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Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder Politics of Plunder: The Philippines under Marcos by Belinda A. Aquino; Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines by Robin Broad; The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export by Gary Hawes; Filipino Politics: Development and Decay by David Wurfel Review by: Paul D. Hutchcroft World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Apr., 1991), pp. 414-450 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: . Accessed: 22/08/2012 10:07
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Review Articles

By PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT* Belinda A. Aquino, Politics of Plunder: The Philippinesunder Marcos. Que-

College of Public Administration, i987, 208 pp. Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The WorldBank, the InternationalMonetary fornia Press, i988, 352 pp. Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, i987, 196 pp. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,i988, 36i pp.

of zon City: Great Books Trading and the University the Philippines

and Los Angeles: University Caliof Fund,and thePhilippines. Berkeley


rise and fall of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Philippines highlights the importantdistinctionthat needs to be made between changesin politicalregimeand changesin thenatureof thestate.Despite nearly a decade and a half of authoritarian rule (1972-86), and several of yearsdevoted to the restoration pre-martiallaw institutions, role the of the statein the postwarPhilippinepoliticaleconomyhas perhaps displayed more fundamental continuity thandiscontinuity: more things the change, the more theystay the same. Access to the state apparatus remains themajor avenue to privateaccumulation, and thequest for"rent* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistanceof the University the Philippines of School of Economics,where he was based while conductingthe dissertation researchthat inspiredthisarticle.He was supportedby a grantfromthe U.S. Departmentof Education ResearchAbroad Program,as well as by a grantfrom Doctoral Dissertation Fulbright-Hays the Social Science ResearchCouncil and the AmericanCouncil of Learned Societies,with fundsprovidedby the William and Flora HewlettFoundation. In addition,he would like to thankall thosewho offered and commentsthat suggestions contributed the ideas in thisreviewarticle:Ben Anderson,GerryBurns,Nick Cullather, to Edna Labra Hutchcroft, Alex Magno, Manuel Montes,JimRush,JimScott,and JohnSidel, read at the Third International as well as thosewho commentedon an earlierversion, Philippine Studies Conference,Quezon City,July13-17, i989. The author,of course, accepts or for responsibility any errors omissionswithinthearticle.


Politics (April World 43

I 99 ), 4 I 4-50





continuesto bring a stampede of favored elites seeking" opportunities and would-be favoredelitesto thegatesof thepresidential palace.' A key question, put verycrudelyby one observer,concerns"why the Philippines could not use the dictatorship its springboardforeconomic deas velopment,as we witness in newly industrializedcountriesin Asia."2 we Alternatively, need to ask why,despitetwo major regimechanges in thepostwarera (Marcos's declarationofmartiallaw in 1972 and his overthrowin i986), therehas been so littlechange in the way in which dominteract with the Philippine state. inanteconomicinterests The frameworkthat best describessuch continuity, this article suggests,derivesfromMax Weber's work on patrimonialism. Political administration-whetherin the pre-martiallaw period or under martial law or in the Aquino years-is oftentreatedas a personal affair.3 The stateapparatusis choked continually an anarchyof particularistic deby and particularistic actionson behalfof,thoseoligarchsand mands from, mostfavoredbyitstop officials: will obtain cronieswho are currently one a highlycoveted loan or importlicense; anotherwill enjoy a stake in a cartelized industryunfettered effective state regulation.As Weber by writesof the patrimonialstate: the of In general notion an objectively official to defined dutyis unknown that theoffice is basedpurely of relations subordination. ... uponpersonal Instead bureaucratic of and impartiality oftheideal-based on theabstract of law without of validity one objective forall-of administrating respect the expersons, opposite principle prevails. Practically everything depends plicitly upon the personalconsiderations: towardthe upon the attitude and concrete and conapplicant hisconcrete request uponpurely personal and favors, nections, promises, privileges.4 Under themartiallaw regimeMarcos attempted centralizea largely to decentralizedpatrimonialpolityand therebyundercutcompetingcenmembersof the old oligarchywere tersof power. The most threatening tamed,and the risingcronieswere set loose in "new field[s]of patrimonialism" (Wurfel,258). But in pursuinga programof selectiveexpropriI For a neoclassicalperspective competitive on rentseeking,see Anne 0. Krueger,"The PoliticalEconomyof the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974),
291-303. 2

3 In "the genuinely patrimonial office," Weber writes, "the politicaladministration is ... treatedas a purelypersonalaffair the ruler,and politicalpower is consideredpart of his of personalproperty." Weber,Economy Society, GuentherRothand Claus Wittich(New and ed. York: Bedminster Press, i968), 3:1028-29. Unless otherwisespecified, subsequentreferall encesare to vol. 3. 4 Ibid., 1041; emphasis in original.

chiro Ishii et al., National Development Policies and the Business Sector in the Philippines (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, i988), 255.

Kenji Koike, "DismantlingCrony Capitalismunder the Aquino Government," Auiin




ation, creationof export monopolies,and promotionof favoredassociates, or "cronies," Marcos was merelyexpanding on earlier patternsof patrimonialplunder. Particularistic demands continuedto prevail,with the difference thatone rulerwas appropriating much largerproportion a of the stateapparatus toward the serviceof his own privateinterests. As Emmanuel de Dios puts it, "The cronyphenomenonwas no more than a logical extensionand culminationof the premartiallaw processof using access to the politicalmachinery accumulate wealth."5In fact,one to might say that Marcos streamlinedthe process: just as Weber explains that patrimonialofficecan "develop bureaucraticfeatureswith increasing functionaldivision and rationalization"s and yet not undermine its distinctly patrimonialcharacter,Marcos could undertake bureaucratic reformand enlistthe aid of technocrats withoutundermininghis own agenda of patrimonialaccumulation. A focus on patrimonialaspects of the state,7 argue, will lead to a I of clearer understanding important characteristics the Philippine poof litical economy.It also bringsa greatersense of coherenceto many disparate aspects of Marco's rule, including his motivationsfor declaring to martiallaw, his efforts undercutthe power bases of rival patrons,his relianceupon loyal friendsand family, promotionof cronyinterests his and export monopolies, his extravagantuse of foreignloans, and his choice of economic strategies. This is not to obscure critical differences between the postcolonial Philippinesand the economies,societies, and politiesanalyzed by Weber many decades ago. Most importantly, Weber's notion of historicalprogressiondoes not anticipatethe "neopatrimonialism" that comes in the wake of a more "rational-legal"colonial state.He likelywould have con5 De Dios, "A PoliticalEconomyof PhilippinePolicy-Making," John in W. Langfordand K. Lorne Brownsey, in eds.,EconomicPolicy-Making theAsia-Pacific Region(Halifax, Nova Scotia: Institute Researchon Public Policy,1990), 14. for 6 Weber (fn.3), 1028. 7 My definition of the state derives fromthe incisivediscussionof postcolonialAfrican statesfoundin RobertH. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg,"Why Africa'sWeak StatesPersist: The Empiricaland the Juridical Statehood,"World in Politics35 (October i982), 1-24. They go beyond Weber's classic "empirical"definition the state ("a corporategroup that has of exercisescontinuousorganization, compulsoryjurisdiction, and claims a monopolyof force over a territory its population,including'all actiontakingplace in the area of its jurisand diction'") (p. 2) and argue theneed to incorporate the "juridical"definition statehood, also of thatwhich is recognizedby the "international of society states."In Europe, theyargue,"empirical statehoodpreceded juridical statehoodor was concurrent with it." In Black Africa and otherpartsof the Third World, however,therehas been a verydifferent of statesort are to building process: "Externalfactors more likelythan internalfactors providean adeand quate explanationof the formation persistence states"(p. 23). "A politicalsystem of may possesssome or all of the empiricalqualifications statehood, withoutthe [internationof but of and ally recognized]juridicalattributes territory independenceit is not a state"(p. 13).





anomalous to findpatrimonialfeaturesin the forsidered it particularly mer colony of the world's most advanced industrialpower. As will be appear to have become more prodiscussed below, patrimonialfeatures independencein 1946, when the economic role of the cennounced after tralstateexpanded.8Second, exceptduringtheMarcos years,thepostwar Philippines has not had the clearly identifiablecentral "ruler" that polities.Instead,a nominallystrong Weber expectedto see in patrimonial shorttenuremustmake major president(see Wurfel,76-88) of relatively accommodations to "local patrimonial lords"9 who possess economic and quasi-judicial functionsin their power and assume quasi-military at localitiesand are represented the national level in a powerfullegislature.'" Third, while Weber's patrimonialpolitieswere largelyself-contained, the Philippinepoliticaleconomydepends upon externalfundsforits suscannotbe understoodextenance-and Marcos's own personalstrategies cept in a world of Swiss banks and Manhattan real estate.And finally, in Weber expectedto see patrimonialism economiesthatare not yetfully monetized and where the means of communicationand transportare poorlydeveloped. While this may partiallydescribesome of the subnational "polities" controlledby local autonomous lords, it does not describe the national-levelpolityon which I am focusing.Weber would in of not have imagined the strengthening patrimonialfeatures a "modernizing" economy. My use of the term "patrimonialfeatures"rather than "patrimonialism" is meant to highlight the transplantingof into a setting thathe did not anticipate." Weber's framework I This parallelsGuentherRoth's discussionof a "detraditionalized"patrimonialism that in "becomesthe dominantformof government" "some of the newerstates."Even in indus. this"personalrulership .. is apparently he enlargedby theextentrializedcountries, writes, and Empiresion of government functions";Roth, "Personal Rulership,Patrimonialism, Politics20 (January i968), 194-206, at i96, i9q. Buildingin the New States,"World "marchof bureaucracy." Weber (fn.3), 1002-3, discussesthe historical 9 Weber (fn.3), io88 and 1059. loThe formation persistence a central statethatis unableto exert of effectively authority and factors: an Americancolonial in of (i) over"local lords"can onlybe understood light external caudillo thatabortedwhat mighthave been a more"natural,"Latin American-style heritage a and superimposed weak centralstateover a polityof quite autonrouteto stateformation of of society states"thathelpsensurethe omous local centers power; and (2) an "international claim control over muchof theirterritories. of survival centralstatesthatcannot,empirically, See BenedictAnderson,"Cacique Democracy and the Philippines:Origins and Dreams," and Rosberg(fn.7). New LeftReview i69 (May-Junei988), 3-33, at 9-13; and Jackson and thenpermits hybridcharacteriWeber (fn3), of course,develops"pure" categories for cases. In his analysisof bureaucratic zations of his historical systems, example,he notes admixtures" 964). It is in this elements"and "patrimonial (p. cases with"strongpatrimonial elements." features" and "patrimonial thatI use the terms"patrimonial spirit based analfromtwo works thatprovideexcellent, historically My analysishas benefited Harold Crouch,"Patrimonialism in settings: dynamics otherpostcolonial ysesof patrimonial Rule in Indonesia," World Politics 31 (July1979), 57I-87; and Thomas M. Caland Military




As the followingsurveyof currentscholarshipon the Marcos regime attemptsto show, littleattentionhas been paid to the patrimonialfeaturesthat endure across regimes withinthe Philippine state. By deof veloping a clearerunderstanding certainfeatures thatWeber best describes, we can explain more adequately how dominant economic have continuedto plunder the Philippinestate. interests

