Wellington: Crossing The Gaves And The Battle Of Orthez

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Text originally published in 1925 under the same title.

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WELLINGTON: THE CROSSING OF THE GAVES AND THE BATTLE OF ORTHEZ

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL F. C. BEATSON CB

Higher—THE GAVE DE PAU AT BERENX, LOOKING DOWN STREAM FROM THE ROAD BRIDGE.

Lower.—THE GAVE DE PAU AND THE OLD BRIDGE OF ORTHEZ, LOOKING DOWN STREAM FROM THE NEW BRIDGE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 6

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 7

PREFACE 8

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION 10

CHAPTER II—WELLINGTON’S POSITION: HIS ADVANTAGES AND SOME OF HIS DIFFICULTIES 19

CHAPTER III—WELLINGTON’S COMMAND OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. THE TREATY OF VALENÇAY 27

The Treaty of Valençay. 34

CHAPTER IV—WELLINGTON’S ARMY: ITS PERSONNEL, BASES AND DEPOTS, SEA AND LAND TRANSPORT, HOSPITALS AND DISTRIBUTION EARLY IN FEBRUARY, 1814 38

Personnel 38

The Spanish Troops 39

Bases and Depots 40

The Land Transport and Supply of the Army 43

Medical 44

Distribution of the Anglo-Portuguese army at the Beginning of February, 1814 45

Cavalry 46

CHAPTER V—THE FRENCH ARMY: SOULT’S DIFFICULTIES AND THE STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENTS OF FRANCE 47

CHAPTER VI—MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY DURING THE LATTER PART OF DECEMBER, 1813, AND JANUARY, 1814: DEPARTURE OF THE CAVALRY AND TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS TO JOIN NAPOLEON, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOULT’S FORCES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN OPENED 51

CHAPTER VII—WELLINGTON’S PLAN FOR THE CAMPAIGN 62

CHAPTER VIII—THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN, 10TH TO 14TH FEBRUARY, 1814 69

CHAPTER IX—15TH FEBRUARY AND THE FIGHT AT GARRIS 76

CHAPTER X—16TH AND 17TH FEBRUARY, 1814 82

16th February 82

17th February 84

CHAPTER XI—18TH FEBRUARY TO 22ND FEBRUARY, 1814 89

19th February 90

20th February 92

CHAPTER XII—23RD FEBRUARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CROSSING OF THE GAVE D’OLORON. THE CROSSING OF THE ADOUR COMMENCED. 24TH FEBRUARY, THE CROSSINGS OF THE GAVE D’OLORON AND ADOUR 95

23rd February 95

24th February, 1814 99

CHAPTER XIII—ALLIED AND FRENCH MOVEMENTS. THE BRIDGE OVER THE ADOUR COMPLETED 104

Friday, 25th February, 1814 104

Saturday, 26th February. The Allied Movements. 106

26th February, 1814. The French about Orthez 111

CHAPTER XIV—SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING 26TH FEBRUARY, 1814 115

CHAPTER XV—THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ORTHEZ, THE ORDERS AND POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 122

Battle of Orthez. Orders and Preliminary Movements 126

CHAPTER XVI—BATTLE OF ORTHEZ (continued) 134

CHAPTER XVII—SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE OF ORTHEZ 146

APPENDIX A—ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AND OF THE SPANISH TROOPS UNDER THE COMMAND OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON 152

ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY 152

STAFF 152

CIVIL STAFF 152

COMPOSITION OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES 152

ROYAL STAFF CORPS 157

SPANISH TROOPS 158

APPENDIX B—ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY OF THE PYRENEES AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO THE GRANDE ARMÉE IN JANUARY, 1814, AND THE INCLUSION OF ABBE’S DIVISION IN THE GARRISON OF BAYONNE 160

APPENDIX C—TREATY OF VALENÇAY 162

APPENDIX D—ORDER ISSUED BY SOULT ON THE EVENING OF 26TH FEBRUARY FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A POSITION ABOUT ORTHEZ BY THE ARMY OF THE PYRENEES 163

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 165

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The Gave de Pau from the Road Bridge

The Gave de Pau from the New Bridge

The Harbour of Passages

Looking towards Meharin

The Field of Garris

The River Saison

Hastingues and the Gave de Pau

Panorama of the Field of Orthez

Looking towards the Roman Camp

Looking from the Orthez

Looking towards the French Position and the Dax Road

The Lac Spur

Looking towards Sault de Navailles

PREFACE

IN this book an attempt is made to show how the greatest of modern British Generals planned and carried out the first stages in the execution of the task set him by his Government, namely, to make a further advance into French territory, and thereby render efficient cooperation to the armies of the other Great Powers then about to invade Northern and Eastern France.

