Everand Logo

Welcome to Everand!

  • Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

    Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

    World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual
    World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual
    World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual
    Ebook567 pages6 hours

    World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual

    By Ian Hall

    ()

    Read preview

    About this ebook

    WORLD WAR 2 SPY SCHOOL
    The Complete 1943 S.O.E. Counter-Espionage Manual
    This document was the official training manual for every allied spy and counter-espionage agent in World War 2.
    Written by the S.O.E. (M.I.6), it was soon picked up and used by the American OSS (the originator of the CIA).
    In great detail, it describes such subjects as Explosives, Fieldcraft, Cyphers, and Propoganda. Care has been taken to deliver the manual in its original style and format.
    With an introduction by Ian Hall, we hope you will find the document both enlightening, informative and interesting.

    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherIan Hall
    Release dateDec 16, 2015
    ISBN9781311659163
    World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual
    Author

    Ian Hall

    Ian Hall is a former Commander Officer of No. 31 Squadron (1992-4), as well as being the editor and writer of the Squadron Association's three-times-a-year 32-page newsletter. He is the author of Upwards, an aviation-themed novel currently available as a Kindle download. This is his first full-length historical study, having previously penned a 80-page history of No 31 Squadron's early Tornado years.

    Read more from Ian Hall

    Related to World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual

    Related ebooks

    Modern History For You

    View More
    View More

    Related podcast episodes

    Related articles

    • Article

      Britain's Secret Army

      Jun 11, 2020

      Britain's Secret Army
      8 min read

    • Article

      Interview Giles Milton Ungentlemanly Warfare

      Oct 30, 2018

      In the spring of 1940, as World War II embroiled Continental Europe, the British government merged three top-secret services to create an organization dedicated to derailing Adolf Hitler’s onrushing war machine via sabotage, propaganda and other mean

      4 min read

    • Article

      Reviews

      Sep 28, 2021

      Reviews
      7 min read

    • Article

      A “Villain for All Seasons”

      Aug 5, 2020

      The real, complex, and historically important Churchill is increasingly disappearing behind crudely mythologised versions erected by those who wish to defend a political position or a series of values, and those who wish to attack them. On the one ha

      9 min read

    • Article

      Guarding The Homefront

      Jun 11, 2020

      Guarding The Homefront
      7 min read

    • Article

      The Dunkirk Evacuation Had Failed?

      Dec 2, 2021

      Joshua Levine practised as a barrister before becoming an actor and writer. He has written several books on the subject of the two World Wars and served as the historical consultant on the 2017 film Dunkirk. Between 26 May and 4 June 1940, a vast ope

      5 min read

    • Article

      Raf Bomber Command Striking Back

      Apr 13, 2021

      by Alan Measures, Whittles Publishing Ltd., 2021, $24.95. On July 14, 1941, Winston Churchill delivered a rousing speech that included the declaration that “from now on we shall bomb Germany on an ever-increasing scale…until the Nazi regime has eithe

      1 min read

    • Article

      The PM And The Boffins

      Feb 11, 2022

      The PM And The Boffins
      11 min read

    • Article

      Gunroom

      Apr 15, 2020

      From 1792 onwards, war with Revolutionary France created a deep-seated fear of French invasion in Britain. While the prospect of an enemy invader on home soil was bad enough, there was an additional political dimension at play here. The French were a

      2 min read

    • Article

      Q&A YOU ASK, WE ANSWER

      May 12, 2022

      Q&A YOU ASK, WE ANSWER
      8 min read

    • Article

      Australia’s War With France

      Nov 30, 2018

      It was the era of ‘Vichy France’, a murky and mostly forgotten period following the French surrender. When the Germans occupied Paris, a conservative – borderline fascist – French puppet government sympathetic to the Nazis was installed at the spa to

      4 min read

    • Article

      Blood Brothers

      Jan 1, 2019

      Blood Brothers
      8 min read

    • Article

      A Dismal Existence

      Jun 8, 2023

      A Dismal Existence
      5 min read

    • Article

      Churchill’s ‘landships’

      Jul 25, 2023

      Churchill’s ‘landships’
      10 min read

    • Article

      Home Guard Records

      Apr 6, 2021

      Home Guard Records
      4 min read

    • Article

      Churchill’s Boer Commandos

      Dec 27, 2019

      Churchill’s Boer Commandos
      7 min read

    • Article

      Storming Yorktown’s Redoubt

      Oct 11, 2022

      The voices of ordinary American soldiers who took part in the Revolutionary War are seldom heard today. One exception is Joseph Plumb Martin, born in 1760 in Massachusetts and raised in Connecticut. Martin plunged into the war at age 15 in June 1776,

      9 min read

    • Article

      The Day The Sea Caught Fire

      Nov 8, 2022

      The Day The Sea Caught Fire
      12 min read

    • Article

      1942 Churchill’s Darkest Hour

      Mar 17, 2022

      1942 Churchill’s Darkest Hour
      8 min read

    • Article

      Operation Mincemeat

      Sep 3, 2020

      Operation Mincemeat
      9 min read

    • Article

      TV & RADIO

      Feb 7, 2023

      TV & RADIO
      2 min read

    Related categories

    Reviews for World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual

    0 ratings

    0 ratings0 reviews

    What did you think?

