Intelligence in Vex: The UK & EU Intelligence Agencies Operate in a State of Fret

Introduction

Most discussions on electronic media and intellectual forums in Europe, and Britain about the effects of globalization on national security focus on violent threats. Notwithstanding the plethora of books, journals and research papers on national and international security, there is an iota research work on the issue of interconnectedness. The interconnectedness of violent threats and their mounting effects pose a grave danger to the aptitude of states to professionally secure their territorial integrity. Technological evolution and aggrandized interlinkage of our world in general, and information technology in particular, has affected people and society in different ways. Daily life of every man and woman has become influenced by these challenges.

The twenty first century appeared with different class of National Security threats. After the first decade, world leaders, research scholars, journalists, politicians, and security experts grasped that the world has become the most dangerous place. The avoidance of war was the primary objective of superpowers, but with the end of the Cold War, emergence of Takfiri Jihadism, extremism, and terrorism prompted many unmatched challenges. Home-grown extremism and radicalization continues to expose a significant threat to the National Security of the EU and Britain. The risks from state-based threats have both grown and diversified. The unmethodical and impulsive use of a military-grade nerve agent on British soil is the worse unlawful act of bioterrorists.

Security experts hoped that Britain’s new National Security Capability Review (NSCR) will play a constructive and positive role in dealing with bio-related diseases, terrorism and cyber warfare, but the exponentially growing number of terror-related incidents in the country put into question its credibility and competency. Britain’s National Security Strategy has also failed to keep momentum with emerging threats, and didn’t adequately respond to the exponentially growing foreign sponsored espionage and terrorist networks across the country.

In 2017, British government published National Security Capability Review (NSCR) as a quick refresh of capabilities, but authorities in one of government committees said it does not do justice to the volatile security environment. In its 04 June 2018 version, the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy spotlights many new things including the proliferation of jihadism and criminal culture, but growing power of jihadist and terror networks across the country, generated negative perceptions about its effectiveness and professional demonstration. In National Security Strategy, Strategic Defense and Security Review, and Cyber Security Strategy, several new amendments have been generated to make effective law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure-dealing with the issue of national security.

In his speech, Home Secretary emphasized partnership on local, national, and international level. At national level, CONTEST ingrained Home Office to lead development and coordination of a cross-government Science and Technology Strategy for counterterrorism. Home Secretary Sajid Javid said: As Home Secretary my priority will always be to keep our country safe. The threat from terrorism is one of the starkest we face and it is clear there has been a step change. The biggest threat is from Islamist terrorism particularly from Daesh, but extreme right-wing terrorism is also an increasing threat. Both exploit grievances, distort the truth, and undermine the values that hold us together.

However, Security Service (MI5) and Counter-Terrorism Policing foiled 25 Islamist plots since June 2013. Some reports indicate that MI5 has been handling more than 500 investigations involving 3,000 suspected individuals since 2013. Now, due to the exponentially growing number of terror-related incidents, Britain faces spectrum of new threats. The threat from Islamist terrorism remains the foremost and significant. However, in view of deteriorating security environment, Chief of Security Service warned that Britain facing an unrelenting terrorist threat. The Salisbury agent attack against the former MI6 agent pointed to the fact that our intelligence agencies have been embroiled in an unending intelligence war.

The United Kingdom National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies chemical, biological, and radiological attack as a Priority Risk. An attack by extremist and non-state actors using such weapons can cause huge fatalities. Biological weapons also referred to as bio-weapons, are deadly pathogens– bacteria, or toxins which can be deliberately released in order to inflict harm. The UK International Biological Security Program (IBSP) sought to reduce these risks by improving international bio-security and bio-safety, but the Salisbury nerve-agent attack authenticated and substantiated the fact that IBSP needs a professional approach to tackle bioterrorism.

The availability of Novichok and other bio-agents in the country means that biological war has been inflicted on British citizens. Terrorists and hostile elements are seeking to acquire or develop these weapons and use it against civilian population, military and security installations. Intelligence war on Britain soil has raised many questions. A critical lesson taken from the tragedy of Mr. Skripals murder attempt indicates that intelligence agencies of our country have been less-attentive to domestic security due to their international engagement.