Five years afterthe downfall of Marcos, scholarsof Philippine politics have yet to achieve even minimal consensuson the propercharacterization of his authoritarian regime.Some see Marcos as largelyan aberration; Belinda Aquino,2 writes that "while corruptionhas always been part of Philippinepoliticallife,it reached epidemic and flagrant proportionsduringthe Marcos years" and displayed"a certainpathologicaldimension" (pp. I, 4). Her examinationof 2,300 pages of the "Marcos Papers" leads her to conclude that systemic explanations alone are the inadequate to understanding "politicsof plunder" under Marcos; one must also "look at the role of individual dictatorsthemselvesin the deof struction theirown societies"(p. 83). A prominentMarxist scholar,Francisco Nemenzo, sees the "Marcos state"as "analogous to. . . 'Bonapartism.'It achieved 'relativeautonomy' fromthe ruling class with the supportof the army and a pliable mass organization."Louis Bonaparte and Marcos, he argues, faced "remarkin ably similar" circumstances:"intense contradictions the ruling class in and a mighty challenge frombelow, resulting the paralysisof the old state machine."'3Similarly,business journalistRigobertoTiglao argues thatin the earlyyearsof martiallaw, "the rulingelite completelycapitwhile enjoying an exceptionallyprofitable ulated to the dictatorship," He period in theirenterprises. sees the originsof the Marcos regime as, in part,an elite project:
While partlyrepresenting Marcos's obsessionto keep his hold on the Philthe would also representthe social project ippine presidency, dictatorship
Zairein Comparative laghy,The State-Society Struggle: Perspective (New York: Columbia Uniin features modernFirstWorld bureauversity Press, i984). Some scholarsfindpatrimonial cracies as well. See the very insightful"revisionist"approach to Weber's ideal-typical and Power bureaucratic statein Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,"Authority A in Bureaucraticand PatrimonialAdministration: Revisionist of Interpretation Weber on Robin Theobald, by contrast, seeks Bureaucracy,"World Politics 31 (January 1979), 195-227. framework underdeveloped to to confinethe patrimonial economies;see Theobald, "PatriPolitics (Julyi982), 548-59. monialism,"World 34 12 "No relation to President Corazon C. Aquino," it is notedin the foreword her book. to 3 Nemenzo, "The Left and the TraditionalOpposition,"in R. J.May and Francisco NeMarcos(New York: St. Martin'sPress,i985), 50. menzo, eds., The Philippines after





of of thedominant sections thePhilippine ruling eliteto breakthedead end it facedin theearlyI970S. Onlytowards thelate I970s would the ... eliterealizetheFrankenstein monster had helpedcreatewhichthreatit ened to eat themup one by one and to drivethe entire nationintoan and economic political holocaust.'4 A thirdschool emphasizes the heightenedrole of externalforces, particularly United States,the International the MonetaryFund, the World Bank, and foreigncapital. Here, Marcos is oftenportrayed acting on as Robert Stauffer, behalf of foreigneconomic and strategicinterests. for example,wrotein 1979 that"the new regimepushes the nationto accept the increasingdegree of directionimposed fromthe agencies of the metinstitutions over which it has conropolitannation and the multilateral Robin Broad followsin this dependencytradition, trollinginfluence."'5 with a detailed examinationof how the IMF and the World Bank, allied with the Marcos-supported"transnationalist"technocratswithin the Philippine state,used two loans fromthe World Bank to outmaneuver in and promoteexport-oriented 'economic nationalists" the government Between 1979 and i982, she argues, industrialand fiindustrialization. nancial sectorloans led to "a reshapingof the entirePhilippine political and social groups within it economyand of the ways major institutions Gary Hawes and David Wurfel adopt more varied approaches. Hawes argues that "martial law marks the emergenceof a new, transand he seeks to determineexactly national coalition of class interests," which class segmentswere dominant in the Philippine state. He sees a of statethat"was able to take actionsthatwere opposed to the interests one class segment-import-substitution manufacturers"-and that also of defended "the general interests capital." But Hawes does not tryto in coalitionand class explain Marcos entirely termsof the transnational "Some actions taken by Marcos," he writes,"can be intersegments: of to pretedonlyin the context domesticpoliticsand his attempts solidify his own regime." For example, Marcos's promotionof cronies and his creationof export monopolies was in clear opposition to World Bank, and U.S. advice. We shall see that an importantpart of Hawes's IMF, betweenstateand regime" (pp. 52-53). analysisis "the key distinction in as Wurfel'swork is as wide-ranging itsframework it is comprehenof sive and balanced as a history recentPhilippine politics.While ideas
I Tiglao, "The Consolidationof the Dictatorship," Aurora Javate-de in Dios et al., eds., and RootsofPeoples'sPower (Metro Manila: ConspectusFoundation Dictatorship Revolution: Incorporated, i988), 27, 31 (quote fromp. 27). 5 Stauffer, "The PoliticalEconomyof Refeudalization," David A. Rosenberg, Marin ed., cosand MartialLaw in thePhilippines (Ithaca,N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 217.

meshed" i62). (p.



most influence and legitimacy of modernization,politicaldevelopment, Wurfel's approach, his work contains many other ingredientsas well. The analysisof the politicaleconomyunder Marcos, forexample, cooks termsand labels: "patrimonialauthorup a veritablestew of theoretical itarianism," centralized patrimonialism," and "neopatrimonialism"; facism"and "corporatism";"authoritarian-technocratic"; "authoritarian "neocolonialism"and "dependency";"developmentalautocrat"; "superpatron,"and so on. Wurfel's purpose seems not to arrive at any single but ratherto provide a careful descriptiveactheoreticalformulation count of Filipino politics-and indeed, his book has already become the standardtexton the subject.Within Wurfel's varied theoreticalframework, one findsa valuable pictureof the complex dynamicsthat charnatureof the regime,the acterizedMarcos's Philippines:thepersonalistic opportunities and pressures coming from external forces, and the and elite-massrelations. changes in intraelite thisessay examof In arguingthe utility the patrimonialframework, ines fourkey aspectsof recentPhilippinepoliticaleconomyin relationto the books under review: (I) the motivationsbehind the declaration of multilateralinstiinternational martial law; (2) the role of technocrats, (3) and foreignindebtednessin the choice of economic strategy; tutions, the riseof the croniesand the Marcos relatives;and (4) the resurgenceof the "old oligarchy"in the early i98os. As an initial step, however, it is of importantto delineate the criticalhistoricalcharacteristics the relationshipbetweenstateand oligarchyin the Philippines.

While scholarsmay stilldebate the natureof the Philippine stateunder Marcos, thereis littledispute thatprior to i972 Philippine state instituAs dominant interests. Willem Wolters extions were weak vis-A-vis plains:
The Philippine state ... which emerged during the late-Spanish and American colonial periods,was characterizedby a limited degree of centralizationand a weak stateapparatus. The land-owning elite in the provinces preventedthe developmentof a strongcentralstate.The classic state namely those over violence monopolies known from European history, and taxation,have never been fullydeveloped in the Philippines.'6

Unlike in Thailand and Indonesia, where "bureaucratic-aristocratic" by elites (descendant of precolonial kingdoms) were strengthened the
6 Luzon (Quezon City: New Day in and Class Conflict Central Patronage Wolters,Politics, Publishers,i984), 3.





nineteenth-century commercializationof agriculture, the same process in the Philippines"gave rise to a new class of ... landowners who were Their economic base was firmly quite separate fromthe bureaucracy."'7 outside the state. From this independentbase, however, they came to exercisepowerful yetparticularistic controlover elementsof the state apparatus througha spoils systemthat had become well entrenchedat the nationallevel earlyin thiscentury.i8BenedictAndersonexplainsthat introducedby the Americans led to-the first representative institutions " creationsof "a solid, visible'national oligarchy,' and throughthese institutions the oligarchyenjoyed suzeraintyover the bureaucraticappaowed their employmentto legislator ratus: "Civil servantsfrequently and up to theend of theAmericanperiod thecivilianmachinery patrons, of stateremainedweak and divided."'9This controlof the bureaucracy, it must be emphasized,was exercisedfroman independentsocietalbase: it in while the oligarchyswamped the legislature, showed littleinterest directly assumingbureacratic posts.Despite significant growthin the bua elite neveremerged.2o reaucracy, bureaucratic Externalsupporthas been vital to oligarchichegemonyover the Philof The consolidation theoligarchs'positioncame ippinestateand society. but under Americancolonial sponsorship, even after1946 both stateand and oligarchyremained highlydependent upon U.S. aid, investment, counterinsurgency support.Three years afterindependence the Philipaupine statenearlycollapsed, in large part because of its lack of tariff the formercolonial power and its inabilityto extract tonomyvis-a-vis The military and economic rescueoperation revenuefromtheoligarchy. came fromWashington.As Frank Golay explains: to seemedwilling let themilitary By theend of I949 thegovernment go and for wither wantoffunds, evento unpaidand theeducational system rather thanfaceup to minimum to succumb theHuk rebellion, responsithat functions....[Therewas] mounting evidence for bility governmental It of thebodypolitic was incapable actionin theinterests all Filipinos. of
17Harold Crouch,EconomicChange,Social Structure and thePoliticalSystem Southeast in withtheOther ASEAN Countries Asia: Philippine Development Compared (Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies,i985), io-i8, quote at io. 18 See Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila: University the of Institute Public Administration, of Philippines 1957), 249. I9Anderson(fn. i0), 11-12. One of the best prewar illustrations an oligarchicraid on of thestatemachinery thesugarbloc's unbridled is assaulton theloans department the newly of formedPhilippineNational Bank, between i9i6 and 1920. See Peter W. Stanley, Nation A in theMaking: The Philippines the UnitedStates,i899-i92I (Cambridge: Harvard Uniand versity Press,1974), 233-48. 20 Daniel F. Doeppers, Manila, I900-I94I: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis, MonographSeries No. 27 (New Haven: Yale University SoutheastAsia Studies, i984), 72. "A See also Paul D. Hutchcroft, State Besieged: HistoricalPatterns State-EliteRelations of in thePhilippines," Issues and Letters (PhilippineCenterforPolicyStudies) I, no. 4 (1990), I10.



is a depressing commentary thereforms, that whenthey come,were did to a considerable extent installed from outsideas a result the Bell the of Mission and itsrecommendations." In part because the grantorof independencewas a risingsuperpowernot a decliningEuropean power,as elsewherein SoutheastAsia-it was for especiallydifficult the Philippinesto emerge as a trulysovereignnation. Even into the Aquino era, in fact,close relationsbetween oligarchs and Washington policymakersendure. Throughout the postwar years oligarchshave needed externalsupportto sustainan unjust, inefficient, and graft-ridden political and economic structure;Washington, in reaccess to two of its most important turn,has receivedunrestricted overinstallations. seas military After independence, I will argue, certain developments led to the of strengthening patrimonialfeatures,or a blurringof the distinction
between "official" and "private" spheres.22 Although further research is

needed, we can make the followingobservations. First,personalcontacts for became even more important entranceinto the centralbureaucracy, examinationbecame relatively and the role of competitive marginal. As felt Wurfelreports, congressmen theywere spending"most of theirtime ... runningan employmentagency." The bureaucracyexpanded rapidly,especiallyat electiontime (pp. 8o, 85).23 relationswere undergoing Second, in the countryside, patron-client had relied on their own significant changes. Patrons, who historically in local (oftenland-based) resources,found expanded opportunities obresources.This did not diminishthe tainingexternaland "office-based" the power of local oligarchsvis-a"-vis centralstatebut merelyincreased the role of state resourceswithinlong-standingpatron-client relationships. In the contextof national electoral system,these local oligarchs disretainedenormouspower to milk the centralstate's"particularistic
tributive capacity."24
Golay, The Philippines: Public Policyand NationalEconomicDevelopment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,196I), 71-72. 2As Weber (fn.3) writes, "The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separationof the 'private'and the 'official' sphere"(p. 1028). 23 There are two explanations commonlygiven forthispostindependence change: (i) increased corruption the bureaucracy in duringthe Japanese occupationand theearlypostwar years;and (2) the birthof the two-party system, injecting more partisanconsiderations into