    Tap to rate

    Review must be at least 10 words

      Book preview

      World War 2 Spy School The Complete 1943 SOE Counter-Espionage Manual - Ian Hall

      INTRODUCTION

      By Ian Hall

      DISCLAIMER: ON THE MANUAL

      From its inception, the SOE (MI-6) Training manual was always a fluid document. It was adapted, changed, altered, and updated on a regular basis to provide the trainee with the most recent information.

      The manual printed below had dates from September 1943 to January 1944. For instance; parts of the manual have already been brought up to date with the latest German losses in Russia.

      Different versions of the document may have been printed overseas for American and Asian trainees.

      Please note, the manual was a top-secret document for many years, just recently released from the Official Secrets Act. Painstaking work has been undertaken to bring you as authentic a document as we can manage. We do appreciate that spelling mistakes did occur in the original documents, and we have taken care to correct these.

      The English used is British English, and we make no apology for this. The SOE manual was a British document, subsequently used by many other countries. It was the industry standard for many years.

      This document is not a pamphlet; the manual is over 300 pages long, and has chapters on many topics. It is worth taking time to consider that these ‘agents-under-training’ must have been of significant intelligence to take on such a rigorous course. The SOE were looking for a PhD who could win a bar fight.

      DISCLAIMER: NOTES ON FORMATTING USED

      Great care has been taken to keep the document’s original formatting. The regular spacing between the lines and phrases has been kept as close to the original as possible. It must be noted that the use of spacing was not to make the document longer, it was a conscious effort to break the information into small chunks, for the ease of the trainer’s delivery and the agent’s memorization.

      Our work was a conscious effort to publish the whole manual. Some of the main criticism in previous publications was the problem with an incomplete manual. We make no claims that the information is original or our own writing.

      While some may say it gives information to subversive groups, we also point out that this information is readily available on the internet, if you know where to look for it, and in thousands of spy and conspiracy thrillers, and in far more up-to-date methods.

      THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

      BRITAIN IN 1940

      In May 1940, after many months of inactivity, the Germans pushed through the Ardennes Forest into Belgium and France. The allied lines were soon completely overrun, and a full-scale retreat was under way. Almost half a million men ended up on the beaches and shores of the small French town of Dunkirk.

      Winston Churchill mobilized the whole of the south-east coast of England to help bring the men home. He called for a flotilla of little boats to bring the troops from the shore to the troopships standing off to sea. But the larger ships were taking a beating from the Luftwaffe, and were soon filled to capacity. In all, close to a third of a million men were transported the twenty miles to safety.

      But in their effort to save men’s lives, tanks, artillery and ammunition had been left behind. With Britain at its ‘darkest hour’, Church hill knew he had some work to do before he could call his country safe.

      CHURCHILL’S HOUR

      Sir Winston Churchill was under no illusion. He knew that barring some unforeseen catastrophe, the German army would soon be landing on British shores. The remnants of the British and French armies were scattered around England, their equipment left in France, their spirit close to breaking. As fast as he could, Churchill commissioned a series of measures to thwart the enemy. Time, money and personnel were limited, so his experimental agencies had to rely on intelligence, guile and cunning rather than brute force and numbers.

      A quote from a fellow Member of Parliament, Commander R.T. Bower, gave a scathing shot across the bows of the current Prime Minister, (Neville Chamberlin) just two days before Churchill came to power, may have spurred him on…

      'When you are fighting for your life against a ruthless opponent you cannot be governed by Queensberry rules. This government would rather lose the war under Queensberry rules than do anything unbecoming to an absolutely perfect gentleman. That kind of thing will not do.'

      CHURCHILL’S PET PROJECTS

      THE COMMANDOES

      In 1941, a new designation of British army unit was born; the commandoes. Small units of highly trained, well-equipped raiding parties specially trained in the quick strike, espionage, explosives, and the ‘silent kill’. These units were successfully used for raids into Norway and France in 1941-42 and spawned other super-specialized forces; the Parachute Regiment, the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS). The USA soon seen the benefit of such am idea, and the Rangers were organised on Commando lines, first trained in Scotland in the Commando schools.