Prime Minister Theresa May’s government expelled 23 Russian diplomats after President Vladimir Putin refused to entertain her 24-hour ultimatum. The European Union also recalled its diplomats from Moscow. British Prime Minister Theresa May said the Salisbury poisoning was part of a pattern of Russian aggression against Europe. Moscow denied the attack. Technological leaps in the field of manufactured biology are quickly expanding the potential for biological warfare, and mean it is no longer solely in the hands of nation states. Researchers put in place their analysis based on the use of virus being released in crowded places. Analyst Andrew Rogan (2017) is of the opinion that the threat of Biological, Nuclear, Chemical and Radiological (CBRN) cannot be predicted due to its evolution in different ways:

The full extent of the potential CBRN threats cannot be predicted because they can evolve in non-linear ways and can be affected by a number of outside factors, including economy, flow of goods and people, meteorological conditions, etc. Such uncertainty can make it difficult to determine the nature or origin of such a threat, and complicate response efforts when detailed information is not yet available. However, there are indications that terrorists intend to acquire CBRN substances for malicious purposes. In addition, there are evidences that even some sovereign states attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and the means of delivery, which could pose a significant threat to the international community in the near future.

Non-state actors can contaminate water by crashing an industrial tank with toxic chemicals to release poison. They have been successful in translating their anger into violent acts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan in yesteryears. This intentional release caused poison students. The current sectarian war in Afghanistan, Persian Gulf and Middle East empowered extremist Salafi Groups who used these weapons with impunity, while gradual aggrandizement in the field of biotechnology has created an environment of fear across the globe.

Terrorist organizations and the EU and UK based extremist groups continue to strike fear into civilian populations with chemical and biological weapons. In 2017, Australian intelligence intercepted a Daesh plot of releasing toxic hydrogen gas. However, German intelligence arrested Saifullah Hamami, a twenty nine years old Tunisian who had apparently managed to manufacture bio-weapons. There are more than 30,000 terror suspects on radar in UK who have received spectrum of training in camps and military barracks in Asia, Middle East, and Africa. The EU based jihadists, extremists, and terrorists-all are on the same page in the case of jihad and terrorism. These jihadists have already carried out attacks in various EU member states, in which hundreds citizens were killed and injured. In her research paper, Caitriona Mcleish has noted important facts of EU terrorist threat:

Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterized as low probability events; however, the apparent normalization of chemical weapons use, including by terrorists, in the ongoing conflict in Syria is causing some in the international security community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are foreign fighters and whose return from the conflict zone might also result in importing chemical weapons use. This article examines the rise of the chemical weapons-returning foreign fighter narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such as early alert and communication systems, so that the attractiveness of these weapons being used within a European context might be reduced. Although there are limitations as to how far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.

In 2015 and 2016, in Europe, armed jihadists plotted and carried out more than 34 attacks either planned or executed. Police in Germany found at least 3,000 castor bean seeds in the Cologne apartment of the Tunisian jihadist, who used to make toxin resin. David Casale in his research paper (2009) has warned that biological weapons can affect several of the EU member states:

The nature of the bioterrorist threat for Europe is peculiar. In fact, a biological attack could likely affect several Member States of the EU simultaneously and have considerable economic and social impact. Therefore, the coordination of Member States’ responses to deal with the occurrence of a biological accident emerges as vital. The first concrete action to protect the Union from the menace of bio-terrorism was the establishment of the Health Security Committee (HSC) in November 2001. The mandate of the HSC is to ensure coordination and exchange of information among Member States in the case of the release of biological or other agents which may threaten public health. The HSC is responsible for coordinating health preparedness systems and emergency response plans and raising the alert in the event of a health-related incident of EU concern.

The most critical counterterrorism efforts within the EU project still need to be streamlined where law enforcement agencies failed to share intelligence information wholeheartedly. The failure to intercept or identify terrorist attacks, counterterrorism approach of Brussels, Germany and French intelligence agencies remained in question. There were so many hindrances due to which the EU member states couldn’t move ahead with a single voice. Speculations that the security assurance of all member states within the EU was mere a hyperbole as complaints of some Easter European allies about the Brussels attitude raised several questions.

The Netherlands, Denmark, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Baltic states felt threatened. Their complaints against a weak intelligence sharing mechanism were matter of great concern. The Nice and Munich attacks further exposed the EU counterterrorism approach, where political parties and civil society pointed to the incompetency of law enforcement agencies. Professional intelligence and law enforcement approach is not something ready-made-available in markets; it is built by experts and policy makers.

The issue of security sector reforms in France and Germany was often discussed in print and electronic media, but in reality, their zeal and resolve were revolving around old mechanism. More than 24 years ago, some intelligence reforms were introduced in France under the 1991 law, but intelligence surveillance was confined to the tapping of Wireless Telephone Communications. After that initiative, in 2015, an intelligence act was adopted by the French government, but after the terror attacks in 2015 and 2016, the country’s Parliamentary Investigation identified multiple failures of intelligence infrastructure. The investigation enquiry, later on recommended a fusion of all six intelligence agencies.

