1 Spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal, petitioners, vs. Nelly L.

Romero Valdellon, and Spouses Cipriano Villanueva and Rufina Panganiban, respondents. FACTS: ESGUERRA, J : The complaint alleges that petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land in Hagonoy, Bulacan purchased (April 1967) for P800 Defendants are family friends of the petitioners, and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand, this info was amended to state that they defendants will return to the plaintiffs the premises in 1969; On demand, defendants refused to surrender the property in question. Thus, plaintiffs had to institute action praying that defendants be ordered: (1) to vacate the premises and surrender the said property; (2) to pay plaintiffs P500 as incidental expenses ; and, (3) to pay P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. whenever the owner of property is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in the said rule, he may initiate and maintain a plenary action to recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of one year before commencing such action. It may also be brought after the expiration of said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible entry and detainer during that time in the inferior court. ACCION PUBLICIANA must be instituted in the CFI. RE CFIs ACTION: The respondent court's action in dismissing this case is precipitate, there is sufficient merit in petitioners' contention that the rights sought to be enforced and the reliefs prayed (recovery of possession and damages) are entirely separate and distinct from that sought in L. R. C. Case. It is a fundamental principle in the law governing UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES (including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property. In this case, there is not even a plea of title on the part of private respondents over the disputed property but a mere allegation that there is another action for registration of title to that land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in the Civil Case. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and NOT THAT OF OWNERSHIP. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Thus, the Civil Case was arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another action, because while identity of parties may be established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that judgment which may be rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res judicata for the other case.

CFI dismissed the complaint because of another case pending between the same parties over the same property (Land Registration Case). MR was denied. ISSUE: Will the pendency of a land registration case bar the institution of an action for the recovery of possession? HELD: The nature of this case is one for RECOVERY OF POSSESSION brought before the CFI by the alleged owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were supposed to have unlawfully continued in possession since 1969 when they were supposed to return it to plaintiffs, plus damages. The defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs since 1969, more than the one year period contemplated in unlawful detainer cases at the time the complaint was filed in 1973. Not all cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases) because

2 RE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL AND LAND CASES: No sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases, since the evidence that may be presented by the parties involving possession and ownership of the disputed parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination of both cases. The evidence involving the issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be related and its presentation before one court of justice would redound to a speedy disposition of this litigation. WHEREFORE, the respondent court's orders are hereby declared null and void and set aside; the complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case revived; both the respondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed to consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No. 2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that court. [G.R. No. 173021. October 20, 2010.] Delfin Lamsis, et al, petitioners, vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, respondent. FACTS:DEL CASTILLO, J: This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land (80,736 sqm) located along Asin Road, Baguio City. While petitioners are the actual occupants, respondent is claiming ownership and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. According to respondent Margarita, her family's ownership and occupation of subject Lot can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. A survey plan was obtained 1964 (186,090sqm). On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes. The heirs of Ap-ap then executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon. Gilbert Semon allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of the subject together with their respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees. When the Lamsis died, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis and Agustin Kitma took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, 13 his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. 14 Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 15 and occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins' occupation of portions of the same lot. This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. 16 Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard 17 Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose). 18 CAcDTI With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint 19 for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita. 20 Margarita claimed that, as they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion. 21 Petitioners denied Margarita's claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). 22 The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin and Agustin's parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents. Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap's children, failed to include two Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito. 23 Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from the quitclaim. HSIaAT

3 According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and openly in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They also corroborated Delfin and Agustin's allegation that the real owners of the property are the heirs of Joaquin Smith. 24 In order to debunk petitioners' claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying the Smiths' application for recognition of the subject property as part of their ancestral land. 25 The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because the Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property . . . . The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs." 26 To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings' ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090square meter property. 27 The said resolution states: DEICTS The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicant's grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs . . . transferred the tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor's office of Baguio. The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case was however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction. It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest have been in exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership, devoting the same for residential and agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants as well as those of their close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets. IDScTE On the matter of the applicant[s'] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of ApAp (one name) who lived along the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vicemayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. . . . On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964, by way of a "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective share of the applicants['] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an "Extrajudicial Settlement/Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights." With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No. Bg-L066 of Thomas Smith has already been