      THE LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP (LRDG)

      Established in June, 1940, and initially New Zealand forces, they eventually conscripted ranks from all Allied nationalities. Designed for behind-the-lines espionage and destruction, they caused many problems in the deserts of North Africa. They were equipped with small jeeps, usually adapted to take machine guns over the bonnet, or 50 caliber on a fixed rack in the rear.

      AUXILIARY UNITS OR GHQ OR BRITISH RESISTANCE ORGANISATION

      These were small groups of 4-8 men (cells), given ordnance and ammunition, and sent into the British countryside to dig in, and prepare for German Invasion. Each unit was independent of the other, and no two were allowed to contact. Well-trained and ruthless, they intended to fight to the last man. Of course, when the RAF won the Battle of Britain, the idea became unnecessary and the units were recalled to the regular army.

      THE BRITISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE)

      In the summer of 1940, under Churchill’s sponsorship, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed.

      Before the SOE, Britain relied on three independent agencies for counter espionage work, each with their own personalities, their own champions, and their own budgets. It made absolute sense to bring the three agencies together;

      One leadership.

      One building.

      One budget.

      One place to trace leaks to.

      The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was formed in 1909, an idea of both the War Department and the Admiralty. During the First World War the SIS spied on enemy shipping, and eventually the foreign arm became known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Section 6 (or MI6 for short). With the aim of sabotage and subversion, plans were drawn to send agents behind enemy lines, but they lacked a coherent plan.

      Across London, a department within the Foreign Office, known as EH or CS also existed, and studied the idea of anti-Nazi propaganda and leafletting.

      The third spy department was a dual based agency inside the War Office. The General Staff (Research) and Military Intelligence (Research) had conducted research into irregular warfare.

      When all three organisations were given premises in 64 Baker Street, London, there would be a short period of interdepartmental bickering before they all settled down to work in unison.

      THE SOE MANUAL

      The SOE decided that the new organisation should have a working training manual for all recruits and instructors to follow. Plans were put in place for bases in North America and Asia, but first they had to find premises in the UK.

      The SOE syllabus was first written in 1940 and adapted and expanded as the war continued. Over a thousand agents passed the classes and went on to work behind enemy lines in every theatre of the war.

      The actual ‘nuts and bolts’ of the manual is ascribed to Paul Dehn who already operated within SOE. Dehn was a film critic before the war and later worked with Ian Fleming (the creator of James Bond).

      The manual would take a common man from the streets and teach him to be a top secret agent, capable of operating behind enemy lines in the most dangerous of situations. It would deal with such topics as espionage, counter intelligence, disguises, forming cells, and codes and cyphers. It would be the spy and espionage blueprint of the war, and was classified for many years.

      THE RECRUITS

      From inception, the recruits chosen were young men and women. Their age varied, but on the whole, priority was given to agents between 19 and 26. The emphasis on youth was on purpose; young people had less a far lesser amount of fear; their feeling of invulnerability gave them an advantage over older subjects. On the whole, once an agent had reached 30 years of age, they were ‘retired’ to the ranks of training staff. Once a person reached 30, it seemed they had lost their ‘edge’.

      SPECIALIST TRAINING SCHOOLS (STS)

      Under one roof, and with one budget, the new SOE soon saw the need for a structured series of Specialist Training Schools (STS) for the training of behind-the-lines operatives.

      These were set up on three levels;

      Preliminary Schools

      In the winter of 1940, the SOE acquired six large estate houses in the Home Counties, to house the first part of the training program. These homes were large, luxurious, but not far from the public eye.

      In the ten weeks at the Preliminary Schools the students' character was assessed, both physically and mentally. The weak links were weeded out here, and did not advance in their training. Care was taken to evaluate their potential for dangerous clandestine work without actually revealing to the candidates much about their ultimate purpose. Although they were under training, details of the SOE and its work were never mentioned.

      From the first day the schools covered general physical training, weapons handling, unarmed combat, elementary demolitions, map reading, fieldcraft and basic signalling. Much of this was the sort of training that any army recruit might expect to receive.

      Paramilitary Schools

      The Paramilitary Schools were a notch harder, lasting about five weeks. Numbered STS 21 to STS 25, they were based in shooting lodges in the Arisaig and Morar areas of Inverness-shire. The surrounding countryside, which includes Loch Morar and Loch Nevis, is rugged and remote, ideal for the harder commando-style training that was provided. Hard physical training, silent killing, weapons handling, demolition, map reading and compass were taught, along with advanced fieldcraft, elementary Morse code, and raid tactics.

