Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942
Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942
Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942
Ebook100 pages1 hour

Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942

Rating: 0 out of 5 stars

()

Read preview

About this ebook

This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he—unintentionally—hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship.

During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919–1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player—as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy.

Thus, Germany’s political situation in the winter of 1932–1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher’s life—from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia’s noble Junker class—coincided with Germany’s tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany’s first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherVerdun Press
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786252364
Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942

Related to Campaign Planning

Related ebooks

Asian History For You

View More

Related articles

Related categories

Reviews for Campaign Planning

Rating: 0 out of 5 stars
0 ratings

0 ratings0 reviews

What did you think?

Tap to rate

Review must be at least 10 words

    Book preview

    Campaign Planning - Major James L. Boling

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

    To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

    Or on Facebook

    Text originally published in 1997 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    CAMPAIGN PLANNING: A DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT THROUGH THE STUDY OF THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGN OF 1942

    A MONOGRAPH

    BY

    Major James L. Boling Armor

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    ABSTRACT 5

    FORWARD: CENTRAL PACIFIC, JUNE 5th, 1942 6

    INTRODUCTION 9

    SECTION I: CAMPAIGN PLANNING DOCTRINE 13

    OVERVIEW 13

    CENTER OF GRAVITY 14

    DECISIVE POINTS 15

    OPERATIONAL REACH 16

    BALANCE 16

    BRANCHES AND SEQUELS 17

    A SUMMARY OF PLANNING CONCEPTS 18

    SECTION II — THE RISING SUN’S PACIFIC WAR 1941—1942 19

    STRATEGIC PRELUDE 19

    STRATEGIC DILEMMA 20

    STRATEGIC DECISION 21

    COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONAL PLANNING 25

    THE MIDWAY OPERATIONAL PLAN 27

    SECTION III: CONSIDERING A JAPANESE JOINT DOCTRINE 31

    CENTER OF GRAVITY 31

    DECISIVE POINTS 32

    OPERATIONAL REACH 32

    BALANCE 33

    BRANCHES AND SEQUELS 34

    SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT 36

    RELEVANCE AND METHOD 36

    JAPANESE PLANS AND JOINT DOCTRINE 36

    JOINT DOCTRINE ASSESSED 37

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 41

    BOOKS 41

    GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 42

    MANUSCRIPTS/STUDENT PAPERS 42

    JOURNAL ARTICLES 43

    MAPS/ATLAS’ 43

    DICTIONARIES 44

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 45

    ABSTRACT

    This monograph assesses the adequacy of current United States joint campaign planning doctrine within the context of conventional operations between similar forces within a theater of war. The study focuses on five key doctrinal planning concepts — center of gravity, decisive points, operational reach, balance, and branches and sequels.

    Joint planning doctrine directly influences the national security of the United States. The foundation of effective and rigorous military planning is the body of professional doctrine that shapes and animates the planning process. The use of poor or insufficient planning doctrine may result in flawed campaign plans which unnecessarily risk the resources and prestige of the United States as well as the lives of America’s servicemen and women. Successful campaigns, developed from intellectually sound and militarily thorough planning doctrine, are the building blocks of national victory in war.

    A case study of Japanese campaign planning efforts at the beginning of 1942 and the retroactive application of selected joint doctrine planning concepts to these efforts is the method and medium of inquiry. Japanese operational planning in 1942 contained a number of complex and difficult challenges. These challenges present a rigorous test for current doctrine. Historically, this process resulted in the disastrous attempt to invade Midway Island. Joint doctrine is assessed as adequate if its application to 1942 Japanese planning would have resulted in the development of a campaign plan potentially more successful than the historical Midway operation.

    This paper concludes that the rigorous application of current joint doctrine by the Japanese to the planning for the 1942 campaign would have resulted in the production of a more thorough, resilient, and potentially more successful plan. Joint campaign planning doctrine, a way to think about warfare, would have overcome the challenges involved in planning this campaign.

    Carried forward to our own era, this conclusion clearly indicates the adequacy of the doctrine for joint conventional campaign planning. Joint doctrine provides a sufficient conceptual framework for the design of war-winning conventional campaigns. When artfully and rigorously applied, the plans developed from this doctrine will continue to maximize and focus the United States’ military might in the pursuit and defense of American national security into the 21st century.

    FORWARD: CENTRAL PACIFIC, JUNE 5th, 1942{1}

    I remind you that you have beaten most of the enemy’s fleet already; and, once defeated, men do not meet the same dangers with their old spirit. — Phormio{2}

    The finest theories and most minute plans often crumble. Complex systems fall by the wayside. Parade ground formations disappear. Our splendidly trained leaders vanish. The good men which we had at the beginning are gone. The raw truth is before us. — GEN William O’Daniel, USA{3}

    Aboard the battleship Yamato IJN Combined Fleet Flagship 400 Miles Northwest of Midway Island

    A terse coded message from the CinC Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was issued at 0225. Deployed across the width and length of the northern and central Pacific, individual ship captains and task force commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy read their orders in disbelief and anguish...

    (1) The Midway Operation is canceled.

    (2) The Main Body will assemble the Midway Invasion Force and the First Carrier Striking Force (less Hiryu and her escorts), and the combined fleet will carry out refueling during the morning of 6 June at position 33 Deg N, 170 Deg E.

    (3) The Screening Force, Hiryu and her escorts, and Nisshin will proceed to the above position.

    (4) The Transport Group

    Enjoying the preview?
    Page 1 of 1