualified o r popular leadership as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the S l d and
the military. The r e l i g i o u s c o m i t y has a b e t t e r known, more acknowledged
leadership, bat the of i t s coming t o power is vehemently opposed by
v i r t u a l l y a l l other powerful groups.
The National Front is the nearest thing i n contemporary Iran t o an
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , but i n r e a l i t y it hardly e e s t s a s an organized
entity. I t consists primarily o f a g r o q o f aging backers of former p r i m
~ n i n s i t e rFhsadeq, the best known of whom i n t h e l a t e 1970s a r e Karim Sanjabl
and &hdi Bazargan. I f t h i s group should resurrect i t s e l f and come t o power
i n the next few years, however, it presumably m u l d seek t o implement i t s
perennial demands f o r s o c i a l , economic, and administrative reforms a t home,
and f o r an independent foreign policy with loosened t i e s t o the US. Other
independent p o l i t i c i a n s have even l e s s following and organization than t h e

Uational Front, but they share with its members a generally l e f t i s t outlook.
SECRET
wewee no evidence that any of these civilian politici

provide strong or effective alternative leadership in t
The element of the civilian leadership msf suspect to the others,
possessing the widest popular following, may continue for the next seven
years to be the Shia clergy. Such figures as Ayatollahs Khameini or
Shariataadari already exert a powerful influence on gownumnt, and will
4htl
cmtinue to do so whoever is in power, but,,have little chance of capitali
on their wide following to w i n control of the gwemmmt for themselves.
NNNNVV ESB013BRA082 Xl'KNr
00 RUQHER P&-3
DE RUEHC W2411 2892350 Ikm:
ZNY C CCC ZZB AN3
0 1 6 2 l 1 2 2 OCT 78 DQI
PM SLCSTATE YASHDC BD3N.2
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 7 2 8 2 IM
BT CR
C 0 N ? I D E N T I A L STATE 2 6 2 4 1 1 Aim
DCA
E.0. 116528 GDS IS0
cw-2
TAGS: PINT, IB 9/@
SUBJECT: BOY SCOUT JAHBORfl!

1. SENIOR BCPRESENTATIVES OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (BSA)
MET ON OCTOBER 16 WITH S T AND NtA/IBN TO RBVIEW PROSPECTS
FOR JAMBOBEE AT NISBAPUR, JULY 19'78. PRESENT PLANS ARE
TEAT \BOUT 2508 AMERICAN SCOUTS WOULD ATTEND, ALTHOUGH
OWING TO H N B EXPENSE AND UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS I N IRAN.
ONLY ABOUT ONE-HALF THAT-NUMBER-HAVE NOW- SIGNED UP A N D '
BSA I S NOT SURE THEY WILL BEACH ORIGINAL TARGET.
2. BSA COUNCIL MEETS ON OCTOBER 19 TO ADDRESS QUESTION OF
U S , P A R T I C I P A T I O N I N JAMBOREE. I F US DECIDES NOT,TO PARTI-
C I P A T E , PROSPECT I S THAT JdHBOREE WILL NOT TAKE PLACE. BSA
I S VERY WORRICD ABOUT IRANIAN INTERNAL CONDITIONS AT T0E'
TIME 01 JAHLnWREE, AND, TO SOMEWEAT LESSER EXTENT, ABOUT
CRITICISW *Ron HUMAN RIGRTS GROUPS AND PROBLEM OF A I R CHAR-
TER ARBANQEMENTS (DCM NAAS I S F A M I L I A R ) . BSA MUST MATE
connrmmzs ron TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS W I T H I N A HATTER OF FFW
W n X S AND I F JAMBOREE I S SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELLED, C6ULD
STAND TO LOSE UPWARDS OF DOLLARS 200 THOUSAND. BSA HAS NO*
BLEU ABLE TO OBTAIN CANCELLATIOY INSiRANCE FROM ANT INTER-
NATIONAL FIRM.
3. I N RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS DEPOFF SUMMARIZED CURRENT
P O L I T I C A L SITUATION IN IRAN AND HAJOR EVENTS WHICH L I E
&HEAD, I.E. HOEARRAM, END OF MARTIAL LAW. AND ELECTIONS.
HE G m O P I N I O N THAT AMERICA# SCOUTS WOULD NOT PACE
DANQEIOUS SECURITY SITUATION I N I R A N , TEAT OPPOSITION
kLtHBNTS EVtN TERRORISTS, HAD NOT TARGETED SUCH S E N S I T I V E
PROUPS ~8 AMERICAN BOY SCOUTS. FURTHER, IRANIAN GOVERN-
MENT WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE IRON-
CL&D E r ? I C I E N T ARRANGEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, DEPARTMENT
OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT G I V E 100 PERCENT GUARANTEE THAT GO1
WOULD HOT LATER CANCEL JAMBOREE OR T H A T ' I T WOULD TAKE
P U C E WITHOUT PROBLEMS. WE D I D NOT THINT THAT JAMBOREE
WAS IN SAME CATEGOST AS S.IIRA"S ART FESTITTAL.
4. 4T E N D np YEFTING, S S t BEPS REMkIr'3L C C N C Z F I Z L AAK WE,
AGREED TO SEFY EYEASSY ASSESSYTNT P C C ? I L L E RLCOYHKYDA-
TIONS AS TO VRETHSB BSA SqOT'T' PR3p.?l'. Jr ALSO SUr.GTSTF3
THAT EYBASSY MIG6T WISH TO S 3 U Y D O'J1 7 . .,
) S S E I I BAVAI.
VFO I S RUNNIN2 JAMB09EE FOR G O I , EOl- r 1: ' T I Z $ S . 6SA RXPS
TOLD US TRAF T3EY WERF SE?IOTJSLY CONSID?QItJG T b 4 1 US
RBCOYYFND TO INTFRNATIOV!L SCOUT CO'JgCIL "hAT A PRIYATS
EMISSARY BE CFNT TO GO1 mO SUGGFST POSTPObEMENr OF JAWFOREL
UFrTIL 19P3. T ' I I S WDVLT, Zh'ASLr, 1 7 1 TO T A d E I Y I T I 4 T I Y E T O
POSTPONE CONFLSPNCE AND AVOID A LOSC O? PACF. JhYdOFEd
COULD BE RELD Ilu SWEDF'4 NEXm "FAR. "!'r)EP 'P'TTSI CIQCl'Y-
STANCES, I T YIGHT YOT BE IDVISABLC F q 2 fiMRPSSY TO A P P 5 ~ O b C r
BANAI, '#;KO MIGhT LATFS BELILVL ? d P T iJS VAS bE IND PLIEILTJ"I
TO POSTPONE IYANIAN GATRESING. M W PROMISFP 6 5 ) 9 E P S
FUFTHFR REPLY BY VOON, OCTOE3q 15. 9 ~ G 9 k . T L I Y ~ I T F D T I Y E
FOR CONSIDFRATION OF TZIS QUESTIOC, KUT YE A?F OBLIbEL
TO ADVISE BsA BPFORS COUNCIL P 2 P T S ON 9CTDELR 19. ?'kISTOt't;S
BT
#2411
10:01--
FlOU CLISSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10 10 1
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PINT, IR
SUBJ: BOY SCOUTS JAMBOREE
REF : STATE 262411
1. IRAN HAS ENTERED A PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL
2 I AND SECURITY UNCERTAINTY WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE

I AT LEAST THROUGH THE PARLIAMENTARY 3LECTIONS PROMISED BY
I THE SHAH NEXT JUNE. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY CHANGE OR NEW
( FACTORS ENTER THE SCENE BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, BUT IN ANY
I CASE IT IS DIFFICULT TO PWDICT WHAT THE LOCAL POLITICAL
I AND SECURITY SITUATION WILL BE IN JULY 1979. MAJOR UNDER-
I TAKING SUCH AS BOY SCOUTS JAMBOREE FOR THE FIRST TIME
I EVER IN IRAN WILL OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE OUTLAY OF HONEY AND
ENERGIES OF CONSIDERABLE PROPORTIONS. WE CANNOT RULE
OUT/- BEING JEOPARDIZED AT THE LAST FlINUTE BY UNFORE-
SEEN SECURITY AND OTHER PROBLEMS. EMBASSY IS THEREFORE
UNABLE TO PREDICT SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS FOR NISHAPUR
I JAMBOREE NEXT JULY.
CONFIDENTIAL OPTIONAL F O R M 15Z(Hl

1Formarly F S 4 1 3 1 H 1 )
CLISSIPtCIT8ON January 1 9 7 5
D e ~ fof. SfafB
CONFIDENTIAL Pa.._-of
2
Classrfication
2. T H I S I S OBVIOUSLY A DECISION BOY SCOUTS OF A M E R I C J
(BSAI MUST MAKE FOR THEMSELVES. WE BELIEVE I T WOULD
BE WISE FOR THEM TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH GO1 REPRE-
SENTATIVES, NOT ONLY D R . HOSSEIN BANAI, BUT ANY
OTHERS WHOSE COOPERATION WOULD REALISTICALLY BE REQUIRED
I F EXTENSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE, L O G I S T I C AND SECURITY
PREPARATIONS FOR JAMBOREE WERE TO TAKE PLACE. FRANKLY,
WE THINK I T AN EXCEEDINGLY AMBITIOUS PROJECT UNDER CONDITI
WE FORESEE FOR IRAN BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT JULYmWITH CHANGES
OF GOVT AND MINISTRY PERSONNEL P O S S I B L E , ADMINISTRATIVE
PREPARATIONS I N THEMSELVES MIGHT BE D I F F I C U L T TO COMPLETE
I N TIME. STRAIN AND STRESSES ON DECISION MAKERS MIGHT
CAUSE A CHANGE I N GO1 ATTITUDE HALF WAY THROUGH THE
ENTERPRISE. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE EMBASSY OR
USG SHOULD BE PUT I N POSITION OF MAKING T H I S DECISION

BSA
FOR AND IRANIAN GOVT. ABOVE SIMPLY REPRESENTS
EMBASSY'S BEST READING OF THE SITUATION.