4 denied by us in our Resolution dated November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous conveyances in favor of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural obstacle in giving due course to the instant application. Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the herein applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director, DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein above is however subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed. ETDAaC Carried this 23rd day of June 1998. 28 The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 29 The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as Case No. 05RHO-CAR-03. 30 The petitioners filed their protest in the said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court 31 After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondent's longtime possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property. 32 The survey plan of the subject property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent's father and, eventually to respondent herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondent's and her predecessors' interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend credence to respondent's claim because, "in the ordinary course of things, persons will not execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have the basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal documents . . . ." 33 In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of the petitioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property. 34 Petitioner Agustin's Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of respondent's own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL. 35 DTAHEC The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioners] (1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the [petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void; (2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession thereof to the [respondent]; (3) To pay [respondent] attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (4) To pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. 36

5 It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court. Nevertheless, the trial court issued an Order 37 allowing the petitioners' Notice of Appeal. 38 Ruling of the Court of Appeals 39 The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses. aTSEcA In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are insufficient to overcome respondent's documentary evidence. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration 40 of the adverse decision but the same was denied. Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA committed any reversible error. 41 Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 42 the petition was reinstated in the Court's January 15, 2007 Resolution. 43 Petitioners' arguments Petitioners assign as error the CA's appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be inadmissible evidence. 44 Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the general rule that a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks the parties' and witnesses' signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proffered regarding the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy. 45 Under the best evidence rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been disregarded by the court. Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property. 46 aDHScI Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondent's muniments of ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not indubitable proofs of respondent's ownership over the subject property given that there are other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey plan over the subject property. 47 Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to recover to prove her superior title. 48 Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Respondent's assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is unsubstantiated. 49 Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP. 50 They assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: "When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, 51 customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute." ADEaHT In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia. 52 They likewise argue that NCIP has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere "when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal . . . In cases where the doctrine of

6 primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence." 53 The courts should stand aside in order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions. 54 Respondent's arguments Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate the speedy administration of justice. 55 Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition. 56 Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer reviewable. 57 The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court's jurisdiction over the case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals, 58 respondent argues that the jurisdictional issue should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal. 59 HEacDA Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from the issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is ownership, possession, and right to recover the real property. 60 Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of forumshopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will not amount to res judicata in the instant case. 61 Issues The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court's decision; 2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription; 3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted; TCASIH 4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action. 62 Our Ruling Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court's decision Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to review the evidence of both parties, despite the CA's finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 63 "Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact." 64 Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari. 65 There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 66 The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners' claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect. ECDaTI In any case, even if petitioners' arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of

7 respondent's father are well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondent's claim over the subject property. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondent's claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial court's observation that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same. 67 The fact that respondent's documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same. Moreover, respondent's version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties' respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondent's version, as both the trial and appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept petitioners' claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription. 68 cSDHEC In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitive prescription had yet to be attained. Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land. 69 Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership 70 upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership 71 that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit . . . The trial court will then conduct a fullblown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. . . . 72 (Emphasis supplied) ECSaAc Likewise apropos is the following explanation: The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the

8 property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership . . . If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. . . . Certificates of title do not establish ownership. 73 (Emphasis supplied) A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title transferred to his name. 74 Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. 75 "For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case." 76 The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case. DHSACT Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners' contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that "forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other." 77 Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter in light of the effectivity 78 of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples. As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 79 the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it." 80 Wisely, some cases 81 have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam. ETAICc In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the appellate court's adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue. In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case