JamesC. Scott,"Patron-Client Politicsand PoliticalChange in SoutheastAsia," in SteffenW. Schmidtet al., eds.,Friends, Followers Factions(Berkeleyand London: University and of CaliforniaPress, 1977), 137 and 143. Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyderexplain that the "growingpenetration nationalbureaucratic of institutions local areas heightens into the

played a less prominent role after 1946; Anderson (fn. IO),

tant: what Anderson calls the "American ringmaster domesticpolitical competition" for

the spoils system. See Corpuz (fn. i8),



A third reason is perhaps most impor-





diversified Third, as oligarchic interests (beyond agriculture,to inand finance),access to the state clude also commerce,manufacturing, became moreimportant thaneverforthecreationof wealth.25 machinery In the period of importand exchangecontrolsin the I950s, forexample, flooded the halls of the Central Bank in rent-seekingentrepreneurs search of the dollar allocationsthatwould enable them to reap windfall in profits producing for a protecteddomestic market. As long as such "rents" can be obtained,Manuel Montes pointsout, rentseekersfind it to more important maintaintheirgovernment connectionsthan to conwith "the internalefficiencies investments" their and of cern themselves in firms.26 Indeed, one studyof the textileindustry the 1950s statesthat "considered effort the Central Bank as importantas at entrepreneurs at [effort] theirplants."27 These postwar developments-in the central bureaucracy, local ventures greatlyheightened patron-client relations,and rent-seeking the the role of the statein privateaccumulationand strengthened patrimonial featuresof the Philippine state. Because these patternsbecame more pronouncedin recenttimes,as access to the statebegan to be more for important securingpatronageand rents,the term"neopatrimonial" best captures the historicalsequence. These postwar developmentsocin of curred in the midst of importantcontinuity the relativestrengths state and oligarchy:whethercolonial or postcolonial,the civilian state apparatus remained "weak and divided" in the face of powerfuloligardependenceof the local elite upon office-based resources";Nowak and Snyder,"Clientelist Politicsin the Philippines:Integration Instability," or American PoliticalScienceReview 68 (September1974), 1147-70, at 1151. See also Brian Fegan's discussionof how the closingof the land frontier made civil servicepositions more important a elementof patron-client largesse in thepostwaryears-and led to a processof "bureaucratic involution" the national on level; Fegan, "The Social Historyof a CentralLuzon Barrio,"in AlfredW. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, Social History: eds.,Philippine Global Tradeand Local Transformations (Honolulu: Press of Hawaii, i982), 119-24. An influential University earlywork on patron-client relations in the Philippinesis Carl H. Lande, Leaders,Factions,and Parties:The Structure of Philippine Politics,Monograph Series No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies,i966). As one scholarwrotein the 1950s, "Businessis born,and flourishes fails,not so much or in the marketplace as in the halls of the legislature in the administrative or offices the of Thomas R. McHale, "An Econecological Approach to Economic Developgovernment"; ment" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1959), 217, quoted in Laurence Davis Stifel,The A Textile in Industry: Case Study Industrial of Data Paper Number Development thePhilippines, 49 (Ithaca,N.Y.: SoutheastAsia Program,Cornell University, i963), 50. The "rent-seeking in society" thePhilippinesis further discussedin Montes,"The Business Sectorand DevelopmentPolicy,"in Ishii et al. (fn.2), 23-77. As he pointsout, "rents" can include "protection fromcompetition and throughquotas, tariffs, measured capacities, subsidized credit,access to foreignreparations, loans, and grants... . [I]n a rent-seeking the of society, operations thestatedetermine assignment and thecontinuedenjoyment the of of economicadvantages"(p. 65). Stifel(fn.25), 104.
25 26 27



chic interests. Moreover, even as raids on state resourcesincreased in importance,the oligarchyretained its firmeconomic base outside the state. Any seriousanalysisof the Philippine state,then,must paradoxically the beginoutside state:first, because thepatrimonialnatureof the system greatly blurs the distinctionbetween "official" and "private" that is found in Weber's genuinelybureaucraticstate; and second, because a generallyincoherent bureaucracy(with a poorlydeveloped bureaucratic elite) has rarelybeen able to counterthe power of the oligarchyover the stateapparatus. Put anotherway, in relationsbetween the stateand the the state is far more likelyto be acted upon than to be an inoligarchy, actor.For this reason, we must understandthe nature of the dependent dominant interests that pursue theirparticularistic agendas within the Philippinestate.28

is for A focus on dominantinterests particularly important a discussion of the declarationof martiallaw. Hawes's explantionrestslargelyupon to an analysisof "elite segments"and the transition a new model of de"Elite cohesionbroke down duringthe i96os," he argues,as velopment. the result of the increasingpower of import-substitution industrialists, and theheightened "the influxof foreign investors," of participation IMF, "One segment, the World Bank, and themultinationals. broadlynationfor owned industry alist ..., favoredprotection domestically and curbs while the othersegmentfavored"an open econon foreigninvestment," omy" (pp. 36-37). Marcos, he argues, was in the second camp, and with the declaration of martial law in I972, he "resolved the breakdown in
28 Theda Skocpol writes that"statesconceivedas organizations claimingcontrolover territoriesand people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simplyreflective the of demands or interests social groups,classes,or society.This is what is usually meant by of 'stateautonomy.'Unless such independent goal formulation occurs,thereis little need to talk about statesas important actors";Skocpol,"Bringing StateBack In: Strategies Analysis the of in CurrentResearch,"in Peter B. Evans et al., eds.,Bringing StateBack In (Cambridge: the Cambridge University Press,i985), 9. While it may be rare to speak of the Philippinestate as an independentactor vis-A-vis dominantinterests, statenevertheless the remainscentralto any comprehensive analysisof the country's politicaleconomy.As noted at the outset,access to the stateapparatus is the means of privateaccumulation.It is indeed paradoxicalthata "weak" stateshould primary be a centralsubject of analysis(and, as noted above, that analysisof the state must begin outsidethe state).The state'simportant role seems to deriveprimarily fromresponsibilities it has necessarily assumed in handlingthe country's external economicrelations:it disburses aid and loans receivedfromabroad and setspolicieson foreign exchange,trade,and investment.In such a paradoxicalsituation, mustbeginour analysiswithan examinationof the we natureof dominantinterests proceedfromthereto develop a clearerpictureof the state and withwhichtheyinteract.





elite cohesion" (p. 20) and "cleared the way for ... export-ledindustrialization" (p. 45). Wurfelseemsat pointsto concurwiththisanalysis(pp. A number of problems emerge from this interpretation events. of First,if Hawes is correctthat the statetook actions against the importindustrialization manufacturers was able to "punish substitution and (isi) segmentsof the bourgeoisieopposed to ... export-oriented industrialization [or EOI]" (p. 14), we should be able to see this in the choice of targetsafterthe declarationof maritallaw. In fact,although outspoken nationalistssuch as Senator JoseDiokno were arrested,thereis no evidence of a concertedattack against businessmenwho produced for the domesticmarket.In true patrimonialfashion,Marcos's targetsafterthe declaration of martial law were those rival clans who threatenedhis household,not "elite segments"standingin the way of a new approach While Marcos claimed to be attackingthe to economic development.29 his fewof theirnumoligarchs, attackswere actuallylimitedto relatively ber, including "his two most potentcompetitors, Benigno Aquino and sugar baron' Eugenio Lopez" (Wurfel,2i). As historianAlfred McCoy explains,Marcos
but and politics.... With modified did notalterthefamilial basisof business 59-60,


Marcosemployed armedforce, maskedwithlaw, considerable dexterity, the of to pursue mainaim ofhisrule-changingthecomposition regional and national elites.3? The second major problemwith Hawes's analysisis thatit positselite

cleavages based on clear differences economic interest.Such cleavages are, of

in fact, difficult find.Stauffer to triedto locate thembut could not. After readingthe journals of the major businessassociationsof thisperiod, he concludes that while individual businessmen supported nationalist causes, "none of the business associationssupportedthe nationalists.... [T]hese groupslargelyaccepted the need to relyheavilyon foreignloans and investments."3' Third, isi was not underminedby martiallaw, and
29 Even Hawes seems to acknowledge this,despite the apparent inconsistency with his thesisabout "the state" acting against "elite segments":"Occasionally individual families were singled out and made an example so that othersmightsee what fate awaited those deemed to be enemiesof the president" 127). (p. 30 McCoy, "The Lopez Family: From Provincial Elite to National Oligarchy,"in Michael PoliticalFamilies(Ann Arbor,Mich.: CenterforSouth and SouthCullinane,ed., Philippine east Asia, University Michigan,forthcoming); of emphasisadded. Stauffer I5), I93. Behind Hawes's "elitesegments" (fn. seems to be the notionthatproduction forthe domesticmarket(or import-substitution industrialization) generallynais while production externalmarketsis not (see p. 45). The difficulty for tionalist, here is that foreign capitalhas playeda centralrole in Philippineisi fromthe beginning(which Hawes actuallyacknowledges,p. 33). See Sylvia Maxfieldand JamesH. Nolt, "Protectionism and the Internationalization Capital: U.S. Sponsorshipof ImportSubstitution of Industrializa3I




As did not emerge triumphant. shall be discussedbelow, the strategy as growth";32 long as the systemwas being luwas one of "debt-driven bricatedby externalfunds,therewas no need to make any hard decisions regardingcontendingeconomic paths. in Resolvingthe difficulties Hawes's analysisrequiresa clearerunderstanding of the basis of intraelitecompetitionin the pre-martial law years. The basic building blocks of the politicaleconomy of the Philippine oligarchyare not "elite segments"but extended families. Hawes when he speaks of the natureof the system, recognizesthe particularistic partisanfashionto de"tendencyof the stateto respond in preferential, mands fromsegmentsof the bourgeoisie" (p. 32). But the state is much more likelyto be respondingto familiesthan to any othercoherentsegweak and poorly ments.Philippinebusinessassociationsare notoriously and institutionalized, its membersknow thatthe way to make money is and then "to exclude inforto gain privilegedaccess to the government mation fromeach other."33 Both Hawes and Wurfel acknowledge the importance of family groupings,though theynonethelesspersistin arguing the presence of otherdefinableelite segments.Hawes admits that"division of the bourgeoisie may be more importantanalyticallythan in real life, because many of the major familiesof the Philippines have economic empires
tion in the Philippines, Turkey and Argentina," International Studies Quarterly 34 (March
1990), 49-8I.

Policy (Tokyo: United Nations University, i989), 98.

of betweenFilipino firmsand forMoreover,Montes pointsto the commonality interest walls and protectionist measures"; Manuel thatare protected the same "tariff by eign firms F. Montes,"Financing Development: The 'Democratic' Approach versus the 'Corporatist' Approach in the Philippines,"in Miguel Urrutiaet al., eds., The PoliticalEconomyof Fiscal ecoif Interestingly, one is looking for coherentsegmentsof capital based on different it nomic interests, can best be foundin analyzingforeign capital.There, Montes pointsout, walls and foreign betweenforeign one can see a clear differentiation capital inside the tariff capitallocated outsidethe country 98). (p.

Montes (fn. 31),


to the government know who to work with." He describedthe largestbusinessassociation, the PhilippineChamber of Commerce and Industries (formedin the late 1970s), as a mere and com"post office"of diverseconcerns, very"personality-oriented" unable to formulate mon positionson major issues. sector"consultations are Economist Montes similarlyexplains that government-private individualinterests. The privatesectordoes not have a ... dominatedby the need to protect interest a privatesector(or as largergroups withinthe privatesector).This as well-defined also involvesthe need to have advance information the of of protecting individualinterests tendsto be individual,based on kinship intentions. Access to information ... government's
and other ties"; see Montes (fn. 31), io8.

Ministry of Industry, April 26, i989. Ortaliz explained that his job during the early i98os associations withinthe privatesector.. .. [B]ut it was hard for industrial was to "strengthen

Interview,Wilhelm G. Ortaliz, formerdirector,Bureau of IndustrialCoordination,


features thosefoundat the level of (mirroring Indeed, one can say thatquasi-patrimonial as usually win out over the state) are found withinbusinessassociations, personalinterests associationalinterests.





I35; see also Wurfel, 57). In real life Philippine firms tend to be closely held within diversified family groups, many of which include a bank whose loan portfolio can be milked by family enterprises. Loyalty is primarily to the family grouping, not to any of its agricultural, industrial, commercial, real estate, or financial elements.34 The primary tensions late in the pre-martial law period, then, have little to do with the "elite segments" described by Hawes. De Dios provides the best analysis of the situation:

that transcendthese analyticalcategories"(p.

a head. The firstwas a worsening economic crisis in the form of severe difficulties balance of payments provokedby heavyelectoralspendingduring the presidentialelections. ... The resultinginflationate into real inunrest. ... [Second,] the uncertain comes ... and led to worker-student statusof U.S. assets in the country,owing to the impending termination in I974 of parityrightsgiven to U.S. citizens.... [And thirdwas Marcos's desire for a third term as president.]The split in the Filipino elite had owing mainlyto thisbid forpoliticaland finanreached crisisproportions, cial hegemonyby the Marcoses and Romualdezes (who were relative upstarts)as against the more establishedpolitical clans such as the Lopezes, Osmenas, Aquino-Cojuangcos, and Jacintos.35 There was intensifying intraelite competition, but it manifested itself largely along clan lines. Wurfel writes that each biennial campaign in the i960s led to "a few hundred political deaths" (p. I03). Vote buying was rampant, and "private armies" were a central component of many campaign organizations. The i969 elections were a turning point in the developing crisis, as all candidates (led by Marcos, who raided the public treasury) spent the equivalent of nearly one-fourth of the national budget (Wurfel, ioo). As Marcos's defeated opponent grumbled, "[We were] out-gooned, out-gunned and out-gold."36 The economy simply could not support the political system. Consis34 Nowak and Snyder (fn. 24) explain that "diversification familialeconomic power of in to decreasessusceptibility fluctuations world prices,potentialloss of privilegesin the U.S. market,and local policychanges such a devaluation,which hurt some sectorsmore than but role of urban real others"(pp. 1148-49). They also note the important, oftenneglected, estatein diversification strategies. that There is one otherreasonfordiversification should be added to theirlist: in an econdiveromyin whichwealthdependsto such a large degreeon access to the statemachinery, of sification helps to guard againstthe uncertainties change in politicalleadership.A family on assistedby current friendsin the Palace, forexcannotdepend exclusively investments thoseinvestments may be jeopardized by a lack of ample,because in thenextadministration in offices. connections keygovernment necessary 35 De Dios (fn.5), I12. 36 JoseVeloso Abueva, "The Philippines:Tradition and Change," Asian Surveyio, no. I (1970), 56-64, at 62.