1 AGS: INFO: USINT ZAGADAD
I ' ( 1 CT: AblEtfBASSY ABU DIkiBI
ANKARn
11 v
I*
DOHA
ISLANABAD
II JIDDA
1 KABiJL
It
KUI:2&1T
, LONDOW
It
I
MAKM.IA
,I
bNS CAT
II
WE\{ DFLHI
PARIS
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCIECPAC
CONFIDENTIAL TEHIlAN 10 16 9
E.O. 11652: GDS
sIi
I /1 TAGS: P I N S , PIilT, POIIS, PGOV, I R
I
I
t',
1 SUEJXCT: ?@L: '1 ! ::?.-L/SE~URITY E P D R T , OCTOBER 18

.. OC'l'i'Ci'rION CLPU'L'Y TAELXD NINE POI>:T C G \ I S u l a bIoTIOl\I
C '. l i,
I N CLOSED DOOR SESSIOM OCT 22. NrlTIONAL FIlOiJT LEADCR S M J A B I
1 17 1.
R.~I
STALED ?.IONARCHV SOT O E ~ E C T I O K P ~ B ~ IF
E IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
JY
,
!I "V~O'.'..
I
..I~.IPIIC R I T I C I Z E D P'JESIDENT CA?.TER FOR IGNORING H W KICHTS

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PRISONERS
IXTO TVO GROUPS--THOSE 11-:?BISONED FOR POLITIC&
ACTS, AND THOSE ARRESTED FOR TERRORISM. F I R S T GIZOUP MAY
BE REI.L:ASED. ?!I:;'LSTZR OF S:;ATX 1 .3 EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS
AZMOUN S A I D TERP.0RISTS WILL NOT BE PARDOKED, BUT OTHER
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,. ..-.,.d.
A?Pt\XXNTLY PRISONERS I N SHIRAZ AKD TABRIZ U E t X O?J S1:.'.1';;:

WITHIN LAST FEU DAYS, JOINIPIG STRIKES AI,:,I.'::'( UNDEX!Jz\Y IN
UARAJ iri'<D QASR PHISON, TEIIRAN. A T E H h i JIJDGE I S ALSO
ON I!U::"I:,:? STZIXE TO PROTEST ALLEGED TEXF'OFAXY DETENTION
OF THREE JUDGES AS THEY DEPARTED NTI;ISTItY OF J U S T i C L Ci.1
SbniDA.2.
6. PRESS REPORTS AMERICAN PEN CI.UB, AN ASSOCiA'rIOB OF
1600 l!RI'l'ERS. K:;%XLSI;ED SUPPORT FOR STRI;<IP;G TEHRAN
JOURNALTSTS DURING RECEZJT WOXK 'STOPl'AGE.
7. AYATOLT,AH Ti:\ i SSXVEr3 .I XIAIDDhST!;BEIB S.':.,' RELEASED
k'tLL721 i;LTENTION OCT 1 7 . IIE WAS A R E S
I N S:;IX,\Z.
8. :;c) f i x ~q x , 7 y ~ > ~OFp
A
,, PIOLEKT DC::D;i:;'iRA'rT.OSS. DE>.Tl! 'TOIL
FEC:.; 2::; 1 5 I::CI)=;:TS :.yv'T:;in,~ TO 7: !?. :<y;::,:~q e:>D yz!.!j?~
DEA'TXS 'r??AN;?AS DRIGIiJ,?LI.:I KEPCXTED, SLIT .%,'TACK TdEiLr:

STIYJLIS CU'i >GG?:S POI,ITICI.!. PIO1,Z:'CS 09 R'2CE:;'T ?!OL.ITHS.
cp.~!:? ,;?,;~c;-~-s ,,,*?
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- -
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.
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(:I. ' <.:::-.:,

-138-
G O S Q U E DuaxKG RELIGIOUS SERVICES. SETTING I(OTOI<C+LES 1
ON F I R E , BURNING P I C T U X E S OF KHOPEIFII, D h W G I N G WOSQUE,
1?27D ATT.?CKIKG I.:3RSSI??ERS .
9. :2::;:: -<.,:;,rx':r<:T:.':; ~::~:~:;,:,;::;:-: .:,I,:., .'\:;,,< 1.5
IN j-s~an.:;~. y:;, ...
\ -,--'-! .
I : , ,:,-. .I% :y?:G!! :Ck:OCr, GY?l,!; Y,!.'.:,l' 1.G T O
SCIIOOL ACCIDEE:TL\LLY CGO::S?D P.IT;IS !.:ITH GROUP O F 40-50

DEXONSTRATORS . WHEN CRCj'n'D BEGAN SHJUTXPJC AT GIRi.:; Tilx'f
KAN. ONE KAS STRUCK BY STONE HURLED FROX CROWD. CROlJD
CONTINUED ON I T S WAY WITHOUT PURSUIIX THEN. (INCIDENT
W.4S FRIGHTEMIKG FOR TKO AtlERICAXS, BUT CRCylD, E::CEPT FOR
OUT hXD IBJURT:.IG AMERXCAlIS .)

I.
E . 0 11852
TAGS [ ACTION: S Y S T A T E WASHDC P R I O R I T Y ,
SUBJECT I N F O : +MEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEZlBASSY ISLAMABAD
ACTION AMEMBASSY J I D D A
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY P A R I S
PO L-d( CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

102b'i
A m -
DCN
p/N
OR
E.O.
TAGS:
11652: GDS
PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR

~...----
CRU-2
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD
1. SUNIURY: WHILE I T I S TOO EARLY TO MAKE D E F I N I T I V E 1

P R E D I C T I O N S , T H E W ARE ENCOURAGING INDIC:ATIONS THAT THE
?IAY HAVE P A S S E D A YEVER POINT AND OPENED SO!"S
1RANIAN C R I S I S ~ ~ % ) [ % E R K X A P ~ R PROSPEC? X ~ X ~
FOR I T S CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION. KOWEVER, A NUMBER OF OTHER
DANGER P O I N T S L I E AHEAD BETWEEN N0b7 AND THE GENERAL
E L E C T I O N S SCHEDULED FOR NEXT JUNE.
2.
END SUMMARY.
WITH THE RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL PASSAGE O F THE DAY O F 1

OPTION
P--TaT. (Fa
CLASSIFICATIOH
-140-
CONFIDENTIAL pQp._lot
Claastllcol!on MRN
CURRENT
&HE RESOLUTION OF MOST~LABORDISPUTES, THE PARISTAN - 1
EXILE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND THE SIGNS OF
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE SHARIF=EMAMI GOVT, THE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN HAS BEGUN TO EASE SOMEWHAT.
HOWEVER, SINCE MARTIAL LAW IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF ALL
MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, IT IS NOT REALLY POSSIBLE TO
GET AN EFFECTIVE READING TO VERIFY THE DEPTH OF THIS
RELAXATION.
3. POLITICAL FIGURES AMONG THE OPPOSITION, WHO ATTENPTED
TO RIDE THE WAVE OF POPULAR DISCONTENT LED BY AYATOLLAH
KHOMEINI AND THE MULLAHS, HAVE BEGUN TO LOWER THEIR

APPARENTMMEXTXBHXXX A M B I T I O N S , ~ WHILE
~ TWO OR
THREE WEEKS AGO, NANY OF THESE POLITICIANS WERE OPENLY
CALLING FOR m E DISMISSAL OF THE SHAH, MOST OF THEM NOW
QUIETLY STATE THAT THEY ACCEPT THE NEED FOR THE SHAH'S
CONTINUED LEADERSHIP, ALBEIT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A
DEMOCRATIC, CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY. THESE SANE FIGURES

HAVE ALSO BEGUN DISCREETLY TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES
FROM KHOMEINI AND TO URGE RESTRAINT UPON THE MULLAHS.
4. IN PART, THIS CHANGE OF POSITION MAY BE PURELY TACTICAL,
REFLECTING A LACK OF ARDOR FOR A FRONTAL CHALLENGE TO
MARTIAL LAW. NORE FUNDAMENTALLY, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO BE
A REFLECTION OF THEIR REALIZATION THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR
A LIBERALIZED, "NATIONAL FRONT" GOVT IN THE CURRENT CIRCUM-
P A N C E S ARE FAR LESS LIKELY THAN THE INTRODTICTION OF A
J
OPTIONAL FORM 162alHl

IFormarly FS413(HIal
Jvnuery 1875
D e w . o l Stat.
CONFIDENTIAL
CI...itlc.lion
SUBSIDE. INHERENT IN THIS REFLECTION IS THE KNOWLEDGE

PREVENT
THAT ONLY THE SHAH CAN- THE IMPOSITION OF A
MILITARY GOVT AND THAT MIS CONTINUING PRESTIGE IS
NECESSARY FOR RESTRAINT.
5. THESE SAME LEADERS ARE CURRENTLY, THEREFORE, SEEKING
TO FIND SOME WAY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURE.IDEALLY, THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE GIVEN THE
GOVERNMENTAL MANDATE AND TAKE OVER THE CABINET. MEN
LIKE ALI-AMINI, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO HAD EARLIER "DEMANDED"

THAT HE BE MADE PRIME MINISTER WITH FULL POWERS OVER THE
MILITARY, ARE NOW SAYING THAT THEY WOULD SETTLE FOR
CONTROL OF GOVT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MILITARY, WHOSE
LEADERSHIP THEY YJOULD LEAVE DIRECTLY WITH THE SHAH. OTHER
MORE MODEST AND REALISTIC OPPOSITIONISTS ARE TALKING IN
TERMS OF A "COALITION GOVT. "
6. IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, THERE SEEMS VERY LITTLE CHANCE
THAT THE SHAH WILL INTRODUCE NATIONAL FRONT POLITICIANS
INTO THE CURRENT CABINET UNLESS M OR UNTIE THOSE POLITICIANS
CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY HAVE GENUINE POPULAR POLITICAL
SUPPORT THROUGH THE TEST OF A FREE ELEC~ION. HE HAS
INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE TO RETAIN SHARIF-EMAtlI, PERHAPS
WITH A SLIGHTLY RESHUFFLED CABINET, UNTIL THE JUNE ELECTIONS
HIS CHALLENGE TO THE OPPOSITIONISTS IS TO COMPETE IN THOSE
CLECTIONS AND SHOW WHETHER THEY CAN TRULY i'4ERI.T
OR A COALITION, OR EVEN PARTIAL PARTICIPATION.
AT.
CI...ifiutiO"
- 142-
CONFIDENTIAL PW.L~I
Ct..sifle.tlon MRN
G. THE OPPOSITION, OF COURSE, TAKES THE POSITION THAT 1

THE ELECTIONS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE FREE, AND THAT THEY
WOULD ONLY BE TRICKED I N T ~SACRIFICING THEIR AMBITIONS IF
THEY WERE TO DEFER THEM AND WAIT UNTIL NEXT JUNE. THE
SHAH, ON THE OTHER HAND, REPEATS HIS ASSURANCES OF OPEN
ELECTIONS AND SUGGESTS THAT THE OPPOSITION IS SEEKING TO
AVOID THE DISPLAY OF THEIR OWN WEAKNESS. THERE ARE SOME
RECENT SIGNS THAT TENTATIVE, INDIRECT, DIALOGUE ABOUT
ELECTIONS IS TAKING SHAPE BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND LOYALISTS.
ONE LEADING OPPOSITIONIST HAS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD
THE GOVT TO DEFINE FREE ELECTIONS AND TO PROVIDE FOR