9 who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court. At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration. IaAEHD When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination 82 conducted by petitioners' lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court's jurisdiction. When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court's appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL's resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA. 83 But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial court's ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed. Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners' theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED. CETDHA Placido Noceda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Marcos Escobar, defendant-appellee. FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant was the owner of a motor cutter (N. S. del Rosario I). which cost about P16K. He used it to transport passengers and cargo (Albay Catanduanes). During WW2 (1942), the Japanese armed forces seized the said vessel and utilized it to transport troops, ammunition, and supplies. After the liberation, US armed forces found said vessel in Cebu and sold it (May 17, 1945) as enemy property for P100. It was then sold (August 14, 1945) for P8K to the defendant Marcos Escobar who caused extensive repairs to be made on the vessel and named it "Long Distance." Plaintiff instituted an action to recover from the defendant the possession of said vessel in the CFI-Cebu or its value in the sum of P20K, plus damages in the sum of P5K. The trial court found in effect that "Long Distance" is the same vessel as "N. S. del Rosario I". It held that the boat had been lawfully seized and confiscated by the Japanese armed forces and that ", the US armed forces acquired a valid title over the same when in the course of liberation of the Philippines said authority took possession of the vessel in Philippine waters." Defendant, thus acquired a valid title to said vessel. CFI dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Appellant's contention is predicated on Article 3 of Hague Conventions of 1907 which provides that Vessels used exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade are exempt from capture." ISSUE: *Should the plaintiff reimburse the defendant for necessary and useful expenditures on said vessel? YES. *Does the defendant have a corresponding obligation to account to the plaintiff the earnings of the vessel during the pendency of this action? YES.

10 HELD: Section 3 of Hague Convention of 1907 is not applicable. When the Japanese armed forces seized the vessel (February 11, 1942), they were already in military occupation of that territory. The vessel was not captured in the course of a naval war, but was seized by the military occupant, who used it in the prosecution of the war. The trial court erred in holding that the Japanese Army could lawfully confiscate said vessel. The regulations under Article 53 authorized the seizure of the vessel but did not authorize its confiscation. It is expressly provided that the things seized must be restored at the conclusion of peace and indemnities paid for them. Therefore, the title to the vessel did not pass to the Japanese but remained in the owner. The vessel did not become enemy property and was not such when it was sold to Vicente Asuncion. Hence said SALE WAS NOT VALID, and the DEFENDANT ACQUIRED NO VALID TITLE to said vessel by virtue of his purchase from Vicente Asuncion. RE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO BE REIMBURSED: The defendant-appellee was initially a purchaser in good faith. But he ceased to be a possessor in good faith from the moment the owner of the vessel claimed it from the defendant judicially or extrajudicially. From that moment the defendant was not unaware that his possession was wrongful. Article 451 of the old Civil Code provides that "fruits received by one in possession in good faith, before possession is legally interrupted, become his own." And article 453 says that "necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith. . . ." Thus, the defendant must account to the plaintiff for the net earnings of the vessel from the time the plaintiff claimed said vessel from him judicially or extrajudicially, and whatever necessary expenditures he may have made on said vessel as well as all useful expenditures made before the possession was legally interrupted, may be deducted from or set off against said earnings. Plaintiff is entitled to the vessel in question. SC reversed the judgment appealed from and ordered the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Republic v. CA - The subject property was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration - Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired by Pedro Cristobal o They presented Tax Declarations as proof - After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names - On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the subject property to petitioner-appellee, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage on the property - After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due thereon - Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a while - On 14 November 1986, petitionerappellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987, for the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property - Oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity), filed its opposition o Petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto - The Heirs of de la Cruz and Kadakilaan Estate likewise filed their opposition o Their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the "primitive owner" of the subject lot o He, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful, notorious and continuous possession of the land in question since time immemorial - The Kadakilaan Estate contends o By reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891