By I970


three ofcircumstances sets combined makematters to cometo




the democracy," statehad tentwithJamesScott'smodel of "patron-client facedwith"intensedistributive a weak revenuebase but was nonetheless scarce Despite increasingly pressures... especiallyin election years."37 in therewas a proliferation the number of national patronageresources, Moreover, the economy was stagnating: the "easy local candidates.38 phase" of isi had long been exhausted,and exportgrowthhad been unimpressivefor the overall period since decontrol (of imports and exchange) in i962.39 The resultwas a major balance of paymentscrisisin the wake of the i969 elections,followed by a devaluation that fueled In This, in turn,heightenedpopular demands for change.40 a inflation. the opportunity, oligarchsbecame especiallyvicious period of constricted slackened," in clawing forthe bootyof state."American-erainhibitions of Andersonnotes,and "it was onlya matter timebeforesomeone would up break the rulesand tryto set himself as Supreme Cacique forLife."41

In the shorttermmartial law resolved the overload on the state's "distributive capacity":the abolitionof Congresseliminatedexpensiveintraand both heightenedrepressionand the curelite electoralcompetition, demands from the masses.42 will be As of elections restricted tailment to decentralized discussedbelow, Marcos attempted centralizea hitherto controlover access to the achieve tighter patrimonialpolityand thereby stateapparatus.At thesame timehe worked on the supplyside problems of the system'soverload and obtained new resources internationally. This was "the most importanttask" of the regime's foreignpolicy,remarks Wurfel (p. i90), and for a full decade Marcos adroitlymanaged



The revenueproblemsare systemic:

distributive A regimethatis dependenton its particularistic capacity... [will] have a time raising revenue from internaltaxation.A rise in direct taxation most difficult and in fact,theyare notoriousforthe undercoltheirbase of support, would threaten lectionof revenuesdue them,since favorsto theirclientsoftentake the formof either debtstheyowe the government. 143) (p. leavingthemofflocal tax rollsor ignoring Nowak and Snyder(fn.24), 1151-54. Industrial Promotion Policiesin Romeo M. Bautista,JohnH. Power, and Associates, for thePhilippines (MetroManila: PhilippineInstitute DevelopmentStudies,1979), 5-9; and Montes (fn.3i), 88-89. 40 As Scott(fn.24) explains:

39 See

pressures generatedby Democratic regimeswhichmustcaterto the strongdistributive vulnerableto the vagariesof world prices for pritheirclienteleare thus particularly economyor declining maryproductson whichtheirbudgetsdepend.... [A] stagnating the world pricesthreatened entirestructure (p. theyhad pieced together. 143)

Anderson(fn. io), i8. See Nowak and Snyder(fn.24),






to extractenormous sums fromthe IMF and World Bank, bilateraldowas lubricatedonce again. nors,and commercialbanks. The system of Marcos began martiallaw withthegood fortune high international for commodityprices,which "generatedwindfallprofits the Philippine economic elite,dispellingwhateverdoubts it stillhad about the Marcos Later in thedecade the regimetook fulladvantage of the dictatorship."43 at of availability cheap petrodollars negativereal ratesof interest. alone cannotexplain the regime'ssuccess.Two genBut good fortune erationsof Filipino oligarchshad tapped American patronage to boost but theirpersonalpositionsdomestically,44 among postwarleaders Marintothenatureof the neocolonial keen insights cos displayedparticularly rather man whose primaryloyaltywas to personal interests bond. As a than to any state or national interests-however defined-Marcos saw for needs presentedample opportunity private that American strategic notof gain. A long history Americanmanipulationof Philippineaffairs Marcos knew that neocolonial manipulation can be a withstanding,45 "More clearlythananyoneelse," Andersonexplains,he two-waystreet.46 understood"that for Washington the Philippines were like Cyprus for London."47Especially at a time when the militarybases were offering such importantsupport to U.S. forcesin Vietnam, Marcos could apIndeed, the proach Washingtonaid givers froma positionof strength. U.S. rewardedmartiallaw with verylarge increasesin grantsand loans (Wurfel,I9I). At the same time close relationswith the U.S. assistedMarcos in his efforts cultivateclose relationswith the IMF and the World Bank.48 to and promulgated intohis government He broughta corpsof technocrats a series of reformagendas that ensured the steadyflow of multilateral and commercial bank loans. In hosting the annual IMF/World Bank meeting in Manila in I976, the regime apparentlydazzled its guests. Even into the early i98os, explains an American banker,"Filipinos had of ... a special hold on theseinstitutions. Cesar Virata [minister finance
44 For enlightening Coloscholarship thisprocess,see Ruby R. Paredes, ed., Philippine on nial Democracy, SoutheastAsia Studies, MonographNo. 32 (New Haven: Yale University 45 For a particularly see well documentedaccountof thishistory, StephenRosskammSha(Philadelphia: Institute States and thePhilippines: Study Neocolonialism A of lom, The United forthe Studyof Human Issues, i98i). 46 RaymondBonner givesa good accountofhow theMarcosesmaneuveredin Washington witha Dictator:The Marcoses Policy and theMating ofAmerican circles;see Bonner,Waltzing (New York: Times Books, I987).

43 Tiglao(fn. 14), 3 8-


StephanHaggard, "The PoliticalEconomyof the PhilippineDebt Crisis,"in JoanNelin son, ed., EconomicCrisisand Policy Choice: The Politicsof Adjustment the Third World Princeton University Press, 1990), 219. (Princeton:

47Anderson IO), (fn.




and otherMarcos technocrats were and, afteri98i, also prime minister] In the admired figures."49 assessingthiscozy relationship, basic intensely debate is whetherMarcos evergenuinelyadopted question thatobservers or the reform agendas of the World Bank, the IMF, and his technocrates, whetherhe instead merelyused theiragendas as a means of aggrandizing his own regime.There is no question thathe gave the Pentagon full and institutions thetechrunofthebases-but did he givethemultilateral nocratsfull run of the economy? Broad, in her analysisof two World Bank loans made between I979 and i982 (a structural adjustmentloan for the industrialsectorand an between apex loan for the financialsector),stressesa unityof interests Marcos and "the corps of Western-educatedtechnocratswho underand of pinned [him]" (p. i6). She also assertsthe strength the technocrats the World Bank within the Marcos regime, when, for example, she writes:"As earlyas mid-ig8i, Marcos announced,'I'm going to sit back run things'as a follow-through World Bank on and let the technocrats suggestionsthat its favored technocratsbe accorded hegemonic posiBut it is a mistake to tions-political as well as economic" (pp. I7677). take at face value-as Broad apparentlydoes-Marcos's public stateEven if we know that Marcos ments of deferenceto the technocrats.50 it to was trying please international to creditors, is incorrect assume that he was theirlapdog. chroniclesthe efforts the World Bank and the IMF of Broad carefully to orientPhilippine policy-makingtoward the exportof manufactured to contribution drawing attention in goods, and she makes an important the criticalrole thattheseinstitutions of play in the formulation domestic however, she relies excessivelyon one key depolicy.5'Unfortunately, marcation as she tries to explain the dynamics of economic policy49 William H. Overholt, for "Pressures and Policies:Prospects CoryAquino's Philippines," and a in Carl H. Lande, ed., Rebuilding Nation:Philippine Policy(WashChallenges American D.C.: WashingtonInstitute Press,i987), 98. ington, 50 Two yearslater, in fact,Marcos declared thatthe "KBL [New SocietyMovement,Marmake governmentpolicy" cos's political party]Central Committee,not the technocrats, includedmajor cronies. (Wurfel,237 n. 8). The centralcommittee 51 Broad explainsat the outsetthather primary relianceis upon the "new detheoretical but Development, Evans's influenceis not pendentistas," especiallyPeter Evans's Dependent clearly evident in her analysis.The major weakness of earlier dependencyanalyses, she positionin which it placed the LDC state"(p. i6). But when all is writes,"was the derivative of assertionon "the centrality the state to accusaid and done, Evans's "incontrovertible" mulationon the periphery" 43) seems to have lostout to a focusmore like thatof Cheryl (p. manage to overpowerThird World states.See Evans, Payer, on how externalinstitutions State,and Local Capital (Princeton: DependentDevelopment:The Allianceof Multinational, Fund Monetary PrincetonUniversity Press, 1979); Payer,The Debt Trap: The International and the ThirdWorld(New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1974); and idem, The WorldBank: Review Press,i982). A Critical (New York: Monthly Analysis





making during the Marcos years. This is the struggleof the "transnaversus the "nationtionalist"factionof the stateand of privateinterests Unlike the framework alist" factionof the stateand of privateinterests. of Hawes (and especiallythat of Wurfel and Aquino), her framework As downplays any independentrole forMarcos's own regime interests. is Broad statesher approach, "Policy formulation viewed as emanating of of classes and infromthe interaction interests local transnationalist challenged,with varyingdegrees of success,by ternationalinstitutions, the of understates influence crofactions" i9). This greatly (p. nationalist decision making of the martial law regime. nyism on the economic neitherdoes she successfully While she does not ignorethephenomenon, it incorporate into her framework. The CentralBank, forexample,is describedas"the locus of nationalist power in the Philippine government"(p. I28), because of its resistance resistedIMF presto EOI. During the I970s, she argues,it had successfully because of for sure forimportliberalization, primarily two reasons:first, protectedby import restrictions" "allegiance to national entrepreneurs on increaseditspower. The first and second,because restrictions imports within her theoreticalframework,but the second reason fitssquarely "nationalist"considerations actually raisesquestionsas to how important of were in explainingthe intransigence the Central Bank. The head of in the importcontroloffice, fact,was Marcos's relative;"around [her]," anecodotes."52 explainsone economist,"grew a hostof rent-seeking the Broad's greatest problemis characterizing major cronies.She tries to put themon one side of the divide: vocaltransnationalists-and biggest the of recipients forAmongthemost Herminio especially eign bank loans-were Marcos'sso-calledcronies, In Silverio. addition being to Jr., Disini,EduardoCojuangco, and Ricardo in thesemen createdempiresin favored government contracts, heavily millions dollars of from transnational Disininetted ties. largepartthrough in the deal. Westinghouse hisroleas agentfor Bataannuclear-power-plant to the franchise assemble madeitbigbywinning Philippine ToySilverio a coconut monopoly, depended ota cars.Cojuangco,who created virtual links his abroad.(pp. on diverse transnational to market coconut products
I o6-7)

is to On closer examination,their loyaltyto transnationalism difficult show. Aquino explains thatDisini (who marrieda cousin of First Lady benefited partners) Imelda Marcos and was one of the president's golfing
52 Raul V. Fabella, "Trade and Industry Reformsin the Philippines:Process and Performance," in Manuel F. Montes and Hideyoshi Sakai, Philippine Perspective: Macroeconomic and of Developments Policies(Tokyo: Institute Developing Economies, I989), 193.



froma I975 presidentialdecree imposing a ioo percentimport tax on tobacco filters all companies otherthan Disini's Philippine Tobacco for Filters Corporation.His own firmwas subject to only a io percenttax. "This differential effectively shutdown Disini's competitors, [including] ... a company owned by American and Britishinterests," and enabled Disini to cornergo percentof the local marketfortobacco filters 45). (p. Like Disini, Silverio was basically an isi entrepreneur, producing cars for the domestic market-behind tariff walls that the IMF and World Bank were trying(without much success) to tear down. Cojuangco's United Coconut Oil Mills bought out Cargill's two subsidiariesin the Philippines in I979 (Hawes, 76), and his coconut monopoly faced conin certedoppositionfromthe multilateral institutions the finalyears of the Marcos regime. Broad acknowledges this pressurebut asserts that Cojuangco "would agree with the Bank ... on most other points" (p.