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND OTHER SUCH SAFEGUARDS.
8. IN THE MEANTIME, THE KHOMEINI STAR SEEMS TO BE WANING.
HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN FRANCE HAVE SUGGESTED THE FUZZY,
ARCHAIC NATURE OF HIS POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS. THE FACT THAT
MAY BE ERODING
HE IS FAR AWAY AND IN A CHRISTIAN COUNTRY/HlhXXPPIPIPXB HIS
INFLUENCE HERE. THE AYATOLLAHS OF QOM SEEM TO FEEL A
GREATER SENSE OF SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ARE IN THE PROCESS
OF NEGOTIATING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE GOVT, WHICH WOULD
ENTAIL THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE SHAH.
9. ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GOVT AND THE PRESS
HAVE RESULTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FREE PRESS, WHICH
CAN BE GENUINELY REGARDED AS INDEPENDENT. IF THE PRESS
FEHAVES RESPONSIBLY IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, IT CAN DO MUCH
_J
LA-
CI.*s,f,csCion
L O LANCE THE B O I L S OF PUBLIC S U S P I C I O N , WHICH HAVE
FESTERED UPON THE VENOM O F OUTRAGEOUS RUMORS. SUCH
WIDELY ACCEPTED CANARDS AS'THE STORY THAT I S - U E L I
SOLDIERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JALLEH SQUARE&
MASSACRE, OUGHT NOT TO HAVE AS MUCH CURRENCY I N THE
FUTURE I F THE PRESS I S BOTH FREE AND RESPONSIBLE.
10. TROUBLESOME PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, REMAIN AHEAD. THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE WAVE HAS ENTAILED AN ENORMOUS
EXPENDITURE WHICH, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WAGE AND FRINGE
BENEFIT INCREASES, WILL ADD 3.5 to 4.3 B I L L I O N DOLLARS
TO THE BUDGET I N THE PERIOD S E P T 2 3 , 1 9 7 8 , TO MARCH 20,
1979. IRANIAN F I S C A L YEAR STARTING IWRCH 2 1 , 1 9 7 9 ,
I S ALREADY BURDENED WITH ANOTHER TWELVE AND HALF PERCENT
WAGE INCREASE, WHICH WILL TOTAL SOME THREE BILLION
DOLLARS THAT YEAR. SIMILAR WAGE COSTS I N THE PRIVATE
SECTOR WILL SURELY RESTORE THE INFLATIONARY S P I R A L OF
1976-77. I F GOODS ARE NOT AVAILABLE I N THE EARLY PART
OF 1 9 7 9 TO MEET T H I S NEW PURCHASING POWER DEMAND, PROBLEFIS
COULD A R I S E AT THE TIME WHEN ClIARTIAL LAW I S SCHEDULED TO
BE LIFTED.
11. THE PROBLEM OF THE U N I V E R S I T I E S I S YET TO BE SETTLED.
THE MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION HAS RESIGNED AND THE
UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY B I L L HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN "FOR FURTHER
STUDY." I T I S PROVING VERY D I F F I C U L T TO F I N D ANYONE WILLING
p TAKE THE HIGHER EDUCATION PORTFOLIO AND IT IS D O U B T F U ~
CONFIDENTIAL
OPTIONAL P O
Ctasslllc~llon
-144-
ENOUGH TO THE U N I V E R S I T I E S TO ASSURE THEIR REBP.
T H I S I S PARTLY BECAUSE THE DEMANDS EMANATING FRI
CAMPUS ARE SO CONFUSED. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISTS. ON THE OTHER, THERE ARI
MARXISTS. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE THE EXPONENT!
AUTONOMY AND THE FACULTY MEMBERS WHO WANT SALARI
PERQUISITE IMPROVEKENTS .
12. THE MILITARY PRESENT A S P E C I A L COMPLICATIOh
THEIR LEADERS l.l&INTAIN THEIR LOYALTY AND ALLEGIP
SHAH, THEY MAKE NO S E C W T O F THE FACT THAT THEY
I S MAKING TOO MANY "CONCESSIONS." THEY WOULD PR
TOUGHER COURSE OF ACTION, ARRESTING g l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
I N S I S T I N G UPON A GREATER RESPECT FOR "LAW AND OR
THEY PLEAD T H I S POINT OF VIEW CONSTANTLY WITH TH
AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON H I S
BECAUSE OF THE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE WHIC
BRING TO H I S ATTENTION. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO B
DISTURBED, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE BUDGET CUTS THE Gc
BE FORCED TO MAKE IMPINGE HEAVILY UPON WE'APONS PI
THERE ARE NO RPT NO S I G N S , AT T H I S JUNCTURE, O F 1
I N C I P I E N T DISLOYALTY OR HINTS OF A MILITARY COUP,
SHAH WILL CLEARLY HAVE TO GIVE CONTINUING ATTENTI
MILITARY MALAISE AS HE MOVES AHEAD.

7
CONFIDENTIAL ~~.-&!.f
CIa.ezfieatlon
r--glm~xmxgKmmwpImxmmXKgxR~w[Kxx~~~~
g#BM~XXB~KKXPWXYKRX~~~XI[XSPIKgXTKKSKX~~IPI~X
~ ~ H X S X X X X M K T K X X H K ~ P C S K X ~ X ~ I P S ~ Z ~ I X E ~ ~
~B5XltlIEX5~XK~EHXKBXXX~XXHKX~EX)IX#IIXXZlIll~X~
MXX~X~HXX#X~X~XSZSXXXBMXZHEXBMB~XTHH~XXMXIUE
W(MXSPSXXXXIBXZXB1(XXIY~XZHS~XX~XZHPX1XXUnaCP
I X I & U E M ~ B X I P X P : ~ I B ~ ~ ~ R ~ X Z I U E X P ~ B W ~
UWblXxSxKxRxXMRXXERqpMXSXTEX~~~MZSX
13.
&x/ I N ADDITION TO THESE MORE OR L E S S SUBSTANTIVE
PROBLEMS, THERE ARE THE EVER-PRESENT EMOTIONAL R I S K S
THAT A R I S E FROM THE RELIGIOUS AREA. THE PERIOD O F
MOHARRAM, SHI-ITE DAYS OF DEEP M O U R N I N G ( $ $

2
d, WILL FALL I N THE F I R S T PART OF DECEMBER. THIS
TRADITIONALLY TENSE PERIOD COULD PROVIDE OCCASIONS FOR
CLASHES BETWEEN MILITANT MUSLIMS AND THE MILITARY.

14.
SX/FINALLY, THERE WILL BE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL
PROBLEMS INHERENT I N THE PROCESS OF "DECOMPRESSIONn FROM
A PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW. ALTHOUGH THE GOVT ASKED FOR AND
RECEIVED PARLINIENTARY AUTHORITY FOR S I X MONTHS OF MARTIAL
LAW, THEY EARNESTLY HOPE THAT, TOWARDS THE END O F DECEMBER,
I F ALL REMAINS CALH, THEY MAY BE ABLE TO L I F T I T , PERHAPS
A CITY AT A TIME, I N ORDER TO RETURN TO C I V I L GOVT I N THE
-
EARLY PART OF 1979. I F T H I S PROCESS RESULTS I N A NEW
ROUND OF RIOTS AND LAWLESSNESS, THE WHOLE SCHEDULE OF
F I B E R A L I Z A T I O N COULD BE PLACED I N JEOPARDY.
CIa.s,llcalia
-146-
CONFIDENTIAL
CI..*Ific.tlon
9;gHUS. THE EIGHT MONTHS REMAINING BETWEEN NOW AND 7

THE ELECTIONS ARE GOING TO BE A VERY COEWLICATED PERIOD FOR
THE SHAH AND HIS GOVT TO NE'GOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY. TO ARRIVE
AT ELECTSON EVE IN THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC GOOD FELLOWSHIP
WHICH WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A NATIONAL ELECTION
IN GOOD FALTH AND CIVILITY WOULD BE PERHAPS TOO MUCH TO ASK
OF THE IRANIAN NATION AT THIS STAGE OF ITS POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT. TO ARRIVE AT THAT JUNCTURE IN RELATIVE
DOMESTIC PEACE AND TRANQWILLITY WILL DEMAND HORE SOPHIS-
TICATION THAN HAS BEEN DISPLAYED IN THE PAST SEVENTY YEARS.
HENCE, WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THIS GOAL AS GRANTED EVEN IF
THE CURRENT TURMOIL SUBSIDES. HOWEVER, THE OBJECTIVE IS
STILL A WORTHY ONE AND IT HAS NOT YET DISAPPEARED FROM VIEW.
4 ULLIVAN
CONFIDENTIAL OPTIONAL FORM 152aiH)

CIa.s+ficmtm !Form.rly FS-413lHlal
Jenuary 1976
Dept. of SUt.
-147-
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY P A R I S
E.O. 11652: GDS

PINS, P I N T , IR
TRADITIONAL IRANIAN POLITICS -- THE
FOR THE FUTURE?
NECESSARY SUPPORT AMONG THE
PROBABLY THE BEST JOURNALISTIC COMMENTATOR ON THE COMPLEX
IRANIAN SCENE TODAY. I N COURSE OF LUNCH OCT 23 WITH
V I S I T I N G ICA AREA DIRECTOR CURRAN, CPAO, AND POLITICAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLaSIIFICATION
- 148-
CONFIDENTIAL
P.ob-'l
2 [64z(
Cl*..ificslton MRN
HE BELIEVES THERE IS NO SINGLE NATIONWIDE ISSUE FUELING\

THE O P P O S I T I O N BUT RATHER A GENERAL DISCONTENT B U I L T
ON A VARIETY O F COMPLAINTS AND GRIEVANCES. CONSEQUENTLY
T U GOVT SHOULD M O B I L I Z E I T S HUMAN RESOURCES TO REBUILD

SUPPORT THROUGH THE MYRIAD TRADITIONAL IRANIAN ORGANIZA-
T I O N S WHICH EXXST I N EVERY LOCALITY DEALING WITH LOCAL
I S S U E S RATHER THAN WORRYING ABOUT FORMING ANY NEWFANGLED
LARGE NATIONWIDE ORGANIZATIONS, WITH NATIONAL I S S U E S .
I N SQORT, THE GO1 TECHNOCRATS SHOULD LEARN TRADITIONAL
IRANIAN POLITICS AND/OR FORGE ALLIANCESWITH TRADITIONAL
POLITICIANS. HOVEYDA UNDERSTOOD T H I S PROCESS AND KEPT
CONTROL THROUGH I T (TAHERI I S A HOVEYDA w). AMOUZEGAR

THE TECHNOCRAT, D I D NOT, AND H I S ENDING OF SUBVENTIONS
TO NEEDY MULLAHS, AS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES O F ECONOMIC
RETRENCHMENT, CONTRIBUTED I N NO SMALL MEASURE TO CURRENT
PROBLEM.
2. TAHERI INDICATED HE WAS CASTING ABOUT FOR A WAY T O
OF SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT. THOUGH HE SAW ARDESHIR ZAHEDI
B R I E F L Y DURING LATTER'S RECENT V I S I T H E W , I T WAS HURRIED
MEETING IIU PRESENCE O F MANY OTHERS AND HE COULD NOT TALK.
ZAHEDI I S , INCIDENTALLY, A POTENTIAL P O L I T I C I A N WLIO --

T& art
BECAUSE HE COMES OF COMMON .STOCK AND H A D ~ L I T T ' ~FORMAL
EDUCATION -- S T I L L CAN COMMUNICATE I N A TRADITIONAL
IFfANIAN WAY W I T H THE P E O P L E , ACCORDING TO TAHERI.

