Napoleon and Doctor Verling on St Helena

Lowe.

Prologue: Napoleon, Verling and St Helena

Napoleon Bonaparte has always been a subject of great fascination to historians and generalists alike. Countless books have been written on every aspect of his career, and his image is familiar to people throughout the world. One of the most interesting periods of Napoleon’s life came towards the end, when he was in exile on St Helena from 1815 until his death in 1821. His treatment there by the British was humane and cruel, appropriate and unimaginable, generous and miserly. Napoleon was allowed to maintain his own imperial court in miniature, complete with staff and servants brought from France. The British laid the groundwork for an honourable and decent, if decidedly lonely, exile.

Unfortunately, Napoleon’s court soon came into conflict with another, namely that of the Governor of the island, Sir Hudson Lowe. The relationship between the two men began on a reasonable and hopeful note, but soon deteriorated into a petty and dangerous feud between two men who were determined not to give an inch in their dispute. While Napoleon initially was given wide latitude in his movements on the island, Lowe soon instituted restrictions that forbade Napoleon to go very far without British accompaniment. This was unacceptable to Napoleon, but it would soon get worse. Lowe began to demand that a member of his staff make a personal sighting of Napoleon each day, to assure him that Napoleon had not escaped. Now, escape from this island was impossible, but Lowe was insistent.

Napoleon was outraged and refused to co-operate. The entire affair became a cat and mouse game, with Napoleon ever more reluctant even to emerge from his home at Longwood. This was detrimental to his health, of course, as he got very little exercise. Napoleon and his staff, and Lowe and his staff, engaged in a long and often absurd battle of wills. Both sides took part in a level of scheming and bickering that was embarrassing in its absurdity.

The Lowe Papers provide a perfect mirror of Lowe’s obsession with maintaining a visual contact with Napoleon. This duty generally fell to Captain Nicholls, and there are numerous letters from him and others with such statements as ‘I saw Napoleon’; ‘I didn’t see Napoleon’; ‘I think I heard Napoleon’; ‘I fancy he is in his bath.’ Notes flew back and forth at a furious pace. Napoleon, anxious not to be seen, would often get his exercise by walking in the billiard room. In one August 1819 episode, it seemed Nicholls might actually break down the door to Napoleon’s room, but cooler heads prevailed and Nicholls was able to observe Napoleon in his bath through a window.

Nowhere was the absurdity of this game more obvious than in the relations between Napoleon, Lowe and an assortment of doctors assigned to provide much-needed medical care for Napoleon. Doctors O’Meara, Stokoe and Verling each became the subject of mistrust, suspicion and accusation from both courts. This situation destroyed the medical careers of the first two doctors. Only Verling managed to escape with his reputation and career intact.

James Roche Verling landed right in the middle of the conflict between the courts of Napoleon and Lowe. Fortunately for modern historians, he kept a very detailed journal, which included copies of letters as well as his recitation of events. This journal gives a reflection of all that was going on in St Helena and is an important document for understanding the interaction between the two courts. Incredibly, it is published here in its entirety for the first time.

For their part, Sir Hudson Lowe and his staff communicated with all concerned through letters, which were copied and saved. These letters give fascinating insight into the politics of the island. Those included here are all that relate to James Verling. The Journal and the letters combine to give us a unique picture of life on St Helena.

Part One

End of a Career, Beginning of a Legend

Chapter 1

Napoleon’s Last Campaigns

Napoleon Bonaparte was born of modest parentage on the island of Corsica on 15 August 1769. Through hard work and good fortune he had risen to the heights of power, leading armies to victory after victory and becoming, in 1804, Emperor of the French. At its height in 1810–12, his empire and alliances gave him control of virtually all of Europe.

Napoleon brought liberal reforms to much of his empire and he was wildly popular in France. He was less popular in the halls of power in London and in the ancient courts of Europe. In time, these forces wore him down. In Spain, Napoleon misjudged the feelings of the common people and the determination of the British. Over a period of years, the ‘Spanish Ulcer’ cost Napoleon valuable soldiers and, more important, his aura of invincibility.

In 1812, war with Russia had become inevitable. Napoleon chose to fight on Russian soil rather than wait for them to attack, so he led his Grande Armée (Great Army) of 600,000 men into Russia, hoping to force one great, decisive battle. He got his victory at Borodino, but his capture of Moscow would prove useless. In the end, numerous delays led to the disastrous winter withdrawal from Russia. He had lost 90 per cent of his army and any remaining reputation of being unbeatable.

By the beginning of 1813, Napoleon was in Paris raising an army and seeing to it that his Russian misadventure had no domestic repercussions. Tsar Alexander of Russia had moved his armies into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and encouraged Prussia to switch sides. By March, the Prussians had done exactly that, and declared war on France. A new alliance was in the works and Napoleon was in trouble.