      STS 23, based at Swordland, Tarbet Bay, concentrated on teaching how to use special devices when attacking ships.

      STS 22, at Glasnacardoch Lodge, Mallaig, was a foreign-weapons school. Stolen weapons from Germany, France, Russia and other eastern countries were used exclusively. In one exercise weapons were stripped, then strewn on the floor in darkened rooms. Blindfolded agents had to identify their own weapon’s parts, assemble the weapon, and exit the room ready to fire.

      Parachute training was one of the last disciplines to learn, at an airfield (STS-51, Ringway) near Manchester. Although candidates from SOE were trained with other units, they were not even allowed to converse.

      Finishing Schools

      Only when the candidates qualified to Finishing School were they told the name of their new employer, the SOE. The training now was extensive and very concentrated. The candidates ate talked and slept Morse Code. They trained in advanced explosives work, and learned how to survive behind enemy lines. When the candidates had completed the course, they were sent to a flat in London for their final briefing and assignments.

      By the end of the war, there were over 50 SOE schools in the UK, employing between 1200-1400 teaching staff. Nearly 7000 students ‘graduated’, although only around 500 were actually British.

      CAMPS OUTSIDE BRITAIN.

      From the outset, it became obvious that the camps inside the UK had limited geographical use. The Germans held mainland Europe, and their conquest of Britain seemed next. There was also no real advantage to having foreign agents-in-training sent to British camps, just to have half their unsuccessful candidates returned to their country of origin. Generally it made sense to have camps elsewhere.

      Camp STS-101 was set up in Singapore in July 1941. The office was short-lived due to the rapid surrender to the invading Japanese, but some SOE agents ‘stayed behind’, some fighting successfully in the jungle until the end of the war. Camp STS 102 was stationed at Ramat David, near Haifa, Palestine, and moved to Italy when a safe foothold had been established. STS-102 was in charge of the agents being deployed into the Mediterranean, Greece, Cyprus and the Balkans. The third site camp STS-103, was opened on 6th December, 1941, east of Toronto, Canada.

      CAMP STS-103 (CAMP X) IN CANADA

      By the autumn of 1941, it was obvious that a good number of candidates had come from the United States and Canada. These students already had a second language due to their French Canadian ancestry or their recent immigrant status in the USA. To save bringing every applicant over, only to have half of them fail the first training period, it was decided to set up the third foreign STS camp; Camp STS 103.

      On 6th December, 1941, just one day before the Japanese navy descended on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Camp STS103, ten miles east of Toronto, opened its gates for the first intake of ‘agents in training’.

      The United States of America was still a neutral power in the global struggle that would be called World War 2, and would remain so for one more day.

      Just six months before, in July 1941, Colonel William J. Donovan had been appointed Coordinator of Information at the newly formed Washington department, commonly called the COI. His blueprint for an American version of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) had been approved and the fledgling department would send its first agents to Canada to be trained.

      The system was hardly new. The British already had such camps in England and Scotland, but they lacked the depth of first generation immigrant that both Canada and America could readily provide. Men and women joined, ready to face hardship and life-threatening danger behind enemy lines; it was the beginning of the spy game as we know it today.

      Since the FBI held a domestic jurisdiction, it was felt necessary for the USA to engage the idea of counter espionage coordination abroad, so six months later, a new department was formed, encapsulating the nucleus of the still small COI group. The new Office of Strategic Services (OSS), would take on all aspects of espionage, propaganda, subversion and post war planning. By the end of the war, it would employ over 24,000 men and women. After the war, the OSS would be the nucleus of the CIA.

      THE RISE OF CAMPS IN THE USA

      Using Camp X as a model, the American OSS soon opened seven camps in Maryland and Virginia, designated Training Area’s A,B,C,D,E,F, and the Farm. Thousands of trainees would go through their gates, trained under the original SOE manual.

      The largest of these camps were Prince William Forest, near Quantico, Virginia, and Catoctin Mountain Park, in Maryland.

      Catoctin (B-2) was opened on April 1st, 1942. Its capacity in October 1943 was 20 officers and 130 enlisted men.

      (This notice was placed in every room on the day of arrival.)

      CAMP ARRANGEMENTS

      NAME__________________________

      COURSE NO._____________________

      ROOM NUMBER__________________

      1.DRESS.

      On arrival in Camp you will be issued with Battle Dress (or Summer Drill) and the necessary accessories. This uniform will be worn during all working periods, for the following reasons:

      Security. This is a military establishment. For the benefit of local inhabitants and visiting tradesmen, it is considered advisable for the military appearance of the Camp to be consistently maintained.