L
CONFIDENTIAL
C1.eaific.tim OPTIONAL FORM 1 5 2 a ( ~
(Formerly f S - d 1 3 ( ~ l a
January 197!
DSPI 01 Scat,
CONFIDENTIAL I
Claeafficslion
I START MUST B E MADE, TAHERI SAYS WITH THE MANY C I T I E S I

AND PROVINCES W'HICH ARE NO-MAN'S LAND, NOT YET CONQUERED
BY THE O P P O S I T I O N . A FEW INCIDENTS INSTIGATED THERE,
UNREST LEADING TO THE K I L L I N G O F ONE OR 'PWO LOCAL PEOPLE

AN-
IiND'PbTHER LOCALITY I S LOST TO THE OPPOSITION. YET
THERE ARE MANY GOOD MEN -- MEMBERS O F M A J L I S , GOVERNORS
GENERAL, OLD RASTAKHIZ A C T I V I S T S , OTHERS O F LOCAL PRO-
MINENCE -- WHO ARE LOYAL TO THE SHAH AND CONTINUE TO
ASK WHAT THEY SHOULD DO. GO1 SHOULD RESTORE COMMUNICA-
TIONS WITH THEM. A CENTRAL COORDINATING BODY SHOULD 1
BE S E T UE QUIETLY I N TEHRAN AND USE NETWORK O F M A J L I S

i
DEPUTIES (AT LEAST loo or 110OF THEM HAVE GOOD LOCAL I
3
ROOTS AND WILL BE REELECTED I N ANY FREE ELECTION) AND
VARIETY OF LOCAL BOSSES I N TRADITIONAL IRANIAN WAY.
THEY FADED I N 1 9 6 2 - 6 3 , AND SHAH FURTHER RUPTURED SUCH 3

TRYING TO BREAK UP THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE BAZAAR, ETC.
I
3. BY CHANCE LATER THAT SAME DAY POL COUNSELOR MET
WITH A C W S E CONFIDANT O F SHARIF-EMAMI, A SENATOR WITH

I
I
LONG P O L I T I C A L T E C T I O N S I N THE TEHRAN AREA WHO, AS
RETIRED"
HE HIMSELF PUT I T , HAS BEEN "INVOLUNTARILY
FROM ACTIVE P O L I T I C S FOR 15-18 YEARS. HE BLAMES
N A S S I R I , HOVEYDA, AND AIAld FOR DRAWING A CURTAIN AROUND
THE SHAH, CUTTING H I M OFF. N A S S I R I HIMSELF WARNED THE
L
CONFIDENTIAL
CI..dfic.tl'm
CONFIDENTIAL 9 - 3 4 / bit%(
Claamifioation URN
SOMEHOW MAKING I T DANGEROUS AND SENATOR W A S OBLIGED
TO STOP RECEIVING THEM. SENATOR HAS NOW COME OUT OF
"RETIREMENT" Z ~ D ,WHILE REFUSING OFFER OF P O S I T I O N I N
S-IF-EMAMI CABINET, HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE BEHIND THE
SCENES. SOME OF H I S A C T I V I T I E S HAVE BEEN REPORTED I N
SEPTELS. ONE CURRENT PROJECT, HE S A I D , I S TO IDENTIFY
PEOPLE WITH A POPULAR FOLLOWING I N (POORER, TROUBLED)
SOUTHERN TEHRAN AND GIVE THEIR NAMES TO PM WITH RECOMMEN-
DATION HE MEET AND RECRUIT THEM. SENATOR INDICATED HE
AND PM HAD ALSO GIVEN THOUGHT TO USING MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT FOR SUCH MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT. HE
READILY ADMITTED NEED ( O F WHICH TAHERI HAD SPOKEN)
TO MOBILIZE THE PROVINCES,ZEK5MOOI THOUGH HE ASSERTED
TEHRAN I T S E L F MUST LEAD THE WAY; AS TEHRAN GOES S O GO
THE PROVINCES. 4
4. COMMENT: ;zL
ri's ANALYSIS AND PRESCRIPTION AriE
s%mEn%mm--
PROBABLY WHAT-HOVEYDA HAD I N MIND I N EARLIER TALKS
xktm--.--h-x~~~
WITH AMBASSADOR. THE TRADITIONAL
~ ~ ~ w Q ( ~ ~ P O L~I T I - B S &
CIANS WERE AFTER ALL BACKBONE OF SHAH'S POLITICAL SUPPORT
(SUCH AS I T WAS) I N 1950s. NHILE WE WOULD NOT EXPECT
WHOLESALE RETURN OF ALL OLD P O L I T I C I A N S (WHOM SHAH
CONSIDERED OBSTRUCTIONIST I N HEY DAY OF H I S "WHITE"

L _I
REVOLUTION 94 DECADE AND A HALF AGO), A GOOD SMATTERING
CONFIDENTIAL
Clo~sification OPTIONAL F O R M 152a(dl
(Formerly FS 4531H)a)
JanvsrY 1915
Dam 07 Staxe
-151-
CONFIDENTIAL ~ o p . 5 , f
CIeasrficat,on
BLENDED WITH NEWER (AND PERHAPS ALSO YOUNGER)
L LEADERS WOULD PROBABLY STAND BETTER CHANCE
[ZING THE " S I L E N T MAJORITY" I N T H I S COUNTRY
RENEWED EFFORT TO CREATE LARGE, WESTERN-
gvm
J T I C A L PARTIES.
B
i
CO~DENTIAL
Clsssll#calron OPTIONAL F O R M I
1 F o r n n r l y FS-d
-152-
flh :YVV ESEZ47BilA@Q4
.I =:lqKI:R
1 J T E 2 C #I771 299i3138
' 1 1 cCCCC ?ZH
' .'522332 OCT 78
1 ?- SFCSTATE VASEDC
R71QMY9/AMEMllASIT T P P R A I P R I O R 1 T Y 7558
' s r n RUFXYO/AWEMBASSI MOSCOW P R I O 8 I T Y 2183
' O ! . F I D l N T I A t
I
i :I'ITED O F F I C I A L O S E STATE 271771
1 s PEPR, ra. us, oz

L
1 ? IQJECT: TC'RYER COHHENT ON IRAN
r ILLOWING I S EXACT TEXT O F ADMIRAL 'I'PRNER's COMMENTS ON

I1 1N:
.'liSTIOV: T P E R E ' S A GOOD DSAL OF NEUS COKING I N T O T F I S
lllNTRY 3 9 O M IRAN, WXICX I S ONF O F OUR MAJOR O I L S U P P L I E R S ,
4 CcCD DEAL OF TFOUELE BAS BEEN R A P P L V I N G I AND A GOOD DEAL
)I C 9 N F L I C T . T B E Q U E S T I O h , I S U P P O S E T Y I F I R S T QUESTION
'0 A S K 15 Y 8 E Y H E 9 THE C I A DETECTS ANY S O V I E T INFLUENCE
P ' l I N D PBFSh, ANY S O V I E T MOVEMENT TO MOVE I N AND TAKE AD-
VAYTAGE OF T S B S E , ANYTEINC O F THAT SORT?
; I Q E C T O R TURNER: Y E L L , I THINK T B E P O S I T I O N T E E SAAH OP
f U A 1 I S I N TODAY I S A VERY D I F F I C U L T ONE. BE'S BEEN
'HvING G E H D I N E t T TO L I B E R A L I Z F , TO MODERNIZE 815 COONT3T
I V F R Q U I T E A P E R I O D O F T I M E NOW. I N RECENT MOKTRS BE'S
*rT C O Y S I D F R b F 6 E R E S I S T A N C E FROM T E E CONSCRVATIVE, RIGAT-
U l N G ELEMEVTS 9F HIS OWN COUNTRY. AS A % E S U L T , EOVEPEB,
'"E L E F T WING'S S F A L L NUCLEUS O F COMMUNISTS BAS T R I E D T O
'AJE ADVANTAGE O F T E I S AYD TO USE THE D I S T U R B A N C I S FROM
1 I 1 F R I C B T !OR T B F I S OWN P A P T I C U L A R ADVANTAGE, I'M SURL
*lIFRT'S SONS S O V I F T INFLUFYCE B E B I N D I T , I N ONE DEGREE OR
rs.l\l':qFR. BUT I TBINS I T ' S AY OPPORTUNISM TAXING ADVANTAGE
' t 4 CFNUIVE D I S S E N T WITHIN T B X COUNTRY AT T 9 P DIRJCTION
" i cqA,t! I S GOING.
PIjT I'M... .
QOZSTION: SPECIIICALLT, DO YOU SEE ANT SOVIET NLW
SOllFT MONEY, NEW SOVIPT AUENTS MOVING IN To E ~ I U DAND
USE THIS BRIDDIEBAD?
DIRECTOR TURNER: NO, I BATLN'T SEEN THAT. AND 1%
PLEASED THAT THP SEAR IS CONTINUING WITH EIS LIBLRALIZA-
TION EFFORTS, AND AS YOU KNOW, TRE BID EVPNT WILL BO
NEXT JUNE W8 HE'S PROMISED -. AND BE'S STICKING ?to 81s
PROHlSE
E!&.10 ELiCTIONS TOR EIS PA~LIAMENT. lTOS d 4
VERY IMPORTANT HOHENT lOR 8IW AND FOR US.
END TEXT. VANCE
BT
#I771
UMl!l?ED OFFICIAL USE
INERNATIONAX. CCMIUNICATICN AGENCY

Tehran, Iran
MMIR4NDlJM OF CQNVERSATION
Fariborz Ata-pour, Writer, TMRAN JOURNAL

Ali Reza Farahmand, Chief, Foreign Desk, K A W
Robert T. Curran, Director, NWICA, Washington,
Jack H. Shellenberger, PAO, ICA Tehran
IMTE 6 PLACE: PA0 Residence, October 25, 1978
'JrKJECT: Iran's Political Crisis
I)ISTRIBUTION: AMB, MEI, POL, POL/MIL, ECON, CONS, OR, ICA/NE%
in the course of a working dinner in honor of Mr. Curran, journalists