11 Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the owner of the subject property o Petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement LC rendered judgment o Confirmed Democrito Plazas title over Relocation Plan 1059 CA affirmed the decision of LC Hence this petition o According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent vintage, private respondent has not established actual possession of the property o Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellee's predecessors-ininterest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax declarations They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof Merely withdrew it from sale but still subject to actual survey and existing private rights o Registration does not vest title; merely evidence of title - We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property o This does not contravene or negate the intention of the proclamation - Petition is DISMISSED Pleasantville Development Corporation v. CA - Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land - In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant - A TCT was then issued under his name - It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof - It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner o Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment payments - After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8 - Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot - After failing to reach an amicable settlement, a complaint for ejectment was filed against Kee in the MTCC - Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI - MTCC ruled: o The MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for o

12 the latters failure to pay the installments due o The rescission was effected in 1979 before the complaint was instituted o The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced RTC ruled: o Kee was a builder in bad faith o Assuming that he was a builder in good faith, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot He appealed directly to the SC, but referred back to the CA o The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the mixup when he began construction o It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI W/N Kee was a builder in good faith The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property o Lot 8 is covered by a TCT different from that which covers Lot 9; Kee is then presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of his property o But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described was Lot 8 o Hence, he was accompanied by a CTTEI employee, who declared that the land she was pointing at is Lot 8 o There was no reason for Kee to be present during the geodetic engineers relocation survey as the final delivery of subdivision lots was part of the regular course of business of CTTEI Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8 o Petitioner failed to prove otherwise Petitioner, to demonstrate bad faith, pointed to contractual breaches committed by Kee o Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind o These merely give rise to a cause of action Petitioner then points out the rescission of the contract between Kee and the former o This fact does not negate the negligence in the pointing of the wrong lot to Kee o This merely gives rise an action for unlawful detainer As for the petitioners liability o CTTEI is the agent of petitioner o The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage o CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate

13 representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent; should then be held liable for damages The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9 Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED o Kee was a builder in good faith o Petitioner and its agent are solidarily liable for damages due to negligence It held the whole contract null and void and without legal effect as well as the subsequent verbal contract The literal sense of the stipulations in the contract should be followed o If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail The words used by the contracting parties in the deed clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum o In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract In the contract, should Emiliana fail to pay the mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale o This was however modified in that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax o This converted it into a contract of antichresis This being a real encumbrance burdening the land, this is illegal and void Hence, it was error to hold that the contract entered into was one of absolute sale and for holding that the contract is null and void o

Kasilag v. Roque - The heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio commenced a civil case for the recovery of possession of the land and its improvements from petitioner, which was granted to Emiliana by way of homestead - Petitioner alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract between him and the deceased - A year after the execution of the said deed, Emiliana was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements o They then entered into an oral contract whereby she conveyed the to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect interest, attend to the payment of land tax, benefit from the fruits of the land and would introduce improvements thereon - Thus, petitioner entered upon the possession of the land - The CA concludes thus: o That the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements

14 Moreover, the petitioner was arguing that the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was a holder in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof o From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116 o This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116 o Hence, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith o Therefore, the respondents are entitled to the improvements upon indemnifying the petitioner or compel the petitioner to buy the land by paying its market value The appealed decision is REVERSED o The contract is valid and binding o The contract of antichresis is null and void and without legal effect o Petitioner is a possessor in good faith Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Corp - The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought a considerable quantity of ricecleaning machinery company from the defendant machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price o It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood - The indebtedness was not paid, the mortgaged property was thus sold by the sheriff and was bought by the machinery company - A few weeks thereafter, on or about the 14th of January, 1914, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not registered - At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the mortgagor, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage to the plaintiff upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to the plaintiff under a contract for the construction of the building o Upon failure of the mortgagor to pay, it levied the execution upon the building - At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the defendant machinery company, which was in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy - The sheriff sold the property at public auction to the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale - This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from the machinery company - TC ruled in favor of the machinery company