This is not to argue that the cronies are necessarily"nationalist." the Rather,the intentis to highlight seriousproblemswith Broad's centraldemarcationof Philippine stateand society.The croniesmade their millions primarilybecause their intimateties to the Palace opened up some involvingclose links to foreigncapital an array of opportunites, and some involving the takeover and displacement of foreign firms. Their loyalty was not to any particulareconomic strategy, to Marcos but over which he presided.As Weber writes: and the "rent-seeking orgy"53
The patrimonial stateoffers wholerealmoftheruler's the discretion a huntas inggroundforaccumulatingwealth.Wherever traditionaland stereotyped does not impose strict prescription limitations, patrimonialism gives freerein the to theenrichment therulerhimself; courtofficials, of favorites, governors, influencepeddlers,and the great merchantsand mandarins,tax collectors, who function tax-farmers, as The ruler's financiers and creditors. purveyors create new wealth favor and disfavor, grantsand confiscations, continuously it and destroy again.54

nationalist and transnationBroad actuallyadmitsthat"the categories alist are not strictly demarcated; numerous entrepreneurs operated in Disini was likelyjust as happy with the both realms" (p. Io7).55Indeed,
Weber (fn.3), io99; emphasisadded. ProblemswithBroad's nationalist/transnationalist categorization arise not onlywiththe cronies,of course,but also with noncrony businesspeople. Except forthisone acknowledgment that the categoriesare "not strictly demarcated,"she generallyseems to suggestthat mere involvement with foreign capital taintslocal capitaland "tendsto wed themideologifree flowof goods and capital" (p. 7). Interestingly, cally to policies furthering international is one of her keyexamplesofa besiegedeconomicnationalist Hilarion Henares, who she says to withforeign "professed have kepthis handsclean of involvement and corporations foreign
54 55

53 Ibid., 205.





he windfallprofits enjoyed as a "national entrepreneur" displacing forin marketas he was with the "transnationeign firms the tobacco filters alist" kickbacks he received from Westinghouse (Aquino, 59-62). For him, what matteredwas thathe was a "favorite."The TNCS, too, seemed to know the best way to enterthe "huntingground"; as Broad reports, "The cronieswere the mostlogical choice forTNCs' partners joint venin tures" (p. I7I)Broad has to fall back on a crony/noncrony in distinction Ultimately, her discussion of the bailout of crony firmsafterthe financialcrisis of effort thatfueledenormousresentment i98i-an among noncronybusinesspeople."The financialsqueeze," she writes, pushed "transnationalist cronies closer to Marcos while pulling non-cronytransnationalists into the Marcos opposition" (p. 229). One "transnationalist crony"discovered that having ties to Toyota meant littleonce the "ruler's ... disfavor" descended upon his house. For seeminglypersonal reasons, the Palace abandoned Silverio afterthe collapse of his industrialand financialempire in the early ig8os.56 Broad does recognize certainissues thatdivided Marcos from"transtariff reform(p. go) and importliberalinationalist"forces,specifically zation (p. 62). But one study,examiningover a decade of IMF credit to or simplyignored by the Philippine govIMF were oftencircumvented ernment."Two separateagendas are evident:"While the chiefobjective of the IMF was to effectshort-term and structural adjustments ..., it aim was to increaseforeigninflows."57 The IMFseems the government's sponsored tariffreduction program, for example, was undermined in part because specificcorporationswere exempted through presidential to efforts increase the country'stax effort were hindecree; similarly, Economist dered in part by tax incentives grantedto Marcos associates.58 Raul Fabella explains further:
markets"(p. I I 5). In fact,Henares has long had close linkageswithU.S. capital,thoughthat seems to have had littleimpacton the nationalist views he regularly expressesin his popular newspaper column. Henares's business interests discussed in William J. Pomeroy,An are American Made Tragedy: Nco-Colonialism Dictatorship thePhilippines and in (New York: International Publishers,I974), 58. 56 Some speculatethatSilverio'sfall from grace was relatedto displeasureover the course of a romancebetweenSilverio'sson and Imee Marcos,the daughterof the FirstCouple. As Weber (fn.3) writes:"Because of its verynaturepatrimonialism was the specific locus forthe riseof favoritism-ofmen close to the rulerwho had tremendous power,but always were in danger of sudden,dramaticdownfallforpurelypersonalreasons"(p. io88). 57 Mark Thompson and Gregory Slayton, "An Essay on CreditArrangements betweenthe
Philippine Review of Economics and

the Philippines, notes a consistentpattern in which "the 'dictates' of the

IMF and the Republic of the Philippines: I970-I983," Business 22, nos. I and 2 (I985), 59-8I, at 6o and 78. 58 Montes(fn. 3I) I05, I I0-I I, I34.




to Technocrats were giventhe prerogative formulate rhetorize and the public agenda in the formof economicand development plans which loans.The political thenallowed formed basisforforeign the leadership of theunconstrained introduction exceptions madecomplete that mockery and of ofthespirit letter theplans.59 The World Bank and the IMF were more comfortable with the technocratsbut ended up providingenormoussupportto the On the whole, Marcos usually managed to "take the money and run." As formerCentral Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros told Broad, "The more moneythey[the Bank and Fund] bringin here,the better"(p. 6i). induced reform Certain elementsof theexternally agendas were initiated in the early i98os, when the scarcityof funds on internationalcapital markets increased the leverage of multilateralinstitutions.61But by no means was there "a reshaping of the entire Philippine political economy," as Broad claims. First, even in the depths of the financialcrisis afterI983, Marcos successfully resistedthe dissolutionof the exportcrop monopolies (Wurfel,292). Second, as long as externalfundswere readily available, therewas never any need to make a comprehensivepush for it export-oriented industrialization; was much more expedientsimplyto of adopt the strategy "debt-drivengrowth." In any case, the "exportof the orientedstrategy did not represent interests any sociallysignif... and the technocrats lacked clout. Over time it became inicant class,"62 creasinglyevident that "the agenda was ultimatelyset by business and closerto the Palace."63 political interests

of These Palace interests, course,were primarily Marcos, his cronies,and his relatives.The cronieswere "a mixed bag, includingnot only relatives of Ferdinand and Imelda, but favouredoligarchsand quite a few 'new
were manyinstances when the more 'irrational,' 'inefficient,' were countenancedor accommodated at timesblatantly corrupt, aspectsof the dictatorship its by these institutions, particularly net lending operationsand cronybail-outs"; de Dios, in Dios (fn. I4), I22. "The Erosion of the Dictatorship," Javate-de 6, See Mario B. Lamberte,"Financial Liberalization:What Have We Learnt?" Journal of
59 Fabella (fn.52), I 97. 60 As de Dios writes:"There

Philippine Development i2, no. 2 (I985), 274-89; and Florian Alburo and Geoffrey Shepherd, "Trade Liberalization Experience in the Philippines, i960-84," Working Paper No. 86-07 of (Manila: PhilippineInstitute DevelopmentStudies,i986). While both studiescite imporin had tant initiatives the early i98os, theyalso show that liberalizationefforts ultimately

while Alburo littlesuccess.Lamberte diagnosesthe "failureof recentliberalization efforts," and Shepherdexplain thatthe "i983 economiccrisis... effectively abortedthesefundamenstructure and commercialpolicy"(p. 37). See also Montes (fn. 3 I), I I 0tal changes in tariff
I I.

De Dios (fn. 6o), I I9-20.


De Dios (fn. 5), II 5.





men.' "64Disini is the classic new man, a virtualunknown prior to acquiringa near monopolyof thetobaccofilter market.By contrast, cronies Roberto S. Benedictoand particularly Cojuangco emerged fromsolidly oligarchicbackgrounds. "Crony" is used to describethose whose positionsare particularly favored by the currentregime,regardlessof theirorigins.An "oligarch" may not be a current cronybut in eithercase has already establishedhis or her fortune earlierdispensations.65 Lopezes are an example of in The noncrony oligarchs;theydepended heavilyupon the statein the creation of theirdiversified empire,but since theywere not dependentupon any particularregime,it is probably not proper, at any point, to describe them as "crony."66 Upon the declaration of martial law, Marcos unleashed a rhetoricalattack on the "oligarchs,"but, as noted above, his targetswere selective.In the course of his regime,both "old oligarchs" and "new men" gained "crony"status, and theywere sometimesreferred as to collectively the "new oligarchy." A degree of "social mobility," dynamismin elite composition, an or is of important characteristic cronyism and underlinesthe patrimonialnatureof state-oligarchy relationsin the Philippines.As Weber explains: Patriarchal is patrimonialismmuchmoretolerant thanfeudalism toward socialmobility theacquisition wealth. and of The patrimonial rulerdoes notlike independent economic and socialpowers.... [B]uthe also does notsupport status barriers.67 Because of the steadystreamof those with newfoundwealth,therefore, it is difficult reduce the Philippine oligarchyto a certainnumber of to old families.Each presidency can createa new set of cronies,and a presdifferent thatof Marcos can be expectedto have idencyas qualitatively as a particularly on stronginfluence elite composition.68
Anderson(fn. IO), 22. when he writes "oligarchand crony"as an "elite cleavof matters Wurfelthusconfuses age on economicissues" (p. 238). A clearerway to expressthisdivisionis "favored"(crony) or versus"nonfavored" "less-favored" (businessperson). 66 McCoy explains that the Lopezes achieved national prominenceafter independence, buildingon prewarprovincialwealth thatwas liquidated duringthe war. In both the preof ... and postwarphases of theiraccumulation,"the viability all Lopez investments has and dependedupon stateregulation licensing.... Don Eugenio [Lopez] used capitalto secure in in politicalprotection, investing politicalcampaigns and taking his profits favors"; see In effect, and independent societal McCoy (fn.30), 21-23. theyraided thestatefroma strong base. 67 Weber (fn.3), 1102. 68 tenurein officeand managed to grab controlof military, Marcos had unprecedented functions thathad previously been dispersedamong manyrivalcenjudicial,and legislative availableto thoseoligarchs"on theouts" tersof power.The measureof protection previously therefore disappearedin 1972. See Anderson(fn. IO), 12, 22, on how the declarationof marof tial law upsetthe "rule of law" thathad long guided the system oligarchichegemony.
64 65



The basis of cronyselectionwas not entrepreneurial skill, of course, but loyaltyand long-standingpersonal connections.69 Benedicto was a fraternity brother,Rodolfo Cuenca and Disini were golfing buddies (Aquino, 39), and Benjamin Romualdez was a brother-in-law. Marcos and Cojuangco shared an enmitywith the rival side of the Cojuangco clan (thatof Corazon Cojuangco Aquino and her husband Benigno) that seems to have forgeda close and enduringpersonalbond. To the extent thatthe cronieswere "new men," or to the extentthattheyrelied exclusivelyupon Marcos for state benefits necessaryto open up a particular "huntingground," the crucial patrimonialelementof loyaltyand "personal dependence" was largelyassured.7o Perhaps as part of Marcos's effortsto curb any tendencytoward independence,few cronieswere able to combine theiraccess to officially granted privilegeswith the formal assumptionof official positions.7' By farthe greateststridestoward independencewere achieved by the First Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, who was concurrently minister of human settlements, governorof Metro Manila, and roving diplomat (oftenon quite sensitivemissions). Palace insiders,Wurfel writes,describedthe First Couple's relationship a standoff "as between two warringcamps,in which the battlegrounds were appointments, government investment contracts, media treatment, priority the and opportunities, in allocationof funds"(p. 241). Whateverthe preciseoriginsof her power,72 thereis no questionthatat some pointafterI972 she was able to establish a relativelyautonomous power base within the regime. In Weber's words, the "boundaries" of her official positionswere "frequently indeand the positions themselveswere treated "as a personal terminate," right."Among government agencies,much of the jurisdictionallimitationof thepowersof office came from"the competingeconomicinterests
69 The FirstLady had a special explanation forthe successof croniesand relatives:"Some are smarter thanothers"(Wurfel,237). of 7?On the importance "personaldependence" to a patrimonial ruler,see Weber (fn. 3), 71 For example,Cojuangco, Disini, Silverio,Rodolfo Cuenca (the construction magnate), and AntonioFloirendo(the "banana king") did not hold important official posts.Benedicto headed the quasi-publicPhilippineSugar Commission,the centralagencyof the sugar monopoly.Major exceptions the rule include GeronimoVelasco (energyminister) to and Juan Ponce Enrile (defenseminister).By the early i98os Benedicto,Cojuangco, and Floirendo were made regionalpartychairmenof Marcos's KilusangBagongLipunan, or New Society Movement(Wurfel,237). See also de Dios (fn.5), I I4. 72 According to a former Marcos adviser,Imelda would threaten Marcos withexposure(of intimatedetailsof life in the Palace) or a "big public divorce,and Marcos never wanted to call her bluff."Interview, Adrian Cristobal,former Special Assistant Special Studies (to for PresidentMarcos),Junei9, i989. Wurfeldescribes as a relationship "mutual blackmail" it of An embroidered (p. 24i). is analysisof the relationship foundin SterlingSeagrave,The MarcosDynasty (New York: Harper and Row, i988), chap. io.






