Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

Antietam And Gettysburg: Tactical Success In An Operational Void
Antietam And Gettysburg: Tactical Success In An Operational Void
Antietam And Gettysburg: Tactical Success In An Operational Void
Ebook48 pages39 minutes

Antietam And Gettysburg: Tactical Success In An Operational Void

Rating: 0 out of 5 stars

()

Read preview

About this ebook

The Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union’s Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals. General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a “premature” pursuit of General Lee.

Upon examination, however, their inability to conceptualize a decisive pursuit of General Lee’s army points to a direct failure at the operational level of War. Both Union generals were unable to link their tactical victories to any larger strategic objective. The reasons for this from the strategic confusion of a conflict evolving from limited War to total War, and from the void in operational training that left both McClellan and Meade ill prepared to perform successfully at this critical level of Warfare.

Examining this operational void, it becomes apparent that a commander’s construct of War must be complete, that is, fully cognizant of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of War, in order to achieve success beyond the limits of the tactical battlefield. Such an examination points to the criticality of the operational level of Warfare, highlights the importance of the commander’s concept of operations and suggests that an operational commander must grow in the sense that his cognitive processes must be tuned into the dynamics of his environment, not only on a tactical level, but on the operational and strategic level.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781782899280
Antietam And Gettysburg: Tactical Success In An Operational Void

Related to Antietam And Gettysburg

Related ebooks

United States History For You

View More

Related articles

Reviews for Antietam And Gettysburg

Rating: 0 out of 5 stars
0 ratings

0 ratings0 reviews

What did you think?

Tap to rate

Review must be at least 10 words

    Book preview

    Antietam And Gettysburg - Lt.-Cmdr Stephen P. Black USN

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

    To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

    Or on Facebook

    Text originally published in 1994 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    ANTIETAM AND GETTYSBURG: TACTICAL SUCCESS IN AN OPERATIONAL VOID

    by

    Stephen P. Black Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    Abstract 5

    I. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. 6

    II. TACTICAL RESERVES AND THE SEEDS OF OPERATIONAL INERTIA 10

    III. STRATEGIC CONFUSION AND THE OPERATIONAL VOID. 15

    IV. CONCLUSION 26

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 27

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 28

    Abstract

    The Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union’s Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals. General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a premature pursuit of General Lee.

    Upon examination, however, their inability to conceptualize a decisive pursuit of General Lee’s army points to a direct failure at the operational level of War. Both Union generals were unable to link their tactical victories to any larger strategic objective. The reasons for this from the strategic confusion of a conflict evolving from limited War to total War, and from the void in operational training that left both McClellan and Meade ill prepared to perform successfully at this critical level of Warfare.

    Examining this operational void, it becomes apparent that a commander’s construct of War must be complete, that is, fully cognizant of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of War, in order to achieve success beyond the limits of the tactical battlefield. Such an examination points to the criticality of the operational level of Warfare, highlights the importance of the commander’s concept of operations and suggests that an operational commander must grow in the sense that his cognitive processes must be tuned into the dynamics of his environment, not only on a tactical level, but on the operational and strategic level.

    I. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

    A relative latecomer to the body of theoretical discussion on the nature of War, Operational Art

    Enjoying the preview?
    Page 1 of 1