(1) [G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER , VS . COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L.

YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS . I. FACTS

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. II. ISSUES Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit. HELD

III.

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the wellsettled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable. (2) G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983 IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents. I. FACTS

The nine of the fourteen detainees were arrested on July 6, 1982 after PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were then having a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence. The other four detainees were arrested on the following day. On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested. The herein fourteen detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya until their transfer on the morning to an undisclosed different places. It is alleged that the arrest was unlawful and illegal since there was no warrant of arrest; they were only armed with a search warrant. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus is filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla. II. ISSUES

Whether or not the detention of the petitioners is legal. III. HELD The decision in the Lansang case was overturned (diluting, if not abandoning) and the verdict on the Barcelon Case and Montenegro case was once again recalled. The court held that the detention as legal and valid as it depends on the President, who may order to whether release them or not. The Supreme Court restated that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was a political question only the President can resolve. The suspension of the privilege of the WoHC carries with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail is given upon times of rebellion, then those who are arrested can re-join their comrades thus risking the governments efforts to end hostile activities in the country. Since the 13 detainees have been released, the petition was moot academic. Although for Dr. Parong, there has been a warrant of arrest against her for illegal possession of firearms so the petition was also moot and academic.

G.R. No. 113539

March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG, respondents. I. FACTS

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag. ISSUES a. Whether or not the subjected land was rural b. Whether or not the sale to Cataniag was valid III. HELD The petition has no merit. a. Subject Land is Urban The conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is based on clear and convincing evidence. Finding the subject land was urban, the petitioners have no ground to invoke the right of redemption, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction: ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land. b. Sale to Cataniag valid Helen Guzmans quitclaim, which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property, collided with the Constitution which states that only the qualified, can acquire lands of the public domain with the exception of hereditary succession. In the 1935 Constitution, aliens cannot acquire public as well as private lands. In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity Ombudsman as, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents FACTS In the 1998 elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. Since the beginning of his term, Estrada encountered problems that cause the deterioration of his popularity. Singson accused petitioner of receiving money from jueteng lords and that issue ignited rage. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. In January 16, when by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met with outburst and the people assembled in the EDSA shrine in protest. Then one by one, his officers resigned from their posts. Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines and the petitioner, with his family, fled. The petitioner released a press statement and along with it was a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office and made the Vice-President the Acting President. After he left the position, numerous legal problems surfaced and cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. ISSUES Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President. HELD A. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond objection: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. At the case, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang after the oath-taking of Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. II.

B. Petitioner assumes that Arroyo as Vice President has no power to declare the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency and the Congress has the ultimate ability. The House of Congress and The Senate both recognized Arroyo as President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents. I. FACTS

In 2002, some of then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and on the same day, they passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) declaring that they had lost confidence in Socrates and called for a recall. Then Socrates filed a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution but the COMELEC dismissed his petition due to its lack of merit. The COMELEC then set dates and activities for the recall election. Edward Hagedorn then filed for candidacy for mayor but several people (Adovo, Gilo, Ollave, Sr., and Manaay) filed petitions to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that Hagedorn is prohibited from running for a fourth consecutive term as he already serve the post for three consecutive full terms. The COMELEC, in a resolution, declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. II. ISSUES a. Whether or not the recall resolution was valid b. Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor in the recall election HELD

III.

a. Validity of the Recall Resolution Petitioner argues that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. In the case, there is no valid reason to hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently erroneous. Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. He admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. b. Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in the recall election These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders. G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004 JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents. FACTS The petitioners, Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were gypsum board and cornice installers at Riviera Home Improvements Inc., that is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials, until they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims before the Lord Arbiter, who ruled in their favour. On appeal, the NLRC reversed LA. A petition was filed in the Court of Appeals who in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal. Then the Agabons further appealed to the SC claiming that the company did not comply with notice and hearing. ISSUES Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed HELD Petition is denied. Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis. They also did not comply with the requirement of notice and hearing. Private

respondent, however, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. The terminations were for a just and valid cause because the Agabons abandoned their work. They also have subcontracted for an installation work for another company. There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse; they should have still sent a notice as mandated by law. For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents. I. FACTS