Ata-pour and Farahmand stated their views of the Iranian crisis. These indi-
v~duals,who were not previously acquainted and differ greatly in terms of
\tatus (Ata-pour is a celebrated--ifnot notorious--TVcmentator and
featured colmist; Farahmand is mainly an editor and not widely known outside
his profession) held a remarkable identity of views on the situation. Their
111ain
points were these:
I. Khomeini is a crucial factor and has more influence over the masses than
the Shah.
2. Khomeini's prescription for Iran is neither fuzzy nor irratioml. W.ile
we, personally, are not among his followers, we think he should not be witten
off as either mad or the tool of outside interests. His thinking is repre-
5ep~vpomz I * m h ,
3. The United States is in.a no-win situation. Regime opponents consider
the United States as the Shah's only prop. Regime adherents continue to
sense that the U.S. will make any deal with anybody to assure continued access
to oil and sales of military hardware. The Carter statements, particularly
the telephone call from Camp David, on balance, have nor-been helpful in that
they tended to confinn m r s that the United States is master-minding every-
thing. They were, however, much less crass than the recent Dzvid Q.*!~R remarks
on the indispensability of the Shah.
4. The U.S. b m m Rights campaign had much to do with the pace of events here
and accelerated everything far beyond anyone's power to manage.
5. Xenophobia is growing although it had been latent in Iran for centuries.
There will be growing pressures to void contracts of western consultants in
all fields. The view, now widely shared even in elite circles, is that
foreign advisers aren't worth the money they cost, that their motives are
suspect and that their reconmendations are uncongenial with and inimical to
Persian culture and traditions.
m I T E D OFFICIhL USE
-155-
LlCMITED OFFICIAL USE
6. Overall Prognosis: Establishment of an Islamic State guaranteed by the

military (a l a Zia) with concomitant changes i n p o l i t i c a l and educational
institutions t h a t a r e satisfactory t o the religious leadership. Neither
of us wantsthis t o pass but things have gone too f a r , too long f o r an
orderly transition t o a democratic s t a t e .
C(P9rZFN: These rather bleak assessments are vintage Ata-pour. Farahmand

i s less rhctorical, more analytic i n h i s judgments. Another guest,
Irnj Ayman. Director of the National I n s t i t u t e of Psychology (a public
opinion research organization) attempted t o argue t h a t the people respect
t l ~ ci n s t i t u t i o n of the Shah, a r e aware of many improvements i n living
standards over the past 25 years, and a r e wary of bothMullah and Marxists.
Ayman's vicws were dismissed a "Niavaran thinking".
"k'
3 h ; i n h e r g e r : rnh
L . . n E I ) OE'FIICUL USE
-156-
YhoNNVV ESRQPgB?APPE
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FP S T C S X T Z XAZSS?C
T O AYTMEA'OY TT99hN 7 € 9 t
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r 0 N P I 2 E N T I A L STAT? 275342
5.0. llF52: CGS
TbCS: P I N S . IR
SUPJLCT: LOO-INC ARCAD
1. YE I R E S P G I N I I N G T q W A i ? INFL'jPNTIbL. OUTSIDE VOICES
FE3S LSSFRT TPAT SEAB'S PGLIC: OX POLITICAL COVC?SS1OIc
PAS PBOVfY MISTATrY A N D TYA? b F SBOr!LD TUXN TC Y4CGZAM
3 F CRbC'.INC D3WN ON DISS1DE"TS. EELISVE I T 'CGBLD BE
TIMELY AND USEFUL I F , VITSOU" SEPLFIQIVC TO T Y I S M i S S h C Z ,
TOD CODZD C I V S US TOUR !!EST ASSESSMSNT OF COVSTQOENCPS/
OCTCOME IN SGDRT AN3 LOUC T I Q " O? A POLICY C P STL'ING
TO RESTORE OSDER BY UYIN? POaC2 TO aFTt?N STYIXSPS T C
JOBS'AND TO XFLP DEMOYSTS~TCRSn?? T ~ ESTPLFTS. PIE-
SOMARLY ASSOCIATEP WITH SUCR ?. POLICY dOPLD BE A CLAMP
DOWN ON TEE PRESS AND U N I V E R S I T I E S AND I ? R E S T S O F LASSE
NURBXRS OF SECFLAS AN3 R E L I C I 9 F S 9 G P O S I T I O N I S T S . (G I?AR
TEAT SECURITY AGFNCIES BELIEVE CPPOeITICY CAN EE ZFELLE3
RT ONLY 40A ICE? ARXESTS.) PLEASF INCLTDF 14 ' AEALTSIS
TOUR BSTIMATE OF LOYALTY O F ARMY AND OTSKB SECUhITY
VORCFS UNDER CONDITIONS OF T I C E T COYTIiCLS 83VEZ aTT2YDEr
PERIOD AND PROBAELP REACTION CF ERCUPS d I 1 3 I N ISAUIAY
BODY P O L I T I C . TOU MICET A L S 3 CO'ISICFX ?"JLT.C S Z I C T I O H
IF ELECTIONS W E l l TO BX POSTPONED.
2. REALIZE TEAT YOU R A V E CIVFN US T O 9 1 VIEWS AHI? INSYSRS
TO TEESE QUESTIONS IN VARIOUS CABLES. BDT BELILVE
BRINGING I T ALL TOGfTH59 IN OYE NORMAL D I S T R I E F T I O N EYEIS
MESSAQE COPLD BE CrlITE HEL?F?lL.
VANCE
B?
Y5342
SSSS
S.?Pr-.p
PDR.93:iAL FrJR GE'I JTJYSER FXOY > W O X CC\iEr-3% G.1ST
SL'I%:tC: SELXXIiY FCR .V!ESIC.U1 PERSO?!SZL IN I'LL! (S)
1. (S) TtE SITLIATIOI Xi1 IRU1 ~ ~ ! D I NSECURITY

C FOR A!.':Z?.IC.Yl P52SC:"'ZL
k l S CiLVlCED SIC!:IFIC.':TLY DIIRING TiE PAST K c : ';.EEG. P9.I >?, 79 Tt:SS
TI%, OUR EFFORTS ?172E TO OFFSET FJt?.D-CORE TXROXIST CRO:;PS. iGlILE
THIS ACl'IVITY WILL NO DOUBT C0hii;xUL. lXETiE iP.E KG;( NEW ELE:iL.TrS
WHICH we ARE UNABLE TO FULLY GAUGE; m~ , CLEAR THAT nE

IT IS
MAKEUP OP TiiESE ELEMENTS AND THE MOTNATION I S SUBSTANTIALLY
DIPFERENm FROM THE HARD-CORE TERRORISTS. THE ACTIVITY I N BOTH
TEHRAN, ESPAHAN AND OTHER C I T I E S APPEARS TO CONSIST OP SNDENTS,
BOM HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY, AND RELIGIOUS AND LEFT-WING GROUPS.
REGARDLESS OF T t E CM.rnSITION THE DEGREB OF ORGANIZATION THAT THEY
POSSESS I S UNCLEAR, BUT PATTERNS ARE DEVEUIPING. THEIR ORIENTATION
APPEARS TO BE BOTH ANTI-GOVEWlENT AND TO SOME EXTENT ANTI-FOREIGN-
PARTICULARLY A m I - M R I C A N .
ARCG PILE
TIAR;IIISH MJ;4+*--021,
PHILIP C. GAST. tWGEN, IJSAF, ARCG 859-201

-
,---?-- -. :..
SECRET
2. (S) THE SITUATION INVOLVES ELE:EUTS OF CIVIL DISORDER FOR'EITEJ CY
VIPEROUS GROIJPS, PROBABLY WORKIWG !BITH D1FFERC;T GOALS A'JD ECICiiCjSS,

WICH CAUSE DISRUPTION AND UNEASINESS TO NBRICXVS. IVE PAVE t t : ~s~t-r:: 2
INnANCES MEW OFFICIAL U.S. PERSOW?L A\;') CC.\T"'rTn?S !L9.'.': Yy-"
l W S E D WHEN BUSES ON !*,YICHTiEY >TRE ??ulKLLI:X PITRE ,ITTAC!ED :;iXT;!
STONES AND IN OSE CASE, A PIPE Ii2:!3. m R E i;r\LT EEE!: 0'il:El I:;ST.V$CC.,S
OP UNOFFIGIAL AMERICAN HO!IES BEING SET ON FIRE, ETC., NOSE OF ISHICH tl.:.. :
LED TO SERIOUS INJURY AT THIS TIME.
3. (S) rite U.S. MISSION IS DEVELOPING A SERIES OF ACTIONS TO OFFSET THe
SITUATION TO THe DEGREE THAT IS POSSIBLE. WE PLAN TO FORM CMlRDIPJATINC
CO!!MITEES COFIWSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THe MISSION AS WELL AS
ELEM@NTS OF THE COVE- OF IRAN. ON THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN SIDE.
WE PLAN TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES FIWM VARIOUS AGENCIES. WE WILL DEVELOP
A SERIES OF PASSIVE AND POSITIVE ACTIONS THAT WILL HELP OUR PEOPLE TO
GO TO HORK SAFELY AND TO MAINTAIN AS NORMAL AS POSSIBLE LIFE WHILE OFF
DUTY. !E BELIEVE THAT BY C0ON)INATISG THIS EFFORT WE CAN HELP TO
OFFSET THE CURRENT SITUATION. OBVIOUSLY OUR GUIDELLXES MUST INCLUDE
'IHOSE KINDS OF ACTIONS THAT WILL NOT ONLY PROVIDE FOR ENHANCED SECURITY
BVT ALSO MAINTAIN THE MORALE OF THE AMERICAN CObMUNITY AND GIVE IT
CONFIDENCE T M T THERE IS A SYSlTM WORKING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION,
ADVISORIES, AS WELL AS SUGGESTED TECHNIQUES AND PRACTICES.
4.(S] THERE ARE LEGAL CONSTAIRS AS TO WHAT THE U.S. MISSION IS AUTHORIZED
lU PERFOkY AND CERTAINLY THERE ARE CONSTRAINTS OF WHAT FUNCTIONS DEPARTFENT
OF DEFENSE PERSONPIEL PERFORM. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD APPRECIATION
05 3C0703Z 00 SSSS
OF THOSE CONSTRAIMS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE CAN OPERATE WITHIN