15 The company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of registry of the plaintiff's certificate o Relied on Article 1473 If the same thing is sold to many vendees, the ownership should transfer to the person who may have first taken possession in good faith If its real property, it shall belong to the party who first recorded it in the registry If theres no entry, then it shall belong to the person who first took possession in good faith - The Court however rules that the property mortgaged is not personal but real property, considering that it was attached to the building of strong materials - The ruling of the TC should be sustained on the basis of the third paragraph as herein respondent took possession of it first - Having bought in the building at the sheriff's sale with full knowledge that at the time of the levy and sale the building had already been sold to the machinery company by the judgment debtor, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been a purchaser in good faith o The subsequent inscription of the sheriffs certificate of title must likewise be tainted with the same defect o Good faith does not merely relate to possession and title, but also to the inscription of the property - One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith - Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED Banco Espanol Filipino v, Peterson - The Spanish-Filipino Bank filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the other defendant, Juan Garcia for declaring that the execution levied upon the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, o canned goods, and other similar merchandise, was illegal Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the 4th of March, 1905, by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter the sum of P141,702 which, added to the amount of the loan, made a total of P226,117.38, Philippine currency That to secure the payment of these two sums and the interest thereon, the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed before a notary on the aforesaid date mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of property belonging to him, and pledged to the said bank part of his personal property o That in the aforesaid deed of pledge it was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes, that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat o Judgment was rendered against the last-mentioned two for the sum of P15,000 upon which judgment execution was issued against the property of the defendants, Reyes and Agtarap For the purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at the request of Garcia, seized the goods which had been pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of the possession of the same o Without the authority of the bank, Reyes could not dispose of the said goods The said sheriff continued to refuse to return the same to the bank and insist that until the Court prohibits him, he would proceed with the public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of Garcia The defendant sheriff, Peterson and Juan Garcia accordingly asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that the plaintiff had no

16 interest whatever in the property described in the complaint The court below entered judgment on the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing plaintiff's action and directing that the defendant recover from the SpanishFilipino Bank Main issue is W/N the contract of pledge entered into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes to secure a loan made by the former to the latter was valid, with all the requisites prescribed by the Civil Code having been complied with The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code o The property was pledged to secure a debt the date of the execution, the terms of the pledge, and the property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of the bank From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears that a third person, appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose o Testimonies support the fact that Reyes did not continue with the possession of the goods after they had been pledged to the plaintiff bank The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 o Conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it o The owner, the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee being the only one authorized to do so through the depositary and special agent who represented it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties was legally placed in possession of the goods o The fact that the goods remained in the warehouse of Reyes is immaterial - The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the goods pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods - Judgment is hereby REVERSED; the plaintiff had a preferential right over that of the defendant Garcia German Management and Services Inc v. CA - Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan - On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision - Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused - Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents o forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice o bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation o trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove

17 and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings The respondents then filed an action for forcible entry against the petitioner o Alleging that they are the mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan o That they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27 o Petitioner deprived them of their property without due process of law MTC dismissed respondents complaint for forcible entry RTC sustained the decision of the MTC CA reversed the decisions of the lower courts o since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession Petitioners MR was denied Hence this appeal Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue o Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror The MTC and RTC rationalized their decision on the basis of the principle of self-help o Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar o When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property Petition is DENIED

Cuaycong v. Benedicto - The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno which is the property of the defendants - One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other as the DacumanToreno road - The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca o That more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda o That on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question - Defendants in their answer averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private property of defendants o That they have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have required them