The distance between the two spheres of action was too great to permit the hope of active cooperation between the armies under Wellington and those of Austria, Prussia and Russia. This Wellington recognized, though it does not appear to have been so clearly realized at the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. The cooperation had to be indirect and be worked by preventing Napoleon from calling to himself the large force of veteran soldiers he still had in the south, by pushing back those opposed to the allied armies under Wellington, and so bringing under the latter’s control a large and wealthy area of Southern France, thereby lessening the Emperor’s prestige and imposing on him the loss of considerable resources in men and money, and opening also a field for action against him by the supporters of the Bourbon party.

When considering the shaping of a plan of action political considerations, finance, the forces available and those of the enemy, the nature of the country about to be operated over, its physical features and its communications, the supply of the army, the weather, the character of the opposing commander, his probable object and the moral of his troops, together with local circumstances at the moment which may tend to aid or hamper the enterprise, have all to be considered. It has been felt necessary, therefore, to consider as briefly as possible all or most of these factors as affecting both sides: so that the reader may have sufficient information of what in the circumstances stood for or against the contending leaders.

On a day like this when our thoughts are full of the heroic deeds performed seven years ago by our soldiers, it is perhaps well also not to forget those of our forebears. In February, 1814, that little Peninsular army, the finest of its day, was in the full flower of its moral, its experience, its steadiness, its marksmanship which its opponents could not bear or challenge, full of confidence in itself and in its leader, wayward sometimes and needing to be held with a tight rein, but never dismayed; it was the prototype of that army, small and termed contemptible, which in August, 1914, slipped away over the sea, saved France and Europe, lost itself but never its glory.

Above it stands the figure of its Great Commander, he who, by his genius for war, his loyalty, his steadfast confidence, absolute truthfulness, patience and devotion to duty and his country, had led it for five years through good and evil days from the shores of Portugal across Spain and the Pyrenees and over the frontier of France. With that little army, says Colonel Charras, the French historian of Waterloo, he did great things, and that army was his work. He will remain one of the grandest military figures of this (the nineteenth) century.

But it may be said, What is the use of reading or of soldiers studying operations which took place a hundred and eleven years ago. Science and invention have changed the world since then; the lessons they may teach us will be of no use today. But is the statement quite true? Let us see what the great master of modern war says. Generals in Chief must be guided by their own experience or genius. Tactics, evolutions, the art of the engineer and artilleryman may be learnt in treatises, but that of strategy is only to be acquired by experience and by studying the campaigns of all the great captains. Read again and again the campaigns of Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only way of acquiring the secret of the art of war. {1}

And what says his disciple, the great soldier of today, Marshal of France and of England? He declares that even after the latest campaigns, though war has at its disposal today means more powerful, more numerous and more delicate, the same laws as of old must be obeyed. Forms evolve, directing principles remain unchanged.

A great teacher and writer to whom the British army and empire owe much, the late Lieutenant Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, often declared that for British officers the campaigns of Wellington have a special and practical value as regards the application of strategical principles, because he considered the British officer will more often than not be called on to campaign under conditions not unlike those in the Peninsula, such as dependence on sea power, association with allies entailing semi-diplomatic functions and always patience and tact, and sometimes having to improvise administrative services with scanty means and inexperienced officials.

But for Colonel Henderson’s untimely death we should now have a real military life of Wellington. This is not an attempt in any way to fill the gap: but merely to give an example of how that general applied his strategical skill with a highly perfected machine.

To living authors of works quoted I tender my grateful acknowledgments, especially to the historical section of the French War Ministry for permission to quote from the articles on the campaign in the Revue d’Histoire in 1912-13 now published in book form as L’Evacuation de l’Espagne et L’Invasion dans le Midi, and also to their author, Capitaine Vidal de la Blache, and also to the Colonel and officers of the 15th The King’s Hussars for permission to make the extracts taken from the diary of Major, afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir J. Thackwell, G.C.B., given in the history of that regiment, and to its editor and publishers.

F. C. BEATSON.

St George’s Day, 1925.