THEM AND PERFORM A VALMBLE SERVICE TO THE A!ERICQl CO!C.I(INITY.
5. (S) T:!E GOVEREEiT OF IRAN AUTHORITIES WILL WORK IN CmSE COOR-
I)I:'.'~I- ; ?:I>! niE U.S. MISSION AND HAS AGREED TO ACTIVATE A SERIES
G? C.:.2:3I:;.\:PI:IG C0:MIlTEES. OUR PLAN OF ACTION WILL BE TO OPERATE
TOTALLY AS P.XRT OF TiE U.S. COW.TRY T E M WITHIN THE GUIDELIi'ES
PROVICZD 3'- ;;i: X!X:IiZ.I!: E! I 3 S S Y . YE P U Y TO DES'ELOP POLICIES AS
APPP.O??II,TZ TO !EXT T:iI4 :!EX SITU.lTION DE PT,Z?:RE@ TO I!.!!'LE:'Z.YT
PROCEDURES AS THE SITUATION CHh'lGES AXD ALSO TO PROVIDE A WAY TO
ASSIST THE CONTRACTORS. 'WE BELIEVE WE CAN HELP CONTRACTORS DEVELOP
THEIR OWN SYSPEFf AND PLAN TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH THEM AS
APPROPRIATE. THROUGH THIS PROCEDURE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ABIDE
BY THE CONSTRAINTS AND ALSO PROVIDE A USEFUL SERVICE.
6.(S) WE REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF SKILLS AND EXPERTISE
THAT ARE NOT PRESENT WITHIN THE U.S. DEFENSE COFMJNITY IN IRAN.
WHILE THE OSI IS VERY CAPABLE IN THE ANTI-TERRORIST AREA OF
OPERATIONS. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THEY ARE NOT TRAINED OR
EWIPPED REGARDING CIVIL DISlURBANCES AND THE COMPLEX REPERCUSSIONS
WITHIN THE U.S. C O W I T Y . THE OSI HAS PERFORMED ADMIRABLY AND
ARE COWINUING TO DO SO UNDER THE NEW SITUATION, HOWEVER, HIE BELIEVE
THAT THERE ARZ KEEDS FOR FOLLOIiING ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES:
SSSS
C. CAPABILITY TO PLAN AHEAD AND TO ANTICIPATE CHANGES I N THE
SITUATION;
D. HPE?T?IEZ C:: TC~.".:".;!.IS;II:IS KL':3PEUTIO::S C E Y E R CO!iCLTT TO

, TIMELY ACTIONS AND TO INFORM PERSONNEL OF CURRENT SITUATION.
E. WE ALSO :iEC3 EI:-..:C::;:ZL 3

:L
.;:!1
.:;1
-"I:3 f i . 2 3:iSZRIEh'CED I N ASSESSING
IWACTS ON nie AMERICAN COE.L~IIJNITY AS FOLLOV;~:
(1) EFFECT O F ACTIOXS TAKEN BY THE DISSIDENT GROUPS;
' ST.iiE OF COI':DITIO>l OF MORALE O F THE AMERICAN

(2) ASSBSS:E:<T OF EE
c o h mI
n;
(3) PERCEIVED NEEDS OF THE Co;ClUNITI;
(4) ASSESS IC"M ACTIONS THAT WE MIGHT TAKE AND HOW THESE ACTIONS KIULD
BE PERCEIVED BY THE CO?P.bYITY.
7. (s) TIE SITUATION IS NOT YET SERIOUS AND IS :WI~,GEABLE. ;E B E LA.2,-

~ ' I - ---'
,.?,.
CONCEPTS DISClJSSED HEREIN ARE A G9OD BEGI?lXI?iG. REQUEST PF.RSO%TL,
PERHAPS S I X TO EIGHT. WITH S K I L L S A h 3 EXPERTISE L I S T E D i# PARA 6 BF
SENT TDY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR A?PROXI?.U\TELY ONE MONTH, WITH OPTIONS
m EXTEND I F REQUIRED.
YGDS-2 5 1 y:: :?23
--'I
2. ACt?UAI, Ii.ICIDSNTS OVER PAST f:::::[<E!4n YCRE LI:.:ITE> 2'0 ,
STOMIXS CF AFJIISK hP23.S BOSCS CCT 2 8 WIIILE I.?:.'?2I;<G DCiSI.RX-
TAPPCH AIR BASI; (NOTED RL;F C) ,. n::o EU?.:~I::S cr e!iITr;;rr cus

1: . ~ .i!3 OT:!,?, :?T':Qr! IT?:-:$ P.F:PE?CFD 'r0 IN REP' C.
LACK CT' ISC1O!:>iri'S k1At: :IO'l' ABATED T;'O;{R:! IN PORE%G;J CO:.:ifI;,II'PY,
"",
:tc~-L"i' "7
Ot' SZ;E.?.?L 1:RI T'ZT::i TH?.ZATS OVZIL Pi\T PE!': DAYS,
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C~O;:DS, :.lXxy Teil:::~C.:i;S A;10 !;',.liii?:; :l?,VT: Si;:.;:l S'CREF;19 DE;".O:I-
Sl'IiATiG?;S 12: ::?,>?Y LOClim:Lr):;S, CT:!?C.CikLZ.Y :;ZAP, I:RA?!lAll :;Ck:OOI,S

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GOREIGN
TARGETS.AT SLVE TIME, INCIDENTS D
;lO!..rT!:S I:;>?.CAZ'E THAT TIICRE IIAS C-"J;T?1 7 P TEREAT .FKDi*l AD

J,,2.-.:,?T.. (T:;29ix zzit'f C m m c T E R 1s NoTOCKNo
/ r I I--L:::,;:..'~ GROUPS OR INDIVIDUP.LS%WHO ALSO EAVE THE CAPA-
B I L I T Y OF ATTACKING LOCAL TARGETS. WHILE MOST A C T I V I T I E S
OF T:IESC G:?OL'?S 02 I::3I'.'It\UI\,S :!AVC SEEN DIRECTED P.GAINST
LOCAL TARGETS, A FZW HATJE, IW FACT, BEEN DIZECTED AGAINST
iu.,;:!?TCANS. i,:Or?POVER, THREAT FIK!tl; T l I I S QUARTER CAN APPEAR
NORE "SPECTACGLAR" TBAN THE SCOPE OF TBKRORIS!.I VIE HAVE HEEN
DEALING WITH I N THE PAST--THE aopj"I;NG OF TIE BHI BUS IN

I S F A H I I N RETMG AN EXA>I?LR. GR3iBTIi OF PUBLIC DFfiCMSTW?TIOMS
i:MC PUDI.IC 1:XPRLSSION OF HE?,KTO?'ORE XG'L'ED .\!;TI-YOXEICN
SCNr1'Ii.1E?IT ALSO OFFP;?S PROSPECT THAT TfIERE MAY UFJINCIDE:N

JEi'JOLVTNG AILCI'I'S A S I'l?.LL AS OT:.l?P, N L T ~ O l ~ A T ~ I T I L S OUR
. PRENCIf,
. : , ..,. ,r-..
:' $: ItEPORT THE SAME TYPE O F
.,
\
, .I.
CCC:,: IO?!?,L L2>! -LC?;:; ::.G<ASS::;::I.:T AGAIivST T I I E I R M<\TIONALS
TLlA!!! %E Hi\TlX FXPFRT.r?t!CPD A":D Ar,SO .SBX;?E OUR PBEL Ci;G 'I'HA?.' THE
I,:.,;i!I,'EJESS IlAS TAXEM SI~:IZIIII.\T I.;:)::.:

' i 3 ~ ! : . C :ri.lTI-Ai.!CRICAN TON$,
LtIR(;EL'I BECAUSZ [:'E ARC LARGZST AND ElOST V I S I C S E i:.!lr':? !!,:':.:.
T i i U C YAK T'? ILLS BLEW LI;*:Il'ED '1'0 I?.n.NDr)l.: Iii:ilJLrl':; , OCChSIQNt\L
I?!.,;: K-,IF;r<O>jIl:C: , WITli 1% L7Ei2.Y i:LtJ pa;''~~P:?'::~i)C.\:<-333:31 >:(is 011
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-164-
T C'n .hr/rcaltun
i . - " L I L ! 'UQN~ ? .---
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0
;' SE:JYIi!ENTS WtfICH HAVE EXISTED F3R SOME T I L I E , BUT HAVE -l
THUS FAR BEEN H E W BACK BY FEAR XIXIID WITH COURTESY.
5. GREATER P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY I N THE STREETS IIAS INCRp+SED
TXE P O S S I B I L I T Y RPT P O S S I B I L I T Y OF ABlCIT IW0LVEMEP:T YN
UiiYI,EfiS:>:YL' 017 D::C;Z!IOUS IXCIDENTS. S a l E EXP:':.:DED RIZK

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\,
DURING CURRENT TIME CF P O L I T I C A L STRESS. SECURITY WATCH
COhDlITTEE MET OCT 22 AHD OCT 25 TO EVOLVE AEOVE ASSESSPIENT.
6. SECURITY VJAl'CH COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED PROBLEI,,l O F
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIERICAN COI-ItIUNITY, WHICH HAS NATURALLY

,.*.F/
FOCUSED I T S O:?K PROBLL?MS. M I S S I O N O F P I C E G S HAVZ BEEN MAKING
S P E C I A L EFFORT TO S E E TllAT NUANCES OF SITU.?iTION ARE BETTER
UNOERSTQOD BY KEY CORPORATE O F F I C E R S AND INDIVIDUALS.
S I M P L I S T I C ATTITUDES THAT "ANTI-Z&I~.DRICA~IS$~ I N INCREASING,"
M I S S COYPLEXITY OF DEVELOPMEAT AND E'ACT TilAT S I T U A T l O N HAS
BECOilZ MORE UNSETTLED FOR EVERYONE, NOT J U S T ?&KITS.
CO?:5I'I'TOi?S P."" T,TYRT,Y T 3 REMAJN UNCERTAIN UNTIL LOCAL
P O L l T I C A L PI?C'13Xh--STRIYLS, Uiit1LlibSlXAT10NS. CTC. --CXf>XCE
SIGNIFICANTLY, EITHER FOR BETTER OR WORSE.
7 . EP:B WILL CONTINUE TO KOVLTOR CONDITIONS AND ADVISE

E.O. 11652:
TAGS: INFO: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
ACTION: AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USCINCEUR
USCINCPAC
AMB
DCM CONFIDENTIAL mH- 106 2 1
ECON 2
P/M E.O. 11652: GDS
ICA TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PINT, IR
OR SUBJ: LOOKING AHEAD: SHIFTING IRANIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES
SY
DAO SUMMARY: EVENTS OF PAST MONTH, PARTICULARLY PAST WEEK, HAVE
AFOSI
CRU
SHIR AND GO1 AMONG MANY GROUPS OF IRANIANS. SIJCH CHANGES. WHILE
TABR
ISF SIGNIFICANT IN THE SHORT RUN. ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT
BECAUSE THEY P
O
-
W CHANGED WAYS OF THINKING AND BELIEVING
ABOUT POLITICS IN IRAN. MOST IMPORTANT CURRENTS ARE: A)
OF SHAH'S EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY,
RENEWED BUESTIONI~~G
CONFIDENTIAL
SLIU(IISAT1ON
-166-
CONFIDENTIAL
CI.**lfIc*tl~
P.l.-of 2 /662( MRN
rTAcIT U f i E ~ r n c E(AND usu-Y ma M o m ) TO SHAH AND mdm-