18 to pay toll for the privilege of doing so The court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription o It was only in 1911-1913 that toll was being collected; apparently done to raise funds for its repair The question is whether this use was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use enjoyed by the public in general Plaintiffs produced 2 witnesses who testified with regard to the use of the road by the present and former owners and occupants of the estates of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alcaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the products of these estates to the town of Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of them testified expressly that any other use had been made of said road o it may be reasonably inferred that the public made use of the road but such use did not extend beyond transportation of products and supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the court concerning the general public use of the road in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that when the complaint was filed, plaintiffs did not contend that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno It also appears that the road has existed since 1885 but still did not prove that the road was a public highway Although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911; nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this restriction until December, 1912, when this action was commenced It was thus concluded that The road has been in existence for 30-40 years o No public funds have been spent for its construction or upkeep, but was worked on by laborers of the owners of the haciendas and their predecessors-ininterest o The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for thirty-five or forty years been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the transportation, by the usual means, of the products of their estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias, and the transportation to their estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons having occasion to travel to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees o The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the person above mentioned was permitted without objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they closed it, and began charging a toll o The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of appellants to the nearest public road W/N the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title o It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here in question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way established by law," There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private ownership The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show o

19 that the Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by their laborers, as a pure voluntary act for their own convenience and interest There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates affected the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user o it was not shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense to show adverse possession by the government It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license o Mere permission granted by the owner for people to cross his property does not equate to his relinquishment of his ownership Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear that the road in question is a public road or way o Their use of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title o That license was essentially revocable o The defendants were within their rights when they closed the road in 1911 - We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants - No evidence was shown to prove immemorial use o It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs - Judgment is REVERSED Bishop of Balanga v. CA - The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 14379 - With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by . . . Catholic Bishop of Balanga registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975 - Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936 the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church - Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused registration by the Register of Deeds o In 1939, Ana died - Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private

20 respondent] who immediately took possession of the property in concept of owner Herein petitioner filed the instant complaint against him after more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed o Alleged that the respondent, w/o knowledge and consent of the petitioner and its predecessorsin-interest, entered and occupied the subject property and that defendant refused to vacate the premises As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent] maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23 August 1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful owner of the subject property and the complaint states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him After 10 months, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations Petitioner opposed alleging that the defense of prescription was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss LC rendered judgment o Defendant-appellant [private respondent] failed to present the necessary power of attorney executed by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila giving Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili the authority to execute the deed of donation o The first 2 paragraphs of the Excritura de Donacion indicates that the parish priest . . . was only the administrator of all, hence, had no authority to dispose in whatever manner any of the properties of the Roman Catholic Church of Balanga, Bataan o Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili was not authorized to, and could not validly, donate the subject lot o Thus, the deed of donation he executed is unenforceable under Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code and defendant-appellant [private respondent], as well as his predecessor-in-interest, never acquired ownership over the subject property CA ruled in favor of respondent o Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through acquisitive prescription because the same having been duly registered under the Torrens system o Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same Hence this petition o Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time o Elements of laches Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue