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION

THE war in the Peninsula had its origin in the national uprising which followed the attempt of Napoleon, then master of much of Europe, to bring Spain also entirely under his sway, and in the determination of Great Britain in 1808 to aid with money, arms and an army a nation which, deserted by its King, weak in everything pertaining to military strength and held down by a French army, had nevertheless risen to regain its freedom.

Though this war was to have considerable influence on the final result of the struggle of the nations against Napoleon’s attempted domination of Europe—he said, it will be remembered, the Spanish ulcer destroyed me —for several years its only direct effect was in the fact that it retained in the Peninsula a large number of French troops. Wellington in January, 1812, estimated their strength as nearer 200,000 than 150,000 men. Thus the operations of the allied army under Wellington were but parts of a local struggle, which aimed at the expulsion of the French troops from the Peninsula, and were in no way connected with efforts made against Napoleon by other nations of the Continent.

Indirect effects there were of course, especially in the example Spain and Portugal were giving to other oppressed nations, and the strengthening of their confidence in themselves as successes in the Peninsula increased.

It was the victory at Vitoria on the 21st June, 1813, which first brought the operations in the Peninsula into direct relations with those of the allied Russian and Prussian armies against Napoleon in Central Europe.

Defeated by Napoleon at Lützen and Bautzen in May, 1813, the allied armies had retreated into Silesia followed by the French. Both sides now desired a suspension of hostilities. The allied forces were in some confusion, had suffered heavy losses, their reinforcements still distant, and there was friction between the Russian and Prussian commanders. Napoleon stated his reasons, as follows: I decided for it on two grounds: first, because of my want of cavalry, which prevented me from dealing great blows, and secondly, because of a hostile attitude on the part of Austria. {2}

In Austria, nominally the ally of France, a strong party, which clamoured for her entrance into the war on the side of the Allies, had arisen since the French disaster in Russia. But this was not the policy of Prince Metternich, the chancellor of the Empire. He held that for the present it was to Austria’s advantage to remain outside and adopt the role of mediator between the combatants. She was the power which in reality held the balance between the fairly equal opposing forces, had her own objects to gain, and was determined to throw in her lot with that side which seemed to offer her the better chance of gaining them. To this end Austria commenced to mobilize and concentrate her troops in Bohemia.

The outcome of the negotiations was that on the 1st June an armistice commencing on the 2nd and lasting till the 20th July, with six days of grace, was concluded at Pläswitz. On the 20th June, after Metternich had had an interview with Napoleon at Dresden, the armistice was extended to the 10th August, and a convention agreed to that a congress should assemble at Prague to settle the terms of a general peace.

Probably none of the Powers were really sincere in their desire for it. Napoleon, knowing the hard terms on which alone he was likely to obtain it, certainly was not. With him, as Emperor of the French, it was all or nothing. It was time they all wanted.

On the morning of the 20th June, the day on which the armistice was extended, Napoleon received the first report of the battle of Vitoria. He did all he could to suppress the news; but effective steps had been taken in London to inform the Powers and make it generally known on the Continent.{3} On the 12th July it reached the allied monarchs at Trachenberg, and its effect was immediate and powerful. The impression on the Allies, says Sir C, Stewart, the British representative at the headquarters of the Prussian army, was strong and universal, and produced ultimately, in my opinion, the recommencement of hostilities. {4}

After many delays the Congress assembled at Prague. It soon became evident that no agreement would be reached. On the 27th July, Austria secretly joined the Grand Alliance; but the Congress was kept in being by both sides as a cover to gain time for completing their arrangements. Napoleon’s reply to an ultimatum sent by Metternich on 7th August was not accepted, and on the 12th August Austria declared war against France. On the same day the Russian and Prussian armies commenced to march from Silesia into Bohemia; on the 15th Blücher, with what remained of the army of Silesia, advanced and drove back the French.

On the 19th October, after the three days’ battle at Leipzig, Napoleon, with the remnant of an army, was fleeing towards France. Pushing aside on the 30th October the attempt of Wrede’s Bavarian corps to block his road, Napoleon and the French army reached Mayence on the 1st and 2nd November. It was indeed but a remnant, for of the 350,000 men with which he had opened the campaign less than 70,000 re-crossed the Rhine. After arranging for the evacuation of the right bank of the river and settling the distribution of his available troops, Napoleon left Mayence on the 7th November and arrived in Paris on the evening of the 9th.