MEN$'; B) GROWING BELIEF AMONG ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY NOT
DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN G O V E ~ I E N TTHAT SHARIF-EHAMI REGIME
CARRIES TOO MUCH BAGGAGE FROM PAST TO BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY
RESTORE ORDER OR PROVIDE FOR TRANSITION 'PO FREELY-ELECTED
GOVERNMENT; C) REALIZATION AMONG MIDDLE CLASS MODERNIZERS
THAT BOTH RELIGIOUS FORCES AND COMMUNISTS HAVE MUCH MORE
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY THAN MOST IMAGINED; AND D) RAPIDLY
SPREADING FEELING THAT PRESENT GO1 WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
COMPROMISE WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND THAT ALTERNATIVE
IS LIKELY TO BE MILITARY GOV~RNMENTAND RATHER SOONER THAN
LATER (LATTER BELIEF IS WIDESPREAD AMONG BOTH SUPPORTERS AND
OPPONENTS OF SHAII). DESPITE PERSIAN TENDENCY TO MANIC-
DEPRESSIVE CYCLES IN POLITICS, SHIFT IN BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
WHICH HAVE UNTIL NOW GOVERNED MOST PEOPLES' BEHAVIOR WILL
FURTHER REDUCE STABILITY OF IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION. BOTH
PRO- AND ANTI- SHAH ELEMENTS ARE AGREED MONARCH MUST SHOW
BETTER LEADERSHIP AND DETERMINATION IF HE IS TO SHAPE EVENTS
HIS WAY AND REVIVE THE CENTER IN IRANIAN POLITICS. END
SUMMARY.
1. OVER PAST TEN DAYS, NUMBER OF EMBOFFS HAVE NOTICED BASIC
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES AMONG DIFFERENT CLASSES AND CATEGORIES
OF INDIVIDUALS. WHAT FOLLOWS IS COMPILATION AND INITIAL
ANALYSIS OF SOME CHANGES WHICH ARE BOUND TO AFFECT FUNDA-
CONFIDENTIAL
CIa.alficalim OPTIONAL FORM 152.lHl
(Fornwrlv FS413(HI.)
J.""..V 1976
m o t . of 9f.f.
---YE%%"
j-THILE THEY WILL U N D O U B - Y m AN IMPACT IN THE SHOR
RUN, PERHAPS THEIR GREATER IMPORTANCE IS IN FORESHADOWING
CHANGED WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT POLITICS WHICH IN THE LONG
RUN MAY ALTER THE WLITICAL SHAPE OF THE COUNTRY.
2. MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE IS WIDESPREAD, NEARLY UNI-
VERSAL PESSIMISM AMONG VIRTUALLY ALL GROUPS IN MODERN SEC
OF SOCIETY ABOUT FUTURE OF COUNTRY AND GOVERNMENT. PUBLIC
REFUSAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO COMPROMISE WITH GO1 AND
ECHOING VIEWS OF AYATOLIJUi SHARIATMADARI (TEHRAN 10499)
HAVE CREATED PBSSIMISM ABOUT PossIBILIm OF ENDING CURRENT
UNREST AND POLITICAL CRISIS ANY TIME SOON ON TERMS WHICH
WOULD ALLOW CONTINUED POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. UPPER C
SUPPORTERS OF SHAH (INCLUDING SOME SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFIC
WIDE RANGE OF BUSINESSMEN, PLUS SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF
MODERATE ACADEMIC "ESTABLISXMENT/" BELIEVE THAT "END" OF
PRESENT POLITICAL GAME IS LIKELY TO BE MILITARY RULE.
THEBE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT AMONG SUBSTANTIAL MEMBERS OF
THOUGHTFUL PERSIANS THAT SHAH HAS NOT EXERCISED EFFECTIVE
LEADERSHIP. HE li?iS NOT EVEN TAKEN 'OBVIOUS" OPPORTUNITY
ADDRESS HIS PEOPLE DIRECTLY ON TV AND DISCUSS ISSUES WITH
TEEM. HE SEEMS STILL TO THINK THE PEOPLE TOO IMMATURE FOR
SERIOUS EXPLANATIONS. THIS IS PARALLE&)BD BY A WILLINGNES
AMONG SIZABLE NUMBERS WHO HAVE SUPPORTED THE SHAH CONSIS-
TENTLY AS IRAN'S BEST HOPE FOR THE FUTURE,TO QUESTION WH
THE SHAH SHOULD REMAIN. THEY DO NOT WISH TO W HIM IN,
h E Y SEE LITTLE HOPE TO BREAK THE DEMONSTRATION CYCLE Id
CONFIDENTIAL
CI.a~IHca11~
-168-
-C P ~ L *
CIa..ifIcation MRN
r P R E s m CIRcuMsTANcEs. SOME WOULD EVEN CHANCE A REGENCY 1

/-CROWN PRINCE. THEY ARE, FOR THEM, "THINKING THE
3. SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS PATTERN IS WIDESPREAD

PERCEPTION8 BY GROUPS NOTED ABOVE PLUS CIVIL SERVANTS AND
EVEN SOME MILITARY, THAT SHARIF-EWWI GOVERNMENT IS BEING
OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER, SUB-
STANTIAL NUMBERS OF BUREAUCRATS, YOUNG TECHNOCRATS, BUSINESS-
MEN AND OTHERS WITH LARGEST STAKE IN MODERNIZATION (WHICH
THAT SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT MUST GO. TOP ECHELON MINISTRY

MEN NOTE WAY CROWDS HAVE "RAMPAGED AT WILL" THROUGH MINIS-
TRIES FOR PAST FOUR OR FIVE DAYS, AND HAVE VIRTUALLY
BROUGHT CERTAIN MINISTRIES'WOF~K TO A HALT. THIS IS REINFORCED
I
BY VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS VIEW OF ALL POLITIU+&S WHO THEMSELVES
DO NOT HAVE DIRECT STAKE IN GOVERNMENT THAT SHARIF-EMAMI
GOVERNMENT AND PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF ARE TOO BURDENED
I
WITH PAST TO EVER BE ABLE TO PRESIDE OVER FREE ELECTIONS.
I
FROM MODERATE POLITIqNS NOW ORGANIZING CENTRIST GROUPS
(WHO AVOW SUPPORT FOR PRIMIN "AT LEAST UNTIL ELECTIONS")
TO NATIONAL FRONTERS WHO CALL FOR 'NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT,
THERE IS BELIEF THAT GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE MUST COME. ECHOING
VIEW IS THAT ANY NEW TRANSITZONAL GOVERNMENT MUST CONTAIN
AT LEAST SOME "NON-ESTABLISHMENT" POLITICIANS IN IT.
CORRUPTION ISSUE HAS BEEN WELL USED BY OPPONENTS OF
L
CONFIDENTIAL
CIaa.illcatIm OPTIONAL FORM 1 6 2 a l k l
(Formerly FS-413lHla)
January 1975
-169- Dam of Sfate
CONFIDENTIAL
CIaeoification
r T o DISCREDIT m y I* NOT MOST POLITICIANS OF PAST F I V E 2

SEVEN YEARS. EVEN POLITICIANS CLOSE TO PRESENT SCENE WILL
RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE IN PRIVATE THAT DAYS OF SHAH'S HAND-
PICKED GOVERNMENTS ARE PROBABLY GONE FOREVER. GOVERNMENT*
INABILITY TO RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER, MORE THAN ANY PRONOUNCE
MENTI ABOUT POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, HAS TURNED MODERN I
INTO PARTICIPATORY STATE IN PUBLIC EYE. (COMMENT: PROBLEM
WITH THIS PERCEPTION IS THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE,
ESPECIALLY FORMERLY ALIENATED NON-POLITICALS AND OPPOSITION
BUT ALSO INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT TYPES SUCH AS CIVIL S
SEE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ACTION NOW IN TERMS OF S T R ~ K E SAND
DEMONSTRATIONS, NOT ORDERED PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS.)
4. Another new perception, which has come as a rather
unpleasant surprise to government, secular opposition, and
modernizers of all stkipes is realization that religious
leaders AND ESPECIALLY EX-TUDEH (COMMUNIST) SUPPORTERS ARE
MUCK BETTER ORGANIZERS THAN ANYONE IMAGINED. VIRTUALLY
ALL ACADEMICS AGREE THAT MAJOR IRANIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENT
70-30
BODIES ARE BEING POLARIZED ABOUT H x M BETWEEN STUDENTS
ADHERING TO ISLAMIC AND COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS RESPEC-
TIVELY. UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION OF TUDEH HAS SURFACED
WITHIN PAST WEEK AT VIRTUALLY ALL UNIVERSITIES (INCLUDING
AMERICAN-FOUNDED DAMAVAND COLLEGE FOR GIRLS, WHICH HAS
NEVER HAD A SERIOUS DEMONSTRATION BEFORE
L
CONFIDENTIAL
CI..alflsation
-170-
r ~ O R UNIVERSITY REFORMS AND FULL INDEPENDENCE'FROM GOI. 1
NUMBER OF OUR BEST ACADEMIC SOURCES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT
MIDDLE GROUP. HAS EVAPORATED ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES AM)
STUDENTS ARE BEING DRAWN TO ONE OF TWO POLES, NEITHER OF

WHICH REALLY WANTS SETTLEMENT UNDER PRESTJNT GOI. THIS HAS,
UNDERSTANDABLY, DEPRESSED MANY, AND IN MANY CASES CREATED
EXTREMELY VISCERAL REACTIONS AGAINST WHAT IS BELIEVED TO
BE UNWISE AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WHICH HAS "FORCED"
IRAN TO PRESENT SITUATION. OTHERS REGARD U.S. AS TRAITOR
TO IRANIAN PEOPLE FOR FAILING TO PRESS HOME CAMPAIGN FOR
?lUMAN RIGBTS, THEREBY LEAVING COUNTRY IN PRESENT MESS.
CLEARLY ONE CASUALTY OF CURRENT UNREST IN IRAN HAS BEEN

m C T I V E , UNEMOTIONAL ANALYSIS BY VERY GROUP-TPROFESSORS--
WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE STABILIZING LEADER-
'SH~PUNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.
6F KEEPING PEOPLE IN STREETS AGAINST.@LL OF GOVERNMENT,