Even so, Napoleon had a number of important cards to play. He was already organizing a new army and his marriage to Marie Louise, a daughter of the Emperor of Austria, gave him an important alliance. Napoleon could not imagine that Emperor Francis would declare war on his own daughter, and on the grandson born of that marriage.

Napoleon moved quickly against the Russian and Prussian threat, soon defeating them at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. But promised Austrian troops never arrived to support Napoleon. Instead, Francis proposed mediation with Russia and Prussia, led by Austrian Foreign Minister Count Clemens Metternich. The resulting talks were little more than a sham, with Austria, Prussia and Russia essentially wanting Napoleon to give up all of his gains since coming to power. This would never be acceptable to the French people and was certainly not acceptable to Napoleon. In the end, the armistice and negotiations gained Napoleon nothing and in August Austria switched sides and declared war on France. So much for family ties! England, sensing an opportunity to defeat her old foe, opened her coffers in support of the new coalition against Napoleon. Napoleon, no longer feared, was on the defensive.

The armies drawn up against Napoleon were better trained and more modern than those he had faced earlier. His enemies had learned from the master of warfare. Still, Napoleon himself was formidable. The allied armies planned to avoid him when possible and concentrate on defeating his subordinates. This approach worked. Napoleon was generally successful but his subordinates were not. Former allies began to desert Napoleon, and even his marshals were beginning to lose heart and question the advisability of continued fighting. When Napoleon lost the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, the rout was on. Stunned by the treachery of the Saxons and Marshal Bernadotte and devastated by the premature destruction of a bridge, costing him 20,000 soldiers and the life of Marshal Prince Poniatowski, Napoleon was forced to withdraw into France. His empire gone, deserted even by his sister Caroline and her husband, Marshal Murat, the King of Naples, Napoleon was now fighting for his very survival. He had not done well in the campaign of 1813. In 1814, in the Campaign of France, he would be more like his old self.

After arranging for the defence of Paris (and further peace negotiations), Napoleon struck at the approaching armies with a fury. He quickly defeated a Russian corps and followed that with several other successes. Stunned, the allies suggested an armistice.

In Paris, the treacherous foreign minister Talleyrand was deserting Napoleon’s cause in favour of that of the Bourbons, the ruling family of France until the overthrow of Louis XVI by the French Revolution. Groundwork was being laid to replace Napoleon with a Bourbon king. On the battlefield, the allies were approaching Paris. Napoleon decided to race them to Paris. Marshal Marmont was already being pushed in that direction and the rest of the marshals insisted on joining him there. It was a reasonable approach to take, offering the possibility of presenting the allies with a fortified Paris with Marmont’s troops in their front and Napoleon at their rear. As Napoleon later told Count Montholon ‘they [the Allies] would never have given battle on the left bank of the Seine with Paris in their rear.’¹

Paris, however, was in no mood to resist and suffer the consequences. The defeat and subsequent defection of Marshal Augereau at Lyons on 23 March did nothing to stiffen their backbone. Countermanding Napoleon’s instructions, Napoleon’s brother Joseph, who had been placed in charge of the defence of Paris, sent the government, along with Marie Louise and her son, out of the city, leaving the political future of Paris, and France, largely in the hands of Talleyrand, who remained behind. Marie Louise tried to intercede with her father, the Emperor of Austria, but to no avail. Joseph was of little use to Napoleon in Paris and he left at the end of March. When Tsar Alexander arrived in Paris, he stayed at Talleyrand’s home. Napoleon’s future was bleak.

Talleyrand led the provisional government and prepared the way for the return of the monarchy that so many had died to remove. Tsar Alexander was willing to consider passing the throne to Napoleon’s son, but it was not to be.

On 3 April, Marshals Ney, Berthier, Oudinot and Lefebvre told Napoleon that he had to abdicate in favour of his son and leave the area. Napoleon reluctantly agreed and the next day abdicated in favour of his son, with Marie Louise as Regent. Tsar Alexander was prepared to accept this proposal. However, Marshal Marmont, under the influence of Talleyrand, marched his 11,000 soldiers into the Austrian camp, thus ending any hope for Napoleon or his son. Without those soldiers, Napoleon no longer had any bargaining power.

On 11 April 1814, Napoleon abdicated unconditionally, saying, ‘there is no sacrifice, not even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interests of France.’² Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother to the deposed and executed Louis XVI, became King Louis XVIII. Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba, just off the coast of Italy, where he would be given the title of Emperor of Elba. It was to be an honourable exile to a pleasant island where they even spoke Napoleon’s native Italian. But the good faith of the allies was brought into question when they refused to allow his wife and son to join him there. Napoleon, awaiting his fate at the chateau of Fontainebleau, was so distraught that he attempted suicide with poison that he always carried with him. The poison had lost much of its potency, though, and the effort failed.

On 20 April, Napoleon said goodbye to the soldiers of his Old Guard, and left for Elba with a personal guard of 1,000 personally selected soldiers.