In officials."73 thiscompetition, FirstLady the of the various patrimonial As oftenemerged triumphant. Montes explains: ... to practice forthepresident requirethatministries It becamenormal The funds thatwere on current budget. savings their attaina io percent thoseof the First saved were used forspecialprojects, notably thereby ministries ofthereasons suchrestrictions learn for only Lady.The affected informally.74 Some observershave tried to determinewhether Marcos promoted at cronyism the outsetor whetherthe regimeonlydegeneratedinto cronyismat a laterstage.Wurfel,forexample,characterizesthe earlymarwhich by the late I970s tial law years as "authoritarian-technocratic," had been graduallyreplaced by a "neopatrimonial"mode (pp. 325, 331). At anotherpoint,however,he writesthattherewas "a slight[and temin porary]shift... toward the technocrats i98i," in part because Virata (p. was named primeminister 254). to goals As Wurfelshows,it is verydifficult separateout technocratic and patrimonialgoals. Commentingon Wurfel's thesis,Marcos's chief Adrian Cristobal remarked that "the intentwas basipolitical theorist cally the same all along. You build on your success." Consistentwith Belinda Aquino's many accounts of regime plunder, he noted that the cronies"had been with Marcos fromtheverystart. They were just waitCristobal, however, explained that Wurfel's ing for the opportunity." mode" was also present from the begin"'authoritarian-technocratic' ning: Marcos was "always receptiveto good ideas," such as administraand more rational the tivereform, developmentof bureaucratic capacity, Marcos "believed he could have a vision development planning.In short, forsociety... and stillloot it. I do not findthatirrational."75 Wurfelis likelyoverstatTechnocrat-crony disputesnotwithstanding, ing matterswhen he describesthe regimeas "an unstablemix of patrimonialism and rule by technocrats"(Wurfel,325; emphasis added). In fact,Marcos was generallyveryadept at managing the admixture.He Virata and yetensure the primacyof his own could promotetechnocrat
73 Weber (fn.3), 1029; limiemphasisin original.He writesthat"thisquasi-jurisdictional results fromthe competing of economicinterests the tationof the powersof office primarily officials." variouspatrimonial 74 Montes(fn.31), io8. 75 Cristobal an for professional technician the state-owned (fn.72). Similarly, (anti-Marcos) of PhilippineNational Oil Company,decriesthereturn unbridledpatronagewithinhis comfor panysince i986 and looks back withan ironicsenseof fondness what one Marcos crony, Geronimo Velasco, did to professionalize their operations.Unlike the leadership under matter littleand "the envelopewitha recommenqualifications Aquino, whereprofessional dation froma senatoris key," he exclaimed,"at least Velasco built up somethingworth interview, April 2, i989. plundering!";anonymous




patrimonial objectives.76 a formerPalace insider explains: Marcos As would utilize the skillsof competentofficials at the same time tryto but limit their "political clout" and keep them "segmented ... in their In fields."77 the same way thatWeber allows fora bureaucraticrationalization of patrimonialleadership" thatdoes not underminethe essential natureof thatleadership,78 can say thatMarcos's earlyefforts buone at reaucraticreform(Wurfel, I35-38) only streamlinedhis plunder of the state.An importantconsiderationin the relativeportionsof the "mix," it seems, is a regime's securityof tenure; if there is a feeling that the regimewill endure into the long term,thereis no necessity maximize to gains in the short term. After the declaration of martial law Marcos likely felt secure enough in his position to know that he, personally, would be able to reap the benefits a better-run of stateapparatus. If therewas simultaneousbureaucraticreform and patrimonialplunder, how is one to understandthe conceptsof stateand regime? Hawes makes a valuable contribution asserting"the necessity clearlydifin of betweenthe stateand the regime"in the Philippinecase (pp. ferentiating I52-53). Alongside his problematicdefinitionof the class basis of the Philippine state,he demonstrates veryclearlyhow "the Marcos regime used the powers of the state to further own economic and political its interests"(p. I34). Unfortunately, however,there is a gap between his and his usage of the term "regime," as well as a difficulty definition in his conceptualization the Philippinestate. of Hawes introducesthe conceptof "regime" fromFernando Cardoso's work on authoritarian regimesof Latin America (p. 49). Cardoso's definitionis concernedprimarily with institutions: I rulesthatlinkthemainpolitical By "regime" meantheformal institutions to executive thejudiciary, party to (legislature theexecutive, and system to themall), as well as the issue of the political natureof the ties citizens between and rulers or (democratic, oligarchic, totalitarian, whatever).79
76 Indeed, when in i98i externalfundsbecame harderto come by,it was usefulforMarcos to promotechieftechnocrat Virata. Wurfel should not take this as an indicationthat the technocrats were temporarily edgingout the cronies(p. 254). The same yeara more ideological technocrat, Economic PlanningMinisterGerardoSicat,was "firedforraisingobjections to the costly projectsof theFirstLady"; see Fabella (fn.52), 197. 77 Interview, Francisco S. Tatad, former information minister (under PresidentMarcos), August 22, i989. In Weber's words,"The ruler'spersonaldiscretion delimitsthe jurisdiction of his officials"; Weber (fn.3), 1029. 78 Weber (fn.3), iQ98; see also p. 1028. 79 Cardoso, "On the Characterization Authoritarian of Regimes in Latin America," in David Collier,ed., TheNew AuthoritarianismLatinAmerica in (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress, 1979), 38.





Based on thisdefinition, one asks what kind of regimeit is, the answer if might be "an authoritarian regime." In a patrimonialsystem, however, where "the ruler's purelypersonalabilityto assert his will is to a very high degree decisive,"8o such an answer may be correctbut insufficient. In the case at hand, it is important specify well thatwe are discussto as ing theMarcos regime.This is in facthow Hawes uses the term,even if it does go beyond Cardoso's more institutionalist definition. When he writesof "personalized rule" and remarksthat "Marcos was hardlythe typical'modern'authoritarian ruler,"Hawes is speakingof a regimethat has at least as much in common with Latin American caudillos as with the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimesthatCardoso is discussing.8' Peralbeit succinct,definition the termcomes of haps the most appropriate, to and fromWurfel: "'Regime' refers both institutions those who wield power withinthem" (p. 75 n. i). Hawes concludes that "the In his discussionof the coconut industry, power of the statewas used forindividual politicalgoals" (p. 82). In his on he second case study, the sugar industry, shows that"the vast bulk of the surpluswent ... to the personaland politicalneeds of the FirstFamand that Marcos was able to "break the power of the preily" (p. I28) is martiallaw sugar bloc" (p. 98). The role of individualinterests clear: in which Marcos weakened old elites"was to createmonopolies one way to control the export of coconuts and sugar, place these monopolies under the controlof presidentialfriends, and use the monopolies firmly as a vehicleto accumulate surplus. ... [They were] a foundationfor his regime" (p. I27). essentialto note both the personalistic and the instituIt is therefore tional aspects of the regime. As Wurfel explains in his most extensive the of nature of treatment the subject of patrimonialism, authoritarian the Marcos regime lies betweencomparativecases of more thoroughly and more thoroughly bureaucratic authoritarianism: personalistic was to The Philippine and modern be called system toocomplex toonearly Nor on simply "patrimonial." was itspowerbased primarily an effective
Weber (fn.3), 1042; emphasisin original. While caudillosimposedpersonalordersbydecree,Cardoso explains,mostmodernmilinstitutional basis of power; Cardoso (fn.79), 35-36. have a more bureaucratic, itary regimes The polityand economyfromwhich the Marcos regimeemerged is larger and seemingly and more institutionalized complexthatthatof mostso-called"caudillos" of modern Latin caudillo it easier to draw comparisonswithpersonalistic America.Nevertheless, is probably regimes(such as thatof Somoza) than with the bureaucratic-authoritatian regimesof the ruled as an inSouthernCone (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay),where the military and differences the similarities stitution. It would be a valuable projectto explore further betweenMarcos and themoderncaudillos.



bureaucracy.Thus the most accurate label forthe martiallaw regime was "patrimonial authoritarianism,"or perhaps "neopatrimonial"-highly personalized forits size but more institutionalized than an Ethiopian monarchyor a Dominican or Nicaraguan dictatorship. 153)82 (p.

It is hard to reconcileHawes's excellentdata on agriculturalexport industries,which point clearly to regime accumulation,and his quite discussion,which posits the "relativeautonomy" of abstracttheoretical the state.He writesthat"in additionto being powerfuland autonomous, the state in the Philippineshas indeed been an arena for class conflict"
(p. 53). Another very general assertion is that "the state is a class state,

defendingthe interests the bourgeoisieas a whole; however,the state of is relatively autonomousin the sensethatit can take and has taken strong stateaction detrimental certainsegmentsof the bourgeoisie" (p. I36). to Hawes's example of such a "relatively autonomous" action is the state's "attack on the isi bourgeoisie"(p. I41), which in factnever occurred (as discussedabove). But when he taps his own data, he gives clear-cutdemonstration the state's"coerciveand administrative of powers" being used forprivateends (p. 82, also p. I53). Given the weak separationof the "private" and "official"spheres,it becomes veryproblematicto assertthe "strengthening the Philippine of state"and its"insulationfromthedemands of civilsociety," when in fact thosewho were supposedlyinsulated(the technocrats) "had no power to resist demands of Marcos and his cronies"(p. I44). It is more accurate the to understandthe plunderousactivity Marcos and his croniesas espeof ciallypowerful"demands of civilsociety." The Marcos regimeembodied potentsocietalinterests thatseized controlof the stateand proceeded to centralize access to that state. There was heightened state capacity throughbureaucraticreformand the use of technocratic expertise,but those technocrats themselveswere not autonomous relationto regime in Given the overall strength "the demands of Marcos and his interests.83 of to cronies,"it is difficult understandhow therecould have been signifi82 If one were to try to determine where Philippinecase is situatedamid more the precisely extreme cases of personalistic bureaucratic and one authoritarianism, would need to conduct arenasof statepolicy.Withineach arena,it would be carefulcomparative analysisof specific to whethertherewas any significant necessary determine change over time in the degree of and "private"spheres.Obviously,such an effort beyondthe scope is separationof "official" of thisarticle. 83 State autonomyis definedabove (fn. 28). State capacity, KathrynSikkink writes,"involves the administrative and coerciveabilitiesof the stateapparatus to implementofficial goals"; Sikkink, "State Autonomyand DevelopmentalistPolicy in Argentinaand Brazil: Frondizi and KubitschekAdministrations at Compared" (Paper presented the Latin American Studies AssociationCongress,i988), 3, quoted with author'spermission).In a system withclear-cutpatrimonial thisdefinition needs to includenot only"official elements, goals," but also the personalgoals of the politicalleadership.





of were cant "strengthening thePhilippinestate."Other societalinterests indeed excluded,but thatdoes not point to the existenceof a "relatively autonomous" state.84 stemsfromintroducingnotionsfroma buHawes's major difficulty reaucratic state into his analysis of a state that exhibitsenduringpatriHis monial characteristics. discussionof the state,at points,seems to
presupposetheconceptual separation the "state,"as an abstractbearer of of sovereign prerogativesand the creator of legal norms,from all personal authority individuals.These conceptual distinctionsare necessarilyreof mote fromthe natureof pre-bureaucratic, especiallyfrompatrimonialand of feudal,structures authority.85