On 21 January 2015, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls presented a package of immediate reforms to address the issue of radicalization and terrorism in his country, but unfortunately, the new counterterrorism measures did not prove effective to save the country. Because, security measures against Muslim communities weaken the roots of French intelligence agencies and the trust deficit further added to the country’s pain. In these new intelligence efforts, government created the code of internal security within the intelligence act, which meant to create the climate of trust between intelligence agencies and minority communities. The act stresses technical capabilities of the intelligence infrastructure to harmonize the range of tools that intelligence can use according to the regime applicable to judicial investigations.

The failure of French intelligence before the 14 July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice was mainly due to the lake of its coordination with law enforcement agencies to prevent the truck runner. However, when the killings started, police and security agencies were unable to show a brisk reaction or intercept the truck immediately. All these attacks were carried out under the nose of police and intelligence surveillance system, which means something, was going wrong under the carpet. Chief of the French domestic intelligence warned in June 2016 that terrorist attacks were inevitable. In these circumstances, French law makers had no option other than to call for a shake-up of intelligence infrastructure of the country. A committee of lawmakers in a press conference regretted on the lack of coordination between the foreign and domestic intelligence agencies. Our intelligence services failed said lawmaker Georges French. German intelligence is not so different from the French spy agencies.

The consecutive failure of German intelligence agencies to intercept the lone-wolves and religiously motivated Muslim extremists, before they translate their ferments and resentment into a violent action, raised important questions about its national security and counterterrorism approach. The lack of predictable security management in the region has also been the nucleation of debate in yesteryears. In Moldova and Georgia, security crisis and political fragmentation give EU more pain. Moldova’s support for the EU integration has been weak, while Georgia has also been thinking on the same lines because their citizens faced an uneven visa regime within the EU member states. Intelligence failure to address the exponentially growing threats to national security in Kosovo, Bosnia and Ukraine generated important debate in EU intellectual forums.

However, amidst this controversial engagement, German intelligence spied on France, created the clouds of surveillance on US and Britain, while Britain spied on Germany, which prompted distrust and secret war in the region. On 06 November, 2013, BBC reported German Parliament’s Intelligence Committee called for enquiries into alleged spying committed by the British embassy in Berlin. German intelligence agencies were looking at the US and UK through a hostile glasses after the taping of Angela Merkel’s personal telephone by NSA and UK’s surveillance operation in the country. These uneasiness and political reservations forced Britain to leave the EU, which left a significant impact on the Union’s ability to help nations united, implement political and economic reform, or to respond to Russia’s determined efforts to expand its sphere of influence.

At present, the EU has no coherent policy to tackle this crisis. Mass migration now poses the gravest threat to the stability of the project. The uncontrollable spy agencies in some EU member state generated an important debate in print media that agencies of some states were operating on diverse direction. In Germany, this question was often raised by experts that legal restrictions must be imposed on the secret services (BND).

Parliamentary enquiry revealed that BND spied on nearly 3,500 individuals of the allied countries. The new legislation in Germany banned BND from spying on foreign governments. To bring intelligence under democratic control, several EU member states recently adopted new laws. In January 2015, in Sweden, Security Service (SAPO) was reorganized to address the complaints of citizens. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Republic of Ireland and Hungary are spying on their own citizens according to their designed surveillance systems, but their electronic approach to national security and stability was not perceived as a professional approach on community level.

The case of the Netherlands was not so different where various forums discussed the menace of radicalization and extremism in different perspectives. But the Netherlands intelligence and security system is much better compared to some EU member states. The country maintains professional intelligence and law enforcement infrastructure that shares information on EU level and helps member states in tackling the scourge of radicalization. The Netherlands actively stressed the importance of professional approach in the international arena. Like Britain, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) defeated extremism, radicalization and international terrorism by adopting professional mechanism, and shared its valuable information with other EU member states.

Musa Khan Jalalzai

August 2018, London, UK

Chapter 1

There is no Intelligence in Anger

On 20 June, 2018, the Register reported Director General of Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) determination on security cooperation among EU allies. In his Brussels speech, Mr. Jeremy Fleming said his intelligence agency worked with EU member states to share understanding of how to protect democratic elections. After Brexit the UK will continue to work with the EU and the EU Member States. We have excellent relationships with intelligence and security agencies right across the continent. For example, in the last year we’ve played a critical role in the disruption of terrorist operations in at least four European countries. Those relationships, and our ability to work together, save lives," Fleming stated.¹

On 14 May 2018, Chief of Security Services (MI5), Mr. Andrew Parker demanded a consistent relationship with EU Intelligence Agencies to counter the threat of terror group Islamic State. In today’s world, we need that shared strength more than ever, the head of Britain’s intelligence services told the EU heads of state in Berlin. I can say confidently that the way we work together has prevented loss of life in Europe, he added, noting that 12 terror attacks have been thwarted in the U.K. since the 2017 Westminster attack.²