In 1986, Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 provides that the petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein but it should be approves by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The rates increased from Php 88.00 to Php 180.00 per month. Because of this, the respondent threatened to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner then filed a petition for injunction. It alleged that Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. The trial court in favour of the petitioner. II. ISSUES Whether or not the Local Government Units can regulate subscriber rates of CATV within their jurisdiction.

III. HELD The sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates, is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. The respondents drifted from the limits of its power. Resolution No. 210 violates the mandates of existing laws and violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry. Because of the conflicting laws, between E.O. No. 205 (mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations) and R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code of the Philippines), the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Then the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation, including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents. In effect, both laws become equally effective and mutually complementary. G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. I. FACTS Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at Bohol. After school, they had lost contact with each other. The two rekindled their communication through exchange of letters and eventually became sweethearts. They got married in 1990 and Barrete went back to Canada to work. In 1991, Barrete filed for divorced in Canada which was granted. Then Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio Morigo was then charged with bigamy but then was moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. He pleaded not guilty asserting that his marriage with Lucia Barrete was void ab initio since no actual marriage ceremony took place. Morigo also claims that he contracted his send marriage in good faith. II. ISSUES Whether or not Morigo should have filed the declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia Barrete before his second marriage with Lumbago so that he can be free of the bigamy case.

III. HELD There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer instead it was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio. Morigo and Barrete were never married at the first place. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect and from that he was

not already married when he contracted the marriage with Lumbago. The first element of bigamy is not committed thus Morigo is acquitted of the instant charge. G.R. No. L-44007 March 20, 1991 THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, EASTERN EXTENSION AUSTRALASIA and CHINA TELEGRAPH COMPANY, LTD., respondents FACTS Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co., Ltd. is a foreign corporation is engaged in international telecommunications. Petitioner was granted for the construction, operation and maintenance of submarine telegraph cable from Hong Kong to Manila. When the concession expired, Republic Act No. 808 was approved, granting to respondent a legislative franchise. R.A. 808 was amended by enlarging the scope of the franchise. The controversy started when petitioner assessed private respondent's deficiency income tax, inclusive of surcharges, interests and penalties. The assessment was done in its belief that the company was inoperative because it failed to conform to the requirement that it must be 60% owned by the Filipinos. Since the company was 100% owned by British citizens, it is illegally operating in the country. In a letter, petitioner rejected the private respondent's position and declared that the Office of the Commissioner finds no reason to withdraw much more cancel its assessment and even reassessed the private respondent. Respondent filed with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review contesting the legality of the assessment with prayer for a restraining order directing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to desist from enforcing and collecting the same. ISSUES Whether or not the constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to the respondent Corporation should have been passed upon by the respondent Court when it was not an issue raised in the pleadings HELD A. It has been the persistent contention of the petitioner that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 808 was never raised as an issue by either party. Moreover, petitioner argued that said issue was not necessary in the resolution of this case. Although the court sustain the respondent tax court's finding that the constitutional issue was squarely raised by the parties, the court find merit with the contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. The fact that constitutional question was properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality. Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private citizens made upon valuable considerations, for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. It is generally considered that the obligation resting upon the grantee to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes a sufficient consideration. b. Lastly, We find that respondent tax court erred in declaring that the assessment for deficiency income tax against respondent corporation is in the nature of a ruling within the purview of section 338-A of the tax code. It can thus be seen from the said provisions that for the purpose of facilitating the assessment of the franchise tax, the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of respondent, may promulgate the implementing rules and regulations. (10) G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents. I. FACTS