An immediate and energetic pursuit after the battle of Leipzig would probably have annihilated what remained of Napoleon’s army. But the Coalition was incapable of swift action. To two corps of the army of Silesia was entrusted the immediate following of the French. These were able to maintain partial contact and to pick up exhausted stragglers and abandoned matériel, but were neither strong enough nor sufficiently mobile to seriously delay the retreating French. Reinforcements were sent to the corps blockading St. Cyr’s troops in Dresden. Bernadotte, with such of his troops of the army of the north as had taken part in the battle, moved northwards towards Hamburg, and, after a day of rest, the remainder of the allied forces moved towards the Rhine.

On the 4th November Schwartzenberg’s advanced guard reached Frankfort, which became the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. During the next few days the main columns of the Allies reached the Rhine and extended along the right bank from Coblentz southwards to Kehl opposite Strasbourg.

Blücher and Gneisenau, his chief of the staff, were urgent in pressing for an immediate entry into France so that Napoleon should have no time to re-organize his troops, raise reinforcements and complete his defensive measures, and the Tsar Alexander supported them. But the other heads of the Alliance, their Ministers and Generals, were against it, and the allied troops went into winter quarters along the Rhine.

An immediate advance having been ruled out, it remained to be decided how and when it should be made later on. But politics came first. The three allied sovereigns, Austria, Prussia and Russia, with their chief Ministers, were present at Schwartzenberg’s headquarters at Frankfort, where Great Britain was also represented by Lords Aberdeen and Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart. Within a few days of their arrival there, it was decided to re-open negotiations with Napoleon, for which the latter had expressed his desire during the battle of Leipzig by means of a captured Austrian general, but to which no reply had then been sent.

On the 9th November a note from the allied Powers was sent to Napoleon by the hands of St. Aignan, the French Minister at Gotha, who had been taken at Leipzig, containing the terms on which they were willing to open negotiations for peace. Briefly the terms were as follow: France to be restricted to her natural limits—the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. Spain to be restored to its ancient dynasty, and the independence of Italy and Germany under princes of their native families. After some delays and correspondence Napoleon intimated his readiness to treat, and it was finally settled that a, congress should assemble at Châtillon-sur-Seine, which was to be considered neutral territory, as both parties agreed that operations were not to be suspended pending the meeting of the Congress or during its session.

Meanwhile, the allied sovereigns on the 1st December published a declaration detailing the principles on which they were prepared to treat with Napoleon and the objects for which they contended. They were, it stated, out to obtain a general peace on a solid foundation: that they made war not on France, but on that general preponderance which Napoleon had long exercised beyond its limits, that they desired a peace, which, by a wise division of power and an equilibrium, might in the future preserve their peoples from the calamities, which for twenty years had oppressed Europe, and that they would not lay down their arms till that result was obtained, and the political state of Europe was secured against vain pretensions.

So far the allied communications with Napoleon and their public declarations had shown at least general agreement on policy. When, however, it came to putting that policy into action by military operations, their different aims and objects at once asserted themselves and old jealousies reappeared.

The Emperor of Austria was reluctant to press matters to extremities against his son-in-law if such could possibly be avoided. Things were going well for Austria in Italy, and compensation for the loss of her Belgian possessions might well be obtained there. She had no interest in the complete overthrow of Napoleon, to continue the war meant further losses of men and money with no certainty of success, and, if it was successful, the gains to Prussia and Russia would far exceed those of Austria. Her influence, therefore, was always on the side of moderation and peace.

The Prussian Generals and the nation were all for extreme measures. Napoleon’s insults to Berlin must be avenged at Paris; her lost Rhine provinces must be regained and Napoleon deposed. King Frederick, naturally timid and unenterprising, was by no means warlike. Owing to their sovereign’s moderate attitude, his Generals did not have it all their own way.

At the Russian headquarters there were some who held to continue fighting at such a distance from Russia was likely to bring her little real profit. But the Tsar Alexander, a vain and inconsistent visionary, was eager to advance, was full of personal animosity against Napoleon and, like the Prussians, eager to avenge at Paris his entry into Moscow. Moreover, intending to assert extensive claims to Polish territory when the final settlement came to be made, claims which could not be otherwise than detrimental to the interests of both Prussia and Austria, he considered that the larger he figured in the public eye as the destroyer of Napoleon, the greater would his weight be at