Hawes's empiricaldata, however,lead him to downplaythis"conceptual

separation." His emphasis on regime use of state power (as well as his use

how remotethisconcepof theterm"quasi statemonopolies") highlights oftenis fromPhilippinereality(p. I28). tual distinction Although Hawes does not acknowledge it, the sugar and coconut tradingmonopoliesprovideexcellentexamplesof the patrimonialnature of the Philippine state.Weber assertsthat under patrimonialism, "only oftenreach a veryhigh level of development."Among these typesare "politicallyorientedcapitalism" and "capitalistwholesale trade"; trade monopolies,he writes,are especiallyimportantin the development of centralizedpatrimonialism.86 of With theestablishment the coconutlevyin I97I, government levies were turnedover to "private organizationsthat claim[ed] to represent ... the entireindustry" (Hawes, 69). Aftermartiallaw, the levy became more onerous,and Marcos "favorites," notablyCojuangco and Enrile, took controlof the levy proceeds (and, by the end of the deeffectively
84 A largelyparallel line of analysis is found in Haggard's insightful discussion of the that"technocrats natureof "weak authoritarian maygain autonomyfrom regimes";he states under authoritarian interest rule,but theydo not necessarily group and legislative pressures stake ... in the crony fromthe executive."This executivehas a "personal gain independence enterprise"; Haggard (fn.48), 217-i8. attention to Of the worksdiscussedin thisarticle,Hawes's book alone devotessignificant of assertsthatin theearly statetheory. Wurfel, But too,in his occasionalmention thesubject, yearsof martiallaw the statehad "autonomyfromthe dominantclass" (p. 333) and had the "capabilityto make and implementpolicy" in a way that was unresponsive"to interests of outside the state structure" 334). Only later did the "state [serve] the interests the (p. clients-the essenceofneopatrimonialism" 333). This "essence and (p. superpatron hisclosest I fromthe beginning. of neopatrimonialism,"am arguing,was present 85 Weber (fn.3), 998; emphasisadded. 86 and 1092. If Weber is the guide, this effectively refutes Weber (fn. 3), 1:240, 3:i09i that"a 'rent-seeking' Montes's(fn.26) assertion as economycannotreadilybe classified capfroma "feudal social basis italist"(p. 65). In Montes'sanalysis(fn.31) the Philippinessuffers of politicalpower" (p. 135).

certain types of capitalism are able to develop ... [and] these forms ...



cade, of the milling and export of most coconut products) in order to and manufacturing build a diversified agricultural, financial, empire. By i983 their United Coconut Planters Bank had assumed control of the San Miguel Corporation."Official"powers of revcountry's largestfirm, enue collectionwere investedin "private"hands,and the resultis a clear indicationof what enormousopportunities patrimonialaccumulation for can come fromlong-term, unchallengedaccess to the Philippine state.

The declarationof martiallaw signaled Marcos's attemptto move from a decentralized to a centralized patrimonialpolity.The most colorful of description thisprocesscomes fromAnderson: Don Ferdinand be seenas theMaster of can Fromonepoint view, Cacique in he or Master Warlord, that pushedthedestructive oftheold order logic In to its naturalconclusion. place of dozens of privatized"security in a NationalConstabulary; place of personal guards," singleprivatized of a instead pliablelocal judges,a client armies, personal Army; Supreme of a Court;instead myriad pocketand rotten boroughs, pocketor rotten and country, managedbycronies, hitmen, flunkies.87 Marcos shared the patrimonialruler's dislike of "independent economic and social powers." He faced "a property-owning, especially... stratumof ... subjects[thathad] easily monopolized the land-owning local offices,"88 and he was determined to undercut those wellentrenchedoligarchicforcesthatmightstand in the way of his centralizing agenda. Yet at the same time, the very fact that they controlled crucial independentresourcesmeant thathe could not affordto antagonize themas a group. In a world of mobile capital,Marcos knew thathe could not "induce business performance"if he acted too generallyand As too rashlyagainsthis rivals.89 mentionedabove, he had to move selechis tivelyagainstthosewho most threatened regime. of Weber explains the classic conflict "patrimonialruler versus local lords": of The continuous struggle thecentral powerwiththevarious centrifugal a for local powerscreates specific whenthepatproblem patrimonialism
88 Weber (fn.3), 1Q40. Anderson(fn. io), 20. The idea of inducement comes fromCharles Lindblom's discussionof "the privileged thereare nonepositionof business."Althoughhe focuseson advanced capitalist countries, thelessparallelsto be foundin Marcos's situation after1972. Especiallyin the beginningthe ruler's household controlledbut a portionof the national economy,and Marcos needed to investors' in ensure(domesticand foreign) confidence generalbusinessconditions. See LindPolitical-Economic blom, Politicsand Markets:The World's System (New York: Basic Books, 87 89 1977),


quote from p.






local patrimonial powers.90

powerresources-hislanded property, ruler, withhis personal rimonial and of and personally loyalofficials soldiers-conothersources revenue as ... not fronts a meremassofsubjects butwhenhe stands one landlord of authority their who landlords, ... wieldan autonomous ... aboveother these ruler cannotalwaysdaretodestroy autonomous own.... Thepatrimonial

As we have seen,Marcos's own "personalpower resources"were greatly capital inflows.Using these resources,he augmented by international attemptedto "centralize ratherthan disband the national network of relations-to become 'supreme godfather'" (Wurfel, I52). patron-client His immediate dissolutionof Congress, of course, had undercut rival patronage networks.And just as Weber notes that "the 'fatherof the people' .. . is the ideal of the patrimonialstates,"9'so the First Couple as to attempted promotethemselves "Father and Mother of the Nation" in barrio-level youthorganizations(Aquino, 86). destruction But Marcos was never able to contemplatethe systematic "in of independentpower bases. Nor did he ever show an interest upsetWhile the regimehad a major influtingthe establishedsocial order."92 faced a fullelite,it ultimately ence on the compositionof the country's scale resurgenceof rival centersof power. As we shall see, opposition
from these forces began to build in the early i98os, and in i986 they

in contributed a major way to his downfall. A closeranalysisof exactlyhow Marcos moved againstthe Lopez clan his in I972 highlights concernnot to antagonize capital holders in genof eral. The expropriations the Lopez newspaper and televisionstudios were "crudely" accomplished,and the facilitiessoon found their way into the hands of Benjamin Romualdez and Benedicto. But in the case of the Manila electriccompany,the Lopez's Meralco, "'Marcos knew thatit would be scandalous to use the same crude methods.'"93 It was a some of them foreign corporationwith twelve thousand stockholders, Marcos effected thisexpropriation arresting one of the Locreditors. by hostage to force compliance, Marcos pez sons, and "with an effective used the fullresourcesof the stateto break the Lopez hold over Meralco By step-by-step." late 1973, utilizing such techniques as cuts in power of ratesand withholding credit,"Marcos gained controlof U.S. $5.7 million in Lopez assetsforonly$I,500." The holdingsof smallerstockholders,however,were not absorbed by the regime.94
9?Weber (fn.3), I055; 91Ibid., II07.



McCoy (fn.30),
Ibid., 45-48.

Anderson (fn. IO), 22. of MS p. 45, quotingan affidavit Oscar Lopez.



Similarly,landowners tended to be punished only to the extentthat theyrepresented threatto the regime.As Wurfelexplains: a function to strike blow at was a Land reform's mostimportant political thosewealthy eliteswho formed coreof his political the the"oligarchy," The Aquino estates wereamongthefirst be expropriated. opposition. to lost keeninterest after owners morethan of The president his originally hectares beendispossessed. i66) had one hundred (p. Moreover,by excludingsugar and otherexportcrops fromland reform, Marcos was being "cautious not to antagonizeall landed wealth at once" The Marcos regimealso trodsoftly thearea of fiscalreform order in in to avoid antagonizingpowerfulbusinessinterests. Authoritarian government was unable to overcome the state's historicalinabilityto tax the monied classes: real property and personal income tax rates remained low, and-just as in the pre-martiallaw years-indirect taxescontinued to supply70-80 percentof totaltax revenueforthe state.The "new government could codifyand simplifytax laws and administration"and granttax and tariff exemptionsto its allies, but "it did not have enough the power to threaten economicpower of thegroups thathad been dominant in the pre-martial-law period."95 And, as discussed above, governbehind which isi ment policies did littleto underminethe trade barriers thrived. entrepreneurs Until roughly i98i much of the pre-martiallaw elite had little to complain about. Besides those who were excluded outright,a second gruop of the pre-martiallaw elitefamilies"managed to hold theirown, and a third,"favored" group expanded its business interests considerThere must have been resentment the First Couple's reported at ably.96 "squeeze" of businesspeople(Wurfel, 137), which was apparentlymost rampant against the more politicallyvulnerableFilipino-Chinese business community.And when nonfavoredfirmswent bust, the regime seemed to have a "kick 'em when they'redown" approach to corporate acquisition: in the course of the I970s seven banks-all in a weak position-ended up in cronyhands. But theseactionswere largelyselective. In termsof overall businessconfidence, high commodityprices and external funds promoted respectable growth rates through the I 970s.
95Montes (fn.31), 96, I 4-I5, I20. at II7, Attempts a morecentralizedpatrimonial polity, then,did not resolvethe revenuedilemmasfacedin thepre-martial law period,when many oligarchicpatronscompetedin the electoralarena. 96 John F. Doherty,"Who ControlsthePhilippineEconomy:Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others," in Belinda A. Aquino, ed., Cronies and Enemies:The Current Philippine Scene, PhilippineStudies Occasional Paper No. 5 (Honolulu: PhilippineStudies Program,Center forAsian and PacificStudies,University Hawaii, i982), 30. of

(p. I 67).





the Moreover,whethercronyor noncrony, oligarchyas a whole was no doubt appreciativeof how the regime had greatlycurbed popular demands. Significant elite oppositionto Marcos did, however, become evident after the financialcrisis of i98i, when a prominentFilipino-Chinese withoutsettling businessmanfledthecountry nearly$85 millionin debts. closed down, and creditbecame verytight. Several financialinstitutions A massive Central Bank bailout of failed cronyfirmsprovoked a great and elite coalitionbased on clear difdeal of resentment, a suprafamilial of ferences economic interest developed among "nonfavored"and "lessfavored" businesspeople. The most prominent business organization seekingpoliticalchange was the Makati BusinessClub, formedin i982.97 Marcos was, in fact,facing increasingopposition frommuch of the "old oligarchy"of pre-martiallaw origins.In theirown analysis,crony economic opportunities. excesses were largelyto blame for constricted First, the bailout of crony firmscontributedheavily to the scarcityof of credit.Second, growinginternational perceptions unbridledcronyism exacerbated the regime's problems in dealing with increasinglytight global credit markets. Especially after the assassination of Benigno thatcame in itswake, international Aquino in i983 and the capital flight lost theirfaithin Marcos; particularly creditors damaging was the falsiof reservefigures the Central Bank. "An imporfication international by tantreasonthebig businesssectorrejectedthe Marcos regimewas itsloss with international creditorsand consequent inability"to of credibility the Because manufurnish economywith essentialexternalresources.g8 interests remainedheavilydependenton importedinputs,and facturing hence foreignexchange,the economywent into a tailspin.Later, many members of the Makati Business Club became key of the influential backersof the presidential campaign of Corazon Aquino in i986; significantly,one of her successfultacticswas to call "a boycottof Marcoscontrollednewspapers,governmentand crony-ownedbanks, and the San Miguel commercialempire" (Wurfel,300). Many membersof thisanti-Marcoscoalitionassumed key postsin the Once in power,theseoligarchshad an opportuAquino administration. attackon thoseaspectsofthepoliticaleconomy nityto launch a concerted thathad long retardedthe developmentof more advanced formsof capitalismin the Philippines.In Weber's terms,"politicallyorientedcapito 6o), Broad attempts link part of this elite oppositionto the 97 See de Dios (fn. 02-3. class" (p. I05; see also p. 3). But a close examinationof eitherthe "nationalentrepreneurial or "bourgeoisbombers,"to whom she is referring, othermajor groups,especiallythe influentialMakati BusinessClub, makes thisimplausible. 98 De Dios (fn.5,), I33.



talism" and "capitalistwholesale trade" had flourishedunder Marcos, but otherformsof capitalismhad been hinderedby "the wide scope for and the expressionof purelypersonal whims on the actual arbitrariness partof the rulerand the membersof his administrative staff."99 WurAs ventureswere "less stable" than fel pointsout, croniesin manufacturing those who were given "control over marketingor processinga major crop" (p. 237). And withinthe export-crop monopolies,therewere often thatwere attempted(Hawes, 76, limitsto the typesof economic activity i02-3). There were, indeed, some relatively activities taken sophisticated over by the cronies, including commercial banks and the San Miguel on Corporation.But while a fewenterprises prospered, cronyenterprises to financialdisasterin the whole contributed significantly the country's beasts that in number between I972 and i984, were patronage-ridden soaked up 30 percentof public expenditures the late Marcos years.'0' by Marcos's attemptat centralized patrimonialismled, in the end, to an in and inconsistency"102 the unprecedenteddegree of "unpredictability of functioning the stateapparatus,as "personal whims" triumphed. Did the oligarchsof the Aquino administration, then,attemptto create "the politicaland proceduralpredictability, indispensableforcapitalist development,which is providedby the rationalrules of modern bureauTo at cratic administration"?103 be sure, there were importantefforts to as liberalizationand privatization, well as major initiatives regain the "ill-gotten"wealth of the Marcos cronies.But on the whole, theseefforts one failed.104And more fundamentally, can stillsay thatpoliticaladmin99Weber (fn. 3), I:239. See the influential whitepaper of theUniversity thePhilippinesschoolof economics; 1oo of Emmanuel S. de Dios, ed., An Analysis thePhilippine EconomicCrisis: A Workshop of Report

the early ig8os.I00 State-owned enterprises, which had more than tripled

of (Quezon City: University the PhilippinesPress,i984). 1ol Stephan Haggard, "The Philippines:PickingUp afterMarcos," in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Promiseof Privatization (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, i988), 93, 97. Withintheseenterprises, public-private the distinction often was blurredbeyondrecognition; as Haggard reports, "severalmanagersof state-owned priorto a i985 SupremeCourt ruling, even denied thattheywere public officials!" 95). See also Weber's discussion enterprises (p. in (fn.3), I097, of the extensive growthof stateenterprises patrimonial polities.