In 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title of land. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs were substituted as applicants. The land registration court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, their predecessors have the land in possession since 1938. In dismissing the petition, the court reasoned that the applicants failed to comply with the condition, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. But the motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. ISSUES Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion HELD Petition is granted Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. The court answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. If the law speaks in a clear language, there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the

application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. (11) G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents. I. FACTS

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez alleging that the Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. Plaintiff recorded the confrontation but as it was allegedly illegal, the defendant filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." Petitioner then filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The trial court then granted the motion reasoning that the acts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200 and the violation punished refers to being taped by a person other than the participant in the communication. The CA, however, reversed the decision reasoning that the allegations sufficiently constituted an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. II. ISSUES Whether or not recorded conversation falls under the violation of RA 4200 III. HELD

The petition is denied. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or would lead to an injustice. The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents. I. FACTS

In 1982, Imelda L. Salazar was employed as a general systems analyst as well as Delfin Saldivar by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR). In 1984, reports of missing company equipment and spare parts under the custody of Saldivar were missing, which prompted petitioner GMCR to conduct an investigation regarding the activities of the latter. According to the report, Saldivar had entered a partnership with Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services, a supplier of equipment and spare parts of petitioner. Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership between Saldivar and Yambao and it appeared that she had knowledge of the whereabouts of the airconditioning unit that Saldivar had taken but failed to inform her employer. In 1984, Salazar was placed under preventive suspension for one month. But instead of submitting a letter of explanation, Salazar filed a complaint against GMCR for illegal suspension. After notifying Salazar in writing, she subsequently amended her complaint. After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position. On appeal, NLRC, limited the back wages to a period of two years and deleted the award for moral damages. ISSUES Whether or not Salazars dismissal is legal. Whether or not Salazar is entitled to two years backwages HELD A. YES. Salazar was suspended. Preventive suspension does not mean that the employee was guilty, she was asked to explain. So it is erroneous to conclude that GMCR had violated Salazars right to due process. She even ignored the memorandum to give her side on the matter. B. In this case, there was no evidence which clearly showed a cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full back wages. The Labor Code is clear and

unambiguous in the statement that those employees that are wrongly dismissed are entitled to backwages and reinstatement. An exception to reinstatement is strained relationship. To qualify one must be in a position of trust and loyalty but as Salazar is not in the position mentioned, she can be reinstated. An employee must not be terminated because of mere presumptions. G.R. No. 96948 August 2, 1991 B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents. I. FACTS The petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. II. ISSUES Whether or not the petitioners have been denied of due process HELD Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction. The Court do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee. I. FACTS

In an information filed, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. II. ISSUES

Whether or not the justice of peace was ruled out from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. III. HELD The rule casus omisus has no applicability in this case. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. The intention of the Legislature did notexclude the justice of the peace from its operation. The court of appeals and the trial court used expressio unius, est exclusion alterius in deciding that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. This rule has no application in the case. G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978 J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners, vs.

HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.

I. FACTS On October 1, 1965, Manuela and Maria filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title. They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. II. ISSUES Whether or not the land was validly in the possession of the defendants III. HELD

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (16) G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992 FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents. I. FACTS

Carlie Surposa , deceased, was insured with Finman General Assurance Corporation with his family all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie, died as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three unidentified men without provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston, were waiting for a ride on their way home. Then private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which it denied because murder and assault was not within the coverage of the insurance. Petitioner filed this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance policy, since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified. II. ISSUES Whether or not the death of Carlie is within the coverage of the insurance III. HELD

In any event, while the act may not exempt the unknown perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. Then since murder and assault have not been expressly included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Moreover, insurance contracts are to be construed liberally in favour of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favour of its beneficiary. (17) G.R. No. L-36378 January 27, 1992 PIO BALATBAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO PASION, respondents.

I.