21 Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant - Petition is DISMISSED Dizon vs. Suntay47 SCRA FACTS:Respondent Lourdes G. Suntay and one Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein the Suntays three-carat diamond ring, valued atP5,500.00, was delivered to Sison for sale on commission. Upon receivingthe ring, Sison executed and delivered to the receipt to Suntay. After thelapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to thering to her, Suntay made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of said jewelry. Clarita R. Sison, however, could not comply with Suntays demands because on June 15, 1962, Melia Sison, niece of the husband ofClarita R. Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, pledged the ringwith the petitioner Dominador Dizon's pawnshop for P2,600.00 without Suntays knowledge. When Suntay found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged the ring, she filed a case of estafa against the latter with the fiscal's office.Subsequently, Suntay wrote a letter to Dizon on September 22, 1962 asking for the return of her ring which was pledged with the latters pawnshop under its Pawnshop Receipt serial B No. 65606, dated June 15,1962.Dizon refused to return the ring, so Suntay filed an action for its recoverywith the CFI of Manila, which declared that she had the right to itspossession. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision. ISSUE:Who has the right title over the subject property? COURT RULING:The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. Thecontrolling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides that [T]he possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has beenunlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession ofthe same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has beenunlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the ownercannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith ofthe possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without, reimbursing the price. Hanging on to said exception as hisbasis, Dizon insisted that the principle of estoppel should apply in this casebut the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of the jewelsmisappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that Clarita R.Sison, acting fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of them and pledgedthem contrary to agreement with no right of ownership, and to theprejudice of Suntay, who was illegally deprived of said jewels and who, asthe owner, has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them, which in this case is Dizons pawnshop. Dizon ought to have been on his guard before accepting the pledge in question,but evidently there was no such precaution availed of and he has no one to blame but himself. While the activity he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it isnot to be lost sight of that it thrives on taking advantage of the necessitiesprecisely of that element of our population whose lives are blighted byextreme poverty. From whatever angle the question is viewed then,estoppel certainly cannot be justly invoked. [G.R. No. L-2939. August 29, 1950.] Placido Noceda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Marcos Escobar, defendant-appellee. FACTS: OZAETA, J: Plaintiff-appellant was the owner of a motor cutter (N. S. del Rosario I). which cost about P16K. He used it to transport passengers and cargo (Albay Catanduanes). During WW2 (1942), the Japanese armed forces seized the said vessel and utilized it to transport troops, ammunition, and supplies. After the liberation, US armed forces found said vessel in Cebu and sold it (May 17, 1945) as enemy property for P100. It was then sold (August 14, 1945) for P8K to the defendant Marcos Escobar who caused

22 extensive repairs to be made on the vessel and named it "Long Distance." Plaintiff instituted an action to recover from the defendant the possession of said vessel in the CFICebu or its value in the sum of P20K, plus damages in the sum of P5K. The trial court found in effect that "Long Distance" is the same vessel as "N. S. del Rosario I". It held that the boat had been lawfully seized and confiscated by the Japanese armed forces and that ", the US armed forces acquired a valid title over the same when in the course of liberation of the Philippines said authority took possession of the vessel in Philippine waters." Defendant, thus acquired a valid title to said vessel. CFI dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Appellant's contention is predicated on Article 3 of Hague Conventions of 1907 which provides that Vessels used exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats employed in local trade are exempt from capture." ISSUE: *Should the plaintiff reimburse the defendant for necessary and useful expenditures on said vessel? YES. *Does the defendant have a corresponding obligation to account to the plaintiff the earnings of the vessel during the pendency of this action? YES. HELD: Section 3 of Hague Convention of 1907 is not applicable. When the Japanese armed forces seized the vessel (February 11, 1942), they were already in military occupation of that territory. The vessel was not captured in the course of a naval war, but was seized by the military occupant, who used it in the prosecution of the war. The trial court erred in holding that the Japanese Army could lawfully confiscate said vessel. The regulations under Article 53 authorized the seizure of the vessel but did not authorize its confiscation. It is expressly provided that the things seized must be restored at the conclusion of peace and indemnities paid for them. Therefore, the title to the vessel did not pass to the Japanese but remained in the owner. The vessel did not become enemy property and was not such when it was sold to Vicente Asuncion. Hence said SALE WAS NOT VALID, and the DEFENDANT ACQUIRED NO VALID TITLE to said vessel by virtue of his purchase from Vicente Asuncion. RE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO BE REIMBURSED: The defendant-appellee was initially a purchaser in good faith. But he ceased to be a possessor in good faith from the moment the owner of the vessel claimed it from the defendant judicially or extrajudicially. From that moment the defendant was not unaware that his possession was wrongful. Article 451 of the old Civil Code provides that "fruits received by one in possession in good faith, before possession is legally interrupted, become his own." And article 453 says that "necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith. . . ." Thus, the defendant must account to the plaintiff for the net earnings of the vessel from the time the plaintiff claimed said vessel from him judicially or extrajudicially, and whatever necessary expenditures he may have made on said vessel as well as all useful expenditures made before the possession was legally interrupted, may be deducted from or set off against said earnings. Plaintiff is entitled to the vessel in question. SC reversed the judgment appealed from and ordered the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.