On 14 May 2018, in his speech at the EU Institute for Security Studies Conference in Brussels, Mr. Michel Barnier acknowledged that future partnership between the EU and the UK must go beyond trade, and it should, in particular, include a strong pillar in foreign, security and defence policy: Prime Minister Theresa May said in Munich that the UK as a third country will pursue an independent foreign policy in the future. But it is also clear that it will be in the UK’s interest to remain close to the values and objectives of the EU’s foreign and security policy. That is why we will keep the door open for close cooperation. Obviously, post-Brexit, our solidarity will be organised on a different basis. We respect the sovereign decision of the UK to leave the Union. Yet, being a third country does not mean that the UK cannot have an ambitious partnership with the EU. This applies in particular to Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, which are subject to specific rules and procedures.³

On 14 May 2018, the Guardian view on intelligence cooperation between the EU and British secret agencies was glorified by intelligence experts. The newspaper underscored the need of bilateral intelligence information cooperation to help agencies in dealing with domestic security:

There are now 28 countries sharing information in real time, and this kind of cooperation is only going to become more important as time goes on. It is true that the UK, partly because of its tight intelligence links with the US, possesses the most effective security services in Europe, but the traffic in information, and the benefits of collective effort, work both ways. It was a great mistake for Theresa May to threaten to use British intelligence cooperation as a bargaining chip in the Brexit negotiations, as she appeared to do in a speech in 2017. After she had spoken a delegation of British spy chiefs went to see her to explain how vital these bonds were for Britain’s own security; that is also the really important message hidden in the plain text of Mr Parker’s speech in Berlin.⁴

No doubt, intelligence sharing is one of the most widespread surveillance practices in the age of globalization. Intelligence sharing is being facilitated by the changing technological development that allows states to collect, store and share data with other states. In EU, method of intelligence communication changed has been replaced by new principles of communication. Communications–emails, text messages, phone calls, social media posts, and web searches transit multiple countries before reaching their destination.

Privacy International in its latest report (April 2018) highlighted the importance of communication and information: At the same time, technology now permits revelatory analyses of types and amounts of data that were previously considered meaningless or incoherent. Finally, the internet has facilitated remote access to information, meaning the sharing of communications and data no longer requires physical transfer from sender to recipient. The new scope and scale of intelligence gathering has given rise to a new scope and scale of the sharing of that intelligence between governments, particularly in response to threats to national security. Despite these dramatic changes, in many countries around the world, the public remains in the dark regarding state surveillance powers and capabilities, and whether those powers and capabilities are subject to the necessary safeguards pursuant to domestic and international law.⁵

The June 2017, Security Sector Reforms (SSR) changed operational mechanism of French intelligence agencies. National Intelligence Council was authorized to set strategies and priorities for secret agencies. It included the President and the Prime Minister, Ministers, the heads of Specialized Services (SS), and the National Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism Coordinator. In Germany, the 2016 security and intelligence reforms did not change operational mechanism of Federal Intelligence Service (BND), but German intelligence experienced deep crisis in yesteryears. In Belgium, the Minister of Justice appoints the head of the service, officers to certain posts, and the Internal Administrative Control. The Minister is also in charge of the expenses and discipline of the services.⁶

In a series of papers, the UK issued its strongest warnings on the internal security of the EU after Brexit, and said there could be significant capability gap unless a deal could be reached. The security of our citizens must be our overriding priority, and that will not be achieved by a marked—and avoidable—reduction in our ability to combat serious crime and terrorism." the note said. Intelligence sharing between the UK and EU countries will also continue after Brexit.

Intelligence agencies play an important role in protecting national security and helping law enforcement to uphold the rule of law. This legal culture in all member states which tackles terrorism, cyber attacks and organized crime groups located outside of the Union, all posing serious threats to Member States. In the UK and EU, governments control societies through electronic surveillance, which caused alienation of the citizens from the state. This way of maintaining law and order does not work properly due to the lack of technical security approach. As we have seen in the past, the UK government has been unable to tackle the exponentially growing power of radicalized forces and terrorist organizations. All its surveillance mechanism, control order, and policing tactics failed in the fight against extremist groups. The EU presents the same picture, where law enforcement agencies failed to positively respond to the threat of terrorism and radicalization in cities and towns.

The Brexit sabotaged the EU while member states are now turning around to find a successful solution to their fractured security and law enforcement infrastructures. The persistent high-noon and head-to-head razzle-dazzle has caused misunderstanding. Bone-crushing conflagration between cold war era intelligence and law enforcement infrastructure and democratic reforms halted all efforts to bring intelligence under democratic control. In Britain, the same pain is making us restless. The U.K intelligence failed to intercept the Manchester and London attacks. Radicalization of British society and the existence of several foreign intelligence networks, and their sponsorship of violent extremist and sectarian groups, wide-reaching terror related arrests across the country point to the fact that many things are not