      Wear and tear. Many of your activities on the course will be undertaken out of doors. By wearing your issued Battle Dress you will save your own civilian clothes and/or uniform.

      There is no objection to your wearing whatever clothes you please for relaxation in the evenings.

      You are not required to render military compliments to the officers of the Camp.

      2. COMMUNICATIONS.

      Any incoming mail may be addressed to you personally at:

      Box 55,

      Terminal A,

      Toronto, 2, Ont. Canada.

      Any outgoing mail will be handed in at the Administration Office. In view of the fact that the Camp's location is secret, this will be mailed in Toronto.

      Therefore, NO mail will be handed to any member of the Camp Staff, other than the Clerks in the Administration Office who have been detailed to handle it.

      For the same reason outgoing mail, though uncensored, will not contain any reference either to the Camp's location, appearance or activities.

      Telephone calls from the Camp may be made outside working hours. NO incoming calls are permitted.

      3. MESSING AND BAR SERVICE.

      Messing will be charged at the rate of .50 cents per day. A service charge of .50 cents per week will be made to cover gratuities to the staff. It is asked that no additional gratuities be made, as this rate is in accordance with Canadian Army scales.

      Bar. Within the limits of current rationing, beer, spirits and Cigarettes are obtainable from the bar which will be open only between the following hours:

      1215 – 1245

      1800 – 1900

      2000 – 2230

      Accounts. All messing and bar accounts will be rendered and paid on the day previous to final departure. Subsequent purchases will be paid for in cash.

      Meal Times.

      Breakfast 0815 Hours

      Lunch 1245 "

      Tea 1630 "

      Supper 1900 "

      It is particularly requested that you observe these times.

      Kitchen accommodation and staff is limited. Considerable inconvenience can be caused through unpunctuality.

      4. INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS.

      You will assemble at hours on in Lecture Room, when the details of the Course will be explained in an introductory address.

      5. LEAVE.

      For Courses of over fourteen days' duration, weekend leave may be arranged from Saturday 1230 until Sunday midnight. A leave application form will be issued. This should be filled in and handed to the Secretary's Office in the Administration Building not later than the Wednesday previous in order to ensure the necessary hotel and transportation reservations.

      6. MISCELLANEOUS REQUESTS.

      Complaints, if any, and requests for interviews or general information should be made to the secretary between the following hours:

      0900 – 0925 ) Mondays – Saturdays

      1215 – 1230 ) inclusive

      1330 – 1410 )

      1000 – 1200 Sundays

      C. Skilbeck, Lieut-Colonel,

      Officer Commanding.

      A.1. OBJECTS AND METHODS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

      OBJECTS

      In Europe and Asia, the enemy seek to obtain from their own, from satellite and from occupied territories the maximum advantage:

      (a) Politically. For example by:

      (i) Indoctrination.

      (ii) Divide and Rule.

      (b) Economically. For example by:

      (i) Use of materials.

      (ii) Use of factories.

      (iii) Recruitment of foreign workers.

      (iv) Financial swindles

      (c) Strategically. For example by:

      (i) Use of communications.

      (ii) Offensive and defensive bases.

      (iii) Use of Quisling & satellite manpower.

      But spontaneous resistance has occurred everywhere:

      (a) Politically. E.g. Norway's battle of Churches and Teachers.

      (b) Economically. E.g. France's resistance to labour- recruitment.

      (c) Strategically. E.g. Mihailovic's guerrillas and abortive Haute Savoie rising.

      Sporadic rising are useless. Necessity to co-ordinate where possible has produced tabulation of United Nations' fundamental objectives in the waging of Irregular Warfare:

      Politically.

      (i) To undermine enemy's morale and that of his collaborators.

      To raise morale of Occupied Territories.

      Economically.

      (i) To damage enemy's material.

      To improve and augment our own material.

      E.g. By infiltration of weapons, explosives, sabotage equipment.

      Strategically.

      (i) To damage enemy's man-power and communications.

      (ii) To improve our own man-power and communications.

      METHODS

      These, by definition, include all methods of attaining the above objectives outside the scope of regular warfare.

      Informational.

      Espionage: The covert collection and transmission of information about the enemy to our own forces.

      Operational.

      Propaganda: The art of persuasion with a view to producing a required mood or a required action.

      - Passive Resistance: Infliction of the maximum damage to the enemy with the minimum danger to oneself.

      - Sabotage: Covert destruction of material profitable to the enemy.

      - Secret Armies: Pre- and post-invasion.

      - Politico-Military uprising.

      INTERDEPENDENCE OF METHODS

      All these methods are interdependent. Each one singly has its relation to our fundamental objectives; but, if each is used singly, the objectives can never be attained.