Elba

Arriving in Elba, he was saddened by the unexpected death of his first wife, Josephine; another tie to the past was gone. However, Napoleon engaged in a serious effort to improve conditions on Elba. He revised the legal and tax system and built new roads and fortifications. His mother joined him, as did his sister, Pauline. Countess Walewska, his Polish mistress, made a final visit, bringing their young son with her. Napoleon held court to many foreign visitors and was generally seen as busy and happy.

All was not as well as it seemed, however. Louis XVIII refused to give Napoleon his pension, leading to financial difficulties. Worse, it was clear that Talleyrand was interested in arranging an entirely different fate for the Emperor of Elba, perhaps prison, perhaps worse. The powers of Europe were meeting at what was called the Congress of Vienna, and there was no telling what they would do. Napoleon began to hear of French dissatisfaction with Louis XVIII and negative moves toward Napoleon by Talleyrand in Vienna. These two factors led Napoleon to decide to leave Elba and attempt to regain control of France.

The One Hundred Days

Napoleon landed in France on 1 March 1815. After a slow start, he began to make his way north. He was determined not to fire a single shot on his way to Paris, fearing that would lead to disaster. He therefore took the mountain road to Grenoble, off the main road. This route, now known as the Route Napoléon, was through difficult terrain and Napoleon was not sure what kind of reception he would receive along the way. But things went well, and after winning over troops sent to capture him at Laffrey, Napoleon entered Grenoble to the cheers of its citizens. He later wrote, ‘On my march from Cannes to Grenoble I was an adventurer; in Grenoble I once more became a sovereign.’³

On his way to Paris Napoleon also picked up the support of Marshal Michel Ney, who had promised Louis XVIII he would bring back Napoleon in an iron cage. Ney had been the King’s last hope, and Louis left Paris just hours before Napoleon entered the city.

Napoleon had two problems to solve. First, he had to reorganize the government and gain the political support of all of the various factions. Second, he had to try to get the rest of Europe to let him reign in peace. If he could get even a few of them to agree – his father-in-law Francis of Austria, for example – his gambit might just work. Along the Route Napoléon he had repeatedly professed his desire for peace and promised no more war. But would the rest of Europe believe him? It was his only hope.

Napoleon moved quickly to organize the government and gain support of the factions. He convinced Benjamin Constant, the leader of Parisian liberals, to join in writing a new constitution. It was a brilliant political move, though the two-chamber legislative body established by that constitution would prove problematic.

Dealing with the governments of Europe was far more difficult and far less successful. Had the governments been safely in their respective capitals, Napoleon’s efforts might have worked. He could divide and conquer, starting with Austria. But they were still all in Vienna, and so was Talleyrand. Louis XVIII had signed a secret treaty with England and Austria, a treaty that Napoleon hoped to use to avoid war with those two countries and perhaps with all of Europe. But Talleyrand, aided by King Murat’s absurd military moves against Austria, was able to convince the allies that Napoleon simply could not be trusted. Peace was out of the question, and the allies began to mobilize their forces.

Napoleon moved quickly, planning to attack the English and Prussian armies that were in Belgium. He rapidly organized the government and mobilized the country, and was able to raise an army of 300,000 soldiers. But staffing his leadership proved to be disastrous. His old friend and chief of staff, Louis Alexander Berthier, fell or was pushed to his death from a window in his estate, depriving Napoleon of the one person who could have filled that job adequately. Marshal Soult, Berthier’s replacement, was an outstanding general but not up to the job of chief of staff.

Napoleon left Marshal Davout as Minister of War in Paris, appointed Marshal Michel Ney to command the left wing of the army and Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy to command the right wing. All of these appointments were disasters.

Faced with the European powers against him, Napoleon had to take the first action. He could not afford to wait until a combined force of perhaps 600,000 moved in from two directions across the borders of France. The English and Prussians were in Belgium: Napoleon would march to meet them, hoping to keep them apart and to defeat each in their turn. It was his only chance. It was a good choice, and it nearly worked.

On 12 June, Napoleon’s army of about 125,000 men marched toward Charleroi, in Belgium. On the morning of the 15th, they routed the Prussian force, who had no idea the French were coming. As in 1805 when he marched to Ülm, Napoleon had managed to maintain a very high level of secrecy.

Wellington was at a ball in Brussels when he was given the astounding news of Napoleon’s actions so near to his army. He and the Prussians decided to make their stands a few miles south at Quatre Bras and Ligny, respectively. Wellington had some 96,000 men under his command and Blücher had about 117,000. Napoleon needed speed, secrecy and a perfect execution of his plans. He accomplished only the first two of those requirements. Almost from the beginning there were delays and confusion. Even so, by the evening of 15 June, Napoleon was in a good position. He had seized Charleroi and had kept the two allied armies apart. The normal course of action would be to turn on first one, and then the other, allowing him to have at least some level of numerical superiority.

Instead, on 16 June, Napoleon did what he almost never did. He split his forces into two wings to fight two separate battles: Ney against Wellington at Quatre Bras and Napoleon and Grouchy against Blücher at