FACTS

Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land located at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga which is owned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to Domingo Pasion. After the sale, Pasion, claiming that he will personally cultivate the land, filed a complaint to eject petitioner alleging that although he notified the petitioner of his intent, Balatbat still refused to vacate the land. In a counterclaim, petitioner denied that he received any notice from private respondent. After trial, the court ordered to eject Balatbat. Petitioner then appealed in the CA but on December 16, the CA affirmed the decision of the agrarian court. II. ISSUES a. Whether or not the court erred in ordering the ejectment of herein petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation. b. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing private respondent's complaint for cultivation III. HELD The petition is dismissed. a. Petitioner asserts that personal cultivation is no a ground to dispossess an agricultural lessee of his landholding. But Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect because, there were statements made on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure" even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded in ejecting the tenants. The Congress also failed to express an intention of a retroactive effect. b. Property ownership is entitled to a social function. The owner shall use the land not only for his benefit but for the others as well. The Court upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the land they till. But the seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who do not own other agricultural lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. (18) G.R. No. 87119 April 16, 1991 HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.

I.

FACTS

On September 1988, Vice-Mayor of Manila Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, the appointments officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409. The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau on whether the payroll of the newly appointed may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. But then the City Legal Officer rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. II. ISSUES Whether or not Section 15 of the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed, and as a result, the City Council can no longer tender appointments to Council positions. III. HELD The petition is dismissed. There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. The provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight the autonomy of local governments. (19) G.R. No. 147192 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY , THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOILO CITY and ROSALINA FRANCISCO, represented by her attorney-in-fact, SALVADOR PAJA I, respondents. I. FACTS

In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco petitioned for the issuance of new transfer certificates of title (TCTs) in her name over two parcels of land. Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in the auction sales held for the satisfaction of delinquent real property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period and the failure of the registered owner or any interested person to redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the corresponding final bill of sale to Francisco.

To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted separate petitions for the entry of title in her name over the two lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed. No appeal was made from both orders of the courts hence, they became final and executory. In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner, as the alleged previous owner of the parcels of land sold at public auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the CA. But the appellate court dismissed its petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA. II. ISSUES Whether or not the exemption of the GSIS to taxes do not conflict with law. HELD

III.

Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in 1997, abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC of 1991. The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to revoke must be clear and manifest. Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible. Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or impliedly, that particular provision of the LGC. The two statutes are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as to compel us to uphold one and strike down the other. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws. Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended Section 234 to run counter to Section 39 of RA 8291. Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section 234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot be made to apply retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private respondent. (20) G.R. No. L-30456 July 30, 1982 VIRGILIO S. VELAZCO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CAVITE, petitioners, vs. EMILIA S. BLAS, CONRADO SAYAS and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH IV, TAGAYTAY CITY, respondents.

I.

FACTS

Resolution No. 3, series of 1968, Emilia S. Blas was authorized to operate a cinema. Because the cinema would be near the medical clinic of Dr. Virgilio S. Velazco, the resolution expressly prohibited the installation and use of any loudspeaker or any similar device that would make the sound audible outside the theatre. After receiving official advice of the resolution and having paid the building permit, Blas started construction of the cinema. However, Resolution No. 68 made Resolution No. 3 null and void on the ground that it was contrary to R.A. 1224. Blas asked the Provincial Board to reconsider but her request was denied but the construction of the cinema was still going on. Dr. Velazco filed in the trial court. After holding the operation of the cinema does not contravene with R.A. 1224 and that the noise from the construction was not a nuisance, the complaint was dismissed. II. ISSUES a. Whether or not a movie theatre falls under R.A. 1224 b. Whether or not Resolution No. 68 was ultra vires HELD

III.

Petition is dismissed a. None of the cases present in a movie house, such as shouting, loud music and others and the nature of boisterous behaviour. To include this form of entertainment by analogy would constitute an unreasonable extension of the context and intent of the law. b. The trial court that the resolution of the Provincial Board in question suffers from a fatal legal infirmity. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. he provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. According to this, Resolution No. 68 is indeed ultra vires.