      PRESENT SITUATION

      There are two phases:

      Pre-Invasion. This phase, which in Europe is ending, consisted mainly in organizing the countries area by area - in a manner either simple or complex according to the country's physical geography, group-distribution and degree of contre-espionage control.

      Invasion. This phase is beginning. For you it will involve the attainment of (a, b or c) objective by the use of (a, b, c, etc.)

      You will be a cog in a very large machine whose smooth functioning depends on each separate cog carrying out its part efficiently.

      It is the objective of this course to clarify the part you will play and ensure the efficiency of your performance.

      A.2. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

      Security: precautions taken by the individual for his own personal protection and the protection of his Organization from the enemy.

      Without these precautions, it is dangerous to attempt regular and impossible to attempt irregular warfare alone or in conjunction with other people.

      APPLICATION.

      Apparent absence of enemy C.E. measures should never be allowed to engender over-confidence. (Cf. graph of agent's confidence.)

      Insecurity by an individual may jeopardise not only his own safety but the safety of the organization with which he is in contact.

      INFORMATION.

      Basis of your self-protection is good information. As much as possible provided before departure, but you must check and supplement on arrival. Information required on:

      i) Local Conditions.

      ii) Local Regulations.

      iii) Enemy methods.

      iv) Enemy personnel.

      v) Your own subordinates.

      INCULCATION

      Security cannot be taught by rule of thumb. It is a frame of mind attainable through self-discipline and self-training that will make the taking of precautions a habit. (Cf. crossing a road.)

      What is a habit? A single action committed so often as to become automatic. What precautionary actions must we practice so often that they become a habit?

      COMMUNICATION.

      The answer is Communicatory Actions. Secret and confidential information can reach the enemy through our carelessness in:

      Speech.

      Confiding in friends to ease nervous strain.

      Adoption of hush-hush attitude through vanity.

      Mentioning facts you are not outwardly supposed to know, or isolated facts which can be strung together.

      Telling people more than they need to know.

      Compromising telephone-conversations through misuse of conventions. (E.g. NOT Three lambs with sweets and toys who need instruction in malaria BUT Three chaps with some goods for Harry who need instruction in my subject.)

      Writing.

      If you must carry documents, select what you must carry.

      Commit as little as possible to writing. Memorise if you can.

      Burn all secret waste and carbons.

      Behaviour.

      Be inconspicuous. Avoid all limelight by being an average citizen in appearance (height, clothes) and conduct (drink, women) .

      Be tidy. All engaged on secret work must be methodical in their habits - e.g. it is mainly knowing exactly where he has placed his belongings and arranged his room that an individual can detect disturbance by police search.

      Have good Cover - the innocent activity undertaken or invented to conceal the secret aspects of his activity. Good cover must be consistent with necessary overt behaviour and non-compromising.

      (For application to operational Agent see A.4.)

      Be observant. Observe and deduce. (E.g. face or voice seen or heard twice suggesting you are being followed. Smell of real coffee in France suggestion someone occupied in Black Market.)

      Have foresight. See danger early. (E.g. axis agent in cafe, policemen checking papers.)

      Plan for emergency. Alternative courses in case of accident (RV's) pre-arranged conversation when talking to colleague in case of sudden interrogation. Danger signs.

      A.2.A. SECURITY FOR W/T OPERATORS

      INTRODUCTION

      Lecture deals with special aspects of security for W/T Operators apart from general principles laid down in Individual Security.

      CHOOSING OF PREMISES FOR WORKING SET.

      Choice depends on:

      Security considerations.

      Technical considerations.

      Combination of i. and ii. and district.

      Security.

      Safer to have number of sets dispersed over wide area with owners or occupants of premises recruited (see further below).

      Technical.

      Avoid steel-framed buildings. Key click easily audible in next room or if radio receiver working off same circuit. Consider aerial camouflage.

      District.

      Thinly populated country districts, possibility for isolated buildings, e.g. farms, etc.

      (ii) Towns - private house or place of occupation.

      In case of d) ii) above, consider following factors:

      Accessibility.

      Operator must be able to get to and from premises without arousing suspicions of neighbours or passers by.

      (ii) Cover.

      Must have genuine reason for frequent visits (e.g. doctor). Use existing household.

      (iii) Facilities, defensive.

      For concealing self and set.

      For escape (exits).

      Vulnerability to surveillance.

      (iv) Control of Access.

      Limit to number and type of people with possible access to

      premises.

      GENERAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

      To be taken in any premises including place of residence.

      Precautions against search during absence - tidiness, leaf in, keyhole, hair, etc.