ALTERNATIVE HAS INCREASINGLY COME TO BE SEEN AS MILITARY
'"i
GOVE-T. OPPOSITIONISTS WOULD P&ER DEPARTURE OF SHAH,

BUT SUSPECT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN YOLUNTARILY. SUPPORTERS
FIRST
OF THE SBIB SEE IRAN'S ~ * fAS ~SOCIAL ORDER. BOTH NOW
TEND TO PERCEIVE INEVITABILITY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITH
OVERWHELNING PROBABILITY IT WILL BE HARD-LINE AFFAIR,
ENDING DOMESTIC POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND PROVOKING
-GREATER ORGANIZEO TERRORIST ACTIVITY. PRO-MONARCHISTS SEE
L A
CONFIDENTIAL
CIa~~Ific~Ilm OPTIONAL FORM 152.IHI
(F6rm~rlvFS-413lH).)
JanULtrV 1976
mot. of state
AND REGRESSlVE FASCISM WHICH WILL OPEN OPPORTUNITIES POR
TERRORISM.
6. NANY GOVERNMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTOR EMPLOYEESI
ESPECIALLY BANKERS AND ECONOMIC PLAWNERS,SEE CURRENT RASX
OF STRIKES SLOWLY STRANGLING COUNTRY WITH NO "WAY OUT."
PRIVATELY, MANY SAY SHARIF-EMAMI POLICY OF LETTING MOBS
VENT FEELING HAS GONE BEYOND HOPE OF SUCCESS TO DISRUPTION
OF BOTH ECONOMY AND SOCIAL FABRIC. OIL PRODUCTION IS DOWN,
FACTORIES ARE IDLE AND INPRRSTRUCTURE PROJECTS SUCH AS
KHUZISTAN SUGAR PLANATION COMPLEX WILL BE IN RUINS AFTER
MONTH OR SO OF NEGLECT. MANY FEEL (AND ARE NOW READY TO
DISCUSS WITH THEIR FRIENDS) THAT SOME SORT OF BASIC CHANGE
IS NECESSARY. WHILE PERIiAPS NOT YET READY TO SERIOUSLY
ADVOCATE NEW GOVERNMENT OR REGIME, THEY ARE NOW LISTENING
SERIOUSLY TO OPPOSITION ANALYSIS THAT SIX MONTHS AGO-
WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BALDERDASH.
7. FOLLOWERS OF PERSIAN SCENE WHO ARE USED TO MANIC-
DEPRESSIVE NATURE OF PERSIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT MAY TEND
ASCKIBE FEATURES DESCRIBED ABOVE TO STANDARD TO-ING AND
FRO-ING OF PEOPLE UNUSED TO DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC AND PARTICI-
PATORY PROBLEMS. SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES GO DEEPER THAN THAT,
HOWEVER, TO QUESTIONING OF BASIC ASSUMPTION OF PAST 15
YEARS THAT SHAH IS TOUGH, UNCHALLENGEABLE LEADER WHO IS 1
I EFFECTIVE LEADER OF COUNTRY. FEELING THAT POLITICS& PR(EE66 1
CONFIDENTIAL
ClrssrNcafion
8
P q . o f /6cz( MRN
OPINION THAN MERE FACTS OF PRESENT UNREST.

8. OVERWHELMING BULK OF IRANIANS OF ALL CLASSES, EVEN HIS
OPPONENTS, SEEM TO BE WAITING FOR SHAH TO DO SOMETHING.
HABIT OF WAITING FOR THE TOP TO ACT IS HARD TO ERADICATE.
SEVERAI. PERCEPTIVE PERSIAN OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THAT
ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES SEEM TO BE WAITING &ROUND FOR SHAH
TO "GIVE THE NODn TO SOME GROUP OR GROUPS TO BEGIN OPERATING
ON HIS BEHALF WITHIN POLITICAL ARENA. EFFECT OF THIS
"WAITING FOR GODOT" ATTITUDE IS THAT MYRIAD OF NEW POLITICAL
PARTIES LACK IMPACT. VIRTUALLY EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY VAST
MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED PART OF POLITICAL
CENTER, ARE LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP, HOPEFULLY FROM THE THRONE.
EVEN OPPOSITIONISTS FEEL THEY HAVE TO HAVE SOMETHING TO
OPPOSE AND THEY SEE THIS AS SHAH AND HIS POLICIES, NOT
GOVERNMENT. FOR BOTH SYMBOLIC AND PRACTIC?&REASONS, SHAH'S
FAILURE TO ACT DECISIVELY (IN FULFILLlJlENT OF PERSIAN STERE-
OTYPE),OR EVEN APPEAR ON TV AND ADDRESS HIS PEOPLE, HAS
LED TO MORE QUESTIONING, LESS SECURE ATTITUDE AMONG VIRTUALLY
ALL SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION.
9. EVEN IF ORDER IS RESTORED SHORTLY WITHOUT A MOVE TO
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, MOST PERSIANS FEEL SHAH MUST DO BETTER
TO SURVIVE. FOR FIRST TIME IN TWO DECADES SERIOUS COFFEE-
HOUSE THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO OTHER POSSIBILITIES. LACK
L _I
CONFIDENTIAL
CIas.iHc..dm OPTIONAL F O R M lS2atH)
IFormmrlv FS-413(HIel
Jaoaary 1975
D e ~ rof
. State
CQNFIDEEITIAI.
c!...ificatron
FO' DIRECT ACTION THUS FAR BY THOSE WHO DO NOT OPPOSE S

AND BY MANY WHO DO GENERALLY REFLECTS ONE ASSUMPTION FROM
PAST THAT R W I N S : THERE IS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE M SHAR.
FOR THIS REASON, EVEN MANY OPPOSITIONISTS THUS FAR REMAIN
WILLING TO LIVE WITH HIM, ALBEIT AS ER OF EVILS.
HOWEVER, THIS ASSUMPTION 'IW IS COW INCREASING
CHALLENGE.
CONFIDENTIAL
CIa~eIficatim
-174-

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CONFIDENTIAL

COLTTRY TEAM MINUTES

The Charge opened the meeting by welcoming Harry Burton, the

General R a b i i t o l d General Gast t h a t t h c I I ~ I I I ~ ~

General Gast s a i d he had l e f t a paper on t h e Roving t i c l i c o p t e r s

D r . Stempel reviewed v a r i o u s s o c i a l n o t e s from around town

Dr. Stempel continued h i s r e p o r t by n o t i n g t h a t t h e Xhomeini

D r . Adler s a i d he has a copy of t h e F a r s i t e x t of t h e n u c l e a r

The objective at the Camp David meeting will remain

Our experience in attempting ta facilitate and

As we move into this crucial new phase of Middle

COUNTRY TEAM MTNUTES

T11n c'harge opened the meeting by saying that the Embassy

tl~o.Marines know his whereabouts at all times.

Is.lahan-styleanti-Westernism. In a related note, the

H I . Taylor commented on the divergence in the local press'

Mr. Taylor continued his analysis by disclosing the Central

M r . Snow reviewed p l a n s f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a new IAS

AMB ADMIN NEA/IRN AMCONSUL ISFAHAN

SECRET TEHRAN 0788 2

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

I TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, IR

I SUBJ: IRAN: WHERE ARE WE NOW.AND WHERE kRJ3 WE GOING?

A) TEHRAN 7 6 5 9 (NoTAL) B ) TEHRAN 7456 (NOTALI

II SUMMARY: THE S H A H ' S CONSTITUTION DAY SPEECH AND THE I W W S I -

T I O N O F MARTIAL LAW I N ISFAHAN I N D I C A T E THAT HE I S COMMITTED

1 MORE FIRMLY WITH THOSE WHO STIMULATE VIOLENCE. MAJOR

I QUESTION I S WHAT IMPACT RELIGIOUSLY I N S P I R E D AGITATION

WILL HAVE ON IRANIAN P O L I T I C A L SYSTEM AND WHAT GOVERNMENT'S

REACTION W I L L BE. P O L I T I C A L VIOLENCE HAS BEEN T R A D I T I O N

I N IRAN. SHAH I S ON A T I G H T ROPE -- TRYING T O M I N I M I Z E

VIOLENCE WHILE CHANNELING P O L I T I C A L CONFLICT I N T O

OPTIONAL FORM 162lHl

ELECTORAL REALM. SUCCESS I S TO, A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT 1

AND SECURITY FORCES. W E BELIEVE HE MUST MANEWER

CAREFULLY, PERHAPS INCLUDING SOME S T E P S TO MEET OPPOSITIOPI

DEMANDS, I F VIOLENCE I S TO BE REDUCED. GIVEN THE

NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, THE SHAH MAY ULTI-

MATELY HAVE TO RESORT TO FORCF. THE PRIMARY HOPE OF

AVOIDING T H I S OPTION IS TO RESHAPE MODERATE OPPOSITION

ATTITUDES AND .IMPROVE GOVERNMENT S E N S I T I V I T Y I N THE

PROCESS O F FURTHER P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY

1. WITH THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW I N ISFAHAN AND

THE STATIONING OF MORE MILITARY UNITS ELSEWHERE FOLLOW-

I N G CLOSJ~LY ON THE HEELS OF THE SHAH'S CONSTITUTION

DAY SPEECH (REFS A AND B ) which REAFFIRMED H I S COMMITMENT

TO P O L I T I C A L LIBERALIZATION, I T SEEMS A GOOD TIME TO

REVIEW WHERE WE ARE AND TAKE A TENTATIVE AND SPECULATIVE

LOOK AHEAD. T H I S I S A PERIOD OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL

TURMOIL I N IRAN FROM WHICH MANY OUTCOMES ARE THEORETICALLY

POSSIBLE. MANY O F THE GIVENS O F THE PAST ARE BEING

CALLED INTO QUESTION, NOT ONLY BY VOCAL OPPONENTS OF

THE REGIME BUT BY THE SHAH HIMSELF.

2. I T I S CLEAR TO US AND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HERE THAT THE SHAH I S SINCERE

I N H I S DESIRE TO LEAD IRAN TOWARD LIBERALIZED POLITICAL

INSTITUTIONS (REF C ) . THERE I S SOME QUESTION I N H I S

tlWN MIND AS TO EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTS AND HOW HE I S 1

SUSPICION OF H I S INTENTIONS AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE LONG

OPPOSED HIM. AFTER ALL, HE HAS NOT EVER WILLINGLY PL.qYE5

THE DEMOCRATIC GAME #BEFORE: WHY NOW? THE ANSWER, WE

RELIEVE, I S I N H I S REAL B E L I B F THAT H I S SON CANNOT SUCCESS-

FULLY SUCCEED HIM UNLESS I R A N ' S P O L I T I C A L TRANSITION