Weber (fn. 3),




ISI monopolistseffectively controlthe policy-making agenda in the Aquino regime,


Ibid.; emphasis in original.

international institutions seekingto push rationalizing liberalizingstrategies or such as industrialization in the queer positionof not havinga clear constitare export-oriented
uency with political influence. . .. [T]he free-trade ideology ...

traditional elite (now holding key positionsin the government) who have been accustomedto privileged, in rent-producing positions the economy.(de Dios [fn.5], I40-41) As early as i988 Haggard concluded that "barriersto rapid privatization emerged,and has implementation lagged behind stateintentions." lightof subsequentexperience,this In See conclusioncould now be statedeven more forcefully. Haggard (fn. Ioi), 92. EconomistGustav Ranis, a longtimeconsultant Philippineeconomic issues,wrote in on

is being resisted by the





is istration oftentreatedas a personalaffair. Patrimonialfeatures endure, of in as thehighly arbitrary personaldiscretion oligarchscurrently power largely determinesthe assignmentof privilegesgranted by the state. Once again, as in thepre-martial law years,a decentralizedpolitysimply gives more oligarchsa chance to claw forthe bootyof state.If Weber is correct,more advanced formsof capitalism will not flourishuntil the Philippine state achieves some minimal level of success in supplying trustworthiness objectivity the legal order, and ... and of "continuity, the rational, predictable functioningof the legal and administrative agencies."1o5 As long as oligarchs and cronies continue to plunder the to state,it is difficult see how such successwill be achieved.

"What are we in power for?" respondeda pre-martiallaw senatorwhen reporters asked him about corruption charges(Wurfel,ioo). Like many oligarchsand cronies in the Philippine state,this politician knew very between "official"and "private" spheres well that the weak distinction means ample opportunity plunder of the state. Marcos elevated the for but even in his absence, patpracticeto its highestlevel of development, rimonialelementsremain strong.Cheap credit,tax incentives, state licenses, and monopoly privileges hinge on "personal considerations." State resourcesare blatantlyappropriatedfor private ends, and a new group of cronies has been spawned. Indeed, certain senators in the Aquino era consider"plunder" such an enduringplague upon the land thattheyintroduceda measure declaringit punishableby death. Persons wealth"-the sponsorswere amassing $2.3 or $4.6 million in "ill-gotten in disagreementas to the proper threshold-would be executed by the statetheyhad sacked.106
not alone in preferring avoid] ... painfulecoi989: "While the Philippinesis certainly [to it nomic restructuring, is undoubtedly one of the foremost of practitioners the art"; Ranis, Even the prosecution Marcos cronieshas been plagued with failure,and only a tiny of of wealth"has been recovered. thePhilippine See portion the"ill-gotten Daily Globe,December i6, i989. Quite earlyon, in fact,the major agencytasked with the effort (the Philippine Commissionon Good Government) was alreadybeing called a "taintedwatchdog" because ofalleged misappropriation seized assets.See theFar Eastern of EconomicReview,September
I7, I987, pp. 22-27.

Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28, i989, pp.



"05 Weber (fn.3), I095. This is not to say,of course,thatcorruption incompatible is with one can thinkofmyriad advancedcapitalism: exampleswherethetwo thrive simultaneously. In Weber's analysisbribery and corruptionhave the "least serious effect"when theyare calculableand become mostonerouswhen feesare "highlyvariable" and "settledfromcase to case with everyindividual official"(vol. I, p. 240). If correct,a major obstacle to the of forms capitalist of accumulationis not corruption se, development more sophisticated per but highly arbitrary corruption. io6Manila Chronicle, Juneii, i989.



Despite its originsin "people power," the best characterization the of Aquino government simply"restorationist."107 followingdescripis The tion of the Philippinepoliticalsystem, written theCentral Intelligence by Agency in i965, remainsremarkably accurate.Afternotinga history of dominationby a "small, wealthyelite,"it asserts theprimacy thekinship of groupoverall institutions, including state. the ... [K]inship personal and connections farmoreimportant merit are than or legalniceties political, in social, and business relations; has contribthis utedto widespread of acceptance nepotism corruption thenormal and as roadto political personal and A advancement. corollary theimportance to of personal is relations thewidespread disrespect theimpersonal for rule oflaw.'08 Marcos's authoritarian governmentdid not bring fundamentalchange to the particularistic, plunderousway in which dominantinterests interact withthePhilippinestate,and withhis departurecame a fundamental of resurrection the more decentralizedpre-martiallaw system.Such a needs to be explained. high degree of continuity The thesispresentedhere is thatthiscontinuity resultsfromongoing of patrimonialfeatures the Philippinestateand thatcurrentscholarship on the Marcos regimeand the Philippinepoliticaleconomywould benefitgreatlyfroma more carefulexaminationof these features.Belinda Aquino's focus on Marcos the individual is entirelycompatible with a but it is essentialto understandthe nature of patrimonialframework, the state that he and his cronies plundered. "Bonapartist"explanations are problematicin their assertion of "relative autonomy" and in the to weak emphasison regimeinterests. (Moreover,it is difficult show the of a "pliable mass organization"of any significance.) Broad represence on distinction that is unlies excessively a "transnationalist-nationalist" for and its persistence. Her asserable to account successfully cronyism tion of a "reshapingof the entirePhilippine political economy" would not lead one to expect any significant across regimes.Hawes continuity into his analysisbut oftencrowds themout in his bringsregimeinterests to efforts definewhich elite segments(each with supposed coherenceof controlthe state.His usefulinsights regimeuse of on economic interest) statepower are oftenobfuscatedby abstracttheorization. Of all the works reviewed,Wurfel'sputs the greateststresson continuityacross regimes(pp. 74, 274, 323, 326, 336), and his book alone inframeworkis quite vartegratespatrimonialterms.Wurfel'stheoretical

GeneralSurvey, CIA, Philippines: National Intelligence Survey,NIS 99, Julyi965 (sanitized copy released November i980), excerptedin Daniel B. Schirmerand Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds., The Philippines Reader:A History Colonialism, Dictaof Neocolonialism, and torship, Resistance (Boston: South End Press,i987), I26.

De Dios (fn.5),






ied, however, and patrimonialismis only one of many themes found the throughout book. In some cases,accountsof patrimonialactivity (for the extensiveuse of Marcos relativesas emissaries,candidates, example, and regimespokespersons) not explicitly are linked to an overall analysis of At of thestrength patrimonial patterns. one point,the pre-martiallaw systemseems to be given patrimonialattributes 325), but in general (p. the he confines termto the Marcos years.In short,patrimonialelements withinthe Philippinestatedeservethe same kind of carefulexamination elementsin Indonesia and that thatCrouch has given to the patrimonial Thomas Callaghy has given to the "patrimonialadministrative state" in

task of futureresearchshould It would seem thatthe most important have persistedin the Philippines be to explain whypatrimonialfeatures despiteenormouschange (forexample,in regimetype,in increasinglevels of economic complexityand "modernization") and yet elsewhere seem to have subsided in the face of change. "Patrimonialism"is a label under which one can findenormous variationaccording to the relative of historical strengths stateand society, natureof domesticcoalitions, the and the economic and strategicrelationshipsof a countryto external forces.Closer examinationof these factors will be useful both in develmodel of "comparative patrioping a clearerand more comprehensive monialism"and in explainingthepersistence evolution patrimonial and of features. The "bureaucraticpolity"in Thailand, forexample, displayed but many patrimonialcharacteristics, the nature of that patrimonialeliteextracted ism in which a bureaucratic privilegefroma historically weak businessclass-contrasts in many ways with patrimonialfeatures in the Philippines,where a powerfuloligarchic business class extracts privilegefroma largelyincoherentbureaucracy.Likewise, the current evolutionof relationsbetween the stateand the business communityin with the basic continuities Thailand contrasts that have endured in the Philippinesetting. In the midstof enormouschange therehas been no effective pressure fromeitherexternalor domestic forcesto undermine the patrimonial of features the Philippine state.For largelystrategic reasons,of course, the systemhas been continuallyfunded by external forces.IIo And beSee Crouch (fn. i i); and Callaghy (fn. i i). 'IOAs GustaveRanis wrotein i989, discussing country's the strong standingwith the U.S. and Japan,

There is likelyto be overwhelmingly strong "need to lend" forgeo-political reasons,on theone hand,and forthe"need to borrow"to avoid domesticadjustment, theother. on As a consequencethe system will probablyfindit possibleto continueits non-optimal that growthpath forsome timeto come.... [T]he veryeconomicopportunity the Phil-



in cause patrimonialfeatures the Philippinesreward oligarchsaccording to those who are temporarily to theirproximity the politicalmachinery, in to "on the outs" exert far more effort trying restoresuch proximity than in pressingforprofoundstructural change. This articlehas highlighted patrimonial features foundin the relationbut ship betweenstateand dominanteconomic interests, the framework in would also have a high degree of utility discussingthe Philippinemilitary(see Wurfel, 256), as well as local politics"' and other areas. It is to also important emphasize thata focuson oligarchsand croniesin the Philippine stateby no means impliesthatanalysesof the state'srelations actorsare any less importantin with domestic popularforcesor external developing a comprehensiveunderstandingof the Philippine state. In discussing"patternsof class domination"(p. i62), forexample, Hawes is correctto show which side the stateis on, and it is important to entirely emphasize the crucial role played by the U.S.-supported systemof state repressionin protecting plunderersfromrevolutionary upheaval.112 Building on Broad's work, a fullerunderstandingof the Philippine staterequiresclear analysisof whyexternalactorsremainso powerfulin when othereconomies in the region that Philippine policy formulation, used to be similarly "dependent" have since managed to carve out For a start, is worthinquiringas to how it roles forthemselves. stronger cliental relationswith the United States seem to have insulated Philippine elites fromany real sense of intrastate competition-competition that has oftenbeen the historicstarting point forserious state-building projects."3For most of this centurythe oligarchy'smajor externalconcern has been how to ensure continued U.S. sponsorship for their domestic hegemony. The plunder of the Philippine state is not selfit dole. As U.S. strasustaining;ultimately, depends on the international findsit increasingly difficult and the oligarchy tegic perceptions change, bases to extractcriticalsupportfromWashington pato use the military trons,one mightbegin to see changes as well in the nature of the Philippine state.
ippines' geo-politicalimportanceprovidesthreatens be the undoing of its political to economy.(Ranis [fn.I04], I54) researchof JohnSidel of Cornell University; Sidel, "Big .ll As attestedby the current see Men withBolos, Bosses,Bullets,Bank Loans, and Bus Companies: Local Power in Philippine Politics"(Unpublishedmanuscript, i990). of When it comes to arrests labor leaders or military harassment peasant communiof ties,of course,the stateis veryclearlyan "independent actor" vis-A-vis societalforces. JoelMigdal, forexample,writesthat"a primemotivation stateleaders to attempt for to stretch the state'srule-makingdomain withinits formalboundaries,even with all the risksthathas entailed,has been to build sufficient cloutto survivethedangersposed bythose outside its boundaries,fromthe world of states"; Migdal, StrongSocieties and Weak States (Princeton:Princeton University Press,i988), 2I.
112 II3