      Minimum incriminating material, coded writings destroyed, etc.

      N.B.: Traces on blotting paper and writing blocks.

      (c) Hiding places prepared, particularly for set.

      i) Inside House - advantages and disadvantages.

      ii) Outside House - advantages and disadvantages.

      Possibility of working set from hiding places.

      Preparation for destroying incriminating material.

      e) Where possible room with 2 doors and light switch near while operating.

      f) Guard while operating, e.g. possibility of hall porter.

      g) All clear and danger signals, visual and/or oral.

      h) Check on surveillance of premises, or when entering or leaving.

      i) Alternative premises in case of emergency.

      j) No casual visitors at premises - only possible ones are cut-outs.

      CUT-OUTS

      a) Definition.

      Intermediary. Link between two agents. May only carry messages,

      Knowing nothing about Organization, or act as liaison officer.

      Should undertake no other subversive activity.

      b) Reason for employment (In case of W/T Operator).

      i) Dangerous for operator to be seen with organizer.

      ii) May not want another member to know him.

      iii) Barrier between himself and authorities, e.g. telegram, official enquiry, hiring flat.

      iv) Transfer of suspicion, delayed or prevented.

      c) Cover.

      Must be able to contact inconspicuously, people of different social

      positions, e.g. doctor, dentist, priest, waiter, postman, etc.

      5. SECURITY RULES FOR OPERATOR.

      a) Must never undertake other subversive activity. Danger of over enthusiasm.

      b) Must not attempt to find out more about Organization than he is told, nor know one or two members.

      c) Christian names only should be used. Numbering dangerous.

      d) Never carry arms unless in situation for which no cover story (e.g. working the set).

      e) Must report suspicious incident immediately, e.g. if followed.

      f) Emergency measures, e.g. warning signals, hide-out, contacts to drop, how to re-establish contact.

      A.3. INFORMANT SERVICE

      1. INTRODUCTION

      Without good information it is impossible:

      a) to protect oneself against enemy C. E.

      b) to plan or time operations (c.f. importance of I to 0 staff in regular army).

      2. WHAT DO YOU REQUIRE TO KNOW?

      a) Local Conditions -

      - unprocurable articles (e.g. danger of ordering wrong drinks or cigarettes).

      - transport service (e.g. fewer trains, buses, taxis) and restrictions (e.g. reason for travelling).

      - market days. Danger of search for Black Market goods.

      - new slang or colloquialisms brought about by war.

      general temper of local population.

      b) Local Regulations -

      Identity papers. Are yours in order?

      (Compare yours with other people's and, if possible, procure genuine ones.)

      - Ration Cards. Find out how to procure these.

      - Movement Restrictions. What passes are necessary?

      - Control Posts. Manned by enemy troops or local police?

      - Evacuation from forbidden zones.

      - Blackout Regulations.

      - Curfew hours.

      - Bicycles - licenses, restrictions, etc.

      c) Enemy Methods and Personnel.

      - location of troops.

      - location of nearest enemy police or Gestapo, with details

      or personnel; attitude of local police.

      - names of civilian police spies, agents provocateurs.

      d) Operational Information

      - possible targets: Enemy communications, R.Q., dumps,

      factories.

      - bottle necks in enemy production and communications.

      - internal working of factories, power station, railways,

      etc. e.g. type of machinery used.

      - personnel employed in any of the above.

      - means of entry: layout, guards, control system.

      - documents: workers' passes, blueprints, etc.

      3. HOW D0 YOU OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION?

      (a) By direct interrogation.

      (b) By constant personal observation.

      (c) By reading newspapers and listening to radio.

      (d) By Informant Service:

      THE INFORMANT SERVICE:

      (a) Personnel

      (i) Very few should know that they are informants. The

      great bulk will be quite unconscious of it.

      (ii) Select from as many strata of society, trades,

      professions, etc., as possible.

      (iii)Best are types who constantly mix with all sorts -

      E.G. ,

      Priests,

      Inn-Keepers,

      Waitresses, barmaids,

      Doctors, Dentists, hospital staffs,

      Postmen, telephone and telegraph operators.

      Bankers, shopkeepers.

      Railway Officials and workers,

      Servants,

      All grumblers and malcontents.

      (iv) In due course you may decide to approach a few of

      the more trustworthy informants with a view to

      recruiting them.

      (b) Methods

      (i) Journalists' technique of eavesdropping on the masses.

      c.f. - Ability to hear and separate two simultaneous conversations while ostensibly listening to a third.

      (ii) Taking advantage of other people's bad security - e.g. -

      - Careless talk

      - Disgruntled enemy personnel.

      Affecting ignorance and thus encouraging others to air their knowledge.

      - Making false statements to elicit correct reply.

      (iii) Do not discourage informants, however trivial the information. c.£. - reporter's maxim: Never refuse a date.

      A.4. COVER

      1. DEFINITION.

      Your cover is the life which you outwardly lead in order to conceal the real purpose of your presence and the explanation which you give of your past and present. It is best considered under the heads:

      Past,

      Link between Past and Present,

      Present and Alibis.

      2. YOUR PAST.

      Before your departure, with the assistance of your Section Officers, you will probably prepare the story of your past life up to the time of your arrival. But you cannot always arrange a complete story before leaving; furthermore, you may have to change part or all of your cover story when you are actually in the field and know what your circumstances are to be.

      Nevertheless you must be able to give some account of yourself if questioned immediately after your arrival.

      In inventing or amending your cover story, or that of another agent, the following points should be considered:

      a) Identity.

      i) Your own.

      Advantages:

      Your story will be mainly true. Only a limited period will have to be explained away. Records will confirm your statements.

      Disadvantages:

      The subversive part of your history may be known to the enemy or to persons who may give you away. This is usually the case with escapees.

      ii) That of a Real Person, Distant or Dead.

      Advantages:

      The story, being real, will be self consistent. Records will confirm at least a part of it.

      Disadvantages:

      People acquainted with the person whom you are impersonating may give you away.

      You may have incomplete information about this person's past life, so that your statements may be shown to be untrue. The person may be suspected without your knowing it.

      iii) Wholly Fictitious.

      Advantages:

      Less chance of entanglements and wider scope.

      Disadvantages:

      Records will not confirm your story.

      In some cases agents have to assume different identities in different places. This should be avoided as far as possible because it leads to contradictions.

      N.B. The danger of two identity cards.

      b) History.

      i) Whatever your identity, your story must be plausible and not indicate any connection with subversive activity.

      ii) It should be based, as far as possible, on the facts of your own life or that of the person whom you are impersonating. Do not introduce places or events which you do not know nor refer to knowledge which you have not. (Do not claim to know of engineering if you do not.)

      iii) Pay particular attention to that part of your story which is linked with the details shown in your documents. These may be examined closely.

      iv) Your recent history is of most interest to the police. It is also most difficult to invent satisfactorily.

      Particular care should be devoted to its preparation.

      v) Although a complete mastery of details is essential in the preparation of the story, vagueness is often desirable when repeating it, especially in the case of more distant and less important parts.

      c) Documents.

      These are supplied by your Section and will be as nearly perfect as possible. The following points must be remembered:

      i) You must know how you would have obtained them if they had been issued to you legally.

      ii) All the documents you need cannot always be produced in this country, e.g. those which change frequently, such as ration cards in some countries.

      iii) The falsity of forged documents is always ultimately detectable if counterfoils exist, especially if they are numbered consecutively. It may take a long time to establish this falsity.

      iv) Perfect documents can only be obtained through official sources in the field.

      d) Clothes and Effects.

      i) Do not take anything with you which does not fit your story.

      ii) Your effects can sometimes furnish valuable corroborative evidence of the truth of your background cover, e.g. unofficial papers, tickets, bills, local products, etc.

      e) Change of Appearance.

      i) To support assumed character (rough hands for workman).

      ii) To avoid recognition if you are going among people who know you.

      N.B. Application of disguise is dealt with in a special lecture.

      f) Final Search

      You must search your person and residence for traces which link you with your other self:

      Before your departure.

      Whenever you change your cover story

      If you wish to conceal some recent activity.

      If you are about to undertake some special subversive act.

      3. FROM PAST TO PRESENT

      As soon as you arrive you must adopt a cover life to account for your presence. Your cover story for your past must merge into this.

      a) From the beginning start completing the details of the cover story of your past. Really do the things you say you have done. Really go to the places you say you have been to. This will serve a double purpose:

      i) You will obtain the information which you would have had had your story been true, e.g. see the towns, learn their recent history, etc. With this knowledge you can support and, if necessary, modify your background cover.

      ii) You can manufacture evidence confirming your background cover, e.g. make acquaintances in the places you go to, possess things coming from these places.

      Build up also your present cover background by innocent and inconspicuous actions to which reference can be made later. It may be useful to make innocent acquaintances, etc.

      4. YOUR PRESENT.

      This is the life which you lead and the story which you will tell about that life to account for your presence. It may be planned with the help of your Section Officers before your departure. Or you may have to work it out for the first time after your arrival. In any case, your ostensible present must be consistent with your alleged past.

      a) Maintenance of

      Enjoying the preview?
      Page 1 of 1